ACADEMICA OF CICERO.

BY

M.L. CAMB. M.A. (LOND.)
ASSISTANT TUTOR AND FORMER FELLOW, CHRIST'S COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE;
ASSISTANT EXAMINER IN CLASSICS AT THE UNIVERSITY OF LONDON.

Since Davies's work was published in 1725, no English scholar has edited the Academica. In Germany, the last edition with explanatory notes is Goerenz's, published in 1810. Madvig's writings provide strong evidence of the shortcomings and unreliability of Goerenz's scholarship; while Davies's work, although much better than Goerenz's, falls short by today's standards of criticism.

This edition is based on a series of intercollegiate lectures I gave at Christ's College a few years ago. I hope that this work, in its current form, will be useful to undergraduate students at universities, as well as to students and teachers in schools where Cicero's philosophical works are studied, particularly in places that aim to teach Ancient Philosophy in a way that prepares students for the in-depth knowledge now required in the final Classical Examinations for Honours at both Oxford and Cambridge. I have written my notes with practical consideration for junior students' needs. Over the past three or four years, I've gone through the Academica with many bright students, and almost every note of mine has been prompted by their questions or challenges. My approach has been to include in an Introduction relevant information about Cicero's philosophical views and the literary background of the Academica that isn't easily found in existing books; provide a strong text; help students gain a deeper understanding of Ciceronian Latin; and finally, enable them to thoroughly learn the philosophy that Cicero addresses.

My text is based on Halm's version, which was published in the 1861 edition of Cicero's philosophical works edited by Baiter and Halm, continuing Orelli's second edition of Cicero's works that was cut short by the editor's death. However, I have closely evaluated all of Halm's readings and the evidence he provides. I've also examined all original critiques of the text that I could find. The outcome is a text that aligns much more closely with the manuscripts than Halm's. I've acknowledged my other sources, apart from Halm, in my notes; the main ones are Madvig's small book titled Emendationes ad Ciceronis libros Philosophicos, published in 1825 in Copenhagen and, as far as I know, never reprinted, and Baiter's text in the edition of Cicero's works co-authored with Kayser. In a few cases, I've introduced my own emendations, but only where the suggestions from other editors seemed too far removed from the manuscripts. If an explanation is needed for discussing textual criticism in the notes, even briefly, I believe it’s important because the high quality of the texts being used is diminishing the educational value of a Classical training. Students used to develop better judgment when they had to navigate through poor texts to reach the author's meaning and master the Latin language. Simply accepting results without understanding the processes behind them is useless for education, which then relies solely on memory. Therefore, I've tried to present the arguments for and against different readings in the key areas where the text is uncertain.

My experience as a teacher and examiner has shown me that the students this edition is meant for have much less familiarity than they should with the unique features and subtleties of language that the best Latin writers show. I've worked hard to lead them to the best teaching of Madvig, on whose work every later editor of Cicero needs to build. His edition of the De Finibus includes more valuable material for explaining not just the language, but also the content of the Academica, than all the official editions of that work currently available. Still, even after Madvig's efforts, a lot remains to be done in clarifying what is, and what is not, Ciceronian Latin. Therefore, I have added many references from my own reading and other sources. Whenever a quote was included solely because it appeared in another work, I’ve noted the source it was derived from. I should mention that I don’t expect or intend for readers to look up all the references provided. It was necessary to offer material so that the student could explore a Latin usage, if it was new to them, and could resolve any language challenges that came up. Due to space constraints, I've often had to replace a direct quote with just a reference.

Since there’s no significant doctrine of Ancient Philosophy that isn't addressed somewhere in the Academica, it's clearly impossible for an editor to provide information that would fully satisfy a reader diving into that subject for the first time. I've therefore aimed to help readers easily locate the information they need and have only focused on the philosophical challenges that were particularly linked to the Academica. The two main texts I refer to in my notes are the English translation of Zeller's Stoics, Epicureans and Sceptics (whenever Zeller is cited without additional description, this book is what is meant) and the Historia Philosophiae by Ritter and Preller. The pages, not the sections, of the fourth edition of this work are cited. All educators should provide these books, along with Madvig's De Finibus, to students studying any philosophical work by Cicero. University students should always have access to Diogenes Laertius, Stobaeus, and Sextus Empiricus, all of which are available in affordable and convenient formats.

Although this edition is mainly aimed at junior students, I hope it will also interest more advanced scholars by gathering a lot of previously hard-to-find information about the Academica. I believe this work will pave the way for a comprehensive edition, either by me or someone more qualified. It should be seen as an experiment, as no recent English scholar has approached any part of Cicero's philosophical works with the specific purpose I have detailed. If this effort is well-received, I plan to edit other lesser-known and less edited works of Cicero in the same way.

In tackling a topic that's this challenging and infrequently addressed, I can’t expect to have avoided mistakes. However, after refining my thoughts over four years, I believe it’s better to share them than to deny students the support they really need. Additionally, it's beneficial, even with some errors, to overcome the intellectual excessive nitpicking that is so common at this University, which more than anything else leads to the lack of productivity in English scholarship compared to that of Germany.

I just want to say that I would appreciate any feedback about mistakes or things I've missed from anyone who cares about the topic.

JAMES S. REID.

CHRIST'S COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE, Dec 1873.

Cic. = Cicero; Ac., Acad. = Academica; Ac., Acad. Post. = Academica Posteriora; D.F. = De Finibus; T.D. = Tusculan Disputations; N.D. = De Natura Deorum; De Div. = De Divinatione; Parad. = Paradoxa; Luc. = Lucullus; Hortens. = Hortensius; De Off. = De Officiis; Tim. = Timaeus; Cat. Mai. = Cato Maior; Lael. = Laelius; De Leg. = De Legibus; De Rep. = De Republica; Somn. Scip. = Somnium Scipionis; De Or. = De Oratore; Orat. = Orator; De Inv. = De Inventione; Brut. = Brutus; Ad Att. = Ad Atticum; Ad Fam. = Ad Familiares; Ad Qu. Frat. = Ad Quintum Fratrem; In Verr., Verr. = In Verrem; Div. in. Qu. Caec. = Divinatio in Quintum Caecilium; In Cat. = In Catilinam.

Plat. = Plato: Rep. = Republic; Tim. = Timaeus; Apol. = Apology of Socrates; Gorg. = Gorgias; Theaet. = Theaetetus.

Arist. = Aristotle; Nic. Eth. = Nicomachean Ethics; Mag. Mor. = Magna Moralia; De Gen. An. = De Generatione Animalium; De Gen. et Corr. = De Generatione et Corruptione; Anal. Post. = Analytica Posteriora; Met. = Metaphysica; Phys. = Physica.

Plut. = Plutarch; De Plac. Phil. = De Placitis Philosophorum; Sto. Rep. = De Stoicis Repugnantiis.

Sext. = Sextus; Sext. Emp. = Sextus Empiricus; Adv. Math. or A.M. = Adversus Mathematicos; Pyrrh. Hypotyp. or Pyrrh. Hyp. or P.H. = Pyrrhoneôn Hypotyposeôn Syntagmata.

Diog. or Diog. Laert. = Diogenes Laertius.

Stob. = Stobaeus; Phys. = Physics; Eth. = Ethics.

Galen; De Decr. Hipp. et Plat. = On the Decrees of Hippocrates and Plato.

Euseb. = Eusebius; Pr. Ev. = Preparation of the Gospel.

Aug. or August. = Augustine; Contra Ac. or C. Ac. = Against the Academics; De Civ. Dei = On the City of God.

Quintil. = Quintilian; Inst. Or. = The Orator's Education.

Seneca; Ep. = Epistles; Consol. ad Helv. = Consolation to Helvidius.

Epic. = Epicurus; Democr. = Democritus.

Madv. = Madvig; M.D.F. = Madvig's edition of the De Finibus; Opusc. = Opuscula; Em. = Emendations on Cicero's philosophical works; Em. Liv. = Livian Emendations; Gram. = Grammar.

Bentl. = Bentley; Bait. = Baiter; Dav. = Davies; Ern. = Ernesti; Forc. = Forcellini; Goer. = Goerenz; Herm. = Hermann; Lamb. = Lambinus; Man. or Manut. = Manutius; Turn. = Turnebus; Wes. or Wesenb. = Wesenberg.

Corss. = Corssen; Ausspr. = Pronunciation, vowel usage, and emphasis.

Curt. = Curtius; Grundz. = Fundamental Principles of Greek Etymology.

Corp. Inscr. = Latin Inscription Collection.

Dict. Biogr. = Dictionary of Classical Biography.

Cf. = compare; conj. = 'conjecture' or 'conjectures'; conjug. = conjugation; constr. = construction; ed. = edition; edd. = editors; em. = emendation; ex. = example; exx. = examples; exc. = except; esp. = especially; fragm. = fragment or fragments; Gr. and Gk. = Greek; Introd. = Introduction; Lat. = Latin; n. = note; nn. = notes; om. = omit, omits, or omission; prep. = preposition; qu. = quotes or quoted by; subj. = subjunctive.

R. and P. = Ritter and Preller's History of Philosophy from the Sources.

I. Cicero as a Student of Philosophy and Man of Letters: 90—45 B.C.

It seems that Cicero's love for literature came from his father, who, due to his poor health, lived most of the time in Arpinum and dedicated a lot of his time to studying.^[1] It's likely that this strong affection for classical Latin drama and epic poetry, which Cicero shows throughout his writings, also stemmed from his father. We can also guess that he encouraged young Cicero to recognize the importance of studying philosophy as a way to balance the somewhat limited rhetorical education of the time.^[2]

Cicero's first organized lessons in philosophy were taught to him by the Epicurean Phaedrus, who was in Rome due to the unstable situation in Athens. Cicero attended his lectures at a very young age, even before he had taken on the toga virilis. The student appeared to be quickly won over by his teacher's beliefs. Phaedrus remained a lifelong friend of Cicero, who frequently praised his teacher's friendly nature and refined style. He is the only Epicurean, possibly along with Lucretius, that Cicero ever acknowledges as having any literary talent. Cicero soon moved away from Epicureanism, but his classmate, T. Pomponius Atticus, was more deeply influenced by Phaedrus's teachings. It was likely during this time that Atticus and Cicero met Patro, who took over as the head of the Epicurean school after Zeno of Sidon.

At this time (i.e., before 88 B.C.), Cicero also attended the lectures of Diodotus the Stoic, with whom he primarily, though not exclusively, studied the art of argumentation.^[6] Cicero considers this skill so crucial for orators that he refers to it as "condensed eloquence." At that time, this art was mainly held by the Stoic school. For a while, Cicero dedicated all his days to intense study with Diodotus, but he didn’t seem to be very interested in general Stoic philosophy. Nevertheless, their friendship continued until Diodotus's death. Following the custom set by the Roman Stoic circle of Scipio and Laelius, he became a resident in Cicero's home, where he passed away in B.C. 59, leaving his student a significant inheritance.^[7] Diodotus appears to have been one of the most skilled men of his time, and Cicero felt gratitude, respect, and admiration towards him.^[8]

In 88 B.C., the renowned Philo of Larissa, then head of the Academic school, arrived in Rome, part of a group of distinguished Greeks who fled Athens as it was about to be besieged during the Mithridatic war. Philo, like Diodotus, was a man of diverse talents: unlike the Stoic philosopher, he was an expert in both the theory and practice of oratory. Cicero barely heard him speak before he completely lost interest in Epicureanism and fully dedicated himself, as he noted, to the brilliant Academic. Filled with incredible enthusiasm, he gave up all other studies in favor of philosophy. His passion was fueled by the belief that Rome's old judicial system was permanently dismantled, and the great opportunities that once existed for an orator were now closed off.

Before Cicero turned twenty, he had already formed close relationships with at least three of the most prominent philosophers of his time, representing the three most influential Greek schools. It’s reasonable to conclude that he became well-acquainted with their ideas and core beliefs. His own statements, after accounting for his self-importance, clearly indicate his dedication as a student. In his later works, he frequently reflects on his youthful passion for philosophy. ^[11] While it may not be wise to overemphasize the close relationship between Greek rhetorical and ethical teachings, it’s clear that Cicero gained significant insights into the ethical aspects of Greek philosophy from the esteemed rhetorician Molo, who was then the Rhodian ambassador in Rome.

During the years 88–81 B.C., Cicero was constantly focused on studying philosophy, law, rhetoric, and literature. He wrote many ambitious works in the last two areas during this time. When Sulla returned to the city after defeating the Marian party in Italy, legal matters resumed their usual course, and Cicero appeared as a lawyer in the courts, claiming to be the only philosophical orator of Rome. For two years, he was actively involved, and then he abruptly left Rome for a trip to Eastern Greece. It's commonly believed that he clashed with Sulla through the freedman Chrysogonus, who was connected to the case of Roscius. However, Cicero’s silence is enough to disprove this theory, which is supported only by Plutarch's weak evidence. When Cicero talks about his speech in defense of Roscius, he never mentions any reason for his departure other than his health, which was suffering because of his intense style of speaking.

The entire two years from 79 to 77 B.C. were spent among Greek philosophers and rhetoric experts. The first six months were spent in Athens, mainly focused on philosophy, as there were no prominent rhetoric teachers in the city at that time except for Demetrius Syrus. On the advice of Philo, Cicero attended lectures by Zeno of Sidon, a clear thinker and writer, who was the head of the Epicurean school, as Diogenes referred to him. Cicero mentions Zeno's teachings in several of his later works. Zeno was sharp and sarcastic in his speech and had a bitter spirit, making him quite different from Patro and Phaedrus. Interestingly, Cicero lists Zeno among the students and admirers of Carneades that he had known. Phaedrus was also in Athens, and along with Atticus, who highly valued him above all other philosophers, Cicero spent a lot of time absorbing his teachings, which were passionately discussed by the two students. Patro was likely in Athens at this time as well, although this isn't explicitly stated anywhere. Cicero must have gained an almost complete understanding of Epicurean doctrines during this period.

There don’t appear to be any prominent members of the Stoic school in Athens at that time. There’s also no record of a Peripatetic teacher whose lectures Cicero might have attended, even though M. Pupius Piso, an avowed Peripatetic, was one of the people with him during his stay in Athens^[21]. Only three notable Peripatetics were living at that time. Of these, Staseas of Naples, who had lived in Piso's house for a while, was not in Athens at that moment^[22]; however, it’s likely that Cicero knew him through Piso, as mentioned in the De Oratore. Cicero often mentions Diodorus, a student of Critolaus, but never as someone he knows personally. Cratippus was not someone he was familiar with at that time.

The philosopher from whom Cicero likely learned the most during this time was Antiochus of Ascalon, who represented a blended Stoic and Academic approach. I will discuss this teacher later when I review the impact he had on our author. For now, it's enough to say that on the key issue debated between Philo and Antiochus, Cicero still agreed with his earlier mentor. However, his later works clearly show that he highly valued Antiochus's skills and knowledge, especially in dialectic, which was taught based on Stoic principles. Cicero describes him as one of the standout philosophers of his time, both for his talent and knowledge ^[23]; as a person of sharp intellect^[24]; with a distinctive style^[25]; and, overall, as the most educated and sharpest philosopher of the era^[26]. A strong friendship developed between Antiochus and Cicero^[27], which was reinforced by the fact that many of Cicero's friends, like Piso, Varro, Lucullus, and Brutus, shared similar views with Antiochus. It seems unlikely that Cicero met Aristus, Antiochus's brother, at this time, since he is mentioned in the Academica^[28] in a way that indicates Cicero did not know him in 62 B.C.

From 77 to 68 B.C., when the series of letters starts, Cicero was definitely too busy with legal and political matters to spend much time on structured study. He often emphasized that his oratory heavily relied on philosophy; [viii] and we know from his letters that he later refreshed his style by studying Greek writers, particularly philosophers. During this period, about which we have little information, we can assume he maintained his knowledge through discussions with many Roman friends interested in philosophy, as well as with Greeks who occasionally visited Rome and frequented the homes of the Optimates; he also squeezed in whatever reading he could manage in his free time. The letters in the first book addressed to Atticus, covering the years 68—62 B.C., provide many examples of his enduring passion for literary pursuits. Early on during this time, we see him pleading with Atticus to let him have a library that was for sale, while at the same time expressing with great intensity his dislike for public affairs and his love for books, which he viewed as the foundation for his old age^[34]. Even amidst his most demanding political work, while he was striving hard for the consulship, he was focused on beautifying his Tusculan villa to reflect his literary and philosophical preferences. This serves as a reflection of his spirit throughout his life. Above all, he was a man of letters; in comparison to literature, politics and oratory were of secondary importance to him. Public business engaged his intellect but never truly captured his heart.

The year 62 freed him from the consulship and allowed him to pursue his love for literature. This year saw the publication of his speeches, which he claimed were filled with philosophical insights; the history of his consulship, written in both Latin and Greek, with the Greek version sent to Posidonius modeled after Isocrates and Aristotle; and a poem about his consulship, of which some fragments still exist. A year or two later, he was enthusiastically reading the works of Dicaearchus and maintaining his relationships with contemporary Greek philosophers. His long absence from free time seemed to have created an intense desire for reading at this point. His friend Paetus had inherited a valuable library, which he gave to Cicero. At that time, it was in Greece, and Cicero wrote to Atticus: "If you care about me and are sure of my care for you, do everything you can to ensure not a single page is lost.... Every day I find more joy in studying, as much as my legal work allows." During this period, Cicero spent much time studying at his properties near Tusculum, Antium, Formiae, and elsewhere. I emphasize these points because there’s a growing belief that Cicero was just a casual writer and that his works were off-the-cuff paraphrases of Greek texts that he barely understood. In reality, his hunger for various kinds of literature was insatiable, and he achieved significant knowledge in each area. He was undoubtedly the most educated Roman of his time, second only to Varro. One of his letters to Atticus will provide a clear picture of his life at this time. He focused especially on the political writings of the Greeks, such as Theophrastus and Dicaearchus. He also wrote historical memoirs in the style of Theopompus.

The years from 59–57 B.C. were times when Cicero's personal troubles overshadowed all other activities. Shortly after he returned from exile in 56, he described himself as "devouring literature" with a remarkable man named Dionysius^[41], jokingly declaring that nothing is sweeter than universal knowledge. He spent a large part of 55 at Cumae or Naples, "feeding upon" the library of Faustus Sulla, the son of the Dictator^[42]. Literature was, he said, his comfort and support, and he preferred to sit in a garden chair that Atticus had, under a bust of Aristotle, rather than in the ivory chair of his office. Toward the end of that year, he was busy working on the De Oratore, a piece that clearly shows his ongoing familiarity with Greek philosophy^[43]. The following year (54), he wrote that politics must come to an end for him, and he was returning to a life more in line with nature, that of a student^[44]. During this year, he mostly stayed at his country villas where his best book collections were. At this time, he wrote the De Republica, a work that serves as evidence that his earlier philosophical studies had not been neglected^[45]. Aristotle was specifically mentioned as one of the authors [xi] read during this period^[46]. In 52 B.C., the De Legibus was written amidst many distractions; it was a work supposedly modeled on Plato and the earlier philosophers of the Socratic schools.

In the year 51, Cicero, while on his way to Cilicia, visited Athens again, much to his enjoyment and that of the Athenians. He stayed at Aristus's house, who was Antiochus's brother and Brutus's teacher. His connection with this philosopher was lasting, judging by the fond mention in the Brutus^[47]. Cicero also speaks warmly of Xeno, an Epicurean friend of Atticus, who was in Athens with Patro at that time. It was during this time that Cicero stepped in to stop Memmius, a student of the great Roman Epicurean Lucretius, from demolishing the house where Epicurus once lived^[48]. Cicero seemed a bit let down by the state of philosophy in Athens, as Aristus was the only worthy philosopher living there at the time^[49]. On his journey from Athens to his province, he met Cratippus, who later became the head of the Peripatetic school in Athens^[50]. At that time, he was living in Mitylene, where Cicero seemed to spend some time in his company^[51]. He was, without a doubt, the greatest, Cicero said, of all the Peripatetics he had heard, and indeed of equal merit to the most distinguished members of that school^[52].

Caring for the chaotic province of Cilicia occupied Cicero's thoughts until the end of 50. [xii] However, he longed for Athens and its philosophy. He wanted to leave a mark on the beautiful city and anxiously asked Atticus if it would seem silly to build a gateway at the Academy, like Appius, his predecessor, had done at Eleusis^[53]. It appears the Athenians at the time were known for modifying their ancient statues to favor the noble Romans and for adding flattering inscriptions. Cicero expressed disgust for this practice. In one letter from this time, he carefully examines the mistakes Atticus had pointed out in the books De Republica^[54]. His desire for Athens still lingered in his mind, and on his way home from Cilicia, he talked about doing something significant for the city^[55]. Cicero was eager to show Rhodes, with its eloquence school, to the two boys Marcus and Quintus, who were with him, and they likely stopped there for a few days^[56]. From there, they went to Athens, where Cicero stayed again with Aristus^[57], and reconnected with other philosophers, including Xeno, Atticus's friend^[58].

On Cicero's return to Italy, public affairs were in a very serious state, leaving little room for thoughts about literature. The letters from this time are quite sad. Cicero often compares the politicians of the day to the Scipio he had depicted in the De Republica^[59]; when he thinks of Caesar, he is reminded of Plato's description of a tyrant [xiii]^[60]; and when he considers what path to take, he naturally recalls the example of Socrates, who chose not to leave Athens during the misrule of the thirty tyrants^[61]. It’s interesting to see Cicero, right in the middle of civil war, studying Demetrius the Magnesian's book on harmony^[62]; or spending his days debating a series of abstract philosophical ideas about tyranny^[63]. Nothing demonstrates more clearly that he was truly a bookish person; he was only a politician by mere chance. In these troubled times, however, nothing suited him for long; books, letters, study, all eventually became unsatisfactory^[64].

As soon as Cicero had fully reconciled with Caesar in 46 BC, he returned with intense energy to his old literary passions. In a letter to Varro that year^[65], he wrote, "I assure you, no sooner had I returned to Rome than I reconnected with my old friends, my books." These provided him with genuine comfort, and his studies seemed to yield richer rewards than during his prosperous days^[66]. The tone of all his letters at this time is consistent: see especially the remaining letters to Varro and also to Sulpicius^[67]. The Partitiones Oratoriae, the Paradoxa, the Orator, and the Laudatio Catonis, which Caesar responded to with his Anticato, were all completed within that year. Before the year's end, the Hortensius and the De Finibus were likely both planned and started. [xiv] Early the following year, the Academica, the history of which I will outline elsewhere, was written.

I have now completed the first part of my task; I have presented Cicero as both a man of letters and a philosophy student during the time before he wrote the Academica. Even the evidence I’ve provided, which doesn’t include indirect signs of his philosophical study found in his actual philosophical works, is enough to support his claim that he was never disconnected from philosophy^[68]. He had every right to defend against the criticism made by some when his first later work—the Hortensius—was published, suggesting he was just a novice in philosophy. He asserted that nothing had occupied his thoughts more throughout his incredibly active life^[69]. If the scope of this edition allowed it, I could easily demonstrate through a detailed examination of his writings and a comparison with ancient sources that his understanding of Greek philosophy was nearly as precise as it was vast. Regarding the Academica, I have the chance in my notes to defend Cicero's significant accuracy; the success of that defense is for the reader to evaluate. Throughout this work, I will address the unfounded feelings and opinions currently held that contribute to a low view of Cicero's philosophical skills. However, there’s one instance of unfairness I must mention now [xv], and that is this: Cicero the philosopher suffers due to the flaws of Cicero the politician. Scholars who have come to scorn his political weaknesses, vanity, and indecisiveness are quick to downplay his contributions to philosophy without closely examining their actual worth. I regret having to mention the renowned Mommsen, who refers to the De Legibus as "an oasis in the desert of this dreary and voluminous writer." I urge all readers to free themselves from political bias and prejudices unrelated to the subject at hand while reading the Academica.

II. The Philosophical Views of Cicero.

To clearly define Cicero's position as a student of philosophy, it's essential to conduct a detailed historical examination of the later Greek schools—the Stoics, Peripatetics, Epicureans, and new Academics. It's necessary to understand these schools not just as they were founded, but as they existed in Cicero's time; Stoicism not as Zeno saw it, but as presented by Posidonius and other students of Panaetius; not just the Epicureanism of Epicurus, but also that of Zeno, Phaedrus, Patro, and Xeno; the doctrines taught in the Lyceum by Cratippus; the new Academic views of Philo as well as those of Arcesilas and Carneades; and the blend of Academicism, Peripateticism, and Stoicism advocated by Antiochus in the name of the Old Academy. A systematic effort to distinguish between the earlier and later forms of doctrine held by these schools is still a significant gap. Cicero's statements about any specific school are often checked against what ancient sources say about the earlier representatives. If any discrepancies are found, it's quickly concluded that Cicero is seriously mistaken, whereas he is likely expressing views that would have been accepted as valid by the leaders of the school in his time. Even Madvig's criticism isn't free from this mistake, as will be evident from my notes on several passages of the Academica^[70]. Since I don't have enough space to conduct the thorough inquiry I believe is necessary, I can only briefly outline Cicero's relationship to the main schools.

The two main tasks of later Greek philosophy were, as Cicero often emphasizes, to establish a criterion that would be sufficient to distinguish the true from the false, and to determine an ethical standard^[71]. In the Academica, Cicero shares his view on the first issue: that obtaining any infallible criterion is impossible. Going into more detail here would anticipate the text of the Lucullus as well as my notes. Without further nuances, I can say that Cicero was largely in agreement with the New Academic school on this matter, opposing all other schools. As he states, the idea that absolute knowledge is impossible was the one Academic belief against which all the other schools [xvii] united^[72]. In what was most distinctively New Academic, Cicero followed the New Academy.

It’s clear why Cicero was drawn to this belief. Nothing was more off-putting to him than dogmatism. As an orator, he was used to hearing arguments presented convincingly from both sides. He saw it as arrogant to assert any claim with the conviction of its absolute, unchangeable truth. For him, a philosophy needed to avoid that arrogance. Respectable philosophers had held completely opposite views on the same topics. The wise choice was to withhold full agreement from all doctrines while giving qualified agreement to those that seemed most likely. Cicero's temperament, apart from his experience as an orator, also leaned towards kindness and tolerance, making him resistant to the intensity of dogmatism. He often noted that the variety of opinions displayed by great minds should encourage people to teach each other with humility and gentleness. There was something reckless and shameful about being overly assertive, which he felt was unworthy of a self-disciplined person. This sentiment reflected a distinctly Roman perspective. Cicero further emphasized arguments akin to those presented by English thinkers from Milton to Mill, asserting that the free exchange of opinions is essential to the growth of philosophy, which flourished rapidly in Greece due to that very freedom. Wherever authority has raised its voice loudly, he says, philosophy has suffered. He cites Pythagoras as a warning example and often depicts the harmful effects of authority. The true philosophical spirit requires us to explore what can be said for every perspective. It is our duty to examine all sides of every question, following the example of the Old Academy and Aristotle. Those who demand a dogmatic statement of belief are simply meddling. The Academics take pride in their freedom to judge. They aren’t bound to defend an opinion just because one of their predecessors established it. Cicero promotes this freedom so much that in the fifth book of the *Tusculan Disputations*, he takes a stance that completely contradicts the entirety of the fourth book of the *De Finibus*, and when this contradiction is pointed out, he refuses to adhere to his previous statements, claiming he is an Academic and a free thinker. "At one time this seems more probable, at another that." The Academic takes the best from every school. He explores the vast landscape of philosophy, while the Stoic is hesitant to stray an inch from Chrysippus. The Academic only desires for others to challenge his views; for like Socrates, his sole aim is to free himself and others from confusion and falsehoods. This spirit is also present in Lucullus the Antiochean. While openly embracing this philosophical freedom, Cicero firmly rejects the accusation that the Academy, despite claiming to seek the truth, lacks any truth to pursue. The probable is considered the true for them.

Another consideration that drew Cicero to these beliefs was their clear adaptability for use in oratory, and the fact that eloquence was, as he put it, the offspring of the Academy^[90]. Orators, politicians, and writers had always found their best inspiration in the teachings of the Academic and Peripatetic masters^[91]. The Stoics and Epicureans didn’t care about the power of expression. Additionally, the Academic beliefs were the ones that the common sense of the world could relate to the most^[92]. The Academy was also the institution with the most respectable background. Compared to its system, all other philosophies seemed less refined^[93]. The philosopher who best upheld the Socratic tradition was highly regarded, ceteris paribus, and that man was Carneades^[94].

When we examine the second major issue, that of ethical standards, we must remember that it was seen by almost all later philosophers as far more significant than the first. Philosophy was clearly defined as the art of [xx] living (ars vivendi). All speculative and non-ethical doctrines were valuable only as foundations upon which this practical skill could be built. This applies equally to the Pyrrhonian skepticism and the dogmatism of Zeno and Epicurus. Their logical and physical doctrines were merely outworks or defenses that supported the usual life of the school. They were mainly useful in times of conflict; in peacetime, ethics ruled supreme. This fact will help us clarify many complexities in Cicero's philosophical writings. For example, in the introduction of the Academica Posteriora^[95], Cicero is accused by Varro of abandoning the Old Academy for the New and he accepts this accusation. How can this be reconciled with his frequent claims that he never rejected the teachings Philo gave him? It's quite simple. Arcesilas, Carneades, and Philo were too focused on their arguments against Zeno and his followers, which were based on logic, to spend much time on ethics. Conversely, in the works that Cicero had written and published before the Academica, wherever he addressed philosophy, it was in its ethical aspect. In addition, these works were direct imitations of early Academic and Peripatetic writers, who, in the general view that focused mainly or exclusively on ethics, effectively formed a single school referred to as the "Vetus Academia." Therefore, general readers, who considered ethical similarity to be far more important than dialectical [xxi] differences, would naturally see Cicero as a supporter of their "Vetus Academia," as long as he stayed away from dialectic; when he emphasized dialectic and clearly supported Carneades, they would understandably view him as having switched from the Old Academy to the New. This perspective is supported by the fact that for many years before Cicero wrote, the Academic dialectic had lacked a prominent expositor. So much so that when Cicero wrote the Academica, he was accused of positioning himself as the defender of a discredited and outdated school^[96].

Cicero's ethics are distinct from his logic. In moral matters, he recognized the risk of doubt. Even in the De Legibus, when discussing a moral issue, he asks the New Academy, which has muddled these topics, to hold their peace^[97]. Although Antiochus is dismissed in the dialectical dialogue, he is spoken of warmly in the De Legibus^[98]. Cicero was drawn to ethical systems that seemed to provide solid moral foundations. He was irresistibly captivated by the Stoics. Regarding their ethical and religious beliefs, he calls them "great and famous philosophers^[99]," often expressing a sense of shame about how they were treated by Arcesilas and Carneades. At one point, he confesses a fear that they might actually be the only true philosophers [xxii] after all^[100]. The Stoics had a certain grandeur in their moral views, more fitting for a superhuman realm than a human one, which attracted Cicero despite the stark nature of Stoic logic driving him away^[101]. On moral issues, he often aligns more closely with Stoicism than even his teacher Antiochus. One major issue among philosophers of the time was whether happiness had levels. The Stoics argued that it did not, and in a notable passage, Cicero agrees with them, explicitly rejecting Antiochus's view that a life filled with virtue but lacking other benefits might be happy, but not the happiest possible^[102]. He urges the Academic and Peripatetic schools to stop making uncertain statements (balbutire) and to accept that the happiness of a wise person would remain intact even if they were thrown into the bull of Phalaris^[103]. In another instance, he concedes the purely Stoic view that virtue is one and indivisible^[104]. However, he refuses to label these beliefs as strictly Stoic, claiming Socrates as his authority for them^[105]. Zeno, whom he considers merely an unworthy wordsmith, borrowed these ideas from the Old Academy. This is Cicero's overall sentiment towards Zeno, and it's clear he picked it up from Antiochus, who, while taking Zeno's doctrines, always claimed Zeno had taken them first. Cicero mainly focused on Zeno's ethics in this regard, while Antiochus primarily considered his logic. This is where the distinction between Antiochus and Cicero lies. Antiochus viewed Zeno's logic as true and Socratic, while Cicero saw it as un-Socratic, considering Socrates to be the champion of doubt^[106]. Overall, Cicero was more aligned with Stoic ethics than Antiochus. However, not in all respects: Antiochus accepted the Stoic paradoxes without hesitation, while Cicero followed them tentatively, even if he acknowledged they had a Socratic origin^[107]. Furthermore, Antiochus subscribed to the Stoic belief that all emotions were sinful; Cicero, who was very human in experiencing joy and sorrow, rejected that notion with disgust^[108]. It's worth noting that Cicero was inconsistent on certain points. In the De Finibus, he argued that the difference between Peripatetic and Stoic ethics was merely semantic; in the Tusculan Disputations, he claimed it to be substantive. The works that are most Stoic in spirit are the Tusculan Disputations and the De Officiis.

