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nikhilam anujachittaM jñânasûtrair naverya@h
 sajabhiva kusumânâM kâlandhhrair vidhatte/
 sa laghum api mamaitaM prAchyavijñânatantuM
upah@rtamatibhaktyâ modatâM mai g@rhîtvâ//

May He, who links the minds of all people, through the apertures of time, with new threads of knowledge like a garland of flowers, be pleased to accept this my thread of Eastern thought, offered, though it be small, with the greatest devotion.

First Edition: Cambridge, 1922

The work and ambition of a life-time is herein humbly dedicated with supreme reverence to the great sages of India, who, for the first time in history, formulated the true principles of freedom and devoted themselves to the holy quest of truth and the final assessment and discovery of the ultimate spiritual essence of man through their concrete lives, critical thought, dominant will and self-denial.

The vowels are pronounced almost in the same way as in Italian, except that the sound of a approaches that of o in bond or u in but, and â that of a as in army. The consonants are as in English, except c, ch in church; @t, @d, @n are cerebrals, to which English t, d, n almost correspond; t, d, n are pure dentals; kh, gh, ch, jh, @th, @dh, th, dh, ph, bh are the simple sounds plus an aspiration; ñ is the French gn; @r is usually pronounced as ri, and s', @s as sh.

The old civilisation of India was a concrete unity of many-sided developments in art, architecture, literature, religion, morals, and science so far as it was understood in those days. But the most important achievement of Indian thought was philosophy. It was regarded as the goal of all the highest practical and theoretical activities, and it indicated the point of unity amidst all the apparent diversities which the complex growth of culture over a vast area inhabited by different peoples produced.

It is not in the history of foreign invasions, in the rise of independent kingdoms at different times, in the empires of this or that great monarch that the unity of India is to be sought. It is essentially one of spiritual aspirations and obedience to the law of the spirit, which were regarded as superior to everything else, and it has outlived all the political changes through which India passed.

The Greeks, the Huns, the Scythians, the Pathans and the Moguls who occupied the land and controlled the political machinery never ruled the minds of the people, for these political events were like hurricanes or the changes of season, mere phenomena of a natural or physical order which never affected the spiritual integrity of Hindu culture. If after a passivity of some centuries India is again going to become creative it is mainly on account of this fundamental unity of her progress and civilisation and not for anything that she may borrow from other countries. It is therefore indispensably necessary for all those who wish to appreciate the significance and potentialities of Indian culture that they should properly understand the history of Indian philosophical thought which is the nucleus round which all that is best and highest in India has grown. Much harm has already been done by the circulation of opinions that the culture and philosophy of India was dreamy and abstract. It is therefore very necessary that Indians as well as other peoples should become more and more acquainted with the true characteristics of the past history of Indian thought and form a correct estimate of its special features.

But it is not only for the sake of the right understanding of India

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that Indian philosophy should be read, or only as a record of the past thoughts of India. For most of the problems that are still debated in modern philosophical thought occurred in more or less divergent forms to the philosophers of India. Their discussions, difficulties and solutions when properly grasped in connection with the problems of our own times may throw light on the course of the process of the future reconstruction of modern thought. The discovery of the important features of Indian philosophical thought, and a due appreciation of their full significance, may turn out to be as important to modern philosophy as the discovery of Sanskrit has been to the investigation of modern philological researches. It is unfortunate that the task of re-interpretation and re-valuation of Indian thought has not yet been undertaken on a comprehensive scale. Sanskritists also with very few exceptions have neglected this important field of study, for most of these scholars have been interested more in mythology, philology, and history than in philosophy. Much work however has already been done in the way of the publication of a large number of important texts, and translations of some of them have also been attempted. But owing to the presence of many technical terms in advanced Sanskrit philosophical literature, the translations in most cases are hardly intelligible to those who are not familiar with the texts themselves.

A work containing some general account of the mutual relations of the chief systems is necessary for those who intend to pursue the study of a particular school. This is also necessary for lay readers interested in philosophy and students of Western philosophy who have no inclination or time to specialise in any Indian system, but who are at the same time interested to know what they can about Indian philosophy. In my two books The Study of Patanjali and Yoga Philosophy in relation to other Indian Systems of Thought I have attempted to interpret the Sämkhya and Yoga systems both from their inner point of view and from the point of view of their relation to other Indian systems. The present attempt deals with the important features of these as also of all the other systems and seeks to show some of their inner philosophical relations especially in regard to the history of their development. I have tried to be as faithful to the original texts as I could and have always given the Sanskrit or Pâli technical terms for the help of those who want to make this book a guide

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for further study. To understand something of these terms is indeed essential for anyone who wishes to be sure that he is following the actual course of the thoughts.

In Sanskrit treatises the style of argument and methods of treating the different topics are altogether different from what we find in any modern work of philosophy. Materials had therefore to be collected from a large number of works on each system and these have been knit together and given a shape which is likely to be more intelligible to people unacquainted with Sanskritic ways of thought. But at the same time I considered it quite undesirable to put any pressure on Indian thoughts in order to make them appear as European. This will explain much of what might appear quaint to a European reader. But while keeping all the thoughts and expressions of the Indian thinkers I have tried to arrange them in a systematic whole in a manner which appeared to me strictly faithful to their clear indications and suggestions. It is only in very few places that I have translated some of the Indian terms by terms of English philosophy, and this I did because it appeared to me that those were approximately the nearest approach to the Indian sense of the term. In all other places I have tried to choose words which have not been made dangerous by the acquirement of technical senses. This however is difficult, for the words which are used in philosophy always acquire some sort of technical sense. I would therefore request my readers to take those words in an unsophisticated sense and associate them with such meanings as are justified by the passages and contexts in which they are used. Some of what will appear as obscure in any system may I hope be removed if it is re-read with care and attention, for unfamiliarity sometimes stands in the way of right comprehension. But I may have also missed giving the proper suggestive links in many places where condensation was inevitable and the systems themselves have also sometimes insoluble difficulties, for no system of philosophy is without its dark and uncomfortable corners.

Though I have begun my work from the Vedic and Brâhma@nic stage, my treatment of this period has been very slight. The beginnings of the evolution of philosophical thought, though they can be traced in the later Vedic hymns, are neither connected nor systematic.

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More is found in the Brâhmanas, but I do not think it worth while to elaborate the broken shreds of thought of this epoch. I could have dealt with the Upani@sad period more fully, but many works on the subject have already been published in Europe and those who wish to go into details will certainly go to them. I have therefore limited myself to the dominant current flowing through the earlier Upani@sads. Notices of other currents of thought will be given in connection with the treatment of other systems in the second volume with which they are more intimately connected. It will be noticed that my treatment of early Buddhism is in some places of an inconclusive character. This is largely due to the inconclusive character of the texts which were put into writing long after Buddha in the form of dialogues and where the precision and directness required in philosophy were not contemplated. This has given rise to a number of theories about the interpretations of the philosophical problems of early Buddhism among modern Buddhist scholars and it is not always easy to decide one way or the other without running the risk of being dogmatic; and the scope of my work was also too limited to allow me to indulge in very elaborate discussions of textual difficulties. But still I also have in many places formed theories of my own, whether they are right or wrong it will be for scholars to judge. I had no space for entering into any polemic, but it will be found that my interpretations of the systems are different in some cases from those offered by some European scholars who have worked on them and I leave it to those who are acquainted with the literature of the subject to decide which of us may be in the right. I have not dealt elaborately with the new school of Logic (Navya-Nyâya) of Bengal, for the simple reason that most of the contributions of this school consist in the invention of technical expressions and the emphasis put on the necessity of strict exactitude and absolute preciseness of logical definitions and discussions and these are almost untranslatable in intelligible English. I have however incorporated what important differences of philosophical points of view I could find in it. Discussions of a purely technical character could not be very fruitful in a work like this. The bibliography given of the different Indian systems in the last six chapters is not exhaustive but consists mostly of books which have been actually studied or consulted in the writing of those chapters. Exact references to the pages of the

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texts have generally been given in footnotes in those cases where a difference of interpretation was anticipated or where it was felt that a reference to the text would make the matter clearer, or where the opinions of modern writers have been incorporated.

It gives me the greatest pleasure to acknowledge my deepest gratefulness to the Hon'ble Maharaja Sir Manindrachandra Nundy, K.C.I.E. Kashimbazar, Bengal, who has kindly promised to bear the entire expense of the publication of both volumes of the present work.

The name of this noble man is almost a household word in Bengal for the magnanimous gifts that he has made to educational and other causes. Up till now he has made a total gift of about £300,000, of which those devoted to education come to about £200,000. But the man himself is far above the gifts he has made. His sterling character, universal sympathy and friendship, his kindness and amiability make him a veritable Bodhisattva—one of the noblest of men that I have ever seen. Like many other scholars of Bengal, I am deeply indebted to him for the encouragement that he has given me in the pursuit of my studies and researches, and my feelings of attachment and gratefulness for him are too deep for utterance.

I am much indebted to my esteemed friends Dr E.J. Thomas of the Cambridge University Library and Mr Douglas Ainslie for their kindly revising the proofs of this work, in the course of which they improved my English in many places. To the former I am also indebted for his attention to the transliteration of a large number of Sanskrit words, and also for the whole-hearted sympathy and great friendliness with which he assisted me with his advice on many points of detail, in particular the exposition of the Buddhist doctrine of the cause of rebirth owes something of its treatment to repeated discussions with him.

I also wish to express my gratefulness to my friend Mr N.K. Siddhanta, M.A., late of the Scottish Churches College, and Mademoiselle Paule Povie for the kind assistance they have rendered in preparing the index. My obligations are also due to the Syndics of the Cambridge University Press for the honour they have done me in publishing this work.

To scholars of Indian philosophy who may do me the honour of reading my book and who may be impressed with its inevitable

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shortcomings and defects, I can only pray in the words of Hemacandra:

  Pramâ@nasiddhântaviruddham atra
  Yatkiñciduktam matimândyado@sât
  Mâtsaryyam utsâryya tadâryyacittâ@h
  Prasâdam âdhâya vis'odhayantu. [Footnote ref 1]

February, 1922.

_____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: May the noble-minded scholars instead of cherishing ill feeling kindly correct whatever errors have been here committed through the dullness of my intellect in the way of wrong interpretations and misstatements.]

 1 The Vedas and their antiquity……………………………10
 2 The place of the Vedas in the Hindu mind………………….10
 3 Classification of the Vedic literature……………………11
 4 The Sa@mhitâs………………………………………….12
 5 The Brâhma@nas…………………………………………13
 6 The Âra@nyakas…………………………………………14
 7 The @Rg-Veda, its civilization…………………………..14
 8 The Vedic gods…………………………………………16
 9 Polytheism, Henotheism, and Monotheism……………………17
10 Growth of a Monotheistic tendency; Prajâpati, Vis'vakarma…..19
11 Brahma………………………………………………..20
12 Sacrifice; the First Rudiments of the Law of Karma…………21
13 Cosmogony—Mythological and Philosophical…………………23
14 Eschatology; the Doctrine of Âtman……………………….25
15 Conclusion…………………………………………….26

 1 The place of the Upani@sads in Vedic literature……………28
 2 The names of the Upani@sads; Non-Brahmanic influence……….30
 3 Brâhma@nas and the Early Upani@sads………………………31
 4 The meaning of the word Upani@sad………………………..38
 5 The composition and growth of diverse Upani@sads…………..38
 6 Revival of Upani@sad studies in modern times………………39
 7 The Upani@sads and their interpretations………………….41
 8 The quest after Brahman: the struggle and the failures……..42
 9 Unknowability of Brahman and the Negative Method…………..44
10 The Âtman doctrine……………………………………..45
11 Place of Brahman in the Upani@sads……………………….48
12 The World……………………………………………..51
13 The World-Soul…………………………………………52
14 The Theory of Causation…………………………………52
15 Doctrine of Transmigration………………………………53
16 Emancipation…………………………………………..58

1 In what sense is a History of Indian Philosophy possible?……62 2 Growth of the Philosophic Literature………………………65 3 The Indian systems of Philosophy………………………….67 4 Some fundamental points of agreement………………………71 1 The Karma theory…………………………………..71 2 The Doctrine of Mukti………………………………74 3 The Doctrine of Soul……………………………….75 5 The Pessimistic Attitude towards the World and the Optimistic Faith in the end………………………………………..75 6 Unity in Indian Sâdhana (philosophical, religious and ethical endeavours)…………………………………………….77

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 1 The State of Philosophy in India before Buddha……………..78
 2 Buddha: his Life………………………………………..81
 3 Early Buddhist Literature………………………………..82
 4 The Doctrine of Causal Connection of early Buddhism…………84
 5 The Khandhas……………………………………………93
 6 Avijjâ and Âsava………………………………………..99
 7 Sîla and Samâdhi……………………………………….100
 8 Kamma…………………………………………………106
 9 Upani@sads and Buddhism…………………………………109
10 The Schools of Theravâda Buddhism………………………..112
11 Mahâyânism…………………………………………….125
12 The Tathatâ Philosophy of As'vagho@sa (80 A.D.)……………129
13 The Mâdhyamika or the Sûnyavâda school—Nihilism…………..138
14 Uncompromising Idealism or the School of Vijñânavâda Buddhism.145
15 Sautrântika theory of Perception…………………………151
16 Sautrântika theory of Inference………………………….155
17 The Doctrine of Momentariness……………………………158
18 The Doctrine of Momentariness and the Doctrine of Causal
 Efficiency (Arthakriyâkâritva)…………………………….163
19 Some Ontological Problems on which the Different Indian Systems
 diverged………………………………………………..164
20 Brief Survey of the Evolution of Buddhist Thought………….166

1 The Origin of Jainism…………………………………..169 2 Two Sects of Jainism……………………………………170 3 The Canonical and other Literature of the Jains……………171 4 Some General Characteristics of the Jains…………………172 5 Life of Mahâvîra……………………………………….173 6 The Fundamental Ideas of Jaina Ontology…………………..173 7 The Doctrine of Relative Pluralism (Anekântavâda)………….175 8 The Doctrine of Nâyas…………………………………..176 9 The Doctrine of Syâdvâda………………………………..179 10 Knowledge, its value for us……………………………..181 11 Theory of Perception……………………………………183 12 Non-Perceptual knowledge………………………………..185 13 Knowledge as Revelation…………………………………186 14 The Jîvas……………………………………………..188 15 Karma Theory…………………………………………..190 16 Karma, Âsrava and Nirjarâ……………………………….192 17 Pudgala……………………………………………….195 18 Dharma, Adharma, Âkâs'a…………………………………197 19 Kâla and Samaya………………………………………..198 20 Jaina Cosmography………………………………………199 21 Jaina Yoga…………………………………………….199 22 Jaina Atheism………………………………………….203 23 Mok@sa (emancipation)…………………………………..207

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1 A Review………………………………………………208 2 The Germs of Sâ@mkhya in the Upani@sads…………………..211 3 Sâ@mkhya and Yoga Literature…………………………….212 4 An Early School of Sâ@mkhya……………………………..213 5 Sâ@mkhya kârikâ, Sâ@mkhya sûtra, Vâcaspati Mis'ra and Vijñâna Bhiksu………………………………………………….222 6 Yoga and Patañjali……………………………………..226 7 The Sâ@mkhya and the Yoga doctrine of Soul or Purusa……….238 8 Thought and Matter……………………………………..241 9 Feelings, the Ultimate Substances………………………..242 10 The Gunas……………………………………………..243 11 Prak@@rti and its evolution……………………………..245 12 Pralaya and the disturbance of the Prak@rti Equilibrium…….247 13 Mahat and Ahamkâra……………………………………..248 14 The Tanmâtras and the Paramâñus………………………….251 15 Principle of Causation and Conservation of Energy………….254 16 Change as the formation of new collocations……………….255 17 Causation as Satkâryavâda (the theory that the effect potentially exists before it is generated by the movement of the cause)……………………………………………257 18 Sâ@mkhya Atheism and Yoga Theism…………………………258 19 Buddhi and Purusa………………………………………259 20 The Cognitive Process and some characteristics of Citta…….261 21 Sorrow and its Dissolution………………………………264 22 Citta…………………………………………………268 23 Yoga Purificatory Practices (Parikarma)…………………..270 24 The Yoga Meditation…………………………………….271

1 Criticism of Buddhism and Sâ@mkhya from the Nyâya standpoint…274 2 Nyâya and Vais'e@sika sûtras……………………………..276 3 Does Vais'e@sika represent an old school of Mîmâ@msâ?……….280 4 Philosophy in the Vais'e@sika sûtras………………………285 5 Philosophy in the Nyâya sûtras……………………………294 6 Philosophy of Nyâya sûtras and Vais'e@sika sûtras…………..301 7 The Vais'e@sika and Nyâya Literature………………………305 8 The main doctrine of the Nyâya-Vais'e@sika Philosophy……….310 9 The six Padârthas: Dravya, Gu@na, Karma, Sâmânya, Vis'e@sa, Samavâya………………………………………………..313 10 The Theory of Causation…………………………………319 11 Dissolution (Pralaya) and Creation (S@r@s@ti)……………..323 12 Proof of the Existence of Is'vara………………………..325 13 The Nyâya-Vais'e@sika Physics……………………………326 14 The Origin of Knowledge (Pramâ@na)……………………….330 15 The four Pramâ@nas of Nyâya……………………………..332 16 Perception (Pratyak@sa)…………………………………333 17 Inference……………………………………………..343 18 Upamâna and S'abda……………………………………..354 19 Negation in Nyâya-Vais'e@sika……………………………355 20 The necessity of the Acquirement of debating devices for the seeker of Salvation…………………………………..360 21 The Doctrine of Soul……………………………………362 22 Îs'vara and Salvation…………………………………..363

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1 A Comparative Review…………………………………….367 2 The Mîmâ@msâ Literature………………………………….369 3 The Parata@h-prâmâ@nya doctrine of Nyâya and the Svata@h-prâmâ@nya doctrine of Mîmâ@msâ……………………..372 4 The place of Sense-organs in Perception……………………375 5 Indeterminate and Determinate Perception…………………..378 6 Some Ontological Problems connected with the Doctrine of Perception………………………………………………379 7 The Nature of Knowledge………………………………….382 8 The Psychology of Illusion……………………………….384 9 Inference………………………………………………387 10 Upamâna, Arthâpatti…………………………………….391 11 S'abda-pramâ@na………………………………………..394 12 The Pramâ@na of Non-perception (anupalabdhi)………………397 13 Self, Salvation, and God………………………………..399 14 Mîmâ@msâ as Philosophy and Mimâ@msâ as Ritualism…………..403

1 Comprehension of the Philosophical Issues more essential than the Dialectic of Controversy………………………………406 2 The philosophical situation: a Review……………………..408 3 Vedânta Literature………………………………………418 4 Vedânta in Gau@dapâda……………………………………420 5 Vedânta and Sa@nkara (788-820 A.D.)……………………….429 6 The main idea of the Vedânta philosophy……………………439 7 In what sense is the world-appearance false?……………….443 8 The nature of the world-appearance, phenomena………………445 9 The Definition of Ajñâna (nescience)………………………452 10 Ajñâna established by Perception and Inference…………….454 11 Locus and Object of Ajñâna, Aha@mkâra and Anta@hkara@na…….457 12 Anirvâcyavâda and the Vedânta dialectic…………………..461 13 The Theory of Causation…………………………………465 14 Vedânta theory of Perception and Inference………………..470 15 Âtman, Jîva, Is'vara, Ekajîvavâda and D@r@s@tis@r@s@tivâda….474 16 Vedânta theory of Illusion………………………………485 17 Vedânta Ethics and Vedânta Emancipation…………………..489 18 Vedânta and other Indian systems…………………………492

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The achievements of the ancient Indians in the field of philosophy are but very imperfectly known to the world at large, and it is unfortunate that the condition is no better even in India. There is a small body of Hindu scholars and ascetics living a retired life in solitude, who are well acquainted with the subject, but they do not know English and are not used to modern ways of thinking, and the idea that they ought to write books in vernaculars in order to popularize the subject does not appeal to them. Through the activity of various learned bodies and private individuals both in Europe and in India large numbers of philosophical works in Sanskrit and Pâli have been published, as well as translations of a few of them, but there has been as yet little systematic attempt on the part of scholars to study them and judge their value. There are hundreds of Sanskrit works on most of the systems of Indian thought and scarcely a hundredth part of them has been translated. Indian modes of expression, entailing difficult technical philosophical terms are so different from those of European thought, that they can hardly ever be accurately translated. It is therefore very difficult for a person unacquainted with Sanskrit to understand Indian philosophical thought in its true bearing from translations. Pâli is a much easier language than Sanskrit, but a knowledge of Pâli is helpful in understanding only the earliest school of Buddhism, when it was in its semi-philosophical stage. Sanskrit is generally regarded as a difficult language. But no one from an acquaintance with Vedic or ordinary literary Sanskrit can have any idea of the difficulty of the logical and abstruse parts of Sanskrit philosophical literature. A man who can easily understand the Vedas. the Upani@sads, the Purânas, the Law Books and the literary works, and is also well acquainted with European philosophical thought, may find it literally impossible to understand even small portions of a work of advanced Indian logic, or the dialectical Vedânta. This is due to two reasons, the use of technical terms and of great condensation in expression, and the hidden allusions to doctrines of other systems. The

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tendency to conceiving philosophical problems in a clear and unambiguous manner is an important feature of Sanskrit thought, but from the ninth century onwards, the habit of using clear, definite, and precise expressions, began to develop in a very striking manner, and as a result of that a large number of technical terms began to be invented. These terms are seldom properly explained, and it is presupposed that the reader who wants to read the works should have a knowledge of them. Any one in olden times who took to the study of any system of philosophy, had to do so with a teacher, who explained those terms to him. The teacher himself had got it from his teacher, and he from his. There was no tendency to popularize philosophy, for the idea then prevalent was that only the chosen few who had otherwise shown their fitness, deserved to become fit students (adhikârî) of philosophy, under the direction of a teacher. Only those who had the grit and high moral strength to devote their whole life to the true understanding of philosophy and the rebuilding of life in accordance with the high truths of philosophy were allowed to study it.

Another difficulty which a beginner will meet is this, that sometimes the same technical terms are used in extremely different senses in different systems. The student must know the meaning of each technical term with reference to the system in which it occurs, and no dictionary will enlighten him much about the matter [Footnote ref 1]. He will have to pick them up as he advances and finds them used. Allusions to the doctrines of other systems and their refutations during the discussions of similar doctrines in any particular system of thought are often very puzzling even to a well-equipped reader; for he cannot be expected to know all the doctrines of other systems without going through them, and so it often becomes difficult to follow the series of answers and refutations which are poured forth in the course of these discussions. There are two important compendiums in Sanskrit giving a summary of some of the principal systems of Indian thought, viz. the Sarvadars'anasa@mgraha, and the @Sa@ddars'anasamuccaya of Haribhadra with the commentary of Gu@naratna; but the former is very sketchy and can throw very little light on the understanding of the ontological or epistemological doctrines of any of the systems. It has been translated by Cowell and Gough, but I

____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: Recently a very able Sanskrit dictionary of technical philosophical terms called Nyâyakos'a has been prepared by M.M. Bhîmâcârya Jhalkikar, Bombay, Govt. Press.]

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am afraid the translation may not be found very intelligible. Gu@naratna's commentary is excellent so far as Jainism is concerned, and it sometimes gives interesting information about other systems, and also supplies us with some short bibliographical notices, but it seldom goes on to explain the epistemological or ontological doctrines or discussions which are so necessary for the right understanding of any of the advanced systems of Indian thought. Thus in the absence of a book which could give us in brief the main epistemological, ontological, and psychological positions of the Indian thinkers, it is difficult even for a good Sanskrit scholar to follow the advanced philosophical literature, even though he may be acquainted with many of the technical philosophical terms. I have spoken enough about the difficulties of studying Indian philosophy, but if once a person can get himself used to the technical terms and the general positions of the different Indian thinkers and their modes of expression, he can master the whole by patient toil. The technical terms, which are a source of difficulty at the beginning, are of inestimable value in helping us to understand the precise and definite meaning of the writers who used them, and the chances of misinterpreting or misunderstanding them are reduced to a minimum. It is I think well-known that avoidance of technical terms has often rendered philosophical works unduly verbose, and liable to misinterpretation. The art of clear writing is indeed a rare virtue and every philosopher cannot expect to have it. But when technical expressions are properly formed, even a bad writer can make himself understood. In the early days of Buddhist philosophy in the Pâli literature, this difficulty is greatly felt. There are some technical terms here which are still very elastic and their repetition in different places in more or less different senses heighten the difficulty of understanding the real meaning intended to be conveyed.

But is it necessary that a history of Indian philosophy should be written? There are some people who think that the Indians never rose beyond the stage of simple faith and that therefore they cannot have any philosophy at all in the proper sense of the term. Thus Professor Frank Thilly of the Cornell University says in his History of Philosophy [Footnote ref 1], "A universal history of philosophy would include the philosophies of all peoples. Not all peoples, however

__________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: New York, 1914, p. 3.]

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have produced real systems of thought, and the speculations of only a few can be said to have had a history. Many do not rise beyond the mythological stage. Even the theories of Oriental peoples, the Hindus, Egyptians, Chinese, consist, in the main, of mythological and ethical doctrines, and are not thoroughgoing systems of thought: they are shot through with poetry and faith. We shall, therefore, limit ourselves to the study of the Western countries, and begin with the philosophy of the ancient Greeks, on whose culture our own civilization in part, rests." There are doubtless many other people who hold such uninformed and untrue beliefs, which only show their ignorance of Indian matters. It is not necessary to say anything in order to refute these views, for what follows will I hope show the falsity of their beliefs. If they are not satisfied, and want to know more definitely and elaborately about the contents of the different systems, I am afraid they will have to go to the originals referred to in the bibliographical notices of the chapters.

There is another opinion, that the time has not yet come for an attempt to write a history of Indian philosophy. Two different reasons are given from two different points of view. It is said that the field of Indian philosophy is so vast, and such a vast literature exists on each of the systems, that it is not possible for anyone to collect his materials directly from the original sources, before separate accounts are prepared by specialists working in each of the particular systems. There is some truth in this objection, but although in some of the important systems the literature that exists is exceedingly vast, yet many of them are more or less repetitions of the same subjects, and a judicious selection of twenty or thirty important works on each of the systems could certainly be made, which would give a fairly correct exposition. In my own undertaking in this direction I have always drawn directly from the original texts, and have always tried to collect my materials from those sources in which they appear at their best. My space has been very limited and I have chosen the features which appeared to me to be the most important. I had to leave out many discussions of difficult problems and diverse important bearings of each of the systems to many interesting aspects of philosophy. This I hope may be excused in a history of philosophy which does not aim at completeness. There are indeed many defects and shortcomings, and

5

these would have been much less in the case of a writer abler than the present one. At any rate it may be hoped that the imperfections of the present attempt will be a stimulus to those whose better and more competent efforts will supersede it. No attempt ought to be called impossible on account of its imperfections.

In the second place it is said that the Indians had no proper and accurate historical records and biographies and it is therefore impossible to write a history of Indian philosophy. This objection is also partially valid. But this defect does not affect us so much as one would at first sight suppose; for, though the dates of the earlier beginnings are very obscure, yet, in later times, we are in a position to affirm some dates and to point out priority and posteriority in the case of other thinkers. As most of the systems developed side by side through many centuries their mutual relations also developed, and these could be well observed. The special nature of this development has been touched on in the fourth chapter. Most of the systems had very early beginnings and a continuous course of development through the succeeding centuries, and it is not possible to take the state of the philosophy of a particular system at a particular time and contrast it with the state of that system at a later time; for the later state did not supersede the previous state, but only showed a more coherent form of it, which was generally true to the original system but was more determinate. Evolution through history has in Western countries often brought forth the development of more coherent types of philosophic thought, but in India, though the types remained the same, their development through history made them more and more coherent and determinate. Most of the parts were probably existent in the earlier stages, but they were in an undifferentiated state; through the criticism and conflict of the different schools existing side by side the parts of each of the systems of thought became more and more differentiated, determinate, and coherent. In some cases this development has been almost imperceptible, and in many cases the earlier forms have been lost, or so inadequately expressed that nothing definite could be made out of them. Wherever such a differentiation could be made in the interests of philosophy, I have tried to do it. But I have never considered it desirable that the philosophical interest should be subordinated to the chronological. It is no

6

doubt true that more definite chronological information would be a very desirable thing, yet I am of opinion that the little chronological data we have give us a fair amount of help in forming a general notion about the growth and development of the different systems by mutual association and conflict. If the condition of the development of philosophy in India had been the same as in Europe, definite chronological knowledge would be considered much more indispensable. For, when one system supersedes another, it is indispensably necessary that we should know which preceded and which succeeded. But when the systems are developing side by side, and when we are getting them in their richer and better forms, the interest with regard to the conditions, nature and environment of their early origin has rather a historical than a philosophical interest. I have tried as best I could to form certain general notions as regards the earlier stages of some of the systems, but though the various features of these systems at these stages in detail may not be ascertainable, yet this, I think, could never be considered as invalidating the whole programme. Moreover, even if we knew definitely the correct dates of the thinkers of the same system we could not treat them separately, as is done in European philosophy, without unnecessarily repeating the same thing twenty times over; for they all dealt with the same system, and tried to bring out the same type of thought in more and more determinate forms.

The earliest literature of India is the Vedas. These consist mostly of hymns in praise of nature gods, such as fire, wind, etc. Excepting in some of the hymns of the later parts of the work (probably about 1000 B.C.), there is not much philosophy in them in our sense of the term. It is here that we first find intensely interesting philosophical questions of a more or less cosmological character expressed in terms of poetry and imagination. In the later Vedic works called the Brâhmaf@nas and the Âra@nyakas written mostly in prose, which followed the Vedic hymns, there are two tendencies, viz. one that sought to establish the magical forms of ritualistic worship, and the other which indulged in speculative thinking through crude generalizations. This latter tendency was indeed much feebler than the former, and it might appear that the ritualistic tendency had actually swallowed up what little of philosophy the later parts of the Vedic hymns were trying to express, but there are unmistakable marks that this tendency

7

existed and worked. Next to this come certain treatises written in prose and verse called the Upani@sads, which contain various sorts of philosophical thoughts mostly monistic or singularistic but also some pluralistic and dualistic ones. These are not reasoned statements, but utterances of truths intuitively perceived or felt as unquestionably real and indubitable, and carrying great force, vigour, and persuasiveness with them. It is very probable that many of the earliest parts of this literature are as old as 500 B.C. to 700 B.C. Buddhist philosophy began with the Buddha from some time about 500 B.C. There is reason to believe that Buddhist philosophy continued to develop in India in one or other of its vigorous forms till some time about the tenth or eleventh century A.D. The earliest beginnings of the other Indian systems of thought are also to be sought chiefly between the age of the Buddha to about 200 B.C. Jaina philosophy was probably prior to the Buddha. But except in its earlier days, when it came in conflict with the doctrines of the Buddha, it does not seem to me that the Jaina thought came much in contact with other systems of Hindu thought. Excepting in some forms of Vai@s@nava thought in later times, Jaina thought is seldom alluded to by the Hindu writers or later Buddhists, though some Jains like Haribhadra and Gu@naratna tried to refute the Hindu and Buddhist systems. The non-aggressive nature of their religion and ideal may to a certain extent explain it, but there may be other reasons too which it is difficult for us to guess. It is interesting to note that, though there have been some dissensions amongst the Jains about dogmas and creeds, Jaina philosophy has not split into many schools of thought more or less differing from one another as Buddhist thought did.

The first volume of this work will contain Buddhist and Jaina philosophy and the six systems of Hindu thought. These six systems of orthodox Hindu thought are the Sâ@mkhya, the Yoga, the Nyâya, the Vais'e@sika, the Mimâ@msâ (generally known as Pûrva Mimâ@msâ), and the Vedânta (known also as Uttara Mimâ@msâ). Of these what is differently known as Sâ@mkhya and Yoga are but different schools of one system. The Vais'e@sika and the Nyâya in later times became so mixed up that, though in early times the similarity of the former with Mimâ@msâ was greater than that with Nyâya, they came to be regarded as fundamentally almost the same systems. Nyâya and Vais'e@sika have therefore been treated

8

together. In addition to these systems some theistic systems began to grow prominent from the ninth century A.D. They also probably had their early beginnings at the time of the Upani@sads. But at that time their interest was probably concentrated on problems of morality and religion. It is not improbable that these were associated with certain metaphysical theories also, but no works treating them in a systematic way are now available. One of their most important early works is the Bhagavadgâtâ. This book is rightly regarded as one of the greatest masterpieces of Hindu thought. It is written in verse, and deals with moral, religious, and metaphysical problems, in a loose form. It is its lack of system and method which gives it its peculiar charm more akin to the poetry of the Upani@sads than to the dialectical and systematic Hindu thought. From the ninth century onwards attempts were made to supplement these loose theistic ideas which were floating about and forming integral parts of religious creeds, by metaphysical theories. Theism is often dualistic and pluralistic, and so are all these systems, which are known as different schools of Vai@s@nava philosophy. Most of the Vai@s@nava thinkers wished to show that their systems were taught in the Upani@sads, and thus wrote commentaries thereon to prove their interpretations, and also wrote commentaries on the Brahmasûtra, the classical exposition of the philosophy of the Upani@sads. In addition to the works of these Vai@s@nava thinkers there sprang up another class of theistic works which were of a more eclectic nature. These also had their beginnings in periods as old as the Upani@sads. They are known as the S'aiva and Tantra thought, and are dealt with in the second volume of this work.

We thus see that the earliest beginnings of most systems of Hindu thought can be traced to some time between 600 B.C. to 100 or 200 B.C. It is extremely difficult to say anything about the relative priority of the systems with any degree of certainty. Some conjectural attempts have been made in this work with regard to some of the systems, but how far they are correct, it will be for our readers to judge. Moreover during the earliest manifestation of a system some crude outlines only are traceable. As time went on the systems of thought began to develop side by side. Most of them were taught from the time in which they were first conceived to about the seventeenth century A.D. in an unbroken chain of teachers and pupils. Even now each system of Hindu thought has its own adherents, though few people now

9

care to write any new works upon them. In the history of the growth of any system of Hindu thought we find that as time went on, and as new problems were suggested, each system tried to answer them consistently with its own doctrines. The order in which we have taken the philosophical systems could not be strictly a chronological one. Thus though it is possible that the earliest speculations of some form of Sâ@mkhya, Yoga, and Mîmâ@msâ were prior to Buddhism yet they have been treated after Buddhism and Jainism, because the elaborate works of these systems which we now possess are later than Buddhism. In my opinion the Vais'e@sika system is also probably pre-Buddhistic, but it has been treated later, partly on account of its association with Nyâya, and partly on account of the fact that all its commentaries are of a much later date. It seems to me almost certain that enormous quantities of old philosophical literature have been lost, which if found could have been of use to us in showing the stages of the early growth of the systems and their mutual relations. But as they are not available we have to be satisfied with what remains. The original sources from which I have drawn my materials have all been indicated in the brief accounts of the literature of each system which I have put in before beginning the study of any particular system of thought.

In my interpretations I have always tried to follow the original sources as accurately as I could. This has sometimes led to old and unfamiliar modes of expression, but this course seemed to me to be preferable to the adoption of European modes of thought for the expression of Indian ideas. But even in spite of this striking similarities to many of the modern philosophical doctrines and ideas will doubtless be noticed. This only proves that the human mind follows more or less the same modes of rational thought. I have never tried to compare any phase of Indian thought with European, for this is beyond the scope of my present attempt, but if I may be allowed to express my own conviction, I might say that many of the philosophical doctrines of European philosophy are essentially the same as those found in Indian philosophy. The main difference is often the difference of the point of view from which the same problems appeared in such a variety of forms in the two countries. My own view with regard to the net value of Indian philosophical development will be expressed in the concluding chapter of the second volume of the present work.

10

The Vedas and their antiquity.

The sacred books of India, the Vedas, are generally believed to be the earliest literary record of the Indo-European race. It is indeed difficult to say when the earliest portions of these compositions came into existence. Many shrewd guesses have been offered, but none of them can be proved to be incontestably true. Max Müller supposed the date to be 1200 B.C., Haug 2400 B.C. and Bâl Ga@ngâdhar Tilak 4000 B.C. The ancient Hindus seldom kept any historical record of their literary, religious or political achievements. The Vedas were handed down from mouth to mouth from a period of unknown antiquity; and the Hindus generally believed that they were never composed by men. It was therefore generally supposed that either they were taught by God to the sages, or that they were of themselves revealed to the sages who were the "seers" (mantradra@s@tâ) of the hymns. Thus we find that when some time had elapsed after the composition of the Vedas, people had come to look upon them not only as very old, but so old that they had, theoretically at least, no beginning in time, though they were believed to have been revealed at some unknown remote period at the beginning of each creation.

The place of the Vedas in the Hindu mind.

When the Vedas were composed, there was probably no system of writing prevalent in India. But such was the scrupulous zeal of the Brahmins, who got the whole Vedic literature by heart by hearing it from their preceptors, that it has been transmitted most faithfully to us through the course of the last 3000 years or more with little or no interpolations at all. The religious history of India had suffered considerable changes in the latter periods, since the time of the Vedic civilization, but such was the reverence paid to the Vedas that they had ever remained as the highest religious authority for all sections of the Hindus at all times. Even at this day all the obligatory duties of the Hindus at birth, marriage, death, etc., are performed according to the old

11

Vedic ritual. The prayers that a Brahmin now says three times a day are the same selections of Vedic verses as were used as prayer verses two or three thousand years ago. A little insight into the life of an ordinary Hindu of the present day will show that the system of image-worship is one that has been grafted upon his life, the regular obligatory duties of which are ordered according to the old Vedic rites. Thus an orthodox Brahmin can dispense with image-worship if he likes, but not so with his daily Vedic prayers or other obligatory ceremonies. Even at this day there are persons who bestow immense sums of money for the performance and teaching of Vedic sacrifices and rituals. Most of the Sanskrit literatures that flourished after the Vedas base upon them their own validity, and appeal to them as authority. Systems of Hindu philosophy not only own their allegiance to the Vedas, but the adherents of each one of them would often quarrel with others and maintain its superiority by trying to prove that it and it alone was the faithful follower of the Vedas and represented correctly their views. The laws which regulate the social, legal, domestic and religious customs and rites of the Hindus even to the present day are said to be but mere systematized memories of old Vedic teachings, and are held to be obligatory on their authority. Even under British administration, in the inheritance of property, adoption, and in such other legal transactions, Hindu Law is followed, and this claims to draw its authority from the Vedas. To enter into details is unnecessary. But suffice it to say that the Vedas, far from being regarded as a dead literature of the past, are still looked upon as the origin and source of almost all literatures except purely secular poetry and drama. Thus in short we may say that in spite of the many changes that time has wrought, the orthodox Hindu life may still be regarded in the main as an adumbration of the Vedic life, which had never ceased to shed its light all through the past.

Classification of the Vedic literature.

A beginner who is introduced for the first time to the study of later Sanskrit literature is likely to appear somewhat confused when he meets with authoritative texts of diverse purport and subjects having the same generic name "Veda" or "S'ruti" (from s'ru to hear); for Veda in its wider sense is not the name of any

12

particular book, but of the literature of a particular epoch extending over a long period, say two thousand years or so. As this literature represents the total achievements of the Indian people in different directions for such a long period, it must of necessity be of a diversified character. If we roughly classify this huge literature from the points of view of age, language, and subject matter, we can point out four different types, namely the Sa@mhitâ or collection of verses (sam together, hita put), Brâhma@nas, Âra@nyakas ("forest treatises") and the Upani@sads. All these literatures, both prose and verse, were looked upon as so holy that in early times it was thought almost a sacrilege to write them; they were therefore learnt by heart by the Brahmins from the mouth of their preceptors and were hence called s'ruti (literally anything heard)[Footnote ref 1].

The Sa@mhitâs.

There are four collections or Sa@mhitâs, namely @Rg-Veda, Sâma-Veda, Yajur-Veda and Atharva-Veda. Of these the @Rg-Veda is probably the earliest. The Sâma-Veda has practically no independent value, for it consists of stanzas taken (excepting only 75) entirely from the @Rg-Veda, which were meant to be sung to certain fixed melodies, and may thus be called the book of chants. The Yajur-Veda however contains in addition to the verses taken from the @Rg-Veda many original prose formulas. The arrangement of the verses of the Sâma-Veda is solely with reference to their place and use in the Soma sacrifice; the contents of the Yajur-Veda are arranged in the order in which the verses were actually employed in the various religious sacrifices. It is therefore called the Veda of Yajus—sacrificial prayers. These may be contrasted with the arrangement in the @Rg-Veda in this, that there the verses are generally arranged in accordance with the gods who are adored in them. Thus, for example, first we get all the poems addressed to Agni or the Fire-god, then all those to the god Indra and so on. The fourth collection, the Atharva-Veda, probably attained its present form considerably later than the @Rg-Veda. In spirit, however, as Professor Macdonell says, "It is not only entirely different from the Rigveda but represents a much more primitive stage of thought. While the Rigveda deals almost exclusively with the higher gods as conceived by a

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[Footnote 1: Pâ@nini, III. iii. 94.]

13

comparatively advanced and refined sacerdotal class, the Atharva-Veda is, in the main a book of spells and incantations appealing to the demon world, and teems with notions about witchcraft current among the lower grades of the population, and derived from an immemorial antiquity. These two, thus complementary to each other in contents are obviously the most important of the four Vedas [Footnote ref 1]."

The Brâhma@nas. [Footnote ref 2]

After the Sa@mhitâs there grew up the theological treatises called the Brâhma@nas, which were of a distinctly different literary type. They are written in prose, and explain the sacred significance of the different rituals to those who are not already familiar with them. "They reflect," says Professor Macdonell, "the spirit of an age in which all intellectual activity is concentrated on the sacrifice, describing its ceremonies, discussing its value, speculating on its origin and significance." These works are full of dogmatic assertions, fanciful symbolism and speculations of an unbounded imagination in the field of sacrificial details. The sacrificial ceremonials were probably never so elaborate at the time when the early hymns were composed. But when the collections of hymns were being handed down from generation to generation the ceremonials became more and more complicated. Thus there came about the necessity of the distribution of the different sacrificial functions among several distinct classes of priests. We may assume that this was a period when the caste system was becoming established, and when the only thing which could engage wise and religious minds was sacrifice and its elaborate rituals. Free speculative thinking was thus subordinated to the service of the sacrifice, and the result was the production of the most fanciful sacramental and symbolic

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[Footnote 1: A.A. Macdonell's History of Sanskrit Literature, p. 31.]

[Footnote 2: Weber (Hist. Ind. Lit., p. 11, note) says that the word Brâhma@na signifies "that which relates to prayer brahman." Max Muller (S.B.E., I.p. lxvi) says that Brâhma@na meant "originally the sayings of Brahmans, whether in the general sense of priests, or in the more special sense of Brahman-priests." Eggeling (S.B.E. XII. Introd. p. xxii) says that the Brhâma@nas were so called "probably either because they were intended for the instruction and guidance of priests (brahman) generally; or because they were, for the most part, the authoritative utterances of such as were thoroughly versed in Vedic and sacrificial lore and competent to act as Brahmans or superintending priests." But in view of the fact that the Brâhma@nas were also supposed to be as much revealed as the Vedas, the present writer thinks that Weber's view is the correct one.]

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system, unparalleled anywhere but among the Gnostics. It is now generally believed that the close of the Brâhma@na period was not later than 500 B.C.

The Âra@nyakas.

As a further development of the Brâhma@nas however we get the Âra@nyakas or forest treatises. These works were probably composed for old men who had retired into the forest and were thus unable to perform elaborate sacrifices requiring a multitude of accessories and articles which could not be procured in forests. In these, meditations on certain symbols were supposed to be of great merit, and they gradually began to supplant the sacrifices as being of a superior order. It is here that we find that amongst a certain section of intelligent people the ritualistic ideas began to give way, and philosophic speculations about the nature of truth became gradually substituted in their place. To take an illustration from the beginning of the B@rhadâra@nyaka we find that instead of the actual performance of the horse sacrifice (as'vamedha) there are directions for meditating upon the dawn (U@sas) as the head of the horse, the sun as the eye of the horse, the air as its life, and so on. This is indeed a distinct advancement of the claims of speculation or meditation over the actual performance of the complicated ceremonials of sacrifice. The growth of the subjective speculation, as being capable of bringing the highest good, gradually resulted in the supersession of Vedic ritualism and the establishment of the claims of philosophic meditation and self-knowledge as the highest goal of life. Thus we find that the Âra@nyaka age was a period during which free thinking tried gradually to shake off the shackles of ritualism which had fettered it for a long time. It was thus that the Âra@nyakas could pave the way for the Upani@sads, revive the germs of philosophic speculation in the Vedas, and develop them in a manner which made the Upani@sads the source of all philosophy that arose in the world of Hindu thought.

