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Influences Of Geographic Environment On The Basis Of Ratzel's System Of Anthropo-Geography

By Ellen Churchill Semple

By Ellen Churchill Semple

Author of "American History and Its Geographic Conditions"

Author of "American History and Its Geographic Conditions"

TO THE MEMORY OF FRIEDRICH RATZEL

TO THE MEMORY OF FRIEDRICH RATZEL

Hither, as to their fountain, other stars

Hither, as to their fountain, other stars

Repairing, in their golden urns draw light.

Repairing, their golden urns attract light.

MILTON.

MILTON.


Preface

The present book, as originally planned over seven years ago, was to be a simplified paraphrase or restatement of the principles embodied in Friedrich Ratzel's Anthropo-Geographie. The German work is difficult reading even for Germans. To most English and American students of geographic environment it is a closed book, a treasure-house bolted and barred. Ratzel himself realized "that any English form could not be a literal translation, but must be adapted to the Anglo-Celtic and especially to the Anglo-American mind." The writer undertook, with Ratzel's approval, to make such an adapted restatement of the principles, with a view to making them pass current where they are now unknown. But the initial stages of the work revealed the necessity of a radical modification of the original plan.

The present book, as originally envisioned seven years ago, was meant to be a simplified version or restatement of the principles found in Friedrich Ratzel's Anthropo-Geographie. The German text is tough to read, even for Germans. For most English and American students of geographic environment, it's like a locked treasure chest. Ratzel himself acknowledged that "any English version couldn't be a literal translation, but must be adapted to the Anglo-Celtic and especially to the Anglo-American perspective." With Ratzel's support, the author set out to create such an adapted restatement of the principles, aiming to help them become better known where they are currently unfamiliar. However, the early stages of the work showed that a major revision of the original plan was necessary.

Ratzel performed the great service of placing anthropo-geography on a secure scientific basis. He had his forerunners in Montesquieu, Alexander von Humboldt, Buckle, Ritter, Kohl, Peschel and others; but he first investigated the subject from the modern scientific point of view, constructed his system according to the principles of evolution, and based his conclusions on world-wide inductions, for which his predecessors did not command the data. To this task he brought thorough training as a naturalist, broad reading and travel, a profound and original intellect, and amazing fertility of thought. Yet the field which he had chosen was so vast, and its material so complex, that even his big mental grasp could not wholly compass it. His conclusions, therefore, are not always exhaustive or final.

Ratzel did a significant job of establishing anthropo-geography on a solid scientific foundation. He had predecessors like Montesquieu, Alexander von Humboldt, Buckle, Ritter, Kohl, Peschel, and others; however, he was the first to explore the topic from a modern scientific perspective, developed his system based on evolution principles, and based his conclusions on global observations that his predecessors did not have the data for. He approached this task with extensive training as a naturalist, a wide range of reading, travel experience, a deep and original intellect, and remarkable creativity. Still, the area he chose was so extensive, and its material so intricate, that even his considerable intellect couldn't completely grasp it. As a result, his conclusions are not always comprehensive or definitive.

Moreover, the very fecundity of his ideas often left him no time to test the validity of his principles. He enunciates one brilliant generalization after another. Sometimes he reveals the mind of a seer or poet, throwing out conclusions which are highly suggestive, on the face of them convincing, but which on examination prove untenable, or at best must be set down as unproven or needing qualification. But these were just the slag from the great furnace of his mind, slag not always worthless. Brilliant and far-reaching as were his conclusions, he did not execute a well-ordered plan. Rather he grew with his work, and his work and its problems grew with him. He took a mountain-top view of things, kept his eyes always on the far horizon, and in the splendid sweep of his scientific conceptions sometimes overlooked the details near at hand. Herein lay his greatness and his limitation.

Moreover, the abundance of his ideas often left him with no time to test the validity of his principles. He comes up with one brilliant generalization after another. Sometimes he shows the mind of a visionary or poet, making conclusions that seem highly suggestive and convincing at first glance, but upon closer inspection, they turn out to be untenable, or at best, must be categorized as unproven or requiring qualifications. But these were just the byproducts of the great furnace of his mind, byproducts that weren't always worthless. As brilliant and far-reaching as his conclusions were, he didn't follow a well-structured plan. Instead, he evolved alongside his work, and his work and its challenges evolved with him. He took a broad view of things, kept his gaze on the distant horizon, and in the grand scope of his scientific ideas, sometimes overlooked the immediate details. This was both his strength and his limitation.

These facts brought the writer face to face with a serious problem. Ratzel's work needed to be tested, verified. The only solution was to go over the whole field from the beginning, making research for the data as from the foundation, and checking off the principles against the facts. This was especially necessary, because it was not always obvious that Ratzel had based his inductions on sufficiently broad data; and his published work had been open to the just criticism of inadequate citation of authorities. It was imperative, moreover, that any investigation of geographic environment for the English-speaking world should meet its public well supported both by facts and authorities, because that public had not previously known a Ritter or a Peschel.

These facts presented the writer with a serious problem. Ratzel's work needed to be tested and verified. The only solution was to examine the entire field from the beginning, gathering data as if starting from scratch, and checking the principles against the facts. This was particularly important because it wasn't always clear that Ratzel had based his conclusions on sufficiently broad data; his published work had faced valid criticism for inadequate citation of sources. Additionally, any investigation of geographic environment for the English-speaking world needed to be well-supported by both facts and authorities, especially since that audience was unfamiliar with a Ritter or a Peschel.

The writer's own investigation revealed the fact that Ratzel's principles of anthropo-geography did not constitute a complete, well-proportioned system. Some aspects of the subject had been developed exhaustively, these of course the most important; but others had been treated inadequately, others were merely a hint or an inference, and yet others were represented by an hiatus. It became necessary, therefor, to work up certain important themes with a thoroughness commensurate with their significance, to reduce the scale of others, and to fill up certain gaps with original contributions to the science. Always it was necessary to clarify the original statement, where that was adhered to, and to throw it into the concrete form of expression demanded by the Anglo-Saxon mind.

The writer's own investigation revealed that Ratzel's principles of anthropo-geography did not form a complete or balanced system. Some parts of the subject had been explored in great detail, particularly the most important ones; however, others were covered insufficiently, some were merely suggested or implied, and others were left unaddressed. Therefore, it was necessary to develop certain key themes with a thoroughness that matched their importance, to scale back others, and to fill in certain gaps with original contributions to the field. It was also essential to clarify the original statements when they were maintained and to express them in a way that resonated with the Anglo-Saxon mindset.

One point more. The organic theory of society and state permeates the Anthropo-geographie, because Ratzel formulated his principles at a time when Herbert Spencer exercised a wide influence upon European thought. This theory, now generally abandoned by sociologists, had to be eliminated from any restatement of Ratzel's system. Though it was applied in the original often in great detail, it stood there nevertheless rather as a scaffolding around the finished edifice; and the stability of the structure, after this scaffolding is removed shows how extraneous to the whole it was. The theory performed, however, a great service in impressing Ratzel's mind with the life-giving connection between land and people.

One more thing. The organic theory of society and state is woven throughout the Anthropo-geographie, because Ratzel developed his ideas at a time when Herbert Spencer had a strong influence on European thought. This theory, which is now mostly outdated among sociologists, had to be removed from any new interpretation of Ratzel's work. Although it was originally applied in great detail, it functioned more like scaffolding around a completed building; the stability of the structure after the scaffolding is taken away shows how unrelated it was to the core. However, the theory significantly impacted Ratzel by emphasizing the vital relationship between land and people.

The writer's own method of research has been to compare typical peoples of all races and all stages of cultural development, living under similar geographic conditions. If these peoples of different ethnic stocks but similar environments manifested similar or related social, economic or historical development, it was reasonable to infer that such similarities were due to environment and not to race. Thus, by extensive comparison, the race factor in these problems of two unknown quantities was eliminated for certain large classes of social and historical phenomena.

The writer's approach to research has been to compare typical people from all races and cultural stages, living in similar geographic conditions. If these groups, despite different ethnic backgrounds, showed similar or related social, economic, or historical developments, it was logical to conclude that these similarities were due to the environment rather than race. Therefore, through extensive comparison, the racial factor in these issues involving two unknown variables was removed for certain broad categories of social and historical phenomena.

The writer, moreover, has purposely avoided definitions, formulas, and the enunciation of hard-and-fast rules; and has refrained from any effort to delimit the field or define the relation of this new science of anthropo-geography to the older sciences. It is unwise to put tight clothes on a growing child. The eventual form and scope of the science, the definition and organization of its material must evolve gradually, after long years and many efforts of many workers in the field. The eternal flux of Nature runs through anthropo-geography, and warns against precipitate or rigid conclusions. But its laws are none the less well founded because they do not lend themselves to mathematical finality of statement. For this reason the writer speaks of geographic factors and influences, shuns the word geographic determinant, and speaks with extreme caution of geographic control.

The writer has intentionally avoided definitions, formulas, and strict rules; and has held back from trying to limit the field or clarify how this new science of anthropo-geography relates to older sciences. It’s unwise to put tight clothes on a growing child. The eventual shape and scope of the science, as well as the definition and organization of its material, need to develop gradually, over many years and through the efforts of many people in the field. The constant change of Nature is present in anthropo-geography and serves as a reminder against hasty or rigid conclusions. However, its principles are still well-established, even if they don't allow for precise mathematical statements. For this reason, the writer talks about geographic factors and influences, avoids the term geographic determinant, and speaks very cautiously about geographic control.

The present volume is offered to the public with a deep sense of its inadequacy; with the realization that some of its principles may have to be modified or their emphasis altered after wider research; but also with the hope that this effort may make the way easier for the scholar who shall some day write the ideal treatise on anthropo-geography.

The current volume is presented to the public with a strong awareness of its shortcomings; understanding that some of its principles may need to be adjusted or their focus changed after further research; but also with the hope that this work may help pave the way for the scholar who will eventually write the definitive guide on anthropo-geography.

In my work on this book I have only one person to thank, the great master who was my teacher and friend during his life, and after his death my inspiration.

In working on this book, I have only one person to thank: the great master who was my teacher and friend during his life, and after his death, my inspiration.

ELLEN CHURCHILL SEMPLE.

Ellen Churchill Semple.

LOUISVILLE, KENTUCKY.

Louisville, KY.

January, 1911.

January 1911.


Contents


List Of Maps.


Chapter I—The Operation Of Geographic Factors In History

Man a product of the earth's surface.

Man is a product of the earth's surface. This means not merely that he is a child of the earth, dust of her dust; but that the earth has mothered him, fed him, set him tasks, directed his thoughts, confronted him with difficulties that have strengthened his body and sharpened his wits, given him his problems of navigation or irrigation, and at the same time whispered hints for their solution. She has entered into his bone and tissue, into his mind and soul. On the mountains she has given him leg muscles of iron to climb the slope; along the coast she has left these weak and flabby, but given him instead vigorous development of chest and arm to handle his paddle or oar. In the river valley she attaches him to the fertile soil, circumscribes his ideas and ambitions by a dull round of calm, exacting duties, narrows his outlook to the cramped horizon of his farm. Up on the wind-swept plateaus, in the boundless stretch of the grasslands and the waterless tracts of the desert, where he roams with his flocks from pasture to pasture and oasis to oasis, where life knows much hardship but escapes the grind of drudgery, where the watching of grazing herd gives him leisure for contemplation, and the wide-ranging life a big horizon, his ideas take on a certain gigantic simplicity; religion becomes monotheism, God becomes one, unrivalled like the sand of the desert and the grass of the steppe, stretching on and on without break or change. Chewing over and over the cud of his simple belief as the one food of his unfed mind, his faith becomes fanaticism; his big spacial ideas, born of that ceaseless regular wandering, outgrow the land that bred them and bear their legitimate fruit in wide imperial conquests.

Man is shaped by the earth's surface. This means he is not just a child of the earth, made from her dust; the earth has nurtured him, provided for him, given him tasks, guided his thoughts, confronted him with challenges that have built his strength and sharpened his mind, given him problems of navigation or irrigation, and at the same time offered hints for their solutions. The earth has become part of his bones and tissues, his mind and soul. In the mountains, she has given him strong leg muscles to climb steep slopes; along the coast, she has left him weaker and flabbier but instead developed his chest and arms to effectively use his paddle or oar. In the river valley, she connects him to fertile soil, limits his ideas and ambitions to a monotonous routine of precise duties, and narrows his perspective to the confined horizon of his farm. Up on the wind-swept plateaus, amidst the vast grasslands and dry deserts, where he moves with his flocks from pasture to pasture and oasis to oasis, where life presents many hardships but frees him from tedious labor, where tending to grazing animals gives him time for reflection, and the wide-ranging lifestyle offers a broad horizon, his ideas develop a certain grand simplicity; religion becomes monotheism, God becomes one, unmatched like the desert's sand and the steppe's grass, extending endlessly without interruption or change. Repeatedly contemplating his simple belief as the sole nourishment for his unfed mind, his faith transforms into fanaticism; his expansive ideas, born from that constant wandering, surpass the land that birthed them and produce their rightful consequences in vast imperial conquests.

Man can no more be scientifically studied apart from the ground which he tills, or the lands over which he travels, or the seas over which he trades, than polar bear or desert cactus can be understood apart from its habitat. Man's relations to his environment are infinitely more numerous and complex than those of the most highly organized plant or animal. So complex are they that they constitute a legitimate and necessary object of special study. The investigation which they receive in anthropology, ethnology, sociology and history is piecemeal and partial, limited as to the race, cultural development, epoch, country or variety of geographic conditions taken into account. Hence all these sciences, together with history so far as history undertakes to explain the causes of events, fail to reach a satisfactory solution of their problems largely because the geographic factor which enters into them all has not been thoroughly analyzed. Man has been so noisy about the way he has "conquered Nature," and Nature has been so silent in her persistent influence over man, that the geographic factor in the equation of human development has been overlooked.

Man cannot be studied scientifically without considering the land he cultivates, the regions he travels, or the seas he trades over, just like a polar bear or a desert cactus cannot be understood without its habitat. Human relationships with their environment are far more numerous and complex than those of the most advanced plants or animals. They are so intricate that they warrant specialized study. The research conducted in anthropology, ethnology, sociology, and history is fragmented and limited, focusing only on specific races, cultural developments, time periods, countries, or geographic conditions. As a result, all these disciplines, along with history when it tries to explain the causes of events, often fail to provide satisfactory solutions to their problems because the geographic factors at play have not been thoroughly examined. While humans have been vocal about how they've "conquered Nature," Nature has remained quietly influential over humanity, causing the geographic factor in human development to be overlooked.

Stability of geographic factors in history.

In every problem of history there are two main factors, variously stated as heredity and environment, man and his geographic conditions, the internal forces of race and the external forces of habitat. Now the geographic element in the long history of human development has been operating strongly and operating persistently. Herein lies its importance. It is a stable force. It never sleeps. This natural environment, this physical basis of history, is for all intents and purposes immutable in comparison with the other factor in the problem—shifting, plastic, progressive, retrogressive man.

In every historical problem, there are two main factors, often referred to as heredity and environment, humanity and its geographic conditions, the internal forces of race and the external forces of habitat. The geographic element in the long history of human development has been a powerful and consistent influence. This is what makes it significant. It's a stable force that never rests. This natural environment, the physical foundation of history, is basically unchanging compared to the other factor in the equation—humanity, which is constantly shifting, evolving, and sometimes regressing.

Persistent effect of remoteness.

History tends to repeat itself largely owing to this steady, unchanging geographic element. If the ancient Roman consul in far-away Britain often assumed an independence of action and initiative unknown in the provincial governors of Gaul, and if, centuries later, Roman Catholicism in England maintained a similar independence towards the Holy See, both facts have their cause in the remoteness of Britain from the center of political or ecclesiastical power in Rome. If the independence of the Roman consul in Britain was duplicated later by the attitude of the Thirteen Colonies toward England, and again within the young Republic by the headstrong self-reliance, impatient of government authority, which characterized the early Trans-Allegheny commonwealths in their aggressive Indian policy, and led them to make war and conclude treaties for the cession of land like sovereign states; and if this attitude of independence in the over-mountain men reappeared in a spirit of political defection looking toward secession from the Union and a new combination with their British neighbor on the Great Lakes or the Spanish beyond the Mississippi, these are all the identical effects of geographical remoteness made yet more remote by barriers of mountain and sea. This is the long reach which weakens the arm of authority, no matter what the race or country or epoch.

History tends to repeat itself mainly because of this constant, unchanging geographic factor. The ancient Roman consul in distant Britain often acted with a level of independence and initiative that was rarely seen in the provincial governors of Gaul. Similarly, centuries later, Roman Catholicism in England showed a comparable independence from the Holy See. Both instances stem from Britain’s distance from the center of political or religious power in Rome. The independence of the Roman consul in Britain was echoed later by the Thirteen Colonies' stance toward England. Furthermore, within the young Republic, this headstrong self-reliance—frustrated by government authority—marked the early Trans-Allegheny commonwealths in their bold Indian policy, leading them to wage war and negotiate land treaties like sovereign states. This spirit of independence among the settlers in the mountains reemerged as a political defection aimed at secession from the Union and a potential alliance with their British neighbors around the Great Lakes or the Spanish territories beyond the Mississippi. All of these reflect the same effects of geographical remoteness, further intensified by natural barriers of mountains and seas. This enduring distance weakens the grip of authority, regardless of the race, country, or time period involved.

Effect of proximity.

As with geographical remoteness, so it is with geographical proximity. The history of the Greek peninsula and the Greek people, because of their location at the threshold of the Orient, has contained a constantly recurring Asiatic element. This comes out most often as a note of warning; like the motif of Ortrud in the opera of "Lohengrin," it mingles ominously in every chorus of Hellenic enterprise or paean of Hellenic victory, and finally swells into a national dirge at the Turkish conquest of the peninsula. It comes out in the legendary history of the Argonautic Expedition and the Trojan War; in the arrival of Phoenician Cadmus and Phrygian Pelops in Grecian lands; in the appearance of Tyrian ships on the coast of the Peloponnesus, where they gather the purple-yielding murex and kidnap Greek women. It appears more conspicuously in the Asiatic sources of Greek culture; more dramatically in the Persian Wars, in the retreat of Xenophon's Ten Thousand, in Alexander's conquest of Asia, and Hellenic domination of Asiatic trade through Syria to the Mediterranean. Again in the thirteenth century the lure of the Levantine trade led Venice and Genoa to appropriate certain islands and promontories of Greece as commercial bases nearer to Asia. In 1396 begins the absorption of Greece into the Asiatic empire of the Turks, the long dark eclipse of sunny Hellas, till it issues from the shadow in 1832 with the achievement of Greek independence.

As with geographical distance, the same applies to geographical closeness. The history of the Greek peninsula and its people, due to their position at the gateway to the East, has always included a recurring Asian influence. This frequently appears as a warning; like the motif of Ortrud in the opera "Lohengrin," it ominously weaves through every instance of Hellenic ambition or celebration of Hellenic victory, eventually building into a national lament during the Turkish conquest of the peninsula. It surfaces in the legendary accounts of the Argonauts and the Trojan War; in the arrival of Phoenician Cadmus and Phrygian Pelops in Greek territories; in the sight of Tyrian ships on the shores of the Peloponnesus, where they collect the purple-producing murex and abduct Greek women. It is more evident in the Asian roots of Greek culture; more dramatically during the Persian Wars, in the retreat of Xenophon’s Ten Thousand, in Alexander’s conquest of Asia, and in Greek control of Asian trade through Syria to the Mediterranean. Again, in the thirteenth century, the attraction of Levantine trade prompted Venice and Genoa to seize certain islands and promontories in Greece as commercial outposts closer to Asia. In 1396, Greece began to be absorbed into the Asian empire of the Turks, marking a long, dark period for sunny Hellas, until it emerged from the shadows in 1832 with the achievement of Greek independence.

Persistent effect of natural barriers.

If the factor is not one of geographical location, but a natural barrier, such as a mountain system or a desert, its effect is just as persistent. The upheaved mass of the Carpathians served to divide the westward moving tide of the Slavs into two streams, diverting one into the maritime plain of northern Germany and Poland, the other into the channel of the Danube Valley which guided them to the Adriatic and the foot of the Alps. This same range checked the westward advance of the mounted Tartar hordes. The Alps long retarded Roman expansion into central Europe, just as they delayed and obstructed the southward advance of the northern barbarians. Only through the partial breaches in the wall known as passes did the Alps admit small, divided bodies of the invaders, like the Cimbri and Teutons, who arrived, therefore, with weakened power and at intervals, so that the Roman forces had time to gather their strength between successive attacks, and thus prolonged the life of the declining empire. So in the Middle Ages, the Alpine barrier facilitated the resistance of Italy to the German emperors, trying to enforce their claim upon this ancient seat of the Holy Roman Empire.

If the factor isn't a geographical location but rather a natural barrier like a mountain range or a desert, its impact is just as lasting. The raised mass of the Carpathians split the westward-moving tide of the Slavs into two groups, directing one into the coastal plain of northern Germany and Poland, and the other into the Danube Valley, which led them to the Adriatic and the base of the Alps. This same range halted the westward advance of the mounted Tartar hordes. The Alps significantly slowed Roman expansion into central Europe, just as they hindered the southern march of the northern barbarians. Only through the few gaps in the wall known as passes did the Alps allow small, divided groups of invaders, like the Cimbri and Teutons, to enter, which meant they arrived with diminished strength and at intervals, giving the Roman forces time to regroup between attacks, and thereby extending the life of the declining empire. Similarly, in the Middle Ages, the Alpine barrier helped Italy resist the German emperors who were trying to enforce their claim on this ancient stronghold of the Holy Roman Empire.

It was by river-worn valleys leading to passes in the ridge that Etruscan trader, Roman legion, barbarian horde, and German army crossed the Alpine ranges. To-day well-made highways and railroads converge upon these valley paths and summit portals, and going is easier; but the Alps still collect their toll, now in added tons of coal consumed by engines and in higher freight rates, instead of the ancient imposts of physical exhaustion paid by pack animal and heavily accoutred soldier. Formerly these mountains barred the weak and timid; to-day they bar the poor, and forbid transit to all merchandise of large bulk and small value which can not pay the heavy transportation charges. Similarly, the wide barrier of the Rockies, prior to the opening of the first overland railroad, excluded all but strong-limbed and strong-hearted pioneers from the fertile valleys of California and Oregon, just as it excludes coal and iron even from the Colorado mines, and checks the free movement of laborers to the fields and factories of California, thereby tightening the grip of the labor unions upon Pacific coast industries.

It was through river-worn valleys leading to passes in the ridge that Etruscan traders, Roman legions, barbarian hordes, and German armies crossed the Alpine ranges. Today, well-built highways and railroads converge on these valley paths and summit routes, making travel easier; but the Alps still exact their toll, now in the extra tons of coal burned by engines and higher freight rates, instead of the physical exhaustion once paid by pack animals and heavily loaded soldiers. In the past, these mountains kept out the weak and timid; today, they block the poor and prohibit the transport of any large, low-value goods that can't afford the high shipping costs. Similarly, before the opening of the first overland railroad, the vast barrier of the Rockies kept all but strong and adventurous pioneers from the fertile valleys of California and Oregon, just as it currently restricts coal and iron from the Colorado mines and limits the movement of workers to the fields and factories of California, tightening the grip of labor unions on Pacific coast industries.

Persistent effect of nature-made highways.

As the surface of the earth presents obstacles, so it offers channels for the easy movement of humanity, grooves whose direction determines the destination of aimless, unplanned migrations, and whose termini become, therefore, regions of historical importance. Along these nature-made highways history repeats itself. The maritime plain of Palestine has been an established route of commerce and war from the time of Sennacherib to Napoleon.1 The Danube Valley has admitted to central Europe a long list of barbarian invaders, covering the period from Attila the Hun to the Turkish besiegers of Vienna in 1683. The history of the Danube Valley has been one of warring throngs, of shifting political frontiers, and unassimilated races; but as the river is a great natural highway, every neighboring state wants to front upon it and strives to secure it as a boundary.

As the surface of the earth presents challenges, it also provides pathways for the easy movement of people, tracks whose direction determines the destination of random, unplanned migrations, and whose endpoints become areas of historical significance. Along these natural highways, history tends to repeat itself. The coastal plain of Palestine has been a well-established route for trade and conflict from the time of Sennacherib to Napoleon.1 The Danube Valley has allowed a long list of barbarian invaders into central Europe, spanning from Attila the Hun to the Turkish attackers of Vienna in 1683. The history of the Danube Valley has been marked by warring groups, changing political borders, and diverse races; yet, since the river serves as a major natural highway, every neighboring country wants to be along its banks and works to claim it as a border.

The movements of peoples constantly recur to these old grooves. The unmarked path of the voyageur's canoe, bringing out pelts from Lake Superior to the fur market at Montreal, is followed to-day by whaleback steamers with their cargoes of Manitoba wheat. To-day the Mohawk depression through the northern Appalachians diverts some of Canada's trade from the Great Lakes to the Hudson, just as in the seventeenth century it enabled the Dutch at New Amsterdam and later the English at Albany to tap the fur trade of Canada's frozen forests. Formerly a line of stream and portage, it carries now the Erie Canal and New York Central Railroad.2 Similarly the narrow level belt of land extending from the mouth of the Hudson to the eastern elbow of the lower Delaware, defining the outer margin of the rough hill country of northern New Jersey and the inner margin of the smooth coastal plain, has been from savage days such a natural thoroughfare. Here ran the trail of the Lenni-Lenapi Indians; a little later, the old Dutch road between New Amsterdam and the Delaware trading-posts; yet later the King's Highway from New York to Philadelphia. In 1838 it became the route of the Delaware and Raritan Canal, and more recently of the Pennsylvania Railroad between New York and Philadelphia.3

The movements of people keep reverting to these old paths. The unmarked route of the traveler’s canoe, transporting furs from Lake Superior to the fur market in Montreal, is now taken by whaleback steamers loaded with Manitoba wheat. Today, the Mohawk Valley through the northern Appalachians redirects some of Canada’s trade from the Great Lakes to the Hudson River, just as it allowed the Dutch in New Amsterdam and later the English in Albany to access the fur trade from Canada’s frozen forests in the seventeenth century. Once a line of streams and portages, it now carries the Erie Canal and the New York Central Railroad.2 Similarly, the narrow strip of land stretching from the mouth of the Hudson to the eastern bend of the lower Delaware, marking the outer edge of the rugged hill country of northern New Jersey and the inner edge of the flat coastal plain, has been a natural route since ancient times. This was the path of the Lenni-Lenapi Indians; later, it became the old Dutch road connecting New Amsterdam to the Delaware trading posts; and even later, it became the King’s Highway from New York to Philadelphia. In 1838, it turned into the route for the Delaware and Raritan Canal, and more recently, the Pennsylvania Railroad between New York and Philadelphia.3

The early Aryans, in their gradual dispersion over northwestern India, reached the Arabian Sea chiefly by a route running southward from the Indus-Ganges divide, between the eastern border of the Rajputana Desert and the western foot of the Aravalli Hills. The streams flowing down from this range across the thirsty plains unite to form the Luni River, which draws a dead-line to the advance of the desert. Here a smooth and well-watered path brought the early Aryans of India to a fertile coast along the Gulf of Cambay.4 In the palmy days of the Mongol Empire during the seventeenth century, and doubtless much earlier, it became an established trade route between the sea and the rich cities of the upper Ganges.5 Recently it determined the line of the Rajputana Railroad from the Gulf of Cambay to Delhi.6 Barygaza, the ancient seaboard terminus of this route, appears in Pliny's time as the most famous emporium of western India, the resort of Greek and Arab merchants.7 It reappears later in history with its name metamorphosed to Baroche or Broach, where in 1616 the British established a factory for trade,8 but is finally superseded, under Portuguese and English rule, by nearby Surat. Thus natural conditions fix the channels in which the stream of humanity most easily moves, determine within certain limits the direction of its flow, the velocity and volume of its current. Every new flood tends to fit itself approximately into the old banks, seeks first these lines of least resistance, and only when it finds them blocked or pre-empted does it turn to more difficult paths.

The early Aryans, as they gradually spread across northwestern India, reached the Arabian Sea mainly by a route that ran south from the Indus-Ganges divide, situated between the eastern edge of the Rajputana Desert and the western slope of the Aravalli Hills. The streams flowing down from this range across the dry plains come together to form the Luni River, which marks the boundary for the advance of the desert. Here, a smooth and well-watered path led the early Aryans of India to a fertile coastline along the Gulf of Cambay.4 In the thriving days of the Mongol Empire during the seventeenth century, and likely much earlier, this route became an established trade connection between the sea and the prosperous cities along the upper Ganges.5 Recently, it guided the path of the Rajputana Railroad from the Gulf of Cambay to Delhi.6 Barygaza, the ancient coastal end of this route, was recognized in Pliny's time as the most renowned marketplace in western India, frequented by Greek and Arab traders.7 It later appears in history with a changed name, becoming Baroche or Broach, where in 1616 the British set up a trading post,8 but it was eventually overshadowed, under Portuguese and English rule, by the nearby Surat. Thus, natural conditions shape the pathways that humanity follows most easily, defining within certain limits the direction of its flow, the speed, and the volume of its movement. Every new wave tends to fit itself into the existing channels, first seeking these lines of least resistance, and only when it encounters obstacles does it turn to more challenging routes.

Regions of historical similarity.

Geographical environment, through the persistence of its influence, acquires peculiar significance. Its effect is not restricted to a given historical event or epoch, but, except when temporarily met by some strong counteracting force, tends to make itself felt under varying guise in all succeeding history. It is the permanent element in the shifting fate of races. Islands show certain fundamental points of agreement which can be distinguished in the economic, ethnic and historical development of England, Japan, Melanesian Fiji, Polynesian New Zealand, and pre-historic Crete. The great belt of deserts and steppes extending across the Old World gives us a vast territory of rare historical uniformity. From time immemorial they have borne and bred tribes of wandering herdsmen; they have sent out the invading hordes who, in successive waves of conquest, have overwhelmed the neighboring river lowlands of Eurasia and Africa. They have given birth in turn to Scythians, Indo-Aryans, Avars, Huns, Saracens, Tartars and Turks, as to the Tuareg tribes of the Sahara, the Sudanese and Bantu folk of the African grasslands. But whether these various peoples have been Negroes, Hamites, Semites, Indo-Europeans or Mongolians, they have always been pastoral nomads. The description given by Herodotus of the ancient Scythians is applicable in its main features to the Kirghis and Kalmuck who inhabit the Caspian plains to-day. The environment of this dry grassland operates now to produce the same mode of life and social organization as it did 2,400 years ago; stamps the cavalry tribes of Cossacks as it did the mounted Huns, energizes its sons by its dry bracing air, toughens them by its harsh conditions of life, organizes them into a mobilized army, always moving with its pastoral commissariat. Then when population presses too hard upon the meager sources of subsistence, when a summer drought burns the pastures and dries up the water-holes, it sends them forth on a mission of conquest, to seek abundance in the better watered lands of their agricultural neighbors. Again and again the productive valleys of the Hoangho, Indus, Ganges, Tigris and Euphrates, Nile, Volga, Dnieper and Danube have been brought into subjection by the imperious nomads of arid Asia, just as the "hoe-people" of the Niger and upper Nile have so often been conquered by the herdsmen of the African grasslands. Thus, regardless of race or epoch—Hyksos or Kaffir—history tends to repeat itself in these rainless tracts, and involves the better watered districts along their borders when the vast tribal movements extend into these peripheral lands.

The geographical environment, through its lasting influence, holds unique importance. Its impact isn't limited to a specific historical event or period; unless countered by a strong opposing force, it tends to manifest in various forms throughout history. It serves as a constant factor in the changing fortunes of different races. Islands share certain essential similarities that can be identified in the economic, ethnic, and historical development of England, Japan, Melanesian Fiji, Polynesian New Zealand, and prehistoric Crete. The extensive deserts and steppes that stretch across the Old World create a vast area of historical consistency. For ages, these regions have supported and nurtured tribes of nomadic herders, sending out waves of invasions that have overrun the neighboring river valleys of Eurasia and Africa. They have given rise to groups such as the Scythians, Indo-Aryans, Avars, Huns, Saracens, Tartars, and Turks, as well as the Tuareg tribes of the Sahara and the Sudanese and Bantu peoples of the African grasslands. Regardless of whether these groups were Negroes, Hamites, Semites, Indo-Europeans, or Mongolians, they have always been nomadic herders. The description by Herodotus of the ancient Scythians still applies to the Kirghis and Kalmuck who live on the Caspian plains today. The environment of this dry grassland continues to foster the same way of life and social structure as it did 2,400 years ago; it shapes the Cossack cavalry tribes just as it did the mounted Huns, energizes them with its dry, invigorating air, toughens them with its harsh living conditions, and organizes them into a mobile army that constantly moves with its pastoral supply lines. When the population presses too heavily on the limited resources, when summer droughts scorch the pastures and dry up the water sources, it drives them to seek wealth in the more fertile lands of their agricultural neighbors. Time and again, the fruitful valleys of the Hoangho, Indus, Ganges, Tigris and Euphrates, Nile, Volga, Dnieper, and Danube have fallen under the control of the dominant nomads from arid Asia, just as the "hoe-people" of the Niger and upper Nile have frequently been conquered by the herders from the African grasslands. Thus, irrespective of race or time—whether Hyksos or Kaffir—history tends to repeat itself in these rainless regions, impacting the better-watered areas along their edges when significant tribal movements extend into these surrounding lands.

Density Of Population In Eastern Hemisphere

Density Of Population In Eastern Hemisphere

Density Of Population In Eastern Hemisphere

Density Of Population In Eastern Hemisphere

Density Of Population In Western Hemisphere

Density Of Population In Western Hemisphere

Density Of Population In Western Hemisphere

Density Of Population In Western Hemisphere

Climatic influences.

Climatic influences are persistent, often obdurate in their control. Arid regions permit agriculture and sedentary life only through irrigation. The economic prosperity of Egypt to-day depends as completely upon the distribution of the Nile waters as in the days of the Pharaohs. The mantle of the ancient Egyptian priest has fallen upon the modern British engineer. Arctic explorers have succeeded only by imitating the life of the Eskimos, adopting their clothes, food, fuel, dwellings, and mode of travel. Intense cold has checked both native and Russian development over that major portion of Siberia lying north of the mean annual isotherm of degree C. (32 degrees F.); and it has had a like effect in the corresponding part of Canada. (Compare maps pages 8 and 9.) It allows these sub-arctic lands scant resources and a population of less than two to the square mile. Even with the intrusion of white colonial peoples, it perpetuates the savage economy of the native hunting tribes, and makes the fur trader their modern exploiter, whether he be the Cossack tribute-gatherer of the lower Lena River, or the factor of the Hudson Bay Company. The assimilation tends to be ethnic as well as economic, because the severity of the climate excludes the white woman. The debilitating effects of heat and humidity, aided by tropical diseases, soon reduce intruding peoples to the dead level of economic inefficiency characteristic of the native races. These, as the fittest, survive and tend to absorb the new-comers, pointing to hybridization as the simplest solution of the problem of tropical colonization.

Climatic influences are persistent and often stubborn in their control. Arid regions only support agriculture and settled life through irrigation. Egypt's economic prosperity today relies completely on the distribution of the Nile waters, just as it did during the time of the Pharaohs. The role of the ancient Egyptian priest has now been taken on by the modern British engineer. Arctic explorers have only succeeded by copying the lifestyle of the Eskimos, adopting their clothing, food, fuel, homes, and means of travel. Extreme cold has hindered both local and Russian development in the large area of Siberia located north of the average annual isotherm of 0°C (32°F), and it has had a similar impact in the corresponding area of Canada. (Compare maps on pages 8 and 9.) This results in these sub-arctic regions having few resources and a population of less than two people per square mile. Even with the arrival of white colonial populations, it continues the primitive economy of the native hunting tribes, making the fur trader their modern exploiter, whether that’s the Cossack tribute collector of the lower Lena River or the representative of the Hudson Bay Company. The assimilation process is both ethnic and economic, as the harsh climate keeps white women away. The damaging effects of heat and humidity, along with tropical diseases, quickly reduce arriving populations to the low level of economic inefficiency typical of the native races. The strongest survive and tend to absorb the newcomers, suggesting hybridization as the simplest solution to the challenges of tropical colonization.

The relation of geography to history.

The more the comparative method is applied to the study of history—and this includes a comparison not only of different countries, but also of successive epochs in the same country—the more apparent becomes the influence of the soil in which humanity is rooted, the more permanent and necessary is that influence seen to be. Geography's claim to make scientific investigation of the physical conditions of historical events is then vindicated. "Which was there first, geography or history?" asks Kant. And then comes his answer: "Geography lies at the basis of history." The two are inseparable. History takes for its field of investigation human events in various periods of time; anthropo-geography studies existence in various regions of terrestrial space. But all historical development takes place on the earth's surface, and therefore is more or less molded by its geographic setting. Geography, to reach accurate conclusions, must compare the operation of its factors in different historical periods and at different stages of cultural development. It therefore regards history in no small part as a succession of geographical factors embodied in events. Back of Massachusetts' passionate abolition movement, it sees the granite soil and boulder-strewn fields of New England; back of the South's long fight for the maintenance of slavery, it sees the rich plantations of tidewater Virginia and the teeming fertility of the Mississippi bottom lands. This is the significance of Herder's saying that "history is geography set into motion." What is to-day a fact of geography becomes to-morrow a factor of history. The two sciences cannot be held apart without doing violence to both, without dismembering what is a natural, vital whole. All historical problems ought to be studied geographically and all geographic problems must be studied historically. Every map has its date. Those in the Statistical Atlas of the United States showing the distribution of population from 1790 to 1890 embody a mass of history as well as of geography. A map of France or the Russian Empire has a long historical perspective; and on the other hand, without that map no change of ethnic or political boundary, no modification in routes of communication, no system of frontier defences or of colonization, no scheme of territorial aggrandizement can be understood.

The more we use the comparative method to study history—this includes comparing not just different countries, but also different periods within the same country—the more we see the strong impact of the land where humanity exists and how essential that impact is. Geography's role in scientifically investigating the physical conditions of historical events is confirmed. "Which came first, geography or history?" Kant asks. And he answers, "Geography is the foundation of history." The two are intertwined. History examines human events across different time periods; anthropo-geography looks at life in different areas of the planet. But all historical development occurs on the earth's surface and is influenced by its geographic context. To draw accurate conclusions, geography must compare how its factors operate across different historical times and stages of cultural development. Thus, it views history largely as a series of geographic factors manifested in events. Behind Massachusetts' passionate abolition movement, we find the granite soil and boulder-filled fields of New England; behind the South's long struggle to maintain slavery, we see the rich plantations of tidewater Virginia and the fertile Mississippi river valley. This highlights Herder's idea that "history is geography in motion." What is a geographic fact today becomes a historical factor tomorrow. The two fields cannot be separated without harming both, breaking apart what is a connected, living whole. All historical issues should be studied through a geographic lens, and all geographic issues should be examined within a historical context. Every map has its date. Those in the Statistical Atlas of the United States showing population distribution from 1790 to 1890 contain a wealth of both history and geography. A map of France or the Russian Empire carries significant historical insight; conversely, without that map, we cannot fully understand changes in ethnic or political boundaries, shifts in communication routes, systems of border defenses or colonization, or plans for territorial expansion.

Multiplicity of geographic factors.

The study of physical environment as a factor in history was unfortunately brought into disrepute by extravagant and ill-founded generalization, before it became the object of investigation according to modern scientific methods. And even to-day principles advanced in the name of anthropo-geography are often superficial, inaccurate, based upon a body of data too limited as to space and time, or couched in terms of unqualified statement which exposes them to criticism or refutation. Investigators in this field, moreover, are prone to get a squint in their eye that makes them see one geographic factor to the exclusion of the rest; whereas it belongs to the very nature of physical environment to combine a whole group of influences, working all at the same time under the law of the resolution of forces. In this plexus of influences, some operate in one direction and some in another; now one loses its beneficent effect like a medicine long used or a garment outgrown; another waxes in power, reinforced by a new geographic factor which has been released from dormancy by the expansion of the known world, or the progress of invention and of human development.

The study of the physical environment as a factor in history lost credibility due to exaggeration and unfounded generalizations before it was explored using modern scientific methods. Even today, concepts put forward in the name of anthropo-geography are often shallow, inaccurate, based on a limited set of data regarding space and time, or expressed in vague terms that make them vulnerable to criticism or rejection. Researchers in this area also tend to focus on one geographic factor to the exclusion of others; however, the physical environment inherently combines a variety of influences that work simultaneously under the principle of force resolution. Within this mix of influences, some push in one direction while others pull in another; sometimes one factor loses its positive effect like a long-used medicine or an outgrown piece of clothing; meanwhile, another gains strength, supported by a new geographic element that has been activated by the expansion of known territory, advances in invention, and human development.

Evolution of geographic relations.

These complex geographic influences cannot be analyzed and their strength estimated except from the standpoint of evolution. That is one reason these half-baked geographic principles rest heavy on our mental digestion. They have been formulated without reference to the all-important fact that the geographical relations of man, like his social and political organization, are subject to the law of development. Just as the embryo state found in the primitive Saxon tribe has passed through many phases in attaining the political character of the present British Empire, so every stage in this maturing growth has been accompanied or even preceded by a steady evolution of the geographic relations of the English people.

These complex geographic influences can't be understood or their impact assessed without considering evolution. That's one reason why these poorly thought-out geographic principles weigh heavily on our minds. They’ve been created without acknowledging the crucial fact that human geographic relationships, just like social and political structures, follow the law of development. Just as the early state seen in the primitive Saxon tribe has gone through many stages to become the modern British Empire, each phase of this growth has been accompanied by or even preceded by a constant evolution of the geographic relations of the English people.

Owing to the evolution of geographic relations, the physical environment favorable to one stage of development may be adverse to another, and vice versa. For instance, a small, isolated and protected habitat, like that of Egypt, Phoenicia, Crete and Greece, encourages the birth and precocious growth of civilization; but later it may cramp progress, and lend the stamp of arrested development to a people who were once the model for all their little world. Open and wind-swept Russia, lacking these small, warm nurseries where Nature could cuddle her children, has bred upon its boundless plains a massive, untutored, homogeneous folk, fed upon the crumbs of culture that have fallen from the richer tables of Europe. But that item of area is a variable quantity in the equation. It changes its character at a higher stage of cultural development. Consequently, when the Muscovite people, instructed by the example of western Europe, shall have grown up intellectually, economically and politically to their big territory, its area will become a great national asset. Russia will come into its own, heir to a long-withheld inheritance. Many of its previous geographic disadvantages will vanish, like the diseases of childhood, while its massive size will dwarf many previous advantages of its European neighbors.

Due to changing geographic relationships, the physical environment that supports one phase of development might hinder another, and vice versa. For example, a small, isolated, and protected environment, like those of Egypt, Phoenicia, Crete, and Greece, fosters the emergence and rapid growth of civilization; however, later on, it may stifle progress and mark a community that was once a model for its small world with signs of stagnation. In contrast, open and windy Russia, lacking these small, nurturing areas where Nature can nurture her children, has produced on its vast plains a large, unrefined, homogeneous population, nourished by the leftover scraps of culture that have fallen from the richer tables of Europe. However, that aspect of area is a variable factor in the equation. It alters its nature at a more advanced stage of cultural development. As a result, when the Muscovite people, guided by the example of Western Europe, mature intellectually, economically, and politically to match their vast territory, its area will turn into a significant national asset. Russia will finally realize its potential, inheriting what has long been withheld. Many of its past geographic disadvantages will fade away, like the illnesses of childhood, while its immense size will overshadow many previous advantages of its European neighbors.

Evolution of world relations.

This evolution of geographic relations applies not only to the local environment, but also to the wider world relations of a people. Greeks and Syrians, English and Japanese, take a different rank among the nations of the earth to-day from that held by their ancestors 2,000 years ago, simply because the world relations of civilized peoples have been steadily expanding since those far-back days of Tyrian and Athenian supremacy. The period of maritime discoveries in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries shifted the foci of the world relations of European states from enclosed seas to the rim of the Atlantic. Venice and Genoa gave way to Cadiz and Lagos, just as sixteen centuries before Corinth and Athens had yielded their ascendency to Rome and Ostia. The keen but circumscribed trade of the Baltic, which gave wealth and historical preeminence to Lübeck and the other Hanse Towns of northern Germany from the twelfth to the seventeenth century, lost its relative importance when the Atlantic became the maritime field of history. Maritime leadership passed westward from Lübeck and Stralsund to Amsterdam and Bristol, as the historical horizon widened. England, prior to this sudden dislocation, lay on the outskirts of civilized Europe, a terminal land, not a focus. The peripheral location which retarded her early development became a source of power when she accumulated sufficient density of population for colonizing enterprises, and when maritime discovery opened a way to trans-oceanic lands.9

This shift in geographic relations affects not only local environments but also how a culture connects with the broader world. Today, Greeks and Syrians, English and Japanese hold a different status among the nations than their ancestors did 2,000 years ago, simply because the global connections of civilized societies have been consistently growing since the days of Tyrian and Athenian dominance. The age of maritime exploration in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries changed the focus of European countries' global relations from inland seas to the Atlantic coast. Venice and Genoa lost their importance to Cádiz and Lagos, much like how Corinth and Athens previously lost their power to Rome and Ostia sixteen centuries earlier. The narrow but lucrative trade of the Baltic, which brought wealth and historical significance to Lübeck and other Hanseatic towns in northern Germany from the twelfth to the seventeenth century, lost its prominence when the Atlantic became the main area of maritime activity. Maritime power shifted from Lübeck and Stralsund to Amsterdam and Bristol as the historical perspective expanded. Before this abrupt change, England was on the edge of civilized Europe, a remote land rather than a focal point. This peripheral position that hindered her early growth ultimately became a strength when she had enough population density for colonization, and when maritime exploration opened routes to lands across the ocean.9

Meanwhile, local geographic advantages in the old basins remain the same, although they are dwarfed by the development of relatively greater advantages elsewhere. The broken coastline, limited area and favorable position of Greece make its people to-day a nation of seamen, and enable them to absorb by their considerable merchant fleet a great part of the trade of the eastern Mediterranean,10 just as they did in the days of Pericles; but that youthful Aegean world which once constituted so large a part of the oikoumene, has shrunken to a modest province, and its highways to local paths. The coast cities of northern Germany still maintain a large commerce in the Baltic, but no longer hold the pre-eminence of the old Hanse Towns. The glory of the Venetian Adriatic is gone; but that the sea has still a local significance is proven by the vast sums spent by Austria and Hungary on their hand-made harbors of Trieste and Fiume.11 The analytical geographer, therefore, while studying a given combination of geographic forces, must be prepared for a momentous readjustment and a new interplay after any marked turning point in the economic, cultural, or world relations of a people.

Meanwhile, the local geographic advantages in the old basins still exist, though they are overshadowed by the development of greater advantages elsewhere. The rugged coastline, limited space, and strategic location of Greece make its people today a nation of sailors, allowing them to utilize their sizable merchant fleet to capture a significant portion of the trade in the eastern Mediterranean,10 just as they did during the time of Pericles; however, that vibrant Aegean world, which once made up a large part of the oikoumene, has diminished to a modest province, and its major routes have become local paths. The coastal cities of northern Germany still have significant trade in the Baltic, but they no longer enjoy the prominence of the old Hanseatic towns. The glory of the Venetian Adriatic has faded; however, the sea still holds local importance, as shown by the vast amounts invested by Austria and Hungary in their custom-built harbors of Trieste and Fiume.11 Therefore, the analytical geographer, while exploring a particular mix of geographic forces, must be ready for a significant shift and a new interaction after any major turning point in the economic, cultural, or global relations of a people.

Interplay of geographic factors.

Skepticism as to the effect of geographic conditions upon human development is apparently justifiable, owing to the multiplicity of the underlying causes and the difficulty of distinguishing between stronger and weaker factors on the one hand, as between permanent and temporary effects on the other. We see the result, but find it difficult to state the equation producing this result. But the important thing is to avoid seizing upon one or two conspicuous geographic elements in the problem and ignoring the rest. The physical environment of a people consists of all the natural conditions to which they have been subjected, not merely a part. Geography admits no single blanket theory. The slow historical development of the Russian folk has been due to many geographic causes—to excess of cold and deficiency of rain, an outskirt location on the Asiatic border of Europe exposed to the attacks of nomadic hordes, a meager and, for the most part, ice-bound coast which was slowly acquired, an undiversified surface, a lack of segregated regions where an infant civilization might be cradled, and a vast area of unfenced plains wherein the national energies spread out thin and dissipated themselves. The better Baltic and Black Sea coasts, the fertility of its Ukraine soil, and location next to wide-awake Germany along the western frontier have helped to accelerate progress, but the slow-moving body carried too heavy a drag.

Skepticism about the impact of geographic conditions on human development is understandable, given the many underlying causes and the difficulty in distinguishing between stronger and weaker factors, as well as between permanent and temporary effects. We see the outcome but struggle to define the equation that leads to it. The key point is to avoid focusing on just one or two prominent geographic elements and overlooking the rest. The physical environment of a population includes all the natural conditions they've experienced, not just a part. Geography doesn’t support a single overriding theory. The gradual historical development of the Russian people has been influenced by numerous geographic factors—extreme cold and lack of rain, a fringe location on the Asian border of Europe vulnerable to nomadic invasions, a sparse and mostly ice-bound coast that was slowly developed, a uniform landscape, a lack of segregated regions where a new civilization could thrive, and a vast expanse of unfenced plains where national energies spread thin and dissipated. The more favorable Baltic and Black Sea coasts, the fertile soil of Ukraine, and the proximity to dynamic Germany along the western border have helped speed up progress, but the slow-moving entity carried too much weight.

Land and sea in co-operation.

The law of the resolutions of forces applies in geography as in the movement of planets. Failure to recognize this fact often enables superficial critics of anthropo-geography to make a brave show of argument. The analysis of these interacting forces and of their various combinations requires careful investigation. Let us consider the interplay of the forces of land and sea apparent in every country with a maritime location. In some cases a small, infertile, niggardly country conspires with a beckoning sea to drive its sons out upon the deep; in others a wide territory with a generous soil keeps its well-fed children at home and silences the call of the sea. In ancient Phoenicia and Greece, in Norway, Finland, New England, in savage Chile and Tierra del Fuego, and the Indian coast district of British Columbia and southern Alaska, a long, broken shoreline, numerous harbors, outlying islands, abundant timber for the construction of ships, difficult communication by land, all tempted the inhabitants to a seafaring life. While the sea drew, the land drove in the same direction. There a hilly or mountainous interior putting obstacles in the way of landward expansion, sterile slopes, a paucity of level, arable land, an excessive or deficient rainfall withholding from agriculture the reward of tillage—some or all of these factors combined to compel the inhabitants to seek on the sea the livelihood denied by the land. Here both forces worked in the same direction.

The law of the resolution of forces applies in geography just like it does in the movement of planets. Not recognizing this fact often allows superficial critics of human geography to put up a bold argument. Analyzing these interacting forces and their various combinations requires careful inspection. Let's look at the interplay of land and sea forces evident in every maritime country. In some instances, a small, barren, unyielding country collaborates with an inviting sea to push its people out into the ocean; in others, a vast area with rich soil retains its well-nourished inhabitants and muffles the sea's call. In ancient Phoenicia and Greece, in Norway, Finland, New England, in wild Chile and Tierra del Fuego, as well as the Indian coastal regions of British Columbia and southern Alaska, a long, jagged shoreline, countless harbors, remote islands, plentiful timber for shipbuilding, and challenging land communication all encouraged the residents to pursue a life at sea. While the sea beckoned, the land pushed in the same direction. There, a hilly or mountainous interior created obstacles to landward growth, poor slopes, a shortage of flat, arable land, and either too much or too little rainfall prevented agriculture from yielding its rewards—any or all of these factors combined to push the residents to seek their living on the sea, which matched the land's limitations. Here, both forces worked together.

In England conditions were much the same, and from the sixteenth century produced there a predominant maritime development which was due not solely to a long indented coastline and an exceptional location for participating in European and American trade. Its limited island area, its large extent of rugged hills and chalky soil fit only for pasturage, and the lack of a really generous natural endowment,12 made it slow to answer the demands of a growing population, till the industrial development of the nineteenth century exploited its mineral wealth. So the English turned to the sea—to fish, to trade, to colonize. Holland's conditions made for the same development. She united advantages of coastline and position with a small infertile territory, consisting chiefly of water-soaked grazing lands. When at the zenith of her maritime development, a native authority estimated that the soil of Holland could not support more than one-eighth of her inhabitants. The meager products of the land had to be eked out by the harvest of the sea. Fish assumed an important place in the diet of the Dutch, and when a process of curing it was discovered, laid the foundation of Holland's export trade. A geographical location central to the Baltic and North Sea countries, and accessible to France and Portugal, combined with a position at the mouth of the great German rivers made it absorb the carrying trade of northern Europe.13 Land and sea coöperated in its maritime development.

In England, the situation was quite similar, and starting in the sixteenth century, it developed a strong maritime industry that was not just a result of its long, irregular coastline and prime location for European and American trade. Its limited island size, extensive rugged hills, and chalky soil that were mainly suitable for grazing, along with a lack of generous natural resources,12 made it slow to meet the needs of a growing population until the industrial growth of the nineteenth century took advantage of its mineral wealth. Consequently, the English turned to the sea—for fishing, trade, and colonization. The conditions in Holland led to a similar outcome. It combined the benefits of a coastline and strategic position with a small, unproductive land area, primarily consisting of soggy grazing fields. At the peak of its maritime growth, an official estimate suggested that the soil of Holland could only sustain about one-eighth of its population. The sparse agricultural output had to be supplemented by sea harvests. Fish became a significant part of the Dutch diet, and the discovery of a curing process laid the groundwork for Holland's export trade. Its central location, connecting the Baltic and North Sea regions and accessible to France and Portugal, combined with its position at the mouth of the major German rivers, allowed it to dominate the northern European shipping trade.13 Land and sea worked together in its maritime development.

Land and sea opposed.

Often the forces of land and sea are directly opposed. If a country's geographic conditions are favorable to agriculture and offer room for growth of population, the land forces prevail, because man is primarily a terrestrial animal. Such a country illustrates what Chisholm, with Attic nicety of speech, calls "the influence of bread-power on history,"14 as opposed to Mahan's sea-power. France, like England, had a long coastline, abundant harbors, and an excellent location for maritime supremacy and colonial expansion; but her larger area and greater amount of fertile soil put off the hour of a redundant population such as England suffered from even in Henry VIII's time. Moreover, in consequence of steady continental expansion from the twelfth to the eighteenth century and a political unification which made its area more effective for the support of the people, the French of Richelieu's time, except those from certain districts, took to the sea, not by national impulse as did the English and Dutch, but rather under the spur of government initiative. They therefore achieved far less in maritime trade and colonization.15 In ancient Palestine, a long stretch of coast, poorly equipped with harbors but accessible to the rich Mediterranean trade, failed to offset the attraction of the gardens and orchards of the Jezreel Valley and the pastures of the Judean hills, or to overcome the land-born predilections and aptitudes of the desert-bred Jews. Similarly, the river-fringed peninsulas of Virginia and Maryland, opening wide their doors to the incoming sea, were powerless, nevertheless, to draw the settlers away from the riotous productiveness of the wide tidewater plains. Here again the geographic force of the land outweighed that of the sea and became the dominant factor in directing the activities of the inhabitants.

Often, the forces of land and sea are in direct conflict. If a country's geography supports agriculture and allows for population growth, land forces take precedence because humans are mainly land-based creatures. Such a country exemplifies what Chisholm, with his elegant choice of words, refers to as "the influence of bread-power on history,"14 as opposed to Mahan's sea-power. France, like England, had a long coastline, plenty of harbors, and a great location for maritime dominance and colonial growth; however, its larger size and more fertile land delayed the time when it faced the overpopulation issues that England dealt with even during Henry VIII's reign. Furthermore, due to consistent continental expansion from the twelfth to the eighteenth century and political unification that made its land more efficient in supporting the population, the French during Richelieu's era—except for those from specific regions—were drawn to the sea, not by national enthusiasm like the English and Dutch, but mainly because of government encouragement. As a result, they accomplished much less in maritime trade and colonization.15 In ancient Palestine, the lengthy coastline, lacking sufficient harbors but open to the lucrative Mediterranean trade, could not compete with the allure of the gardens and orchards in the Jezreel Valley and the pastures in the Judean hills, nor could it overcome the land-based preferences and skills of the desert-born Jews. In the same way, the river-bordered peninsulas of Virginia and Maryland, welcoming the incoming sea, still couldn’t persuade settlers to leave the bountiful productivity of the expansive tidewater plains. Once again, the geographical power of the land outweighed that of the sea, becoming the key factor in shaping the activities of the inhabitants.

The two antagonistic geographic forces may be both of the land, one born of a country's topography, the other of its location. Switzerland's history has for centuries shown the conflict of two political policies, one a policy of cantonal and communal independence, which has sprung from the division of that mountainous country into segregated districts, and the other one of political centralization, dictated by the necessity for coöperation to meet the dangers of Switzerland's central location mid a circle of larger and stronger neighbors. Local geographic conditions within the Swiss territory fixed the national ideal as a league of "sovereign cantons," to use the term of their constitution, enjoying a maximum of individual rights and privileges, and tolerating a minimum of interference from the central authority. Here was physical dismemberment coupled with mutual political repulsion. But a location at the meeting place of French, German, Austrian and Italian frontiers laid upon them the distasteful necessity of union within to withstand aggressions crowding upon them from without. Hence the growth of the Swiss constitution since 1798 has meant a fight of the Confederation against the canton in behalf of general rights, expanding the functions of the central government, contracting those of canton and commune.16

The two conflicting geographic forces can both stem from the land, one arising from a country's terrain and the other from its location. Switzerland's history has long demonstrated the struggle between two political approaches: one promoting cantonal and communal independence, which emerged from the division of that mountainous country into separate districts, and the other advocating for political centralization, driven by the need for cooperation to face the dangers posed by Switzerland's central position among larger and stronger neighbors. The local geographic conditions within Switzerland shaped the national ideal as a league of "sovereign cantons," as described in their constitution, enjoying maximum individual rights and privileges while tolerating minimal interference from the central authority. This created a situation of physical fragmentation coupled with mutual political estrangement. However, being situated at the crossroads of French, German, Austrian, and Italian borders imposed the unpleasant necessity of internal unity to resist external threats. Thus, the development of the Swiss constitution since 1798 has represented a struggle of the Confederation against the canton in favor of general rights, expanding the powers of the central government while limiting those of the cantons and communes.16

Local and remote geographic factors.

Every country forms an independent whole, and as such finds its national history influenced by its local climate, soil, relief, its location whether inland or maritime, its river highways, and its boundaries of mountain, sea, or desert. But it is also a link in a great chain of lands, and therefore may feel a shock or vibration imparted at the remotest end. The gradual desiccation of western Asia which took a fresh start about 2,000 years ago caused that great exodus and displacement of peoples known as the Völkerwanderung, and thus contributed to the downfall of Rome; it was one factor in the Saxon conquest of Britain and the final peopling of central Europe. The impact of the Turkish hordes hurling themselves against the defenses of Constantinople in 1453 was felt only forty years afterward by the far-off shores of savage America. Earlier still it reached England as the revival of learning, and it gave Portugal a shock which started its navigators towards the Cape of Good Hope in their search for a sea route to India. The history of South Africa is intimately connected with the Isthmus of Suez. It owes its Portuguese, Dutch, and English populations to that barrier on the Mediterranean pathway to the Orient; its importance as a way station on the outside route to India fluctuates with every crisis in the history of Suez.

Every country is a distinct entity, and therefore its national history is shaped by its local climate, soil, terrain, its location whether inland or coastal, its river routes, and its borders of mountains, seas, or deserts. But it’s also part of a larger network of lands, so it can feel a shock or ripple from events happening at the farthest reaches. The slow drying out of western Asia, which began about 2,000 years ago, led to the major migration and displacement of peoples known as the Völkerwanderung, contributing to the fall of Rome; this was a factor in the Saxon invasion of Britain and the eventual settlement of central Europe. The impact of the Turkish forces attacking Constantinople in 1453 was felt as far away as the distant shores of wild America, forty years later. Even earlier, it influenced England through the Renaissance, and it gave Portugal a jolt that set its explorers on the path to the Cape of Good Hope in search of a sea route to India. The history of South Africa is closely linked to the Isthmus of Suez. Its Portuguese, Dutch, and English populations are tied to that barrier on the Mediterranean route to the East; its significance as a way station on the outer route to India varies with every crisis that affects Suez.

Direct and indirect effects of environment.

The geographic factors in history appear now as conspicuous direct effects of environment, such as the forest warfare of the American Indian or the irrigation works of the Pueblo tribes, now as a group of indirect effects, operating through the economic, social and political activities of a people. These remoter secondary results are often of supreme importance; they are the ones which give the final stamp to the national temperament and character, and yet in them the causal connection between environment and development is far from obvious. They have, therefore, presented pitfalls to the precipitate theorizer. He has either interpreted them as the direct effect of some geographic cause from which they were wholly divorced and thus arrived at conclusions which further investigation failed to sustain; or seeing no direct and obvious connection, he has denied the possibility of a generalization.

The geographic factors in history now seem like obvious direct effects of the environment, such as the forest warfare of American Indians or the irrigation systems of Pueblo tribes. They also show up as a group of indirect effects, influencing the economic, social, and political activities of a community. These more distant secondary results are often extremely significant; they ultimately shape the national temperament and character, even though the link between the environment and development isn't always clear. This has created challenges for hasty theorists. Some have interpreted these as direct effects of specific geographic causes, which led them to reach conclusions that later investigations couldn't support. Others, not seeing any direct and clear connection, have denied the possibility of generalizations.

Montesquieu ascribes the immutability of religion, manners, custom and laws in India and other Oriental countries to their warm climate.17 Buckle attributes a highly wrought imagination and gross superstition to all people, like those of India, living in the presence of great mountains and vast plains, knowing Nature only in its overpowering aspects, which excite the fancy and paralyze reason. He finds, on the other hand, an early predominance of reason in the inhabitants of a country like ancient Greece, where natural features are on a small scale, more comprehensible, nearer the measure of man himself.18 The scientific geographer, grown suspicious of the omnipotence of climate and cautious of predicating immediate psychological effects which are easy to assert but difficult to prove, approaches the problem more indirectly and reaches a different solution. He finds that geographic conditions have condemned India to isolation. On the land side, a great sweep of high mountains has restricted intercourse with the interior; on the sea side, the deltaic swamps of the Indus and Ganges Rivers and an unbroken shoreline, backed by mountains on the west of the peninsula and by coastal marshes and lagoons on the east, have combined to reduce its accessibility from the ocean. The effect of such isolation is ignorance, superstition, and the early crystallization of thought and custom. Ignorance involves the lack of material for comparison, hence a restriction of the higher reasoning processes, and an unscientific attitude of mind which gives imagination free play. In contrast, the accessibility of Greece and its focal location in the ancient world made it an intellectual clearing-house for the eastern Mediterranean. The general information gathered there afforded material for wide comparison. It fed the brilliant reason of the Athenian philosopher and the trained imagination which produced the masterpieces of Greek art and literature.

Montesquieu believes the unchanging nature of religion, customs, manners, and laws in India and other Eastern countries is due to their hot climate.17 Buckle claims that people, like those in India, living near massive mountains and vast plains develop a highly imaginative yet superstitious mindset, as they only see Nature in its overwhelming forms, which stirs their imagination and stifles their reasoning. In contrast, he notes that the people of a place like ancient Greece displayed early signs of rational thought, where the natural landscape is smaller, easier to understand, and more relatable to human scale.18 The scientific geographer, skeptical of climate's all-encompassing influence and careful about claiming immediate psychological effects that are easy to suggest but hard to prove, addresses the issue differently. He observes that geographic factors have isolated India. On the land side, a vast range of high mountains limits access to the interior; on the sea side, the delta swamps of the Indus and Ganges Rivers, along with an uninterrupted coastline, bordered by mountains to the west and wetlands and lagoons to the east, have made ocean access difficult. This isolation leads to ignorance, superstition, and a rigid early formation of thought and customs. Ignorance means there isn’t much material for comparison, which limits higher-level reasoning and fosters a non-scientific mindset where imagination reigns freely. In contrast, Greece's accessibility and central position in the ancient world turned it into an intellectual hub for the Eastern Mediterranean. The diverse information accumulated there allowed for broader comparisons, fueling the sharp reasoning of Athenian philosophers and the imaginative skills that produced the great works of Greek art and literature.

Indirect mental effects.

Heinrich von Treitschke, in his recent "Politik," imitates the direct inference of Buckle when he ascribes the absence of artistic and poetic development in Switzerland and the Alpine lands to the overwhelming aspect of nature there, its majestic sublimity which paralyzes the mind.19 He reinforces his position by the fact that, by contrast, the lower mountains and hill country of Swabia, Franconia and Thuringia, where nature is gentler, stimulating, appealing, and not overpowering, have produced many poets and artists. The facts are incontestable. They reappear in France in the geographical distribution of the awards made by the Paris Salon of 1896. Judged by these awards, the rough highlands of Savoy, Alpine Provence, the massive eastern Pyrenees, and the Auvergne Plateau, together with the barren peninsula of Brittany, are singularly lacking in artistic instinct, while art nourishes in all the river lowlands of France. Moreover, French men of letters, by the distribution of their birthplaces, are essentially products of fluvial valleys and plains, rarely of upland and mountain.20

Heinrich von Treitschke, in his recent "Politik," echoes Buckle's argument when he explains that the lack of artistic and poetic growth in Switzerland and the Alpine regions is due to the sheer power of nature there, its impressive beauty that can overwhelm the mind.19 He supports his point by noting that, in contrast, the lower mountains and hills of Swabia, Franconia, and Thuringia—where nature is gentler, more stimulating, and inviting—have produced numerous poets and artists. These facts are undeniable. They also appear in France in the geographical distribution of the awards given by the Paris Salon of 1896. According to these awards, the rugged highlands of Savoy, Alpine Provence, the imposing eastern Pyrenees, and the Auvergne Plateau, along with the barren peninsula of Brittany, are notably deficient in artistic instinct, while art thrives in all the river lowlands of France. Additionally, French writers, based on their birthplaces, predominantly come from river valleys and plains, very rarely from upland and mountain areas.20

This contrast has been ascribed to a fundamental ethnic distinction between the Teutonic population of the lowlands and the Alpine or Celtic stock which survives in the isolation of highland and peninsula, thus making talent an attribute of race. But the Po Valley of northern Italy, whose population contains a strong infusion of this supposedly stultifying Alpine blood, and the neighboring lowlands and hill country of Tuscany show an enormous preponderance of intellectual and artistic power over the highlands of the peninsula.21 Hence the same contrast appears among different races under like geographic conditions. Moreover, in France other social phenomena, such as suicide, divorce, decreasing birth-rate, and radicalism in politics, show this same startling parallelism of geographic distribution,22 and these cannot be attributed to the stimulating or depressing effect of natural scenery upon the human mind.

This difference has been attributed to a basic ethnic distinction between the Teutonic population of the lowlands and the Alpine or Celtic ancestry that persists in the isolated highlands and peninsula, suggesting that talent is a trait of race. However, the Po Valley in northern Italy, which has a significant mix of this supposedly stifling Alpine blood, along with the neighboring lowlands and hill country of Tuscany, shows a remarkable excess of intellectual and artistic ability compared to the highlands of the peninsula.21 Therefore, the same contrast can be seen among different races under similar geographic conditions. Additionally, in France, other social issues like suicide, divorce, declining birth rates, and political radicalism also display this same surprising geographic distribution,22 and these cannot be explained by the inspiring or discouraging impact of natural scenery on the human mind.

Mountain regions discourage the budding of genius because they are areas of isolation, confinement, remote from the great currents of men and ideas that move along the river valleys. They are regions of much labor and little leisure, of poverty to-day and anxiety for the morrow, of toil-cramped hands and toil-dulled brains. In the fertile alluvial plains are wealth, leisure, contact with many minds, large urban centers where commodities and ideas are exchanged. The two contrasted environments produce directly certain economic and social results, which, in turn, become the causes of secondary intellectual and artistic effects. The low mountains of central Germany which von Treitschke cites as homes of poets and artists, owing to abundant and varied mineral wealth, are the seats of active industries and dense populations,23 while their low reliefs present no serious obstacle to the numerous highways across them. They, therefore, afford all conditions for culture.

Mountain regions stifle the growth of genius because they are isolated areas, far from the vibrant exchanges of people and ideas that flow through the river valleys. They are places of hard work and little downtime, struggling with poverty today and worry about tomorrow, where hands are worn from labor and minds are dulled by toil. In the rich alluvial plains, there's wealth, leisure, interaction with diverse minds, and bustling urban centers where goods and ideas are shared. These two contrasting environments lead to clear economic and social outcomes, which then create secondary intellectual and artistic effects. The low mountains of central Germany that von Treitschke mentions as havens for poets and artists, thanks to their rich and varied mineral resources, are thriving with industries and dense populations,23 and their gentle slopes pose no significant barrier to the many highways that cross them. They therefore offer all the right conditions for culture.

Indirect effects in differentiation of colonial peoples.

Let us take a different example. The rapid modification in physical and mental constitution of the English transplanted to North America, South Africa, Australia and New Zealand has been the result of several geographic causes working through the economic and social media; but it has been ascribed by Darwin and others to the effect of climate. The prevailing energy and initiative of colonists have been explained by the stimulating atmosphere of their new homes. Even Natal has not escaped this soft impeachment. But the enterprise of colonials has cropped out, under almost every condition of heat and cold, aridity and humidity, of a habitat at sea-level and on high plateau. This blanket theory of climate cannot, therefore, cover the case. Careful analysis supersedes it by a whole group of geographic factors working directly and indirectly. The first of these was the dividing ocean which, prior to the introduction of cheap ocean transportation and bustling steerage agents, made a basis of artificial selection. Then it was the man of abundant energy who, cramped by the narrow environment of a Norwegian farm or Irish bog, came over to America to take up a quarter-section of prairie land or rise to the eminence of Boston police sergeant. The Scotch immigrants in America who fought in the Civil War were nearly two inches taller than the average in the home country.24 But the ocean barrier culled superior qualities of mind and character also—independence of political and religious conviction, and the courage of those convictions, whether found in royalist or Puritan, Huguenot or English Catholic.

Let’s consider a different example. The rapid changes in the physical and mental makeup of the English who settled in North America, South Africa, Australia, and New Zealand have resulted from several geographic factors that influenced economic and social aspects. However, Darwin and others attributed this to climate effects. The energetic and ambitious nature of the colonists has been explained by the uplifting environment of their new homes. Even Natal has not been left out of this criticism. Yet, the drive of colonials has emerged under nearly every condition—whether under extreme heat or cold, dryness or humidity, at sea level or elevated plateaus. Therefore, this broad theory of climate cannot fully explain their situation. A detailed analysis reveals a variety of geographic factors at play, both directly and indirectly. The first of these was the separating ocean, which, before the advent of cheap ocean travel and busy shipping agents, created conditions for artificial selection. Next, it was the highly energetic individuals who, limited by the constraints of a Norwegian farm or Irish bog, moved to America to take up a quarter-section of prairie land or rise to the rank of Boston police sergeant. The Scottish immigrants in America who fought in the Civil War were nearly two inches taller than the average back home.24 But the ocean barrier also selected for superior qualities of mind and character—independence in political and religious beliefs, along with the courage to stand by those beliefs, whether they were royalist, Puritan, Huguenot, or English Catholic.

Indirect effect through isolation.

Such colonists in a remote country were necessarily few and could not be readily reinforced from home. Their new and isolated geographical environment favored variation. Heredity passed on the characteristics of a small, highly selected group. The race was kept pure from intermixture with the aborigines of the country, owing to the social and cultural abyss which separated them, and to the steady withdrawal of the natives before the advance of the whites. The homogeneity of island peoples seems to indicate that individual variations are in time communicated by heredity to a whole population under conditions of isolation; and in this way modifications due to artificial selection and a changed environment become widely spread.

Such colonists in a remote country were necessarily few and couldn't easily get reinforcements from home. Their new and isolated geographical environment encouraged variation. Heredity transmitted the traits of a small, highly selected group. The race remained pure from mixing with the local natives because of the social and cultural gap that separated them, and the steady withdrawal of the natives in the face of white expansion. The uniformity of island populations suggests that individual variations are eventually passed down through heredity to the entire population in isolated conditions; and in this way, changes due to artificial selection and a new environment become widespread.

Nor is this all. The modified type soon becomes established, because the abundance of land at the disposal of the colonists and the consequent better conditions of living encourage a rapid increase of population. A second geographic factor of mere area here begins to operate. Ease in gaining subsistence, the greater independence of the individual and the family, emancipation from carking care, the hopeful attitude of mind engendered by the consciousness of an almost unlimited opportunity and capacity for expansion, the expectation of large returns upon labor, and, finally, the profound influence of this hopefulness upon the national character, all combined, produce a social rejuvenation of the race. New conditions present new problems which call for prompt and original solution, make a demand upon the ingenuity and resourcefulness of the individual, and therefore work to the same end as his previous removal from the paralyzing effect of custom in the old home country. Activity is youth and sluggishness or paralysis is age. Hence the energy, initiative, adaptability, and receptivity to new ideas—all youthful qualities—which characterize the Anglo-Saxon American as well as the English Africander, can be traced back to the stimulating influences, not of a bracing or variable climate, but of the abundant opportunities offered by a great, rich, unexploited country. Variation under new natural conditions, when safe-guarded by isolation, tends to produce modification of the colonial type; this is the direct effect of a changed environment. But the new economic and social activities of a transplanted people become the vehicle of a mass of indirect geographic influences which contribute to the differentiation of the national character.

Nor is this all. The modified type soon becomes established because the abundance of land available to the colonists and the resulting better living conditions promote rapid population growth. A second geographical factor related to area comes into play here. Easier access to food, greater independence for individuals and families, freedom from constant worry, the optimistic mindset created by the awareness of almost limitless opportunities and capacity for growth, the expectation of high returns from hard work, and finally, the deep impact of this optimism on national character—all of these factors combined lead to a social renewal of the race. New conditions create new challenges that require quick and original solutions, demanding the creativity and resourcefulness of individuals, which helps to break the paralyzing effects of tradition from their former home country. Activity is like youth, while sluggishness or paralysis represents age. Thus, the energy, initiative, adaptability, and openness to new ideas—all youthful qualities—that characterize the Anglo-Saxon American as well as the English Africander can be traced back to the stimulating influences, not of a refreshing or changeable climate, but of the plentiful opportunities presented by a vast, rich, untapped country. Changes under new natural conditions, when safeguarded by isolation, tend to modify the colonial type; this is the direct effect of a changed environment. However, the new economic and social activities of a transplanted people serve as a means for a variety of indirect geographical influences that contribute to the differentiation of national character.

General importance of indirect effects.

The tendency to overlook such links between conspicuous effects and their remote, less evident geographic causes has been common in geographic investigation. This direct rather than indirect approach to the heart of the problem has led to false inferences or to the assumption that reliable conclusions were impossible. Environment influences the higher, mental life of a people chiefly through the medium of their economic and social life; hence its ultimate effects should be traced through the latter back to the underlying cause. But rarely has this been done. Even so astute a geographer as Strabo, though he recognizes the influence of geographic isolation in differentiating dialects and customs in Greece,25 ascribes some national characteristics to the nature of the country, especially to its climate, and the others to education and institutions. He thinks that the nature of their respective lands had nothing to do with making the Athenians cultured, the Spartans and Thebans ignorant; that the predilection for natural science in Babylonia and Egypt was not a result of environment but of the institutions and education of those countries.26 But here arise the questions, how far custom and education in their turn depend upon environment; to what degree natural conditions, molding economic and political development, may through them fundamentally affect social customs, education, culture, and the dominant intellectual aptitudes of a people. It is not difficult to see, back of the astronomy and mathematics and hydraulics of Egypt, the far off sweep of the rain-laden monsoons against the mountains of Abyssinia and the creeping of the tawny Nile flood over that river-born oasis.

The tendency to ignore the connections between obvious effects and their distant, less clear geographical causes has been common in geographic research. This straightforward approach to addressing the issue has led to false conclusions or the belief that reliable results were unattainable. The environment mainly influences the higher mental life of a community through their economic and social life; therefore, its ultimate effects should be traced through those back to the root cause. However, this has rarely been done. Even a sharp-minded geographer like Strabo, although he acknowledges the impact of geographic isolation in creating different dialects and customs in Greece,25 attributes some national characteristics to the country's natural features, especially its climate, and others to education and institutions. He believes that the characteristics of their lands had nothing to do with making the Athenians cultured, while the Spartans and Thebans were uninformed; that the interest in natural science in Babylonia and Egypt was not because of their environment but due to the institutions and education of those places.26 But this raises the questions of how much customs and education, in turn, depend on the environment; to what extent natural conditions, shaping economic and political development, may fundamentally influence social customs, education, culture, and the prevailing intellectual tendencies of a people. It's not hard to see, behind the astronomy, mathematics, and hydraulics of Egypt, the distant impact of rain-laden monsoons against the mountains of Abyssinia and the gradual flow of the tawny Nile flood over that river-born oasis.

Indirect political and moral effects.

Plutarch states in his "Solon" that after the rebellion of Kylon in 612 B.C. the Athenian people were divided into as many political factions as there were physical types of country in Attica. The mountaineers, who were the poorest party, wanted something like a democracy; the people of the plains, comprising the greatest number of rich families, were clamorous for an oligarchy; the coast population of the south, intermediate both in social position and wealth, wanted something between the two. The same three-fold division appeared again in 564 B.C. on the usurpation of Peisistratus.27 Here the connection between geographic condition and political opinion is clear enough, though the links are agriculture and commerce. New England's opposition to the War of 1812, culminating in the threat of secession of the Hartford Convention, can be traced back through the active maritime trade to the broken coastline and unproductive soil of that glaciated country.

Plutarch mentions in his "Solon" that after Kylon's rebellion in 612 B.C., the people of Athens were split into as many political factions as there were different types of land in Attica. The mountaineers, who were the least wealthy group, wanted a democracy; the people from the plains, who had the most rich families, were demanding an oligarchy; and the coastal population of the south, situated somewhere in between in terms of social status and wealth, wanted a compromise between the two. This same three-way division reappeared in 564 B.C. during Peisistratus's rise to power.27 Here, the relationship between geographic factors and political views is quite clear, with agriculture and commerce being the connections. New England's opposition to the War of 1812, which peaked with the Hartford Convention's threat of secession, can be traced back through its active maritime trade to the region's rugged coastline and less fertile land.

In all democratic or representative forms of government permitting free expression of popular opinion, history shows that division into political parties tends to follow geographical lines of cleavage. In our own Civil War the dividing line between North and South did not always run east and west. The mountain area of the Southern Appalachians supported the Union and drove a wedge of disaffection into the heart of the South. Mountainous West Virginia was politically opposed to the tidewater plains of old Virginia, because slave labor did not pay on the barren "upright" farms of the Cumberland Plateau; whereas, it was remunerative on the wide fertile plantations of the coastal lowland. The ethics of the question were obscured where conditions of soil and topography made the institution profitable. In the mountains, as also in New England, a law of diminishing financial returns had for its corollary a law of increasing moral insight. In this case, geographic conditions worked through the medium of direct economic effects to more important political and ethical results.

In all democratic or representative governments that allow free expression of public opinion, history shows that political parties often align along geographical divides. During our Civil War, the line between North and South didn’t always run east to west. The mountainous region of the Southern Appalachians backed the Union and created division in the heart of the South. Mountainous West Virginia was politically against the low-lying areas of old Virginia because slave labor wasn't profitable on the barren "upright" farms of the Cumberland Plateau, while it thrived on the expansive fertile plantations of the coastal lowland. The ethical aspects of the issue were clouded where soil and topography made slavery financially beneficial. In the mountains, similar to New England, the law of diminishing financial returns correlated with a growing moral understanding. In this case, geographical factors influenced direct economic outcomes that led to significant political and ethical implications.

The roots of geographic influence often run far underground before coming to the surface, to sprout into some flowering growth; and to trace this back to its parent stem is the necessary but not easy task of the geographer.