In terms of physics, I should point out right from the start that this area of philosophy was considered relatively unimportant during Cicero's time. Its main significance was that ancient theology was, like all natural theology, a part of physical science. Cicero’s religious inclinations led him to strongly resonate with the Stoic beliefs about the overarching divine power in the universe. He believed that piety, holiness, and moral goodness could not exist in any form if the divine governance of the universe was denied. It troubled Cicero that Carneades found it necessary to challenge the beautiful Stoic theology, and he defended the great skeptic by arguing that his primary goal was to encourage people to seek the truth. At the same time, while he was genuinely following the Stoics in physics, Cicero often thought he was aligned with Aristotle. This partly resulted from the late Peripatetics adopting many Stoic ideas and presenting them as Aristotelian. The difference between the fake and the real Aristotelian views went unnoticed due to the strange neglect of the most significant works of Aristotle. Still, Cicero managed to correct many of the Stoic's excesses in physics by studying Aristotle and Plato. To fully understand his ideas about physics, Plato's Timaeus, which he knew well and translated, is particularly important. It should also be noted that Stoic physics were mainly Aristotelian, and Cicero was well aware of this.

Very few words are needed to describe Cicero's view of the Peripatetic and Epicurean schools. The former wasn't very influential during his time. The philosophical followers of the author of the Organon were known for their lack of knowledge in logic^[112], and in ethics, they had come quite close to Stoic teachings. While Cicero wasn't heavily influenced by this school, he generally treated it kindly due to its significant history, considering it a respectable branch of the true Socratic tradition. The situation with the Epicureans was different. In physics, they stood completely alone; their system was extremely anti-intellectual, and they rejected mathematics. Their ethical beliefs made Cicero feel nothing but disgust, they didn't engage in dialectic, and they compounded all their mistakes with one unforgivable flaw in Cicero's eyes: their complete indifference to the elegance and beauty of language.

III. The goal of Cicero in writing his philosophical works.

People often criticize Cicero for lacking originality as a philosopher, leading to a devaluation of his works. While this criticism has some merit, it's still unreasonable because it reflects a misunderstanding of both Cicero's intent in writing and the entire essence of later Greek thought. The conclusion drawn from this criticism is also unfounded. If the later philosophy of the Greeks has any value, then Cicero's works hold equal value, as they provide the most complete and clear perspective on it. Anyone who tries to make sense of the contradictions found in Stobaeus, Diogenes Laertius, Sextus Empiricus, Plutarch, and other sources might not feel inclined to complain about the confusion in Cicero's ideas. This common complaint largely stems from the lack, which I've already pointed out, of any clear explanation of the variations in doctrine that the late Greek schools demonstrated in the two centuries leading up to the Christian era. But back to the accusation of lacking originality—this is a quality Cicero never claims. Almost every one of his works (except for the third book of the De Officiis) is openly acknowledged to be derived entirely from Greek sources. In fact, during his time, originality would have been seen more as a flaw than a virtue. For two centuries, excluding Carneades, no one really introduced anything substantively new in philosophy; there was merely a series of eclectic mixes of existing ideas. It would be premature to conclude that the writers of these two centuries don't deserve our attention, as the spirit, if not the substance, of their doctrines underwent a significant transformation that ultimately had a notable impact on society and on Christian religion itself.

When Cicero started writing, the Latin language was basically lacking any philosophical literature. Philosophy was a closed book for those who didn't know Greek. His goal was to take the best Greek ideas and present them in elegant Latin, to enhance the education of his fellow countrymen and to enrich their literature. At the same time, he wanted to challenge the dominance of Epicureanism across Italy. The ideas of Epicurus were the only ones that had been presented in Latin in a way that appealed to the masses. There seemed to be a large body of Epicurean literature in Latin, but now only a few remnants remain. C. Amafinius, mentioned in [xxvii] the Academica^[113], was the first to write, and his works appear to have circulated widely^[114]. He had many imitators who were received so well that, in Cicero's strong words, they took over all of Italy^[115]. Rabirius and Catius the Insubrian, possibly the Epicurean and friend of Horace, were among the most notable of these writers. Cicero lists various reasons for their huge popularity: the straightforward nature of Epicurean physics, the absence of any other philosophy for Latin readers, and the tempting allure of pleasure. This last reason, as he seems to suggest in one passage, likely held little real significance. It's striking that the entire Roman Epicurean literature focused much more on the physics than the ethics of Epicurus. This can be explained by the fact that the Italian people still had a strong practical foundation for morality based on family laws and social structure, so they didn't feel a great need for any speculative system; meanwhile, the decline in belief in the supernatural among the educated classes, together with an increase in superstition among the general population, paved the way for a purely mechanical understanding of the universe. However, as interesting and important as this topic is, and despite being overlooked, I won't go any further into it.

These Roman Epicureans are constantly criticized [xxviii] by Cicero for their awkward writing style^[116]. He admits he hasn’t read them, but his opinion of them was probably right. A curious question comes up, which I can't discuss here, about why Cicero didn’t mention Lucretius when talking about these Roman Epicureans. The most likely explanation is that he found it impossible to include the great poet in his broad criticism, and since he didn’t want to acknowledge that anything good could come from the Epicurean school, he chose to remain silent, especially since Lucretius was relatively unknown and only gradually gained public recognition.

In addition to his desire to undermine Epicureanism in Italy, Cicero had a patriotic wish to remove the criticism that his country's literature was completely lacking where Greek was richest. He often uses the most far-fetched arguments to show that philosophy had influenced the early Italian peoples^[117]. To those who argue that philosophy is best left to the Greek language, he responds with indignation, accusing them of being unfaithful to their country^[118]. He believes it would be a glorious thing if Romans no longer felt compelled to rely on Greeks^[119]. He won't even admit that Greek is a richer language than Latin^[120]. As for the supposed inability of the Roman intellect to handle philosophical inquiries, he rejects that idea. He claims it's only because the nation's energy has been directed elsewhere that so little progress has been made. He refers to the history of Roman oratory to support this view^[121]. If only there were a push in Rome for the pursuit of philosophy, which was already declining in Greece, Cicero believed it would thrive and take the place of oratory, which he thought was dying amid the chaos of civil war^[122].

There’s no doubt that Cicero firmly believed he could really help his country this way. In his forced political inactivity and amidst the chaos of the law courts, it was the only service he could provide^[123]. He is justified in seeking praise for not giving in to idleness or something worse, unlike many of the most notable men of his time^[124]. For Cicero, idleness was misery, and during those dark times, he was driven to action by profound sorrow^[125]. Philosophy replaced courtroom rhetoric, public speeches, and politics^[126]. It’s odd to see Cicero making such detailed justifications for dedicating himself to philosophy, and a casual reader might dismiss it as egotism. However, it’s important to remember that in Rome, such studies were regarded as mere pastimes for the wealthy; dedicating one’s life to them seemed fine for Greeks, [xxx] but for Romans, it was seen as unmanly, impractical, and not fitting for a statesman^[127]. Many Romans were eager to denounce such pursuits entirely and viewed any new import from Greece much like how English patriots reacted to French ideas right after the great war. Others, like Neoptolemus in Ennius’s works, believed a bit of philosophical knowledge was beneficial, but too much could be risky^[128]. A few preferred that Cicero write about different topics^[129]. In response, he emphasizes the urgent need for philosophical works in Latin.

Still, despite a lot of criticism, enough interest and sympathy were sparked by his first philosophical works to encourage Cicero to keep going. The older generation, whose approval he valued the most, praised the books, and many people were inspired to both read and write philosophy. Cicero now expanded his original plan, which seemed vague at first, to include every topic that Greek philosophers were known to discuss. Individual questions in philosophy couldn't be fully understood until the entire subject had been grasped. This plan, which isn't clearly stated in the two earliest works we have, the Academica and the De Finibus, called for the creation of a kind of philosophical encyclopaedia. Cicero never claimed to be more than an interpreter of Greek philosophy to the Romans. He never pretended to present new perspectives on philosophy or even original critiques of its history. The only thing he asserts as his own is his style. Viewed in this true light, his work cannot be seen as a failure. Those who manage to pass this judgment must either insist on applying a standard that it doesn’t aim for, or fail to comprehend the Greek philosophy it emulates, or perhaps make Cicero pay for the perceived shortcomings of the philosophy of his time.

Following Greek tradition, Cicero states that all or most of his oratorical and political writings were published before the Hortensius and included in his philosophical encyclopedia^[133]. The only two works considered strictly philosophical, even by ancient standards, that came before the Academica were the De Consolatione, based on Crantor's book, about grief, and the Hortensius, which served as an introduction to philosophy, or what was then referred to as protreptic.

For a list of Cicero's philosophical works and their composition dates, students should refer to the Dict. of Biography, Art. Cicero.

IV. History of the Academica.

On the death of Tullia, which occurred in Tusculum in February 45 B.C., Cicero took refuge in the solitude of his villa at Astura, which was nicely located on the Latin coast between Antium and [xxxii] Circeii^[134]. There, he tried to ease his deep sorrow through constant work. He first wrote the book De Consolatione. He found that the physical act of writing was the best way to cope with his pain, and he would write for entire days^[135]. At other times, he would dive into the dense woods near his villa in the early morning and stay there absorbed in study until nightfall^[136]. Often, the effort didn’t bring relief; still, he ignored Atticus's pleas to return to the forum and the senate. He felt that the grief, which books and solitude could barely help him handle, would overwhelm him in the busy city^[137].

It was in this environment that the Academica was written. The first indication of his intention to write the treatise appears in a letter from Cicero to Atticus, which seems to date back to the early weeks of his mourning^[138]. He often relied on Atticus for historical and biographical details, and in this letter, he asks for exactly the kind of information he would need to write the Academica. The way he introduces his request suggests that he had decided on a new project that the Academica would relate to^[139]. He asks what reason brought the delegation that Carneades was part of to Rome; who was the current leader of the Epicurean school; and who were the most prominent politicians in Athens at that time. The significance of the last question is clarified in a section of the De Oratore^[140], [xxxiii] where Cicero refers to the combined Academic and Peripatetic schools by that name. It might be in relation to the progress of the Academica that in a later letter he expresses satisfaction with the progress he has made in his literary projects^[141]. Throughout the rest of his time in Astura, he remained actively engaged; however, although he mentions various other literary plans, there’s no direct reference to the Academica in his letters to Atticus^[142]. He states that no matter how much his critics in Rome may accuse him of idleness, they couldn't keep up with the many difficult works he has been working on in the same amount of time that he has spent writing them^[143].

In early June, Cicero spent a few days at his villa near Antium^[144], where he wrote a treatise for Caesar, which he later decided not to publish^[145]. From there, he informed Atticus about his plan to go to Tusculum or Rome, passing through Lanuvium around mid-June^[146]. After Tullia's death, he had developed a dislike for Tusculum, the place where she had died. Now, he felt he had to overcome that aversion; otherwise, he would either have to completely avoid Tusculum or, if he ever returned, a delay of even ten years would make the experience just as painful^[147]. Before leaving for Antium, Cicero wrote to Atticus that he had completed while at Astura duo magna constitutions, a phrase that has sparked considerable debate^[148]. Many scholars, including Madvig, believe that this refers to the first edition of the Academica along with De Finibus. Krische's arguments against this interpretation are quite convincing^[149]. It's evident from the letters to Atticus that the De Finibus was being developed book by book long after the first edition of the Academica had reached Atticus. The De Finibus actually began at Astura^[150], but it was still incomplete when Cicero started revising the Academica^[151]. The final arrangement of the characters in De Finibus was announced later^[152], and Cicero even later complained that Balbus had managed to sneakily obtain a copy of the fifth book before it was properly corrected, with the unstoppable Caerellia having copied all five books while they were still in that rough form^[153]. A passage in the De Divinatione^[154] provides almost direct evidence that the Academica was published before the De Finibus. For all these reasons, I believe these two works cannot be the ones that Cicero talks about having finished at the same time at Astura.

Another perspective on the constitutions in question is that they refer to the two books titled Catulus and Lucullus from the Priora Academica. I believe [xxxv] the term σύνταγμα, which Madvig suspects is used to indicate a part of a work^[155], thus takes on its natural meaning. Cicero uses the term retirement to refer to the entire work^[156], while Σύνταγμα^[157] and textbook^[158] point to specific parts or sections of a work. Therefore, I'd be quite satisfied to attribute the words of Cicero to the Catulus and Lucullus. However, Krische, without providing reasons, finds this view unsatisfactory and prefers to believe that the Hortensius (or de Philosophia) and the Priora Academica are the works in question. If this guess is correct, then the disputed passage contains the only mention of the Hortensius found in Cicero's letters. We know for sure that the book was written in Astura and published before the Academica. This is evident from the reference in the Academica Posteriora alone^[159], but Cicero's words in the De Finibus^[160] confirm it beyond doubt, indicating that the Hortensius was published long enough before the De Finibus to have reached a fairly broad audience. Additionally, in the Tusculan Disputations and the De Divinatione^[161], the Hortensius and the Academica are mentioned together in a way that suggests the former was completed and released to the public prior to the latter. Thus, nothing prevents Krische's hypothesis, except for the uncertainty I have regarding the use of the term constitution, which also affects the older viewpoint held by Madvig.

No matter the truth about this, it's undeniable that the Hortensius and the Academica must have been more similar in style and tone than any other two works by Cicero, except maybe the Academica and the De Finibus. The characters in the Hortensius are exactly the same as those in the Academica Priora, since the inclusion of Balbus in some editions of the Hortensius fragments is a mistake^[162]. The conversation in the Academica Priora takes place at Hortensius' villa near Bauli; in the Hortensius, it’s at Lucullus' villa near Cumae. It’s quite surprising that under these circumstances there is only one direct reference to the Hortensius in the Lucullus^[163].

While at his villa in Tusculum, shortly after mid-June, 45 B.C., Cicero sent Atticus the Torquatus, which he calls the first book of the De Finibus^[164]. He had already sent the first edition of the Academica to Rome^[165]. There's a mention that new introductions had been added to the Catulus and Lucullus, which praised the public figures from whom the books were named. It's likely that the existing introduction of the Lucullus is the one that was added at that time. Atticus, who visited Cicero in Tusculum, probably pointed out the mismatch between Catulus and Lucullus's known abilities and the roles they were given in complex philosophical discussions. It’s typical of Cicero that his first approach to addressing this mismatch was to deliberately present his readers with statements about the skills and knowledge of these two distinguished Romans that he knew were false and even acknowledged in his letters to Atticus. I should also mention, as it relates to the Academica, that among the unwelcome visits Cicero received in Tusculum was one from Varro^[166].

On July 23rd, Cicero left Rome for Arpinum to take care of some business and to avoid the unwanted attention from Brutus^[167]. However, before leaving Astura, he initially intended to head to Arpinum^[168]. He still seemed dissatisfied with his choice of speakers for the Academica, as the first thing he did upon arrival was to switch out Catulus and Lucullus for Cato and Brutus^[169]. This plan was quickly discarded after he received a letter from Atticus, strongly suggesting that the entire work should be dedicated to Varro, or if not the Academica, then the De Finibus^[170]. Cicero had never been very close with Varro; their connection seemed largely maintained through Atticus, who was always eager to bring them closer together. Nine years earlier, he had urged Cicero to mention Varro in his works^[171]. The nature of the works Cicero was engaged in at that time made it hard to meet that request^[172]. Varro had promised two years before the Academica was written that he would dedicate his major work De Lingua Latino to Cicero. In response to Atticus’s later request, Cicero expressed his frustration with Varro's failure to follow through on his promise. This indicates that Cicero had no idea about the depth or scale of that work. His complaint that Varro had been working for two years without making any headway^[173] shows that there was little friendship between the two. Besides these grievances, Cicero thought Atticus's suggestion was a "godsend^[174]." Since the De Finibus was already "promised" to Brutus, he agreed to dedicate the Academica to Varro, acknowledging that although Catulus and Lucullus came from noble backgrounds, they had no claim to scholarship^[175]. They had so little scholarly depth that they could never even have imagined the doctrines they were made to defend in the first edition of the Academica^[176]. Another place would be found for them, and it was noted that the Academica would fit Varro perfectly, as he was a follower of Antiochus and the most suitable person to explain that philosopher's views^[177]. It so happened that it rained continuously during the first few days of Cicero's stay in Arpinum, so he spent all his time re-editing his Academica, which he now divided into four books instead of two, making himself, Varro, and Atticus the speakers^[178]. Atticus’s role in the dialogue was quite a minor one, but he was so pleased with it that Cicero decided to give him such smaller parts more often in the future^[179]. A suggestion from Atticus to include Cotta was deemed unfeasible^[180].

Although the editing process was pushed forward vigorously, Cicero was always unsure about whether it was a good idea to dedicate the work to Varro. He often placed the entire burden of the decision on Atticus, but if it weren't for Atticus's insistence, he might have changed his mind again. Almost every letter written to Atticus during this time contains pleas for him to rethink the matter repeatedly before making a final decision^[181]. Since no reasons were given for these requests, Atticus understandably became impatient, and Cicero had to reassure him that there were reasons he couldn't share in a letter^[182]. However, the real reasons eventually came to light in some later letters. In one, Cicero stated: "I support Varro, especially because he wants it, but you know he is

So I often have a vision of his face in my mind as he complains, possibly that my contribution to the treatise is more generously supported than his—a claim that you will see is false^[183]." Cicero was afraid of Varro's temperament and maybe his knowledge and genuine critical standards. Before explaining, Atticus [xl] had concluded that Cicero was worried about how the work might be received by the public. Cicero assured him this idea was incorrect; the only reason for his hesitation was his uncertainty about how Varro would react to the dedication^[184]. Atticus seemed to have communicated with Varro multiple times and reassured Cicero there was no reason to be concerned; however, Cicero wanted more than a general assurance and asked for a detailed explanation of the reasons behind it^[185]. To motivate his friend, Atticus claimed that Varro was envious of some people to whom Cicero had shown more favor^[186]. Cicero eagerly sought more information on this topic: was it Brutus that Varro was jealous of? It seems odd that Cicero hadn't reached out to Varro himself. It seems that etiquette required that the person receiving a dedication should assume they were unaware of the donor's intentions until they were about to be executed. So, even though Cicero saw Brutus often while at Tusculum, he apparently didn't talk to him about the De Finibus, but instead had Atticus find out how Brutus felt about the dedication^[187].

Cicero often shares his thoughts about the finished second edition of the Academica in his letters. He mentions that it was generally longer than the first edition, even though a lot was left out; [xli] he adds, "Unless I'm mistaken because of human vanity, the books are so well done that even the Greeks have nothing in the same category of literature that compares.... This edition will be more impressive, more concise, and overall better than the last^[188]." He also states: "The sections on Antioch have all the sharpness of Antiochus mixed with whatever refinement my style may have^[189]." And again: "I’ve completed the book with I don't know what level of success, but with care that is unmatched^[190]." A lot of attention went into the binding and decoration of the presentation copy for Varro, and the letter that accompanied it was carefully crafted^[191]. Yet, even after everything was done and the book was sent to Atticus in Rome, Cicero was still anxious about how Varro would receive it. He wrote to Atticus: "I keep telling you that the presentation will be at your own risk. So if you start to hesitate, let's go to Brutus, who is also a student of Antiochus. Oh Academy, always on the move, flitting hither and thither!" Atticus, for his part, "shuddered" at the thought of taking on the responsibility^[192]. After the work was in his hands, Cicero urged him to take every precaution to keep it from circulating until they could meet in Rome^[193]. This warning was necessary because Balbus and Caerellia had just found a way to access the De Finibus^[194]. In a letter dated apparently a day or two later, Cicero expressed his intention [xlii] to meet Atticus in Rome and send the work to Varro, if it seemed appropriate, after they consulted^[195]. The meeting ultimately didn’t happen, but Cicero left the four books with Atticus, promising to support any decision that might be made^[196]. Atticus replied that as soon as Varro arrived in Rome, the books would be sent to him. "By this time, then," Cicero said when he received the letter, "you've taken the fateful step; oh no! if only you knew the danger this poses for you! Maybe my letter stopped you, even if you hadn’t read it when you wrote. I can’t wait to hear how things stand^[197]." Later, he added: "So you've been bold enough to give Varro the books? I'm waiting for his feedback, but when will he actually read them?" Varro probably received the books in the first two weeks of August, 45 B.C., while Cicero was busy working on the Tusculan Disputations^[198]. A copy of the first edition had already reached Varro, as we learn from a letter in which Cicero asks Atticus to request Varro to make some edits in his copy of the Academica, while the fate of the second edition was still uncertain^[199]. From this, we can conclude that Cicero had given up on suppressing the first edition. When he comforts Atticus about the redundancy of his copies of the first edition, it doesn’t contradict my assumption, as Cicero surely believes that Atticus, regardless of what others think, wants to have the "more splendid, shorter, and better" version. Still, on every occasion possible, the author aimed to highlight that his authorized edition was the one in four books. He did this in a passage written right after the Academica Posteriora was finished^[200], and frequently afterward, when he notably referred to the number of the books as four^[201]. It’s clear that he wanted the work to be titled Academica^[202]. The terms Academica quaestio, Academic pension, and Academia, are merely descriptive^[203]; the same goes for the frequent reference to Academici libri^[204]. The title Academicae Quaestiones, found in many editions, is just a copy of the Tusculanae Quaestiones, backed by the false idea, known as early as Pliny^[205], that Cicero had a villa called Academia where the book was written. He did have a Gymnasium at his Tusculan villa, which he referred to as his Academia, but we know from letters to Atticus that the work was entirely written in Astura, Antium, and Arpinum.

Quintilian seems to have been very familiar with the first edition^[206], but the second edition is the one that gets quoted most often. The four books are specifically mentioned by Nonius, Diomedes, and Lactantius under the title Academica. Augustine refers to them only as Academici libri, and his references indicate that he was only aware of the second edition. Lactantius also sometimes uses this name, though he usually calls it the Academica. Plutarch appears to only know the first edition^[207].

I thought it would be helpful to clearly explain the history of how this book came to be, based on Cicero's letters to Atticus. It's clear that this isn't unnecessary because of the shocking ideas put forth by renowned scholars regarding the two editions. A good overview of those ideas can be found in Goerenz's preface. Now, I will look into the structure and organization of the two editions.

The lost dialogue "Catulus."

The characters in this dialogue and the Lucullus are part of the genuine Optimates and supporters of the senatorial party that Cicero admires so much. The Catulus, from whom the lost dialogue got its name, was the son of the famous colleague of Marius. We won’t focus much on the political careers of the father and son. I just want to explore their stance on the philosophy of the time and how they were connected to Cicero.

Catulus the Younger doesn’t need to take up much of our time. It's clear from the Lucullus^[208] that he mainly shared opinions handed down from his father. Cicero would have preferred to let the elder man speak for himself, but in that case, as with the De Oratore, the author would have had to remove himself from the discussion^[209]. Thus, the son is simply the voice of his father, much like Lucullus, in the dialogue named after him, only conveys a speech from Antiochus, which he claims to have heard^[210]. The arrangement in both instances has to do with their ατριψια concerning philosophy^[211]. This ατριψια wasn’t equivalent to illiteracy, or else Cicero wouldn’t have chosen Catulus the Younger to represent philosophy in the Hortensius^[212]. Although Cicero sometimes groups the father and son as cultured individuals with excellent mastery of Latin, it’s clear from comparing all references to both that little importance was attached to the son’s learning^[213]. Yet, no matter how limited Catulus the Younger’s claims to philosophical status were, he was strongly connected to Cicero in other ways. Throughout Cicero’s most illustrious period, Catulus was one of the top Optimates in Rome, and his character, life, and influence are often described in even exaggerated terms by the orator^[214]. Cicero declares he is one of the pillars of the state^[215] and deserves to be honored alongside Rome's ancient heroes^[216]. When he opposes the Manilian law and asks the citizens who they would trust if Pompey, with all his immense power, were to die, the crowd responds in unison, “On you^[217].” He was the only one brave enough to criticize both the mob's follies and the senate's^[218]. No peril or fortune could ever instill fear or hope in him, nor lead him off his chosen path^[219]. His influence, even in death, will always endure among his fellow citizens^[220]. He was not only celebrated in life but also fortunate in death^[221].

Apart from Cicero's general agreement with Catulus in politics, there were specific reasons for his enthusiasm. Catulus was one of the viri consulares who fully supported the measures taken to suppress the Catilinarian conspiracy, and he was the first to give Cicero the greatest honor of his life, the title "Father of his Country^[222]." Cicero considered himself so closely connected to Catulus that a friend tried to comfort him for the death of Tullia by reminding him of "Catulus and the old days^[223]." Catulus’s statement, often referenced by Cicero, that Rome had never been so unlucky as to have two bad consuls in the same year, except when Cinna held the position, may have been meant to highlight the contrast between Cicero's enthusiasm and the indifference of his colleague Antonius^[224]. Archias, who wrote in honor of Cicero's consulship, lived in the house of the two Catuli^[225].

We saw that when Cicero realized it was too late to recall the first edition of the Academica from circulation, he added a preface to each book, praising Catulus in the first and Lucullus in the second. From the passages quoted above and from what we know of Cicero's approach to these things, we can at least guess part of the content of the lost preface to the Catulus. The accomplishments of the elder Catulus were likely celebrated, as well as those of his son. The philosophical wisdom of the older man probably shone a light on the younger. Cicero's illustrious consulship was praised again, emphasizing the support it received from such a notable figure as the younger Catulus, whose praises were expressed with the passionate language Cicero uses elsewhere on the same topic. There was likely some reference to Archias's connection with the Catuli and to the poem he had written in Cicero's honor. Then the context of the dialogue, its supposed date, and the location where it took place were mentioned. The location was the Cuman villa of Catulus^[226]. The fictional date must be set between the year 60 B.C., when Catulus died, and 63, the year of Cicero's consulship, which is referenced in the Lucullus^[227]. It's well known that in arranging his dialogues, Cicero took great care to avoid anachronisms.

The introduction was over, and the conversation began. They definitely referenced the Hortensius, where the same speakers had engaged before; and after a few more compliments were exchanged, most of which would go to Cicero, someone suggested they discuss the significant differences between the dogmatic and skeptic schools. Catulus offered to share his father's views while praising his father's knowledge of philosophy. Before we outline Catulus's speech based on hints from the Lucullus, we need to discuss the character and philosophical beliefs of Catulus the elder.

In the numerous passages where Cicero talks about him, he rarely forgets to mention his sapientia, suggesting a certain knowledge of philosophy. Cicero describes him as the kindest, most honest, wisest, and holiest of men^[228]. He was a man of universal merit, exceptional worth, a second Laelius^[229]. From the De Oratore, in which he appears as a participant, it's easy to gather a more detailed view of his achievements. Throughout the second and third books, he is regarded as the most educated member of the group^[230]. People turn to him when any question arises related to Greek literature and philosophy. We are specifically told that his knowledge of Greek and how he spoke it earned him admiration even among the Greeks^[231]. He defends the Greeks against Crassus's criticisms^[232]. He scornfully compares Latin historians to their Greek counterparts^[233]. He downplays the later Greek rhetorical teachings while highly praising the early sophists^[234]. He has a strong preference for the systematic rhetoric of Aristotle and Theophrastus^[235]. He provides an account of the history of Greek thought in Italy^[236]. The unblemished purity of his Latin style made many consider him the only true speaker of the language^[237]. He had written a history of his own actions, in the style of Xenophon, which Cicero had emulated^[238], and he was well-known as a wit and an epigram writer^[239].

Although a lot is said about his general education, we only really learn about his philosophical views from the Academica. In the De Oratore, when he talks about Carneades' visit to Rome^[240], he doesn't claim to be a follower of that philosopher, nor does Crassus in his lengthy speech about Greek philosophy link Catulus to any specific teacher. The only Greek he specifically names as a friend is the poet Antipater of Sidon^[241]. Still, it might be concluded that he was aligned with either the Academic or Peripatetic Schools. Cicero repeatedly states that no other schools can produce an orator, and the overall tone of the De Oratore suggests that Catulus would not have been inclined towards the Stoics or Epicureans^[242]. It's likely that he never spent a significant amount of time learning from Greek teachers, but instead gathered his knowledge [l] from books, especially from the writings of Clitomachus. If he had ever interacted directly with any notable Academics, Cicero would have mentioned it, as he does with Antonius^[243] and Crassus^[244]. It's quite unlikely that there was any direct communication between Philo and Catulus, although one passage in the Lucullus seems to suggest otherwise^[245]. Nonetheless, Philo had a great reputation during Catulus's later years, and anyone knowledgeable about Greek literature or society would have been well aware of his views^[246]. No follower of Carneades and Clitomachus, such as Catulus clearly was^[247], could take the latest developments in Academic thought lightly. It's likely that Catulus was not familiar with Philo's famous works^[248].

I will now outline the key aspects of Catulus the younger's speech based on the references in the Lucullus. It likely began with a mention of Philo's books^[249]. A significant part of the speech must have criticized the changes Philo made to the true Carneadean doctrine. The elder Catulus had strongly rejected these, even accusing Philo of deliberately misrepresenting the older Academics^[250]. However, the most crucial part of the speech likely defended Carneades and Arcesilas against [li] the dogmatic schools^[251]. Catulus clearly focused more on the later skeptics than on the earlier ones. It's also very likely that he only briefly touched on the negative Academic arguments while fully developing the positive teaching about the likely, which was so characteristic of Carneades. All of Lucullus's counterarguments concerning the destructive aspects of Academic teaching appear to be specifically aimed at Cicero, who must have represented it in the discourse of the day before^[252]. On the other hand, Lucullus's parts of the speech that address the constructive side of Academicism^[253] seem directed toward Catulus, for whom maintaining the true Carneadean distinction between αδηλα and incomprehensible would be especially fitting. Thus, Lucullus's praise for how the probabile was handled pertains to Catulus. The explanation of skeptical criticism would naturally be left to the most brilliant and incisive orator of the group—Cicero himself. These speculations create a close connection between the introduction, Catulus's speech, and the subsequent one by Hortensius. In the introduction, Philo's innovations were mentioned; Catulus then demonstrated that their sole aim, a solid foundation for science, was already achieved by the Carneadean theory of the probably; afterwards, Hortensius showed, following the principles of Antiochus, that [lii] such a foundation was provided by the older philosophy, which both Carneades and Philo had wrongly abandoned. Thus, Philo becomes the central focus of the discussion. With this setup, none of the indications in the Lucullus contradict each other. Even the request made by Hortensius to Catulus^[254] only needs to imply a straightforward statement from Catulus about the negative Arcesilaean doctrines that would pave the way for the Carneadean likely. One significant viewpoint held by Catulus after Carneades, that the wise person would opine^[255] (to honor the wise), seems to further indicate the generally constructive nature of his exposition. Everything suggests that this part of the dialogue was mainly derived by Cicero from Clitomachus's writings.