The @Rg-Veda, its civilization.

The hymns of the @Rg-Veda are neither the productions of a single hand nor do they probably belong to any single age. They were composed probably at different periods by different sages, and it is not improbable that some of them were composed

15

before the Aryan people entered the plains of India. They were handed down from mouth to mouth and gradually swelled through the new additions that were made by the poets of succeeding generations. It was when the collection had increased to a very considerable extent that it was probably arranged in the present form, or in some other previous forms to which the present arrangement owes its origin. They therefore reflect the civilization of the Aryan people at different periods of antiquity before and after they had come to India. This unique monument of a long vanished age is of great aesthetic value, and contains much that is genuine poetry. It enables us to get an estimate of the primitive society which produced it—the oldest book of the Aryan race. The principal means of sustenance were cattle-keeping and the cultivation of the soil with plough and harrow, mattock and hoe, and watering the ground when necessary with artificial canals. "The chief food consists," as Kaegi says, "together with bread, of various preparations of milk, cakes of flour and butter, many sorts of vegetables and fruits; meat cooked on the spits or in pots, is little used, and was probably eaten only at the great feasts and family gatherings. Drinking plays throughout a much more important part than eating [Footnote ref 1]." The wood-worker built war-chariots and wagons, as also more delicate carved works and artistic cups. Metal-workers, smiths and potters continued their trade. The women understood the plaiting of mats, weaving and sewing; they manufactured the wool of the sheep into clothing for men and covering for animals. The group of individuals forming a tribe was the highest political unit; each of the different families forming a tribe was under the sway of the father or the head of the family. Kingship was probably hereditary and in some cases electoral. Kingship was nowhere absolute, but limited by the will of the people. Most developed ideas of justice, right and law, were present in the country. Thus Kaegi says, "the hymns strongly prove how deeply the prominent minds in the people were persuaded that the eternal ordinances of the rulers of the world were as inviolable in mental and moral matters as in the realm of nature, and that every wrong act, even the unconscious, was punished and the sin expiated."[Footnote ref 2] Thus it is only right and proper to think that the Aryans had attained a pretty high degree

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[Footnote 1: The Rigveda, by Kaegi, 1886 edition, p. 13.]

[Footnote 2: Ibid. p. 18.]

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of civilization, but nowhere was the sincere spirit of the Aryans more manifested than in religion, which was the most essential and dominant feature of almost all the hymns, except a few secular ones. Thus Kaegi says, "The whole significance of the Rigveda in reference to the general history of religion, as has repeatedly been pointed out in modern times, rests upon this, that it presents to us the development of religious conceptions from the earliest beginnings to the deepest apprehension of the godhead and its relation to man [Footnote ref 1]."

The Vedic Gods.

The hymns of the @Rg-Veda were almost all composed in praise of the gods. The social and other materials are of secondary importance, as these references had only to be mentioned incidentally in giving vent to their feelings of devotion to the god. The gods here are however personalities presiding over the diverse powers of nature or forming their very essence. They have therefore no definite, systematic and separate characters like the Greek gods or the gods of the later Indian mythical works, the Purâ@nas. The powers of nature such as the storm, the rain, the thunder, are closely associated with one another, and the gods associated with them are also similar in character. The same epithets are attributed to different gods and it is only in a few specific qualities that they differ from one another. In the later mythological compositions of the Purâ@nas the gods lost their character as hypostatic powers of nature, and thus became actual personalities and characters having their tales of joy and sorrow like the mortal here below. The Vedic gods may be contrasted with them in this, that they are of an impersonal nature, as the characters they display are mostly but expressions of the powers of nature. To take an example, the fire or Agni is described, as Kaegi has it, as one that "lies concealed in the softer wood, as in a chamber, until, called forth by the rubbing in the early morning hour, he suddenly springs forth in gleaming brightness. The sacrificer takes and lays him on the wood. When the priests pour melted butter upon him, he leaps up crackling and neighing like a horse—he whom men love to see increasing like their own prosperity. They wonder at him, when, decking himself with

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[Footnote 1: The Rigveda, by Kaegi, p. 26.]

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changing colors like a suitor, equally beautiful on all sides, he presents to all sides his front.

   "All-searching is his beam, the gleaming of his light,
   His, the all-beautiful, of beauteous face and glance,
   The changing shimmer like that floats upon the stream,
   So Agni's rays gleam over bright and never cease."

[Footnote ref 1] R.V.I. 143. 3.

They would describe the wind (Vâta) and adore him and say

   "In what place was he born, and from whence comes he?
   The vital breath of gods, the world's great offspring,
   The God where'er he will moves at his pleasure:
   His rushing sound we hear—what his appearance, no one."

[Footnote ref 2] R.V.X. 168. 3, 4.

It was the forces of nature and her manifestations, on earth here, the atmosphere around and above us, or in the Heaven beyond the vault of the sky that excited the devotion and imagination of the Vedic poets. Thus with the exception of a few abstract gods of whom we shall presently speak and some dual divinities, the gods may be roughly classified as the terrestrial, atmospheric, and celestial.

Polytheism, Henotheism and Monotheism.

The plurality of the Vedic gods may lead a superficial enquirer to think the faith of the Vedic people polytheistic. But an intelligent reader will find here neither polytheism nor monotheism but a simple primitive stage of belief to which both of these may be said to owe their origin. The gods here do not preserve their proper places as in a polytheistic faith, but each one of them shrinks into insignificance or shines as supreme according as it is the object of adoration or not. The Vedic poets were the children of nature. Every natural phenomenon excited their wonder, admiration or veneration. The poet is struck with wonder that "the rough red cow gives soft white milk." The appearance or the setting of the sun sends a thrill into the minds of the Vedic sage and with wonder-gazing eyes he exclaims:

   "Undropped beneath, not fastened firm, how comes it
   That downward turned he falls not downward?
   The guide of his ascending path,—who saw it?"

[Footnote Ref 1] R.V. IV. 13. 5.

The sages wonder how "the sparkling waters of all rivers flow into one ocean without ever filling it." The minds of the Vedic

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[Footnote 1: The Rigveda, by Kaegi, p. 35.]

[Footnote 2: Ibid, p. 38.]

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people as we find in the hymns were highly impressionable and fresh. At this stage the time was not ripe enough for them to accord a consistent and well-defined existence to the multitude of gods nor to universalize them in a monotheistic creed. They hypostatized unconsciously any force of nature that overawed them or filled them with gratefulness and joy by its beneficent or aesthetic character, and adored it. The deity which moved the devotion or admiration of their mind was the most supreme for the time. This peculiar trait of the Vedic hymns Max Muller has called Henotheism or Kathenotheism: "a belief in single gods, each in turn standing out as the highest. And since the gods are thought of as specially ruling in their own spheres, the singers, in their special concerns and desires, call most of all on that god to whom they ascribe the most power in the matter,—to whose department if I may say so, their wish belongs. This god alone is present to the mind of the suppliant; with him for the time being is associated everything that can be said of a divine being;—he is the highest, the only god, before whom all others disappear, there being in this, however, no offence or depreciation of any other god [Footnote ref 1]." "Against this theory it has been urged," as Macdonell rightly says in his Vedic Mythology [Footnote ref 2], "that Vedic deities are not represented as 'independent of all the rest,' since no religion brings its gods into more frequent and varied juxtaposition and combination, and that even the mightiest gods of the Veda are made dependent on others. Thus Varu@na and Sûrya are subordinate to Indra (I. 101), Varu@na and the As'vins submit to the power of Vi@s@nu (I. 156)….Even when a god is spoken of as unique or chief (eka), as is natural enough in laudations, such statements lose their temporarily monotheistic force, through the modifications or corrections supplied by the context or even by the same verse [Footnote Ref 3]. "Henotheism is therefore an appearance," says Macdonell, "rather than a reality, an appearance produced by the indefiniteness due to undeveloped anthropomorphism, by the lack of any Vedic god occupying the position of a Zeus as the constant head of the pantheon, by the natural tendency of the priest or singer in extolling a particular god to exaggerate his greatness and to ignore other gods, and by the

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[Footnote 1: The Rigveda, by Kaegi, p. 27.]

[Footnote 2: See Ibid. p. 33. See also Arrowsmith's note on it for other references to Henotheism.]

[Footnote 3: Macdonell's Vedic Mythology, pp. 16, 17.]

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growing belief in the unity of the gods (cf. the refrain of 3, 35) each of whom might be regarded as a type of the divine [Footnote ref 1]." But whether we call it Henotheism or the mere temporary exaggeration of the powers of the deity in question, it is evident that this stage can neither be properly called polytheistic nor monotheistic, but one which had a tendency towards them both, although it was not sufficiently developed to be identified with either of them. The tendency towards extreme exaggeration could be called a monotheistic bias in germ, whereas the correlation of different deities as independent of one another and yet existing side by side was a tendency towards polytheism.

Growth of a Monotheistic tendency; Prajâpati, Vis'vakarma.

This tendency towards extolling a god as the greatest and highest gradually brought forth the conception of a supreme Lord of all beings (Prajâpati), not by a process of conscious generalization but as a necessary stage of development of the mind, able to imagine a deity as the repository of the highest moral and physical power, though its direct manifestation cannot be perceived. Thus the epithet Prajâpati or the Lord of beings, which was originally an epithet for other deities, came to be recognized as a separate deity, the highest and the greatest. Thus it is said in R.V.x. 121 [Footnote Ref 2]:

  In the beginning rose Hira@nyagarbha,
  Born as the only lord of all existence.
  This earth he settled firm and heaven established:
  What god shall we adore with our oblations?
  Who gives us breath, who gives us strength, whose bidding
  All creatures must obey, the bright gods even;
  Whose shade is death, whose shadow life immortal:
  What god shall we adore with our oblations?
  Who by his might alone became the monarch
  Of all that breathes, of all that wakes or slumbers,
  Of all, both man and beast, the lord eternal:
  What god shall we adore with our oblations?
  Whose might and majesty these snowy mountains,
  The ocean and the distant stream exhibit;
  Whose arms extended are these spreading regions:
  What god shall we adore with our oblations?
  Who made the heavens bright, the earth enduring,
  Who fixed the firmament, the heaven of heavens;
  Who measured out the air's extended spaces:
  What god shall we adore with our oblations?

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[Footnote 1: Macdonell's Vedic Mythology, p. 17.]

[Footnote 2: The Rigveda, by Kaegi, pp. 88, 89.]

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Similar attributes are also ascribed to the deity Vis'vakarma
(All-creator) [Footnote ref 1]. He is said to be father and procreator of
all beings, though himself uncreated. He generated the primitive waters.
It is to him that the sage says,

  Who is our father, our creator, maker,
  Who every place doth know and every creature,
  By whom alone to gods their names were given,
  To him all other creatures go to ask him [Footnote ref 2]
                                          R.V.x.82.3.

Brahma.

The conception of Brahman which has been the highest glory for the Vedânta philosophy of later days had hardly emerged in the @Rg-Veda from the associations of the sacrificial mind. The meanings that Sâya@na the celebrated commentator of the Vedas gives of the word as collected by Haug are: (a) food, food offering, (b) the chant of the sâma-singer, (c) magical formula or text, (d) duly completed ceremonies, (e) the chant and sacrificial gift together, (f) the recitation of the hot@r priest, (g) great. Roth says that it also means "the devotion which manifests itself as longing and satisfaction of the soul and reaches forth to the gods." But it is only in the S'atapatha Brâhma@na that the conception of Brahman has acquired a great significance as the supreme principle which is the moving force behind the gods. Thus the S'atapatha says, "Verily in the beginning this (universe) was the Brahman (neut.). It created the gods; and, having created the gods, it made them ascend these worlds: Agni this (terrestrial) world, Vâyu the air, and Sûrya the sky…. Then the Brahman itself went up to the sphere beyond. Having gone up to the sphere beyond, it considered, 'How can I descend again into these worlds?' It then descended again by means of these two, Form and Name. Whatever has a name, that is name; and that again which has no name and which one knows by its form, 'this is (of a certain) form,' that is form: as far as there are Form and Name so far, indeed, extends this (universe). These indeed are the two great forces of Brahman; and, verily, he who knows these two great forces of Brahman becomes himself a great force [Footnote ref 3]. In another place Brahman is said to be the ultimate thing in the Universe and is identified with Prajâpati, Puru@sa and Prâ@na

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[Footnote 1: See The Rigveda, by Kaegi, p. 89, and also Muir's Sanskrit
Texts, vol. IV. pp. 5-11.]

[Footnote 2: Kaegi's translation.]

[Footnote 3: See Eggeling's translation of S'atapatha Brâhmana S.B.E. vol. XLIV. pp. 27, 28.]

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(the vital air [Footnote ref 1]). In another place Brahman is described as being the Svayambhû (self-born) performing austerities, who offered his own self in the creatures and the creatures in his own self, and thus compassed supremacy, sovereignty and lordship over all creatures [Footnote ref 2]. The conception of the supreme man (Puru@sa) in the @Rg-Veda also supposes that the supreme man pervades the world with only a fourth part of Himself, whereas the remaining three parts transcend to a region beyond. He is at once the present, past and future [Footnote ref 3].

Sacrifice; the First Rudiments of the Law of Karma.

It will however be wrong to suppose that these monotheistic tendencies were gradually supplanting the polytheistic sacrifices. On the other hand, the complications of ritualism were gradually growing in their elaborate details. The direct result of this growth contributed however to relegate the gods to a relatively unimportant position, and to raise the dignity of the magical characteristics of the sacrifice as an institution which could give the desired fruits of themselves. The offerings at a sacrifice were not dictated by a devotion with which we are familiar under Christian or Vai@s@nava influence. The sacrifice taken as a whole is conceived as Haug notes "to be a kind of machinery in which every piece must tally with the other," the slightest discrepancy in the performance of even a minute ritualistic detail, say in the pouring of the melted butter on the fire, or the proper placing of utensils employed in the sacrifice, or even the misplacing of a mere straw contrary to the injunctions was sufficient to spoil the whole sacrifice with whatsoever earnestness it might be performed. Even if a word was mispronounced the most dreadful results might follow. Thus when Tva@s@t@r performed a sacrifice for the production of a demon who would be able to kill his enemy Indra, owing to the mistaken accent of a single word the object was reversed and the demon produced was killed by Indra. But if the sacrifice could be duly performed down to the minutest detail, there was no power which could arrest or delay the fruition of the object. Thus the objects of a sacrifice were fulfilled not by the grace of the gods, but as a natural result of the sacrifice. The performance of the rituals invariably produced certain mystic or magical results by virtue of which the object desired

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[Footnote 1: See S.B.E. XLIII. pp.59,60,400 and XLIV. p.409.]

[Footnote 2: See Ibid., XLIV, p. 418.]

[Footnote 3: R.V.x.90, Puru@sa Sûkta.]

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by the sacrificer was fulfilled in due course like the fulfilment of a natural law in the physical world. The sacrifice was believed to have existed from eternity like the Vedas. The creation of the world itself was even regarded as the fruit of a sacrifice performed by the supreme Being. It exists as Haug says "as an invisible thing at all times and is like the latent power of electricity in an electrifying machine, requiring only the operation of a suitable apparatus in order to be elicited." The sacrifice is not offered to a god with a view to propitiate him or to obtain from him welfare on earth or bliss in Heaven; these rewards are directly produced by the sacrifice itself through the correct performance of complicated and interconnected ceremonies which constitute the sacrifice. Though in each sacrifice certain gods were invoked and received the offerings, the gods themselves were but instruments in bringing about the sacrifice or in completing the course of mystical ceremonies composing it. Sacrifice is thus regarded as possessing a mystical potency superior even to the gods, who it is sometimes stated attained to their divine rank by means of sacrifice. Sacrifice was regarded as almost the only kind of duty, and it was also called karma or kriyâ (action) and the unalterable law was, that these mystical ceremonies for good or for bad, moral or immoral (for there were many kinds of sacrifices which were performed for injuring one's enemies or gaining worldly prosperity or supremacy at the cost of others) were destined to produce their effects. It is well to note here that the first recognition of a cosmic order or law prevailing in nature under the guardianship of the highest gods is to be found in the use of the word @Rta (literally the course of things). This word was also used, as Macdonell observes, to denote the "'order' in the moral world as truth and 'right' and in the religious world as sacrifice or 'rite'[Footnote ref 1]" and its unalterable law of producing effects. It is interesting to note in this connection that it is here that we find the first germs of the law of karma, which exercises such a dominating control over Indian thought up to the present day. Thus we find the simple faith and devotion of the Vedic hymns on one hand being supplanted by the growth of a complex system of sacrificial rites, and on the other bending their course towards a monotheistic or philosophic knowledge of the ultimate reality of the universe.

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[Footnote 1: Macdonell's Vedic Mythology, p. 11.]

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Cosmogony—Mythological and philosophical.

The cosmogony of the @Rg-Veda may be looked at from two aspects, the mythological and the philosophical. The mythological aspect has in general two currents, as Professor Macdonell says, "The one regards the universe as the result of mechanical production, the work of carpenter's and joiner's skill; the other represents it as the result of natural generation [Footnote ref. 1]." Thus in the @Rg-Veda we find that the poet in one place says, "what was the wood and what was the tree out of which they built heaven and earth [Footnote ref. 2]?" The answer given to this question in Taittirîya-Brâhma@na is "Brahman the wood and Brahman the tree from which the heaven and earth were made [Footnote ref 3]." Heaven and Earth are sometimes described as having been supported with posts [Footnote ref 4]. They are also sometimes spoken of as universal parents, and parentage is sometimes attributed to Aditi and Dak@sa.

Under this philosophical aspect the semi-pantheistic Man-hymn [Footnote ref 5] attracts our notice. The supreme man as we have already noticed above is there said to be the whole universe, whatever has been and shall be; he is the lord of immortality who has become diffused everywhere among things animate and inanimate, and all beings came out of him; from his navel came the atmosphere; from his head arose the sky; from his feet came the earth; from his ear the four quarters. Again there are other hymns in which the Sun is called the soul (âtman) of all that is movable and all that is immovable [Footnote ref 6]. There are also statements to the effect that the Being is one, though it is called by many names by the sages [Footnote ref 7]. The supreme being is sometimes extolled as the supreme Lord of the world called the golden egg (Hira@nyagarbha [Footnote ref 8]). In some passages it is said "Brahma@naspati blew forth these births like a blacksmith. In the earliest age of the gods, the existent sprang from the non-existent. In the first age of the gods, the existent sprang from the non-existent: thereafter the regions sprang, thereafter, from Uttânapada [Footnote ref 9]." The most remarkable and sublime hymn in which the first germs of philosophic speculation

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[Footnote 1: Macdonell's Vedic Mythology, p. 11.]

[Footnote 2: R.V.x. 81. 4.]

[Footnote 3: Taitt. Br. II. 8. 9. 6.]

[Footnote 4: Macdonell's Vedic Mythology, p. 11; also R.V. II. 15 and IV. 56.]

[Footnote 5: R.V.x. 90.]

[Footnote 6: R.V.I. 115.]

[Footnote 7: R.V.I. 164. 46.]

[Footnote 8: R.V.X. 121.]

[Footnote 9: Muir's translation of R.V.x. 72; Muir's Sanskrit Texts, vol. v.p. 48.]

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with regard to the wonderful mystery of the origin of the world are found is the 129th hymn of R.V.x.

1. Then there was neither being nor not-being.
   The atmosphere was not, nor sky above it.
   What covered all? and where? by what protected?
   Was there the fathomless abyss of waters?

2. Then neither death nor deathless existed;
   Of day and night there was yet no distinction.
   Alone that one breathed calmly, self-supported,
   Other than It was none, nor aught above It.

3. Darkness there was at first in darkness hidden;
   The universe was undistinguished water.
   That which in void and emptiness lay hidden
   Alone by power of fervor was developed.

4. Then for the first time there arose desire,
   Which was the primal germ of mind, within it.
   And sages, searching in their heart, discovered
   In Nothing the connecting bond of Being.

6. Who is it knows? Who here can tell us surely
   From what and how this universe has risen?
   And whether not till after it the gods lived?
   Who then can know from what it has arisen?

7. The source from which this universe has risen,
   And whether it was made, or uncreated,
   He only knows, who from the highest heaven
   Rules, the all-seeing lord—or does not He know [Footnote ref 1]?

The earliest commentary on this is probably a passage in the S'atapatha Brâhma@na (x. 5. 3.I) which says that "in the beginning this (universe) was as it were neither non-existent nor existent; in the beginning this (universe) was as it were, existed and did not exist: there was then only that Mind. Wherefore it has been declared by the Rishi (@Rg-Veda X. 129. I), 'There was then neither the non-existent nor the existent' for Mind was, as it were, neither existent nor non-existent. This Mind when created, wished to become manifest,—more defined, more substantial: it sought after a self (a body); it practised austerity: it acquired consistency [Footnote ref 2]." In the Atharva-Veda also we find it stated that all forms of the universe were comprehended within the god Skambha [Footnote ref 3].

Thus we find that even in the period of the Vedas there sprang forth such a philosophic yearning, at least among some who could

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[Footnote 1: The Rigveda, by Kaegi, p. 90. R.V.x. 129.]

[Footnote 2: See Eggeling's translation of S'.B., S.B.E. vol. XLIII. pp. 374, 375.]

[Footnote 3: A.V. x. 7. 10.]

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question whether this universe was at all a creation or not, which could think of the origin of the world as being enveloped in the mystery of a primal non-differentiation of being and non-being; and which could think that it was the primal One which by its inherent fervour gave rise to the desire of a creation as the first manifestation of the germ of mind, from which the universe sprang forth through a series of mysterious gradual processes. In the Brâhma@nas, however, we find that the cosmogonic view generally requires the agency of a creator, who is not however always the starting point, and we find that the theory of evolution is combined with the theory of creation, so that Prajâpati is sometimes spoken of as the creator while at other times the creator is said to have floated in the primeval water as a cosmic golden egg.

Eschatology; the Doctrine of Âtman.

There seems to be a belief in the Vedas that the soul could be separated from the body in states of swoon, and that it could exist after death, though we do not find there any trace of the doctrine of transmigration in a developed form. In the S'atapatha Brâhma@na it is said that those who do not perform rites with correct knowledge are born again after death and suffer death again. In a hymn of the @Rg-Veda (X. 58) the soul (manas) of a man apparently unconscious is invited to come back to him from the trees, herbs, the sky, the sun, etc. In many of the hymns there is also the belief in the existence of another world, where the highest material joys are attained as a result of the performance of the sacrifices and also in a hell of darkness underneath where the evil-doers are punished. In the S'atapatha Brâhma@na we find that the dead pass between two fires which burn the evil-doers, but let the good go by [Footnote ref 1]; it is also said there that everyone is born again after death, is weighed in a balance, and receives reward or punishment according as his works are good or bad. It is easy to see that scattered ideas like these with regard to the destiny of the soul of man according to the sacrifice that he performs or other good or bad deeds form the first rudiments of the later doctrine of metempsychosis. The idea that man enjoys or suffers, either in another world or by being born in this world according to his good or bad deeds, is the first beginning of the moral idea, though in the Brahmanic days the good deeds were

_____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: See S.B. I. 9.3, and also Macdonell's Vedic Mythology, pp. 166, 167.]

26

more often of the nature of sacrificial duties than ordinary good works. These ideas of the possibilities of a necessary connection of the enjoyments and sorrows of a man with his good and bad works when combined with the notion of an inviolable law or order, which we have already seen was gradually growing with the conception of @rta, and the unalterable law which produces the effects of sacrificial works, led to the Law of Karma and the doctrine of transmigration. The words which denote soul in the @Rg-Veda are manas, âtman and asu. The word âtman however which became famous in later Indian thought is generally used to mean vital breath. Manas is regarded as the seat of thought and emotion, and it seems to be regarded, as Macdonell says, as dwelling in the heart[Footnote ref 1]. It is however difficult to understand how âtman as vital breath, or as a separable part of man going out of the dead man came to be regarded as the ultimate essence or reality in man and the universe. There is however at least one passage in the @Rg-Veda where the poet penetrating deeper and deeper passes from the vital breath (asu) to the blood, and thence to âtman as the inmost self of the world; "Who has seen how the first-born, being the Bone-possessing (the shaped world), was born from the Boneless (the shapeless)? where was the vital breath, the blood, the Self (âtman) of the world? Who went to ask him that knows it [Footnote ref 2]?" In Taittîrya Âra@nyaka I. 23, however, it is said that Prajâpati after having created his self (as the world) with his own self entered into it. In Taittîrya Brâhma@na the âtman is called omnipresent, and it is said that he who knows him is no more stained by evil deeds. Thus we find that in the pre-Upani@sad Vedic literature âtman probably was first used to denote "vital breath" in man, then the self of the world, and then the self in man. It is from this last stage that we find the traces of a growing tendency to looking at the self of man as the omnipresent supreme principle of the universe, the knowledge of which makes a man sinless and pure.

Conclusion.

Looking at the advancement of thought in the @Rg-Veda we find first that a fabric of thought was gradually growing which not only looked upon the universe as a correlation of parts or a

____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: Macdonell's Vedic Mythology, p.166 and R.V. viii.89.]

[Footnote 2: R.V.i. 164. 4 and Deussen's article on Âtman in Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics.

27

construction made of them, but sought to explain it as having emanated from one great being who is sometimes described as one with the universe and surpassing it, and at other times as being separate from it; the agnostic spirit which is the mother of philosophic thought is seen at times to be so bold as to express doubts even on the most fundamental questions of creation—"Who knows whether this world was ever created or not?" Secondly the growth of sacrifices has helped to establish the unalterable nature of the law by which the (sacrificial) actions produced their effects of themselves. It also lessened the importance of deities as being the supreme masters of the world and our fate, and the tendency of henotheism gradually diminished their multiple character and advanced the monotheistic tendency in some quarters. Thirdly, the soul of man is described as being separable from his body and subject to suffering and enjoyment in another world according to his good or bad deeds; the doctrine that the soul of man could go to plants, etc., or that it could again be reborn on earth, is also hinted at in certain passages, and this may be regarded as sowing the first seeds of the later doctrine of transmigration. The self (âtman) is spoken of in one place as the essence of the world, and when we trace the idea in the Brâhma@nas and the Âra@nyakas we see that âtman has begun to mean the supreme essence in man as well as in the universe, and has thus approached the great Âtman doctrine of the Upani@sads.

THE EARLIER UPANI@SADS [Footnote ref 1]. (700 B.C.-600 B.C.)

The place of the Upani@sads in Vedic literature.

Though it is generally held that the Upani@sads are usually attached as appendices to the Âra@nyakas which are again attached to the Brâhma@nas, yet it cannot be said that their distinction as separate treatises is always observed. Thus we find in some cases that subjects which we should expect to be discussed in a Brâhma@na are introduced into the Âra@nyakas and the Âra@nyaka materials are sometimes fused into the great bulk of Upani@sad teaching. This shows that these three literatures gradually grew up in one

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[Footnote 1: There are about 112 Upani@sads which have been published by the "Nir@naya-Sâgara" Press, Bombay, 1917. These are 1 Ísâ, 2 Kena, 3 Katha, 4 Pras'na, 5 Mun@daka, 6 Mâ@n@dukya, 7 Taittirîya, 7 Aitareya, 9 Chândogya, 10 B@rhadâra@nyaka, 11 S'vetâs'vatara, 12 Kau@sitaki, 13 Maitreyî, 14 Kaivalya, 15 Jâbâla, 16 Brahmabindu, 17 Ha@msa, 18 Âru@nika, 19 Garbha, 20 Nârâya@na, 21 Nârâya@na, 22 Paramaha@msa, 23 Brahma, 24 Am@rtanâda, 25 Atharvas'iras, 26 Atharvas'ikhâ, 27 Maitrâya@nî, 28 B@rhajjâbâla, 29 N@rsi@mhapûrvatâpinî, 30 N@rsi@mhottaratâpinî, 31 Kâlâgnirudra, 32 Subâla, 33 K@surikâ, 34 Yantrikâ, 35 Sarvasâra, 36 Nirâlamba, 37 S'ukarahasya, 38 Vajrasûcikâ, 39 Tejobindu, 40 Nâdabindu, 41 Dhyânabindu, 42 Brahmavidyâ, 43 Yogatattva, 44 Atmabodha, 45 Nâradaparivrâjaka, 46 Tris'ikhibrâhma@na, 47 Sîtâ, 48 Yogacû@dama@ni, 49 Nirvâna, 50 Ma@ndalabrâhma@na, 51 Dak@si@nâmûrtti, 52 S'arabha, 53 Skanda, 54 Tripâdvibhûtimahânârya@na, 55 Advayatâraka, 56 Ramarahasya, 57 Râmapûrvatâpinî, 58 Râmottaratâpinî, 59 Vâsudeva, 60 Mudgala, 61 Sâ@n@dilya, 62 Pai@ngala, 63 Bhik@suka, Mahâ, 65 S'ârîraka, 66 Yogas'ikhâ, 67 Turiyâtîta, 68 Sa@mnyâsa, 69 Paramaha@msaparivrâjaka, 70 Ak@samâlâ, 71 Avyakta, 72 Ekâk@sara, 73 Annapûrnâ, 74 Sûrya, 75 Aksi, 76 Adhyâtma, 77 Ku@n@dika, 78 Sâvitrî, 79 Âtman, 80 Pâ'supatabrahma, 81 Parabrahma, 82 Avadhûta, 83 Tripurârâpini, 84 Devî, 85 Tripurâ, 86 Ka@tharudra, 87 Bhâvanâ, 88 Rudrah@rdaya, 89 Yogaku@n@dali, 90 Bhasmajâbâla, 91 Rudrâk@sajâbâla, 92 Ga@napati, 93 Jâbâladars'ana, 94 Tâiasâra, 95 Mahâvakya, 96 Paficabrahma, 97 Prâ@nâgnihotra, 98 Gopâlapûrvatâpinî, 99 Gopâlottaratâpinî, 100 K@r@s@na, 101 Yâjñavalkya, 102 Varâha, 103 S'âthyâyanîya, 104 Hayagrîva, 105 Dattâtreya, 106 Garu@da, 107 Kalisantara@na, 108 Jâbâli, 109 Saubhâgyalak@smî, 110 Sarasvatîrahasya, 111 Bahvrca, 112 Muktika.

The collection of Upani@sads translated by Dara shiko, Aurangzeb's brother, contained 50 Upani@sads. The Muktika Upani@sad gives a list of 108 Upani@sads. With the exception of the first 13 Upani@sads most of them are of more or less later date. The Upani@sads dealt with in this chapter are the earlier ones. Amongst the later ones there are some which repeat the purport of these, there are others which deal with the S'aiva, S'âkta, the Yoga and the Vai@s@nava doctrines. These will be referred to in connection with the consideration of those systems in Volume II. The later Upani@sads which only repeat the purport of those dealt with in this chapter do not require further mention. Some of the later Upani@sads were composed even as late as the fourteenth or the fifteenth century.]

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process of development and they were probably regarded as parts of one literature, in spite of the differences in their subject-matter. Deussen supposes that the principle of this division was to be found in this, that the Brâhma@nas were intended for the householders, the Âra@nyakas for those who in their old age withdrew into the solitude of the forests and the Upani@sads for those who renounced the world to attain ultimate salvation by meditation. Whatever might be said about these literary classifications the ancient philosophers of India looked upon the Upani@sads as being of an entirely different type from the rest of the Vedic literature as dictating the path of knowledge (jñâna-mârga) as opposed to the path of works (karma-mârga) which forms the content of the latter. It is not out of place here to mention that the orthodox Hindu view holds that whatever may be written in the Veda is to be interpreted as commandments to perform certain actions (vidhi) or prohibitions against committing certain others (ni@sedha). Even the stories or episodes are to be so interpreted that the real objects of their insertion might appear as only to praise the performance of the commandments and to blame the commission of the prohibitions. No person has any right to argue why any particular Vedic commandment is to be followed, for no reason can ever discover that, and it is only because reason fails to find out why a certain Vedic act leads to a certain effect that the Vedas have been revealed as commandments and prohibitions to show the true path of happiness. The Vedic teaching belongs therefore to that of the Karma-mârga or the performance of Vedic duties of sacrifice, etc. The Upani@sads however do not require the performance of any action, but only reveal the ultimate truth and reality, a knowledge of which at once emancipates a man. Readers of Hindu philosophy are aware that there is a very strong controversy on this point between the adherents of the Vedânta (Upani@sads) and those of the Veda. For the latter seek in analogy to the other parts of the Vedic literature to establish the principle that the Upani@sads should not be regarded as an exception, but that they should also be so interpreted that they might also be held out as commending the performance of duties; but the former dissociate the Upani@sads from the rest of the Vedic literature and assert that they do not make the slightest reference to any Vedic duties, but only delineate the ultimate reality which reveals the highest knowledge in the minds of the deserving.

30

S'a@nkara the most eminent exponent of the Upani@sads holds that they are meant for such superior men who are already above worldly or heavenly prosperities, and for whom the Vedic duties have ceased to have any attraction. Wheresoever there may be such a deserving person, be he a student, a householder or an ascetic, for him the Upani@sads have been revealed for his ultimate emancipation and the true knowledge. Those who perform the Vedic duties belong to a stage inferior to those who no longer care for the fruits of the Vedic duties but are eager for final emancipation, and it is the latter who alone are fit to hear the Upani@sads [Footnote ref 1].

The names of the Upani@sads; Non-Brahmanic influence.

The Upani@sads are also known by another name Vedânta, as they are believed to be the last portions of the Vedas (veda-anta, end); it is by this name that the philosophy of the Upani@sads, the Vedânta philosophy, is so familiar to us. A modern student knows that in language the Upani@sads approach the classical Sanskrit; the ideas preached also show that they are the culmination of the intellectual achievement of a great epoch. As they thus formed the concluding parts of the Vedas they retained their Vedic names which they took from the name of the different schools or branches (s'âkhâ) among which the Vedas were studied [Footnote ref 2]. Thus the Upani@sads attached to the Brâhma@nas of the Aitareya and Kau@sîtaki schools are called respectively Aitareya and Kau@sîtaki Upani@sads. Those of the Tâ@n@dins and Talavakâras of the Sâma-veda are called the Chândogya and Talavakâra (or Kena) Upani@sads. Those of the Taittirïya school of the Yajurveda

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[Footnote 1: This is what is called the difference of fitness (adhikâribheda). Those who perform the sacrifices are not fit to hear the Upani@sads and those who are fit to hear the Upani@sads have no longer any necessity to perform the sacrificial duties.]

[Footnote 2: When the Sa@mhitâ texts had become substantially fixed, they were committed to memory in different parts of the country and transmitted from teacher to pupil along with directions for the practical performance of sacrificial duties. The latter formed the matter of prose compositions, the Brâhma@nas. These however were gradually liable to diverse kinds of modifications according to the special tendencies and needs of the people among which they were recited. Thus after a time there occurred a great divergence in the readings of the texts of the Brâhma@nas even of the same Veda among different people. These different schools were known by the name of particular S'âkhâs (e.g. Aitareya, Kau@sîtaki) with which the Brâhma@nas were associated or named. According to the divergence of the Brâhma@nas of the different S'âkhâs there occurred the divergences of content and the length of the Upani@sads associated with them.]

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form the Taittirîya and Mahânâraya@na, of the Ka@tha school the Kâ@thaka, of the Maitrâya@nî school the Maitrâya@nî. The B@rhadâra@nyaka Upani@sad forms part of the S'atapatha Brâhma@na of the Vâjasaneyi schools. The Îs'â Upani@sad also belongs to the latter school. But the school to which the S'vetâs'vatara belongs cannot be traced, and has probably been lost. The presumption with regard to these Upani@sads is that they represent the enlightened views of the particular schools among which they flourished, and under whose names they passed. A large number of Upani@sads of a comparatively later age were attached to the Atharva-Veda, most of which were named not according to the Vedic schools but according to the subject-matter with which they dealt [Footnote ref 1].

It may not be out of place here to mention that from the frequent episodes in the Upani@sads in which the Brahmins are described as having gone to the K@sattriyas for the highest knowledge of philosophy, as well as from the disparateness of the Upani@sad teachings from that of the general doctrines of the Brâhma@nas and from the allusions to the existence of philosophical speculations amongst the people in Pâli works, it may be inferred that among the K@sattriyas in general there existed earnest philosophic enquiries which must be regarded as having exerted an important influence in the formation of the Upani@sad doctrines. There is thus some probability in the supposition that though the Upani@sads are found directly incorporated with the Brâhma@nas it was not the production of the growth of Brahmanic dogmas alone, but that non-Brahmanic thought as well must have either set the Upani@sad doctrines afoot, or have rendered fruitful assistance to their formulation and cultivation, though they achieved their culmination in the hands of the Brahmins.

Brâhma@nas and the Early Upani@sads.

The passage of the Indian mind from the Brâhmanic to the Upani@sad thought is probably the most remarkable event in the history of philosophic thought. We know that in the later Vedic hymns some monotheistic conceptions of great excellence were developed, but these differ in their nature from the absolutism of the Upani@sads as much as the Ptolemaic and the Copernican

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[Footnote 1: Garbha Upani@sad, Âtman Upani@sad, Pras'na Upani@sad, etc.
There were however some exceptions such as the Mâ@n@dûkya, Jâbâla,
Pai@ngala, S'aunaka, etc.]

32

systems in astronomy. The direct translation of Vis'vakarman or Hira@nyagarbha into the âtman and the Brahman of the Upani@sads seems to me to be very improbable, though I am quite willing to admit that these conceptions were swallowed up by the âtman doctrine when it had developed to a proper extent. Throughout the earlier Upani@sads no mention is to be found of Vis'vakarman, Hira@nyagarbha or Brahma@naspati and no reference of such a nature is to be found as can justify us in connecting the Upani@sad ideas with those conceptions [Footnote ref l]. The word puru@sa no doubt occurs frequently in the Upani@sads, but the sense and the association that come along with it are widely different from that of the puru@sa of the Puru@sasûkta of the @Rg-Veda.

When the @Rg-Veda describes Vis'vakarman it describes him as a creator from outside, a controller of mundane events, to whom they pray for worldly benefits. "What was the position, which and whence was the principle, from which the all-seeing Vis'vakarman produced the earth, and disclosed the sky by his might? The one god, who has on every side eyes, on every side a face, on every side arms, on every side feet, when producing the sky and earth, shapes them with his arms and with his wings….Do thou, Vis'vakarman, grant to thy friends those thy abodes which are the highest, and the lowest, and the middle…may a generous son remain here to us [Footnote ref 2]"; again in R.V.X. 82 we find "Vis'vakarman is wise, energetic, the creator, the disposer, and the highest object of intuition….He who is our father, our creator, disposer, who knows all spheres and creatures, who alone assigns to the gods their names, to him the other creatures resort for instruction [Footnote ref 3]." Again about Hira@nyagarbha we find in R.V.I. 121, "Hira@nyagarbha arose in the beginning; born, he was the one lord of things existing. He established the earth and this sky; to what god shall we offer our oblation?… May he not injure us, he who is the generator of the earth, who ruling by fixed ordinances, produced the heavens, who produced the great and brilliant waters!—to what god, etc.? Prajâpati, no other than thou is lord over all these created things: may we obtain that, through desire of which we have invoked thee; may we become masters of riches [Footnote ref 4]." Speaking of the puru@sa the @Rg-Veda

__________________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: The name Vis'vakarma appears in S'vet. IV. 17.
Hira@nyagarbha appears in S'vet. III. 4 and IV. 12, but only as the
first created being. The phrase Sarvâhammânî Hira@nyagarbha which
Deussen refers to occurs only in the later N@rsi@m@h. 9. The word
Brahma@naspati does not occur at all in the Upani@sads.]

[Footnote 2: Muir's Sanskrit Texts, vol. IV. pp. 6, 7.]

[Footnote 3: Ibid. p, 7.]

[Footnote 4: Ibid. pp. 16, 17.]

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says "Purusha has a thousand heads…a thousand eyes, and a thousand feet. On every side enveloping the earth he transcended [it] by a space of ten fingers….He formed those aerial creatures, and the animals, both wild and tame [Footnote ref 1]," etc. Even that famous hymn (R.V.x. 129) which begins with "There was then neither being nor non-being, there was no air nor sky above" ends with saying "From whence this creation came into being, whether it was created or not—he who is in the highest sky, its ruler, probably knows or does not know."

In the Upani@sads however, the position is entirely changed, and the centre of interest there is not in a creator from outside but in the self: the natural development of the monotheistic position of the Vedas could have grown into some form of developed theism, but not into the doctrine that the self was the only reality and that everything else was far below it. There is no relation here of the worshipper and the worshipped and no prayers are offered to it, but the whole quest is of the highest truth, and the true self of man is discovered as the greatest reality. This change of philosophical position seems to me to be a matter of great interest. This change of the mind from the objective to the subjective does not carry with it in the Upani@sads any elaborate philosophical discussions, or subtle analysis of mind. It comes there as a matter of direct perception, and the conviction with which the truth has been grasped cannot fail to impress the readers. That out of the apparently meaningless speculations of the Brâhma@nas this doctrine could have developed, might indeed appear to be too improbable to be believed.

On the strength of the stories of Bâlâki Ga'rgya and Ajâtas'atru (B@rh. II. i), S'vetaketu and Pravâha@na Jaibali (Châ. V. 3 and B@rh. VI. 2) and Âru@ni and As'vapati Kaikeya (Châ. V. 11) Garbe thinks "that it can be proven that the Brahman's profoundest wisdom, the doctrine of All-one, which has exercised an unmistakable influence on the intellectual life even of our time, did not have its origin in the circle of Brahmans at all [Footnote ref 2]" and that "it took its rise in the ranks of the warrior caste [Footnote ref 3]." This if true would of course lead the development of the Upani@sads away from the influence of the Veda, Brâhma@nas and the Âra@nyakas. But do the facts prove this? Let us briefly examine the evidences that Garbe himself

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: Muir's Sanskrit Texts, vol. v. pp. 368, 371.]

[Footnote 2: Garbe's article, "Hindu Monism," p. 68.]

[Footnote 3: Ibid. p. 78.

34

self has produced. In the story of Bâlâki Gârgya and Ajâtas'atru (B@rh. II. 1) referred to by him, Bâlâki Gârgya is a boastful man who wants to teach the K@sattriya Ajâtas'atru the true Brahman, but fails and then wants it to be taught by him. To this Ajâtas'atru replies (following Garbe's own translation) "it is contrary to the natural order that a Brahman receive instruction from a warrior and expect the latter to declare the Brahman to him [Footnote ref l]." Does this not imply that in the natural order of things a Brahmin always taught the knowledge of Brahman to the K@sattriyas, and that it was unusual to find a Brahmin asking a K@sattriya about the true knowledge of Brahman? At the beginning of the conversation, Ajâtas'atru had promised to pay Bâlâki one thousand coins if he could tell him about Brahman, since all people used to run to Janaka to speak about Brahman [Footnote ref 2]. The second story of S'vetaketu and Pravâha@na Jaibali seems to be fairly conclusive with regard to the fact that the transmigration doctrines, the way of the gods (devayâna) and the way of the fathers (pit@ryâna) had originated among the K@sattriyas, but it is without any relevancy with regard to the origin of the superior knowledge of Brahman as the true self.

The third story of Âru@ni and As'vapati Kaikeya (Châ. V. 11) is hardly more convincing, for here five Brahmins wishing to know what the Brahman and the self were, went to Uddâlaka Âru@ni; but as he did not know sufficiently about it he accompanied them to the K@sattriya king As'vapati Kaikeya who was studying the subject. But As'vapati ends the conversation by giving them certain instructions about the fire doctrine (vaisvânara agni) and the import of its sacrifices. He does not say anything about the true self as Brahman. We ought also to consider that there are only the few exceptional cases where K@sattriya kings were instructing the Brahmins. But in all other cases the Brahmins were discussing and instructing the âtman knowledge. I am thus led to think that Garbe owing to his bitterness of feeling against the Brahmins as expressed in the earlier part of the essay had been too hasty in his judgment. The opinion of Garbe seems to have been shared to some extent by Winternitz also, and the references given by him to the Upani@sad passages are also the same as we

____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: Garbe's article, "Hindu Monism," p. 74.]

[Footnote 2: B@rh. II., compare also B@rh. IV. 3, how Yâjñavalkya speaks to Janaka about the brahmavidyâ.]