The roots of geographic influence often go deep underground before breaking through to the surface, blossoming into some form of growth; tracing this back to its origin is a crucial but challenging job for the geographer.

Time element.

The complexity of this problem does not end here. The modification of human development by environment is a natural process; like all other natural processes, it involves the cumulative effects of causes operating imperceptibly but persistently through vast periods of time. Slowly and deliberately does geography engrave the subtitles to a people's history. Neglect of this time element in the consideration of geographic influences accounts equally for many an exaggerated assertion and denial of their power. A critic undertakes to disprove modification through physical environment by showing that it has not produced tangible results in the last fifty or five hundred years. This attitude recalls the early geologists, whose imaginations could not conceive the vast ages necessary in a scientific explanation of geologic phenomena.

The complexity of this problem doesn't stop here. The way the environment shapes human development is a natural process; like all other natural processes, it involves the gradual effects of causes that work quietly but steadily over long periods. Geography slowly and intentionally carves out the details of a people's history. Ignoring this time factor when considering geographical influences leads to many exaggerated claims and dismissals of their power. A critic tries to disprove the impact of physical environments by arguing that it hasn't produced clear results in the last fifty or five hundred years. This viewpoint is reminiscent of early geologists, whose understanding couldn't grasp the immense time required to scientifically explain geological phenomena.

The theory of evolution has taught us in science to think in larger terms of time, so that we no longer raise the question whether European colonists in Africa can turn into negroes, though we do find the recent amazing statement that the Yankee, in his tall, gaunt figure, "the colour of his skin, and the formation of his hair, has begun to differentiate himself from his European kinsman and approach the type of the aboriginal Indians."28 Evolution tells the story of modification by a succession of infinitesimal changes, and emphasizes the permanence of a modification once produced long after the causes for it cease to act. The mesas of Arizona, the earth sculpture of the Grand Canyon remain as monuments to the erosive forces which produced them. So a habitat leaves upon man no ephemeral impress; it affects him in one way at a low stage of his development, and differently at a later or higher stage, because the man himself and his relation to his environment have been modified in the earlier period; but traces of that earlier adaptation survive in his maturer life. Hence man's relation to his environment must be looked at through the perspective of historical development. It would be impossible to explain the history and national character of the contemporary English solely by their twentieth century response to their environment, because with insular conservatism they carry and cherish vestiges of times when their islands represented different geographic relations from those of to-day. Witness the wool-sack of the lord chancellor. We cannot understand the location of modern Athens, Rome or Berlin from the present day relations of urban populations to their environment, because the original choice of these sites was dictated by far different considerations from those ruling to-day. In the history of these cities a whole succession of geographic factors have in turn been active, each leaving its impress of which the cities become, as it were, repositories.

The theory of evolution has taught us in science to think on a larger timescale, so now we no longer question whether European colonists in Africa can become like Africans. However, we do see the recent and surprising claim that the American, with his tall, lean figure, "the color of his skin and the shape of his hair, has started to differentiate himself from his European relatives and move closer to the type of the indigenous Indians."28 Evolution tells the story of change through a series of tiny adjustments and highlights the lasting impact of a change once it has been made, long after the original reasons for it have ceased. The mesas of Arizona and the carved landscape of the Grand Canyon stand as reminders of the erosive forces that shaped them. Similarly, a habitat leaves a lasting imprint on humans; it influences them in one way at a lower stage of development and differently at a later or more advanced stage because both the individual and their relationship to their environment have evolved during that earlier period. Traces of that earlier adaptation persist in their mature lives. Thus, we need to view a person's relationship to their environment through the lens of historical growth. It would be impossible to explain the history and national character of modern English people solely by their 20th-century reactions to their surroundings since, with their insular conservatism, they carry and value remnants of times when their islands had very different geographic connections than today. Take, for example, the wool-sack of the Lord Chancellor. We cannot understand why modern Athens, Rome, or Berlin are located where they are just from the current relationships between urban populations and their environment because the initial choices for these sites were based on considerations that differ significantly from today's factors. Throughout the history of these cities, a whole range of geographic influences has played a role, each leaving its mark, making the cities, in a manner of speaking, repositories of these changes.

Effect of a previous habitat.

The importance of this time element for a solution of anthropo-geographic problems becomes plainer, where a certain locality has received an entirely new population, or where a given people by migration change their habitat. The result in either case is the same, a new combination, new modifications superimposed on old modifications. And it is with this sort of case that anthropo-geography most often has to deal. So restless has mankind been, that the testimony of history and ethnology is all against the assumption that a social group has ever been subjected to but one type of environment during its long period of development from a primitive to a civilized society. Therefore, if we assert that a people is the product of the country which it inhabits at a given time, we forget that many different countries which its forbears occupied have left their mark on the present race in the form of inherited aptitudes and traditional customs acquired in those remote ancestral habitats. The Moors of Granada had passed through a wide range of ancestral experiences; they bore the impress of Asia, Africa and Europe, and on their expulsion from Spain carried back with them to Morocco traces of their peninsula life.

The significance of the time factor in solving anthropo-geographic issues becomes clearer when a certain area has seen an entirely new population come in, or when a particular group migrates and changes their living environment. The outcome in both scenarios is similar: a new mix, with new changes layered over old changes. This is the kind of situation that anthropo-geography often encounters. Humanity has been so restless that history and ethnology show that no social group has ever been limited to just one type of environment throughout its long journey from a primitive to a civilized society. So, when we say that a group of people is shaped by the land they occupy at a specific time, we overlook the many different countries their ancestors lived in that have influenced the current population through inherited traits and traditional customs established in those distant ancestral homelands. The Moors of Granada experienced a diverse range of ancestral backgrounds; they carried influences from Asia, Africa, and Europe, and when they were expelled from Spain, they took with them traces of their life on the peninsula back to Morocco.

A race or tribe develops certain characteristics in a certain region, then moves on, leaving the old abode but not all the accretions of custom, social organization and economic method there acquired. These travel on with the migrant people; some are dropped, others are preserved because of utility, sentiment or mere habit. For centuries after the settlement of the Jews in Palestine, traces of their pastoral life in the grasslands of Mesopotamia could be discerned in their social and political organization, in their ritual and literature. Survivals of their nomadic life in Asiatic steppes still persist among the Turks of Europe, after six centuries of sedentary life in the best agricultural land of the Balkan Peninsula. One of these appears in their choice of meat. They eat chiefly sheep and goats, beef very rarely, and swine not at all.29 The first two thrive on poor pastures and travel well, so that they are admirably adapted to nomadic life in arid lands; the last two, far less so, but on the other hand are the regular concomitant of agricultural life. The Turk's taste to-day, therefore, is determined by the flocks and herds which he once pastured on the Trans-Caspian plains. The finished terrace agriculture and methods of irrigation, which the Saracens had learned on the mountain sides of Yemen through a schooling of a thousand years or more, facilitated their economic conquest of Spain. Their intelligent exploitation of the country's resources for the support of their growing numbers in the favorable climatic conditions which Spain offered was a light-hearted task, because of the severe training which they had had in their Arabian home.

A race or tribe develops specific traits in a particular region, then moves on, leaving their old home but carrying with them some customs, social structures, and economic methods they acquired there. These practices travel with the migrating people; some are discarded, while others are kept due to their usefulness, emotional connections, or simply out of habit. For centuries after the Jews settled in Palestine, signs of their pastoral life in the grasslands of Mesopotamia could still be seen in their social and political structures, rituals, and literature. Elements of their nomadic lifestyle in the Asian steppes continue to exist among the Turks in Europe, even after six centuries of settled life in the fertile agricultural lands of the Balkan Peninsula. One of these is their choice of meat. They primarily eat sheep and goats, rarely consume beef, and completely avoid pork.29 The first two thrive on poor pastures and travel well, making them well-suited for nomadic life in dry areas; the last two are much less adaptable but are typical for agricultural living. Thus, the Turk's preferences today are shaped by the flocks and herds he once tended on the Trans-Caspian plains. The advanced terrace farming and irrigation methods that the Saracens learned in the mountains of Yemen over a thousand years greatly aided their economic takeover of Spain. Their smart use of the country’s resources to support their growing population in the favorable climate of Spain was made easier because of the rigorous training they received in their Arabian homeland.

The origin of Roman political institutions is intimately connected with conditions of the naturally small territory where arose the greatness of Rome. But now, after two thousand years we see the political impress of this narrow origin spreading to the governments of an area of Europe immeasurably larger than the region that gave it birth. In the United States, little New England has been the source of the strongest influences modifying the political, religious and cultural life of half a continent; and as far as Texas and California these influences bear the stamp of that narrow, unproductive environment which gave to its sons energy of character and ideals.

The roots of Roman political institutions are closely tied to the small territory where the greatness of Rome began. Now, after two thousand years, we can see the impact of that limited origin spreading to the governments of an area in Europe that is far larger than the region that created it. In the United States, small New England has significantly shaped the political, religious, and cultural life across half of the continent; and as far as Texas and California, these influences reflect the character and ideals that emerged from that small, unproductive environment.

Transplanted religions.

Ideas especially are light baggage, and travel with migrant peoples over many a long and rough road. They are wafted like winged seed by the wind, and strike root in regions where they could never have originated. Few classes of ideas bear so plainly the geographic stamp of their origin as religious ones, yet none have spread more widely. The abstract monotheism sprung from the bare grasslands of western Asia made slow but final headway against the exuberant forest gods of the early Germans. Religious ideas travel far from their seedbeds along established lines of communication. We have the almost amusing episode of the brawny Burgundians of the fifth century, who received the Arian form of Christianity by way of the Danube highway from the schools of Athens and Alexandria, valiantly supporting the niceties of Greek religious thought against the Roman version of the faith which came up the Rhone Valley.

Ideas, in particular, are light baggage that travel with migrating peoples over many long and rough journeys. They're carried like winged seeds by the wind and take root in places where they could never have originated. Few types of ideas show their geographical origin as clearly as religious ones, yet none have spread more widely. The abstract monotheism that emerged from the open grasslands of western Asia made slow but significant progress against the vibrant forest gods of the early Germans. Religious ideas travel far from their original sources along established routes. We see the almost amusing instance of the strong Burgundians in the fifth century, who adopted the Arian version of Christianity through the Danube highway from the schools of Athens and Alexandria, bravely defending the nuances of Greek religious thought against the Roman interpretation of the faith that came up the Rhone Valley.

If the sacred literature of Judaism and Christianity take weak hold upon the western mind, this is largely because it is written in the symbolism of the pastoral nomad. Its figures of speech reflect life in deserts and grasslands. For these figures the western mind has few or vague corresponding ideas. It loses, therefore, half the import, for instance, of the Twenty-third Psalm, that picture of the nomad shepherd guiding his flock across parched and trackless plains, to bring them at evening, weary, hungry, thirsty, to the fresh pastures and waving palms of some oasis, whose green tints stand out in vivid contrast to the tawny wastes of the encompassing sands. "He leadeth me beside the still waters," not the noisy rushing stream of the rainy lands, but the quiet desert pool that reflects the stars. What real significance has the tropical radiance of the lotus flower, the sacred symbol of Buddhism, for the Mongolian lama in the cold and arid borders of Gobi or the wind-swept highlands of sterile Tibet? And yet these exotic ideas live on, even if they no longer bloom in the uncongenial soil. But to explain them in terms of their present environment would be indeed impossible.

If the sacred texts of Judaism and Christianity have a weak impact on the Western mind, it's mainly because they use the imagery of pastoral nomads. Their metaphors reflect life in deserts and grasslands. For these images, the Western mind has few or unclear corresponding concepts. Therefore, it misses half the meaning, for example, of the Twenty-third Psalm, which depicts a nomadic shepherd leading his flock across dry and unmarked plains, bringing them in the evening, tired, hungry, and thirsty, to the lush pastures and swaying palms of an oasis, with its green colors standing out sharply against the golden expanses of the surrounding sands. "He leadeth me beside the still waters," not the noisy, rushing streams of rainy regions, but the calm desert pool that mirrors the stars. What real significance does the tropical beauty of the lotus flower, the sacred symbol of Buddhism, hold for the Mongolian lama in the cold, dry edges of the Gobi or the windswept highlands of barren Tibet? Yet these foreign ideas continue to exist, even though they no longer thrive in the unsuitable environment. However, explaining them in terms of their current surroundings would be truly impossible.

Partial response to environment

A people may present at any given time only a partial response to their environment also for other reasons. This may be either because their arrival has been too recent for the new habitat to make its influence felt; or because, even after long residence, one overpowering geographic factor has operated to the temporary exclusion of all others. Under these circumstances, suddenly acquired geographic advantages of a high order or such advantages, long possessed but tardily made available by the release of national powers from more pressing tasks, may institute a new trend of historical development, resulting more from stimulating geographic conditions than from the natural capacities or aptitudes of the people themselves. Such developments, though often brilliant, are likely to be short-lived and to end suddenly or disastrously, because not sustained by a deep-seated national impulse animating the whole mass of the people. They cease when the first enthusiasm spends itself, or when outside competition is intensified, or the material rewards decrease.

A group of people might only partially respond to their environment for various reasons. This could be because they’ve only recently arrived, and the new surroundings haven’t had enough time to influence them; or it may be that, even after living there for a long time, one dominant geographic factor has overshadowed all others temporarily. In such cases, suddenly gained significant geographic advantages, or advantages that have existed for a long time but were only recently tapped into due to the release of national resources from more urgent priorities, might lead to a new trend in historical development. This shift is often more influenced by stimulating geographic conditions than by the natural abilities or talents of the people themselves. While these developments can be impressive, they're usually short-lived and can end abruptly or poorly because they lack a strong national drive that motivates the entire population. They fade away as soon as the initial enthusiasm dies down, when external competition increases, or when material benefits diminish.

The case of Spain.

An illustration is found in the mediæval history of Spain. The intercontinental location of the Iberian Peninsula exposed it to the Saracen conquest and to the constant reinforcements to Islam power furnished by the Mohammedanized Berbers of North Africa. For seven centuries this location was the dominant geographic factor in Spain's history. It made the expulsion of the Moors the sole object of all the Iberian states, converted the country into an armed camp, made the gentleman adventurer and Christian knight the national ideal. It placed the center of political control high up on the barren plateau of Castile, far from the centers of population and culture in the river lowlands or along the coast. It excluded the industrial and commercial development which was giving bone and sinew to the other European states. The release of the national energies by the fall of Granada in 1492 and the now ingrained spirit of adventure enabled Spain and Portugal to utilize the unparalleled advantage of their geographical position at the junction of the Mediterranean and Atlantic highways, and by their great maritime explorations in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, to become foremost among European colonial powers. But the development was sporadic, not supported by any widespread national movement. In a few decades the maritime preëminence of the Iberian Peninsula began to yield to the competition of the Dutch and English, who were, so to speak, saturated with their own maritime environment. Then followed the rapid decay of the sea power of Spain, followed by that of Portugal, till by 1648 even her coasting trade was in the hands of the Dutch, and Dutch vessels were employed to maintain communication with the West Indies.30

An example can be seen in the medieval history of Spain. The Iberian Peninsula's strategic location made it vulnerable to the Saracen conquest and constantly reinforced Islamic power from the Mohammedanized Berbers of North Africa. For seven centuries, this geographical position was the key factor in Spain's history. It turned the expulsion of the Moors into the primary goal of all the Iberian states, transforming the country into a military camp and elevating the gentleman adventurer and Christian knight as the national ideal. This focus moved political control to the high, barren plateau of Castile, far away from the population and cultural centers in the river lowlands and along the coast. It stifled the industrial and commercial growth that was strengthening other European countries. The release of national energy with the fall of Granada in 1492 and a newfound spirit of adventure allowed Spain and Portugal to take advantage of their prime geographical position at the crossroads of the Mediterranean and Atlantic trade routes. Through extensive maritime exploration in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, they became leading colonial powers in Europe. However, this development was uneven and lacked a widespread national movement. Within a few decades, the maritime supremacy of the Iberian Peninsula started to decline due to competition from the Dutch and English, who were well acclimated to their own maritime environment. This led to the swift decline of Spanish sea power, followed by that of Portugal, until by 1648 even local trade was dominated by the Dutch, who were used to maintain communication with the West Indies.30

Sporadic response to a new environment.

We have a later instance of sporadic development under the stimulus of new and favorable geographic conditions, a similar anti-climax. The expansion of the Russians across the lowlands of Siberia was quite in harmony with the genius of that land-bred people; but when they reached Bering Sea, the enclosed basin, the proximity of the American continent, the island stepping-stones between, and the lure of rich sealskins to the fur-hunting Cossacks determined a sudden maritime expansion, for which the Russian people were unfitted. Beginning in 1747, it swept the coast of Alaska, located its American administrative center first on Kadiak, then on Baranof Island, and by 1812 placed its southern outposts on the California coast near San Francisco Bay and on the Farralone Islands.31 Russian convicts were employed to man the crazy boats built of green lumber on the shores of Bering Sea, and Aleutian hunters with their bidarkas were impressed to catch the seal. 32 The movement was productive only of countless shipwrecks, many seal skins, and an opportunity to satisfy an old grudge against England. The territory gained was sold to the United States in 1867. This is the one instance in Russian history of any attempt at maritime expansion, and also of any withdrawal from territory to which the Muscovite power had once established its claim. This fact alone would indicate that only excessively tempting geographic conditions led the Russians into an economic and political venture which neither the previously developed aptitudes of the people nor the conditions of population and historical development on the Siberian seaboard were able to sustain.

We see another instance of sporadic growth triggered by new and favorable geographic conditions, leading to a similar letdown. The Russians' expansion across the flatlands of Siberia matched well with the character of that land-based culture. However, when they reached Bering Sea—an enclosed body of water, close to the American continent, with islands serving as stepping stones and the appeal of valuable sealskins for the fur-hunting Cossacks—they suddenly shifted to maritime expansion, for which the Russian people were unprepared. Starting in 1747, it progressed along the Alaskan coast, first establishing its American administrative center on Kadiak, then on Baranof Island, and by 1812, it had set up southern outposts on the California coast near San Francisco Bay and on the Farralone Islands.31 Russian convicts were used to operate the makeshift boats built from green lumber along the Bering Sea shores, and Aleutian hunters with their bidarkas were recruited to catch seals. 32 The initiative resulted only in numerous shipwrecks, some seal skins, and a chance to settle an old score with England. The territory gained was sold to the United States in 1867. This is the only instance in Russian history where there was any attempt at maritime expansion, and also where there was a withdrawal from territory that the Muscovite power had once claimed. This alone suggests that only overly tempting geographic conditions led the Russians into an economic and political endeavor that neither the people’s previously developed skills nor the population and historical conditions on the Siberian coast could support.

The larger conception of the environment.

The history and culture of a people embody the effects of previous habitats and of their final environment; but this means something more than local geographic conditions. It involves influences emanating from far beyond the borders. No country, no continent, no sea, mountain or river is restricted to itself in the influence which it either exercises or receives. The history of Austria cannot be understood merely from Austrian ground. Austrian territory is part of the Mediterranean hinterland, and therefore has been linked historically with Rome, Italy, and the Adriatic. It is a part of the upper Danube Valley and therefore shares much of its history with Bavaria and Germany, while the lower Danube has linked it with the Black Sea, Greece, the Russian steppes, and Asia. The Asiatic Hungarians have pushed forward their ethnic boundary nearly to Vienna. The Austrian capital has seen the warring Turks beneath its walls, and shapes its foreign policy with a view to the relative strength of the Sultan and the Czar.

The history and culture of a people reflect the impact of their past environments and their current surroundings; but this goes beyond just local geographic conditions. It includes influences coming from far outside their borders. No country, continent, sea, mountain, or river operates in isolation in terms of the influence it exerts or receives. You can’t fully understand the history of Austria by only looking at Austrian land. Austrian territory is part of the Mediterranean area and has historically been connected to Rome, Italy, and the Adriatic. It's part of the upper Danube Valley, so it shares a lot of its history with Bavaria and Germany, while the lower Danube has connected it to the Black Sea, Greece, the Russian steppes, and Asia. The Asian Hungarians have pushed their ethnic boundary close to Vienna. The Austrian capital has witnessed the warring Turks at its gates and shapes its foreign policy based on the relative power of the Sultan and the Czar.

Unity of the earth.

The earth is an inseparable whole. Each country or sea is physically and historically intelligible only as a portion of that whole. Currents and wind-systems of the oceans modify the climate of the nearby continents, and direct the first daring navigations of their peoples. The alternating monsoons of the Indian Ocean guided Arab merchantmen from ancient times back and forth between the Red Sea and the Malabar coast of India.33 The Equatorial Current and the northeast trade-wind carried the timid ships of Columbus across the Atlantic to America. The Gulf Stream and the prevailing westerlies later gave English vessels the advantage on the return voyage. Europe is a part of the Atlantic coast. This is a fact so significant that the North Atlantic has become a European sea. The United States also is a part of the Atlantic coast: this is the dominant fact of American history. China forms a section of the Pacific rim. This is the fact back of the geographic distribution of Chinese emigration to Annam, Tonkin, Siam, Malacca, the Philippines, East Indies, Borneo, Australia, Hawaiian Islands, the Pacific Coast States, British Columbia, the Alaskan coast southward from Bristol Bay in Bering Sea, Ecuador and Peru.

The earth is a connected whole. Each country or sea makes sense only as part of that whole, both physically and historically. Ocean currents and wind patterns affect the climate of nearby continents and shape the early explorations of their people. The shifting monsoons of the Indian Ocean helped Arab traders travel between the Red Sea and the Malabar coast of India for centuries. The Equatorial Current and the northeast trade winds assisted Columbus’s ships in crossing the Atlantic to America. The Gulf Stream and prevailing westerlies later gave English ships an edge on the return trip. Europe is part of the Atlantic coast. This is such an important fact that the North Atlantic has become a European sea. The United States is also part of the Atlantic coast: this is a key fact in American history. China is part of the Pacific rim. This fact explains the geographic distribution of Chinese emigration to Annam, Tonkin, Siam, Malacca, the Philippines, East Indies, Borneo, Australia, the Hawaiian Islands, the Pacific Coast States, British Columbia, and the Alaskan coast southward from Bristol Bay in Bering Sea, as well as to Ecuador and Peru.

As the earth is one, so is humanity. Its unity of species points to some degree of communication through a long prehistoric past. Universal history is not entitled to the name unless it embraces all parts of the earth and all peoples, whether savage or civilized. To fill the gaps in the written record it must turn to ethnology and geography, which by tracing the distribution and movements of primitive peoples can often reconstruct the most important features of their history.

As the earth is one, so is humanity. Its unity as a species suggests some level of communication over a long prehistoric past. Universal history can only be called that if it includes all parts of the earth and all peoples, whether uncivilized or civilized. To fill in the gaps of the written record, it must rely on ethnology and geography, which, by mapping the distribution and movements of primitive peoples, can often piece together the most important aspects of their history.

Anthropo-geographic problems are never simple. They must all be viewed in the long perspective of evolution and the historical past. They require allowance for the dominance of different geographic factors at different periods, and for a possible range of geographic influences wide as the earth itself. In the investigator they call for pains-taking analysis and, above all, an open mind.

Anthropo-geographic issues are never straightforward. They need to be considered in the long view of evolution and history. It's important to account for the varying importance of different geographic factors at different times, as well as a wide range of geographic influences across the globe. For the researcher, this demands careful analysis and, most importantly, an open mind.


NOTES TO CHAPTER I

Chapter I Notes


1.

George Adam Smith, Historical Geography of the Holy Land, pp. 149-157. New York, 1897.

George Adam Smith, Historical Geography of the Holy Land, pp. 149-157. New York, 1897.

2.

A.P. Brigham, Geographic Influences in American History, Chap. I. Boston, 1903.

A.P. Brigham, Geographic Influences in American History, Chap. I. Boston, 1903.

3.

R.H. Whitbeck, Geographic Influences in the Development of New Jersey, Journal of Geography, Vol. V, No. 6. January, 1908.

R.H. Whitbeck, Geographic Influences on the Development of New Jersey, Journal of Geography, Vol. V, No. 6. January, 1908.

4.

Hans Helmolt, History of the World, Vol. II, p. 372. London and New York, 1902-1906.

Hans Helmolt, History of the World, Vol. II, p. 372. London and New York, 1902-1906.

5.

Jean Baptiste Tavernier, Travels in India, 1641-1667. Vol. I, chap. V and map. London, 1889.

Jean Baptiste Tavernier, Travels in India, 1641-1667. Vol. I, chap. V and map. London, 1889.

6.

Sir Thomas Holdich, India, p. 305. London, 1905.

Sir Thomas Holdich, India, p. 305. London, 1905.

7.

Bunbury, History of Ancient Geography, Vol. II, pp. 464-465, 469. London, 1883.

Bunbury, History of Ancient Geography, Vol. II, pp. 464-465, 469. London, 1883.

8.

Imperial Gazetteer for India, Vol. III, p. 109. London, 1885.

Imperial Gazetteer for India, Vol. III, p. 109. London, 1885.

9.

G.G. Chisholm, The Relativity of Geographic Advantages, Scottish Geog. Mag., Vol. XIII, No. 9, Sept. 1897.

G.G. Chisholm, The Relativity of Geographic Advantages, Scottish Geog. Mag., Vol. XIII, No. 9, Sept. 1897.

10.

Hugh Robert Mill, International Geography, p. 347. New York, 1902.

Hugh Robert Mill, International Geography, p. 347. New York, 1902.

11.

Joseph Partsch, Central Europe, pp. 228-230. London, 1903.

Joseph Partsch, Central Europe, pp. 228-230. London, 1903.

12.

H.J. Mackinder, Britain and the British Seas, pp. 317-323. London, 1904.

H.J. Mackinder, Britain and the British Seas, pp. 317-323. London, 1904.

13.

Captain A.T. Mahan, Influence of Sea Power upon History, pp. 36-38. Boston, 1902.

Captain A.T. Mahan, Influence of Sea Power on History, pp. 36-38. Boston, 1902.

14.

G.G. Chisholm, Economic Geography, Scottish Geog. Mag., March, 1908.

G.G. Chisholm, Economic Geography, Scottish Geog. Mag., March 1908.

15.

Captain A.T. Mahan, Influence of Sea Power upon History, pp. 37-38. Boston, 1902.

Captain A.T. Mahan, Influence of Sea Power on History, pp. 37-38. Boston, 1902.

16.

Boyd Winchester, The Swiss Republic, pp. 123, 124, 145-147. Philadelphia, 1891.

Boyd Winchester, The Swiss Republic, pp. 123, 124, 145-147. Philadelphia, 1891.

17.

Montesquieu, Spirit of the Laws, Book XIV, chap. IV.

Montesquieu, Spirit of the Laws, Book XIV, chap. IV.

18.

Henry Buckle, History of Civilization in England, Vol. I, pp. 86-106.

Henry Buckle, History of Civilization in England, Vol. I, pp. 86-106.

19.

Heinrich von Treitschke, Politik, Vol. I, p. 225. Leipzig, 1897. This whole chapter on Land und Leute is suggestive.

Heinrich von Treitschke, Politik, Vol. I, p. 225. Leipzig, 1897. This entire chapter on Land und Leute is thought-provoking.

20.

W.Z. Ripley, Races of Europe, pp. 524-525. New York, 1899.

W.Z. Ripley, Races of Europe, pp. 524-525. New York, 1899.

21.

Ibid., 526.

Ibid., 526.

22.

Ibid., 517-520, 533-536.

Same source, 517-520, 533-536.

23.

Joseph Partsch, Central Europe, pp. 256-257, 268-271. London, 1903.

Joseph Partsch, Central Europe, pp. 256-257, 268-271. London, 1903.

24.

W.Z. Ripley, Races of Europe, p. 89. New York, 1899.

W.Z. Ripley, Races of Europe, p. 89. New York, 1899.

25.

Strabo, Book VII, chap. I, 2.

Strabo, Book VII, chap. I, 2.

26.

Strabo, Book II, chap. III, 7.

Strabo, Book II, chap. III, 7.

27.

Plutarch, Solon, pp. 13, 29, 154.

Plutarch, Solon, pp. 13, 29, 154.

28.

Hans Helmolt, History of the World, Vol. II, pp. 244-245. New York, 1902-1906.

Hans Helmolt, History of the World, Vol. II, pp. 244-245. New York, 1902-1906.

29.

Roscher, National-oekonomik des Ackerbaues, p. 33, note 3. Stuttgart, 1888.

Roscher, National Economics of Agriculture, p. 33, note 3. Stuttgart, 1888.

30.

Captain A.T. Mahan, Influence of Sea Power upon History, pp. 41-42, 50-53. Boston, 1902.

Captain A.T. Mahan, Influence of Sea Power on History, pp. 41-42, 50-53. Boston, 1902.

31.

H. Bancroft, History of California, Vol. I, pp. 298, 628-635. San Francisco.

H. Bancroft, History of California, Vol. I, pp. 298, 628-635. San Francisco.

32.

Agnes Laut, Vikings of the Pacific, pp. 64-82. New York, 1905.

Agnes Laut, Vikings of the Pacific, pp. 64-82. New York, 1905.

33.

Bunbury, History of Ancient Geography, Vol. II, pp. 351, 470-471. London, 1883.

Bunbury, History of Ancient Geography, Vol. II, pp. 351, 470-471. London, 1883.


Chapter II—Classes Of Geographic Influences

Into almost every anthropo-geographical problem the element of environment enters in different phases, with different modes of operation and varying degrees of importance. Since the causal conception of geography demands a detailed analysis of all the relations between environment and human development, it is advisable to distinguish the various classes of geographic influences.

Into almost every human geography issue, the element of environment plays a role in different ways, with different methods of impact and varying importance. Because understanding the causes in geography requires a thorough analysis of all the relationships between the environment and human development, it’s helpful to identify the different types of geographic influences.

Physical effects.

Four fundamental classes of effects can be distinguished.

Four main types of effects can be identified.

1. The first class includes direct physical effects of environment, similar to those exerted on plants and animals by their habitat. Certain geographic conditions, more conspicuously those of climate, apply certain stimuli to which man, like the lower animals, responds by an adaption of his organism to his environment. Many physiological peculiarities of man are due to physical effects of environment, which doubtless operated very strongly in the earliest stages of human development, and in those shadowy ages contributed to the differentiation of races. The unity of the human species is as clearly established as the diversity of races and peoples, whose divergences must be interpreted chiefly as modifications in response to various habitats in long periods of time.

1. The first class includes the direct physical effects of the environment, similar to those experienced by plants and animals in their habitats. Certain geographic conditions, especially climate, exert specific stimuli to which humans, like other animals, adapt their bodies to fit their surroundings. Many of mankind's unique physical traits result from the physical effects of the environment, which likely played a significant role in the early stages of human development and contributed to the differentiation of races in those ancient times. The unity of the human species is as clearly established as the diversity of races and cultures, whose differences should primarily be understood as adaptations to varying habitats over long periods.

Variation and natural conditions.

Such modifications have probably been numerous in the persistent and unending movements, shiftings, and migrations which have made up the long prehistoric history of man. If the origin of species is found in variability and inheritance, variation is undoubtedly influenced by a change of natural conditions. To quote Darwin, "In one sense the conditions of life may be said, not only to cause variability, either directly or indirectly, but likewise to include natural selection, for the conditions determine whether this or that variety shall survive."34 The variability of man does not mean that every external influence leaves its mark upon him, but that man as an organism, by the preservation of beneficent variations and the elimination of deleterious ones, is gradually adapted to his environment, so that he can utilize most completely that which it contributes to his needs. This self-maintenance under outward influences is an essential part of the conception of life which Herbert Spencer defines as the correspondence between internal conditions and external circumstances, or August Comte as the harmony between the living being and the surrounding medium or milieu.

Such changes have likely been many in the continuous movements, shifts, and migrations that have shaped the long prehistoric history of humanity. If the origin of species lies in variability and inheritance, then variation is certainly influenced by changes in natural conditions. To quote Darwin, "In one sense the conditions of life may be said, not only to cause variability, either directly or indirectly, but likewise to include natural selection, for the conditions determine whether this or that variety shall survive."34 The variability of humans doesn't mean that every external influence leaves its mark on them, but instead that humans, as organisms, adapt to their environment over time by preserving beneficial variations and eliminating harmful ones, allowing them to make the most of what their environment provides. This ability to maintain oneself in response to external influences is a fundamental aspect of life, which Herbert Spencer defines as the correspondence between internal conditions and external circumstances, or August Comte as the harmony between the living being and the surrounding medium or milieu.

According to Virchow, the distinction of races rests upon hereditary variations, but heredity itself cannot become active till the characteristic or Zustand is produced which is to be handed down.35 But environment determines what variation shall become stable enough to be passed on by heredity. For instance, we can hardly err in attributing the great lung capacity, massive chests, and abnormally large torsos of the Quichua and Aymara Indians inhabiting the high Andean plateaus to the rarified air found at an altitude of 10,000 or 15,000 feet above sea level. Whether these have been acquired by centuries of extreme lung expansion, or represent the survival of a chance variation of undoubted advantage, they are a product of the environment. They are a serious handicap when the Aymara Indian descends to the plains, where he either dies off or leaves descendants with diminishing chests.36 [See map page 101.]

According to Virchow, the classification of races is based on hereditary variations, but heredity itself only becomes active when the characteristic or Zustand is created to be passed on.35 But the environment influences which variation becomes stable enough to be inherited. For example, it’s hard to argue against the idea that the large lung capacity, broad chests, and unusually large torsos of the Quichua and Aymara Indians living in the high Andean plateaus are a result of the thin air present at altitudes of 10,000 to 15,000 feet above sea level. Whether these traits developed through centuries of extreme lung expansion, or are simply the luck of a favorable variation, they are still a result of environmental conditions. They become a significant disadvantage when the Aymara Indian goes down to the plains, where he either dies off or has descendants with smaller chests.36 [See map page 101.]

Stature and environment

Darwin holds that many slight changes in animals and plants, such as size, color, thickness of skin and hair, have been produced through food supply and climate from the external conditions under which the forms lived.37 Paul Ehrenreich, while regarding the chief race distinctions as permanent forms, not to be explained by external conditions, nevertheless concedes the slight and slow variation of the sub-race under changing conditions of food and climate as beyond doubt.38 Stature is partly a matter of feeding and hence of geographic condition. In mountain regions, where the food resources are scant, the varieties of wild animals are characterized by smaller size in general than are corresponding species in the lowlands. It is a noticeable fact that dwarfed horses or ponies have originated in islands, in Iceland, the Shetlands, Corsica and Sardinia. This is due either to scanty and unvaried food or to excessive inbreeding, or probably to both. The horses introduced into the Falkland Islands in 1764 have deteriorated so in size and strength in a few generations that they are in a fair way to develop a Falkland variety of pony.39 On the other hand, Mr. Homer Davenport states that the pure-bred Arabian horses raised on his New Jersey stock farm are in the third generation a hand higher than their grandsires imported from Arabia, and of more angular build. The result is due to more abundant and nutritious food and the elimination of long desert journeys.

Darwin believes that many small changes in animals and plants, like size, color, and thickness of skin and hair, have come about due to food supply and climate from the external conditions where these forms lived.37 Paul Ehrenreich, while considering the main racial differences to be fixed forms that can't be explained by external conditions, still agrees that the small and slow variations of sub-races under changing food and climate conditions are undeniable.38 Height is partly determined by nutrition and thus by geographic conditions. In mountainous areas, where food is limited, the wild animals tend to be generally smaller than those in the lowlands. It’s notable that tiny horses or ponies have emerged on islands like Iceland, the Shetlands, Corsica, and Sardinia. This is likely due to limited and repetitive food sources, excessive inbreeding, or both. The horses brought to the Falkland Islands in 1764 have shrunk so much in size and strength over just a few generations that they are on track to create a distinct Falkland pony variety.39 Conversely, Mr. Homer Davenport notes that the purebred Arabian horses raised on his stock farm in New Jersey are a hand taller in their third generation compared to their grandsires brought from Arabia, and they have a more angular build. This difference is a result of having more plentiful and nutritious food and not having to endure long journeys through the desert.

The low stature of the natives prevailing in certain "misery spots" of Europe, as in the Auvergne Plateau of southern France, is due in part to race, in part to a disastrous artificial selection by the emigration of the taller and more robust individuals, but in considerable part to the harsh climate and starvation food-yield of that sterile soil; for the children of the region, if removed to the more fertile valleys of the Loire and Garonne, grow to average stature.40 The effect of a scant and uncertain food supply is especially clear in savages, who have erected fewer buffers between themselves and the pressure of environment. The Bushmen of the Kalahari Desert are shorter than their Hottentot kindred who pasture their flocks and herds in the neighboring grasslands.41 Samoyedes, Lapps, and other hyperborean races of Eurasia are shorter than their more southern neighbors, the physical record of an immemorial struggle against cold and hunger. The stunted forms and wretched aspect of the Snake Indians inhabiting the Rocky Mountain deserts distinguished these clans from the tall buffalo-hunting tribes of the plains.42 Any feature of geographic environment tending to affect directly the physical vigor and strength of a people cannot fail to prove a potent factor in their history.

The shorter height of the natives in certain "misery spots" of Europe, like the Auvergne Plateau in southern France, is partly due to race, partly due to a harmful selection process caused by the emigration of taller and stronger individuals, but largely because of the harsh climate and poor food output of that barren land; if the children from this area are moved to the more fertile valleys of the Loire and Garonne, they grow to average height.40 The impact of a limited and unreliable food supply is especially evident in primitive societies, which have created fewer barriers between themselves and environmental pressures. The Bushmen of the Kalahari Desert are shorter than their Hottentot relatives who raise livestock in the nearby grasslands.41 Samoyedes, Lapps, and other northern races of Eurasia are shorter than their southern neighbors, reflecting a long history of struggle against cold and hunger. The small stature and poor condition of the Snake Indians living in the Rocky Mountain deserts set them apart from the taller buffalo-hunting tribes of the plains.42 Any aspect of the geographic environment that directly influences the physical strength and health of a people is undoubtedly a significant factor in their history.

Physical effects of dominant activities.

Oftentimes environment modifies the physique of a people indirectly by imposing upon them certain predominant activities, which may develop one part of the body almost to the point of deformity. This is the effect of increased use or disuse which Darwin discusses. He attributes the thin legs and thick arms of the Payaguas Indians living along the Paraguay River to generations of lives spent in canoes, with the lower extremities motionless and the arm and chest muscles in constant exercise.43 Livingstone found these same characteristics of broad chests and shoulders with ill-developed legs among the Barotse of the upper Zambesi;44 and they have been observed in pronounced form, coupled with distinctly impaired powers of locomotion, among the Tlingit, Tsimshean, and Haida Indians of the southern Alaskan and British Columbia coast, where the geographic conditions of a mountainous and almost strandless shore interdicted agriculture and necessitated sea-faring activities.45 An identical environment has produced a like physical effect upon the canoemen of Tierra del Fuego46 and the Aleutian Islanders, who often sit in their boats twenty hours at a time.47 These special adaptations are temporary in their nature and tend to disappear with change of occupation, as, for instance, among the Tlingit Indians, who develop improved leg muscles when employed as laborers in the salmon canneries of British Columbia.

Often, the environment shapes the physical traits of a group of people indirectly by pushing them toward certain dominant activities, which can lead to the development of one part of the body to the point of deformity. This is the result of increased use or disuse, which Darwin discusses. He attributes the thin legs and thick arms of the Payaguas Indians living along the Paraguay River to generations spent in canoes, where their lower legs remained still while their arms and chest muscles were continuously engaged.43 Livingstone observed the same characteristics of broad chests and shoulders combined with poorly developed legs among the Barotse of the upper Zambesi;44 these traits have been seen in an exaggerated form, along with noticeably reduced mobility, among the Tlingit, Tsimshean, and Haida Indians of the southern Alaskan and British Columbia coast, where the geography of a mountainous and nearly shoreless region limited agriculture and required sea-faring activities.45 A similar environment has led to the same physical adaptations for the canoeists of Tierra del Fuego46 and the Aleutian Islanders, who frequently remain sitting in their boats for up to twenty hours at a time.47 These specific adaptations are temporary and tend to fade when occupations change, as seen with the Tlingit Indians, who develop stronger leg muscles when they work as laborers in the salmon canneries of British Columbia.

Effects of climate.

Both the direct and indirect physical effects of environment thus far instanced are obvious in themselves and easily explained. Far different is it with the majority of physical effects, especially those of climate, whose mode of operation is much more obscure than was once supposed. The modern geographer does not indulge in the naive hypothesis of the last century, which assumed a prompt and direct effect of environment upon the form and features of man. Carl Ritter regarded the small, slit eyes and swollen lids of the Turkoman as "an obvious effect of the desert upon the organism." Stanhope Smith ascribed the high shoulders and short neck of the Tartars of Mongolia to their habit of raising their shoulders to protect the neck against the cold; their small, squinting eyes, overhanging brows, broad faces and high cheek bones, to the effect of the bitter, driving winds and the glare of the snow, till, he says, "every feature by the action of the cold is harsh and distorted."48 These profound influences of a severe climate upon physiognomy he finds also among the Lapps, northern Mongolians, Samoyedes and Eskimo.

Both the direct and indirect physical effects of the environment mentioned so far are clear and easy to explain. However, most physical effects, especially those related to climate, operate in ways that are much less understood than previously thought. Today's geographers don’t subscribe to the simple ideas of the last century, which assumed that the environment directly and immediately shaped human appearance. Carl Ritter considered the small, slit eyes and swollen eyelids of the Turkoman to be "an obvious effect of the desert on the body." Stanhope Smith attributed the high shoulders and short neck of the Mongolian Tartars to their tendency to raise their shoulders to shield their necks from the cold; he suggested that their small, squinting eyes, prominent brows, broad faces, and high cheekbones result from the harsh, biting winds and the glare of the snow, leading to "every feature being harsh and distorted" due to the cold.48 He notes these significant effects of a harsh climate on appearance in the Lapps, northern Mongolians, Samoyedes, and Eskimos.

Acclimatization

Most of these problems are only secondarily grist for the geographer's mill. For instance, when the Aryans descended to the enervating lowlands of tropical India, and in that debilitating climate lost the qualities which first gave them supremacy, the change which they underwent was primarily a physiological one. It can be scientifically described and explained therefore only by physiologists and physico-chemists; and upon their investigations the geographer must wait before he approaches the problem from the standpoint of geographical distribution. Into this sub-class of physical effects come all questions of acclimatization.49 These are important to the anthropo-geographer, just as they are to colonial governments like England or France, because they affect the power of national or racial expansion, and fix the historical fate of tropical lands. The present populations of the earth represent physical adaptation to their environments. The intense heat and humidity of most tropical lands prevent any permanent occupation by a native-born population of pure whites. The catarrhal zone north of the fortieth parallel in America soon exterminates the negroes.50

Most of these issues are mainly relevant to geographers. For example, when the Aryans moved down to the draining lowlands of tropical India, they lost the qualities that initially gave them dominance due to the harsh climate. This change was mainly physiological. As a result, only physiologists and physical chemists can scientifically describe and explain this, and geographers must wait for their research before they can tackle the problem from a geographical distribution perspective. Questions of acclimatization fall into this category. These issues are significant for anthropo-geographers, just as they are for colonial governments like England or France, because they impact the potential for national or racial expansion and shape the historical fate of tropical regions. The current populations of the world reflect physical adaptation to their environments. The extreme heat and humidity in most tropical areas prevent any lasting settlement by a native-born population of pure whites. The cold zone north of the fortieth parallel in America quickly wipes out the negroes.

The Indians of South America, though all fundamentally of the same ethnic stock, are variously acclimated to the warm, damp, forested plains of the Amazon; to the hot, dry, treeless coasts of Peru; and to the cold, arid heights of the Andes. The habitat that bred them tends to hold them, by restricting the range of climate which they can endure. In the zone of the Andean slope lying between 4,000 and 6,000 feet of altitude, which produces the best flavored coffee and which must be cultivated, the imported Indians from the high plateaus and from the low Amazon plains alike sicken and die after a short time; so that they take employment on these coffee plantations for only three or five months, and then return to their own homes. Labor becomes nomadic on these slopes, and in the intervals these farm lands of intensive agriculture show the anomaly of a sparse population only of resident managers.51 Similarly in the high, dry Himalayan valley of the upper Indus, over 10,000 feet above sea level, the natives of Ladak are restricted to a habitat that yields them little margin of food for natural growth of population but forbids them to emigrate in search of more,—applies at the same time the lash to drive and the leash to hold, for these highlanders soon die when they reach the plains.52 Here are two antagonistic geographic influences at work from the same environment, one physical and the other social-economic. The Ladaki have reached an interesting resolution of these two forces by the institution of polyandry, which keeps population practically stationary.

The Indigenous people of South America, although they share the same ethnic background, have adapted to different environments: the warm, humid forests of the Amazon; the hot, dry, treeless coasts of Peru; and the cold, dry heights of the Andes. The environment that shaped them tends to hold them back by limiting the variety of climates they can tolerate. In the Andean region between 4,000 and 6,000 feet in altitude, where the best-tasting coffee is grown and needs to be cultivated, both imported Indians from the high plateaus and those from the low Amazon plains get sick and die after a short time. They typically work on these coffee plantations for only three to five months before returning home. Consequently, labor becomes nomadic in these areas, and in the gaps between harvests, these intensive agricultural lands show the odd situation of having only a small population of resident managers.51 Similarly, in the high, dry Himalayan valley of the upper Indus, over 10,000 feet above sea level, the locals of Ladak are limited by an environment that offers little food for natural population growth and prevents them from relocating in search of more. This situation combines both motivation and restriction, as these highlanders quickly perish when they descend to the plains.52 In this setting, two conflicting geographic influences operate simultaneously—one physical and the other social-economic. The Ladaki have found an intriguing balance between these forces through the practice of polyandry, which keeps their population relatively stable.

Pigmentation and climate.

The relation of pigmentation to climate has long interested geographers as a question of environment; but their speculations on the subject have been barren, because the preliminary investigations of the physiologist, physicist and chemist are still incomplete. The general fact of increasing nigrescence from temperate towards equatorial regions is conspicuous enough, despite some irregularity of the shading.53 This fact points strongly to some direct relation between climate and pigmentation, but gives no hint how the pigmental processes are affected. The physiologist finds that in the case of the negro, the dark skin is associated with a dense cuticle, diminished perspiration, smaller chests and less respiratory power, a lower temperature and more rapid pulse,54 all which variations may enter into the problem of the negroes coloring. The question is therefore by no means simple.

The connection between skin color and climate has intrigued geographers for a long time as an environmental issue; however, their theories on the topic have been unproductive because the initial research by physiologists, physicists, and chemists is still incomplete. The observable increase in skin darkness from temperate to equatorial regions is apparent, despite some inconsistencies in the shading.53 This fact strongly suggests a direct link between climate and skin color, but does not clarify how pigmentation processes are influenced. The physiologist observes that in the case of Black individuals, the dark skin is linked to a thick outer layer, reduced sweating, smaller chest sizes and lower lung capacity, a cooler body temperature, and a faster heart rate,54 all of which may play a role in the issue of skin color among Black people. Thus, the question is certainly not straightforward.

Yet it is generally conceded by scientists that pigment is a protective device of nature. The negro's skin is comparatively insensitive to a sun heat that blisters a white man. Livingstone found the bodies of albino negroes in Bechuana Land always blistered on exposure to the sun,55 and a like effect has been observed among albino Polynesians, and Melanesians of Fiji.56 Paul Ehrenreich finds that the degree of coloration depends less upon annual temperature than upon the direct effect of the sun's rays; and that therefore a people dwelling in a cool, dry climate, but exposed to the sun may be darker than another in a hot, moist climate but living in a dense forest. The forest-dwelling Botokudos of the upper San Francisco River in Brazil are fairer than the kindred Kayapo tribe, who inhabit the open campos; and the Arawak of the Purus River forests are lighter than their fellows in the central Matto Grosso.57 Sea-faring coast folk, who are constantly exposed to the sun, especially in the Tropics, show a deeper pigmentation than their kindred of the wooded interior.58 The coast Moros of western Mindanao are darker than the Subanos, their Malay brethren of the back country, the lightness of whose color can be explained by their forest life.59 So the Duallas of the Kamerun coast of Africa are darker than the Bakwiri inhabiting the forested mountains just behind them, though both tribes belong to the Bantu group of people.60 Here light, in contradistinction to heat, appears the dominant factor in pigmentation. A recent theory, advanced by von Schmaedel in 1895, rests upon the chemical power of light. It holds that the black pigment renders the negro skin insensitive to the luminous or actinic effects of solar radiation, which are far more destructive to living protoplasm than the merely calorific effects.61

Yet it's widely accepted by scientists that pigment serves as a natural protective mechanism. Black skin is relatively less sensitive to sun exposure that can blister lighter skin. Livingstone found that the bodies of albino Black individuals in Bechuana Land were always blistered when exposed to the sun,55 and a similar effect has been noted among albino Polynesians and Melanesians in Fiji.56 Paul Ehrenreich suggests that the level of pigmentation is influenced more by direct sunlight rather than the annual temperature; thus, a group living in a cool, dry area but exposed to the sun can be darker than another group in a hot, humid climate but sheltered by dense forests. The forest-dwelling Botokudos of the upper San Francisco River in Brazil are lighter than their relatives, the Kayapo tribe, who live in open fields; and the Arawak of the Purus River forests are fairer than other members of their group in central Matto Grosso.57 Coastal communities exposed to the sun, especially in tropical regions, tend to have darker skin than their relatives living in wooded areas.58 The coastal Moros of western Mindanao are darker than the Subanos, their Malay relatives from the interior, whose lighter skin can be attributed to their forest environment.59 Similarly, the Duallas of the Kamerun coast in Africa are darker than the Bakwiri who live in the forested mountains nearby, despite both tribes being part of the Bantu group.60 Here, light—contrasted with heat—appears to be the primary factor in pigmentation. A recent theory proposed by von Schmaedel in 1895 focuses on the chemical properties of light. It suggests that black pigment makes Black skin less sensitive to the destructive effects of solar radiation, which are much more harmful to living cells than just the heat effects.61

Pigmentation and altitude

Coloration responds to other more obscure influences of environment. A close connection between pigmentation and elevation above sea level has been established: a high altitude operates like a high latitude. Blondness increases appreciably on the higher slopes of the Black Forest, Vosges Mountains, and Swiss Alps, though these isolated highlands are the stronghold of the brunette Alpine race.62 Livi, in his treatise on military anthropometry, deduced a special action of mountains upon pigmentation on observing a prevailing increase of blondness in Italy above the four-hundred meter line, a phenomenon which came out as strongly in Basilicata and Calabria provinces of the south as in Piedmont and Lombardy in the north.63 The dark Hamitic Berbers of northern Africa have developed an unmistakable blond variant in high valleys of the Atlas range, which in a sub-tropical region rises to the height of 12,000 feet. Here among the Kabyles the population is fair; grey, blue or green eyes are frequent, as is also reddish blond or chestnut hair.64 Waitz long ago affirmed this tendency of mountaineers to lighter coloring from his study of primitive peoples.65 The modification can not be attributed wholly to climatic contrast between mountain and plain. Some other factor, like the economic poverty of the environment and the poor food-supply, as Livi suggests, has had a hand in the result; but just what it is or how it has operated cannot yet be defined.66

Coloration is influenced by various, less obvious environmental factors. A clear link between pigmentation and altitude has been established: being at a higher elevation is similar to being at a higher latitude. Blond hair noticeably increases on the higher slopes of the Black Forest, Vosges Mountains, and Swiss Alps, although these isolated highlands are mainly home to the brunette Alpine population.62 Livi, in his study on military anthropology, noted a specific effect of mountains on pigmentation, observing a significant increase in blondness in Italy above the four-hundred-meter mark. This occurrence is evident in both the southern provinces of Basilicata and Calabria and the northern regions of Piedmont and Lombardy.63 The dark-skinned Hamitic Berbers of northern Africa have shown a distinct blond variation in the high valleys of the Atlas Mountains, which reach elevations of 12,000 feet in a subtropical region. Here, among the Kabyles, the population is fair-skinned, and grey, blue, or green eyes are common, along with reddish blond or chestnut hair.64 Waitz noted this tendency for mountaineers to have lighter coloring based on his study of primitive peoples long ago.65 The change cannot be entirely attributed to the climatic differences between mountains and plains. Other factors, like the economic hardships of the environment and limited food supplies, as Livi suggests, have also played a role; however, the exact influence or mechanism behind this is still unclear.66

Difficulty of Generalization

Enough has been said to show that the geographer can formulate no broad generalization as to the relation of pigmentation and climate from the occurrence of the darkest skins in the Tropics; because this fact is weakened by the appearance also of lighter tints in the hottest districts, and of darker ones in arctic and temperate regions. The geographer must investigate the questions when and where deeper shades develop in the skins of fair races; what is the significance of dark skins in the cold zones and of fair ones in hot zones. His answer must be based largely on the conclusions of physiologists and physicists, and only when these have reached a satisfactory solution of each detail of the problem can the geographer summarize the influence of environment upon pigmentation. The rule can therefore safely be laid down that in all investigation of geographic influences upon the permanent physical characteristics of races, the geographic distribution of these should be left out of consideration till the last, since it so easily misleads.67 Moreover, owing to the ceaseless movements of mankind, these effects do not remain confined to the region that produced them, but pass on with the wandering throng in whom they have once developed, and in whom they endure or vanish according as they prove beneficial or deleterious in the new habitat.

Enough has been said to show that geographers can’t make broad generalizations about the relationship between skin color and climate just based on the fact that the darkest skin tones are found in the Tropics; this observation is complicated by the presence of lighter skin tones in the hottest areas and darker tones in colder and temperate regions. Geographers need to investigate when and where deeper skin tones appear in lighter-skinned populations, and what dark skin means in cold climates versus light skin in hot climates. Their answers must rely heavily on the findings of physiologists and physicists, and only when these scientists have resolved all the details of the problem can geographers summarize how the environment influences pigmentation. It's safe to say that in any study of geographical impacts on the physical characteristics of different races, the geographical distribution of these characteristics should be considered only at the end, as it can easily lead to misconceptions.67 Additionally, because of the constant movement of people, these effects don't stay confined to their original regions but travel with the groups who first developed them, continuing or disappearing based on whether they are beneficial or harmful in the new environment.

Psychical effects.

II. More varied and important are the psychical effects of geographic environment. As direct effects they are doubtless bound up in many physiological modifications; and as influences of climate, they help differentiate peoples and races in point of temperament. They are reflected in man's religion and his literature, in his modes of thought and figures of speech. Blackstone states that "in the Isle of Man, to take away a horse or ox was no felony, but a trespass, because of the difficulty in that little territory to conceal them or to carry them off; but to steal a pig or a fowl, which is easily done, was a capital misdemeanour, and the offender punished with death." The judges or deemsters in this island of fishermen swore to execute the laws as impartially "as the herring's backbone doth lie in the middle of the fish."68 The whole mythology of the Polynesians is an echo of the encompassing ocean. The cosmography of every primitive people, their first crude effort in the science of the universe, bears the impress of their habitat. The Eskimo's hell is a place of darkness, storm and intense cold;69 the Jew's is a place of eternal fire. Buddha, born in the steaming Himalayan piedmont, fighting the lassitude induced by heat and humidity, pictured his heaven as Nirvana, the cessation of all activity and individual life.

II. The psychological effects of geographic environment are more varied and significant. Directly, they are definitely linked to many physiological changes; and as climate influences, they help to distinguish different peoples and races based on temperament. These effects are seen in human religion and literature, as well as in ways of thinking and expressions. Blackstone notes that "in the Isle of Man, taking a horse or ox was not a felony, but a trespass, due to the difficulty of concealing or moving them in such a small territory; however, stealing a pig or a chicken, which can be done easily, was considered a serious crime and punished by death." The judges, or deemsters, on this island of fishermen vowed to enforce the laws as fairly "as the herring's backbone lies in the middle of the fish."68 The entire mythology of the Polynesians reflects the surrounding ocean. The cosmography of every primitive society, their first basic attempt at understanding the universe, shows the influence of their environment. The Eskimo's version of hell is a place of darkness, storms, and extreme cold;69 while the Jew's conception is a place of eternal fire. Buddha, who was born in the humid Himalayan foothills and struggled against the lethargy caused by heat and moisture, envisioned his paradise as Nirvana, the end of all activity and individual existence.

Indirect effect upon language

Intellectual effects of environment may appear in the enrichment of a language in one direction to a rare nicety of expression; but this may be combined with a meager vocabulary in all other directions. The greatest cattle-breeders among the native Africans, such as the Hereros of western Damaraland and the Dinkas of the upper White Nile, have an amazing choice of words for all colors describing their animals—brown, dun, red, white, dapple, and so on in every gradation of shade and hue. The Samoyedes of northern Russia have eleven or twelve terms to designate the various grays and browns of their reindeer, despite their otherwise low cultural development.70 The speech of nomads has an abundance of expressions for cattle in every relation of life. It includes different words for breeding, pregnancy, death, and slaughtering in relation to every different kind of domestic animal. The Magyars, among whom pastoral life still survives on the low plains of the Danube and Theiss, have a generic word for herd, csorda, and special terms for herds of cattle, horses, sheep, and swine.71 While the vocabulary of Malays and Polynesians is especially rich in nautical terms, the Kirghis shepherd tribes who wander over the highlands of western Asia from the Tian Shan to the Hindu Kush have four different terms for four kinds of mountain passes. A daban is a difficult, rocky defile; an art is very high and dangerous; a bel is a low, easy pass, and a kutal is a broad opening between low hills.72

The intellectual impact of the environment can show in how a language develops, becoming exceptionally precise in one area while lacking vocabulary in others. The top cattle breeders among native Africans, like the Hereros of western Damaraland and the Dinkas of the upper White Nile, have an incredible range of words for colors when describing their animals—brown, dun, red, white, dapple, and every shade in between. The Samoyedes in northern Russia have eleven or twelve words to describe the various grays and browns of their reindeer, even with their overall limited cultural development.70 Nomadic speech is rich in terms related to cattle in every aspect of life. It includes distinct words for breeding, pregnancy, death, and slaughtering concerning each kind of domestic animal. The Magyars, where pastoral life continues to thrive on the low plains of the Danube and Theiss, have a general term for herd, csorda, along with specific words for herds of cattle, horses, sheep, and pigs.71 While Malays and Polynesians have a particularly rich vocabulary in nautical terms, the Kirghis shepherd tribes roaming the highlands of western Asia from Tian Shan to Hindu Kush use four different terms for four types of mountain passes. A daban refers to a difficult, rocky gorge; an art describes something very high and dangerous; a bel is a low, easy pass, and a kutal is a wide opening between low hills.72

To such influences man is a passive subject, especially in the earlier stages of his development; but there are more important influences emanating from his environment which affect him as an active agent, challenge his will by furnishing the motives for its exercise, give purpose to his activities, and determine the direction which they shall take.73 These mold his mind and character through the media of his economic and social life, and produce effects none the less important because they are secondary. About these anthropo-geography can reach surer conclusions than regarding direct psychical effects, because it can trace their mode of operation as well as define the result. Direct psychical effects are more matters of conjecture, whose causation is asserted rather than proved. They seem to float in the air, detached from the solid ground under foot, and are therefore subject matter for the psychologist rather than the geographer.

To such influences, a person is a passive subject, especially in the earlier stages of development; however, there are more significant influences from the environment that affect him as an active agent, challenge his will by providing motives for action, give purpose to his activities, and determine their direction.73 These shape his mind and character through the lenses of his economic and social life and produce effects that are no less important simply because they are secondary. Anthropo-geography can draw more reliable conclusions about these influences than about direct psychological effects, as it can trace how they operate as well as define the outcomes. Direct psychological effects are often more about speculation, with their causes asserted rather than proven. They seem to exist in a vacuous space, disconnected from the solid ground beneath, making them more relevant to psychologists than geographers.

The great man in history.

What of the great man in this geographical interpretation of history? It seems to take no account of him, or to put him into the melting-pot with the masses. Both are to some extent true. As a science, anthropo-geography can deal only with large averages, and these exclude or minimize the exceptional individual. Moreover, geographic conditions which give this or that bent to a nation's purposes and determine its aggregate activities have a similar effect upon the individual; but he may institute a far-seeing policy, to whose wisdom only gradually is the people awakened. The acts of the great man are rarely arbitrary or artificial; he accelerates or retards the normal course of development, but cannot turn it counter to the channels of natural conditions. As a rule he is a product of the same forces that made his people. He moves with them and is followed by them under a common impulse. Daniel Boone, that picturesque figure leading the van of the westward movement over the Allegheny Mountains, was born of his frontier environment and found a multitude of his kind in that region of backwoods farms to follow him into the wilderness. Thomas Jefferson of Virginia, in the Louisiana Purchase, carried out the policy of expansion adumbrated in Governor Spottswood's expedition with the Knights of the Golden Horseshoe over the Blue Ridge in 1712. Jefferson's daring consummation of the purchase without government authority showed his community of purpose with the majority of the people. Peter the Great's location of his capital at St. Petersburg, usually stigmatized as the act of a despot, was made in response to natural conditions offering access to the Baltic nations, just as certainly as ten centuries before similar conditions and identical advantages led the early Russian merchants to build up a town at nearby Novgorod, in easy water connection with the Baltic commerce.74

What about the great individuals in this geographical interpretation of history? It seems to overlook them or lump them together with the masses. Both perspectives hold some truth. As a science, anthropo-geography can only deal with broad averages, which tend to exclude or minimize exceptional individuals. Moreover, geographic conditions that shape a nation's goals and determine its collective actions also impact individuals; however, an individual may develop a visionary policy that the people gradually come to recognize as wise. The actions of great individuals are rarely random or superficial; they may speed up or slow down the natural course of development, but they can't change it against the backdrop of natural conditions. Generally, they are products of the same forces that formed their people. They progress alongside them and are driven by a shared motivation. Daniel Boone, that iconic figure leading the westward expansion over the Allegheny Mountains, was shaped by his frontier background and found many others like him in that area of rural farms ready to follow him into the wilderness. Thomas Jefferson from Virginia, in the Louisiana Purchase, executed the expansionist policy hinted at in Governor Spottswood's expedition with the Knights of the Golden Horseshoe over the Blue Ridge in 1712. Jefferson's bold completion of the purchase without government approval reflected his alignment with the majority of the people. Peter the Great's decision to establish his capital at St. Petersburg, often criticized as the act of a tyrant, was a response to natural conditions that provided access to the Baltic nations, just as similar factors had prompted early Russian traders to establish a town at nearby Novgorod, easily linked by water to Baltic commerce.74

Economic and social effects.

III. Geographic conditions influence the economic and social development of a people by the abundance, paucity, or general character of the natural resources, by the local ease or difficulty of securing the necessaries of life, and by the possibility of industry and commerce afforded by the environment. From the standpoint of production and exchange, these influences are primarily the subject matter of economic and commercial geography; but since they also permeate national life, determine or modify its social structure, condemn it to the dwarfing effects of national poverty, or open to it the cultural and political possibilities resident in national wealth, they are legitimate material also for anthropo-geography.

III. Geographic conditions impact the economic and social development of a community through the abundance, scarcity, or overall character of natural resources, by how easy or hard it is to secure the essentials of life locally, and by the potential for industry and commerce provided by the environment. From the perspective of production and trade, these influences are mainly the focus of economic and commercial geography; however, since they also influence national life, shape or change its social structure, restrict it to the limiting effects of national poverty, or open it to the cultural and political opportunities that come with national wealth, they are also relevant to anthropo-geography.

Size of the social group.

They are especially significant because they determine the size of the social group. This must be forever small in areas of limited resources or of limited extent, as in the little islands of the world and the yet smaller oases. The desert of Chinese Turkestan supports, in certain detached spots of river-born fertility, populations like the 60,000 of Kashgar, and from this size groups all the way down to the single families which Younghusband found living by a mere trickle of a stream flowing down the southern slope of the Tian Shan. Small islands, according to their size, fertility, and command of trade, may harbor a sparse and scant population, like the five hundred souls struggling for an ill-fed existence on the barren Westman Isles of Iceland; or a compact, teeming, yet absolutely small social group, like that crowding Malta or the Bermudas. Whether sparsely or compactly distributed, such groups suffer the limitations inherent in their small size. They are forever excluded from the historical significance attaching to the large, continuously distributed populations of fertile continental lands.

They are particularly important because they determine the size of the social group. This size must always be small in areas with limited resources or limited space, like the little islands of the world and even smaller oases. The desert of Chinese Turkestan supports populations like the 60,000 in Kashgar in certain fertile spots by rivers, and there are groups that range all the way down to the single families that Younghusband found living by a small stream flowing down the southern slope of the Tian Shan. Small islands, depending on their size, fertility, and trade opportunities, may have a sparse population, like the five hundred people struggling to survive on the barren Westman Isles of Iceland, or a dense but still small social group, like the ones in Malta or the Bermudas. Regardless of whether they are spread out or close together, these groups face the limitations that come with their small size. They are always excluded from the historical significance that comes with large, continuously spread populations in fertile continental areas.

Effect upon movements of peoples.

IV. The next class belongs exclusively to the domain of geography, because it embraces the influence of the features of the earth's surface in directing the movements and ultimate distribution of mankind. It includes the effect of natural barriers, like mountains, deserts, swamps, and seas, in obstructing or deflecting the course of migrating people and in giving direction to national expansion; it considers the tendency of river valleys and treeless plains to facilitate such movements, the power of rivers, lakes, bays and oceans either to block the path or open a highway, according as navigation is in a primitive or advanced stage; and finally the influence of all these natural features in determining the territory which a people is likely to occupy, and the boundaries which shall separate from their neighbors.

IV. The next category is purely about geography because it looks at how the earth's surface shapes the movements and ultimate distribution of people. It considers how natural barriers like mountains, deserts, swamps, and seas can block or redirect migrations and influence national growth. It also examines how river valleys and open plains facilitate those movements, while rivers, lakes, bays, and oceans can either obstruct paths or create routes, depending on whether navigation is basic or advanced. Lastly, it discusses how all these natural features impact where a population is likely to settle and the borders that will separate them from their neighbors.

River routes.

The lines of expansion followed by the French and English in the settlement of America and also the extent of territory covered by each were powerfully influenced by geographic conditions. The early French explorers entered the great east-west waterway of the St. Lawrence River and the Great Lakes, which carried them around the northern end of the Appalachian barrier into the heart of the continent, planted them on the low, swampy, often navigable watershed of the Mississippi, and started them on another river voyage of nearly two thousand miles to the Gulf of Mexico. Here were the conditions and temptation for almost unlimited expansion; hence French Canada reached to the head of Lake Superior, and French Louisiana to the sources of the Missouri, To the lot of the English fell a series of short rivers with fertile valleys, nearly barred at their not distant sources by a wall of forested mountains, but separated from one another by low watersheds which facilitated lateral expansion over a narrow belt between mountains and sea. Here a region of mild climate and fertile soil suited to agriculture, enclosed by strong natural boundaries, made for compact settlement, in contrast to the wide diffusion of the French. Later, when a growing population pressed against the western barrier, mountain gates opened at Cumberland Gap and the Mohawk Valley; the Ohio River and the Great Lakes became interior thoroughfares, and the northwestern prairies lines of least resistance to the western settler. Rivers played the same part in directing and expediting this forward movement, as did the Lena and the Amoor in the Russian advance into Siberia, the Humber and the Trent in the progress of the Angles into the heart of Britain, the Rhone and Danube in the march of the Romans into central Europe.

The paths of expansion taken by the French and English in settling America, as well as the areas each covered, were greatly shaped by geographic conditions. The early French explorers navigated the vast east-west waterway of the St. Lawrence River and the Great Lakes, which led them around the northern edge of the Appalachian Mountains into the continent’s interior, placing them on the low, swampy, often navigable watershed of the Mississippi. This launched them on another river journey of nearly two thousand miles to the Gulf of Mexico. These conditions presented opportunities for almost unlimited expansion; as a result, French Canada extended to the head of Lake Superior, and French Louisiana reached the sources of the Missouri. The English, on the other hand, were limited to a series of shorter rivers with fertile valleys, nearly blocked at their nearby sources by a wall of forested mountains, but separated by low watersheds that allowed for lateral expansion over a narrow area between mountains and sea. This region, with its mild climate and fertile soil conducive to agriculture, surrounded by strong natural boundaries, supported compact settlement, unlike the broader dispersion of the French. Later, as a growing population pushed against the western barrier, access points opened at Cumberland Gap and the Mohawk Valley; the Ohio River and the Great Lakes became key routes for travel, and the northwestern prairies provided easier paths for western settlers. Rivers played a similar role in guiding and speeding up this movement, just as the Lena and the Amur did for the Russians advancing into Siberia, the Humber and the Trent did for the Angles moving into central Britain, and the Rhone and Danube did for the Romans marching into central Europe.

Segregation and accessibility.

The geographical environment of a people may be such as to segregate them from others, and thereby to preserve or even intensify their natural characteristics; or it may expose them to extraneous influences, to an infusion of new blood and new ideas, till their peculiarities are toned down, their distinctive features of dialect or national dress or provincial customs eliminated, and the people as a whole approach to the composite type of civilized humanity. A land shut off by mountains or sea from the rest of the world tends to develop a homogeneous people, since it limits or prevents the intrusion of foreign elements; or when once these are introduced, it encourages their rapid assimilation by the strongly interactive life of a confined locality. Therefore large or remote islands are, as a rule, distinguished by the unity of their inhabitants in point of civilization and race characteristics. Witness Great Britain, Ireland, Japan, Iceland, as also Australia and New Zealand at the time of their discovery. The highlands of the Southern Appalachians, which form the "mountain backyards" of Kentucky, Tennessee and North Carolina, are peopled by the purest English stock in the United States, descendants of the backwoodsmen of the late eighteenth century. Difficulty of access and lack of arable land have combined to discourage immigration. In consequence, foreign elements, including the elsewhere ubiquitous negro, are wanting, except along the few railroads which in recent years have penetrated this country. Here survive an eighteenth century English, Christmas celebrated on Twelfth Night, the spinning wheel, and a belief in Joshua's power to arrest the course of the sun.75

The geographical environment of a group of people can either isolate them from others, preserving or even intensifying their natural traits, or it can expose them to outside influences, introducing new ideas and bloodlines until their unique characteristics, like dialect, national dress, or local customs, fade away. This can lead to the group becoming more like a composite type of civilized humanity. A land that is cut off by mountains or sea tends to develop a more uniform population because it limits or prevents foreign influences; once these influences are introduced, the strong interactions within a confined area encourage quick assimilation. Thus, large or isolated islands generally show a unity among their people in terms of civilization and racial traits. Examples include Great Britain, Ireland, Japan, Iceland, as well as Australia and New Zealand at the time of their discovery. The Southern Appalachian highlands, which are the "mountain backyards" of Kentucky, Tennessee, and North Carolina, are inhabited by the purest English ancestry in the United States, descendants of the backwoodsmen from the late 18th century. The challenging access and lack of arable land have helped to limit immigration. As a result, foreign elements, including the widely present African American population, are minimal, except along the few railroads that have recently entered this area. Here, you can still find an 18th-century English lifestyle, Christmas celebrated on Twelfth Night, the spinning wheel, and a belief in Joshua's ability to stop the sun's movement.75

An easily accessible land is geographically hospitable to all new-comers, facilitates the mingling of peoples, the exchange of commodities and ideas. The amalgamation of races in such regions depends upon the similarity or diversity of the ethnic elements and the duration of the common occupation. The broad, open valley of the Danube from the Black Sea to Vienna contains a bizarre mixture of several stocks—Turks, Bulgarians, various families of pure Slavs, Roumanians, Hungarians, and Germans. These elements are too diverse and their occupation of the valley too recent for amalgamation to have advanced very far as yet. The maritime plain and open river valleys of northern France show a complete fusion of the native Celts with the Saxons, Franks, and Normans who have successively drifted into the region, just as the Teutonic and scanter Slav elements have blended in the Baltic plains from the Elbe to the Vistula.

An easily accessible land is welcoming to all newcomers, encouraging the mingling of people, and the exchange of goods and ideas. The blending of races in these areas depends on how similar or diverse the ethnic groups are and how long they have been together. The wide open valley of the Danube, stretching from the Black Sea to Vienna, has a strange mix of various groups—Turks, Bulgarians, different families of pure Slavs, Romanians, Hungarians, and Germans. These groups are too diverse, and their presence in the valley is too recent for merging to have progressed very far yet. The coastal plain and open river valleys of northern France show a complete blending of the native Celts with the Saxons, Franks, and Normans who have gradually settled in the area, just as the Teutonic and smaller Slav populations have mixed in the Baltic plains from the Elbe to the Vistula.

Change of habitat.

Here are four different classes of geographic influences, all which may become active in modifying a people when it changes its habitat. Many of the characteristics acquired in the old home still live on, or at best yield slowly to the new environment. This is especially true of the direct physical and psychical effects. But a country may work a prompt and radical change in the social organization of an immigrant people by the totally new conditions of economic life which it presents. These may be either greater wealth or poverty of natural resources than the race has previously known, new stimulants or deterrents to commerce and intercourse, and new conditions of climate which affect the efficiency of the workman and the general character of production. From these a whole complex mass of secondary effects may follow.

Here are four different types of geographic influences that can change a community when they move to a new area. Many traits from their old home persist, or change slowly in response to the new environment. This is particularly true for direct physical and mental effects. However, a country can cause significant and quick changes in the social structure of immigrant communities due to entirely new economic conditions it offers. These might include either greater wealth or less access to natural resources than the group has experienced before, new opportunities or obstacles for trade and interaction, and different climate conditions that impact workers' efficiency and overall production quality. From these factors, a variety of secondary effects can arise.

The Aryans and Mongols, leaving their homes in the cool barren highlands of Central Asia where nature dispensed her gifts with a miserly hand, and coming down to the hot, low, fertile plains of the Indian rivers, underwent several fundamental changes in the process of adaptation to their new environment. An enervating climate did its work in slaking their energies; but more radical still was the change wrought by the contrast of poverty and abundance, enforced asceticism and luxury, presented by the old and new home. The restless, tireless shepherds became a sedentary, agricultural people; the abstemious nomads,—spare, sinewy, strangers to indulgence—became a race of rulers, revelling in luxury, lording it over countless subjects; finally, their numbers increased rapidly, no longer kept down by the scant subsistence of arid grasslands and scattered oases.

The Aryans and Mongols, leaving their homes in the cool, barren highlands of Central Asia, where nature offered its gifts sparingly, and moving down to the hot, low, fertile plains of the Indian rivers, underwent several significant changes as they adapted to their new environment. The exhausting climate drained their energy; but even more impactful was the stark difference between poverty and abundance, enforced self-discipline and luxury, that they experienced between their old and new homes. The restless, tireless shepherds transformed into a settled, agricultural society; the disciplined nomads—lean, tough, and unaccustomed to excess—became a ruling class, indulging in luxury and dominating countless subjects; ultimately, their population grew rapidly, no longer limited by the meager resources of dry grasslands and scattered oases.

In a similar way, the Arab of the desert became transformed into the sedentary lord of Spain. In the luxuriance of field and orchard which his skilful methods of irrigation and tillage produced, in the growing predominance of the intellectual over the nomadic military life, of the complex affairs of city and mart over the simple tasks of herdsman or cultivator, he lost the benefit of the early harsh training and therewith his hold upon his Iberian empire. Biblical history gives us the picture of the Sheik Abraham, accompanied by his nephew Lot, moving up from the rainless plains of Mesopotamia with his flocks and herds into the better watered Palestine. There his descendants in the garden land of Canaan became an agricultural people; and the problem of Moses and the Judges was to prevent their assimilation in religion and custom to the settled Semitic tribes about them, and to make them preserve the ideals born in the starry solitudes of the desert.

In a similar way, the desert Arab became the settled ruler of Spain. In the richness of fields and orchards that his skilled irrigation and farming methods created, and with the growing importance of intellectual pursuits over the nomadic warrior lifestyle, as well as the complex activities of city and market over the simple tasks of herding or farming, he lost the advantages of his early tough training and, along with it, his grip on his Iberian empire. Biblical history shows us the image of Sheikh Abraham, accompanied by his nephew Lot, moving from the arid plains of Mesopotamia with his flocks and herds into the better-watered Palestine. There, his descendants in the fertile land of Canaan became an agricultural society; the challenge for Moses and the Judges was to prevent them from blending in the religion and customs of the settled Semitic tribes around them, and to ensure they maintained the ideals that originated in the starry solitude of the desert.

Retrogression in new habitat.

The change from the nomadic to the sedentary life represents an economic advance. Sometimes removal to strongly contrasted geographic conditions necessitates a reversion to a lower economic type of existence. The French colonists who came to Lower Canada in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries found themselves located in a region of intense cold, where arable soil was inferior in quality and limited in amount, producing no staple like the tobacco of Virginia or the wheat of Maryland or the cotton of South Carolina or the sugar of the West Indies, by which a young colony might secure a place in European trade. But the snow-wrapped forests of Canada yielded an abundance of fur-bearing animals, the fineness and thickness of whose pelts were born of this frozen north. Into their remotest haunts at the head of Lake Superior or of Hudson Bay, long lines of rivers and lakes opened level water roads a thousand miles or more from the crude little colonial capital at Quebec. And over in Europe beaver hats and fur-trimmed garments were all the style! So the plodding farmer from Normandy and the fisherman from Poitou, transferred to Canadian soil, were irresistibly drawn into the adventurous life of the trapper and fur-trader. The fur trade became the accepted basis of colonial life; the voyageur and courier de bois, clad in skins, paddling up ice-rimmed streams in their birch-bark canoes, fraternizing with Indians who were their only companions in that bleak interior, and married often to dusky squaws, became assimilated to the savage life about them and reverted to the lower hunter stage of civilization.76

The shift from a nomadic lifestyle to a settled one marks an economic step forward. Sometimes, moving to vastly different geographic conditions forces a return to a more primitive economic existence. The French colonists who arrived in Lower Canada during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries found themselves in a region of harsh winters, where the quality and amount of arable land were lacking, producing no staple like Virginia's tobacco, Maryland's wheat, South Carolina's cotton, or the West Indies' sugar, which would help a young colony enter European trade. However, the snow-covered forests of Canada provided a wealth of fur-bearing animals, whose high-quality pelts thrived in the cold north. Vast networks of rivers and lakes created accessible waterways a thousand miles or more from the small colonial capital in Quebec. Meanwhile, beaver hats and fur-trimmed clothing were all the rage in Europe! So, the hardworking farmer from Normandy and the fisherman from Poitou, when they arrived in Canada, were irresistibly drawn into the adventurous world of trapping and fur trading. The fur trade became the foundation of colonial life; the voyageur and courier de bois, dressed in animal skins, paddling up icy streams in their birch-bark canoes, mingling with the Indigenous people who were their only companions in that harsh wilderness, and often marrying Indigenous women, adapted to the wild way of life around them and reverted to a more primitive hunter stage of civilization.76

The Boers of South Africa

Another pronounced instance of rapid retrogression under new unfavorable geographic conditions is afforded by the South African Boer. The transfer from the busy commercial cities of the Rhine mouths to the far-away periphery of the world's trade, from the intensive agriculture of small deltaic gardens and the scientific dairy farming of the moist Netherlands to the semi-arid pastures of the high, treeless veldt, where they were barred from contact with the vivifying sea and its ship-borne commerce, has changed the enterprising seventeenth century Hollander into the conservative pastoral Boer. Dutch cleanliness has necessarily become a tradition to a people who can scarcely find water for their cattle. The comfort and solid bourgeois elegance of the Dutch home lost its material equipment in the Great Trek, when the long wagon journey reduced household furniture to its lowest terms. House-wifely habits and order vanished in the semi-nomadic life which followed.77 The gregarious instinct, bred by the closely-packed population of little Holland, was transformed to a love of solitude, which in all lands characterizes the people of a remote and sparsely inhabited frontier. It is a common saying that the Boer cannot bear to see another man's smoke from his stoep, just as the early Trans-Allegheny pioneer was always on the move westward, because he could not bear to hear his neighbor's watch-dog bark. Even the Boer language has deteriorated under the effects of isolation and a lower status of civilization. The native Taal differs widely from the polished speech of Holland; it preserves some features of the High Dutch of two centuries ago, but has lost inflexions and borrowed words for new phenomena from the English, Kaffirs and Hottentots; can express no abstract ideas, only the concrete ideas of a dull, work-a-day world.78

Another clear example of rapid decline due to new unfavorable geographic conditions is the South African Boer. The move from the bustling commercial cities at the mouths of the Rhine to the far-off edge of global trade, from the intensive farming of small delta gardens and scientific dairy farming in the wet Netherlands to the semi-arid grasslands of the high, treeless veldt, where they were cut off from the revitalizing sea and its maritime trade, has turned the enterprising 17th-century Hollander into the conservative pastoral Boer. Dutch cleanliness has inevitably become a tradition for a people who can hardly find water for their cattle. The comfort and solid middle-class elegance of the Dutch home lost its material possessions during the Great Trek, when the long journey in wagons reduced household items to the bare essentials. Domestic habits and order disappeared in the semi-nomadic life that followed. The social instinct, developed by the densely populated little Holland, was transformed into a craving for solitude, which characterizes the people of a remote and sparsely populated frontier in every country. It's a common saying that the Boer can't stand to see another man's smoke from his stoep, just as early pioneers in the Trans-Allegheny region were always moving west because they couldn't tolerate the barking of their neighbor's watchdog. Even the Boer language has declined due to the effects of isolation and a lower level of civilization. The native Taal differs significantly from the refined speech of Holland; it retains some features of the High Dutch from two centuries ago but has lost inflections and borrowed words for new things from English, Kaffirs, and Hottentots. It can't express abstract ideas, only the concrete thoughts of a dull, everyday world.