Catulus was succeeded by Hortensius, who somehow supported Antiochean views, but to what extent is unclear^[256]. I believe it's very likely that he summarized the history of philosophy, which aligns with Varro’s speech at the beginning of the Academica Posteriora. One major reason for this belief is the difficulty in determining who, if not Hortensius, could have been the one speaking in the initial edition. In the Academica Posteriora, Varro needed to speak first, not second as Hortensius did; this explains why Hortensius's argumentative part vanished in the second edition^[257], which would only make sense coming from someone responding to a previous speech. According to my interpretation, there wouldn’t be much trouble with the fact that Hortensius now promotes a dogmatic philosophy, even though in the lost dialogue that was named after him, he argued against philosophy entirely^[258], claiming that philosophy and wisdom were not the same thing at all^[259]. A historical summary like the one I think Hortensius provided would have been accessible to any educated person of the time and would only have been presented to show that the New Academic criticism of the so-called old Academico-Peripatetic school was unjustified. There is actual reason to state that his explanation of Antiochus was simply superficial^[260]. Thus, we can avoid the need to distort the meaning of the word commoveris^[261], which Krische suggests indicates that the dialogue titled Hortensius concluded with the orator’s conversion to philosophy. There is no other mention of such a conversion elsewhere.

The relationship between Hortensius and Cicero, along with his character and skills, is widely recognized and doesn't need further explanation here. He appears to have been almost entirely unfamiliar with philosophy, which is quite striking for an educated person. Cicero likely based Hortensius's speech on the published writings and teachings of Antiochus.

The speech by Hortensius was answered by Cicero himself. If I’m right about the previous speech, [liv] it seems that Cicero, in his reply, followed the same approach he took in his response to Varro, part of which is found in the Academica Posteriora^[262]. He defended the New Academy by demonstrating that it was fundamentally aligned with the Old Academy, as well as with those ancient philosophers who came before Plato. Lucullus, therefore, criticizes him as a rebel in philosophy, who invokes great and ancient names like a seditious tribune^[263]. According to Lucullus, Cicero misused the ideas of Empedocles, Anaxagoras, Democritus, Parmenides, Xenophanes, Plato, and Socrates^[264]. But Cicero didn’t just provide a historical summary. He must have addressed the theory of grasping imagination and concepts (which, although originally Stoic, had been adopted by Antiochus), since he found it necessary to "create" (fabricari) Latin terms to represent the Greek^[265]. He likely also commented on the reckless way the dogmatists accepted the truth of phenomena. Lucullus responds to this^[266]. The fact that Cicero’s critique of the dogmatic schools was lacking can be observed in that he hadn’t needed to Latinize the terms καταληψις (i.e., in the abstract, as opposed to the individual captivating imagination), ενέργεια, ‛ορμή, απόδειξη, δόγμα, οικείο, αόρατος, εποχή, almost all crucial terms in the Stoic, and somewhat in the Antiochean system, which Lucullus is obliged to translate himself^[267]. The further we examine the matter, the clearer it becomes that Cicero’s primary goal in this speech was to justify the position of the New Academy from the history of philosophy, rather than to put forth skeptical arguments against experience, which he reserved for his response to Lucullus. In his later speech, he makes it clear that the skeptical paradoxes he presented on the first day were really out of place and were only introduced to disarm Lucullus, who would speak next^[268]. Yet these arguments must have taken up a significant part of Cicero’s speech, even though they weren’t central to its main aim^[269]. He likely provided a summarized classification of sensations, with reasons for rejecting the truth of each class^[270]. The entire structure and nature of Cicero’s detailed speech in the Lucullus shows that no comprehensive or minute demonstration of the impossibility of science in the dogmatic sense had been attempted in his statement from the day before. Lucullus agreed that Cicero’s argument in the Catulus had significantly weakened the case for Antiochus^[271]. The three speeches of Catulus, Hortensius, and Cicero had covered nearly all the ground set for the discussion^[272], but only briefly, leaving plenty of room for a more detailed examination in the Lucullus.

One question remains: how far did Cicero defend Philo against Catulus's attack? Krische believes that Catulus's arguments were addressed point by point. I can't agree with this opinion. Cicero never really appears as the defender of Philo's conservative ideas. Lucullus's comments suggest that all the debaters dismissed this part of Philo's teachings. Thus, when Cicero, in his letter of dedication to Varro, describes his own role as that of Philo (partes mihi sumpsi Philonis), he’s simply linking Philo's name to the general New Academic ideas that had been so convincingly supported by Clitomachus's pupil in earlier times. The two main sources for Cicero's speech in the Catulus were likely Philo himself and Clitomachus.

In that intermediate version of the Academica, where Cato and Brutus replace Hortensius and Lucullus, it’s clear that Brutus had a more significant role than Cato. This means Cato must have taken the less important role of Hortensius, while Brutus took on that of Lucullus. It might seem odd that a Stoic like Cato was chosen to represent Antiochus, even though that philosopher may have taken ideas from Zeno. However, the role assigned to Hortensius was something any educated person could handle as long as they hadn't fully committed to skeptical beliefs. Such a prominent figure as Brutus would not be relegated to the lesser role given to Hortensius in the Academica Priora. He would naturally take the place assigned to Varro in the second edition^[276]. If this is correct, Brutus wouldn’t speak extensively in the first half of the work. Cato isn’t closely linked enough to the Academica to require further discussion of him.

b. *The "Lucullus."*

The day after the conversation described in the Catulus, where Lucullus was just an observer, the entire group left Catulus's villa in Cumae early in the morning and headed to Hortensius's villa at Bauli^[277]. In the evening, if the wind was favorable, Lucullus planned to head to his villa in Neapolis, while Cicero would go to his in Pompeii^[278]. Bauli was a small place on the Gulf of Baiae, close to Cimmerium, surrounded by many legends^[279]. The view was stunning^[280]. As the group sat in the xystus with its polished floor and rows of statues, the waves lapped at their feet, and the sea stretched out to the horizon, sparkling and shimmering under the bright sun and shifting colors with the fresh breeze. Within view were the Cuman shore and Puteoli, thirty stadia away^[281].

Cicero aimed to make the dialogue vibrant and [lviii] to ensure it was entirely free from anachronisms. Diodotus is mentioned as if he is still alive, even though he had been dead for many years when the text was written^[282]. Hortensius, who is just a beginner in philosophy, expresses dramatic surprise at Lucullus’s wisdom^[283]. The numerous political and personal issues weighing on Cicero while he was writing the work are deliberately kept out of view. However, we can still pick up hints of the thoughts and plans that were actively occupying his mind at Astura. His intention to visit Tusculum is evident in the last section of the book, while in the second to last section, the De Finibus, the De Natura Deorum, and other works are hinted at^[284]. In another part, the concept of the Tusculan Disputations, which was executed right after the release of the Academica and De Finibus, is clearly visible^[285].

Hortensius and Catulus now take a backseat in the discussion, which is picked up again by Lucullus. Cicero specifically notes that Lucullus's speech is based on the works of Antiochus^[286]. Almost everything known about Lucullus's learning comes from Cicero's dialogue and the previously quoted letters. He appears to have at least engaged with culture, although his main focus as a private citizen was on managing his fish ponds^[287]. Accompanying him to Sicily was the poet Archias, and during his entire time in the East, he sought to surround himself with learned individuals. In Alexandria, he was found with Antiochus, Aristus, Heraclitus Tyrius, Tetrilius Rogus, and the Selii, all of whom had a philosophical bent^[288]. Pliny mentions him several times in the Natural History as a supporter of Greek artists. However, as noted earlier, Cicero admitted in his letters to Atticus that Lucullus was not a philosopher. He needs to be supported, like Catulus, by someone else's authority. All his arguments are clearly stated to be taken from a discussion he heard Antiochus participate in. Lucullus's speech was primarily a response to Cicero's in the Catulus. Any deeper analysis of its content will have to wait until I annotate its actual text. The same goes for Cicero’s response.

In the middle version of the Academica, Lucullus's speech was likely assigned to Brutus, but since he has only a minor connection to the work, I don't think it's necessary to elaborate much further. However, I should point out the close ties Brutus had with the other figures we've discussed. He was the nephew of Cato, whose half-sister Servilia was Lucullus's wife^[289]. Cato was the tutor to Lucullus's son, with Cicero serving as a sort of adviser; meanwhile, Hortensius had married a divorced wife of Cato. They were all part of the Senatorial party, and Cato and Brutus were present, along with Cicero, during the conflict between Pompey [lx] and Caesar. Brutus and Cicero were also friends of Antiochus and Aristus, of whom Brutus was a pupil^[290].

c. The 2nd Edition.

When Cicero dedicated the Academica to Varro, only a few minor changes were needed in the setting and other details of the work. Cicero owned a villa near Catulus' villa in Cumae and almost within sight of Hortensius' villa at Bauli^[291]. Varro's villa, where the scene is now set, was close to the Lucrine Lake^[292]. Regarding the fictional date of the discussion, we can note that right at the beginning of the work, it's made clear that it's not far from the actual time it was written^[293]. There are many references to recent events, like the complete defeat of the Pompeian faction, Tullia's death^[294], and the publication of the Hortensius^[295]. It can be shown that between the date of Tullia's death and the writing of the Academica, Varro, Cicero, and Atticus could not have met at Cumae. Thus, Cicero includes a factual impossibility in his works for the first time. This impossibility would immediately strike Varro, and Cicero anticipates his surprise in the dedication letter^[296].

For the main facts of Varro's life, students should refer to the usual sources of information. A brief overview of how his life intersects with Cicero’s, along with a few comments on his philosophical opinions, is all that’s needed here. The first mention of Varro in Cicero’s writings clearly illustrates his character and the unlikelihood of any real friendship between them. Varro had helped Cicero during the difficult period before his exile. In a letter to Atticus, Cicero praised Varro and asked Atticus to send him the praise to read, adding, "Mirabiliter moratus est, sicut nosti, ελευθερία και τίποτα^[297]." All mentions of Varro in Cicero’s letters to Atticus follow the same tone. Cicero needed to be encouraged to write Varro a thank-you letter for his supposed efforts on his behalf during his exile^[298]. Several passages indicate that Cicero was skeptical about Varro’s enthusiasm, as reported by Atticus^[299]. When Cicero returned from exile, he and Varro remained in a semi-friendly relationship. Around 54 B.C., as we already noted, Atticus unsuccessfully urged Cicero to dedicate a work to the great polymath. After the defeat of the Pompeians, Cicero and Varro seemed to become a bit closer. Eight letters, mostly written the year before the Academica was published, indicate this closer connection^[300]. Still, they feel cold, forced, and artificial; very different from the letters Cicero wrote to his true friends, such as Sulpicius, Caelius, Paetus, Plancus, and Trebatius. They all reveal a concern about offending Varro’s harsh temperament and a humility in the face of his vast knowledge that isn’t typical of Cicero. The discussions between Atticus and Cicero regarding the dedication of the second edition, as already detailed, show that this slight improvement in cordiality did not evolve into friendship^[301].

The philosophical views of Varro can be accurately gathered from Augustine, who quotes extensively from Varro's work De Philosophia^[302]. It's clear that he followed Antiochus and the Old Academy. How he chose this school out of the 288 philosophies he considered is discussed in detail by Augustine. My notes on the Academica Posteriora will demonstrate that Cicero is not to be blamed for misunderstanding Varro's philosophical views. This idea comes from Müller, who, based on Stoic phrases in De Lingua Latina, assumed Varro had shifted to Stoicism before that work was written. Any Stoic elements in Varro's work came from Antiochus^[303].

The specific details of the changes in the arrangement of the subject matter, required by the dedication to Varro, will be better discussed when we look at the fragments of the second edition preserved by Nonius and others. Generally speaking, the contents of the four books were as follows. Book I: the historical and philosophical explanation of Antiochus' views, previously presented by Hortensius and now by Varro; then the historical justification of the Philonian position, which Cicero had provided in the first edition as a response to Hortensius. Book II: an explanation by Cicero of Carneades' positive teachings, almost identical to that given by Catulus in the first edition; likely included was a preview of the negative arguments against dogmatism, which in the first edition was part of Cicero's response to Hortensius. Book III: a speech by Varro in response to Cicero, closely resembling that of Lucullus in the first edition. Book IV: Cicero's reply, which was essentially the same as in the first edition. Atticus must have been almost a κωφον προσωπον.

I should point out something that might confuse students. In some old editions, the Lucullus is labeled throughout as Academicorum liber IV. This is a complete mistake that came from a misunderstanding of Nonius' quotations, which are always from the second edition and don’t provide any information about the structure of the first. One more thing is worth mentioning. Halm (like many before him) places the Academica Priora before the Posteriora. To me, this seems like an awkward arrangement; the subject matter of the Varro is definitely logically prior to that of the Lucullus.

I. 1. Recently, when Atticus was with me in Cumano, we were informed by M. Varro that he had arrived in Rome the night before and, unless he was tired from the journey, would have come to see us right away. Upon hearing this, we thought there was no reason to delay seeing him, as he is connected to us through shared interests and our long-standing friendship. So, we immediately set off to meet him, and when we were a little way from his villa, we saw him coming towards us. We embraced him, as is customary among friends, and then we escorted him back to his villa after an adequately long conversation. 2. He spoke a little at first, and when we asked him if there was anything new from Rome, Atticus replied, "Please skip those topics that we can't ask or hear about without discomfort, and instead, ask what I know myself." For the Muses of Varro have been silent longer than usual, and I believe he is not idle but rather hiding what he is writing. "Not at all," he said. "I think it’s reckless to write something one wants to hide; however, I do have a significant work in progress, which I’ve had for quite some time. This very project—he was referring to me—contains certain subjects that are indeed substantial and refined by me." 3. And I said: "I have indeed been waiting a long time for that, Varro, but I don’t dare to press you for it. I've heard from our friend Libo, whose dedication you know—after all, we can’t hide anything of that nature—that you are not neglecting it but working on it more carefully and never letting it leave your hands. However, it never occurred to me until now to ask you about that; but now, since I've undertaken the subjects I learned alongside you, I want to record them and illustrate that ancient philosophy stemming from Socrates in Latin literature. I’m curious why, despite writing so much, you let this genre slide, especially since you excel in it and it surpasses all other studies and arts."

II. 4. So, you’re asking me about something I’ve thought about a lot and discussed many times. Without hesitating, I’ll respond, sharing what I find easy to express since I’ve spent a lot of time considering this topic. When I saw philosophy explained very thoroughly in Greek literature, I thought that if anyone from our background were interested in it and educated in Greek teachings, they would prefer to read Greek texts over ours. However, if they were completely disconnected from Greek arts and disciplines, they wouldn’t care about ideas that can’t be understood without that Greek education; therefore, I didn’t want to write anything that neither the uneducated could understand nor the educated would care to read. 5. You see, as you yourself have learned, we cannot be like the Amafinii or Rabirii, who discuss visible matters in plain speech without using any technique, defining nothing, dividing nothing, concluding nothing through well-formed questions, and who ultimately think there is no skill in speaking or reasoning. However, we are compelled by the principles of dialecticians and rhetoricians, as both are viewed as strengths of our craft, to employ both new vocabulary and strict rules; educated people, as I mentioned, prefer to draw from the Greeks, while the uneducated wouldn’t even accept our teachings, rendering all effort pointless labor. 6. As for physics, if I were to support Epicurus, that is, if I were to support Democritus, I could write about it quite straightforwardly, just like Amafinius. What’s grand about discussing the chance encounter of tiny particles—what he calls atoms—after removing the causes of things? You know our physics, which includes both production and the raw material shaped and formed by that production; what terminology could anyone use to articulate it, and who could even grasp it? What about the very essence of life and morals, and what’s desirable versus undesirable? They simply see the same good for both animals and humans: but you’re aware of the subtlety that exists within our views. 7. Whether you follow Zeno, it’s quite a task to make someone understand what that true and simple good is, one that cannot be separated from honor: Epicurus outright denies that such goodness exists without the pleasures that stimulate the senses. If we pursue the old Academy, which you know we favor, how sharp and subtle will our discussions need to be, especially against the Stoics! Therefore, I personally embrace the entirety of this philosophical study for its value to the consistency of life and for the delight of the mind, and I don’t believe there’s a greater or better gift from the gods to humanity, as Plato suggests. 8. But I’m sending my friends, who are interested in this study, to Greece, or rather, I’m directing them to visit the Greeks, so they can draw from the original sources rather than follow the streams. The things that no one has taught yet, nor is there a source from which learners could gain insight, I’ve done my best to make known to our people—nothing about my efforts amazes me greatly. They couldn’t draw from the Greeks, nor even from the Latins after the decline of L. Aelius. Yet in those old works of ours, where we have followed Menippus in spirit but not in translation, we infused with a certain cheerfulness, mixing in much from deeper philosophy and many dialectic statements to make it easier for the less educated to understand while enticing them with a bit of enjoyment to read, in praises and in these very introductions to the antiques, we wanted to express philosophy if we managed to do it.

III. 9. So, I say, Varro. In our city, your books have guided us, like guests in your home, allowing us to recognize who we are and where we belong. You’ve provided information about the history of our homeland, descriptions of the times, the laws of sacred rites, the roles of priests, the domestic and military disciplines, the locations of regions, and the names, types, duties, and reasons for all divine and human matters. You've contributed immensely to our poets and to all Latin literature with light and words, and you’ve created a diverse and elegant poem almost in every category, delving into philosophy in many places, sufficient for inspiration but lacking in teaching. 10. You indeed offer a plausible reason; either the educated would prefer to read Greek, or even those who don’t know Greek would not read this. But tell me now: do you think that’s enough proof? In fact, even those who can’t read Greek and those who can will not despise their own. What reason is there for educated readers to read Latin poets but not philosophers? Is it because Ennius, Pacuvius, Attius, and many others delight us because they captured the essence rather than just the words of the Greek poets? How much more will philosophers delight us if, just like Aeschylus, Sophocles, and Euripides, these imitate Plato, Aristotle, and Theophrastus? I see that orators are praised if they imitate our own Hyperides or Demosthenes. 11. But I—because it’s how it is—while ambition, honors, causes, and not only care for the republic but also a kind of management kept me engaged and constrained with many duties, I held onto these insights and refreshed them through reading whenever I could. Now, however, struck by a severe blow of fortune and freed from public duties, I seek healing for my pain in philosophy and consider this quiet pastime to be the most honorable. Either this is most suitable for this age or for those things we have done worthy of praise, this is chiefly appropriate, or, if this is not the case, I see nothing else we could be doing to educate our citizens. 12. Indeed, our Brutus, outstanding in every kind of praise, pursues philosophy through Latin literature in such a way that nothing from Greece is lacking on these topics, and he follows the same sentiment as you. For he listened to Aris in Athens for a long time, whose brother you call Antiochus. Therefore, I ask you to also embrace this type of literature.

IV. 13. So, he said. I’ll definitely think about that, especially with you around. But what is it about you that I’m hearing? What do you mean? He said that the old stuff you left behind is being discussed, and a new topic is being handled. What? So, I said, was it easier for our friend Antiochus to move back to the old house from the new one than for us to move from the old to the new? Surely, the most recent ideas are the ones that have been fixed and improved the most. Although Antiochus's teacher, Philo, a great man, as you think, denies in his writings—something we also heard him state—that there are two Academies and refutes those who believe that. It is, he said, as you suggest: but I don’t think you’re unaware of what Antiochus has written against Philo. 14. Indeed, I would like you to renew that and the entire old Academy, which I have been away from for a long time, unless it bothers you, and let’s sit together, I said, if that seems good. Certainly, he replied: I am indeed quite weak. But let’s see if Atticus agrees to what seems fine to you. For me, he said: what could I prefer more than recalling what I heard from Antiochus long ago? And at the same time, to see if it can be said comfortably in Latin? After this was said, we all sat down.

15. Varro began by saying: Socrates seems to me, as is agreed by everyone, the first to steer philosophy away from hidden things and the very nature of existence, where all the philosophers before him had been occupied, and to direct it toward everyday life, seeking to understand virtues and vices, and indeed, all good and bad things, while considering celestial matters to be far removed from our understanding or, if they are known, to be of no value for living well. 16. In nearly all the discussions recorded by those who listened to him, he argues in a way that he asserts nothing himself but refutes others: he claims to know nothing except this one thing, and thus surpasses others, because while they think they know things they do not understand, he claims to know nothing and only this one thing, which is why he believes he has been called the wisest by Apollo, since this is the essence of all wisdom—not thinking you know what you don’t. Even as he said this firmly and remained steadfast in this belief, all his speeches, however, were focused on praising virtue and encouraging people to pursue it, as can be understood from the works of the Socratics, especially Plato. 17. However, according to Plato’s authority—who was varied, complex, and rich in ideas—a unified form of philosophy emerged under two main names: that of the Academics and the Peripatetics, which differed based on their respective approaches. For when Plato left Speusippus, the son of his sister, as his philosophical heir, he also had in mind two exceptionally studious and learned individuals, Xenocrates from Chalcedon and Aristotle from Stagira. Those who walked with Aristotle came to be called the Peripatetics because they debated while walking in the Lyceum, while those who gathered in the Academy, which is another place of learning, and were accustomed to have discussions, took their name from the location. But both groups, filled with Plato’s richness, established a certain form of discipline that was indeed full and abundant, leaving behind the Socratic method of questioning everything without asserting anything. Thus, a method of philosophy and an organization of disciplines came to be established, which Socrates disapproved of the most. 18. Indeed, at first, there was unity under the two names I mentioned: for there was no difference between the Peripatetics and that old Academy. Aristotle presented a certain abundance of talent, it seems to me, but the same source was common to both and the same classification of things to be desired and avoided was maintained.

V. “So what am I doing?” he said, “Am I even sane for teaching you all this? Because even if I’m not Minerva, as they say, anyone who tries to teach Minerva is just foolish.” Then Atticus replied, “Please, continue, Varro. I really love our discussions, especially when they’re in Latin and presented this way. What do you think I am, someone who has already professed philosophy to our people?” “Let’s go on then,” he said, “since you’re enjoying it.” 19. So, Plato’s approach to philosophy was already accepted as threefold: one was about life and morals, another about nature and hidden things, and the third about reasoning and determining what is true, what is false, what is right in speech and what is wrong, what is in agreement, and what is in conflict when judging. First, they sought the part about living well from nature and claimed that it must be obeyed, establishing that the highest good should be sought only in nature, to which everything should refer, concluding that the ultimate goal of all things desired and the end of goods is found in nature, the mind, the body, and life. Concerning the body, they positioned certain qualities as being total, and others in parts: health and overall beauty in the whole, but in parts, they measured complete senses and some excellence of individual parts, like speed in the feet, strength in the arms, clarity in the voice, and a developed ability in the tongue to convey sound: 20. As for the mind, they divided qualities suitable for understanding virtue by nature and morals. They recognized nature’s speed as a means for learning and memory: both of which are proper to the mind and intellect. They believed that morals involved tendencies and a sort of habit: which they shaped partly through consistent practice and partly through reason, in which philosophy itself was involved. In this regard, what is only begun and not fully realized is referred to as progress toward virtue; while what is fully realized, that is virtue, is seen as the perfection of nature and of all things they place in the mind, being the one best thing. Therefore, all these relate to the mind. 21. They said that life—this was indeed the third—should be connected to the use of virtue. For the virtue of the mind is recognized in both good and body, and in some things that are not so much related to nature, but to a blessed life. They considered a person to be a part of society and of the entire human race, tied together with people through a social bond. Regarding the highest and natural good, they treat it this way: they think that all other things pertain to it either by adding to or protecting it, like wealth, resources, fame, and favor. Thus, they introduce a tripartite approach to goods.

VI. 22. These are the three types that most people think the Peripatetics talk about. This is certainly not incorrect: this is indeed their classification. However, it would be unwise to think there are some who are Academics, referred to as such, and others who are Peripatetics. The general idea here seemed to be the same for both groups regarding the ultimate aim of goodness: to achieve what is in accordance with natural principles and is inherently desirable, whether that be all things or just the most important ones. Those most important things are found in the mind and in virtue itself. Therefore, all that ancient philosophy recognized a happy life being centered around a single virtue, and yet, it is not the happiest unless body and other factors, as previously mentioned, are suitable for the practice of virtue. 23. From this description, we could also find a starting point for action in life and in fulfilling one’s duties: which involved preserving those things that nature prescribes. From this arose the avoidance of laziness and contempt for pleasures, leading to the acceptance of many labors and pains for the sake of great and honorable causes, as well as those things that were consistent with the description of nature, from which friendship, justice, and fairness emerged; these were also prioritized over pleasures and many comforts of life. This indeed was their way of life and the form and description of that part which I first mentioned.

24. About nature—this was the follow-up—they said it could be divided into two parts, where one was active and the other served as its foundation, the latter being what was produced. They believed that the active part had power, while the passive part had a certain material quality: in both, there was something of each. For the material itself wouldn’t be able to hold together without some kind of force, nor would there be a force without some material. Nothing exists that isn’t compelled to be somewhere. But what arises from both is what they called a body and something like a quality: you’ll certainly give in, as we do in unusual matters, just like the Greeks themselves do, who have discussed this for a long time, by sometimes using unheard-of words.

VII. 25. "But," said Atticus, "you can also use Greek whenever you want, in case Latin fails you. You're doing well, but I will strive to speak in Latin, except when using terms like philosophy, rhetoric, physics, or dialectics, where custom already uses Greek instead of Latin. Therefore, I referred to qualities, which the Greeks call quality, a term not commonly used in everyday Greek but by philosophers, among others. In fact, there are no common terms in dialectics; they use their own jargon. This is almost universal across all the arts. Either new names for new things must be created, or names must be borrowed from others. If the Greeks can do this, having dealt with these subjects for so many centuries, how much more should we be allowed to do the same, as we try to tackle these topics for the first time? 26. You, indeed, Varro, seem to me deserving of praise from your fellow citizens, not only for increasing their resources, as you have done, but also for expanding their vocabulary. Therefore, we will dare to use new words with your endorsement if necessary. Among those qualities, some are primary and others are derived from these. The primary ones are uniform and simple; the derived ones are varied and almost multifaceted. Thus, air (which we are using as Latin), fire, water, and earth are the first elements: from these arise the forms of living beings and the things that are generated from the earth. Hence those beginnings, which I will translate from Greek, are called elements: of which air and fire have the power to move and create, while the other parts (I mean water and earth) receive and undergo changes. The fifth kind, from which stars and minds come, was believed by Aristotle to be a unique substance, unlike the four I mentioned above. 27. But they think that there is a subject matter beneath everything that lacks any form and is devoid of all those qualities—let's make this term more common and familiar through usage—a certain material from which everything is shaped and formed: which can encompass everything and be changed in every way and from every side, and can even perish, not into nothingness, but into its own parts, which can be infinitely cut and divided, since nothing in nature is so small that it cannot be divided: and whatever is in motion moves across intervals, which can also be infinitely divided. 28. And when that force, which we described as a quality, moves this way and that, they believe the very material itself is deeply transformed, creating what they call qualities, by which in all nature, connected and continuous with all its parts, the world is brought into being, outside of which there is no part of matter and no body, and everything that exists in it belongs to the world, which is held by a perceiving nature, in which a perfect reason exists, the same eternal reason: for nothing can be stronger than that from which it may perish: 29. they say that the force is the mind of the world, the same as wisdom, which they call God, overseeing all things under it, like a certain prudence, primarily managing celestial matters, and then those on earth that pertain to humans: which they sometimes refer to as necessity, because nothing can happen otherwise than what is determined by it, amid what is almost fatal and immutable within the eternal order: and sometimes they call it fortune, because it brings about many unforeseen and unexpected events for us due to the obscure nature of our ignorance about the causes.

VIII. 30. The third part of philosophy, which focused on reasoning and discussion, was handled in this way by both sides. Although it originated from the senses, they believed that true judgment did not come from sensory perception. They wanted the mind to be the judge of things, believing it was the only reliable source as it alone could grasp what is always simple, uniform, and exactly as it is. They called this ιδεαν, a term already named by Plato; we can rightly refer to it as the form. 31. They considered all senses to be dull and sluggish, perceiving in no way things that seemed to be presented to the senses, whether they were so small that they couldn't be sensed or so quick and chaotic that nothing could ever remain constant, not even the same thing, because everything constantly ebbed and flowed. Therefore, they referred to this entire part of things as opinionated. 32. They thought that knowledge existed nowhere but in the notions and reasoning of the mind: for this reason, they approved definitions of things and applied them to all topics under discussion. The explanation of words was also approved, meaning how each thing came to be named as it is, which they referred to as ετυμολογιαν: afterward, they used arguments and almost like guiding notes of things to prove and conclude what they wanted to explain; thus, they taught the whole discipline of dialectics, that is, the reasoned conclusion of speech. To this, an oratorical power of speech was applied, suitable for persuasive continuous discourse. 33. This was the discipline handed down to them by Plato: if you wish, I can explain the changes I have received from it. Indeed, I want to say that I will respond in a manner suitable for an Attic style as well.

IX. "You're right," he said. "The authority of the Peripatetics and the old Academy is explained beautifully. Aristotle was the first to undermine the categories I mentioned earlier, which Plato had embraced so passionately that he claimed there was something divine about them. Theophrastus, a man both eloquent and so well-mannered that he radiates a sense of integrity and nobility, also weakened the authority of the older teachings in a significant way: he stripped virtue of its beauty and made it seem weak, arguing that living well was not solely based on it. 34. As for Strato, his student, although he had a sharp mind, he was entirely separated from that teaching: he completely abandoned the essential part of philosophy that is grounded in virtue and ethics and dedicated himself to the investigation of nature, in which he greatly deviated from his predecessors. Speusippus and Xenocrates, who first took on Plato's reasoning and authority, were followed by Polemo and Crates, along with Crantor, who gathered in the Academy and carefully defended what they had received from their forerunners. By now, Zeno and Arcesilas had been listening to Polemo consistently. 35. But Zeno, being older than Arcesilas and discussing things very subtly and insightfully, attempted to correct the school’s teachings. I will explain that correction too, if it seems appropriate, as Antiochus used to do. To me, it seems that what you see signifies the same thing as Pomponius."

X. Zeno was definitely not someone who, like Theophrastus, would cut the nerves of virtue, but rather someone who placed everything related to a happy life into a single virtue and wouldn’t consider anything else among the good things, calling it honorable, which was a simple and unique good. 36. Moreover, although the rest were neither good nor bad, he said some were in accordance with nature, while others were contrary to nature. He categorized these with other intervening and intermediate things. What was in accordance with nature should be accepted and considered deserving of value, while the contrary should be disregarded; neither side, however, contained anything that was of any significance. 37. But among those things that should be accepted, some should be considered more valuable, while others less so. Those deemed more valuable he called preferred, while those considered less valuable were rejected. Just as he didn't merely swap terms for things, he also placed certain intermediates between right action and wrongdoing, duty and the opposite of duty: only right actions were included among good actions, while wrong actions, or sins, were categorized among bad actions; he considered duties that were kept and those overlooked to be intermediates, as I said. 38. While his predecessors didn't say that all virtue lay in reason but rather that certain virtues were perfected by nature or custom, he placed everything in reason, and while they believed that the kinds of virtues I mentioned could be separated, he argued that this was not possible in any way, nor did he think it was only the use of virtue, as they did, but that the very habit itself was remarkable, and that virtue was never absent from anyone as long as they used it consistently. While they believed that emotional disturbances didn't stem from man and that nature made people grieve, desire, fear, and be carried away with joy, but they would compress these emotions and narrow them down, he aimed for the wise person to be free from all these so-called ailments. 39. Although they claimed these disturbances were natural and placed desire in one part of the mind and reason in another, he did not agree with them either. He believed that disturbances were voluntary and stemmed from opinion, and he thought that immoderation was the mother of all disturbances. This is generally about ethics.