35

just examined [Footnote ref 1]. The truth seems to me to be this, that the K@sattriyas and even some women took interest in the religio-philosophical quest manifested in the Upani@sads. The enquirers were so eager that either in receiving the instruction of Brahman or in imparting it to others, they had no considerations of sex and birth [Footnote ref 2]; and there seems to be no definite evidence for thinking that the Upani@sad philosophy originated among the K@sattriyas or that the germs of its growth could not be traced in the Brâhma@nas and the Âra@nyakas which were the productions of the Brahmins.

The change of the Brâhma@na into the Âra@nyaka thought is signified by a transference of values from the actual sacrifices to their symbolic representations and meditations which were regarded as being productive of various earthly benefits. Thus we find in the B@rhadâra@nyaka (I.1) that instead of a horse sacrifice the visible universe is to be conceived as a horse and meditated upon as such. The dawn is the head of the horse, the sun is the eye, wind is its life, fire is its mouth and the year is its soul, and so on. What is the horse that grazes in the field and to what good can its sacrifice lead? This moving universe is the horse which is most significant to the mind, and the meditation of it as such is the most suitable substitute of the sacrifice of the horse, the mere animal. Thought-activity as meditation, is here taking the place of an external worship in the form of sacrifices. The material substances and the most elaborate and accurate sacrificial rituals lost their value and bare meditations took their place. Side by side with the ritualistic sacrifices of the generality of the Brahmins, was springing up a system where thinking and symbolic meditations were taking the place of gross matter and action involved in sacrifices. These symbols were not only chosen from the external world as the sun, the wind, etc., from the body of man, his various vital functions and the senses, but even arbitrary alphabets were taken up and it was believed that the meditation of these as the highest and the greatest was productive of great beneficial results. Sacrifice in itself was losing value in the eyes of these men and diverse mystical significances and imports were beginning to be considered as their real truth [Footnote ref 3].

_______________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: Winternitz's Geschichte der indischen Litteratur, I. pp. 197 ff.]

[Footnote 2: The story of Maitryî and Yâjñavalikya (B@rh. II. 4) and that of Satyakâma son of Jabâlâ and his teacher (Châ. IV. 4).]

[Footnote 3: Châ. V. II.]

36

The Uktha (verse) of @Rg-Veda was identified in the Aitareya Âra@nyaka under several allegorical forms with the Prâ@na [Footnote ref 1], the Udgîtha of the Sâmaveda was identified with Om, Prâ@na, sun and eye; in Chândogya II. the Sâman was identified with Om, rain, water, seasons, Prâ@na, etc., in Chândogya III. 16-17 man was identified with sacrifice; his hunger, thirst, sorrow, with initiation; laughing, eating, etc., with the utterance of the Mantras; and asceticism, gift, sincerity, restraint from injury, truth, with sacrificial fees (dak@si@nâ). The gifted mind of these cultured Vedic Indians was anxious to come to some unity, but logical precision of thought had not developed, and as a result of that we find in the Âra@nyakas the most grotesque and fanciful unifications of things which to our eyes have little or no connection. Any kind of instrumentality in producing an effect was often considered as pure identity. Thus in Ait. Âra@n. II. 1. 3 we find "Then comes the origin of food. The seed of Prajâpati are the gods. The seed of the gods is rain. The seed of rain is herbs. The seed of herbs is food. The seed of food is seed. The seed of seed is creatures. The seed of creatures is the heart. The seed of the heart is the mind. The seed of the mind is speech. The seed of speech is action. The act done is this man the abode of Brahman [Footnote ref 2]."

The word Brahman according to Sâya@na meant mantras (magical verses), the ceremonies, the hot@r priest, the great. Hillebrandt points out that it is spoken of in R.V. as being new, "as not having hitherto existed," and as "coming into being from the fathers." It originates from the seat of the @Rta, springs forth at the sound of the sacrifice, begins really to exist when the soma juice is pressed and the hymns are recited at the savana rite, endures with the help of the gods even in battle, and soma is its guardian (R.V. VIII. 37. I, VIII. 69. 9, VI. 23. 5, 1. 47. 2, VII. 22. 9, VI. 52. 3, etc.). On the strength of these Hillebrandt justifies the conjecture of Haug that it signifies a mysterious power which can be called forth by various ceremonies, and his definition of it, as the magical force which is derived from the orderly cooperation of the hymns, the chants and the sacrificial gifts [Footnote ref 3]. I am disposed to think that this meaning is closely connected with the meaning as we find it in many passages in the Âra@nyakas and the Upani@sads. The meaning in many of these seems to be midway between

________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: Ait. Âra@n. II 1-3.]

[Footnote 2: Keith's Translation of Aitareya Âranyaka.]

[Footnote 3: Hillebrandt's article on Brahman, E.R.E..]

37

"magical force" and "great," transition between which is rather easy. Even when the sacrifices began to be replaced by meditations, the old belief in the power of the sacrifices still remained, and as a result of that we find that in many passages of the Upani@sads people are thinking of meditating upon this great force "Brahman" as being identified with diverse symbols, natural objects, parts and functions of the body.

When the main interest of sacrifice was transferred from its actual performance in the external world to certain forms of meditation, we find that the understanding of particular allegories of sacrifice having a relation to particular kinds of bodily functions was regarded as Brahman, without a knowledge of which nothing could be obtained. The fact that these allegorical interpretations of the Pañcâgnividyâ are so much referred to in the Upani@sads as a secret doctrine, shows that some people came to think that the real efficacy of sacrifices depended upon such meditations. When the sages rose to the culminating conception, that he is really ignorant who thinks the gods to be different from him, they thought that as each man was nourished by many beasts, so the gods were nourished by each man, and as it is unpleasant for a man if any of his beasts are taken away, so it is unpleasant for the gods that men should know this great truth. [Footnote ref 1].

In the Kena we find it indicated that all the powers of the gods such as that of Agni (fire) to burn, Vâyu (wind) to blow, depended upon Brahman, and that it is through Brahman that all the gods and all the senses of man could work. The whole process of Upani@sad thought shows that the magic power of sacrifices as associated with @Rta (unalterable law) was being abstracted from the sacrifices and conceived as the supreme power. There are many stories in the Upani@sads of the search after the nature of this great power the Brahman, which was at first only imperfectly realized. They identified it with the dominating power of the natural objects of wonder, the sun, the moon, etc. with bodily and mental functions and with various symbolical representations, and deluded themselves for a time with the idea that these were satisfactory. But as these were gradually found inadequate, they came to the final solution, and the doctrine of the inner self of man as being the highest truth the Brahman originated.

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: B@rh. I. 4. 10.]

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The meaning of the word Upani@sad.

The word Upani@sad is derived from the root sad with the prefix ni (to sit), and Max Muller says that the word originally meant the act of sitting down near a teacher and of submissively listening to him. In his introduction to the Upani@sads he says, "The history and the genius of the Sanskrit language leave little doubt that Upani@sad meant originally session, particularly a session consisting of pupils, assembled at a respectful distance round their teacher [Footnote ref 1]." Deussen points out that the word means "secret" or "secret instruction," and this is borne out by many of the passages of the Upani@sads themselves. Max Muller also agrees that the word was used in this sense in the Upani@sads [Footnote ref 2]. There we find that great injunctions of secrecy are to be observed for the communication of the doctrines, and it is said that it should only be given to a student or pupil who by his supreme moral restraint and noble desires proves himself deserving to hear them. S'ankara however, the great Indian exponent of the Upani@sads, derives the word from the root sad to destroy and supposes that it is so called because it destroys inborn ignorance and leads to salvation by revealing the right knowledge. But if we compare the many texts in which the word Upani@sad occurs in the Upani@sads themselves it seems that Deussen's meaning is fully justified [Footnote ref 3].

The composition and growth of diverse Upani@sads.

The oldest Upani@sads are written in prose. Next to these we have some in verses very similar to those that are to be found in classical Sanskrit. As is easy to see, the older the Upani@sad the more archaic is it in its language. The earliest Upani@sads have an almost mysterious forcefulness in their expressions at least to Indian ears. They are simple, pithy and penetrate to the heart. We can read and read them over again without getting tired. The lines are always as fresh as ever. As such they have a charm apart from the value of the ideas they intend to convey. The word Upani@sad was used, as we have seen, in the sense of "secret doctrine or instruction"; the Upani@sad teachings were also intended to be conveyed in strictest secrecy to earnest enquirers of high morals and superior self-restraint for the purpose of achieving

______________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: Max Muller's Translation of the Upanishads, S.B.E. vol.
I.p. lxxxi.]

[Footnote 2: S. B.E. vol. I, p lxxxi.]

[Footnote 3: Deussen's Philosophy of the Upanishads, pp. 10-15.]

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emancipation. It was thus that the Upani@sad style of expression, when it once came into use, came to possess the greatest charm and attraction for earnest religious people; and as a result of that we find that even when other forms of prose and verse had been adapted for the Sanskrit language, the Upani@sad form of composition had not stopped. Thus though the earliest Upani@sads were compiled by 500 B C., they continued to be written even so late as the spread of Mahommedan influence in India. The earliest and most important are probably those that have been commented upon by S'ankara namely B@rhadâra@nyaka, Chândogya, Aitareya, Taittiriya, Îs'a, Kena, Katha, Pras'na, Mundaka and Mândûkya [Footnote ref 1]. It is important to note in this connection that the separate Upani@sads differ much from one another with regard to their content and methods of exposition. Thus while some of them are busy laying great stress upon the monistic doctrine of the self as the only reality, there are others which lay stress upon the practice of Yoga, asceticism, the cult of S'iva, of Visnu and the philosophy or anatomy of the body, and may thus be respectively called the Yoga, S'aiva, Visnu and S'ârîra Upani@sads. These in all make up the number to one hundred and eight.

Revival of Upani@sad studies in modern times.

How the Upani@sads came to be introduced into Europe is an interesting story Dâra Shiko the eldest son of the Emperor Shah Jahan heard of the Upani@sads during his stay in Kashmir in 1640. He invited several Pandits from Benares to Delhi, who undertook the work of translating them into Persian. In 1775 Anquetil Duperron, the discoverer of the Zend Avesta, received a manuscript of it presented to him by his friend Le Gentil, the French resident in Faizabad at the court of Shujâ-uddaulah. Anquetil translated it into Latin which was published in 1801-1802. This translation though largely unintelligible was read by Schopenhauer with great enthusiasm. It had, as Schopenhauer himself admits, profoundly influenced his philosophy. Thus he

______________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: Deussen supposes that Kausîtaki is also one of the earliest. Max Müller and Schroeder think that Maitrây@anî also belongs to the earliest group, whereas Deussen counts it as a comparatively later production. Winternitz divides the Upani@sads into four periods. In the first period he includes B@rhadâra@nyaka, Chândogya, Taittirîya, Aitareya, Kausîtaki and Kena. In that second he includes Kâ@thaka, Ís'â, S'vetâs'vatara, Mu@ndaka, Mahânârâyana, and in the third period he includes Pras'na, Maitrâya@nî and Mân@dûkya. The rest of the Upani@sads he includes in the fourth period.]

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writes in the preface to his Welt als Wille und Vorstellung [Footnote ref 1], "And if, indeed, in addition to this he is a partaker of the benefit conferred by the Vedas, the access to which, opened to us through the Upanishads, is in my eyes the greatest advantage which this still young century enjoys over previous ones, because I believe that the influence of the Sanskrit literature will penetrate not less deeply than did the revival of Greek literature in the fifteenth century: if, I say, the reader has also already received and assimilated the sacred, primitive Indian wisdom, then is he best of all prepared to hear what I have to say to him….I might express the opinion that each one of the individual and disconnected aphorisms which make up the Upanishads may be deduced as a consequence from the thought I am going to impart, though the converse, that my thought is to be found in the Upanishads is by no means the case." Again, "How does every line display its firm, definite, and throughout harmonious meaning! From every sentence deep, original, and sublime thoughts arise, and the whole is pervaded by a high and holy and earnest spirit….In the whole world there is no study, except that of the originals, so beneficial and so elevating as that of the Oupanikhat. It has been the solace of my life, it will be the solace of my death! [Footnote ref 2]" Through Schopenhauer the study of the Upani@sads attracted much attention in Germany and with the growth of a general interest in the study of Sanskrit, they found their way into other parts of Europe as well.

The study of the Upani@sads has however gained a great impetus by the earnest attempts of our Ram Mohan Roy who not only translated them into Bengali, Hindi and English and published them at his own expense, but founded the Brahma Samaj in Bengal, the main religious doctrines of which were derived directly from the Upani@sads.

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[Footnote 1: Translation by Haldane and Kemp, vol. I. pp. xii and xiii.]

[Footnote 2: Max Muller says in his introduction to the Upanishada (­S.B.E. I p. lxii; see also pp. lx, lxi) "that Schopenhauer should have spoken of the Upanishads as 'products of the highest wisdom'…that he should have placed the pantheism there taught high above the pantheism of Bruno, Malebranche, Spinoza and Scotus Erigena, as brought to light again at Oxford in 1681, may perhaps secure a more considerate reception for those relics of ancient wisdom than anything that I could say in their favour."]

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The Upani@sads and their interpretations.

Before entering into the philosophy of the Upani@sads it may be worth while to say a few words as to the reason why diverse and even contradictory explanations as to the real import of the Upani@sads had been offered by the great Indian scholars of past times. The Upani@sads, as we have seen, formed the concluding portion of the revealed Vedic literature, and were thus called the Vedânta. It was almost universally believed by the Hindus that the highest truths could only be found in the revelation of the Vedas. Reason was regarded generally as occupying a comparatively subservient place, and its proper use was to be found in its judicious employment in getting out the real meaning of the apparently conflicting ideas of the Vedas. The highest knowledge of ultimate truth and reality was thus regarded as having been once for all declared in the Upani@sads. Reason had only to unravel it in the light of experience. It is important that readers of Hindu philosophy should bear in mind the contrast that it presents to the ruling idea of the modern world that new truths are discovered by reason and experience every day, and even in those cases where the old truths remain, they change their hue and character every day, and that in matters of ultimate truths no finality can ever be achieved; we are to be content only with as much as comes before the purview of our reason and experience at the time. It was therefore thought to be extremely audacious that any person howsoever learned and brilliant he might be should have any right to say anything regarding the highest truths simply on the authority of his own opinion or the reasons that he might offer. In order to make himself heard it was necessary for him to show from the texts of the Upani@sads that they supported him, and that their purport was also the same. Thus it was that most schools of Hindu philosophy found it one of their principal duties to interpret the Upani@sads in order to show that they alone represented the true Vedânta doctrines. Any one who should feel himself persuaded by the interpretations of any particular school might say that in following that school he was following the Vedânta.

The difficulty of assuring oneself that any interpretation is absolutely the right one is enhanced by the fact that germs of diverse kinds of thoughts are found scattered over the Upani@sads

42

which are not worked out in a systematic manner. Thus each interpreter in his turn made the texts favourable to his own doctrines prominent and brought them to the forefront, and tried to repress others or explain them away. But comparing the various systems of Upani@sad interpretation we find that the interpretation offered by S'a@nkara very largely represents the view of the general body of the earlier Upani@sad doctrines, though there are some which distinctly foreshadow the doctrines of other systems, but in a crude and germinal form. It is thus that Vedânta is generally associated with the interpretation of S'a@nkara and S'a@nkara's system of thought is called the Vedânta system, though there are many other systems which put forth their claim as representing the true Vedânta doctrines.

Under these circumstances it is necessary that a modern interpreter of the Upani@sads should turn a deaf ear to the absolute claims of these exponents, and look upon the Upani@sads not as a systematic treatise but as a repository of diverse currents of thought—the melting pot in which all later philosophic ideas were still in a state of fusion, though the monistic doctrine of S'a@nkara, or rather an approach thereto, may be regarded as the purport of by far the largest majority of the texts. It will be better that a modern interpreter should not agree to the claims of the ancients that all the Upani@sads represent a connected system, but take the texts independently and separately and determine their meanings, though keeping an attentive eye on the context in which they appear. It is in this way alone that we can detect the germs of the thoughts of other Indian systems in the Upani@sads, and thus find in them the earliest records of those tendencies of thoughts.

The quest after Brahman: the struggle and the failures.

The fundamental idea which runs through the early Upani@sads is that underlying the exterior world of change there is an unchangeable reality which is identical with that which underlies the essence in man [Footnote ref 1]. If we look at Greek philosophy in Parmenides or Plato or at modern philosophy in Kant, we find the same tendency towards glorifying one unspeakable entity as the reality or the essence. I have said above that the Upani@sads are

_______________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: B@rh. IV. 4. 5. 22.

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no systematic treatises of a single hand, but are rather collations or compilations of floating monologues, dialogues or anecdotes. There are no doubt here and there simple discussions but there is no pedantry or gymnastics of logic. Even the most casual reader cannot but be struck with the earnestness and enthusiasm of the sages. They run from place to place with great eagerness in search of a teacher competent to instruct them about the nature of Brahman. Where is Brahman? What is his nature?

We have noticed that during the closing period of the Sa@mhitâ there were people who had risen to the conception of a single creator and controller of the universe, variously called Prajâpati, Vis'vakarman, Puru@sa, Brahma@naspati and Brahman. But this divine controller was yet only a deity. The search as to the nature of this deity began in the Upani@sads. Many visible objects of nature such as the sun or the wind on one hand and the various psychological functions in man were tried, but none could render satisfaction to the great ideal that had been aroused. The sages in the Upani@sad had already started with the idea that there was a supreme controller or essence presiding over man and the universe. But what was its nature? Could it be identified with any of the deities of Nature, was it a new deity or was it no deity at all? The Upani@sads present to us the history of this quest and the results that were achieved.

When we look merely to this quest we find that we have not yet gone out of the Âra@nyaka ideas and of symbolic (pratîka) forms of worship. Prâ@na (vital breath) was regarded as the most essential function for the life of man, and many anecdotes are related to show that it is superior to the other organs, such as the eye or ear, and that on it all other functions depend. This recognition of the superiority of prâ@na brings us to the meditations on prâ@na as Brahman as leading to the most beneficial results. So also we find that owing to the presence of the exalting characters of omnipresence and eternality âkâs'a (space) is meditated upon as Brahman. So also manas and Âditya (sun) are meditated upon as Brahman. Again side by side with the visible material representation of Brahman as the pervading Vâyu, or the sun and the immaterial representation as âkâs'a, manas or prâ@na, we find also the various kinds of meditations as substitutes for actual sacrifice. Thus it is that there was an earnest quest after the discovery of Brahman. We find a stratum of thought

44

which shows that the sages were still blinded by the old ritualistic associations, and though meditation had taken the place of sacrifice yet this was hardly adequate for the highest attainment of Brahman.

Next to the failure of the meditations we have to notice the history of the search after Brahman in which the sages sought to identify Brahman with the presiding deity of the sun, moon, lightning, ether, wind, fire, water, etc., and failed; for none of these could satisfy the ideal they cherished of Brahman. It is indeed needless here to multiply these examples, for they are tiresome not only in this summary treatment but in the original as well. They are of value only in this that they indicate how toilsome was the process by which the old ritualistic associations could be got rid of; what struggles and failures the sages had to undergo before they reached a knowledge of the true nature of Brahman.

Unknowability of Brahman and the Negative Method.

It is indeed true that the magical element involved in the discharge of sacrificial duties lingered for a while in the symbolic worship of Brahman in which He was conceived almost as a deity. The minds of the Vedic poets so long accustomed to worship deities of visible manifestation could not easily dispense with the idea of seeking after a positive and definite content of Brahman. They tried some of the sublime powers of nature and also many symbols, but these could not render ultimate satisfaction. They did not know what the Brahman was like, for they had only a dim and dreamy vision of it in the deep craving of their souls which could not be translated into permanent terms. But this was enough to lead them on to the goal, for they could not be satisfied with anything short of the highest.

They found that by whatever means they tried to give a positive and definite content of the ultimate reality, the Brahman, they failed. Positive definitions were impossible. They could not point out what the Brahman was like in order to give an utterance to that which was unutterable, they could only say that it was not like aught that we find in experience. Yâjñavalkya said "He the âtman is not this, nor this (neti neti). He is inconceivable, for he cannot be conceived, unchangeable, for he is not changed, untouched, for nothing touches him; he cannot suffer by a stroke

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of the sword, he cannot suffer any injury [Footnote ref 1]." He is asat, non-being, for the being which Brahman is, is not to be understood as such being as is known to us by experience; yet he is being, for he alone is supremely real, for the universe subsists by him. We ourselves are but he, and yet we know not what he is. Whatever we can experience, whatever we can express, is limited, but he is the unlimited, the basis of all. "That which is inaudible, intangible, invisible, indestructible, which cannot be tasted, nor smelt, eternal, without beginning or end, greater than the great (mahat), the fixed. He who knows it is released from the jaws of death [Footnote ref 2]." Space, time and causality do not appertain to him, for he at once forms their essence and transcends them. He is the infinite and the vast, yet the smallest of the small, at once here as there, there as here; no characterisation of him is possible, otherwise than by the denial to him of all empirical attributes, relations and definitions. He is independent of all limitations of space, time, and cause which rules all that is objectively presented, and therefore the empirical universe. When Bâhva was questioned by Va@skali, he expounded the nature of Brahman to him by maintaining silence—"Teach me," said Va@skali, "most reverent sir, the nature of Brahman." Bâhva however remained silent. But when the question was put forth a second or third time he answered, "I teach you indeed but you do not understand; the Âtman is silence [Footnote ref 3]." The way to indicate it is thus by neti neti, it is not this, it is not this. We cannot describe it by any positive content which is always limited by conceptual thought.

The Âtman doctrine.

The sum and substance of the Upani@sad teaching is involved in the equation Âtman=Brahman. We have already seen that the word Âtman was used in the @Rg-Veda to denote on the one hand the ultimate essence of the universe, and on the other the vital breath in man. Later on in the Upani@sads we see that the word Brahman is generally used in the former sense, while the word Âtman is reserved to denote the inmost essence in man, and the

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[Footnote 1: B@rh. IV. 5. 15. Deussen, Max Muller and Roer have all misinterpreted this passage; asito has been interpreted as an adjective or participle, though no evidence has ever been adduced; it is evidently the ablative of asi, a sword.]

[Footnote 2: Ka@tha III. 15.]

[Footnote 3: Sa@nkara on Brahmasûtra, III. 2. 17, and also Deussen, Philosophy of the Upanishads, p. 156.]

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Upani@sads are emphatic in their declaration that the two are one and the same. But what is the inmost essence of man? The self of man involves an ambiguity, as it is used in a variety of senses. Thus so far as man consists of the essence of food (i.e. the physical parts of man) he is called annamaya. But behind the sheath of this body there is the other self consisting of the vital breath which is called the self as vital breath (prâ@namaya âtman). Behind this again there is the other self "consisting of will" called the manomaya âtman. This again contains within it the self "consisting of consciousness" called the vijñânamaya âtman. But behind it we come to the final essence the self as pure bliss (the ânandamaya âtman). The texts say: "Truly he is the rapture; for whoever gets this rapture becomes blissful. For who could live, who could breathe if this space (âkâs'a) was not bliss? For it is he who behaves as bliss. For whoever in that Invisible, Self-surpassing, Unspeakable, Supportless finds fearless support, he really becomes fearless. But whoever finds even a slight difference, between himself and this Âtman there is fear for him [Footnote ref 1]."

Again in another place we find that Prajâpati said: "The self (âtman) which is free from sin, free from old age, from death and grief, from hunger and thirst, whose desires are true, whose cogitations are true, that is to be searched for, that is to be enquired; he gets all his desires and all worlds who knows that self [Footnote ref 2]." The gods and the demons on hearing of this sent Indra and Virocana respectively as their representatives to enquire of this self from Prajâpati. He agreed to teach them, and asked them to look into a vessel of water and tell him how much of self they could find. They answered: "We see, this our whole self, even to the hair, and to the nails." And he said, "Well, that is the self, that is the deathless and the fearless, that is the Brahman." They went away pleased, but Prajâpati thought, "There they go away, without having discovered, without having realized the self." Virocana came away with the conviction that the body was the self; but Indra did not return back to the gods, he was afraid and pestered with doubts and came back to Prajâpati and said, "just as the self becomes decorated when the body is decorated, well-dressed when the body is well-dressed, well-cleaned when the body is well-cleaned, even so that image self will be blind when the body is blind, injured in one eye when the body is injured in one eye, and mutilated when the body is mutilated, and it perishes

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[Footnote 1: Taitt. II. 7.]

[Footnote 2: Châ. VIII. 7. 1.]

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when the body perishes, therefore I can see no good in this theory." Prajâpati then gave him a higher instruction about the self, and said, "He who goes about enjoying dreams, he is the self, this is the deathless, the fearless, this is Brahman." Indra departed but was again disturbed with doubts, and was afraid and came back and said "that though the dream self does not become blind when the body is blind, or injured in one eye when the body is so injured and is not affected by its defects, and is not killed by its destruction, but yet it is as if it was overwhelmed, as if it suffered and as if it wept—in this I see no good." Prajâpati gave a still higher instruction: "When a man, fast asleep, in total contentment, does not know any dreams, this is the self, this is the deathless, the fearless, this is Brahman." Indra departed but was again filled with doubts on the way, and returned again and said "the self in deep sleep does not know himself, that I am this, nor does he know any other existing objects. He is destroyed and lost. I see no good in this." And now Prajâpati after having given a course of successively higher instructions as self as the body, as the self in dreams and as the self in deep dreamless sleep, and having found that the enquirer in each case could find out that this was not the ultimate truth about the self that he was seeking, ultimately gave him the ultimate and final instruction about the full truth about the self, and said "this body is the support of the deathless and the bodiless self. The self as embodied is affected by pleasure and pain, the self when associated with the body cannot get rid of pleasure and pain, but pleasure and pain do not touch the bodiless self [Footnote ref 1]."

As the anecdote shows, they sought such a constant and unchangeable essence in man as was beyond the limits of any change. This inmost essence has sometimes been described as pure subject-object-less consciousness, the reality, and the bliss. He is the seer of all seeing, the hearer of all hearing and the knower of all knowledge. He sees but is not seen, hears but is not heard, knows but is not known. He is the light of all lights. He is like a lump of salt, with no inner or outer, which consists through and through entirely of savour; as in truth this Âtman has no inner or outer, but consists through and through entirely of knowledge. Bliss is not an attribute of it but it is bliss itself. The state of Brahman is thus likened unto the state of dreamless sleep. And he who has reached this bliss is beyond any fear. It is dearer to us than

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[Footnote 1: Châ. VIII. 7-12.]

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son, brother, wife, or husband, wealth or prosperity. It is for it and by it that things appear dear to us. It is the dearest par excellence, our inmost Âtman. All limitation is fraught with pain; it is the infinite alone that is the highest bliss. When a man receives this rapture, then is he full of bliss; for who could breathe, who live, if that bliss had not filled this void (âkâs'a)? It is he who behaves as bliss. For when a man finds his peace, his fearless support in that invisible, supportless, inexpressible, unspeakable one, then has he attained peace.

Place of Brahman in the Upani@sads.

There is the âtman not in man alone but in all objects of the universe, the sun, the moon, the world; and Brahman is this âtman. There is nothing outside the âtman, and therefore there is no plurality at all. As from a lump of clay all that is made of clay is known, as from an ingot of black iron all that is made of black iron is known, so when this âtman the Brahman is known everything else is known. The essence in man and the essence of the universe are one and the same, and it is Brahman.

Now a question may arise as to what may be called the nature of the phenomenal world of colour, sound, taste, and smell. But we must also remember that the Upani@sads do not represent so much a conceptional system of philosophy as visions of the seers who are possessed by the spirit of this Brahman. They do not notice even the contradiction between the Brahman as unity and nature in its diversity. When the empirical aspect of diversity attracts their notice, they affirm it and yet declare that it is all Brahman. From Brahman it has come forth and to it will it return. He has himself created it out of himself and then entered into it as its inner controller (antaryâmin). Here is thus a glaring dualistic trait of the world of matter and Brahman as its controller, though in other places we find it asserted most emphatically that these are but names and forms, and when Brahman is known everything else is known. No attempts at reconciliation are made for the sake of the consistency of conceptual utterance, as S'a@nkara the great professor of Vedânta does by explaining away the dualistic texts. The universe is said to be a reality, but the real in it is Brahman alone. It is on account of Brahman that the fire burns and the wind blows. He is the active principle in the entire universe, and yet the most passive and unmoved. The

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world is his body, yet he is the soul within. "He creates all, wills all, smells all, tastes all, he has pervaded all, silent and unaffected [Footnote ref 1]." He is below, above, in the back, in front, in the south and in the north, he is all this [Footnote ref 2]." These rivers in the east and in the west originating from the ocean, return back into it and become the ocean themselves, though they do not know that they are so. So also all these people coming into being from the Being do not know that they have come from the Being…That which is the subtlest that is the self, that is all this, the truth, that self thou art O S'vetaketu [Footnote ref 3]." "Brahman," as Deussen points out, "was regarded as the cause antecedent in time, and the universe as the effect proceeding from it; the inner dependence of the universe on Brahman and its essential identity with him was represented as a creation of the universe by and out of Brahman." Thus it is said in Mund. I.I. 7:

  As a spider ejects and retracts (the threads),
  As the plants shoot forth on the earth,
  As the hairs on the head and body of the living man,
  So from the imperishable all that is here.
  As the sparks from the well-kindled fire,
  In nature akin to it, spring forth in their thousands,
  So, my dear sir, from the imperishable
  Living beings of many kinds go forth,
  And again return into him [Footnote ref 4].

Yet this world principle is the dearest to us and the highest teaching of the Upani@sads is "That art thou."

Again the growth of the doctrine that Brahman is the "inner controller" in all the parts and forces of nature and of mankind as the âtman thereof, and that all the effects of the universe are the result of his commands which no one can outstep, gave rise to a theistic current of thought in which Brahman is held as standing aloof as God and controlling the world. It is by his ordaining, it is said, that the sun and moon are held together, and the sky and earth stand held together [Footnote ref 5]. God and soul are distinguished again in the famous verse of S'vetâs'vatara [Footnote ref 6]:

  Two bright-feathered bosom friends
  Flit around one and the same tree;
  One of them tastes the sweet berries,
  The other without eating merely gazes down.

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[Footnote 1: Châ. III. 14. 4.]

[Footnote 2: Ibid. VII. 25. i; also Mu@n@daka II. 2. ii.]

[Footnote 3: Châ. VI. 10.]

[Footnote 4: Deussen's translation in Philosophy of the Upanishads, p. 164.]

[Footnote 5: B@rh. III. 8. i.]

[Footnote 6: S'vetâs'vatara IV. 6, and Mu@n@daka III. i, 1, also Deussen's translation in Philosophy of the Upanishads, p. 177.]

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But in spite of this apparent theistic tendency and the occasional use of the word Îs'a or Îs'âna, there seems to be no doubt that theism in its true sense was never prominent, and this acknowledgement of a supreme Lord was also an offshoot of the exalted position of the âtman as the supreme principle. Thus we read in Kau@sîtaki Upani@sad 3. 9, "He is not great by good deeds nor low by evil deeds, but it is he makes one do good deeds whom he wants to raise, and makes him commit bad deeds whom he wants to lower down. He is the protector of the universe, he is the master of the world and the lord of all; he is my soul (âtman)." Thus the lord in spite of his greatness is still my soul. There are again other passages which regard Brahman as being at once immanent and transcendent. Thus it is said that there is that eternally existing tree whose roots grow upward and whose branches grow downward. All the universes are supported in it and no one can transcend it. This is that, "…from its fear the fire burns, the sun shines, and from its fear Indra, Vâyu and Death the fifth (with the other two) run on [Footnote ref 1]."

If we overlook the different shades in the development of the conception of Brahman in the Upani@sads and look to the main currents, we find that the strongest current of thought which has found expression in the majority of the texts is this that the Âtman or the Brahman is the only reality and that besides this everything else is unreal. The other current of thought which is to be found in many of the texts is the pantheistic creed that identifies the universe with the Âtman or Brahman. The third current is that of theism which looks upon Brahman as the Lord controlling the world. It is because these ideas were still in the melting pot, in which none of them were systematically worked out, that the later exponents of Vedânta, S'a@nkara, Râmânuja, and others quarrelled over the meanings of texts in order to develop a consistent systematic philosophy out of them. Thus it is that the doctrine of Mâyâ which is slightly hinted at once in B@rhadâra@nyaka and thrice in S'vetâs'vatara, becomes the foundation of S'a@nkara's philosophy of the Vedânta in which Brahman alone is real and all else beside him is unreal [Footnote ref 2].

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[Footnote 1: Ka@tha II. 6. 1 and 3.]

[Footnote 2: B@rh. II. 5. 19, S'vet. I. 10, IV. 9, 10.]

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The World.

We have already seen that the universe has come out of Brahman, has its essence in Brahman, and will also return back to it. But in spite of its existence as Brahman its character as represented to experience could not be denied. S'a@nkara held that the Upani@sads referred to the external world and accorded a reality to it consciously with the purpose of treating it as merely relatively real, which will eventually appear as unreal as soon as the ultimate truth, the Brahman, is known. This however remains to be modified to this extent that the sages had not probably any conscious purpose of according a relative reality to the phenomenal world, but in spite of regarding Brahman as the highest reality they could not ignore the claims of the exterior world, and had to accord a reality to it. The inconsistency of this reality of the phenomenal world with the ultimate and only reality of Brahman was attempted to be reconciled by holding that this world is not beside him but it has come out of him, it is maintained in him and it will return back to him.

The world is sometimes spoken of in its twofold aspect, the organic and the inorganic. All organic things, whether plants, animals or men, have souls [Footnote ref 1]. Brahman desiring to be many created fire (tejas), water (ap) and earth (k@siti). Then the self-existent Brahman entered into these three, and it is by their combination that all other bodies are formed [Footnote ref 2]. So all other things are produced as a result of an alloying or compounding of the parts of these three together. In this theory of the threefold division of the primitive elements lies the earliest germ of the later distinction (especially in the Sâ@mkhya school) of pure infinitesimal substances (tanmâtra) and gross elements, and the theory that each gross substance is composed of the atoms of the primary elements. And in Pras'na IV. 8 we find the gross elements distinguished from their subtler natures, e.g. earth (p@rthivî), and the subtler state of earth (p@rthivîmâtra). In the Taittirîya, II. 1, however, ether (âkâs'a) is also described as proceeding from Brahman, and the other elements, air, fire, water, and earth, are described as each proceeding directly from the one which directly preceded it.

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[Footnote 1: Châ. VI.11.]

[Footnote 2: ibid. VI.2,3,4.]

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The World-Soul.

The conception of a world-soul related to the universe as the soul of man to his body is found for the first time in R.V.X. 121. I, where he is said to have sprung forth as the firstborn of creation from the primeval waters. This being has twice been referred to in the S'vetâs'vatara, in III. 4 and IV. 12. It is indeed very strange that this being is not referred to in any of the earlier Upani@sads. In the two passages in which he has been spoken of, his mythical character is apparent. He is regarded as one of the earlier products in the process of cosmic creation, but his importance from the point of view of the development of the theory of Brahman or Âtman is almost nothing. The fact that neither the Puru@sa, nor the Vis'vakarma, nor the Hira@nyagarbha played an important part in the earlier development of the Upani@sads leads me to think that the Upani@sad doctrines were not directly developed from the monotheistic tendencies of the later @Rg-Veda speculations. The passages in S'vetâs'vatara clearly show how from the supreme eminence that he had in R.V.X. 121, Hira@nyagarbha had been brought to the level of one of the created beings. Deussen in explaining the philosophical significance of the Hira@nyagarbha doctrine of the Upani@sads says that the "entire objective universe is possible only in so far as it is sustained by a knowing subject. This subject as a sustainer of the objective universe is manifested in all individual objects but is by no means identical with them. For the individual objects pass away but the objective universe continues to exist without them; there exists therefore the eternal knowing subject also (hira@nyagarbha) by whom it is sustained. Space and time are derived from this subject. It is itself accordingly not in space and does not belong to time, and therefore from an empirical point of view it is in general non-existent; it has no empirical but only a metaphysical reality [Footnote ref 1]." This however seems to me to be wholly irrelevant, since the Hira@nyagarbha doctrine cannot be supposed to have any philosophical importance in the Upani@sads.

The Theory of Causation.

There was practically no systematic theory of causation in the Upani@sads. S'a@nkara, the later exponent of Vedânta philosophy, always tried to show that the Upani@sads looked upon the cause

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[Footnote 1: Deussen's Philosophy of the Upanishads, p. 201.]

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as mere ground of change which though unchanged in itself in reality had only an appearance of suffering change. This he did on the strength of a series of examples in the Chândogya Upani@sad (VI. 1) in which the material cause, e.g. the clay, is spoken of as the only reality in all its transformations as the pot, the jug or the plate. It is said that though there are so many diversities of appearance that one is called the plate, the other the pot, and the other the jug, yet these are only empty distinctions of name and form, for the only thing real in them is the earth which in its essence remains ever the same whether you call it the pot, plate, or Jug. So it is that the ultimate cause, the unchangeable Brahman, remains ever constant, though it may appear to suffer change as the manifold world outside. This world is thus only an unsubstantial appearance, a mirage imposed upon Brahman, the real par excellence.

It seems however that though such a view may be regarded as having been expounded in the Upani@sads in an imperfect manner, there is also side by side the other view which looks upon the effect as the product of a real change wrought in the cause itself through the action and combination of the elements of diversity in it. Thus when the different objects of nature have been spoken of in one place as the product of the combination of the three elements fire, water and earth, the effect signifies a real change produced by their compounding. This is in germ (as we shall see hereafter) the Pari@nâma theory of causation advocated by the Sâ@mkhya school [Footnote ref 1].

Doctrine of Transmigration.

When the Vedic people witnessed the burning of a dead body they supposed that the eye of the man went to the sun, his breath to the wind, his speech to the fire, his limbs to the different parts of the universe. They also believed as we have already seen in the recompense of good and bad actions in worlds other than our own, and though we hear of such things as the passage of the human soul into trees, etc., the tendency towards transmigration had but little developed at the time.

In the Upani@sads however we find a clear development in the direction of transmigration in two distinct stages. In the one the Vedic idea of a recompense in the other world is combined with

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[Footnote 1: Châ. VI. 2-4.]

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the doctrine of transmigration, whereas in the other the doctrine of transmigration comes to the forefront in supersession of the idea of a recompense in the other world. Thus it is said that those who performed charitable deeds or such public works as the digging of wells, etc., follow after death the way of the fathers (pit@ryâna), in which the soul after death enters first into smoke, then into night, the dark half of the month, etc., and at last reaches the moon; after a residence there as long as the remnant of his good deeds remains he descends again through ether, wind, smoke, mist, cloud, rain, herbage, food and seed, and through the assimilation of food by man he enters the womb of the mother and is born again. Here we see that the soul had not only a recompense in the world of the moon, but was re-born again in this world [Footnote ref 1].

The other way is the way of gods (devayâna), meant for those who cultivate faith and asceticism (tapas). These souls at death enter successively into flame, day, bright half of the month, bright half of the year, sun, moon, lightning, and then finally into Brahman never to return. Deussen says that "the meaning of the whole is that the soul on the way of the gods reaches regions of ever-increasing light, in which is concentrated all that is bright and radiant as stations on the way to Brahman the 'light of lights'" (jyoti@sâ@m jyoti@h) [Footnote ref 2].

The other line of thought is a direct reference to the doctrine of transmigration unmixed with the idea of reaping the fruits of his deeds (karma) by passing through the other worlds and without reference to the doctrine of the ways of the fathers and gods, the Yânas. Thus Yâjñavalkya says, "when the soul becomes weak (apparent weakness owing to the weakness of the body with which it is associated) and falls into a swoon as it were, these senses go towards it. It (Soul) takes these light particles within itself and centres itself only in the heart. Thus when the person in the eye turns back, then the soul cannot know colour; (the senses) become one (with him); (people about him) say he does not see; (the senses) become one (with him), he does not smell, (the senses) become one (with him), he does not taste, (the senses) become one (with him), he does not speak, (the senses) become one (with him), he does not hear, (the senses) become one (with him), he does not think, (the senses) become one with him, he does not touch, (the senses) become one with him, he does not know, they say. The

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[Footnote 1: Châ. V. 10.]

[Footnote 2: Deussen's Philosophy of the Upanishads, p. 335.]

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tip of his heart shines and by that shining this soul goes out. When he goes out either through the eye, the head, or by any other part of the body, the vital function (prâ@na) follows and all the senses follow the vital function (prâ@na) in coming out. He is then with determinate consciousness and as such he comes out. Knowledge, the deeds as well as previous experience (prajñâ) accompany him. Just as a caterpillar going to the end of a blade of grass, by undertaking a separate movement collects itself, so this self after destroying this body, removing ignorance, by a separate movement collects itself. Just as a goldsmith taking a small bit of gold, gives to it a newer and fairer form, so the soul after destroying this body and removing ignorance fashions a newer and fairer form as of the Pit@rs, the Gandharvas, the gods, of Prajâpati or Brahma or of any other being….As he acts and behaves so he becomes, good by good deeds, bad by bad deeds, virtuous by virtuous deeds and vicious by vice. The man is full of desires. As he desires so he wills, as he wills so he works, as the work is done so it happens. There is also a verse, being attached to that he wants to gain by karma that to which he was attached. Having reaped the full fruit (lit. gone to the end) of the karma that he does here, he returns back to this world for doing karma [Footnote ref 1]. So it is the case with those who have desires. He who has no desires, who had no desires, who has freed himself from all desires, is satisfied in his desires and in himself, his senses do not go out. He being Brahma attains Brahmahood. Thus the verse says, when all the desires that are in his heart are got rid of, the mortal becomes immortal and attains Brahma here" (B@rh. IV. iv. 1-7).

A close consideration of the above passage shows that the self itself destroyed the body and built up a newer and fairer frame by its own activity when it reached the end of the present life. At the time of death, the self collected within itself all senses and faculties and after death all its previous knowledge, work and experience accompanied him. The falling off of the body at the time of death is only for the building of a newer body either in this world or in the other worlds. The self which thus takes rebirth is regarded as an aggregation of diverse categories. Thus it is said that "he is of the essence of understanding,

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[Footnote 1: It is possible that there is a vague and obscure reference here to the doctrine that the fruits of our deeds are reaped in other worlds.]

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of the vital function, of the visual sense, of the auditory sense, of the essence of the five elements (which would make up the physical body in accordance with its needs) or the essence of desires, of the essence of restraint of desires, of the essence of anger, of the essence of turning off from all anger, of the essence of dharma, of the essence of adharma, of the essence of all that is this (manifest) and that is that (unmanifest or latent)" (B@rh. IV. iv. 5). The self that undergoes rebirth is thus a unity not only of moral and psychological tendencies, but also of all the elements which compose the physical world. The whole process of his changes follows from this nature of his; for whatever he desires, he wills and whatever he wills he acts, and in accordance with his acts the fruit happens. The whole logic of the genesis of karma and its fruits is held up within him, for he is a unity of the moral and psychological tendencies on the one hand and elements of the physical world on the other.

The self that undergoes rebirth being a combination of diverse psychological and moral tendencies and the physical elements holds within itself the principle of all its transformations. The root of all this is the desire of the self and the consequent fruition of it through will and act. When the self continues to desire and act, it reaps the fruit and comes again to this world for performing acts. This world is generally regarded as the field for performing karma, whereas other worlds are regarded as places where the fruits of karma are reaped by those born as celestial beings. But there is no emphasis in the Upani@sads on this point. The Pit@ryâna theory is not indeed given up, but it seems only to form a part in the larger scheme of rebirth in other worlds and sometimes in this world too. All the course of these rebirths is effected by the self itself by its own desires, and if it ceases to desire, it suffers no rebirth and becomes immortal. The most distinctive feature of this doctrine is this, that it refers to desires as the cause of rebirth and not karma. Karma only comes as the connecting link between desires and rebirth—for it is said that whatever a man desires he wills, and whatever he wills he acts.