The new habitat may eliminate many previously acquired characteristics and hence transform a people, as in the case of the Boers; or it may intensify tribal or national traits, as in the seafaring propensities of the Angles and Saxons when transferred to Britain, and of the seventeenth century English when transplanted to the indented coasts of New England; or it may tolerate mere survival or the slow dissuetude of qualities which escape any particular pressure in the new environment, and which neither benefit nor handicap in the modified struggle for existence.

The new environment might get rid of many traits that were previously developed, thereby changing a group of people, like with the Boers. Alternatively, it could enhance tribal or national characteristics, similar to how the seafaring tendencies of the Angles and Saxons became more pronounced when they moved to Britain, or how 17th-century English settlers displayed these traits when they settled along the coasts of New England. It might also allow for the mere survival or gradual fading away of traits that are not particularly affected by the new surroundings, traits that neither help nor hinder in the altered fight for survival.


NOTES TO CHAPTER II

Notes on Chapter II


34.

Darwin, Origin of Species, Chap. V, p. 166. New York, 1895.

Darwin, Origin of Species, Chap. V, p. 166. New York, 1895.

35.

R. Virchow, Rassenbildung und Erblichkeit, Bastian Festschrift,pp. 14, 43, 44. Berlin, 1896.

R. Virchow, Rassenbildung und Erblichkeit, Bastian Festschrift, pp. 14, 43, 44. Berlin, 1896.

36.

Darwin, Descent of Man, pp. 34-35. New York, 1899.

Darwin, Descent of Man, pp. 34-35. New York, 1899.

37.

Darwin, Origin of Species, Chap. I, pp. 8-9. New York, 1895.

Darwin, Origin of Species, Chap. I, pp. 8-9. New York, 1895.

38.

P. Ehrenreich, Die Urbewohner Brasiliens, p. 30. Braunschweig, 1897.

P. Ehrenreich, Die Urbewohner Brasiliens, p. 30. Braunschweig, 1897.

39.

Ratzel, Die Erde und das Leben, Vol. I, pp. 364, 365. Leipzig and Vienna, 1901.

Ratzel, The Earth and Life, Vol. I, pp. 364, 365. Leipzig and Vienna, 1901.

40.

W.Z. Ripley, Races of Europe, pp. 79-86, 96, 100. New York, 1899.

W.Z. Ripley, Races of Europe, pp. 79-86, 96, 100. New York, 1899.

41.

T. Waitz, Anthropology, pp. 57-58. Edited by J.F. Collingwood. London, 1863.

T. Waitz, Anthropology, pp. 57-58. Edited by J.F. Collingwood. London, 1863.

42.

Schoolcraft, Indian Tribes of the United States, Vol. I, pp. 198-200, 219. Philadelphia, 1853.

Schoolcraft, Indian Tribes of the United States, Vol. I, pp. 198-200, 219. Philadelphia, 1853.

43.

Darwin, Descent of Man, p. 33. New York, 1899.

Darwin, Descent of Man, p. 33. New York, 1899.

44.

D. Livingstone, Missionary Travels, p. 266. New York, 1858.

D. Livingstone, Missionary Travels, p. 266. New York, 1858.

45.

Alaska, Eleventh Census Report, pp. 54, 56. Washington, 1893, and Albert P. Niblack, The Coast Indians of Southern Alaska and Northern British Columbia, p. 237. Washington, 1888.

Alaska, Eleventh Census Report, pp. 54, 56. Washington, 1893, and Albert P. Niblack, The Coast Indians of Southern Alaska and Northern British Columbia, p. 237. Washington, 1888.

46.

Fitz-Roy, Voyage of the Beagle, Vol. II, pp. 130-132, 137, 138. London, 1839.

Fitz-Roy, Voyage of the Beagle, Vol. II, pp. 130-132, 137, 138. London, 1839.

47.

H. Bancroft, Native Races, Vol. I, pp. 88-89. San Francisco, 1886.

H. Bancroft, Native Races, Vol. I, pp. 88-89. San Francisco, 1886.

48.

S. Stanhope Smith, Essay on the Causes of the Variety of Complexion and Figure in the Human Species, pp. 103-110. New Brunswick and New York, 1810.

S. Stanhope Smith, Essay on the Causes of the Variety of Complexion and Figure in the Human Species, pp. 103-110. New Brunswick and New York, 1810.

49.

For full discussion see A.R. Wallace's article on acclimatization in Encyclopedia Britanica, and W.Z. Ripley, Races of Europe. Chap. XXI. New York, 1899.

For a complete discussion, see A.R. Wallace's article on acclimatization in Encyclopedia Britannica, and W.Z. Ripley, Races of Europe. Chap. XXI. New York, 1899.

50.

D.G. Brinton, Races and Peoples, pp. 39-41. Philadelphia, 1901.

D.G. Brinton, Races and Peoples, pp. 39-41. Philadelphia, 1901.

51.

Darwin, Descent of Man, pp. 34-35. New York, 1899.

Darwin, Descent of Man, pp. 34-35. New York, 1899.

52.

E.F. Knight, Where Three Empires Meet, pp. 137-138. London, 1897.

E.F. Knight, Where Three Empires Meet, pp. 137-138. London, 1897.

53.

W.Z. Ripley, Races of Europe, pp. 58-71, Map. New York, 1898.

W.Z. Ripley, Races of Europe, pp. 58-71, Map. New York, 1898.

54.

Ibid., p. 566. D.G. Brinton, Races and Peoples, pp. 29-30. Philadelphia, 1901.

Ibid., p. 566. D.G. Brinton, Races and Peoples, pp. 29-30. Philadelphia, 1901.

55.

D. Livingstone, Missionary Travels, p. 607. New York, 1858.

D. Livingstone, Missionary Travels, p. 607. New York, 1858.

56.

Williams and Calvert, Fiji and the Fijians, p. 83, New York, 1859.

Williams and Calvert, Fiji and the Fijians, p. 83, New York, 1859.

57.

P. Ehrenreich, Die Urbewohner Brasiliens, p. 32. Braunschweig, 1897.

P. Ehrenreich, Die Urbewohner Brasiliens, p. 32. Braunschweig, 1897.

58.

T. Waitz, Anthropology, pp. 46-49. Edited by Collingwood, London, 1863.

T. Waitz, Anthropology, pp. 46-49. Edited by Collingwood, London, 1863.

59.

Philippine Census, Vol. I, p. 552. Washington, 1903.

Philippine Census, Vol. I, p. 552. Washington, 1903.

60.

F. Ratzel, History of Mankind, Vol. III, p. 106. London, 1908.

F. Ratzel, History of Mankind, Vol. III, p. 106. London, 1908.

61.

Major Charles E. Woodruff, The Effect of Tropical Light on the White Man, New York, 1905, is a suggestive but not convincing discussion of the theory.

Major Charles E. Woodruff, The Effect of Tropical Light on the White Man, New York, 1905, is an interesting but unconvincing discussion of the theory.

62.

W.Z. Ripley, Races of Europe, pp. 74-77. New York, 1899.

W.Z. Ripley, Races of Europe, pp. 74-77. New York, 1899.

63.

Quoted in G. Sergi, The Mediterranean Race, p. 73. London and New York, 1901.

Quoted in G. Sergi, The Mediterranean Race, p. 73. London and New York, 1901.

64.

Ibid., pp. 63-69, 74-75.

Ibid., pp. 63-69, 74-75.

65.

T. Waitz, Anthropology, pp. 44-45. Edited by J.F. Collingwood, London, 1863.

T. Waitz, Anthropology, pp. 44-45. Edited by J.F. Collingwood, London, 1863.

66.

W.Z. Ripley, Races of Europe, p. 76. New York, 1899.

W.Z. Ripley, Races of Europe, p. 76. New York, 1899.

67.

For able discussion, see Topinard, Anthropology, pp. 385-392. Tr. from French, London, 1894.

For a detailed discussion, see Topinard, Anthropology, pp. 385-392. Translated from French, London, 1894.

68.

J. Johnson, Jurisprudence of the Isle of Man, pp. 44, 71. Edinburgh, 1811.

J. Johnson, Jurisprudence of the Isle of Man, pp. 44, 71. Edinburgh, 1811.

69.

Charles F. Hall, Arctic Researches and Life among the Eskimo, p. 571. New York, 1866. Franz Boas, The Central Eskimo, Sixth Annual Report of the Bureau of Ethnology, pp. 588-590. Washington, 1888.

Charles F. Hall, Arctic Researches and Life among the Eskimo, p. 571. New York, 1866. Franz Boas, The Central Eskimo, Sixth Annual Report of the Bureau of Ethnology, pp. 588-590. Washington, 1888.

70.

Ratzel, History of Mankind, Vol. I, p. 35. London, 1896-1898.

Ratzel, History of Mankind, Vol. I, p. 35. London, 1896-1898.

71.

Roscher, National-Oekonomik des Ackerbaues, p. 34, note 8. Stuttgart, 1888.

Roscher, National-Economics of Agriculture, p. 34, note 8. Stuttgart, 1888.

72.

Elisée Reclus, The Earth and Its Inhabitants, Asia, Vol. I, p. 171. New York, 1895.

Elisée Reclus, The Earth and Its Inhabitants, Asia, Vol. I, p. 171. New York, 1895.

73.

Alfred Hettner, Die Geographie des Menschen, pp. 409-410 in Geographische Zeitschrift, Vol. XIII, No. 8. Leipzig, 1907.

Alfred Hettner, Die Geographie des Menschen, pp. 409-410 in Geographische Zeitschrift, Vol. XIII, No. 8. Leipzig, 1907.

74.

S.B. Boulton, The Russian Empire, pp. 60-64. London, 1882.

S.B. Boulton, The Russian Empire, pp. 60-64. London, 1882.

75.

E.C. Semple, The Anglo-Saxons of the Kentucky Mountains, The Geographical Journal, Vol. XVII, No. 6, pp. 588-623. London, 1901.

E.C. Semple, The Anglo-Saxons of the Kentucky Mountains, The Geographical Journal, Vol. XVII, No. 6, pp. 588-623. London, 1901.

76.

E.C. Semple, American History and its Geographic Conditions, pp. 25-31. Boston, 1903. The Influence of Geographic Environment on the Lower St. Lawrence, Bull. Amer. Geog. Society, Vol. XXXVI, p. 449-466. New York, 1904.

E.C. Semple, American History and its Geographic Conditions, pp. 25-31. Boston, 1903. The Influence of Geographic Environment on the Lower St. Lawrence, Bull. Amer. Geog. Society, Vol. XXXVI, p. 449-466. New York, 1904.

77.

A.R. Colquhoun, Africander Land, pp. 200-201. New York, 1906.

A.R. Colquhoun, Africander Land, pp. 200-201. New York, 1906.

78.

Ibid., pp. 140-145. James Bryce, Impressions of South Africa, p. 398. New York, 1897.

Ibid., pp. 140-145. James Bryce, Impressions of South Africa, p. 398. New York, 1897.


Chapter III—Society And State In Relation To The Land

People and land.

Every clan, tribe, state or nation includes two ideas, a people and its land, the first unthinkable without the other. History, sociology, ethnology touch only the inhabited areas of the earth. These areas gain their final significance because of the people who occupy them; their local conditions of climate, soil, natural resources, physical features and geographic situation are important primarily as factors in the development of actual or possible inhabitants. A land is fully comprehended only when studied in the light of its influence upon its people, and a people cannot be understood apart from the field of its activities. More than this, human activities are fully intelligible only in relation to the various geographic conditions which have stimulated them in different parts of the world. The principles of the evolution of navigation, of agriculture, of trade, as also the theory of population, can never reach their correct and final statement, unless the data for the conclusions are drawn from every part of the world, and each fact interpreted in the light of the local conditions whence it sprang. Therefore anthropology, sociology and history should be permeated by geography.

Every clan, tribe, state, or nation involves two concepts: its people and their land, with one being unimaginable without the other. History, sociology, and ethnology only focus on the areas of the earth that are inhabited. These places gain their true significance from the people who live there; their local conditions—such as climate, soil, natural resources, physical features, and geographic location—are primarily important as factors that influence the development of current or potential inhabitants. A land is fully understood only when examined through the lens of its impact on its people, and a group of people cannot be understood without considering the context of their actions. Moreover, human activities can only be completely understood in relation to the various geographic factors that have inspired them in different regions of the world. The principles surrounding the development of navigation, agriculture, and trade, as well as population theory, can never be accurately and comprehensively articulated unless the data for these conclusions is sourced from every corner of the globe, and each fact is interpreted in light of the local conditions from which it originated. Therefore, anthropology, sociology, and history should be deeply informed by geography.

Political geography and history.

In history, the question of territory,—by which is meant mere area in contrast to specific geographic conditions—has constantly come to the front, because a state obviously involved land and boundaries, and assumed as its chief function the defence and extension of these. Therefore political geography developed early as an offshoot of history. Political science has often formulated its principles without regard to the geographic conditions of states, but as a matter of fact, the most fruitful political policies of nations have almost invariably had a geographic core. Witness the colonial policy of Holland, England, France and Portugal, the free-trade policy of England, the militantism of Germany, the whole complex question of European balance of power and the Bosporus, and the Monroe Doctrine of the United States. Dividing lines between political parties tend to follow approximately geographic lines of cleavage; and these make themselves apparent at recurring intervals of national upheaval, perhaps with, centuries between, like a submarine volcanic rift. In England the southeastern plain and the northwestern uplands have been repeatedly arrayed against each other, from the Roman conquest which embraced the lowlands up to about the 500-foot contour line,79 through the War of the Roses and the Civil War,80 to the struggle for the repeal of the Corn Laws and the great Reform Bill of 1832.81 Though the boundary lines have been only roughly the same and each district has contained opponents of the dominant local party, nevertheless the geographic core has been plain enough.

In history, the issue of territory—meaning just the area rather than specific geographic features—has always been a key topic, since a state is fundamentally tied to land and borders, with its primary role being the defense and expansion of these. As a result, political geography emerged early on as a branch of history. Political science has often defined its principles without considering the geographic conditions of states, but in reality, the most effective political strategies of nations almost always have a geographic basis. Look at the colonial policies of the Netherlands, England, France, and Portugal, the free-trade approach of England, the militarism of Germany, the entire intricate issue of European power balance and the Bosporus, and the Monroe Doctrine in the United States. The dividing lines between political parties tend to follow geographic divisions, which reveal themselves at repeated moments of national turmoil, sometimes separated by centuries, like an underwater volcanic rift. In England, the southeastern plains and the northwestern uplands have consistently confronted each other, starting from the Roman conquest that included the lowlands up to about the 500-foot elevation line,79 through the War of the Roses and the Civil War,80 to the battle for the repeal of the Corn Laws and the significant Reform Bill of 1832.81 Although the borders have been somewhat inconsistent and each region has had opponents of the prevailing local party, the geographic core has been quite clear.

Political versus social geography.

The land is a more conspicuous factor in the history of states than in the history of society, but not more necessary and potent. Wars, which constitute so large a part of political history, have usually aimed more or less directly at acquisition or retention of territory; they have made every petty quarrel the pretext for mulcting the weaker nation of part of its land. Political maps are therefore subject to sudden and radical alterations, as when France's name was wiped off the North American continent in 1763, or when recently Spain's sovereignty in the Western Hemisphere was obliterated. But the race stocks, languages, customs, and institutions of both France and Spain remained after the flags had departed. The reason is that society is far more deeply rooted in the land than is a state, does not expand or contract its area so readily. Society is always, in a sense, adscripta glebae; an expanding state which incorporates a new piece of territory inevitably incorporates its inhabitants, unless it exterminates or expels them. Yet because racial and social geography changes slowly, quietly and imperceptibly, like all those fundamental processes which we call growth, it is not so easy and obvious a task to formulate a natural law for the territorial relations of the various hunter, pastoral nomadic, agricultural, and industrial types of society as for those of the growing state.

The land plays a more noticeable role in the history of states than in the history of society, but it's not more essential or powerful. Wars, which make up a significant part of political history, have often been aimed at gaining or keeping territory; they've turned every minor dispute into an excuse to strip the weaker nation of some of its land. As a result, political maps can change suddenly and dramatically, like when France was effectively erased from the North American continent in 1763, or when Spain's control in the Western Hemisphere was recently lost. However, the racial groups, languages, customs, and institutions of both France and Spain remained even after their flags were gone. The reason is that society is much more deeply connected to the land than a state is, and it doesn't easily expand or shrink its area. Society is always, in a sense, adscripta glebae; a growing state that takes over a new territory inevitably brings its people along, unless it exterminates or drives them out. Yet, because racial and social geography changes slowly, quietly, and subtly, like all the essential processes we call growth, it's not as straightforward to establish a natural law for the territorial relations of the different types of societies—hunter, pastoral nomadic, agricultural, and industrial—as it is for those of the expanding state.

Land basis of society.

Most systems of sociology treat man as if he were in some way detached from the earth's surface; they ignore the land basis of society. The anthropo-geographer recognizes the various social forces, economic and psychologic, which sociologists regard as the cement of societies; but he has something to add. He sees in the land occupied by a primitive tribe or a highly organized state the underlying material bond holding society together, the ultimate basis of their fundamental social activities, which are therefore derivatives from the land. He sees the common territory exercising an integrating force,—weak in primitive communities where the group has established only a few slight and temporary relations with its soil, so that this low social complex breaks up readily like its organic counterpart, the low animal organism found in an amoeba; he sees it growing stronger with every advance in civilization involving more complex relations to the land,—with settled habitations, with increased density of population, with a discriminating and highly differentiated use of the soil, with the exploitation of mineral resources, and finally with that far-reaching exchange of commodities and ideas which means the establishment of varied extra-territorial relations. Finally, the modern society or state has grown into every foot of its own soil, exploited its every geographic advantage, utilized its geographic location to enrich itself by international trade, and when possible, to absorb outlying territories by means of colonies. The broader this geographic base, the richer, more varied its resources, and the more favorable its climate to their exploitation, the more numerous and complex are the connections which the members of a social group can establish with it, and through it with each other; or in other words, the greater may be its ultimate historical significance. The polar regions and the subtropical deserts, on the other hand, permit man to form only few and intermittent relations with any one spot, restrict economic methods to the lower stages of development, produce only the small, weak, loosely organized horde, which never evolves into a state so long as it remains in that retarding environment.

Most sociology systems treat people as if they are somehow separate from the earth; they overlook the land’s role in society. The anthropo-geographer acknowledges the various social, economic, and psychological forces that sociologists see as the glue holding societies together, but he adds something else. He views the land occupied by a primitive tribe or a well-organized state as the fundamental material bond that unites society, the core of their essential social activities, which stem from the land. He observes that a shared territory exerts an integrating force—weak in primitive communities where the group has only established a few fleeting connections with their land, causing this simple social structure to easily disintegrate, much like a basic animal organism such as an amoeba; he sees it becoming stronger with every advancement in civilization that brings about more complex interactions with the land—through settled living, increased population density, a selective and varied use of the land, the extraction of mineral resources, and ultimately through extensive exchanges of goods and ideas, which leads to the development of diverse connections beyond territorial boundaries. In contrast, modern society or state has thoroughly integrated itself with its land, taking advantage of every geographical benefit, using its location to gain wealth through international trade, and where possible, expanding into surrounding areas via colonies. The broader this geographical foundation, the richer and more diverse its resources, and the more favorable its climate for exploitation, the more connections its members can form with each other and the land, enhancing its overall historical significance. Conversely, the polar regions and subtropical deserts allow humans to create only a few and sporadic connections with any given spot, limiting economic growth to basic levels and resulting in small, weak, loosely organized groups that never evolve into a state as long as they remain in that limiting environment.

Morgan's Societas.

Man in his larger activities, as opposed to his mere physiological or psychological processes, cannot be studied apart from the land which he inhabits. Whether we consider him singly or in a group—family, clan, tribe or state—we must always consider him or his group in relation to a piece of land. The ancient Irish sept, Highland clan, Russian mir, Cherokee hill-town, Bedouin tribe, and the ancient Helvetian canton, like the political state of history, have meant always a group of people and a bit of land. The first presupposes the second. In all cases the form and size of the social group, the nature of its activities, the trend and limit of its development will be strongly influenced by the size and nature of its habitat. The land basis is always present, in spite of Morgan's artificial distinction between a theoretically landless societas, held together only by the bond of common blood, and the political civitas based upon land.82 Though primitive society found its conscious bond in common blood, nevertheless the land bond was always there, and it gradually asserted its fundamental character with the evolution of society.

A person, in their broader activities, rather than just their biological or psychological processes, cannot be examined separately from the land they live on. Whether we look at them individually or as part of a group—like a family, clan, tribe, or state—we must always consider them or their group in relation to a specific piece of land. The ancient Irish sept, Highland clan, Russian mir, Cherokee hill-town, Bedouin tribe, and ancient Helvetian canton, just like historical political states, have always represented a group of people and a piece of land. One assumes the existence of the other. In every case, the shape and size of the social group, the nature of its activities, and the direction and boundaries of its development will be significantly impacted by the size and characteristics of its environment. The land foundation is always there, despite Morgan's artificial distinction between a theoretically landless societas, connected only by shared blood, and the political civitas based on land.82 Even though primitive society found its primary connection in shared blood, the land connection was always present and gradually became more prominent as society evolved.

The savage and barbarous groups which in Morgan's classification would fall under the head of societas have nevertheless a clear conception of their ownership of the tribal lands which they use in common. This idea is probably of very primitive origin, arising from the association of a group with its habitat, whose food supply they regard as a monopoly.83 This is true even of migratory hunting tribes. They claim a certain area whose boundaries, however, are often ill-defined and subject to fluctuations, because the lands are not held by permanent occupancy and cultivation. An exceptional case is that of the Shoshone Indians, inhabiting the barren Utah basin and the upper valleys of the Snake and Salmon Rivers, who are accredited with no sense of ownership of the soil. In their natural state they roved about in small, totally unorganized bands or single families, and changed their locations so widely, that they seemed to lay no claim to any particular portion. The hopeless sterility of the region and its poverty of game kept its destitute inhabitants constantly on the move to gather in the meager food supply, and often restricted the social group to the family.84 Here the bond between land and tribe, and hence between the members of the tribe, was the weakest possible.

The savage and barbaric groups that Morgan classified as societas do have a clear idea of their ownership of the tribal lands they use in common. This concept probably comes from a very primitive origin, stemming from the bond between a group and its environment, whose food supply they see as a monopoly.83 This is true even for migratory hunting tribes. They claim a certain area, although its boundaries are often vague and can change, since the land isn't controlled through permanent occupancy and farming. An unusual case is the Shoshone Indians, who live in the desolate Utah basin and the upper valleys of the Snake and Salmon Rivers, and are said to have no sense of ownership of the land. In their natural state, they moved around in small, completely unorganized bands or single families, shifting their locations so widely that it appeared they didn't lay claim to any specific area. The utter barrenness of the region and the scarcity of game forced its impoverished inhabitants to keep moving to gather the little food available, often limiting the social group to family units.84 In this context, the connection between land and tribe, and thus between the members of the tribe, was extremely weak.

Land bond in hunter tribes.

The usual type of tribal ownership was presented by the Comanches, nomadic horse Indians who occupied the grassy plains of northern Texas. They held their territory and the game upon it as the common property of the tribe, and jealously guarded the integrity of their domain.85 The chief Algonquin tribes, who occupied the territory between the Ohio River and the Great Lakes, had each its separate domain, within which it shifted its villages every few years; but its size depended upon the power of the tribe to repel encroachment upon its hunting grounds. Relying mainly on the chase and fishing, little on agriculture, for their subsistence, their relations to their soil were superficial and transitory, their tribal organization in a high degree unstable.86 Students of American ethnology generally agree that most of the Indian tribes east of the Mississippi were occupying definite areas at the time of the discovery, and were to a considerable extent sedentary and agricultural. Though nomadic within the tribal territory, as they moved with the season in pursuit of game, they returned to their villages, which were shifted only at relatively long intervals.87

The typical form of tribal ownership was represented by the Comanches, nomadic horse-riding Indians who lived on the grassy plains of northern Texas. They regarded their territory and the game within it as the tribe's common property and fiercely protected the integrity of their land.85 The main Algonquin tribes, which lived in the area between the Ohio River and the Great Lakes, had distinct domains where they would move their villages every few years; however, the size of these domains depended on the tribe's ability to defend their hunting grounds from outsiders. Mainly relying on hunting and fishing, and spending little time on farming for their livelihood, their connection to the land was quite superficial and temporary, and their tribal organization was highly unstable.86 Scholars of American ethnology generally agree that most of the Indian tribes east of the Mississippi were living in defined areas at the time of European contact and were significantly sedentary and agricultural. Although they were nomadic within their tribal territory, moving with the seasons to hunt, they returned to their villages, which were relocated only at relatively long intervals.87

The political organization of the native Australians, low as they were in the social scale, seems to have been based chiefly on the claim of each wretched wandering tribe to a definite territory.88 In north central Australia, where even a very sparse population has sufficed to saturate the sterile soil, tribal boundaries have become fixed and inviolable, so that even war brings no transfer of territory. Land and people are identified. The bond is cemented by their primitive religion, for the tribe's spirit ancestors occupied this special territory.89 In a like manner a very definite conception of tribal ownership of land prevails among the Bushmen and Bechuanas of South Africa; and to the pastoral Hereros the alienation of their land is inconceivable.90 [See map page 105.]

The political structure of Indigenous Australians, despite their lower status in the social hierarchy, appears to have primarily relied on each struggling, nomadic tribe's claim to a specific territory.88 In north-central Australia, where even a very sparse population can saturate the barren land, tribal boundaries have become fixed and untouchable, meaning that even war does not result in changes to territory. Land and people are seen as one. This connection is reinforced by their traditional beliefs, as the tribe's spirit ancestors inhabit this unique territory.89 Similarly, a strong sense of tribal land ownership exists among the Bushmen and Bechuanas of South Africa; for the pastoral Hereros, the idea of losing their land is unimaginable.90 [See map page 105.]

A tribe of hunters can never be more than a small horde, because the simple, monotonous savage economy permits no concentration of population, no division of labor except that between the sexes, and hence no evolution of classes. The common economic level of all is reflected in the simple social organization,91 which necessarily has little cohesion, because the group must be prepared to break up and scatter in smaller divisions, when its members increase or its savage supplies decrease even a little. Such primitive groups cannot grow into larger units, because these would demand more roots sent down into the sustaining soil; but they multiply by fission, like the infusorial monads, and thereafter lead independent existences remote from each other. This is the explanation of multiplication of dialects among savage tribes.

A tribe of hunters can never be more than a small group because the simple, monotonous savage economy doesn't allow for a large population, any division of labor beyond the roles of men and women, and therefore no development of social classes. The shared economic status of everyone is reflected in the straightforward social organization,91 which naturally lacks cohesion since the group needs to be ready to break apart and split into smaller sections when its members grow or when its basic resources drop, even slightly. These primitive groups can't expand into larger units because that would require deeper connections to the resources needed for survival; instead, they multiply by splitting apart, like tiny microorganisms, and afterward live separate lives far from each other. This explains why there are so many different dialects among savage tribes.

Land bond in fisher tribes.

Fishing tribes have their chief occupation determined by their habitats, which are found along well stocked rivers, lakes, or coastal fishing grounds. Conditions here encourage an early adoption of sedentary life, discourage wandering except for short periods, and facilitate the introduction of agriculture wherever conditions of climate and soil permit. Hence these fisher folk develop relatively large and permanent social groups, as testified by the ancient lake-villages of Switzerland, based upon a concentrated food-supply resulting from a systematic and often varied exploitation of the local resources. The coöperation and submission to a leader necessary in pelagic fishing often gives the preliminary training for higher political organization.92 All the primitive stocks of the Brazilian Indians, except the mountain Ges, are fishermen and agriculturists; hence their annual migrations are kept within narrow limits. Each linguistic group occupies a fixed and relatively well defined district.93 Stanley found along the Congo large permanent villages of the natives, who were engaged in fishing and tilling the fruitful soil, but knew little about the country ten miles back from the river. These two generous means of subsistence are everywhere combined in Polynesia, Micronesia and Melanesia: there they are associated with dense populations and often with advanced political organization, as we find it in the feudal monarchy of Tonga and the savage Fiji Islands.94 Fisher tribes, therefore, get an early impulse forward in civilization;95 and even where conditions do not permit the upward step to agriculture, these tribes have permanent relations with their land, form stable social groups, and often utilize their location on a natural highway to develop systematic trade. For instance, on the northwest coast of British Columbia and Southern Alaska, the Haida, Tlingit and Tsimshean Indians have portioned out all the land about their seaboard villages among the separate families or households as hunting, fishing, and berrying grounds. These are regarded as private property and are handed down from generation to generation. If they are used by anyone other than the owner, the privilege must be paid for. Every salmon stream has its proprietor, whose summer camp can be seen set up at the point where the run of the fish is greatest. Combined with this private property in land there is a brisk trade up and down the coast, and a tendency toward feudalism in the village communities, owing to the association of power and social distinction with wealth and property in land.96

Fishing tribes have their main activities shaped by their environments, which are located along well-stocked rivers, lakes, or coastal fishing areas. Conditions in these places promote an early shift to a settled lifestyle, limit nomadic behavior to short trips, and encourage the introduction of agriculture wherever climate and soil allow. As a result, these fishing communities create relatively large and stable social groups, as evidenced by the ancient lake villages in Switzerland, which relied on a steady food supply from systematic and varied use of local resources. The teamwork and obedience to a leader necessary for deep-sea fishing often provide essential training for more complex political structures.92 All the primitive groups of Brazilian Indians, except the mountain-dwelling Ges, are fishermen and farmers; therefore, their annual migrations are confined to small areas. Each language group occupies a defined and relatively stable territory.93 Stanley discovered large permanent villages of natives along the Congo, who were involved in fishing and cultivating the fertile land but knew little about the area ten miles inland from the river. These two abundant sources of food are commonly integrated in Polynesia, Micronesia, and Melanesia, where they are linked with dense populations and often sophisticated political systems, like those found in the feudal monarchy of Tonga and the tribal Fiji Islands.94 Fisher tribes, therefore, experience an early advancement in civilization;95 and even in places where conditions don’t support a move toward agriculture, these tribes maintain lasting connections to their land, form stable social groups, and often take advantage of their location on natural trade routes. For example, on the northwest coast of British Columbia and southern Alaska, the Haida, Tlingit, and Tsimshean Indians have divided all the land around their coastal villages among individual families or households for hunting, fishing, and berry-picking. These areas are seen as private property and are passed down from one generation to the next. If someone other than the owner uses them, a fee must be paid. Each salmon stream has an owner, whose summer camp can typically be found at the point with the highest fish activity. Alongside this private land ownership, there is a vibrant trade along the coast, and a trend towards feudalism in village communities due to the association of power and social status with wealth and land ownership.96

Land bond in pastoral societies.

Among pastoral nomads, among whom a systematic use of their territory begins to appear, and therefore a more definite relation between land and people, we find a more distinct notion than among wandering hunters of territorial ownership, the right of communal use, and the distinct obligation of common defense. Hence the social bond is drawn closer. The nomad identifies himself with a certain district, which belongs to his tribe by tradition or conquest, and has its clearly defined boundaries. Here he roams between its summer and winter pastures, possibly one hundred and fifty miles apart, visits its small arable patches in the spring for his limited agricultural ventures, and returns to them in the fall to reap their meager harvest. Its springs, streams, or wells assume enhanced value, are things to be fought for, owing to the prevailing aridity of summer; while ownership of a certain tract of desert or grassland carries with it a certain right in the bordering settled district as an area of plunder.97

Among pastoral nomads, where a systematic use of their territory starts to emerge, and thus a clearer relationship between land and people develops, we see a stronger concept of land ownership than among wandering hunters. This includes the right to shared use and the clear responsibility of collective defense. As a result, social connections become tighter. The nomad connects himself to a specific area, which belongs to his tribe through tradition or conquest, and has clearly defined boundaries. He moves between his summer and winter grazing lands, which may be as much as one hundred fifty miles apart, tends to small farming plots in the spring for limited agricultural activities, and returns in the fall to harvest any meager crops. The springs, streams, or wells become even more valuable and are fought over due to the dry summer conditions; meanwhile, owning a certain patch of desert or grassland grants some rights to the neighboring settled area as a place to raid.97

The Kara-Kirghis stock, who have been located since the sixteenth century on Lake Issik-Kul, long ago portioned out the land among the separate families, and determined their limits by natural features of the landscape.98 Sven Hedin found on the Tarim River poles set up to mark the boundary between the Shah-yar and Kuchar tribal pastures.99 John de Plano Carpini, traveling over southern Russia in 1246, immediately after the Tartar conquest, found that the Dnieper, Don, Volga and Ural rivers were all boundaries between domains of the various millionaries or thousands, into which the Tartar horde was organized.100 The population of this vast country was distributed according to the different degrees of fertility and the size of the pastoral groups.101 Volney observed the same distinction in the distribution of the Bedouins of Syria. He found the barren cantons held by small, widely scattered tribes, as in the Desert of Suez; but the cultivable cantons, like the Hauran and the Pachalic of Aleppo, closely dotted by the encampments of the pastoral owners.102

The Kara-Kirghis people, who have lived by Lake Issik-Kul since the sixteenth century, divided the land among individual families long ago, using natural features of the landscape to set their boundaries.98 Sven Hedin discovered poles along the Tarim River marking the boundary between the Shah-yar and Kuchar tribal grazing lands.99 John de Plano Carpini, traveling through southern Russia in 1246 right after the Tartar conquest, noted that the Dnieper, Don, Volga, and Ural rivers served as boundaries between the various millionaires or thousands into which the Tartar horde was organized.100 The population in this vast country was spread out according to the differing levels of fertility and the sizes of the pastoral groups.101 Volney observed a similar pattern in the distribution of the Bedouins in Syria. He saw that the barren areas were occupied by small, scattered tribes, like in the Desert of Suez, while the arable areas, such as Hauran and the Pachalic of Aleppo, were closely dotted with the camps of pastoral owners.102

The large range of territory held by a nomadic tribe is all successively occupied in the course of a year, but each part only for a short period of time. A pastoral use of even a good district necessitates a move of five or ten miles every few weeks. The whole, large as it may be, is absolutely necessary for the annual support of the tribe. Hence any outside encroachment upon their territory calls for the united resistance of the tribe. This joint or social action is dictated by their common interest in pastures and herds. The social administration embodied in the apportionment of pastures among the families or clans grows out of the systematic use of their territory, which represents a closer relation between land and people than is found among purely hunting tribes. Overcrowding by men or livestock, on the other hand, puts a strain upon the social bond. When Abraham and Lot, typical nomads, returned from Egypt to Canaan with their large flocks and herds, rivalry for the pastures occasioned conflicts among their shepherds, so the two sheiks decided to separate. Abraham took the hill pastures of Judea, and Lot the plains of Jordan near the settled district of Sodom.103

The vast territory held by a nomadic tribe is occupied in shifts over the course of a year, but each area is only used for a short time. Even in a good region, a pastoral lifestyle requires moving five to ten miles every few weeks. The entire area, no matter how large, is essential for the tribe's annual survival. Therefore, any outside invasion of their land prompts the tribe to unite in resistance. This collective action is driven by their shared interest in grazing and livestock. The social organization reflected in the division of grazing land among families or clans arises from their systematic use of the territory, creating a stronger connection between the land and the people than what is observed in purely hunting tribes. However, pressures from overcrowding—whether from people or livestock—can strain social ties. When Abraham and Lot, who were typical nomads, returned from Egypt to Canaan with their large flocks and herds, competition for pastures led to conflicts among their shepherds, prompting the two leaders to part ways. Abraham chose the hilly pastures of Judea, while Lot took the plains of Jordan near the settled area of Sodom.103

Geographical mark of low-type societies.

The larger the amount of territory necessary for the support of a given number of people, whether the proportion be due to permanent poverty of natural resources as in the Eskimo country, or to retarded economic development as among the Indians of primitive America or the present Sudanese, the looser is the connection between land and people, and the lower the type of social organization. For such groups the organic theory of society finds an apt description. To quote Spencer, "The original clusters, animal and social, are not only small, but they lack density. Creatures of low type occupy large spaces considering the small quantity of animal substance they contain; and low-type societies spread over areas that are wide relatively to the number of their component individuals."104 In common language this means small tribes or even detached families sparsely scattered over wide areas, living in temporary huts or encampments of tepees and tents shifted from place to place, making no effort to modify the surface of the land beyond scratching the soil to raise a niggardly crop of grain or tubers, and no investment of labor that might attach to one spot the sparse and migrant population. [See density maps pages 8 and 9.]

The larger the amount of land needed to support a specific number of people, whether this is due to the constant lack of natural resources like in the Eskimo regions or slow economic progress as seen with the indigenous peoples of early America or today's Sudanese, the weaker the connection becomes between land and people, leading to a simpler form of social organization. For such groups, the organic theory of society provides a fitting description. As Spencer states, "The original clusters, animal and social, are not only small, but they lack density. Creatures of low type occupy large spaces considering the small quantity of animal substance they contain; and low-type societies spread over areas that are wide relatively to the number of their component individuals."104 In simpler terms, this refers to small tribes or even individual families that are spread thin across large areas, living in temporary shelters like huts or tepees that are moved frequently. They make no effort to alter the landscape beyond barely scratching the ground to grow a meager harvest of grains or tubers, with no labor investment to anchor the sparse and mobile population to one location. [See density maps pages 8 and 9.]

Land and state.

The superiority over this social type of the civilized state lies in the highly organized utilization of its whole geographic basis by the mature community, and in the development of government that has followed the increasing density of population and multiplication of activities growing out of this manifold use of the land. Sedentary agriculture, which forms its initial economic basis, is followed by industrialism and commerce. The migratory life presents only limited accumulation of capital, and restricts narrowly its forms. Permanent settlement encourages accumulation in every form, and under growing pressure of population slowly reveals the possibilities of every foot of ground, of every geographic advantage. These are the fibers of the land which become woven into the whole fabric of the nation's life. These are the geographic elements constituting the soil in which empires are rooted; they rise in the sap of the nation.

The advantage of this social type in a civilized state comes from how well the mature community uses its entire geographic area and the development of government that has emerged alongside the growing population density and the increase in various activities stemming from this diverse use of the land. It starts with sedentary agriculture as its economic foundation, followed by industrialization and commerce. A nomadic lifestyle leads to only a limited accumulation of capital and severely restricts its forms. On the other hand, permanent settlement promotes accumulation in all its forms and, under increasing population pressure, gradually uncovers the potential of every piece of land and every geographic benefit. These elements of the land weave together to form the overall culture of the nation. They represent the geographic factors that make up the soil in which empires grow; they are the lifeblood of the nation.

Strength of the land bond in the state.

The geographic basis of a state embodies a whole complex of physical conditions which may influence its historical development. The most potent of these are its size and zonal location; its situation, whether continental or insular, inland or maritime, on the open ocean or an enclosed sea; its boundaries, whether drawn by sea, mountain, desert or the faint demarking line of a river; its forested mountains, grassy plains, and arable lowlands; its climate and drainage system; finally its equipment with plant and animal life, whether indigenous or imported, and its mineral resources. When a state has taken advantage of all its natural conditions, the land becomes a constituent part of the state,105 modifying the people which inhabit it, modified by them in turn, till the connection between the two becomes so strong by reciprocal interaction, that the people cannot be understood apart from their land. Any attempt to divide them theoretically reduces the social or political body to a cadaver, valuable for the study of structural anatomy after the method of Herbert Spencer, but throwing little light upon the vital processes.

The geography of a state includes a complex set of physical factors that can shape its historical development. The most significant of these are its size and location; whether it's on a continent or an island, inland or coastal, by the open ocean or a closed sea; its borders, which might be defined by the sea, mountains, deserts, or the subtle line of a river; its forested mountains, grassy plains, and fertile lowlands; its climate and drainage systems; and its resources, whether plants and animals are native or imported, as well as its mineral wealth. When a state fully utilizes its natural resources, the land becomes an integral part of the state,105 shaping the people who live there, who in turn also modify the land, until their connection is so strong through mutual interaction that the people can't be understood apart from their environment. Any attempt to separate them conceptually reduces the social or political entity to a lifeless shell, useful for studying structural anatomy in the manner of Herbert Spencer, but offering little insight into the vital processes at play.

Weak land tenure of hunting and pastoral tribes.

A people who makes only a transitory or superficial use of its land has upon it no permanent or secure hold. The power to hold is measured by the power to use; hence the weak tenure of hunting and pastoral tribes. Between their scattered encampments at any given time are wide interstices, inviting occupation by any settlers who know how to make better use of the soil. This explains the easy intrusion of the English colonists into the sparsely tenanted territory of the Indians, of the agricultural Chinese into the pasture lands of the Mongols beyond the Great Wall, of the American pioneers into the hunting grounds of the Hudson Bay Company in the disputed Oregon country.106 The frail bonds which unite these lower societies to their soil are easily ruptured and the people themselves dislodged, while their land is appropriated by the intruder. But who could ever conceive of dislodging the Chinese or the close-packed millions of India? A modern state with a given population on a wide area is more vulnerable than another of like population more closely distributed; but the former has the advantage of a reserve territory for future growth.107 This was the case of Kursachsen and Brandenburg in the sixteenth century, and of the United States throughout its history. But beside the danger of inherent weakness before attack, a condition of relative underpopulation always threatens a retardation of development. Easy-going man needs the prod of a pressing population. [Compare maps pages 8 and 103 for examples.]

A people that only makes temporary or superficial use of its land doesn't have a lasting or secure claim to it. The ability to hold land is determined by how well it is used; this is why hunting and pastoral tribes have weak land ownership. Between their widely spaced camps at any given time, there are large gaps that can be filled by settlers who know how to use the land better. This explains why English colonists easily moved into the lightly inhabited areas of Native Americans, why agricultural Chinese groups encroached on Mongolian pasture lands beyond the Great Wall, and why American pioneers settled in the hunting grounds of the Hudson Bay Company in the contested Oregon region.106 The fragile connections between these less developed societies and their land can be easily broken, allowing intruders to take over. But who could ever imagine pushing out the Chinese or the densely packed millions in India? A modern state with a certain population spread over a large area is more vulnerable than one with the same population more densely packed; however, the former has the benefit of extra territory for future expansion.107 This was the situation for Kursachsen and Brandenburg in the sixteenth century, and for the United States throughout its history. But aside from the risk of inherent weakness against attack, being relatively underpopulated always poses a threat to development. Easy-going people need the push of a growing population. [Compare maps pages 8 and 103 for examples.]

Land and food supply.

Food is the urgent and recurrent need of individuals and of society. It dictates their activities in relation to their land at every stage of economic development, fixes the locality of the encampment or village, and determines the size of the territory from which sustenance is drawn. The length of residence in one place depends upon whether the springs of its food supply are perennial or intermittent, while the abundance of their flow determines how large a population a given piece of land can support.

Food is a basic and ongoing need for people and society. It shapes their activities concerning their land at each stage of economic growth, determines where they settle or establish communities, and influences the area from which they obtain their resources. How long they stay in one location depends on whether their food sources are constant or temporary, while the abundance of these sources impacts how large a population can be supported by a specific piece of land.

Advance from natural to artificial basis of subsistence.

Hunter and fisher folk, relying almost exclusively upon what their land produces of itself, need a large area and derive from it only an irregular food supply, which in winter diminishes to the verge of famine. The transition to the pastoral stage has meant the substitution of an artificial for a natural basis of subsistence, and therewith a change which more than any other one thing has inaugurated the advance from savagery to civilization.108 From the standpoint of economics, the forward stride has consisted in the application of capital in the form of flocks and herds to the task of feeding the wandering horde;109 from the standpoint of alimentation, in the guarantee of a more reliable and generally more nutritious food supply, which enables population to grow more steadily and rapidly; from the standpoint of geography, in the marked reduction in the per capita amount of land necessary to yield an adequate and stable food supply. Pastoral nomadism can support in a given district of average quality from ten to twenty times as many souls as can the chase; but in this respect is surpassed from twenty to thirty-fold by the more productive agriculture. While the subsistence of a nomad requires 100 to 200 acres of land, for that of a skillful farmer from 1 to 2 acres suffice.110 In contrast, the land of the Indians living in the Hudson Bay Territory in 1857 averaged 10 square miles per capita; that of the Indians in the United States in 1825, subsidized moreover by the government, 1-1/4 square miles.111

Hunter-gatherers, who depend almost entirely on what their land naturally produces, require a large area and only receive an inconsistent food supply, which significantly decreases in winter, often leading to near famine. The shift to a pastoral lifestyle has replaced a natural way of getting food with an artificial one, marking a major change that has played a crucial role in the transition from savagery to civilization.108 From an economic perspective, this progress has involved using capital in the form of livestock to support the roaming groups;109 from a food standpoint, it provides a more dependable and generally more nutritious food supply, allowing populations to grow more steadily and quickly; from a geographic view, it significantly reduces the amount of land needed per person to produce a stable and adequate food supply. Pastoral nomadism can sustain ten to twenty times as many people in a typical area compared to hunting, but even this is outperformed by more productive agriculture, which can support twenty to thirty times more. While a nomad’s livelihood needs 100 to 200 acres, a skilled farmer can manage with just 1 to 2 acres.110 In comparison, the land for the Indigenous people living in the Hudson Bay area in 1857 averaged 10 square miles per person, while the land for the Indigenous people in the United States in 1825, who also received government aid, averaged 1.25 square miles.111

Land in relation to agriculture.

With transition to the sedentary life of agriculture, society makes a further gain over nomadism in the closer integration of its social units, due to permanent residence in larger and more complex groups; in the continuous release of labor from the task of mere food-getting for higher activities, resulting especially in the rapid evolution of the home; and finally in the more elaborate organization in the use of the land, leading to economic differentiation of different localities and to a rapid increase in the population supported by a given area, so that the land becomes the dominant cohesive force in society. [See maps pages 8 and 9.]

With the shift to a settled farming life, society benefits even more from nomadism through tighter integration of social groups, thanks to permanent living arrangements in larger and more complex communities. This shift allows for continuous labor to be freed from just gathering food, enabling people to engage in higher-level activities, particularly the quick development of home life. Additionally, the more sophisticated organization in land use leads to economic differences in various areas and a significant population growth supported by a specific region, making land the main unifying force in society. [See maps pages 8 and 9.]

Migratory agriculture

Agriculture is adopted at first on a small scale as an adjunct to the chase or herding. It tends therefore to partake of the same extensive and nomadic character112 as these other methods of gaining subsistence, and only gradually becomes sedentary and intensive. Such was the superficial, migratory tillage of most American Indians, shifting with the village in the wake of the retreating game or in search of fresh unexhausted soil. Such is the agriculture of the primitive Korkus in the Mahadeo Hills in Central India. They clear a forested slope by burning; rake over the ashes in which they sow their grain, and reap a fairly good crop in the fertilized soil. The second year the clearing yields a reduced product and the third year is abandoned. When the hamlet of five or six families has exhausted all the land about it, it moves to a new spot to repeat the process.113

Agriculture initially starts on a small scale as a supplement to hunting or herding. As a result, it tends to share the same broad and nomadic nature as these other methods of obtaining food, and it only slowly becomes permanent and more intensive. Most American Indians practiced surface-level, migratory farming, moving with their villages as game diminished or in search of fresh, untapped soil. Similarly, the primitive Korkus in the Mahadeo Hills of Central India clear a wooded slope by burning it; they rake over the ashes to plant their grain and manage to harvest a decent crop from the enriched soil. The second year, the land produces less, and by the third year, it’s left unused. Once the small community of five or six families has depleted all the surrounding land, they relocate to a new area to repeat the process.

The same superficial, extensive tillage, with abandonment of fields every few years, prevails in the Tartar districts of the Russian steppes, as it did among the cattle-raising Germans at the beginning of their history. Tacitus says of them, Arva per annos mutant et superest ager,114 commenting at the same time upon their abundance of land and their reluctance to till. Where nomadism is made imperative by aridity, the agriculture which accompanies it tends to become fixed, owing to the few localities blessed with an irrigating stream to moisten the soil. These spots, generally selected for the winter residence, have their soil enriched, moreover, by the long stay of the herd and thus avoid exhaustion.115 Often, however, in enclosed basins the salinity of the irrigating streams in their lower course ruins the fields after one or two crops, and necessitates a constant shifting of the cultivated patches; hence agriculture remains subsidiary to the yield of the pastures. This condition and effect is conspicuous along the termini of the streams draining the northern slope of the Kuen Lun into the Tarim basin.116

The same shallow, widespread farming, with fields being abandoned every few years, is common in the Tartar regions of the Russian steppes, just as it was among the cattle-raising Germans at the start of their history. Tacitus mentions them, Arva per annos mutant et superest ager,114 pointing out their plentiful land and their unwillingness to farm. Where nomadism is necessary due to dryness, the agriculture that comes with it tends to become more stable, because there are only a few places with a reliable water source to keep the soil moist. These locations, usually chosen for winter living, have their soil improved by the long presence of livestock and therefore avoid exhaustion.115 However, in enclosed basins, the salt content in the irrigation streams as they flow lower can destroy the fields after just one or two harvests, requiring a continuous shift in the areas being cultivated; thus, farming remains secondary to the productivity of the pastures. This situation and its effects are particularly noticeable at the ends of the streams flowing from the northern slope of the Kuen Lun into the Tarim basin.116

Geographic checks to progress.

The desultory, intermittent, extensive use of the land practised by hunters and nomads tends, under the growing pressure of population, to pass into the systematic, continuous, intensive use practised by the farmer, except where nature presents positive checks to the transition. The most obvious check consists in adverse conditions of climate and soil. Where agriculture meets insurmountable obstacles, like the intense cold of Arctic Siberia and Lapland, or the alkaline soils of Nevada and the Caspian Depression, or the inadequate rainfall of Mongolia and Central Arabia, the land can produce no higher economic and social groups than pastoral hordes. Hence shepherd folk are found in their purest types in deserts and steppes, where conditions early crystallized the social form and checked development. [Rainfall map chap. XIV.]

The random and occasional use of land by hunters and nomads tends to shift, under increasing population pressure, into the organized, ongoing, and intensive use typical of farmers, unless nature imposes clear barriers to this change. The most obvious barrier comes from unfavorable climate and soil conditions. In places where agriculture faces significant challenges, such as the extreme cold of Arctic Siberia and Lapland, the alkaline soils of Nevada and the Caspian Depression, or the insufficient rainfall in Mongolia and Central Arabia, the land supports no more advanced economic and social groups than wandering herds. Therefore, you find shepherd communities in their most traditional forms in deserts and steppes, where conditions have long solidified the social structure and inhibited progress. [Rainfall map chap. XIV.]

Native animal and plant life as factors.

Adverse conditions of climate and soil are not the only factors in this retardation. The very unequal native equipment of the several continents with plant and animal forms likely to accelerate the advance to nomadism and agriculture also enters into the equation. In Australia, the lack of a single indigenous mammal fit for domestication and of all cereals blocked from the start the pastoral and agricultural development of the natives. Hence at the arrival of the Europeans, Australia presented the unique spectacle of a whole continent with its population still held in the vise of nature. The Americas had a limited variety of animals susceptible of domestication, but were more meagerly equipped than the Old World. Yet the Eskimo failed to tame and herd the reindeer, though their precarious food-supply furnished a motive for the transition. Moreover, an abundance of grass and reindeer moss (Cladonia rangiferina), and congenial climatic conditions favored it especially for the Alaskan Eskimo, who had, besides, the nearby example of the Siberian Chukches as reindeer herders.117 The buffalo, whose domesticability has been proved, was never utilized in this way by the Indians, though the Spaniard Gomara writes of one tribe, living in the sixteenth century in the southwestern part of what is now United States territory, whose chief wealth consisted in herds of tame buffalo.118 North America, at the time of the discovery, saw only the dog hanging about the lodges of the Indians; but in South America the llama and alpaca, confined to the higher levels of the Andes (10,000 to 15,000 feet elevation) were used in domestic herds only in the mountain-rimmed valleys of ancient Peru, where, owing to the restricted areas of these intermontane basins, stock-raising early became stationary,119 as we find it in the Alps. Moreover, the high ridges of the Andes supported a species of grass called ichu, growing up to the snowline from the equator to the southern extremity of Patagonia. Its geographical distribution coincided with that of the llama and alpaca, whose chief pasturage it furnished.120 In contrast, the absence of any wild fodder plants in Japan, and the exclusion of all foreign forms by the successful competition of the native bamboo grass have together eliminated pastoral life from the economic history of the island.

Adverse climate and soil conditions aren’t the only reasons for this delay. The unequal availability of plant and animal species across different continents that could have sped up the shift to nomadism and agriculture also plays a role. In Australia, the absence of any native mammals suitable for domestication and all cereals completely blocked the natives' development in pastoral and agricultural practices from the outset. So, when Europeans arrived, Australia was uniquely a whole continent with its population still constrained by nature. The Americas had a limited number of animals that could be domesticated but were not as well-equipped as the Old World. Even the Eskimo didn’t tame or herd reindeer, despite their unstable food supply offering a reason for that transition. Furthermore, the abundant grass and reindeer moss (Cladonia rangiferina), along with favorable climatic conditions, especially suited the Alaskan Eskimo, who also had the nearby example of the Siberian Chukches as reindeer herders.117 Although the buffalo has been proven to be domesticable, it was never used this way by the Indians. However, the Spaniard Gomara wrote about one tribe in the sixteenth century in the southwestern part of what is now the United States, whose main wealth consisted of herds of tame buffalo.118 At the time of discovery, North America only saw dogs near Indian lodges. In contrast, in South America, llamas and alpacas, which were found only in the higher Andes (10,000 to 15,000 feet up), were used in domestic herds only in the mountain valleys of ancient Peru. Because these intermontane basins had limited areas, stock-raising quickly became stationary,119 similar to what we find in the Alps. Additionally, the high Andes supported a type of grass called ichu, which grew up to the snowline from the equator down to the southern tip of Patagonia. Its geographical area matched that of the llama and alpaca, which relied on it for grazing.120 In contrast, Japan lacked any wild fodder plants and was dominated by native bamboo grass, which successfully outcompeted all foreign species, effectively eliminating pastoral life from the island’s economic history.

The Old World, on the other hand, furnished an abundant supply of indigenous animals susceptible of domestication, and especially those fitted for nomadic life, such as the camel, horse, ass, sheep and goat. Hence it produced in the widespread grasslands and deserts of Europe, Asia, and Africa the most perfect types of pastoral development in its natural or nomadic form. Moreover, the early history of the civilized agricultural peoples of these three continents reveals their previous pastoral mode of life.

The Old World, in contrast, provided a rich supply of local animals that could be domesticated, especially those suited for nomadic living, like the camel, horse, donkey, sheep, and goat. This led to the development of highly effective pastoral lifestyles in the vast grasslands and deserts of Europe, Asia, and Africa. Additionally, the early history of the agricultural societies on these three continents shows that they previously lived a pastoral life.

North and South America offered over most of their area conditions of climate and soil highly favorable to agriculture, and a fair list of indigenous cereals, tubers, and pulses yielding goodly crops even to superficial tillage. Maize especially was admirably suited for a race of semi-migratory hunters. It could be sown without plowing, ripened in a warm season even in ninety days, could be harvested without a sickle and at the pleasure of the cultivator, and needed no preparation beyond roasting before it was ready for food.121 The beans and pumpkins which the Indians raised also needed only a short season. Hence many Indian tribes, while showing no trace of pastoral development, combined with the chase a semi-nomadic agriculture; and in a few districts where geographic conditions had applied peculiar pressure, they had accomplished the transition to sedentary agriculture.

North and South America had climate and soil conditions that were great for farming, along with a decent variety of native grains, tubers, and legumes that produced good crops even with basic farming methods. Maize, in particular, was perfect for a society of semi-nomadic hunters. It could be planted without plowing, matured in a warm season in as little as ninety days, could be harvested without tools and at the farmer's convenience, and only needed roasting before it was ready to eat.121 The beans and pumpkins grown by the Indigenous people also required only a short growing season. As a result, many Native American tribes, despite lacking any signs of pastoral development, combined hunting with semi-nomadic farming; and in a few areas where local conditions pushed them, they successfully made the shift to settled farming.

Land per capita under various cultural and geographic conditions.

Every advance to a higher state of civilization has meant a progressive decrease in the amount of land necessary for the support of the individual, and a progressive increase in the relations between man and his habitat. The stage of social development remaining the same, the per capita amount of land decreases also from poorer to better endowed geographical districts, and with every invention which brings into use some natural resource. The following classification122 illustrates the relation of density of population to various geographic and socio-economic conditions.

Every step forward in civilization has meant a gradual decrease in the amount of land needed to support each person, along with a steady increase in the connections between people and their environment. As social development remains constant, the amount of land per person also decreases from less fertile to more fertile geographic areas, and with every new invention that utilizes a natural resource. The following classification122 illustrates the relationship between population density and different geographic and socio-economic conditions.

Hunter tribes on the outskirts of the habitable area, as in Arctic America and Siberia, require from 70 to 200 square miles per capita; in arid lands, like the Kalahari Desert and Patagonia, 40 to 200 square miles per capita; in choice districts and combining with the chase some primitive agriculture, as did the Cherokee, Shawnee and Iroquois Indians, the Dyaks of Borneo and the Papuans of New Guinea, 1/2 to 2 square miles per capita.

Hunter tribes on the edges of livable areas, like Arctic America and Siberia, need between 70 to 200 square miles per person; in dry areas, such as the Kalahari Desert and Patagonia, they require 40 to 200 square miles per person; in more favorable regions and when incorporating some basic agriculture, as the Cherokee, Shawnee, and Iroquois Indians did, along with the Dyaks of Borneo and the Papuans of New Guinea, they need about 1/2 to 2 square miles per person.

Pastoral nomads show a density of from 2 to 5 to the square mile; practicing some agriculture, as in Kordofan and Sennar districts of eastern Sudan, 10 to 15 to the square mile. Agriculture, undeveloped but combined with some trade and industry as in Equatorial Africa, Borneo and most of the Central American states, supports 5 to 15 to the square mile; practised with European methods in young or colonial lands, as in Arkansas, Texas, Minnesota, Hawaii, Canada and Argentine, or in European lands with unfavorable climate, up to 25 to the square mile.

Pastoral nomads have a population density of 2 to 5 people per square mile. In areas like Kordofan and Sennar districts in eastern Sudan, where some agriculture is practiced, the density rises to 10 to 15 people per square mile. In regions with underdeveloped agriculture combined with trade and industry, such as Equatorial Africa, Borneo, and most Central American countries, the density ranges from 5 to 15 people per square mile. When agriculture is done using European methods in newer or colonial areas, such as Arkansas, Texas, Minnesota, Hawaii, Canada, and Argentina, or in European areas with challenging climates, it can reach up to 25 people per square mile.

Pure agricultural lands of central Europe support 100 to the square mile, and those of southern Europe, 200; when combining some industry, from 250 to 300. But these figures rise to 500 or more in lowland India and China. Industrial districts of modern Europe, such as England, Belgium, Saxony, Departments Nord and Rhone in France, show a density of 500 to 800 to the square mile. [See maps pages 8 and 9.]

Pure agricultural lands in central Europe support 100 people per square mile, while those in southern Europe support 200. When combined with some industry, this number increases to 250 or 300. However, these figures soar to 500 or more in lowland India and China. Industrial areas in modern Europe, like England, Belgium, Saxony, and the Nord and Rhone departments in France, exhibit a density of 500 to 800 people per square mile. [See maps pages 8 and 9.]

Density of population and government.

With every increase of the population inhabiting a given area, and with the consequent multiplication and constriction of the bonds uniting society with its land, comes a growing necessity for a more highly organized government, both to reduce friction within and to secure to the people the land on which and by which they live. Therefore protection becomes a prime function of the state. It wards off outside attack which may aim at acquisition of its territory, or an invasion of its rights, or curtailment of its geographic sphere of activity. The modern industrial state, furthermore, with the purpose of strengthening the nation, assists or itself undertakes the construction of highways, canals, and railroads, and the maintenance of steamship lines. These encourage the development of natural resources and of commerce, and hence lay the foundation for an increased population, by multiplying the relations between land and people.

As the population in a certain area grows, and as the connections between society and its land increase and tighten, there is a rising need for a more organized government to minimize internal conflict and ensure that people have control over the land they depend on for their livelihoods. Thus, protection becomes a key responsibility of the state. It defends against outside threats aimed at taking its territory, infringing on its rights, or limiting its ability to operate geographically. Moreover, the modern industrial state, aiming to strengthen the nation, either supports or directly takes on the construction of highways, canals, and railroads, as well as the maintenance of shipping lines. These efforts promote the development of natural resources and commerce, which in turn creates a foundation for a larger population by increasing the connections between land and people.

Territorial expansion of the state.

A like object is attained by territorial expansion, which often follows in the wake of commercial expansion. This strengthens the nation positively by enlarging its geographic base, and negatively by forcing back the boundaries of its neighbors. The expansion of the Thirteen Colonies from the Atlantic slope to the Mississippi River and the Great Lakes by the treaty concluding the Revolution was a strong guarantee of the survival of the young Republic against future aggressions either of England or Spain, though it exchanged the scientific or protecting boundary of the Appalachian Mountains for the unscientific and exposed boundary of a river. The expansion to the Rocky Mountains by the Louisiana purchase not only gave wider play to national energies, stimulated natural increase of population, and attracted immigration, but it eliminated a dangerous neighbor in the French, and placed a wide buffer of untenanted land between the United States and the petty aggressions of the Spanish in Mexico. Rome's expansion into the valley of the Po, as later into Trans-Alpine Gaul and Germany, had for its purpose the protection of the peninsula against barbarian inroads. Japan's recent aggression against the Russians in the Far East was actuated by the realization that she had to expand into Korea at the cost of Muscovite ascendency, or contract later at the cost of her own independence.

A similar goal is achieved through territorial expansion, which often follows commercial growth. This strengthens the nation both by increasing its geographic base and by pushing back the borders of its neighbors. The expansion of the Thirteen Colonies from the Atlantic coast to the Mississippi River and the Great Lakes through the treaty that ended the Revolution was a strong assurance of the young Republic's survival against future threats from either England or Spain, even though it traded the natural or protective boundary of the Appalachian Mountains for the less secure boundary of a river. The expansion to the Rocky Mountains through the Louisiana Purchase not only allowed for greater national energy, encouraged population growth, and attracted immigrants, but also removed a dangerous neighbor in the French and created a wide buffer of unoccupied land between the United States and the minor threats posed by the Spanish in Mexico. Rome's expansion into the valley of the Po, and later into Trans-Alpine Gaul and Germany, aimed to protect the peninsula from barbarian invasions. Japan's recent aggression against the Russians in the Far East was driven by the understanding that it needed to expand into Korea at the expense of Russian influence, or risk losing its own independence later.

Checks to population.

If a state lacks the energy and national purpose, like Italy, or the possibility, like Switzerland, for territorial expansion, and accepts its boundaries as final, the natural increase of population upon a fixed area produces an increased density, unless certain social forces counteract it. Without these forces, the relation of men to the land would have tended to modify everywhere in the same way. Increase in numbers would have been attended by a corresponding decrease in the amount of land at the disposal of each individual. Those states which, like Norway and Switzerland, cannot expand and which have exploited their natural resources to the utmost, must resign themselves to the emigration of their redundant population. But those which have remained within their own boundaries and have adopted a policy of isolation, like China, feudal Japan during its two and a half centuries of seclusion, and numerous Polynesian islands, have been forced to war with nature itself by checking the operation of the law of natural increase. All the repulsive devices contributing to this end, whether infanticide, abortion, cannibalism, the sanctioned murder of the aged and infirm, honorable suicide, polyandry or persistent war, are the social deformities consequent upon suppressed growth. Such artificial checks upon population are more conspicuous in natural regions with sharply defined boundaries, like islands and oases, as Malthus observed;123 but they are visible also among savage tribes whose boundaries are fixed not by natural features but by the mutual repulsion and rivalry characterizing the stage of development, and whose limit of population is reduced by their low economic status.

If a country lacks energy and national purpose, like Italy, or the ability, like Switzerland, to expand its territory, and accepts its borders as final, the natural growth of the population in a limited area leads to increased density unless specific social forces counteract it. Without these forces, the relationship between people and land would have tended to change consistently everywhere. An increase in numbers would have resulted in a proportional decrease in the amount of land available to each person. Countries that, like Norway and Switzerland, cannot expand and have fully utilized their natural resources must accept the emigration of their excess population. But those that have stuck to their own borders and enacted isolationist policies, like China, feudal Japan during its 250 years of seclusion, and various Polynesian islands, have had to struggle against nature itself by inhibiting the natural growth process. All the repulsive measures contributing to this, whether infanticide, abortion, cannibalism, sanctioned killing of the elderly and sick, honorable suicide, polyandry, or ongoing war, are the social deformities that result from stunted growth. These artificial limits on population are more apparent in natural regions with clearly defined boundaries, like islands and oases, as Malthus noted; but they are also evident among primitive tribes whose boundaries are shaped not by natural features but by mutual hostility and competition typical of that developmental stage, and whose population limits are lowered by their poor economic conditions.

Extra-territorial relations.

There is a great difference between those states whose inhabitants subsist exclusively from the products of their own country and those which rely more or less upon other lands. Great industrial states, like England and Germany, which derive only a portion of their food and raw material from their own territory, supply their dense populations through international trade. Interruption of such foreign commerce is disastrous to the population at home; hence the state by a navy protects the lines of communication with those far-away lands of wheat fields and cattle ranch. This is no purely modern development. Athens in the time of Pericles used her navy not only to secure her political domination in the Aegean, but also her connections with the colonial wheat lands about the Euxine.

There’s a significant difference between areas where people rely solely on local resources and those that depend on imports. Major industrial countries, like England and Germany, get only part of their food and raw materials from their own land, sustaining their large populations through international trade. Interruptions to this foreign trade can be disastrous for their citizens; therefore, a navy is used to protect trade routes with distant regions filled with wheat fields and cattle ranches. This isn’t just a modern issue. Athens during Pericles’ time used its navy not only to maintain political control in the Aegean but also to ensure its connections with the colonial wheat-producing areas around the Black Sea.

The modern state strives to render this circle of trade both large and permanent by means of commercial treaties, customs-unions, trading-posts and colonies. Thus while society at home is multiplying its relations with its own land, the state is enabling it to multiply also its relations with the whole producing world. While at home the nation is becoming more closely knit together through the common bond of the fatherland, in the world at large humanity is evolving a brotherhood of man by the union of each with all through the common growing bond of the earth. Hence we cannot avoid the question: Are we in process of evolving a social idea vaster than that underlying nationality? Do the Socialists hint to us the geographic basis of this new development, when they describe themselves as an international political party?

The modern state aims to expand this trade network to make it bigger and lasting through things like trade agreements, customs unions, trading posts, and colonies. So, while society at home is increasing its connections with its own territory, the state is also helping it build relationships with the entire producing world. As the nation becomes more united through the shared bond of homeland, humanity in the larger world is creating a brotherhood of man by linking everyone together through the common ties of the earth. Therefore, we must ask ourselves: Are we developing a social idea that’s broader than just nationality? Are the Socialists pointing out the global foundation of this new movement when they call themselves an international political party?

Geography in the philosophy of history.

It is natural that the old philosophy of history should have fixed its attention upon the geographic basis of historical events. Searching for the permanent and common in the outwardly mutable, it found always at the bottom of changing events the same solid earth. Biology has had the same experience. The history of the life forms of the world leads always back to the land on which that life arose, spread, and struggled for existence. The philosophy of history was superior to early sociology, in that its method was one of historical comparison, which inevitably guided it back to the land as the material for the first generalization. Thus it happens that the importance of the land factor in history was approached first from the philosophical side. Montesquieu and Herder had no intention of solving sociological and geographical problems, when they considered the relation of peoples and states to their soil; they wished to understand the purpose and destiny of man as an inhabitant of the earth.

It's natural that the old philosophy of history focused on the geographic foundation of historical events. By looking for what stays the same amidst constant change, it always found solid ground beneath shifting occurrences. Biology has gone through a similar realization. The history of living forms on our planet connects back to the land where that life emerged, spread, and fought to survive. The philosophy of history was more advanced than early sociology because its approach involved historical comparison, which naturally led it back to the land as the basis for initial generalizations. As a result, the significance of land in history was first explored from a philosophical angle. Montesquieu and Herder weren't trying to tackle sociological and geographical issues when they examined the relationship between people, states, and their land; they aimed to understand the purpose and destiny of humanity as inhabitants of the earth.

Theory of progress from the standpoint of geography.

The study of history is always, from one standpoint, a study of progress. Yet after all the century-long investigation of the history of every people working out its destiny in its given environment, struggling against the difficulties of its habitat, progressing when it overcame them and retrograding when it failed, advancing when it made the most of its opportunities and declining when it made less or succumbed to an invader armed with better economic or political methods to exploit the land, it is amazing how little the land, in which all activities finally root, has been taken into account in the discussion of progress. Nevertheless, for a theory of progress it offers a solid basis. From the standpoint of the land social and political organizations, in successive stages of development, embrace ever increasing areas, and make them support ever denser populations; and in this concentration of population and intensification of economic development they assume ever higher forms. It does not suffice that a people, in order to progress, should extend and multiply only its local relations to its land. This would eventuate in arrested development, such as Japan showed at the time of Perry's visit. The ideal basis of progress is the expansion of the world relations of a people, the extension of its field of activity and sphere of influence far beyond the limits of its own territory, by which it exchanges commodities and ideas with various countries of the world. Universal history shows us that, as the geographical horizon of the known world has widened from gray antiquity to the present, societies and states have expanded their territorial and economic scope; that they have grown not only in the number of their square miles and in the geographical range of their international intercourse, but in national efficiency, power, and permanence, and especially in that intellectual force which feeds upon the nutritious food of wide comparisons. Every great movement which has widened the geographical outlook of a people, such as the Crusades in the Middle Ages, or the colonization of the Americas, has applied an intellectual and economic stimulus. The expanding field of advancing history has therefore been an essential concomitant and at the same time a driving force in the progress of every people and of the world.

The study of history is essentially a study of progress. After all the years of research into how different societies shape their futures in their environments—facing their challenges, making strides when they overcome obstacles, and experiencing setbacks when they can't—it's surprising how little attention has been paid to the land itself in discussions about progress. However, the land provides a strong foundation for a theory of progress. From the perspective of the land, social and political organizations grow to cover larger areas and support more densely populated communities over time, and in this process, they develop into more advanced forms. It's not enough for a society to only increase its local connections to its land to make progress. This would lead to stagnation, as seen in Japan during Perry's visit. The ideal foundation for progress is a society's expansion of global relationships—extending its activities and influence well beyond its own territory, engaging in the exchange of goods and ideas with countries around the world. History shows us that as the geographical understanding of the world has expanded from ancient times to today, societies and states have also broadened their territorial and economic reach. They have increased not only in land area and the geography of their global interactions but also in national efficiency, power, stability, and especially in the intellectual growth that comes from broad comparisons. Every major movement that has expanded a society's geographical perspective, like the Crusades in the Middle Ages or the colonization of the Americas, has provided both an intellectual and economic boost. Therefore, the expanding landscape of history has been both a crucial companion and a driving force in the progress of every society and the world as a whole.

Man's increasing dependence upon nature.

Since progress in civilization involves an increasing exploitation of natural advantages and the development of closer relations between a land and its people, it is an erroneous idea that man tends to emancipate himself more and more from the control of the natural conditions forming at once the foundation and environment of his activities. On the contrary, he multiplies his dependencies upon nature;124 but while increasing their sum total, he diminishes the force of each. There lies the gist of the matter. As his bonds become more numerous, they become also more elastic. Civilization has lengthened his leash and padded his collar, so that it does not gall; but the leash is never slipped. The Delaware Indians depended upon the forests alone for fuel. A citizen of Pennsylvania, occupying the former Delaware tract, has the choice of wood, hard or soft coal, coke, petroleum, natural gas, or manufactured gas. Does this mean emancipation? By no means. For while fuel was a necessity to the Indian only for warmth and cooking, and incidentally for the pleasureable excitement of burning an enemy at the stake, it enters into the manufacture of almost every article that the Pennsylvanian uses in his daily life. His dependence upon nature has become more far-reaching, though less conspicuous and especially less arbitrary.

Since progress in civilization means increasingly using natural resources and building stronger connections between a place and its people, it's a mistake to think that people are becoming more freed from the influence of the natural conditions that form the basis and environment of their activities. On the contrary, they are becoming more dependent on nature; 124 but while the total number of dependencies grows, the pressure of each one lessens. That's the key point. As their ties become more numerous, they also become more flexible. Civilization has extended his leash and padded his collar so it doesn’t chafe; but the leash is never released. The Delaware Indians relied solely on the forests for fuel. A citizen of Pennsylvania living on the former Delaware land has the option of wood, hard or soft coal, coke, oil, natural gas, or manufactured gas. Does this mean freedom? Not at all. While fuel was only necessary for the Indian for warmth and cooking, and incidentally for the thrilling act of burning an enemy at the stake, it is now essential for producing almost every item the Pennsylvanian uses in daily life. His dependence on nature has become broader, though less noticeable and especially less extreme.

Increase in kind and amount.

These dependencies increase enormously both in variety and amount. Great Britain, with its twenty thousand merchant ships aggregating over ten million tons, and its immense import and export trade, finds its harbors vastly more important to-day for the national welfare than in Cromwell's time, when they were used by a scanty mercantile fleet. Since the generation of electricity by water-power and its application to industry, the plunging falls of the Scandinavian Mountains, of the Alps of Switzerland, France, and Italy, of the Southern Appalachians and the Cascade Range, are geographical features representing new and unsuspected forms of national capital, and therefore new bonds between land and people in these localities. Russia since 1844 has built 35,572 miles (57,374 kilometers) of railroad in her European territory, and thereby derived a new benefit from her level plains, which so facilitate the construction and cheap operation of railroads, that they have become in this aspect alone a new feature in her national economy. On the other hand, the galling restrictions of Russia's meager and strategically confined coasts, which tie her hand in any wide maritime policy, work a greater hardship to-day than they did a hundred years ago, since her growing population creates a more insistent demand for international trade. In contrast to Russia, Norway, with its paucity of arable soil and of other natural resources, finds its long indented coastline and the coast-bred seamanship of its people a progressively important national asset. Hence as ocean-carriers the Norwegians have developed a merchant marine nearly half as large again as that of Russia and Finland combined—1,569,646 tons125 as against 1,084,165 tons.

These dependencies have increased significantly in both variety and quantity. Great Britain, with its twenty thousand merchant ships totaling over ten million tons, and its huge import and export trade, finds its ports much more crucial for national welfare today than in Cromwell's time, when they were used by a limited merchant fleet. Since the generation of electricity from water power and its application in industry, the plunging waterfalls of the Scandinavian Mountains, the Alps in Switzerland, France, and Italy, the Southern Appalachians, and the Cascade Range represent new and unexpected forms of national capital, establishing new connections between the land and the people in these areas. Since 1844, Russia has built 35,572 miles (57,374 kilometers) of railroad in its European territory, gaining new advantages from its flat plains that make railroad construction and operation cheaper, thus making them a new aspect of its national economy. Conversely, the restrictive nature of Russia's limited and strategically positioned coastlines, which hampers its ability to adopt a broad maritime policy, poses a greater challenge today than it did a century ago, as its growing population creates a stronger demand for international trade. In contrast to Russia, Norway, with its scarcity of arable land and other natural resources, finds its long, winding coastline and the strong seamanship of its people increasingly valuable as a national asset. As a result, the Norwegians have developed a merchant marine almost fifty percent larger than that of Russia and Finland combined—1,569,646 tons125 compared to 1,084,165 tons.

This growing dependence of a civilized people upon its land is characterized by intelligence and self-help. Man forms a partnership with nature, contributing brains and labor, while she provides the capital or raw material in ever more abundant and varied forms. As a result of this coöperation, held by the terms of the contract, he secures a better living than the savage who, like a mendicant, accepts what nature is pleased to dole out, and lives under the tyranny of her caprices.

This increasing dependence of a civilized society on its land is marked by intelligence and self-sufficiency. People team up with nature, using their knowledge and hard work while nature provides resources and materials in more abundant and diverse ways. Because of this cooperation, defined by the terms of their partnership, they achieve a better standard of living than those who live primitively, who, like beggars, take what nature offers and are at the mercy of her whims.


NOTES TO CHAPTER III

Notes for Chapter III


79.

H.J. Mackinder, Britain and the British Seas, p. 196. London, 1904.

H.J. Mackinder, Britain and the British Seas, p. 196. London, 1904.

80.

Gardner, Atlas of English History, Map 29. New York, 1905.

Gardner, Atlas of English History, Map 29. New York, 1905.

81.

Hereford George, Historical Geography of Great Britain, pp. 58-60. London, 1904.

Hereford George, Historical Geography of Great Britain, pp. 58-60. London, 1904.

82.

Lewis Morgan, Ancient Society, p. 62. New York, 1878.

Lewis Morgan, Ancient Society, p. 62. New York, 1878.

83.

Franklin H. Giddings, Elements of Sociology, p. 247. New York, 1902.

Franklin H. Giddings, Elements of Sociology, p. 247. New York, 1902.

84.

Schoolcraft, The Indian Tribes of the United States, Vol. I, pp. 198-200, 224. Philadelphia, 1853.

Schoolcraft, The Indian Tribes of the United States, Vol. I, pp. 198-200, 224. Philadelphia, 1853.

85.

Ibid., Vol. I, pp. 231-232, 241.

Ibid., Vol. I, pp. 231-232, 241.

86.

Roosevelt, The Winning of the West, Vol. I, pp. 70-73, 88. New York, 1895.

Roosevelt, The Winning of the West, Vol. I, pp. 70-73, 88. New York, 1895.

87.

McGee and Thomas, Prehistoric North America, pp. 392-393, 408, Vol. XIX, of History of North America, edited by Francis W. Thorpe, Philadelphia, 1905. Eleventh Census Report on the Indians, p. 51. Washington, 1894.

McGee and Thomas, Prehistoric North America, pp. 392-393, 408, Vol. XIX, of History of North America, edited by Francis W. Thorpe, Philadelphia, 1905. Eleventh Census Report on the Indians, p. 51. Washington, 1894.

88.

Hans Helmolt, History of the World, Vol. II, pp. 249-250. New York, 1902-1906.

Hans Helmolt, History of the World, Vol. II, pp. 249-250. New York, 1902-1906.

89.

Spencer and Gillen, Northern Tribes of Central Australia, pp. 13-15. London, 1904.

Spencer and Gillen, Northern Tribes of Central Australia, pp. 13-15. London, 1904.