XI. About the natures, he believed first that there should not be a fifth nature from which higher senses and the mind are made out of those four beginnings. He maintained that fire itself is the nature that produces everything, along with the mind and the senses. He also disagreed with others because he firmly believed that nothing could come from what lacked a body, which is the view that Xenocrates and the earlier thinkers also held regarding the soul; nor indeed could something be produced or become something that wasn't a body. 40. However, he made many changes in that third part of philosophy. There, he first spoke of certain new ideas about the senses, which he thought were connected through some kind of external impulse, which he called φαντασία, although we might refer to it as perception and hold onto this term: it will indeed be frequently used in the remaining discourse. But to what was perceived and seemingly accepted by the senses, he added the consensus of the mind, which he believed to be placed within us and voluntary. 41. He did not add belief to all perceptions, but only to those that had some unique declaration of the things that seemed to be: this perception, when it was seen distinctly on its own, was comprehensible—will you accept this? Indeed, he said. For how could you say καταληπτον?—But when it had been received and approved, he called it comprehension, similar to things that can be grasped by hand: it was from this that the term was derived since no one had used that word before in this context, and he also used many new terms—he referred to them as new. What was understood through the senses, he called the sense itself, and if it was comprehended in such a way that it couldn't be challenged by reasoning, he called it knowledge; if otherwise, he referred to it as ignorance, from which also arises opinion, which is weak and shares common ground with the false and unknown. 42. But between knowledge and ignorance, he placed that comprehension I mentioned, and he did not categorize it as either correct or incorrect, but asserted that it should only be believed. From this, he also granted belief to the senses, since, as I stated earlier, comprehension formed by the senses seemed true and reliable, not because it comprehended everything that existed, but because it left nothing unaccounted for that could fall within it, and because nature had provided a sort of standard of knowledge and a principle of itself, from which later concepts of things would be imprinted in the minds, from which not just principles but also broader pathways for reasoning could be discovered. He excised error, recklessness, ignorance, opinion, and suspicion, effectively removing everything that deviated from firm and constant consensus from virtue and wisdom. And this was where all the changes and disagreements of Zeno with the earlier thinkers were centered.

XII. 43. After saying this: "You've explained the principles of the old Academy and the Stoics very clearly and concisely, Varro. I think it’s true, as it pleased our friend Antiochus, that we should consider a correction of the old Academy rather than adopting a new philosophy." Then Varro said, "It's your turn now to explain, since you break away from the traditional teachings and support those ideas introduced by Arcesilaus. Teach us why this split happened, so we can see if it's a valid disagreement." 44. Then I said: "As we have learned, Arcesilas set up a contest with Zeno, not out of stubbornness or a desire to win, but because of the obscurity of those issues that led Socrates and even before him Democritus, Anaxagoras, Empedocles, and nearly all the ancient philosophers to declare that nothing can be known, perceived, or understood. They said our senses are limited, our minds are weak, from our brief lives, and as Democritus stated, truth lies submerged in the depths, with everything else held by opinions and customs, leaving nothing to the truth, and everything thereafter surrounded by darkness." 45. Thus, Arcesilas denied that anything could be known, not even that which Socrates had left behind, believing that everything lay hidden: nothing could be seen or understood. For this reason, no one should profess or assert anything, nor should they approve anything by agreement, and always hold back from any reckless assumption, which would be especially folly if something false or unknown were approved, and there is nothing more shameful than to jump ahead of knowledge and perception with approval and acceptance. He aligned himself with this philosophy, arguing that against opposing views, he would lead many to see that in the same matter, equal opposing reasons could be found, making it easier for both sides to support their agreement. 46. This new Academy is what they call it, which seems old to me, since we count Plato among the ancients, whose writings affirm nothing and discuss many things on both sides, questioning everything and declaring nothing certain; yet that which I have explained seems old, while this is considered new: which continued up to Carneades, who was the fourth from Arcesilas, maintaining the same principles as Arcesilas. Carneades, however, was knowledgeable in no philosophy and, as I learned from those who had listened to him, especially from Epicurean Zeno, who greatly disagreed with him, yet marveled at his incredible ability....

From the Book I.

1. Nonius p. 65 Merc. It has been said that to fight means to disagree and to dispute, a term derived from gladiators. Cicero Academicorum lib. I.: So why is Menesarchus so upset? Why is Antipater arguing with Carneades with so many volumes?

2. Nonius s.v. concinnare p. 43. Same in Academics book I.: who, with the similarity of the word concinere, seemed most fitting to him.

From Book II.

3. Nonius p. 65. Cicero confirms in his book II of the Academics that the term "aequor" comes from something equal and flat: what seems flatter than the sea? And from this, poets also refer to it as "aequor."

4. Nonius p. 69. Adamare Cicero Academicorum lib. II.: those who pursue honors too late are hardly admitted to them and cannot be sufficiently recommended to the public.

5. Nonius p. 104. To display as examples of good. Cicero in Academic Questions Book II.: to break greed, to set aside crimes, to present one's life for the youth to emulate.

6. Nonius p. 121. Hebes is used for something that is vague or dull. Cicero in Academicorum lib. II.: What? Can you describe the features of the moon? Its horns appear blunter at times and sharper at others, both when it's waxing and waning.

7. Nonius p. 162. It turns purple. Cicero in his Academicorum Book II: What? Isn't the sea blue? But when it's stirred by oars, it turns purple: and indeed, in a certain way, the water is tinted and stained...

8. Nonius p. 162. Plumb lines and straightedges. Cic. Academicorum lib. II.: But if we believed that, we wouldn’t use plumb lines, straightedges, or rules.

9. Nonius p. 394. Dry is referred to as being arid and without moisture ... Dry is also described as sober, not wet ... Cic. Academicorum lib. II.: one (color) for adults, another for adolescents, another for the sick, another for the healthy, one for the dry, another for the intoxicated ...

10. Nonius p. 474. Urinantur. Cic. in Academicis lib. II.: because whenever we get immersed, like those who are submerged, we either see nothing above or can barely make anything out.

11. Nonius p. 545. Alabaster. Cic. Academicorum lib. II.: which also seems to be alabaster full of perfume.

FROM BOOK III.

Cicero ad Att. XVI. 6. §4. I sent you the book on glory: but in it the preface is what’s in the third Academico.

12. Nonius p. 65. Digladiari ... idem tertio: To always engage in gladiatorial combat and fight against criminals and bold individuals, who wouldn't call this not only the most miserable but also the stupidest thing?

13. Nonius p. 65. To exult means to leap up. Cic. Academicorum lib. III.: and as we now sit, we see the little fish at Lucrinum leaping...

14. Nonius p. 123. Ingeneraretur ut innasceretur. Cic. Academicorum lib. III.: in such a vast variety of living beings, only humans were driven by a desire for knowledge and understanding.

15. Nonius p. 419. To claim, to draw, to free ... Cicero on Academics, Book III.: If there is any power, it should claim its freedom.

16. Lactantius Inst. div. VI. 24. Cicero ... whose words are in the third book of the Academics: if it were allowed for those who have strayed on their journey to correct their mistakes by regretting their misguided lives, it would make it easier to fix their recklessness.

17. Diomedes p. 373, ed. Putsch.: p. 377, ed. Keil. Varro ad Ciceronem tertio fixed et Cicero Academicorum tertio (= Lucullus §27): †malcho in works attached.

18. Nonius p. 139. We should say that the clarity, which we need to hold firmly, is absent. = Lucullus §51.

19. Nonius p. 117. Gallinas. Cic. Academicorum lib. III.: Those who used to raise a lot of hens for profit would typically say which hen laid the egg after inspecting it. = Lucullus §57.

FROM BOOK IV.

20. Nonius p. 69, To agree means to provide support. Cic. in Academicis lib. IV.: it is false.... Antiochus. = Lucullus §67.

21. Nonius p. 65. The Maeniana were named after their inventor Maenius; hence the Maenian column. Cic. Academicorum lib. IV.: similarly, when he was burning with passion, he followed the path of the old Maenian philosophers, just like the Academics. = Lucullus §70.

22. Nonius p. 99. Dolitum, which is referred to as dolatum in usage, meaning it’s been chipped away, worn down, or excavated... Cicero dolatum Academicorum book IV.: for it is not sculpted from stone or carved out of oak. = Lucullus §100.

23. Nonius p. 164. Ravum fulvum. Cic. Academicorum lib. IIII.: because it appears both blue and reddish to us, and it now shines from the sun.... = Lucullus §105.

24. Nonius p. 107. To exhaust means to endure or overcome. Cic. In the Academics, Book IV.: I believe Clitomachus wrote about this, comparing it to a certain labor of Hercules. = Lucullus §108.

25. Nonius p. 163. Fat and stupid things are described as hindered and useless. Cic. Academicorum lib. IIII.: because they themselves ... contrary. = Lucullus §109.

26. Nonius p. 122. Infinitatem. Cic. Academicorum lib. IIII.: but this refers to the infinite according to Anaximander. = Lucullus §118.

27. Nonius p. 65. Natrices are called swimming snakes Cic. Academicorum lib. IIII.: for you want ... he will have done. = Lucullus §120.

28. Nonius p. 189. Curved from the hook. Cic. Academicorum lib. IIII.: nor like the one who says that these things are made up of harsh and hooked little bodies. = Lucullus §121.

29. Martianus Capella V. §517, p. 444, ed. Kopp. Cicero ... in Academicis: all of these things remain hidden, Varro, overshadowed by great darkness and surrounded by shadows. = Lucullus §122.

30. Nonius p. 102. It is located directly opposite. Cic. Academicorum lib. IIII.: I too ... you say that they stand opposing us on the opposite side of the earth, who have their feet planted against ours. = Lucullus §123.

31. Nonius p. 80. To stutter is to hesitate and fumble with your words, feeling nervous, Cic. Academicorum lib. IIII.: clearly, as mentioned above, the Stoic stuttered very little. = Lucullus §135.

From uncertain books.

32. Lactantius Inst. div. III. 14. These are your words (i.e., Cicero!): to me, it seems that we are not just blind when it comes to wisdom, but also dull and slow when it comes to even those things that can be seen to some extent.

33. August. against the Academics II. §26.: it seems plausible or similar to the truth that the Academics can invite us to act without approval. ... Such things, the Academic says, seem to me to all be things I’ve considered to be probable or similar to the truth: if you want to call them something else, I won’t object. It’s enough for me that you’ve understood well what I’m saying, which is the reasons for giving these names; for a wise person should be an investigator of things, not a craftsman of words. [In the words that follow this, Augustine clearly affirms that these are the very words of Cicero.]

34. Augustin. c. Acad. III. §15. In the writings of Cicero, which he composed in support of this case (i.e. the Academics), there is a certain passage.... A wise Academic believes that the opinions of all the other schools, who see themselves as wise, should take a back seat; since everyone must claim the leading role for themselves; from which it can be reasonably concluded that the one who is considered second by everyone else is, in fact, first according to his own judgment.

35. Augustin. c. Acad. III. §43. Cicero said that those (i.e., the Academics) had the habit of keeping their opinions to themselves and would only share them with someone who had lived with them until old age.

36. Augustine. City of God VI. 2. Finally, Tully himself gives this kind of testimony about him (i.e. M.T. Varro), stating that he had a discussion with M. Varro, a man, he says, who is by far the sharpest and without a doubt the most learned of all.

I. 1. Lucius Lucullus was known for his remarkable talent and passion for the finest arts, along with a breadth of knowledge suitable for a nobleman, which allowed him to thrive in the public arena. However, he was completely detached from urban affairs. As a young man, he pursued his father's rivalries with great success; after becoming a quaestor, he went to Asia, where he served as governor for many years with extraordinary acclaim. Later, he became an aedile while absent and then immediately became a praetor—since it was allowed to advance through the ranks quickly because of legal rewards—and afterward went to Africa, eventually reaching the consulship in a manner that impressed everyone with his diligence and showcased his natural talent. Later, he was sent to the Mithridatic War by the Senate, surpassing everyone's expectations of his capabilities and even achieving greater glory than his predecessors. 2. This was particularly remarkable because he was not expected to gain military praise, having spent his youth focused on legal matters and consumed by a lengthy quaestorship while Murena led the war in Pontus during a time of peace in Asia. Yet, an incredible brilliance was evident in his talent, which did not require practical experience to cultivate. Thus, after dedicating his entire journey and naval voyages partly to seeking advice from experts and partly to studying historical events, he arrived in Asia as a commander, having set off from Rome without military experience. He possessed an almost divine memory of events, and his ability to recall words was greater than Hortensius's, but since effectiveness in handling affairs benefits more from actions than words, his memory was superior even to that of Themistocles, whom we consider one of Greece's foremost leaders. It is said that he once told someone promising to teach him a memory technique that he preferred to forget rather than learn, likely because everything he heard and saw became firmly lodged in his memory. With such innate talent, Lucullus had also embraced the education that Themistocles had rejected. Therefore, just as we document in writing what we want to preserve in monuments, he had inscribed events in his mind. 3. Thus, he was such a great commander in every aspect of warfare—battles, sieges, naval confrontations, and the entire orchestration of war—that the king, after Alexander the Great, acknowledged him as a superior leader known to him, more so than any of those he had read about. He also displayed such wisdom in establishing and regulating cities and such fairness that even today, Asia remains devoted to following Lucullus's principles and to tracing his legacy. However, despite the significant benefits to the state, such a force of virtue and brilliance remained absent from the eyes of the public and the Senate for longer than I would have preferred. Indeed, when he returned victorious from the Mithridatic War, accusations from his enemies delayed his triumph by three years longer than it should have. We, as consuls, brought the chariot of this illustrious man nearly into the city, and I could speak about how much his wisdom and authority contributed to major affairs, but that would require me to talk about myself, which is unnecessary at this time. Therefore, I will spare him the due honor rather than share it alongside my own glory.

II. 4. The achievements that should have brought Lucullus popular fame are mostly celebrated in both Greek and Latin literature. We, however, have often learned about these external successes from many sources, while we discovered the more personal aspects from a few direct experiences. Lucullus was more dedicated to all types of literature and philosophy than those who didn't know him might have thought, and this was true not only in his youth but also during his years as quaestor and even in the military campaigns, where the demands of warfare usually leave little leisure time for a commander. He believed that among the philosophers, Antiochus, a student of Philo, excelled in both talent and knowledge, and he had him with him first as quaestor and later as commander. With that sharp memory I mentioned earlier, he often easily absorbed what he heard, retaining what he could remember even after just one listen. He was truly delighted by reading the books that he heard about.

5. I do sometimes fear that by praising such individuals, I might also diminish their glory. There are many who do not appreciate Greek literature at all, more who have issues with philosophy, and the rest, even if they don't outright disapprove, think discussing such topics isn't fitting for leaders of the state. However, since I have learned that M. Cato studied Greek literature in his old age and that P. Africanus spoke about history during that famous mission he undertook before the censors, I no longer seek any authors of Greek literature or philosophy. 6. Now, I must respond to those who would prefer that people of such weight not be involved in conversations of this nature. As if it were necessary for prominent figures to either engage in silence or only indulge in shallow banter! Indeed, if in a certain book philosophy has truly been praised by us, then discussing it is surely worthy of the best and most expansive minds; we should only be cautious not to let private interests detract from public duties. If, when we had to fulfill our role, we not only never removed ourselves from the public assembly but never wrote anything except for the courts, who would criticize our leisure, who in it not only desires to avoid dullness, but also strives to be of benefit to as many as possible? We actually believe that our glory is not only not diminished, but increased by the contributions we make to the popular and illustrious praises, adding these lesser-known and less widespread accolades. 7. There are also those who claim that the individuals who debate in our writings lacked knowledge about the subjects they discuss: these people seem to envy not only the living but also the dead.

III. Let's restate one type of critic who disapproves of the Academy's approach. It would be harder to bear if anyone approved of any discipline of philosophy other than the one they followed themselves. However, since we usually argue against everything that seems obvious, we can't help but reject dissenters from our perspective: although our case is quite straightforward, as we seek to find the truth without any contention, and we pursue it with the utmost care and dedication. Even though all knowledge is blocked by many difficulties, and there is obscurity in the very subjects as well as weakness in our judgments, so much so that even the oldest and most learned have sometimes felt hopeless in finding what they desire, they did not give up, and neither will we abandon our pursuit of inquiry, nor do our discussions serve any purpose other than to elicit and express something on both sides that is either true or as close to the truth as possible. 8. There is no real difference between us and those who think they know, except that they are certain about the truth of what they defend, while we have many plausible ideas that we can follow easily but can barely affirm. This makes us more liberated and relaxed, as we have the freedom to judge without needing to defend everything that is prescribed or commanded. Others are first bound by constraints before they can judge what is best; then, in the weakest moments of their life, either by yielding to some friend or captivated by the first speech they heard from someone, they judge unknown matters and cling to whatever discipline they've been swept into, like a shipwrecked person clinging to a rock. 9. As for what they claim to fully believe in whoever they think was wise, I would approve if these same uneducated people could actually judge that, for discerning who is wise seems most akin to being wise; but in their evaluation, they could only do so after hearing and knowing everything else, yet they judged based on what they only heard once and relied on the authority of one person. Still, I can't understand why most prefer to err and defend their beloved opinion with fierce determination rather than calmly seek out what is stated most consistently without stubbornness. Many issues have been discussed and questioned extensively regarding these matters, and once at Hortensius's villa, which is near Bauli, Catulus, Lucullus, and ourselves came on the following day after being with Catulus. We even arrived sooner because it was arranged that, if the wind was favorable, Lucullus would sail to Neapolis, while I would go to Pompeii. So after exchanging a few words in the colonnade, we sat down in the same space.

IV. 10. Hic Catulus: Even though yesterday, he said, the question at hand was almost fully discussed to the point where it seems like the entire matter has been covered, I’m still waiting for you, Lucullus, to share what you promised to convey from Antiochus. Truly, said Hortensius, I did more than I wanted: the whole thing should have been preserved intact for Lucullus. And yet, maybe it has been preserved: I spoke about what was readily available, but I’m looking for more obscure points from Lucullus. Then he replied: Honestly, Hortensius, your anticipation doesn’t trouble me, even though for those who want to please, nothing is more conflicting, but since I’m not burdened with needing to prove how much I might be agreed with, I’m even less troubled. I won’t say either my points or his, in which case, if they aren’t valid, I’d rather lose than win. But by Hercules, as things stand now, even though it was undermined in our conversation yesterday, it still seems to me to be quite true. I will speak therefore as Antiochus did: for I am familiar with the matter. I was listening to him with an open mind and great interest, frequently on the same topic, in order to generate even more expectation for myself than Hortensius just created. Once he began, we all perked up to listen. 11. Then he said: When I was serving as quaestor in Alexandria, Antiochus was with me, and before that, the Tyrian Heraclitus, who was already a familiar of Antiochus, had been in Alexandria, a truly respected and notable figure in that philosophy which is now nearly forgotten but is being revived. I listened to Antiochus frequently debate with him, albeit gently. Indeed, these two books of Philon that Catulus mentioned yesterday were brought to Alexandria at that time, and they first came into Antiochus's hands: and although the man was by nature extremely gentle—nothing could be softer than him—still, he began to get annoyed. I was amazed, for I had never seen him like that before. But he, calling upon the memory of Heraclitus, asked whether those points of Philon or if he had ever heard them from Philon or any Academic at any time? He denied it. However, he did recognize Philon's writings: nor could there be any doubt about it: for my friends were present, knowledgeable men, P. and C. Selii and Tetrilius Rogus, who claimed to have heard those things in Rome and stated that they had transcribed those two books directly from him. 12. Then Antiochus mentioned those things that Catulus recalled from what his father said to Philon yesterday, and many other things as well, and he couldn’t help but publish a book against his own teacher, named Sosus. So, while I was keenly listening to Heraclitus arguing against Antiochus and likewise Antiochus debating with the Academics, I dedicated myself diligently to Antiochus to fully understand the case from him. Therefore, we spent several days with Heraclitus and several knowledgeable men, including Antiochus's brother, Aristo, and also Ariston and Dion, to whom he granted considerable weight according to his brother, consuming a lot of time in this one discussion. But the part that was against Philon needs to be skipped: he is a less sharp opponent who denies that the points defended yesterday are stated by the Academics at all. Though he lies, still, he is a gentler adversary. Let’s move on to Arcesilaus and Carneades.

V. 13. When he said this, he started again: First of all, it seems to me—you actually called me by name—doing the same thing that rebellious citizens often do, when they bring up some of the famous figures from the past, claiming that they were popular, so that they themselves seem similar to them. They refer back to P. Valerius, who was consul in the first year after the kings were overthrown, and they mention others who enacted popular laws on appeals, while they were consuls; then they mention more known figures, such as C. Flaminius, who proposed the agrarian law several years before the Second Punic War against the senate's wishes and later served as consul twice, L. Cassius, Q. Pompeius; indeed, they often include P. Africanus in the same group. They also mention the two wisest and most distinguished brothers, P. Crassus and P. Scaevola, claiming that Ti. Gracchus was their inspiration for the laws, one openly, the other more subtly, as suspected. They also add C. Marius. And there’s no doubt about this. With the names of so many great men presented, they claim to follow their example. 14. Similarly, you philosophers, when you wish to disturb a well-established philosophy like they did to the republic, invoke the names of Empedocles, Anaxagoras, Democritus, Parmenides, Xenophanes, Plato, and even Socrates. But neither Saturninus, whom I especially name as our enemy, had anything similar to those ancients, nor can the slander of Arcesilaus be compared to the modesty of Democritus. And yet these philosophers hardly ever, when stuck somewhere, shout out as if inspired, Empedocles indeed sometimes seems to me to rave, saying that everything is obscure, that we feel nothing, see nothing, and can discover nothing at all. However, it seems to me that most of them affirm too much and claim to know more than they do. 15. But if they faltered in new matters as if just being born, do we really think that nothing has been elucidated over all these centuries, by the greatest minds and the most profound studies? Isn’t it true that when the disciplines of philosophy had already been firmly established, Ti. Gracchus emerged to disturb peace, just as Arcesilaus arose to overturn established philosophy and hide behind the authority of those who deny that anything can be known or grasped? Among these, both Plato and Socrates must be excluded: one, because he left behind a most perfect system, the Peripatetics and Academics, differing in names but consistent in substance, from which the Stoics disagreed more in words than in ideas. Socrates, however, while weighing his own merits, often gave more credence to those he wanted to refute in debate. Thus, when he recognized and felt something different, he was often willing to use that kind of pretense, which the Greeks call ειρωνειαν: which Fannius claims was also present in Africanus, and it should not be thought ill of him for doing what Socrates did.

VI. 16. These concepts may be unknown to the ancients, if you want. So has nothing been done that hasn’t already been investigated, after Arcesilas, who is thought to have criticized Zeno for not discovering anything new but rather for refining earlier ideas by changing the wording, tried to obscure the clearest matters? His reasoning wasn’t well-received at first, even though it thrived with sharp wit and a remarkable charm in speaking, and it was mostly maintained from the teachings of Lacydes. Later, it was developed by Carneades, who was the fourth from Arcesila. He heard Hegesinus, who had heard Euandrus, Lacydes's student, since Lacydes had been a disciple of Arcesilas. Carneades himself held on for a long time: he lived for ninety years, and those who listened to him flourished significantly, with Clitomachus being particularly industrious—this is shown by the multitude of his books—along with great intelligence in [Aeschine], in Charmada’s eloquence, and in Melanthius of Rhodes's sweetness. It was thought that Carneades was well-known by Stratonicean Metrodorus. 17. Now, Clitomachus dedicated many years of effort. While Philo was alive, he was a supporter of the Academy. However, what we are about to do, to argue against the Academics, some philosophers, and indeed not inconsiderable ones, didn’t believe should be done at all: nor did they think there was any reason to dispute with those who proved nothing. They criticized the Stoic Antipater, who focused heavily on that matter, and claimed it wasn’t necessary to define what knowledge or perception was, or if we want to use their terms, comprehension, which they call καταληψιν, insisting that those who want to persuade should indicate that there is something that could be comprehended and perceived, saying it was done ignorantly since nothing is clearer εναργειαι, as the Greeks say: let us name clear perception or evident understanding. They claimed that no speech could be found that was more distinguished than evident truth itself, and they believed that things that were so clear shouldn’t even be defined. Others, however, denied that they would say anything prior to this evident matter, but thought that it should be said against what was being argued, so that nobody would be deceived. 18. However, most do not disapprove of definitions of even evident things and believe there are suitable subjects for inquiry and worthy people to discuss with. But Philo, while stirring up some new ideas, could hardly support what was stated against the stubbornness of the Academics, and he openly lied, as he was rebuked by Father Catulus, and as Antiochus taught, he got into that very thing he feared. For when he denied that anything could be comprehended—which we want to be incomprehensible—if that were to be, as Zeno would define, such a sight—this term for fantasies we have already casually discussed—then it would be a sight imprinted and shaped from whatever it might be, such that it couldn’t come from where it wasn’t, and this we say is rightly defined by Zeno: for who can claim that something can be comprehended, so that you can be completely confident that it is perceived and known, which could be such, as to whether it could also be false? When Philo invalidates and negates this, he removes the judgment of the unknown and the known: from which it follows that nothing can be comprehended. Thus, unwittingly, he rolls back to the point he least desires. Therefore, all speech is undertaken against the Academy by us, so that we may maintain the definition that Philo sought to overturn. Unless we obtain this, we concede that nothing can be perceived.

VII. 19. Therefore, we are guided by the senses: they are so clear and certain in their judgments that, if we were given the choice by our nature, and if God were to ask whether we should rely on our intact and uncorrupted senses or seek something better, I don't see what more there is to ask. Nor should we wait here for a reply about a bent reed or the neck of a dove: I am not the kind of person who would say that whatever seems to be is exactly what it is. Epicurus recognized this and many other things. In my opinion, the greatest truth lies in our senses, provided they are healthy and strong, and all obstacles that hinder them are removed. Thus, we often want to change the light and the position of the things we observe, and we either contract or expand the intervals, and we do many things until the sight itself confirms the validity of its judgment. The same applies to sounds, smells, and tastes, so that none of us asks for sharper judgments regarding our own senses. 20. With practice and skill, like holding an image with our eyes or music with our ears, who cannot see the great power of the senses? How much do painters see in shadows and highlights that we do not notice! How many things escape our notice in music that those skilled in that genre hear! Some claim that at the first sound of the flute, they recognize Antiope or Andromache, while we don't even suspect it. There's no need to talk about taste and smell, where understanding, even if flawed, still exists. What about touch, especially that which philosophers call inner, or pain or pleasure? Do the Cyrenaics truly believe that the judgment is real simply because it is felt? Can anyone say that there is no difference between someone who is in pain and someone who is in pleasure? Or that someone who feels does not very clearly enjoy sanity? 21. However, the kinds of things we say can be perceived by the senses are followed by those that cannot be directly perceived by the senses but can be recognized in some way through them, such as: 'that is white, this is sweet, that is loud, this has a good smell, this is rough.' Our minds grasp these things rather than our senses. 'That one' is a horse, 'that one' is a dog. The sequence continues, connecting greater concepts, like those that embrace a complete understanding of things: 'if it is a man, it is a mortal animal, a participant in reason.' From this category, knowledge of things is impressed upon us, without which nothing can truly be understood or debated. 22. If these pieces of knowledge were false—έννοια indeed seems to be what you were calling knowledge—if these were false or of such a kind that they couldn’t be distinguished from what is false, how then would we use them? How could we recognize what is consistent with each thing and what opposes it? Surely, in memory, which encompasses not only philosophy but the very essence of life and all arts, there is no room for such falsehood. What can there be in the memory of falsehoods? Or what can anyone remember that is not comprehended and held in the mind? But what kind of skill could exist unless it consists not of one or two perceptions but of many? If you remove that, how will you distinguish a skilled artisan from an unskilled one? We cannot just say that one is a craftsman by chance while denying it of another, as we see one holding a full understanding of the concepts while the other does not. While some arts might only be seen by the mind, others require creating something in reality, as how could a geometrician see things that are either nonexistent or cannot be distinguished from falsehoods, or how could someone using a lyre produce notes and compose verses? The same applies to similar arts, all of which require doing and acting. For what can be achieved through skill unless the one practicing the art has perceived much?

VIII. 23. The understanding of virtues really confirms that we can perceive and comprehend many things. In this, we say that knowledge also involves understanding, which we consider to be stable and unchanging, as well as wisdom, the art of living, which itself has consistency. However, if that consistency has nothing to do with perception and knowledge, I wonder where it originated or how it exists? I also ask, that good person who decides to endure every torment, being painfully tortured rather than betray duty or loyalty, why has he imposed such severe laws on himself, when for any reason he should, he would have nothing comprehended, perceived, understood, or established? Therefore, it is impossible for anyone to value equity and loyalty so highly that they would refuse any punishment to preserve them, unless they adhere to principles that cannot possibly be false. 24. Indeed, wisdom itself, if it does not recognize whether it is wisdom or not, how will it first obtain the name of wisdom? Then how will it dare to undertake or act on anything confidently, when there will be nothing certain to follow? But when it doubts what the ultimate and supreme good is, not knowing what everything refers to, who can be called wise? It is also clear that there must be an initiating point, which wisdom follows when it starts to act, and that initiating point must align with nature. For otherwise, desire—that is what we want it to be ‛ορμην—which drives us to act, cannot pursue what has been seen. 25. Furthermore, what motivates must first be seen and believed: this cannot happen if what is perceived cannot be distinguished from the false. But how can the mind be moved to desire if what seems to be true is not perceived as appropriate or alien to nature? Likewise, if any duty does not occur to the mind, it will never act at all, it will not be moved toward anything. If it will ever act, it must be that what comes to it appears to be true. 26. What if, if these things are true, all reasoning is removed, like a certain light and illumination of life, and yet you will persist in such wrongdoing? For the beginning of inquiry brings forth reason, which perfects virtue, with reason itself being confirmed by the seeking. Inquiry is the desire for knowledge, and the end of the inquiry is discovery. But no one finds what is false, nor can those things that remain uncertain be discovered. Rather, when those things that were previously unclear become clear, then they are said to be discovered. Thus, the beginning of inquiry and the conclusion of perception and understanding are held. Therefore, the conclusion of the argument, which in Greek is proof, is defined as: 'the reasoning that brings from perceived things to that which was not perceived.'

IX. 27. If everything were as they say, such that it could possibly be false, how could any understanding discern whether someone concluded something or discovered something at all, or what the credibility of a concluded argument would be? What about philosophy itself, which should progress through reasoning—what outcome will it have? And what will happen to wisdom? It should neither doubt itself nor its decisions, which philosophers call doctrines, none of which can emerge without wrongdoing. For when a decision is made, the law of truth and what is right is established, from which errors and betrayals in friendships and public matters often arise. Thus, it cannot be doubted that no decision can be false, and it is not enough for wisdom for something to not be false; it must also be stable, fixed, and valid in such a way that no reasoning can alter it. However, such things cannot exist or be seen by those who deny any distinction between the perceived and the false. 28. From this arises Hortensius’s assertion, that one should at least say that nothing can be perceived by a wise person. But when Antipater made the same claim, arguing that it was consistent to say that something could be perceived, while other things could not, Carneades countered more sharply. For he said that it was far from consistent to argue that one could deny anything being perceived. If someone denies that anything exists that can be perceived, then they cannot perceive anything; thus, it becomes necessary that even the very claim that something cannot be perceived cannot be comprehended or understood at all. 29. Antiochus seemed to approach this point more precisely. Since the Academics held this decree—indeed, you already feel me calling this doctrine—that nothing can be perceived, they should not waver in their decree, as with other matters, especially since it is foundational: this is the rule of all philosophy, the distinction between truth and falsehood, the known and the unknown. Because they wanted to take up this reasoning and teach what kind of perception should be embraced and what should be rejected, certainly they should have perceived precisely that which forms the judgment between truth and falsehood; indeed, there are two main pillars in philosophy, the judgment of truth and the pursuit of good, and no one can be wise who does not know either the beginning of knowledge or the ultimate goal of seeking, so they would neither know from where to start nor where to arrive. To have such doubts and to rely on them to the point they cannot be moved is to be very far from wisdom. Therefore, it would have been better for them to have demanded at least this one thing, that they declare nothing can be perceived. But regarding the inconsistency of their entire viewpoint, if there exists any opinion that disapproves of anything, this, I believe, has been stated enough.