Thus it is said in another place "he who knowingly desires is born by his desires in those places (accordingly), but for him whose desires have been fulfilled and who has realized himself, all his desires vanish here" (Mu@n@d III. 2. 2). This destruction of desires is effected by the right knowledge of the self. "He who knows

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his self as 'I am the person' for what wish and for what desire will he trouble the body,…even being here if we know it, well if we do not, what a great destruction" (B@rh. IV. iv. 12 and 14). "In former times the wise men did not desire sons, thinking what shall we do with sons since this our self is the universe" (B@rh. IV. iv. 22). None of the complexities of the karma doctrine which we find later on in more recent developments of Hindu thought can be found in the Upani@sads. The whole scheme is worked out on the principle of desire (kâma) and karma only serves as the link between it and the actual effects desired and willed by the person.

It is interesting to note in this connection that consistently with the idea that desires (kâma) led to rebirth, we find that in some Upani@sads the discharge of the semen in the womb of a woman as a result of desires is considered as the first birth of man, and the birth of the son as the second birth and the birth elsewhere after death is regarded as the third birth. Thus it is said, "It is in man that there comes first the embryo, which is but the semen which is produced as the essence of all parts of his body and which holds itself within itself, and when it is put in a woman, that is his first birth. That embryo then becomes part of the woman's self like any part of her body; it therefore does not hurt her; she protects and develops the embryo within herself. As she protects (the embryo) so she also should be protected. It is the woman who bears the embryo (before birth) but when after birth the father takes care of the son always, he is taking care only of himself, for it is through sons alone that the continuity of the existence of people can be maintained. This is his second birth. He makes this self of his a representative for performing all the virtuous deeds. The other self of his after realizing himself and attaining age goes away and when going away he is born again that is his third birth" (Aitareya, II. 1-4) [Footnote ref 1]. No special emphasis is given in the Upani@sads to the sex-desire or the desire for a son; for, being called kâma, whatever was the desire for a son was the same as the desire for money and the desire for money was the same as any other worldly desire (B@rh. IV. iv. 22), and hence sex-desires stand on the same plane as any other desire.

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[Footnote 1: See also Kau@sîtaki, II. 15.]

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Emancipation.

The doctrine which next attracts our attention in this connection is that of emancipation (mukti). Already we know that the doctrine of Devayâna held that those who were faithful and performed asceticism (tapas) went by the way of the gods through successive stages never to return to the world and suffer rebirth. This could be contrasted with the way of the fathers (pit@ryâna) where the dead were for a time recompensed in another world and then had to suffer rebirth. Thus we find that those who are faithful and perform s'raddhâ had a distinctly different type of goal from those who performed ordinary virtues, such as those of a general altruistic nature. This distinction attains its fullest development in the doctrine of emancipation. Emancipation or Mukti means in the Upani@sads the state of infiniteness that a man attains when he knows his own self and thus becomes Brahman. The ceaseless course of transmigration is only for those who are ignorant. The wise man however who has divested himself of all passions and knows himself to be Brahman, at once becomes Brahman and no bondage of any kind can ever affect him.

  He who beholds that loftiest and deepest,
  For him the fetters of the heart break asunder,
  For him all doubts are solved,
  And his works become nothingness [Footnote ref 1].

The knowledge of the self reveals the fact that all our passions and antipathies, all our limitations of experience, all that is ignoble and small in us, all that is transient and finite in us is false. We "do not know" but are "pure knowledge" ourselves. We are not limited by anything, for we are the infinite; we do not suffer death, for we are immortal. Emancipation thus is not a new acquisition, product, an effect, or result of any action, but it always exists as the Truth of our nature. We are always emancipated and always free. We do not seem to be so and seem to suffer rebirth and thousands of other troubles only because we do not know the true nature of our self. Thus it is that the true knowledge of self does not lead to emancipation but is emancipation itself. All sufferings and limitations are true only so long as we do not know our self. Emancipation is the natural and only goal of man simply because it represents the true nature and essence of man. It is the realization of our own nature that

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[Footnote 1: Deussen's Philosophy of the Upanishads, p. 352.]

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is called emancipation. Since we are all already and always in our own true nature and as such emancipated, the only thing necessary for us is to know that we are so. Self-knowledge is therefore the only desideratum which can wipe off all false knowledge, all illusions of death and rebirth. The story is told in the Ka@tha Upani@sad that Yama, the lord of death, promised Naciketas, the son of Gautama, to grant him three boons at his choice. Naciketas, knowing that his father Gautama was offended with him, said, "O death let Gautama be pleased in mind and forget his anger against me." This being granted Naciketas asked the second boon that the fire by which heaven is gained should be made known to him. This also being granted Naciketas said, "There is this enquiry, some say the soul exists after the death of man; others say it does not exist. This I should like to know instructed by thee. This is my third boon." Yama said, "It was inquired of old, even by the gods; for it is not easy to understand it. Subtle is its nature, choose another boon. Do not compel me to this." Naciketas said, "Even by the gods was it inquired before, and even thou O Death sayest that it is not easy to understand it, but there is no other speaker to be found like thee. There is no other boon like this." Yama said, "Choose sons and grandsons who may live a hundred years, choose herds of cattle; choose elephants and gold and horses; choose the wide expanded earth, and live thyself as many years as thou wishest. Or if thou knowest a boon like this choose it together with wealth and far-extending life. Be a king on the wide earth. I will make thee the enjoyer of all desires. All those desires that are difficult to gain in the world of mortals, all those ask thou at thy pleasure; those fair nymphs with their chariots, with their musical instruments; the like of them are not to be gained by men. I will give them to thee, but do not ask the question regarding death." Naciketas replied, "All those enjoyments are of to-morrow and they only weaken the senses. All life is short, with thee the dance and song. Man cannot be satisfied with wealth, we could obtain wealth, as long as we did not reach you we live only as long as thou pleasest. The boon which I choose I have said." Yama said, "One thing is good, another is pleasant. Blessed is he who takes the good, but he who chooses the pleasant loses the object of man. But thou considering the objects of desire, hast abandoned them. These two, ignorance (whose object is

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what is pleasant) and knowledge (whose object is what is good), are known to be far asunder, and to lead to different goals. Believing that this world exists and not the other, the careless youth is subject to my sway. That knowledge which thou hast asked is not to be obtained by argument. I know worldly happiness is transient for that firm one is not to be obtained by what is not firm. The wise by concentrating on the soul, knowing him whom it is hard to behold, leaves both grief and joy. Thee O Naciketas, I believe to be like a house whose door is open to Brahman. Brahman is deathless, whoever knows him obtains whatever he wishes. The wise man is not born; he does not die; he is not produced from anywhere. Unborn, eternal, the soul is not slain, though the body is slain; subtler than what is subtle, greater than what is great, sitting it goes far, lying it goes everywhere. Thinking the soul as unbodily among bodies, firm among fleeting things, the wise man casts off all grief. The soul cannot be gained by eloquence, by understanding, or by learning. It can be obtained by him alone whom it chooses. To him it reveals its own nature [Footnote ref 1]." So long as the Self identifies itself with its desires, he wills and acts according to them and reaps the fruits in the present and in future lives. But when he comes to know the highest truth about himself, that he is the highest essence and principle of the universe, the immortal and the infinite, he ceases to have desires, and receding from all desires realizes the ultimate truth of himself in his own infinitude. Man is as it were the epitome of the universe and he holds within himself the fine constituents of the gross body (annamaya ko@sa), the vital functions (prâ@namaya ko@sa) of life, the will and desire (manomaya) and the thoughts and ideas (vijñânamaya), and so long as he keeps himself in these spheres and passes through a series of experiences in the present life and in other lives to come, these experiences are willed by him and in that sense created by him. He suffers pleasures and pains, disease and death. But if he retires from these into his true unchangeable being, he is in a state where he is one with his experience and there is no change and no movement. What this state is cannot be explained by the use of concepts. One could only indicate it by pointing out that it is not any of those concepts found in ordinary knowledge; it is not

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[Footnote 1: Ka@tha II. The translation is not continuous. There are some parts in the extract which may be differently interpreted.]

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whatever one knows as this and this (neti neti). In this infinite and true self there is no difference, no diversity, no meum and tuum. It is like an ocean in which all our phenomenal existence will dissolve like salt in water. "Just as a lump of salt when put in water will disappear in it and it cannot be taken out separately but in whatever portion of water we taste we find the salt, so, Maitreyî, does this great reality infinite and limitless consisting only of pure intelligence manifesting itself in all these (phenomenal existences) vanish in them and there is then no phenomenal knowledge" (B@rh. II. 4. 12). The true self manifests itself in all the processes of our phenomenal existences, but ultimately when it retires back to itself, it can no longer be found in them. It is a state of absolute infinitude of pure intelligence, pure being, and pure blessedness.

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In what Sense is a History of Indian Philosophy possible?

It is hardly possible to attempt a history of Indian philosophy in the manner in which the histories of European philosophy have been written. In Europe from the earliest times, thinkers came one after another and offered their independent speculations on philosophy. The work of a modern historian consists in chronologically arranging these views and in commenting upon the influence of one school upon another or upon the general change from time to time in the tides and currents of philosophy. Here in India, however, the principal systems of philosophy had their beginning in times of which we have but scanty record, and it is hardly possible to say correctly at what time they began, or to compute the influence that led to the foundation of so many divergent systems at so early a period, for in all probability these were formulated just after the earliest Upani@sads had been composed or arranged.

The systematic treatises were written in short and pregnant half-sentences (sûtras) which did not elaborate the subject in detail, but served only to hold before the reader the lost threads of memory of elaborate disquisitions with which he was already thoroughly acquainted. It seems, therefore, that these pithy half-sentences were like lecture hints, intended for those who had had direct elaborate oral instructions on the subject. It is indeed difficult to guess from the sûtras the extent of their significance, or how far the discussions which they gave rise to in later days were originally intended by them. The sûtras of the Vedânta system, known as the S'ârîraka-sûtras or Brahma-sûtras of Bâdarâya@na for example were of so ambiguous a nature that they gave rise to more than half a dozen divergent interpretations, each one of which claimed to be the only faithful one. Such was the high esteem and respect in which these writers of the sûtras were held by later writers that whenever they had any new speculations to

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offer, these were reconciled with the doctrines of one or other of the existing systems, and put down as faithful interpretations of the system in the form of commentaries. Such was the hold of these systems upon scholars that all the orthodox teachers since the foundation of the systems of philosophy belonged to one or other of these schools. Their pupils were thus naturally brought up in accordance with the views of their teachers. All the independence of their thinking was limited and enchained by the faith of the school to which they were attached. Instead of producing a succession of free-lance thinkers having their own systems to propound and establish, India had brought forth schools of pupils who carried the traditionary views of particular systems from generation to generation, who explained and expounded them, and defended them against the attacks of other rival schools which they constantly attacked in order to establish the superiority of the system to which they adhered. To take an example, the Nyâya system of philosophy consisting of a number of half-sentences or sûtras is attributed to Gautama, also called Ak@sapâda. The earliest commentary on these sûtras, called the Vâtsyâyana bhâ@sya, was written by Vâtsyâyana. This work was sharply criticized by the Buddhist Di@nnâga, and to answer these criticisms Udyotakara wrote a commentary on this commentary called the Bhâ@syavâttika [Footnote ref 1]. As time went on the original force of this work was lost, and it failed to maintain the old dignity of the school. At this Vâcaspati Mis'ra wrote a commentary called Vârttika-tâtparya@tîkâ on this second commentary, where he tried to refute all objections against the Nyâya system made by other rival schools and particularly by the Buddhists. This commentary, called Nyâya-tâtparya@tîkâ, had another commentary called Nyâya-tâtparya@tîkâ-paris'uddhi written by the great Udayana. This commentary had another commentary called Nyâya-nibandha-prakâs'a written by Varddhamâna the son of the illustrious Ga@nges'a. This again had another commentary called Varddha-mânendu upon it by Padmanâbha Mis'ra, and this again had another named Nyâya-tâtparyama@n@dana by S'a@nkara Mis'ra. The names of Vâtsyâyana, Vâcaspati, and Udayana are indeed very great, but even they contented themselves by writing commentaries on commentaries, and did not try to formulate any

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[Footnote 1: I have preferred to spell Di@nnâga after Vâcaspati's Tâtparyatîkâ (p. I) and not Dignnâga as it is generally spelt.]

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original system. Even S'a@nkara, probably the greatest man of India after Buddha, spent his life in writing commentaries on the Brahma-sûtras, the Upani@sads, and the Bhagavadgîtâ.

As a system passed on it had to meet unexpected opponents and troublesome criticisms for which it was not in the least prepared. Its adherents had therefore to use all their ingenuity and subtlety in support of their own positions, and to discover the defects of the rival schools that attacked them. A system as it was originally formulated in the sûtras had probably but few problems to solve, but as it fought its way in the teeth of opposition of other schools, it had to offer consistent opinions on other problems in which the original views were more or less involved but to which no attention had been given before.

The contributions of the successive commentators served to make each system more and more complete in all its parts, and stronger and stronger to enable it to hold its own successfully against the opposition and attacks of the rival schools. A system in the sûtras is weak and shapeless as a newborn babe, but if we take it along with its developments down to the beginning of the seventeenth century it appears as a fully developed man strong and harmonious in all its limbs. It is therefore not possible to write any history of successive philosophies of India, but it is necessity that each system should be studied and interpreted in all the growth it has acquired through the successive ages of history from its conflicts with the rival systems as one whole [Footnote ref 1]. In the history of Indian philosophy we have no place for systems which had their importance only so long as they lived and were then forgotten or remembered only as targets of criticism. Each system grew and developed by the untiring energy of its adherents through all the successive ages of history, and a history of this growth is a history of its conflicts. No study of any Indian system is therefore adequate unless it is taken throughout all the growth it attained by the work of its champions, the commentators whose selfless toil for it had kept it living through the ages of history.

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[Footnote 1: In the case of some systems it is indeed possible to suggest one or two earlier phases of the system, but this principle cannot be carried all through, for the supplementary information and arguments given by the later commentators often appear as harmonious elaborations of the earlier writings and are very seldom in conflict with them.]

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Growth of the Philosophic Literature.

It is difficult to say how the systems were originally formulated, and what were the influences that led to it. We know that a spirit of philosophic enquiry had already begun in the days of the earliest Upani@sads. The spirit of that enquiry was that the final essence or truth was the âtman, that a search after it was our highest duty, and that until we are ultimately merged in it we can only feel this truth and remain uncontented with everything else and say that it is not the truth we want, it is not the truth we want (neti neti). Philosophical enquires were however continuing in circles other than those of the Upani@sads. Thus the Buddha who closely followed the early Upani@sad period, spoke of and enumerated sixty-two kinds of heresies [Footnote ref 1], and these can hardly be traced in the Upani@sads. The Jaina activities were also probably going on contemporaneously but in the Upani@sads no reference to these can be found. We may thus reasonably suppose that there were different forms of philosophic enquiry in spheres other than those of the Upani@sad sages, of which we have but scanty records. It seems probable that the Hindu systems of thought originated among the sages who though attached chiefly to the Upani@sad circles used to take note of the discussions and views of the antagonistic and heretical philosophic circles. In the assemblies of these sages and their pupils, the views of the heretical circles were probably discussed and refuted. So it continued probably for some time when some illustrious member of the assembly such as Gautama or Kanada collected the purport of these discussions on various topics and problems, filled up many of the missing links, classified and arranged these in the form of a system of philosophy and recorded it in sûtras. These sûtras were intended probably for people who had attended the elaborate oral discussions and thus could easily follow the meaning of the suggestive phrases contained in the aphorisms. The sûtras thus contain sometimes allusions to the views of the rival schools and indicate the way in which they could be refuted. The commentators were possessed of the general drift of the different discussions alluded to and conveyed from generation to generation through an unbroken chain of succession of teachers and pupils. They were however free to supplement these traditionary explanations with their own

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[Footnote 1: Brahmajâla-sutta, Dîgha, 1. p. 12 ff.]

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views or to modify and even suppress such of the traditionary views with which they did not agree or which they found it difficult to maintain. Brilliant oppositions from the opposing schools often made it necessary for them to offer solutions to new problems unthought of before, but put forward by some illustrious adherent of a rival school. In order to reconcile these new solutions with the other parts of the system, the commentators never hesitated to offer such slight modifications of the doctrines as could harmonize them into a complete whole. These elaborations or modifications generally developed the traditionary system, but did not effect any serious change in the system as expounded by the older teachers, for the new exponents always bound themselves to the explanations of the older teachers and never contradicted them. They would only interpret them to suit their own ideas, or say new things only in those cases where the older teachers had remained silent. It is not therefore possible to describe the growth of any system by treating the contributions of the individual commentators separately. This would only mean unnecessary repetition. Except when there is a specially new development, the system is to be interpreted on the basis of the joint work of the commentators treating their contributions as forming one whole.

The fact that each system had to contend with other rival systems in order to hold its own has left its permanent mark upon all the philosophic literatures of India which are always written in the form of disputes, where the writer is supposed to be always faced with objections from rival schools to whatever he has got to say. At each step he supposes certain objections put forth against him which he answers, and points out the defects of the objector or shows that the objection itself is ill founded. It is thus through interminable byways of objections, counter-objections and their answers that the writer can wend his way to his destination. Most often the objections of the rival schools are referred to in so brief a manner that those only who know the views can catch them. To add to these difficulties the Sanskrit style of most of the commentaries is so condensed and different from literary Sanskrit, and aims so much at precision and brevity, leading to the use of technical words current in the diverse systems, that a study of these becomes often impossible without the aid of an expert preceptor; it is difficult therefore for all who are not widely read in all the different systems to follow any advanced

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work of any particular system, as the deliberations of that particular system are expressed in such close interconnection with the views of other systems that these can hardly be understood without them. Each system of India has grown (at least in particular epochs) in relation to and in opposition to the growth of other systems of thought, and to be a thorough student of Indian philosophy one should study all the systems in their mutual opposition and relation from the earliest times to a period at which they ceased to grow and came to a stop—a purpose for which a work like the present one may only be regarded as forming a preliminary introduction.

Besides the sûtras and their commentaries there are also independent treatises on the systems in verse called kârikâs, which try to summarize the important topics of any system in a succinct manner; the Sâ@mkhya kârikâ may be mentioned as a work of this kind. In addition to these there were also long dissertations, commentaries, or general observations on any system written in verses called the vârttikas; the S'lokavârttika, of Kumarila or the Vârttika of Sures'vara may be mentioned as examples. All these of course had their commentaries to explain them. In addition to these there were also advanced treatises on the systems in prose in which the writers either nominally followed some selected sûtras or proceeded independently of them. Of the former class the Nyâyamañjarî of Jayanta may be mentioned as an example and of the latter the Pras'astapâda bhâ@sya, the Advaitasiddhi of Madhusûdana Sarasvatî or the Vedânta-paribhâ@sâ of Dharmarâjâdhvarîndra. The more remarkable of these treatises were of a masterly nature in which the writers represented the systems they adhered to in a highly forcible and logical manner by dint of their own great mental powers and genius. These also had their commentaries to explain and elaborate them. The period of the growth of the philosophic literatures of India begins from about 500 B.C. (about the time of the Buddha) and practically ends in the later half of the seventeenth century, though even now some minor publications are seen to come out.

The Indian Systems of Philosophy.

The Hindus classify the systems of philosophy into two classes, namely, the nâstika and the âstika. The nâstika (na asti "it is not") views are those which neither regard the Vedas as infallible

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nor try to establish their own validity on their authority. These are principally three in number, the Buddhist, Jaina and the Cârvâka. The âstika-mata or orthodox schools are six in number, Sâ@mkhya, Yoga, Vedânta, Mîmâ@msâ, Nyâya and Vais'e@sika, generally known as the six systems (@sa@ddars'ana [Footnote ref 1]).

The Sâ@mkhya is ascribed to a mythical Kâpila, but the earliest works on the subject are probably now lost. The Yoga system is attributed to Patañjali and the original sûtras are called the Pâtañjala Yoga sûtras. The general metaphysical position of these two systems with regard to soul, nature, cosmology and the final goal is almost the same, and the difference lies in this that the Yoga system acknowledges a god (Îs'vara) as distinct from Âtman and lays much importance on certain mystical practices (commonly known as Yoga practices) for the achievement of liberation, whereas the Sâ@mkhya denies the existence of Îs'vara and thinks that sincere philosophic thought and culture are sufficient to produce the true conviction of the truth and thereby bring about liberation. It is probable that the system of Sâ@mkhya associated with Kâpila and the Yoga system associated with Patañjali are but two divergent modifications of an original Sâ@mkhya school, of which we now get only references here and there. These systems therefore though generally counted as two should more properly be looked upon as two different schools of the same Sâ@mkhya system—one may be called the Kâpila Sâ@mkhya and the other Pâtañjala Sâ@mkhya.

The Pûrva Mîmâ@msâ (from the root man to think—rational conclusions) cannot properly be spoken of as a system of philosophy. It is a systematized code of principles in accordance with which the Vedic texts are to be interpreted for purposes of sacrifices.

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[Footnote 1: The word "dars'ana" in the sense of true philosophic knowledge has its earliest use in the Vais'e@sika sûtras of Ka@nâda (IX. ii. 13) which I consider as pre-Buddhistic. The Buddhist pi@takas (400 B.C.) called the heretical opinions "ditthi" (Sanskrit—dr@sti from the same root d@rs' from which dars'ana is formed). Haribhadra (fifth century A.D.) uses the word Dars'ana in the sense of systems of philosophy (sarvadars'anavâcyo' rtha@h—@Sa@ddars'anasamuccaya I.). Ratnakîrtti (end of the tenth century A.D.) uses the word also in the same sense ("Yadi nâma dars'ane dars'ane nânâprakâram sattvatak-@sanam uktamasti." K@sa@nabha@ngasiddhi in Six Buddhist Nyâya tracts, p.20). Mâdhava (1331 A.D.) calls his Compendium of all systems of philosophy, Sarvadars'anasa@mgra@na. The word "mata" (opinion or view) was also freely used in quoting the views of other systems. But there is no word to denote 'philosophers' in the technical sense. The Buddhists used to call those who held heretical views "tairthika." The words "siddha," "jñânin," etc. do not denote philosophers, in the modern sense, they are used rather in the sense of "seers" or "perfects."]

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The Vedic texts were used as mantras (incantations) for sacrifices, and people often disputed as to the relation of words in a sentence or their mutual relative importance with reference to the general drift of the sentence. There were also differences of view with regard to the meaning of a sentence, the use to which it may be applied as a mantra, its relative importance or the exact nature of its connection with other similar sentences in a complex Vedic context. The Mîmâ@msâ formulated some principles according to which one could arrive at rational and uniform solutions for all these difficulties. Preliminary to these its main objects, it indulges in speculations with regard to the external world, soul, perception, inference, the validity of the Vedas, or the like, for in order that a man might perform sacrifices with mantras, a definite order of the universe and its relation to man or the position and nature of the mantras of the Veda must be demonstrated and established. Though its interest in such abstract speculations is but secondary yet it briefly discusses these in order to prepare a rational ground for its doctrine of the mantras and their practical utility for man. It is only so far as there are these preliminary discussions in the Mîmâ@msâ that it may be called a system of philosophy. Its principles and maxims for the interpretation of the import of words and sentences have a legal value even to this day. The sûtras of Mîmâ@msâ are attributed to Jaimini, and S'abara wrote a bhâ@sya upon it. The two great names in the history of Mîmâ@msâ literature after Jaimini and S'abara are Kumârila Bha@t@ta and his pupil Prabhâkara, who criticized the opinions of his master so much, that the master used to call him guru (master) in sarcasm, and to this day his opinions pass as guru-mata, whereas the views of Kumârila Bha@t@ta pass as bha@t@ta-mata [Footnote ref 1]. It may not be out of place to mention here that Hindu Law (sm@rti) accepts without any reservation the maxims and principles settled and formulated by the Mîmâ@msâ.

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[Footnote 1: There is a story that Kumârila could not understand the meaning of a Sanskrit sentence "Atra tunoktam tatrâpinoktam iti paunaraktam" (hence spoken twice). Tunoktam phonetically admits of two combinations, tu noktam (but not said) and tunâuktam (said by the particle tu) and tatrâpi noktam as tatra api na uktam (not said also there) and tatra apinâ uktam (said there by the particle api). Under the first interpretation the sentence would mean, "Not spoken here, not spoken there, it is thus spoken twice." This puzzled Kumârila, when Prabhâkara taking the second meaning pointed out to him that the meaning was "here it is indicated by tu and there by api, and so it is indicated twice." Kumârila was so pleased that he called his pupil "Guru" (master) at this.]

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The Vedânta sûtras, also called Uttara Mîmâ@msâ, written by Bâdarâya@na, otherwise known as the Brahma-sûtras, form the original authoritative work of Vedânta. The word Vedânta means "end of the Veda," i.e. the Upani@sads, and the Vedânta sûtras are so called as they are but a summarized statement of the general views of the Upani@sads. This work is divided into four books or adhyâyas and each adhyâya is divided into four pâdas or chapters. The first four sûtras of the work commonly known as Catu@hsûtrî are (1) How to ask about Brahman, (2) From whom proceed birth and decay, (3) This is because from him the Vedas have come forth, (4) This is shown by the harmonious testimony of the Upani@sads. The whole of the first chapter of the second book is devoted to justifying the position of the Vedânta against the attacks of the rival schools. The second chapter of the second book is busy in dealing blows at rival systems. All the other parts of the book are devoted to settling the disputed interpretations of a number of individual Upani@sad texts. The really philosophical portion of the work is thus limited to the first four sûtras and the first and second chapters of the second book. The other portions are like commentaries to the Upani@sads, which however contain many theological views of the system. The first commentary of the Brahma-sûtra was probably written by Baudhâyana, which however is not available now. The earliest commentary that is now found is that of the great S'a@nkara. His interpretations of the Brahma-sûtras together with all the commentaries and other works that follow his views are popularly known as Vedânta philosophy, though this philosophy ought more properly to be called Vis'uddhâdvaitavâda school of Vedânta philosophy (i.e. the Vedânta philosophy of the school of absolute monism). Variant forms of dualistic philosophy as represented by the Vai@s@navas, S'aivas, Râmâyatas, etc., also claim to express the original purport of the Brahma sûtras. We thus find that apostles of dualistic creeds such as Râmânuja, Vallabha, Madhva, S'rîka@n@tha, Baladeva, etc., have written independent commentaries on the Brahma-sûtra to show that the philosophy as elaborated by themselves is the view of the Upani@sads and as summarized in the Brahma-sûtras. These differed largely and often vehemently attacked S'a@nkara's interpretations of the same sûtras. These systems as expounded by them also pass by the name of Vedânta as these are also claimed to be the real interpretations intended by the Vedânta (Upani@sads)

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and the Vedânta sûtras. Of these the system of Râmânuja has great philosophical importance.

The Nyâya sûtras attributed to Gautama, called also Ak@sapâda, and the Vais'e@sika sûtras attributed to Ka@nâda, called also Ulûka, represent the same system for all practical purposes. They are in later times considered to differ only in a few points of minor importance. So far as the sûtras are concerned the Nyâya sûtras lay particular stress on the cultivation of logic as an art, while the Vais'e@sika sûtras deal mostly with metaphysics and physics. In addition to these six systems, the Tantras had also philosophies of their own, which however may generally be looked upon largely as modifications of the Sâ@mkhya and Vedânta systems, though their own contributions are also noteworthy.

Some fundamental Points of Agreement.

I. The Karma Theory.

It is, however, remarkable that with the exception of the Cârvâka materialists all the other systems agree on some fundamental points of importance. The systems of philosophy in India were not stirred up merely by the speculative demands of the human mind which has a natural inclination for indulging in abstract thought, but by a deep craving after the realization of the religious purpose of life. It is surprising to note that the postulates, aims and conditions for such a realization were found to be identical in all the conflicting systems. Whatever may be their differences of opinion in other matters, so far as the general postulates for the realization of the transcendent state, the summum bonum of life, were concerned, all the systems were practically in thorough agreement. It may be worth while to note some of them at this stage.

First, the theory of Karma and rebirth. All the Indian systems agree in believing that whatever action is done by an individual leaves behind it some sort of potency which has the power to ordain for him joy or sorrow in the future according as it is good or bad. When the fruits of the actions are such that they cannot be enjoyed in the present life or in a human life, the individual has to take another birth as a man or any other being in order to suffer them.

The Vedic belief that the mantras uttered in the correct accent at the sacrifices with the proper observance of all ritualistic

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details, exactly according to the directions without the slightest error even in the smallest trifle, had something like a magical virtue automatically to produce the desired object immediately or after a lapse of time, was probably the earliest form of the Karma doctrine. It postulates a semi-conscious belief that certain mystical actions can produce at a distant time certain effects without the ordinary process of the instrumentality of visible agents of ordinary cause and effect. When the sacrifice is performed, the action leaves such an unseen magical virtue, called the ad@r@s@ta (the unseen) or the apûrva (new), that by it the desired object will be achieved in a mysterious manner, for the modus operandi of the apûrva is unknown. There is also the notion prevalent in the Sa@mhitâs, as we have already noticed, that he who commits wicked deeds suffers in another world, whereas he who performs good deeds enjoys the highest material pleasures. These were probably associated with the conception of @rta, the inviolable order of things. Thus these are probably the elements which built up the Karma theory which we find pretty well established but not emphasized in the Upani@sads, where it is said that according to good or bad actions men will have good or bad births.

To notice other relevant points in connection with the Karma doctrine as established in the âstika systems we find that it was believed that the unseen (ad@r@s@ta) potency of the action generally required some time before it could be fit for giving the doer the merited punishment or enjoyment. These would often accumulate and prepare the items of suffering and enjoyment for the doer in his next life. Only the fruits of those actions which are extremely wicked or particularly good could be reaped in this life. The nature of the next birth of a man is determined by the nature of pleasurable or painful experiences that have been made ready for him by his maturing actions of this life. If the experiences determined for him by his action are such that they are possible to be realized in the life of a goat, the man will die and be born as a goat. As there is no ultimate beginning in time of this world process, so there is no time at which any person first began his actions or experiences. Man has had an infinite number of past lives of the most varied nature, and the instincts of each kind of life exist dormant in the life of every individual, and thus whenever he has any particular birth as this or that animal or man,

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the special instincts of that life (technically called vâsanâ) come forth. In accordance with these vâsanâs the person passes through the painful or pleasurable experiences as determined for him by his action. The length of life is also determined by the number and duration of experiences as preordained by the fructifying actions of his past life. When once certain actions become fit for giving certain experiences, these cannot be avoided, but those actions which have not matured are uprooted once for all if the person attains true knowledge as advocated by philosophy. But even such an emancipated (mukta) person has to pass through the pleasurable or painful experiences ordained for him by the actions just ripened for giving their fruits. There are four kinds of actions, white or virtuous (s'ukla), black or wicked (k@r@s@na), white-black or partly virtuous and partly vicious (s'ukla-k@r@s@na) as most of our actions are, neither black nor white (as'uklâk@r@s@na), i.e. those acts of self-renunciation or meditation which are not associated with any desires for the fruit. It is only when a person can so restrain himself as to perform only the last kind of action that he ceases to accumulate any new karma for giving fresh fruits. He has thus only to enjoy the fruits of his previous karmas which have ripened for giving fruits. If in the meantime he attains true knowledge, all his past accumulated actions become destroyed, and as his acts are only of the as'uklâk@r@s@na type no fresh karma for ripening is accumulated, and thus he becomes divested of all karma after enjoying the fruits of the ripened karmas alone.

The Jains think that through the actions of body, speech and mind a kind of subtle matter technically called karma is produced. The passions of a man act like a viscous substance that attracts this karma matter, which thus pours into the soul and sticks to it. The karma matter thus accumulated round the soul during the infinite number of past lives is technically called kârmas'arîra, which encircles the soul as it passes on from birth to birth. This karma matter sticking to the soul gradually ripens and exhausts itself in ordaining the sufferance of pains or the enjoyment of pleasures for the individual. While some karma matter is being expended in this way, other karma matters are accumulating by his activities, and thus keep him in a continuous process of suffering and enjoyment. The karma matter thus accumulated in the soul produces a kind of coloration called les'yâ, such as white, black, etc., which marks the character of the soul. The

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idea of the s'ukla and k@r@s@na karmas of the Yoga system was probably suggested by the Jaina view. But when a man is free from passions, and acts in strict compliance with the rules of conduct, his actions produce karma which lasts but for a moment and is then annihilated. Every karma that the sage has previously earned has its predestined limits within which it must take effect and be purged away. But when by contemplation and the strict adherence to the five great vows, no new karma is generated, and when all the karmas are exhausted the worldly existence of the person rapidly draws towards its end. Thus in the last stage of contemplation, all karma being annihilated, and all activities having ceased, the soul leaves the body and goes up to the top of the universe, where the liberated souls stay for ever.

Buddhism also contributes some new traits to the karma theory which however being intimately connected with their metaphysics will be treated later on.

2. The Doctrine of Mukti.

Not only do the Indian systems agree as to the cause of the inequalities in the share of sufferings and enjoyments in the case of different persons, and the manner in which the cycle of births and rebirths has been kept going from beginningless time, on the basis of the mysterious connection of one's actions with the happenings of the world, but they also agree in believing that this beginningless chain of karma and its fruits, of births and rebirths, this running on from beginningless time has somewhere its end. This end was not to be attained at some distant time or in some distant kingdom, but was to be sought within us. Karma leads us to this endless cycle, and if we could divest ourselves of all such emotions, ideas or desires as lead us to action we should find within us the actionless self which neither suffers nor enjoys, neither works nor undergoes rebirth. When the Indians, wearied by the endless bustle and turmoil of worldly events, sought for and believed that somewhere a peaceful goal could be found, they generally hit upon the self of man. The belief that the soul could be realized in some stage as being permanently divested of all action, feelings or ideas, led logically to the conclusion that the connection of the soul with these worldly elements was extraneous, artificial or even illusory. In its true nature the soul is untouched by the impurities of our ordinary life, and it is through ignorance

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and passion as inherited from the cycle of karma from beginningless time that we connect it with these. The realization of this transcendent state is the goal and final achievement of this endless cycle of births and rebirths through karma. The Buddhists did not admit the existence of soul, but recognized that the final realization of the process of karma is to be found in the ultimate dissolution called Nirvâ@na, the nature of which we shall discuss later on.

3. The Doctrine of Soul.

All the Indian systems except Buddhism admit the existence of a permanent entity variously called atman, puru@sa or jîva. As to the exact nature of this soul there are indeed divergences of view. Thus while the Nyâya calls it absolutely qualityless and characterless, indeterminate unconscious entity, Sâ@mkhya describes it as being of the nature of pure consciousness, the Vedânta says that it is that fundamental point of unity implied in pure consciousness (cit), pure bliss (ânanda), and pure being (sat). But all agree in holding that it is pure and unsullied in its nature and that all impurities of action or passion do not form a real part of it. The summum bonum of life is attained when all impurities are removed and the pure nature of the self is thoroughly and permanently apprehended and all other extraneous connections with it are absolutely dissociated.

The Pessimistic Attitude towards the World and the
Optimistic Faith in the end.

Though the belief that the world is full of sorrow has not been equally prominently emphasized in all systems, yet it may be considered as being shared by all of them. It finds its strongest utterance in Sâ@mkhya, Yoga, and Buddhism. This interminable chain of pleasurable and painful experiences was looked upon as nearing no peaceful end but embroiling and entangling us in the meshes of karma, rebirth, and sorrow. What appear as pleasures are but a mere appearance for the attempt to keep them steady is painful, there is pain when we lose the pleasures or when we are anxious to have them. When the pleasures are so much associated with pains they are but pains themselves. We are but duped when we seek pleasures, for they are sure to lead us to pain. All our experiences are essentially sorrowful and ultimately sorrow-begetting. Sorrow is the ultimate truth of this process of the

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world. That which to an ordinary person seems pleasurable appears to a wise person or to a yogin who has a clearer vision as painful. The greater the knowledge the higher is the sensitiveness to sorrow and dissatisfaction with world experiences. The yogin is like the pupil of the eye to which even the smallest grain of disturbance is unbearable. This sorrow of worldly experiences cannot be removed by bringing in remedies for each sorrow as it comes, for the moment it is remedied another sorrow comes in. It cannot also be avoided by mere inaction or suicide, for we are continually being forced to action by our nature, and suicide will but lead to another life of sorrow and rebirth. The only way to get rid of it is by the culmination of moral greatness and true knowledge which uproot sorrow once for all. It is our ignorance that the self is intimately connected with the experiences of life or its pleasures, that leads us to action and arouses passion in us for the enjoyment of pleasures and other emotions and activities. Through the highest moral elevation a man may attain absolute dispassion towards world-experiences and retire in body, mind, and speech from all worldly concerns. When the mind is so purified, the self shines in its true light, and its true nature is rightly conceived. When this is once done the self can never again be associated with passion or ignorance. It becomes at this stage ultimately dissociated from citta which contains within it the root of all emotions, ideas, and actions. Thus emancipated the self for ever conquers all sorrow. It is important, however, to note in this connection that emancipation is not based on a general aversion to intercourse with the world or on such feelings as a disappointed person may have, but on the appreciation of the state of mukti as the supremely blessed one. The details of the pessimistic creed of each system have developed from the logical necessity peculiar to each system. There was never the slightest tendency to shirk the duties of this life, but to rise above them through right performance and right understanding. It is only when a man rises to the highest pinnacle of moral glory that he is fit for aspiring to that realization of selfhood in comparison with which all worldly things or even the joys of Heaven would not only shrink into insignificance, but appear in their true character as sorrowful and loathsome. It is when his mind has thus turned from all ordinary joys that he can strive towards his ideal of salvation. In fact it seems to me that a sincere religious craving after some

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ideal blessedness and quiet of self-realization is indeed the fundamental fact from which not only her philosophy but many of the complex phenomena of the civilization of India can be logically deduced. The sorrow around us has no fear for us if we remember that we are naturally sorrowless and blessed in ourselves. The pessimistic view loses all terror as it closes in absolute optimistic confidence in one's own self and the ultimate destiny and goal of emancipation.

Unity in Indian Sâdhana (philosophical, religious and ethical endeavours).

As might be expected the Indian systems are all agreed upon the general principles of ethical conduct which must be followed for the attainment of salvation. That all passions are to be controlled, no injury to life in any form should be done, and that all desire for pleasures should be checked, are principles which are almost universally acknowledged. When a man attains a very high degree of moral greatness he has to strengthen and prepare his mind for further purifying and steadying it for the attainment of his ideal; and most of the Indian systems are unanimous with regard to the means to be employed for the purpose. There are indeed divergences in certain details or technical names, but the means to be adopted for purification are almost everywhere essentially the same as those advocated by the Yoga system. It is only in later times that devotion (bhakti) is seen to occupy a more prominent place specially in Vai@s@nava schools of thought. Thus it was that though there were many differences among the various systems, yet their goal of life, their attitude towards the world and the means fur the attainment of the goal (sâdhana) being fundamentally the same, there was a unique unity in the practical sâdhana of almost all the Indian systems. The religious craving has been universal in India and this uniformity of sâdhana has therefore secured for India a unity in all her aspirations and strivings.

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Many scholars are of opinion that the Sâ@mkhya and the Yoga represent the earliest systematic speculations of India. It is also suggested that Buddhism drew much of its inspiration from them. It may be that there is some truth in such a view, but the systematic Sâ@mkhya and Yoga treatises as we have them had decidedly been written after Buddhism. Moreover it is well-known to every student of Hindu philosophy that a conflict with the Buddhists has largely stimulated philosophic enquiry in most of the systems of Hindu thought. A knowledge of Buddhism is therefore indispensable for a right understanding of the different systems in their mutual relation and opposition to Buddhism. It seems desirable therefore that I should begin with Buddhism first.

The State of Philosophy in India before the Buddha.

It is indeed difficult to give a short sketch of the different philosophical speculations that were prevalent in India before Buddhism. The doctrines of the Upani@sads are well known, and these have already been briefly described. But these were not the only ones. Even in the Upani@sads we find references to diverse atheistical creeds [Footnote ref 1]. We find there that the origin of the world and its processes were sometimes discussed, and some thought that "time" was the ultimate cause of all, others that all these had sprung forth by their own nature (svabhâva), others that everything had come forth in accordance with an inexorable destiny or a fortuitous concourse of accidental happenings, or through matter combinations in general. References to diverse kinds of heresies are found in Buddhist literature also, but no detailed accounts of these views are known. Of the Upani@sad type of materialists the two schools of Cârvâkas (Dhûrtta and Sus'ik@sita) are referred to in later literature, though the time in which these flourished cannot rightly be discovered [Footnote ref 2]. But it seems

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[Footnote 1: S'vetâs'vatara, I. 2, kâla@h svabhâbo niyatiryad@rcchâ bhutâni yoni@h puru@sa iti cintyam.]

[Footnote 2: Lokâyata (literally, that which is found among people in general) seems to have been the name by which all carvâka doctrines were generally known. See Gu@naratna on the Lokâyatas.]

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probable however that the allusion to the materialists contained in the Upani@sads refers to these or to similar schools. The Cârvâkas did not believe in the authority of the Vedas or any other holy scripture. According to them there was no soul. Life and consciousness were the products of the combination of matter, just as red colour was the result of mixing up white with yellow or as the power of intoxication was generated in molasses (madas'akti). There is no after-life, and no reward of actions, as there is neither virtue nor vice. Life is only for enjoyment. So long as it lasts it is needless to think of anything else, as everything will end with death, for when at death the body is burnt to ashes there cannot be any rebirth. They do not believe in the validity of inference. Nothing is trustworthy but what can be directly perceived, for it is impossible to determine that the distribution of the middle term (hetu) has not depended upon some extraneous condition, the absence of which might destroy the validity of any particular piece of inference. If in any case any inference comes to be true, it is only an accidental fact and there is no certitude about it. They were called Cârvâka because they would only eat but would not accept any other religious or moral responsibility. The word comes from carv to eat. The Dhûrtta Cârvâkas held that there was nothing but the four elements of earth, water, air and fire, and that the body was but the result of atomic combination. There was no self or soul, no virtue or vice. The Sus'ik@sita Cârvâkas held that there was a soul apart from the body but that it also was destroyed with the destruction of the body. The original work of the Cârvâkas was written in sûtras probably by B@rhaspati. Jayanta and Gu@naratna quote two sûtras from it. Short accounts of this school may be found in Jayanta's Nyâyamañjarî, Mâdhava's Sarvadars'anasa@mgraha and Gu@naratna's Tarkarahasyadîpikâ. Mahâbhârata gives an account of a man called Cârvâka meeting Yudhi@s@thira.

Side by side with the doctrine of the Cârvâka materialists we are reminded of the Âjîvakas of which Makkhali Gosâla, probably a renegade disciple of the Jain saint Mahâvîra and a contemporary of Buddha and Mahâvîra, was the leader. This was a thorough-going determinism denying the free will of man and his moral responsibility for any so-called good or evil. The essence of Makkhali's system is this, that "there is no cause, either proximate or remote, for the depravity of beings or for their purity. They

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become so without any cause. Nothing depends either on one's own efforts or on the efforts of others, in short nothing depends on any human effort, for there is no such thing as power or energy, or human exertion. The varying conditions at any time are due to fate, to their environment and their own nature [Footnote ref 1]."

Another sophistical school led by Ajita Kesakambali taught that there was no fruit or result of good or evil deeds; there is no other world, nor was this one real; nor had parents nor any former lives any efficacy with respect to this life. Nothing that we can do prevents any of us alike from being wholly brought to an end at death [Footnote ref 2].

There were thus at least three currents of thought: firstly the sacrificial Karma by the force of the magical rites of which any person could attain anything he desired; secondly the Upani@sad teaching that the Brahman, the self, is the ultimate reality and being, and all else but name and form which pass away but do not abide. That which permanently abides without change is the real and true, and this is self. Thirdly the nihilistic conceptions that there is no law, no abiding reality, that everything comes into being by a fortuitous concourse of circumstances or by some unknown fate. In each of these schools, philosophy had probably come to a deadlock. There were the Yoga practices prevalent in the country and these were accepted partly on the strength of traditional custom among certain sections, and partly by virtue of the great spiritual, intellectual and physical power which they gave to those who performed them. But these had no rational basis behind them on which they could lean for support. These were probably then just tending towards being affiliated to the nebulous Sâ@mkhya doctrines which had grown up among certain sections. It was at this juncture that we find Buddha erecting a new superstructure of thought on altogether original lines which thenceforth opened up a new avenue of philosophy for all posterity to come. If the Being of the Upani@sads, the superlatively motionless, was the only real, how could it offer scope for further new speculations, as it had already discarded all other matters of interest? If everything was due to a reasonless fortuitous concourse of circumstances, reason could not proceed further in the direction to create any philosophy of the unreason. The magical

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[Footnote 1: Sâmaññaphala-sutta, Dîgha, II. 20. Hoernlé's article on the Âjîvakas, E.R.E.]