90.

Ratzel, History of Mankind, Vol. I, p. 126. London, 1896-1898.

Ratzel, History of Mankind, Vol. I, p. 126. London, 1896-1898.

91.

Roscher, National-Oekonomik des Ackerbaues, p. 24. Stuttgart, 1888.

Roscher, National Economics of Agriculture, p. 24. Stuttgart, 1888.

92.

Ratzel, History of Mankind, Vol. I, p. 131. London, 1896-1898.

Ratzel, History of Mankind, Vol. I, p. 131. London, 1896-1898.

93.

Paul Ehrenreich, Die Einteilung und Verbreitung der Völkerstämme Brasiliens, Peterman's Geographische Mittheilungen, Vol. XXXVII, p. 85. Gotha, 1891.

Paul Ehrenreich, Die Einteilung und Verbreitung der Völkerstämme Brasiliens, Peterman's Geographische Mittheilungen, Vol. XXXVII, p. 85. Gotha, 1891.

94.

Roscher, National-Oekonomik des Ackerbaues, p. 26, Note 5. Stuttgart, 1888.

Roscher, National Economics of Agriculture, p. 26, Note 5. Stuttgart, 1888.

95.

Ibid., p. 27.

Ibid., p. 27.

96.

Albert Niblack, The Coast Indians of Southern Alaska and Northern British Columbia, pp. 298-299, 304, 337-339. Washington, 1888.

Albert Niblack, The Coast Indians of Southern Alaska and Northern British Columbia, pp. 298-299, 304, 337-339. Washington, 1888.

97.

Ratzel, History of Mankind, Vol. III, p. 173. London, 1896-1898.

Ratzel, History of Mankind, Vol. III, p. 173. London, 1896-1898.

98.

Ibid., Vol. III. pp. 173-174.

Ibid., Vol. 3, pp. 173-174.

99.

Sven Hedin, Central Asia and Tibet, Vol. I, p. 184. New York and London, 1903.

Sven Hedin, Central Asia and Tibet, Vol. I, p. 184. New York and London, 1903.

100.

John de Plano Carpini, Journey in 1246, p. 130. Hakluyt Society, London, 1904.

John de Plano Carpini, Journey in 1246, p. 130. Hakluyt Society, London, 1904.

101.

Journey of William de Rubruquis in 1253, p. 188. Hakluyt Society, London, 1903.

Journey of William de Rubruquis in 1253, p. 188. Hakluyt Society, London, 1903.

102.

Volney, quoted in Malthus, Principles of Population, Chap. VII, p. 60. London, 1878.

Volney, quoted in Malthus, Principles of Population, Chap. VII, p. 60. London, 1878.

103.

Genesis, Chap. XIII, 1-12.

Genesis 13:1-12.

104.

Herbert Spencer, Principles of Sociology, Vol. I. p. 457. New York.

Herbert Spencer, Principles of Sociology, Vol. I, p. 457. New York.

105.

Heinrich von Treitschke, Politik, Vol. I, pp. 202-204. Leipzig, 1897.

Heinrich von Treitschke, Politik, Vol. I, pp. 202-204. Leipzig, 1897.

106.

E.C. Semple, American History and Its Geographic Conditions, pp. 206-207. Boston, 1903.

E.C. Semple, American History and Its Geographic Conditions, pp. 206-207. Boston, 1903.

107.

Roscher, Grundlagen des National-Oekonomik, Book VI. Bevölkerung, p. 694, Note 5. Stuttgart, 1886.

Roscher, Fundamentals of National Economics, Book VI. Population, p. 694, Note 5. Stuttgart, 1886.

108.

Edward John Payne, History of the New World Called America, Vol. I, p. 303-313. Oxford and New York, 1892.

Edward John Payne, History of the New World Called America, Vol. I, p. 303-313. Oxford and New York, 1892.

109.

Roscher, National-Oekonomik des Ackerbaues, pp. 31, 52. Stuttgart, 1888.

Roscher, National Economics of Agriculture, pp. 31, 52. Stuttgart, 1888.

110.

Ibid., p. 56, Note 5.

Ibid., p. 56, Note 5.

111.

For these and other averages, Sir John Lubbock, Prehistoric Times, pp. 593-595. New York, 1872.

For these and other averages, Sir John Lubbock, Prehistoric Times, pp. 593-595. New York, 1872.

112.

Roscher, National-Oekonomik des Ackerbaues, pp. 79-80, p. 81, Note 7. Stuttgart, 1888. William I. Thomas, Source Book for Social Origins, pp. 96-112. Chicago, 1909.

Roscher, National Economics of Agriculture, pp. 79-80, p. 81, Note 7. Stuttgart, 1888. William I. Thomas, Source Book for Social Origins, pp. 96-112. Chicago, 1909.

113.

Capt. J. Forsyth, The Highlands of Central India, pp. 101-107, 168. London, 1889.

Capt. J. Forsyth, The Highlands of Central India, pp. 101-107, 168. London, 1889.

114.

Tacitus, Germania, III.

Tacitus, *Germania*, III.

115.

Roscher, National-Oekonomik des Ackerbaues, p. 32, Note 15 on p. 36. Stuttgart, 1888.

Roscher, National Economics of Agriculture, p. 32, Note 15 on p. 36. Stuttgart, 1888.

116.

E. Huntington, The Pulse of Asia, pp. 202, 203, 212, 213, 236-237. Boston, 1907.

E. Huntington, The Pulse of Asia, pp. 202, 203, 212, 213, 236-237. Boston, 1907.

117.

Sheldon Jackson, Introduction of Domesticated Reindeer into Alaska, pp. 20, 25-29, 127-129. Washington, 1894.

Sheldon Jackson, Introduction of Domesticated Reindeer into Alaska, pp. 20, 25-29, 127-129. Washington, 1894.

118.

Quoted in Alexander von Humboldt, Aspects of Nature in Different Lands, pp. 62, 139. Philadelphia, 1849.

Quoted in Alexander von Humboldt, Aspects of Nature in Different Lands, pp. 62, 139. Philadelphia, 1849.

119.

Edward John Payne, History of the New World Called America, Vol. I, pp. 311-321. 333-354, 364-366. New York, 1892.

Edward John Payne, *History of the New World Called America*, Vol. I, pp. 311-321, 333-354, 364-366. New York, 1892.

120.

Prescott, Conquest of Peru, Vol. I, p. 47. New York, 1848.

Prescott, Conquest of Peru, Vol. I, p. 47. New York, 1848.

121.

McGee and Thomas, Prehistoric North America, Vol. XIX, pp. 151-161, of The History of North America, edited by Francis W. Thorpe, Philadelphia, 1905.

McGee and Thomas, Prehistoric North America, Vol. XIX, pp. 151-161, of The History of North America, edited by Francis W. Thorpe, Philadelphia, 1905.

122.

Ratzel, Anthropo-geographie, Vol. II, pp. 264-265.

Ratzel, *Anthropo-geography*, Vol. II, pp. 264-265.

123.

Malthus, Principles of Population, Chapters V and VII. London, 1878.

Malthus, Principles of Population, Chapters V and VII. London, 1878.

124.

Nathaniel Shaler, Nature and Man in America, pp. 147-151. W.Z. Ripley, Races of Europe, Chap. I, New York, 1899.

Nathaniel Shaler, Nature and Man in America, pp. 147-151. W.Z. Ripley, Races of Europe, Chap. I, New York, 1899.

125.

Justus Perthes, Taschen-Atlas, pp. 44, 47. Gotha, 1910.

Justus Perthes, Taschen-Atlas, pp. 44, 47. Gotha, 1910.


Chapter IV—The Movements Of Peoples In Their Geographical Significance

Universality of these movements.

The ethnic and political boundaries of Europe to-day are the residuum of countless racial, national, tribal and individual movements reaching back into an unrecorded past. The very names of Turkey, Bulgaria, England, Scotland and France are borrowed from intruding peoples. New England, New France, New Scotland or Nova Scotia and many more on the American continents register the Trans-Atlantic nativity of their first white settlers. The provinces of Galicia in Spain, Lombardy in Italy, Brittany in France, Essex and Sussex in England record in their names streams of humanity diverted from the great currents of the Völkerwanderung. The Romance group of languages, from Portugal to Roumania, testify to the sweep of expanding Rome, just as the wide distribution of the Aryan linguistic family points to many roads and long migrations from some unplaced birthplace. Names like Cis-Alpine and Trans-Alpine Gaul in the Roman Empire, Trans-Caucasia, Trans-Caspia and Trans-Baikalia in the Russian Empire, the Transvaal and Transkei in South Africa, indicate the direction whence the advancing people have come.

The ethnic and political boundaries of Europe today are the result of countless racial, national, tribal, and individual movements stretching back into an unrecorded past. The very names of Turkey, Bulgaria, England, Scotland, and France come from invading peoples. New England, New France, New Scotland, or Nova Scotia and many others on the American continents reflect the Trans-Atlantic origins of their first white settlers. The provinces of Galicia in Spain, Lombardy in Italy, Brittany in France, Essex and Sussex in England capture in their names the flow of humanity redirected from the major currents of the migrations. The Romance group of languages, from Portugal to Romania, testify to the expansion of Rome, just as the widespread distribution of the Aryan linguistic family indicates many routes and long migrations from some unknown birthplace. Names like Cis-Alpine and Trans-Alpine Gaul in the Roman Empire, Trans-Caucasia, Trans-Caspia, and Trans-Baikalia in the Russian Empire, and the Transvaal and Transkei in South Africa show the direction from which these advancing peoples have come.

Stratification of races

Ethnology reveals an east and west stratification of linguistic groups in Europe, a north and south stratification of races, and another stratification by altitude, which reappears in all parts of the world, and shows certain invading dominant races occupying the lowlands and other displaced ones the highlands. This definite arrangement points to successive arrivals, a crowding forward, an intrusion of the strong into fertile, accessible valleys and plains, and a dislodgment of the weak into the rough but safe keeping of mountain range or barren peninsula, where they are brought to bay. Ethnic fragments, linguistic survivals, or merely place names, dropped like discarded baggage along the march of a retreating army, bear witness everywhere to tragic recessionals.

Ethnology shows a division of linguistic groups in Europe between the east and west, a racial division between the north and south, and another division based on altitude, which can be seen in all parts of the world. This demonstrates how certain dominant invading races occupy the lowlands while other displaced groups occupy the highlands. This clear arrangement indicates a series of arrivals, a push forward, an invasion of the strong into fertile, accessible valleys and plains, and a displacement of the weak into the rugged but safer areas of mountain ranges or barren peninsulas, where they are cornered. Ethnic remnants, linguistic traces, or even place names, left behind like discarded luggage along the path of a retreating army, testify everywhere to tragic losses.

The name Historical Movement.

Every country whose history we examine proves the recipient of successive streams of humanity. Even sea-girt England has received various intruding peoples from the Roman occupation to the recent influx of Russian Jews. In prehistoric times it combined several elements in its population, as the discovery of the "long barrow" men and "round barrow" men by archaeologists, and the identification of a surviving Iberian or Mediterranean strain by ethnologists go to prove.126 Egypt, Mesopotamia, and India tell the same story, whether in their recorded or unrecorded history. Tropical Africa lacks a history; but all that has been pieced together by ethnologists and anthropologists, in an effort to reconstruct its past, shows incessant movement,—growth, expansion and short-lived conquest, followed by shrinkage, expulsion or absorption by another invader.127 To this constant shifting of races and peoples the name of historical movement has been given, because it underlies most of written history, and constitutes the major part of unwritten history, especially that of savage and nomadic tribes. Two things are vital in the history of every people, its ethnic composition and the wars it wages in defense or extension of its boundaries. Both rest upon historical movements,—intrusions, whether peaceful or hostile, into its own land, and encroachments upon neighboring territory necessitated by growth. Back of all such movements is natural increase of population beyond local means of subsistence, and the development of the war spirit in the effort to secure more abundant subsistence either by raid or conquest of territory.

Every country we study has been shaped by waves of people. Even isolated England has seen various groups come through, from the Romans to the recent influx of Russian Jews. In ancient times, its population was a mix of different groups, as shown by archaeologists’ discoveries of the "long barrow" and "round barrow" people, and the identification of a lingering Iberian or Mediterranean descent by ethnologists.126 Egypt, Mesopotamia, and India share this same narrative, whether in their documented or undocumented histories. Tropical Africa doesn't have a clear history; however, what ethnologists and anthropologists have managed to put together indicates ongoing movement—growth, expansion, brief conquests, then reduction, expulsion, or absorption by new invaders.127 This constant change in races and groups is called historical movement, as it forms the foundation of most recorded history and is a significant part of unwritten history, particularly for primitive and nomadic tribes. Two key aspects are crucial in the history of any group: its ethnic makeup and the wars fought to defend or expand its borders. Both are influenced by historical movements—whether peaceful or hostile intrusions into its own land, and invasions into neighboring areas prompted by growth. Underlying all these movements is the natural increase in population beyond local resources, alongside the development of a warrior mentality to secure greater resources through raiding or territorial conquest.

Evolution of the Historical Movement.

Among primitive peoples this movement is simple and monotonous. It involves all members of the tribe, either in pursuit of game, or following the herd over the tribal territory, or in migrations seeking more and better land. Among civilized peoples it assumes various forms, and especially is differentiated for different members of the social group. The civilized state develops specialized frontiersmen, armies, explorers, maritime traders, colonists, and missionaries, who keep a part of the people constantly moving and directing external expansion, while the mass of the population converts the force once expended in the migrant food-quest into internal activity. Here we come upon a paradox. The nation as a whole, with the development of sedentary life, increases its population and therewith its need for external movements; it widens its national area and its circle of contact with other lands, enlarges its geographical horizon, and improves its internal communication over a growing territory; it evolves a greater mobility within and without, which attaches, however, to certain classes of society, not to the entire social group. This mobility becomes the outward expression of a whole complex of economic wants, intellectual needs, and political ambitions. It is embodied in the conquests which build up empires, in the colonization which develops new lands, in the world-wide exchange of commodities and ideas which lifts the level of civilization, till this movement of peoples becomes a fundamental fact of history.

Among primitive peoples, this movement is straightforward and repetitive. It involves all tribe members, whether they're hunting for food, following herds across tribal land, or migrating in search of better land. In contrast, among civilized societies, it takes on various forms and is especially tailored to different members of the social group. A civilized society creates specialized roles like frontiersmen, armies, explorers, maritime traders, colonists, and missionaries, which keep part of the population constantly on the move and focused on external expansion, while the majority shift the energy once spent on migrating for food into internal activities. This presents a paradox. The nation as a whole, with the rise of settled life, grows its population and therefore its need for external movement; it expands its national territory and its connections with other lands, broadens its geographical perspective, and enhances its internal communication across an increasing area. It develops greater mobility both within and outside, but this mobility is primarily confined to certain classes of society, rather than the entire social group. This mobility reflects a complex mix of economic demands, intellectual needs, and political aspirations. It manifests in the conquests that build empires, in the colonization of new lands, and in the worldwide exchange of goods and ideas that elevate the level of civilization, ultimately turning this movement of peoples into a fundamental aspect of history.

Nature of primitive movements.

This movement is and has been universal and varied. When most unobtrusive in its operation, it has produced its greatest effects. To seize upon a few conspicuous migrations, like the Völkerwanderung and the irruption of the Turks into Europe, made dramatic by their relation to the declining empires of Rome and Constantinople, and to ignore the vast sum of lesser but more normal movements which by slow increments produce greater and more lasting results, leads to wrong conclusions both in ethnology and history. Here, as in geology, great effects do not necessarily presuppose vast forces, but rather the steady operation of small ones. It is often assumed that the world was peopled by a series of migrations; whereas everything indicates that humanity spread over the earth little by little, much as the imported gypsy moth is gradually occupying New England or the water hyacinth the rivers of Florida. Louis Agassiz observed in 1853 that "the boundaries within which the different natural combinations of animals are known to be circumscribed upon the surface of the earth, coincide with the natural range of distinct types of man."128 The close parallelism between Australian race and flora, Eskimo race and Arctic fauna, points to a similar manner of dispersion. Wallace, in describing how the Russian frontier of settlement slowly creeps forward along the Volga, encroaching upon the Finnish and Tartar areas, and permeating them with Slav blood and civilization, adds that this is probably the normal method of expansion.129 Thucydides describes the same process of encroachment, displacement, and migration in ancient Hellas.130 Strabo quotes Posidonius as saying that the emigration of the Cimbrians and other kindred tribes from their native seats was gradual and by no means sudden.131 The traditions of the Delaware Indians show their advance from their early home in central Canada southward to the Delaware River and Chesapeake Bay to have been a slow zigzag movement, interrupted by frequent long halts, leaving behind one laggard group here and sending out an offshoot there, who formed new tribes and thereby diversified the stock.132 It was an aimless wandering, without destination and purpose other than to find a pleasanter habitat. The Vandals appear first as "a loose aggregation of restless tribes who must not be too definitely assigned to any precise district on the map," somewhere in central or eastern Prussia.133 Far-reaching migrations aiming at a distant goal, like the Gothic and Hunnish conquests of Italy, demand both a geographical knowledge and an organization too high for primitive peoples, and therefore belong to a later period of development.134

This movement is and has always been universal and diverse. When it operates in the background, it often has the most significant impact. Focusing only on a few notable migrations, like the Völkerwanderung and the Turks' invasion of Europe, which are highlighted by their connection to the declining empires of Rome and Constantinople, while overlooking the many smaller, more typical movements that gradually create larger and more enduring changes, leads to inaccurate conclusions in both ethnology and history. Similar to geology, substantial effects do not always require immense forces; rather, they often stem from the consistent action of smaller ones. It's commonly believed that the world's population resulted from a series of migrations, but evidence suggests that humanity spread slowly across the globe, much like how the invasive gypsy moth is gradually taking over New England or the water hyacinth is spreading through Florida's rivers. In 1853, Louis Agassiz noted that "the boundaries within which the various natural combinations of animals are known to exist on the Earth's surface align with the natural range of distinct human types." The close similarities between the Australian race and its flora, and the Eskimo race and Arctic fauna, suggest a similar pattern of dispersion. Wallace describes how the Russian settlement frontier slowly advances along the Volga, gradually encroaching on the Finnish and Tartar regions while infusing them with Slavic blood and culture, adding that this is likely the typical method of expansion. Thucydides outlines the same process of encroachment, displacement, and migration in ancient Greece. Strabo cites Posidonius, remarking that the emigration of the Cimbrians and related tribes from their original territories was gradual and far from abrupt. The traditions of the Delaware Indians indicate that their movement from central Canada south to the Delaware River and Chesapeake Bay was a slow, zigzag journey marked by frequent long pauses, resulting in one group lagging behind here while another branch emerged there, eventually forming new tribes and thereby diversifying their lineage. It was a meandering journey, lacking any specific destination or goal other than to find a more pleasant living environment. The Vandals first appear as "a loose collection of restless tribes who cannot be easily placed in a specific location on the map," somewhere in central or eastern Prussia. Extensive migrations aiming for a distant goal, like the Gothic and Hunnish conquests of Italy, require both geographical knowledge and organizational skills that primitive peoples likely did not possess, and thus these migrations belong to a later stage of development.

Number and range.

The long list of recorded migrations has been supplemented by the researches of ethnologists, which have revealed a multitude of prehistoric movements. These are disclosed in greater number and range with successive investigation. The prehistoric wanderings of the Polynesians assume far more significance to-day than a hundred years ago, when their scope was supposed to have its western limit at Fiji and the Ellice group. They have now been traced to almost every island of Melanesia; vestiges of their influence have been detected in the languages of Australia, and the culture of the distant coasts of Alaska and British Columbia. The western pioneers of America knew the Shoshone Indians as small bands of savages, constantly moving about in search of food in the barren region west of the Rocky Mountains, and occasionally venturing eastward to hunt buffalo on the plains. Recent investigation has identified as offshoots of this retarded Shoshonean stock the sedentary agriculturalists of the Moqui Pueblo, and the advanced populations of ancient Mexico and Central America.135 Here was a great human current which through the centuries slowly drifted from the present frontier of Canada to the shores of Lake Nicaragua. Powell's map of the distribution of the linguistic stocks of American Indians is intelligible only in the light of constant mobility. Haebler's map of the South American stocks reveals the same restless past. This cartographical presentation of the facts, giving only the final results, suggests tribal excursions of the nature of migrations; but ethnologists see them as the sum total of countless small movements which are more or less part of the normal activity of an unrooted savage people. [Map page 101.]

The extensive list of documented migrations has been expanded by studies from ethnologists, uncovering many prehistoric movements. These findings have increased in number and scope with ongoing research. The ancient journeys of the Polynesians are now seen as much more significant than they were a hundred years ago, when it was thought their western boundary was at Fiji and the Ellice Islands. They’ve now been traced to nearly every island in Melanesia; traces of their influence have been found in Australian languages, as well as in the cultures of distant regions like Alaska and British Columbia. The early pioneers of America viewed the Shoshone Indians as small tribes of nomads, always moving around in search of food in the desolate area west of the Rocky Mountains, occasionally heading east to hunt buffalo on the plains. Recent studies have linked the settled agricultural communities of the Moqui Pueblo and the advanced populations of ancient Mexico and Central America as offshoots of this slower-moving Shoshonean group. Here was a significant human movement that, over the centuries, slowly traveled from the current Canadian border to the shores of Lake Nicaragua. Powell's map showing the distribution of Native American languages only makes sense when considering this ongoing mobility. Haebler's map of South American language groups reveals a similar restless history. This visual representation of the facts, which only displays the final outcomes, implies tribal journeys that resemble migrations; however, ethnologists interpret them as the overall result of countless small movements, which are often just part of the usual life of a nomadic people. [Map page 101.]

Otis Mason finds that the life of a social group involves a variety of movements characterized by different ranges or scopes. I. The daily round from bed to bed. II. The annual round from year to year, like that of the Tunguse Orochon of Siberia who in pursuit of various fish and game change their residence within their territory from month to month, or the pastoral nomads who move with the seasons from pasture to pasture. III. Less systematic outside movements covering the tribal sphere of influence, such as journeys or voyages to remote hunting or fishing grounds, forays or piratical descents upon neighboring lands eventuating usually in conquest, expansion into border regions for occasional occupation or colonization. IV. Participation in streams of barter or commerce. V. And at a higher stage in the great currents of human intercourse, experience, and ideas, which finally compass the world.136 In all this series the narrower movement prepares for the broader, of which it constitutes at once an impulse and a part.

Otis Mason discovers that the life of a social group involves various movements with different ranges or scopes. I. The daily routine of moving from bed to bed. II. The annual cycle from year to year, like the Tunguse Orochon of Siberia, who, in search of different fish and game, change where they live within their territory each month, or the pastoral nomads who shift from pasture to pasture with the seasons. III. Less organized external movements that span the tribal area of influence, including trips or voyages to distant hunting or fishing grounds, raids or invasions of neighboring lands that usually lead to conquest, and expansion into border areas for temporary settlement or colonization. IV. Involvement in networks of trade or commerce. V. And at a more advanced level, in the major flows of human interaction, experience, and ideas, which ultimately connect the entire world.136 In all of these movements, the narrower actions set the stage for the broader ones, acting as both an impulse and a component.

Importance of such movements in history.

The real character and importance of these movements have been appreciated by broad-minded historians. Thucydides elucidates the conditions leading up to the Peloponnesian War by a description of the semi-migratory population of Hellas, the exposure of the more fertile districts to incursions, and the influence of these movements in differentiating Dorian from Ionian Greece.137 Johannes von Muller, in the introduction to his history of Switzerland, assigns to federations and migrations a conspicuous rôle in historical development. Edward A. Ross sees in such movements a thorough-going selective process which weeds out the unfit, or rather spares only the highly fit. He lays down the principle that repeated migrations tend to the creation of energetic races of men. He adds, "This principle may account for the fact that those branches of a race achieve the most brilliant success which have wandered the farthest from their ancestral home.... The Arabs and Moors that skirted Africa and won a home in far-away Spain, developed the most brilliant of the Saracen civilizations. Hebrews, Dorians, Quirites, Rajputs, Hovas were far invaders. No communities in classic times flourished like the cities of Asia created by the overflow from Greece. Nowhere under the Czar are there such vigorous, progressive communities as in Siberia."138 Brinton distinguishes the associative and dispersive elements in ethnography. The latter is favored by the physical adaptability of the human race to all climates and external conditions; it is stimulated by the food-quest, the pressure of foes, and the resultant restlessness of an unstable primitive society.139

The true nature and significance of these movements have been recognized by open-minded historians. Thucydides explains the circumstances that led to the Peloponnesian War by describing the semi-nomadic population of Greece, the vulnerability of the more fertile areas to invasions, and how these movements helped distinguish Dorian from Ionian Greece.137 Johannes von Muller, in the introduction to his history of Switzerland, assigns a notable role to federations and migrations in historical development. Edward A. Ross views these movements as a thorough process of selection that eliminates the unfit, or rather, preserves only the highly fit. He proposes that repeated migrations lead to the formation of energetic races of people. He adds, "This principle may explain why the branches of a race that have traveled the farthest from their ancestral home achieve the most remarkable success.... The Arabs and Moors who traversed Africa and settled in far-off Spain developed the most dazzling of the Saracen civilizations. Hebrews, Dorians, Quirites, Rajputs, and Hovas were far-flung invaders. No societies in ancient times thrived like the cities of Asia that were established by the influx from Greece. Nowhere under the Czar are there such dynamic, forward-looking communities as in Siberia."138 Brinton distinguishes between associative and dispersive elements in ethnography. The latter is supported by the physical adaptability of humans to various climates and external conditions; it is driven by the quest for food, the pressure from enemies, and the resulting restlessness of an unstable primitive society.139

The earth's surface is at once factor and basis in these movements. In an active way it directs them; but they in turn clothe the passive earth with a mantle of humanity. This mantle is of varied weave and thickness, showing here the simple pattern of a primitive society, there the intricate design of advanced civilization; here a closely woven or a gauzy texture, there disclosing a great rent where a rocky peak or the ice-wrapped poles protrude through the warm human covering. This is the magic web whereof man is at once woof and weaver, and the flying shuttle that never rests. Given a region, what is its living envelope, asks anthropo-geography. Whence and how did it get there? What is the material of warp and woof? Will new threads enter to vary the color and design? If so, from what source? Or will the local pattern repeat itself over and over with dull uniformity?

The earth's surface is both a factor and a foundation in these movements. It actively guides them, but in turn, they cover the passive earth with a layer of humanity. This layer has different textures and thicknesses, displaying the simple design of a primitive society in some areas and the complex patterns of advanced civilization in others; some parts are tightly woven, while others are sheer, revealing breaks where rocky peaks or ice-covered poles stick out through the warm human layer. This is the intricate fabric of which humans are both the thread and the weaver, with a shuttle that never stops moving. Given a region, anthropo-geography asks, what is its living cover? How did it come to be? What is the material of its threads? Will new strands be added to change its colors and patterns? If so, where will they come from? Or will the local design repeat itself endlessly in boring uniformity?

Geographical interpretation of historical movement.

It was the great intellectual service of Copernicus that he conceived of a world in motion instead of a world at rest. So anthropo-geography must see its world in motion, whether it is considering English colonization, or the westward expansion of the Southern slave power in search of unexhausted land, or the counter expansion of the free-soil movement, or the early advance of the trappers westward to the Rockies after the retreating game, or the withdrawal thither of the declining Indian tribes before the protruding line of white settlement, and their ultimate confinement to ever shrinking reservations. In studying increase of population, it sees in Switzerland chalet and farm creeping higher up the Alp, as the lapping of a rising tide of humanity below; it sees movement in the projection of a new dike in Holland to reclaim from the sea the land for another thousand inhabitants, movement in Japan's doubling of its territory by conquest, in order to house and feed its redundant millions.

It was Copernicus's major intellectual contribution that he imagined a world in motion instead of a world at rest. So, anthropo-geography must view its world as dynamic, whether it's looking at English colonization, the westward expansion of the Southern slave power in search of unclaimed land, the counter-expansion of the free-soil movement, or the early movement of trappers westward to the Rockies following the retreating game, or the migration of declining Indian tribes before the encroaching line of white settlement, ultimately leading to their confinement to ever-shrinking reservations. When studying population growth, it sees in Switzerland farms and chalets moving higher up the Alps, like the rise of a tide of humanity below; it sees movement in the construction of a new dike in Holland to reclaim land from the sea for another thousand inhabitants, and in Japan's expansion of its territory through conquest to accommodate and feed its overflowing millions.

The whole complex relation of unresting man to the earth is the subject matter of anthropo-geography. The science traces his movements on the earth's surface, measures their velocity, range, and recurrence, determines their nature by the way they utilize the land, notes their transformation at different stages of economic development and under different environments. Just as an understanding of animal and plant geography requires a previous knowledge of the various means of dispersal, active and passive, possessed by these lower forms of life, so anthropo-geography must start with a study of the movements of mankind.

The entire complex relationship between restless humans and the earth is the focus of anthropo-geography. This science tracks human movements across the earth's surface, measures their speed, distance, and frequency, defines their nature based on how they use the land, and observes their changes at various stages of economic development and in different environments. Just like understanding animal and plant geography requires prior knowledge of the different ways these lower forms of life disperse, both actively and passively, anthropo-geography must begin with studying human movements.

Mobility of primitive peoples.

First of all is to be noted an evolution in the mobility of peoples. In the lower stages of culture mobility is great. It is favored by the persistent food-quest over wide areas incident to retarded economic methods, and by the loose attachment of society to the soil. The small social groups peculiar to these stages and their innate tendency to fission help the movements to ramify. The consequent scattered distribution of the population offers wide interstices between encampments or villages, and into these vacant spaces other wandering tribes easily penetrate. The rapid decline of the Indian race in America before the advancing whites was due chiefly to the division of the savages into small groups, scattered sparsely over a wide territory. Hunter and pastoral peoples need far more land than they can occupy at any one time. Hence the temporarily vacant spots invite incursion. Moreover, the slight impedimenta carried by primitive folk minimize the natural physical obstacles which they meet when on the march. The lightly equipped war parties of the Shawnee Indians used gorges and gaps for the passage of the Allegheny Mountains which were prohibitive to all white pioneers except the lonely trapper. Finally, this mobility gets into the primitive mind. The Wanderlust is strong. Long residence in one territory is irksome, attachment is weak. Therefore a small cause suffices to start the whole or part of the social body moving. A temporary failure of the food supply, cruelty or excessive exaction of tribute on the part of the chief, occasions an exodus. The history of every negro tribe in Africa gives instances of such secessions, which often leave whole districts empty and exposed to the next wandering occupant. Methods of preventing such withdrawals, and therewith the diminution of his treasury receipts and his fighting force, belong to the policy of every negro chieftain.

First, it's important to note the evolution in the movement of people. In earlier stages of culture, mobility is high. It's encouraged by the constant search for food over large areas, which is linked to underdeveloped economic methods, and by the loose connection of society to the land. The small social groups typical of these stages, along with their natural tendency to split apart, facilitate widespread movement. As a result, the scattered distribution of the population creates large gaps between encampments or villages, and other wandering tribes can easily move into these empty spaces. The rapid decline of Native Americans in America before the advancing white settlers was mainly due to the division of tribes into small groups dispersed over a vast area. Hunter-gatherer and pastoral societies require much more land than they can occupy at any given time. Therefore, the temporarily vacant areas invite new arrivals. Additionally, the minimal belongings carried by primitive people reduce the natural physical obstacles they encounter while traveling. Lightly equipped war parties of the Shawnee Indians used gorges and gaps to navigate the Allegheny Mountains, which were nearly impossible for all white pioneers except for the solitary trapper. Ultimately, this mobility permeates the primitive mindset. The desire to wander is strong. Prolonged stay in one area is bothersome, and attachment is weak. Thus, even a small issue can cause the entire group or part of it to move. A temporary shortage of food, cruel treatment, or excessive demands from the chief can trigger an exodus. The history of every African tribal group provides examples of such separations, often leaving entire regions vacant and vulnerable to the next group that comes along. Strategies to prevent such departures, which would decrease his income and his fighting force, are part of the strategy of every African chief.

Natural barriers to movement.

The checks to this native mobility of primitive peoples are two: physical and mental. In addition to the usual barriers of mountains, deserts, and seas before the invention of boats, primeval forests have always offered serious obstacles to man armed only with stone or bronze axe, and they rebuffed even man of the iron age. War and hunting parties had to move along the natural clearings of the rivers, the tracks of animals, or the few trails beaten out in time by the natives themselves. Primitive agriculture has never battled successfully against the phalanx of the trees. Forests balked the expansion of the Inca civilization on the rainy slope of the Andes, and in Central Africa the negro invaded only their edges for his yam fields and plantain groves. The earliest settlements in ancient Britain were confined to the natural clearings of the chalk downs and oolitic uplands; and here population was chiefly concentrated even at the close of the Roman occupation. Only gradually, as the valley woodlands were cleared, did the richer soil of the alluvial basins attract men from the high, poor ground where tillage required no preliminary work. But after four centuries of Roman rule and Roman roads, the clearings along the river valleys were still mere strips of culture mid an encompassing wilderness of woods. When the Germanic invaders came, they too appropriated the treeless downs and were blocked by the forests.140 On the other hand, grasslands and savannahs have developed the most mobile people whom we know, steppe hunters like the Sioux Indians and Patagonians. Thus while the forest dweller, confined to the highway of the stream, devised only canoe and dugout boat in various forms for purposes of transportation, steppe peoples of the Old World introduced the use of draft and pack animals, and invented the sledge and cart.

The limitations on the natural mobility of primitive peoples are twofold: physical and mental. Besides the usual obstacles of mountains, deserts, and seas before boats were invented, ancient forests have always posed serious challenges to people armed with only stone or bronze axes, and even iron Age people faced difficulties. War and hunting groups had to travel along natural river clearings, animal trails, or the few paths created over time by the natives themselves. Primitive farming has never effectively overcome the barrier of trees. Forests hindered the growth of Inca civilization on the rainy slopes of the Andes, and in Central Africa, people only invaded the forest edges for their yam fields and plantain groves. The earliest settlements in ancient Britain were limited to the natural clearings of the chalk downs and oolitic uplands; population was mainly concentrated there even after the Romans left. Only gradually, as the valley woodlands were cleared, did the richer soil of the floodplains attract people from the high, less fertile land where farming required less preparation. But even after four centuries of Roman rule and Roman roads, the clearings along the river valleys were still just narrow strips of cultivated land surrounded by vast wilderness. When the Germanic invaders arrived, they also took over the treeless downs but were blocked by the forests.140 On the other hand, grasslands and savannahs produced the most mobile groups we know of, like the steppe hunters, such as the Sioux Indians and Patagonians. So while forest dwellers, limited to the waterways, only developed canoes and dugout boats for transportation, the steppe peoples of the Old World used draft and pack animals and invented sledges and carts.

Effect of geographical horizon.

Primitive peoples carry a drag upon their migrations in their restricted geographical outlook; ignorance robs them of definite goals. The evolution of the historical movement is accelerated by every expansion of the geographical horizon. It progresses most rapidly where the knowledge of outlying or remote lands travels fastest, as along rivers and thalassic coasts. Rome's location as toll-gate keeper of the Tiber gave her knowledge of the upstream country and directed her conquest of its valley; and the movement thus started gathered momentum as it advanced. Cæsar's occupation of Gaul meant to his generation simply the command of the roads leading from the Mediterranean to the northern sources of tin and amber, and the establishment of frontier outposts to protect the land boundaries of Italy; this represented a bold policy of inland expansion for that day. The modern historian sees in that step the momentous advance of history beyond the narrow limits of the Mediterranean basin, and its gradual inclusion of all the Atlantic countries of Europe, through whose maritime enterprise the historical horizon was stretched to include America. In the same way, mediæval trade with the Orient, which had familiarized Europe with distant India and Cathay, developed its full historico-geographical importance when it started the maritime discoveries of the fifteenth century. The expansion of the geographical horizon in 1512 to embrace the earth inaugurated a widespread historical movement, which has resulted in the Europeanization of the world.

Primitive peoples face limitations in their migrations due to their narrow geographical perspective; their ignorance leaves them without clear goals. The progress of historical change speeds up with every expansion of geographical awareness. It advances most quickly where knowledge of distant lands spreads rapidly, such as along rivers and coastal areas. Rome's position as the toll-gate keeper of the Tiber provided insight into the upstream regions and guided her conquest of its valley; this initial movement gained momentum as it progressed. For Cæsar’s generation, taking control of Gaul simply meant controlling the routes from the Mediterranean to the northern sources of tin and amber, and establishing outposts to secure Italy's borders; this was a bold expansion strategy for that time. Modern historians view this action as a significant turning point in history, pushing beyond the Mediterranean basin's limits and gradually incorporating all the Atlantic countries of Europe, whose maritime ventures eventually expanded the historical horizon to include America. Similarly, medieval trade with the East, which introduced Europe to far-off India and Cathay, gained substantial historical and geographical significance when it led to the maritime explorations of the fifteenth century. The broadening of the geographical understanding in 1512 to include the entire globe sparked a widespread historical movement, resulting in the Europeanization of the world.

Civilization and mobility.

Civilized man is at once more and less mobile than his primitive brother. Every advance in civilization multiplies and tightens the bonds uniting him with his soil; makes him a sedentary instead of a migratory being. On the other hand every advance in civilization is attended by the rapid clearing of the forests, by the construction of bridges and interlacing roads, the invention of more effective vehicles for transportation whereby intercourse increases, and the improvement of navigation to the same end. Civilized man progressively modifies the land which he occupies, removes or reduces obstacles to intercourse, and thereby approximates it to the open plain. Thus far he facilitates movements. But while doing this he also places upon the land a dense population, closely attached to the soil, strong to resist incursion, and for economic reasons inhospitable to any marked accession of population from without. Herein lies the great difference between migration in empty or sparsely inhabited regions, such as predominated when the world was young, and in the densely populated countries of our era. As the earth grew old and humanity multiplied, peoples themselves became the greatest barriers to any massive migrations, till in certain countries of Europe and Asia the historical movement has been reduced to a continual pressure, resulting in compression of population here, repression there. Hence, though political boundaries may shift, ethnic boundaries scarcely budge. The greatest wars of modern Europe have hardly left a trace upon the distribution of its peoples. Only in the Balkan Peninsula, as the frontiers of the Turkish Empire have been forced back from the Danube, the alien Turks have withdrawn to the shrinking territory of the Sultan and especially to Asia Minor.

Civilized humans are both more and less mobile than their primitive ancestors. Every step forward in civilization strengthens the ties connecting them to their land, turning them into settled beings instead of nomads. On the flip side, every advancement in civilization accompanies the rapid clearing of forests, the building of bridges and extensive road networks, the creation of better transportation vehicles, and improved navigation, all of which increase interactions. Civilized people gradually alter the land they inhabit, remove or lessen barriers to communication, making it more like an open plain. This initially helps movement. However, while doing this, they also create a dense population that is strongly rooted in the land, resistant to outside invasion, and economically unwilling to accept a significant influx of outsiders. This highlights the stark difference between migration in empty or sparsely populated areas, which was common in the early world, and in the densely populated countries of today. As the world aged and the human population grew, people themselves became the biggest obstacles to large migrations, leading to continuous pressure in certain European and Asian countries, resulting in population density in some areas and repression in others. So, even though political borders may change, ethnic boundaries remain mostly unchanged. The major wars of modern Europe have barely affected the distribution of its people. Only in the Balkan Peninsula, as the borders of the Turkish Empire have retreated from the Danube, have the foreign Turks moved back to the shrinking territory of the Sultan, especially into Asia Minor.

Diffusion of culture.

Where a population too great to be dislodged occupies the land, conquest results in the eventual absorption of the victors and their civilization by the native folk, as happened to the Lombards in Italy, the Vandals in Africa and the Normans in England. Where the invaders are markedly superior in culture though numerically weak, conquest results in the gradual permeation of the conquered with the religion, economic methods, language, and customs of the new-comers.141 The latter process, too, is always attended by some intermixture of blood, where no race repulsion exists, but this is small in comparison to the diffusion of civilization. This was the method by which Greek traders and colonists Hellenized the countries about the eastern Mediterranean, and spread their culture far back from the shores which their settlements had appropriated. In this way Saracen armies soon after the death of Mohammed Arabized the whole eastern and southern sides of the Mediterranean from Syria to Spain, and Arab merchants set the stamp of their language and religion on the coasts of East Africa as far as Moçambique. The handful of Spanish adventurers who came upon the relatively dense populations of Mexico and Peru left among them a civilization essentially European, but only a thin strain of Castilian blood. Thus the immigration of small bands of people sufficed to influence the culture of that big territory known as Latin America.

When a population is too large to be displaced, conquest leads to the eventual blending of the conquerors and their civilization with the native people, as seen with the Lombards in Italy, the Vandals in Africa, and the Normans in England. When the invaders are culturally superior but fewer in number, conquest results in the gradual integration of the conquered people with the religion, economic practices, language, and customs of the newcomers.141 This process is also accompanied by some mixing of blood when there is no racial conflict, but that is minor compared to the spread of civilization. This is how Greek traders and colonists spread Hellenistic culture throughout the countries around the eastern Mediterranean, reaching far inland from the coastal settlements they established. Similarly, shortly after Muhammad's death, Saracen armies Arabized the entire eastern and southern Mediterranean, from Syria to Spain, while Arab merchants influenced the language and religion along the East African coast as far as Moçambique. The small group of Spanish adventurers who encountered the relatively large populations of Mexico and Peru left behind a civilization that was primarily European in character but only a slight infusion of Castilian blood. Thus, the immigration of small groups was enough to shape the culture of the vast region known as Latin America.

Ethnic intermixture.

That vast sum of migrations, great and small, which we group under the general term of historical movement has involved an endless mingling of races and cultures. As Professor Petrie has remarked, the prevalent notion that in prehistoric times races were pure and unmixed is without foundation. An examination of the various forms of the historical movement reveals the extent and complexity of this mingling process.

That huge amount of migrations, big and small, which we refer to as historical movement, has led to a constant blending of races and cultures. As Professor Petrie noted, the common belief that races were pure and unmixed in prehistoric times is unfounded. Looking into the different forms of historical movement shows just how extensive and complex this blending process is.

In the first place, no migration is ever simple; it involves a number of secondary movements, each of which in turn occasions a new combination of tribal or racial elements. The transference of a whole people from its native or adopted seat to a new habitat, as in the Völkerwanderungen, empties the original district, which then becomes a catchment basin for various streams of people about its rim; and in the new territory it dislodges a few or all of the occupants, and thereby starts up a fresh movement as the original one comes to rest.

First of all, no migration is ever straightforward; it includes several secondary movements, each of which creates a new mix of tribal or racial groups. When a whole community moves from its home or adopted area to a new place, like in the Völkerwanderungen, it leaves its original area empty, turning it into a catchment zone for various groups of people around it; and in the new area, it pushes out some or all of the existing inhabitants, triggering a new movement as the original one settles down.

Nor is this all. A torrent that issues from its source in the mountains is not the river which reaches the sea. On its long journey from highland to lowland it receives now the milky waters of a glacier-fed stream, now a muddy tributary from agricultural lands, now the clear waters from a limestone plateau, while all the time its racing current bears a burden of soil torn from its own banks. Now it rests in a lake, where it lays down its weight of silt, then goes on, perhaps across an arid stretch where its water is sucked up by the thirsty air or diverted to irrigate fields of grain. So with those rivers of men which we call migrations. The ethnic stream may start comparatively pure, but it becomes mixed on the way. From time to time it leaves behind laggard elements which in turn make a new racial blend where they stop. Such were the six thousand Aduatici whom Cæsar found in Belgian Gaul. These were a detachment of the migrating Cimbri, left there in charge of surplus cattle and baggage while the main body went on to Italy.142

Nor is this all. A torrent that comes from its source in the mountains is not the same as the river that reaches the sea. On its long journey from highland to lowland, it picks up the milky waters of a glacier-fed stream, a muddy tributary from farmland, and the clear waters from a limestone plateau, while all the time its rushing current carries away soil eroded from its own banks. Sometimes it rests in a lake, where it deposits its load of silt, and then continues on, perhaps across a dry area where its water is absorbed by the thirsty air or diverted to irrigate fields of grain. This is similar to those rivers of people that we call migrations. The ethnic stream may start off relatively pure, but it becomes mixed along the way. Now and then, it leaves behind some groups that then create a new racial blend where they settle. Such were the six thousand Aduatici whom Cæsar found in Belgian Gaul. They were a group of migrants from the Cimbri, left there to take care of surplus cattle and baggage while the main group continued on to Italy.142

Complex currents of migration.

A migration rarely involves a single people even at the start. It becomes contagious either by example or by the subjection of several neighboring tribes to the same impelling force, by reason of which all start at or near the same time. We find the Cimbri and Teutons combined with Celts from the island of Batavia143 in the first Germanic invasion of the Roman Empire. Jutes, Saxons and Angles started in close succession for Britain, and the Saxon group included Frisians.144 An unavoidable concomitant of great migrations, especially those of nomads, is their tendency to sweep into the vortex of their movement any people whom they brush on the way. Both individuals and tribes are thus caught up by the current. The general convergence of the central German tribes towards the Danube frontier of the Roman Empire during the Marcomannic War drew in its train the Lombards from the lower Elbe down to the middle Danube and Theiss.145 The force of the Lombards invading Italy in 568 included twenty thousand Saxons from Swabia, Gepidae from the middle Danube, Bulgarians, Slavs from the Russian Ukraine, together with various tribes from the Alpine district of Noricum and the fluvial plains of Pannonia. Two centuries later the names of these non-Lombard tribes still survived in certain villages of Italy which had formed their centers.146 The army which Attila the Hun brought into Gaul was a motley crowd, comprising peoples of probable Slav origin from the Russian steppes, Teutonic Ostrogoths and Gepidae, and numerous German tribes, besides the Huns themselves. When this horde withdrew after the death of Attila, Gepidae and Ostrogoths settled along the middle Danube, and the Slavonic contingent along the Alpine courses of the Drave and Save Rivers.147 The Vandal migration which in 409 invaded Spain included the Turanian Alans and the German Suevi. The Alans found a temporary home in Portugal, which they later abandoned to join the Vandal invasion of North Africa, while the Suevi settled permanently in the northwestern mountains of Spain. The Vandals occupied in Spain two widely separated districts, one in the mountain region of Galicia next to the Suevi, and the other in the fertile valley of Andalusia in the south, while the northeastern part of the peninsula was occupied by intruding Visigoths.148 Add to these the original Iberian and Celtic stocks of the peninsula and the Roman strain previously introduced, and the various elements which have entered into the Spanish people become apparent.149

A migration rarely starts with just one group of people. It spreads quickly, either by example or because nearby tribes are also drawn in by the same force, causing them to move at about the same time. We see the Cimbri and Teutons joined by Celts from the island of Batavia in the first Germanic invasion of the Roman Empire. The Jutes, Saxons, and Angles followed closely behind to Britain, with the Saxon group including Frisians. A common result of major migrations, especially those of nomads, is that they tend to pull in anyone they encounter along the way. Both individuals and tribes get swept up in this movement. The central German tribes moving towards the Danube frontier of the Roman Empire during the Marcomannic War also drew in the Lombards from the lower Elbe to the middle Danube and Theiss. The Lombards invading Italy in 568 included twenty thousand Saxons from Swabia, Gepidae from the middle Danube, Bulgarians, Slavs from the Russian Ukraine, and various tribes from the Alpine region of Noricum and the river plains of Pannonia. Two centuries later, the names of those non-Lombard tribes were still found in some Italian villages that had become their centers. The army that Attila the Hun brought into Gaul was a diverse mix, including peoples likely of Slavic origin from the Russian steppes, Teutonic Ostrogoths and Gepidae, plus numerous German tribes, along with the Huns themselves. After Attila's death, the Gepidae and Ostrogoths settled along the middle Danube, while the Slavic group settled along the Alpine rivers of the Drave and Save. The Vandal migration that invaded Spain in 409 included the Turanian Alans and the German Suevi. The Alans temporarily settled in Portugal before leaving to join the Vandal invasion of North Africa, while the Suevi established themselves permanently in the northwestern mountains of Spain. The Vandals occupied two widely separated areas in Spain: one in the mountainous region of Galicia next to the Suevi, and the other in the fertile valley of Andalusia in the south, while the northeastern part of the peninsula was taken over by the invading Visigoths. Add to this the original Iberian and Celtic populations of the peninsula and the earlier Roman influence, and the various elements that make up the Spanish people become clear.

Cultural modification during migration.

The absorption of foreign elements is not confined to large groups whose names come down in history, nor is the ensuing modification one of blood alone. Every land migration or expansion of a people passes by or through the territories of other peoples; by these it is inevitably influenced in point of civilization, and from them individuals are absorbed into the wandering throng by marriage or adoption, or a score of ways. This assimilation of blood and local culture is facilitated by the fact that the vast majority of historical movements are slow, a leisurely drift. Even the great Völkerwanderung, which history has shown us generally in the moment of swift, final descent upon the imperial city, in reality consisted of a succession of advances with long halts between. The Vandals, whose original seats were probably in central or eastern Prussia, drifted southward with the general movement of the German barbarians toward the borders of the Empire late in the second century, and, after the Marcomannic War (175 A.D.), settled in Dacia north of the lower Danube under the Roman sway. In 271 they were located on the middle Danube, and sixty years afterwards in Moravia. Later they settled for seventy years in Pannonia within the Empire, where they assimilated Roman civilization and adopted the Arian form of Christianity from their Gothic neighbors.150 In Spain, as we have seen, they occupied Galicia and Andalusia for a time before passing over into Africa in 429. Here was a migration lasting two centuries and a half, reaching from the Baltic to the southern shores of the Mediterranean, starting on the bleak sterile plains of the north amid barbarous neighbors, ending in the sunny grain fields and rich cities of Roman Africa. The picture which we get of the victorious Vandals parceling out the estates of Roman nobles, and, from the standpoint of their more liberal faith, profiting by the dissensions of the two Catholic sects of Africa, shows us a people greatly modified by their long sweep through the civilized outskirts of the Empire. So it was with the Lombards and Goths who invaded Italy.

The absorption of foreign elements isn't limited to large groups whose names are remembered in history, nor is the resulting change just about bloodlines. Every movement or expansion of a people passes through the lands of others; as a result, they are inevitably influenced in terms of culture. Individuals from those groups are absorbed into the wandering population through marriage, adoption, and many other means. This blending of blood and local culture is made easier by the fact that most historical movements happen slowly, as a gradual drift. Even the great Völkerwanderung, which history portrays as a rapid, final assault on the imperial city, actually consisted of a series of advances with long pauses in between. The Vandals, who likely originated in central or eastern Prussia, moved southward along with the general movement of Germanic tribes toward the Empire's borders in the late second century, and, after the Marcomannic War (175 A.D.), settled in Dacia, north of the lower Danube, under Roman rule. By 271, they were in the middle Danube, and sixty years later, they had moved to Moravia. Later, they spent seventy years in Pannonia within the Empire, where they absorbed Roman culture and adopted the Arian form of Christianity from their Gothic neighbors.150 In Spain, as we have seen, they occupied Galicia and Andalusia for a while before moving into Africa in 429. This was a migration that lasted two and a half centuries, stretching from the Baltic to the southern shores of the Mediterranean, starting on the harsh, barren plains of the north among barbaric neighbors, and ending in the sunny grain fields and prosperous cities of Roman Africa. The image we get of the victorious Vandals dividing up the estates of Roman nobles and taking advantage of the disagreements between two Catholic sects in Africa highlights a people greatly changed by their long journey through the civilized edges of the Empire. The same happened with the Lombards and Goths who invaded Italy.

Among primitive tribes, who move in smaller groups and must conform closely to the dictates of their environment, the modifying effects of people and land through which they pass are conspicuous. Ratzel describes the gradual withdrawal of a Hottentot people from western Cape Colony far into the arid interior before the advance of Kaffirs and Europeans by saying: "The stock and name of the Namaquas wandered northward, acquiring new elements, and in course of time filling the old mold with new contents."151 This is the typical result of such primitive movements. The migration of the Delaware Indians from an early home somewhere northwest of the Great Lakes to their historical habitat between the Hudson and Potomac Rivers was a slow progress, which somewhere brought them into contact with maize-growing tribes, and gave them their start in agriculture.152 The transit lands through which these great race journeys pass exercise a modifying effect chiefly through their culture and their peoples, less through their physical features and climate. For that the stay of the visitants is generally too brief.

Among primitive tribes, who live in smaller groups and need to closely follow the demands of their surroundings, the impact of the people and land they encounter is quite noticeable. Ratzel describes how a Hottentot group moved from the western Cape Colony deep into the dry interior as Kaffirs and Europeans advanced, saying: "The stock and name of the Namaquas wandered northward, acquiring new elements, and in course of time filling the old mold with new contents."151 This is a typical result of such primitive migrations. The movement of the Delaware Indians from their original home somewhere northwest of the Great Lakes to their historical area between the Hudson and Potomac Rivers was a gradual process that eventually brought them into contact with maize-growing tribes, giving them a start in agriculture.152 The lands these large migrations travel through mainly influence them by their culture and peoples, rather than their physical characteristics and climate. This is because the visitors usually stay for a relatively short time.

Effect of early maritime migration.

Even early maritime migrants did not keep their strains pure. The untried navigator sailing from island to headland, hugging the coast and putting ashore for water, came into contact with the natives. Cross currents of migration can be traced in Polynesian waters, where certain islands are nodal points which have given and received of races and culture through centuries of movement. The original white population of Uruguay differed widely from that of the other Spanish republics of South America. Its nucleus was a large immigration of Canary Islanders. These were descendants of Spaniards and the native Guanches of the Canaries, mingled also with Norman, Flemish and Moorish blood.153 The Norse on their way to Iceland may have picked up a Celtic element in the islands north of Scotland; but from the Faroe group onward they found only empty Iceland and Greenland. This was an exceptional experience. Early navigation, owing to its limitations, purposely restricted itself to the known. Men voyaged where men had voyaged before and were to be found. Journeys into the untenanted parts of the world were rare. However, the probable eastward expansion of the Eskimo along the Arctic rim of North America belongs in this class, so that this northern folk has suffered no modification from contact with others, except where Alaska approaches Asia.

Even early maritime migrants didn’t keep their bloodlines pure. The inexperienced navigator sailing from one island to the next, hugging the coast and stopping for water, encountered the locals. You can see the cross currents of migration in Polynesian waters, where certain islands acted as hubs that exchanged races and cultures over centuries of movement. The original white population of Uruguay was very different from that of other Spanish republics in South America. Its core consisted of a large influx of Canary Islanders. These were descendants of Spaniards and the native Guanches of the Canaries, mixed with Norman, Flemish, and Moorish ancestry.153 The Norse, on their way to Iceland, may have picked up some Celtic influences in the islands north of Scotland, but from the Faroe Islands onward, they found only uninhabited Iceland and Greenland. This was a unique experience. Early navigation, due to its limitations, intentionally confined itself to what was known. People traveled where others had previously been and where they could find others. Journeys into uninhabited parts of the world were rare. However, the likely eastward expansion of the Eskimo along the Arctic edge of North America falls into this category, meaning this northern group has not changed through contact with others, except where Alaska meets Asia.

The transit land.

The land traversed by a migrating horde is not to be pictured as a dead road beneath their feet, but rather as a wide region of transit and transition, potent to influence them by its geography and people, and to modify them in the course of their passage. The route which they follow is a succession of habitats, in which they linger and domicile themselves for a while, though not long enough to lose wholly the habits of life and thought acquired in their previous dwelling place. Although nature in many places, by means of valleys, low plains, mountain passes or oasis lines, points out the way of these race movements, it is safer to think and speak of this way as a transit land, not as a path or road. Even where the district of migration has been the sea, as among the Caribs of the Antilles Islands, the Moros of the Philippines, and the Polynesians of the Pacific, man sends his roots like a water plant down into the restless element beneath, and reflects its influence in all his thought and activities.

The land crossed by a migrating group shouldn't be seen as a barren path under their feet, but instead as a vast area of movement and change, full of potential to shape them through its geography and communities, and to alter them during their journey. The route they take is a series of habitats where they stop and settle for a bit, though not long enough to completely forget the ways of life and thoughts they gained from their previous home. While nature often guides these movements through valleys, low plains, mountain passes, or oasis lines, it’s better to consider this as a transit area rather than a fixed path or road. Even when migration happens across the sea, like with the Caribs of the Antilles Islands, the Moros of the Philippines, and the Polynesians of the Pacific, people anchor themselves like water plants into the restless waters below, and this influence shapes all their thoughts and actions.

War as a form of the historical movement.

Every aggressive historical movement, whether bold migration or forcible extension of the home territory, involves displacement or passive movement of other peoples (except in those rare occupations of vacant lands), who in turn are forced to encroach upon the lands of others. These conditions involve war, which is an important form of the historical movement, contributing to new social contacts and fusion of racial stocks. Raids and piratical descents are often the preliminary of great historical movements. They first expand the geographical horizon, and end in permanent settlements, which involve finally considerable transfers of population, summoned to strengthen the position of the interloper. Such was the history of the Germanic invasions of Britain, the Scandinavian settlements on the shores of Iceland, Britain, and France, and the incursions of Saharan tribes into the Sudanese states. Among pastoral nomads war is the rule; the tribe, a mobilized nation, is always on a war footing with its neighbors. The scant supply of wells and pasturage, inadequate in the dry season, involves rivalry and conflict for their possession as agricultural lands do not. Failure of water or grass is followed by the decline of the herds, and then by marauding expeditions into the river valleys to supply the temporary want of food. When population increases beyond the limits of subsistence in the needy steppes, such raids become the rule and end in the conquest of the more favored lands, with resulting amalgamation of race and culture.154

Every aggressive historical movement, whether it's a bold migration or the forceful expansion of territory, involves the displacement or passive movement of other people (except in those rare cases of occupying uninhabited land), who then have to encroach upon the lands of others. These situations lead to war, which is a significant part of historical movements, contributing to new social connections and the blending of different racial groups. Raids and pirate attacks often precede major historical shifts. They first broaden the geographical scope and ultimately result in permanent settlements, which lead to considerable population transfers, brought in to solidify the position of the intruder. This was the case with the Germanic invasions of Britain, the Scandinavian settlements along the coasts of Iceland, Britain, and France, and the incursions of Saharan tribes into the Sudanese states. Among pastoral nomads, war is the norm; the tribe, a mobilized nation, is always prepared for conflict with nearby groups. The limited availability of wells and grazing land, which is insufficient during the dry season, leads to competition and conflict over these resources, unlike agricultural lands. A shortage of water or grass results in a decline in livestock, followed by raids into river valleys to temporarily address food shortages. When the population surpasses the subsistence limits in the arid steppes, such raids become common and lead to the conquest of more favorable lands, resulting in the blending of races and cultures.154

Primitive war.

The wars of savage and pastoral peoples affect the whole tribe. All the able-bodied men are combatants, and all the women and children constitute the spoils of war in case of defeat. This fact is important, since the purpose of primitive conflicts is to enslave and pillage, rather than to acquire land. The result is that a whole district may be laid waste, but when the devastators withdraw, it is gradually repopulated by bordering tribes, who make new ethnic combinations. After the destruction of the Eries by the Iroquois in 1655, Ohio was left practically uninhabited for a hundred and fifty years. Then the Iroquoian Wyandots extended their settlements into northwestern Ohio from their base in southern Michigan, while the Miami Confederacy along the southern shore of Lake Michigan pushed their borders into the western part. The Muskingum Valley in the eastern portion was occupied about 1750 by Delawares from eastern Pennsylvania, the Scioto by Shawnees, and the northeast corner of the territory by detachments of Iroquois, chiefly Senecas.155 The long wars between the Algonquin Indians of the north and the Appalachian tribes of the south kept the district of Kentucky a No Man's Land, in convenient vacancy for occupation by the white settlers, when they began the westward movement.156 [Map page 156.]

The wars between savage and pastoral peoples affect the entire tribe. All the able-bodied men are fighters, and all the women and children become the spoils of war if they are defeated. This is significant, as the aim of primitive conflicts is to enslave and loot, rather than to take over land. The outcome is that an entire area can be devastated, but when the conquerors leave, it is gradually repopulated by neighboring tribes, leading to new ethnic mixes. After the Eries were destroyed by the Iroquois in 1655, Ohio remained largely uninhabited for one hundred and fifty years. Later, the Iroquoian Wyandots expanded their settlements into northwestern Ohio from their base in southern Michigan, while the Miami Confederacy along the southern shore of Lake Michigan extended their territory into the western part. By around 1750, the Muskingum Valley in the eastern section was settled by Delawares from eastern Pennsylvania, the Scioto by Shawnees, and the northeast corner of the area by groups of Iroquois, mainly Senecas.155 The long wars between the Algonquin Indians of the north and the Appalachian tribes of the south kept Kentucky a No Man's Land, which was conveniently empty for the white settlers when they began moving west.156 [Map page 156.]

Slavery as form of historical movement.

This desolation is produced partly by killing, but chiefly by enslavement of prisoners and the flight of the conquered. Both constitute compulsory migrations of far-reaching effect in the fusion of races and the blending of civilizations. The thousands of Greek slaves who were brought to ancient Rome contributed to its refinement and polish. All the nations of the known world, from Briton to Syrian and Jew, were represented in the slave markets of the imperial capital, and contributed their elements to the final composition of the Roman people. When we read of ninety-seven thousand Hebrews whom Titus sold into bondage after the fall of Jerusalem, of forty thousand Greeks sold by Lucullus after one victory, and the auction sub corona of whole tribes in Gaul by Cæsar, the scale of this forcible transfer becomes apparent, and its power as an agent of race amalgamation. Senator Sam Houston of Texas, speaking of the Comanche Indians, in the United States Senate, December 31, 1854, said: "There are not less than two thousand prisoners (whites) in the hands of the Comanches, four hundred in one band in my own state.... They take no prisoners but women and boys."157 It was customary among the Indians to use captured women as concubines and to adopt into the tribe such boys as survived the cruel treatment to which they were subjected. Since the Comanches in 1847 were variously estimated to number from nine to twelve thousand,158 so large a proportion of captives would modify the native stock.

This emptiness is created partly by killing, but mainly by the enslavement of prisoners and the escape of the conquered. Both lead to forced migrations that significantly impact the mixing of races and the merging of cultures. The thousands of Greek slaves brought to ancient Rome added to its refinement and sophistication. All the nations known at that time, from the Britons to Syrians and Jews, were represented in the slave markets of the imperial capital, contributing their parts to the overall makeup of the Roman people. When we hear about ninety-seven thousand Hebrews sold into slavery by Titus after the fall of Jerusalem, or forty thousand Greeks sold by Lucullus after one victory, and the auction sub corona of entire tribes in Gaul by Caesar, the magnitude of this forced transfer becomes clear, as does its role in racial blending. Senator Sam Houston of Texas remarked about the Comanche Indians in the United States Senate on December 31, 1854, saying: "There are not less than two thousand prisoners (whites) in the hands of the Comanches, four hundred in one band in my own state.... They take no prisoners but women and boys."157 It was common among the Indians to use captured women as concubines and to adopt surviving boys into the tribe after the harsh treatment they endured. Since the Comanches in 1847 were estimated to number between nine and twelve thousand,158 a substantial portion of captives would alter the native population.

In Africa slavery has been intimately associated with agriculture as a source of wealth, and therefore has lent motive to intertribal wars. Captives were enslaved and then gradually absorbed into the tribe of their masters. Thus war and slavery contributed greatly to that widespread blending of races which characterizes negro Africa. Slaves became a medium of exchange and an article of commerce with other continents. The negro slave trade had its chief importance in the eyes of ethnologists and historians because, in distributing the black races in white continents, it has given a "negro question" to the United States, superseded the native Indian stock of the Antilles by negroes, and left a broad negro strain in the blood of Colombia, Venezuela, and Brazil. This particular historical movement, which during the two centuries of its greatest activity involved larger numbers than the Tartar invasion of Russia or the Turkish invasion of Europe, for a long period gave to black Africa the only historical importance which it possessed for the rest of the world.159

In Africa, slavery has been closely linked to agriculture as a source of wealth, which has driven intertribal wars. Captives were enslaved and gradually integrated into their masters' tribes. Thus, war and slavery played significant roles in the widespread mixing of races that defines black Africa. Slaves became a form of currency and a commodity for trade with other continents. The black slave trade was particularly significant to ethnologists and historians because, by spreading black populations across white continents, it created a "negro question" in the United States, replaced the native Indian population of the Caribbean with Africans, and left a significant black heritage in the populations of Colombia, Venezuela, and Brazil. This specific historical movement, which during its peak spanned two centuries and involved more people than the Tartar invasion of Russia or the Turkish invasion of Europe, for a long time gave black Africa its only relevance in the eyes of the rest of the world.159

Fusion by deported and military colonies.

In higher stages of political development, war aiming at the subjugation of large territories finds another means to fuse the subject peoples and assimilate them to a common standard of civilization. The purpose is unification and the obliteration of local differences. These are also the unconscious ends of evolution by historical movement. With this object, conquerors the world over have used a system of tribal and racial exchanges. It was the policy of the Incas of ancient Peru to remove conquered tribes to distant parts of the realm, and supply their places with colonists from other districts who had long been subjected and were more or less assimilated.160 In 722 B.C. the Assyrian king, Sargon, overran Samaria, carried away the Ten Tribes of Israel beyond the Tigris and scattered them among the cities of Media, where they probably merged with the local population. To the country left vacant by their wholesale deportation he transplanted people from Babylon and other Mesopotamian cities.161 The descendants of these, mingled with the poorer class of Jews still left there, formed the despised Samaritans of the time of Christ. The Kingdom of Judah later was despoiled by Nebuchadnezzar of much of its population, which was carried off to Babylon.

In advanced stages of political development, wars aimed at dominating large territories find new ways to bring together subject peoples and integrate them into a shared standard of civilization. The goal is unity and the elimination of local differences. These are also the unintended objectives of historical evolution. To achieve this, conquerors around the world have implemented systems of tribal and racial exchanges. The Incas of ancient Peru, for example, practiced the policy of relocating conquered tribes to far parts of their realm and replacing them with colonists from other areas who had been subjected for a long time and were somewhat assimilated.160 In 722 B.C., the Assyrian king Sargon invaded Samaria, took the Ten Tribes of Israel beyond the Tigris, and scattered them among the cities of Media, where they likely merged with the local population. To fill the empty land left by this mass deportation, he brought in people from Babylon and other Mesopotamian cities.161 The descendants of these newcomers, combined with the poorer class of Jews who remained, became the despised Samaritans during the time of Christ. Later, the Kingdom of Judah was plundered by Nebuchadnezzar, resulting in much of its population being taken to Babylon.

This plan of partial deportation and colonization characterized the Roman method of Romanization. Removal of the conquered from their native environment facilitated the process, while it weakened the spirit and power of revolt. The Romans met bitter opposition from the mountain tribes when trying to open up the northern passes of the Apennines. Consequently they removed the Ligurian tribe of the Apuanians, forty-seven thousand in number, far south to Samnium. When in 15 B.C. the region of the Rhaetian Alps was joined to the Empire, forty thousand of the inhabitants were transplanted from the mountains to the plain. The same method was used with the Scordisci and Dacians of the Danube. More often the mortality of war so thinned the population, that the settlement of Roman military colonies among them sufficed to keep down revolt and to Romanize the surviving fragment. The large area of Romance speech found in Roumania and eastern Hungary, despite the controversy about its origin,162 seems to have had its chief source in the extensive Roman colonies planted by the Emperor Trajan in conquered Dacia.163 In Iberian Spain, which bitterly resisted Romanization, the process was facilitated by the presence of large garrisons of soldiers. Between 196 and 169 B.C. the troops amounted to one hundred and fifty thousand, and many of them remained in the country as colonists.164 Compare the settlement of Scotch troops in French Canada by land grants after 1763, resulting in the survival to-day of sandy hair, blue eyes, and highland names among the French-speaking habitants of Murray Bay and other districts. The Turks in the fifteenth century brought large bodies of Moslem converts from Asia Minor to garrison Macedonia and Thessaly, thereby robbing the Anatolian Plateau of half its original population. Into the vacuum thus formed a current of nomads from inner Asia has poured ever since.165

This plan for partial deportation and colonization defined the Roman way of expanding their influence. Removing the conquered people from their homeland made it easier to control them and weakened their resistance. The Romans faced fierce opposition from mountain tribes when attempting to open the northern passes of the Apennines. As a result, they relocated the Ligurian tribe of the Apuanians, numbering forty-seven thousand, far south to Samnium. When the Rhaetian Alps region was annexed to the Empire in 15 B.C., forty thousand residents were moved from the mountains to the plains. The same approach was applied to the Scordisci and Dacians along the Danube. More often, the casualties from war significantly reduced the population, so settling Roman military colonies among the survivors was enough to suppress uprisings and assimilate the remaining people. The large area of Romance language spoken in Romania and eastern Hungary, despite debates about its origins,162 seems to have primarily stemmed from the extensive Roman colonies established by Emperor Trajan in conquered Dacia.163 In Iberian Spain, which strongly resisted Romanization, the process was aided by a significant presence of military garrisons. Between 196 and 169 B.C., the number of troops reached one hundred and fifty thousand, many of whom stayed in the region as colonists.164 This situation can be compared to the settlement of Scottish troops in French Canada through land grants after 1763, which led to the persistence of fair hair, blue eyes, and Highland names among the French-speaking *habitants* of Murray Bay and other areas. In the fifteenth century, the Turks transferred large groups of Muslim converts from Asia Minor to garrison Macedonia and Thessaly, thereby depriving the Anatolian Plateau of half its original population. Since then, a wave of nomads from inner Asia has continuously moved into the resulting void.165

Withdrawal and flight.

Every active historical movement which enters an already populated country gives rise there to passive movements, either compression of the native folk followed by amalgamation, or displacement and withdrawal. The latter in some degree attends every territorial encroachment. Only where there is an abundance of free land can a people retire as a whole before the onslaught, and maintain their national or racial solidarity. Thus the Slavs seem largely to have withdrawn before the Germans in the Baltic plains of Europe. The Indians of North and South America retired westward before the advance of the whites from the Atlantic coast. The Cherokee nation, who once had a broad belt of country extending from the Tennessee Valley through South Carolina to the ocean,166 first retracted their frontier to the Appalachian Mountains; in 1816 they were confined to an ever shrinking territory on the middle Tennessee and the southern end of the highlands; in 1818 they began to retire beyond the Mississippi, and in 1828 beyond the western boundary of Arkansas.167 The story of the Shawnees and Delawares is a replica of this.168 In the same way Hottentots and Kaffirs in South Africa are withdrawing northward and westward into the desert before the protruding frontier of white settlement, as the Boers before the English treked farther into the veldt. [See map page 105.]

Every active historical movement that enters an already settled country leads to passive movements, either the oppression of the native people followed by merging, or displacement and withdrawal. The latter is a common outcome of any territorial invasion. Only where there is plenty of free land can a people fully retreat from the attack and preserve their national or racial unity. For instance, the Slavs largely withdrew in front of the Germans in the Baltic plains of Europe. The Native Americans in North and South America moved westward in response to the advance of whites from the Atlantic coast. The Cherokee nation, which once had a large area stretching from the Tennessee Valley through South Carolina to the ocean,166 first pulled back their frontier to the Appalachian Mountains; by 1816, they were confined to an ever-shrinking territory in middle Tennessee and the southern highlands; in 1818, they began moving beyond the Mississippi, and by 1828, beyond the western boundary of Arkansas.167 The story of the Shawnees and Delawares is similar.168 Similarly, the Hottentots and Kaffirs in South Africa are moving northward and westward into the desert before the advancing frontier of white settlement, just as the Boers did when they moved farther into the veldt. [See map page 105.]

Where the people attacked or displaced is small or a broken remnant, it often takes refuge among a neighboring or kindred tribe. The small Siouan tribes of the Carolinas, reduced to fragments by repeated Iroquois raids, combined with their Siouan kinsmen the Catawbas, who consequently in 1743 included twenty dialects among their little band.169 The Iroquoian Tuscaroras of North Carolina, defeated and weakened by the whites in 1711, fled north to the Iroquois of New York, where they formed the Sixth Nation of the Confederation. The Yamese Indians, who shifted back and forth between the borders of Florida and South Carolina, defeated first by the whites and then by the Creeks, found a refuge for the remnant of their tribe among the Seminoles, in whom they merged and disappeared as a distinct tribe170 —the fate of most of these fragmentary peoples. [See map page 54.]

Where the people were attacked or displaced is small or a broken remnant, they often seek refuge among a neighboring or related tribe. The small Siouan tribes of the Carolinas, reduced to fragments by repeated Iroquois raids, joined forces with their Siouan relatives, the Catawbas, who by 1743 included twenty dialects within their small group.169 The Iroquoian Tuscaroras of North Carolina, defeated and weakened by the colonists in 1711, fled north to the Iroquois in New York, where they became the Sixth Nation of the Confederation. The Yamese Indians, who moved back and forth between the borders of Florida and South Carolina, first defeated by the colonists and then by the Creeks, found refuge for the remnants of their tribe among the Seminoles, merging and disappearing as a distinct tribe170 —the fate of most of these fragmented peoples. [See map page 54.]

Dispersal in flight.

When the fugitive body is large, it is forced to split up in order to escape. Hence every fugitive movement tends to assume the character of a dispersal, all the more as organization and leadership vanish in the catastrophe. The fissile character of primitive societies especially contributes to this end, so that almost every story of Indian and native African warfare tells of shattered remnants fleeing in several directions. Among civilized peoples, the dispersal is that of individuals and has far-reaching historical effects. After the destruction of Jerusalem, the Jews were scattered over the earth, the debris of a nation. The religious wars of France during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries caused Huguenots to flee to Switzerland, Germany, Holland, England, and South Carolina; they even tried to establish a colony on the coast of Brazil. Everywhere they contributed a valuable element to the economic and social life of the community which they joined. The great schism in the Russian Church became an agent of emigration and colonization. It helped to spread the Russian nationality over remote frontier regions of the empire which previously had been almost exclusively Asiatic; and distributed groups of dissenters in the neighboring provinces of Turkey, Roumania, Austria, Poland and Prussia.171

When a large group is on the run, they have to break apart to escape. So, every act of fleeing tends to become a separation, especially since organization and leadership disappear in the chaos. The fragmented nature of primitive societies really adds to this, so nearly every account of Indian and native African warfare describes shattered groups fleeing in different directions. Among more developed societies, the separation involves individuals and has significant historical consequences. After Jerusalem was destroyed, the Jews were scattered across the globe, becoming the remnants of a nation. The religious wars in France during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries forced Huguenots to escape to Switzerland, Germany, Holland, England, and South Carolina; they even attempted to start a colony on the coast of Brazil. Wherever they went, they became a valuable part of the economic and social life of the communities they integrated into. The major split in the Russian Church also triggered emigration and colonization. It played a role in spreading Russian culture into far-flung areas of the empire that had previously been almost entirely Asian, and it created groups of dissenters in neighboring regions like Turkey, Romania, Austria, Poland, and Prussia.171

Natural regions of retreat.

The hope of safety from pursuit drives fugitive peoples into isolated and barren places that are scarcely accessible or habitable, and thereby extends the inhabited area of the earth long before mere pressure of population would have stretched it to such limits. We find these refugee folk living in pile villages built over the water, in deserts, in swamps, mangrove thickets, very high mountains, marshy deltas, and remote or barren islands, all which can be classified as regions of retreat. Fugitives try to place between themselves and their pursuers a barrier of sea or desert or mountains, and in doing this have themselves surmounted some of the greatest obstacles to the spread of the human race.

The desire for safety from chasing forces pushes fleeing groups into isolated and desolate areas that are hardly reachable or livable, expanding the areas of the earth where people live long before population pressure would have naturally pushed it to those limits. We see these refugees residing in stilt villages over water, in deserts, swamps, mangrove forests, high mountains, marshy deltas, and remote or barren islands, all of which can be categorized as safe spaces. Fugitives attempt to place barriers like seas, deserts, or mountains between themselves and their pursuers, successfully overcoming some of the biggest challenges to human expansion.

Districts of refuge located centrally to several natural regions of migration receive immigrants from many sides, and are therefore often characterized by a bizarre grouping of populations. The cluster of marshy islands at the head of the Adriatic received fugitives from a long semi-circle of north Italian cities during the barbarian invasions. Each refugee colony occupied a separate island, and finally all coalesced to form the city of Venice. Central mountain districts like the Alps and Caucasus contain "the sweepings of the plains." The Caucasus particularly, on the border between Europe and Asia, contains every physical type and representative of every linguistic family of Eurasia, except pure Aryan. Nowhere else in the world probably is there such a heterogeneous lot of peoples, languages and religions. Ripley calls the Caucasus "a grave of peoples, of languages, of customs and physical types."172 Its base, north and south, and the longitudinal groove through its center from east to west have been swept by various racial currents, which have cast up their flotsam into its valleys. The pueblos of our arid Southwest, essentially an area of asylum, are inhabited by Indians of four distinct stocks, and only one of them, the Moquis, show clearly kinship to another tribe outside this territory,173 so that they are survivals. The twenty-eight different Indian stocks huddled together in small and diverse linguistic groups between the Pacific Ocean and the eastern slope of the Sierra Nevada and Cascade Range174 leave the impression that these protected valleys, similar to the Caucasus in their ethnic diversity, were an asylum for remnants of depleted stocks who had fled to the western highlands before the great Indian migrations of the interior.175 Making their way painfully and at great cost of life through a region of mountain and desert, they came out in diminished bands to survive in the protection of the great barrier. Of the twenty-one Indian linguistic stocks which have become extinct since the arrival of the white man, fifteen belong to this transmontane strip of the Pacific slope176 —evidence of the fragmentary character of these stocks and their consequently small power of resistance, [See map page 54.]

Districts of refuge located centrally to various natural migration areas receive immigrants from multiple directions, resulting in a unique mix of populations. The cluster of marshy islands at the head of the Adriatic welcomed refugees from a long semi-circle of northern Italian cities during the barbarian invasions. Each refugee group settled on a separate island, and eventually, they all came together to create the city of Venice. Central mountain regions like the Alps and Caucasus are home to "the remnants of the plains." The Caucasus, especially at the border of Europe and Asia, contains every physical type and representative of every language family in Eurasia, except pure Aryan. It’s probably unmatched anywhere else in the world in its mix of peoples, languages, and religions. Ripley refers to the Caucasus as "a grave of peoples, of languages, of customs and physical types."172 Its northern and southern bases, along with the longitudinal groove running through its center from east to west, have been shaped by various racial movements, leaving their remnants scattered throughout its valleys. The pueblos of our dry Southwest, essentially a haven, are occupied by Indians from four distinct groups, with only one, the Moquis, showing clear connections to another tribe outside this region,173 making them survivors. The twenty-eight different Indian groups clustered in small and diverse language families between the Pacific Ocean and the eastern slopes of the Sierra Nevada and Cascade Range174 suggest that these protected valleys, much like the Caucasus in their ethnic diversity, served as a refuge for remnants of dwindling groups that fled to the western highlands before the major Indian migrations of the interior.175 Struggling and with significant loss of life through mountains and deserts, they emerged in smaller bands to seek safety behind the great barrier. Of the twenty-one Indian language groups that have become extinct since the arrival of white settlers, fifteen belong to this mountainous strip of the Pacific slope176 —evidence of the fragmented nature of these groups and their consequently weak ability to resist. [See map page 54.]

Emigration and colonization.