X. 30. So, there’s that lengthy discussion, which is indeed quite complex—it has some aspects of physics—so I worry that I might give too much freedom and leeway to the one who will be arguing against it. What should I expect them to do with obscure and hidden matters if they try to pull light away from them? However, it could be argued in a nuanced way how nature crafted the first living being and then, most of all, humans, what power exists in our senses, how we are initially driven by what we see, and then how our desires follow from those. We are meant to focus our senses on what we perceive. The mind itself, which is the source of the senses and is also part of the senses, has a natural inclination toward the things that move it. Therefore, it grabs onto some perceptions and immediately uses them, while it seems to store others, from which memory arises. It also builds other ideas through similarities, creating the knowledge of things, which the Greeks call concept and preventive measures. When this cognitive process is combined with logical reasoning and the vast multitude of things, a clear perception of everything appears, and this reasoning, perfected through these stages, reaches wisdom. 31. Therefore, since the mind of a person is most suitable for the knowledge of things and the steadiness of life, it primarily embraces understanding and that καταληψιν, which, as I said, we describe as comprehension, as it loves it for its own sake—nothing is sweeter to it than the light of truth—also because of its usefulness. Thus, it utilizes the senses and creates art as if creating additional senses, and it strengthens philosophy itself to the extent that it generates virtue, promoting a life that is fit overall. Therefore, those who deny that anything can be comprehended undermine these very tools or ornaments of life or even completely overturn life itself, depriving the very being of its mind, making it difficult to speak of their recklessness, just as the situation demands.

32. But I really can’t determine what their plan is or what they want. Sometimes when we address them like this: 'If what’s being discussed is true, then everything will be uncertain,' they respond: 'What does that have to do with us? Is it our fault? Blame nature for hiding the truth so deeply, as Democritus says.' Others, who are more refined, complain that we accuse them of saying everything is uncertain, and they try to teach the difference between uncertainty and what can’t be perceived. So, let’s engage with those who make these distinctions: we leave behind those who say everything is uncertain as if they were some kind of lost causes. They want— and this is something I noticed you were particularly concerned about—there to be something probable and seemingly true, using this as a guideline both in their actions and in seeking and discussing matters.

XI. 33. What is this rule of truth and falsehood, if we have no concept of truth and falsehood because they cannot be distinguished? If we do have this understanding, there must be a difference between right and wrong, just as there is between true and false. If there’s no difference, there’s no rule, and someone who has a common vision of truth and falsehood can have no judgment or any notion of truth at all. For when they claim to eliminate one from the equation, allowing something to seem true while simultaneously allowing it to also seem false, they are being childish. For in judging anything, if the rest is removed, they deny themselves everything: as if someone, having deprived another of sight, were to say they haven't taken away what could be seen. Just as those things are recognized by sight, so too are the others by vision, but the properties of truth must be distinct from the common indicators of truth and falsehood. Therefore, whether you offer a probable vision or one that is not hindered, as Carneades wanted, or something else to match it, you must return to that vision we are discussing. 34. In that case, if there is a commonality with the false, there will be no judgment, because it cannot be marked by a specific common sign. If, however, nothing common exists, I have what I want: for I seek what seems true to me, so that it cannot also seem false. They operate on a similar error when, pressured by the force of truth, they try to distinguish clearly from perceptions and attempt to show there is something clear, whereas what is truly inscribed in the mind cannot be perceived or understood. How can you say clearly that something is white when it may happen that what is black can also appear white? Or how can we call these things clear or subtly inscribed when it is uncertain whether they move truly or in vain? Thus, neither color nor body nor truth nor argument nor any clear perception remains. 35. From this, it often happens that whenever they speak, they are questioned by some: 'So, do you actually perceive that?' But those who ask in this way are ridiculed by others. They do not press them to prove that no one can contend or assert anything without some certain and specific mark of that thing they claim to have. So what, then, is your probable reasoning? For if whatever comes to mind that seems probable at first glance is confirmed, what could be lighter than that? 36. But if they claim to follow what has been seen through some careful consideration, they will not succeed: first, because faith is equally denied to all the things they see, among which there is no difference; secondly, when they say it may happen that, even after taking great care in everything, something can appear similar to the truth yet be far from it, they cannot have any confidence that even a large part can accurately approach the truth itself. For to have such confidence, they must possess a known sign of truth; with that obscured and suppressed, what will they ultimately think they can grasp as true? What could be said more absurdly than when they say: 'This is indeed a sign or argument of that thing, and for that reason, I follow it, but it is possible that what is indicated could be false or not exist at all.' But enough about perception. For if anyone wishes to undermine what has been said, truth will easily defend itself even in our absence.

XII. 37. His satis cognitis, quae iam explicata sunt, nunc de adsensione atque approbatione, quam Graeci συγκαταθεσιν vocant, pauca dicemus, non quo non latus locus sit, sed paulo ante iacta sunt fundamenta. Nam cum vim, quae esset in sensibus, explicabamus, simul illud aperiebatur, comprehendi multa et percipi sensibus, quod fieri sine adsensione non potest. Deinde cum inter inanimum et animal hoc maxime intersit, quod animal agit aliquid—nihil enim agens ne cogitari quidem potest quale sit—, aut ei sensus adimendus est aut ea, quae est in nostra potestate sita, reddenda adsensio. 38. At vero animus quodam modo eripitur iis, quos neque sentire neque adsentiri volunt. Ut enim necesse est lancem in libra ponderibus impositis deprimi, sic animum perspicuis cedere. Nam quo modo non potest animal ullum non appetere id, quod accommodatum ad naturam appareat—Graeci id οικειον appellant—, sic non potest obiectam rem perspicuam non approbare. Quamquam, si illa, de quibus disputatum est, vera sunt, nihil attinet de adsensione omnino loqui. Qui enim quid percipit, adsentitur statim. Sed haec etiam secuntur, nec memoriam sine adsensione posse constare nec notitias rerum nec artis, idque, quod maximum est, ut sit aliquid in nostra potestate, in eo, qui rei nulli adsentietur, non erit. 39. Ubi igitur virtus, si nihil situm est in ipsis nobis? Maxime autem absurdum vitia in ipsorum esse potestate neque peccare quemquam nisi adsensione: hoc idem in virtute non esse, cuius omnis constantia et firmitas ex iis rebus constat, quibus adsensa est et quas approbavit, omninoque ante videri aliquid quam agamus necesse est, eique, quod visum sit, adsentiatur. Qua re qui aut visum aut adsensum tollit, is omnem actionem tollit e vita.

XIII. 40. Now let’s look at what is often argued against these points. But first, you should understand the basic principles of their reasoning. They begin by creating an art form based on the things we perceive, defining both their power and types, focusing on what can be perceived and understood, using the same words as the Stoics. Then they present two points that seem to encompass this entire question: those points appear such that other things could also be seen in the same way, without any difference between them; there can't be instances where some things can be perceived while others cannot. However, it doesn't matter if they are all the same in every aspect, or if they cannot be distinguished. With these premises established, the entire argument can be captured in a single conclusion. This conclusion states: 'Among the things that are perceived, some are true and some are false, and what is false cannot be perceived: however, what has been seen as true is such that even what is false can also appear the same.' And, 'for things that seem to be of this kind, there is no difference, so it cannot happen that some can be perceived while others cannot.' 41. Therefore, there is no perception that can be possible.' When they aim to arrive at their conclusion, they think that two things can be granted: for no one opposes this. These are as follows: 'Things that appear to be false cannot be perceived,' and the second: 'Among those that appear, there is no difference, so it cannot be such that some could be perceived while others cannot:' and they defend these points with a range of arguments, identifying two main aspects: one is that 'among things that are perceived, some are true and some are false,' and the other is that 'all perception that is derived from the true must also be such that it could come from falsehood.' 42. These two assertions are not overlooked but are expanded upon with significant care and attention. They divide them into considerable parts: first, into sensations, and then into those that arise from senses and from any customs that they wish to obscure. Then they arrive at the point that nothing can be perceived even through reasoning or any conjecture. This entire framework is broken down even further. Just as you saw in yesterday’s discussion about sensations, they do the same with other elements, and in each item, which they break down into its smallest details, they want to establish that everything that seems to be true is accompanied by false elements that differ nothing from the true: since they are like this, they cannot be comprehended.

XIV. 43. I find this subtlety to be quite worthy of philosophy, but for those who discuss it, it seems very far removed. Definitions and classifications, utilizing the light of these concepts, along with the similarities and differences and their fine and sharp distinctions, give confidence to people that what they protect is true, firm, and certain, not those who scream that something is just as true as it is false. What will they do if someone asks them whether a defined term can be applied to something else? If they say it can, what will they put forth as the reason that it's a true definition? If they deny it, they must admit that because a true definition cannot be transferred to a false one, what is explained by that definition can be perceived, which is exactly what they do not want. The same can be said in all parts. 44. For if they say they clearly perceive what they are discussing and are not hindered by any commonality of vision, they will admit they can grasp it. But if they deny that true visions can be distinguished from false ones, who can progress further? It comes to light, just as it has come to light before. For an argument cannot be concluded unless it is based on premises established in such a way that no false counterpart could exist. Therefore, if reasoning based on understood and perceived things achieves this, that nothing can be comprehended, what could be discovered that would contradict itself more? And since the very nature of precise discourse professes this, that it will reveal something that doesn't appear, and, to achieve this more easily, will employ both the senses and what is clear, such as the speech of those who want everything to be seen rather than just to exist? They are most convincingly disproven when they take these two, which are so vehemently contradictory, as if they are congruent: first, that there are certain false perceptions; when they desire this, they declare some things to be true; then there, between false perceptions and true ones, there's no difference. But at first, you have taken it as if there were a difference: thus the earlier does not connect to the later, nor does the later connect to the earlier.

45. But let's move forward and act in a way that we don't seem to agree with anything and pursue what is said by them in such a manner that we leave nothing unresolved in the past. Therefore, that clarity we mentioned has enough power to reveal things to us as they truly are. Still, to stay more firmly and consistently in clarity, we need either greater skill or diligence to avoid being led astray by things that are clear on their own through some tricks or deceptions. For those who tried to address the errors of Epicurus, which seem to disrupt the understanding of truth, and claimed that it is wise to separate opinion from clarity, achieved nothing: they did not eliminate the error of that very opinion at all.

XV. 46. Since two obvious and clear reasons oppose each other, we must prepare the same number of counter-arguments. The first issue is that they don't focus their minds enough on what is clear, so they can recognize the extent to which it is surrounded by light; the second is that some people, misled and deceived by deceptive and tricky questions, abandon the truth because they can't dismantle those arguments. Therefore, we need to have on hand the responses that can be made in favor of clarity, as we've already mentioned, and be prepared to confront their questions and dismantle their traps: this is what I plan to do next. 47. I will generally lay out their arguments since they themselves tend not to speak confusedly. First, they try to show that there are many things that seem to exist but actually don't, as the mind is stirred up in the same way by things that aren't real as by things that are. For when you say that certain visions are sent by God, like those seen in dreams and those declared by oracles, auspices, and other omens—these are things they claim are supported by the Stoics, against whom they argue—they ask how God could make false visions seem likely: why could He not make those that come very close to the truth? Or, if He can do that, why not those that are exceedingly difficult to distinguish? And if He can do this, why not the ones between which there is absolutely nothing at all? 48. Then, since the mind can be disturbed by itself, as evidenced by things we imagine, and by those that sometimes appear to the sleeping or the mad, it seems plausible that the mind could be stirred in such a way that it not only cannot distinguish whether those visions are true or false but that there is also absolutely nothing to distinguish: like if someone trembled and turned pale either from some internal mental movement or from fearsome external objects, there would be nothing to distinguish that trembling and paleness, nor would anything matter between what is internal and what is offered. Finally, if there are no likely visions that are false, that’s one reasoning. But if there are, why not also those that are not easily distinguishable? And why not make it seem like there is absolutely nothing when you say wise men resist all assent in a rage, because there is no distinction visible in the visions?

XVI. 49. Antiochus certainly had many empty visions and talked a lot, and there was a discussion about this one issue for a whole day. However, I don’t think I should do the same, but rather state the main points. First of all, it should be criticized that they use a very tricky type of questioning, which is not usually accepted in philosophy when something is added or taken away in detail and gradually. This is called a sorites, because they create a heap by adding one grain. It’s a flawed and deceptive method! For that’s how you climb: If such a vision is presented by a sleeping god, making it probable, then why is it not also highly plausible? Why then shouldn’t it be difficult to distinguish from the truth? Then, for it not to be distinguishable at all? Finally, that there’s no difference between this and that? If you get here, if I concede everything to you first, my fault will be: if you proceed of your own accord, then it’s yours. 50. For who has given you the idea that god can do everything or that he will do so, if he can? How then do you take it, that if anything could be similar, it follows that it could also be hard to distinguish? Then for it to not be distinguishable? Finally, for them to be the same? If wolves are similar to dogs ,you would call them the same in the end. Indeed, there are some things that are similar to the honorable that are not honorable and to the good that are not good and to the skillful that are least skillful: so why do we hesitate to assert that there is no difference between these? Don’t we see the contradiction? For nothing can be transferred from one kind to another. But if it were to happen, that among the visions of different kinds, there was no difference, there would be found things that are both in their own kind and in another’s. 51. Who could make that happen? Then there’s a rejection of all empty visions, whether they are formed by thought, which we allow can happen, or in sleep, or through wine, or through madness. For we would say that from all visions of this kind, the clarity, which we must hold onto tightly, is absent. For who, when they imagine something and depict it in thought, does not simultaneously shake themselves and bring themselves back to realize the difference between what is clear and what is empty? The same principle applies to dreams. Do you think Ennius, when he was walking in the gardens with his neighbor Ser. Galba, said, 'I seemed to walk with Galba?' But when he dreamed, he narrated it this way:

Same in Epicharmus:

Itaque, simul ut experrecti sumus, visa illa contemnimus neque ita habemus, ut ea, quae in foro gessimus.

XVII. 52. When they appear, the dream images are the same as those we see when awake! There’s a key difference: but let’s set that aside. What we mean to say is that the power and clarity of our thoughts when we’re asleep are not the same as when we’re awake, either in mind or senses. Even drunk people don’t do things with the same approval as sober people: they hesitate, waver, and sometimes pull back, agreeing less firmly with what they see. Once they’ve sobered up, they realize how trivial those perceptions were. The same happens to the insane, who feel and say things that aren’t real while they’re starting to lose their minds, and when they calm down, they understand and say what Alcmaeon said:

53. But the wise person manages to keep their composure in madness, so they don’t mistake falsehoods for truths. Often, if there’s any heaviness or slowness in their senses, or if things seem obscure, or if they’re excluded due to the briefness of time, they may struggle with understanding. However, sometimes it’s contradictory to think the wise person would agree with you. If there were no difference between perceptions, they would either agree all the time or never. But from this whole category, we can see the triviality of those who want to blur all boundaries. We seek judgments of seriousness, consistency, firmness, and wisdom: we use examples of dreamers, the insane, and the drunk. What we pay attention to in all this is how inconsistently we speak. We wouldn’t absurdly claim that there’s a difference between the perceptions of the awake and those of the sober, rational individuals and those who are affected otherwise, nor would we say there’s none. 54. They don’t even realize that they’re making everything uncertain, which they don’t want—those uncertainties I refer to as αδηλα in Greek. If things were such that there’s no difference between whether someone perceives like a mad person or a sane one, how could anyone ascertain their own sanity? To aim for that isn’t just a moderate level of madness. They foolishly pursue similarities or likenesses as if they were twins or marked by impressions in rings. Who among us denies that similarities exist, since they appear in many things? But if it’s enough to eliminate recognition to have many similarities among many, why aren’t you satisfied with that, especially when we concede? And why do you insist on something that the nature of things doesn’t allow, that nothing can be entirely the same as if it were a single type, nor can there be any community of essence that doesn’t vary at all in two or more things? For example, eggs should be similar to eggs, and bees to bees: so why fight about it? Or what do you want in twins? It’s accepted that they can be similar enough to satisfy you; however, you want them to be completely identical, not just similar: which is simply impossible. 55. Then you take refuge among the physicists, who are often ridiculed in the Academy, from whom you won’t even refrain, and you say Democritus claims there are countless worlds, some of which are not only similar but completely and absolutely identical, such that there’s absolutely no difference between them [and indeed, they are countless], as well as among humans. Then you ask, if one world can be exactly like another, so that there’s not even the smallest difference, can it also be allowed that in this world something is so similar to another that there’s no difference at all? Why, you might ask, of those individuals from which Democritus claims everything originates, can there be countless Q. Lutatii Catuli in those other worlds and indeed in those countless worlds, yet in this vast world, another Catulus cannot come to be?

XVIII. 56. First of all, you call me to Democritus, with whom I do not agree, and I actually refute him because it is clearly taught by the more refined physicists that each thing has its own unique properties. Just consider the ancient Servilius twins, who are said to be so similar; do you really think they were the same people? They weren't recognized outside, but at home: not by outsiders, but by their own. Don't we see this happening in reality, that those we never thought could be distinguished from us, we easily recognize through familiarity, so that they don't seem even slightly similar? 57. Here, though you may argue, I will not resist: rather, I will even concede that the very wise man we are discussing would, when he encounters similar things that he has not previously identified, maintain some agreement and would never assent to anything he sees unless it has such a nature that it cannot be false. Also, regarding other things, he has a certain skill through which he can distinguish the true from the false, and this practice should be applied to those similarities. Just as a mother can distinguish twins by the familiarity of her eyes, so too will you recognize them if you get used to it. Do you see how there is a saying about the similarity of eggs among themselves? Yet we have heard that there were several people in Delos who, for profit, would raise many chickens: when they inspected an egg, they would say which hen it had come from. 58. This is not against us: for it is enough for us not to distinguish those eggs. There is nothing more appropriate to agree with than that this one thing is that, as if there were no difference among them at all: for I have a rule that allows me to judge such things as true which cannot be false: from this rule, I am not allowed to deviate, as they say, even a finger's breadth, lest I confuse everything. For the distinction between true and false will not only be knowledge but also will be obliterated if nothing exists that makes a difference: therefore, it would also be absurd for you to say sometimes, when perceptions are impressed in the mind, that nothing matters between those impressions, but between the appearances and certain forms of them. As if indeed they are not judged by appearance! They would have no credibility if the signs of truth and falsehood were removed. 59. It is truly absurd what you say about following probabilities if nothing impedes you. First, how can you be unimpeded when true and false are indistinct? Then, what judgment is there of the true when it is common to the false? From these ideas necessarily arises era, that is, the retention of assent, in which Arcesilas was better established, if the things said about Carneades are true. For if nothing can be perceived that has been seen by both, the assent must be removed. For what is more futile than to approve of anything unknown? Moreover, we even heard yesterday that Carneades was accustomed to slip into saying that the wise man is likely to err. For me, it is not as certain that something can be comprehended, about which I have already debated for far too long, than that the wise man should never assume anything, that is, should never assent to things that are either false or unknown. 60. What remains is what they say, that for the sake of finding the truth, everything must be said and for everything. Therefore, I want to see what they have found. “We do not usually show,” they say. What are these mysteries? Or why do you hide your opinion as if it’s something shameful? “So that those who listen are led by reason rather than authority,” they say. What if it’s by both? Is that worse? However, they do not hide one thing, that there is nothing that can be perceived. Does authority have no effect on that? It seems to me it has quite a lot. For who would have followed such openly, clearly, and perversely false ideas, if there had not been such great authority in Arcesila, and even greater in Carneades, both in the abundance of ideas and in the power of speech?

XIX. 61. Antiochus brought this up often, both in Alexandria and many years later, much more emphatically when he was with me in Syria, just before he died. But now that the matter is settled, I won't hesitate to advise you, my dear friend—he used to call me that—and several years younger than he was: When you have praised philosophy so highly and stirred up disagreement with our Hortensius, are you really going to follow a philosophy that mixes truth and falsehood, robs us of judgment, takes away approval, and leaves us blind to all our senses? Indeed, the Cimmerians, who had been deprived of sunlight by either some god or nature, or the location they inhabited, still had fires that allowed them to see by their light; but those you support have left us in such thick darkness that they haven’t even given us a spark to see by: if we follow them, we would be bound in chains that prevent us from moving at all. 62. For they have taken away agreement and thus removed all movement of the mind and action of things: which cannot only not be done rightly, but cannot be done at all. Also, don’t think that you alone are allowed to defend this position. When you have revealed the most hidden matters and brought them into the light, swearing that you learned them, which I could also have done since I learned them from you, will you deny that there’s anything that can be known, understood, or perceived? Please be careful not to let your authority diminish regarding those most splendid matters. After he said this, he stopped. 63. Hortensius, however, was very impressed, as he often was while Lucullus spoke, raising his hands frequently; and no wonder: for I never think anything has been said against the Academy more subtly, prompting me, jokingly or seriously—since I didn’t fully understand—to pause. Then Catulus said to me: If Lucullus's speech has swayed you, which was well-remembered, precise, and rich, I'm silent and think it shouldn’t deter you from changing your mind if you see fit. However, I would not advise you to be influenced by his authority. He has certainly not only warned you, he said with a smile, to be cautious so that no corrupt tribune of the people, of whom you know there will always be plenty, catches you off guard and questions you in a public assembly about your assertions, when you have just denied that anything certain can be found and simultaneously claimed to know it. Please don’t let this scare you. As for the matter itself, I’d really prefer you to disagree with this. If you concede, I wouldn’t be too surprised. I remember Antiochus himself, having sensed other things for many years, immediately around the time it was revealed, stopped showing his opinion. When Catulus said this, everyone turned to look at me.

XX. 64. So, I'm just as moved as I usually am in major matters; I started with this kind of speech because Lucullus's comments really impacted me. You see, Catulus, the way he spoke on the subject made me realize that, while he was knowledgeable, articulate, and thorough in covering everything that could be said about the issue, I didn’t think I’d struggle to respond. However, the weight of his authority affected me significantly—unless you countered with an equally strong argument. So, let me begin, but first, let me say a few things about my reputation. 65. If I’ve turned to this philosophy either out of some sort of show-off behavior or competitive spirit, I consider that not only foolish but also a condemnation of my character and nature. Because if being persistent in minor matters is criticized and even calumny is restrained, should I really be eager to either fight others or outsmart both them and myself on the overall state and decisions of life? Therefore, unless I thought it was silly to act in a way that sometimes happens during discussions about the state, I would swear by Jupiter and the household gods that I am indeed passionate about discovering the truth and genuinely feel what I express. 66. How can I not wish to uncover the truth when I feel joy if I find something similar to the truth? But as much as I think it's beautiful to see the truth, it's absolutely disgraceful to approve falsehoods in place of what is true. Yet, I’m not one to approve of anything false, I never go along with falsehoods, and I don’t just assume anything—but I'm on a quest for wisdom. Indeed, I can be a big thinker—though I wouldn’t say I’m wise—and I direct my thoughts not towards that little guiding star,

ut ait Aratus, eoce directius govern.

But Helicon and the brightest Northern stars, meaning these concepts in a broader sense, aren't finely polished. This causes me to stray and wander more. But it’s not about me, as I said, it’s about the wise person. For when these things sharply strike my mind or senses, I sometimes accept them, and yet I don’t fully grasp them; for I think nothing can truly be understood. I am not wise; therefore, I yield to what I see and cannot resist. However, this is considered the greatest power by the wise person, as Arcesilas agrees with Zeno, cautioning against being caught or misled in perception. Nothing is further from that thought we have about the gravity of the wise than error, lightness, or recklessness. So what then shall I say about the wisdom's firmness? Indeed, you, Lucullus, allow that nothing could be assumed about it. Since this is supported by you—so that I deal with you in an unusual way, I will soon return to the order—first, consider what power this conclusion might have.

XXI. 67. If anyone ever agrees with something, they might sometimes have an opinion, but they will never truly have an opinion: therefore, they will agree with nothing. This conclusion was supported by Arcesilas, as he affirmed both the first and second points. Carneades sometimes accepted the second point: that one might agree at times. This implies that he could also have an opinion, which you rightly reject, as it seems to me. But the first point, that a wise person, if they were to agree, would also have an opinion, is said to be false by both the Stoics and their supporter Antiochus: for they can distinguish between what is false and true, and what can be perceived from what cannot. 68. However, to us, even if something can be perceived, the very practice of agreeing seems to be dangerous and slippery. Therefore, since it’s clear that agreeing with anything false or unknown is so flawed, it’s better to avoid all agreement to prevent any reckless descent. Indeed, falsehoods are closely linked to truths, and those things that cannot be perceived from those that can—if there are indeed some—will not lead a wise person to take such a dangerous plunge. But if I take the position that there is absolutely nothing that can be perceived and accept what you give me, then a wise person will not hold any opinions. That will mean that every agreement is to be restrained, and you should see whether you prefer that a wise person remains neutral or has some opinion. You will say, neither of those. Therefore, let’s strive to conclude that nothing can be perceived: after all, that’s where all the debate lies.

XXII. 69. But first, a few words with Antiochus, who has learned these very things that I defend from Philo for so long that it is clear no one has learned them longer, and he wrote very keenly about these matters, yet he did not criticize them more intensely in old age than he had defended them before. Therefore, even though he was sharp-minded, his authority is diminished by inconsistency. For what day has shone upon him that revealed the mark of truth and falsehood he had denied for so many years? Did he come up with something new? He says the same things the Stoics do. Was he sorry he felt that way? Why didn’t he turn to others, especially the Stoics? For that was their specific disagreement. What about Mnesarchus? Or Dardanus? Who were at that time the leaders of the Stoics in Athens. He never left Philo, except later when he began to have those who would listen to him. 70. But why was the old Academy suddenly called back? It seems he wanted to retain the dignity of the name, as it was separating from the actual matter, since there were those who said he did it for the sake of glory, hoping that those who followed him would be called Antiochians. However, it seems to me that he could not withstand the gathering of all philosophers. In fact, among them, there are some common points, but this one opinion of the Academics is something that no other philosophers approve of. Therefore, he retreated, and just as those who cannot bear the light of the New sun, likewise he, when overwhelmed, followed the shadow of the old ones, like the Maenian, thus the Academics. 71. And he used to argue then when he pleased that nothing could be grasped when he inquired whether that certain mark, which you say should be agreed upon, was comprehended by that Dionysius of Heraclea, whether what he had held for many years, believing it to be from Zenon, that the honorable thing alone is good, or what he later defended, that the name of honorable was empty, that pleasure is the highest good: he who wished to teach from his altered opinion that nothing could be signified in our minds from the truth that could not similarly be from the false, took care that what argument he himself had taken from Dionysius, the others would also take from him. But since I have discussed this elsewhere, let’s now turn to what you, Lucullus, have said.

XXIII. 72. First, let’s see what you mentioned at the beginning: similarly, we tend to remember the ancient philosophers and the rebellious ones who were renowned, but we might name a few popular figures. They want to appear like virtuous people even when they deal with bad matters. However, we assert that we find value in what you acknowledge pleased the most celebrated philosophers. Anaxagoras claimed that snow is black. Would you accept it if I said the same? You, not even if I hesitated. But who is he? Is he just a sophist?—for so they were called, those who philosophized for show or profit—: he was of the highest glory in both gravity and intellect. 73. What should I say about Democritus? Who can we compare him to, not only in intellectual greatness but in spirit? He dared to start with: 'I speak about the universe.' Nothing is excluded from what he professes. For what could exist outside the universe? Who wouldn't rank this philosopher above Cleanthes, Chrysippus, and the others of a lower age? They seem to me to belong to a lower class compared to him. And he doesn't claim what we, who do not deny that something is real, deny can be perceived; he clearly denies that there is any truth: he says that the senses are not misleading, but they are dark: that’s how he describes them. The one who admired him most, Chius Metrodorus, begins his book on nature saying: 'I deny that we know whether we know something or nothing, not even whether we know or don’t know, nor whether there is something or nothing at all.' 74. You think Empedocles is mad: but to me, he seems to emit a sound worthy of the matters he speaks about. Does he blind us or deprive us of our senses if he thinks there's little significant power in what lies beneath to be judged? Parmenides and Xenophanes, though their verses are not as good, still admonish their arrogance as if angry, those who, when nothing can be known, dare to claim they know. And you said Socrates and Plato should be excluded from those. Why? Can I say anything with certainty about any of them? I feel as if I’ve lived with them: so many conversations have been recorded that it cannot be doubted that Socrates thought nothing could be known. He accepted only one thing, 'that he knows he knows nothing,' nothing more. What should I say about Plato? Surely he wouldn’t have pursued these matters in so many books unless he had proven them. There was no reason to follow the irony of another, especially a perpetual one.

XXIV. 75. What do you think, not like Saturninus, just naming famous people, but only imitating the renowned or the noble? Yet I had some annoying, but minor figures for you, Stilpo, Diodorus, Alexinus, whose arguments are twisted and sharp sophisms; because that’s what deceptive conclusions are called. But why should I gather them when I have Chrysippus, who is thought to support the Stoic school? How much he says against the senses, how much against everything that is commonly accepted as good! Yet he refutes it all. It doesn’t seem to me, but he certainly has refuted it. Surely he wouldn’t have gathered so many things that would mislead us with great probability unless he saw that it wasn’t easy to resist them. 76. What do you think of the Cyrenaics, those hardly disregarded philosophers? They deny there’s anything that can be perceived from outside: they only perceive what they feel through direct contact, like pain or pleasure; they don’t know what anything is in color or sound, but only feel themselves affected in a certain way.

Satis multa de auctoribus. Quamquam ex me quaesieras nonne putarem post illos veteres tot saeculis inveniri verum potuisse tot ingeniis tantisque studiis quaerentibus. Quid inventum sit paulo post videro, te ipso quidem iudice. Arcesilam vero non obtrectandi causa cum Zenone pugnavisse, sed verum invenire voluisse sic intellegitur. 77. Nemo, inquam, superiorum non modo expresserat, sed ne dixerat quidem posse hominem nihil opinari, nec solum posse, sed ita necesse esse sapienti. Visa est Arcesilae cum vera sententia tum honesta et digna sapiente. Quaesivit de Zenone fortasse quid futurum esset, si nec percipere quicquam posset sapiens nec opinari sapientis esset. Ille, credo, nihil opinaturum, quoniam esset, quod percipi posset. Quid ergo id esset? Visum, credo. Quale igitur visum? tum illum ita definisse, ex eo, quod esset, sicut esset, impressum et signatum et effictum. Post requisitum etiamne, si eiusdem modi esset visum verum, quale vel falsum. Hic Zenonem vidisse acute nullum esse visum quod percipi posset, si id tale esset ab eo, quod est, ut eiusdem modi ab eo, quod non est, posset esse. Recte consensit Arcesilas; ad definitionem additum: neque enim falsum percipi posse neque verum, si esset tale, quale vel falsum. Incubuit autem in eas disputationes, ut doceret nullum tale esse visum a vero, ut non eiusdem modi etiam a falso possit esse. 78. Haec est una contentio, quae adhuc permanserit. Nam illud, nulli rei adsensurum esse sapientem, nihil ad hanc controversiam pertinebat. Licebat enim nihil percipere et tamen opinari, quod a Carneade dicitur probatum: equidem Clitomacho plus quam Philoni aut Metrodoro credens, hoc magis ab eo disputatum quam probatum puto. Sed id omittamus. Illud certe opinatione et perceptione sublata sequitur, omnium adsensionum retentio, ut, si ostendero nihil posse percipi, tu concedas numquam adsensurum esse.