[Footnote 2: Sâmaññaphala-sutta, II. 23.]

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force of the hocus-pocus of sorcery or sacrifice had but little that was inviting for philosophy to proceed on. If we thus take into account the state of Indian philosophic culture before Buddha, we shall be better able to understand the value of the Buddhistic contribution to philosophy.

Buddha: his Life.

Gautama the Buddha was born in or about the year 560 B.C. in the Lumbini Grove near the ancient town of Kapilavastu in the now dense terai region of Nepal. His father was Suddhodana, a prince of the Sâkya clan, and his mother Queen Mahâmâyâ. According to the legends it was foretold of him that he would enter upon the ascetic life when he should see "A decrepit old man, a diseased man, a dead man, and a monk." His father tried his best to keep him away from these by marrying him and surrounding him with luxuries. But on successive occasions, issuing from the palace, he was confronted by those four things, which filled him with amazement and distress, and realizing the impermanence of all earthly things determined to forsake his home and try if he could to discover some means to immortality to remove the sufferings of men. He made his "Great Renunciation" when he was twenty-nine years old. He travelled on foot to Râjag@rha (Rajgir) and thence to Uruvelâ, where in company with other five ascetics he entered upon a course of extreme self-discipline, carrying his austerities to such a length that his body became utterly emaciated and he fell down senseless and was believed to be dead. After six years of this great struggle he was convinced that the truth was not to be won by the way of extreme asceticism, and resuming an ordinary course of life at last attained absolute and supreme enlightenment. Thereafter the Buddha spent a life prolonged over forty-five years in travelling from place to place and preaching the doctrine to all who would listen. At the age of over eighty years Buddha realized that the time drew near for him to die. He then entered into Dhyana and passing through its successive stages attained nirvâna [Footnote ref 1]. The vast developments which the system of this great teacher underwent in the succeeding centuries in India and in other countries have not been thoroughly studied, and it will probably take yet many years more before even the materials for

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[Footnote 1: Mahâparinibbânasuttanta, Dîgha, XVI. 6, 8, 9.]

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such a study can be collected. But from what we now possess it is proved incontestably that it is one of the most wonderful and subtle productions of human wisdom. It is impossible to overestimate the debt that the philosophy, culture and civilization of India owe to it in all her developments for many succeeding centuries.

Early Buddhist Literature.

The Buddhist Pâli Scriptures contain three different collections: the Sutta (relating to the doctrines), the Vinaya (relating to the discipline of the monks) and the Abhidhamma (relating generally to the same subjects as the suttas but dealing with them in a scholastic and technical manner). Scholars of Buddhistic religious history of modern times have failed as yet to fix any definite dates for the collection or composition of the different parts of the aforesaid canonical literature of the Buddhists. The suttas were however composed before the Abhidhamma and it is very probable that almost the whole of the canonical works were completed before 241 B.C., the date of the third council during the reign of King Asoka. The suttas mainly deal with the doctrine (Dhamma) of the Buddhistic faith whereas the Vinaya deals only with the regulations concerning the discipline of the monks. The subject of the Abhidhamma is mostly the same as that of the suttas, namely, the interpretation of the Dhamma. Buddhaghos@a in his introduction to Atthasâlinî, the commentary on the Dhammasa@nga@ni, says that the Abhidhamma is so called (abhi and dhamma) because it describes the same Dhammas as are related in the suttas in a more intensified (dhammâtireka) and specialized (dhammavisesatthena) manner. The Abhidhammas do not give any new doctrines that are not in the suttas, but they deal somewhat elaborately with those that are already found in the suttas. Buddhagho@sa in distinguishing the special features of the suttas from the Abhidhammas says that the acquirement of the former leads one to attain meditation (samâdhi) whereas the latter leads one to attain wisdom (paññâsampadam). The force of this statement probably lies in this, that the dialogues of the suttas leave a chastening effect on the mind, the like of which is not to be found in the Abhidhammas, which busy themselves in enumerating the Buddhistic doctrines and defining them in a technical manner, which is more fitted to produce a reasoned

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insight into the doctrines than directly to generate a craving for following the path of meditation for the extinction of sorrow. The Abhidhamma known as the Kathâvatthu differs from the other Abhidhammas in this, that it attempts to reduce the views of the heterodox schools to absurdity. The discussions proceed in the form of questions and answers, and the answers of the opponents are often shown to be based on contradictory assumptions.

The suttas contain five groups of collections called the Nikâyas. These are (1) Dîgha Nikâya, called so on account of the length of the suttas contained in it; (2) Majjhima Nikâya (middling Nikâya), called so on account of the middling extent of the suttas contained in it; (3) Sa@myutta Nikâya (Nikâyas relating to special meetings), called sa@myutta on account of their being delivered owing to the meetings (sa@myoga) of special persons which were the occasions for them; (4) A@nguttara Nikâya, so called because in each succeeding book of this work the topics of discussion increase by one [Footnote ref 1]; (5) Khuddaka Nikâya containing Khuddaka pâ@tha, Dhammapada, Udâna, Itivuttaka, Sutta Nipâta, Vimâna-vatthu, Petavatthu, Theragathâ, Therîgathâ, Jâtaka, Niddesa, Pa@tisambhidâmagga, Apadâna, Buddhava@msa, Caryâpi@taka.

The Abhidhammas are Pa@t@thâna, Dhammasa@nga@ni, Dhâtukathâ, Puggalapaññatti, Vibha@nga, Yamaka and Kathâvatthu. There exists also a large commentary literature on diverse parts of the above works known as atthakathâ. The work known as Milinda Pañha (questions of King Milinda), of uncertain date, is of considerable philosophical value.

The doctrines and views incorporated in the above literature is generally now known as Sthaviravâda or Theravâda. On the origin of the name Theravâda (the doctrine of the elders) Dîpava@msa says that since the Theras (elders) met (at the first council) and collected the doctrines it was known as the Thera Vâda [Footnote ref 2]. It does not appear that Buddhism as it appears in this Pâli literature developed much since the time of Buddhagho@sa (4OO A.D.), the writer of Visuddhimagga (a compendium of theravâda doctrines) and the commentator of Dîghanikâya, Dhammasa@nga@ni, etc.

Hindu philosophy in later times seems to have been influenced by the later offshoots of the different schools of Buddhism, but it does not appear that Pâli Buddhism had any share in it. I

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[Footnote 1: See Buddhagho@sa's Atthasâlini, p. 25.]

[Footnote 2: Oldenberg's Dîpava@msa, p. 31.]

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have not been able to discover any old Hindu writer who could be considered as being acquainted with Pâli.

The Doctrine of Causal Connection of early Buddhism [Footnote ref 1].

The word Dhamma in the Buddhist scriptures is used generally in four senses: (1) Scriptural texts, (2) quality (gu@na), (3) cause (hetu) and (4) unsubstantial and soulless (nissatta nijjîva [Footnote ref 2]). Of these it is the last meaning which is particularly important, from the point of view of Buddhist philosophy. The early Buddhist philosophy did not accept any fixed entity as determining all reality; the only things with it were the unsubstantial phenomena and these were called dhammas. The question arises that if there is no substance or reality how are we to account for the phenomena? But the phenomena are happening and passing away and the main point of interest with the Buddha was to find out "What being what else is," "What happening what else happens" and "What not being what else is not." The phenomena are happening in a series and we see that there being certain phenomena there become some others; by the happening of some events others also are produced. This is called (pa@ticca-samuppâda) dependent origination. But it is difficult to understand what is the exact nature of this dependence. The question as Sa@myutta Nikâya (II. 5) has it with which the Buddha started before attaining Buddhahood was this: in what miserable condition are the people! they are born, they decay, they die, pass away and are born again; and they do not know the path of escape from this decay, death and misery.

How to know the Way to escape from this misery of decay and death. Then it occurred to him what being there, are decay and death, depending on what do they come? As he thought deeply into the root of the matter, it occurred to him that decay and death can only occur when there is birth (jâti), so they depend

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[Footnote 1: There are some differences of opinion as to whether one could take the doctrine of the twelve links of causes as we find it in the Sa@myutta Nikâya as the earliest Buddhist view, as Sa@myutta does not represent the oldest part of the suttas. But as this doctrine of the twelve causes became regarded as a fundamental Buddhist doctrine and as it gives us a start in philosophy I have not thought it fit to enter into conjectural discussions as to the earliest form. Dr E.J. Thomas drew my attention to this fact.]

[Footnote 2: Atthasâtinî, p. 38. There are also other senses in which
the word is used, as dhamma-desanâ where it means religious teaching.
The La@nkâvatâra described Dharmma as gu@nadravyapûrvakâ dharmmâ, i.e.
Dharmmas are those which are associated as attributes and substances.]

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on birth. What being there, is there birth, on what does birth depend? Then it occurred to him that birth could only be if there were previous existence (bhava) [Footnote ref 1]. But on what does this existence depend, or what being there is there bhava. Then it occurred to him that there could not be existence unless there were holding fast (upâdâna) [Footnote ref 2]. But on what did upâdâna depend? It occurred to him that it was desire (ta@nhâ) on which upâdâna depended. There can be upâdâna if there is desire (tanhâ) [Footnote ref 3]. But what being there, can there be desire? To this question it occurred to him that there must be feeling (vedanâ) in order that there may be desire. But on what does vedanâ depend, or rather what must be there, that there may be feeling (vedanâ)? To this it occurred to him that there must be a sense-contact (phassa) in order that there may be feeling [Footnote ref 4]. If there should be no sense-contact there would be no feeling. But on what does sense-contact depend? It occurred to him that as there are six sense-contacts, there are the six fields of contact (âyatana) [Footnote ref 5]. But on what do the six âyatanas depend? It occurred to him that there must be the mind and body (nâmarûpa) in order that there may be the six fields of contact [Footnote ref 6]; but on what does nâmarûpa depend? It occurred to him that without consciousness (viññâna) there could be no nâmarûpa [Footnote ref 8]. But what being there would there

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[Footnote 1: This word bhava is interpreted by Candrakîrtti in his Mâdhyamîka v@rtti, p. 565 (La Vallée Poussin's edition) as the deed which brought about rebirth (punarbhavajanaka@m karma samutthâpayali kâyena vâcâ manasâ ca).]

[Footnote 2: Atthasâlinî, p. 385, upâdânantida@lhagaha@na@m. Candrakîrtti in explaining upâdâna says that whatever thing a man desires he holds fast to the materials necessary for attaining it (yatra vastuni sat@r@s@nastasya vastuno 'rjanâya vi@dhapanâya upâdânamupâdatte tatra tatra prârthayate). Mâdhyamîka v@rtti, p. 565.]

[Footnote 3: Candrakîrtti describes t@r@s@nâ as âsvadanâbhinandanâdhyavasânasthânâdâtmapriyarûpairviyogo mâ bhût, nityamaparityâgo bhavediti, yeyam prârthanâ—the desire that there may not ever be any separation from those pleasures, etc., which are dear to us. Ibid. 565.]

[Footnote 4: We read also of phassâyatana and phassakâya. M. N. II. 261, III. 280, etc. Candrakîrtti says that @sa@dbhirâyatanadvârai@h k@rtyaprak@riyâ@h pravarttante prajñâyante. tannâmarûpapratyaya@m @sa@dâyatanamucyate. sa@dbhyas`câyatanebhya@h @sa@tspars`akâyâ@h pravarttante. M.V. 565.]

[Footnote 5: Âyatana means the six senses together with their objects. Âyatana literally is "Field of operation." Sa@lâyatana means six senses as six fields of operation. Candrakîrtti has âyatanadvârai@h.]

[Footnote 6: I have followed the translation of Aung in rendering nâmarûpa as mind and body, Compendium, p. 271. This seems to me to be fairly correct. The four skandhas are called nâma in each birth. These together with rûpa (matter) give us nâmarûpa (mind and body) which being developed render the activities through the six sense-gates possible so that there may be knowledge. Cf. M. V. 564. Govindânanda, the commentator on S'a@nkara's bhâsya on the Brahma sûtras (II. ii. 19), gives a different interpretation of Namarûpa which may probably refer to the Vijñanavada view though we have no means at hand to verify it. He says—To think the momentary as the permanent is Avidya; from there come the samskaras of attachment, antipathy or anger, and infatuation; from there the first vijñana or thought of the foetus is produced, from that alayavijnana, and the four elements (which are objects of name and are hence called nama) are produced, and from those are produced the white and black, semen and blood called rûpa. Both Vacaspati and Amalananda agree with Govindananda in holding that nama signifies the semen and the ovum while rûpa means the visible physical body built out of them. Vijñaña entered the womb and on account of it namarupa were produced through the association of previous karma. See Vedantakalpataru, pp 274, 275. On the doctrine of the entrance of vijñaña into the womb compare D N II. 63.]

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be viññâna. Here it occurred to him that in order that there might be viññâna there must be the conformations (sa@nkhâra) [Footnote ref 1]. But what being there are there the sa@nkhâras? Here it occurred to him that the sa@nkhâras can only be if there is ignorance (avijjâ). If avijjâ could be stopped then the sa@nkhâras will be stopped, and if the sa@nkhâras could be stopped viññâna could be stopped and so on [Footnote ref 2].

It is indeed difficult to be definite as to what the Buddha actually wished to mean by this cycle of dependence of existence sometimes called Bhavacakra (wheel of existence). Decay and death (jarâmarana) could not have happened if there was no birth [Footnote ref 3]. This seems to be clear. But at this point the difficulty begins. We must remember that the theory of rebirth was

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[Footnote 1: It is difficult to say what is the exact sense of the word here. The Buddha was one of the first few earliest thinkers to introduce proper philosophical terms and phraseology with a distinct philosophical method and he had often to use the same word in more or less different senses. Some of the philosophical terms at least are therefore rather elastic when compared with the terms of precise and definite meaning which we find in later Sanskrit thought. Thus in S N III. p. 87, "Sankhata@m abdisa@nkharonta," sa@nkhara means that which synthesises the complexes. In the Compendium it is translated as will, action. Mr. Aung thinks that it means the same as karma; it is here used in a different sense from what we find in the word sa@nkhâta khandha (viz mental states). We get a list of 51 mental states forming sa@nkhâta khandha in Dhamma Sangam, p 18, and another different set of 40 mental states in Dharmasamgraha, p. 6. In addition to these forty cittasamprayuktasa@mskâra, it also counts thirteen cittaviprayuktasa@mskara. Candrakirtti interprets it as meaning attachment, antipathy and infatuation, p 563. Govindananda, the commentator on S'a@nkara's Brahma sutra (II. ii. 19), also interprets the word in connection with the doctrine of Pratityasamutpada as attachment, antipathy and infatuation.]

[Footnote 2: Samyutta Nikaya, II. 7-8.]

[Footnote 3: Jara and marana bring in s'oka (grief), paridevanâ (lamentation), duhkha (suffering), daurmanasya (feeling of wretchedness and miserableness) and upayasa (feeling of extreme destitution) at the prospect of one's death or the death of other dear ones. All these make up suffering and are the results of jâti (birth). M. V. (B.T.S.p. 208). S'a@nkara in his bhâsya counted all the terms from jarâ, separately. The whole series is to be taken as representing the entirety of duhkhaskandha.]

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enunciated in the Upani@sads. The B@rhadâra@nyaka says that just as an insect going to the end of a leaf of grass by a new effort collects itself in another so does the soul coming to the end of this life collect itself in another. This life thus presupposes another existence. So far as I remember there has seldom been before or after Buddha any serious attempt to prove or disprove the doctrine of rebirth [Footnote ref 1]. All schools of philosophy except the Cârvâkas believed in it and so little is known to us of the Cârvâka sûtras that it is difficult to say what they did to refute this doctrine. The Buddha also accepts it as a fact and does not criticize it. This life therefore comes only as one which had an infinite number of lives before, and which except in the case of a few emancipated ones would have an infinite number of them in the future. It was strongly believed by all people, and the Buddha also, when he came to think to what our present birth might be due, had to fall back upon another existence (bhava). If bhava means karma which brings rebirth as Candrakîrtti takes it to mean, then it would mean that the present birth could only take place on account of the works of a previous existence which determined it. Here also we are reminded of the Upani@sad note "as a man does so will he be born" (Yat karma kurute tadabhisampadyate, Brh IV. iv. 5). Candrakîrtti's interpretation of "bhava" as Karma (punarbhavajanakam karma) seems to me to suit better than "existence." The word was probably used rather loosely for kammabhava. The word bhava is not found in the earlier Upani@sads and was used in the Pâli scriptures for the first time as a philosophical term. But on what does this bhava depend? There could not have been a previous existence if people had not betaken themselves to things or works they desired. This betaking oneself to actions or things in accordance with desire is called upâdâna. In the Upani@sads we read, "whatever one betakes himself to, so does he work" (Yatkraturbhavati tatkarmma kurute, B@rh. IV. iv. 5). As this betaking to the thing depends upon desire {t@r@s@nâ}, it is said that in order that there may be upâdâna there must be tanhâ. In the Upani@sads also we read "Whatever one desires so does he betake himself to" (sa yathâkâmo bhavati tatkraturbhavati). Neither the word upâdâna nor t@rs@nâ (the Sanskrit word corresponding

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[Footnote 1: The attempts to prove the doctrine of rebirth in the Hindu philosophical works such as the Nyâya, etc., are slight and inadequate.]

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to ta@nhâ) is found in the earlier Upani@sads, but the ideas contained in them are similar to the words "kratu" and "kâma." Desire (ta@nhâ) is then said to depend on feeling or sense-contact. Sense-contact presupposes the six senses as fields of operation [Footnote ref 1]. These six senses or operating fields would again presuppose the whole psychosis of the man (the body and the mind together) called nâmarûpa. We are familiar with this word in the Upani@sads but there it is used in the sense of determinate forms and names as distinguished from the indeterminate indefinable reality [Footnote ref 2]. Buddhagho@sa in the Visuddhimagga says that by "Name" are meant the three groups beginning with sensation (i.e. sensation, perception and the predisposition); by "Form" the four elements and form derivative from the four elements [Footnote ref 3]. He further says that name by itself can produce physical changes, such as eating, drinking, making movements or the like. So form also cannot produce any of those changes by itself. But like the cripple and the blind they mutually help one another and effectuate the changes [Footnote ref 4]. But there exists no heap or collection of material for the production of Name and Form; "but just as when a lute is played upon, there is no previous store of sound; and when the sound comes into existence it does not come from any such store; and when it ceases, it does not go to any of the cardinal or intermediate points of the compass;…in exactly the same way all the elements of being both those with form and those without, come into existence after having previously been non-existent and having come into existence pass away [Footnote ref 5]." Nâmarûpa taken in this sense will not mean the whole of mind and body, but only the sense functions and the body which are found to operate in the six doors of sense (sa@lâyatana). If we take nâmarûpa in this sense, we can see that it may be said to depend upon the viññâna (consciousness). Consciousness has been compared in the Milinda Pañha with a watchman at the middle of

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[Footnote 1: The word âyatana is found in many places in the earlier Upani@sads in the sense of "field or place," Châ. I. 5, B@rh. III. 9. 10, but @sa@dâyatana does not occur.]

[Footnote 2: Candrakîrtti interprets nâma as Vedanâdayo' rûpi@nas'catvâra@h skandhâstatra tatra bhave nâmayantîli nâma. saha rûpaskandhena ca nâma rûpam ceti nâmarûpamucyate. The four skandhas in each specific birth act as name. These together with rûpa make nâmarûpa. M. V. 564.]

[Footnote 3: Warren's Buddhism in Translations, p. 184.]

[Footnote 4: Ibid. p. 185, Visuddhimagga, Ch. XVII.]

[Footnote 5: Ibid. pp. 185-186, Visuddhimagga, Ch. XVII.]

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the cross-roads beholding all that come from any direction [Footnote ref 1]. Buddhagho@sa in the Atthasâlinî also says that consciousness means that which thinks its object. If we are to define its characteristics we must say that it knows (vijânana), goes in advance (pubba@ngama), connects (sandhâna), and stands on nâmarûpa (nâmarûpapada@t@thânam). When the consciousness gets a door, at a place the objects of sense are discerned (ârammana-vibhâvana@t@thâne) and it goes first as the precursor. When a visual object is seen by the eye it is known only by the consciousness, and when the dhammas are made the objects of (mind) mano, it is known only by the consciousness [Footnote ref 2]. Buddhagho@sa also refers here to the passage in the Milinda Pañha we have just referred to. He further goes on to say that when states of consciousness rise one after another, they leave no gap between the previous state and the later and consciousness therefore appears as connected. When there are the aggregates of the five khandhas it is lost; but there are the four aggregates as nâmarûpa, it stands on nâma and therefore it is said that it stands on nâmarûpa. He further asks, Is this consciousness the same as the previous consciousness or different from it? He answers that it is the same. Just so, the sun shows itself with all its colours, etc., but he is not different from those in truth; and it is said that just when the sun rises, its collected heat and yellow colour also rise then, but it does not mean that the sun is different from these. So the citta or consciousness takes the phenomena of contact, etc., and cognizes them. So though it is the same as they are yet in a sense it is different from them [Footnote ref 3].

To go back to the chain of twelve causes, we find that jâti (birth) is the cause of decay and death, jarâmara@na, etc. Jâti is the appearance of the body or the totality of the five skandhas [Footnote ref 4]. Coming to bhava which determines jâti, I cannot think of any better rational explanation of bhava, than that I have already

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[Footnote 1: Warren's Buddhism in Translations, p. 182, Milinda Pañha (628).]

[Footnote 2: Atthasâlinî, p. 112…]

[Footnote 3: Ibid. p. 113, Yathâ hi rûpâdîni upâdâya paññattâ suriyâdayo na atthato rûpâdîhi aññe honti ten' eva yasmin samaye suriyo udeti tasmin samaye tassa tejâ-sa@nkhâtam rûpa@m pîti eva@m vuccamâne pi na rûpâdihi añño suriyo nâma atthi. Tathâ cittam phassâdayo dhamme upâdâya paññapiyati. Atthato pan' ettha tehi aññam eva. Tena yasmin samaye cittam uppanna@m hoti eka@msen eva tasmin samaye phassâdihi atthato aññad eva hotî ti.]

[Footnote 4: "Jâtirdehajanma pañcaskandhasamudâya@h," Govindânanda's Ratnaprabhâ on S'a@nkara's bhâ@sya, II. ii. 19.]

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suggested, namely, the works (karma) which produce the birth [Footnote ref 1]. Upâdâna is an advanced t@r@s@nâ leading to positive clinging [Footnote ref 2]. It is produced by t@r@s@nâ (desire) which again is the result of vedanâ (pleasure and pain). But this vedanâ is of course vedanâ with ignorance (avidyâ), for an Arhat may have also vedanâ but as he has no avidyâ, the vedanâ cannot produce t@r@s@nâ in turn. On its development it immediately passes into upâdâna. Vedanâ means pleasurable, painful or indifferent feeling. On the one side it leads to t@r@s@nâ (desire) and on the other it is produced by sense-contact (spars'a). Prof. De la Vallée Poussin says that S'rîlâbha distinguishes three processes in the production of vedanâ. Thus first there is the contact between the sense and the object; then there is the knowledge of the object, and then there is the vedanâ. Depending on Majjhima Nikâya, iii. 242, Poussin gives the other opinion that just as in the case of two sticks heat takes place simultaneously with rubbing, so here also vedanâ takes place simultaneously with spars'a for they are "produits par un même complexe de causes (sâmagrî) [Footnote ref 3]."

Spars'a is produced by @sa@dâyatana, @sa@dâyatana by nâmarûpa, and nâmarûpa by vijñâna, and is said to descend in the womb of the mother and produce the five skandhas as nâmarûpa, out of which the six senses are specialized.

Vijñâna in this connection probably means the principle or germ of consciousness in the womb of the mother upholding the five elements of the new body there. It is the product of the past karmas (sa@nkhâra) of the dying man and of his past consciousness too.

We sometimes find that the Buddhists believed that the last thoughts of the dying man determined the nature of his next

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[Footnote 1: Govindananda in his Ratnaprabhâ on S'a@nkara's bhâ@sya, II. ii. 19, explains "bhava" as that from which anything becomes, as merit and demerit (dharmâdi). See also Vibhanga, p. 137 and Warren's Buddhism in Translations, p. 201. Mr Aung says in Abhidhammatthasa@ngaha, p. 189, that bhavo includes kammabhavo (the active side of an existence) and upapattibhavo (the passive side). And the commentators say that bhava is a contraction of "kammabhava" or Karma-becoming i.e. karmic activity.]

[Footnote 2: Prof. De la Vallée Poussin in his Théoric des Douze Causes, p. 26, says that S'âlistambhasûtra explains the word "upâdâna" as "t@r@s@nâvaipulya" or hyper-t@r@s@nâ and Candrakîrtti also gives the same meaning, M. V. (B.T.S.p. 210). Govmdânanda explains "upâdâna" as prav@rtti (movement) generated by t@r@s@nâ (desire), i.e. the active tendency in pursuance of desire. But if upâdâna means "support" it would denote all the five skandhas. Thus Madhyamaka v@rtti says upâdânam pañcaskandhalak@sa@nam…pañcopâdânaskandhâkhyam upâdânam. M.V. XXVII. 6.]

[Footnote 3: Poussin's Théorie des Douze Causes, p. 23.

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birth [Footnote ref 1]. The manner in which the vijñâna produced in the womb is determined by the past vijñâna of the previous existence is according to some authorities of the nature of a reflected image, like the transmission of learning from the teacher to the disciple, like the lighting of a lamp from another lamp or like the impress of a stamp on wax. As all the skandhas are changing in life, so death also is but a similar change; there is no great break, but the same uniform sort of destruction and coming into being. New skandhas are produced as simultaneously as the two scale pans of a balance rise up and fall, in the same manner as a lamp is lighted or an image is reflected. At the death of the man the vijñâna resulting from his previous karmas and vijñânas enters into the womb of that mother (animal, man or the gods) in which the next skandhas are to be matured. This vijñâna thus forms the principle of the new life. It is in this vijñâna that name (nâma) and form (rûpa) become associated.

The vijñâna is indeed a direct product of the sa@mskâras and the sort of birth in which vijñâna should bring down (nâmayati) the new existence (upapatti) is determined by the sa@mskâras [Footnote ref 2], for in reality the happening of death (mara@nabhava) and the instillation of the vijñâna as the beginning of the new life (upapattibhava) cannot be simultaneous, but the latter succeeds just at the next moment, and it is to signify this close succession that they are said to be simultaneous. If the vijñâna had not entered the womb then no nâmarûpa could have appeared [Footnote ref 3].

This chain of twelve causes extends over three lives. Thus avidyâ and sa@mskâra of the past life produce the vijñâna, nâmarupa,

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[Footnote 1: The deities of the gardens, the woods, the trees and the plants, finding the master of the house, Citta, ill said "make your resolution, 'May I be a cakravarttî king in a next existence,'" Sa@myutta, IV. 303.]

[Footnote 2: "sa cedânandavijñâna@m mâtu@hkuk@sim nâvakrâmeta, na tat kalalam kalalatvâya sannivartteta," M. V. 552. Compare Caraka, S'ârîra, III. 5-8, where he speaks of a "upapîduka sattva" which connects the soul with body and by the absence of which the character is changed, the senses become affected and life ceases, when it is in a pure condition one can remember even the previous births; character, purity, antipathy, memory, fear, energy, all mental qualities are produced out of it. Just as a chariot is made by the combination of many elements, so is the foetus.]

[Footnote 3: Madhyamaka v@riti (B.T.S. 202-203). Poussin quotes from Dîgha, II. 63, "si le vijñâna ne descendait pas dans le sein maternel la namarupa s'y constituerait-il?" Govindânanda on S'a@nkara's commentary on the Brahma-sûtras (II. ii. 19) says that the first consciousness (vijñâna) of the foetus is produced by the sa@mskâras of the previous birth, and from that the four elements (which he calls nâma) and from that the white and red, semen and ovum, and the first stage of the foetus (kalala-budbudâvasthâ} is produced.]

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@sa@dâyatana, spars'a, vedanâ, t@r@s@nâ, upâdâna and the bhava (leading to another life) of the present actual life. This bhava produces the jâti and jarâmara@na of the next life [Footnote ref l].

It is interesting to note that these twelve links in the chain extending in three sections over three lives are all but the manifestations of sorrow to the bringing in of which they naturally determine one another. Thus Abhidhammatthasa@ngaha says "each of these twelve terms is a factor. For the composite term 'sorrow,' etc. is only meant to show incidental consequences of birth. Again when 'ignorance' and 'the actions of the mind' have been taken into account, craving (t@r@s@nâ), grasping (upâdâna) and (karma) becoming (bhava) are implicitly accounted for also. In the same manner when craving, grasping and (karma) becoming have been taken into account, ignorance and the actions of the mind are (implicitly) accounted for, also; and when birth, decay, and death are taken into account, even the fivefold fruit, to wit (rebirth), consciousness, and the rest are accounted for. And thus:

Five causes in the Past and Now a fivefold 'fruit.'

Five causes Now and yet to come a fivefold 'fruit' make up the Twenty Modes, the Three Connections (1. sa@nkhâra and viññâna, 2. vedanâ and tanhâ, 3. bhava and jâti) and the four groups (one causal group in the Past, one resultant group in the Present, one causal group in the Present and one resultant group in the Future, each group consisting of five modes) [Footnote ref 2]."

These twelve interdependent links (dvâdas'â@nga) represent the pa@ticcasamuppâda (pratâtyasamutpâda) doctrines (dependent origination) [Footnote ref 3] which are themselves but sorrow and lead to cycles of sorrow. The term pa@ticcasamuppâda or pratîtyasamutpâda has been differently interpreted in later Buddhist literature [Footnote ref 4].

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[Footnote 1: This explanation probably cannot be found in the early Pâli texts; but Buddhagho@sa mentions it in Suma@ngalavilâsinî on Mahânidâna suttanta. We find it also in Abhidhammatthasa@ngaha, VIII. 3. Ignorance and the actions of the mind belong to the past; "birth," "decay and death" to the future; the intermediate eight to the present. It is styled as tri@kâ@n@daka (having three branches) in Abhidkarmakos'a, III. 20-24. Two in the past branch, two in the future and eight in the middle "sa pratîtyasamutpâdo dvâdas'â@ngastrikâ@n@daka@h pûrvâparântayordve dve madhye@s@tau."]

[Footnote 2: Aung and Mrs Rhys Davids' translation of Abhidhammatthasa@ngaha, pp. 189-190.]

[Footnote 3: The twelve links are not always constant. Thus in the list given in the Dialogues of the Buddha, II. 23 f., avijjâ and sa@nkhâra have been omitted and the start has been made with consciousness, and it has been said that "Cognition turns back from name and form; it goes not beyond."]

[Footnote 4: M. V. p. 5 f.]

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Samutpâda means appearance or arising (prâdurbhdâva) and pratîtya means after getting (prati+i+ya); combining the two we find, arising after getting (something). The elements, depending on which there is some kind of arising, are called hetu (cause) and paccaya (ground). These two words however are often used in the same sense and are interchangeable. But paccaya is also used in a specific sense. Thus when it is said that avijjâ is the paccaya of sa@nkhâra it is meant that avijjâ is the ground (@thiti) of the origin of the sa@nkhâras, is the ground of their movement, of the instrument through which they stand (nimitta@t@thiti), of their ayuhana (conglomeration), of their interconnection, of their intelligibility, of their conjoint arising, of their function as cause and of their function as the ground with reference to those which are determined by them. Avijjâ in all these nine ways is the ground of sa@nkhâra both in the past and also in the future, though avijjâ itself is determined in its turn by other grounds [Footnote ref 1]. When we take the betu aspect of the causal chain, we cannot think of anything else but succession, but when we take the paccaya aspect we can have a better vision into the nature of the cause as ground. Thus when avijjâ is said to be the ground of the sa@nkhâras in the nine ways mentioned above, it seems reasonable to think that the sa@nkhâras were in some sense regarded as special manifestations of avijjâ [Footnote ref 2]. But as this point was not further developed in the early Buddhist texts it would be unwise to proceed further with it.

The Khandhas.

The word khandha (Skr. skandha) means the trunk of a tree and is generally used to mean group or aggregate [Footnote ref 3]. We have seen that Buddha said that there was no âtman (soul). He said that when people held that they found the much spoken of soul, they really only found the five khandhas together or any one of them. The khandhas are aggregates of bodily and psychical states which are immediate with us and are divided into five

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[Footnote 1: See Pa@tisambhidâmagga, vol. I.p. 50; see also Majjhima Nikâya, I. 67, sa@nkhâra…avijjânidânâ avijjâsamudayâ avijjâjâtikâ avijjâpabhavâ.]

[Footnote 2: In the Yoga derivation of asmitâ (egoism), râga (attachment), dve@sa (antipathy) and abhinives'a (self love) from avidyâ we find also that all the five are regarded as the five special stages of the growth of avidyâ (pañcaparvî avidyâ).]

[Footnote 3: The word skandha is used in Chândogya, II. 23 (trayo dharmaskandhâ@h yajña@h adhyayanam dânam) in the sense of branches and in almost the same sense in Maitrî, VII. II.]

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classes: (1) rûpa (four elements, the body, the senses), sense data, etc., (2) vedanâ (feeling—pleasurable, painful and indifferent), (3) saññâ (conceptual knowledge), (4) sa@nkhâra (synthetic mental states and the synthetic functioning of compound sense-affections, compound feelings and compound concepts), (5) viññâna (consciousness) [Footnote ref 1].

All these states rise depending one upon the other (pa@ticcasamuppanna) and when a man says that he perceives the self he only deludes himself, for he only perceives one or more of these. The word rûpa in rûpakhandha stands for matter and material qualities, the senses, and the sense data [Footnote ref 2]. But "rûpa" is also used in the sense of pure organic affections or states of mind as we find in the Khandha Yamaka, I.p. 16, and also in Sa@myutta Nikâya, III. 86. Rûpaskandha according to Dharmasa@mgraha means the aggregate of five senses, the five sensations, and the implicatory communications associated in sense perceptions vijñapti).

The elaborate discussion of Dhammasa@nga@ni begins by defining rûpa as "cattâro ca mahâbhûtâ catunnañca mahâbhntanam upâdâya rûpam" (the four mahâbhûtas or elements and that proceeding from the grasping of that is called rûpa) [Footnote ref 3]. Buddhagho@sa explains it by saying that rûpa means the four mahâbhûtas and those which arise depending (nissâya) on them as a modification of them. In the rûpa the six senses including their affections are also included. In explaining why the four elements are called mahâbhûtas, Buddhagho@sa says: "Just as a magician (mâyâkâra) makes the water which is not hard appear as hard, makes the stone which is not gold appear as gold; just as he himself though not a ghost nor a bird makes himself appear as a ghost or a bird, so these elements though not themselves blue make themselves appear as blue (nîlam upâdâ rûpam), not yellow, red, or white make themselves appear as yellow, red or white (odâtam upâdârûpam), so on account of their similarity to the appearances created by the magician they are called mahâbhûta [Footnote ref 4]."

In the Sa@myutta Nikâya we find that the Buddha says, "O
Bhikkhus it is called rûpam because it manifests (rûpyati); how

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[Footnote 1: Sa@myutta Nikâya, III. 86, etc.]

[Footnote 2: Abhidhammatthasangaha, J.P.T.S. 1884, p. 27 ff.]

[Footnote 3: Dhammasa@nga@ni, pp. 124-179.]

[Footnote 4: Atthasâlinî, p. 299.]

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does it manifest? It manifests as cold, and as heat, as hunger and as thirst, it manifests as the touch of gnats, mosquitos, wind, the sun and the snake; it manifests, therefore it is called rûpa [Footnote ref 1]."

If we take the somewhat conflicting passages referred to above for our consideration and try to combine them so as to understand what is meant by rûpa, I think we find that that which manifested itself to the senses and organs was called rûpa. No distinction seems to have been made between the sense-data as colours, smells, etc., as existing in the physical world and their appearance as sensations. They were only numerically different and the appearance of the sensations was dependent upon the sense-data and the senses but the sense-data and the sensations were "rûpa." Under certain conditions the sense-data were followed by the sensations. Buddhism did not probably start with the same kind of division of matter and mind as we now do. And it may not be out of place to mention that such an opposition and duality were found neither in the Upani@sads nor in the Sâ@mkhya system which is regarded by some as pre-Buddhistic. The four elements manifested themselves in certain forms and were therefore called rûpa; the forms of affection that appeared were also called rûpa; many other mental states or features which appeared with them were also called rûpa [Footnote ref 2]. The âyatanas or the senses were also called rûpa [Footnote ref 3]. The mahâbhûtas or four elements were themselves but changing manifestations, and they together with all that appeared in association with them were called rûpa and formed the rûpa khandha (the classes of sense-materials, sense-data, senses and sensations).

In Sa@myutta Nikâya (III. 101) it is said that "the four mahâbhûtas were the hetu and the paccaya for the communication of the rûpakkhandha (rûpakkhandhassa paññâpanâya). Contact (sense-contact, phassa) is the cause of the communication of feelings (vedanâ); sense-contact was also the hetu and paccaya for the communication of the saññâkkhandha; sense-contact is also the hetu and paccaya for the communication of the sa@nkhârakkhandha. But nâmarûpa is the hetu and the paccaya for the communication of the viññânakkhandha." Thus not only feelings arise on account of the sense-contact but saññâ and sa@nkhâra also arise therefrom. Saññâ is that where specific knowing or

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[Footnote 1: Sa@myutta Nikâya, III. 86.]

[Footnote 2: Khandhayamaka.]

[Footnote 3: Dhammasanga@ni, p. 124 ff.]

96

conceiving takes place. This is the stage where the specific distinctive knowledge as the yellow or the red takes place.

Mrs. Rhys Davids writing on saññâ says: "In editing the second book of the Abhidhamma pi@taka I found a classification distinguishing between saññâ as cognitive assimilation on occasion of sense, and saññâ as cognitive assimilation of ideas by way of naming. The former is called perception of resistance, or opposition (patigha-saññâ). This, writes Buddhagho@sa, is perception on occasion of sight, hearing, etc., when consciousness is aware of the impact of impressions; of external things as different, we might say. The latter is called perception of the equivalent word or name (adhivachânâ-saññâ) and is exercised by the sensus communis (mano), when e.g. 'one is seated…and asks another who is thoughtful: "What are you thinking of?" one perceives through his speech.' Thus there are two stages of saññâ-consciousness, 1. contemplating sense-impressions, 2. ability to know what they are by naming [Footnote ref 1]."

About sa@nkhâra we read in Sa@myutta Nikâya (III. 87) that it is called sa@nkhâra because it synthesises (abhisa@nkharonti), it is that which conglomerated rûpa as rûpa, conglomerated saññâ as saññâ, sa@nkhâra as sa@nkhâra and consciousness (viññâna) as consciousness. It is called sa@nkhâra because it synthesises the conglomerated (sa@nkhatam abhisa@nkharonti). It is thus a synthetic function which synthesises the passive rûpa, saññâ, sa@nkhâra and viññâna elements. The fact that we hear of 52 sa@nkhâra states and also that the sa@nkhâra exercises its synthetic activity on the conglomerated elements in it, goes to show that probably the word sa@nkhâra is used in two senses, as mental states and as synthetic activity.

Viññâna or consciousness meant according to Buddhagho@sa, as we have already seen in the previous section, both the stage at which the intellectual process started and also the final resulting consciousness.

Buddhagho@sa in explaining the process of Buddhist psychology says that "consciousness(citta)first comes into touch (phassa) with its object (âramma@na) and thereafter feeling, conception (saññâ) and volition (cetanâ) come in. This contact is like the pillars of a palace, and the rest are but the superstructure built upon it (dabbasambhârasadisâ). But it should not be thought that contact

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[Footnote 1: Buddhist Psychology, pp. 49, 50.]

97

is the beginning of the psychological processes, for in one whole consciousness (ekacittasmi@m) it cannot be said that this comes first and that comes after, so we can take contact in association with feeling (vedanâ), conceiving (saññâ) or volition (cetanâ); it is itself an immaterial state but yet since it comprehends objects it is called contact." "There is no impinging on one side of the object (as in physical contact), nevertheless contact causes consciousness and object to be in collision, as visible object and visual organs, sound and hearing; thus impact is its function; or it has impact as its essential property in the sense of attainment, owing to the impact of the physical basis with the mental object. For it is said in the Commentary:—"contact in the four planes of existence is never without the characteristic of touch with the object; but the function of impact takes place in the five doors. For to sense, or five-door contact, is given the name 'having the characteristic of touch' as well as 'having the function of impact.' But to contact in the mind-door there is only the characteristic of touch, but not the function of impact. And then this Sutta is quoted 'As if, sire, two rams were to fight, one ram to represent the eye, the second the visible object, and their collision contact. And as if, sire, two cymbals were to strike against each other, or two hands were to clap against each other; one hand would represent the eye, the second the visible object and their collision contact. Thus contact has the characteristic of touch and the function of impact [Footnote ref 1]'. Contact is the manifestation of the union of the three (the object, the consciousness and the sense) and its effect is feeling (vedanâ); though it is generated by the objects it is felt in the consciousness and its chief feature is experiencing (anubhava) the taste of the object. As regards enjoying the taste of an object, the remaining associated states enjoy it only partially. Of contact there is (the function of) the mere touching, of perception the mere noting or perceiving, of volition the mere coordinating, of consciousness the mere cognizing. But feeling alone, through governance, proficiency, mastery, enjoys the taste of an object. For feeling is like the king, the remaining states are like the cook. As the cook, when he has prepared food of diverse tastes, puts it in a basket, seals it, takes it to the king, breaks the seal, opens the basket, takes the best of all the soup and curries, puts them in a dish, swallows (a portion) to find out

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[Footnote 1: Atthasâlinî, p. 108; translation, pp. 143-144.]

98

whether they are faulty or not and afterwards offers the food of various excellent tastes to the king, and the king, being lord, expert, and master, eats whatever he likes, even so the mere tasting of the food by the cook is like the partial enjoyment of the object by the remaining states, and as the cook tastes a portion of the food, so the remaining states enjoy a portion of the object, and as the king, being lord, expert and master, eats the meal according to his pleasure so feeling being lord expert, and master, enjoys the taste of the object and therefore it is said that enjoyment or experience is its function [Footnote ref 1]."

The special feature of saññâ is said to be the recognizing (paccabhiññâ) by means of a sign (abhiññânena). According to another explanation, a recognition takes place by the inclusion of the totality (of aspects)—sabbasa@ngahikavasena. The work of volition (cetanâ) is said to be coordination or binding together (abhisandahana). "Volition is exceedingly energetic and makes a double effort, a double exertion. Hence the Ancients said 'Volition is like the nature of a landowner, a cultivator who taking fifty-five strong men, went down to the fields to reap. He was exceedingly energetic and exceedingly strenuous; he doubled his strength and said "Take your sickles" and so forth, pointed out the portion to be reaped, offered them drink, food, scent, flowers, etc., and took an equal share of the work.' The simile should be thus applied: volition is like the cultivator, the fifty-five moral states which arise as factors of consciousness are like the fifty-five strong men; like the time of doubling strength, doubling effort by the cultivator is the doubled strength, doubled effort of volition as regards activity in moral and immoral acts [Footnote ref 2]." It seems that probably the active side operating in sa@nkhâra was separately designated as cetanâ (volition).

"When one says 'I,' what he does is that he refers either to all the khandhas combined or any one of them and deludes himself that that was 'I.' Just as one could not say that the fragrance of the lotus belonged to the petals, the colour or the pollen, so one could not say that the rûpa was 'I' or that the vedanâ was 'I' or any of the other khandhas was 'I.' There is nowhere to be found in the khandhas 'I am [Footnote ref 3]'."

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[Footnote 1: Atthasâlinî, pp. 109-110; translation, pp. 145-146.]

[Footnote 2: Ibid. p. 111; translation, pp. 147-148.]

[Footnote 3: Samyutta Nikâya, III. 130.]

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Avijjâ and Âsava.