Advance to a completely sedentary life, as we see it among modern civilized nations, prohibits the migration of whole peoples, or even of large groups when maintaining their political organization. On the other hand, however, sedentary life and advanced civilization bring rapid increase of population, improved methods of communication, and an enlarged geographical horizon. These conditions encourage and facilitate emigration and colonization, forms of historical movement which have characterized the great commercial peoples of antiquity and the overcrowded nations of modern times. These forms do not involve a whole people, but only individuals and small groups, though in time the total result may represent a considerable proportion of the original population. The United States in 1890 contained 980,938 immigrants from Canada and Newfoundland,177 or just one-fifth the total population of the Dominion in that same year. Germany since 1820 has contributed at least five million citizens to non-European lands. Ireland since 1841 has seen nearly four millions of its inhabitants drawn off to other countries,178 an amount only little less than its present population. It is estimated that since 1851 emigration has carried off from County Clare and Kerry seventy-two per cent. of the average population; and yet those counties are still crowded.179 Among those who abandon their homes in search of easier conditions of living, certain ages and certain social and industrial classes predominate. A typical emigrant group to America represents largely the lower walks of life, includes an abnormal proportion of men and adults, and about three-fourths of it are unskilled laborers and agriculturists.180

Moving to a completely sedentary lifestyle, as seen in modern civilized nations, limits the migration of entire populations or even large groups when trying to maintain their political structure. However, this sedentary way of life and developed civilization lead to a rapid growth in population, better communication methods, and a broader geographical perspective. These factors encourage and make it easier for people to emigrate and settle in new places, which have been defining characteristics of the great trading nations of the past and the overcrowded nations of today. These movements don't involve entire populations, but rather individuals and small groups, although over time the cumulative effect can represent a significant portion of the original population. As of 1890, the United States had 980,938 immigrants from Canada and Newfoundland,177 accounting for about one-fifth of the total population of the Dominion that same year. Since 1820, Germany has sent at least five million of its citizens to non-European countries. Since 1841, nearly four million people from Ireland have moved to other countries,178 which is only slightly less than its current population. It’s estimated that emigration has taken away seventy-two percent of the average population from County Clare and Kerry since 1851; yet those counties are still overpopulated.179 Among those who leave their homes in search of better living conditions, certain age groups and social and industrial classes are more prominent. A typical group of emigrants to America largely consists of lower-income individuals, has an unusually high percentage of men and adults, and about three-fourths are unskilled workers and farmers.180

Colonization, the most potent instrument of organized expansion, has in recent centuries changed the relative significance of the great colonial nations of Europe. It raised England from a small insular country to the center of a world power. It gave sudden though temporary preëminence to Spain and Portugal, a new lease of life to little Holland, and ominous importance to Russia. Germany, who entered the colonial field only in 1880, found little desirable land left; and yet it was especially Germany who needed an outlet for her redundant population. With all these states, as with ancient Phoenicia, Greece and Yemen, the initial purpose was commerce or in some form the exploitation of the new territory. Colonies were originally trading stations established as safe termini for trade routes.181 Colonial government, as administered by the mother country, originally had an eye single for the profits of trade: witness the experience of the Thirteen Colonies with Great Britain. Colonial wars have largely meant the rivalry of competing nations seeking the same markets, as the history of the Portuguese and Dutch in the East Indies, and the English and French in America prove. The first Punic War had a like commercial origin—rivalry for the trade of Magna Græcia between Rome and Carthage, the dominant colonial powers of the western Mediterranean. Such wars result in expansion for the victor.

Colonization, the most powerful tool for organized expansion, has significantly altered the importance of Europe's major colonial nations in recent centuries. It transformed England from a small island nation into a major world power. It temporarily elevated Spain and Portugal, revitalized small Holland, and gave Russia a troubling prominence. Germany, which entered the colonial scene only in 1880, found little desirable land available; yet it was Germany that particularly needed an outlet for its excess population. Similar to ancient Phoenicia, Greece, and Yemen, the initial goal for all these states was trade or some form of exploitation of new territories. Colonies were originally trading posts set up as safe endpoints for trade routes.181 Colonial governance, as handled by the mother country, was primarily focused on maximizing trade profits: a clear example being the experience of the Thirteen Colonies with Great Britain. Colonial conflicts largely stemmed from the competition between nations vying for the same markets, as evidenced by the histories of the Portuguese and Dutch in the East Indies, and the English and French in America. The first Punic War had a similar commercial basis — competition for trade in Magna Græcia between Rome and Carthage, the leading colonial powers of the western Mediterranean. Such wars typically lead to expansion for the victor.

Commerce.

Commerce, which so largely underlies colonization, is itself a form of historical movement. It both causes and stimulates great movements of peoples, yet it differs from these fundamentally in its relation to the land. Commerce traverses the land to reach its destination, but takes account of natural features only as these affect transportation and travel. It has to do with systems of routes and goals, which it aims to reach as quickly as possible. It reduces its cortege to essentials; eliminates women and children. Therefore it surmounts natural barriers which block the advance of other forms of the historical movement. Merchant caravans are constantly crossing the desert, but not so peoples. Traders with loaded yaks or ponies push across the Karakorum Mountains by passes where a migrating horde would starve and freeze. The northern limit of the Mediterranean race in Spain lies sharply defined along the crest of the Pyrenees, whose long unbroken wall forms one of the most pronounced boundaries in Europe;182 yet traders and smugglers have pushed their way through from time immemorial. Long after Etruscan merchants had crossed northward over the Alps, Roman expansion and colonization made a detour around the mountains westward into Gaul, with the result that the Germans received Roman civilization not straight from the south, but secondhand through their Gallic neighbors west of the Rhine.

Commerce, which is a major driver of colonization, is a historical movement in itself. It both initiates and fuels significant movements of people, yet it fundamentally differs from these in its connection to the land. Commerce moves across the land to reach its destinations but only considers natural features as they impact transportation and travel. It focuses on efficient routes and goals that it wants to reach as quickly as possible. It streamlines its followers to the essentials, leaving out women and children. Consequently, it overcomes natural barriers that hinder other forms of historical movement. Merchant caravans constantly traverse the desert, while entire populations do not. Traders with loaded yaks or ponies navigate the Karakorum Mountains through passes where migrating groups would struggle to survive. The northern limit of the Mediterranean people in Spain is sharply marked by the crest of the Pyrenees, whose long, unbroken wall is one of the most distinct boundaries in Europe;182 yet traders and smugglers have been moving through since ancient times. Long after Etruscan merchants had traveled northward over the Alps, Roman expansion and colonization took a detour westward into Gaul, leading to the Germans receiving Roman civilization not directly from the south, but as a secondary influence through their Gallic neighbors to the west of the Rhine.

Commerce a guide to various movements.

Commerce, though differing from other historical movements, may give to these direction and destination. The trader is frequently the herald of soldier and settler. He becomes their guide, takes them along the trail which he has blazed, and gives them his own definiteness of aim. The earliest Roman conquest of the Alpine tribes was made for the purpose of opening the passes for traders and abolishing the heavy transit duties imposed by the mountaineers.183 Fur-traders inaugurated French expansion to the far west of Canada, and the Russian advance into Siberia. The ancient amber route across Russia from the Baltic to the Euxine probably guided the Goths in their migration from their northern seats to the fertile lands in southern Russia, where they first appear in history as the Ostrogoths.184 The caravan trade across the Sahara from the Niger to the Mediterranean coast has itself embodied an historical movement, by bringing out enough negro slaves appreciably to modify the ethnic composition of the population in many parts of North Africa.185 It was this trade which also suggested to Prince Henry of Portugal in 1415, when campaigning in Morocco, the plan of reaching the Guinea Coast by sea and diverting its gold dust and slaves to the port of Lisbon, a movement which resulted in the Portuguese circumnavigation of Africa.186

Commerce, while different from other historical movements, can provide direction and purpose. Traders often pave the way for soldiers and settlers. They serve as guides, leading others along the paths they've established and sharing their own clarity of goals. The initial Roman conquest of the Alpine tribes aimed to open trade routes for merchants and eliminate the heavy transit taxes enforced by the mountain people.183 Fur traders initiated French expansion into the far west of Canada and prompted Russian advancement into Siberia. The ancient amber route across Russia from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea likely guided the Goths in their migration from northern regions to the fertile lands of southern Russia, where they first appear in history as the Ostrogoths.184 The caravan trade across the Sahara from the Niger River to the Mediterranean coast has itself represented a historical movement, significantly altering the ethnic makeup of the population in many areas of North Africa by bringing in a considerable number of enslaved Africans.185 It was this trade that inspired Prince Henry of Portugal in 1415, during his campaign in Morocco, to devise a plan to reach the Guinea Coast by sea and redirect its gold dust and enslaved people to the port of Lisbon, which ultimately led to the Portuguese circumnavigation of Africa.186

Every staple place and trading station is a center of geographical information; it therefore gives an impulse to expansion by widening the geographical horizon. The Lewis and Clark Expedition found the Mandan villages at the northern bend of the Missouri River the center of a trade which extended west to the Pacific, through the agency of the Crow and Paunch Indians of the upper Yellowstone, and far north to the Assiniboine and Saskatchewan Rivers. Here in conversation with British and French fur-traders of the Northwest Company's posts, they secured information about the western country they were to explore.187 Similarly the trade of the early Jesuit missions at La Pointe near the west end of Lake Superior annually drew the Indians from a wide circle sweeping from Green Bay and the Fox River in the south, across the Mississippi around to the Lake of the Woods and far north of Lake Superior.188 Here Marquette first heard of the great river destined to carry French dominion to the Gulf of Mexico.

Every key location and trading post serves as a hub of geographical knowledge; it thus promotes expansion by broadening the geographical perspective. The Lewis and Clark Expedition discovered the Mandan villages at the northern bend of the Missouri River, which were the center of a trade network that extended west to the Pacific through the Crow and Paunch Indians of the upper Yellowstone, and far north to the Assiniboine and Saskatchewan Rivers. Here, in discussions with British and French fur traders at the Northwest Company's posts, they gathered information about the western territories they intended to explore.187 Similarly, the trade at the early Jesuit missions at La Pointe near the western end of Lake Superior attracted Native Americans from a wide area extending from Green Bay and the Fox River in the south, across the Mississippi, around to the Lake of the Woods, and far north of Lake Superior.188 It was here that Marquette first learned of the great river that would help establish French control all the way to the Gulf of Mexico.

Movements due to religion.

Trade often finds in religion an associate and coadjutor in directing and stimulating the historical movement. China regards modern Christian missions as effective European agencies for the spread of commercial and political power. Jesuit and fur-trader plunged together into the wilds of colonial Canada; Spanish priest and gold-seeker into Mexico and Peru. American missionary pressed close upon the heels of fur-trader into the Oregon country. Jason Lee, having established a Methodist mission on the Willamette in 1834, himself experienced sudden conversion from religionist to colonizer. He undertook a temporary mission back to the settled States, where he preached a stirring propaganda for the settlement and appropriation of the disputed Oregon country, before the British should fasten their grip upon it. The United States owes Hawaii to the expansionist spirit of American missionaries. Thirty years after their arrival in the islands, they held all the important offices under the native government, and had secured valuable tracts of lands, laying the foundation of the landed aristocracy of planters established there to-day. Their sons and grandsons took the lead in the Revolution of 1893, and in the movement for annexation to the United States. Thus sometimes do the meek inherit the earth.

Trade often finds support in religion to guide and drive historical progress. China sees modern Christian missions as effective European tools for spreading commercial and political influence. Jesuits and fur traders ventured into the wilds of colonial Canada together; Spanish priests and gold seekers traveled into Mexico and Peru. American missionaries closely followed fur traders into the Oregon territory. Jason Lee, who set up a Methodist mission on the Willamette in 1834, underwent a sudden transformation from a religious leader to a colonizer. He made a brief trip back to the settled States, where he passionately advocated for the settlement and claiming of the contested Oregon territory before the British could take control. The United States owes Hawaii to the expansionist spirit of American missionaries. Thirty years after they arrived in the islands, they held all the significant positions in the native government and acquired valuable land, establishing the foundation for the landed aristocracy of planters present there today. Their sons and grandsons led the Revolution of 1893 and the movement for annexation to the United States. Thus, sometimes the meek do inherit the earth.

Religious pilgrimages.

The famous pilgrimages of the world, in which the commercial element has been more or less conspicuous,189 have contributed greatly to the circulation of peoples and ideas, especially as they involve multitudes and draw from a large circle of lands. Their economic, intellectual and political effects rank them as one phase of the historical movement. Herodotus tells of seven hundred thousand Egyptians flocking to the city of Bubastis from all parts of Egypt for the festival of Diana.190 The worship of Ashtoreth in Bambyce in Syria drew votaries from all the Semitic peoples except the Jews. As early as 386 A.D. Christian pilgrims flocked to Jerusalem from Armenia, Persia, India, Ethiopia, and even from Gaul and Britain. Jerusalem gave rise to those armed pilgrimages, the Crusades, with all their far-reaching results. The pilgrimages to Rome, which in the Jubilee of 1300 brought two hundred thousand worshipers to the sacred city, did much to consolidate papal supremacy over Latin Christendom.191 As the roads to Rome took the pious wayfarers through Milan, Venice, Genoa, Florence, Bologna, and other great cities of Italy, they were so many channels for the distribution of Italian art and culture over the more untutored lands of western Europe.

The famous pilgrimages around the world, where the commercial aspect has been fairly noticeable,189 have significantly contributed to the movement of people and ideas, particularly since they involve large crowds and draw participants from a wide range of countries. Their economic, intellectual, and political impacts make them a notable part of historical developments. Herodotus mentions seven hundred thousand Egyptians traveling to Bubastis from all over Egypt for the festival of Diana.190 The worship of Ashtoreth in Bambyce in Syria attracted followers from all Semitic groups except the Jews. As early as 386 A.D., Christian pilgrims traveled to Jerusalem from Armenia, Persia, India, Ethiopia, and even Gaul and Britain. Jerusalem led to the armed pilgrimages known as the Crusades, which had far-reaching consequences. The pilgrimages to Rome, which brought two hundred thousand worshipers to the holy city during the Jubilee of 1300, greatly helped strengthen papal authority over Latin Christendom.191 The routes to Rome took these devoted travelers through major cities like Milan, Venice, Genoa, Florence, Bologna, and others, serving as channels for spreading Italian art and culture to the less cultured regions of western Europe.

Though Mecca is visited annually by only seventy or eighty thousand pilgrims, it puts into motion a far greater number over the whole Mohammedan world, from westernmost Africa to Chinese Turkestan.192 Yearly a great pilgrimage, numbering in 1905 eighty thousand souls, moves across Africa eastward through the Sudan on its way to the Red Sea and Mecca. Many traders join the caravans of the devout both for protection and profit, and the devout themselves travel with herds of cattle to trade in on the way. The merchants are prone to drop out and settle in any attractive country, and few get beyond the populous markets of Wadai. The British and French governments in the Sudan aid and protect these pilgrimages; they recognize them as a political force, because they spread the story of the security and order of European rule.193 The markets of western Tibet, recently opened to Indian merchants by the British expedition to Lhassa, promote intercourse between the two countries especially because of the sacred lakes and mountains in their vicinity, which are goals of pilgrimage alike to Hindu and Tibetan Buddhist. They offer an opportunity to acquire merit and profit at the same time, an irresistible combination to the needy, pious Hindu. Therefore across the rugged passes of the Himalayas he drives his yaks laden with English merchandise, an unconscious instrument for the spread of English influence, English civilization and the extension of the English market, as the Colonial Office well understands.194

Though Mecca is visited every year by only seventy or eighty thousand pilgrims, it sets off a much larger movement across the entire Muslim world, from western Africa to Chinese Turkestan.192 Each year, a major pilgrimage, which in 1905 included eighty thousand travelers, makes its way eastward across Africa through the Sudan toward the Red Sea and Mecca. Many traders join the devout in their caravans for safety and profit, while the pilgrims themselves travel with herds of cattle to trade along the journey. Merchants often drop out and settle in appealing locations, and few manage to get beyond the bustling markets of Wadai. The British and French governments in the Sudan support and protect these pilgrimages; they see them as a political force because they help spread the message of the safety and order of European rule.193 The markets of western Tibet, recently opened to Indian traders by the British expedition to Lhassa, encourage interaction between the two countries, especially due to the sacred lakes and mountains nearby, which are pilgrimage destinations for both Hindus and Tibetan Buddhists. They provide a chance to gain merit and make a profit at the same time, which is an irresistible draw for the needy, devout Hindu. So, across the rugged Himalayan passes, he drives his yaks loaded with British goods, unwittingly serving as a means for the spread of British influence, British civilization, and the expansion of the British market, as the Colonial Office is well aware.194

Historical movement and race distribution.

The forms which have been assumed by the historical movement are varied, but all have contributed to the spread of man over the habitable globe. The yellow, white and red races have become adapted to every zone; the black race, whether in Africa, Australia or Melanesia, is confined chiefly to the Tropics. A like conservatism as to habitat tends to characterize all sub-races, peoples, and tribes of the human family. The fact which strikes one in studying the migrations of these smaller groups is their adherence each to a certain zone or heat belt defined by certain isothermal lines (see map chap. XVII.), their reluctance to protrude beyond its limits, and the restricted range and small numerical strength of such protrusions as occur. This seems to be the conservatism of the mature race type, which has lost some of its plasticity and shuns or succumbs to the ordeal of adaptation to contrasted climatic conditions, except when civilization enables it partially to neutralize their effects.

The forms that the historical movement has taken are diverse, but all have helped spread humans across the habitable world. The yellow, white, and red races have adapted to every climate; the black race, whether in Africa, Australia, or Melanesia, is mainly found in the Tropics. A similar conservatism regarding habitat tends to characterize all sub-races, peoples, and tribes of the human family. One striking observation when studying the migrations of these smaller groups is their commitment to a specific climate zone or heat belt defined by certain isothermal lines (see map chap. XVII.), their hesitance to move beyond its boundaries, and the limited range and small numbers of any such expansions that do occur. This seems to indicate the conservatism of a mature race type, which has lost some of its flexibility and avoids or struggles to adapt to contrasting climatic conditions, unless civilization allows it to partially counteract their effects.

Primitive Indian Stocks Of South America (From Helmolt's History of the World. By permission of Dodd, Mead & Co.)

Primitive Indian Stocks Of South America (From Helmolt's History of the World. By permission of Dodd, Mead & Co.)

Primitive Indian Stocks Of South America (From Helmolt's History of the World. By permission of Dodd, Mead & Co.)

Primitive Indian Stocks Of South America (From Helmolt's History of the World. By permission of Dodd, Mead & Co.)

Migrations in relation to zones and heat belts.

In South America, Caribs and Arawaks showed a strictly tropical distribution from Hayti to the southern watershed of the Amazon. The Tupis, moving down the Parana-La Plata system, made a short excursion beyond the Tropic of Capricorn, though not beyond the hot belt, then turned equator-ward again along the coast.195 In North America we find some exceptions to the rule. For instance, though the main area of the Athapascan stock is found in the frigid belt of Canada and Alaska, north of the annual isotherm of 0°C. (32°F.) small residual fragments of these people are scattered also along the Pacific coast of Oregon and California, marking the old line of march of a large group which drifted southward into Arizona, New Mexico, Texas and the northern part of Mexico. The Shoshone stock, which originally occupied the Great Basin and western intermontane plateau up to the borders of Canada, sent out offshoots which developed into the ancient civilized tribes of tropical Mexico and Central America. Both these emigrations to more southern zones were part of the great southward trend characterizing all movements on the Pacific side of the continent, probably from an original ethnic port of entry near Bering Strait; and part also of the general southward drift in search of more genial climate, which landed the van of northern Siouan, Algonquin and Iroquoian stocks in the present area of South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi and Louisiana, while the base of their territory stretched out to its greatest width in southern Canada and contiguous parts of the United States. [See map page 54.]196

In South America, the Caribs and Arawaks had a clear tropical range from Haiti to the southern edge of the Amazon. The Tupis traveled down the Paraná-La Plata system, briefly going just south of the Tropic of Capricorn but staying within the hot zone, then moved back towards the equator along the coast.195 In North America, there are some exceptions. For example, the main area of the Athapascan group is in the cold regions of Canada and Alaska, north of the annual isotherm of 0°C (32°F), but small remnants of these people are also found along the Pacific coast of Oregon and California, marking the historic path of a larger group that moved south into Arizona, New Mexico, Texas, and northern Mexico. The Shoshone group, which originally lived in the Great Basin and the western intermontane plateau up to Canada’s borders, sent out branches that evolved into the ancient civilized tribes of tropical Mexico and Central America. Both of these migrations to southern regions were part of the broader southward movement characteristic of all movements along the Pacific side of the continent, likely stemming from an initial ethnic entry point near the Bering Strait; they were also part of the general southward drift in search of a milder climate, which led the front of northern Siouan, Algonquin, and Iroquoian groups to settle in the present-day areas of South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana, while their territory extended the widest in southern Canada and neighboring parts of the United States. [See map page 54.]196

Ethnographical Map Of India From The Indian Census Of 1901.

Ethnographical Map Of India From The Indian Census Of 1901.

Ethnographical Map Of India From The Indian Census Of 1901.

Ethnographic Map of India from the Indian Census of 1901.

Ethnographical Map Of Asia. Vertical Shading in the North is Slav.

Ethnographical Map Of Asia. Vertical Shading in the North is Slav.

Ethnographical Map Of Asia. Vertical Shading in the North is Slav.

Ethnographic Map of Asia. Vertical shading in the north represents Slavic regions.

Range of movements in Asia.

If we turn to the eastern hemisphere, we find the Malays and Malayo-Polynesians, differentiated offshoots of the Mongolian stock, restricted to the Tropics, except where Polynesians have spread to outlying New Zealand. The Chinese draw their political boundary nearly along the Tropic of Cancer, but they have freely lapped over this frontier into Indo-China as far as Singapore.197 Combined with this expansion was the early infiltration of the Chinese into the Philippines, Borneo, and the western Sunda Isles, all distinctly tropical. The fact that the Chinese show a physical capacity for acclimatization found in no other race explains in part their presence into the Tropics. In contrast, the Aryan folk of India, whether in their pure type as found in the Punjab and Rajputana Desert, or mingled with the earlier Dravidian races belong to the hot belt but scarcely reach the Tropic of Cancer,198 though their language has far overshot this line both in the Deccan and the Ganges Delta. One spore of Aryan stock, in about 450 B.C., moved by sea from the Bay of Cambay to Ceylon; mingling there with the Tamil natives, they became the progenitors of the Singhalese, forming a hybrid tropical offshoot.

If we look at the eastern hemisphere, we see the Malays and Malayo-Polynesians, distinct branches of the Mongolian group, limited to the Tropics, except where Polynesians have spread to far-off New Zealand. The Chinese set their political boundary roughly along the Tropic of Cancer, but they have expanded beyond this border into Indo-China as far as Singapore.197 This expansion was accompanied by the early movement of the Chinese into the Philippines, Borneo, and the western Sunda Islands, all of which are definitely in the tropics. The Chinese have a physical ability to adapt to heat that is unique compared to other races, which partly explains their presence in the Tropics. In contrast, the Aryan people of India, whether in their pure form as seen in the Punjab and Rajputana Desert, or mixed with the earlier Dravidian groups, belong to the hot zone but hardly reach the Tropic of Cancer,198 even though their language has spread well beyond this line in both the Deccan and the Ganges Delta. One group of Aryans, around 450 B.C., traveled by sea from the Bay of Cambay to Ceylon; there they mixed with the Tamil natives and became the ancestors of the Singhalese, creating a hybrid tropical group.

Europe, except for its small sub-arctic area, has received immigrants, according to the testimony of history and ethnology, only from the temperate parts of Asia and Africa, with the one exception of the Saracens of Arabia, whose original home lay wholly within the hot climate belt of 20°C. (68°F.). Saracen expansion, in covering Persia, Syria, and Egypt, still kept to this hot belt; only in the Barbary Coast of Africa and in Spain did it protrude into the temperate belt. Though this last territory was extra-tropical, it was essentially semi-arid and sub-tropical in temperature, like the dry trade-wind belt whence the Saracens had sprung.

Europe, aside from its small sub-arctic region, has primarily received immigrants from the temperate zones of Asia and Africa, with the notable exception of the Saracens from Arabia, whose original homeland was entirely within the warm climate zone of 20°C (68°F). As the Saracens expanded into Persia, Syria, and Egypt, they remained within this warm zone; only on the Barbary Coast of Africa and in Spain did they venture into the temperate region. Although this latter area was outside the tropics, it was essentially semi-arid and had a subtropical climate, similar to the dry trade-wind area from which the Saracens originated.

Ethnographical Map Of Africa And Arabia.

Ethnographical Map Of Africa And Arabia.

Ethnographical Map Of Africa And Arabia.

Ethnographic Map of Africa and Arabia.

Range of movements in Africa.

The Semitic folk of Arabia and the desert Hamites of northern Africa, bred by their hot, dry environment to a nomadic life, have been drawn southward over the Sahara across the Tropic into the grasslands of the Sudan, permeating a wide zone of negro folk with the political control, religion, civilization and blood of the Mediterranean north. Here similar though better conditions of life, a climate hotter though less arid, attracted Hamitic invasion, while the relatively dense native population in a lower stage of economic development presented to the commercial Semites the attraction of lucrative trade. South of the equator the native Bantu Kaffirs, essentially a tropical people, spread beyond their zonal border to the south coast of Africa at 33° S.L., and displaced the yellow Hottentots199 before the arrival of the Dutch in 1602; while in the early nineteenth century we hear of the Makololo, a division of this same Kaffir stock, leaving their native seats near the southern sources of the Vaal River at 28° S.L. and moving some nine hundred miles northward to the Barotse territory on the upper Zambesi at 15° S.L.200 This again was a movement of a pastoral people across a tropic to other grasslands, to climatic conditions scarcely different from those which they had left.

The Semitic people of Arabia and the desert Hamites of northern Africa, shaped by their hot, dry environment into a nomadic lifestyle, have been drawn southward across the Sahara into the grasslands of Sudan, influencing a broad area of Black communities with the political control, religion, civilization, and blood of the Mediterranean north. Here, the somewhat better living conditions and a climate that is hotter but less dry attracted Hamitic invasions, while the relatively dense local population at a lower level of economic development offered lucrative trade opportunities to the commercial Semites. South of the equator, the native Bantu Kaffirs, primarily a tropical people, expanded beyond their typical range to the southern coast of Africa at 33° S.L., pushing out the yellow Hottentots199 before the arrival of the Dutch in 1602; while in the early nineteenth century, we hear about the Makololo, a subgroup of this same Kaffir stock, leaving their home near the southern sources of the Vaal River at 28° S.L. and moving about nine hundred miles north to the Barotse territory on the upper Zambezi at 15° S.L.200 This was yet another movement of a pastoral community across a tropic to other grasslands, in climatic conditions not much different from those they had left.

Colonization and latitude.

The modern colonial movements which have been genuine race expansions have shown a tendency not only to adhere to their zone, but to follow parallels of latitude or isotherms. The stratification of European peoples in the Americas, excepting Spanish and Portuguese, coincides with heat zones. Internal colonization in the United States reveals the same principle.201 Russian settlements in Asia stretch across Siberia chiefly between the fiftieth and fifty-fifth parallels; these same lines include the ancient Slav territory in Germany between the Vistula and Weser. The great efflux of home-seekers, as opposed to the smaller contingent of mere conquerors and exploiters, which has poured forth from Europe since the fifteenth century, has found its destinations largely in the temperate parts of the Americas, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa. Even the Spanish overlords in Mexico and Peru domiciled themselves chiefly in the highlands, where altitude in part counteracts tropical latitude. European immigration into South America to-day greatly predominates in the temperate portions,—in Argentine, Uruguay, Paraguay, southern Brazil and southern Chile. While Argentine's population includes over one million white foreigners, who comprise twenty per cent. of the total,202 Venezuela has no genuine white immigration. Its population, which comprises only one per cent. of pure whites, consists chiefly of negroes, mulattoes, and Sambos, hybrids of negro and Indian race. In British Guiana, negroes and East Indian coolies, both importations from other tropical lands, comprise eighty-one per cent. of the population.203

The modern colonial movements that have genuinely expanded races have shown a tendency not just to stick to their areas, but to follow lines of latitude or temperature zones. The distribution of European people in the Americas, other than the Spanish and Portuguese, aligns with heat zones. Internal colonization in the United States demonstrates the same principle.201 Russian settlements in Asia stretch across Siberia mainly between the fiftieth and fifty-fifth parallels; these same lines cover the ancient Slavic territory in Germany between the Vistula and Weser rivers. The significant outpouring of people searching for homes, compared to the smaller group of just conquerors and exploiters, has flowed from Europe since the fifteenth century, primarily settling in the temperate regions of the Americas, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa. Even the Spanish rulers in Mexico and Peru settled mostly in the highlands, where the altitude helps balance out the tropical latitude. Today, European immigration into South America is concentrated in the temperate areas—Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguay, southern Brazil, and southern Chile. Argentina's population includes over one million white foreigners, making up twenty percent of the total,202 while Venezuela has no significant white immigration. Its population, which is only one percent pure whites, largely consists of Black people, mulattos, and Sambos, hybrids of Black and Indigenous races. In British Guiana, Black people and East Indian laborers, both brought in from other tropical regions, make up eighty-one percent of the population.203

The movement of Europeans into the tropical regions of Asia, Australasia, Africa and America, like the American advance into the Philippines, represents commercial and political, not genuine ethnic expansion. Except where it resorts to hybridization, it seeks not new homesteads, but the profits of tropical trade and the markets for European manufactures found in retarded populations. These it secures either by a small but permanently domiciled ruling class, as formerly in Spanish and Portuguese America, or by a body of European officials, clerks, agents and soldiers, sent out for a term of years. Such are the seventy-six thousand Britishers who manage the affairs of commerce and state in British India, and the smaller number of Dutch who perform the same functions in the Dutch East India islands. The basis of this system is exploitation. It represents neither a high economic, ethical, nor social ideal, and therefore lacks the stamp of geographic finality.

The movement of Europeans into the tropical regions of Asia, Australasia, Africa, and America, like the American expansion into the Philippines, is driven by commercial and political motives, not by genuine ethnic growth. Unless it leads to hybridization, it doesn't aim to establish new homesteads but rather seeks the profits of tropical trade and markets for European goods among less developed populations. This is achieved either through a small but permanently settled ruling class, as was the case in Spanish and Portuguese America, or through a group of European officials, clerks, agents, and soldiers who are sent out for a limited number of years. Examples include the seventy-six thousand Brits managing commerce and state affairs in British India, and the smaller number of Dutch officials carrying out similar roles in the Dutch East Indies. The foundation of this system is exploitation. It does not embody a high economic, ethical, or social ideal, and therefore lacks the mark of geographic permanence.

Movement to like geographic conditions.

A migrating or expanding people, when free to choose, is prone to seek a new home with like geographic conditions to the old. Hence the stamp once given by an environment tends to perpetuate itself. All people, especially those in the lower stages of culture, are conservative in their fundamental activities. Agriculture is intolerable to pastoral nomads, hunting has little attraction for a genuine fisher folk. Therefore such peoples in expansion seek an environment in which the national aptitudes, slowly evolved in their native seats, find a ready field. Thus arise natural provinces of distribution, whose location, climate, physical features, and size reflect the social and economic adaptation of the inhabitants to a certain type of environment. A shepherd folk, when breaking off from its parent stock like Abraham's family from their Mesopotamian kinsmen, seeks a land rich in open pastures and large enough to support its wasteful nomadic economy. A seafaring people absorb an ever longer strip of seaboard, like the Eskimo of Arctic America, or throw out their settlements from inlet to inlet or island to island, as did Malays and Polynesians in the Pacific, ancient Greeks and Phoenicians in the subtropical Mediterranean, and the Norse in the northern seas. The Dutch, bred to the national profession of diking and draining, appear in their element in the water-logged coast of Sumatra and Guiana,204 where they cultivate lands reclaimed from the sea; or as colonists in the Vistula lowlands, whither Prussia imported them to do their ancestral task, just as the English employed their Dutch prisoners after the wars with Holland in the seventeenth century to dike and drain the fens of Cambridgeshire and Lincolnshire. Moreover, the commercial talent of the Dutch, trained by their advantageous situation on the North Sea about the Rhine mouths, guided their early traders to similar locations elsewhere, like the Hudson and Delaware Rivers, or planted them on islands either furnishing or commanding extensive trade, such as Ceylon, Mauritius, the East Indies, or the Dutch holdings in the Antilles.

A migrating or expanding group of people, when given the choice, tends to look for a new home that has similar geographic conditions to their old one. Therefore, the characteristics established by one environment often continue to influence choices. All cultures, especially those at lower stages of development, tend to be conservative in their basic activities. Farming is unsuitable for pastoral nomads, and hunting doesn't appeal much to genuine fishing communities. So, as these groups expand, they look for an environment where the skills they've slowly developed in their homeland can thrive. This leads to the creation of natural areas of distribution, the location, climate, physical features, and size of which reflect how well the inhabitants have adapted socially and economically to a specific type of environment. A herding community, when separating from its original group like Abraham's family did from their relatives in Mesopotamia, will seek out land rich in open pastures that can support their nomadic lifestyle. A seafaring society will occupy an increasingly longer stretch of coastline, like the Eskimo in Arctic America, or establish settlements from bay to bay or island to island, similar to the Malays and Polynesians in the Pacific, ancient Greeks and Phoenicians in the subtropical Mediterranean, and the Norse in the northern seas. The Dutch, who are skilled at diking and draining, thrive in the waterlogged coasts of Sumatra and Guiana, where they cultivate land reclaimed from the sea; or as colonists in the Vistula lowlands, brought there by Prussia to continue their traditional work, just as the English used their Dutch prisoners after the wars with Holland in the seventeenth century to manage the fens of Cambridgeshire and Lincolnshire. Additionally, the Dutch, known for their commercial skills honed by their advantageous position near the North Sea and Rhine mouths, directed their early traders to similar locations elsewhere, like the Hudson and Delaware Rivers, or settled on islands that provided or controlled extensive trade, such as Ceylon, Mauritius, the East Indies, or the Dutch territories in the Antilles.

Much farther down in the cultural scale we find the fisher tribes of Central Africa extending their villages from point to point along the equatorial streams, and the river Indians of South America gradually spreading from headwaters to estuary, and thence to the related environment of the coast. The Tupis, essentially a water race, have left traces of their occupation only where river or coast enabled them to live by their inherited aptitudes.205 The distribution of the ancient mounds in North America shows their builders to have sought with few exceptions protected sites near alluvial lowlands, commanding rich soil for cultivation and the fish supply from the nearby river. Mountaineer folk often move from one upland district to another, as did the Lombards of Alpine Pannonia in their conquest of Lombardy and Apennine Italy, where all their four duchies were restricted to the highlands of the peninsula.206 The conquests of the ancient Incas and the spread of their race covered one Andean valley after another for a stretch of one thousand five hundred miles, wherever climatic and physical conditions were favorable to their irrigated tillage and highland herds of llamas. They found it easier to climb pass after pass and mount to ever higher altitudes, rather than descend to the suffocating coasts where neither man nor beast could long survive, though they pushed the political boundary finally to the seaboard. [Map page 101.]

Much further down the cultural spectrum, we find the fishing communities of Central Africa establishing their villages along the equatorial rivers, and the river tribes of South America gradually expanding from the upper reaches to the mouth of the rivers, and then to the connected coastal areas. The Tupis, primarily a water-based culture, have only left evidence of their presence where rivers or the coast allowed them to thrive based on their natural skills.205 The distribution of ancient mounds in North America indicates that their builders typically sought out protected locations near alluvial plains, where the soil was rich for farming and fish were readily available from the nearby rivers. Mountain communities often relocate from one highland area to another, just like the Lombards did when they conquered Lombardy and Apennine Italy, where all of their four duchies were confined to the highlands of the peninsula.206 The conquests of the ancient Incas and the expansion of their people covered one Andean valley after another for about one thousand five hundred miles, wherever the climate and terrain supported their irrigation-based agriculture and highland herds of llamas. They found it easier to climb pass after pass and ascend to higher elevations rather than descend to the suffocating coasts, where neither humans nor animals could survive for long, although they eventually pushed their political borders to the coastline. [Map page 101.]

Movement to better geographic conditions.

The search for better land, milder climate, and easier conditions of living starts many a movement of peoples which, in view of their purpose, necessarily leads them into an environment sharply contrasted to their original habitat. Such has been the radial outflow of the Mongoloid tribes down from the rugged highlands of central Asia to the fertile river lowlands of the peripheral lands; the descent of the Iran pastors upon the agricultural folk of the Indus, Ganges and Mesopotamian valleys, and the swoop of desert-born conquerors upon the unresisting tillers of well-watered fields in all times, from the ancient Hyksos of the Nile to the modern Fulbe of the Niger Valley.

The quest for better land, milder climates, and easier living conditions initiates many migrations, which, given their goals, inevitably lead people into environments that are drastically different from where they originally came. This has been the case with the movement of Mongoloid tribes from the rugged highlands of Central Asia to the fertile river valleys of surrounding regions; the migration of Iranian pastoralists towards the farming communities of the Indus, Ganges, and Mesopotamian river systems; and the invasion of desert-raised conquerors upon the defenseless farmers of well-watered areas throughout history, from the ancient Hyksos in the Nile to the modern Fulbe in the Niger Valley.

Southward and westward drifts in the northern hemisphere.

The attraction of a milder climate has caused in the northern hemisphere a constantly recurring migration from north to south. In primitive North America, along the whole broad Atlantic slope, the predominant direction of Indian migrations was from north to south, accompanied by a drift from west to east.207 On the Pacific side of the continent also the trend was southward. This is generally conceded regardless of theory as to whether the Indians first found entrance to the continent at its northeast or northwest corner. It was a movement toward milder climates.208 Study of the Völkerwanderungen in Europe reveals two currents or drifts in varied combination, one from north to south and the other from east to west, but both of them aimed at regions of better climate; for the milder temperature and more abundant rainfall of western Europe made a country as alluring to the Goths, Huns, Alans, Slavs, Bulgars and Tartars of Asiatic deserts and Russian steppes, as were the sunny Mediterranean peninsulas to the dwellers of the bleak Baltic coasts. This is one geographic fact back of the conspicuous westward movement formulated into an historical principle: "Westward the star of empire takes its course." The establishment of European colonies on the western side of the Atlantic, their extension thence to the Pacific and ever westward, till European culture was transplanted to the Philippines by Spain and more recently by the United States, constitute the most remarkable sustained movement made by any one race.

The appeal of a milder climate has led to a continuous migration from north to south in the northern hemisphere. In early North America, across the entire broad Atlantic coast, the main direction of Indian migrations was from north to south, with a shift from west to east.207 On the Pacific side of the continent, the trend was also toward the south. This is generally agreed upon, regardless of the theory on whether the Indians first entered the continent from its northeast or northwest corner. It was a movement towards warmer climates.208 Studying the Völkerwanderungen in Europe shows two patterns or movements in various combinations, one from north to south and the other from east to west, both targeting areas with better climates. The milder temperatures and greater rainfall of western Europe attracted groups like the Goths, Huns, Alans, Slavs, Bulgars, and Tartars from the Asian deserts and Russian steppes, just as the sunny Mediterranean peninsulas drew people from the harsh Baltic coasts. This is a geographic truth behind the notable westward movement that has been captured in the historical principle: "Westward the star of empire takes its course." The establishment of European colonies on the western side of the Atlantic, their expansion to the Pacific, and the continuous westward movement until European culture was brought to the Philippines by Spain and later by the United States, represent one of the most significant and sustained movements by any single race.

Eastward movements.

But westward movements are not the only ones. On the Pacific slope of Asia the star has moved eastward. From highland Mongolia issued the throng which originally populated the lowlands of China; and ever since, one nomad conqueror after the other has descended thence to rule the fruitful plains of Chili and the teeming populations of the Yangtze Valley.209 Russia, blocked in its hoped for expansion to the west by the strong powers of central Europe, stretched its dominion eastward to the Pacific and for a short time over to Alaska. The chief expansion of the German people and the German Empire in historical times has also been from west to east; but this eastward advance is probably only retracing the steps taken by many primitive Teutonic tribes as they drifted Rhineward from an earlier habitat along the Vistula.

But westward movements aren’t the only ones. On the Pacific slope of Asia, the star has moved eastward. From highland Mongolia came the group that originally populated the lowlands of China; and ever since, one nomadic conqueror after another has come down to rule the fertile plains of Chile and the bustling populations of the Yangtze Valley.209 Russia, blocked in its hopes for expansion to the west by the strong powers of central Europe, expanded its territory eastward to the Pacific and briefly to Alaska. The main expansion of the German people and the German Empire in historical times has also been from west to east; but this eastward movement is likely just retracing the steps taken by many early Teutonic tribes as they moved toward the Rhine from their earlier home along the Vistula.

Return movements.

Since the world is small, it frequently happens that a people after an interval of generations, armed with a higher civilization, will reënter a region which it once left when too crude and untutored to develop the possibilities of the land, but which its better equipment later enables it to exploit. Thus we find a backward expansion of the Chinese westward to the foot of the Pamir, and an internal colonization of the empire to the Ili feeder of Lake Balkash. The expansion of the Japanese into Korea and Saghalin is undoubtedly such a return current, after an interval long enough to work a complete transformation in the primitive Mongolians who found their way to that island home. Sometimes the return represents the ebbing of the tide, rather than the back water of a stream in flood. Such was the retreat of the Moors from Spain to the Berber districts of North Africa, whither they carried echoes of the brilliant Saracen civilization in the Iberian Peninsula. Such has been the gradual withdrawal of the Turks from Europe back to their native Asia, and slow expulsion of the Tartar tribes from Russia to the barren Asiatic limits of their former territory. [See map page 225.]

Since the world is small, it often happens that a group of people, after several generations, returns to a region they once left behind when they were too primitive and uneducated to fully utilize the land. With their improved skills later on, they're able to take advantage of it. For example, we see the Chinese expanding westward to the foot of the Pamir Mountains and colonizing the interior of their empire towards the Ili River that feeds Lake Balkash. The Japanese expansion into Korea and Saghalin is definitely a similar case of returning, after enough time has passed to completely transform the primitive Mongolians who originally settled there. Sometimes this return reflects a decline instead of the surge of a flood. A good example of this is the retreat of the Moors from Spain back to the Berber regions of North Africa, where they brought remnants of the vibrant Saracen culture from the Iberian Peninsula. This pattern has also been seen in the gradual withdrawal of the Turks from Europe back to Asia, along with the slow expulsion of the Tartar tribes from Russia to the desolate Asian borders of their former lands. [See map page 225.]

Regions of attraction and repulsion.

Voluntary historical movements, seeking congenial or choice regions of the earth, have left its less favored spots undisturbed. Paucity of resources and isolation have generally insured to a region a peaceful history; natural wealth has always brought the conqueror. In ancient Greece the fruitful plains of Thessaly, Boeotia, Elis and Laconia had a fatal attraction for every migrating horde; Attica's rugged surface, poor soil, and side-tracked location off the main line of travel between Hellas and the Peloponnesus saved it from many a rough visitant,210 and hence left the Athenians, according to Thucydides, an indigenous race. The fertility of the Rhine Valley has always attracted invasion, the barren Black Forest range has repelled and obstructed it.

Voluntary historical movements, in search of welcoming or preferred areas of the earth, have left the less desirable spots untouched. A lack of resources and isolation have typically ensured a region's peaceful history; natural wealth has always attracted conquerors. In ancient Greece, the fertile plains of Thessaly, Boeotia, Elis, and Laconia were irresistibly appealing to every migrating group; Attica's rough terrain, poor soil, and off-the-beaten-path location between Hellas and the Peloponnesus kept it safe from many unwelcome visitors,210 allowing the Athenians, according to Thucydides, to remain an indigenous people. The fertility of the Rhine Valley has always drawn invaders, while the barren Black Forest has kept them at bay.

The security of such unproductive highlands lies more in their failure to attract than in their power to resist conquest. When to abundant natural resources, a single spot adds a reputation for wealth, magnificence, an exceptional position for the control of territory or commerce, it becomes a geographical magnet. Such was Delphi for the Gauls of the Balkan Peninsula in the third century, Rome for the Germanic and Hunnish tribes of the Völkerwanderung, Constantinople for the Normans, Turks and Russians, Venice for land-locked Austria, the Mississippi highway and the outlet at New Orleans for our Trans-Allegheny pioneers.

The security of these unproductive highlands comes more from their lack of appeal than from their ability to resist conquest. When a place has abundant natural resources and a reputation for wealth, grandeur, and an excellent position for controlling territory or trade, it becomes a geographical lure. This was true for Delphi for the Gauls in the Balkans during the third century, Rome for the Germanic and Hunnish tribes during the Migration Period, Constantinople for the Normans, Turks, and Russians, Venice for landlocked Austria, and the Mississippi River and the port in New Orleans for our pioneers beyond the Alleghenies.

Psychical influences in certain movements.

Sometimes the goal is fabulous or mythical, but potent to lure, like the land of El Dorado, abounding in gold and jewels, which for two centuries spurred on Spanish exploration in America. Other than purely material motives may initiate or maintain such a movement, an ideal or a dream of good, like the fountain of eternal youth which brought Ponce de Leon to Florida, the search for the Islands of the Blessed, or the spirit of religious propaganda which stimulated the spread of the Spanish in Mexico and the French in Canada, or the hope of religious toleration which has drawn Quaker, Puritan, Huguenot, and Jew to America. It was an idea of purely spiritual import which directed the century-long movement of the Crusades toward Jerusalem, half Latinized the Levant, and widened the intellectual horizon of Europe. A national or racial sentiment which enhaloes a certain spot may be pregnant with historical results, because at any moment it may start some band of enthusiasts on a path of migration or conquest. The Zionist agitation for the return of oppressed Jews to Palestine, and the establishment of the Liberian Republic for the negroes in Africa rest upon such a sentiment. The reverence of the Christian world for Rome as a goal of pilgrimages materially enhanced the influence of Italy as a school of culture during the Middle Ages. The spiritual and ethnic association of the Mohammedan world with Mecca is always fraught with possible political results. The dominant tribes of the Sudan, followers of Islam, who proudly trace back a fictitious line of ancestry to the Arabs of Yemen, are readily incited to support a new prophet sprung from the race of Mecca.211 The pilgrimages which the Buddhists of the Asiatic highlands make to the sacred city of Lhassa ensure China's control over the restless nomads through the instrumentality of the Grand Lama of Tibet.

Sometimes the goal is amazing or mythical, but powerful enough to entice, like the land of El Dorado, filled with gold and jewels, which for two centuries drove Spanish exploration in America. Beyond just material motives, an ideal or dream of good, like the fountain of eternal youth that inspired Ponce de Leon to visit Florida, the quest for the Islands of the Blessed, or the spirit of religious outreach that encouraged the Spanish in Mexico and the French in Canada, or the hope for religious freedom that attracted Quakers, Puritans, Huguenots, and Jews to America. A purely spiritual idea directed the century-long movement of the Crusades towards Jerusalem, partially Latinizing the Levant and expanding Europe’s intellectual horizons. A national or racial sentiment surrounding a particular place can lead to significant historical outcomes because it may spur a group of enthusiasts into migration or conquest at any moment. The Zionist movement for the return of oppressed Jews to Palestine and the founding of the Liberian Republic for Africans are based on such sentiments. The Christian world's reverence for Rome as a pilgrimage destination greatly strengthened Italy's role as a cultural center during the Middle Ages. The spiritual and ethnic ties of the Muslim world to Mecca are always full of potential political implications. The dominant tribes of the Sudan, who follow Islam and proudly claim a fictional lineage back to the Arabs of Yemen, are easily motivated to support a new prophet from the lineage of Mecca.211 The pilgrimages that Buddhists from the Asian highlands make to the sacred city of Lhassa help ensure China’s control over the restless nomads through the authority of the Grand Lama of Tibet.

Results of historical movement.

Historical movements are varied as to motive, direction, numerical strength, and character, but their final results are two, differentiation and assimilation. Both are important phases of the process of evolution, but the latter gains force with the progress of history and the increase of the world's population.

Historical movements vary in motive, direction, size, and nature, but their ultimate outcomes are two: differentiation and assimilation. Both are significant stages of the evolutionary process, but assimilation gains momentum as history progresses and the global population grows.

Differentiation and area.

A people or race which, in its process of numerical growth, spreads over a large territory subjects itself to a widening range of geographic conditions, and therefore of differentiation. The broad expansion of the Teutonic race in Europe, America, Australia and South Africa has brought it into every variety of habitat. If the territory has a monotonous relief like Russia, nevertheless, its mere extent involves diversity of climate and location. The diversity of climate incident to large area involves in turn different animal and plant life, different crops, different economic activities. Even in lowlands the relief, geologic structure, and soil are prone to vary over wide districts. The monotonous surface of Holland shows such contrasts. So do the North German lowlands; here the sandy barren flats of the "geest" alternate with stretches of fertile silt deposited by the rivers or the sea,212 and support different types of communities, which have been admirably described by Gustav Frenssen in his great novel of Jön Uhl. The flat surface of southern Illinois shows in small compass the teeming fertility of the famous "American bottom," the poor clay soil of "Egypt" with its backward population, and the rich prairie land just to the north with its prosperous and progressive farmer class.

A group of people or a race that, while growing in numbers, spreads over a large area exposes itself to a wider range of geographic conditions, leading to more differentiation. The extensive expansion of the Teutonic race in Europe, America, Australia, and South Africa has brought it into every kind of habitat. Even if the territory has a flat landscape like Russia, its vast size still results in varying climates and locations. The different climates across a large area lead to various types of animal and plant life, different crops, and different economic activities. Even low-lying areas can have significant variations in relief, geological structure, and soil across wide regions. The flat landscape of Holland shows such contrasts. The North German lowlands also display this; here, the sandy, barren flats known as "geest" alternate with stretches of fertile silt left by rivers or the sea,212 supporting different types of communities, which have been wonderfully depicted by Gustav Frenssen in his great novel about Jön Uhl. The flat land of southern Illinois illustrates in a small area the rich fertility of the famous "American bottom," the poor clay soil of "Egypt" with its struggling population, and the productive prairie land just north of it, home to a thriving and forward-thinking farming community.

When the relief includes mountains, the character not only of the land but of the climate changes, and therewith the type of community. Hence neighboring districts may produce strongly contrasted types of society. Madison County of Kentucky, lying on the eastern margin of the Bluegrass region, contains the rich landed estates, negro laboring class and aristocratic society characteristic of the "planter" communities of the old South; and only twenty miles southeast of Richmond, the center of this wealth and refinement, it includes also the rough barren hill country of the Cumberland Plateau, where are found one-room cabins, moonshine stills, feuds, and a backward population sprung from the same pure English stock as the Bluegrass people.

When the landscape includes mountains, both the land and climate change, and so does the type of community. This means that neighboring areas can have very different types of societies. Madison County in Kentucky, located on the eastern edge of the Bluegrass region, features the wealthy estates, black working class, and aristocratic society typical of the "planter" communities of the old South. Just twenty miles southeast of Richmond, the heart of this wealth and sophistication, you’ll find the rough, desolate hills of the Cumberland Plateau, where there are one-room cabins, moonshine stills, feuds, and a struggling population that comes from the same pure English heritage as the Bluegrass people.

Contrasted environments.

Here is differentiation due to the immediate influences of environment. The phenomenon reappears in every part of the world, in every race and every age. The contrast between the ancient Greeks of the mountains, coasts and alluvial valleys shows the power of environment to direct economic activities and to modify culture and social organization. So does the differences between the coast, steppe, and forest Indians of Guiana,213 the Kirghis of the Pamir pastures and the Irtysh River valley, the agricultural Berbers of the Atlas Mountains and the Berber nomads of the Sahara, the Swiss of the high, lonely Engadine and those of the crowded Aar valley.

Here is differentiation due to the immediate influences of the environment. This phenomenon appears in every part of the world, in every race and every age. The contrast between the ancient Greeks from the mountains, coasts, and alluvial valleys illustrates how powerful the environment is in shaping economic activities and altering culture and social organization. This is also evident in the differences between the coastal, steppe, and forest Indians of Guiana,213 the Kirghis of the Pamir pastures and the Irtysh River valley, the agricultural Berbers of the Atlas Mountains and the Berber nomads of the Sahara, and the Swiss from the high, isolated Engadine and those from the crowded Aar Valley.

Contrasted environments effect a natural selection in another way and thereby greatly stimulate differentiation, whenever an intruding people contest the ownership of the territory with the inhabitants. The struggle for land means a struggle also for the best land, which therefore falls to the share of the strongest peoples. Weaklings must content themselves with poor soils, inaccessible regions of mountain, swamp or desert. There they deteriorate, or at best strike a slower pace of increase or progress. The difference between the people of the highlands and plains of Great Britain or of France is therefore in part a distinction of race due to this geographical selection,214 in part a distinction of economic development and culture due to geographic influences. Therefore the piedmont belts of the world, except in arid lands, are cultural, ethnic and often political lines of cleavage, showing marked differentiation on either side. Isotherms are other such cleavage lines, marking the limits beyond which an aggressive people did not desire to expand because of an uncongenial climate. The distinction between Anglo-Saxon and Latin America is one of zone as well as race. Everywhere in North America the English stock has dominated or displaced French and Spanish competitors down to the Mexican frontier.

Contrasting environments create natural selection in a different way and significantly encourage differentiation whenever a new group challenges the land ownership of the local inhabitants. The fight for land also means a fight for the best land, which ultimately goes to the strongest groups. The weaker ones have to settle for poorer soils and difficult terrains like mountains, swamps, or deserts. There, they decline, or at best, progress at a slower rate. The difference between the people from the highlands and the plains of Great Britain or France is partly a racial distinction from this geographical selection,214 and partly a distinction of economic development and culture influenced by geography. Therefore, the foothill areas of the world, except in dry regions, often serve as cultural, ethnic, and sometimes political boundaries, showing significant differences on either side. Isotherms are also these boundary lines, indicating the limits to where an aggressive group did not want to expand because of an unsuitable climate. The difference between Anglo-Saxon and Latin America is one of zone as well as race. Throughout North America, English descendants have overshadowed or replaced French and Spanish rivals all the way to the Mexican border.

As the great process of European colonization has permeated the earth and multiplied its population, not only the best land but the amount of this has commenced to differentiate the history of various European nations, and that in a way whose end cannot yet be definitely predicted. The best lands have fallen to the first-comers strong enough to hold them. People who early develop powers of expansion, like the English, or who, like the French and Russians, formulate and execute vast territorial policies, secure for their future growth a wide base which will for all time distinguish them from late-comers into the colonial field, like Germany and Italy. These countries see the fecundity of their people redounding to the benefit of alien colonial lands, which have been acquired by enterprising rivals in the choice sections of the temperate zone. German and Italian colonies in torrid, unhealthy, or barren tropical lands, fail to attract emigrants from the mother country, and therefore to enhance national growth.

As European colonization has spread across the globe and increased its population, not only has the best land but also the total amount of land begun to shape the histories of different European nations in a way that can't yet be fully predicted. The prime lands have gone to the first arrivals who were strong enough to claim them. Nations that developed expansion efforts early on, like the English, or those like the French and Russians who made and implemented large-scale territorial strategies, secure a solid foundation for their future growth, setting them apart from later entrants in the colonial arena, like Germany and Italy. These countries observe how the productivity of their people benefits foreign colonial territories taken by more enterprising competitors in choice areas of the temperate zone. German and Italian colonies in hot, unhealthy, or unproductive tropical regions struggle to attract migrants from their home countries, thus failing to promote national growth.

Two-type populations.

When colonizers or conquerors appropriate the land of a lower race, we find a territory occupied at least for a time by two types of population, constituting an ethnic, social and often economic differentiation. The separation may be made geographical also. The Indians in the United States have been confined to reservations, like the Hottentots to the twenty or more "locations" in Cape Colony. This is the simplest arrangement. Whether the second or lower type survives depends upon their economic and social utility, into which again geographic conditions enter. The Indians of Canada are a distinct economic factor in that country as trappers for the Hudson Bay Company, and they will so remain till the hunting grounds of the far north are exhausted. The native agriculturists in the Tropics are indispensable to the unacclimated whites. The negroes of the South, introduced for an economic purpose, find their natural habitat in the Black Belt. Here we have an ethnic division of labor for geographical reasons. Castes or social classes, often distinguished by shades of color as in Brahman India, survive as differentiations indicating old lines of race cleavage. There is abundant evidence that the upper classes in Germany, France, Austria, and the British Isles are distinctly lighter of hair and eyes than the peasantry.215 The high-class Japanese are taller and fairer than the masses. Nearly all the African tribes of the Sudan and bordering Sahara include two distinct classes, one of lighter and one of darker shade. Many Fulbe tribes distinguish these classes by the names of "Blacks" and "Whites."216 The two-type people are the result of historical movements.

When colonizers or conquerors take over the land of a less privileged race, we see a territory occupied, at least for a time, by two different types of populations, creating ethnic, social, and often economic distinctions. This separation might also be geographical. Native Americans in the United States have been restricted to reservations, similar to how the Hottentots are confined to the twenty or more "locations" in Cape Colony. This is the simplest arrangement. The survival of the second or lower type depends on their economic and social usefulness, which is also influenced by geographic conditions. The Indigenous peoples of Canada are a unique economic force in that country as trappers for the Hudson Bay Company, and they'll remain that way until the hunting grounds of the far north are depleted. The native farmers in the Tropics are essential to the unacclimated whites. The African Americans in the South, brought in for economic reasons, naturally thrive in the Black Belt. Here we see an ethnic division of labor due to geographical factors. Social classes or castes, often differentiated by skin color as in Brahman India, persist as distinctions that indicate ancient racial divisions. There is plenty of evidence that the upper classes in Germany, France, Austria, and the British Isles tend to have distinctly lighter hair and eyes than the peasantry.215 The wealthy Japanese are taller and fairer than the general population. Nearly all the African tribes in the Sudan and bordering Sahara have two distinct classes, one lighter and one darker. Many Fulbe tribes refer to these classes as "Blacks" and "Whites."216 The existence of these two types of people results from historical movements.

Differentiation and isolation.

Differentiation results not only from contrasted geographic conditions, but also from segregation. A moving or expanding throng in search of more and better lands drops off one group to occupy a fertile valley or plain, while the main body goes on its way, till it reaches a satisfactory destination or destinations. The tendency to split and divide, characteristic of primitive peoples, is thus stimulated by migration and expansion. Each offshoot, detached from the main body, tends to diverge from the stock type. If it reaches a naturally isolated region, where its contact without is practically cut off, it grows from its own loins, emphasizes its group characteristic by close in-breeding, and tends to show a development related to biological divergence under conditions of isolation. Since man is essentially a gregarious animal, the size of every such migrating band will always prevent the evolution of any sharply defined variety, according to the standard of biology. Nevertheless, the divergent types of men and societies developed in segregated regions are an echo of the formation of new species under conditions of isolation which is now generally acknowledged by biological science. Isolation was recognized by Darwin as an occasional factor in the origin of species and especially of divergence; in combination with migration it was made the basis of a theory of evolution by Moritz Wagner in 1873;217 and in recent years has come to be regarded as an essential in the explanation of divergence of types, as opposed to differentiation.218

Differentiation comes not just from different geographic conditions, but also from separation. A group on the move or expanding in search of better land may leave behind part of its members to settle in a fertile valley or plain, while the main group continues on until it reaches a suitable destination or destinations. The tendency to split and divide, which is typical of early human societies, is further encouraged by migration and expansion. Each offshoot, separated from the main group, is likely to drift away from the original type. If it settles in a naturally isolated area, where its contact with the outside world is mostly cut off, it will develop independently, strengthen its unique traits through close in-breeding, and show characteristics similar to those seen in biological divergence due to isolation. Since humans are inherently social creatures, the size of each migrating group typically prevents the emergence of distinct varieties, according to biological standards. Still, the different types of people and societies that arise in isolated areas reflect the process of forming new species under isolation, which is now widely accepted in biological science. Darwin acknowledged isolation as an occasional factor in the origin of species, particularly regarding divergence; combined with migration, it formed the basis of an evolutionary theory by Moritz Wagner in 1873;217 and in recent years, it has been seen as crucial for explaining the divergence of types, as opposed to mere differentiation.218

Differentiation and digression.

The traditions of the Delaware Indians and Sioux in the north of the United States territory, and of the Creeks in the south, commence with each stock group as a united body, which, as it migrates, splits into tribes and sends out offshoots developing different dialects. Here was tribal differentiation after entry into the general stock area, the process going on during migration as well as after the tribes had become established in their respective habitats. Culture, however, made little progress till after they became sedentary and took up agriculture to supplement the chase.219 Tribes sometimes wander far beyond the limits of their stock, like the Iroquoian Cherokees of East Tennessee and North Carolina or the Athapascan Navajos and Apaches of arid New Mexico and Arizona, who had placed twenty or thirty degrees of latitude between themselves and their brethren in the basins of the Yukon and Mackenzie rivers. Such inevitably come into contrasted climatic conditions, which further modify the immigrants. [See map page 54.]

The traditions of the Delaware Indians and Sioux in the northern United States, and of the Creeks in the south, start with each group as a united body, which, as it migrates, divides into tribes and develops different dialects. This marks the beginning of tribal differentiation after entering the general area, a process that continues during migration and after the tribes have settled in their respective areas. However, culture progressed very little until they became settled and started farming to complement hunting.219 Tribes sometimes moved far beyond their original areas, like the Iroquoian Cherokees of East Tennessee and North Carolina or the Athapascan Navajos and Apaches of dry New Mexico and Arizona, who found themselves twenty or thirty degrees of latitude away from their relatives in the Yukon and Mackenzie river basins. These groups inevitably encountered different climatic conditions, which further influenced their development. [See map page 54.]

Wide digressions differentiate them still further from the parent stock by landing them amid different ethnic and social groups, by contact with whom they are inevitably modified. The Namaqua Hottentots, living on the southern margin of the Hottentot country near the frontier of the European settlements in Cape Colony, acquired some elements of civilization, together with a strain of Boer and English blood, and in some cases even the Dutch vernacular. They were therefore differentiated from their nomadic and warlike kinsmen in the grasslands north of the Orange River, which formed the center of the Hottentot area.220 A view of the ancient Germans during the first five or six centuries after Christ reveals differentiation by various contacts in process along all the ragged borders of the Germanic area. The offshoots who pushed westward across the Rhine into Belgian Gaul were rapidly Celticized, abandoning their semi-nomadic life for sedentary agriculture, assimilating the superior civilization which they found there, and steadily merging with the native population. They became Belgae, though still conscious of their Teutonic origin.221 The Batavians, an offshoot of the ancient Chatti living near the Thuringian Forest, appropriated the river island between the Rhine and the Waal. There in the seclusion of their swamps, they became a distinct national unit, retaining their backward German culture and primitive type of German speech, which the Chatti themselves lost by contact with the High Germans.222 Far away on the southeastern margin of the Teutonic area the same process of assimilation to a foreign civilization went on a little later when the Visigoths, after a century of residence on the lower Danube in contact with the Eastern Empire, adopted the Arian form of Christianity which had arisen in the Greek peninsula.223 The border regions of the world show the typical results of the historical movement—differentiation from the core or central group through assimilation to a new group which meets and blends with it along the frontier.

Wide digressions set them apart even more from the original group by placing them among different ethnic and social groups, which inevitably changes them. The Namaqua Hottentots, living on the southern edge of Hottentot territory near the border of European settlements in Cape Colony, gained some elements of civilization, along with some Boer and English ancestry, and in some cases even the Dutch language. As a result, they were distinct from their nomadic and warlike relatives in the grasslands north of the Orange River, which was the heart of Hottentot territory.220 A look at the ancient Germans during the first five or six centuries after Christ shows differences emerging from various interactions along all the uneven borders of the Germanic region. The groups that moved westward across the Rhine into Belgian Gaul quickly became Celticized, giving up their semi-nomadic lifestyle for settled farming, adopting the advanced civilization they encountered there, and steadily merging with the local population. They became Belgae, although they remained aware of their Teutonic roots.221 The Batavians, a branch of the ancient Chatti living near the Thuringian Forest, took control of the river island between the Rhine and the Waal. There, in the isolation of their swamps, they became a distinct national entity, maintaining their less developed German culture and primitive version of the German language, which the Chatti themselves lost through contact with the High Germans.222 Far away on the southeastern edge of the Teutonic region, a similar process of assimilation to a foreign civilization occurred a bit later when the Visigoths, after a century of living on the lower Danube in contact with the Eastern Empire, adopted the Arian form of Christianity that had developed in the Greek peninsula.223 The border regions of the world show the typical results of historical movements—divergence from the central or core group through blending with a new group that meets and merges with it along the frontier.

Geographic conditions of heterogeneity and homogeneity.

Entrance into a naturally isolated district, from which subsequent incursions are debarred, gives conditions for divergence and the creation of a new type. On the other hand, where few physical barriers are present to form these natural pockets, the process of assimilation goes on over a wide field. Europe is peculiar among the family of continents for its "much divided" geography, commented upon by Strabo. Hence its islands, peninsulas and mountain-rimmed basins have produced a variegated assemblage of peoples, languages and culture. Only where it runs off into the monotonous immensity of Russia do we find a people who in their physical traits, language, and civilization reflect the uniformity of their environment.224

Entering a naturally isolated area, where later incursions are prohibited, creates conditions for divergence and the emergence of a new type. On the flip side, in places where few physical barriers exist to form these natural pockets, the process of assimilation continues over a broad area. Europe stands out among the continents for its "highly divided" geography, as noted by Strabo. Therefore, its islands, peninsulas, and mountain-encircled basins have led to a diverse mix of peoples, languages, and cultures. Only where it merges into the vast sameness of Russia do we find a population that, in its physical features, language, and civilization, mirrors the uniformity of its surroundings.224

Africa's smooth outline, its plateau surface rimmed with mountains which enclose but fail to divide, and its monotonous configuration have produced a racial and cultural uniformity as striking as Europe's heterogeneity. Constant movements and commixture, migration and conquest, have been the history of the black races, varied by victorious incursions of the Hamitic and Semitic whites from the north, which, however, have resulted in the amalgamation of the two races after conquest.225 Constant fusion has leveled also the social and political relations of the people to one type; it has eliminated primordial groups, except where the dwarf hunters have taken refuge in the equatorial forests and the Bushmen in the southwestern deserts, just as it has thwarted the development of higher social groups by failure to segregate and protect. It has sown the Bantu speech broadcast over the immense area of Central Africa, and is disseminating the Hausa language through the agency of a highly mixed commercial folk over a wide tract of the western Sudan. The long east-and-west stretch of the Sudan grasslands presents an unobstructed zone between the thousand-mile belt of desert to the north and the dense equatorial forests to the south, between hunger and thirst on one side, heat and fever and impenetrable forests on the other. Hence the Sudan in all history has been the crowded Broadway of Africa. Here pass commercial caravans, hybrid merchant tribes like the Hausa, throngs of pilgrims, streams of peoples, herds of cattle moving to busy markets, rude incursive shoppers or looters from the desert, coming to buy or rob or rule in this highway belt. [See map page 105.]

Africa's smooth outline, with its plateau surface bordered by mountains that enclose but don’t divide, together with its uniform landscape, has created a racial and cultural consistency as remarkable as Europe's diversity. The history of the black races has been shaped by constant movement and mixing, migration and conquest, punctuated by successful incursions of Hamitic and Semitic whites from the north, which have ultimately led to the blending of the two groups post-conquest.225 This ongoing fusion has also standardized the social and political relationships among the people into one type; it has erased original groups, except where the dwarf hunters have found refuge in the equatorial forests and the Bushmen in the southwestern deserts. This process has hindered the emergence of advanced social groups by failing to segregate and protect them. It has spread the Bantu language widely across the vast area of Central Africa and is transmitting the Hausa language through a diverse commercial population across a broad area of the western Sudan. The long east-west expanse of the Sudan grasslands forms an unblocked zone between the thousand-mile stretch of desert to the north and the dense equatorial forests to the south, caught between hunger and thirst on one side and heat, fever, and impenetrable forests on the other. Thus, throughout history, the Sudan has been the bustling center of Africa. Here, commercial caravans pass by, mixed merchant tribes like the Hausa move through, crowds of pilgrims stream past, peoples migrate, and herds of cattle head to busy markets, alongside wandering shoppers or thieves from the desert, coming to buy, steal, or assert control in this corridor of trade. [See map page 105.]

Differentiation versus assimilation.

Historical development advances by means of differentiation and assimilation. A change of environment stimulates variation. Primitive culture is loath to change; its inertia is deep-seated. Only a sharp prod will start it moving or accelerate its speed; such a prod is found in new geographic conditions or new social contacts. Divergence in a segregated spot may be overdone. Progress crawls among a people too long isolated, though incipient civilization thrives for a time in seclusion. But in general, accessibility, exposure to some measure of ethnic amalgamation and social contact is essential to sustained progress.226 As the world has become more closely populated and means of communication have improved, geographical segregation is increasingly rare. The earth has lost its "corners." All parts are being drawn into the circle of intercourse. Therefore differentiation, the first effect of the historical movement, abates; the second effect, assimilation, takes the lead.

Historical development progresses through differentiation and assimilation. A change in the environment encourages variation. Primitive culture is resistant to change; its inertia runs deep. Only a strong push will get it moving or speed things up; that push comes from new geographical conditions or new social interactions. Divergence in an isolated area can be excessive. Progress moves slowly among groups that have been too long cut off, even though early civilization can thrive for a while in isolation. But generally, accessibility and exposure to some degree of ethnic mixing and social interaction are crucial for sustained progress.226 As the world has become more densely populated and communication has improved, geographical isolation is becoming increasingly rare. The earth has lost its "corners." All regions are being pulled into a circle of interaction. Consequently, differentiation, the initial effect of historical movement, diminishes; the second effect, assimilation, takes priority.

Elimination by historical movement.

The ceaseless human movements making for new combinations have stimulated development. They have lifted the level of culture, and worked towards homogeneity of race and civilization on a higher plane. Since the period of the great discoveries inaugurated by Columbus enabled the historical movement to compass the world, whole continents, like North America and Australia, have been reclaimed to civilization by colonization. The process of assimilation is often ruthless in its method. Hence it has been attended by a marked reduction in the number of different ethnic stocks, tribes, languages, dialects, social and cultural types through wide-spread elimination of the weak, backward or unfit.227 These have been wiped out, either by extermination or the slower process of absorption. The Indian linguistic stocks in the United States have been reduced from fifty-three to thirty-two; and of those thirty-two, many survive as a single tribe or the shrinking remnant of one.228 In Africa the slave trade has caused the annihilation of many small tribes.229 The history of the Hottentots, who have been passive before the active advance of the English, Dutch and Kaffirs about them, shows a race undergoing a widespread process of hybridization230 and extermination.231

The constant movement of people creating new combinations has fueled development. It has raised the level of culture and has worked towards a unification of races and civilizations at a higher level. Since the age of major discoveries started by Columbus, which allowed historical changes to span the globe, entire continents like North America and Australia have been brought into the fold of civilization through colonization. The process of blending cultures is often harsh in its approach. As a result, there has been a significant decrease in the number of different ethnic groups, tribes, languages, dialects, and social and cultural types due to the widespread elimination of the weak, backward, or unfit.227 Many have been wiped out, either through extermination or the slower process of assimilation. The number of Indian linguistic groups in the United States has dropped from fifty-three to thirty-two; and of those thirty-two, many now exist as a single tribe or the dwindling remnant of one.228 In Africa, the slave trade has led to the destruction of many small tribes.229 The history of the Hottentots, who have passively faced the advancing English, Dutch, and Kaffirs around them, illustrates a race undergoing a widespread process of hybridization230 and extermination.231

Strong peoples, like the English, French, Russians and Chinese, occupy ever larger areas. Where an adverse climate precludes genuine colonization, as it did for the Spanish in Central and South America, and for the English and Dutch in the Indies, they make their civilization, if not their race, permeate the acquired territory, and gradually impose on it their language and economic methods. The Poles, who once boasted a large and distinguished nationality, are being Germanized and Russified to their final national extinction. The Finns, whose Scandinavian offshoot has been almost absorbed in Sweden,232 are being forcibly dissolved in the Muscovite dominion by powerful reägents, by Russian schoolmasters, a Russian priesthood, Russian military service.

Strong nations, like the English, French, Russians, and Chinese, are taking up more and more space. Where a harsh climate prevents true colonization, as it did for the Spanish in Central and South America, and for the English and Dutch in the Indies, they still make their civilization, if not their race, spread throughout the territories they control, gradually imposing their language and economic practices. The Poles, who once had a large and notable nationality, are being Germanized and Russified to the point of national extinction. The Finns, whose Scandinavian roots have nearly been absorbed into Sweden,232 are being forcibly dissolved in the Russian dominion by powerful officials, Russian teachers, a Russian priesthood, and Russian military service.

No new ethnic types.

No new types of races have been developed either by amalgamation or by transfer to new climatic and economic conditions in historic times. Contrasted geographic conditions long ago lost their power to work radical physical changes in the race type, because man even with the beginnings of civilization learned to protect himself against extremes of climate. He therefore preserved his race type, which consequently in the course of ages lost much of its plasticity and therewith its capacity to evolve new varieties.233 Where ethnic amalgamations on a large scale have occurred as a result of the historical movement, as in Mexico, the Sudan and Central Africa, the local race, being numerically stronger than the intruders and better adapted to the environment, has succeeded in maintaining its type, though slightly modified, side by side with the intruders. The great historical movements of modern times, however, have been the expansion of European peoples over the retarded regions of the world. These peoples, coming into contact with inferior races, and armed generally with a race pride which was antagonistic to hybrid marriages, preserved their blood from extensive intermixture. Hybridism, where it existed, was an ephemeral feature restricted to pioneer days, when white women were scarce, or to regions of extreme heat or cold, where white women and children could with difficulty survive. Even in Spanish America, where ethnic blendings were most extensive, something of the old Spanish pride of race has reasserted itself.

No new types of races have emerged through mixing or adapting to new climates and economic conditions in recorded history. Geographic contrasts have long since lost their ability to create significant physical changes in race types because humans, even at the dawn of civilization, learned to protect themselves from extreme weather. As a result, they maintained their racial characteristics, which over time have lost much of their flexibility and ability to develop new varieties.233 In places where large-scale ethnic mixing has occurred due to historical movements, like in Mexico, the Sudan, and Central Africa, the local race has remained, being numerically stronger than the newcomers and better suited to the environment, although slightly altered. However, the major historical movements of modern times have involved the expansion of European peoples into less developed regions of the world. These groups, encountering less advanced races, generally held a sense of racial pride that opposed mixed marriages, helping them maintain their bloodline from extensive mixing. Any hybridization that did occur was usually short-lived, limited to early settlement times when white women were scarce, or to extreme climates where white women and children struggled to survive. Even in Spanish America, where ethnic mixtures were most prevalent, some of the old Spanish pride in their race has made a comeback.

Checks to differentiation.

Improved communication maintains or increases the ranks of the intruders from the home supply. The negroes in North America, imported as they were en masse, then steadily recruited by two centuries of the slave trade, while their race integrity was somewhat protected by social ostracism, have not been seriously modified physically by several generations of residence in a temperate land. Their changes have been chiefly cultural. The Englishman has altered only superficially in the various British colonial lands. Constant intercourse and the progress of inventions have enabled him to maintain in diverse regions approximate uniformity of physical well-being, similar social and political ideals. The changed environment modifies him in details of thought, manner, and speech, but not in fundamentals.

Improved communication keeps or boosts the numbers of the outsiders from the household supply. The Black people in North America, brought over in large numbers and then continuously added to for two centuries through the slave trade, have mostly maintained their racial integrity due to social exclusion, and they haven’t significantly changed physically after several generations in a temperate climate. Their changes have mostly been cultural. The Englishman has only changed on the surface in different British colonies. Ongoing interactions and advancements in technology have allowed him to sustain a similar level of physical well-being, social, and political ideals across various regions. While the changed environment affects his details of thought, behavior, and language, it doesn’t alter his core principles.

Moreover, civilized man spreading everywhere and turning all parts of the earth's surface to his uses, has succeeded to some extent in reducing its physical differences. The earth as modified by human action is a conspicuous fact of historical development.234 Irrigation, drainage, fertilization of soils, terrace agriculture, denudation of forests and forestration of prairies have all combined to diminish the contrasts between diverse environments, while the acclimatization of plants, animals and men works even more plainly to the same end of uniformity. The unity of the human race, varied only by superficial differences, reflects the unity of the spherical earth, whose diversities of geographical feature nowhere depart greatly from the mean except in point of climate. Differentiation due to geography, therefore, early reached its limits. For assimilation no limit can be forseen.

Moreover, civilized humans are spreading everywhere and transforming all parts of the Earth's surface for their use, achieving some degree of reduction in its physical differences. The Earth's alteration through human actions is a noticeable aspect of historical development.234 Irrigation, drainage, soil fertilization, terrace farming, deforestation, and forestation of prairies have all worked together to lessen the contrasts between different environments, while the adaptation of plants, animals, and people further contributes to this goal of uniformity. The unity of the human race, varying only by surface differences, reflects the unity of the spherical Earth, whose geographical diversities do not greatly deviate from the average except concerning climate. Therefore, the differentiation caused by geography has already reached its limits. For assimilation, no limits can be anticipated.

Geographical origins.

In view of this constant differentiation on the one hand, and assimilation on the other, the historical movement has made it difficult to trace race types to their origin; and yet this is a task in which geography must have a hand. Borrowed civilizations and purloined languages are often so many disguises which conceal the truth of ethnic relationships. A long migration to a radically different habitat, into an outskirt or detached location protected from the swamping effects of cross-breeding, results eventually in a divergence great enough to obliterate almost every cue to the ancient kinship. The long-headed Teutonic race of northern Europe is regarded now by ethnologists as an offshoot of the long-headed brunette Mediterranean race of African origin, which became bleached out under the pale suns of Scandinavian skies. The present distribution of the various Teutonic stocks is a geographical fact; their supposed cradle in the Mediterranean basin is a geographical hypothesis. The connecting links must also be geographical. They must prove the former presence of the migrating folk in the intervening territory. A dolichocephalic substratum of population, with a negroid type of skull, has in fact been traced by archaeologists all over Europe through the early and late Stone Ages. The remains of these aboriginal inhabitants are marked in France, even in sparsely tenanted districts like the Auvergne Plateau, which is now occupied by the broad-headed Alpine race; and they are found to underlie, in point of time, other brachycephalic areas, like the Po Valley, Bavaria and Russia.235

Given the ongoing differences on one side and the blending on the other, it’s become challenging to trace race types back to their origins; this is a task that geography needs to help with. Adopted cultures and borrowed languages often serve as disguises that hide the real ethnic connections. A long journey to a completely different environment, especially into a remote area shielded from the overwhelming effects of cross-breeding, ultimately leads to enough divergence to erase almost any hint of ancient kinship. The long-headed Teutonic race of Northern Europe is now seen by ethnologists as a branch of the long-headed brunette Mediterranean race, originating from Africa, which became lighter under the pale skies of Scandinavia. The current spread of various Teutonic groups is a geographical reality; their supposed origin in the Mediterranean basin is a geographical theory. The links connecting them also have to be geographic. They should demonstrate the previous presence of the migrating people in the lands between. Archaeologists have indeed traced a long-headed population with a Negroid skull type across Europe throughout the early and late Stone Ages. Remains of these original inhabitants can be found in France, even in sparsely populated areas like the Auvergne Plateau, which is now home to the broad-headed Alpine race; they also exist beneath, historically, other short-headed regions like the Po Valley, Bavaria, and Russia.235

The origin of a people can be investigated and stated only in terms of geography. The problem of origin can be solved only by tracing a people from its present habitat, through the country over which it has migrated, back to its original seat. Here are three geographical entities which can be laid down upon a map, though seldom with sharply defined boundaries. They represent three successive geographic locations, all embodying geographic conditions potent to influence the people and their movement. Hence the geographical element emerges in every investigation as to origins; whether in ethnology, history, philology, mythology or religion. The transit land, the course between start and finish, is of supreme importance. Especially is this true for religion, which is transformed by travel. Christianity did not conquer the world in the form in which it issued from the cramped and isolated environment of Palestine, but only after it had been remodelled in Asia Minor, Egypt, Greece and Rome, and cosmopolized in the wide contact of the Mediterranean basin. The Roman speech and civilization, which spread through the Romance speaking peoples of Europe, were variously diluted and alloyed before being transplanted by French, Spaniard and Portuguese to American shores, there to be further transformed.