XXV. 79. So what can we perceive if our senses don't even convey the truth? You, Lucullus, defend a common view: that’s why yesterday I spoke out against the senses at great length. But you insist that you’re unmoved by the broken oar and the dove's neck. Why is that? Because I sense that the oar isn't as it seems, and the dove appears to have more colors than it actually does. Have we said nothing else?—Those points remain, and the cause stands: the truth claims its senses. So you always have an advocate who argues their case at great personal risk! Epicurus makes this point: if one sense ever deceived in life, no one should ever be trusted again. 80. This is what it means to trust the evidence and insist on your view! So Timagoras the Epicurean claims that whenever he squints, he never sees two flames from a lamp: deception is in opinion, not in the eyes. As if we should ask what something is, not what it seems. But you, similar to the ancients, distinguish between what the senses perceive as true and false. Please stop relying on common ideas: these things arise at home for us. If, you ask, God were to question you: With clear and sound senses, do you want anything more? What would you say?—I wish He would ask! He'd hear how poorly we fare. To see the truth, how far can we see? I can see Catulus’s place in Cumae from here, but I can’t spot Pompeii, and there’s nothing in between blocking my view; my gaze just can't reach further. Oh, what a splendid view! We see Puteoli: yet we can't see our friend C. Avianius, perhaps strolling in the portico of Neptune. 81. But that unknown fellow, who is often mentioned in schools, claimed to see a distance of 1,800 stadia: some birds were visible even farther. Therefore, I would boldly reply to that god of yours: with these very eyes, I’m definitely not content. He might say I see more sharply than those fish that perhaps aren’t visible to us and right now are definitely under our noses, unable to perceive us either. So just as they are submerged in water, we are overwhelmed by thick air. But we don’t desire more than that. What? Do you think a mole desires light? I wouldn’t complain to God about seeing something less clear than something false. Do you see that ship? It seems to be standing still to us, but to those on board, this villa seems to be moving. Look for the reasoning behind this perception: no matter how hard you try to figure it out—and I’m not sure you can—you won’t have a true witness, but it will only show that he testifies falsely for a reason.

XXVI. 82. What about the ship? I see that you hold the oar in contempt. Perhaps you're looking for something bigger. What could be greater than the sun? Mathematicians claim it is more significant than the earth by more than eighteen parts. How small does it seem to us! To me, it appears almost like a foot. However, Epicurus believes it could even be smaller than it appears, but not by much; he doesn’t think it’s significantly larger than it looks, so that our eyes either have to be deceiving us or only a little. So where is it really? But let's move away from this gullible perspective that never thinks the senses can deceive; who, even now, when that sun is racing with such speed that we can hardly imagine it, still appears to be standing still. 83. But to minimize the controversy, please see how small the dispute is. There are four main points that conclude that there's nothing that can be known, perceived, or comprehended—that’s the whole question at hand. First, there’s the existence of some false vision; second, that it can't be perceived; third, that among those viewed, there is nothing different, so it won’t be possible for some to be perceived while others cannot; fourth, there is no true vision that originates from the senses, which is not accompanied by another vision that is no different and cannot be perceived. All concede the second and third points. Epicurus doesn’t accept the first; you, with whom the matter is, accept that too. The whole argument is about the fourth point. 84. So when P. Servilius Geminus was seen, if Quintus thought he was being seen, he fell into such a vision that couldn’t be perceived, as no distinguishing mark separated the true from the false: without that distinction, how would someone recognize it in C. Cotta, who was consul twice with Geminus, by identifying a mark that couldn’t possibly be false? You deny that such a similarity exists in nature. I absolutely dispute, but with an easy opponent. Let it not be so: it can certainly appear that way. Therefore, the senses can be deceived, and if one type of resemblance deceives, it renders everything uncertain. For if that judgment needed to recognize something is removed, then even if it is the one you saw, who appears to you, you still won’t judge with that mark that you say must exist, so that it cannot be of the same kind as the false. 85. How can P. Geminus seem like Quintus to you then? What solid reason do you have that Cotta cannot appear to you who isn't him, since something seems to exist that isn’t? You say that everything is of a unique kind, and that nothing is the same as something else. It is indeed Stoic and not very believable to say that “there isn’t a hair in all things that is like another hair, nor a grain.” These can be refuted, but I don’t want to argue. As for what’s being discussed, it doesn’t matter whether something perceived is indistinguishable in all its parts or whether it cannot be distinguished, even if it differs. But if human resemblance cannot be that significant, then how about with signs? Tell me, could Lysippus not make a hundred Alexanders of the same bronze, with the same treatment, in the same sky and all else? By what distinguishing mark would you tell them apart? 86. What if I impress a hundred seals in that same wax with this ring, could there be any distinction in recognition? Or will you need to find some jeweler, since you discovered that chicken keeper in Delos who could recognize eggs?

XXVII. But you also use an art that appeals to the senses. A painter sees what we cannot, and simultaneously, when the musician plays, a master recognizes the tune. What? Doesn't this seem to contradict you, if without great artistry, which few can achieve, we are indeed unable to see or hear? Just think how remarkable it is; what skill it would take for nature to create our senses, our minds, and the entire structure of a human being! 87. Why shouldn't I be afraid of the audacity of opinions? Can you even assert, Lucullus, that there is some force, with prudence and planning, that has shaped or, to use your word, that has constructed a human being? What kind of construction is that? Where was it applied? When? Why? How? These issues are handled ingeniously: they are debated quite elegantly. Ultimately, they should truly appear to be considered, rather than just asserted. But soon, we'll discuss the physical matters and indeed for that reason, so you, who just said I would do the same, do not seem to have lied. But let's return to the clearer topics; the whole of reality has been deeply engaged, and volumes have been filled not only by our own but also by Chrysippus:—about whom the Stoics complain, while he diligently sought out everything against the senses and clarity, against all custom and reason, claiming that he himself was inferior, and thus was armed against Carneades.—88. These are the kinds of things that you have examined most thoroughly. You said that the visions of the sleeping, the drunk, and the insane are weaker than those of the awake, sober, and sane. How so? Because, when Ennius was awake, he would not say he "saw Homer," but rather that he "was seen," while Alcmaeo, on the other hand:

Similia de vinolentis. Just like someone wouldn’t deny that a person who has woken up from a drunken state might think that the dreams they had were real, even if they actually weren’t. But that’s not the point: it’s about how they appeared at the time and how they were perceived. Unless we really believe that Ennius didn’t hear all of that.

si modo id somniavit, ut si vigilans audiret. Experrectus enim potuit illa visa putare, ut erant, somnia: dormienti vero aeque ac vigilanti probabantur. Quid? Iliona somno illo:

nonne ita credit filium locutum, ut experrecta etiam crederet? Unde enim illa:

'Age, come here: listen: I need you to repeat the same things to me!' Doesn’t it seem to you that that looks less convincing than when we’re wide awake?

XXVIII. 89. What can I say about the insane? What was your relative like, Catulus, Tuditanus? Does anyone who is perfectly sane think their perception is as reliable as what they see? What about that guy who:

nonne etiam bis exclamavit se videre, cum omnino non videret? Quid? apud Euripidem Hercules, cum, ut Eurysthei filios, ita suos configebat sagittis, cum uxorem interemebat, cum conabatur etiam patrem, non perinde movebatur falsis, ut veris moveretur? Quid? ipse Alcmaeo tuus, qui negat 'cor sibi cum oculis consentire,' nonne ibidem incitato furore:

and then she:

What? when he appeals to the maiden's faith:

Num dubitas quin sibi haec vedere videatur? Itemque cetera:

90. Who would believe these things more, if they were, than they already believed, just because they seem real? It’s clear now that 'the heart agrees with the eyes.' All of this is brought up so that we reach that conclusion, where there’s absolutely no difference to the mind between what is truly seen and what is false. But you don’t achieve anything when you counter those falsehoods with the memories of madmen or dreamers. What matters isn’t what kind of memories those who have woken up or those who have stopped being mad usually have, but what kind of vision the mad or the dreamers had when they were in those states. But I digress from the senses.

91. What can be understood through reason? You say dialectic has been invented as a way to judge and debate truth and falsehood. Whose truth and falsehood? And in what matters? Will a dialectician decide what's true or false in geometry, in literature, or in music? But it doesn’t know those. So in philosophy. How big is the sun in relation to it? What is the ultimate good, and what does it need in order to judge? So what will it judge? What combination or separation is true, what was stated ambiguously, what follows from what, and what contradicts? If it judges these and similar things, it judges itself. But it promised more. For being able to judge these is not enough for the many and significant matters that exist in philosophy. 92. But since you place so much emphasis on this art, be careful that it doesn't turn against you: which at first joyfully teaches the basics of speaking and the understanding of ambiguities and reasoning for conclusions, then, with a few additions, moves on to sorites, a truly slippery and dangerous territory, which you just mentioned as a flawed type of questioning.

XXIX. So what? Is this flaw our fault? The nature of things doesn’t give us any understanding of limits, so we can't decide how far we can go in anything. This applies not only to a heap of wheat, from which the name comes, but in no situation can we definitively say whether something is little or much, great or small, long or short, broad or narrow, whether adding or subtracting makes any difference. —93. But the flaws are disastrous. — So break them if you can, so they don’t bother you. They will be a nuisance unless you’re careful. It’s been warned, he says. So, as Chrysippus suggests, when asked step by step, for example, whether three are few or many, it’s better to pause before getting to “many,” which is what is meant by ησυχάζειν. You can even snore, Carneades says, you don’t have to rest. But what’s the point? Because someone will wake you and ask the same questions. In which number did you fall silent if I add one to that number? Will there be many? Move forward again, as long as it seems right. What more can I say? You admit that you can’t answer whether you’re among the few or among the many. This kind of error flows in such a way that I can’t see where it can’t go. 94. Nothing bothers me, he says: I, as a clever prompter, will hold the horses before I reach the finish line, especially if the place where the horses are going is steep. So I hold back and don’t respond for too long to the tricky questions. If you have something clear and don't respond, you're being arrogant: if you don’t, you won’t understand either. If I give in because it’s obscure. But you deny that you move towards the obscure. Therefore, you insist on well-known matters. If you only intend to be silent, you achieve nothing. What does it matter to the one who wants to trap you, whether he ensnares you when you’re silent or speaking? However, if up to nine, for example, you without doubt answer that there are few, you insist in the tenth: you even hold back acceptance from certain and clearer things. You don’t allow me to do the same with obscure matters. Thus, this skill doesn’t help you against errors, which teach neither what is first nor last, whether increasing or decreasing. 95. What about the fact that this very skill, like Penelope unweaving her web, ultimately pulls back to what’s above? Is this your fault or ours? The foundation of dialectics is whatever is stated—this is called axiom, which means something uttered—either true or false. So what? Are these true or false? If you claim to be lying and say it’s true, are you lying or stating the truth? Clearly, you say these things are inexplicable. That is more loathsome than what we call incomprehensible and not perceived.

XXX. But I will skip this. I ask this: if those things cannot be explained, and if no judgment can be found regarding them, so that you can determine whether they are true or false, where is that definition: 'a statement is that which is either true or false'? Given the matters at hand, I will add that some of these should be followed, while others should be rejected, which belong to the opposite kind. 96. How then do you judge this conclusion to be valid? 'If you say it is shining now and you speak the truth, it shines; but you say it is shining now and you speak the truth: therefore it shines.' You certainly affirm the kind and say that the conclusion is correct. Therefore, in teaching, you first present this method of concluding. So whatever concludes in the same way, you will affirm or else that art is nonexistent. So consider whether you can prove this conclusion: 'If you say you are lying and you speak the truth, you are lying; but if you say you are lying and you speak the truth, therefore you are lying.' How can you not prove this if you have already proven the prior conclusion of the same type? These are the arguments of Chrysippus, which even he could not refute. For what would challenge this conclusion? 'If it shines, it shines; but it shines: therefore it shines.' It would certainly give way. For the very nature of connection, when you concede the former, compels you to concede the latter. So what then differentiates this conclusion from that one? 'If you are lying, you are lying; but you are lying: therefore you are lying.' You deny that you can neither affirm nor deny this. 97. Who then is more so? If the art, if the reasoning, if the approach, if the force of conclusion is valid, the same applies in both cases. But this is their final demand: they request that these inexplicable matters be exempted. I think they should talk to some tribune: they will never get such an exemption from me. Indeed, since they do not gain from Epicurus, who both despises and mocks the entire dialectic, the concession that it is true what we will state, 'either Hermarchus will live tomorrow or he will not live,' while the dialecticians assert that anything in such a disjunction, as 'either this or that,' is not only true but also necessary: see how clever he is, whom they think is slow. For if he says, if I concede either to be necessary, it will be necessary that Hermarchus either lives or does not live tomorrow; however, such necessity does not exist in the nature of things. Thus, the dialecticians contest this, namely, Antiochus and the Stoics: for it completely overturns the entire dialectic. For if from contradictories the disjunction—by contradictories, I mean when one asserts and the other denies, if such a disjunction can be false, none can be true. 98. But what do those involved in the disputes have against me, as I follow their discipline? When something of this sort arises, this is how Carneades used to joke: 'If you conclude correctly, I hold; if incorrectly, Diogenes will pay a fine.' For he had learned dialectic from that Stoic: however, this was the price of the dialecticians. So I follow those paths, which I learned from Antiochus, and I do not find a way to judge 'if it shines, it shines,' to be true for the reason that I learned it, everything that is connected in itself is true, nor do I judge 'if you are lying, you are lying,' to be connected in the same way. So either this and that or, unless this, I will not even judge that.

XXXI. But let's set aside all those sharp points and the whole twisted way of arguing, and show who we are; now that Carneades' entire viewpoint has been explained, Antiochea will fall apart entirely. I won’t say anything that someone might suspect is made up: I’ll take from Clitomachus, who was with Carneades until old age, a sharp-minded man, as clever as a Phoenician, and very eager and diligent. He has written four books on sustaining beliefs. What I’m about to say is taken from the first book. 99. Carneades distinguishes two types of perceptions. In one category, he says: 'some perceptions can be grasped, while others cannot.' In the second category: 'some perceptions are probable; others are not.' Therefore, what is said against the senses and against clarity belongs to the first category, while there’s nothing to say against the second: thus, it seems correct that no such perception exists that could lead to understanding, but there can be many probabilities. Indeed, it would be against nature if nothing were probable. And everything in life follows the path that you, Lucullus, mentioned, leads to ruin. Thus, there are many things that must be proven by the senses, provided that nothing is found in them that is any way similar to falsehood. So, anything that appears probable, if nothing presents itself that contradicts that probability, will be utilized by the wise, and thus all reasoning in life will be governed. For indeed, he who is deemed wise by you also follows many probabilities, which are neither understood, nor grasped, nor accepted, but resemble the truth: unless he proves this, his whole life would be meaningless. 100. What about this? When a wise person boards a ship, do they consider what they have in mind or what they understand will send them on their way? Who can? But if they set out from this point towards Puteoli thirty stadia away, with a good ship, a good captain, and in this calm weather, it seems probable they will arrive there safely. In this way, they will make decisions about acting or not acting based on such perceptions, and it will be easier for him to prove that snow is white than it was for Anaxagoras, who not only denied it was so, but since he knew there was black water where it formed, even thought it could not be white. 101. And whatever thing touches him so that it seems probable without being impeded by anything, will move him. For he is not carved from stone or hewn from wood; he has a body, has a mind, moves with thought, moves with the senses, so many truths seem to him, yet he does not possess that particular and distinct mark of understanding: hence the wise man does not assent, because something similar could exist as false, just as this is true. Nor do we say anything contrary to the senses different from the Stoics, who say that many things are false and that they are very different from how they seem to the senses.

XXXII. However, if this is the case, and only one aspect seems false to the senses, there is someone who denies that anything can be perceived by the senses. Thus, when we remain silent, one principle of Epicurus is negated by your understanding and comprehension. What is Epicurus's principle? "If any sense perception is false, nothing can be perceived." And what is yours? "Sense perceptions are false." What follows? If I remain silent, the conclusion speaks for itself: "Nothing can be perceived." I do not agree with Epicurus. Therefore, it is certain that with someone who is entirely different from you: do not align with me, as I certainly agree with you that there is something false in the senses. 102. Yet, nothing seems as surprising to me as this claim, especially from Antiochus, to whom what I mentioned a bit earlier was very well known. While anyone can criticize this at their own discretion, claiming we deny that anything can be perceived is certainly a lighter criticism: however, what we say is that there are certain probabilities, which does not seem to be enough for you. Let it not be: we must certainly avoid those points that you have emphasized the most: "So you see nothing? You hear nothing? Nothing is clear to you?" I explained a while ago, based on Clitomachus, how Carneades would express these ideas. Consider how Clitomachus presents the same arguments in that book he wrote to Gaius Lucilius the poet, when he also wrote about these matters to Lucius Censorinus, who was consul with Marcus Manilius. He wrote almost with these words— I know them well, because the first principles and kind of discipline about those very matters we are discussing are contained in that book— but it is written like this: 103. "The Academics find it agreeable that there are such differences between things, that some seem probable and others the opposite: however, this is not sufficient to say that some can be perceived while others cannot, because many false things are probable, but nothing false can be perceived or known." Thus, he says that those are gravely mistaken who claim that the senses are taken away by the Academy, as no one has ever stated that there is no color, no flavor, or no sound, but that it has been argued about whether these have a proper label of truth and certainty that exists nowhere else. 104. When he has laid this out, he adds that the wise person must endure assent in two ways: one is when it is understood that they do not assent to anything at all; the other is when they refrain from responding, to either approve or disapprove of something, so they neither deny nor affirm anything. Since this is the case, one is agreeable, that they never assent; the other holds that they can follow probability, wherever it may arise or fail, or be able to respond with "yes" or "no." †Not that, in seeking your approval, someone who refrains from conceding on all matters may still be influenced and take action by those perceptions that urge us to act: likewise, those things to which we can respond in either direction, only following what seems right, though without assent: and yet, not all of these perceptions should be approved, but only those that are not hindered by anything. 105. If we do not endorse these points, they may be false, but they are certainly not malicious. For we do not take away light, but we merely say that those things that you can perceive and comprehend, we, if they are probable, claim to see in the same way.

XXXIII. So now, having established a reasonable argument, and having made it clear and straightforward, unhindered by anything, you can see, Lucullus, that your defense of clarity is at stake. For this wise person I'm talking about will perceive everything with the same eyes that you use to observe the sky, earth, and sea. That sea, which now appears purple with the rising west wind, will look the same to our friend here, yet it won’t agree because to us it seemed blue just a moment ago, and at dawn it looked reddish, and now, where the sun shines on it, it turns white and sparkles, appearing different from nearby and continuous surfaces. Even if you can explain why this happens, you still can’t defend as true what seems to your eyes. 106. So, how can we remember if we don’t perceive anything? That’s what you were asking. What? Can we remember something unless we have grasped it? What? Polyaenus, who is said to have been a great mathematician, after agreeing with Epicurus, believed all of geometry to be false—did he forget everything he knew? But that which is false cannot be perceived, as you like to think. Therefore, if memory is of things that are perceived and grasped, then everything one remembers is indeed grasped and perceived. However, nothing false can be grasped, and Siron remembers all of Epicurus' doctrines. Thus, all of this is true now. I can say this through me: but you must either concede that this is the case, which you very much don’t want, or you have to allow me my memory and admit there's a place for it, even if there’s no grasping or perception. 107. What will happen to the arts? To which ones? Those that admit they rely more on conjecture than on knowledge, or those that only follow what appears and don’t have that art of yours that distinguishes true from false?

But there are two main points that contain this argument. First, it’s denied that anyone can agree with nothing. This is quite clear. When Panaetius, whom I consider almost the leader of the Stoics, says he doubts this matter, while all other Stoics except for him firmly believe that the responses of the diviners, the omens, prophecies, dreams, and predictions are true, and he holds back from agreeing: if he can do this regarding those things which those from whom he learned considered certain, why couldn’t a wise person do the same about other matters? Is there anything that can either be disapproved or approved without the possibility of doubt? Or can you do this in a specific instance when you want to: and that person won’t be able to stand firm in other matters, especially when he can follow the very appearance of truth without being hindered by agreement? 108. The second point is that it’s denied that the action of anything can exist in someone who does not approve it with his agreement. First, it should be seen where agreement is even present. For the Stoics claim that the senses are the agreements themselves, which are followed by desire, leading to action: everything would be removed if perceptions were removed.

XXXIV. A lot has been said and written about this topic, but the matter can be summed up simply. I believe that even though the main action seems to contradict what we see, resist opinions, and endure wobbly agreements, I agree with Clitomachus's writing, that Hercules faced a certain labor that was exhausted by Carneades, which, like handling a monstrous beast, would remove from our minds that agreement, that is, our opinions and recklessness. However, to leave that part of the defense aside, what would prevent the action of someone who follows what is plausible, with no real obstacle? 109. This, he says, will be impeded by the fact that it determines that not even what it accepts can be comprehended. Now, this will also hold you back in sailing, in farming, in marrying, in having many children, and in numerous other matters where nothing follows except what is plausible.

Et yet you mention that common and often rejected point, not like Antipater, but, as you say, 'more precisely.' For Antipater was criticized because he claimed that it was consistent for someone to state that nothing could be comprehended, while at the same time, admitting that he could at least say that this very thing could be comprehended, which seemed to him and contradicted himself. It cannot properly be said that nothing can be comprehended if anything is claimed to be comprehensible. In this way, he thinks Carneades should have been pressed: since a wise person can have no decree unless it is comprehended, perceived, or understood, accepting that this very decree, which would belong to the wise, that nothing can be perceived, admits that it is perceived. Therefore, it is as if no wise person has any other decree or can live without decrees! 110. But just as it contains probabilities not perceived, so does the very claim that nothing can be perceived. For if it had the mark of knowledge in this, it would use it in others. Since it does not have that, it resorts to probabilities. Thus, it does not fear appearing to confuse everything and make things uncertain. For example, if someone were to ask whether the number of stars is even or odd, or if he claims to not know about his duties and many other things he has practiced and trained in. In uncertainties, nothing is probable; where there is knowledge, the wise will not lack in knowing what to do or what to respond. 111. You have also not overlooked, Lucullus, the criticism of Antiochus—nor is it surprising: for it is especially notable—where he used to say that Philo was extremely disturbed. For when he was questioned, he would state that there are certain false appearances, and another that they do not differ at all from the true ones, not attending to the fact that previously it was conceded by him that there is a certain difference in living things; by denying that appearances differ from truths, nothing could be more opposed. It would be so if we completely rejected the true. But we do not. For we perceive both the true and the false. But it is a matter of proving: we have no sign of perceiving.

XXXV. 112. I feel like I'm still being too simplistic. There’s a vast field where discourse can flourish, so why are we confining it to such narrow paths and into the thorns of Stoicism? If I were to discuss this with a Peripatetic who claimed that something could only be grasped if it was 'impressed from the truth,' and who didn’t bring up that significant addition, 'how could it be impressed from what is false?'—if I were speaking plainly with an ordinary person without trying too hard, and even if they argued that a wise person sometimes holds onto opinions, I wouldn't object, especially not to Carneades, who strongly disagrees here. Now, what can I do? 113. I ask what can be understood. None of the greats—Aristotle, Theophrastus, not even Xenocrates or Polemo—respond to me, but someone lesser says, 'A truth cannot be such that a falsehood cannot be.' I find nothing of that sort. Therefore, I will adhere to the unknown, that is, I will assume. This is what both the Peripatetics and the old Academy allow me; you deny it, especially Antiochus, who greatly disturbs me, either because I loved the man, as he did me, or because I think he is the most refined and perceptive of all philosophers in our memory. From him, I first ask how he claims to belong to that Academy. To skip other points, did anyone from the old Academy or the Peripatetics ever claim that it was only possible to grasp what was true and couldn’t be a falsehood, or that a wise person has no opinions? Certainly not. Neither of these was strongly defended before Zeno. Yet I believe both are true, and I do not say this due to the time constraints, but rather I wholeheartedly prove it.

XXXVI. 114. I can't handle that. You say that it's shameful and extremely reckless for you to agree with me incognito, and yet you assume so much authority to explain the discipline of wisdom, unravel the nature of everything, shape moral character, establish the ends of good and evil, describe duties, define the life I should lead, and also say that you will teach both the judgment of discussion and understanding, while I gather all these countless ideas without stumbling, believing nothing? What discipline could this possibly be, to which you would lead me if you took me away from this? I fear you might arrogantly assume if you say it's yours. But you have to say it that way. 115. And it's not just you; everyone will rush to their own. Alright, I’ll hold back from the Peripatetics, who claim to have a connection with orators, asserting that they’ve often guided the Republic with their famous men, and I’ll stand firm against the Epicureans, my good friends who genuinely care for each other. What's to be done with Diodotus the Stoic, who I've listened to since childhood? He’s lived with me for so many years? He stays at my place? I admire him and cherish him? He looks down on these ideas from Antioch? You will say that our views alone are true. Certainly they are the only truths, if true; for more than one truth cannot exist in contradiction. So, are we the shameless ones who refuse to stumble, or are they the arrogant ones who believe they alone know everything? Not me, he says, but I say that the wise person knows. Very well: they only know what is in your discipline. What kind of thing is it that wisdom is explained by someone who isn’t wise? But let’s move away from ourselves and talk about the wise person, and as I’ve often said, this entire question revolves around them.

116. Wisdom is divided into three parts, both by most people and by yourselves. First, if you like, let's examine what has been questioned about the nature of things: but first, is there anyone so full of false beliefs that they think they truly know these things? I'm not looking for reasons based on guesswork, which are dragged around through discussions without any need for persuasion. Let the geometer take care, those who claim they don't persuade but compel, and who prove everything they describe to you. I'm not interested in those foundational principles of mathematics without which they cannot advance a single step. A point is something that has no magnitude: it's an extreme and like a balance where there’s no thickness at all: a line without any breadth. If I concede that these things are true, do you think that if I insist on an oath from the wise person, they would swear before Archimedes has described the reasoning by which it is shown that the sun is greater than the earth in many ways? If they do, they would disregard the sun, which they consider to be a god. 117. But if they won't believe geometric reasoning, which is powerful in teaching, how can you expect them to trust the arguments of philosophers? And if they are to trust someone, whose reasoning should they trust most? For although everything about physics can be explained, that's a long discussion: I still ask whom they should follow. Imagine someone becoming wise now, who isn’t yet, which viewpoint or discipline would they choose? Even if they choose any, they would choose poorly. But if they have divine reasoning, which one would they most approve among physicists? They can't approve more than one. I'm not pursuing endless questions: let's just see which foundational principles they would support, as there is a significant disagreement among great minds.

XXXVII. 118. Princeps Thales, one of the seven, who is said to have given precedence to the other six, stated that everything comes from water. However, he did not convince his peer and friend Anaximander, who argued that the origin of nature is the infinite, from which all things emerge. Following him, Anaximenes defined the infinite as air, from which the earth, water, and fire arise, and then everything else comes from these. Anaxagoras described an infinite matter but said it consists of particles that are similar to each other, initially in a chaotic state and later organized by a divine mind. Xenophanes, who was even older, claimed that everything is one, unchangeable, and that this is the divine, neither born nor ever ceasing to exist, with a globular shape. Parmenides spoke of fire as something that moves the earth formed from it; Leucippus proposed the concepts of the full and the void; Democritus was similar in this but more expansive in others. Empedocles spread and made known the four elements; Heraclitus focused on fire; Melissus claimed that what is infinite and unchangeable has always existed and will always be. Plato believed that everything in the world comes from a divine creator who uses matter to create. The Pythagoreans asserted that all things originate from numbers and the principles of mathematics. Out of these, your wise person will likely choose one to follow, while the others, all these great men, will be rejected and condemned by him. 119. Whatever opinion he approves, he will hold it in mind as something that senses cannot provide more confirmation of now than, because he is a Stoic, this world being wise, having a mind that has constructed both itself and everything else, guiding, moving, and governing all things. He will also be convinced that the sun, moon, and stars, as well as the earth and sea, are divine beings since a certain intelligence of living beings permeates and passes through all of them, though it will eventually come to pass that this entire world might be consumed by fire.

XXXVIII. Are these things true? You see, I now admit something is true, but I deny that it can be fully understood or perceived. When your Stoic philosopher analyzes this for you, a torrent of elegant speech will come forth from Aristotle, who will say he’s foolish. For there has never been a world created without a fresh plan for such an extraordinary undertaking, and it is so perfectly arranged that no force can bring about such movements and changes, and no seniority of ages can lead to its decay or destruction. You will have to reject this, yet defend your reputation and standing, leaving me without a doubt. 120. To set aside the folly of those who blindly agree, how can I not value freedom as much as you do? Why did God, when creating everything for our sake—as you believe—produce such a powerful force of snakes and vipers? Why scatter so many deadly and harmful creatures across land and sea? You deny that these can be achieved so skillfully and delicately without some divine cleverness. Indeed, you reduce the majesty of God to the level of ants and bees, as if some minor deity among the gods might be a creator of trivial things. 121. You deny anything can happen without God. Here’s Strato from Lampsacus, who gives that God the immunity of a great gift: but if the priests of the gods have exemptions, how much more fitting is it to have the gods themselves! He denies that the work of the gods is used to create the world. Whatever it may be, he shows that everything is the result of nature, and that those who claim these things, being formed with coarse, light, and hooked bodies, do so while interjecting nothingness. He considers these to be dreams of Democritus, not of one teaching, but wishing. However, he, pursuing each part of the universe, teaches that whatever exists or happens is natural, produced or happening due to certain weights and motions. Not only does he free the gods from a grand task, but me from fear. For who can think they are cared for by a god without trembling day and night at the divine presence, and if anything adverse occurs—which could happen to anyone—fearing that it might have come about justly? Yet I do not agree with Strato, nor with you at all. Sometimes this seems more likely, sometimes that.

XXXIX. 122. All of this, Lucullus, is hidden and shrouded in darkness, so that no level of human intellect is great enough to penetrate the heavens or reach the earth: we do not know our bodies; we are ignorant of the location of their parts or the function of each part. Therefore, the physicians themselves, who were interested in knowing this, revealed it, so it seems. Yet, empirics claim those revelations may not be any clearer, as it could happen that such findings and understandings change. But can we pursue, reveal, and dissect the nature of things in the same way, so we can see if the earth is firmly rooted, clinging to its foundations, or if it hangs suspended in the middle? 123. Xenophanes claims that the moon is inhabited and is a land of many cities and mountains. It seems fantastical, but neither he who said it could swear it to be true, nor I would go along with it. You also say that there are people standing opposite us on the other side of the earth, who walk in the opposite direction to us, whom you call αντιποδας: why do you get angrier at me, who does not dismiss this, more than at those who, when they hear this, think you’re being foolish? Hicetas of Syracuse, as Theophrastus says, believes that the sky, the sun, the moon, and the stars, in short, everything above, remains still and that nothing else in the world moves except the earth: which, when it spins around its axis with the greatest speed, produces the same results as if the sky moved while the earth remained still. Some think Plato says this in the Timaeus, though it's a bit less clear. What about you, Epicurus? Speak up. Do you think the sun is very small? Me? Not even close! And you ridicule him and yourself elude him in turn. So, free from such ridicule is Socrates, and free is Aristo of Chios, who believes that nothing of this can be known. 124. But I return to the mind and body. Are we finally familiar with the nature of the nerves, the nature of the veins? Do we understand what the mind is and where it is? Ultimately, is there a mind at all, as Dicaearchus believed, or perhaps there isn’t one? If there is, does it have three parts, as Plato thought: reason, anger, and desire, or is it simple and singular? If it is simple, is it fire, or spirit, or blood, or, as Xenocrates argued, a number without any body—which is hard to comprehend—and whatever it is, is it mortal or eternal? For many arguments exist on both sides of this question. Something of this seems certain to your wise man, while our inquiries find hardly anything even probable: thus, in most conflicting arguments, there are equal weights of consideration.