As to the question how the avijjâ (ignorance) first started there can be no answer, for we could never say that either ignorance or desire for existence ever has any beginning [Footnote ref 1]. Its fruition is seen in the cycle of existence and the sorrow that comes in its train, and it comes and goes with them all. Thus as we can never say that it has any beginning, it determines the elements which bring about cycles of existence and is itself determined by certain others. This mutual determination can only take place in and through the changing series of dependent phenomena, for there is nothing which can be said to have any absolute priority in time or stability. It is said that it is through the coming into being of the âsavas or depravities that the avijjâ came into being, and that through the destruction of the depravities (âsava) the avijjâ was destroyed [Footnote ref 2]. These âsavas are classified in the Dhammasa@nga@ni as kâmâsava, bhavâsava, di@t@thâsava and avijjâsava. Kâmâsava means desire, attachment, pleasure, and thirst after the qualities associated with the senses; bhavâsava means desire, attachment and will for existence or birth; di@t@thâsava means the holding of heretical views, such as, the world is eternal or non-eternal, or that the world will come to an end or will not come to an end, or that the body and the soul are one or are different; avijjâsava means the ignorance of sorrow, its cause, its extinction and its means of extinction. Dhammasa@nga@ni adds four more supplementary ones, viz. ignorance about the nature of anterior mental khandhas, posterior mental khandhas, anterior and posterior together, and their mutual dependence [Footnote ref 3]. Kâmâsava and bhavâsava can as Buddhagho@sa says be counted as one, for they are both but depravities due to attachment [Footnote ref 4].

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[Footnote 1: Warren's Buddhism in Translations (Visuddhimagga, chap.
XVII.), p. 175.]

[Footnote 2: M. N. I.p. 54. Childers translates "âsava" as "depravities" and Mrs Rhys Davids as "intoxicants." The word "âsava" in Skr. means "old wine." It is derived from "su" to produce by Buddhagho@sa and the meaning that he gives to it is "cira pârivâsika@t@thena" (on account of its being stored up for a long time like wine). They work through the eye and the mind and continue to produce all beings up to Indra. As those wines which are kept long are called "âsavas" so these are also called âsavas for remaining a long time. The other alternative that Buddhagho@sa gives is that they are called âsava on account of their producing sa@msâradukkha (sorrows of the world), Atthasâlinî, p. 48. Contrast it with Jaina âsrava (flowing in of karma matter). Finding it difficult to translate it in one word after Buddhagho@sa, I have translated it as "depravities," after Childers.]

[Footnote 3: See Dhammasa@nga@ni, p. 195.]

[Footnote 4: Buddhagho@sa's Atthasâlinî, p. 371.]

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The di@t@thâsavas by clouding the mind with false metaphysical views stand in the way of one's adopting the true Buddhistic doctrines. The kâmasâvas stand in the way of one's entering into the way of Nirvâ@na (anâgâmimagga) and the bhavâsavas and avijjâsavas stand in the way of one's attaining arha or final emancipation. When the Majjhima Nikâya says that from the rise of the âsavas avijjâ rises, it evidently counts avijjâ there as in some sense separate from the other âsavas, such as those of attachment and desire of existence which veil the true knowledge about sorrow.

The afflictions (kilesas) do not differ much from the âsavas for they are but the specific passions in forms ordinarily familiar to us, such as covetousness (lobha), anger or hatred (dosa), infatuation (moha), arrogance, pride or vanity (mâna), heresy (di@t@thi), doubt or uncertainty (vicikicchâ), idleness (thîna), boastfulness (udhacca), shamelessness (ahirika) and hardness of heart anottapa); these kilesas proceed directly as a result of the âsavas. In spite of these varieties they are often counted as three (lobha, dosa, moha) and these together are called kilesa. They are associated with the vedanâkkhandha, saññâkkhandha, sa@nkhârakkhandha and viññânakkhandha. From these arise the three kinds of actions, of speech, of body, and of mind [Footnote ref 1].

Sîla and Samâdhi.

We are intertwined all through outside and inside by the tangles of desire (ta@nhâ ja@tâ), and the only way by which these may be loosened is by the practice of right discipline (sîla), concentration (samâdhi) and wisdom (paññâ). Sîla briefly means the desisting from committing all sinful deeds (sabbapâpassa akara@nam). With sîla therefore the first start has to be made, for by it one ceases to do all actions prompted by bad desires and thereby removes the inrush of dangers and disturbances. This serves to remove the kilesas, and therefore the proper performance of the sîla would lead one to the first two successive stages of sainthood, viz. the sotâpannabhâva (the stage in which one is put in the right current) and the sakadâgâmibhâva (the stage when one has only one more birth to undergo). Samâdhi is a more advanced effort, for by it all the old roots of the old kilesas are destroyed and the ta@nhâ or desire is removed and

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[Footnote 1: Dhammasa@nga@ni, p. 180.]

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by it one is led to the more advanced states of a saint. It directly brings in paññâ (true wisdom) and by paññâ the saint achieves final emancipation and becomes what is called an arhat [Footnote ref 1]. Wisdom (paññâ) is right knowledge about the four âriya saccas, viz. sorrow, its cause, its destruction and its cause of destruction.

Sîla means those particular volitions and mental states, etc. by which a man who desists from committing sinful actions maintains himself on the right path. Sîla thus means 1. right volition (cetanâ), 2. the associated mental states (cetasika), 3. mental control (sa@mvara) and 4. the actual non-transgression (in body and speech) of the course of conduct already in the mind by the preceding three sîlas called avîtikkama. Sa@mvara is spoken of as being of five kinds, 1. Pâ@timokkhasa@mvara (the control which saves him who abides by it), 2. Satisa@mvara (the control of mindfulness), 3. Ñânasa@mvara (the control of knowledge), 4. Khantisa@mvara (the control of patience), 5. Viriyasa@mvara (the control of active self-restraint). Pâ@timokkhasa@mvara means all self-control in general. Satisa@mvara means the mindfulness by which one can bring in the right and good associations when using one's cognitive senses. Even when looking at any tempting object he will by virtue of his mindfulness (sati) control himself from being tempted by avoiding to think of its tempting side and by thinking on such aspects of it as may lead in the right direction. Khantisa@mvara is that by which one can remain unperturbed in heat and cold. By the proper adherence to sîla all our bodily, mental and vocal activities (kamma) are duly systematized, organized, stabilized (samâdhânam, upadhâra@na@m, pati@t@thâ) [Footnote ref 2].

The sage who adopts the full course should also follow a number of healthy monastic rules with reference to dress, sitting, dining, etc., which are called the dhûta@ngas or pure disciplinary parts [Footnote ref 3]. The practice of sîla and the dhûtangas help the sage to adopt the course of samâdhi. Samâdhi as we have seen means the concentration of the mind bent on right endeavours (kusalacittekaggatâ samâdhi@h) together with its states upon one particular object (ekâramma@na) so that they may completely cease to shift and change (sammâ ca avikkhipamânâ) [Footnote ref 4].

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[Footnote 1: Visuddhimagga Nidânâdikathâ.]

[Footnote 2: Visuddhimagga-sîlaniddeso, pp. 7 and 8.]

[Footnote 3: Visuddhimagga, II.]

[Footnote 4: Visuddhimagga, pp. 84-85.]

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The man who has practised sîla must train his mind first in particular ways, so that it may be possible for him to acquire the chief concentration of meditation called jhâna (fixed and steady meditation). These preliminary endeavours of the mind for the acquirement of jhânasamâdhi eventually lead to it and are called upacâra samâdhi (preliminary samâdhi) as distinguished from the jhânasamâdhi called the appanâsamâdhi (achieved samâdhi) [Footnote ref 1]. Thus as a preparatory measure, firstly he has to train his mind continually to view with disgust the appetitive desires for eating and drinking (âhâre pa@tikkûlasaññâ) by emphasizing in the mind the various troubles that are associated in seeking food and drink and their ultimate loathsome transformations as various nauseating bodily elements. When a man continually habituates himself to emphasize the disgusting associations of food and drink, he ceases to have any attachment to them and simply takes them as an unavoidable evil, only awaiting the day when the final dissolution of all sorrows will come [Footnote ref 2]. Secondly he has to habituate his mind to the idea that all the parts of our body are made up of the four elements, k@siti (earth), ap (water), tejas (fire) and wind (air), like the carcase of a cow at the butcher's shop. This is technically called catudhâtuvavatthânabhâvanâ (the meditation of the body as being made up of the four elements) [Footnote ref 3]. Thirdly he has to habituate his mind to think again and again (anussati) about the virtues or greatness of the Buddha, the sa@ngha (the monks following the Buddha), the gods and the law (dhamma) of the Buddha, about the good effects of sîla, and the making of gifts (câgânussati), about the nature of death (mara@nânussati) and about the deep nature and qualities of the final extinction of all phenomena (upasamânussati) [Footnote ref 4].

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[Footnote 1: As it is not possible for me to enter into details, I follow what appears to me to be the main line of division showing the interconnection of jhâna (Skr. dhyâna) with its accessory stages called parikammas (Visuddhimagga, pp. 85 f.).]

[Footnote 2: Visuddhimagga, pp. 341-347; mark the intense pessimistic attitude, "Imañ ca pana âhâre pa@tikulasaññâ@m anuyuttassa bhikkhu@no rasata@nhâya cittam pa@tilîyati, pa@tiku@t@tati, pa@tiva@t@tati; so, kantâranitthara@na@t@thiko viya puttama@msa@m vigatamado âhâra@m âhâreti yâvad eva dukkhassa ni@t@thara@natthâya," p. 347. The mind of him who inspires himself with this supreme disgust to all food, becomes free from all desires for palatable tastes, and turns its back to them and flies off from them. As a means of getting rid of all sorrow he takes his food without any attachment as one would eat the flesh of his own son to sustain himself in crossing a forest.]

[Footnote 3: Visuddhimagga, pp. 347-370.]

[Footnote 4: Visuddhimagga, pp. 197-294.]

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Advancing further from the preliminary meditations or preparations called the upacâra samâdhi we come to those other sources of concentration and meditation called the appanâsamâdhi which directly lead to the achievement of the highest samâdhi. The processes of purification and strengthening of the mind continue in this stage also, but these represent the last attempts which lead the mind to its final goal Nibbâna. In the first part of this stage the sage has to go to the cremation grounds and notice the diverse horrifying changes of the human carcases and think how nauseating, loathsome, unsightly and impure they are, and from this he will turn his mind to the living human bodies and convince himself that they being in essence the same as the dead carcases are as loathsome as they [Footnote ref.1] This is called asubhakamma@t@thâna or the endeavour to perceive the impurity of our bodies. He should think of the anatomical parts and constituents of the body as well as their processes, and this will help him to enter into the first jhâna by leading his mind away from his body. This is called the kayagatasati or the continual mindfulness about the nature of the body [Footnote ref 2]. As an aid to concentration the sage should sit in a quiet place and fix his mind on the inhaling (passâsa) and the exhaling (âssâsa) of his breath, so that instead of breathing in a more or less unconscious manner he may be aware whether he is breathing quickly or slowly; he ought to mark it definitely by counting numbers, so that by fixing his mind on the numbers counted he may fix his mind on the whole process of inhalation and exhalation in all stages of its course. This is called the anapânasati or the mindfulness of inhalation and exhalation [Footnote ref 3]

Next to this we come to Brahmavihâra, the fourfold meditation of metta (universal friendship), karu@nâ (universal pity), muditâ (happiness in the prosperity and happiness of all) and upekkhâ (indifference to any kind of preferment of oneself, his friend, enemy or a third party). In order to habituate oneself to the meditation on universal friendship, one should start with thinking how he should himself like to root out all misery and become happy, how he should himself like to avoid death and live cheerfully, and then pass over to the idea that other beings would also have the same desires. He should thus habituate himself to think that his friends, his enemies, and all those with whom he is not

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[Footnote 1: Visuddhimagga, VI.]

[Footnote 2: Ibid. pp. 239-266.]

[Footnote 3: Ibid. pp. 266-292.]

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connected might all live and become happy. He should fix himself to such an extent in this meditation that he would not find any difference between the happiness or safety of himself and of others. He should never become angry with any person. Should he at any time feel himself offended on account of the injuries inflicted on him by his enemies, he should think of the futility of doubling his sadness by becoming sorry or vexed on that account. He should think that if he should allow himself to be affected by anger, he would spoil all his sîla which he was so carefully practising. If anyone has done a vile action by inflicting injury, should he himself also do the same by being angry at it? If he were finding fault with others for being angry, could he himself indulge in anger? Moreover he should think that all the dhammas are momentary (kha@nikattâ); that there no longer existed the khandhas which had inflicted the injury, and moreover the infliction of any injury being only a joint product, the man who was injured was himself an indispensable element in the production of the infliction as much as the man who inflicted the injury, and there could not thus be any special reason for making him responsible and of being angry with him. If even after thinking in this way the anger does not subside, he should think that by indulging in anger he could only bring mischief on himself through his bad deeds, and he should further think that the other man by being angry was only producing mischief to himself but not to him. By thinking in these ways the sage would be able to free his mind from anger against his enemies and establish himself in an attitude of universal friendship [Footnote ref 1]. This is called the mettâ-bhâvana. In the meditation of universal pity (karu@nâ) also one should sympathize with the sorrows of his friends and foes alike. The sage being more keen-sighted will feel pity for those who are apparently leading a happy life, but are neither acquiring merits nor endeavouring to proceed on the way to Nibbâna, for they are to suffer innumerable lives of sorrow [Footnote ref 2].

We next come to the jhânas with the help of material things as objects of concentration called the Kasi@nam. These objects of concentration may either be earth, water, fire, wind, blue colour, yellow colour, red colour, white colour, light or limited space (parîcchinnâkâsa). Thus the sage may take a brown ball of earth and concentrate his mind upon it as an earth ball, sometimes

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[Footnote 1: Visuddhimagga, pp. 295-314.]

[Footnote 2: Ibid. pp. 314-315.]

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with eyes open and sometimes with eyes shut. When he finds that even in shutting his eyes he can visualize the object in his mind, he may leave off the object and retire to another place to concentrate upon the image of the earth ball in his mind.

In the first stages of the first meditation (pathamam jhânam) the mind is concentrated on the object in the way of understanding it with its form and name and of comprehending it with its diverse relations. This state of concentration is called vitakka (discursive meditation). The next stage of the first meditation is that in which the mind does not move in the object in relational terms but becomes fixed and settled in it and penetrates into it without any quivering. This state is called vicâra (steadily moving). The first stage vitakka has been compared in Buddhagho@sa's Visuddhimagga to the flying of a kite with its wings flapping, whereas the second stage is compared to its flying in a sweep without the least quiver of its wings. These two stages are associated with a buoyant exaltation (pîti) and a steady inward bliss called sukha [Footnote ref 1] instilling the mind. The formation of this first jhâna roots out five ties of avijjâ, kamacchando (dallying with desires), vyâpâdo (hatred), thinamiddham (sloth and torpor), uddhaccakukkuccam (pride and restlessness), and vicikicchâ (doubt). The five elements of which this jhâna is constituted are vitakka, vicâra, plti, sukham and ekaggata (one pointedness).

When the sage masters the first jhâna he finds it defective and wants to enter into the second meditation (dutiyam jhânam), where there is neither any vitakka nor vicâra of the first jhâna, but the mind is in one unruffled state (ekodibhâvam). It is a much steadier state and does not possess the movement which characterized the vitakka and the vicâra stages of the first jhâna and is therefore a very placid state (vitakka-vicârakkhobha-virahe@na ativiya acalatâ suppasannatâ ca). It is however associated with pîti, sukha and ekaggatâ as the first jhâna was.

When the second jhâna is mastered the sage becomes disinclined towards the enjoyment of the pîti of that stage and becomes indifferent to them (upekkhako). A sage in this stage sees the objects but is neither pleased nor displeased. At this stage all the âsavas of the sage become loosened (khî@nâsava). The enjoyment of sukha however still remains in the stage and the

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[Footnote 1: Where there is pîti there is sukha, but where there is sukha there may not necessarily be pîti. Vîsuddhimagga, p. 145.]

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mind if not properly and carefully watched would like sometimes to turn back to the enjoyment of pîti again. The two characteristics of this jhâna are sukha and ekaggatâ. It should however be noted that though there is the feeling of highest sukha here, the mind is not only not attached to it but is indifferent to it (atimadhhurasukhe sukhapâramippatte pi tatiyajjhâne upekkhako, na tattha sukhâbhisangena âka@d@dhiyati) [Footnote ref 1]. The earth ball (pa@thavî) is however still the object of the jhâna.

In the fourth or the last jhâna both the sukha (happiness) and the dukkha (misery) vanish away and all the roots of attachment and antipathies are destroyed. This state is characterized by supreme and absolute indifference (upekkhâ) which was slowly growing in all the various stages of the jhânas. The characteristics of this jhâna are therefore upekkhâ and ekaggatâ. With the mastery of this jhâna comes final perfection and total extinction of the citta called cetovimutti, and the sage becomes thereby an arhat [Footnote ref 2]. There is no further production of the khandhas, no rebirth, and there is the absolute cessation of all sorrows and sufferings—Nibbâna.

Kamma.

In the Katha (II. 6) Yama says that "a fool who is blinded with the infatuation of riches does not believe in a future life; he thinks that only this life exists and not any other, and thus he comes again and again within my grasp." In the Digha Nikâya also we read how Pâyâsi was trying to give his reasons in support of his belief that "Neither is there any other world, nor are there beings, reborn otherwise than from parents, nor is there fruit or result of deeds well done or ill done [Footnote ref 3]." Some of his arguments were that neither the vicious nor the virtuous return to tell us that they suffered or enjoyed happiness in the other world, that if the virtuous had a better life in store, and if they believed in it, they would certainly commit suicide in order to get it at the earliest opportunity, that in spite of taking the best precautions we do not find at the time of the death of any person that his soul goes out, or that his body weighs less on account of the departure of his soul, and so on. Kassapa refutes his arguments with apt illustrations. But in spite of a few agnostics of

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[Footnote 1: Visuddhimagga, p. 163.]

[Footnote 2: Majjhima Nikâya, I.p. 296, and Visuddhimagga, pp. 167-168.]

[Footnote 3: Dialogues of the Buddha, II. p. 349; D. N. II. pp. 317 ff.]

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Pâyâsi's type, we have every reason to believe that the doctrine of rebirth in other worlds and in this was often spoken of in the Upani@sads and taken as an accepted fact by the Buddha. In the Milinda Pañha, we find Nâgasena saying "it is through a difference in their karma that men are not all alike, but some long lived, some short lived, some healthy and some sickly, some handsome and some ugly, some powerful and some weak, some rich and some poor, some of high degree and some of low degree, some wise and some foolish [Footnote ref 1]." We have seen in the third chapter that the same soil of views was enunciated by the Upani@sad sages.

But karma could produce its effect in this life or any other life only when there were covetousness, antipathy and infatuation. But "when a man's deeds are performed without covetousness, arise without covetousness and are occasioned without covetousness, then inasmuch as covetousness is gone these deeds are abandoned, uprooted, pulled out of the ground like a palmyra tree and become non-existent and not liable to spring up again in the future [Footnote ref 2]." Karma by itself without craving (ta@nhâ) is incapable of bearing good or bad fruits. Thus we read in the Mahâsatipa@t@thâna sutta, "even this craving, potent for rebirth, that is accompanied by lust and self-indulgence, seeking satisfaction now here, now there, to wit, the craving for the life of sense, the craving for becoming (renewed life) and the craving for not becoming (for no new rebirth) [Footnote ref 3]." "Craving for things visible, craving for things audible, craving for things that may be smelt, tasted, touched, for things in memory recalled. These are the things in this world that are dear, that are pleasant. There does craving take its rise, there does it dwell [Footnote ref 4]." Pre-occupation and deliberation of sensual gratification giving rise to craving is the reason why sorrow comes. And this is the first ârya satya (noble truth).

The cessation of sorrow can only happen with "the utter cessation of and disenchantment about that very craving, giving it up, renouncing it and emancipation from it [Footnote ref 5]."

When the desire or craving (ta@nhâ) has once ceased the sage becomes an arhat, and the deeds that he may do after that will bear no fruit. An arhat cannot have any good or bad

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[Footnote 1: Warren's Buddhism in Translations, p. 215.]

[Footnote 2: Ibid. pp. 216-217.]

[Footnote 3: Dialogues of the Buddha, II. p. 340.]

[Footnote 4: Ibid. p. 341.]

[Footnote 5: Ibid. p. 341.]

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fruits of whatever he does. For it is through desire that karma finds its scope of giving fruit. With the cessation of desire all ignorance, antipathy and grasping cease and consequently there is nothing which can determine rebirth. An arhat may suffer the effects of the deeds done by him in some previous birth just as Moggallâna did, but in spite of the remnants of his past karma an arhat was an emancipated man on account of the cessation of his desire [Footnote ref 1].

Kammas are said to be of three kinds, of body, speech and mind (kâyika, vâcika and mânasika). The root of this kamma is however volition (cetanâ) and the states associated with it [Footnote ref 2]. If a man wishing to kill animals goes out into the forest in search of them, but cannot get any of them there even after a long search, his misconduct is not a bodily one, for he could not actually commit the deed with his body. So if he gives an order for committing a similar misdeed, and if it is not actually carried out with the body, it would be a misdeed by speech (vâcika) and not by the body. But the merest bad thought or ill will alone whether carried into effect or not would be a kamma of the mind (mânasika) [Footnote ref 3]. But the mental kamma must be present as the root of all bodily and vocal kammas, for if this is absent, as in the case of an arhat, there cannot be any kammas at all for him.

Kammas are divided from the point of view of effects into four classes, viz. (1) those which are bad and produce impurity, (2) those which are good and productive of purity, (3) those which are partly good and partly bad and thus productive of both purity and impurity, (4) those which are neither good nor bad and productive neither of purity nor of impurity, but which contribute to the destruction of kammas [Footnote ref 4].

Final extinction of sorrow (nibbâna) takes place as the natural result of the destruction of desires. Scholars of Buddhism have tried to discover the meaning of this ultimate happening, and various interpretations have been offered. Professor De la Vallée Poussin has pointed out that in the Pâli texts Nibbâna has sometimes been represented as a happy state, as pure annihilation, as an inconceivable existence or as a changeless state [Footnote ref 5].

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[Footnote 1: See Kathâvatthu and Warren's Buddhism in Translations, pp, 221 ff.]

[Footnote 2: Atthasâlinî, p. 88.]

[Footnote 3: See Atthasâlinî, p. 90.]

[Footnote 4: See Atthasâlinî, p. 89.]

[Footnote 5: Prof. De la Valláe Poussin's article in the E. R.E. on
Nirvâ@na. See also Cullavagga, IX. i. 4; Mrs Rhys Davids's Psalms
of the early Buddhists, I. and II., Introduction, p. xxxvii; Dîgha,
II. 15; Udâna, VIII.; Sa@myutta, III. 109.]

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Mr Schrader, in discussing Nibbâna in Pali Text Society Journal, 1905, says that the Buddha held that those who sought to become identified after death with the soul of the world as infinite space (âkâsa) or consciousness (viññâna) attained to a state in which they had a corresponding feeling of infiniteness without having really lost their individuality. This latter interpretation of Nibbâna seems to me to be very new and quite against the spirit of the Buddhistic texts. It seems to me to be a hopeless task to explain Nibbâna in terms of worldly experience, and there is no way in which we can better indicate it than by saying that it is a cessation of all sorrow; the stage at which all worldly experiences have ceased can hardly be described either as positive or negative. Whether we exist in some form eternally or do not exist is not a proper Buddhistic question, for it is a heresy to think of a Tathâgata as existing eternally (s'âs'vata) or not-existing (as'âs'vata) or whether he is existing as well as not existing or whether he is neither existing nor non-existing. Any one who seeks to discuss whether Nibbâna is either a positive and eternal state or a mere state of non-existence or annihilation, takes a view which has been discarded in Buddhism as heretical. It is true that we in modern times are not satisfied with it, for we want to know what it all means. But it is not possible to give any answer since Buddhism regarded all these questions as illegitimate.

Later Buddhistic writers like Nâgârjuna and Candrakîrtti took advantage of this attitude of early Buddhism and interpreted it as meaning the non-essential character of all existence. Nothing existed, and therefore any question regarding the existence or non-existence of anything would be meaningless. There is no difference between the worldly stage (sa@msâra) and Nibbâna, for as all appearances are non-essential, they never existed during the sa@msâra so that they could not be annihilated in Nibbâna.

Upani@sads and Buddhism.

The Upani@sads had discovered that the true self was ânanda (bliss) [Footnote ref 1]. We could suppose that early Buddhism tacitly presupposes some such idea. It was probably thought that if there was the self (attâ) it must be bliss. The Upani@sads had asserted that the self(âtman) was indestructible and eternal [Footnote ref 2]. If we are allowed

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[Footnote 1: Tait, II.5.]

[Footnote 2: B@rh. IV. 5. 14. Ka@tha V. 13.]

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to make explicit what was implicit in early Buddhism we could conceive it as holding that if there was the self it must be bliss, because it was eternal. This causal connection has not indeed been anywhere definitely pronounced in the Upani@sads, but he who carefully reads the Upani@sads cannot but think that the reason why the Upani@sads speak of the self as bliss is that it is eternal. But the converse statement that what was not eternal was sorrow does not appear to be emphasized clearly in the Upani@sads. The important postulate of the Buddha is that that which is changing is sorrow, and whatever is sorrow is not self [Footnote ref 1]. The point at which Buddhism parted from the Upani@sads lies in the experiences of the self. The Upani@sads doubtless considered that there were many experiences which we often identify with self, but which are impermanent. But the belief is found in the Upani@sads that there was associated with these a permanent part as well, and that it was this permanent essence which was the true and unchangeable self, the blissful. They considered that this permanent self as pure bliss could not be defined as this, but could only be indicated as not this, not this (neti neti) [Footnote ref 2]. But the early Pali scriptures hold that we could nowhere find out such a permanent essence, any constant self, in our changing experiences. All were but changing phenomena and therefore sorrow and therefore non-self, and what was non-self was not mine, neither I belonged to it, nor did it belong to me as my self [Footnote ref 3].

The true self was with the Upani@sads a matter of transcendental experience as it were, for they said that it could not be described in terms of anything, but could only be pointed out as "there," behind all the changing mental categories. The Buddha looked into the mind and saw that it did not exist. But how was it that the existence of this self was so widely spoken of as demonstrated in experience? To this the reply of the Buddha was that what people perceived there when they said that they perceived the self was but the mental experiences either individually or together. The ignorant ordinary man did not know the noble truths and was not trained in the way of wise men, and considered himself to be endowed with form (rûpa) or found the forms in his self or the self in the forms. He

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[Footnote 1: Sa@myutta Nikûya, III. pp. 44-45 ff.]

[Footnote 2: See B@rh. IV. iv. Chândogya, VIII. 7-12.]

[Footnote 3: Sa@myutta Nikaya, III 45.]

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experienced the thought (of the moment) as it were the self or experienced himself as being endowed with thought, or the thought in the self or the self in the thought. It is these kinds of experiences that he considered as the perception of the self [Footnote ref 1].

The Upani@sads did not try to establish any school of discipline or systematic thought. They revealed throughout the dawn of an experience of an immutable Reality as the self of man, as the only abiding truth behind all changes. But Buddhism holds that this immutable self of man is a delusion and a false knowledge. The first postulate of the system is that impermanence is sorrow. Ignorance about sorrow, ignorance about the way it originates, ignorance about the nature of the extinction of sorrow, and ignorance about the means of bringing about this extinction represent the fourfold ignorance (avijjâ) [Footnote ref 2]. The avidyâ, which is equivalent to the Pâli word avijjâ, occurs in the Upani@sads also, but there it means ignorance about the âtman doctrine, and it is sometimes contrasted with vidyâ or true knowledge about the self (âtman) [Footnote ref 3]. With the Upani@sads the highest truth was the permanent self, the bliss, but with the Buddha there was nothing permanent; and all was change; and all change and impermanence was sorrow [Footnote ref 4]. This is, then, the cardinal truth of Buddhism, and ignorance concerning it in the above fourfold ways represented the fourfold ignorance which stood in the way of the right comprehension of the fourfold cardinal truths (âriya sacca)—sorrow, cause of the origination of sorrow, extinction of sorrow, and the means thereto.

There is no Brahman or supreme permanent reality and no self, and this ignorance does not belong to any ego or self as we may ordinarily be led to suppose.

Thus it is said in the Visuddhimagga "inasmuch however as ignorance is empty of stability from being subject to a coming into existence and a disappearing from existence…and is empty of a self-determining Ego from being subject to dependence,—…or in other words inasmuch as ignorance is not an Ego, and similarly with reference to Karma and the rest—therefore is it to be understood of the wheel of existence that it is empty with a twelvefold emptiness [Footnote ref 5]."

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[Footnote 1: Samyutta Nikâya, II. 46.]

[Footnote 2: Majjhima Nikâya, I.p. 54.]

[Footnote 3: Châ. I.i. 10. B@rh. IV. 3.20. There are some passages where vidyâ and avidyâ have been used in a different and rather obscure sense, I's'â 9-11.]

[Footnote 4: A@ng. Nikâya, III. 85.]

[Footnote 5 Warren's Buddhism in Translations (Visuddhimagga, chap.
XVII.), p. 175.]

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The Schools of Theravâda Buddhism.

There is reason to believe that the oral instructions of the Buddha were not collected until a few centuries after his death. Serious quarrels arose amongst his disciples or rather amongst the successive generations of the disciples of his disciples about his doctrines and other monastic rules which he had enjoined upon his followers. Thus we find that when the council of Vesâli decided against the V@rjin monks, called also the Vajjiputtakas, they in their turn held another great meeting (Mahâsa@ngha) and came to their own decisions about certain monastic rules and thus came to be called as the Mahâsa@nghikas [Footnote ref 1]. According to Vasumitra as translated by Vassilief, the Mahâsa@nghikas seceded in 400 B.C. and during the next one hundred years they gave rise first to the three schools Ekavyavahârikas, Lokottaravâdins, and Kukkulikas and after that the Bahus'rutîyas. In the course of the next one hundred years, other schools rose out of it namely the Prajñaptivâdins, Caittikas, Aparas'ailas and Uttaras'ailas. The Theravâda or the Sthaviravâda school which had convened the council of Vesâli developed during the second and first century B.C. into a number of schools, viz. the Haimavatas, Dharmaguptikas, Mahîs'âsakas, Kâs'yapîyas, Sa@nkrântikas (more well known as Sautrântikas) and the Vâtsiputtrîyas which latter was again split up into the Dharmottarîyas, Bhadrayânîyas, Sammitîyas and Channâgarikas. The main branch of the Theravâda school was from the second century downwards known as the Hetuvâdins or Sarvâstivâdins [Footnote ref 2]. The Mahâbodhiva@msa identifies the Theravâda school with the Vibhajjavâdins. The commentator of the Kathâvatthu who probably lived according to Mrs Rhys Davids sometime in the fifth century A.D. mentions a few other schools of Buddhists. But of all these Buddhist schools we know very little. Vasumitra (100 A.D.) gives us some very meagre accounts of

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[Footnote 1: The Mahâva@msa differs from Dîpava@msa in holding that the Vajjiputtakas did not develop into the Mahâsa@nghikas, but it was the Mahâsa@nghikas who first seceded while the Vajjiputtakas seceded independently of them. The Mahâbodhiva@msa, which according to Professor Geiger was composed 975 A.D.—1000 A.D., follows the Mahava@msa in holding the Mahâsa@nghikas to be the first seceders and Vajjiputtakas to have seceded independently.

Vasumitra confuses the council of Vesali with the third council of
Pâ@taliputra. See introduction to translation of Kathâvatthu by
Mrs Rhys Davids.]

[Footnote 2: For other accounts of the schism see Mr Aung and Mrs Rhys
Davids's translation of Kathâvatthu, pp. xxxvi-xlv.]

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certain schools, of the Mahâsa@nghikas, Lokottaravâdins, Ekavyavahârikas, Kakkulikas, Prajñaptivâdins and Sarvâstivâdins, but these accounts deal more with subsidiary matters of little philosophical importance. Some of the points of interest are (1) that the Mahâsa@nghikas were said to believe that the body was filled with mind (citta) which was represented as sitting, (2) that the Prajñaptivâdins held that there was no agent in man, that there was no untimely death, for it was caused by the previous deeds of man, (3) that the Sarvâstivâdins believed that everything existed. From the discussions found in the Kathâvatthu also we may know the views of some of the schools on some points which are not always devoid of philosophical interest. But there is nothing to be found by which we can properly know the philosophy of these schools. It is quite possible however that these so-called schools of Buddhism were not so many different systems but only differed from one another on some points of dogma or practice which were considered as being of sufficient interest to them, but which to us now appear to be quite trifling. But as we do not know any of their literatures, it is better not to make any unwarrantable surmises. These schools are however not very important for a history of later Indian Philosophy, for none of them are even referred to in any of the systems of Hindu thought. The only schools of Buddhism with which other schools of philosophical thought came in direct contact, are the Sarvâstivâdins including the Sautrântikas and the Vaibhâ@sikas, the Yogâcâra or the Vijñânavâdins and the Mâdhyamikas or the S'ûnyavâdins. We do not know which of the diverse smaller schools were taken up into these four great schools, the Sautrântika, Vaibhâ@sika, Yogâcâra and the Mâdhyamika schools. But as these schools were most important in relation to the development of the different systems in Hindu thought, it is best that we should set ourselves to gather what we can about these systems of Buddhistic thought.

When the Hindu writers refer to the Buddhist doctrine in general terms such as "the Buddhists say" without calling them the Vijñânavâdins or the Yogâcâras and the S'ûnyavâdins, they often refer to the Sarvûstivûdins by which they mean both the Sautrûntikas and the Vaibhû@sikas, ignoring the difference that exists between these two schools. It is well to mention that there is hardly any evidence to prove that the Hindu writers were acquainted with the Theravûda doctrines

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as expressed in the Pâli works. The Vaibhâ@sikas and the Sautrântikas have been more or less associated with each other. Thus the Abhidharmakos'as'âstra of Vasubandhu who was a Vaibhâ@sika was commented upon by Yas'omitra who was a Sautrântika. The difference between the Vaibhâ@sikas and the Sautrântikas that attracted the notice of the Hindu writers was this, that the former believed that external objects were directly perceived, whereas the latter believed that the existence of the external objects could only be inferred from our diversified knowledge [Footnote ref 1]. Gu@naratna (fourteenth century A.D.) in his commentary Tarkarahasyadîpikâ on @Sa@ddars'anasamuccaya says that the Vaibhâsika was but another name of the Âryasammitîya school. According to Gu@naratna the Vaibhâ@sikas held that things existed for four moments, the moment of production, the moment of existence, the moment of decay and the moment of annihilation. It has been pointed out in Vastlbandhu's Abhidharmakos'a that the Vaibhâ@sikas believed these to be four kinds of forces which by coming in combination with the permanent essence of an entity produced its impermanent manifestations in life (see Prof. Stcherbatsky's translation of Yas'omitra on Abhidharmakos'a kârikâ, V. 25). The self called pudgala also possessed those characteristics. Knowledge was formless and was produced along with its object by the very same conditions (arthasahabhâsî ekasamâgryadhînah). The Sautrântikas according to Gu@naratna held that there was no soul but only the five skandhas. These skandhas transmigrated. The past, the future, annihilation, dependence on cause, âkâs'a and pudgala are but names (sa@mjñâmâtram), mere assertions (pratijñâmâtram), mere limitations (samv@rtamâtram) and mere phenomena (vyavahâramâtram). By pudgala they meant that which other people called eternal and all pervasive soul. External objects are never directly perceived but are only inferred as existing for explaining the diversity of knowledge. Definite cognitions are valid; all compounded things are momentary (k@sa@nikâh sarvasa@mskârâh).

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[Footnote 1: Mâdhavâcârya's Sarvadars'anasa@mgraha, chapter II. S'âstradîpikâ, the discussions on Pratyak@sa, Amalañanda's commentary (on Bhâmatî) Vedântakalpataru, p 286. "vaibhâ@sikasya bâhyo'rtha@h pratyak@sa@h, sautrântikasya jñânagatâkâravaicitrye@n anumeya@h." The nature of the inference of the Sautrântikas is shown thus by Amalânanda (1247-1260 A.D.) "ye yasmin satyapi kâdâcitkâ@h te tadatiriktâpek@sâ@h" (those [i.e. cognitions] which in spite of certain unvaried conditions are of unaccounted diversity must depend on other things in addition to these, i.e. the external objects) Vedântakalpataru, p. 289.]

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The atoms of colour, taste, smell and touch, and cognition are being destroyed every moment. The meanings of words always imply the negations of all other things, excepting that which is intended to be signified by that word (anyâpoha@h s'abdârtha@h). Salvation (mok@sa) comes as the result of the destruction of the process of knowledge through continual meditation that there is no soul [Footnote ref 1].

One of the main differences between the Vibhajjavâdins, Sautrântikas and the Vaibhâ@sikas or the Sarvâstivâdins appears to refer to the notion of time which is a subject of great interest with Buddhist philosophy. Thus Abhidharmakos'a (v. 24…) describes the Sarvâstivâdins as those who maintain the universal existence of everything past, present and future. The Vibhajjavâdins are those "who maintain that the present elements and those among the past that have not yet produced their fruition, are existent, but they deny the existence of the future ones and of those among the past that have already produced fruition." There were four branches of this school represented by Dharmatrâta, Gho@sa, Vasumitra and Buddhadeva. Dharmatrâta maintained that when an element enters different times, its existence changes but not its essence, just as when milk is changed into curd or a golden vessel is broken, the form of the existence changes though the essence remains the same. Gho@sa held that "when an element appears at different times, the past one retains its past aspects without being severed from its future and present aspects, the present likewise retains its present aspect without completely losing its past and future aspects," just as a man in passionate love with a woman does not lose his capacity to love other women though he is not actually in love with them. Vasumitra held that an entity is called present, past and future according as it produces its efficiency, ceases to produce after having once produced it or has not yet begun to produce it. Buddhadeva maintained the view that just as the same woman may be called mother, daughter, wife, so the same entity may be called present, past or future in accordance with its relation to the preceding or the succeeding moment.

All these schools are in some sense Sarvâstivâdins, for they maintain universal existence. But the Vaibhâ@sika finds them all defective excepting the view of Vasumitra. For Dharmatrâta's

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[Footnote 1: Gu@naratna's Tarkarahasyadîpikâ, pp. 46-47.]

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view is only a veiled Sâ@mkhya doctrine; that of Gho@sa is a confusion of the notion of time, since it presupposes the coexistence of all the aspects of an entity at the same time, and that of Buddhadeva is also an impossible situation, since it would suppose that all the three times were found together and included in one of them. The Vaibhâ@sika finds himself in agreement with Vasumitra's view and holds that the difference in time depends upon the difference of the function of an entity; at the time when an entity does not actually produce its function it is future; when it produces it, it becomes present; when after having produced it, it stops, it becomes past; there is a real existence of the past and the future as much as of the present. He thinks that if the past did not exist and assert some efficiency it could not have been the object of my knowledge, and deeds done in past times could not have produced its effects in the present time. The Sautrântika however thought that the Vaibhâ@sika's doctrine would imply the heretical doctrine of eternal existence, for according to them the stuff remained the same and the time-difference appeared in it. The true view according to him was, that there was no difference between the efficiency of an entity, the entity and the time of its appearance. Entities appeared from non-existence, existed for a moment and again ceased to exist. He objected to the Vaibhâ@sika view that the past is to be regarded as existent because it exerts efficiency in bringing about the present on the ground that in that case there should be no difference between the past and the present, since both exerted efficiency. If a distinction is made between past, present and future efficiency by a second grade of efficiencies, then we should have to continue it and thus have a vicious infinite. We can know non-existent entities as much as we can know existent ones, and hence our knowledge of the past does not imply that the past is exerting any efficiency. If a distinction is made between an efficiency and an entity, then the reason why efficiency started at any particular time and ceased at another would be inexplicable. Once you admit that there is no difference between efficiency and the entity, you at once find that there is no time at all and the efficiency, the entity and the moment are all one and the same. When we remember a thing of the past we do not know it as existing in the past, but in the same way in which we knew it when it was present. We are

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never attracted to past passions as the Vaibhâ@sika suggests, but past passions leave residues which become the causes of new passions of the present moment [Footnote ref.1].

Again we can have a glimpse of the respective positions of the Vâtsiputtrîyas and the Sarvâstivâdins as represented by Vasubandhu if we attend to the discussion on the subject of the existence of soul in Abhidharmakos'a. The argument of Vasubandhu against the existence of soul is this, that though it is true that the sense organs may be regarded as a determining cause of perception, no such cause can be found which may render the inference of the existence of soul necessary. If soul actually exists, it must have an essence of its own and must be something different from the elements or entities of a personal life. Moreover, such an eternal, uncaused and unchanging being would be without any practical efficiency (arthakriyâkâritva) which alone determines or proves existence. The soul can thus be said to have a mere nominal existence as a mere object of current usage. There is no soul, but there are only the elements of a personal life. But the Vâtsiputtrîya school held that just as fire could not be said to be either the same as the burning wood or as different from it, and yet it is separate from it, so the soul is an individual (pudgala) which has a separate existence, though we could not say that it was altogether different from the elements of a personal life or the same as these. It exists as being conditioned by the elements of personal life, but it cannot further be defined. But its existence cannot be denied, for wherever there is an activity, there must be an agent (e.g. Devadatta walks). To be conscious is likewise an action, hence the agent who is conscious must also exist. To this Vasubandhu replies that Devadatta (the name of a person) does not represent an unity. "It is only an unbroken continuity of momentary forces (flashing into existence), which simple people believe to be a unity and to which they give the name Devadatta. Their belief that Devadatta moves is conditioned, and is based on an analogy with their own experience, but their own continuity of life consists in constantly moving from one place to another. This movement, though regarded as

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[Footnote 1: I am indebted for the above account to the unpublished translation from Tibetan of a small portion of Abhidharmakoia by my esteemed friend Prof. Th. Stcherbatsky of Petrograd. I am grateful to him that he allowed me to utilize it.]

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belonging to a permanent entity, is but a series of new productions in different places, just as the expressions 'fire moves,' 'sound spreads' have the meaning of continuities (of new productions in new places). They likewise use the words 'Devadatta cognises' in order to express the fact that a cognition (takes place in the present moment) which has a cause (in the former moments, these former moments coming in close succession being called Devadatta)."

The problem of memory also does not bring any difficulty, for the stream of consciousness being one throughout, it produces its recollections when connected with a previous knowledge of the remembered object under certain conditions of attention, etc., and absence of distractive factors, such as bodily pains or violent emotions. No agent is required in the phenomena of memory. The cause of recollection is a suitable state of mind and nothing else. When the Buddha told his birth stories saying that he was such and such in such and such a life, he only meant that his past and his present belonged to one and the same lineage of momentary existences. Just as when we say "this same fire which had been consuming that has reached this object," we know that the fire is not identical at any two moments, but yet we overlook the difference and say that it is the same fire. Again, what we call an individual can only be known by descriptions such as "this venerable man, having this name, of such a caste, of such a family, of such an age, eating such food, finding pleasure or displeasure in such things, of such an age, the man who after a life of such length, will pass away having reached an age." Only so much description can be understood, but we have never a direct acquaintance with the individual; all that is perceived are the momentary elements of sensations, images, feelings, etc., and these happening at the former moments exert a pressure on the later ones. The individual is thus only a fiction, a mere nominal existence, a mere thing of description and not of acquaintance; it cannot be grasped either by the senses or by the action of pure intellect. This becomes evident when we judge it by analogies from other fields. Thus whenever we use any common noun, e.g. milk, we sometimes falsely think that there is such an entity as milk, but what really exists is only certain momentary colours, tastes, etc., fictitiously unified as milk; and "just as milk and water are

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conventional names (for a set of independent elements) for some colour, smell (taste and touch) taken together, so is the designation 'individual' but a common name for the different elements of which it is composed."

The reason why the Buddha declined to decide the question whether the "living being is identical with the body or not" is just because there did not exist any living being as "individual," as is generally supposed. He did not declare that the living being did not exist, because in that case the questioner would have thought that the continuity of the elements of a life was also denied. In truth the "living being" is only a conventional name for a set of constantly changing elements [Footnote ref 1].

The only book of the Sammitîyas known to us and that by name only is the Sammitîyas'âstra translated into Chinese between 350 A.D. to 431 A.D.; the original Sanskrit works are however probably lost [Footnote ref 2].

The Vaibhâ@sikas are identified with the Sarvâstivâdins who according to Dîpava@msa V. 47, as pointed out by Takakusu, branched off from the Mahîs'âsakas, who in their turn had separated from the Theravâda school.