The origin of a people can only be understood through geography. The question of origin can be addressed by tracing a group from where they currently live, through the areas they migrated through, back to where they originally settled. There are three geographical regions that can be plotted on a map, though they often don’t have clear boundaries. These regions represent three different locations that influence the people and their movements. Therefore, geography plays a crucial role in any examination of origins, whether in fields like ethnology, history, linguistics, mythology, or religion. The path taken between the starting point and the destination is extremely important. This is especially true for religion, which changes through travel. Christianity didn’t spread across the world in the exact form it took in the isolated setting of Palestine; it evolved in Asia Minor, Egypt, Greece, and Rome, and became more diverse through the extensive interactions around the Mediterranean Sea. The Latin language and culture, which spread among the Romance-speaking populations of Europe, were modified and mixed before being carried by the French, Spanish, and Portuguese to the Americas, where they underwent further transformation.

Large centers of dispersion.

In view of the countless springs and tributaries that combine to swell the current of every historical movement, anthropo-geography looks for the origin of a people not in a narrowly defined area, but in a broad, ill-defined center of dispersion, from which many streams simultaneously and successively flow out as from a low-rimmed basin, and which has been filled from many remoter sources. Autochthones, aborigines are therefore merely scientific tropes, indicating the limit beyond which the movement of people cannot be traced in the gray light of an uncertain dawn. The vaguer and more complex these movements on account of their historical remoteness, the wider their probable range. The question as to the geographical origin of the Aryan linguistic family of peoples brings us to speculative sources, more or less scientifically based, reaching from Scandinavia and Lithuania to the Hindu Kush Mountains and northern Africa.236 The sum total of all these conjectural cradles, amounting to a large geographical area, would more nearly approximate the truth as to Aryan origins. For the study of the historical movement makes it clear that a large, highly differentiated ethnic or linguistic family presupposes a big center end a long period of dispersion, protracted wanderings, and a diversified area both for their migrations and successive settlements.

In light of the countless springs and tributaries that come together to enhance the flow of every historical movement, anthropo-geography seeks the origin of a people not in a narrowly defined area, but in a broad, vaguely defined center of dispersion, from which many streams simultaneously and successively flow out like from a shallow basin, filled from various distant sources. Indigenous people and aborigines are therefore just scientific terms, marking the limit beyond which the movement of people cannot be traced in the dim light of an uncertain dawn. The more vague and complex these movements are due to their historical distance, the broader their likely range. The question of the geographical origin of the Aryan linguistic family of peoples brings us to speculative sources, which are more or less scientifically founded, stretching from Scandinavia and Lithuania to the Hindu Kush Mountains and northern Africa.236 The total of all these conjectural origins, covering a large geographical area, would get us closer to the truth about Aryan origins. The study of historical movement shows that a large, highly diverse ethnic or linguistic family requires a substantial center and an extended period of dispersion, prolonged migrations, and a varied area for their movements and subsequent settlements.

Small centers.

The slighter the inner differences in an ethnic stock, whether in culture, language or physical traits, the smaller was their center of distribution and the more rapid their dispersal. The small initial habitat restricts the chances of variation through isolation and contrasted geographic conditions, as does also the short duration of their subsequent separation. The amazing uniformity of the Eskimo type from Bering Strait to eastern Greenland can only thus be explained, even after making allowance for the monotony of their geographic conditions and remoteness from outside influences. The distribution of the Bantu dialects over so wide a region in Central Africa and with such slight divergences presupposes narrow limits both of space and time for their origin, and a short period since their dispersal.237

The smaller the inner differences in an ethnic group, whether in culture, language, or physical traits, the more limited their area of distribution and the quicker their spread. A small initial habitat limits the chances for variation due to isolation and differing geographic conditions, as does the brief time they've been separated. The remarkable consistency of the Eskimo type from Bering Strait to eastern Greenland can only be understood this way, even when accounting for the uniformity of their geographic conditions and isolation from outside influences. The spread of the Bantu dialects over such a vast region in Central Africa, with so few differences, suggests a narrow scope in both space and time for their origin, and a short time since their dispersal.237

Small centers of dispersion are generally natural districts with fixed boundaries, favored by their geographical location or natural resources or by both for the development of a relatively dense population. When this increases beyond the local limits of subsistence, there follows an emigration in point of number and duration out of all proportion to the small area whence it issues. Ancient Phoenicia, Crete, Samos, mediæval Norway, Venice, Yemen, modern Malta, Gilbert Islands, England and Japan furnish examples. Such small favored areas, when they embody also strong political power, may get the start in the occupation of colonial lands. This gives them a permanent advantage, if their colonies are chosen with a view to settlement in congenial climates, as were those of the English, rather than the more ephemeral advantage of trade, as were those of the Dutch and Portuguese in the Tropics. It seems also essential to these centers of dispersion, that, to be effective, they must command the wide choice of outlet and destination afforded by the mighty common of the sea. Only the Inca Empire in South America gives us an example of the extensive political expansion of a small mountain state.

Small centers of dispersion are usually natural regions with defined boundaries, benefiting from their geographic location or natural resources—or both—for developing a relatively dense population. When this population grows beyond the local capacity for sustenance, it leads to emigration that is significantly larger in number and duration than what you'd expect from such a small area. Historical examples include ancient Phoenicia, Crete, Samos, medieval Norway, Venice, Yemen, modern Malta, the Gilbert Islands, England, and Japan. These small, favored areas, especially if they also possess strong political power, can gain an early advantage in occupying colonial lands. This gives them a lasting benefit, particularly if their colonies are chosen for settlement in favorable climates, like the English colonies, rather than the more short-lived trade-based colonies of the Dutch and Portuguese in the Tropics. It also seems crucial for these centers of dispersion to effectively command a wide range of options for outlets and destinations, which is provided by the vast common of the sea. The Inca Empire in South America is the only example of a small mountain state achieving significant political expansion.

Tests of origin.

The question arises whether any single rule can as yet be formulated for identifying the original seats of existing peoples. By some ethnologists and historians such homes have been sought where the people are distributed in the largest area, as the Athapascan and Algonquin Indians are assigned to a northern source, because their territories attained their greatest continuous extent in Canada, but were intermittent or attenuated farther south. The fact that colonial peoples often multiply inordinately in new lands, and there occupy a territory vastly greater than that of the mother country, points to the danger in such a generalization. Of the ten millions of Jews in the world, only a handful remain in the ancient center of dispersion in Palestine, while about eight millions are found in Poland and the contiguous territories of western Russia, Roumania, Austria-Hungary and eastern Germany. Moreover, history and the German element in the "Yiddish" speech of the Russian Jews point to a secondary center of dispersion in the Rhine cities and Franconia, whither the Jews were drawn by the trade route up the Rhone Valley in the third century.238

The question arises whether a single rule can be established for identifying the original homes of existing peoples. Some ethnologists and historians have looked for homes where people are spread over the largest area, as the Athapascan and Algonquin Indians are believed to have originated from a northern source, since their territories reached their greatest continuous extent in Canada but were fragmented or smaller farther south. The fact that colonial peoples often multiply significantly in new lands and occupy territories much larger than their country of origin raises concerns about such a generalization. Of the ten million Jews in the world, only a small number remain in the ancient center of dispersion in Palestine, while around eight million reside in Poland and the neighboring areas of western Russia, Romania, Austria-Hungary, and eastern Germany. Furthermore, history and the German influence in the "Yiddish" language of the Russian Jews suggest a secondary center of dispersion in the Rhine cities and Franconia, where Jews were drawn by trade routes along the Rhone Valley in the third century.238

A more scientific procedure is to look for the early home of a race in the locality around which its people or family of peoples centers in modern times. Therefore we place the cradle of the negro race in Africa, rather than Melanesia. Density often supplies a test, because colonial lands are generally more sparsely inhabited than the mother country. But even this conclusion fails always to apply, as in the case of Samos, which has a population vastly more dense than any section of the Grecian mainland. The largest compact area including at once the greatest density of population and the greatest purity of race would more nearly indicate the center of dispersion; because purity of race is incompatible with long migrations, as we have seen, though in the native seat it may be affected by intrusive elements. When this purity of race is combined with archaic forms of language and culture, as among the Lithuanians of Aryan speech among the Baltic swamps, it may indicate that the locality formed a segregated corner of the early center of dispersion. It seems essential to such an original seat that, whether large or small, it should be marked by some degree of isolation, as the condition for the development of specific racial characteristics.

A more scientific approach is to look for the early home of a race in the area where its people or group are centered today. Therefore, we identify the birthplace of the Black race as Africa, rather than Melanesia. Population density often serves as a test, since colonial territories tend to be less densely populated than the parent country. However, this conclusion doesn't always hold true, as seen in the case of Samos, which has a population density far greater than any part of mainland Greece. The largest compact area that includes both the highest population density and the greatest racial purity would more accurately indicate the center of dispersion; because racial purity is not compatible with long migrations, as we've seen, although it may be impacted by outside influences in the original area. When this racial purity is combined with ancient forms of language and culture, as found among the Lithuanians who speak an Aryan language in the Baltic marshes, it may suggest that the area was a segregated part of the early center of dispersion. It seems crucial for such an original home, whether large or small, to be marked by some level of isolation, as this is a condition for the development of specific racial traits.

The complexity of this question of ethnic origins is typical of anthropo-geographic problems, typical also in the warning which it gives against any rigidly systematic method of solution. The whole science of anthropo-geography is as yet too young for hard-and-fast rules, and its subject matter too complex for formulas.

The complexity of this question about ethnic origins is typical of anthropo-geographic issues, and it also serves as a caution against using any inflexible, systematic approach to finding solutions. The entire field of anthropo-geography is still too young for strict rules, and its subject matter is too intricate for simple formulas.


NOTES TO CHAPTER IV

Notes on Chapter IV


126.

H.J. Mackinder, Britain and the British Seas, pp. 179-187. London, 1904. W.Z. Ripley, The Races of Europe, pp. 306-310, 319-326. New York, 1899.

H.J. Mackinder, Britain and the British Seas, pp. 179-187. London, 1904. W.Z. Ripley, The Races of Europe, pp. 306-310, 319-326. New York, 1899.

127.

Compare observations of Georg Schweinfurth, The Heart of Africa, Vol. I, pp. 312-313. London, 1873.

Compare observations of Georg Schweinfurth, The Heart of Africa, Vol. I, pp. 312-313. London, 1873.

128.

Nott and Gliddon, Types of Mankind, p. lvii. Philadelphia, 1868.

Nott and Gliddon, Types of Mankind, p. lvii. Philadelphia, 1868.

129.

D.M. Wallace, Russia, pp. 151-155. New York, 1904.

D.M. Wallace, Russia, pp. 151-155. New York, 1904.

130.

Thucydides, Book I, chap. II.

Thucydides, Book I, Chapter II.

131.

Strabo, Book II, chap. III, 7.

Strabo, Book II, chap. III, 7.

132.

McGee and Thomas, Prehistoric North America, pp. 408-414, Vol. XIX of History of North America, edited by T.N. Thorpe. Philadelphia, 1905.

McGee and Thomas, Prehistoric North America, pp. 408-414, Vol. XIX of History of North America, edited by T.N. Thorpe. Philadelphia, 1905.

133.

Hodgkin, Italy and Her Invaders, Vol. II, p. 214. Oxford, 1892.

Hodgkin, Italy and Her Invaders, Vol. II, p. 214. Oxford, 1892.

134.

Sir John Lubbock, Prehistoric Times, p. 587. New York, 1872.

Sir John Lubbock, Prehistoric Times, p. 587. New York, 1872.

135.

D.G. Brinton, The American Race, pp. 116-119. Philadelphia, 1901.

D.G. Brinton, The American Race, pp. 116-119. Philadelphia, 1901.

136.

O.T. Mason, Primitive Travel and Transportation, pp. 249-250. Smithsonian Report, Washington, 1896.

O.T. Mason, Primitive Travel and Transportation, pp. 249-250. Smithsonian Report, Washington, 1896.

137.

Thucydides, Book I, chap. II.

Thucydides, Book 1, Chap 2.

138.

Edward A. Boss, Foundations of Sociology, pp. 359-363, 386-389. New York, 1905.

Edward A. Boss, Foundations of Sociology, pp. 359-363, 386-389. New York, 1905.

139.

D.G. Brinton, Races and Peoples, pp. 73-75. Philadelphia, 1901.

D.G. Brinton, Races and Peoples, pp. 73-75. Philadelphia, 1901.

140.

John Richard Green, The Making of England, Vol. I, pp. 9-11, 45-46, 52-54, 57, 62. London, 1904.

John Richard Green, The Making of England, Vol. I, pp. 9-11, 45-46, 52-54, 57, 62. London, 1904.

141.

James Bryce, The Migration of the Races of Men Considered Historically, Scottish Geographical Magazine, Vol. VIII, pp. 400-421, and Smithsonian Report for 1893, pp. 567-588.

James Bryce, The Migration of the Races of Men Considered Historically, Scottish Geographical Magazine, Vol. VIII, pp. 400-421, and Smithsonian Report for 1893, pp. 567-588.

142.

Cæsar, De Bello Gallico, Book II, chap. 29.

César, De Bello Gallico, Book II, chap. 29.

143.

Motley, Rise of the Dutch Republic, Vol. I, p. 5. New York, 1883.

Motley, Rise of the Dutch Republic, Vol. I, p. 5. New York, 1883.

144.

John Richard Green, The Making of England, Vol. I, p. 46. London, 1904.

John Richard Green, The Making of England, Vol. I, p. 46. London, 1904.

145.

Hodgkin, Italy and Her Invaders, Vol. V, pp. 99-101. Oxford, 1895.

Hodgkin, Italy and Her Invaders, Vol. V, pp. 99-101. Oxford, 1895.

146.

Ibid., Vol. V, pp. 156-157.

Ibid., Vol. 5, pp. 156-157.

147.

Hodgkin, Italy and Her Invaders, Vol. II, pp. 107, 195. Oxford, 1892.

Hodgkin, Italy and Her Invaders, Vol. II, pp. 107, 195. Oxford, 1892.

148.

Ibid., Vol. II, pp. 219-223, 230.

Ibid., Vol. II, pp. 219-223, 230.

149.

W.Z. Ripley, Races of Europe, pp. 276-277. New York, 1899.

W.Z. Ripley, Races of Europe, pp. 276-277. New York, 1899.

150.

Hodgkin, Italy and Her Invaders, Vol. II, pp. 214-219. Oxford, 1892.

Hodgkin, Italy and Her Invaders, Vol. II, pp. 214-219. Oxford, 1892.

151.

Ratzel, History of Mankind, Vol. II, p. 296. London, 1896-1898.

Ratzel, History of Mankind, Vol. II, p. 296. London, 1896-1898.

152.

McGee and Thomas, Prehistoric North America, pp. 408-412, Vol. XIX of History of North America. Philadelphia, 1905.

McGee and Thomas, Prehistoric North America, pp. 408-412, Vol. XIX of History of North America. Philadelphia, 1905.

153.

Hugh R. Mill, International Geography, p. 858. New York, 1902.

Hugh R. Mill, International Geography, p. 858. New York, 1902.

154.

Roscher, National-Oekonomik des Ackerbaues, pp. 44-48. Stuttgart, 1888.

Roscher, National Economics of Agriculture, pp. 44-48. Stuttgart, 1888.

155.

Cyrus Thomas, The Indians of North America in Historical Times, p. 261. Vol. II of History of North America, Philadelphia, 1903.

Cyrus Thomas, The Indians of North America in Historical Times, p. 261. Vol. II of History of North America, Philadelphia, 1903.

156.

Roosevelt, Winning of the West, Vol. I, pp. 134-135, 250. New York, 1895. Justin Winsor, The Westward Movement, p. 16. Boston, 1899.

Roosevelt, Winning of the West, Vol. I, pp. 134-135, 250. New York, 1895. Justin Winsor, The Westward Movement, p. 16. Boston, 1899.

157.

Eleventh Census, Report on the Indians, p. 54. Washington, 1894.

Eleventh Census, Report on the Indians, p. 54. Washington, 1894.

158.

Ibid., p. 531.

Ibid., p. 531.

159.

Hans Helmolt, History of the World, Vol. III, p. 411. New York, 1902-1906.

Hans Helmolt, History of the World, Vol. III, p. 411. New York, 1902-1906.

160.

Edward John Payne, History of the New World Called America, Vol. II, pp. 57-58. Oxford, 1899.

Edward John Payne, History of the New World Called America, Vol. II, pp. 57-58. Oxford, 1899.

161.

II Kings, Chap. XVII, 6-24.

2 Kings, Chap. 17, 6-24.

162.

W.Z. Ripley, Races of Europe, pp. 432-434. New York, 1899.

W.Z. Ripley, Races of Europe, pp. 432-434. New York, 1899.

163.

Hans Helmolt, History of the World, Vol. V, pp. 353-354. New York, 1902-1906.

Hans Helmolt, History of the World, Vol. V, pp. 353-354. New York, 1902-1906.

164.

Ibid., Vol. VI, p. 15.

Ibid., Vol. 6, p. 15.

165.

D.G. Hogarth, The Nearer East, p. 247. London, 1902.

D.G. Hogarth, The Nearer East, p. 247. London, 1902.

166.

Roosevelt, Winning of the West, Vol. I, p. 248. New York, 1895.

Roosevelt, Winning of the West, Vol. I, p. 248. New York, 1895.

167.

C.C. Royce, The Cherokee Nation of Indians, pp. 130-131. Maps VIII and IX. Fifth Annual Report of Bureau of Ethnology, Washington, 1887.

C.C. Royce, The Cherokee Nation of Indians, pp. 130-131. Maps VIII and IX. Fifth Annual Report of Bureau of Ethnology, Washington, 1887.

168.

Albert Gallatin, Report on the Indians in 1836, reprinted in Eleventh Census, Report on the Indians, p. 33. Washington, 1894.

Albert Gallatin, Report on the Indians in 1836, reprinted in Eleventh Census, Report on the Indians, p. 33. Washington, 1894.

169.

Cyrus Thomas, Indians of North America in Historical Times, pp. 94, 96. Vol. II of History of North America, Philadelphia, 1903.

Cyrus Thomas, Indians of North America in Historical Times, pp. 94, 96. Vol. II of History of North America, Philadelphia, 1903.

170.

Ibid., Vol. II, pp. 100-101.

Ibid., Vol. II, pp. 100-101.

171.

Anatole Leroy-Beaulieu, The Empire of the Tsars, Vol. III, pp. 333-334. New York, 1902.

Anatole Leroy-Beaulieu, The Empire of the Tsars, Vol. III, pp. 333-334. New York, 1902.

172.

W.Z. Ripley, Races of Europe, pp. 437-438. New York, 1899.

W.Z. Ripley, Races of Europe, pp. 437-438. New York, 1899.

173.

D.G. Brinton, The American Race, pp. 115-116. Philadelphia, 1901.

D.G. Brinton, The American Race, pp. 115-116. Philadelphia, 1901.

174.

H. Bancroft, The Native Races, Vol. III, pp. 559, 635-638. San Francisco, 1886.

H. Bancroft, The Native Races, Vol. III, pp. 559, 635-638. San Francisco, 1886.

175.

Cyrus Thomas, Indians of North America in Historical Times, pp. 381-382, Vol. II of History of North America. Philadelphia, 1903.

Cyrus Thomas, Indians of North America in Historical Times, pp. 381-382, Vol. II of History of North America. Philadelphia, 1903.

176.

Eleventh Census, Report on the Indians, p. 35. Washington, 1894.

Eleventh Census, Report on the Indians, p. 35. Washington, 1894.

177.

Eleventh Census, Report on Population, Vol. I, p. cxxxviii. Washington, 1894.

Eleventh Census, Report on Population, Vol. I, p. 138. Washington, 1894.

178.

Justus Perthes, Taschen Atlas, p. 38. Gotha, 1905.

Justus Perthes, Taschen Atlas, p. 38. Gotha, 1905.

179.

Richmond Mayo-Smith, Emigration and Immigration, p. 24. New York.

Richmond Mayo-Smith, Emigration and Immigration, p. 24. New York.

180.

Ibid., pp. 79-80, 113-115.

Ibid., pp. 79-80, 113-115.

181.

Capt. A.T. Mahan, Influence of Sea Power upon History, pp. 27-28. Boston, 1902.

Capt. A.T. Mahan, Influence of Sea Power on History, pp. 27-28. Boston, 1902.

182.

W.Z. Ripley, Races of Europe, pp. 247, 272-274. New York, 1899.

W.Z. Ripley, Races of Europe, pp. 247, 272-274. New York, 1899.

183.

Cæsar, Bella Gallico, Book III, chap. I.

César, Gallic Wars, Book III, chap. I.

184.

Hodgkin, Italy and Her Invaders, Vol. I, Part I, pp. 34-43. Oxford, 1892.

Hodgkin, Italy and Her Invaders, Vol. I, Part I, pp. 34-43. Oxford, 1892.

185.

Ratzel, History of Mankind, Vol. III, pp. 242, 245, 250, 257. London, 1896-1898.

Ratzel, History of Mankind, Vol. III, pp. 242, 245, 250, 257. London, 1896-1898.

186.

John Fiske, Discovery of America, Vol. I, pp. 316-317. Boston, 1893.

John Fiske, Discovery of America, Vol. I, pp. 316-317. Boston, 1893.

187.

Elliott Coues, History of the Lewis and Clark Expedition, Vol. I. pp. 193-198, 203-212, 240. New York, 1893.

Elliott Coues, History of the Lewis and Clark Expedition, Vol. I. pp. 193-198, 203-212, 240. New York, 1893.

188.

Francis Parkman, La Salle and the Discovery of the Great West, pp. 39-40, Note 2. Boston, 1904.

Francis Parkman, La Salle and the Discovery of the Great West, pp. 39-40, Note 2. Boston, 1904.

189.

George G. Chisholm, Commercial Geography, pp. 56-57. London, 1904.

George G. Chisholm, Commercial Geography, pp. 56-57. London, 1904.

190.

Herodotus, Book II, 60.

Herodotus, Book 2, 60.

191.

Encyclopædia Britanica, Article Pilgrimages.

Encyclopædia Britannica, Article Pilgrimages.

192.

E. Huntington, The Pulse of Asia, p. 88. Boston, 1907.

E. Huntington, The Pulse of Asia, p. 88. Boston, 1907.

193.

Boyd Alexander, From the Niger to the Nile, Vol. II, pp. 3-7. London, 1907.

Boyd Alexander, From the Niger to the Nile, Vol. II, pp. 3-7. London, 1907.

194.

C.A. Sherring, Western Tibet and the British Borderland, pp. 3-4, 144-145, 280-284. London, 1906.

C.A. Sherring, Western Tibet and the British Borderland, pp. 3-4, 144-145, 280-284. London, 1906.

195.

Hans Helmolt, History of the World, Vol. I, pp. 189-191. Map p. 190. New York and London, 1902-1906.

Hans Helmolt, History of the World, Vol. I, pp. 189-191. Map p. 190. New York and London, 1902-1906.

196.

J.W. Powell, Map of Linguistic Stocks of American Indians, Annual Report of Bureau of Ethnology, Vol. VII.

J.W. Powell, Map of Linguistic Groups of Native Americans, Annual Report of the Bureau of Ethnology, Vol. VII.

197.

Archibald Little, The Far East, Ethnological Map, p. 8. Oxford, 1905.

Archibald Little, The Far East, Ethnological Map, p. 8. Oxford, 1905.

198.

Census of India, 1901, General Report by H.H. Risley and E.A. Gait, Vol. I, Part I, pp. 500-504; and Ethnographic Appendices by H.H. Risley, Vol. I, map, p. 60. Calcutta, 1903. P. Vidal de la Blache, Le Peuple de l'Inde, d'après la série des recensements, pp. 431-434, Annales de Géographie, Vol. XV. Paris, 1906.

Census of India, 1901, General Report by H.H. Risley and E.A. Gait, Vol. I, Part I, pp. 500-504; and Ethnographic Appendices by H.H. Risley, Vol. I, map, p. 60. Calcutta, 1903. P. Vidal de la Blache, Le Peuple de l'Inde, d'après la série des recensements, pp. 431-434, Annales de Géographie, Vol. XV. Paris, 1906.

199.

Hans Helmolt, History of the World, Vol. III, pp. 422, 424, 434-436. New York, 1902-1906.

Hans Helmolt, History of the World, Vol. III, pp. 422, 424, 434-436. New York, 1902-1906.

200.

D. Livingstone, Missionary Travels, pp. 97-102. New York, 1858.

D. Livingstone, Missionary Travels, pp. 97-102. New York, 1858.

201.

James Bryce, Migrations of the Races of Men Considered Historically, Scottish Geographical Magazine, Vol. VIII, pp. 400-421, May, 1892.

James Bryce, Migrations of the Races of Men Considered Historically, Scottish Geographical Magazine, Vol. VIII, pp. 400-421, May, 1892.

202.

Justus Perthes, Taschen Atlas, p. 78. Gotha, 1905.

Justus Perthes, Taschen Atlas, p. 78. Gotha, 1905.

203.

Ibid., p. 80.

Ibid., p. 80.

204.

Hugh R. Mill, International Geography, p. 878. New York, 1902.

Hugh R. Mill, International Geography, p. 878. New York, 1902.

205.

Hans Helmolt, History of the World, Vol. I, pp. 189-191. New York, 1902-1906.

Hans Helmolt, History of the World, Vol. I, pp. 189-191. New York, 1902-1906.

206.

Hodgkin, Italy and Her Invaders, Vol. VI, pp. 23-27, 38-42, 63-68, 83-87. Oxford, 1896.

Hodgkin, Italy and Her Invaders, Vol. VI, pp. 23-27, 38-42, 63-68, 83-87. Oxford, 1896.

207.

McGee and Thomas, Prehistoric North America, Chap. XXI, Vol. XIX of History of North America, Philadelphia, 1905.

McGee and Thomas, Prehistoric North America, Chap. XXI, Vol. XIX of History of North America, Philadelphia, 1905.

208.

Ibid., pp. 83, 87, Map of Migrations, p. 3.

Ibid., pp. 83, 87, Map of Migrations, p. 3.

209.

Archibald Little, The Far East, pp. 34-38. Oxford, 1905.

Archibald Little, The Far East, pp. 34-38. Oxford, 1905.

210.

Strabo, Book VIII, chap. I, 2.

Strabo, Book VIII, chap. I, 2.

211.

Heinrich Barth, Travels in North and Central Africa, Vol. II, p. 548. New York, 1857.

Heinrich Barth, Travels in North and Central Africa, Vol. II, p. 548. New York, 1857.

212.

Joseph Partsch, Central Europe, pp. 104-105. London, 1903.

Joseph Partsch, Central Europe, pp. 104-105. London, 1903.

213.

E.F. im Thurn, Among the Indians of Guiana, pp. 167-171, 202-207. London, 1883.

E.F. im Thurn, Among the Indians of Guiana, pp. 167-171, 202-207. London, 1883.

214.

W. Z. Ripley, Races of Europe, p. 237. New York, 1899.

W. Z. Ripley, Races of Europe, p. 237. New York, 1899.

215.

Ibid., p. 469.

Ibid., p. 469.

216.

H. Barth, Human Society in Northern Central Africa, Journal of the Royal Geog. Society, Vol. XXX, p. 116. London, 1860.

H. Barth, Human Society in Northern Central Africa, Journal of the Royal Geog. Society, Vol. XXX, p. 116. London, 1860.

217.

Moritz Wagner, Die Entstehung der Arten durch räumliche Sonderung. Basel, 1889.

Moritz Wagner, The Origin of Species by Geographical Isolation. Basel, 1889.

218.

H. W. Conn, The Method of Evolution, pp. 282-295. New York, 1900.

H. W. Conn, The Method of Evolution, pp. 282-295. New York, 1900.

219.

McGee and Thomas, Prehistoric North America, pp. 418, 424, Vol. XIX of History of North America. Philadelphia, 1905.

McGee and Thomas, Prehistoric North America, pp. 418, 424, Vol. XIX of History of North America. Philadelphia, 1905.

220.

Ratzel, History of Mankind, Vol. II, pp. 280-283. London, 1896-1898.

Ratzel, History of Mankind, Vol. II, pp. 280-283. London, 1896-1898.

221.

Cæsar, Bella Gallico, Book II, chap. IV.

Cæsar, Commentaries on the Gallic War, Book II, Chapter IV.

222.

H. Helmolt, History of the World, Vol. VI, pp. 32-33. New York, 1902-1906.

H. Helmolt, History of the World, Vol. VI, pp. 32-33. New York, 1902-1906.

223.

Hodgkin, Italy and Her Invaders, Vol. I, Part I, pp. 75, 81, 82. Oxford, 1895.

Hodgkin, Italy and Her Invaders, Vol. I, Part I, pp. 75, 81, 82. Oxford, 1895.

224.

W.Z. Ripley, Races of Europe, pp. 34, 341-342. New York, 1899.

W.Z. Ripley, Races of Europe, pp. 34, 341-342. New York, 1899.

225.

H. Helmolt, History of the World, Vol. III, pp. 400, 417, New York, 1902-1906.

H. Helmolt, History of the World, Vol. III, pp. 400, 417, New York, 1902-1906.

226.

A.C. Haddon, The Study of Man, p. xix. New York and London, 1898.

A.C. Haddon, The Study of Man, p. xix. New York and London, 1898.

227.

James Bryce, Migrations of the Races of Men Considered Historically, Scottish Geographical Magazine, Vol. VIII, pp. 400-421. May, 1892.

James Bryce, Migrations of the Races of Men Considered Historically, Scottish Geographical Magazine, Vol. VIII, pp. 400-421. May, 1892.

228.

Eleventh Census, Report on the Indians, pp. 34-35. Washington, 1894.

Eleventh Census, Report on the Indians, pp. 34-35. Washington, 1894.

229.

H. Helmolt, History of the World, Vol. III, p. 42. New York, 1902-1906.

H. Helmolt, History of the World, Vol. III, p. 42. New York, 1902-1906.

230.

Ratzel, History of Mankind, Vol. II, pp. 279-283, London, 1896-98.

Ratzel, History of Mankind, Vol. II, pp. 279-283, London, 1896-98.

231.

Jerome Dowd, The Negro Races, Vol. I, pp. 47-48, 61-62. New York, 1907.

Jerome Dowd, The Negro Races, Vol. I, pp. 47-48, 61-62. New York, 1907.

232.

Sweden, Its People and Its Industries, p. 93. Edited by G. Sundbärg, Stockholm, 1904.

Sweden, Its People and Its Industries, p. 93. Edited by G. Sundbärg, Stockholm, 1904.

233.

Sir John Lubbock, Prehistoric Times, pp. 589-593. New York, 1872.

Sir John Lubbock, Prehistoric Times, pp. 589-593. New York, 1872.

234.

G.P. Marsh, The Earth as Modified by Human Action, New York, 1877.

G.P. Marsh, The Earth as Changed by Human Activity, New York, 1877.

235.

W.Z. Ripley, Races of Europe, pp. 261-267. New York, 1899.

W.Z. Ripley, Races of Europe, pp. 261-267. New York, 1899.

236.

Ibid., pp. 475-485.

Ibid., pp. 475-485.

237.

Ratzel, History of Mankind, Vol. II, pp. 402-405. London, 1896-1898.

Ratzel, History of Mankind, Vol. II, pp. 402-405. London, 1896-1898.

238.

W.Z. Ripley, Races of Europe, pp. 371-372. Map, p. 374. New York. 1899.

W.Z. Ripley, Races of Europe, pp. 371-372. Map, p. 374. New York. 1899.


Chapter V—Geographical Location

Importance of geographical location.

The location of a country or people is always the supreme geographical fact in its history. It outweighs every other single geographic force. All that has been said of Russia's vast area, of her steppes and tundra wastes, of her impotent seaboard on land-locked basins or ice-bound coasts, of her poverty of mountains and wealth of rivers, fades into the background before her location on the border of Asia. From her defeat by the Tartar hordes in 1224 to her attack upon the Mongolian rulers of the Bosporus in 1877, and her recent struggle with Japan, most of her wars have been waged against Asiatics. Location made her the bulwark of Central Europe against Asiatic invasion and the apostle of Western civilization to the heart of Asia. If this position on the outskirts of Europe, remote from its great centers of development, has made Russia only partially accessible to European culture and, furthermore, has subjected her to the retarding ethnic and social influences emanating from her Asiatic neighbors,239 and if the rough tasks imposed by her frontier situation have hampered her progress, these are all the limitations of her geographical location, limitations which not even the advantage of her vast area has been able to outweigh.

The location of a country or people is always the most important geographical fact in its history. It outweighs every other single geographic factor. Everything that's been said about Russia's vast land, her steppes and tundra wastelands, her ineffective coastline on landlocked basins or icy shores, her lack of mountains and abundance of rivers, fades into the background when considering her position on the edge of Asia. From her defeat by the Tartar hordes in 1224 to her conflict with the Mongolian rulers of the Bosporus in 1877, and her recent struggle with Japan, most of her wars have been fought against Asian nations. Location has made her the shield of Central Europe against Asian invasions and the bearer of Western civilization to the heart of Asia. If this position on the outskirts of Europe, far from its major centers of development, has made Russia only somewhat open to European culture, and has also subjected her to the slowing ethnic and social influences coming from her Asian neighbors,239 and if the tough challenges from her frontier situation have limited her progress, these are all the constraints of her geographical location—constraints that not even her vast area can surpass.

Area itself, important as it is, must yield to location. Location may mean only a single spot, and yet from this spot powerful influences may radiate. No one thinks of size when mention is made of Rome or Athens, of Jerusalem or Mecca, of Gibraltar or Port Arthur. Iceland and Greenland guided early Norse ships to the continent of America, as the Canaries and Antilles did those of Spain; but the location of the smaller islands in sub-tropical latitudes and in the course of the northeast trade-winds made them determine the first permanent path across the western seas.

Area itself, important as it is, must give way to location. Location might refer to just one specific spot, yet from this spot, significant influences can spread out. No one thinks about size when talking about Rome or Athens, Jerusalem or Mecca, Gibraltar or Port Arthur. Iceland and Greenland helped early Norse ships reach America, just as the Canaries and Antilles did for those from Spain; however, the position of the smaller islands in sub-tropical latitudes and along the northeast trade winds led them to establish the first permanent route across the western seas.

The historical significance of many small peoples, and the historical insignificance of many big ones even to the nil point, is merely the expression of the preponderant importance of location over area. The Phoenicians, from their narrow strip of coast at the foot of Mount Lebanon, were disseminators of culture over the whole Mediterranean. Holland owed her commercial and maritime supremacy, from the thirteenth to the middle of the seventeenth century, to her exceptional position at the mouth of the great Rhine highway and at the southern angle of the North Sea near the entrance to the unexploited regions of the Baltic. The Iroquois tribes, located where the Mohawk Valley opened a way through the Appalachian barrier between the Hudson River and Lake Ontario, occupied both in the French wars and in the Revolution a strategic position which gave them a power and importance out of all proportion to their numbers.

The historical significance of many small groups and the historical insignificance of many large ones, even to the point of being negligible, is simply a reflection of how much location matters more than size. The Phoenicians, from their narrow stretch of coast at the base of Mount Lebanon, spread culture throughout the entire Mediterranean. Holland's dominance in trade and maritime power from the thirteenth century to the mid-seventeenth century was due to its exceptional position at the mouth of the great Rhine River and at the southern edge of the North Sea, near the entrance to the untapped areas of the Baltic. The Iroquois tribes, situated where the Mohawk Valley opened a path through the Appalachian barrier between the Hudson River and Lake Ontario, held a strategic position during both the French wars and the Revolution, giving them a power and significance far greater than their numbers.

Location often assumes a fictitious political value, due to a combination of political interests. The Turkish power owes its survival on the soil of Europe to-day wholly to its position on the Bosporus. Holland owes the integrity of her kingdom, and Roumania that of hers, to their respective locations at the mouths of the Rhine and the Danube, because the interest of western Europe demands that these two important arteries of commerce should be held by powers too weak ever to tie them up. The same principle has guaranteed the neutrality of Switzerland, whose position puts it in control of the passes of the Central Alps from Savoy to the Tyrol; and, more recently, that of the young state of Panama, through which the Isthmian Canal is to pass.

Location often takes on a made-up political significance because of a mix of political interests. Today's Turkish power survives in Europe mainly because of its position on the Bosporus. Holland's kingdom remains intact, and Romania's territory does too, thanks to their locations at the mouths of the Rhine and the Danube; western Europe's interests require that these critical trade routes be held by powers that are too weak to ever control them completely. The same idea has ensured Switzerland's neutrality, as its position allows it to control the passes of the Central Alps from Savoy to the Tyrol; and more recently, it applies to the young state of Panama, through which the Isthmian Canal will run.

Content of the term location.

Geographical location necessarily includes the idea of the size and form of a country. Even the most general statement of the zonal and interoceanic situation of Canada, the United States, Mexico, and the Russian Empire, indicates the area and contour of their territories. This is still more conspicuously the case with naturally defined regions, such as island and peninsula countries. But location includes a complex of yet larger and more potent relations which go with mere attachment to this or that continent, or to one or another side of a continent. Every part of the world gives to its lands and its people some of its own qualities; and so again every part of this part. Arabia, India and Farther India, spurs of the Asiatic land-mass, have had and will always have a radically different ethnic and political history from Greece, Italy and Spain, the corresponding peninsulas of Europe, because the histories of these two groups are bound up in their respective continents. The idea of a European state has a different content from that of an Asiatic, or North American or African state; it includes a different race or combination of races, different social and economic development, different political ideals. Location, therefore, means climate and plant life at one end of the scale, civilization and political status at the other.

Geographical location inevitably involves the size and shape of a country. Even a basic overview of the regional and interoceanic position of Canada, the United States, Mexico, and the Russian Empire reflects the area and outline of their territories. This is even more evident with naturally defined regions like island and peninsula countries. However, location encompasses a broader and more influential set of relationships that come with being attached to a specific continent or side of a continent. Every region of the world imparts some of its unique characteristics to its land and people, and this applies again to every area within that region. Arabia, India, and Southeast Asia, which are extensions of the Asian landmass, have historically had and will always have a fundamentally different ethnic and political narrative compared to Greece, Italy, and Spain, which are the equivalent peninsulas in Europe, because the histories of these two groups are intertwined with their respective continents. The concept of a European state has a different meaning than that of an Asian, North American, or African state; it encompasses different races or combinations of races, varying social and economic development, and distinct political ideals. Therefore, location signifies climate and vegetation at one end of the spectrum, and civilization and political status at the other.

Intercontinental location.

This larger conception of location brings a correspondingly larger conception of environment, which affords the solution of many otherwise hopeless problems of anthropo-geography. It is embodied in the law that the influences of a land upon its people spring not only from the physical features of the land itself, but also from a wide circle of lands into which it has been grouped by virtue of its location. Almost every geographical interpretation of the ancient and modern history of Greece has been inadequate, because it has failed sufficiently to emphasize the most essential factor in this history, namely, Greece's location at the threshold of the Orient. This location has given to Greek history a strong Asiatic color. It comes out in the accessibility of Greece to ancient Oriental civilization and commerce, and is conspicuous in every period from the Argonautic Expedition to the achievement of independence in 1832 and the recent efforts for the liberation of Crete. This outpost location before the Mediterranean portals of the vast and arid plains of southwestern Asia, exposed to every tide of migration or conquest sent out by those hungry lands, had in it always an element of weakness. In comparison with the shadow of Asia, which constantly overhung the Greek people and from 1401 to 1832 enveloped them, only secondary importance can be attributed to advantageous local conditions as factors in Greek history.

This broader idea of location brings a bigger perspective on the environment, which helps solve many otherwise difficult problems in anthropo-geography. It's summed up in the principle that the impact of a land on its people comes not just from the physical characteristics of the land itself, but also from a wider range of lands that it is associated with due to its location. Almost every geographical analysis of ancient and modern Greek history has been insufficient because it hasn't highlighted the key factor in this history, which is Greece's position right at the edge of the Orient. This positioning has given Greek history a significant Asian influence. It's evident in Greece's accessibility to ancient Oriental civilization and trade, and it stands out in every period from the Argonauts' Expedition to the fight for independence in 1832 and the more recent efforts for the liberation of Crete. This outpost location at the Mediterranean gateway to the vast and dry plains of southwestern Asia, vulnerable to every wave of migration or conquest from those resource-hungry lands, always carried an element of weakness. Compared to the looming presence of Asia, which constantly cast a shadow over the Greek people and dominated them from 1401 to 1832, local advantages hold only minor significance as factors in Greek history.

It is a similar intercontinental location in the isthmian region between the Mediterranean on the west and the ancient maritime routes of the Red Sea and Persian Gulf on the east, which gave to Phoenicia the office of middleman between the Orient and Occident,240 and predestined its conquest, now by the various Asiatic powers of Mesopotamia, now by the Pharaohs of Egypt, now by European Greeks and Romans, now by a succession of Asiatic peoples, till to-day we find it incorporated in the Asiatic-European Empire of Turkey. Proximity to Africa has closely allied Spain to the southern continent in flora, fauna, and ethnic stock. The long-headed, brunette Mediterranean race occupies the Iberian Peninsula and the Berber territory of northwest Africa.241 This community of race is also reflected in the political union of the two districts for long periods, first under the Carthaginians, then the Romans, who secured Hispania by a victory on African soil, and finally by the Saracens. This same African note in Spanish history recurs to-day in Spain's interest in Morocco and the influence in Moroccan affairs yielded her by France and Germany at the Algeciras convention in 1905, and in her ownership of Ceuta and five smaller presidios on the Moroccan coast. Compare Portugal's former ownership of Tangier.

It’s a similar intercontinental location in the isthmus area between the Mediterranean on the west and the old trade routes of the Red Sea and Persian Gulf on the east. This geography positioned Phoenicia as a middleman between the East and West,240 making it vulnerable to conquest, first by various Asiatic powers from Mesopotamia, then by the Pharaohs of Egypt, later by European Greeks and Romans, and eventually by a succession of Asiatic peoples, up to now, when it is part of Turkey's Asiatic-European Empire. Its closeness to Africa has strongly connected Spain to the southern continent in terms of plants, animals, and ethnic groups. The long-headed, dark-haired Mediterranean people inhabit the Iberian Peninsula and the Berber lands of northwest Africa.241 This racial connection is also seen in the long political union between the two areas, first under the Carthaginians, then the Romans, who secured Hispania with a victory on African soil, and finally under the Saracens. This same African influence in Spanish history is evident today in Spain's interest in Morocco and the influence in Moroccan matters granted to her by France and Germany at the Algeciras conference in 1905, as well as in her ownership of Ceuta and five smaller presidios on the Moroccan coast. Compare this to Portugal's former ownership of Tangier.

In contradistinction to continental and intercontinental location, anthropo-geography recognizes two other narrower meanings of the term. The innate mobility of the human race, due primarily to the eternal food-quest and increase of numbers, leads a people to spread out over a territory till they reach the barriers which nature has set up, or meet the frontiers of other tribes and nations. Their habitat or their specific geographic location is thus defined by natural features of mountain, desert and sea, or by the neighbors whom they are unable to displace, or more often by both.

In contrast to continental and intercontinental locations, anthropo-geography recognizes two other more specific meanings of the term. The natural mobility of humans, driven mainly by the constant search for food and population growth, causes a group of people to expand across a territory until they hit the barriers set by nature or encounter the borders of other tribes and nations. Their home or specific geographic location is therefore defined by natural features like mountains, deserts, and seas, or by the neighboring communities they can't displace, and more often by a combination of both.

Natural versus vicinal location.

A people has, therefore, a twofold location, an immediate one, based upon their actual territory, and a mediate or vicinal one, growing out of its relations to the countries nearest them. The first is a question of the land under their feet; the other, of the neighbors about them. The first or natural location embodies the complex of local geographic conditions which furnish the basis for their tribal or national existence. This basis may be a peninsula, island, archipelago, an oasis, an arid steppe, a mountain system, or a fertile lowland. The stronger the vicinal location, the more dependent is the people upon the neighboring states, but the more potent the influence which it can, under certain circumstances, exert upon them. Witness Germany in relation to Holland, France, Austria and Poland. The stronger the natural location, on the other hand, the more independent is the people and the more strongly marked is the national character. This is exemplified in the people of mountain lands like Switzerland, Abyssinia and Nepal; of peninsulas like Korea, Spain and Scandinavia; and of islands like England and Japan. To-day we stand amazed at that strong primordial brand of the Japanese character which nothing can blur or erase.

A population, therefore, has two types of location—an immediate one based on their actual territory, and a secondary one stemming from their relationships with nearby countries. The first concerns the land beneath them, while the second deals with their neighboring nations. The first, or natural location, reflects the complex of local geographic conditions that establish the foundation for their tribal or national existence. This foundation may consist of a peninsula, island, archipelago, oasis, a dry plain, a mountain range, or fertile lowland. The stronger the secondary location, the more dependent the population is on neighboring states, but it also has the potential to exert significant influence on them under certain circumstances. Take, for example, Germany's relationship with Holland, France, Austria, and Poland. Conversely, the stronger the natural location, the more independent the population is, and the more definitive their national character. This is seen in the people of mountainous regions like Switzerland, Abyssinia, and Nepal; of peninsulas like Korea, Spain, and Scandinavia; and of islands like England and Japan. Today, we are amazed by the strong, inherent nature of the Japanese character that nothing can obscure or erase.

Naturally defined location.

Clearly defined natural locations, in which barriers of mountains and sea draw the boundaries and guarantee some degree of isolation, tend to hold their people in a calm embrace, to guard them against outside interference and infusion of foreign blood, and thus to make them develop the national genius in such direction as the local geographic conditions permit. In the unceasing movements which have made up most of the historic and prehistoric life of the human race, in their migrations and counter-migrations, their incursions, retreats, and expansions over the face of the earth, vast unfenced areas, like the open lowlands of Russia and the grasslands of Africa, present the picture of a great thoroughfare swept by pressing throngs. Other regions, more secluded, appear as quiet nooks, made for a temporary halt or a permanent rest. Here some part of the passing human flow is caught as in a vessel and held till it crystallizes into a nation. These are the conspicuous areas of race characterization. The development of the various ethnic and political offspring of the Roman Empire in the naturally defined areas of Italy, the Iberian Peninsula, and France illustrates the process of national differentiation which goes on in such secluded locations.

Clearly defined natural areas, where mountains and seas create boundaries and provide a level of isolation, tend to keep their people calm, shielding them from outside interference and the mixing of foreign blood. This helps them develop their national identity in ways allowed by the local geography. Throughout history and prehistory, as people moved around—migrating, retreating, and expanding—vast open spaces like the lowlands of Russia and Africa’s grasslands served as major thoroughfares filled with crowds. Other, more secluded regions function as quiet spots for a brief pause or a lasting settlement. Here, part of the human flow is captured like in a vessel, holding it until it solidifies into a nation. These are the noticeable areas of ethnic identity. The evolution of the different ethnic and political descendants of the Roman Empire in naturally defined regions like Italy, the Iberian Peninsula, and France demonstrates the process of national differentiation that occurs in such isolated locations.

A marked influence upon this development is generally ascribed to the protection afforded by such segregated districts. But protection alone is only a negative force in the life of a people; it leaves them free to develop in their own way, but does not say what that way shall be. On the other hand, the fact that such a district embraces a certain number of geographic features, and encompasses them by obstructive boundaries, is of immense historical importance; because this restriction leads to the concentration of the national powers, to the more thorough utilization of natural advantages, both racial and geographical, and thereby to the growth of an historical individuality. Nothing robs the historical process of so much of its greatness or weakens so much its effects as its dispersion over a wide, boundless area. This was the disintegrating force which sapped the strength of the French colonies in America. The endless valleys of the St. Lawrence and the Mississippi and the alluring fur trade tempted them to an expansion that was their political and economic undoing. Russia's history illustrates the curse of a distant horizon. On the other hand, out of a restricted geographical base, with its power to concentrate and intensify the national forces, grew Rome and Greece, England and Japan, ancient Peru and the Thirteen Colonies of America.

A significant influence on this development is often attributed to the protection provided by these segregated areas. However, protection alone is just a negative force in a community's life; it allows them to grow in their own way but doesn’t dictate how they should grow. Conversely, the fact that such an area includes certain geographic features and is surrounded by barriers is historically crucial; this limitation leads to the concentration of national strengths, better use of natural advantages—both racial and geographical—and thus fosters the development of a unique historical identity. Nothing diminishes the historical process or weakens its impact as much as its spread over a vast, limitless area. This was the disintegrating force that drained the strength of the French colonies in America. The endless valleys of the St. Lawrence and the Mississippi and the tempting fur trade encouraged them toward an expansion that ultimately led to their political and economic downfall. Russia's history highlights the burden of a distant horizon. In contrast, from a limited geographical base, with its ability to focus and amplify national strengths, emerged Rome and Greece, England and Japan, ancient Peru, and the Thirteen Colonies of America.

Vicinal location.

If even the most detached and isolated of these natural locations be examined, its people will, nevertheless, reveal a transitional character, intermediate between those of its neighbors, because from these it has borrowed both ethnic stock and culture, Great Britain is an island, but its vicinal location groups it with the North Sea family of people. Even in historic times it has derived ancient Belgian stock, Roman, Anglo-Saxon, Danish and Scandinavian from the long semi-circle of nearby continental lands, which have likewise contributed so much to the civilization of the island. Similarly, Japan traces the sources of its population to the north of Asia by way of the island of Sakhalin, to the west through Korea, and to the Malay district of the south, whence the Kuro Siwa has swept stragglers to the shores of Kiu-siu. Like England, Japan also has drawn its civilization from its neighbors, and then, under the isolating influence of its local environment, has individualized both race and culture. Here we have the interplay of the forces of natural and vicinal location.

If you look at even the most remote and isolated natural locations, the people there will still show a mix of characteristics that are between those of their neighbors, because they have borrowed both ethnic background and culture from them. Great Britain is an island, but its close location connects it with the North Sea community. Even in ancient times, it has drawn from ancient Belgian roots, as well as Roman, Anglo-Saxon, Danish, and Scandinavian influences from the nearby continental areas that have also played a significant role in shaping the island’s civilization. Similarly, Japan traces its population back to northern Asia through the island of Sakhalin, to the west via Korea, and to the south from the Malay region, where the Kuro Siwa current has carried people to the shores of Kiu-siu. Just like England, Japan has also shaped its civilization based on its neighbors, and then, due to the isolating effects of its local environment, has developed a unique identity in both race and culture. Here we see the interaction between the influences of natural and neighboring locations.

A people situated between two other peoples form an ethnic and cultural link between the two. The transitional type is as familiar in anthropo-geography as in biology. The only exception is found in the young intrusion of a migrating or conquering people, like that of the Hungarians and Turks in southeastern Europe, and of the Berger Tuaregs and Fulbes among the negroes of western Sudan; or of a colonizing people, like that of the Russians in Mongolian Siberia and of Europeans among the aborigines of South Africa. Even in these instances race amalgamation tends to take place along the frontiers, as was the case in Latin America and as occurs to-day in Alaska and northern Canada, where the "squaw man" is no rarity. The assimilation of culture, at least in a superficial sense, may be yet more rapid, especially where hard climatic conditions force the interloper to imitate the life of the native. The industrial and commercial Hollander, when transplanted to the dry grasslands of South Africa, became pastoral like the native Kaffirs. The French voyageur of Canada could scarcely be distinguished from the Indian trapper; occupation, food, dress, and spouse were the same. Only a lighter tint of skin distinguished the half-breed children of the Frenchman. The settlers of the early Trans-Allegheny commonwealths, at least for a generation or two, showed little outward difference in mode of life from that of the savage community among which they dwelt.242

A group of people located between two other groups forms an ethnic and cultural connection between them. This transitional type is just as common in human geography as it is in biology. The only exception occurs when a migrating or conquering group intrudes, like the Hungarians and Turks in southeastern Europe, or the Berger Tuaregs and Fulbes among the Black populations of western Sudan; or when a colonizing group moves in, like the Russians in Mongolian Siberia or Europeans among the indigenous people of South Africa. Even in these cases, racial mixing tends to happen along the borders, as seen in Latin America and currently in Alaska and northern Canada, where "squaw men" are not uncommon. The adoption of culture, at least on the surface, can be even quicker, especially where harsh climate conditions force the newcomers to imitate the lifestyle of the locals. The industrial and business-oriented Dutch person, when relocated to the dry grasslands of South Africa, became a pastoralist like the native Kaffirs. The French voyageurs in Canada were hardly distinguishable from the Indian trappers; their occupations, food, clothing, and partners were the same. Only a lighter skin tone set apart the mixed-race children of the Frenchman. The settlers in the early Trans-Allegheny commonwealths showed little outward difference in lifestyle from the indigenous communities around them for at least a generation or two.242

Vicinal groups of similar or diverse race and culture.

The more alike the components of such a vicinal group of people, the easier, freer and more effective will be the mediating function of the central one. Germany has demonstrated this in her long history as intermediary between the nations of southeastern and western Europe. The people of Poland, occupying a portion of the Baltic slope of northern Europe, fended by no natural barriers from their eastern and western neighbors, long constituted a transition form between the two. Though affiliated with Russia in point of language, the Poles are Occidental in their religion; and their head-form resembles that of northern Germany rather than that of Russia.243 The country belongs to western Europe in the density of its population (74 to the square kilometer or 190 to the square mile), which is quadruple that of remaining European Russia, and also in its industrial and social development. The partition of Poland among the three neighboring powers was the final expression of its intermediate location and character.244 One part was joined politically to the Slav-German western border of Russia, and another to the German-Slav border of Germany, while the portion that fell to the Austrian Empire simply extended the northern Slav area of that country found in Bohemia, Moravia, and the Slovak border of Hungary. [Map page 223.]

The more similar the members of a nearby group of people are, the easier, more relaxed, and more effective the central person's mediating role will be. Germany has shown this throughout its long history as a go-between for the nations of southeastern and western Europe. The people of Poland, located on the Baltic slope of northern Europe and lacking natural barriers from their eastern and western neighbors, long served as a bridge between the two. While the Poles use a language related to Russia, they are Western in their religion; their head shape is more similar to that of northern Germans than to that of Russians.243 The country is part of western Europe with its population density (74 people per square kilometer or 190 per square mile), which is four times that of the rest of European Russia, and also in terms of its industrial and social progress. The division of Poland among the three neighboring powers was the final result of its intermediate location and character.244 One part was politically linked to the Slav-German western border of Russia, another to the German-Slav border of Germany, while the portion that went to the Austrian Empire simply extended the northern Slav region of that country found in Bohemia, Moravia, and the Slovak border of Hungary. [Map page 223.]

If the intermediate people greatly differs in race or civilization from both neighbors, it exercises and receives slight influence. The Mongols of Central Asia, between China on one side and Persia and India on the other, have been poor vehicles for the exchange of culture between these two great districts. The Hungarians, located between the Roumanians and Germans on the east and west, Slovaks and Croatians on the north and south, have helped little to reconcile race differences in the great empire of the Danube.

If the intermediate groups are very different in race or culture from both their neighbors, they have little impact on either side. The Mongols of Central Asia, positioned between China on one side and Persia and India on the other, haven't facilitated much cultural exchange between these two major regions. The Hungarians, situated between the Romanians and Germans to the east and west, and the Slovaks and Croatians to the north and south, have not done much to bridge the racial differences in the vast Danube Empire.

Thalassic vicinal location.

The unifying effect of vicinal location is greatly enhanced if the neighboring people are grouped about an enclosed sea which affords an easy highway for communication. The integrating force of such a basin will often overcome the disintegrating force of race antagonisms. The Roman Empire in the Mediterranean was able to evolve an effective centralized government and to spread one culture over the neighboring shores, despite great variety of nationality and language and every degree of cultural development. A certain similarity of natural conditions, climatic and otherwise, from the Iberian Peninsula to the borders of the Syrian desert, also aided in the process of amalgamation.

The unifying effect of nearby location is greatly enhanced when the neighboring communities are clustered around an enclosed sea, which provides an easy route for communication. The integrating power of such a basin often overcomes the disrupting effects of racial conflicts. The Roman Empire in the Mediterranean was able to establish an effective centralized government and spread a single culture across the neighboring shores, despite significant differences in nationality, language, and levels of cultural development. Similar natural conditions, including climate, from the Iberian Peninsula to the edges of the Syrian desert, also helped in the process of merging different cultures.

Where similarity of race already forms a basis for congeniality, such circumthalassic groups display the highest degree of interactive influence. These contribute to a further blending of population and unification of culture, by which the whole circle of the enclosing lands tends to approach one standard of civilization. This was the history of the Baltic coast from the thirteenth to the sixteenth centuries, when the German Hansa distributed the material products of Europe's highest civilization from Russian Novgorod to Norway. The North Sea group, first under the leadership of Holland, later under England's guidance, became a single community of advancing culture, which was a later reflection of the early community of race stretching from the Faroe and Shetland Islands to the Rhine and the Elbe. This same process has been going on for ages about the marginal basins of eastern Asia, the Yellow and Japan Seas. Community of race and culture stamps China, Korea and Japan. A general advance in civilization under the leadership of Japan, the England of the East, now inaugurates the elevation of the whole group.

Where people of the same race already have a shared bond, these surrounding groups show the strongest level of interaction. This leads to a greater mixing of populations and unification of culture, making the entire area more similar in its standards of civilization. This was the story of the Baltic coast from the 13th to the 16th centuries, when the German Hanse took the products of Europe’s highest civilization from Russian Novgorod to Norway. The North Sea group, first led by Holland and later guided by England, became a unified community of advancing culture, reflecting the early shared racial community from the Faroe and Shetland Islands to the Rhine and the Elbe. This same process has been occurring for ages around the eastern Asian marginal seas, the Yellow and Japan Seas. The community of race and culture connects China, Korea, and Japan. A general rise in civilization, led by Japan—often referred to as the England of the East—now begins the uplift of the entire region.

Complementary locations.

An even closer connection exists between adjoining peoples who are united by ties of blood and are further made economically dependent upon one another, because of a contrast in the physical conditions and, therefore, in the products of their respective territories. Numerous coast and inland tribes, pastoral and agricultural tribes are united because they are mutually necessary. In British Columbia and Alaska the fishing Indians of the seaboard long held a definite commercial relation to the hunting tribes of the interior, selling them the products and wares of the coast, while monopolizing their market for the inland furs. Such was the position of the Ugalentz tribe of Tlingits near the mouth of the Copper River in relation to the up-stream Athapascans; of the Kinik tribe at the head of Cook's Inlet in relation to the inland Atnas,245 of the Chilcats of Chilkoot Inlet to the mountain Tinnehs. Similarly, the hunting folk of the Kalahari Desert in South Africa attach themselves to influential tribesmen of the adjacent Bechuana grasslands, in order to exchange the skins of the desert animals for spears, knives, and tobacco.246 Fertile agricultural lands adjoining pastoral regions of deserts and steppes have in all times drawn to their border markets the mounted plainsmen, bringing the products of their herds to exchange for grain; and in all times the abundance of their green fields has tempted their ill-fed neighbors to conquest, so that the economic bond becomes a preliminary to a political bond and an ethnic amalgamation growing out of this strong vicinal location. The forest lands of Great Russia supplement the grain-bearing Black Lands of Little Russia; the two are united through geographico-economic conditions, which would not permit an independent existence to the smaller, weaker section of the south, ever open to hostile invasion from Asia.247

A closer connection exists between neighboring people who are linked by family ties and economically dependent on each other due to differences in their physical environments and the products of their territories. Many coastal and inland tribes, both pastoral and agricultural, are united because they rely on each other. In British Columbia and Alaska, the fishing tribes on the coast had a clear commercial relationship with the hunting tribes in the interior, selling them coastal goods while controlling the market for inland furs. For example, the Ugalentz tribe of Tlingits at the mouth of the Copper River interacted with the upstream Athapascans, and the Kinik tribe at the top of Cook's Inlet had relations with the inland Atnas, and the Chilcats of Chilkoot Inlet traded with the mountain Tinnehs. In a similar manner, the hunting people of the Kalahari Desert in South Africa associate with powerful tribesmen from the nearby Bechuana grasslands to trade desert animal skins for spears, knives, and tobacco. Fertile agricultural areas next to desert and steppe pastoral regions have always attracted mounted plainsmen who bring their herd products to trade for grain; the abundance of greenery has often tempted their poorly fed neighbors to attempt conquest, resulting in an economic bond that can lead to political ties and ethnic blending due to their close proximity. The forest lands of Great Russia complement the grain-rich Black Lands of Little Russia; these two areas are connected through geographical and economic conditions that prevent the smaller, weaker southern region from existing independently, as it is always at risk of hostile invasion from Asia.

Types of location.

Leaving now the ethnic and economic ties which may strengthen the cohesive power of such vicinal grouping, and considering only its purely geographic aspects, we distinguish the following types:

Leaving aside the ethnic and economic connections that might enhance the unity of such local groups, and focusing only on its purely geographic aspects, we can identify the following types:

I. Central location. Examples: The Magyars in the Danube Valley; the Iroquois Indians on the Mohawk River and the Finger Lakes; Russia from the 10th to the 18th century; Poland from 1000 to its final partition in 1795; Bolivia, Switzerland, and Afghanistan.

I. Central location. Examples: The Magyars in the Danube Valley; the Iroquois Indians on the Mohawk River and the Finger Lakes; Russia from the 10th to the 18th century; Poland from 1000 to its final partition in 1795; Bolivia, Switzerland, and Afghanistan.

II. Peripheral location: Ancient Phoenicia; Greek colonies in Asia Minor and southern Italy; the Roman Empire at the accession of Augustus; the Thirteen Colonies in 1750; island and peninsula lands.

II. Peripheral location: Ancient Phoenicia; Greek colonies in Asia Minor and southern Italy; the Roman Empire at the start of Augustus's reign; the Thirteen Colonies in 1750; island and peninsula lands.

III. Scattered location: English and French settlements in America prior to 1700; Indians in the United States and the Kaffirs in South Africa; Portuguese holdings in the Orient, and French in India.

III. Scattered location: English and French settlements in America prior to 1700; Native Americans in the United States and the Kaffirs in South Africa; Portuguese territories in the Orient, and French in India.

IV. Location in a related series: Oasis states grouped along desert routes; islands along great marine routes.

IV. Location in a related series: Oasis states clustered along desert routes; islands situated along major sea routes.

Continuous and scattered location.

All peoples in their geographical distribution tend to follow a social and political law of gravitation, in accordance with which members of the same tribe or race gather around a common center or occupy a continuous stretch of territory, as compactly as their own economic status, and the physical conditions of climate and soil will permit. This is characteristic of all mature and historically significant peoples who have risen to sedentary life, maintained their hold on a given territory, and, with increase of population, have widened their boundaries. The nucleus of such a people may be situated somewhere in the interior of a continent, and with growing strength it may expand in every direction; or it may originate on some advantageous inlet of the sea and spread thence up and down the coast, till the people have possessed themselves of a long-drawn hem of land and used this peripheral location to intercept the trade between their back country and the sea.

All communities, in their geographic layout, tend to follow a social and political law of attraction, where members of the same tribe or race come together around a common center or occupy a continuous stretch of land, as compactly as their economic situation and the physical conditions of climate and soil allow. This is typical of all mature and historically important communities that have transitioned to settled life, maintained control over a specific territory, and, with a growing population, expanded their borders. The core of such a community might be located somewhere inland on a continent, and as it gains strength, it can spread in all directions; or it may start at a favorable coastal inlet and extend up and down the shore until the community claims a long strip of land and uses this edge location to facilitate trade between their inland areas and the sea.

These are the two types of continuous location. In contrast to them, a discontinuous or scattered location characterizes the sparse distribution of primitive hunting and pastoral tribes; or the shattered fragments of a conquered people, whose territory has been honeycombed by the land appropriation of the victors; or a declining, moribund people, who, owing to bad government, poor economic methods, and excessive competition in the struggle for existence, have shrunk to mere patches. As a favorable symptom, scattered location regularly marks the healthy growth of an expanding people, who throw out here and there detached centers of settlement far beyond the compact frontier, and fix these as the goal for the advance of their boundary. It is also a familiar feature of maritime commercial expansion, which is guided by no territorial ambition but merely aims to secure widely distributed trading stations at favorable coast points, in order to make the circle of commerce as ample and resourceful as possible. But this latter form of scattered location is not permanently sound. Back of it lies the short-sighted policy of the middleman nation, which makes wholly inadequate estimate of the value of land, and is content with an ephemeral prosperity.

These are the two types of continuous location. In contrast, a discontinuous or scattered location is characterized by the sparse distribution of primitive hunting and pastoral tribes; or the broken fragments of a conquered people, whose territory has been eaten away by the land grabbing of the victors; or a declining, struggling people, who, due to poor governance, weak economic strategies, and intense competition for survival, have been reduced to mere patches. On a positive note, scattered locations often indicate the healthy growth of expanding populations, which develop isolated centers of settlement far beyond their solid borders and aim to extend their territory. This scattered location is also a common feature of maritime commercial expansion, which lacks any territorial ambition and simply seeks to establish widespread trading posts at advantageous coastal locations to enhance the scope and richness of its commerce. However, this latter form of scattered location is not sustainably viable. Behind it lies the shortsighted approach of the middleman nation, which makes a poor assessment of land value and is satisfied with a fleeting prosperity.

Central versus peripheral location.

A broad territorial base and security of possession are the guarantees of national survival. The geographic conditions which favor one often operate against the other. Peripheral location means a narrow base but a protected frontier along the sea; central location means opportunity for widening the territory, but it also means danger. A state embedded in the heart of a continent has, if strong, every prospect of radial expansion and the exercise of widespread influence; but if weak, its very existence is imperilled, because it is exposed to encroachments on every side. A central location minus the bulwark of natural boundaries enabled the kingdom of Poland to be devoured piecemeal by its voracious neighbors. The kingdom of Burgundy, always a state of fluctuating boundaries and shifting allegiances, fell at last a victim to its central location, and saw its name obliterated from the map. Hungary, which, in the year 1000, occupied a restricted inland location on the middle Danube, by the 14th century broke through the barriers of its close-hugging neighbors, and stretched its boundaries from the Adriatic to the Euxine; two hundred years later its territory contracted to a fragment before the encroachments of the Turks, but afterwards recovered in part its old dimensions. Germany has, in common with the little Sudanese state of Wadai, an influential and dangerous position. A central location in the Sudan has made Wadai accessible to the rich caravan trade from Tripoli and Barca on the north, from the great market town of Kano in Sokoto on the west, and from the Nile Valley and Red Sea on the east. But the little state has had to fight for its life against the aggressions of its western rival Bornu and its eastern neighbor Darfur. And now more formidable enemies menace it in the French, who have occupied the territory between it and Bornu, and the English, who have already caught Darfur in the dragnet of the Egyptian Sudan.248

A broad territorial base and secure possession are essential for a nation's survival. The geographic factors that support one often hinder the other. Being on the outskirts means a narrow base but a secure coastline; being in the center means the chance to expand but also brings risks. A state situated in the heart of a continent can expand radially and exert influence if it's strong; however, if it's weak, its very existence is threatened due to attacks from all sides. The lack of natural boundaries in a central location led to Poland being gradually taken over by its greedy neighbors. Burgundy, always shifting in borders and allegiances, ultimately fell victim to its central location and disappeared from the map. Hungary, which had a constrained inland position by the middle Danube in 1000, managed by the 14th century to break free from its neighboring constraints and extend its borders from the Adriatic to the Black Sea; two hundred years later, it shrank significantly due to Turkish invasions, but later regained part of its former size. Germany shares with the small Sudanese state of Wadai an influential but dangerous position. Its central location in Sudan has made Wadai attractive for the lucrative caravan trade from the north (Tripoli and Barca), the west (the significant market town of Kano in Sokoto), and the east (the Nile Valley and Red Sea). However, this small state has had to battle for its survival against attacks from its western rival Bornu and its eastern neighbor Darfur. Now, it faces even more formidable threats from the French, who occupy the land between Wadai and Bornu, and the English, who have entangled Darfur in the grip of the Egyptian Sudan.248

Danger of central location.

Germany, crowded in among three powerful neighbors like France, Russia, and Austria, has had no choice about maintaining a strong standing army and impregnable frontier defenses. The location of the Central European states between the Baltic and the Balkans has exposed them to all the limitations and dangers arising from a narrow circle of land neighbors. Moreover, the diversified character of the area, its complex mountain systems, and diverging river courses have acted as disintegrating forces which have prevented the political concentration necessary to repel interference from without. The Muscovite power, which had its beginning in a modest central location about the sources of the Dwina, Dnieper and Volga, was aided by the physical unity of its unobstructed plains, which facilitated political combination. Hence, on every side it burst through its encompassing neighbors and stretched its boundaries to the untenanted frontier of the sea. Central location was the undoing of the Transvaal Republic. Its efforts to expand to the Indian Ocean were blocked by its powerful British rival at every point—at Delagoa Bay in 1875 by treaty with Portugal, at Santa Lucia Bay in 1884, and through Swaziland in 1894. The Orange Free State was maimed in the same way when, in 1868, she tried to stretch out an arm through Basutoland to the sea.249 Here even weak neighbors were effective to curtail the seaward growth of these inland states, because they were made the tools of one strong, rapacious neighbor. A central position teaches always the lesson of vigilance and preparedness for hostilities, as the Boer equipment in 1899, the military organization of Germany, and the bristling fortresses on the Swiss Alpine passes prove.

Germany, situated among three powerful neighbors—France, Russia, and Austria—has no choice but to maintain a strong standing army and solid border defenses. The Central European countries, located between the Baltic and the Balkans, face various limitations and dangers from their close land neighbors. Additionally, the diverse characteristics of the region, with its complex mountain ranges and winding rivers, have acted as disintegrating forces that hindered the necessary political unity to fend off outside interference. The Muscovite power, which started from a central location near the sources of the Dwina, Dnieper, and Volga rivers, benefited from the physical unity of its open plains, which enabled it to form a strong political structure. Consequently, it broke free from surrounding neighbors and expanded its territory to the uninhabited shores of the sea. A central location spelled trouble for the Transvaal Republic. Its attempts to expand to the Indian Ocean were thwarted by its powerful British rival at every turn—in Delagoa Bay in 1875 through a treaty with Portugal, at Santa Lucia Bay in 1884, and via Swaziland in 1894. The Orange Free State faced a similar fate when, in 1868, it sought to reach the sea through Basutoland. Here, even weak neighbors became effective in limiting the coastal expansion of these inland states, as they were manipulated by a single strong, greedy neighbor. A central position constantly teaches the lesson of needing vigilance and preparedness for conflict, as demonstrated by the Boer military equipment in 1899, the military organization of Germany, and the fortified positions along the Swiss Alpine passes.

Mutual relations between center and periphery.

How intimate and necessary are the relations between central and peripheral location is shown by the fact that all states strive to combine the two. In countries like Norway, France, Spain, Japan, Korea and Chile, peripheral location predominates, and therefore confers upon them at once the security and commercial accessibility which result from contact with the sea. Other countries, like Russia, Germany and Austro-Hungary, chiefly central in location, have the strategic and even the commercial value of their coasts reduced by the long, tortuous course which connects them with the open ocean. Therefore, we find Russia planning to make a great port at Ekaterina Harbor on the northernmost point of her Lapland coast, where an out-runner from the Gulf Stream ensures an ice-free port on the open sea.250 An admirable combination of central and peripheral location is seen in the United States. Here the value of periphery is greatly enhanced by the interoceanic location of the country; and the danger of entanglements arising from a marked central location is reduced by the simplicity of the political neighborhood. But our country has paid for this security by an historical aloofness and poverty of influence. Civilized countries which are wholly central in their location are very few, only nine in all. Six of these are mountain or plateau states, like Switzerland and Abyssinia, which have used the fortress character of their land to resist conquest, and have preferred independence to the commercial advantages to be gained only by affiliation with their peripheral neighbors.

The closeness and importance of the relationship between central and peripheral locations is evident in how all states aim to merge the two. In countries like Norway, France, Spain, Japan, Korea, and Chile, peripheral locations are dominant, providing both security and commercial access due to their connections with the sea. In contrast, nations like Russia, Germany, and Austro-Hungary, which are mostly centrally located, experience their coasts' strategic and commercial value diminished by the lengthy, winding routes that link them to the open ocean. For this reason, Russia is working to establish a major port at Ekaterina Harbor on the northernmost tip of its Lapland coast, where a current from the Gulf Stream guarantees an ice-free port on the open sea.250 A great blend of central and peripheral location is seen in the United States. Here, the advantage of the periphery is significantly boosted by the country's interoceanic position, while the risks of complications from a strong central location are lessened by the straightforwardness of the political landscape. However, the U.S. has paid for this security with a history of isolation and limited influence. There are very few civilized countries that are entirely central in their location, numbering only nine. Out of these, six are mountainous or plateau states, like Switzerland and Abyssinia, which have leveraged the fortress-like nature of their land to fend off conquest and have chosen independence over the commercial benefits that come only with connections to their peripheral neighbors.

Inland and coastward expansion.

Central and peripheral location presuppose and supplement one another. One people inhabits the interior of an island or continent whose rim is occupied by another. The first suffers from exclusion from the sea and therefore strives to get a strip of coast. The coast people feel the drawback of their narrow foothold upon the land, want a broader base in order to exploit fully the advantages of their maritime location, fear the pressure of their hinterland when the great forces there imprisoned shall begin to move; so they tend to expand inland to strengthen themselves and weaken the neighbor in their rear. The English colonies of America, prior to 1763, held a long cordon of coast, hemmed in between the Appalachian Mountains and the sea. Despite threats of French encroachments from the interior, they expanded from this narrow peripheral base into the heart of the continent, and after the Revolution reached the Mississippi River and the northern boundary of the Spanish Floridas. They now held a central location in relation to the long Spanish periphery of the Gulf of Mexico. True to the instincts of that location, they began to throw the weight of their vast hinterland against the weak coastal barrier. This gave way, either to forcible appropriation of territory or diplomacy or war, till the United States had incorporated in her own territory the peripheral lands of the Gulf from Florida Strait to the Rio Grande. [See map page 156.]

Central and peripheral locations depend on and enhance each other. One group of people lives in the interior of an island or continent, while another occupies its edge. The first group feels isolated from the sea and thus wants to obtain a strip of coast. The coastal people recognize the downside of their limited land area and seek a broader base to fully take advantage of their maritime position; they also fear the pressures of the land behind them when the significant forces there start to mobilize. Consequently, they tend to expand inland to fortify themselves and diminish the strength of their neighbors behind them. Before 1763, the English colonies in America had a long stretch of coastline, squeezed in between the Appalachian Mountains and the sea. Despite the threat of French encroachment from the interior, they expanded from this narrow coastal base into the heart of the continent and reached the Mississippi River and the northern boundary of Spanish Florida after the Revolution. They now had a central position in relation to the extensive Spanish coastal area of the Gulf of Mexico. Staying true to the instincts associated with that position, they began to apply the resources of their vast hinterland against the vulnerable coastal barrier. This led to either forcefully taking territory, negotiating, or engaging in war, until the United States absorbed the peripheral lands of the Gulf from Florida Strait to the Rio Grande. [See map page 156.]

Russian expansion in Asia.

In Asia this same process has been perennial and on a far greater scale. The big arid core of that continent, containing many million square miles, has been charged with an expansive force. From the appearance of the Aryans in the Indus Valley and the Scythians on the borders of Macedonia, it has sent out hordes to overwhelm the peripheral lands from the Yellow Sea to the Black, and from the Indian Ocean to the White Sea.251 To-day Russia is making history there on the pattern set by geographic conditions. From her most southerly province in Trans-Caspia, conquered a short twenty-five years ago, she is heading towards the Indian Ocean. The Anglo-Russian convention of August 31st, 1907, yielding to Russia all northern Persia as her sphere of influence, enables her to advance half way to the Persian Gulf, though British statesmen regard it as a check upon her ambition, because England has secured right to the littoral. But Russia by this great stride toward her goal is working with causes, satisfied to let the effects follow at their leisure. She has gained the best portion of Persia, comprising the six largest cities and the most important lines of communication radiating from the capital.252 This country will make a solid base for her further advance to the Persian Gulf; and, when developed by Russian enterprise in railroad building and commerce, it will make a heavy weight bearing down upon the coast. The Muscovite area which is pressing upon England's Persian littoral reaches from Ispahan and Yezd to the far-away shores of the Arctic Ocean.

In Asia, this same process has been ongoing and on a much larger scale. The vast arid core of the continent, covering many millions of square miles, has been energized by a powerful force. Since the arrival of the Aryans in the Indus Valley and the Scythians at the borders of Macedonia, it has sent out large groups to conquer the surrounding lands from the Yellow Sea to the Black Sea, and from the Indian Ocean to the White Sea.251 Today, Russia is making history there, following the patterns set by geographic factors. From its southernmost province in Trans-Caspia, which was conquered just twenty-five years ago, Russia is moving toward the Indian Ocean. The Anglo-Russian convention of August 31, 1907, granting Russia control over all of northern Persia as her sphere of influence, allows her to advance halfway to the Persian Gulf, even though British politicians see it as a limit to her ambitions since England has secured rights to the coastline. However, Russia, by making this significant move toward her goal, is working with underlying causes while letting the results unfold in their own time. She has captured the best parts of Persia, which include the six largest cities and the most vital communication lines extending from the capital.252 This region will provide a strong foundation for her continued push towards the Persian Gulf; and once developed by Russian investment in railroads and trade, it will become a significant force pressing down on the coast. The area under Russian influence, which is bearing down on England's Persian coast, stretches from Ispahan and Yezd all the way to the distant shores of the Arctic Ocean.

Periphery as goal of expansion.

In the essentially complementary character of interior and periphery are rooted all these coastward and landward movements of expansion. Where an equilibrium seems to have been reached, the peoples who have accepted either the one or the other one-sided location have generally for the time being ceased to grow. Such a location has therefore a passive character. But the surprising elasticity of many nations may start up an unexpected activity which will upset this equilibrium. Where the central location is that of small mountain states, which are handicapped by limited resources and population, like Nepal and Afghanistan, or overshadowed by far more powerful neighbors, like Switzerland, the passive character is plain enough. In the case of larger states, like Servia, Abyssinia, and Bolivia, which offer the material and geographical base for larger populations than they now support, it is often difficult to say whether progression or retrogression is to be their fate. As a rule, however, the expulsion of a people from a peripheral point of advantage and their confinement in the interior gives the sign of national decay, as did Poland's loss of her Baltic seaboard. Russia's loss of her Manchurian port and the resignation of her ambition on the Chinese coasts is at least a serious check. On the other hand, if an inland country enclosed by neighbors succeeds in somewhere getting a maritime outlet, the sign is hopeful. The century-old political slogan of Hungary, "To the sea, Magyars!" has borne fruit in the Adriatic harbor of Fiume, which is to-day the pride of the nation and in no small degree a basis for its hope of autonomy. The history of Montenegro took on a new phase when from its mountain seclusion it recently secured the short strip of seaboard which it had won and lost so often. Such peripheral holdings are the lungs through which states breathe.

In the basically complementary nature of the interior and the outskirts lie all these movements of expansion toward the coast and inland. When a balance seems to be achieved, the people who have settled in either the inner or outer locations often stop growing for the time being. This type of location, therefore, has a passive nature. However, the surprising adaptability of many nations can spark unexpected activity that disrupts this balance. In cases where the central location consists of small mountain states, which are limited by their resources and population, like Nepal and Afghanistan, or overshadowed by much stronger neighbors, like Switzerland, the passive nature is quite clear. For larger states, like Serbia, Ethiopia, and Bolivia, which have the potential for larger populations than they currently support, it can be hard to determine whether they are moving forward or backward. Generally speaking, when a group of people is forced out from a point of advantage on the outskirts and confined to the interior, it signals national decline, as seen with Poland's loss of its Baltic coast. Russia's loss of its port in Manchuria and its withdrawal from ambitions on the Chinese coasts represent a serious setback. Conversely, if a landlocked country surrounded by neighbors manages to find a maritime outlet, it signals hope. Hungary's long-standing political slogan, "To the sea, Magyars!" has resulted in the Adriatic port of Fiume, which today is a source of national pride and a key element of its hopes for autonomy. Montenegro's history took a new turn when it recently secured the small stretch of coastline it has repeatedly fought over. Such peripheral territories are the lifelines through which states thrive.

Reaction between center and periphery.