XL. 125. You act more modestly and accuse me, not because I disagree with your reasoning, but because I have to choose whom I will agree with... who, particularly? Who? Democritus: for I have always been, as you know, interested in nobility. I am now being pressured by all your shouting. Do you really think there’s anything meaningless, when everything is so full and compact that whatever is set in motion gives way and something else immediately follows? Or are there any atoms, from which everything is formed, entirely different from one another? Or can anything remarkable be created without some kind of mind? And when the decorations of this one world are so amazing, countless above, below, to the right and to the left, and that there are worlds different from some and similar to others? And just as we now see ourselves in Bauli and Puteoli, are there countless others in the same places with the same names, honors, accomplishments, talents, appearances, and ages, discussing the same topics? And if we now seem to see or even witness something in our minds while we sleep, do images come crashing into our minds from outside through our bodies? You really shouldn’t even think about that or be swayed by fictional matters. There’s nothing better than recognizing such twisted perceptions. 126. So this isn’t about me approving anything with my agreement; what you demand, make sure you don't ask for it shamelessly, especially since your arguments don’t even seem plausible to me. I don’t think any of the divination you support has merit, and I dismiss that fate by which you say everything is contained. I don’t even believe this world was built according to divine design, and I’m not sure if that’s the case.

XLI. But why am I drawn into envy? Is it possible for you not to know what I don’t know? Can the Stoics themselves debate among each other when they are not allowed to discuss with these others? To Zeno and the other Stoics, the ether seems to be the highest god, endowed with a mind that governs everything. Cleanthes, who is somewhat the elder Stoic of the nations, a student of Zeno, believes that the sun rules and dominates things. Thus, we are forced to ignore our lord due to the disagreement among the wise, since we don’t know whether we serve the sun or the ether. As for the sun's size—he, glowing, seems to look at me and reminds me to frequently mention him—you all measure this magnitude as if it were ten feet: I deny, like a bad architect, to trust your measurements. Therefore, it is uncertain which of us is, to put it lightly, more modest? 127. Yet I don’t think those questions of the physicists should be dismissed. For the natural consideration and contemplation of nature serve as a kind of nourishment for the minds and spirits. We are uplifted, we seem to become more elevated, we disdain human matters, and while thinking about the higher and celestial things, we dismiss our own as small and insignificant. The inquiry into both the greatest and even the most hidden things has its own pleasure. If something arises that seems believable, the mind is filled with the most human pleasure. 128. Therefore, your wise man and our man will seek this, but yours will believe, agree, affirm, while ours will hesitate to make bold claims and think it is acting excellently if it finds something that seems true in such matters. Let’s now come to the concepts of good and evil: but it must be said a bit earlier. It doesn’t seem to me that they consider, as they affirm these physical matters strongly, that they also lose the authority of those things that seem more illustrious. For they neither agree nor approve that the crow is now shining, just as it neither commands nor forbids anything when it croaks, nor will they affirm that that sign is six feet long if they are measured, more than they can say the sun is more than eighteen times larger than the earth. From this arises the conclusion: if the size of the sun cannot be perceived, one who approves it, just as he approves other things in the same way he does the sun's size, does not perceive those things. However, the size of the sun cannot be perceived. Therefore, whoever approves this, as if he perceives it, perceives nothing. They might respond that it is possible to perceive how large the sun is. I won’t argue, as long as they say the other things can be comprehended in the same way. For they cannot say that something is more or less comprehensible than another, since there is one definition for comprehending all things.

XLII. 129. But to continue what I was saying: What do we have in examining good and bad things? We certainly need to set goals to which both the total of good and bad can be related: so why is there so much disagreement among prominent thinkers on this matter? I will skip over those opinions that seem to have been left behind, like that of Herillus, who considers knowledge and understanding as the highest good: given that he was a student of Zeno, you can see how much he disagrees with him and how he doesn’t diverge much from Plato. The Megarian school had a notable doctrine, of which the chief was Xenophanes, whom I just mentioned, followed by Parmenides and Zeno; from these thinkers, they were called Eleatic philosophers. After Euclid, a student of Socrates, the Megareans, named after him, claimed that the only good is that which is one, similar, and always the same. He, too, borrowed many ideas from Plato. Menedemus, who was from Eretria, led to the Eretrians, who placed all good within the mind and the sharpness of the intellect, through which the truth could be perceived, similar to Herillus, but, I believe, in a more detailed and eloquent way. 130. If we disregard these and consider them already outdated, we should certainly hold those in lesser regard, like Ariston, who, having been a student of Zeno, confirmed through reasoning what he articulated verbally: that nothing is good except virtue, and nothing is bad except what goes against virtue; he believed that there are none of the important moments Zeno proposed in the middle ground. For him, the highest good is to remain unmoved by these matters, which he calls indifference. Pyrrho, however, thought that a wise person should not even feel what is called apathy. Thus, to omit all these differing opinions, let’s now consider those that have been defended for a long time. 131. Others have thought that pleasure is the ultimate goal: the leader among them is Aristippus, who had listened to Socrates, hence the Cyrenaics. Following him came Epicurus, whose ideas are now more well-known, yet he does not completely agree with the Cyrenaics regarding pleasure itself. Callipho believed that both pleasure and honor are the ultimate goals; Hieronymus said to be free from all annoyance; Diodorus proposed the same idea along with honor: both were Peripatetics. Living honorably means enjoying those things that nature first aligns with humans, and the old Academy accepted this, as indicated by the writings of Polemon, whom Antiochus greatly approved, and Aristotle and his friends now seem to closely align with. Carneades also introduced this idea, not to support it, but to challenge the Stoics, that the highest good is found in enjoying the things that nature has first aligned with. Zeno, who was the founder and leader of the Stoics, stated that living honorably, as determined by nature's alignment, is the ultimate goal of good.

XLIII. 132. It's clear that the borders of the good I’ve described have opposing boundaries of the bad. Now I turn to you about whom I should follow: just don’t respond with something completely naive and absurd like, 'Anyone, as long as it's someone.' Nothing could be more thoughtless than that. I want to follow the Stoics. Is it allowed—setting aside Aristotle, who in my opinion is nearly unique in philosophy—to follow Antiochus himself? He was called Academic, and if he had changed just a few things, he would have been a true Stoic. So, we’re at a critical point. For either we establish the Stoic as wise or the old Academy. Both cannot be true. The contention is over not terms, but the entire premise. For all ways of life are contained in the definition of the highest good, and those who disagree about this have differing views on the entire way of living. Therefore, both cannot be wise, since they disagree profoundly; only one can be. If Polemon is wrong as a Stoic, agreeing to something false—since you assert nothing is so far removed from the wise: if Zeno's views are true, the same should apply to the old Academics and the Peripatetics. So, then, will neither be agreed upon? So, I ask, who is the wiser one? 133. What? When Antiochus himself disagrees with some of the things he loves about the Stoics, doesn’t that show that those cannot be approved by the wise? The Stoics believe all faults are equal. But this greatly displeases Antiochus. So, can I finally consider which opinion I should follow? He says, cut it off: decide on whatever you want at some point. What’s more, the things being said seem sharp to me on both sides and equal, shouldn’t I be careful not to commit a crime? For you said, Lucullus, it would be a crime to betray a doctrine. So I hold back so as not to agree unknowingly: this doctrine I share with you. 134. There is indeed a much larger disagreement. Zeno thinks that a happy life is based on a single virtue. What about Antiochus? He says it’s a happy life, but not the happiest. That god, who thought nothing was lacking in virtue, this man believes many things aside from virtue are partly dear and partly necessary for a person. But I fear he might attribute too much to virtue beyond what nature allows, especially with Theophrastus speaking so clearly and abundantly. And I worry that he barely holds to his own views when he says there are certain evils of the body and fortune, yet still considers one who possesses all these to be happy if he is wise. I am torn: sometimes this seems more probable to me, at other times the other, and yet unless one or the other is true, I think virtue falls short completely. They truly disagree on these matters.

XLIV. 135. What about those things they agree on? Can we truly consider them valid? A wise person’s mind should never be swayed by desire or lifted up by joy. Come on, these might be reasonable: do they never fear, never grieve? Doesn’t a wise person fear if their homeland is destroyed? Don’t they grieve if it is destroyed? Harsh, but necessary for Zeno, for whom nothing besides honor is good; but for you, Antiochus, certainly not, since, apart from honor, many things seem good and many bad things—involving ugliness—seem to be feared by the wise. It’s necessary that they fear what is to come and grieve for what has happened. But I wonder when these ideas were established by the old Academy, claiming that a wise person’s mind cannot be disturbed or troubled? They approved of mediocrity and wanted to see a certain moderation in all emotional upheaval. We all read the old academic Crantor on mourning. It isn’t long, but rather golden and, as Panaetius instructs Tubero, needs to be memorized word for word. They even said that those emotional disturbances were given to our souls by nature: fear for the sake of caution, compassion for sadness, and anger as a spur to courage; whether we’ve seen it rightly or otherwise. 136. I don’t know how your intensity burst into the old Academy: however, I can’t stand it, not because I dislike it. Many Socratic ideas are truly amazing Stoic ones, known as paradoxa, but where did Xenocrates or Aristotle touch upon these? You seem to want them to be the same. Did they ever say that only wise people are kings, only wise people are rich, only wise people are beautiful? That everything everywhere belongs to the wise? No consul, praetor, general, not even a quinquennial official, unless he is wise? Ultimately, only a citizen, only a free person? All fools, foreigners, exiles, slaves, and madmen? In the end, are the writings of Lycurgus, Solon, our Twelve Tables not laws? Not even those of the city or state, unless they belong to the wise? 137. You, Lucullus, if you're in agreement with Antiochus, your friend, must defend these points as you would the city walls: for me, in a good way, only as it seems fitting.

XLV. I was at a meeting with Clitomachus, while Carneades and the Stoic Diogenes stood before the Senate in the Capitol, when A. Albinus, who was serving as praetor with P. Scipio and M. Marcellus in office, said to Carneades, jokingly: "I don’t think I’m fit to be a praetor because I’m not wise; neither is this city nor the citizenry within it." Then Carneades replied: "You don’t seem like a Stoic." Aristotle or Xenocrates, whom Antiochus wanted to follow, wouldn’t have doubted that he was both a praetor and that Rome was a city with its people. But as I said earlier, our Stoic is quite different, speaking very little. 138. You, however, worry that I might be led astray by an opinion and adopt something unknown that you definitely don’t want. What advice do you have? Chrysippus often stated that there are only three opinions regarding the ends of good things: he cuts down and eliminates the multitude. For there is either honor as the end, or pleasure, or both: those who say the highest good is freedom from all distress tend to avoid the envious label of pleasure but linger near it, the same being true for those who combined it with honor, and not much differently for those who add the primary benefits of nature to honor: thus, he leaves three opinions which he believes can be probably defended. 139. So let it be—though I find it hard to separate from the boundaries set by Polemo, the Peripatetics, and Antiochus, and so far I have nothing more plausible—yet I see how sweetly pleasure enchants our senses. I struggle to agree with Epicurus or Aristippus. Virtue pulls us back or rather scolds us with a hand: it says that those movements are like beasts, linking man to the divine. I can be in the middle, since, as Aristippus argues, we possess no mind, only looking after the body; while Zeno, as if we are devoid of the body, embraces only the mind, so I might follow Calliphon, whose opinion Carneades defended so fervently that he almost seemed to endorse it. Although Clitomachus maintained he could never understand what Carneades was supporting. But if I want to pursue that goal, shouldn’t truth itself as well as serious and sound reasoning come to mind? You, when honor rests on despising pleasure, would join honor and pleasure like a man to a beast?

XLVI. 140. So the main thing to argue about is the balance between pleasure and integrity. From what I understand, Chrysippus didn't have a strong disagreement about this. If you focus only on one, everything falls apart, especially the community of humanity, love, friendship, justice, and other virtues, none of which can exist without being genuine. For anything that is prompted by pleasure as if it were some kind of reward isn't virtue but a deceptive imitation of it. Listen to those who say they don’t even recognize the term integrity unless it’s something glorious that we want to call honest: they believe that the source of all good comes from within, and that this principle, this guideline, this prescription is part of nature, and anyone who strays from it will never find anything worthwhile in life. 141. So, you really think that I’m not affected when I hear these things and countless others? I’m just as moved as you are, Lucullus, and I don’t think any less of myself than you do. The difference is that when you are moved, you settle down, you agree, you want what’s true, clear, grasped, understood, solid, fixed, and unshakeable: as for me, I don’t believe there’s anything of that sort that, if I agree with it, I won’t often mistakenly accept, since there’s no clear distinction between the true and the false, especially when those judgments lack real analysis.

142. Now I come to the third part of philosophy. Protagoras has one view, believing that what seems true to someone is true for them; the Cyrenaics have another, claiming that aside from deep emotions, there’s nothing else involved in judgment; and then there’s Epicurus, who bases all judgment on the senses, knowledge of things, and pleasure. However, Plato asserted that all judgment of truth, and truth itself, should be derived from thought rather than opinions or sensory experiences. 143. Does our friend Antiochus support any of these views? Not even his ancestors. Where does he follow Xenocrates, whose numerous and highly regarded writings on the art of speaking exist, or Aristotle himself, whose insights are undoubtedly sharper and more refined? He doesn't take a step from Chrysippus.

XLVII. So, what are we Academics called? Are we abusing the glory of the name? Or why are we forced to follow those who disagree with each other? In the very element that dialecticians teach, about how to judge whether something is true or false, if something is connected like this, 'if it is daytime, it is light,' how much contention is there! Diodorus has one opinion, Philo another, and Chrysippus sees it differently. What about the fact that Cleantes disagrees with his teacher Chrysippus on so many matters! And what about the two leading dialecticians, Antipater and Archidemus, who are both quite opinionated—don’t they disagree on many things? 144. So why, Lucullus, do you call me into an envious situation and as if into a public assembly? Indeed, just like the seditious tribunes, you order to close the shops? What does that imply when you complain that we are doing away with the arts, except to stir up the craftsmen? If all the workers gather, they will easily be incited against you. I will first express the envy in saying that you declare everyone in the assembly to be exiles, slaves, or insane: then I will address those issues that no longer concern the crowd, but you yourselves who are present. For Zeno denies that you know anything. How so? you might ask: for we defend that even the ignorant grasp many things. 145. But you deny that anyone knows anything except the wise. And Zeno demonstrated this through gesture. For, when he had extended his fingers with an open hand, he said, 'This is perception.' Then, when he had slightly contracted his fingers, he said, 'This is assent.' Finally, when he had completely closed his fist, he claimed this was comprehension: by this analogy, he even assigned a name to this idea, which hadn’t existed before, καταληψιν. When he turned to his left hand and compressed that fist strongly, he stated that such knowledge is possessed only by those who are wise. But even those who are wise, or have been, do not usually say who they are. So now you, Catulus, do not know how to shine, nor do you, Hortensius, realize that we are in your villa. 146. Are these statements not said with less envy? Yet they’re not too elegant: those are more subtle. But how could you say that if nothing could be grasped, arts would collapse without giving me what could be reasonably held that has enough power over the craft? Just like Zeuxis, Phidias, or Polyclitus could not tolerate knowing nothing when they had such skill in those things? If someone had taught them how much power knowledge holds, they would stop being angry; they wouldn’t even resent us when they learned that we were doing away with what didn’t exist, while leaving enough behind for themselves. This reasoning is even supported by the diligence of our ancestors, who first wanted everyone to swear 'from the judgment of their own minds,' and then to be held: 'if a knowledgeable person were to mislead,' recognizing that ignorance lurked in many aspects of life, so that whoever gave testimony would say they 'believed' even what they themselves had seen, and that what the sworn judges had recognized would be declared not as facts but as things that 'seemed' to be.

XLVIII. 147. But since it's not just the sailor who indicates this, but also the gentle breeze whispers to us, Lucullus, that it’s time to sail, and since I've said quite enough, I need to make my final point. However, from now on, when we seek these things, let’s discuss the significant disagreements among great minds, the mystery of nature, and the errors of so many philosophers, who differ so greatly on matters of good and bad that, since only one truth can exist, it’s necessary to set aside so many noble disciplines like those concerning the deceptions of sight and other senses, as well as the fallacies they have woven against themselves, the Stoics. 148. Then Lucullus said: I don’t take offense at our discussion. As we meet more often, especially in our Tusculans, we will revisit whatever seems relevant. Excellent, I replied, but what does Catulus think? What about Hortensius? Then Catulus said: Me? I fall back on my father's opinion, which he used to say was Carneadean, that nothing can be truly perceived, and that if something isn’t perceived, the wise person will merely speculate but will understand that they are only speculating and know that nothing can be comprehended or directly perceived; for this reason, I strongly agree with the view that rejects the possibility of perception altogether. I hold your opinion, I said, and I don’t entirely dismiss it. But what do you think, Hortensius? Then he laughed: It has to be eliminated. I got you, I said: that’s the position of the Academy. With that, Catulus remained silent, and we went down to our boats.

§1. Noster: our mutual friend. Varro was much more of a friend to Atticus than to Cic., see Introd. p. 37. Nuntiatum: the spelling nunciatum is a mistake, see Corssen, Ausspr. I. p. 51. A M. Varrone: from M. Varro's house news arrived. Audissemus: Cic. uses the shortened forms of such subjunctives, as well as the full forms, but not intermediate forms like audiissemus. Confestim: notice how cleverly Cic. employs the dramatic form of the dialogue to emphasize his affection for Varro. Ab eius villa: the preposition is missing from the manuscripts, but Wesenberg (Em. M.T. Cic. Epistolarum, p. 62) demonstrates that it must be included. Cic. writes abesse Roma (Ad Fam. V. 15, 4), patria (T.D. V. 106) etc., but not abesse officio (De Off. I. 43, where Wes. changes it) or similar phrases. Satis eum longo intervallo: thus all the manuscripts; but Halm, after Davies, reads se visentum for satis eum, quoting Ad Att. I. 4, Madv. tum for eum (Baiter and Halm's ed. of 1861, p. 854). The text is accurate; the repetition of pronouns (illum, eum) is distinctly Ciceronian. The emphatic ille often follows the unemphatic is, see T.D. III. 71, and M.D.F. V. 22. I should note that separating satis from longo by the word eum is very much in Cicero's style (see my note on 25 quanta id magis). Some editors get confused (Goerenz terribly) by interpreting intervallo as distance in space instead of duration in time, while others incorrectly insist that satis, which only means "fairly," should mean "adequately." The phrase satis longo intervallo essentially means "after a fairly long delay." For the clause ut mos, etc., see De Or. II. 13.

§2. Here are a few things at first: for the omission of locuti, see the very similar passages in D.F. I. 14, III. 8, and also my note on 14. And this: Halm includes ea in brackets, which is completely unnecessary, as its inclusion is like Cic. Is anything new coming from Rome: Roma is in the ablative, and a verb like attulisset is omitted. (So Turnebus.) Mistakenly taking it as a nominative, implying faciat, is clearly incorrect. To inquire: the spelling percunctari is based on a false derivation (Corss. I. 36). Is there anything new: see De Or. II. 13. The manuscripts have and if anything, which is poor Latin, altered by Manutius. That person: some editions have ipsum, but Cic. frequently uses iste for someone who is present. Goer. refers to Brut. 125, De Or. II. 228. Wants: Walker reads velis with St Jerome. For quod velit = quod quis velit, see De Or. I. 30. In hand: this is used frequently, see Cat. Mai. 38. And this: the manuscripts have in place of this quod with variants que, quae, qui, quo. Dav. provided quia, which was the common reading until Halm, who reads idque, after Christ. To this very one: the manuscripts have eum for enim (except Halm's G). This combination of pronouns is unsuccessfully defended by Goer.; for phrases like me illum ipsum (Ad Att. II. 1, 11) are not relevant. Of course, if quia is used above, eum must be removed entirely. Some things I established: the De Lingua Latina; see Ad. Att XIII. 12.

§3. E Libone: the father-in-law of Sextus Pompeius; see Caesar B. Civ. III. 5, 16, 24. Nihil enim eius modi again all MSS. except Halm's G. have eum for enim. Christ conj. enim eum; so Baiter. Illud ... requirere: that is, the question which follows; cf. requiris in 4. Tecum simul: Halm's G om. tecum; but cf. De Or. III. 330. Mandare monumentis—letteris illustrare: common phrases in Cicero, e.g. D.F. I. 1, T.D. I. 1, De Div. II. 4. Monumentis: this, and not monimentis (Halm) or monementis, is probably the right spelling; cf. Corss. II. 314. Ortam a: Cicero always writes the prep. after ortus; cf. M.D.F. V. 69. Genus: regularly used by Cicero as opus by Quintilian to mean "department of literature." Ea res: one of Halm's MSS. followed by Baiter has ars; on the other hand Bentley (if the amicus so often quoted in Davies' notes be really he) reads artibus for rebus below. The slight variation, however, from res to artibus is such as Cicero loves. Ceteris: the spelling caeteris (Klotz) is absolutely wrong, cf. Corss. I. 325. Antecedat: some MSS. give antecellat. a frequent variant, cf. De Off. I. 105

§4. Deliberatam—agitatam: Cicero, as usual, exaggerates the knowledge held by the personae of the dialogue; see Introd. p. 38, De Or. II. 1. In promptu: similarly, II. 10. Quod ista ipsa ... cogitavi: Goerentz, who a half-page earlier mocked the gloss hunters, here himself detected a poor gloss; Schutz, echoing Goerenz, removes the words. Yet they are very much like Cicero (cf. De Div. II. 1, Cat. Mai. 38), and besides, nothing is more Ciceronian than the repetition of words and phrases in slightly different forms. The reason here is partly the strong desire to flatter Varro. Si qui ... si essent: the first si doesn’t really have conditional meaning, si qui like ειτινες just means "all who," for a strong example see Ad Fam. I. 9, 13, ed Nobbe, si accusandi sunt, si qui pertimuerunt. Ea nolui scribere, etc.: very similar expressions appear in the prologue to D.F. I., which should be compared with this prologue throughout.

§5. As you see ... you have learned: Manuscripts have you see, however, you yourself have learned indeed. My version follows Dav. and is supported by Baiter. Halm, after Christ, has you see, however, you—the same you have learned—cannot, etc. Similar: Halm, respecting the manuscripts, makes Cicero write i and e interchangeably in the accusative plural of i stems. I will write i everywhere; I believe this will bring us much closer to Cicero's actual writing. Although I don’t claim that his usage didn’t vary, he must have written i in the vast majority of instances, see Corss. I. 738—744. Amafinii or Rabirii: cf. Introduction p. 26. They define ... they divide: see note on 32. Interrogation: Faber recognized this as correct, but several later scholars changed it, e.g. Bentl. argumentation, Ernesti reason. However, the word as it stands has exactly the meaning these changes aim to achieve. Interrogation is merely the conclusion or syllogism expressed as a series of questions. See Paradoxa 2, with T.D. II. 42, which will show that interrogatiuncula and conclusiuncula are almost interchangeable terms. See also M.D.F. I. 39. Neither speaking nor arguing: Cicero's consistent way of referring to the Greek rhetoric and dialectic; see note on 32. And of orators also: Man., Lamb. omit also, unnecessarily. In Ad Fam. IX. 25, 3, the two words even appear together without any other word to separate them. For orators, Pearce suggested rhetors. Rhetor, however, is not used this way in Cicero's philosophical works. Both powers or virtues: it’s odd that Baiter (especially after Halm's note) would choose Manutius' far-fetched suggestion one for virtue. Any power or capability (vis, dynamis) may be referred to in Greek as virtue, in Latin virtus. Two passages, D.F. III. 72, De Or. III. 65, will eliminate any doubts about the text. With new words: Manuscripts have although which is, however, impossible in this context in Cicero (cf. M.D.F. V. 68). Not even from us: so all the manuscripts, but Orelli (after Ernesti), thinking that the phrase "arrogantly stated" moves even after they will receive. The text is correct, not even, as Halm notes, implies nothing more than the German auch nicht, cf. also Greek ν/a. Let the effort be undertaken: Manuscripts omit the noun, but it is added by a later hand in G.

§6. Epicurus, that is to say if Democritus: for the accusation see D.F. I. 17, IV. 13, N.D. I. 73. That is often introduces in Cic. a clause that intensifies rather than just explains the first clause, for example in M.D.F. I. 33. Once you remove the causes of efficient things: cf. D.F. I. 18, the same accusation is made by Aristotle against the Atomists, Met. A, 2. Many editors from Lamb. to Halm and Baiter read efficientis, which would then govern rerum (cf. D.F. V. 81, De Fato, 33, also Gk. poetic). But the genitive is merely one of definition, the causae are the res efficientes, for which see 24 and Topica, 58, the nearest topic is efficient things, which are called causes. So Faber, though less thoroughly. It is called: that is, Amafinius, who was the first to translate atom this way. Which are contained: this reading has by far the best manuscript support, it must be kept, and it should also apply begins the apodosis. Madvig (Emendationes ad Ciceronis Libros Philosophicos, Hauniae, 1825, p. 108) subtly reads continentur without cum, as do Orelli and Klotz. Goer. absurdly tries to make sense of the subjunctive without cum. Which ones?: Durand's em. for quoniam quibusnam from the manuscripts, presented by Halm and also Baiter. Madv. (Em. p. 108) defended quoniam, as showing a quick transition from one subject to another (from physics to ethics) like the Greek επει, but only one parallel instance was mentioned (T.D. III. 14) and this usage likely isn't Latin. To introduce?: The question mark is Halm's; thus the whole sentence, up to this point, explains the difficulty in laying out the true system of physics. If quoniam is read and no break is made at adducere, everything after quoniam will refer to ethics, then there would be a strange change of subject in moving from quisquam to haec ipsa, both of which will be nominatives to poterit, furthermore, there will be the almost impossible omission of ars, scientia, or something like it after haec ipsa. On every account, the reading by Madv. is unsustainable. What, these very things: I have added quid to fill in the gap left by Halm, who assumed much more was lost. [The technical philosophical terms contained in this section will be clarified later. For the Epicurean ignorance of geometry see note on II. 123] For they simply: "frankly," cf. Ad Fam. VIII. 6, 1 The beast and human: see note on II. 139.

§7. Or follow ... it's significant: for the construction see II. 140. It's significant: cf. what is significant, 6. True and straightforward good: see 35. That good ... not even to suspect a belief frequently criticized by Cicero, particularly in T.D. III. 41, where Cicero's Latin closely matches the Greek preserved by Diogenes Laertius X. 6 (see Zeller, 451), and less accurately by Athenaeus, VII. 279 (see R. and P. 353). Not even to suspect: for this, manuscripts give nor to suspect, but Madvig (D.F., Excursus III.) has convincingly shown that nor for not ... even is post-Augustan Latin. Christ suggests a term like to feel may have been omitted before nor to suspect; however, this is incorrect as seen in D.F. II. 20, 30, T.D. III. 46, N.D. I. 111, where the same views of Epicurus are addressed, showing either not even to suspect or not even to understand (cf. also In Pisonem 69). Moreover, not ... even is especially common with to suspect (D.F. II. 20), and verbs of a similar type (to think II. 82), and especially, as Durand pointed out, at the end of sentences e.g. Verr. II. 1, 155. Note denies ... not even to suspect without oneself, which however Baiter adds, despite the many examples quoted from Cicero by Madvig (Em. 111), where not only oneself but myself, ourselves, and other accusative pronouns are absent before the infinitive after verbs like denies. Cf. also the omission of oneself in Paradoxa 40. If indeed: this, following for either above, is a deviation from Cicero's rule, which is to write either—either or if—if not, but not if—either or either—if. This and two or three other similar instances in Cicero are interpreted as anacolutha by Madvig in a significant and thorough excursus in his D.F. (p. 785, ed. 2), and are linked with other examples of disrupted sequence. Therefore, there’s no need to read either here, as Turn. Lamb. Dav. and others did. As we ... approve: see Intro p. 62. It will need explanation: for the separation of these words by others interposed, which is characteristic of Cicero, see 11, 17. I’m surprised that Halm and Baiter both align with Ernesti in his overly critical objection to the phrase to explain the Academy, opting for will be against the manuscripts, making that plural. If will be is used, it will need must be supplied from it to accompany to be discussed, which is awkward. As cleverly, as obscurely: at first glance an oxymoron, but cleverly doesn't only imply clarity, it simply means "in a sharp way". As much as I can: some manuscripts have as much, which is hardly Latin since in Cicero an accusative only follows I can’t, I want, I prefer, I can, and such verbs when an infinitive can be easily supplied to govern it. For I want, see a good example in D.F. III. 68, where consult Madvig. Firmness: the concepts of steadfastness, consistency, and clarity of mind are wrapped up in this word, see II. 53. In Plato: Timaeus, 47 B, frequently quoted or imitated by Cicero, see De Leg. I. 58, Laelius 20, 47, T.D. I. 64.

§8. That is ... I command: these words have often been thought to be an explanation. But Cicero is nothing if not repetitive; he likes to place slightly different phrases next to each other. See some notable examples of slightly changed phrases linked by that is in D.F. I. 72, II. 6, 90. Therefore, I consider Halm and Baiter wrong in placing these words in brackets. From a: Lamb., objecting to the sound (which indeed doesn't resemble Cic.), would read e instead of a, which Halm would also prefer. From, by, and from follow haurire interchangeably in Cicero. They will follow the streams: so Wordsworth, "to hunt the waterfalls". The metaphor involved in sources—streams is often applied by Cicero to philosophy, especially in a sarcastic remark about Epicurus in N.D. I. 120. For nothing truly: truly should be written in two words, not as truly, cf. the phrases greatly, excessively, the same applies to as much, as many. L. Aelii: MSS. Laelii. The person mentioned is L. Aelius Stilo or Praeconinus, the teacher of Varro, and the first systematic grammarian of Rome. See Quintil. Inst. Or. X. 1, 99, Gellius X. 21, Sueton. Gramm. 3. Occasum: an unusual metaphor. Menippum: a Cynic satirist, see Dict. Biogr. Significant fragments of Varro's Menippean Satires remain and have often been edited—most recently by Riese (published by Teubner). To imitate, not to interpret: Cic. D.F. I. 7, gives his view on the proper use of Greek models. †What where: these words are clearly incorrect. Halm, following Faber, removes what, and Baiter agrees. Varro is thus made to say that he presented many things differently, so that the public would be encouraged to read. I believe the issue lies in the word where, for which I would prefer to read when (which would be written quō in the manuscripts). The general sense would then be "Having brought philosophy into that type of literature which the uneducated read, I proceeded to introduce it into that which the educated read." In praises: λόγοι επιταφίοι, cf. Ad Att. XIII. 48 where Varro's is mentioned. †To write philosophy: all manuscripts give philosophie. Klotz has philosophiam, which is clearly incorrect, physical, musical etc. to write can be said, but not physical, musical etc. to write. The one previously referenced passage to justify the phrase to write philosophy is now changed in the best texts (T.D. V. 121, see Tischer). Goer. reads to write for philosophy; his explanation is, as Orelli gently puts it, "hardly Latin." I can hardly think Halm's philosophe is correct, the word appears nowhere else, and Cicero almost condemns it by his use of the Greek φιλοσοφικά (Ad Att. XIII. 20). In older Greek, the adverb does not appear, nor is philosopher used much as an adjective, yet Cicero uses philosophus adjectivally in T.D. V. 121, Cat. Mai. 22, N.D. III. 23, just as he uses tyrant (De Rep. III. 45), and anapaest (T.D. III. 57). Could we not read for philosophers, in the dative, which only requires the change of a single letter from the manuscripts' reading? The meaning would then be "to write for philosophers," which would align with my change of when for where above. Philosophically would be an appealing change, but that the word philosophical is not Greek, nor do philosophicus, philosophice appear until very late Latin times. If only we have achieved that: cf. Brut. 316.