From the Kathâvatthu we know (1) that the Sabbatthivâdins believed that everything existed, (2) that the dawn of right attainment was not a momentary flash of insight but by a gradual process, (3) that consciousness or even samâdhi was nothing but

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[Footnote 1: This account is based on the translation of A@s@tamakos'asthânanibaddha@h pudgolavinis'caya@h, a special appendix to the eighth chapter of Abhidharmakos'a, by Prof Th. Stcherbatsky, Bulletin de l' Académie des Sciences de Russie, 1919.]

[Footnote 2: Professor De la Vallée Poussin has collected some of the points of this doctrine in an article on the Sammitîyas in the E. R.E. He there says that in the Abhidharmakos'avyâkhyâ the Sammitîyas have been identified with the Vâtsîputtrîyas and that many of its texts were admitted by the Vaibhâ@sikas of a later age. Some of their views are as follows: (1) An arhat in possession of nirvâna can fall away; (2) there is an intermediate state between death and rebirth called antarâbhava; (3) merit accrues not only by gift (tyagânvaya) but also by the fact of the actual use and advantage reaped by the man to whom the thing was given (paribhogânvaya pu@nya); (4) not only abstention from evil deeds but a declaration of intention to that end produces merit by itself alone; (5) they believe in a pudgala (soul) as distinct from the skandhas from which it can be said to be either different or non-different. "The pudgala cannot be said to be transitory (anitye) like the skandhas since it transmigrates laying down the burden (skandhas) shouldering a new burden; it cannot be said to be permanent, since it is made of transitory constituents." This pudgala doctrine of the Sammitîyas as sketched by Professor De la Vallée Poussin is not in full agreement with the pudgala doctrine of the Sammitîyas as sketched by Gu@naratna which we have noticed above.]

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a flux and (4) that an arhat (saint) may fall away [Footnote ref 1]. The Sabbatthivâdins or Sarvâstivâdins have a vast Abhidharma literature still existing in Chinese translations which is different from the Abhidharma of the Theravâda school which we have already mentioned [Footnote ref 2]. These are 1. Jñânaprasthâna S'âstra of Kâtyâyanîputtra which passed by the name of Mahâ Vibhâ@sâ from which the Sabbatthivâdins who followed it are called Vaibhâ@sikas [Footnote ref 3]. This work is said to have been given a literary form by As'vagho@sa. 2. Dharmaskandha by S'âriputtra. 3. Dhâtukâya by Pûr@na. 4. Prajñaptis'âstra by Maudgalyâyana. 5. Vijñânakâya by Devak@sema. 6. Sa@ngîtiparyyâya by Sâriputtra and Prakara@napâda by Vasumitra. Vasubandhu (420 A.D.-500 A.D.) wrote a work on the Vaibhâ@sika [Footnote ref 4] system in verses (kârikâ) known as the Abhidharmakos'a, to which he appended a commentary of his own which passes by the name Abhidharma Kos'abhâ@sya in which he pointed out some of the defects of the Vaibhâ@sika school from the Sautrântika point of view [Footnote ref 5]. This work was commented upon by Vasumitra and Gu@namati and later on by Yas'omitra who was himself a Sautrântika and called his work Abhidharmakos'a vyâkhyâ; Sa@nghabhadra a contemporary of Vasubandhu wrote Samayapradipa and Nyâyânusâra (Chinese translations of which are available) on strict Vaibhâ@sika lines. We hear also of other Vaibhâ@sika writers such as Dharmatrâta, Gho@saka, Vasumitra and Bhadanta, the writer of Sa@myuktâbhidharmas'âstra and Mahâvibhâ@sâ. Di@nnâga(480 A.D.), the celebrated logician, a Vaibhâ@sika or a Sautrântika and reputed to be a pupil of Vasubandhu, wrote his famous work Pramâ@nasamuccaya in which he established Buddhist logic and refuted many of the views of Vâtsyâyana the celebrated commentator of the Nyâya sûtras; but we regret

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[Footnote 1: See Mrs Rhys Davids's translation Kathâvatthu, p. xix, and Sections I.6,7; II. 9 and XI. 6.]

[Footnote 2: Mahâvyutpatti gives two names for Sarvâstivâda, viz. Mûlasarvâstivâda and Âryyasarvâstivâda. Itsing (671-695 A.D.) speaks of Âryyamûlasarvâstivâda and Mûlasarvâstivâda. In his time he found it prevailing in Magadha, Guzrat, Sind, S. India, E. India. Takakusu says (P.T.S. 1904-1905) that Paramârtha, in his life of Vasubandhu, says that it was propagated from Kashmere to Middle India by Vasubhadra, who studied it there.]

[Footnote 3: Takakusu says (P.T.S. 1904-1905) that Kâtyâyanîputtra's work was probably a compilation from other Vibhâ@sâs which existed before the Chinese translations and Vibhâ@sâ texts dated 383 A.D.]

[Footnote 4: See Takakusu's article J.R.A.S. 1905.]

[Footnote 5: The Sautrântikas did not regard the Abhidharmas of the Vaibhâ@sikas as authentic and laid stress on the suttanta doctrines as given in the Suttapi@taka.]

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to say that none of the above works are available in Sanskrit, nor have they been retranslated from Chinese or Tibetan into any of the modern European or Indian languages.

The Japanese scholar Mr Yamakami Sogen, late lecturer at Calcutta University, describes the doctrine of the Sabbatthivâdins from the Chinese versions of the Abhidharmakos'a, Mahâvibhâ@sâs'âstra, etc., rather elaborately [Footnote ref 1]. The following is a short sketch, which is borrowed mainly from the accounts given by Mr Sogen.

The Sabbatthivâdins admitted the five skandhas, twelve âyatanas, eighteen dhâtus, the three asa@msk@rta dharmas of pratisa@mkhyânirodha apratisa@mkhyânirodha and âkâs'a, and the sa@msk@rta dharmas (things composite and interdependent) of rûpa (matter), citta (mind), caitta (mental) and cittaviprayukta (non-mental) [Footnote ref 2]. All effects are produced by the coming together (sa@msk@rta) of a number of causes. The five skandhas, and the rûpa, citta, etc., are thus called sa@msk@rta dharmas (composite things or collocations—sambhûyakâri). The rûpa dharmas are eleven in number, one citta dharma, 46 caitta dharmas and 14 cittaviprayukta sa@mskâra dharmas (non-mental composite things); adding to these the three asa@msk@rta dharmas we have the seventy-five dharmas. Rûpa is that which has the capacity to obstruct the sense organs. Matter is regarded as the collective organism or collocation, consisting of the fourfold substratum of colour, smell, taste and contact. The unit possessing this fourfold substratum is known as paramâ@nu, which is the minutest form of rûpa. It cannot be pierced through or picked up or thrown away. It is indivisible, unanalysable, invisible, inaudible, untastable and intangible. But yet it is not permanent, but is like a momentary flash into being. The simple atoms are called dravyaparamâ@nu and the compound ones sa@mghâtaparamâ@nu. In the words of Prof. Stcherbatsky "the universal elements of matter are manifested in their actions or functions. They are consequently more energies than substances." The organs of sense are also regarded as modifications of atomic matter. Seven such paramâ@nus combine together to form an a@nu, and it is in this combined form only that they become perceptible. The combination takes place in the form of a cluster having one atom at the centre and

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[Footnote 1: Systems of Buddhistic Thought, published by the Calcutta
University.]

[Footnote 2: S'a@nkara in his meagre sketch of the doctrine of the Sarvâstivâdins in his bhâ@sya on the Brahma-sûtras II. 2 notices some of the categories mentioned by Sogen.]

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others around it. The point which must be remembered in connection with the conception of matter is this, that the qualities of all the mahâbhûtas are inherent in the paramâ@nus. The special characteristics of roughness (which naturally belongs to earth), viscousness (which naturally belongs to water), heat (belonging to fire), movableness (belonging to wind), combine together to form each of the elements; the difference between the different elements consists only in this, that in each of them its own special characteristics were predominant and active, and other characteristics though present remained only in a potential form. The mutual resistance of material things is due to the quality of earth or the solidness inherent in them; the mutual attraction of things is due to moisture or the quality of water, and so forth. The four elements are to be observed from three aspects, namely, (1) as things, (2) from the point of view of their natures (such as activity, moisture, etc.), and (3) function (such as dh@rti or attraction, sa@mgraha or cohesion, pakti or chemical heat, and vyûhana or clustering and collecting). These combine together naturally by other conditions or causes. The main point of distinction between the Vaibhâ@sika Sarvâstivadins and other forms of Buddhism is this, that here the five skandhas and matter are regarded as permanent and eternal; they are said to be momentary only in the sense that they are changing their phases constantly, owing to their constant change of combination. Avidyâ is not regarded here as a link in the chain of the causal series of pratîtyasamutpâda; nor is it ignorance of any particular individual, but is rather identical with "moha" or delusion and represents the ultimate state of immaterial dharmas. Avidyâ, which through sa@mskâra, etc., produces nâmarûpa in the case of a particular individual, is not his avidyâ in the present existence but the avidyâ of his past existence bearing fruit in the present life.

"The cause never perishes but only changes its name, when it becomes an effect, having changed its state." For example, clay becomes jar, having changed its state; and in this case the name clay is lost and the name jar arises [Footnote ref 1]. The Sarvâstivâdins allowed simultaneousness between cause and effect only in the case of composite things (sa@mprayukta hetu) and in the case of

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[Footnote 1: Sogen's quotation from Kumârajîva's Chinese version of
Âryyadeva's commentary on the Mâdhyamika s'âstra (chapter XX. Kârikâ 9).]

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the interaction of mental and material things. The substratum of "vijñâna" or "consciousness" is regarded as permanent and the aggregate of the five senses (indriyas) is called the perceiver. It must be remembered that the indriyas being material had a permanent substratum, and their aggregate had therefore also a substratum formed of them.

The sense of sight grasps the four main colours of blue, yellow, red, white, and their combinations, as also the visual forms of appearance (sa@msthâna) of long, short, round, square, high, low, straight, and crooked. The sense of touch (kâyendriya) has for its object the four elements and the qualities of smoothness, roughness, lightness, heaviness, cold, hunger and thirst. These qualities represent the feelings generated in sentient beings by the objects of touch, hunger, thirst, etc., and are also counted under it, as they are the organic effects produced by a touch which excites the physical frame at a time when the energy of wind becomes active in our body and predominates over other energies; so also the feeling of thirst is caused by a touch which excites the physical frame when the energy of the element of fire becomes active and predominates over the other energies. The indriyas (senses) can after grasping the external objects arouse thought (vijñâna); each of the five senses is an agent without which none of the five vijñânas would become capable of perceiving an external object. The essence of the senses is entirely material. Each sense has two subdivisions, namely, the principal sense and the auxiliary sense. The substratum of the principal senses consists of a combination of paramâ@nus, which are extremely pure and minute, while the substratum of the latter is the flesh, made of grosser materials. The five senses differ from one another with respect to the manner and form of their respective atomic combinations. In all sense-acts, whenever an act is performed and an idea is impressed, a latent energy is impressed on our person which is designated as avijñapti rûpa. It is called rûpa because it is a result or effect of rûpa-contact; it is called avijñapti because it is latent and unconscious; this latent energy is bound sooner or later to express itself in karma effects and is the only bridge which connects the cause and the effect of karma done by body or speech. Karma in this school is considered as twofold, namely, that as thought (cetana karma) and that as activity (caitasika karma). This last, again, is of two kinds, viz.

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that due to body-motion (kâyika karma) and speech (vâcika karma). Both these may again be latent (avijñapti) and patent (vijñapti), giving us the kâyika-vijnñpti karma, kâyikâvijñapti karma, vâcika-vijñapti karma and vâcikâvijñapti karma. Avijñapti rûpa and avijñapti karma are what we should call in modern phraseology sub-conscious ideas, feelings and activity. Corresponding to each conscious sensation, feeling, thought or activity there is another similar sub-conscious state which expresses itself in future thoughts and actions; as these are not directly known but are similar to those which are known, they are called avijñapti.

The mind, says Vasubandhu, is called cittam, because it wills (cetati), manas because it thinks (manvate) and vijñâna because it discriminates (nirdis'ati). The discrimination may be of three kinds: (1) svabhâva nirdes'a (natural perceptual discrimination), (2) prayoga nirdes'a (actual discrimination as present, past and future), and (3) anusm@rti nirdes'a (reminiscent discrimination referring only to the past). The senses only possess the svabhâva nirdes'a, the other two belong exclusively to manovijñâna. Each of the vijñânas as associated with its specific sense discriminates its particular object and perceives its general characteristics; the six vijñânas combine to form what is known as the Vijñânaskandha, which is presided over by mind (mano). There are forty-six caitta sa@msk@rta dharmas. Of the three asa@msk@rta dharmas âkâs'a (ether) is in essence the freedom from obstruction, establishing it as a permanent omnipresent immaterial substance (nîrûpâkhya, non-rûpa). The second asa@msk@rta dharma, apratisa@mkhyâ nirodha, means the non-perception of dharmas caused by the absence of pratyayas or conditions. Thus when I fix my attention on one thing, other things are not seen then, not because they are non-existent but because the conditions which would have made them visible were absent. The third asa@msk@rta dharma, pratisa@mkhyâ nirodha, is the final deliverance from bondage. Its essential characteristic is everlastingness. These are called asa@msk@rta because being of the nature of negation they are non-collocative and hence have no production or dissolution. The eightfold noble path which leads to this state consists of right views, right aspirations, right speech, right conduct, right livelihood, right effort, right mindfulness, right rapture [Footnote ref 1].

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[Footnote 1: Mr Sogen mentions the name of another Buddhist Hînayâna thinker (about 250 A.D.), Harivarman, who founded a school known as Satyasiddhi school, which propounded the same sort of doctrines as those preached by Nâgârjuna. None of his works are available in Sanskrit and I have never come across any allusion to his name by Sanskrit writers.]

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Mahâyânism.

It is difficult to say precisely at what time Mahâyânism took its rise. But there is reason to think that as the Mahâsa@nghikas separated themselves from the Theravâdins probably some time in 400 B.C. and split themselves up into eight different schools, those elements of thoughts and ideas which in later days came to be labelled as Mahâyâna were gradually on the way to taking their first inception. We hear in about 100 A.D. of a number of works which are regarded as various Mahâyâna sûtras, some of which are probably as old as at least 100 B.C. (if not earlier) and others as late as 300 or 400 A.D.[Footnote ref 1]. These Mahâyânasûtras, also called the Vaipulyasûtras, are generally all in the form of instructions given by the Buddha. Nothing is known about their authors or compilers, but they are all written in some form of Sanskrit and were probably written by those who seceded from the Theravâda school.

The word Hînayâna refers to the schools of Theravâda, and as such it is contrasted with Mahâyâna. The words are generally translated as small vehicle (hîna = small, yâna = vehicle) and great vehicle (mahâ = great, yâna = vehicle). But this translation by no means expresses what is meant by Mahâyâna and Hînayâna [Footnote ref 2]. Asa@nga (480 A.D.) in his Mahâyânasûtrâla@mkâra gives

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[Footnote 1: Quotations and references to many of these sûtras are found in
Candrakîrtti's commentary on the Mâdhyamîka kârikâs of Nâgârjuna; some of
these are the following: A@s@tasâhasrikâprajñâpâramitâ (translated into
Chinese 164 A.D.-167 A.D.), _S'atasâhasrikâprajñâpâramitâ, Gaganagañja,
Samâdhisûtra, Tathâgataguhyasûtra, D@r@dhâdhyâs'ayasañcodanâsûtra,
Dhyâyitamu@s@tisûtra, Pitâputrasamâgamasûtra, Mahâyânasûtra,
Mâradamanasûtra, Ratnakû@tasûtra, Ratnacû@dâparip@rcchâsûtra,
Ratnameghasûtra, Ratnarâs`isûtra, Ratnâkarasûtra,
Râ@s@trapâlaparip@rcchâsûtra, La@nkâvatârasûtra, Lalitavistarasûtra,
Vajracchedikâsûtra, Vimalakîrttinirdes'asûtra, S'âlistambhasûtra,
Samâdhirajasutra, Sukhâvatîvyûha, Suvar@naprabhâsasûtra,
Saddharmapu@n@darika (translated into Chinese A.D. 255),
Amitâyurdhyânasûtra, Hastikâkhyasûtra, etc.]

[Footnote 2: The word Yâna is generally translated as vehicle, but a consideration of numerous contexts in which the word occurs seems to suggest that it means career or course or way, rather than vehicle (Lalitavistara, pp. 25, 38; Prajñâpâramitâ, pp. 24, 319; Samâdhirâjasûtra, p. 1; Karu@nâpu@ndarîka, p. 67; La@nkâvatârasûtra, pp. 68, 108, 132). The word Yâna is as old as the Upani@sads where we read of Devayâna and Pit@ryâna. There is no reason why this word should be taken in a different sense. We hear in La@nkâvatâra of S'râvakayâna (career of the S'râvakas or the Theravâdin Buddhists), Pratyekabuddhayâna (the career of saints before the coming of the Buddha), Buddha yâna (career of the Buddhas), Ekayâna (one career), Devayâna (career of the gods), Brahmayâna (career of becoming a Brahmâ), Tathâgatayâna (career of a Tathâgata). In one place Lankâvatâra says that ordinarily distinction is made between the three careers and one career and no career, but these distinctions are only for the ignorant (Lankâvatâra, p. 68).]

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us the reason why one school was called Hînayâna whereas the other, which he professed, was called Mahâyâna. He says that, considered from the point of view of the ultimate goal of religion, the instructions, attempts, realization, and time, the Hînayâna occupies a lower and smaller place than the other called Mahâ (great) Yâna, and hence it is branded as Hîna (small, or low). This brings us to one of the fundamental points of distinction between Hînayâna and Mahâyâna. The ultimate good of an adherent of the Hînayâna is to attain his own nirvâ@na or salvation, whereas the ultimate goal of those who professed the Mahâyâna creed was not to seek their own salvation but to seek the salvation of all beings. So the Hînayâna goal was lower, and in consequence of that the instructions that its followers received, the attempts they undertook, and the results they achieved were narrower than that of the Mahâyâna adherents. A Hînayâna man had only a short business in attaining his own salvation, and this could be done in three lives, whereas a Mahâyâna adherent was prepared to work for infinite time in helping all beings to attain salvation. So the Hînayana adherents required only a short period of work and may from that point of view also be called hîna, or lower.

This point, though important from the point of view of the difference in the creed of the two schools, is not so from the point of view of philosophy. But there is another trait of the Mahâyânists which distinguishes them from the Hînayânists from the philosophical point of view. The Mahâyânists believed that all things were of a non-essential and indefinable character and void at bottom, whereas the Hînayânists only believed in the impermanence of all things, but did not proceed further than that.

It is sometimes erroneously thought that Nâgârjuna first preached the doctrine of S'ûnyavâda (essencelessness or voidness of all appearance), but in reality almost all the Mahâyâna sûtras either definitely preach this doctrine or allude to it. Thus if we take some of those sûtras which were in all probability earlier than Nâgârjuna, we find that the doctrine which Nâgârjuna expounded

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with all the rigour of his powerful dialectic was quietly accepted as an indisputable truth. Thus we find Subhûti saying to the Buddha that vedanâ (feeling), samjñâ (concepts) and the sa@mskâras (conformations) are all mâyâ (illusion) [Footnote ref 1]. All the skandhas, dhätus (elements) and âyatanas are void and absolute cessation. The highest knowledge of everything as pure void is not different from the skandhas, dhâtus and âyatanas, and this absolute cessation of dharmas is regarded as the highest knowledge (prajñâpâramitâ) [Footnote ref 2]. Everything being void there is in reality no process and no cessation. The truth is neither eternal (s'âs'vata) nor non-eternal (as'âs'vata) but pure void. It should be the object of a saint's endeavour to put himself in the "thatness" (tathatâ) and consider all things as void. The saint (bodhisattva) has to establish himself in all the virtues (pâramitâ), benevolence (dânapâramitâ), the virtue of character (s'îlapâramitâ), the virtue of forbearance (k@sântipâramitâ), the virtue of tenacity and strength (vîryyapâramitâ) and the virtue of meditation (dhyânapâramitâ). The saint (bodhisattva) is firmly determined that he will help an infinite number of souls to attain nirvâ@na. In reality, however, there are no beings, there is no bondage, no salvation; and the saint knows it but too well, yet he is not afraid of this high truth, but proceeds on his career of attaining for all illusory beings illusory emancipation from illusory bondage. The saint is actuated with that feeling and proceeds in his work on the strength of his pâramitâs, though in reality there is no one who is to attain salvation in reality and no one who is to help him to attain it [Footnote ref 3]. The true prajñapâramitâ is the absolute cessation of all appearance (ya@h anupalambha@h sarvadharmâ@nâm sa prajñâpâramitâ ityucyate) [Footnote ref 4].

The Mahâyâna doctrine has developed on two lines, viz. that of S'ûnyavâda or the Mâdhyamika doctrine and Vijñânavâda. The difference between S'ûnyavâda and Vijñânavâda (the theory that there is only the appearance of phenomena of consciousness) is not fundamental, but is rather one of method. Both of them agree in holding that there is no truth in anything, everything is only passing appearance akin to dream or magic. But while the S'ûnyavâdins were more busy in showing this indefinableness of all phenomena, the Vijñânavâdins, tacitly accepting

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[Footnote 1: A@s@tesâhasiihâprajñâpâramita, p. 16.]

[Footnote 2: Ibid p. 177.]

[Footnote 3: Ibid p. 21.]

[Footnote 4: Ibid p. 177.]

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the truth preached by the S'ûnyavâdins, interested themselves in explaining the phenomena of consciousness by their theory of beginningless illusory root-ideas or instincts of the mind (vâsanâ).

As'vagho@sa (100 A.D.) seems to have been the greatest teacher of a new type of idealism (vijñânavâda) known as the Tathatâ philosophy. Trusting in Suzuki's identification of a quotation in As'vagho@sa's S'raddhotpâdas'âstra as being made from La@nkâvatârasûtra, we should think of the La@nkâvatârasûtra as being one of the early works of the Vijñânavâdins [Footnote ref 1]. The greatest later writer of the Vijñânavâda school was Asa@nga (400 A.D.), to whom are attributed the Saptadas'abhûmi sûtra, Mahâyâna sûtra, Upades'a, Mahâyânasamparigraha s'âstra, Yogâcârabhûmi s'âstra and Mahâyânasûtrâla@mkâra. None of these works excepting the last one is available to readers who have no access to the Chinese and Tibetan manuscripts, as the Sanskrit originals are in all probability lost. The Vijñânavâda school is known to Hindu writers by another name also, viz. Yogâcâra, and it does not seem an improbable supposition that Asa@nga's Yogâcârabhûmi s'âstra was responsible for the new name. Vasubandhu, a younger brother of Asa@nga, was, as Paramârtha (499-569) tells us, at first a liberal Sarvâstivâdin, but was converted to Vijñânavâda, late in his life, by Asa@nga. Thus Vasubandhu, who wrote in his early life the great standard work of the Sarvâstivâdins, Abhidharmakos'a, devoted himself in his later life to Vijñânavâda [Footnote ref 2]. He is said to have commented upon a number of Mahâyâna sûtras, such as Avata@msaka, Nirvâ@na, Saddharmapu@n@darîka, Prajñâpâramitâ, Vimalakîrtti and S'rîmâlâsi@mhanâda, and compiled some Mahâyâna sûtras, such as Vijñânamâtrasiddhi, Ratnatraya, etc. The school of Vijñânavâda continued for at least a century or two after Vasubandhu, but we are not in possession of any work of great fame of this school after him.

We have already noticed that the S'ûnyavâda formed the fundamental principle of all schools of Mahâyâna. The most powerful exponent of this doctrine was Nâgârjuna (1OO A.D.), a brief account of whose system will be given in its proper place. Nâgârjuna's kârikâs (verses) were commented upon by Âryyadeva, a disciple of his, Kumârajîva (383 A.D.). Buddhapâlita and Candrakîrtti (550 A.D.). Âryyadeva in addition to this commentary wrote at

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[Footnote 1: Dr S.C. Vidyâbhûshana thinks that Lankâvatâna belongs to about 300 A.D.]

[Footnote 2: Takakusu's "A study of the Paramârtha's life of Vasubandhu," J.R.A.S. 1905.]

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least three other books, viz. Catu@hs'ataka, Hastabâlaprakara@nav@rtti and Cittavis`uddhiprakara@na [Footnote ref 1]. In the small work called Hastabâlaprakara@nav@rtti Âryyadeva says that whatever depends for its existence on anything else may be proved to be illusory; all our notions of external objects depend on space perceptions and notions of part and whole and should therefore be regarded as mere appearance. Knowing therefore that all that is dependent on others for establishing itself is illusory, no wise man should feel attachment or antipathy towards these mere phenomenal appearances. In his Cittavis'uddhiprakara@na he says that just as a crystal appears to be coloured, catching the reflection of a coloured object, even so the mind though in itself colourless appears to show diverse colours by coloration of imagination (vikalpa). In reality the mind (citta) without a touch of imagination (kalpanâ) in it is the pure reality.

It does not seem however that the S'ûnyavâdins could produce any great writers after Candrakîrtti. References to S'ûnyavâda show that it was a living philosophy amongst the Hindu writers until the time of the great Mîmâ@msâ authority Kumârila who flourished in the eighth century; but in later times the S'ûnyavâdins were no longer occupying the position of strong and active disputants.

The Tathataâ Philosophy of As'vagho@sa (80 A.D.) [Footnote ref 2].

As'vagho@sa was the son of a Brahmin named Sai@mhaguhya who spent his early days in travelling over the different parts of India and defeating the Buddhists in open debates. He was probably converted to Buddhism by Pâr@sva who was an important person in the third Buddhist Council promoted, according to some authorities, by the King of Kashmere and according to other authorities by Pu@nyayas'as [Footnote ref 3].

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[Footnote 1: Âryyadeva's Hastabâlaprakara@nav@rtti has been reclaimed by
Dr. F.W. Thomas. Fragmentary portions of his Cittavis'uddhiprakara@na
were published by Mahâmahopâdhyâya Haraprasâda s'âstrî in the Bengal
Asiatic Society's journal, 1898.]

[Footnote 2: The above section is based on the Awakening of Faith, an English translation by Suzuki of the Chinese version of S'raddhotpâdas`âstra by As'vagho@sa, the Sanskrit original of which appears to have been lost. Suzuki has brought forward a mass of evidence to show that As'vagho@sa was a contemporary of Kani@ska.]

[Footnote 3: Târanâtha says that he was converted by Aryadeva, a disciple of Nâgârjuna, Geschichte des Buddhismus, German translation by Schiefner, pp. 84-85. See Suzuki's Awakening of Faith, pp. 24-32. As'vagho@sa wrote the Buddhacaritakâvya, of great poetical excellence, and the Mahâla@mkâras'âstra. He was also a musician and had invented a musical instrument called Râstavara that he might by that means convert the people of the city. "Its melody was classical, mournful, and melodious, inducing the audience to ponder on the misery, emptiness, and non-âtmanness of life." Suzuki, p. 35.]

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He held that in the soul two aspects may be distinguished —the aspect as thatness (bhûtatathatâ) and the aspect as the cycle of birth and death (sa@msâra). The soul as bhûtatathatâ means the oneness of the totality of all things (dharmadhâtu). Its essential nature is uncreate and external. All things simply on account of the beginningless traces of the incipient and unconscious memory of our past experiences of many previous lives (sm@rti) appear under the forms of individuation [Footnote ref 1]. If we could overcome this sm@rti "the signs of individuation would disappear and there would be no trace of a world of objects." "All things in their fundamental nature are not nameable or explicable. They cannot be adequately expressed in any form of language. They possess absolute sameness (samatâ). They are subject neither to transformation nor to destruction. They are nothing but one soul" —thatness (bhûtatathatâ). This "thatness" has no attribute and it can only be somehow pointed out in speech as "thatness." As soon as you understand that when the totality of existence is spoken of or thought of, there is neither that which speaks nor that which is spoken of, there is neither that which thinks nor that which is thought of, "this is the stage of thatness." This bhûtatathatâ is neither that which is existence, nor that which is non-existence, nor that which is at once existence and non-existence, nor that which is not at once existence and non-existence; it is neither that which is plurality, nor that which is at once unity and plurality, nor that which is not at once unity and plurality. It is a negative concept in the sense that it is beyond all that is conditional and yet it is a positive concept in the sense that it holds all within it. It cannot be comprehended by any kind of particularization or distinction. It is only by transcending the range of our intellectual categories of the comprehension of the limited range of finite phenomena that we can get a glimpse of it. It cannot be comprehended by the particularizing consciousness of all beings, and we thus may call it negation, "s'ûnyatâ," in this sense. The truth is that which

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[Footnote 1: I have ventured to translate "sm@rti" in the sense of vâsanâ in preference to Suzuki's "confused subjectivity" because sm@rti in the sense of vâsanâ is not unfamiliar to the readers of such Buddhist works as La@nkâvatâra. The word "subjectivity" seems to be too European a term to be used as a word to represent the Buddhist sense.]

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subjectively does not exist by itself, that the negation (s'ûnyatâ) is also void (s'ûnya) in its nature, that neither that which is negated nor that which negates is an independent entity. It is the pure soul that manifests itself as eternal, permanent, immutable, and completely holds all things within it. On that account it may be called affirmation. But yet there is no trace of affirmation in it, because it is not the product of the creative instinctive memory (sm@rti) of conceptual thought and the only way of grasping the truth—the thatness, is by transcending all conceptual creations.

"The soul as birth and death (sa@msâra) comes forth from the Tathâgata womb (tathâgatagarbha), the ultimate reality. But the immortal and the mortal coincide with each other. Though they are not identical they are not duality either. Thus when the absolute soul assumes a relative aspect by its self-affirmation it is called the all-conserving mind (âlayavijñâna). It embraces two principles, (1) enlightenment, (2) non-enlightenment. Enlightenment is the perfection of the mind when it is free from the corruptions of the creative instinctive incipient memory (sm@rti). It penetrates all and is the unity of all (dharmadhâtu). That is to say, it is the universal dharmakâya of all Tathâgatas constituting the ultimate foundation of existence.

"When it is said that all consciousness starts from this fundamental truth, it should not be thought that consciousness had any real origin, for it was merely phenomenal existence—a mere imaginary creation of the perceivers under the influence of the delusive sm@rti. The multitude of people (bahujana) are said to be lacking in enlightenment, because ignorance (avidyâ) prevails there from all eternity, because there is a constant succession of sm@rti (past confused memory working as instinct) from which they have never been emancipated. But when they are divested of this sm@rti they can then recognize that no states of mentation, viz. their appearance, presence, change and disappearance, have any reality. They are neither in a temporal nor in a spatial relation with the one soul, for they are not self-existent.

"This high enlightenment shows itself imperfectly in our corrupted phenomenal experience as prajñâ (wisdom) and karma (incomprehensible activity of life). By pure wisdom we understand that when one, by virtue of the perfuming power of dharma, disciplines himself truthfully (i.e. according to the dharma), and accomplishes meritorious deeds, the mind (i.e. the âlayavijñâna)

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which implicates itself with birth and death will be broken down and the modes of the evolving consciousness will be annulled, and the pure and the genuine wisdom of the Dharmakâya will manifest itself. Though all modes of consciousness and mentation are mere products of ignorance, ignorance in its ultimate nature is identical and non-identical with enlightenment; and therefore ignorance is in one sense destructible, though in another sense it is indestructible. This may be illustrated by the simile of the water and the waves which are stirred up in the ocean. Here the water can be said to be both identical and non-identical with the waves. The waves are stirred up by the wind, but the water remains the same. When the wind ceases the motion of the waves subsides, but the water remains the same. Likewise when the mind of all creatures, which in its own nature is pure and clean, is stirred up by the wind of ignorance (avidyâ), the waves of mentality (vijñâna) make their appearance. These three (i.e. the mind, ignorance, and mentality) however have no existence, and they are neither unity nor plurality. When the ignorance is annihilated, the awakened mentality is tranquillized, whilst the essence of the wisdom remains unmolested." The truth or the enlightenment "is absolutely unobtainable by any modes of relativity or by any outward signs of enlightenment. All events in the phenomenal world are reflected in enlightenment, so that they neither pass out of it, nor enter into it, and they neither disappear nor are destroyed." It is for ever cut off from the hindrances both affectional (kles'âvara@na) and intellectual (jñeyâvara@na), as well as from the mind (i.e. âlayavijñâna) which implicates itself with birth and death, since it is in its true nature clean, pure, eternal, calm, and immutable. The truth again is such that it transforms and unfolds itself wherever conditions are favourable in the form of a tathâgata or in some other forms, in order that all beings may be induced thereby to bring their virtue to maturity.

"Non-elightenment has no existence of its own aside from its relation with enlightenment a priori." But enlightenment a priori is spoken of only in contrast to non-enlightenment, and as non-enlightenment is a non-entity, true enlightenment in turn loses its significance too. They are distinguished only in mutual relation as enlightenment or non-enlightenment. The manifestations of non-enlightenment are made in three ways: (1) as a disturbance of the mind (âlayavijñâna), by the avidyâkarma (ignorant

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action), producing misery (du@hkha); (2) by the appearance of an ego or of a perceiver; and (3) by the creation of an external world which does not exist in itself, independent of the perceiver. Conditioned by the unreal external world six kinds of phenomena arise in succession. The first phenomenon is intelligence (sensation); being affected by the external world the mind becomes conscious of the difference between the agreeable and the disagreeable. The second phenomenon is succession. Following upon intelligence, memory retains the sensations, agreeable as well as disagreeable, in a continuous succession of subjective states. The third phenomenon is clinging. Through the retention and succession of sensations, agreeable as well as disagreeable, there arises the desire of clinging. The fourth phenomenon is an attachment to names or ideas (sa@mjñâ), etc. By clinging the mind hypostatizes all names whereby to give definitions to all things. The fifth phenomenon is the performance of deeds (karma). On account of attachment to names, etc., there arise all the variations of deeds, productive of individuality. "The sixth phenomenon is the suffering due to the fetter of deeds. Through deeds suffering arises in which the mind finds itself entangled and curtailed of its freedom." All these phenomena have thus sprung forth through avidyâ.

The relation between this truth and avidyâ is in one sense a mere identity and may be illustrated by the simile of all kinds of pottery which though different are all made of the same clay [Footnote ref 1]. Likewise the undefiled (anâsrava) and ignorance (avidyâ) and their various transient forms all come from one and the same entity. Therefore Buddha teaches that all beings are from all eternity abiding in Nirvâ@na.

It is by the touch of ignorance (avidyâ) that this truth assumes all the phenomenal forms of existence.

In the all-conserving mind (âlayavijñâna) ignorance manifests itself; and from non-enlightenment starts that which sees, that which represents, that which apprehends an objective world, and that which constantly particularizes. This is called ego (manas). Five different names are given to the ego (according to its different modes of operation). The first name is activity-consciousness (karmavijñâna) in the sense that through the agency of ignorance an unenlightened mind begins to be disturbed (or

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[Footnote 1: Compare Chândogya, VI. 1. 4.]

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awakened). The second name is evolving-consciousness (prav@rttiivijñâna) in the sense that when the mind is disturbed, there evolves that which sees an external world. The third name is representation-consciousness in the sense that the ego (manas} represents (or reflects) an external world. As a clean mirror reflects the images of all description, it is even so with the representation-consciousness. When it is confronted, for instance, with the objects of the five senses, it represents them instantaneously and without effort. The fourth is particularization-consciousness, in the sense that it discriminates between different things defiled as well as pure. The fifth name is succession-consciousness, in the sense that continuously directed by the awakening consciousness of attention (manaskâra) it (manas) retains all experiences and never loses or suffers the destruction of any karma, good as well as evil, which had been sown in the past, and whose retribution, painful or agreeable, it never fails to mature, be it in the present or in the future, and also in the sense that it unconsciously recollects things gone by and in imagination anticipates things to come. Therefore the three domains (kâmaloka, domain of feeling—rûpaloka, domain of bodily existence—arûpaloka, domain of incorporeality) are nothing but the self manifestation of the mind (i.e. âlayavijñâna which is practically identical with bhûtatathatâ). Since all things, owing the principle of their existence to the mind (âlayavijñâna), are produced by sm@rti, all the modes of particularization are the self-particularizations of the mind. The mind in itself (or the soul) being however free from all attributes is not differentiated. Therefore we come to the conclusion that all things and conditions in the phenomenal world, hypostatized and established only through ignorance (avidyâ) and memory (sm@rti), have no more reality than the images in a mirror. They arise simply from the ideality of a particularizing mind. When the mind is disturbed, the multiplicity of things is produced; but when the mind is quieted, the multiplicity of things disappears. By ego-consciousness (manovijñâna) we mean the ignorant mind which by its succession-consciousness clings to the conception of I and Not-I and misapprehends the nature of the six objects of sense. The ego-consciousness is also called separation-consciousness, because it is nourished by the perfuming influence of the prejudices (âsrava), intellectual as well as affectional. Thus believing in the external world produced by memory, the mind becomes

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oblivious of the principle of sameness (samatâ) that underlies all things which are one and perfectly calm and tranquil and show no sign of becoming.

Non-enlightenment is the raison d'étre of samsâra. When this is annihilated the conditions—the external world—are also annihilated and with them the state of an interrelated mind is also annihilated. But this annihilation does not mean the annihilation of the mind but of its modes only. It becomes calm like an unruffled sea when all winds which were disturbing it and producing the waves have been annihilated.

In describing the relation of the interaction of avidyâ (ignorance), karmavijñâna (activity-consciousness—the subjective mind), vi@saya (external world—represented by the senses) and the tathatâ (suchness), As'vaghosa says that there is an interperfuming of these elements. Thus As'vaghosa says, "By perfuming we mean that while our worldly clothes (viz. those which we wear) have no odour of their own, neither offensive nor agreeable, they can yet acquire one or the other odour according to the nature of the substance with which they are perfumed. Suchness (tathatâ) is likewise a pure dharma free from all defilements caused by the perfuming power of ignorance. On the other hand ignorance has nothing to do with purity. Nevertheless we speak of its being able to do the work of purity because it in its turn is perfumed by suchness. Determined by suchness ignorance becomes the raison d'étre of all forms of defilement. And this ignorance perfumes suchness and produces sm@rti. This sm@rti in its turn perfumes ignorance. On account of this (reciprocal) perfuming, the truth is misunderstood. On account of its being misunderstood an external world of subjectivity appears. Further, on account of the perfuming power of memory, various modes of individuation are produced. And by clinging to them various deeds are done, and we suffer as the result miseries mentally as well as bodily." Again "suchness perfumes ignorance, and in consequence of this perfuming the individual in subjectivity is caused to loathe the misery of birth and death and to seek after the blessing of Nirvâna. This longing and loathing on the part of the subjective mind in turn perfumes suchness. On account of this perfuming influence we are enabled to believe that we are in possession within ourselves of suchness whose essential nature is pure and immaculate; and we also recognize that all phenomena in the world are nothing

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but the illusory manifestations of the mind (âlayavijñâna) and have no reality of their own. Since we thus rightly understand the truth, we can practise the means of liberation, can perform those actions which are in accordance with the dharma. We should neither particularize, nor cling to objects of desire. By virtue of this discipline and habituation during the lapse of innumerable âsa@nkhyeyakalpas [Footnote ref 1] we get ignorance annihilated. As ignorance is thus annihilated, the mind (âlayavijñâna) is no longer disturbed, so as to be subject to individuation. As the mind is no longer disturbed, the particularization of the surrounding world is annihilated. When in this wise the principle and the condition of defilement, their products, and the mental disturbances are all annihilated, it is said that we attain Nirvâ@na and that various spontaneous displays of activity are accomplished." The Nirvâ@na of the tathatâ philosophy is not nothingness, but tathatâ (suchness or thatness) in its purity unassociated with any kind of disturbance which produces all the diversity of experience.

To the question that if all beings are uniformly in possession of suchness and are therefore equally perfumed by it, how is it that there are some who do not believe in it, while others do, As'vagho@sa's reply is that though all beings are uniformly in possession of suchness, the intensity of ignorance and the principle of individuation, that work from all eternity, vary in such manifold grades as to outnumber the sands of the Ganges, and hence the difference. There is an inherent perfuming principle in one's own being which, embraced and protected by the love (maitrî) and compassion (karu@nâ) of all Buddhas and Bodhisattvas, is caused to loathe the misery of birth and death, to believe in nirvâ@na, to cultivate the root of merit (kus'alamûla), to habituate oneself to it and to bring it to maturity. In consequence of this, one is enabled to see all Buddhas and Bodhisattvas and, receiving instructions from them, is benefited, gladdened and induced to practise good deeds, etc., till one can attain to Buddhahood and enter into Nirvâ@na. This implies that all beings have such perfuming power in them that they may be affected by the good wishes of the Buddhas and Bodhisattvas for leading them to the path of virtue, and thus it is that sometimes hearing the Bodhisattvas and sometimes seeing them, "all beings thereby acquire (spiritual) benefits (hitatâ)" and "entering into the samâdhi of purity, they

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[Footnote 1: Technical name for a very vast period of time.]

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destroy hindrances wherever they are met with and obtain all-penetrating insight that enables them to become conscious of the absolute oneness (samatâ) of the universe (sarvaloka) and to see innumerable Buddhas and Bodhisattvas."

There is a difference between the perfuming which is not in unison with suchness, as in the case of s'râvakas (theravâdin monks), pratyekabuddhas and the novice bodhisattvas, who only continue their religious discipline but do not attain to the state of non-particularization in unison with the essence of suchness. But those bodhisattvas whose perfuming is already in unison with suchness attain to the state of non-particularization and allow themselves to be influenced only by the power of the dharma. The incessant perfuming of the defiled dharma (ignorance from all eternity) works on, but when one attains to Buddhahood one at once puts an end to it. The perfuming of the pure dharma (i.e. suchness) however works on to eternity without any interruption. For this suchness or thatness is the effulgence of great wisdom, the universal illumination of the dharmadhâtu (universe), the true and adequate knowledge, the mind pure and clean in its own nature, the eternal, the blessed, the self-regulating and the pure, the tranquil, the inimitable and the free, and this is called the tathâgatagarbha or the dharmakâya. It may be objected that since thatness or suchness has been described as being without characteristics, it is now a contradiction to speak of it as embracing all merits, but it is held, that in spite of its embracing all merits, it is free in its nature from all forms of distinction, because all objects in the world are of one and the same taste; and being of one reality they have nothing to do with the modes of particularization or of dualistic character. "Though all things in their (metaphysical) origin come from the soul alone and in truth are free from particularization, yet on account of non-enlightenment there originates a subjective mind (âlayavijñâna) that becomes conscious of an external world." This is called ignorance or avidyâ. Nevertheless the pure essence of the mind is perfectly pure and there is no awakening of ignorance in it. Hence we assign to suchness this quality, the effulgence of great wisdom. It is called universal illumination, because there is nothing for it to illumine. This perfuming of suchness therefore continues for ever, though the stage of the perfuming of avidyâ comes to an end with the Buddhas when they attain to nirvâ@na. All Buddhas while at

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the stage of discipline feel a deep compassion (mahâkaru@nâ) for all beings, practise all virtues (pâramitâs) and many other meritorious deeds, treat others as their own selves, and wish to work out a universal salvation of mankind in ages to come, through limitless numbers of kalpas, recognize truthfully and adequately the principle of equality (samatâ)among people; and do not cling to the individual existence of a sentient being. This is what is meant by the activity of tathatâ. The main idea of this tathatâ philosophy seems to be this, that this transcendent "thatness" is at once the quintessence of all thought and activity; as avidyâ veils it or perfumes it, the world-appearance springs forth, but as the pure thatness also perfumes the avidyâ there is a striving for the good as well. As the stage of avidyâ is passed its luminous character shines forth, for it is the ultimate truth which only illusorily appeared as the many of the world.

This doctrine seems to be more in agreement with the view of an absolute unchangeable reality as the ultimate truth than that of the nihilistic idealism of La@nkâvatâra. Considering the fact that As'vagho@sa was a learned Brahmin scholar in his early life, it is easy to guess that there was much Upani@sad influence in this interpretation of Buddhism, which compares so favourably with the Vedânta as interpreted by S'a@nkara. The La@nkâvatâra admitted a reality only as a make-believe to attract the Tairthikas (heretics) who had a prejudice in favour of an unchangeable self (âtman). But As'vagho@sa plainly admitted an unspeakable reality as the ultimate truth. Nâgârjuna's Mâdhyamika doctrines which eclipsed the profound philosophy of As'vagho@sa seem to be more faithful to the traditional Buddhist creed and to the Vijñânavâda creed of Buddhism as explained in the La@nkâvatâra [Footnote ref 1].