History and the study of race distribution reveal a mass of facts which represent the contrast and reaction between interior and periphery. The marginal lands of Asia, from northern Japan, where climatic conditions first make historical development possible, around the whole fringe of islands, peninsulas and border lowlands to the Aegean coast of Asia Minor, present a picture of culture and progress as compared with the high, mountain-rimmed core of the continent, condemned by its remoteness and inaccessibility to eternal retardation. Europe shows the same contrast, though in less pronounced form. Its ragged periphery, all the way from the Balkan Gibraltar at Constantinople to the far northern projections of Scandinavia and Finland, shows the value of a seaward outlook both in culture and climate. Germany beyond the Elbe and Austria beyond the Danube begin to feel the shadow of the continental mass behind them; and from their eastern borders on through Russia the benumbing influence of a central location grows, till beyond the Volga the climatic, economic, social and political conditions of Asia prevail. Africa is all core: contour and relief have combined to reduce its periphery to a narrow coastal hem, offering at best a few vantage points for exploitation to the great maritime merchant peoples of the world. Egypt, embedded in an endless stretch of desert like a jewel in its matrix, was powerless to shake off the influence of its continental environment. Its location was predominantly central; its culture bore the stamp of isolation and finally of arrested development. Australia, the classic ground of retardation, where only shades of savagery can be distinguished, offered the natives of its northern coast some faint stimuli in the visits of Malay seamen from the nearby Sunda Islands; but its central tribes, shielded by geographic segregation from external influences, have retained the most primitive customs and beliefs.253

History and the study of race distribution show a lot of facts that highlight the contrast and reaction between the center and the outskirts. The marginal lands of Asia, starting from northern Japan, where climatic conditions first allow for historical development, extend around the entire edge of islands, peninsulas, and border lowlands to the Aegean coast of Asia Minor. This area presents a picture of culture and progress when compared to the high, mountain-bordered core of the continent, which is trapped in its remoteness and inaccessibility, facing eternal underdevelopment. Europe displays a similar contrast, though it's less pronounced. Its jagged periphery stretches from the Balkan Gibraltar at Constantinople to the far northern parts of Scandinavia and Finland, illustrating the benefits of a coastal perspective in both culture and climate. Germany beyond the Elbe and Austria beyond the Danube start to feel the weight of the vast continental mass behind them; from their eastern borders and into Russia, the stifling impact of a central location increases, until beyond the Volga, the climatic, economic, social, and political conditions of Asia dominate. Africa is entirely central: its shape and terrain have managed to reduce its periphery to a thin coastal strip, providing only a few opportunities for exploitation by the major maritime trading nations of the world. Egypt, set within an endless desert like a jewel in its setting, couldn’t escape the influence of its continental surroundings. Its location was mostly central; its culture reflected the isolation and ultimately the stagnation of development. Australia, the typical example of underdevelopment, where only hints of savagery can be seen, offered the natives of its northern coast some minor stimulation from visits by Malay sailors from the nearby Sunda Islands. However, its central tribes, protected by geographic isolation from outside influences, have held onto the most primitive customs and beliefs.253

Expanding Europe has long been wrestling with Africa, but it can not get a grip, owing to the form of its antagonist; it finds no limb by which the giant can be tripped and thrown. Asia presents a wide border of marginal lands, some of them like Arabia and India being almost continental in their proportions. Since Europe began her career of maritime and colonial expansion in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, she has seized upon these peripheral projections as if they were the handles on a pilot wheel, and by them she has steered the course of Asia ever since. These semi-detached outlyers of the continent have enabled her to stretch a girdle of European influences around the central core. Such influences, through the avenues of commerce, railway concessions, missionary propaganda, or political dominion, have permeated the accessible periphery and are slowly spreading thence into the interior. China and Persia have felt these influences not less than India and Tongking; Japan, which has most effectually preserved its political autonomy, has profited by them most.

Expanding Europe has been struggling with Africa for a long time, but it can’t get a hold of it due to the nature of its opponent; it finds no way to trip or throw this giant. Asia offers a wide border of marginal lands, some of which, like Arabia and India, are almost continental in size. Since Europe started its maritime and colonial expansion in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, it has grabbed onto these outlying areas as if they were handles on a steering wheel, guiding the course of Asia ever since. These semi-detached extensions of the continent have allowed Europe to wrap a belt of influences around the central region. These influences, through trade, railway agreements, missionary efforts, or political control, have spread into the accessible edges and are slowly making their way into the interior. China and Persia have felt these influences just as much as India and Tonkin; Japan, which has effectively maintained its political independence, has benefited from them the most.

This historical contrast between center and periphery of continents reappears in smaller land masses, such as peninsulas and islands. The principle holds good regardless of size. The whole fringe of Arabia, from Antioch to Aden and from Mocha to Mascat, has been the scene of incoming and outgoing activities, has developed live bases of trade, maritime growth, and culture, while the inert, somnolent interior has drowsed away its long eventless existence. The rugged, inaccessible heart of little Sardinia repeats the story of central Arabia in its aloofness, its impregnability, backwardness, and in the purity of its race. Its accessible coast, forming a convenient way-station on the maritime crossroads of the western Mediterranean, has received a succession of conquerors and an intermittent influx of every ethnic strain known in the great basin.

This historical contrast between the center and the edges of continents shows up in smaller land masses like peninsulas and islands. The principle applies no matter the size. The entire perimeter of Arabia, from Antioch to Aden and from Mocha to Muscat, has been a hub of movement and activity, fostering vibrant trade, maritime development, and culture, while the dull, sleepy interior has languished in a long, uneventful existence. The rugged, hard-to-reach heart of small Sardinia tells a similar story to central Arabia with its isolation, resilience, backwardness, and the purity of its people. Its accessible coastline, acting as a convenient stopping point on the maritime crossroads of the western Mediterranean, has welcomed a series of conquerors and a sporadic mix of every ethnic group found in the wider region.

Periphery of colonization.

The story of discovery and colonization, from the days of ancient Greek enterprise in the Mediterranean to the recent German expansion along the Gulf of Guinea, shows the appropriation first of the rims of islands and continents, and later that of the interior. A difference of race and culture between inland and peripheral inhabitants meets us almost everywhere in retarded colonial lands. In the Philippines, the wild people of Luzon, Mindoro and the Visayas are confined almost entirely to the interior, while civilized or Christianized Malays occupy the whole seaboard, except where the rugged Sierra Madre Mountains, fronting the Pacific in Luzon, harbor a sparse population of primitive Negritos.254 For centuries Arabs held the coast of East Africa, where their narrow zone of settlement bordered on that of native blacks, with whom they traded. Even ancient Greece showed a wide difference in type of character and culture between the inland and maritime states. The Greek landsman was courageous and steadfast, but crude, illiterate, unenterprising, showing sterility of imagination and intellect; while his brother of the seaboard was active, daring, mercurial, imaginative, open to all the influences of a refining civilization.255 To-day the distribution of the Greeks along the rim of the Balkan peninsula and Asia Minor, in contrast to the Turks and Slavs of the interior, is distinctly a peripheral phenomenon.256

The story of discovery and colonization, from the days of ancient Greek ventures in the Mediterranean to the recent German expansion along the Gulf of Guinea, illustrates the takeover of the edges of islands and continents, followed by the exploitation of the interior. We often encounter differences in race and culture between the indigenous populations and those on the outskirts in less developed colonial areas. In the Philippines, the indigenous people of Luzon, Mindoro, and the Visayas are mostly confined to the interior, while the more civilized or Christianized Malays occupy the entire coastline, except where the rugged Sierra Madre Mountains, facing the Pacific in Luzon, host a sparse population of primitive Negritos.254 For centuries, Arabs controlled the coast of East Africa, where their narrow areas of settlement bordered the territories of native blacks, with whom they traded. Even in ancient Greece, there was a significant contrast in character and culture between the inland and coastal states. The Greek land dweller was courageous and steadfast but rough, uneducated, and lacking initiative, showing a lack of imagination and intellect; whereas his coastal counterpart was active, bold, mercurial, imaginative, and open to the influences of a more refined civilization.255 Today, the distribution of Greeks along the edges of the Balkan peninsula and Asia Minor, in contrast to the Turks and Slavs of the interior, clearly represents a peripheral phenomenon.256

The rapid inland advance from the coast of oversea colonists is part of that restless activity which is fostered by contact with the sea and supported by the command of abundant resources conferred by maritime superiority. The Anglo-Saxon invasion of England, as later the English colonization of America, seized the rim of the land, and promptly pushed up the rivers in sea-going boats far into the interior. But periphery may give to central region something more than conquerors and colonists. From its active markets and cosmopolitan exchanges there steadily filter into the interior culture and commodities, carried by peaceful merchant and missionary, who, however, are often only the harbingers of the conqueror. The accessibility of the periphery tends to raise it in culture, wealth, density of population, and often in political importance, far in advance of the center.

The quick movement inland from the coast by overseas colonists is part of that restless activity driven by interaction with the sea and supported by the abundance of resources that comes from maritime dominance. The Anglo-Saxon invasion of England, and later the English colonization of America, took hold of the coastline and quickly navigated the rivers in sea-going boats deep into the continent. However, the peripheral areas can offer the central regions something beyond just conquerors and colonists. From its bustling markets and diverse exchanges, culture and goods consistently flow into the interior, carried by peaceful merchants and missionaries, who, although often just the forerunners of conquest, spread their influence. The ease of access to the periphery often elevates it in terms of culture, wealth, population density, and frequently political significance, outpacing the center.

Philippine Islands. Distribution of Civilized and Wild Peoples

Philippine Islands. Distribution of Civilized and Wild Peoples

Philippine Islands. Distribution of Civilized and Wild Peoples

Philippine Islands. Distribution of Civilized and Wild Peoples

Dominant historical side.

The maritime periphery of a country receives a variety of oversea influences, blends and assimilates these to its own culture, Hellenizes, Americanizes or Japanizes them, as the case may be, and then passes them on into the interior. Here no one foreign influence prevails. On the land boundaries the case is different. Each inland frontier has to reckon with a different neighbor and its undiluted influence. A predominant central location means a succession of such neighbors, on all sides friction which may polish or rub sore. The distinction between a many-sided and a one-sided historical development depends upon the contact of a people with its neighbors. Consider the multiplicity of influences which have flowed in upon Austria from all sides. But not all such influences are similar in kind or in degree. The most powerful neighbor will chiefly determine on which boundary of a country its dominant historical processes are to work themselves out in a given epoch. Therefore, it is of supreme importance to the character of a peopled history on which side this most powerful neighbor is located. Russia had for several centuries such a neighbor in the Tartar hordes along its southeastern frontier, and therefore its history received an Asiatic stamp; so, too, did that of Austria and Hungary in the long resistance to Turkish invasion. All three states suffered in consequence a retardation of development on their western sides. After the turmoil on the Asiatic frontier had subsided, the great centers of European culture and commerce in Italy, Germany and the Baltic lands began to assert their powers of attraction. The young Roman Republic drew up its forces to face the threatening power of Carthage in the south, and thereby was forced into rapid maritime development; the Roman Empire faced north to meet the inroads of the barbarians, and thereby was drawn into inland expansion. All these instances show that a vital historical turning-point is reached in the development of every country, when the scene of its great historical happenings shifts from one side to another.

The coastal areas of a country are influenced by various overseas factors, blending and adapting these to their own culture, whether they are from Greece, America, or Japan, depending on the case, before passing them into the country’s interior. Here, no single foreign influence dominates. However, the situation is different along land borders. Each inland boundary faces a unique neighbor with its direct influence. A central location leads to multiple neighboring influences, creating friction that can either refine or irritate relationships. The difference between a diverse and a singular historical development hinges on how a people engages with its neighbors. Take Austria, for instance, which has received varied influences from multiple directions. Not all these influences are the same in type or intensity. The most powerful neighbor largely determines which border of a country will experience its major historical developments during a particular period. Thus, it's crucial for a country’s historical character to know where this dominant neighbor is located. For several centuries, Russia faced the Tartar hordes along its southeastern border, which shaped its history with an Asian influence; similarly, Austria and Hungary experienced a long struggle against Turkish invasion. All three states consequently saw a slowdown in development on their western sides. Once the conflict on the Asian border subsided, the key centers of European culture and trade in Italy, Germany, and the Baltic regions began to exert their attraction. The young Roman Republic mobilized to counter the looming threat from Carthage in the south, prompting rapid maritime development; meanwhile, the Roman Empire turned northward to confront barbarian invasions, leading to inland expansion. All these examples illustrate that a significant turning point in a country's development occurs when major historical events shift from one side to another.

The Mediterranean side of Europe.

In addition to the aggressive neighbor, there is often a more sustained force that may draw the activities of a people toward one or another boundary of their territory. This may be the abundance of land and unexploited resources lying on a colonial frontier and attracting the unemployed energies of the people, such as existed till recently in the United States,257 and such as is now transferring the most active scenes of Russian history to far-away Siberia. But a stronger attraction is that of a higher civilization and dominant economic interests. So long as the known world was confined to the temperate regions of Europe, Asia and Africa, together with the tropical districts of the Indian Ocean, the necessities of trade between Orient and Occident and the historical prestige of the lands bordering on the Mediterranean placed in this basin the center of gravity of the cultural, commercial and political life of Europe. The continent was dominated by its Asiatic corner; its every country took on an historical significance proportionate to its proximity and accessibility to this center. The Papacy was a Mediterranean power. The Crusades were Mediterranean wars. Athens, Rome, Constantinople, Venice, and Genoa held in turn the focal positions in this Asiatic-European sea; they were on the sunny side of the continent, while Portugal and England lay in shadow. Only that portion of Britain facing France felt the cultural influences of the southern lands. The estuaries of the Mersey and Clyde were marshy solitudes, echoing to the cry of the bittern and the ripple of Celtic fishing-boat.

In addition to the aggressive neighbor, there's often a deeper force that can draw a society's activities toward one boundary of their territory or another. This might be the wealth of land and untapped resources on a colonial frontier, attracting the unemployed energy of the people, as was the case until recently in the United States,257 and what is now moving the most dynamic parts of Russian history to far-off Siberia. However, a stronger attraction comes from a more advanced civilization and powerful economic interests. As long as the known world was limited to the temperate regions of Europe, Asia, and Africa, along with the tropical areas of the Indian Ocean, the needs for trade between East and West and the historical importance of the lands around the Mediterranean positioned this area as the center of gravity for the cultural, commercial, and political life of Europe. The continent was influenced by its Asian region; every country's historical significance was related to how close and accessible it was to this center. The Papacy was a Mediterranean power. The Crusades were Mediterranean wars. Athens, Rome, Constantinople, Venice, and Genoa took turns as focal points in this Asian-European sea; they were on the sunny side of the continent, while Portugal and England remained in the shadows. Only the part of Britain facing France felt the cultural influences from the southern regions. The estuaries of the Mersey and Clyde were marshy wastelands, resonating with the calls of bitterns and the sounds of Celtic fishing boats.

Change of historical front.

After the year 1492 inaugurated the Atlantic period of history, the western front of Europe superseded the Mediterranean side in the historical leadership of the continent. The Breton coast of France waked up, the southern seaboard dozed. The old centers in the Aegean and Adriatic became drowsy corners. The busy traffic of the Mediterranean was transferred to the open ocean, where, from Trafalger to Norway, the western states of Europe held the choice location on the world's new highway. Liverpool, Plymouth, Glasgow, Hamburg, Rotterdam, Antwerp, Cherbourg, Lisbon and Cadiz were shifted from shadowy margin to illuminated center, and became the foci of the new activity. Theirs was a new continental location, maintaining relations of trade and colonization with two hemispheres. Their neighbors were now found on the Atlantic shores of the Americas and the peripheral lands of Asia. These cities became the exponents of the intensity with which their respective states exploited the natural advantages of this location.

After the year 1492 kicked off the Atlantic era in history, the western part of Europe took over as the leading force on the continent, surpassing the Mediterranean region. The Breton coast of France sprang to life, while the southern coast remained sleepy. The old centers in the Aegean and Adriatic became quiet backwaters. The bustling trade of the Mediterranean moved to the open ocean, where the western European states established prime positions on the world's new trade routes. Liverpool, Plymouth, Glasgow, Hamburg, Rotterdam, Antwerp, Cherbourg, Lisbon, and Cadiz shifted from the shadows to the spotlight, becoming centers of new activity. They occupied a new continental position, establishing trade and colonization relationships with both hemispheres. Their counterparts were now located on the Atlantic coasts of the Americas and the fringes of Asia. These cities represented the extent to which their respective nations took advantage of this advantageous location.

The experience of Germany was typical of the change of front. From the tenth to the middle of the sixteenth century, this heir of the old Roman Empire was drawn toward Italy by every tie of culture, commerce, and political ideal. This concentration of interest in its southern neighbor made it ignore a fact so important as the maritime development of the Hanse Towns, wherein lay the real promise of its future, the hope of its commercial and colonial expansion. The shifting of its historical center of gravity to the Atlantic seaboard therefore came late, further retarded by lack of national unity and national purposes. But the present wide circle of Germany's transoceanic commerce incident upon its recent industrial development, the phenomenal increase of its merchant marine, the growth of Hamburg and Bremen, the construction of ship canals to that short North Sea coast, and the enormous utilization of Dutch ports for German commerce, all point to the attraction of distant economic interests, even when meagerly supported by colonial possessions.

The situation in Germany was typical of the shift in focus. From the tenth century until the mid-sixteenth century, this successor of the old Roman Empire was drawn to Italy by cultural, commercial, and political connections. This focus on its southern neighbor led it to overlook a significant fact: the maritime growth of the Hanse Towns, which held the real promise for its future and the potential for economic and colonial expansion. The move of its historical center of gravity to the Atlantic coast happened late and was further delayed by a lack of national unity and purpose. However, the current broad scope of Germany's transoceanic commerce, arising from its recent industrial growth, the huge increase in its merchant fleet, the development of Hamburg and Bremen, the creation of ship canals along the short North Sea coast, and the extensive use of Dutch ports for German trade, all highlight the attraction of distant economic interests, even when minimally backed by colonial holdings.

Location, therefore, while it is the most important single geographic factor, is at the same time the one most subject to the vicissitudes attending the anthropo-geographical evolution of the earth. Its value changes with the transfer of the seats of the higher civilizations from sub-tropical to temperate lands; from the margin of enclosed sea to the hem of the open ocean; from small, naturally defined territories to large, elastic areas; from mere periphery to a combination of periphery and interior, commanding at once the freedom of the sea and the resources of a wide hinterland.

Location is the most crucial geographic factor, but it's also the one most affected by the changes that come with the human-geographic development of the earth. Its significance shifts as higher civilizations move from subtropical regions to temperate areas; from the edges of enclosed seas to the borders of the open ocean; from small, clearly defined territories to large, flexible regions; and from mere outskirts to a mix of outskirts and interior regions, controlling both the freedom of the sea and the resources of a broad hinterland.

Contrasted historical sides.

Even in Europe, however, where the Atlantic leaning of all the states is so marked as to suggest a certain dependence, the strength of this one-sided attraction is weakened by the complexity and closeness of the vicinal grouping of the several nations. Germany's reliance upon the neighboring grain fields of Russia and Hungary and the leather of the southern steppes counteracts somewhat the far-off magnet of America's wheat and cattle. England experienced a radical change of geographic front with the sailing of the Cabots; but the enormous tonnage entering and passing from the North Sea and Channel ports for her European trade258 show the attraction of the nearby Continent. Oftentimes we find two sides of a country each playing simultaneously a different, yet an equally important historical part, and thus distributing the historical activities, while diversifying the historical development of the people. The young United States were profoundly influenced as to national ideals and their eventual territorial career by the free, eager life and the untrammeled enterprise of its wilderness frontier beyond the Alleghenies, while through the Atlantic seaboard it was kept in steadying contact with England and the inherited ideals of the race. Russia is subjected to different influences on its various fronts; it is progressive, industrial, socialistic on its European side in Poland; expansive and radical in a different way in colonial Siberia; aggressive in the south, bending its energies toward political expansion along the Mediterranean and Persian Gulf seaboards. In all such countries there is a constant shifting and readjustment of extra-territorial influences.

Even in Europe, where the Atlantic influence on all the states is so strong that it suggests a certain dependence, this attraction is weakened by the complexity and proximity of neighboring countries. Germany's reliance on the nearby grain fields of Russia and Hungary and the leather from the southern steppes somewhat counteracts the distant pull of America's wheat and cattle. England underwent a significant geographic shift with the sailing of the Cabots; however, the huge volume of trade flowing through the North Sea and Channel ports for its European trade shows the attraction of the nearby continent. Often, we see two sides of a country each playing a different but equally important historical role, distributing historical activities and diversifying the historical development of its people. The young United States were deeply impacted in terms of national ideals and their eventual territorial growth by the free, vibrant life and unrestricted opportunities of the wilderness frontier beyond the Alleghenies, while the Atlantic seaboard kept it in steady contact with England and the inherited ideals of its race. Russia experiences different influences on its various fronts; it is progressive, industrial, and socialistic on its European side in Poland; expansive and radical in a different way in colonial Siberia; aggressive in the south, directing its efforts toward political expansion along the Mediterranean and Persian Gulf coasts. In all such countries, there is a constant shifting and readjustment of external influences.

One-sided historical relations.

It is otherwise in states of very simple vicinal grouping, coupled with only a single country or at best two. Spain, from the time Hamilcar Barca made it a colony of ancient Carthage, down to the decline of its Saracen conquerors, was historically linked with Africa. Freeman calls attention to "the general law by which, in almost all periods of history, either the masters of Spain have borne rule in Africa or the masters of Africa have borne rule in Spain." The history of such simply located countries tends to have a correspondingly one-sided character. Portugal's development has been under the exclusive influence of Spain, except for the oversea stimuli brought to it by the Atlantic. England's long southern face close to the French coast had for centuries the effect of interweaving its history with that of its southern neighbor. The conspicuous fact in the foreign history of Japan has been its intimate connection with Korea above all the other states.259 Egypt, which projects as an alluvial peninsula into an ocean of desert from southwestern Asia, has seen its history, from the time of the Shepherd Kings to that of Napoleon, repeatedly linked with Palestine and Syria. Every Asiatic or European conquest of these two countries has eventually been extended to the valley of the Nile; and Egypt's one great period of expansion saw this eastern coast of the Mediterranean as far as the Euphrates united to the dominion of the Pharaohs. Here is a one-sided geographical location in an exaggerated form, emphasized by the physical and political barrenness of the adjacent regions of Africa and the strategic importance of the isthmian district between the Mediterranean and Indian Ocean.

It's different in regions with very simple nearby groupings, connected mainly to just one country or at most two. Spain, since Hamilcar Barca turned it into a colony of ancient Carthage, and continuing until the decline of its Saracen conquerors, has had a historical link with Africa. Freeman highlights "the general law that, in almost all periods of history, either those in charge of Spain have ruled over Africa or vice versa." The history of such simply located countries tends to be pretty one-sided. Portugal's development has been shaped solely by Spain, apart from the overseas influences brought in by the Atlantic. England's long southern coast near France has intertwined its history with that of its southern neighbor for centuries. A notable point in Japan's foreign history is its close relationship with Korea above all other states. Egypt, which juts out as an alluvial peninsula into a sea of desert from southwestern Asia, has seen its history, from the time of the Shepherd Kings to Napoleon's era, consistently connected with Palestine and Syria. Every Asian or European conquest of these two regions has eventually influenced the Nile Valley; and Egypt's only significant period of expansion included the eastern Mediterranean coast all the way to the Euphrates under the Pharaohs' control. This represents an extreme example of a one-sided geographical position, accentuated by the physical and political barrenness of the neighboring regions in Africa and the strategic significance of the isthmian area between the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean.

Scattered location due to geographic conditions.

The forms of vicinal location thus far considered presuppose a compact or continuous distribution, such as characterizes the more fertile and populous areas of the earth. Desert regions, whether due to Arctic cold or extreme aridity, distribute their sparse population in small groups at a few favored points, and thus from physical causes give rise to the anthropo-geographical phenomenon of scattered location. Districts of intense cold, which sustain life only in contact with marine supplies of food, necessitate an intermittent distribution along the seaboard, with long, unoccupied stretches between. This is the location we are familiar with among the Eskimo of Greenland and Alaska, among the Norse and Lapps in the rugged Norwegian province of Finmarken, where over two-thirds of the population live by fishing. In the interior districts of this province about Karasjok and Kantokeino, the reindeer Lapps show a corresponding scattered grouping here and there on the inhospitable slopes of the mountains.260 In that one-half of Switzerland lying above the altitude where agriculture is possible, population is sprinkled at wide intervals over the sterile surface of the highlands.

The types of nearby locations we’ve looked at so far assume a compact or continuous arrangement, like what you find in the more fertile and populated areas of the world. Desert regions, whether because of Arctic cold or extreme dryness, spread their sparse populations in small groups at a few favored spots, leading to the geographical phenomenon of scattered populations. Areas of intense cold, which can only support life when they are near marine food supplies, require a scattered distribution along the coast, with long stretches in between that are uninhabited. This is similar to what we see among the Eskimo in Greenland and Alaska, as well as the Norse and Lapps in the rugged Norwegian province of Finmarken, where more than two-thirds of the population relies on fishing. In the interior areas of this province around Karasjok and Kantokeino, the reindeer Lapps exhibit a similar scattered arrangement here and there on the harsh mountain slopes.260 In the part of Switzerland that lies above the altitude where farming is feasible, the population is spread out at wide intervals across the barren highlands.

A somewhat similar scattered location is found in arid deserts, where population is restricted to the oases dropped here and there at wide intervals amid the waste of sand. But unlike those fragments of human life on the frozen outskirts of the habitable world, the oasis states usually constitute links in a chain of connection across the desert between the fertile lands on either side, and therefore form part of a series, in which the members maintain firm and necessary economic relations. Every caravan route across the Sahara is dotted by a series of larger or smaller tribal settlements. Tripoli, Sokna, Murzuk, Bilma and Bornu form one such chain; Algiers, El Golea, Twat, the salt mines of Taudeni, Arawan and Timbuctoo, another. Bagdad, Hayil, Boreyda and Mecca trace the road of pilgrim and merchant starting from the Moslem land of the Euphrates to the shrine of Mohammed.261

A somewhat similar scattered situation can be found in dry deserts, where the population is limited to the oases that appear at intervals amid the sandy wasteland. However, unlike those isolated patches of human existence on the frozen edges of the habitable world, the oasis towns usually serve as connections in a chain across the desert linking the fertile lands on either side, and thus they form part of a system where each location has vital economic ties. Every caravan route across the Sahara is marked by a series of larger or smaller tribal communities. Tripoli, Sokna, Murzuk, Bilma, and Bornu create one such chain; Algiers, El Golea, Twat, the salt mines of Taudeni, Arawan, and Timbuctoo form another. Baghdad, Hayil, Boreyda, and Mecca outline the path for pilgrims and traders traveling from the Muslim regions of the Euphrates to the shrine of Mohammed.261

Distribution Of Settlement In The Norwegian Province Of Finmarken.

Distribution Of Settlement In The Norwegian Province Of Finmarken.

Distribution Of Settlement In The Norwegian Province Of Finmarken.

Distribution of Settlement in the Norwegian Province of Finnmark.

Island way station on maritime routes.

Not unlike this serial grouping of oasis states along caravan routes through the desert are the island way stations that rise out of the waste of the sea and are connected by the great maritime routes of trade. Such are the Portuguese Madeiras, Bissagos, and San Thomé on the line between Lisbon and Portuguese Loanda in West Africa; and their other series of the Madeiras, Cape Verde, and Fernando, which facilitated communication with Pernambuco when Brazil was a Portuguese colony. The classic example of this serial grouping is found in the line of islands, physical or political, which trace England's artery of communication with India—Gibraltar, Malta, Cyprus, Perim, Aden, Sokotra, and Ceylon, besides her dominant position at Suez.

Similar to the series of oasis states along caravan routes through the desert, there are island way stations that rise out of the sea and are linked by major maritime trade routes. Examples include the Portuguese Madeiras, Bissagos, and San Thomé, located on the path between Lisbon and Portuguese Loanda in West Africa; along with other islands like the Madeiras, Cape Verde, and Fernando, which helped in connecting with Pernambuco when Brazil was a Portuguese colony. A classic instance of this series can be seen in the line of islands, whether physical or political, that connect England with India—Gibraltar, Malta, Cyprus, Perim, Aden, Sokotra, and Ceylon, in addition to its crucial position at Suez.

Scattered location of primitive tribes.

Quite different from this scattered distribution, due to physical conditions, in an otherwise uninhabited waste is that wide dispersal of a people in small detached groups which is the rule in lower stages of culture, and which bespeaks the necessity of relatively large territorial reserves for the uneconomic method of land utilization characteristic of hunting, fishing, pastoral nomadism, and primitive agriculture. A distribution which claims large areas, without, however, maintaining exclusive possession or complete occupation, indicates among advanced peoples an unfinished process,262 especially unfinished expansion, such as marked the early French and English colonies in America and the recent Russian occupation of Siberia. Among primitive peoples it is the normal condition, belongs to the stage of civilization, not to any one land or any one race, though it has been called the American form of distribution.

Very different from this scattered distribution, due to physical conditions, in an otherwise uninhabited wasteland is the widespread dispersal of people in small, separate groups, which is typical in lower stages of culture. This situation reflects the need for relatively large territorial reserves for the inefficient ways of using land that are characteristic of hunting, fishing, pastoral nomadism, and primitive agriculture. A distribution that covers large areas without maintaining exclusive possession or full occupation indicates an unfinished process among advanced societies, especially incomplete expansion, like what characterized the early French and English colonies in America and the recent Russian occupation of Siberia. For primitive peoples, this is the normal condition, relating to the stage of civilization, not tied to any specific land or race, even though it has been referred to as the American form of distribution.

Not only are villages and encampments widely dispersed, but also the tribal territories. The Tupis were found by the Portuguese explorers along the coast of eastern Brazil and in the interior from the mouth of the La Plata to the lower Amazon, while two distant tribes of the Tupis were dropped down amid a prevailing Arawak population far away among the foothills of the Andes in two separate localities on the western Amazon.263 [See map page 101.] The Athapascans, from their great compact northern area between Hudson Bay, the Saskatchewan River, and the Eskimo shores of the Arctic Ocean sent southward a detached offshoot comprising the Navajos, Apaches and Lipans, who were found along the Rio Grande from its source almost to its mouth; and several smaller fragments westward who were scattered along the Pacific seaboard from Puget Sound to northern California.264 The Cherokees of the southern Appalachians and the Tuscaroras of eastern North Carolina were detached groups of the Iroquois, who had their chief seat about the lower Great Lakes and the St. Lawrence. Virginia and North Carolina harbored also several tribes of Sioux,265 who were also represented in southern Mississippi by the small Biloxi nation, though the chief Sioux area lay between the Arkansas and Saskatchewan rivers. Similarly the Caddoes of Louisiana and eastern Texas had one remote offshoot on the Platte River and another, the Arikaras, on the upper Missouri near its great bend. [See map page 54.] But the territory of the Caddoes, in turn, was sprinkled with Choctaws, who belonged properly east of the Mississippi, but who in 1803 were found scattered in fixed villages or wandering groups near the Bayou Teche, on the Red River, the Washita, and the Arkansas.266 Their villages were frequently interspersed with others of the Biloxi Sioux.

Not only are villages and camps widely spread out, but so are the tribal territories. The Tupis were discovered by Portuguese explorers along the eastern coast of Brazil and in the interior from the mouth of the La Plata to the lower Amazon. Meanwhile, two distant tribes of the Tupis were located among a predominant Arawak population far away in the foothills of the Andes in two separate locations on the western Amazon.263 [See map page 101.] The Athapascans, from their large compact northern area between Hudson Bay, the Saskatchewan River, and the Eskimo shores of the Arctic Ocean, sent a splinter group southward that included the Navajos, Apaches, and Lipans, who were found along the Rio Grande from its source almost to its mouth, and several smaller groups that were scattered along the Pacific coastline from Puget Sound to northern California.264 The Cherokees from the southern Appalachians and the Tuscaroras from eastern North Carolina were separate groups of the Iroquois, who primarily inhabited the area around the lower Great Lakes and the St. Lawrence. Virginia and North Carolina also had several tribes of Sioux,265 who were additionally found in southern Mississippi through the small Biloxi nation, although the main Sioux region stretched between the Arkansas and Saskatchewan rivers. Similarly, the Caddoes of Louisiana and eastern Texas had one distant offshoot along the Platte River and another, the Arikaras, along the upper Missouri near its great bend. [See map page 54.] However, the Caddoes’ territory was also dotted with Choctaws, who properly belonged east of the Mississippi but were found scattered in fixed villages or wandering groups near Bayou Teche, on the Red River, the Washita, and the Arkansas in 1803.266 Their villages were often mixed with those of the Biloxi Sioux.

This fragmentary distribution appears in Africa among people in parallel stages of civilization. Dr. Junker found it as a universal phenomenon in Central Africa along the watershed between the White Nile and the Welle-Congo. Here the territory of the dominant Zandeh harbored a motley collection of shattered tribes, remnants of peoples, and intruding or refugee colonies from neighboring districts.267 The few weak bonds between people and soil characterizing retarded races are insufficient to secure permanent residence in the face of a diminished game supply, as in the case of the Choctaws above cited, or of political disturbance or oppression, or merely the desire for greater independence, as in that of so many African tribes.

This uneven distribution is seen in Africa among groups at similar levels of civilization. Dr. Junker observed it as a widespread phenomenon in Central Africa along the divide between the White Nile and the Welle-Congo. In this area, the powerful Zandeh territory included a mixed group of broken tribes, remnants of other peoples, and arriving or displaced communities from nearby regions.267 The few weak connections between people and land that define less developed races aren’t enough to ensure permanent settlement when faced with a declining supply of game, like in the case of the Choctaws mentioned earlier, or due to political unrest or oppression, or simply the wish for more freedom, as seen with many African tribes.

Distribution Of Population In The United States In 1800.

Distribution Of Population In The United States In 1800.

Distribution Of Population In The United States In 1800.

Distribution Of Population In The United States In 1800.

Ethnic islands of expansion.

A scattered location results in all stages of civilization when an expanding or intruding people begins to appropriate the territory of a different race. Any long continued infiltration, whether peaceful or aggressive, results in race islands or archipelagoes distributed through a sea of aborigines. Semitic immigration from southern Arabia has in this way striped and polka-dotted the surface of Hamitic Abyssinia.268 Groups of pure German stock are to-day scattered through the Baltic and Polish provinces of Russia.269 [See map page 223.] In ancient times the advance guard of Teutonic migration crossed the Rhenish border of Gaul, selected choice sites here and there, after the manner of Ariovistus, and appeared as enclaves in the encompassing Gallic population. While the Anahuac plateau of Mexico formed the center of the Aztec or Nahuatl group of Indians, outlying colonies of this stock occurred among the Maya people of the Tehuantepec region, and in Guatemala and Nicaragua.270

A scattered location leads to all stages of civilization when an expanding or invading group starts to take over the land of another race. Any prolonged infiltration, whether peaceful or aggressive, results in racial islands or archipelagos sprinkled throughout a sea of indigenous people. Semitic migration from southern Arabia has, in this way, striped and polka-dotted the landscape of Hamitic Abyssinia.268 Pure German groups are now scattered across the Baltic and Polish regions of Russia.269 [See map page 223.] In ancient times, the advance guard of Teutonic migration crossed the Rhine border of Gaul, picked prime locations here and there, similar to Ariovistus, and appeared as enclaves within the surrounding Gallic population. While the Anahuac plateau of Mexico was the center of the Aztec or Nahuatl group of Indians, outlying colonies of this group were found among the Maya people of the Tehuantepec region, as well as in Guatemala and Nicaragua.270

Such detached fragments or rather spores of settlement characterize all young geographical boundaries, where ethnic and political frontiers are still in the making. The early French, English, Dutch, and Swedish settlements in America took the form of archipelagoes in a surrounding sea of Indian-owned forest land; and in 1800, beyond the frontier of continuous settlement in the United States long slender peninsulas and remote outlying islands of white occupation indicated American advance at the cost of the native. Similarly the Portuguese, at the end of the sixteenth century, seized and fortified detached points along the coast of East Africa at Sofala, Malindi, Mombassa, Kilwa, Lamu, Zanzibar and Barava, which served as way stations for Portuguese ships bound for India, and were outposts of expansion from their Moçambique territory.271 The snow-muffled forests of northern Siberia have their solitudes broken at wide intervals by Russian villages, located only along the streams for fishing, gold-washing and trading with the native. These lonely clearings are outposts of the broad band of Muscovite settlement which stretches across southern Siberia from the Ural Mountains to the Angara River.272 [See map page 103.]

Such separate bits or rather seeds of settlement define all young geographical borders, where ethnic and political lines are still being established. The early French, English, Dutch, and Swedish settlements in America resembled islands in a surrounding sea of Native American-owned forest land; and by 1800, beyond the frontier of continuous settlement in the United States, long narrow peninsulas and remote outlying islands of white habitation marked American progress at the expense of the native people. Similarly, the Portuguese, at the end of the sixteenth century, took and fortified separate points along the coast of East Africa at Sofala, Malindi, Mombassa, Kilwa, Lamu, Zanzibar, and Barava, which served as way stations for Portuguese ships heading to India and were outposts of expansion from their Moçambique territory.271 The snow-covered forests of northern Siberia are intermittently interrupted by Russian villages, situated only along streams for fishing, gold-washing, and trading with the locals. These isolated clearings are outposts of the extensive band of Muscovite settlement that stretches across southern Siberia from the Ural Mountains to the Angara River.272 [See map page 103.]

Political islands of expansion.

The most exaggerated example of scattered political location existing to-day is found in the bizarre arrangement of European holdings on the west coast of Africa between the Senegal and Congo rivers. Here in each case a handful of governing whites is dropped down in the midst of a dark-skinned population in several districts along the coast. The six detached seaboard colonies of the French run back in the interior into a common French-owned hinterland formed by the Sahara and western Sudan, which since 1894 link the Guinea Coast colonies with French Algeria and Tunis; but the various British holdings have no territorial cohesion at any point, nor have the Spanish or Portuguese or German. The scattered location of these different European possessions is for the most part the expression of a young colonizing activity, developed in the past fifty years, and signalized by the vigorous intrusion of the French and Germans into the field. To the anthropo-geographer the map of western Africa presents the picture of a political situation wholly immature, even embryonic. The history of similar scattered outposts of political expansion in America, India and South Africa teaches us to look for extensive consolidation.

The most extreme example of fragmented political territory today is seen in the strange layout of European territories on the west coast of Africa between the Senegal and Congo rivers. In this area, a small number of governing white officials are placed among a largely dark-skinned population in several coastal districts. The six separate French coastal colonies extend inland into a shared French-controlled hinterland made up of the Sahara and western Sudan, which since 1894 connects the Guinea Coast colonies with French Algeria and Tunis. However, the various British territories lack any territorial unity, and the same goes for the Spanish, Portuguese, and Germans. The scattered nature of these different European possessions mostly reflects a young colonization effort that has developed over the last fifty years, marked by the strong encroachment of the French and Germans into this region. For the anthropo-geographer, the map of western Africa illustrates a political situation that is completely underdeveloped, almost embryonic. The history of similar dispersed outposts of political expansion in America, India, and South Africa teaches us to expect significant consolidation.

Ethnic islands of survival.

Race islands occur also when a land is so inundated by a tide of invasion or continuous colonization that the original inhabitants survive only as detached remnants, where protecting natural conditions, such as forests, jungles, mountains or swamps, provide an asylum, or where a sterile soil or rugged plateau has failed to attract the cupidity of the conqueror. The dismembered race, especially one in a lower status of civilization, can be recognized as such islands of survival by their divided distribution in less favored localities, into which they have fled, and in which seldom can they increase and recombine to recover their lost heritage. In Central Africa, between the watersheds of the Nile, Congo and Zambesi, there is scarcely a large native state that does not shelter in its forests scattered groups of dwarf hunter folk variously known as Watwa, Batwa, and Akka.273 They serve the agricultural tribes as auxiliaries in war, and trade with them in meat and ivory, but also rob their banana groves and manioc patches. The local dispersion of these pygmies in small isolated groups among stronger peoples points to them as survivals of a once wide-spread aboriginal race, another branch of which, as Schweinfurth suggested, is probably found in the dwarfed Bushmen and Hottentots of South Africa.274 [See map page 105.]

Race islands also occur when a land is so overwhelmed by a tide of invasion or ongoing colonization that the original inhabitants survive only as isolated remnants. In these cases, natural conditions like forests, jungles, mountains, or swamps offer them sanctuary, or areas with poor soil or harsh terrain have failed to attract the greed of the conquerors. The fragmented race, particularly those in a lower level of civilization, can be identified as these islands of survival by their scattered presence in less favorable locations, where they have sought refuge and where they rarely have the chance to grow and come together again to reclaim their lost heritage. In Central Africa, between the watersheds of the Nile, Congo, and Zambezi, there is hardly a significant native state that doesn’t host, in its forests, scattered groups of dwarf hunter-gatherers known as Watwa, Batwa, and Akka.273 They assist the agricultural tribes in warfare and trade with them for meat and ivory, but also steal from their banana groves and manioc patches. The local distribution of these pygmies in small, isolated groups among stronger communities indicates that they are remnants of a once widespread indigenous race, another branch of which, as Schweinfurth suggested, is likely found in the diminutive Bushmen and Hottentots of South Africa.274 [See map page 105.]

Similar in distribution and in mode of life are the aborigines of the Philippines, the dwarf Negritos, who are still found inhabiting the forests in various localities. They are dispersed through eight provinces of Luzon and in several other islands, generally in the interior, whither they have been driven by the invading Malays.275 [See map page 147.] But the Negritos crop out again in the mountain interior of Formosa and Borneo, in the eastern peninsula of Celebes, and in various islands of the Malay Archipelago as far east as Ceram and Flores, amid a prevailing Malay stock. Toward the west they come to the surface in the central highland of Malacca, in the Nicobar and Andaman Islands, and in several mountain and jungle districts of India. Here again is the typical geographic distribution of a moribund aboriginal race, whose shrivelled patches merely dot the surface of their once wide territory.276 The aboriginal Kolarian tribes of India are found under the names of Bhils, Kols and Santals scattered about in the fastnesses of the Central Indian jungles, the Vindhyan Range, and in the Rajputana Desert, within the area covered by Indo-Aryan occupation.277 [See map page 103.]

Similar in distribution and way of life are the indigenous people of the Philippines, the dwarf Negritos, who still live in forests across various areas. They are spread across eight provinces of Luzon and in several other islands, mainly in the interior, where they have been pushed by incoming Malays.275 [See map page 147.] However, the Negritos also appear again in the mountainous interiors of Formosa and Borneo, in the eastern peninsula of Celebes, and in various islands of the Malay Archipelago as far east as Ceram and Flores, amid a dominant Malay population. To the west, they emerge in the central highlands of Malacca, in the Nicobar and Andaman Islands, and in several mountain and jungle areas of India. Here again is the typical geographic distribution of a declining indigenous race, whose sparse populations merely dot the remnants of their once vast territory.276 The indigenous Kolarian tribes of India are known as Bhils, Kols, and Santals, scattered throughout the remote areas of the Central Indian jungles, the Vindhyan Range, and in the Rajputana Desert, within the region occupied by Indo-Aryans.277 [See map page 103.]

Discontinuous distribution.

Such broad, intermittent dispersal is the anthropological prototype of the "discontinuous distribution" of biologists. By this they mean that certain types of plants and animals occur in widely separated regions, without the presence of any living representatives in the intermediate area. But they point to the rock records to show that the type once occupied the whole territory, till extensive elimination occurred, owing to changes in climatic or geologic conditions or to sharpened competition in the struggle for existence, with the result that the type survived only in detached localities offering a favorable environment.278 In animal and plant life, the ice invasion of the Glacial Age explains most of these islands of survival; in human life, the invasion of stronger peoples. The Finnish race, which in the ninth century covered nearly a third of European Russia, has been shattered by the blows of Slav expansion into numerous fragments which lie scattered about within the old ethnic boundary from the Arctic Ocean to the Don-Volga watershed.279 The encroachments of the whites upon the red men of America early resulted in their geographical dispersion. The map showing the distribution of population in 1830 reveals large detached areas of Indian occupancy embedded in the prevailing white territory.280 The rapid compression of the tribal lands and the introduction of the reservation system resulted in the present arrangement of yet smaller and more widely scattered groups. Such islands of survival tend constantly to contract and diminish in number with the growing progress, density, and land hunger of the surrounding race. The Kaffir islands and the Hottentot "locations" in South Africa, large as they now are, will repeat the history of the American Indian lands, a history of gradual shrinkage and disappearance as territorial entities.

Such widespread, sporadic dispersal is the anthropological example of the "discontinuous distribution" that biologists refer to. This means certain types of plants and animals are found in widely separated areas, with no living representatives in between. They cite rock records as evidence that the type once occupied the entire territory until significant losses occurred due to changes in climate or geology, or because of increased competition for survival. This resulted in the type surviving only in isolated areas that provided a favorable environment.278 In the case of animal and plant life, the ice age explains many of these survival islands; for human populations, it's the invasion of stronger groups. The Finnish people, who in the ninth century covered nearly a third of European Russia, have been fragmented by the expansion of Slavic peoples into numerous pieces scattered within the old ethnic boundaries stretching from the Arctic Ocean to the Don-Volga watershed.279 The encroachment of white settlers on the Native American populations early on led to their geographical dispersion. A map showing the population distribution in 1830 reveals large, isolated areas of Indian residency embedded within the predominantly white territories.280 The rapid reduction of tribal lands and the implementation of the reservation system resulted in the current arrangement of even smaller and more dispersed groups. These islands of survival tend to shrink and decrease in number as progress, population density, and land demand from the surrounding race continue to grow. The Kaffir islands and the Hottentot locations in South Africa, despite being large now, will follow the same trajectory as Native American lands: a history of gradual reduction and disappearance as distinct territorial entities.

Contrasted location.

Every land contains in close juxtaposition areas of sharply contrasted cultural, economic and political development, due to the influence of diverse natural locations emphasizing lines of ethnic cleavage made perhaps by some great historical struggle. In mountainous countries the conquered people withdraw to the less accessible heights and leave the fertile valleys to the victorious intruders. The two races are thus held apart, and the difference in their respective modes of life forced upon them by contrasted geographic conditions tends still farther for a time to accentuate their diversity. The contrasted location of the dislodged Alpine race, surviving in all the mountains and highlands of western Europe over against the Teutonic victors settled in the plains,281 has its parallel in many parts of Asia and Africa; it is almost always coupled with a corresponding contrast in mode of life, which is at least in part geographically determined. In Algeria, the Arab conquerors, who form the larger part of the population, are found in the plains where they live the life of nomads in their tents; the Berbers, who were the original inhabitants, driven back into the fastnesses of the Atlas ranges, form now an industrious, sedentary farmer class, living in stone houses, raising stock, and tilling their fields as if they were market gardeners.282 In the Andean states of South America, the eastern slopes of the Cordilleras, which are densely forested owing to their position in the course of the trade-winds, harbor wild, nomadic tribes of hunting and fishing Indians who differ in stock and culture from the Inca Indians settled in the drier Andean basins.283 [See map page 101.]

Every region has areas with sharply contrasting cultural, economic, and political developments, influenced by different natural environments that highlight ethnic divisions possibly created by significant historical conflicts. In mountainous nations, the conquered people tend to retreat to the more remote heights, leaving the fertile valleys to the victorious conquerors. This separation keeps the two groups apart, and the differences in their lifestyles, shaped by varying geographical conditions, continue to emphasize their diversity over time. The distinct location of the displaced Alpine people, who survive in the mountains and highlands of western Europe compared to the Teutonic victors settled in the plains,281 mirrors similar situations in many regions of Asia and Africa; it often comes with a corresponding difference in lifestyle, which is at least partly determined by geography. In Algeria, the Arab conquerors, who make up the majority of the population, live in the plains where they maintain a nomadic lifestyle in tents; the Berbers, the original inhabitants, have been pushed back into the rugged Atlas mountains and now form an industrious, settled farming community, living in stone houses, raising livestock, and cultivating their fields as if they were market gardeners.282 In the Andean states of South America, the eastern slopes of the Cordilleras, which are densely forested due to their position along the trade winds, are home to wild, nomadic tribes of hunting and fishing Indians who differ in ethnicity and culture from the Inca Indians who are settled in the dryer Andean valleys.283 [See map page 101.]

Geographical polarity.

Every geographical region of strongly marked character possesses a certain polarity, by reason of which it attracts certain racial or economic elements of population, and repels others. The predatory tribes of the desert are constantly reinforced by refugee outlaws from the settled agricultural communities along its borders.284 The mountains which offer a welcome asylum for the persecuted Waldenses have no lure for the money-making Jew, who is therefore rarely found there. The negroes of the United States are more and more congregating in the Gulf States, making the "Black Belt" blacker. The fertile tidewater plains of ante-bellum Virginia and Maryland had a rich, aristocratic white population of slave-holding planters; the mountain backwoods of the Appalachian ranges, whose conditions of soil and relief were ill adapted for slave cultivation, had attracted a poorer democratic farmer class, who tilled their small holdings by their own labor and consequently entertained little sympathy for the social and economic system of the tidewater country. This is the contrast between mountain and plain which is as old as humanity. It presented problems to the legislation of Solon, and caused West Virginia to split off from the mother State during the Civil War.285

Every distinctive geographic region has a certain polarity that attracts some racial or economic groups while pushing others away. The fierce tribes of the desert are continually bolstered by runaway outlaws from the settled agricultural communities nearby.284 The mountains, which provide refuge for the persecuted Waldenses, offer no appeal to the profit-seeking Jew, who is therefore seldom found there. African Americans in the United States are increasingly gathering in the Gulf States, making the "Black Belt" even more pronounced. The fertile tidewater plains of pre-Civil War Virginia and Maryland were home to a wealthy, elite white population of slave-owning planters, while the mountainous backwoods of the Appalachian ranges, which were not suitable for slave farming, attracted a poorer, more democratic class of farmers who worked their small plots themselves and thus had little sympathy for the social and economic system of the tidewater region. This contrast between mountains and plains is as old as humanity itself. It posed challenges for the legislation of Solon and led to West Virginia breaking away from the parent State during the Civil War.285

Each contrasted district has its own polarity; but with this it attracts not one but many of the disruptive forces which are pent up in every people or state. Certain conditions of climate, soil, and tillable area in the Southern States of the Union made slave labor remunerative, while opposite conditions in the North combined eventually to exclude it thence. Slave labor in the South brought with it in turn a whole train of social and economic consequences, notably the repulsion of foreign white immigration and the development of shiftless or wasteful industrial methods, which further sharpened the contrast between the two sections. The same contrast occurs in Italian territory between Sicily and Lombardy. Here location at the two extremities of the peninsula has involved a striking difference in ethnic infusions in the two districts, different historical careers owing to different vicinal grouping, and dissimilar geographic conditions. These effects operating together and attracting other minor elements of divergence, have conspired to emphasize the already strong contrast between northern and southern Italy.

Each contrasting region has its own characteristics; but along with this, it attracts not just one but many disruptive forces that are stored up in every people or state. Specific factors like climate, soil, and arable land in the Southern States of the Union made slave labor profitable, while opposing factors in the North eventually led to its exclusion there. Slave labor in the South brought about a whole series of social and economic consequences, notably pushing away foreign white immigration and developing inefficient or wasteful industrial practices, which further heightened the difference between the two regions. The same contrast exists in Italy between Sicily and Lombardy. Here, being located at the two ends of the peninsula has resulted in a significant difference in ethnic compositions in the two areas, different historical developments due to differing local groupings, and varying geographic conditions. These combined effects, along with other smaller elements of difference, have worked together to emphasize the already strong contrast between northern and southern Italy.

Geographical marks of growth.

In geographical location can be read the signs of growth or decay. There are racial and national areas whose form is indicative of development, expansion, while others show the symptoms of decline. The growing people seize all the geographic advantages within their reach, whether lying inside their boundaries or beyond. In the latter case, they promptly extend their frontiers to include the object of their desire, as the young United States did in the case of the Mississippi River and the Gulf coast. European peoples, like the Russians in Asia, all strive to reach the sea; and when they have got there, they proceed to embrace as big a strip of coast as possible. Therefore the whole colonization movement of western and central Europe was in the earlier periods restricted to coasts, although not to such an excessive degree as that of the Phoenicians and Greeks. Their own maritime location had instructed them as to the value of seaboards, and at the same time made this form of expansion the simplest and easiest.

In geographical location, you can see signs of growth or decline. There are racial and national regions whose shape indicates development and expansion, while others display signs of decline. Growing populations take advantage of all the geographic benefits available to them, whether within their borders or beyond. In the latter case, they quickly expand their boundaries to include what they desire, like the young United States did with the Mississippi River and the Gulf coast. European nations, such as the Russians in Asia, all aim to reach the sea; and once they arrive, they tend to claim as much coastline as possible. Therefore, the entire colonization effort of western and central Europe was earlier mostly limited to coastlines, though not as excessively as that of the Phoenicians and Greeks. Their own coastal position taught them the value of seaside areas, making this type of expansion the easiest and most straightforward.

Marks of inland expansion.

On the other hand, that growing people which finds its coastward advance blocked, and is therefore restricted to landward expansion, seizes upon every natural feature that will aid its purpose. It utilizes every valley highway and navigable river, as the Russians did in the case of the Dnieper, Don, Volga, Kama and Northern Dwina in their radial expansion from the Muscovite center at Moscow, and as later they used the icy streams of Siberia in their progress toward the Pacific; or as the Americans in their trans-continental advance used the Ohio, Tennessee, the Great Lakes, and the Missouri. They reach out toward every mountain pass leading to some choice ultramontane highway. Bulges or projecting angles of their frontier indicate the path they plan to follow, and always include or aim at some natural feature which will facilitate their territorial growth. The acquisition of the province of Ticino in 1512 gave the Swiss Confederation a foothold upon Lake Maggiore, perhaps the most important waterway of northern Italy, and the possession of the Val Leventina, which now carries the St. Gotthard Railroad down to the plains of the Po. Every bulge of Russia's Asiatic frontier, whether in the Trans-Caucasus toward the Mesopotamian basin and the Persian Gulf, or up the Murghab and Tedjend rivers toward the gates of Herat, is directed at some mountain pass and an outlet seaward beyond.

On the other hand, a growing population that finds its coastal expansion blocked and is thus forced to grow inland takes advantage of every natural feature that can help its cause. It makes use of every valley route and navigable river, just like the Russians did with the Dnieper, Don, Volga, Kama, and Northern Dwina as they expanded outward from Moscow, and later when they utilized the icy rivers of Siberia to move toward the Pacific. Similarly, the Americans used the Ohio, Tennessee, Great Lakes, and Missouri during their westward expansion. They reach for every mountain pass that leads to a desirable route. The outward curves or protruding angles of their border indicate the paths they plan to take, always targeting some natural feature that will support their territorial growth. The acquisition of the province of Ticino in 1512 provided the Swiss Confederation with access to Lake Maggiore, arguably the most significant waterway in northern Italy, along with the possession of Val Leventina, which now carries the St. Gotthard Railroad down to the Po plains. Every bulge in Russia's Asian frontier, whether in the Trans-Caucasus towards the Mesopotamian basin and the Persian Gulf or up the Murghab and Tedjend rivers towards Herat, is aimed at some mountain pass and a pathway to the sea beyond.

If this process of growth bring a people to the borders of a desert, there they halt perhaps for a time, but only, as it were, to take breath for a stride across the sand to the nearest oasis. The ancient Egyptians advanced by a chain of oases—Siwa, Angila, Sella and Sokna, across the Libyan Desert to the Syrtis Minor. The Russians in the last twenty-five years have spread across the arid wastes of Turkestan by way of the fertile spots of Khiva, Bukhara and Merv to the irrigated slopes of the Hindu Kush and Tian Shan Mountains. The French extended the boundaries of Algiers southward into the desert to include the caravan routes focusing at the great oases of Twat and Tidekelt, years before their recent appropriation of the western Sahara.

If this growth process leads a people to the edge of a desert, they might stop there for a while, but only to catch their breath before taking a leap across the sand to the nearest oasis. The ancient Egyptians progressed through a series of oases—Siwa, Angila, Sella, and Sokna—across the Libyan Desert to the Syrtis Minor. In the last twenty-five years, the Russians have expanded into the dry lands of Turkestan through the fertile areas of Khiva, Bukhara, and Merv to the irrigated slopes of the Hindu Kush and Tian Shan Mountains. The French pushed the boundaries of Algiers south into the desert to include the caravan routes centered around the major oases of Twat and Tidekelt, years before they recently took control of the western Sahara.

Marks of decline.

As territorial expansion is the mark of growth, so the sign of decline is the relinquishment of land that is valuable or necessary to a people's well-being. The gradual retreat of the Tartars and in part also of the Kirghis tribes from their best pasture lands along the Volga into the desert or steppes indicates their decrease of power, just as the withdrawal of the Indians from their hunting grounds in forest and prairie was the beginning of their decay. Bolivia maimed herself for all time when in 1884 she relinquished to Chile her one hundred and eighty miles of coast between the Rio Lao and the twenty-fourth parallel. Her repeated efforts later to recover at least one seaport on the Pacific indicate her own estimate of the loss by which she was limited to an inland location, and deprived of her maritime periphery.286

As territorial expansion signifies growth, the loss of valuable land that is essential for a community's well-being signifies decline. The slow retreat of the Tartars and, to some extent, the Kirghis tribes from their prime pasture lands along the Volga into the desert or steppes shows their diminishing power, similar to how the withdrawal of the Indians from their hunting grounds in forests and prairies marked the start of their downfall. Bolivia permanently harmed itself when, in 1884, it ceded its one hundred eighty miles of coastline between the Rio Lao and the twenty-fourth parallel to Chile. Her repeated attempts later to regain at least one seaport on the Pacific reflect her own acknowledgment of the loss that left her landlocked and stripped of her maritime access.286

Interpretation of scattered and marginal location.

The habits of a people and the consequent demands which they make upon their environment must be taken into account in judging whether or not a restricted geographical location is indicative of a retrograde process. The narrow marginal distribution of the Haida, Tlingit, and Tsimshean Indians on the islands and coastal strips of northwestern America means simply the selection of sites most congenial to those inveterate fisher tribes. The fact that the English in the vicinity of the Newfoundland Banks settled on a narrow rim of coast in order to exploit the fisheries, while the French peasants penetrated into the interior forests and farmlands of Canada, was no sign of territorial decline. English and French were both on the forward march, each in their own way. The scattered peripheral location of the Phoenician trading stations and later of the Greek colonies on the shores of the Mediterranean was the expression of the trading and maritime activity of those two peoples. Centuries later a similar distribution of Arab posts along the coast of East Africa, Madagascar and the western islands of the Sunda Archipelago indicated the great commercial expansion of the Mohammedan traders of Oman and Yemen. The lack came when this distribution, normal as a preliminary form, bore no fruit in the occupation of wide territorial bases. [See map page 251.]

The habits of a people and the resulting demands they place on their environment must be considered when judging whether a limited geographical area suggests a decline. The narrow range of the Haida, Tlingit, and Tsimshean Indians on the islands and coastal areas of northwestern America simply reflects their preference for locations that are ideal for these dedicated fishing tribes. The fact that the English near the Newfoundland Banks settled along a narrow coastal strip to take advantage of the fisheries, while the French farmers moved into the interior forests and farmland of Canada, didn't indicate a decline in territory. Both the English and French were progressing forward, each in their own way. The scattered locations of the Phoenician trading posts and later Greek colonies along the Mediterranean coasts represented the trading and maritime activity of those cultures. Centuries later, a similar spread of Arab trading posts along the coasts of East Africa, Madagascar, and the western islands of the Sunda Archipelago showed the significant commercial expansion of the Muslim traders from Oman and Yemen. The issue arose when this distribution, which was normal as a starting point, failed to lead to the establishment of substantial territorial holdings. [See map page 251.]

Prevalence of ethnic islands of decline.

In general, however, any piecemeal or marginal location of a people justifies the question as to whether it results from encroachment, dismemberment, and consequently national or racial decline. This inference as a rule strikes the truth. The abundance of such ethnic islands and reefs—some scarcely distinguishable above the flood of the surrounding population—is due to the fact that when the area of distribution of any life form, whether racial or merely animal, is for any cause reduced, it does not merely contract but breaks up into detached fragments. These isolated groups often give the impression of being emigrants from the original home who, in some earlier period of expansion, had occupied this outlying territory. At the dawn of western European history, Gaul was the largest and most compact area of Celtic speech. For this reason it has been regarded as the land whence sprang the Celts of Britain, the Iberian Peninsula, the Alps and northern Italy. Freeman thinks that the Gauls of the Danube and Po valleys were detachments which had been left behind in the great Celtic migration toward the west;287 but does not consider the possibility of a once far more extensive Celtic area, which, as a matter of fact, once reached eastward to the Weser River and the Sudetes Mountains and was later dismembered.288 The islands of Celtic speech which now mark the western flank of Great Britain and Ireland are shrunken fragments of a Celtic linguistic area which, as place-names indicate, once comprised the whole country.289 Similarly, all over Russia Finnic place-names testify to the former occupation of the country by a people now submerged by the immigrant Slavs, except where they emerge in ethnic islands in the far north and about the elbow of the Volga.290 [See map page 225.] Beyond the compact area of the Melanesian race occupying New Guinea and the islands eastward to the Fiji and Loyalty groups, are found scattered patches of negroid folk far to the westward, relegated to the interiors of islands and peninsulas. The dispersed and fragmentary distribution of this negroid stock has suggested that it formed the older and primitive race of a wide region extending from India to Fiji and possibly even beyond.291

In general, however, any small or marginal presence of a group raises the question of whether it results from encroachment, disintegration, and consequently national or racial decline. This assumption typically reflects the truth. The presence of numerous ethnic enclaves and isolated communities—some barely noticeable among the surrounding population—occurs because when the range of distribution of any life form, whether racial or just animal, is reduced for any reason, it doesn’t just shrink but breaks apart into separate bits. These isolated groups often seem like emigrants from the original homeland who, at some earlier point of expansion, settled in this outlying area. At the beginning of western European history, Gaul was the largest and most unified area of Celtic language. For this reason, it has been seen as the origin of the Celts in Britain, the Iberian Peninsula, the Alps, and northern Italy. Freeman believes that the Gauls in the Danube and Po valleys were detachments left behind during the great Celtic migration to the west;287 but he doesn’t consider the possibility of a much larger Celtic area that once extended east to the Weser River and the Sudetes Mountains, which was later fragmented.288 The areas in western Great Britain and Ireland with Celtic speech are diminished remnants of a once extensive Celtic linguistic region that, as place-names show, used to encompass the entire country.289 Similarly, across Russia, Finnic place-names indicate the previous occupation of the land by a people now overshadowed by Slavic immigrants, except where they resurface in ethnic enclaves in the far north and around the bend of the Volga.290 [See map page 225.] Beyond the concentrated region of the Melanesian race in New Guinea and the islands eastward to the Fiji and Loyalty groups, there are scattered groups of negroid people far to the west, confined to the interiors of islands and peninsulas. The uneven and fragmented distribution of this negroid stock suggests that it represented the older, more primitive race of a vast area stretching from India to Fiji, and possibly even beyond.291

Contrast between ethnic islands of growth and decline.

Ethnic or political islands of decline can be distinguished from islands of expansion by various marks. When survivals of an inferior people, they are generally characterized by inaccessible or unfavorable geographic location. When remnants of former large colonial possessions of modern civilized nations, they are characterized by good or even excellent location, but lack a big compact territory nearby to which they stand in the relation of outpost. Such are the Portuguese fragments on the west coast of India at Goa, Damaon, and Diu Island, and the Portuguese half of the island of Timor with the islet of Kambing in the East Indies. Such also are the remnants of the French empire in India, founded by the genius of François Dupleix, which are located on the seaboard at Chandarnagar, Carical, Pondicherry, Yanaon and Mahe. They tell the geographer a far different story from that of the small detached French holding of Kwang-chan Bay and Nao-chan Island on the southern coast of China, which are outposts of the vigorous French colony of Tongking.

Ethnic or political islands of decline can be identified from islands of expansion by various indicators. When they are remnants of an inferior group, they are usually found in difficult or hard-to-reach geographic locations. When they are leftovers from former large colonial territories of modern civilized nations, they typically have good or even excellent locations, but lack a substantial nearby territory that they relate to as an outpost. Examples include the Portuguese remnants on the west coast of India at Goa, Damaon, and Diu Island, as well as the Portuguese half of the island of Timor and the islet of Kambing in the East Indies. The same goes for the remnants of the French empire in India, established by the genius of François Dupleix, which are located along the coast at Chandarnagar, Carical, Pondicherry, Yanaon, and Mahe. They reveal a very different story than that of the small detached French holdings of Kwang-chan Bay and Nao-chan Island on the southern coast of China, which serve as outposts of the thriving French colony of Tongking.

The scattered islands of an intrusive people, bent upon conquest or colonization, are distinguished by a choice of sites favorable to growth and consolidation, and by the rapid extension of their boundaries until that consolidation is achieved; while the people themselves give signs of the rapid differentiation incident to adaptation to a new environment.

The scattered islands of an invading people, focused on conquest or colonization, are marked by their selection of locations that are ideal for growth and stability, as well as the quick expansion of their borders until that stability is reached; meanwhile, the people themselves show clear signs of the fast changes that come with adapting to a new environment.


NOTES TO CHAPTER V

Notes to Chapter V


239.

Anatole Leroy-Beaulieu, The Empire of the Tsars, Vol. I. pp. 98-101. New York. 1893.

Anatole Leroy-Beaulieu, The Empire of the Tsars, Vol. I. pp. 98-101. New York. 1893.

240.

George Adam Smith, Historical Geography of the Holy Land, pp. 5-8, 12, 13, 19-28, 37. New York, 1897.

George Adam Smith, Historical Geography of the Holy Land, pp. 5-8, 12, 13, 19-28, 37. New York, 1897.

241.

W.Z. Ripley, Races of Europe, pp. 272-273. New York, 1899.

W.Z. Ripley, Races of Europe, pp. 272-273. New York, 1899.

242.

Monette, History of the Valley of the Mississippi, Vol. II, chap. I. 1846.

Monette, History of the Valley of the Mississippi, Vol. II, chap. I. 1846.

243.

W.Z. Ripley, Races of Europe, pp. 336, 334. Map. p. 53. New York, 1899.

W.Z. Ripley, Races of Europe, pp. 336, 334. Map. p. 53. New York, 1899.

244.

J. Partsch, Central Europe, p. 137. London, 1903.

J. Partsch, Central Europe, p. 137. London, 1903.

245.

Eleventh Census, Report for Alaska, pp. 66, 67, 70. Washington, 1893.

Eleventh Census, Report for Alaska, pp. 66, 67, 70. Washington, 1893.

246.

Livingstone, Travels in South Africa, p. 56. New York, 1858.

Livingstone, Travels in South Africa, p. 56. New York, 1858.

247.

Anatole Leroy-Beaulieu, The Empire of the Tsars, Vol I, pp. 36, 108. New York, 1893.

Anatole Leroy-Beaulieu, The Empire of the Tsars, Vol I, pp. 36, 108. New York, 1893.

248.

Boyd Alexander, From the Niger to the Nile, Vol. II, pp. 127-130, 170. London, 1907.

Boyd Alexander, From the Niger to the Nile, Vol. II, pp. 127-130, 170. London, 1907.

249.

James Bryce, Impressions of South Africa, pp. 147, 150, 170-173. New York, 1897.

James Bryce, Impressions of South Africa, pp. 147, 150, 170-173. New York, 1897.

250.

Alexander P. Engelhardt, A Russian Province of the North, pp. 135, 140-147, 165, 170. Translated from the Russian. London, 1899.

Alexander P. Engelhardt, A Russian Province of the North, pp. 135, 140-147, 165, 170. Translated from the Russian. London, 1899.

251.

For full and able discussion, see H. J. Mackinder, The Geographical Pivot of History, in the Geographical Journal, April, 1904. London.

For a complete and thorough discussion, see H. J. Mackinder, The Geographical Pivot of History, in the Geographical Journal, April, 1904. London.

252.

The Anglo-Russian Agreement, with map, in The Independent, October, 10, 1907.

The Anglo-Russian Agreement, along with a map, in The Independent, October 10, 1907.

253.

Spencer and Gillen, The Northern Tribes of Central Australia, p. xii. London, 1904.

Spencer and Gillen, The Northern Tribes of Central Australia, p. xii. London, 1904.

254.

Census of the Philippine Islands, Vol. I, p. 526; Vol II, pp. 34-35, 50-52 and map. Washington, 1903.

Census of the Philippine Islands, Vol. I, p. 526; Vol II, pp. 34-35, 50-52 and map. Washington, 1903.

255.

Grote, History of Greece, Vol. II, pp. 225-226. New York, 1859.

Grote, History of Greece, Vol. II, pp. 225-226. New York, 1859.

256.

W.Z. Ripley, The Races of Europe, pp. 402-410, map. New York, 1899.

W.Z. Ripley, The Races of Europe, pp. 402-410, map. New York, 1899.

257.

Frederick J. Turner, The Significance of the Frontier in American History, in the Annual Report of the American Historical Association for 1893, pp. 199-227. Washington, 1894.

Frederick J. Turner, The Significance of the Frontier in American History, in the Annual Report of the American Historical Association for 1893, pp. 199-227. Washington, 1894.

258.

Hugh R. Mill, International Geography, pp. 150-152. New York, 1902.

Hugh R. Mill, International Geography, pp. 150-152. New York, 1902.

259.

W.E. Griffis, The Mikado's Empire, Vol. I, pp. 75, 83. New York, 1903. Henry Dyer, Dai Nippon, pp. 59, 69. New York, 1904.

W.E. Griffis, The Mikado's Empire, Vol. I, pp. 75, 83. New York, 1903. Henry Dyer, Dai Nippon, pp. 59, 69. New York, 1904.

260.

Norway, Official Publication, pp. 4, 83, 99, and map. Christiania, 1900.

Norway, Official Publication, pp. 4, 83, 99, and map. Oslo, 1900.

261.

D.G. Hogarth, The Nearer East, pp. 221-224, map. London, 1902.

D.G. Hogarth, The Nearer East, pp. 221-224, map. London, 1902.

262.

Heinrich von Treitschke, Politik, Vol. I, p. 224. Leipzig, 1897.

Heinrich von Treitschke, Politics, Vol. I, p. 224. Leipzig, 1897.

263.

Helmolt, History of the World, Vol. I, pp. 189-191. New York, 1902-1906.

Helmolt, History of the World, Vol. I, pp. 189-191. New York, 1902-1906.

264.

Eleventh Census, Report on the Indians, pp. 36-37. Washington, 1894.

Eleventh Census, Report on the Indians, pp. 36-37. Washington, 1894.

265.

John Fiske, Old Virginia and her Neighbors, Vol. II, p. 299. Boston, 1897.

John Fiske, Old Virginia and her Neighbors, Vol. II, p. 299. Boston, 1897.

266.

Eleventh Census, Report on the Indians, pp. 30-31. Washington, 1894.

Eleventh Census, Report on the Indians, pp. 30-31. Washington, 1894.

267.

Dr. William Junker, Travels in Africa, 1882-1886, pp. 30, 31, 34, 37, 44, 50-54, 64, 94-95, 140, 145-148. London, 1892.

Dr. William Junker, Travels in Africa, 1882-1886, pp. 30, 31, 34, 37, 44, 50-54, 64, 94-95, 140, 145-148. London, 1892.

268.

Ratzel, History of Mankind, Vol. III, pp. 193-195. London, 1896-1898.

Ratzel, History of Mankind, Vol. III, pp. 193-195. London, 1896-1898.

269.

Anatole Leroy-Beaulieu, Empire of the Tsars, Vol. I, pp. 124-129. Hew York, 1893.

Anatole Leroy-Beaulieu, Empire of the Tsars, Vol. I, pp. 124-129. New York, 1893.

270.

D.G. Brinton, The American Race, p. 266. Philadelphia, 1901.

D.G. Brinton, The American Race, p. 266. Philadelphia, 1901.

271.

Helmolt, History of the World, Vol. III, pp. 484, 485. New York, 1902-06.

Helmolt, History of the World, Vol. III, pp. 484, 485. New York, 1902-06.

272.

Nordenskiold, The Voyage of the Vega, p. 291. New York, 1882.

Nordenskiold, The Voyage of the Vega, p. 291. New York, 1882.

273.

H.M. Stanley, Through the Dark Continent, Vol. II, pp. 100-103, 218. In Darkest Africa, Vol. I, pp. 208, 261, 374-375; Vol. II, pp. 40-44.

H.M. Stanley, Through the Dark Continent, Vol. II, pp. 100-103, 218. In Darkest Africa, Vol. I, pp. 208, 261, 374-375; Vol. II, pp. 40-44.

274.

Georg Schweinfurth, The Heart of Africa, Vol. II, chap. XI, 3rd edition, London.

Georg Schweinfurth, The Heart of Africa, Vol. II, chapter XI, 3rd edition, London.

275.

Census of the Philippine Islands, Vol. I, pp. 411, 436, 532, 533. Washington, 1903.

Census of the Philippine Islands, Vol. I, pp. 411, 436, 532, 533. Washington, 1903.

276.

Quatrefages, The Pygmies, pp. 24-51. New York, 1895.

Quatrefages, The Pygmies, pp. 24-51. New York, 1895.

277.

Sir T.H. Holdich, India, pp. 202-203, map. London, 1905.

Sir T.H. Holdich, India, pp. 202-203, map. London, 1905.

278.

Darwin, Origin of Species, Vol. II, chap. XII. New York, 1895.

Darwin, Origin of Species, Vol. II, chap. XII. New York, 1895.

279.

Anatole Leroy-Beaulieu, The Empire of the Tsars, Vol. I, pp. 66-70, maps facing pp. 64 and 80. New York, 1893.

Anatole Leroy-Beaulieu, The Empire of the Tsars, Vol. I, pp. 66-70, maps facing pp. 64 and 80. New York, 1893.

280.

Eleventh Census of the United States, Report on Population, Part I, map p. 23. Washington, 1894.

Eleventh Census of the United States, Report on Population, Part I, map p. 23. Washington, 1894.

281.

W.Z. Ripley, Races of Europe, Chapters 7, 8, 11. New York, 1899.

W.Z. Ripley, Races of Europe, Chapters 7, 8, 11. New York, 1899.

282.

H.R. Mill, International Geography, p. 910. New York, 1902.

H.R. Mill, International Geography, p. 910. New York, 1902.

283.

Ibid., pp. 832, 836.

Ibid., pp. 832, 836.

284.

Ratzel, History of Mankind, Vol. III, pp. 175, 257. London, 1896-1898.

Ratzel, *History of Mankind*, Vol. III, pp. 175, 257. London, 1896-1898.

285.

E.C. Semple, American History and its Geographic Conditions, pp. 280-287. Boston, 1903.

E.C. Semple, American History and its Geographic Conditions, pp. 280-287. Boston, 1903.

286.

C.E. Akers, History of South America, 1854-1894, pp. 501-502, 556-562. New York, 1904.

C.E. Akers, History of South America, 1854-1894, pp. 501-502, 556-562. New York, 1904.

287.

E.A. Freeman, Historical Geography of Europe, p. 14. London, 1882.

E.A. Freeman, Historical Geography of Europe, p. 14. London, 1882.

288.

Helmolt, History of the World, Vol. VI, pp. 125-132, map. New York, 1902-1906. Ripley, Races of Europe, pp. 274, 297, 308, 472-473. New York, 1899.

Helmolt, History of the World, Vol. VI, pp. 125-132, map. New York, 1902-1906. Ripley, Races of Europe, pp. 274, 297, 308, 472-473. New York, 1899.

289.

H.J. Mackinder, Britain and the British Seas, pp. 183-191. London, 1904.

H.J. Mackinder, Britain and the British Seas, pp. 183-191. London, 1904.

290.

W.Z. Ripley, Races of Europe, pp. 26, 353, 361-365. Map. New York, 1899.

W.Z. Ripley, Races of Europe, pp. 26, 353, 361-365. Map. New York, 1899.

291.

Ratzel, History of Mankind, Vol. I, 214-218. London, 1896-1898.

Ratzel, History of Mankind, Vol. I, 214-218. London, 1896-1898.


Chapter VI—Geographical Area

The size of the earth.

Every consideration of geographical area must take as its starting point the 199,000,000 square miles (510,000,000 square kilometers) of the earth's surface. Though some 8,000,000 square miles (21,000,000 square kilometers) about the poles remain unexplored, and only the twenty-eight per cent. of the total constituting the land area is the actual habitat of man, still the earth as a whole is his planet. Its surface fixes the limits of his possible dwelling place, the range of his voyages and migrations, the distribution of animals and plants on which he must depend. These conditions he has shared with all forms of life from the amoeba to the civilized nation. The earth's superficial area is the primal and immutable condition of earth-born, earth-bound man; it is the common soil whence is sprung our common humanity. Nations belong to countries and races to continents, but humanity belongs to the whole world. Naught but the united forces of the whole earth could have produced this single species of a single genus which we call Man.

Every consideration of geographical area must start with the 199,000,000 square miles (510,000,000 square kilometers) of the earth's surface. While about 8,000,000 square miles (21,000,000 square kilometers) around the poles remain unexplored, and only twenty-eight percent of the total land area is where humans actually live, the earth as a whole is our planet. Its surface sets the boundaries of where we can live, the extent of our travels and migrations, and the distribution of animals and plants that we rely on. These conditions are shared by all forms of life, from amoebas to advanced civilizations. The earth's surface area is the fundamental and unchanging condition for earth-born, earth-bound humans; it is the common ground from which our shared humanity emerges. Nations belong to specific countries, and races belong to continents, but humanity belongs to the entire world. Only the combined forces of the entire earth could have produced this single species of one genus that we call Man.

Relation of area to life.

The relation of life to the earth's area is a fundamental question of bio-geography. The amount of that area available for terrestrial life, the proportion of land and water, the reduction or enlargement of the available surface by the operation of great cosmic forces, all enter into this problem, which changes from one geologic period to another. The present limited plant life of the Arctic regions is the impoverished successor of a vegetation abundant enough at the eighty-third parallel to produce coal. That was in the Genial Period, when the northern hemisphere with its broad land-masses presented a far larger area for the support of life than to-day. Then the Glacial Period spread an ice-sheet from the North Pole to approximately the fiftieth parallel, forced back life to the lower latitudes, and confined the bio-sphere to the smaller land-masses of the southern hemisphere and a girdle north of the equator. The sum total of life on the globe was greatly reduced at the height of glaciation, and since the retreat of the ice has probably never regained the abundance of the Middle Tertiary; so that our period is probably one of relative impoverishment and faulty adjustment both of life to life and of life to physical environment.292 The continent of North America contained a small vital area during the Later Cretaceous Period, when a notable encroachment of the sea submerged the Atlantic coastal plain, large sections of the Pacific coast, the Great Plains, Texas and the adjacent Gulf plain up the Mississippi Valley to the mouth of the Ohio.293

The relationship between life and the earth's surface is a key issue in biogeography. The amount of land available for terrestrial life, the ratio of land to water, and the changes to accessible land caused by major cosmic forces all contribute to this question, which shifts from one geological period to another. The limited plant life we see today in the Arctic regions is the diminished descendant of a lush vegetation that once existed as far north as the eighty-third parallel, where it was abundant enough to produce coal. This was during the Warm Period, when the northern hemisphere, with its extensive landmasses, offered a much larger area to support life than it does today. Then came the Ice Age, which extended a massive ice sheet from the North Pole down to around the fiftieth parallel, pushing life to lower latitudes and confining the biosphere to smaller landmasses in the southern hemisphere and a band north of the equator. The total amount of life on Earth was significantly reduced during the peak of glaciation, and since the ice has retreated, it likely has never reached the thriving levels of the Middle Tertiary. Therefore, our current era is probably one of relative scarcity and poor adaptation, both among different forms of life and between life and the physical environment.292 During the Later Cretaceous Period, the continent of North America had a small habitable area while the sea advanced, submerging the Atlantic coastal plain, large portions of the Pacific coast, the Great Plains, Texas, and the Gulf plain along the Mississippi Valley up to the mouth of the Ohio.293

The task of estimating the area supporting terrestrial life which the earth presented at any given time is an important one, not only because the amount of life depends upon this area, but because every increase of available area tends to multiply conditions favorable to variation. Darwin shows that largeness of area, more than anything else, affords the best conditions for rapid and improved variation through natural selection; because a large area supports a larger number of individuals in whom chance variations, advantageous in the struggle for existence, appear oftener than in a small group. This position is maintained also by the most recent evolutionists.294

The job of estimating the area on Earth that supports life at any given time is crucial, not only because the amount of life depends on this area, but also because any increase in available area tends to create more conditions that are favorable for variation. Darwin demonstrates that a larger area, more than anything else, provides the best conditions for rapid and improved variation through natural selection; this is because a large area can support a greater number of individuals, and those individuals are more likely to have chance variations that are advantageous in the struggle for survival than those in a smaller group. This view is also supported by the latest evolutionists.294

On purely geographical grounds, also, a large area stimulates differentiation by presenting a greater diversity of natural conditions, each of which tends to produce its appropriate species or variety.295 Consider the different environments found in a vast and varied continent like Eurasia, which extends from the equator far beyond the Arctic Circle, as compared with a small land-mass like Australia, relatively monotonous in its geographic conditions; and observe how much farther evolution has progressed in the one than in the other, in point of animal forms, races and civilization. If we hold with Moritz Wagner and others that isolation in naturally defined regions, alternating with periods of migration, offers the necessary condition for the rapid evolution of type forms, and thus go farther than Darwin, who regards isolation merely as a fortunate contributory circumstance, we find that for the evolution of mankind it is large areas like Eurasia which afford the greatest number and variety of these naturally segregated habitats, and at the same time the best opportunity for vast historical movements.