§9. Sunt ista: = these are, so often, e.g. Lael. 6. Some editors have sint, which is unlikely to be correct. Nos in nostra: Augustine (De Civ. Dei VI. 2) cites this with the reading reduxerunt for deduxerunt, which is accepted by Baiter and Halm; who quotes with approval Durand's remark, "deducimus honoris causa sed errantes reducimus humanitatis." The terms, however, are nearly interchangeable; see Cat. Mai. 63. In Lael. 12, Brut. 86, we find reducere, where Durand's rule would require deducere, on the other hand, cf. Ad Herennium IV. 64, hospites domum deducere. Aetatem patriae etc., Augustine (De Civ. Dei VI. 3) describes Varro's "Libri Antiquitatum" (mentioned in 8), in which most of the topics discussed here were covered. Descriptiones temporum: lists of dates, so times is technically used for dates, Thuc. V. 20, etc. Tu sacerdotum: after this, Lamb. adds munera to balance the clauses. Cicero, however, loves variety as much as he does formal accuracy. Domesticam—bellicam: opposed like domi bellique, cf. Brut. 49, De Off. I. 74. Augustine's reading publicam shows he was quoting from memory. Sedem: so the best manuscripts of Augustine, some editions here give sedium. The argument for sedem is the awkwardness of making the three genitives, sedium, regionum, locorum, depend on the accusatives, nomina, genera, officia, causas. Cicero tends to use sedes, locus, regio together, see Pro Murena, 85, Pro Cluentio, 171, quoted by Goer. Omnium divinarum humanarumque rerum: from Augustine's frequent references, it appears that the "Libri Antiquitatum" were divided into two parts, one covering res humanae, the other res divinae (De Civ. Dei, IV. 1, 27, VI. 3). Et litteris luminis: for luminis, cf. T.D. I. 5. Et verbis: Manut. reads rebus from 26. Varro's studies on the Latin language are intended. Multis locis incohasti: Varro's book "De Philosophia" had apparently not been written yet.

§10. Cause: = προφασις. Probable: = misleading. They don't know: Halm, with his only manuscript G, which is crafted by a skilled editor, provides nescient to match malent above, and is followed by Baiter. It's not necessary to impose on Cicero this formally precise sequence of tenses, which Halm himself admits can be disrupted in two similar instances, II. 20, 105. But tell me now, do you think that's enough?: So all manuscripts except G, which has the clear modification but that (that) you don't really prove to me. This last is given by Baiter, while Halm after Durand reads but that you don't prove to me enough, which strays too far from the manuscripts to satisfy me. The text as it stands isn’t intolerable, though tell me for speak to me is certainly poetic. Show yourself to me (Manut., Goer., Orelli) is way too intense for this context and can't be backed by 12, Brut. 306, Ad Fam. II. 8, or similar references. Attius: the old spelling Accius is incorrect. If anyone ... imitated: note the arrangement, and see 17. Halm unnecessarily writes sint for manuscripts sunt. For this section throughout see the prologues to D.F. I., T.D. I. and II.

§11. Procuratio: for the correct meaning of procurator and procuratio, refer to Jordan on Pro Caecina 55. Implacatum et constrictum: the conjunction introduces a stronger word, as is common; cf. 17 plenam ac refertam, II. 127 exigua et minima, similar to και in Greek. Inclusa habebam: cf. T.D. I. 1. The term Obsolescerent, used regarding individual memory, is notable. Percussus volnere: many editions provide the common variant perculsus. The volnus, which Goer. finds quite mysterious, refers to Tullia's death; cf. N.D. I. 9, De Consolatione, fragment 7, ed. Nobbe, and Introd. p. 32. Aut ... aut ... aut ... aut: This searching for an excuse reflects how low philosophy was regarded in public opinion in Rome. See Introd. p. 29. The same detailed justifications often appear, especially in the introduction of N.D. I.

§12. Brutus: the same praise often appears in D.F. and the Brutus Graecia desideret, so all of Halm's manuscripts, except G, which has Graeca. Halm (and later Baiter) adopts Aldus the younger's suggestion, Graeca desideres. A reviewer of Halm in Schneidewin's Philologus XXIV. 483, supports this reading, interestingly arguing that Brutus wasn’t focused on meeting Greek standards but aimed to eliminate the necessity for Romans to turn to Greece for philosophy. I maintain the manuscript reading because, for Cicero, Greece is the ultimate authority in philosophy; if she's satisfied, the philosophical community is at peace. See Ad Att. I. 20, 6, D.F. I. 8, Ad Qu. Fr. II. 16, 5. I just mention the emendation by Turnebus, a Graecia desideres, and that of Dav. Graecia desideretur. Eandem sententiam: see Introd. p. 56. Aristum: see II. 11, and M.D.F. V. 8.

§13. Without you: = σου διχα. Left behind: Cicero very rarely omits to be, see note on II. 77, for Cicero's supposed conversion see Introd. p. 20. This old: Manuscripts have this for old. The position of this would be strange in the passage which used to be compared, Pro Cluentio 16, Classen and Baiter now omit the word. Furthermore, old and new can hardly be used so simply to denote the Old and the New Academy. The reading old is from Madv. (Em. 115), and is supported by that old (18), that ancient (22), of that old (D.F. V. 8), and similar uses. Bentl. (followed by Halm and Bait.) thinks this comprises the last two syllables of Academy, which he reads. Corrected and improved: a fine sentiment to come from a conservative like Cic. The words often appear together and illustrate Cic.'s love for small variations in expression, cf. De Leg. III. 30, D.F. IV. 21, also Tac. Hist. I. 37. Denies: Manuscripts have denied, but Cic. never writes the subjunctive after although in direct speech, as Tac. does, unless there is some conditional or potential force in the sentence; see M.D.F. III. 70. Nothing is more common in the manuscripts than the substitution of the imperfect subjunctive for the present indicative of first conjugation verbs and vice versa. In the books: see II. 11. Two Academies: for the various ways of dividing the Academy refer to R. and P. 404. Against those of Philon: Manuscripts have against Philon merely, except Halm's V., which gives Philon, as does the ed. Rom. (1471). I have added those. Orelli quotes Ad Att. XII. 23, 2, from Apollodorus. Possibly the manuscripts may be right, and books may be supplied from in the books above, so in Ad Att. XIII. 32, 2, Dicaearchi about the soul both, the word books has to be supplied from the preceding letter, cf. a similar omission of goods in 19, 22. Madvig's Philonia is improbable from its non-appearance elsewhere, while the companion adjective Antiochus is frequent. Halm inserts opinion, a heroic remedy. To make against an adverb and construe Philon's Antiochus together, supplying listener, as is done by some unknown commentators who probably only exist in Goerenz's note, is wild, and cannot be justified by D.F. V. 13.

§14. Aqua absum iam diu: Some manuscripts have curiously aqua absumtam diu, corrected by Manut. Renovari: the vulgar revocari is an interesting oversight. It accidentally made its way into Goer.'s text, as he actually noted renovari. Orelli—who mentions Goerenz's "praestantissima recensio," and based his own text on it two years after Madvig's thorough critique in his Em., which I often refer to—not only reads revocari, but also cites renovari as an emendation from the 1536 edition of Victoriana. Orelli's work was picked up by Klotz, whose text lacks any independent value. Renovare in Cicero often means "to refresh the memory," for example, 11, Brut. 315. Nisi molestum est: similar to nisi alienum putas, a variation of the common si placet, si videtur. Adsidamus: some manuscripts have adsideamus, which would be incorrect in this context. Sane istud: Halm istuc from G. Inquit: the positioning of this word in later texts, often due to its relationship with quoniam, quidem, etc., see M.D.F. III. 20 Quae cum essent dicta, in conspectu consedimus (omnes): most editions since Gulielmus publish this without essent as a hexameter and assume it is a quotation. However, first, a phrase so common, if familiar, would likely appear elsewhere in Cicero, just like others do, and if it’s not familiar, it wouldn’t be cited without noting the author. Secondly, most manuscripts have sint or essent before dicta. Therefore, it’s more likely that omnes was added to create a hexameter rhythm. Phrases like quae cum essent dicta consedimus often appear in similar contexts in Cicero's dialogues, see De Div. II. 150, and Augustine, who follows Cicero, Contra Academicos, I. 25, also uses consedimus at the end of a clause in Brut. 24, and considitur in De Or. III. 18. Mihi vero: the absence of inquit, which is unusual for Goer., is well demonstrated in M.D.F. I. 9. There’s an unusual omission of laudasti in D.F. V. 81.

§15. A rebus ... involutis: physical phenomena are often described in these terms by Cicero, see 19, Timaeus c. 1, D.F. I. 64, IV. 18, V. 10, N.D. I. 49. Ursinus rejected ab here, but whether to include or exclude ab after the passive verb depends on how much natura is personified; if 28 is compared to Tim. c. 1, this will be clear. Involutis = veiled; cf. involucrum. Cicero shows his appreciation of the metaphor by adding quasi in II. 26, and often. Avocavisse philosophiam: this, the Xenophontic view of Socrates, was the popular opinion in Cicero's time, see II. 123, T.D. V. 10, D.F. V. 87, 88, and also Varro in Augustine's De Civ. Dei, VIII. 3. However, Cicero had objections to it, which were interestingly addressed in De Rep. I. 16 (see also Varro in Augustine's De Civ. Dei, VIII. 4). This same view is thought to be found in Aristotle; see the passages quoted by R. and P. 141. To form a well-rounded opinion on this complex question, the student should read Schleiermacher's Essay on the Worth of Socrates as a Philosopher (translated by Thirlwall), and Zeller's Socrates and the Socratic Schools, English Translation, pp. 112—116 [I disagree with his interpretation of Aristotle's evidence], and Schwegler's Handbook, as far as it pertains to Socrates and Plato. Nihil tamen ad bene vivendum valere: valere is missing from the manuscripts and is added by Halm, its use in 21 makes it more likely than conferre, which appears in the Roman edition (1471). Gronovius unsuccessfully attempts to validate the manuscript reading using passages like D.F. I. 39, T.D. I. 70. The most unusual instance of nihil ad elsewhere in Cicero is in De Leg. I. 6.

§16. Hic ... illum: for this repetition of pronouns see M.D.F. IV. 43. Varie et copiose: MSS. omit et, but it may be doubted whether Cic. would let two adverbs stand together without et, though three may (cf. II. 63), and though with pairs of nouns and adjectives, et often is left out, as in the passages quoted here by Manut. Ad Att. IV. 3, 3, Ad Fam. XIII. 24, XIII. 28, cf. also the learned note of Wesenberg, reprinted in Baiter and Halm's edition, of Cic.'s philosophical works (1861), on T.D. III. 6. Varie et copiose is also in De Or. II. 240. Cf. the omission of que in 23, also II. 63. Perscripti: Cic. like Aristotle often speaks of Plato's dialogues as though they were authentic reports of Socratic conversations, cf. II. 74. Nihil adfirmet: so T.D. I. 99. "Eoque praestare ceteris" this is evidently from Plato Apol. p. 21, as to the proper understanding of which see note on II. 74. Ab Apolline, Plato Apol. 21 A, Omnium: Dav. conj. hominum needlessly. Dictum: Lamb., followed by Schutz, reads iudicatum, it is remarkable that in four passages where Cic. speaks of this very oracle (Cato Mai. 78, Lael. 7, 9, 13) he uses the verb iudicare. Una omnis: Lamb. hominis, Baiter also. Omnis eius oratio tamen: notwithstanding his negative dialectic he gave positive teaching in morals. Tamen: for MSS. tam or tum is due to Gruter, Halm has tantum. Tam, tum and tamen are often confused in MSS., e.g. In Veri (Act II.) I. 3, 65, II. 55, 112, V. 78, where see Zumpt. Goer. abuses edd. for not knowing that tum ... et, tum ... que, et ... tum, correspond in Cic. like tum ... cum, tum ... tum. His proofs of this new Latin may be sampled by Ac. II. 1, 43. Ad virtutis studium cohortandis: this broad assertion is distinctly untrue; see Zeller's Socrates 88, with footnote.

§17. Various and diverse, and abundant: these traits are mentioned to explain the divergence from Plato to the later schools. For diverse "many-sided," see T.D. V. 11. Unified and consistent: this is a belief held by Antiochus that Cicero often adopted, as seen in D.F. IV. 5 De Leg. I. 38, De Or. III. 67. Five ancient philosophers are generally included in this supposed harmonious Academico-Peripatetic school, namely Aristotle, Theophrastus, Speusippus, Xenocrates, and Polemo (see D.F. IV. 2), sometimes Crantor is added. The harmony was thought to have been first disrupted by Polemo's students; so Varro claims (from Antiochus) in Aug. De Civ. Dei XIX. 1, also see 34. Antiochus likely based his theory mostly on the ethical similarities between the two schools. In D.F. V. 21, which comes directly from Antiochus, this is evident, as well as in Varro (in Aug. as above) who often implied that ethics was the whole of philosophy (also see De Off. III. 20). Antiochus probably downplayed such dialectical disputes between the two schools as the one concerning ideas, which had long ended. Krische Uber Cicero's Akademika p. 51, has some insightful comments. By names: the same as by words above. Cicero does not follow Varro's differentiation (De L. L. IX. 1) which limits nomen to proper nouns, vocabulum to common nouns, although he would not use vocabulum as Tacitus did, for the name of a person (Annals XII. 66, etc.). As if an heir ... but two: the correction by Ciaconus "ex asse heredem, secundos autem" is as clever as it is ridiculous. Two: it's hard to determine whether this or duo is correct in Cicero, he can hardly have been as inconsistent as the manuscripts and editions suggest (see Baiter and Halm's ed., Ac. II. 11, 13 with De Div. I. 6). The older inscriptions in the Corpus vol. I. have duo, but only in duoviros, two near the time of Cicero (C.I. vol. I. nos. 571 and 1007) give duos, which Cicero probably wrote. Duo is found in ancient Latin poets and Virgil. Chalcedonium: not Calchedonium as Klotz, see Gk. Χαλκηδόνιον. Outstanding: Halm is incorrect, see Brut. 125. Of Stagira: not Stagiritam as Lamb., because Cicero, except in a few nouns like Persa, pirata, etc., which have come from antiquity, did not change Greek nouns ending in -ης into Latin nouns ending in -a. See M.D.F. II. 94. Group ... accustomed: see 10. From the richness of Plato: see Quintilian's "that milky richness of Livy." Full and overflowing: note on 11. Doubt: Halm with one manuscript, G, gives dubitantem, Baiter dubitanter, Why change? Some kind of art of philosophy: before these words all of Halm's manuscripts, except G, add disserendi, probably carried over from the previous line, Lipsius keeps it and removes philosophiae, while Lamb. and Day read philosophia in the nominative. Varro, however, would never claim that philosophy became entirely dialectical in the hands of the old Academics and Peripatetics. Art = art, a set of definitive rules, so Varro in Aug. (as above) refers to the certa dogmata of this old school in contrast to the uncertainty of the New Academy. Description: so Halm here, but often discriptio. The Corp. Inscr., vol. I. nos. 198 and 200, contains discriptos or discriptum three times, while the other spelling never appears.

§18. It seems to me: Manuscripts swap quidem and videtur, as in 44. Quidem, however, almost always comes right after the pronoun, see M.D.F. IV. 43, see also I. 71, III. 28, Opusc. I. 406. Expetendarum fugiendarumque: Chosen and avoided, about which there will be more in note on 36. Platonic and Aristotelian ethics do have an external similarity, but their foundational principles are quite different. By rejecting the Idea of the Good, Aristotle eliminated what Plato would have considered most valuable in his framework. The ideal theory was, however, practically dead by the time of Antiochus, so the similarity between the two schools appeared much greater than it actually was. Non sus Minervam: a Greek proverb, cf. Theocr. Id. V. 23, De Or. II. 233, Ad Fam. IX. 18, 3. Binder, in his German translation of the Academica, also cites Plutarch Præc. Polit. 7. Inepte ... docet: short for inepte docet, quisquis docet. Nostra atque nostros: few editors have grasped this. Atticus is fond of everything Athenian and speaks as if he were one of them; in Cicero's letters to him, the term "tui cives," referring to the Athenians, frequently appears. Quid me putas: i.e. velle. Exhibiturum: Halm adds me before this from his one manuscript G, which was clearly edited here by its copyist. For the omission of me, see note on 7.

§19. Triple Ratio: Plato does not have this division, either deliberately or unintentionally, even though it was largely associated with him during Cicero's time, as noted by Varro himself (from Antiochus) in Aug. City of God VIII. 4, and by Diogenes Laertius III. 56 (see R. and P., p. 195). This division cannot be traced back further than Xenocrates and the post-Aristotelian Peripatetics, who are identified as its originators by Sextus Empiricus in Against the Mathematicians VII. 16. It was likely first emphasized strongly by the Stoics, which allowed them to more clearly prioritize Ethics over all other areas of philosophy. Cf. especially M.D.F. IV. 3. What is true ... when judging in conflict: Manuscripts excluding G have and before what is false, leading Klotz to suggest is to resolve the awkwardness of is contrary which manuscripts have for when judging. Krische proposes reading consequent instead of agreeing, comparing Orator 115, T.D. V. 68, On Divination II. 150, adding T.D. V. 21. On the other hand cf. II. 22, 91. Note the dual translations of the Greek terms, on life and morals for ethics, etc. This is very characteristic of Cicero, as we shall see later. And first: many manuscripts and editors have first, cf. 23, 30. From nature they sought: it is hard to see how Antiochus could have found this in Plato and Aristotle; however, that he did is undeniable; see D.F. V. 24—27, which should be closely compared with our passage, and Varro in Aug. XIX. 3. The core of Plato's system is the idea of the Good, while Aristotle is so far from basing his system on the abstract φυσις that he hardly even alludes to φυσις in his ethical works. The abstract concept of nature in relation to ethics first emerged strongly in Polemo, from whom it transferred into Stoic thought and then into that of Antiochus. All must be taken: expressed differently in D.F. V. 24, 26, cf. also D.F. II. 33, 34, And II. 131. In both mind and body and life: this forms the τριας or τριλογία των αγαθών, which in this form belongs to late Peripateticism (cf. M.D.F. III. 43), with the third division evolving from Aristotle's perfect life. The trios in this distinct form is foreign to both Plato and Aristotle, although Stobaeus in Ethica II. 6, 4 tries hard to illustrate it in Plato; Varro seems to combine the last two divisions into one in Aug. City of God XIX 3. This aligns better with D.F. V. 34—36, cf. also Aug. VIII. 8. For more on the Antiochean finis, see the note on 22. Other things of the body: for the omission of bona, see note on 13. They proposed to be: note on 36. In total and in parts: the same distinction exists in Stob. Eth. II. 6, 7; cf. also D.F. V. 35. Beauty: Cic. Orator 160 confirms the spelling pulcher; it frequently appears in inscriptions from the Republic era. Conversely, only pulcrai, pulcrum, etc., occur in inscriptions, except for pulchre, which is found once (Corp. Inscr. I. no 1019). Tomb, however, is common from an early period. For the tendency to aspirate even native Latin words, see Boscher in Curtius' Studien II. 1, p. 145. The false derivation from colorful may have contributed to the corruption of pulcher. Likewise, in modern times, J.C. Scaliger derived it from very cool (Curtius' Grundz ed. 3, p. 8). For health, strength, beauty, cf. the Health is strength is beauty of Stob. Eth. II. 6, 7, and T.D. V. 22. Full senses sensitivity in Stob., cf. also D.F. V. 36 (in senses, there is each one's virtue). Quickness: so ποδωκεια in Stob., to run well in Aug. XIX. 3. Clarity in voice: cf. De Off. I. 133. Impression: others say expression. For the former, cf. De Or. III. 185, which illustrates that it means the distinct marking of each sound; for the latter, De Or. III. 41, which disproves Klotz's remark "the tongue marks sounds, it does not express them." See also De Off. I. 133. An ancient edition has pressionem, which, although not strictly Ciceronian, recalls presse loqui, and N.D. II. 149. Pliny, Panegyric, ch. 64, uses expressit explanavitque verba; he and Quintilian frequently use exprimere in this way.

§20. Ingeniis: dismissed by many (according to Halm), but see T.D. III. 2, and animis below and in N.D. II. 58. In naturam et mores: for in ea quae natura et moribus fiunt. A similar inaccuracy in wording is found in II. 42. The division is essentially Aristotle's, who splits αρεται into intellectuals and ηθικαι (Nic. Eth. I. c. 13, Magna Mor. I. c. 5). In D.F. V. 38, the intellectual are referred to as non voluntariae, while the ηθικαι are voluntariae. Celeritatem ad discendum et memoriam: refer to the easy learning, memory of Aristotle (who adds αγχινοια σοφια φρονησις), and the docilitas, memoria of D.F. V. 36. Quasi consuetudinem: the quasi indicates a translation from the Greek, as often, likely referring to εθισμός (Nic. Eth. II. c. 1). Partim ratione formabant: the relationship that reason has to virtue is outlined in Nic. Eth. VI. c. 2. In quibus: meaning in moribus. All the later schools believed that ethics was the sole ultimate goal of philosophy. Erat: note the shift from oratio obliqua to recta, and see the opposite change in II. 40. Progressio: this, like the entire sentence in which it appears, is deeply Stoic. For the Stoic prosperity, aiming for virtue, see M.D.F. IV. 64, 66, R. and P. 392, sq., Zeller, Stoics 258, 276. The phrases are sometimes attributed to the Peripatetics, but if so, they must belong only to the later Stoic-influenced Peripateticism noted in Stobaeus. Perfectio naturae: see especially De Leg. I. 25. Even more Stoic is the definition of virtue as the perfection of reason, see II. 26, D.F. IV. 35, V. 38, and Madvig's note on D.F. II. 88. Faber references Galen De Decr. Hipp. et Plat. c. 5, Virtue is the perfection of each individual nature.. Una res optima: the supremacy of virtue is also asserted by Varro in Aug. XIX. 3, see also D.F. V. 36, 38.

§21. Virtutis usum: the Stoics refer to their indifferent as the training ground for virtue (D.F. III. 50), see also virtutis usum in Aug. XIX. 1. Nam virtus: most manuscripts have iam, which is out of place here. Animi bonis et corporis cernitur et in quibusdam: manuscripts omit et between cernitur and in, except for Halm's G which includes in before animi and also before corporis. These last insertions aren't necessary, as can be seen from Topica 80, causa certis personis locis temporibus actionibus negotiis cernitur aut in omnibus aut in plerisque, also T.D. V. 22. In Stob. II. 6, 8, the end of the Peripatetics is stated to be Living according to virtue in relation to the body and external goods., here quibusdam quae etc., denote the outside or εκτός αγαθών, the third class in 19. Hominem ... societate: all of this is strongly Stoic, though also attributed to the Peripatetics by Stob. II. 6, 7 (Common charity), etc., and the humanitarianism of the Stoics easily united with the man is by nature a political animal theory of Aristotle. For Cic. see D.F. III. 66, De Leg. I. 23, for the Stoics, Zeller 293—296. The repetitions hominem, humani, hominibus, humana are noticeable. For the last, Bentley (i.e. Davies' anonymous friend) proposed mundana from T.D. V. 108, but Varro has humana societas in Aug. XIX. 3. Cetera autem: what are these cetera? They form part of the out of goods, and although not strictly contained within the summum bonum are essential to enrich and preserve it. Of the things listed in Stob. II. 6, 8, 13, love, friends would belong to the quaedam of Cicero, while wealth source happiness kindness dynasty would be included in cetera. The same distinction is made in Aug. VIII. 8. Tuendum: most manuscripts have tenendum, but tuendum corresponds best with the division of αγαθα into poetic and φυλακτικά, Stob. II. 6, 13. For the word pertinere see M.D.F. III. 54.

§22. Plerique: Antiochus thinks it’s also Academic. Qui tum appellarentur: Manuscripts have dum, the subjunctive is odd, and the writer of Halm's G noted this, so it has appellantur. Videbatur: Goer. and Orelli misunderstand this, not recognizing that it strongly means the same as the Greek εδοκει, "it was their doctrine," which appears often. Adipisci: cf. adeptum esse, 19. Quae essent prima natura: Manuscripts have in natura. For the different ways of expressing the first by nature in Latin, see Madvig's Fourth Excursus to the D.F., which anyone studying Cic.'s philosophy should memorize. The phrase prima natura (abl.) cannot stand alone, as the first by nature is one of Goerenz's many forgeries. The ablative is always dependent on some verb, see Madv. Comparing this statement of the ethical finis with that in 19 and the passages mentioned in my note there will show that Cic. made little distinction between the Stoic the first according to nature and the Peripatetic trilogy. Madvig demonstrates that this is historically absurd in his Excursus, but he doesn’t fully acknowledge that Cicero accurately reported Antiochus. In any case, Varro's report (Aug. De Civ. Dei XIX. 3) aligns with Cic.'s in every detail. Even the inexplicabilis perversitas that Madv. complains of (p. 821) can be traced back to Antiochus, who, as noted in Augustine XIX. 1, 3, included even virtus among the prima naturae. A little thought will reveal that there’s no other way Antiochus could have insisted on the practical similarity of Stoic and Peripatetic views of the finis. I regret that my space does not permit me to explore this complex topic further. For the Stoic first according to nature see Zeller, chap XI. Ipsa per sese expetenda: Gk. Hello, which applies to everything included within the summum bonum. Since the Stoic finis was virtue alone, that was the only thing considered ‛αιρετον, while their first cause were not ‛αιρετα (cf. D.F. III. 21). Antiochus' prima naturae were Hello for him, cf. Aug. XIX. 3, prima illa naturae propter se ipsa existimat expetenda, as Stob., II. 6, 7, illustrates each aspect of the trilogy to be καθ' αυτο ‛αυτοτικό. Aut omnia aut maxima: this is common in Cic., e.g., D.F. IV. 27, also Stob. II. 6, 8, the most and primarily. Ea sunt maxima: as noted by Stob., Varro in Aug. passim. Sensit: often misunderstood by editors, here = iudicavit not animadvertit, cf. M.D.F. II. 6. Reperiebatur: for change of construction cf. D.F. IV. 26 Nec tamen beatissimam: the query of whether virtue was self-sufficient for happiness was one of the most significant to late Greek philosophy. For information on Antiochus, see M.D.F. V. 67.

§23. Agendi aliquid: Gk. πραξεως, the typical translation, cf. II. 24, 37. Officii ipsius initium: του καθήκοντος αρχή, Stob. II. 6, 7. This sentence subtly targets the New Academics, whose skepticism, according to the dogmatists, undermines the foundation of action and duty, see II. 24. Recti honestique: these terms resonate with the Stoa. Earum rerum: Halm believes something like appetitio is missing, but susceptio above is sufficient for both clauses; a similar usage can be found in D.F. III. 32. Descriptione naturae: Halm, using one manuscript (G), provides praescriptione, which is in II. 140, cf. also praescriberet above. The phrase is Antiochean; cf. prima constitutio naturae in D.F. IV. 15. Aequitas: not in the Roman legal sense, but as a translation of leniency. Eaeque: so Halm for MSS. haeque, haecque. Of course haecque, like hicque, sicque, would be un-Ciceronian. Voluptatibus: a subtle jab at the Epicureans. Forma see note on 33.

§24. Nature: this term is crucial to understand, as it translates both φυσις and substance. Here, substance is taken in its broadest sense, referring to everything that exists. In res duas: the distinction between Force and Matter, the active and passive elements in the universe, originates from Aristotle and Plato. However, Antiochus likely understood the distinction as modified by the Stoics; refer carefully to Zeller, 135 sq., including the footnotes. The clearest explanation of Aristotle's doctrine can be found in Schwegler, Handbook, pp 99—105. R. and P. 273 sq. should be consulted for the significant connection between Force and logical genus (species), and Matter (‛υλη) with logical differentia (difference). For the duae res, see D.F. I. 18. Efficiens ... huic se praebens: this is an attempt to translate the doing and the suffering from the Theaetetus, as well as the source and the accepted from the Timaeus (50 D). Cicero in Tim. uses efficere and pati, while Lucretius mentions I. 440 facere and fungi. Ea quae: as noted by Gruter, Halm for MSS. eaque. This implies that passive matter, when influenced by an active generative form, results in an aliquid, a this thing as Aristotle describes it. Passive matter Asset is only potentially this thing, becoming actual this thing when affected by form. (See this, that, Plato Tim. 49 E, 50 A, also Arist. Metaph H, 1, R. and P. 270—274). A figurative explanation of the process is provided in Timaeus, 50 D. In eo quod efficeret ... materiam quandam: Cicero is restricted by the patrii sermonis egestas, which forces him to express simple Greek terms using complicated phrases. Id quod efficit is not separate from, but equivalent to vis, while id quod efficitur relates to materia. Materiam quandam: it's remarkable how editors (especially Goer.) could misinterpret quandam and quasi in this context. Both terms (which are linked below) simply highlight the unfamiliarity of the Latin word in its philosophical application, while in Greek υλη the strangeness had faded. In utroque: for in eo quod ex utroque (i.e., vi et materia) fit, the meaning is clarified by the following clause, indicating that Force and Matter cannot truly exist separately but only in their combination, the formed entity, which is a distinctly Aristotelian concept. See the references mentioned earlier. Nihil enim est quod non alicubi esse cogatur: the meaning here is clear; that nothing can exist unless it's in space (alicubi). It's less clear why this point is included here. Unless est is interpreted as merely phenomenal existence (the only existence the Stoics and Antiochus would acknowledge), the statement doesn't represent Aristotle and Plato's beliefs. The ideas, for example, though existent for Plato in the highest sense, do not exist in physical space. (Aristotle explicitly states this in Phys. III. 4). Aristotle also recognized many things as existent that did not exist in space, as referenced in Phys. IV. 5 (q.v. R. and P. 289). Cicero may be translating here from Tim. 52 B, We have to acknowledge that the answer lies somewhere in a specific place.. For ancient theories on space, students should refer to history of philosophy texts. A useful summary is provided by Stob. Phys. about the void, place, and space, ch. XVIII. 1. Corpus et quasi qualitatem: note that corpus refers to formed matter, in contrast with materia, which refers to unformed matter. Qualitas is incorrectly used for quale; it should only refer to Force, not the outcome of the interaction between Force and Matter, see 28. The Greeks themselves sometimes mix up quality and who, with the confusion reinforced by the ambiguous phrase the identity in Greek, which can refer to either the this thing as who, or the Force that creates it who. That's why Aristotle uses one of his categories the identity and quality interchangeably. For more on the Stoic view of quality, see Zeller, 96—103, including footnotes.

§25. Bene facis: passim in comedy, which Cicero takes from; see D.F. III. 16, a passage that is otherwise very similar to this. Rhetoricam: Hülsemann suggests ethicam, which is however not Latin. The words have no philosophical significance here, but are simply examples of words once foreign, now naturalized. D.F. III. 5 is very similar. Cicero's words make it clear that these nouns should be treated as Latin first declension nouns; however, the manuscripts often provide a Greek accusative in en. Non est vulgi verbum: it first appears in Theaet. 182 A, where it is called weird name. Nova ... facienda: = imponenda in D.F. III. 5. Suis utuntur: so D.F. III. 4. Transferenda: transferre = μεταφέρεις, which is technically used as early as Isocrates. See Cicero on metaphor, De Or. III. 153 sq., where necessitas is noted as one reason for it (159) just like here; also cf. De Or. III. 149. Saecula: the spelling secula is incorrect; Corss. I. 325, 377. The diphthong prevents the old derivations from secare, and sequi. Quanto id magis: Cicero is very fond of separating tam quam ita tantus quantus, etc., from the words with which they are syntactically connected, by just one small word, e.g. Lael. 53 quam id recte, Acad. II. 125 tam sit mirabilis, II. 68 tam in praecipitem; also D.F. III. 5 quanto id nobis magis est concedendum qui ea nunc primum audemus attingere.