The Mâdhyamika or the S'ûntavâda school.—Nihilism.

Candrakîrtti, the commentator of Nâgârjuna's verses known as "Mâdhyamika kârikâ," in explaining the doctrine of dependent origination (pratîtyasamutpâda) as described by Nâgârjuna starts with two interpretations of the word. According to one the word pratîtyasamutpâda means the origination (utpâda) of the nonexistent (abhâva) depending on (pratîtya) reasons and causes

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[Footnote 1: As I have no access to the Chinese translation of
As'vagho@sa's S'raddhotpâda S'âstra, I had to depend entirely on
Suzuki's expressions as they appear in his translation.]

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(hetupratyaya). According to the other interpretation pratîtya means each and every destructible individual and pratîtyasamutpâda means the origination of each and every destructible individual. But he disapproves of both these meanings. The second meaning does not suit the context in which the Pâli Scriptures generally speak of pratîtyasamutpâda (e.g. cak@su@h pratîtya rûpâni ca utpadyante cak@survijñânam) for it does not mean the origination of each and every destructible individual, but the originating of specific individual phenomena (e.g. perception of form by the operation in connection with the eye) depending upon certain specific conditions.

The first meaning also is equally unsuitable. Thus for example if we take the case of any origination, e.g. that of the visual percept, we see that there cannot be any contact between visual knowledge and physical sense, the eye, and so it would not be intelligible that the former should depend upon the latter. If we interpret the maxim of pratîtyasamutpâda as this happening that happens, that would not explain any specific origination. All origination is false, for a thing can neither originate by itself nor by others, nor by a co-operation of both nor without any reason. For if a thing exists already it cannot originate again by itself. To suppose that it is originated by others would also mean that the origination was of a thing already existing. If again without any further qualification it is said that depending on one the other comes into being, then depending on anything any other thing could come into being—from light we could have darkness! Since a thing could not originate from itself or by others, it could not also be originated by a combination of both of them together. A thing also could not originate without any cause, for then all things could come into being at all times. It is therefore to be acknowledged that wherever the Buddha spoke of this so-called dependent origination (pratîtyasamutpâda) it was referred to as illusory manifestations appearing to intellects and senses stricken with ignorance. This dependent origination is not thus a real law, but only an appearance due to ignorance (avidyâ). The only thing which is not lost (amo@sadharma) is nirvâ@na; but all other forms of knowledge and phenomena (sa@mskâra) are false and are lost with their appearances (sarvasa@mskârâs'ca m@r@sâmo@sadharmâ@na@h).

It is sometimes objected to this doctrine that if all appearances

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are false, then they do not exist at all. There are then no good or bad works and no cycle of existence, and if such is the case, then it may be argued that no philosophical discussion should be attempted. But the reply to such an objection is that the nihilistic doctrine is engaged in destroying the misplaced confidence of the people that things are true. Those who are really wise do not find anything either false or true, for to them clearly they do not exist at all and they do not trouble themselves with the question of their truth or falsehood. For him who knows thus there are neither works nor cycles of births (sa@msâra) and also he does not trouble himself about the existence or non-existence of any of the appearances. Thus it is said in the Ratnakû@tasûtra that howsoever carefully one may search one cannot discover consciousness (citta); what cannot be perceived cannot be said to exist, and what does not exist is neither past, nor future, nor present, and as such it cannot be said to have any nature at all; and that which has no nature is subject neither to origination nor to extinction. He who through his false knowledge (viparyyâsa) does not comprehend the falsehood of all appearances, but thinks them to be real, works and suffers the cycles of rebirth (sa@msâra). Like all illusions, though false these appearances can produce all the harm of rebirth and sorrow.

It may again be objected that if there is nothing true according to the nihilists (s'ûnyavâdins), then their statement that there is no origination or extinction is also not true. Candrakirtti in replying to this says that with s'ûnyavâdins the truth is absolute silence. When the S'ûnyavâdin sages argue, they only accept for the moment what other people regard as reasons, and deal with them in their own manner to help them to come to a right comprehension of all appearances. It is of no use to say, in spite of all arguments tending to show the falsehood of all appearances, that they are testified by our experience, for the whole thing that we call "our experience" is but false illusion inasmuch as these phenomena have no true essence.

When the doctrine of pratîtyasamutpâda is described as "this being that is," what is really meant is that things can only be indicated as mere appearances one after another, for they have no essence or true nature. Nihilism (s'ûnyavâda) also means just this. The true meaning of pratîtyasamutpâda or s'ûnyavâda is this, that there is no truth, no essence in all phenomena that

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appear [Footnote ref 1]. As the phenomena have no essence they are neither produced nor destroyed; they really neither come nor go. They are merely the appearance of maya or illusion. The void (s'ûnya) does not mean pure negation, for that is relative to some kind of position. It simply means that none of the appearances have any intrinsic nature of their own (ni@hsvabhâvatvam).

The Madhyamaka or S'ûnya system does not hold that anything has any essence or nature (svabhâva) of its own; even heat cannot be said to be the essence of fire; for both the heat and the fire are the result of the combination of many conditions, and what depends on many conditions cannot be said to be the nature or essence of the thing. That alone may be said to be the true essence or nature of anything which does not depend on anything else, and since no such essence or nature can be pointed out which stands independently by itself we cannot say that it exists. If a thing has no essence or existence of its own, we cannot affirm the essence of other things to it (parabhâva). If we cannot affirm anything of anything as positive, we cannot consequently assert anything of anything as negative. If anyone first believes in things positive and afterwards discovers that they are not so, he no doubt thus takes his stand on a negation (abhâva), but in reality since we cannot speak of anything positive, we cannot speak of anything negative either [Footnote ref 2].

It is again objected that we nevertheless perceive a process going on. To this the Madhyamaka reply is that a process of change could not be affirmed of things that are permanent. But we can hardly speak of a process with reference to momentary things; for those which are momentary are destroyed the next moment after they appear, and so there is nothing which can continue to justify a process. That which appears as being neither comes from anywhere nor goes anywhere, and that which appears as destroyed also does not come from anywhere nor go anywhere, and so a process (sa@msâra) cannot be affirmed of them. It cannot be that when the second moment arose, the first moment had suffered a change in the process, for it was not the same as the second, as there is no so-called cause-effect connection. In fact there being no relation between the two, the temporal determination as prior and later is wrong. The supposition that there is a self which suffers changes is also not valid, for howsoever we

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[Footnote 1: See Mâdhyamikav@rtti (B.T.S.), p. 50.]

[Footnote 2: Ibid. pp. 93-100.]

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may search we find the five skandhas but no self. Moreover if the soul is a unity it cannot undergo any process or progression, for that would presuppose that the soul abandons one character and takes up another at the same identical moment which is inconceivable [Footnote ref 1].

But then again the question arises that if there is no process, and no cycle of worldly existence of thousands of afflictions, what is then the nirvâ@na which is described as the final extinction of all afflictions (kles'a)? To this the Madhyamaka reply is that it does not agree to such a definition of nirvâ@na. Nirvâ@na on the Madhyamaka theory is the absence of the essence of all phenomena, that which cannot be conceived either as anything which has ceased or as anything which is produced (aniruddham anntpannam}. In nirvâ@na all phenomena are lost; we say that the phenomena cease to exist in nirvâ@na, but like the illusory snake in the rope they never existed [Footnote ref 2]. Nirvâ@na cannot be any positive thing or any sort of state of being (bhâva), for all positive states or things are joint products of combined causes (sa@msk@rta) and are liable to decay and destruction. Neither can it be a negative existence, for since we cannot speak of any positive existence, we cannot speak of a negative existence either. The appearances or the phenomena are communicated as being in a state of change and process coming one after another, but beyond that no essence, existence, or truth can be affirmed of them. Phenomena sometimes appear to be produced and sometimes to be destroyed, but they cannot be determined as existent or non-existent. Nirvâ@na is merely the cessation of the seeming phenomenal flow (prapañcaprav@rtti). It cannot therefore be designated either as positive or as negative for these conceptions belong to phenomena (na câprav@rttimatram bhâvâbhâveti parikalpitum pâryyate evam na bhâvâbhâvanirvâ@nam, M.V. 197). In this state there is nothing which is known, and even the knowledge that the phenomena have ceased to appear is not found. Even the Buddha himself is a phenomenon, a mirage or a dream, and so are all his teachings [Footnote ref 3].

It is easy to see that in this system there cannot exist any bondage or emancipation; all phenomena are like shadows, like the mirage, the dream, the mâyâ, and the magic without any real nature (ni@hsvabhâva). It is mere false knowledge to suppose that

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[Footnote 1: See Madhyamikav@rtti (B.T.S.), pp. 101-102.]

[Footnote 2: Ibid. p. 194.]

[Footnote 3: Ibid. pp.162 and 201.]

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one is trying to win a real nirvâ@na [Footnote ref 1]. It is this false egoism that is to be considered as avidyâ. When considered deeply it is found that there is not even the slightest trace of any positive existence. Thus it is seen that if there were no ignorance (avidyâ), there would have been no conformations (sa@mskâras), and if there were no conformations there would have been no consciousness, and so on; but it cannot be said of the ignorance "I am generating the sa@mskâras," and it can be said of the sa@mskâras "we are being produced by the avidyâ." But there being avidyâ, there come the sa@mskarâs and so on with other categories too. This character of the pratîtyasamutpâda is known as the coming of the consequent depending on an antecedent reason (hetûpanibandha).

It can be viewed from another aspect, namely that of dependence on conglomeration or combination (pratyayopanibandh). It is by the combination (samavâya) of the four elements, space (âkâs'a) and consciousness (vijñâna) that a man is made. It is due to earth (p@rthivî) that the body becomes solid, it is due to water that there is fat in the body, it is due to fire that there is digestion, it is due to wind that there is respiration; it is due to âkâs'a that there is porosity, and it is due to vijñâna that there is mind-consciousness. It is by their mutual combination that we find a man as he is. But none of these elements think that they have done any of the functions that are considered to be allotted to them. None of these are real substances or beings or souls. It is by ignorance that these are thought of as existents and attachment is generated for them. Through ignorance thus come the sa@mskâras, consisting of attachment, antipathy and thoughtlessness (râga, dve@sa, moha); from these proceed the vijñâna and the four skandhas. These with the four elements bring about name and form (nâmarûpa), from these proceed the senses (@sa@dayatana), from the coming together of those three comes contact (spars'a); from that feelings, from that comes desire (tr@s@nâ) and so on. These flow on like the stream of a river, but there is no essence or truth behind them all or as the ground of them all [Footnote ref 2]. The phenomena therefore cannot be said to be either existent or non-existent, and no truth can be affirmed of either eternalism (s'âs'vatavâda) or nihilism (ucchedavâda), and it is for this reason

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[Footnote 1: See Mâdhyamikav@rtti (B.T.S.), pp. 101-108.]

[Footnote: Ibid. pp. 209-211, quoted from Sâlistambhasûtra.
Vâcaspatimis'ra also quotes this passage in his Bhâmatî on
S'a@nkara's Brahma-sûtra.]

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that this doctrine is called the middle doctrine (madhyamaka) [Footnote ref 1]. Existence and non-existence have only a relative truth (samv@rtisatya) in them, as in all phenomena, but there is no true reality (paramârthasatya) in them or anything else. Morality plays as high a part in this nihilistic system as it does in any other Indian system. I quote below some stanzas from Nâgârjuna's Suk@rllekha as translated by Wenzel (P.T.S. 1886) from the Tibetan translation.

6. Knowing that riches are unstable and void (asâra) give according to the moral precepts, to Bhikshus, Brahmins, the poor and friends for there is no better friend than giving.

7. Exhibit morality (s'îla) faultless and sublime, unmixed and spotless, for morality is the supporting ground of all eminence, as the earth is of the moving and immovable.

8. Exercise the imponderable, transcendental virtues of charity, morality, patience, energy, meditation, and likewise wisdom, in order that, having reached the farther shore of the sea of existence, you may become a Jina prince.

9. View as enemies, avarice (mâtsaryya), deceit (s'â@thya), duplicity (mâyâ), lust, indolence (kausîdya), pride (mâna), greed (râga), hatred (dve@sa) and pride (mada) concerning family, figure, glory, youth, or power.

15. Since nothing is so difficult of attainment as patience, open no door for anger; the Buddha has pronounced that he who renounces anger shall attain the degree of an anâgâmin (a saint who never suffers rebirth).

21. Do not look after another's wife; but if you see her, regard her, according to age, like your mother, daughter or sister.

24. Of him who has conquered the unstable, ever moving objects of the six senses and him who has overcome the mass of his enemies in battle, the wise praise the first as the greater hero.

29. Thou who knowest the world, be equanimous against the eight worldly conditions, gain and loss, happiness and suffering, fame and dishonour, blame and praise, for they are not objects for your thoughts.

37. But one (a woman) that is gentle as a sister, winning as a friend, careful of your well being as a mother, obedient as a servant her (you must) honour as the guardian god(dess) of the family.

40. Always perfectly meditate on (turn your thoughts to) kindness, pity, joy and indifference; then if you do not obtain a higher degree you (certainly) will obtain the happiness of Brahman's world (brahmavihâra).

41. By the four dhyânas completely abandoning desire (kâma), reflection (vicâra), joy (prîti), and happiness and pain (sukha, du@hkha) you will obtain as fruit the lot of a Brahman.

49. If you say "I am not the form, you thereby will understand I am not endowed with form, I do not dwell in form, the form does not dwell in me; and in like manner you will understand the voidness of the other four aggregates."

50. The aggregates do not arise from desire, nor from time, nor from

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[Footnote 1: See Mâdhyamikav@rtti (B.T.S.), p. 160.]

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nature (prak@rti), not from themselves (svabhâvât), nor from the Lord (îs'vara), nor yet are they without cause; know that they arise from ignorance (avidyâ) and desire (t@r@s@nâ).

51. Know that attachment to religious ceremonies (s'îlabrataparâmars'a), wrong views (mithyâd@r@s@ti) and doubt (vicikitsâ) are the three fetters.

53. Steadily instruct yourself (more and more) in the highest morality, the highest wisdom and the highest thought, for the hundred and fifty one rules (of the prâtimok@sa) are combined perfectly in these three.

58. Because thus (as demonstrated) all this is unstable (anitya) without substance (anâtma) without help (as'ara@na) without protector (anâtha) and without abode (asthâna) thou O Lord of men must become discontented with this worthless (asâra) kadali-tree of the orb.

104. If a fire were to seize your head or your dress you would extinguish and subdue it, even then endeavour to annihilate desire, for there is no other higher necessity than this.

105. By morality, knowledge and contemplation, attain the spotless dignity of the quieting and the subduing nirvâ@na not subject to age, death or decay, devoid of earth, water, fire, wind, sun and moon.

107. Where there is no wisdom (prajñâ) there is also no contemplation (dhyana), where there is no contemplation there is also no wisdom; but know that for him who possesses these two the sea of existence is like a grove.

Uncompromising Idealism or the School of Vijñânavâda Buddhism.

The school of Buddhist philosophy known as the Vijñânavâda or Yogâcâra has often been referred to by such prominent teachers of Hindu thought as Kumârila and S'a@nkara. It agrees to a great extent with the S'ûnyavâdins whom we have already described. All the dharmas (qualities and substances) are but imaginary constructions of ignorant minds. There is no movement in the so-called external world as we suppose, for it does not exist. We construct it ourselves and then are ourselves deluded that it exists by itself (nirmmitapratimohi) [Footnote ref 1]. There are two functions involved in our consciousness, viz. that which holds the perceptions (khyâti vijñâna), and that which orders them by imaginary constructions (vastuprativikalpavijñâna). The two functions however mutually determine each other and cannot be separately distinguished (abhinnalak@sa@ne anyonyahetuke). These functions are set to work on account of the beginningless instinctive tendencies inherent in them in relation to the world of appearance (anâdikâla-prapañca-vâsanahetukañca) [Footnote ref 2].

All sense knowledge can be stopped only when the diverse

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[Footnote 1: Lankâvatârasûtra, pp. 21-22.]

[Footnote 2 Ibid. p. 44.]

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unmanifested instincts of imagination are stopped (abhûta-parikalpa-vâsanâ-vaicitra-nirodha) [Footnote ref 1]. All our phenomenal knowledge is without any essence or truth (nihsvabhâva) and is but a creation of mâyâ, a mirage or a dream. There is nothing which may be called external, but all is the imaginary creation of the mind (svacitta), which has been accustomed to create imaginary appearances from beginningless time. This mind by whose movement these creations take place as subject and object has no appearance in itself and is thus without any origination, existence and extinction (utpâdasthitibha@ngavarjjam) and is called the âlayavijñâna. The reason why this âlayavijñâna itself is said to be without origination, existence, and extinction is probably this, that it is always a hypothetical state which merely explains all the phenomenal states that appear, and therefore it has no existence in the sense in which the term is used and we could not affirm any special essence of it.

We do not realize that all visible phenomena are of nothing external but of our own mind (svacitta), and there is also the beginningless tendency for believing and creating a phenomenal world of appearance. There is also the nature of knowledge (which takes things as the perceiver and the perceived) and there is also the instinct in the mind to experience diverse forms. On account of these four reasons there are produced in the âlayavijñâna (mind) the ripples of our sense experiences (prav@rttivijñana) as in a lake, and these are manifested as sense experiences. All the five skandhas called pañchavijñânakâya thus appear in a proper synthetic form. None of the phenomenal knowledge that appears is either identical or different from the âlayavijñâna just as the waves cannot be said to be either identical or different from the ocean. As the ocean dances on in waves so the citta or the âlayavijñâna is also dancing as it were in its diverse operations (v@rtti). As citta it collects all movements (karma) within it, as manas it synthesizes (vidhîyate) and as vijñâna it constructs the fivefold perceptions (vijñânân vijânâti d@rs'yam kalpate pañcabhi@h) [Footnote ref 2].

It is only due to mâyâ (illusion) that the phenomena appear in their twofold aspect as subject and object. This must always be regarded as an appearance (samv@rtisatyatâ) whereas in the real aspect we could never say whether they existed (bhâva) or did not exist [Footnote ref 3].

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[Footnote 1: Pañcâvatârasûtra, p. 44.]

[Footnote 2: Ibid., pp. 50-55.]

[Footnote 3: Asa@nga's Mahâyânasûtrâla@mkâra, pp. 58-59.]

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All phenomena both being and non-being are illusory (sadasanta@h mâyopamâ@h). When we look deeply into them we find that there is an absolute negation of all appearances, including even all negations, for they are also appearances. This would make the ultimate truth positive. But this is not so, for it is that in which the positive and negative are one and the same (bhâvâbhâvasamânatâ) [Footnote ref 1]. Such a state which is complete in itself and has no name and no substance had been described in the La@nkâvatârasûtra as thatness (tathatâ) [Footnote ref 2]. This state is also described in another place in the La@nkâvatâra as voidness (s'ûnyatâ) which is one and has no origination and no essence [Footnote ref 3]. In another place it is also designated as tathâgatagarbha [Footnote ref 4].

It may be supposed that this doctrine of an unqualified ultimate truth comes near to the Vedantic âtman or Brahman like the tathatâ doctrine of As'vagho@sa; and we find in La@nkavatâra that Râva@na asks the Buddha "How can you say that your doctrine of tathâgatagarbha was not the same as the âtman doctrine of the other schools of philosophers, for those heretics also consider the âtman as eternal, agent, unqualified, all pervading and unchanged?" To this the Buddha is found to reply thus—"Our doctrine is not the same as the doctrine of those heretics; it is in consideration of the fact that the instruction of a philosophy which considered that there was no soul or substance in anything (nairatmya) would frighten the disciples, that I say that all things are in reality the tathâgatagarbha. This should not be regarded as âtman. Just as a lump of clay is made into various shapes, so it is the non-essential nature of all phenomena and their freedom from all characteristics (sarvavikalpalak@sa@navinivrttam) that is variously described as the garbha or the nairâtmya (essencelessness). This explanation of tathâgatagarbha as the ultimate truth and reality is given in order to attract to our creed those heretics who are superstitiously inclined to believe in the âtman doctrine [Footnote ref 5]."

So far as the appearance of the phenomena was concerned, the idealistic Buddhists (vijñânavâdins) agreed to the doctrine of pratîtyasamutpâda with certain modifications. There was with them an external pratîtyasamutpâda just as it appeared in the

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[Footnote 1: Asa@nga's Mahâyânasûtrâla@mkâra, p. 65.]

[Footnote 2: Lankâvatârasûtra, p. 70.]

[Footnote 3: Ibid. p. 78.]

[Footnote 4: Ibid. p. 80.]

[Footnote 5: Ibid. pp. 80-81.]

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objective aspect and an internal pratîtyasamutpâda. The external pratîtyasamutpâda (dependent origination) is represented in the way in which material things (e.g. a jug) came into being by the co-operation of diverse elements—the lump of clay, the potter, the wheel, etc. The internal (âdhyâtmika) pratîtyasamutpâda was represented by avidyâ, t@r@s@nâ, karma, the skandhas, and the âyatanas produced out of them [Footnote ref 1].

Our understanding is composed of two categories called the pravichayabuddhi and the vikalpalak@sa@nagrahâbhinives'aprati@s@thapikâbuddhi. The pravicayabuddhi is that which always seeks to take things in either of the following four ways, that they are either this or the other (ekatvânyaiva); either both or not both (ubhayânubhaya), either are or are not (astinâsti), either eternal or non-eternal (nityânitya). But in reality none of these can be affirmed of the phenomena. The second category consists of that habit of the mind by virtue of which it constructs diversities and arranges them (created in their turn by its own constructive activity—parikalpa) in a logical order of diverse relations of subject and predicate, causal and other relations. He who knows the nature of these two categories of the mind knows that there is no external world of matter and that they are all experienced only in the mind. There is no water, but it is the sense construction of smoothness (sneha) that constructs the water as an external substance; it is the sense construction of activity or energy that constructs the external substance of fire; it is the sense construction of movement that constructs the external substance of air. In this way through the false habit of taking the unreal as the real (mithyâsatyâbhinives'a) five skandhas appear. If these were to appear all together, we could not speak of any kind of causal relations, and if they appeared in succession there could be no connection between them, as there is nothing to bind them together. In reality there is nothing which is produced or destroyed, it is only our constructive imagination that builds up things as perceived with all their relations, and ourselves as perceivers. It is simply a convention (vyavahâra) to speak of things as known [Footnote ref 2]. Whatever we designate by speech is mere speech-construction (vâgvikalpa) and unreal. In speech one could not speak of anything without relating things in some kind of causal

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[Footnote 1: La@nkâvatârasûtra, p. 85.]

[Footnote 2: Lankâvatârasûtra, p. 87, compare the term "vyavahârika" as used of the phenomenal and the conventional world in almost the same sense by S'a@nkara.]

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relation, but none of these characters may be said to be true; the real truth (paramartha) can never be referred to by such speech-construction.

The nothingness (s'ûnyata) of things may be viewed from seven aspects—(1) that they are always interdependent, and hence have no special characteristics by themselves, and as they cannot be determined in themselves they cannot be determined in terms of others, for, their own nature being undetermined, a reference to an "other" is also undetermined, and hence they are all indefinable (laksanas'ûnyata); (2) that they have no positive essence (bhâvasvabhâvas'ûnyatâ), since they spring up from a natural non-existence (svabhâvâbhâvotpatti); (3) that they are of an unknown type of non-existence (apracaritas'ûnyatâ), since all the skandhas vanish in the nirvana; (4) that they appear phenomenally as connected though non-existent (pracaritas'ûnyatâ), for their skandhas have no reality in themselves nor are they related to others, but yet they appear to be somehow causally connected; (5) that none of the things can be described as having any definite nature, they are all undemonstrable by language (nirabhilapyas'ûnyatâ); (6) that there cannot be any knowledge about them except that which is brought about by the long-standing defects of desires which pollute all our vision; (7) that things are also non-existent in the sense that we affirm them to be in a particular place and time in which they are not (itaretaras'ûnyatâ).

There is thus only non-existence, which again is neither eternal nor destructible, and the world is but a dream and a mâyâ; the two kinds of negation (nirodha) are âkâs'a (space) and nirvana; things which are neither existent nor non-existent are only imagined to be existent by fools.

This view apparently comes into conflict with the doctrine of this school, that the reality is called the tathâgatagarbha (the womb of all that is merged in thatness) and all the phenomenal appearances of the clusters (skandhas), elements (dhâtus), and fields of sense operation (âyatanas) only serve to veil it with impurities, and this would bring it nearer to the assumption of a universal soul as the reality. But the La@nkâvatâra attempts to explain away this conflict by suggesting that the reference to the tathâgatagarbha as the reality is only a sort of false bait to attract those who are afraid of listening to the nairâtmya (non-soul doctrine) [Footnote ref 1].

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[Footnote 1: La@nkâvatârasûtra, p. 80.

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The Bodhisattvas may attain their highest by the fourfold knowledge of (1) svacittad@rs'hyabhâvanâ, (2) utpâdasthitibha@ngavivarjjanatâ, (3) bâhyabhâvâbhâvopalak@sa@natâ and (4) svapratyâryyajñânâdhigamâbhinnalak@sa@natâ. The first means that all things are but creations of the imagination of one's mind. The second means that as things have no essence there is no origination, existence or destruction. The third means that one should know the distinctive sense in which all external things are said either to be existent or non-existent, for their existence is merely like the mirage which is produced by the beginningless desire (vâsanâ) of creating and perceiving the manifold. This brings us to the fourth one, which means the right comprehension of the nature of all things.

The four dhyânas spoken of in the Lankâvatâra seem to be different from those which have been described in connection with the Theravâda Buddhism. These dhyânas are called (1) bâlopacârika, (2) arthapravichaya, (3) tathatâlambana and (4) tathâgata. The first one is said to be that practised by the s'râvakas and the pratyekabuddhas. It consists in concentrating upon the doctrine that there is no soul (pudgalanairâtmya), and that everything is transitory, miserable and impure. When considering all things in this way from beginning to end the sage advances on till all conceptual knowing ceases (âsa@mjñânirodhât); we have what is called the vâlopacârika dhyâna (the meditation for beginners).

The second is the advanced state where not only there is full consciousness that there is no self, but there is also the comprehension that neither these nor the doctrines of other heretics may be said to exist, and that there is none of the dharmas that appears. This is called the arthapravicayadhyâna, for the sage concentrates here on the subject of thoroughly seeking out (pravichaya) the nature of all things (artha).

The third dhyâna, that in which the mind realizes that the thought that there is no self nor that there are the appearances, is itself the result of imagination and thus lapses into the thatness (tathatâ). This dhyâna is called tathatâlambana, because it has for its object tathatâ or thatness.

The last or the fourth dhyâna is that in which the lapse of the mind into the state of thatness is such that the nothingness and incomprehensibility of all phenomena is perfectly realized;

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and nirvâna is that in which all root desires (vâsanâ) manifesting themselves in knowledge are destroyed and the mind with knowledge and perceptions, making false creations, ceases to work. This cannot be called death, for it will not have any rebirth and it cannot be called destruction, for only compounded things (sa@msk@rta) suffer destruction, so that it is different from either death or destruction. This nirvâna is different from that of the s'râvakas and the pratyekabuddhas for they are satisfied to call that state nirvâ@na, in which by the knowledge of the general characteristics of all things (transitoriness and misery) they are not attached to things and cease to make erroneous judgments [Footnote ref 1].

Thus we see that there is no cause (in the sense of ground) of all these phenomena as other heretics maintain. When it is said that the world is mâyâ or illusion, what is meant to be emphasized is this, that there is no cause, no ground. The phenomena that seem to originate, stay, and be destroyed are mere constructions of tainted imagination, and the tathatâ or thatness is nothing but the turning away of this constructive activity or nature of the imagination (vikalpa) tainted with the associations of beginningless root desires (vâsanâ) [Footnote ref 2]. The tathatâ has no separate reality from illusion, but it is illusion itself when the course of the construction of illusion has ceased. It is therefore also spoken of as that which is cut off or detached from the mind (cittavimukta), for here there is no construction of imagination (sarvakalpanavirahitam) [Footnote ref 3].

Sautrântika Theory of Perception.

Dharmottara (847 A.D.), a commentator of Dharmakîrtti's [Footnote ref 4] (about 635 A.D.) Nyâyabindu, a Sautrantika logical and epistemological work, describes right knowledge (samyagjñâna) as an invariable antecedent to the accomplishment of all that a man

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[Footnote 1: Lankâvatarasûtra, p. 100.]

[Footnote 2: Ibid. p. 109.]

[Footnote 3: This account of the Vijñanavada school is collected mainly from Lankâvatârasûtra, as no other authentic work of the Vijñânavâda school is available. Hindu accounts and criticisms of this school may be had in such books as Kumarila's S'loka vârttika or S'a@nkara's bhasya, II. ii, etc. Asak@nga's Mahâyânasûtralamkâra deals more with the duties concerning the career of a saint (Bodhisattva) than with the metaphysics of the system.]

[Footnote 4: Dharmakîrtti calls himself an adherent of Vijñanavâda in his Santânântarasiddhi, a treatise on solipsism, but his Nyâyabindu seems rightly to have been considered by the author of Nyâyabindu@tîkâ@tippani (p. 19) as being written from the Sautrântika point of view.]

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desires to have (samyagjñânapûrvikâ sarvapuru@sârthasiddhi) [Footnote ref 1]. When on proceeding, in accordance with the presentation of any knowledge, we get a thing as presented by it we call it right knowledge. Right knowledge is thus the knowledge by which one can practically acquire the thing he wants to acquire (arthâdhigati). The process of knowledge, therefore, starts with the perceptual presentation and ends with the attainment of the thing represented by it and the fulfilment of the practical need by it (arthâdhigamât samâpta@h pramâ@navyâpârah). Thus there are three moments in the perceptual acquirement of knowledge: (1) the presentation, (2) our prompting in accordance with it, and (3) the final realization of the object in accordance with our endeavour following the direction of knowledge. Inference is also to be called right knowledge, as it also serves our practical need by representing the presence of objects in certain connections and helping us to realize them. In perception this presentation is direct, while in inference this is brought about indirectly through the li@nga (reason). Knowledge is sought by men for the realization of their ends, and the subject of knowledge is discussed in philosophical works only because knowledge is sought by men. Any knowledge, therefore, which will not lead us to the realization of the object represented by it could not be called right knowledge. All illusory perceptions, therefore, such as the perception of a white conch-shell as yellow or dream perceptions, are not right knowledge, since they do not lead to the realization of such objects as are presented by them. It is true no doubt that since all objects are momentary, the object which was perceived at the moment of perception was not the same as that which was realized at a later moment. But the series of existents which started with the first perception of a blue object finds itself realized by the realization of other existents of the same series (nîlâdau ya eva santâna@h paricchinno nilajñânena sa eva tena prâpita@h tena nilajñânam pramâ@nam) [Footnote ref 2].

When it is said that right knowledge is an invariable antecedent of the realization of any desirable thing or the retarding of any undesirable thing, it must be noted that it is not meant

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[Footnote 1: Brief extracts from the opinions of two other commentators of Nyâyaybindu, Vinîtadeva and S'antabhadra (seventh century), are found in Nyâyabindu@tîkâtippanî, a commentary of Nyayabindutikâ of Dharmmottara, but their texts are not available to us.]

[Footnote 2: Nyâyabindu@tîkâ@tippanî, p. 11.]

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that right knowledge is directly the cause of it; for, with the rise of any right perception, there is a memory of past experiences, desire is aroused, through desire an endeavour in accordance with it is launched, and as a result of that there is realization of the object of desire. Thus, looked at from this point of view, right knowledge is not directly the cause of the realization of the object. Right knowledge of course directly indicates the presentation, the object of desire, but so far as the object is a mere presentation it is not a subject of enquiry. It becomes a subject of enquiry only in connection with our achieving the object presented by perception.

Perception (pratyaks'a) has been defined by Dharmakîrtti as a presentation, which is generated by the objects alone, unassociated by any names or relations (kalpanâ) and which is not erroneous (kalpanâpo@dhamabhrântam) [Footnote ref 1]. This definition does not indeed represent the actual nature (svarûpa) of perception, but only shows the condition which must be fulfilled in order that anything may be valid perception. What is meant by saying that a perception is not erroneous is simply this, that it will be such that if one engages himself in an endeavour in accordance with it, he will not be baffled in the object which was presented to him by his perception (tasmâdgrâhye arthe vasturûpe yadaviparyastam tadabhrântamiha veditavyam}. It is said that a right perception could not be associated with names (kalpanâ or abhilâpa). This qualification is added only with a view of leaving out all that is not directly generated by the object. A name is given to a thing only when it is associated in the mind, through memory, as being the same as perceived before. This cannot, therefore, be regarded as being produced by the object of perception. The senses present the objects by coming in contact with them, and the objects also must of necessity allow themselves to be presented as they are when they are in contact with the proper senses. But the work of recognition or giving names is not what is directly produced by the objects themselves, for this involves the unification of previous experiences, and this is certainly not what is presented

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[Footnote 1: The definition first given in the Pramânasamucaya (not available in Sanskrit) of Di@nnâga (500 A.D.) was "Kalpanâpodham." According to Dharmakirtti it is the indeterminate knowledge (nirvikalpa jñâna) consisting only of the copy of the object presented to the senses that constitutes the valid element presented to perception. The determinate knowledge (savikalpa jñâna), as formed by the conceptual activity of the mind identifying the object with what has been experienced before, cannot be regarded as truly representing what is really presented to the senses.]

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to the sense (pûrvad@r@s@tâparad@r@s@tañcârthamekîkurvadvijñânamasannihitavi@sayam pûrvad@r@s@tasyâsannihitatvât). In all illusory perceptions it is the sense which is affected either by extraneous or by inherent physiological causes. If the senses are not perverted they are bound to present the object correctly. Perception thus means the correct presentation through the senses of an object in its own uniqueness as containing only those features which are its and its alone (svalak@sa@nam). The validity of knowledge consists in the sameness that it has with the objects presented by it (arthena saha yatsârûpyam sâd@rs'yamasya jñânasya tatpramâ@namiha). But the objection here is that if our percept is only similar to the external object then this similarity is a thing which is different from the presentation, and thus perception becomes invalid. But the similarity is not different from the percept which appears as being similar to the object. It is by virtue of their sameness that we refer to the object by the percept (taditi sârûpyam tasya vas'ât) and our perception of the object becomes possible. It is because we have an awareness of blueness that we speak of having perceived a blue object. The relation, however, between the notion of similarity of the perception with the blue object and the indefinite awareness of blue in perception is not one of causation but of a determinant and a determinate (vyavasthâpyavyavasthâpakabhâvena). Thus it is the same cognition which in one form stands as signifying the similarity with the object of perception and is in another indefinite form the awareness as the percept (tata ekasya vastuna@h kiñcidrûpam pramâ@nam kiñcitpramâ@naphalam na virudhyate). It is on account of this similarity with the object that a cognition can be a determinant of the definite awareness (vyavasthâpanaheturhi sârûpyam), so that by the determinate we know the determinant and thus by the similarity of the sense-datum with the object {pramâ@na) we come to think that our awareness has this particular form as "blue" (pramâ@naphala). If this sameness between the knowledge and its object was not felt we could not have spoken of the object from the awareness (sârûpyamanubhûtam vyavasthâpanahetu@h). The object generates an awareness similar to itself, and it is this correspondence that can lead us to the realization of the object so presented by right knowledge [Footnote ref l].

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[Footnote 1: See also pp. 340 and 409. It is unfortunate that, excepting the Nyâyabindu, Nyâyabindu@tîkâ, Nyâyabindu@tîkâ@tippanî (St Petersburg, 1909), no other works dealing with this interesting doctrine of perception are available to us. Nyâyabindu is probably one of the earliest works in which we hear of the doctrine of arthakriyâkâritva (practical fulfilment of our desire as a criterion of right knowledge). Later on it was regarded as a criterion of existence, as Ratnakîrtti's works and the profuse references by Hindu writers to the Buddhistic doctrines prove. The word arthakriyâ is found in Candrakîrtti's commentary on Nâgârjuna and also in such early works as Lalitavistara (pointed out to me by Dr E.J. Thomas of the Cambridge University Library) but the word has no philosophical significance there.]

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Sautrântika theory of Inference [Footnote ref 1].

According to the Sautrântika doctrine of Buddhism as described by Dharmakîrtti and Dharmmottara which is probably the only account of systematic Buddhist logic that is now available to us in Sanskrit, inference (anumâna) is divided into two classes, called svârthânumâna (inferential knowledge attained by a person arguing in his own mind or judgments), and parârthânumâna (inference through the help of articulated propositions for convincing others in a debate). The validity of inference depended, like the validity of perception, on copying the actually existing facts of the external world. Inference copied external realities as much as perception did; just as the validity of the immediate perception of blue depends upon its similarity to the external blue thing perceived, so the validity of the inference of a blue thing also, so far as it is knowledge, depends upon its resemblance to the external fact thus inferred (sârûpyavas'âddhi tannîlapratîtirûpam sidhyati).

The reason by which an inference is made should be such that it may be present only in those cases where the thing to be inferred exists, and absent in every case where it does not exist. It is only when the reason is tested by both these joint conditions that an unfailing connection (pratibandha) between the reason and the thing to be inferred can be established. It is not enough that the reason should be present in all cases where the thing to be inferred exists and absent where it does not exist, but it is necessary that it should be present only in the above case. This law (niyama) is essential for establishing the unfailing condition necessary for inference [Footnote ref 2]. This unfailing natural connection (svabhâvapratibandha) is found in two types

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[Footnote 1: As the Pramâ@nasamuccaya of Diñnâga is not available in Sanskrit, we can hardly know anything of developed Buddhist logic except what can be got from the Nyâyabindu@tîkâ of Dharmmottara.]

[Footnote 2: tasmât niyamavatorevânvayavyatirekayo@h prayoga@h karttavya@h yena pratibandho gamyeta sâdhanyasa sâdhyena. Nyâyabindu@tîkâ, p. 24.]

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of cases. The first is that where the nature of the reason is contained in the thing to be inferred as a part of its nature, i.e. where the reason stands for a species of which the thing to be inferred is a genus; thus a stupid person living in a place full of tall pines may come to think that pines are called trees because they are tall and it may be useful to point out to him that even a small pine plant is a tree because it is pine; the quality of pineness forms a part of the essence of treeness, for the former being a species is contained in the latter as a genus; the nature of the species being identical with the nature of the genus, one could infer the latter from the former but not vice versa; this is called the unfailing natural connection of identity of nature (tâdâtmya). The second is that where the cause is inferred from the effect which stands as the reason of the former. Thus from the smoke the fire which has produced it may be inferred. The ground of these inferences is that reason is naturally indissolubly connected with the thing to be inferred, and unless this is the case, no inference is warrantable.

This natural indissoluble connection (svabhâvapratibandha), be it of the nature of identity of essence of the species in the genus or inseparable connection of the effect with the cause, is the ground of all inference [Footnote ref 1]. The svabhâvapratibandha determines the inseparability of connection (avinâbhâvaniyama) and the inference is made not through a series of premisses, but directly by the li@nga (reason) which has the inseparable connection [Footnote ref 2].

The second type of inference known as parârthânumâna agrees with svârthânumâna in all essential characteristics; the main difference between the two is this, that in the case of parârthânumâna, the inferential process has to be put verbally in premisses.

Pandit Ratnâkarasânti, probably of the ninth or the tenth century
A.D., wrote a paper named Antarvyâptisamarthana in which

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[Footnote 1: na hi yo yatra svabhâvena na pratibaddha@h sa tam apratibaddhavi@sayamavs'yameva na vyabhicaratîti nâsti tayoravyabhicâraniyama. Nyâyabindu@tîkâ, p. 29.]

[Footnote 2: The inseparable connection determining inference is only possible when the li@nga satisfies the three following conditions, viz. (1) pak@sasattva (existence of the li@nga in the pak@sa—the thing about which something is inferred); (2) sapak@sasattva (existence of the li@nga in those cases where the sâdhya oc probandum existed), and (3) vipak@sâsattva (its non-existence in all those places where the sâdhya did not exist). The Buddhists admitted three propositions in a syllogism, e.g. The hill has fire, because it has smoke, like a kitchen but unlike a lake.]

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he tried to show that the concomitance is not between those cases which possess the li@nga or reason with the cases which possess the sâdhya (probandum) but between that which has the characteristics of the li@nga with that which has the characteristics of the sâdhya (probandum); or in other words the concomitance is not between the places containing the smoke such as kitchen, etc., and the places containing fire but between that which has the characteristic of the li@nga, viz. the smoke, and that which has the characteristic of the sâdhya, viz. the fire. This view of the nature of concomitance is known as inner concomitance (antarvyâpti), whereas the former, viz. the concomitance between the thing possessing li@nga and that possessing sâdhya, is known as outer concomitance (bahirvyâpti) and generally accepted by the Nyâya school of thought. This antarvyâpti doctrine of concomitance is indeed a later Buddhist doctrine.

It may not be out of place here to remark that evidences of some form of Buddhist logic probably go back at least as early as the Kathâvatthu (200 B.C.). Thus Aung on the evidence of the Yamaka points out that Buddhist logic at the time of As'oka "was conversant with the distribution of terms" and the process of conversion. He further points out that the logical premisses such as the udâhara@na (Yo yo aggimâ so so dhûmavâ—whatever is fiery is smoky), the upanayana (ayam pabbato dhûmavâ—this hill is smoky) and the niggama (tasmâdayam aggimâ—therefore that is fiery) were also known. (Aung further sums up the method of the arguments which are found in the Kathâvatthu as follows:

"Adherent. Is A B? (@thâpanâ).
Opponent. Yes.

Adherent. Is C D? (pâpanâ).
Opponent. No.

Adherent. But if A be B then (you should have said) C is D.
That B can be affirmed of A but D of C is false.
Hence your first answer is refuted.")

The antecedent of the hypothetical major premiss is termed @thâpanâ, because the opponent's position, A is B, is conditionally established for the purpose of refutation.

The consequent of the hypothetical major premiss is termed pâpanâ because it is got from the antecedent. And the conclusion

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is termed ropa@na because the regulation is placed on the opponent. Next:

"If D be derived of C. Then B should have been derived of A. But you affirmed B of A. (therefore) That B can be affirmed of A but not of D or C is wrong."

This is the pa@tiloma, inverse or indirect method, as contrasted with the former or direct method, anuloma. In both methods the consequent is derived. But if we reverse the hypothetical major in the latter method we get

  "If A is B C is D.
  But A is B.
  Therefore C is D.

By this indirect method the opponent's second answer is reestablished
[Footnote ref 1]."

The Doctrine of Momentariness.

Ratnakîrtti (950 A.D.) sought to prove the momentariness of all existence (sattva), first, by the concomitance discovered by the method of agreement in presence (anvayavyâpti), and then by the method of difference by proving that the production of effects could not be justified on the assumption of things being permanent and hence accepting the doctrine of momentariness as the only alternative. Existence is defined as the capacity of producing anything (arthakriyâkâritva). The form of the first type of argument by anvayavyâpti may be given thus: "Whatever exists is momentary, by virtue of its existence, as for example the jug; all things about the momentariness of which we are discussing are existents and are therefore momentary." It cannot be said that the jug which has been chosen as an example of an existent is not momentary; for the jug is producing certain effects at the present moment; and it cannot be held that these are all identical in the past and the future or that it is producing no effect at all in the past and future, for the first is impossible, for those which are done now could not be done again in the future; the second is impossible, for if it has any capacity to

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[Footnote: 1: See introduction to the translation of Kathâvatthu (Points of Controversy) by Mrs Rhys Davids.]

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produce effects it must not cease doing so, as in that case one might as well expect that there should not be any effect even at the present moment. Whatever has the capacity of producing anything at any time must of necessity do it. So if it does produce at one moment and does not produce at another, this contradiction will prove the supposition that the things were different at the different moments. If it is held that the nature of production varies at different moments, then also the thing at those two moments must be different, for a thing could not have in it two contradictory capacities.

Since the jug does not produce at the present moment the work of the past and the future moments, it cannot evidently do so, and hence is not identical with the jug in the past and in the future, for the fact that the jug has the capacity and has not the capacity as well, proves that it is not the same jug at the two moments (s'aktâs'aktasvabhavatayâ pratik@sa@nam bheda@h). The capacity of producing effects (arthakriyâs'akti), which is but the other name of existence, is universally concomitant with momentariness (k@sa@nikatvavyâpta).