On purely geographical grounds, a large area encourages differentiation by providing a greater variety of natural conditions, each of which tends to produce its suitable species or variety.295 Take a look at the different environments found in a vast and diverse continent like Eurasia, which stretches from the equator far beyond the Arctic Circle, compared to a smaller landmass like Australia, which has relatively uniform geographic conditions; and notice how much further evolution has advanced in one compared to the other, in terms of animal forms, races, and civilization. If we agree with Moritz Wagner and others that isolation in naturally defined regions, combined with periods of migration, provides the necessary conditions for the rapid evolution of types, and thus take a stance further than Darwin, who sees isolation merely as a lucky contributing factor, we find that for the evolution of humanity, it is large areas like Eurasia that offer the greatest number and variety of these naturally segregated habitats, along with the best chances for significant historical movements.

The struggle for space.

Evolution needs room but finds the earth's surface limited. Everywhere old and new forms of life live side by side in deadly competition; but the later improved variety multiplies and spreads at the cost of less favored types. The struggle for existence means a struggle for space.296 This is true of man and the lower animals. A superior people, invading the territory of its weaker savage neighbors, robs them of their land, forces them back into corners too small for their support, and continues to encroach even upon this meager possession, till the weaker finally loses the last remnant of its domain, is literally crowded off the earth, becomes extinct as the Tasmanians and so many Indian tribes have done.297 The superiority of such expansionists consists primarily in their greater ability to appropriate, thoroughly utilize and populate a territory. Hence this is the faculty by which they hasten the extinction of the weaker; and since this superiority is peculiar to the higher stages of civilization, the higher stages inevitably supplant the lower.

Evolution requires space, but the earth's surface is limited. Everywhere, old and new forms of life coexist, competing fiercely; however, the later, improved varieties grow and spread at the expense of the less favored types. The struggle for existence is ultimately a struggle for space.296 This applies to humans and lower animals alike. A dominant group, invading the territory of weaker, primitive neighbors, takes over their land, pushing them into increasingly smaller areas that cannot support them, and continues to intrude upon this dwindling territory until the weaker group finally loses its last remnants, is effectively pushed off the earth, and becomes extinct, as the Tasmanians and many Indian tribes have done.297 The advantage of such expansionist groups lies mainly in their superior ability to claim, fully utilize, and populate a territory. Thus, this is the ability that accelerates the extinction of the weaker; and since this superiority is characteristic of the higher levels of civilization, the higher levels will inevitably replace the lower ones.

Area an index of social and political development.

The successive stages of social development—savage, pastoral nomadic, agricultural, and industrial—represent increasing density of population, increasing numerical strength of the social group, and finally increasing geographical area, resulting in a vastly enlarged social group or state. Increase in the population of a given land is accompanied by a decrease in the share which each individual can claim as his own. This progressive readjustment to a smaller proportion of land brings in its train the evolution of all economic and social processes, reacting again favorably on density of population and resulting eventually in the greatly increased social group and enlarged territory of the modern civilized state. Hence we may lay down the rule that change in areal relations, both of the individual to his decreasing quota of land, and of the state to its increasing quota of the earth's surface is an important index of social and political evolution. Therefore the rise and decline not only of peoples but of whole civilizations have depended upon their relations to area. Therefore problems of area, such as the expansion of a small territory, the economic and political mastery of a large one, dominate all history.

The stages of social development—savage, pastoral nomadic, agricultural, and industrial—show an increase in population density, a growth in the size of social groups, and, ultimately, a larger geographical area, leading to the creation of significantly larger social groups or states. As the population of a particular area rises, the portion that each individual can claim decreases. This shift towards a smaller share of land drives the evolution of all economic and social processes, which in turn positively influences population density and ultimately leads to the much larger social groups and expanded territories of modern civilized states. Therefore, we can assert that changes in the relationship between individuals and their diminishing share of land, as well as between states and their growing share of the Earth's surface, are crucial indicators of social and political evolution. The rise and fall of not just peoples but entire civilizations have depended on their relationship with land. Thus, issues related to land, such as expanding a small territory or gaining economic and political control over a large one, have shaped all of history.

The Oikoumene.

Humanity's area of distribution and historical movement call the Oikoumene. It forms a girdle around the earth between the two polar regions, and embraces the Tropics, the Temperate Zones, and a part of the North Frigid, in all, five-sixths of the earth's surface. This area of distribution is unusually large. Few other living species so nearly permeate the whole vital area, and many of these have reached their wide expansion only in the company of man. Only about 49,000,000 square miles (125,000,000 square kilometers) of the Oikoumene is land and therefore constitutes properly the habitat of man. But just as we cannot understand a nation from the study of its own country alone, but must take into consideration the wider area of its spreading activities, so we cannot understand mankind without including in his world not only his habitat but also the vastly larger sphere of his activities, which is almost identical with the earth itself. The most progressive peoples to-day find their scientific, economic, religious and political interests embracing the earth.

Humanity's area of distribution and historical movement is called the Oikoumene. It wraps around the earth between the two polar regions and includes the Tropics, the Temperate Zones, and part of the North Frigid Zone, covering about five-sixths of the earth's surface. This area is unusually large. Few other living species cover such a vast vital area, and many have expanded their range only in association with humans. Only about 49,000,000 square miles (125,000,000 square kilometers) of the Oikoumene is land and thus properly serves as the habitat for humans. However, just as we can't understand a nation by only studying its own territory and must consider the broader context of its activities, we can't fully grasp humanity without including not only its habitat but also the much larger sphere of its activities, which almost coincides with the entire earth. Today, the most progressive peoples find their scientific, economic, religious, and political interests extend across the globe.

Unity of the human species in the relation to the earth.

Mankind has in common with all other forms of life the tendency toward expansion. The more adaptable and mobile an organism is, the wider the distribution which it attains and the greater the rapidity with which it displaces its weaker kin. In the most favored cases it embraces the whole vital area of the earth, leaving no space free for the development of diversity of forms, and itself showing everywhere only superficial distinctions. Mankind has achieved such wide distribution. Before his persistent intrusions and his mobility, the earth has no longer any really segregated districts where a strongly divergent type of the man animal might develop. Hence mankind shows only superficial distinctions of hair, color, head-form and stature between its different groups. It has got beyond the point of forming species, and is restricted to the slighter variations of races. Even these are few in comparison with the area of the earth's surface, and their list tends to decrease. The Guanches and Tasmanians have vanished, the Australians are on the road to extinction; and when they shall have disappeared, there will be one variety the less in humanity. So the process of assimilation advances, here by the simple elimination of weaker divergent types of men, there by amalgamation and absorption into the stock of the stronger.

Humanity shares a common trait with all other life forms: the tendency to expand. The more adaptable and mobile an organism is, the broader its distribution and the faster it replaces weaker counterparts. In the best cases, it can occupy entire vital areas of the Earth, leaving no space for varied forms to develop, resulting in only superficial differences everywhere. Humanity has achieved such wide distribution. Because of its persistent intrusions and mobility, the Earth no longer has genuinely isolated regions where a distinctly different type of human could evolve. As a result, people show only surface differences in hair, skin color, head shape, and height among their various groups. Humanity has gone beyond forming new species and is limited to minor variations in races. Even these variations are few compared to the Earth's surface area, and their numbers are decreasing. The Guanches and Tasmanians have disappeared, and the Australians are on the verge of extinction; when they are gone, there will be one less variety in humanity. Thus, the process of assimilation continues, sometimes simply by eliminating weaker divergent types of humans and other times through merging and absorbing into the stronger population.

This unity of the human species has been achieved in spite of the fact that, owing to the three-fold predominance of the water surface of the globe, the land surface appears as detached fragments which rise as islands from the surrounding ocean. Among these fragments we have every gradation in size, from the continuous continental mass of Eurasia-Africa with its 31,000,000 square miles, the Americas with 15,000,000, Australia with nearly 3,000,000, Madagascar with 230,000, and New Zealand with 104,000, down to Guam with its 199 square miles, Ascension with 58, Tristan da Cunha with 45, and the rocky Islet of Helgoland with its scant 150 acres. All these down to the smallest constitute separate vital districts.

This unity of the human species has been achieved even though, due to the overwhelming presence of water on the planet, the land appears as separate pieces that rise like islands from the surrounding ocean. Among these pieces, we see a wide range of sizes, from the massive continental landmass of Eurasia-Africa at 31,000,000 square miles, the Americas at 15,000,000, Australia at nearly 3,000,000, Madagascar at 230,000, and New Zealand at 104,000, down to Guam at 199 square miles, Ascension at 58, Tristan da Cunha at 45, and the rocky islet of Helgoland with its mere 150 acres. All of these, even the smallest, make up distinct vital areas.

Isolation and differentiation.

Small, naturally defined areas, whether their boundaries are drawn by mountains, sea, or by both, always harbor small but markedly individual peoples, as also peculiar or endemic animal forms, whose differentiation varies with the degree of isolation. Such peoples can be found over and over again in islands, peninsulas, confined mountain valleys, or desert-rimmed oases. The cause lies in the barriers to expansion and to accessions of population from without which confront such peoples on every side. Broad, uniform continental areas, on the other hand, where nature has erected no such obstacles are the habitats of wide-spread peoples, monotonous in type. The long stretch of coastal lowlands encircling the Arctic Ocean and running back into the wide plains of North America and Eurasia show a remarkable uniformity of animal and plant forms298 and a striking similarity of race through the Lapps, the Samoyedes of northern Russia, the various Mongolian tribes of Arctic Siberia to Bering Strait, and the Eskimo, that curiously transitional race, formerly classified as Mongolian and more recently as a divergent Indian stock; for the Eskimos are similar to the Siberians in stature, features, coloring, mode of life, in everything but head-form, though even the cephalic indices approach on the opposite shores of Bering Sea.299 Where geography draws no dividing line, ethnology finds it difficult to do so. Where the continental land-masses converge is found similarity or even identity of race, easy gradations from one type to another; where they diverge most widely in the peninsular extremities of South America, South Africa and Australia, they show the greatest dissimilarity in their native races, and a corresponding diversity in their animal life.300 Geographical proximity combined with accessibility results in similarity of human and animal occupants, while a corresponding dissimilarity is the attendant of remoteness or of segregation. Therefore, despite the distribution of mankind over the total habitable area of the earth, his penetration into its detached regions and hidden corners has maintained such variations as still exist in the human family.

Small, naturally defined areas, whether their boundaries are formed by mountains, the sea, or both, always contain small but distinct communities, as well as unique or native animal species, whose differences depend on how isolated they are. These groups can frequently be found on islands, peninsulas, narrow mountain valleys, or desert-fringed oases. This is due to the barriers to growth and the influx of outside populations that these communities face on all sides. In contrast, broad, uniform continental areas, where nature hasn’t set up obstacles, host widespread communities that are pretty similar in nature. The long stretch of coastal lowlands surrounding the Arctic Ocean and extending back into the expansive plains of North America and Eurasia displays a notable uniformity of animal and plant species298 and a striking resemblance of races, from the Lapps and the Samoyedes of northern Russia to the various Mongolian tribes of Arctic Siberia and the Bering Strait, as well as the Eskimos, a notably transitional group, once considered Mongolian and more recently categorized as a divergent Indian ancestry. Eskimos share characteristics such as height, features, skin color, and lifestyle with Siberians, differing only in head shape, though even their head measurements are similar on the opposite shores of the Bering Sea.299 Where geography does not create a divide, ethnology finds it challenging to do the same. At the points where the continental landmasses come together, racial similarities or identity can be found, with smooth transitions from one type to another; where they diverge most significantly, such as at the peninsular ends of South America, South Africa, and Australia, we see the greatest differences in their native populations and corresponding diversity in their animal life.300 Geographic proximity combined with ease of access leads to similarities in the human and animal inhabitants, while distance or segregation results in dissimilarity. Thus, even with humanity spread across the entire habitable planet, our exploration of the isolated regions and hidden corners has preserved the variations that still exist within the human family.

Monotonous race type of small area.

If the distribution of the several races be examined in the light of this conclusion, it becomes apparent that the races who have succeeded in appropriating only limited portions of the earth's surface, though each may be a marked variant of the human family, are characterized by few inner diversities, either of physical features or culture. Their subdivisions feel only in a slight degree the differentiating effects of geographic remoteness, which in a small area operates with weakened force; and they enjoy few of those diversities of environment which stimulate variation. They form close and distinct ethnic unities also because their scant numbers restrict the appearance of variations. The habitat of the negro race in Africa south of the Sahara, relatively small, limited in its zonal location almost wholly to the Tropics, poorly diversified both in relief and contour, has produced only a retarded and monotonous social development based upon tropical agriculture or a low type of pastoral life. The still smaller, still less varied habitat of the Australian race, again tropical or sub-tropical in location, has produced over its whole extent only one grade of civilization and that the lowest, one physical, mental and moral type.301

If we look at the distribution of different races through this lens, it becomes clear that those races that have only claimed small portions of the Earth's surface, while each may be a distinct branch of the human family, show very few internal differences, whether in physical traits or culture. Their subdivisions experience only minimal effects from geographic isolation, which has a diminished impact in smaller areas, and they have few of the environmental diversities that promote variation. They tend to form tight and distinct ethnic groups as their small populations limit the emergence of variations. The habitat of the Black race in Africa south of the Sahara, which is relatively small and mainly found in tropical regions, has resulted in a slow and uniform social development centered around tropical agriculture or a low form of pastoral living. Similarly, the even smaller and less varied environment of the Australian race, also tropical or subtropical, has only produced one level of civilization across its entire area, and that is the most basic, with a single physical, mental, and moral type.301

Wide race distribution and inner diversities.

The Mongoloid area of distribution, on the other hand, is so large that it necessarily includes a great range of climates and variety of geographic conditions. [Maps pages 103 and 225.] Representatives of this race, reflecting their diversified habitats, show many ethnic differentiations. They reveal also every stage and phase of cultural development from the industrialism of Japan, with its artistic and literary concomitants, to the savage economy and retarded intellectual life of the Chukches fisher tribes or the Giljak hunters of Sakhalin. The white race, identified primarily with Europe, that choice and diversified continent, comprised also a large area of southwestern Asia and the northern third of Africa. It thus extended from the Arctic Circle well within the Tropics. Its area included every variety of geographic condition and originally every degree of cultural development; but the rapid expansion in recent centuries of the most advanced peoples of this race has made them the apostles of civilization to the whole world. It has also given them, through the occupation of Australia and the Americas, the widest distribution and the most varied habitats. As agents of the modern historical movement, however, they are subjected to all its assimilating effects, which tend to counteract the diversities born of geographic segregation, and to raise all branches of the white race to one superior cosmopolitan type. On the other hand, the vast international division of labor and specialization of production, geographically based and entailed by advancing economic development, besides the differences of traditions and ideals reaching far back into an historic past and rooted in the land, will serve to maintain many subtle inner differences between even the most progressive nations.

The Mongoloid area of distribution is so vast that it naturally encompasses a wide range of climates and different geographic conditions. [Maps pages 103 and 225.] People from this race, who represent their varied environments, display many ethnic differences. They also illustrate every stage and aspect of cultural development, from Japan's industrial society, with its artistic and literary elements, to the primitive economies and limited intellectual lives of the Chukchi fishing tribes or the Gilyak hunters of Sakhalin. The white race, mainly associated with Europe, that selective and diverse continent, also spans a large portion of southwestern Asia and the northern third of Africa. Therefore, it stretches from the Arctic Circle well into the Tropics. Its territory includes all types of geographic conditions and originally every level of cultural development; however, the rapid expansion of the most advanced peoples from this race in recent centuries has made them the carriers of civilization to the entire world. This growth has also led to the occupation of Australia and the Americas, providing them with the widest distribution and most varied habitats. As drivers of the modern historical movement, they are subjected to all its assimilating effects, which tend to diminish the differences created by geographic separation and elevate all branches of the white race to a single, dominant cosmopolitan type. On the flip side, the extensive international division of labor and specialized production, based on geography and spurred by advancing economic development, along with the differences in traditions and ideals that reach deep into history and are rooted in the land, will help maintain many subtle internal distinctions even among the most progressive nations.

Area and language.

Hence the wide area which Darwin found to be most favorable to improved variation and rapid evolution in animals, operates to the same end in human development, and its influence becomes a law of anthropo-geography. It permeates the higher aspects of life. The wide, varied area occupied by the Germanic tribes of Europe permitted the evolution of the many dialects which finally made the richness of modern German speech. English has gained in vocabulary and idiom with every expansion of its area. New territories mean to a people new pursuits, new relations, new wants; and all these become reflected in their speech. Languages, like peoples, cease to grow with national stagnation.302 To such stagnation movement or expansion is the surest antidote. America will in time make its contribution to the English tongue. The rich crop of slang that springs up on the frontier is not wholly to be deplored. The crudeness and vigor of cowboy speech are marks of youth: they are also promises of growth. Language can not live by dictionary alone. It tends to form new variants with every change of habitat. The French of the Canadian habitant has absorbed Indian and English words, and adapted old terms to new uses;303 but it is otherwise a survival of seventeenth century French. Boer speech in South Africa shows the same thing—absorption of new Kaffir and English words, coupled with marks of retardation due to isolation. Religion in the same way gains by wide dispersal. Christianity is one thing in St. Petersburg, another among the Copts of Cairo, another in Rome, another in London, and yet another in Boston. Buddhism takes on a different color in Ceylon, Tibet, China and Japan. In religion as in other phases of human development, differentiation must mean eventual enrichment, a larger content of the religious idea, to which each faith makes its contribution.

Thus, the expansive area that Darwin identified as most conducive to enhanced variation and quick evolution in animals also applies to human development, becoming a principle of anthropo-geography. It influences the higher aspects of life. The broad, diverse area inhabited by the Germanic tribes of Europe allowed for the evolution of the many dialects that ultimately enriched modern German. English has expanded its vocabulary and idiom with every increase in its geographical reach. New territories introduce a people to new activities, new relationships, and new needs; all of these are reflected in their language. Languages, like people, stop growing when a nation becomes stagnant. Movement or expansion is the best remedy for such stagnation. Over time, America will contribute to the English language. The abundance of slang emerging on the frontier isn't entirely negative. The rawness and energy of cowboy speech indicate youth and promise of growth. Language can't thrive on the dictionary alone. It tends to develop new variations with every change in environment. The French spoken by Canadian settlers has adopted Indian and English words and adapted old terms for new uses; however, it is still essentially a version of seventeenth-century French. Boer speech in South Africa reflects a similar trend—adopting new Kaffir and English terms, along with signs of delay caused by isolation. Religion, too, benefits from wide dispersion. Christianity is experienced differently in St. Petersburg, among the Copts of Cairo, in Rome, in London, and yet again in Boston. Buddhism looks different in Ceylon, Tibet, China, and Japan. In religion, as in other aspects of human development, differentiation leads to eventual enrichment, enhancing the depth of religious ideas, to which each faith contributes.

Large area a guarantee of racial or national permanence.

The larger the area occupied by a race or people, other geographic conditions being equal, the surer the guarantee of their permanence, and the less the chance of their repression or annihilation. A broad geographic base means generally abundant command of the resources of life and growth. Though for a growing people of wide possessions, like the Russians, the significance of the land may not be obvious, it becomes apparent enough in national decline and decay; for these even in their incipiency betray themselves in a loss of territory. A people which, voluntarily or otherwise, renounces its hold upon its land is on the downward path. Nothing else could show so plainly the national vitality of Japan as her tenacious purpose to get back Port Arthur taken from her by the Shimonoseki treaty in 1895. A people may decrease in numbers without serious consequences if it still retains its land; for herein lies its resources by which it may again hope to grow. The recurring loss of millions of lives in China from the wide-sweeping floods of the Hoangho is a passing episode, forgotten as soon as the mighty stream is re-embanked and the flooded plains reclaimed. The Civil War in the United States involved a temporary diminution of population and check to progress, but no lasting national weakness because no loss of territory. But the expulsion of the American Indians from their well-stocked hunting grounds in the Mississippi Valley and Atlantic plain to more restricted and barren lands in the far West, and the withdrawal of the Australian natives from the fertile coasts to the desert interior have meant racial renunciation of the sources of life.

The larger the area a race or people occupies, assuming other geographic conditions are equal, the more secure their permanence and the less likely they are to face repression or extinction. A broad geographic base usually means greater access to life and growth resources. Even if it isn't obvious for a growing population with extensive landholdings, like the Russians, the importance of the land becomes clear during periods of national decline; the early signs can be seen in territorial losses. A people that gives up its connection to its land, whether voluntarily or not, is on a downward trajectory. Nothing illustrates Japan's national vitality more clearly than its determined effort to reclaim Port Arthur, which was taken from it by the Treaty of Shimonoseki in 1895. A population can decrease without dire consequences as long as it retains its land; this land provides the resources needed for potential recovery and growth. The recurring loss of millions of lives in China due to the devastating floods of the Hoangho is just a temporary setback, quickly forgotten once the river is controlled and the flooded areas are restored. The American Civil War led to a temporary drop in population and slowed progress, but there was no lasting national weakness since there was no loss of territory. However, the displacement of Native Americans from their abundant hunting grounds in the Mississippi Valley and Atlantic plain to less fertile, more barren lands in the West, along with the movement of Australian natives from fertile coastal regions to the desert interiors, represented a racial abandonment of vital resources.

Hence a people who are conquered and dislodged from their territory, as were the ancient Britons by the Saxons, the Slavs from the land between the Elbe and the Niemen by the mediæval Germans, and the Kaffirs in South Africa by the Dutch and English, the Ainos from Hondo by the Japanese, and the whole original Alpine race by the later coming Teutons from the fertile valleys and plains into the more barren highlands of western Europe, have little or no chance of regaining their own. When conquest results not in dislodgement, but only in the subjection of an undisturbed native population to a new ruling class, the vanquished retain their hold, only slightly impaired, perhaps, upon their strength-giving fields, recover themselves, and sooner or later conquer their conquerors either by absorption or revolution. This was the history of ancient Egypt with its Shepherd Kings, of England with its Norman lords, of Mexico and Peru with their Spanish victors.

So, when a people is conquered and forced out of their territory, like the ancient Britons by the Saxons, the Slavs from the land between the Elbe and the Niemen by the medieval Germans, the Kaffirs in South Africa by the Dutch and English, the Ainos from Hondo by the Japanese, and the original Alpine race by the later arriving Teutons from the fertile valleys and plains into the more barren highlands of western Europe, they have little to no chance of getting their land back. When conquest leads to subjugation rather than displacement, and the native population remains undisturbed under a new ruling class, the defeated people often manage to hold onto their strength-giving lands, recover, and eventually overpower their conquerors through absorption or revolution. This was the case with ancient Egypt and its Shepherd Kings, England with its Norman lords, and Mexico and Peru with their Spanish conquerors.

Weakness of small states.

A large area throws around all the life forms which it supports the protection of its mere distances, which facilitate defense in competition with other forms, render attack difficult, and afford room for retreat under pursuit. On the other hand, the small area is easily compassed by the invaders, and its inhabitants soon brought to bay. Since there is a general correspondence between size of area and number of inhabitants, where physical conditions and economic development are similar, a small area involves a further handicap of numerical weakness of population. Greece has always suffered from the small size of the peninsula and the further political dismemberment entailed by its geographic subdivisions. Despite superior civilization and national heroism, it has fallen a victim to almost every invader. Belgium, Holland, Switzerland exist as distinct nations only on sufferance. Finland's history since 1900 shows that the day for the national existence of small peoples is passing.304 The fragmentary political geography of the Danube basin gives the geographer the impression of an artist's crayon studies of details, destined later to be incorporated in a finished picture. Their small areas promise short-lived autonomy. The recent absorption of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austria indicates the destiny of these Danubian states as fixed by the law of increasing territorial aggregates.

A large area provides a protective buffer for all the life forms it supports, creating distances that make defense against competition easier, complicate attacks, and provide space for escape when pursued. In contrast, a small area can be easily surrounded by invaders, and its inhabitants are quickly cornered. Since there’s a general link between area size and population numbers, when physical conditions and economic development are similar, a small area also suffers from fewer inhabitants. Greece has always struggled due to the small size of its peninsula and the political fragmentation caused by its geographic divisions. Despite its advanced civilization and national pride, it has succumbed to almost every invader. Belgium, Holland, and Switzerland exist as distinct nations only by the grace of others. Finland's history since 1900 shows that the time for the national survival of smaller peoples is fading. The fragmented political landscape of the Danube basin gives geographers the impression of an artist's sketch of details, meant to be integrated into a complete picture later on. Their small territories suggest temporary autonomy. The recent takeover of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austria reflects the future of these Danubian states, determined by the trend toward larger territorial entities.

What is true of states is true also of peoples. The extinction of the retarded "provisional peoples" of the earth progresses more rapidly in small groups than in large, and in small islands more quickly than in continental areas. Of the twenty-one Indian stocks or families which have died out in the United States, fifteen belonged to the small bands once found in the Pacific coast states, and four more were similar fragments found on the lower Mississippi and its bayous.305 [See map page 54.] The native Gaunches of Teneriffe Island disappeared long ago. The last Tasmanian died in 1876. New Zealand, whose area is four times that of Tasmania, and therefore gives some respite before the encroachments of the whites, still harbors 47,835 Maoris, or little over one-third the native population of the island in 1840.306 But these compete for the land with nearly one million English colonists, and in the limited area of the islands they will eventually find no place of retreat before the relentless white advance.

What is true for nations is also true for people. The extinction of the marginalized "temporary peoples" of the world happens more quickly in small groups than in large ones, and on small islands faster than in continental areas. Of the twenty-one Native American tribes that have disappeared in the United States, fifteen were from the small bands once located in the Pacific coast states, while four more were similar fragments found along the lower Mississippi and its bayous.305 [See map page 54.] The native Guanches of Tenerife Island vanished a long time ago. The last Tasmanian passed away in 1876. New Zealand, which is four times larger than Tasmania, thus offering some relief before the encroachment of white settlers, still has 47,835 Maoris, just over one-third of the indigenous population of the island in 1840.306 But these individuals have to compete for land with nearly one million English colonists, and in the limited space of the islands, they will eventually find no refuge from the relentless advance of white settlers.

To the Australians, on the other hand, much inferior to the Maoris, the larger area of their continent affords extensive deserts and steppes into which the natives have withdrawn and whither the whites do not care to follow. Hence mere area, robbed of every other favorable geographical circumstance, has contributed to the survival of the 230,000 natives in Australia. Similarly the Arawaks were early wiped out on the island of Cuba and the Caribs on San Domingo and the smaller Antilles by the truculent methods of the Spanish conquerors, while both stocks survive on the continent of South America. Even the truculent methods of the Spanish conquerors could make little impression upon the relatively massive populations of Mexico and Peru, whose survival and latter-day recovery of independence can be ascribed largely though not solely to their ample territorial base. So the vast area of the United States and Canada has afforded a hinterland of asylum to the retreating Indians, whose moribund condition, especially in the United States, is betrayed by their scattered distribution in small, unfavorable localities. On the other hand, the vast extent of Arctic and sub-Arctic Canada, combined with the adverse climatic conditions of the region, will guarantee the northern Indians a longer survival. In Tierra del Fuego, the encroachments of sheep-farmers and gold-miners from Patagonia twenty years ago, by fencing off the land and killing off the wild guanaco, threatened the existence of this animal and of the Onas natives of the island. These, soon brought to bay in that natural enclosure, attacked the farmers, whose reprisals between 1890 and 1900 reduced the number of the Onas from 2,000 to 800 souls.307

To the Australians, who are generally less advanced than the Maoris, the larger part of their continent has vast deserts and grasslands where the natives have retreated and where white settlers don't want to go. As a result, the sheer size of the area, lacking any other favorable geographical conditions, has helped the 230,000 Indigenous people in Australia survive. Similarly, the Arawaks were quickly wiped out on the island of Cuba and the Caribs on San Domingo and the smaller Antilles by the brutal tactics of the Spanish conquerors, while both groups continue to exist on the continent of South America. Even the aggressive methods of the Spanish conquerors had little effect on the relatively large populations of Mexico and Peru, whose survival and eventual recovery of independence can largely, though not exclusively, be attributed to their substantial land area. Thus, the vast territories of the United States and Canada have provided a refuge for the fleeing Native Americans, whose declining condition, especially in the U.S., is evident in their scattered presence in small, inhospitable areas. On the other hand, the extensive Arctic and sub-Arctic regions of Canada, along with the harsh climate, will likely allow the northern Indigenous people to endure longer. In Tierra del Fuego, the invasion of sheep farmers and gold miners from Patagonia twenty years ago, by fencing off the land and hunting the wild guanaco, posed a threat to both the animal and the Ona people of the island. The Onas were soon cornered in that natural enclosure and began to attack the farmers, whose retaliation between 1890 and 1900 reduced the Ona population from 2,000 to 800 individuals.307

Contrast of large and small areas in bio-geography.

The same law holds good in bio-geography; here, too, area gives strength and a small territorial foothold means weakness. The native flora and fauna of New Zealand seem involved in the same process of extinction as the native race. The Maoris themselves have observed this fact and applied the principle to their own obvious fate. They have seen hardy imported English grasses offering deadly competition to the indigenous vegetation; the Norway rat, entering by European ships, extirpating the native variety; the European house fly, purposely imported and distributed to destroy the noxious indigenous species.308 The same unequal combat between imported plants and animals, equipped by the fierce Iliads of continental areas, and the local flora and fauna has taken place on the little island of St. Helena, to the threatened destruction of the native forms.309

The same principle applies in biogeography; here, too, size matters for strength, and a small territory leads to vulnerability. The native plants and animals of New Zealand appear to be going through a similar extinction process as the native people. The Maoris themselves have recognized this reality and connected it to their own evident fate. They have noticed resilient imported English grasses providing fierce competition to the native plants; the Norway rat, arriving on European ships, wiping out the local species; and the European house fly, intentionally brought in and spread to eliminate the harmful native species.308 The same uneven battle between introduced plants and animals, armed with the advantages of larger continental areas, and the local flora and fauna has occurred on the small island of St. Helena, threatening the survival of native species.309

The preponderant migration of animals from the northern to the southern hemisphere is attributed by Darwin to the greater extent of land in the north, whereby the northern types have existed in greater numbers and have been so perfected through natural selection and competition, that they have surpassed the southern forms in dominating power and therefore have encroached successfully.310 Also the races and nations of the northern continents have seriously invaded the southern land-masses and are still expanding. It is the largest continent, Eurasia, which has been the chief center of dispersal.

The massive migration of animals from the northern to the southern hemisphere is explained by Darwin as being due to the larger land area in the north. The northern species have thrived in greater numbers and have been refined through natural selection and competition, allowing them to dominate over the southern species. They've successfully encroached on their territory.310 Additionally, the races and nations from the northern continents have significantly invaded the southern landmasses and continue to expand. Eurasia, the largest continent, has been the main hub for this dispersal.

Political domination of large areas.

The Temperate Zone of North America will always harbor a more powerful people than the corresponding zone of South America, because the latter continent begins to contract and tapers off to a point where the other at the northern Tropic begins to spread out. Therefore North America possesses more abundantly all the advantages accruing to a continent from a location in the Temperate Zone. The wide basis of the North Slavs in Russia and Siberia has given them a natural leadership in the whole Slav family, just as the broad unbroken area of ever expanding Prussia gave that state the ascendency in the German Empire over the geographically partitioned and politically dismembered surface of southern Germany. English domination of the United Kingdom is based not only upon race, location, geographical features and resources, but also on the larger size of England. So in the United States, abolitionist statesmen adopted the most effective means of fighting slavery when they limited its area by law, while permitting free states to go on multiplying in the new territory of the vast Northwest.

The Temperate Zone of North America will always have a more powerful population than the equivalent zone in South America because the latter continent starts to narrow and tapers off to a point, while the former begins to expand at the northern Tropic. As a result, North America benefits more from the advantages of being in the Temperate Zone. The large base of the North Slavs in Russia and Siberia has naturally positioned them as leaders within the entire Slavic community, just as the extensive, uninterrupted area of ever-expanding Prussia gave that state dominance in the German Empire over the geographically divided and politically fragmented regions of southern Germany. English control of the United Kingdom is rooted not only in race, location, geographical features, and resources but also in the larger size of England. Similarly, in the United States, abolitionist lawmakers took the most effective measures to combat slavery by legally limiting its territory while allowing free states to continue growing in the vast new Northwest.

In a peninsula political ascendency often falls to the broad base connecting it with the continent, because this part alone has the area to support a large population, and moreover commands a large hinterland, whence it continually draws new and invigorating blood. The geographical basis of the Aryan and later the Mongol supremacy in India was the wide zone of lowlands between the Indus and the Brahmaputra. [See map page 103.] The only ancient Greek state ever able to dominate the Balkan Peninsula was non-Hellenic Macedonia, after it had extended its boundaries to the Euxine and the Adriatic. To-day a much larger area in this same peninsular base harbors the widespread southern Slavs, who numerically and economically far outweigh Albanians and Greeks, and who could with ease achieve political domination over the small Turkish minority, were it not for the European fear of a Slavic Bosporus, and its union with Russia. The Cisalpine Gauls of the wide Po basin repeatedly threatened the existence of the smaller but more civilized Etruscan and Latin tribes. The latter, maturing their civilization under the concentrating influences of a limited area, at last dominated the larger Celtic district to the north. But in the nineteenth century this district took the lead in the movement for a United Italy, and now exercises the strong influence in Italian affairs which belongs to it by reason of its superior area, location, and more vigorous race. [See map of Italy's population, Chap. XVI.]

In a peninsula, political power typically goes to the broad area that connects it to the continent because this part has enough space to support a large population and has a significant hinterland, providing a continuous influx of new and invigorating people. The geographical foundation of Aryan and later Mongol dominance in India was the extensive lowlands between the Indus and the Brahmaputra. [See map page 103.] The only ancient Greek state that managed to dominate the Balkan Peninsula was non-Hellenic Macedonia, after it expanded its borders to the Black Sea and the Adriatic. Today, a much larger region in this same peninsular area is home to the numerous southern Slavs, who outnumber and economically surpass Albanians and Greeks and could easily gain political control over the small Turkish minority, if not for the European concerns about a Slavic Bosporus and its potential union with Russia. The Cisalpine Gauls of the vast Po basin repeatedly threatened the existence of the smaller, more civilized Etruscan and Latin tribes. The latter, developing their civilization in a concentrated area, eventually dominated the larger Celtic region to the north. However, in the nineteenth century, this region led the movement for a United Italy and now holds significant influence in Italian affairs due to its larger area, strategic location, and more vigorous population. [See map of Italy's population, Chap. XVI.]

The broad territorial base of the Anglo-Saxon race, Slavs, Germans and Chinese promises a long ethnic life, whereas the narrow foothold, of the Danes, Dutch, Greeks, and the Turks in Europe carries with it the persistent risk of conquest and absorption by a larger neighbor. Such a fate repeatedly threatens these people, but has thus far been warded off, now by the protection of an isolating environment, now by the diplomatic intervention of some not disinterested power. The scattered fragments of Osman stock in European Turkey, which constitute only about ten per cent. of the total population, and are almost lost in the surrounding mass of Slavs and Greeks, provide a poor guarantee for the duration of the race and their empire on European soil. On the other hand, the Osmani who are compactly spread over the whole interior of Asia Minor have a better prospect of national survival.

The extensive territorial presence of the Anglo-Saxon race, Slavs, Germans, and Chinese suggests a long-lasting ethnic identity, while the limited presence of the Danes, Dutch, Greeks, and Turks in Europe poses a constant risk of being conquered and absorbed by larger neighbors. Such a fate consistently looms over these groups, but has so far been averted, sometimes by the protection of a surrounding isolation and at other times by the diplomatic influence of some self-interested power. The small remnants of Ottoman heritage in European Turkey, which make up only about ten percent of the total population and are nearly indistinguishable amidst the surrounding Slavic and Greek majority, provide weak assurance for the longevity of the race and their empire in Europe. In contrast, the Ottomans who are densely settled throughout the interior of Asia Minor have a better chance of national survival.

Area and literature.

An important factor in the preservation of national consciousness and the spread of national influence is always a national language and literature. This principle is recognized by the government of the Czar in its Russification of Finland,311 Poland, and the German centers in the Baltic provinces, when it substitutes Russian for the local language in education, law courts and all public offices, and restricts the publication of local literature. The survival of a language and its literature is intimately connected with area and the population which that area can support. The extinction of small, weak peoples has its counterpart in the gradual elimination of dialects and languages having restricted territorial sway, whose fate is foreshadowed by the unequal competition of their literatures with those of numerically stronger peoples. An author writing in a language like the Danish, intelligible to only a small public, can expect only small returns for his labor in either influence, fame, or fortune. The return may be so small that it is prohibitive. Hence we find the Danish Hans Christian Andersen and the Norwegian Ibsen writing in German, as do also many Scandinavian scientists. Georg Brandes abandons his native Danish and seeks a larger public by making English the language of his books. The incentive to follow a literary career, especially if it includes making a living, is relatively weak among a people of only two or three millions, but gains enormously among large and cultivated peoples, like the seventy million German-speaking folk of Europe, or the one hundred and thirty millions of English speech scattered over the world. The common literature which represents the response to this incentive forms a bond of union among the various branches of these peoples, and may be eventually productive of political results.

An important factor in maintaining national identity and expanding national influence is always a national language and literature. The Czar's government acknowledges this principle in its efforts to Russify Finland,311 Poland, and the German communities in the Baltic provinces by replacing local languages with Russian in education, courts, and all public offices while limiting the publication of local literature. The survival of a language and its literature is closely linked to the area it occupies and the population it can support. The decline of small, weak nations often parallels the gradual disappearance of dialects and languages with limited geographic reach, which face overwhelming competition from the literatures of larger populations. An author writing in a language like Danish, understood by only a small audience, can expect minimal rewards in terms of influence, fame, or financial success. The rewards may be so insignificant that pursuing it becomes impractical. This is why we see Danish Hans Christian Andersen and Norwegian Ibsen writing in German, as do many Scandinavian scientists. Georg Brandes gives up his native Danish to reach a wider audience by writing in English. The motivation to pursue a literary career, especially if it involves earning a living, is relatively weak among populations of only two or three million but significantly stronger among larger, educated populations like the seventy million German speakers in Europe or the one hundred thirty million English speakers worldwide. The shared literature that arises from this motivation creates a bond among the different branches of these peoples and may eventually lead to political outcomes.

Small geographic base of primitive societies.

Growth has been the law of human societies since the birth of man's gregarious instinct. It has manifested itself in the formation of ever larger social groups, appropriating ever larger areas. It has registered itself geographically in the protrusion of ethnic boundaries, economically in more intensive utilization of the land, socially in increasing density of population, and politically in the formation of ever larger national territorial aggregates. The lowest stages of culture reveal small tribes, growing very slowly or at times not at all, disseminated over areas small in themselves but large for the number of their inhabitants, hence sparsely populated. The size of these primitive holdings depends upon the natural food supply yielded by the region. They assume wide dimensions but support groups of only a few families on the chill rocky coasts of Tierra del Fuego or the sterile plains of central Australia; and they contract to smaller areas dotted with fairly populous villages in the fertile districts of the middle Congo or bordering the rich coast fishing grounds of southern Alaska and British Columbia. But always land is abundant, and is drawn upon in widening circles when the food supply becomes inadequate or precarious.

Growth has been a fundamental aspect of human societies since the beginning of our social nature. It shows up in the formation of larger social groups that take up more space. It can be seen geographically in the expansion of ethnic boundaries, economically in the more intensive use of land, socially in increasing population density, and politically in the creation of larger national territories. The earliest stages of culture show small tribes that grow very slowly or sometimes not at all, spread over areas that may seem small but are large relative to their population, which is why they are sparsely populated. The size of these basic communities depends on the natural food supply in the area. They can cover vast areas but only sustain a few families, such as on the cold, rocky shores of Tierra del Fuego or the barren plains of central Australia. In contrast, they shrink to smaller areas with more densely populated villages in fertile regions like central Congo or along the rich fishing coasts of southern Alaska and British Columbia. But land is always plentiful and is relied upon in expanding circles when food becomes insufficient or unstable.

Influence of small confined areas.

Where nature presents barriers to far-ranging food-quests, man is forced to advance from the natural to the artificial basis of subsistence; he leaves the chase for the sedentary life of agriculture. Extensive activities are replaced by intensive ones, wide dispersal of tribal energies by concentration. The extensive forests and grassy plains of the Americas supported abundant animal life and therefore afforded conditions for the long survival of the hunting tribes; nature put no pressure upon man to coerce him to progress, except in the small mountain-walled valleys of Peru and Mexico, and in the restricted districts of isthmian Central America. Here game was soon exhausted. Agriculture became an increasing source of subsistence and was forced by limited area out of its migratory or essartage stage of development into the sedentary. As fields become fixed in such enclosed areas, so do the cultivators. Here first population becomes relatively dense, and thereby necessitates more elaborate social and political organization in order to prevent inner friction.

Where nature creates obstacles for extensive food gathering, humans have to transition from relying on natural resources to creating artificial means of living; they shift from hunting to a settled agricultural lifestyle. Large-scale activities are replaced by more intensive ones, and the widespread distribution of tribal efforts is replaced by focused efforts. The vast forests and grasslands of the Americas were home to a wealth of animal life, allowing hunting tribes to thrive for a long time; nature did not push humans to evolve, except in the small mountain valleys of Peru and Mexico, and in the limited areas of isthmian Central America. In these places, game quickly ran out. Agriculture became a more crucial source of food, evolving from its migratory or shifting stage into a settled practice because of the restricted land available. As fields were established in these enclosed areas, the farmers became settled too. This led to relatively dense populations, which required more complex social and political structures to manage internal conflicts.

The geographically enclosed district has the further advantage that its inhabitants soon come to know it out to its boundaries, understand its possibilities, exploit to the utmost its resources, and because of the closeness of their relationship to it and to each other come to develop a conscious national spirit. The population, since it cannot easily spread beyond the nature-set limits, increases in density. The members of the compact society react constantly upon one another and exchange the elements of civilization. Thus the small territory is characterized by the early maturity of a highly individualized civilization, which then, with inherent power of expansion, proceeds to overleap its narrow borders and conquer for itself a wide sphere of influence. Hand in hand with this process goes political concentration, which aids the subsequent expansion. Therefore islands, oases, slender coastal strips and mountain valleys repeatedly show us small peoples who, in their seclusion, have developed a tribal or national consciousness akin in its intensity to clan feeling. This national feeling is conspicuous in the English, Japanese, Swiss and Dutch, as it was in the ancient city-states of Greece. The accompanying civilization, once brought to maturity in its narrow breeding place, spreads under favorable geographic conditions over a much larger space, which the accumulated race energy takes for its field of activity. The flower which thus early blooms may soon fade and decay; nevertheless the geographically evolved national consciousness persists and retains a certain power of renewal. This has been demonstrated in the Italians and modern Greeks, in the Danes and the Icelanders. In the Jews it has resisted exile from their native land, complete political dissolution, and dispersal over the habitable world. Long and often as Italy had to submit to foreign dominion, the idea of the national unity of the peninsula was never lost.

The geographically enclosed region has the added benefit of its residents quickly becoming familiar with its boundaries, understanding its potential, fully utilizing its resources, and, due to their close connection to it and to each other, developing a strong national identity. The population, unable to easily expand beyond the natural limits, becomes denser. Members of this tight-knit community continuously interact and share elements of civilization. As a result, this small area is marked by the early development of a distinctly individual civilization, which, with its natural capacity for growth, eventually extends beyond its limited borders and creates a broad sphere of influence. This process is accompanied by political centralization, which facilitates further expansion. Thus, islands, oases, narrow coastal regions, and mountain valleys often showcase small groups of people who, in their isolation, have cultivated a sense of tribal or national identity similar in intensity to clan loyalty. This national sentiment is evident in the English, Japanese, Swiss, and Dutch, as it was in the ancient city-states of Greece. Once the accompanying civilization matures in its limited environment, it can spread over a much larger area under favorable geographic conditions, where the accumulated cultural energy finds its outlet. The early bloom of this culture might quickly fade and decline; however, the national consciousness that has emerged from geographic conditions endures and retains a degree of vitality. This has been seen in the Italians and modern Greeks, as well as the Danes and Icelanders. Among the Jews, this consciousness has survived despite exile from their homeland, complete political disintegration, and dispersion across the world. For as long as Italy had to endure foreign rule, the idea of national unity on the peninsula was never forgotten.

The process of territorial growth.

In vast unobstructed territories, on the other hand, the evil of wide, sparse dispersal is checked only by natural increase of population and the impinging of one growing people upon another, which restricts the territory of either. When the boundary waste between the small scattered tribal groups has been occupied, encroachment from the side of the stronger follows; then comes war, incorporation of territory, amalgamation of race and coalescence, or the extinction of the weaker. The larger people, commanding its larger area, expands numerically and territorially, and continues to throw out wider frontiers, till it meets insurmountable natural obstacles or the confines of a people strong as itself. After a pause, during which the existing area is outgrown and population begins to press harder upon the limits of subsistence, the weight of a nation is thrown against the barrier, be it physical or political. In consequence, the old boundaries are enlarged, either by successful encroachment upon a neighbor, or, in case of defeat, by incorporation in the antagonist's territory. But even defeat brings participation in a larger geographic base, wider coöperation, a greater sum total of common national interests, and especially the protection of the larger social group. The Transvaal and the Orange Free State find compensation for the loss of independence by their incorporation in the British Empire, even if gradual absorption be the destiny of the Boer stock.

In large open areas, the problem of sparse population spread is only limited by natural population growth and the interaction of one expanding group with another, which restricts each group's land. When the empty land between small, scattered tribal groups gets occupied, the stronger group starts to move in; this leads to conflict, the takeover of land, merging of different races, or the elimination of the weaker group. The larger group, with its greater territory, grows both in numbers and land and continues to push further outwards until it encounters significant natural barriers or another equally strong group. After a period where the current land is no longer sufficient and the population starts to push against the limits of resources, the pressure of the nation is directed at the barriers, whether they are physical or political. As a result, old borders are expanded, either by successfully invading a neighbor or, if defeated, by being absorbed into the stronger group's territory. However, even a loss allows for participation in a larger geographic region, broader cooperation, a greater total of shared national interests, and especially the protection of the larger community. The Transvaal and the Orange Free State find compensation for losing their independence by becoming part of the British Empire, even if gradual absorption is the eventual fate of the Boer population.

Area and growth.

Of adjacent areas equally advanced in civilization and in density of population but of unequal size, the larger must dominate because its people have the resistance and aggressive force inherent in the larger mass. This is the explanation of the absorption of so many colonies and conquerors by the native races, when no great cultural abyss or race antagonism separates the two. The long rule of the Scandinavians in the Hebrides ended in their absorption by the local Gaelic stock, simply because their settlements were too small and the number of their women too few. The lowlands on the eastern coasts of Scotland accommodated larger bands of Norse, who even to-day can be distinguished from the neighboring Scotch of the Highlands; but on the rugged western coast, where only small and widely separated deltas at the heads of the fiords offered a narrow foothold to the invaders, their scattered ethnic islands were soon inundated by the contiguous population.312 The Teutonic elements, both English and Norwegian, which for centuries filtered into Ireland, have been swallowed up in the native Celtic stock, except where religious antagonisms served to keep the two apart. So the dominant Anglo-Saxon population of England was a solvent for the Norman French, and the densely packed humanity of China for their Manchu conquerors.

In areas that are similar in development and population density but vary in size, the larger area tends to take over because its people have the resilience and strength that come with a bigger population. This explains why many colonies and conquerors have been absorbed by native populations when there isn't a significant cultural or racial divide between them. The long presence of the Scandinavians in the Hebrides ended when they were absorbed by the local Gaelic people, simply because their settlements were too small and there weren't enough women. The eastern lowlands of Scotland had larger groups of Norse who can still be recognized today as different from the Highland Scots; however, on the rugged western coast, where only small, isolated deltas at the ends of the fiords provided limited space for the invaders, their scattered communities were quickly overwhelmed by the surrounding population. 312 The Teutonic groups, both English and Norwegian, that gradually moved into Ireland have largely been integrated into the native Celtic population, except where religious differences kept the two groups apart. Thus, the dominant Anglo-Saxon population in England absorbed the Norman French, and the densely populated society of China absorbed their Manchu conquerors.

On the other hand, extensive areas, like early North America and Australia, sparsely inhabited by small scattered groups who have only an attenuated connection with their soil and therefore only a feeble hold upon their land, cannot compete with small areas, if these have the dense and evenly distributed population which ensures a firm tenure of the land. Small, geographically confined areas foster this compact and systematic occupation on the part of their inhabitants, since they put barriers in the way of precipitate and disintegrating expansion; and this characteristic compensates in some degree and for a period at least for the weakness otherwise inherent in the narrow territorial base.

On the other hand, large areas like early North America and Australia, which were sparsely populated by small, scattered groups that had only a weak connection to their land, can't compete with smaller areas that have dense and evenly distributed populations, ensuring a strong hold on the land. Smaller, geographically limited areas promote this compact and organized occupation by their residents, as they create barriers against rapid and chaotic expansion; this characteristic partly compensates for the inherent weakness of having a narrow territorial base, at least for a while.

Historical advance from small to large areas.

Every race, people, and state has had the history of progress from a small to a large area. All have been small in their youth. The bit of land covered by Roma Quadrata has given language, customs, laws, culture, and a faint strain of Latin blood to nations now occupying half a million square miles of Europe. The Arab inundation, which flooded the vast domain of the Caliphs, traced back to that spring of ethnic and religious energy which welled up in the arid plain of Mecca and the Arabian oases. The world-wide maritime expansion of the English-speaking people had its starting point in the lowlands of the Elbe. The makers of empire in northern China were cradled in the small highland valley of the Wei River. The little principality of Moscow was the nucleus of the Russian Empire.

Every race, people, and nation has a history of growing from small beginnings to large territories. They were all small in their early days. The piece of land that became Roma Quadrata has contributed language, customs, laws, culture, and a hint of Latin ancestry to nations now covering half a million square miles in Europe. The Arab influx, which spread across the vast territory of the Caliphs, can be traced back to a surge of ethnic and religious energy that arose in the dry plains of Mecca and the Arabian oases. The global maritime expansion of English-speaking people began in the lowlands of the Elbe. The empire builders in northern China originated from the small highland valley of the Wei River. The tiny principality of Moscow was the foundation of the Russian Empire.

Penetration into a people's remote past comes always upon some limited spot which has nurtured the young nation, and reveals the fact that territorial expansion is the incontestible feature of their history. This advance from small to large characterizes their political area, the scope of their trade relations, their spheres of activity, the size of their known world, and finally the sway of their religions. Every religion in its early stages of development bears the stamp of a narrow origin, traceable to the circumscribed habitat of the primitive social group, or back of that to the small circle of lands constituting the known world whence it sprang. First it is tribal, and makes a distinction between my God and thy God; but even when it has expanded to embody a universal system, it still retains vestigial forms of its narrow past. Jerusalem, Mecca and Rome remain the sacred goal of pilgrimages, while the vaster import of a monotheistic faith and the higher ethical teaching of the brotherhood of man have encircled the world.

Exploring a people's distant past often leads us to a specific place that helped raise the nation, revealing that territorial expansion is a clear aspect of their history. The shift from small to large defines their political landscape, the reach of their trade relations, their areas of influence, the size of their known world, and ultimately the impact of their religions. Every religion, in its early stages, shows signs of its limited beginnings, traceable to the confined environment of the early social group or even further back to the small areas that made up the known world from which it originated. Initially, it is tribal, distinguishing between "my God" and "your God"; yet even as it grows into a universal belief system, it still holds onto remnants of its limited origins. Jerusalem, Mecca, and Rome remain significant pilgrimage destinations, while the broader significance of monotheistic beliefs and the higher moral teachings of human brotherhood have spread across the globe.

When religion, language and race have spread, in their wake comes the growing state. Everywhere the political area tends gradually to embrace the whole linguistic area of which it forms a part, and finally the yet larger race area. Only the diplomacy of united Europe has availed to prevent France from absorbing French-speaking Belgium, or Russia from incorporating into her domain that vast Slav region extending from the Drave and Danube almost to the Gulf of Corinth, now parcelled out among seven different states, but bound to the Muscovite empire by ties of related speech, by race and religion. The detachment of the various Danubian principalities from the uncongenial dominion of the Turks, though a dismemberment of a large political territory and a seeming backward step, can be regarded only as a leisurely preliminary for a new territorial alignment. History's movements are unhurried; the backward step may prepare for the longer leap forward. It is impossible to resist the conclusion that the vigorous, reorganized German Empire will one day try to incorporate the Germanic areas found in Austria, Switzerland and Holland.

When religion, language, and race spread, they bring about the growing state. Everywhere, political boundaries tend to gradually encompass the entire linguistic area of which they are a part, and eventually the even larger racial area. Only the diplomacy of a united Europe has stopped France from absorbing French-speaking Belgium, or Russia from incorporating the vast Slavic region stretching from the Drave and Danube almost to the Gulf of Corinth, which is now divided among seven different states but is connected to the Russian empire by shared language, ethnicity, and religion. The separation of the various Danubian principalities from the alien rule of the Turks, although it seems like a fragmentation of a large political territory and a backward step, should be viewed as a slow prelude to a new territorial alignment. Historical movements are not rushed; the backward step may set the stage for a larger leap forward. It's hard to ignore the conclusion that the revitalized German Empire will eventually attempt to incorporate the German-speaking regions in Austria, Switzerland, and the Netherlands.

Gradations in area and in development.

Throughout the life of any people, from its foetal period in some small locality to its well rounded adult era marked by the occupation and organization of a wide national territory, gradations in area mark gradations of development. And this is true whether we consider the compass of their commercial exchanges, the scope of their maritime ventures, the extent of their linguistic area, the measure of their territorial ambitions, or the range of their intellectual interests and human sympathies. From land to ethics, the rule holds good. Peoples in the lower stages of civilization have contracted spacial ideas, desire and need at a given time only a limited territory, though they may change that territory often; they think in small linear terms, have a small horizon, a small circle of contact with others, a small range of influence, only tribal sympathies; they have an exaggerated conception of their own size and importance, because their basis of comparison is fatally limited. With a mature, widespread people like the English or French, all this is different; they have made the earth their own, so far as possible.

Throughout the life of any nation, from its early stages in a small area to its fully developed adult phase characterized by the occupation and organization of a large national territory, different sizes correspond to different levels of development. This applies whether we look at the extent of their trade, the range of their maritime activities, the area covered by their language, the scope of their territorial ambitions, or the breadth of their intellectual interests and human connections. The principle holds true across the board. Societies at lower stages of civilization tend to have limited spatial concepts; they seek and require only a small territory at a given time, even if that territory changes frequently. They think in narrow terms, have a limited outlook, minimal interaction with others, and a restricted influence, often having only tribal connections. They hold an inflated view of their own size and significance because their point of reference is critically restricted. In contrast, mature, expansive nations like the English or French see things differently; they have claimed the earth for themselves as much as possible.

Just because of this universal tendency towards the occupation of ever larger areas and the formation of vaster political aggregates, in making a sociological or political estimate of different peoples, we should never lose sight of the fact that all racial and national characteristics which operate towards the absorption of more land and impel to political expansion are of fundamental value. A ship of state manned by such a crew has its sails set to catch the winds of the world.

Just because of this universal tendency to take over larger areas and create bigger political groups, when we assess different cultures or nations sociologically or politically, we should always remember that all racial and national traits that drive land absorption and push for political expansion are fundamentally important. A nation led by such a team has its sails set to catch the winds of the world.

Preliminaries to ethnic and political expansion.

Territorial expansion is always preceded by an extension of the circle of influence which a people exerts through its traders, its deep-sea fishermen, its picturesque marauders and more respectable missionaries, and earlier still by a widening of its mere geographical horizon through fortuitous or systematic exploration. The Northmen visited the coasts of Britain and France first as pirates, then as settlers. Norman and Breton fishermen were drawing in their nets on the Grand Bank of Newfoundland thirty years before Cartier sailed up the St. Lawrence. Japanese fishing boats preceded Japanese colonists to the coasts of Yezo. Trading fleets were the forerunners of the Greek colonies along the Black Sea and Mediterranean, and of Phoenician settlements in North Africa, Sicily and Spain. It was in the wake of trapper and fur trader that English and American pioneer advanced across our continent to the Pacific; just as in French Canada Jesuit priest and voyageur opened the way for the settler. Religious propaganda was yoked with greed of conquest in the campaigns of Cortez and Pizarro. Modern statesmen pushing a policy of expansion are alive to the diplomatic possibilities of missionaries endangered or their property destroyed. They find a still better asset to be realized on territorially in enterprising capitalists settled among a weaker people, by whom their property is threatened or overtaxed, or their trade interfered with. The British acquisition of Hongkong in 1842 followed a war with China to prevent the exclusion of the English opium trade from the Celestial Empire. The annexation of the Transvaal resulted from the expansion of English capitalists to the Rand mines, much as the advance of the United States flag to the Hawaiian Islands followed American sugar planters thither. American capital in the Caribbean states of South America has repeatedly tried to embroil those countries with the United States government; and its increasing presence in Cuba is undoubtedly ominous for the independence of the island, because with capital go men and influence.

Territorial expansion is always preceded by the widening of a people's influence through their traders, deep-sea fishermen, adventurous raiders, and more respectable missionaries, and even earlier by an expanding geographical awareness through random or planned exploration. The Norse first visited the coasts of Britain and France as pirates, and later as settlers. Norman and Breton fishermen were hauling in their nets on the Grand Bank of Newfoundland thirty years before Cartier sailed up the St. Lawrence. Japanese fishing boats arrived at the coasts of Yezo before Japanese colonists. Trading fleets were the predecessors of Greek colonies along the Black Sea and Mediterranean, and Phoenician settlements in North Africa, Sicily, and Spain. It was in the wake of trappers and fur traders that English and American pioneers moved across our continent to the Pacific; similarly, in French Canada, Jesuit priests and voyageurs paved the way for settlers. Religious motives were mixed with the greed for conquest in the campaigns of Cortez and Pizarro. Modern politicians promoting expansion are aware of the diplomatic potential of missionaries in danger or whose property has been harmed. They find an even better advantage in ambitious capitalists settled among a weaker population, whose property is threatened or overtaxed, or whose trade is disrupted. The British acquisition of Hong Kong in 1842 followed a war with China to prevent the exclusion of the English opium trade from the Celestial Empire. The annexation of the Transvaal resulted from the expansion of English capitalists to the Rand mines, much like the advance of the United States flag to the Hawaiian Islands followed American sugar planters there. American capital in the Caribbean states of South America has repeatedly attempted to involve those countries with the United States government; and its growing presence in Cuba is undoubtedly a threat to the island’s independence, because where capital goes, people and influence follow.

When the foreign investor is not a corporation but a government, the expanding commercial influence looks still more surely to tangible political results; because such national enterprises have at bottom a political motive, however much overlaid by an economic exterior. When the British government secured a working majority of the Suez Canal stock, it sealed the fate of Egypt to become ultimately a province of the British Empire. Russian railroads in Manchuria were the well-selected tool for the Russification and final annexation of the province. The weight of American national enterprise in the Panama Canal Zone sufficed to split off from the Colombian federation a peripheral state, whose detachment is obviously a preliminary for eventual incorporation into United States domain. The efforts of the German government to secure from the Sultan of Turkey railroad concessions through Asia Minor for German capitalists has aroused jealousy in financial and political circles in St. Petersburg, and prompted a demand from the Russian Foreign Office upon Turkey for the privilege of constructing railroads through eastern Asia Minor.313

When the foreign investor is a government rather than a corporation, the growing commercial influence is even more likely to lead to clear political outcomes. This is because national enterprises ultimately have a political agenda, even if it appears economically motivated on the surface. When the British government obtained a working majority of Suez Canal shares, it sealed Egypt's fate, making it eventually a part of the British Empire. Russian railroads in Manchuria were strategically used for the Russification and eventual annexation of the province. The impact of American investment in the Panama Canal Zone was enough to separate a peripheral state from the Colombian federation, which is obviously a first step towards its eventual incorporation into the United States. The German government's attempts to secure railroad concessions through Asia Minor for German investors have triggered jealousy in financial and political circles in St. Petersburg, leading to a request from the Russian Foreign Office to Turkey for the right to build railroads in eastern Asia Minor.313

Significance of sphere of activity or influence.

Beyond the home of a people lies its sphere of influence or activities, which in the last analysis may be taken as a protest against the narrowness of the domestic habitat. It represents the larger area which the people wants and which in course of time it might advantageously occupy or annex. It embodies the effort to embrace more varied and generous natural conditions, whereby the struggle for subsistence may be made less hard. Finally, it is an expression of the law that for peoples and races the struggle for existence is at bottom a struggle for space. Geography sees various forms of the historical movement as the struggle for space in which humanity has forever been engaged. In this struggle the stronger peoples have absorbed ever larger portions of the earth's surface. Hence, through continual subjection to new conditions here or there and to a greater sum total of various conditions, they gain in power by improved variation, as well as numerically by the enlargement of their geographic base. The Anglo-Saxon branch of the Teutonic stock has, by its phenomenal increase, overspread sections of whole continents, drawn from their varied soils nourishment for its finest efflorescence, and thereby has far out-grown the Germanic branch by which, at the start, it was overshadowed. The fact that the British Empire comprises 28,615,000 square kilometers or exactly one-fifth of the total land area of the earth, and that the Russian Empire contains over one-seventh, are full of encouragement for Anglo-Saxon and Slav, but contain a warning to the other peoples of the world.

Beyond a nation’s home lies its sphere of influence or activities, which ultimately can be seen as a reaction against the limitations of its domestic space. It represents the broader area that the people desire and may eventually occupy or assimilate over time. It embodies the effort to embrace more diverse and abundant natural conditions, making the struggle for survival less difficult. Ultimately, it reflects the principle that for nations and ethnic groups, the fight for existence is fundamentally a fight for territory. Geography recognizes various forms of historical movement as the battle for space in which humanity has always been engaged. In this struggle, stronger nations have absorbed larger portions of the earth's surface. Thus, by continually adapting to new conditions here and there, as well as to a greater range of different conditions, they gain strength through improved variation, as well as in numbers by expanding their geographic base. The Anglo-Saxon branch of the Teutonic group has, through its remarkable growth, spread across parts of entire continents, drawing nourishment from diverse soils for its greatest development, and thereby has significantly surpassed the Germanic branch that initially overshadowed it. The fact that the British Empire covers 28,615,000 square kilometers, or exactly one-fifth of the total land area of the earth, and that the Russian Empire encompasses over one-seventh, serves as a source of encouragement for Anglo-Saxons and Slavs but is a warning to other nations around the globe.

Nature of expansion in new and old countries.

The large area which misleads a primitive folk into excessive dispersion and the dissipation of their tribal powers, offers to an advanced people, who in some circumscribed habitat have learned the value of land, the freest conditions for their development. A wide, unobstructed territory, occupied by a sparse population of wandering tribes capable of little resistance to conquest or encroachment, affords the most favorable conditions to an intruding superior race. Such conditions the Chinese found in Mongolia and Manchuria, the Russians in Siberia, and European colonists in the Americas, Australia and Africa. Almost unlimited space and undeveloped resources met their land hunger and their commercial ambition. Their numerical growth was rapid, both by the natural increase reflecting an abundant food supply, and by accessions from the home countries. Expansion advanced by strides. In contrast to this care-free, easy development in a new land, growth in old countries like Europe and the more civilized parts of Asia means a slow protrusion of the frontier, made at the cost of blood; it means either the absorption of the native people, because there are no unoccupied corners into which they can be driven, or the imposition upon them of an unwelcome rule exercised by alien officials. Witness the advance of the Russians into Poland and Finland, of the Germans into Poland and Alsace-Lorraine, of the Japanese into Korea, and of the English into crowded India.

The vast area that misleads a primitive people into spreading too thin and weakening their tribal strength provides advanced societies, who have recognized the value of land in a specific region, the best conditions for their growth. A large, open territory, inhabited by a small population of nomadic tribes that can offer little resistance to conquest or encroachment, creates the perfect environment for a superior race to impose itself. The Chinese discovered such conditions in Mongolia and Manchuria, the Russians in Siberia, and European colonists in the Americas, Australia, and Africa. Almost limitless space and untapped resources satisfied their need for land and their commercial ambitions. Their population grew rapidly, both through natural increase from a plentiful food supply and through immigration from their home countries. Expansion proceeded quickly. In contrast to this easy, carefree development in new lands, growth in old countries like Europe and the more developed regions of Asia involves a slow pushing of the frontier, often at the cost of lives; it either leads to the absorption of the native people, since there are no unoccupied areas to push them into, or the enforcement of an unwanted rule by foreign officials. Look at the advance of the Russians into Poland and Finland, of the Germans into Poland and Alsace-Lorraine, of the Japanese into Korea, and of the English into densely populated India.

The rapid unfolding of the geographical horizon in a young land communicates to an expanding people new springs of mobility, new motives for movement out and beyond the old confines, new goals holding out new and undreamt of benefits. Life becomes fresh, young, hopeful. Old checks to natural increase of population are removed. Emigrant bands beat out new trails radiating from the old home. They go on individual initiative or state-directed enterprises; but no matter which, the manifold life in the far-away periphery reacts upon the center to vivify and rejuvenate it.

The quick expansion of the landscape in a young country offers its growing population new opportunities for travel, fresh reasons to move beyond previous limits, and exciting new goals filled with unexpected rewards. Life feels vibrant, youthful, and full of hope. Old restrictions on population growth are lifted. Groups of emigrants forge new paths away from their original homes. They embark on these journeys through personal choices or government-sponsored initiatives; either way, the diverse life in the distant regions stimulates and revitalizes the core communities.

Relation of ethnic to political expansion.

The laws of the territorial growth of peoples and of states are in general the same. The main differences between the two lies in the fact that ethnic expansion, since it depends upon natural increase, is slow, steady, and among civilized peoples is subject to slight fluctuations; while the frontiers of a state, after a long period of permanence, can suddenly be advanced by conquest far beyond the ethnic boundaries, often, however, only to be as quickly lost again. Therefore the important law may be laid down, that the more closely the territorial growth of a state keeps pace with that of its people, and the more nearly the political area coincides with the ethnic, the greater is the strength and stability of the state. This is the explanation of the vigor and permanence of the early English colonies in America. The slow westward protrusion of their frontier of continuous settlement within the boundaries of the Allegheny Mountains formed a marked contrast to the wide sweep of French voyageur camp and lonely trading-station in the Canadian forests, and even more to the handful of priests and soldiers who for three centuries kept an unsteady hold upon the Spanish empire in the Western Hemisphere. The political advance of the United States across the continent from the Alleghenies to the Mississippi, thence to the Rocky Mountains, and thence to the Pacific was always preceded by bands of enterprising settlers, who planted themselves beyond the frontier and beckoned to the flag to follow. The great empires of antiquity were enlarged mechanically by conquest and annexation. They were mosaics, not growths. The cohesive power of a common ethnic bond was lacking; so was the modern substitute for this to be found in close economic interdependence maintained by improved methods of communication. Hence these empires soon broke up again along lines of old geographic and ethnic cleavage. For Rome, the cementing power of the Mediterranean and the fairly unified civilization which this enclosed sea had been evolving since the dawn of Cretan and Phoenician trade, compensated in part for the lack of common speech and national ideals throughout the political domain. But the Empire proved in the end to be merely a mosaic, easily broken.

The laws governing how people and states grow are generally the same. The main differences come from the fact that ethnic expansion, since it relies on natural growth, is slow, steady, and has only minor fluctuations among civilized peoples. In contrast, a state's borders, after being stable for a long time, can suddenly change through conquest, often pushing far beyond ethnic boundaries, only to be quickly lost again. Therefore, a key principle can be established: the closer a state’s territorial growth aligns with its population growth, and the more the political area matches the ethnic area, the stronger and more stable the state will be. This explains the strength and longevity of the early English colonies in America. Their slow westward expansion of continuous settlement within the Allegheny Mountains sharply contrasted with the extensive reach of French traders and solitary trading posts in the Canadian forests, and even more so with the few priests and soldiers who maintained an unstable grip on the Spanish empire in the Western Hemisphere for three centuries. The political expansion of the United States across the continent—from the Alleghenies to the Mississippi, from there to the Rocky Mountains, and then to the Pacific—was always preceded by groups of determined settlers who established themselves beyond the frontier and called for the flag to follow them. The great empires of antiquity grew through conquest and annexation in a mechanical way. They were mosaics, not organic growths. They lacked the unifying force of a common ethnic bond and the modern equivalent of economic interdependence fostered by better communication methods. As a result, these empires quickly fragmented along traditional geographic and ethnic lines. For Rome, the unifying force of the Mediterranean and the relatively unified civilization it had been developing since the early days of Cretan and Phoenician trade partially compensated for the absence of a common language and national ideals across the political realm. However, in the end, the Empire was just a mosaic, easily shattered.

Relation of people and state to political boundary.

The second point of difference between the expansion of peoples and of states lies in their respective relation to the political frontier. This confines the state like a stockade, fixing the territorial limits of its administrative functions; but for the subjects of the state it is an imaginary line, powerless to check the range of their activities, except when a military or tariff war is going on. The state boundary, if it coincides with a strong natural barrier, may for decades or even centuries succeed in confining a growing people, if these, by intelligent economy, increase the productivity of the soil whose area they are unable to extend. Yet the time comes even for these when they must break through the barriers and secure more land, either by foreign conquest or colonization. The classic example of the confinement of a people within its political boundaries is the long isolation of Japan from 1624 to 1854. The pent-up forces there accumulated, in a population which had doubled itself in the interval and which by hard schooling was made receptive to every improved economic method, manifest themselves in the insistent demand for more land which has permeated all the recent policy of Japan. But the history of Japan is exceptional. The rule is that the growing people slowly but continually overflow their political boundary, which then advances to cover the successive flood plains of the national inundation, or yet farther to anticipate the next rise. This has been the history of Germany in its progress eastward across the Elbe, the Oder, the Vistula and the Niemen. The dream of a greater empire embraces all the German-speaking people from Switzerland, Tyrol and Steiermark to those outlying groups in the Baltic provinces of Russia and the related offshoot in Holland.314 [See map page 223.]

The second key difference between the growth of communities and that of states is how they relate to political boundaries. These boundaries act like a fence for the state, defining the limits of its governance. However, for the citizens of the state, it's just an imaginary line that doesn't really restrict their activities, except during a military conflict or trade war. If the state boundary aligns with a strong natural obstacle, it may keep a growing population contained for decades or even centuries, as long as they intelligently manage their resources to boost the productivity of the land they can't expand. Eventually, though, they must push past these boundaries to acquire more land through conquest or colonization. A classic example of a population being confined within its political borders is Japan's long isolation from 1624 to 1854. The intense buildup of forces during this time led to a population that had doubled and was well-prepared to adopt improved methods of economic growth, resulting in a strong demand for more land that has influenced all of Japan's recent policies. However, Japan's history is an exception. Generally, growing populations gradually overflow their political boundaries, leading them to expand and cover new territories as they emerge. This has been evident in Germany's expansion eastward across the Elbe, the Oder, the Vistula, and the Niemen. The ambition for a greater empire includes all German-speaking people from Switzerland, Tyrol, and Steiermark to those in the Baltic provinces of Russia and the related groups in Holland.314 [See map page 223.]

Though political boundaries, especially where they coincide with natural barriers, may restrict the territorial growth of a people, on the other hand, political expansion is always a stimulus to racial expansion, because it opens up more land and makes the conditions of life easier for an increasing people, by relieving congestion in the older areas. More than this, it materially aids while guiding and focusing the out-going streams of population. Thus it keeps them concentrated for the reinforcement of the nation in the form of colonies, and tends to reduce the political evil of indiscriminate emigration, by which the streams are dissipated and diverted to strengthen other nations. Witness the active internal colonization practiced by Germany in her Polish territory,315 by Russia in Siberia, in an effort to make the ethnic boundary hurry after and overtake the political frontier.

Though political borders, especially where they align with natural barriers, can limit the territorial growth of a group, political expansion always encourages racial growth because it opens up more land and makes life easier for a growing population by easing congestion in older areas. Furthermore, it significantly supports while directing the outflow of people. This keeps them concentrated to strengthen the nation through colonies and helps reduce the political issues caused by random emigration, which can spread and divert populations to bolster other nations. Consider the active internal colonization by Germany in its Polish territory,315 and by Russia in Siberia, as they aim to push the ethnic boundaries to catch up with the political borders.

Expansion of civilization.

Just as the development of a people and state is marked by advance from small to ever larger areas, so is that of a civilization. It may originate in a small district; but more mobile than humanity itself, it does not remain confined to one spot, but passes on from individual to individual and from people to people. Greece served only as a garden in which the flowers of Oriental and Egyptian civilization were temporarily transplanted. As soon as they were modified and adapted to their new conditions, their seed spread over all Europe. The narrow area of ancient Greece, which caused the early dissemination of its people over the Mediterranean basin, and thereby weakened the political force of the country at home, was an important factor in the wide distribution of its culture. Commerce, colonization and war are vehicles of civilization, where favorable geographic conditions open the way for trade in the wake of the victorious army. The imposition of Roman dominion meant everywhere the gift of Roman civilization. The Crusaders brought back from Syria more than their scars and their trophies. Every European factory in China, every Hudson Bay Company post in the wilds of northern Canada, every Arab settlement in savage Africa is surrounded by a sphere of trade; and this in turn is enclosed in a wider sphere of influence through which its civilization, though much diluted, has filtered. The higher the civilization, the wider the area which it masters. The manifold activities of a civilized people demand a large sphere of influence, and include, furthermore, improved means of communication which enable it to control such a sphere.

Just as the growth of a nation and its people is characterized by expanding from small to larger territories, so too is the evolution of a civilization. It might start in a small region, but being more dynamic than humanity itself, it doesn't stay in one place; instead, it spreads from person to person and community to community. Greece was merely a garden where the ideas of Eastern and Egyptian civilizations were temporarily planted. Once they were adapted to new conditions, their influence spread throughout Europe. The limited area of ancient Greece, which led to the early migration of its people across the Mediterranean, ultimately weakened the political power at home but played a key role in the widespread distribution of its culture. Trade, colonization, and conflict are means by which civilization advances, wherever favorable geographical conditions allow trade to follow an advancing army. The establishment of Roman rule brought the benefits of Roman civilization everywhere. The Crusaders returned from Syria with more than just battle scars and trophies. Every European trading post in China, every Hudson Bay Company location in the remote northern Canada, and every Arab settlement in wild Africa exists within a trade network, which is further encompassed by a broader sphere of influence through which its civilization, although somewhat diluted, has permeated. The more advanced a civilization is, the larger the area it encompasses. The diverse activities of a civilized people require a substantial sphere of influence and also demand improved communication methods that allow them to manage such a sphere.

Even a relatively low civilization may spread over a vast area if carried by a highly mobile people. Mohammedanism, which embodies a cultural system as well as a religion, found its vehicles of dispersal in the pastoral nomads occupying the arid land of northern Africa and western Asia, and thus spread from the Senegal River to Chinese Turkestan. It was carried by the maritime Arabs of Oman and Yemen to Malacca and Sumatra, where it was communicated to the seafaring Malays. These island folk, who approximate the most highly civilized peoples in their nautical efficiency, distributed the meager elements of Mohammedan civilization over the Malay Archipelago. [See map of the Religions of the Eastern Hemisphere, in chapter XIV.]

Even a relatively simple civilization can cover a large area if it's supported by a highly mobile population. Islam, which represents both a cultural system and a religion, spread through the pastoral nomads living in the dry regions of northern Africa and western Asia, reaching from the Senegal River to Chinese Turkestan. It was brought by the seafaring Arabs from Oman and Yemen to Malacca and Sumatra, where it was shared with the maritime Malays. These islanders, who are comparable to the most advanced societies in their sailing skills, spread the limited aspects of Islamic civilization throughout the Malay Archipelago. [See map of the Religions of the Eastern Hemisphere, in chapter XIV.]

Cultural advantages of large political area.

The larger the area which a civilized nation occupies, the more numerous are its points of contact with other peoples, and the less likely is there to be a premature crystallization of its civilization from isolation. Extension of area on a large scale means eventually extension of the seaboard and access to those multiform international relations which the ocean highway confers. The world wide expansion of the British Empire has given it at every outward step wider oceanic contact and eventually a cosmopolitan civilization. The same thing is true of the other great colonial empires of history, whether Portuguese, Spanish, Dutch or French; and even of the great continental empires, like Russia and the United States. The Russian advance across Siberia, like the American advance across the Rockies, meant access to the Pacific, and a modification of its civilization on those remote shores.

The larger the area a civilized nation occupies, the more connections it has with other peoples, making it less likely for its civilization to become isolated too soon. Expanding territory on a large scale eventually leads to a longer coastline and access to the diverse international relations that come with ocean routes. The global expansion of the British Empire has provided wider oceanic connections at every step and ultimately fostered a cosmopolitan civilization. The same applies to other major colonial empires in history, whether Portuguese, Spanish, Dutch, or French; and even to the major continental empires like Russia and the United States. Russia's expansion across Siberia and America's push across the Rockies both opened access to the Pacific and altered their civilizations on those distant shores.

A large area means varied vicinal locations and hence differentiation of civilization, at least along the frontier. How rapidly the vivifying influences of this contact will penetrate into the bulk of the interior depends upon size, location as scattered or compact, and general geographic conditions like navigable rivers or mountains, which facilitate or bar intercourse with that interior. The Russian Empire has eleven different nations, speaking even more different languages, on its western and southern frontiers. Its long line of Asiatic contact will inevitably give to the European civilization transplanted hither in Russian colonies a new and perhaps not unfruitful development. The Siberian citizen of future centuries may compare favorably with his brother in Moscow. Japan, even while impressing its civilization upon the reluctant Koreans, will see itself modified by the contact and its culture differentiated by the transplanting; but the content of Japanese civilization will be increased by every new variant thus formed.

A large area means different neighboring locations and, therefore, a variety of cultures, especially along the border. How quickly the revitalizing effects of this interaction will spread into the interior depends on factors like size, whether the area is scattered or compact, and general geographic features such as navigable rivers or mountains, which can either promote or hinder communication with the interior. The Russian Empire has eleven different nations, each speaking a variety of languages, along its western and southern borders. Its extensive Asian connections will inevitably lead to a new and potentially fruitful evolution of European culture introduced in Russian colonies. In future centuries, a Siberian citizen may be seen as comparable to someone from Moscow. Japan, while imposing its culture on the reluctant Koreans, will also be shaped by this interaction, with its culture becoming unique through this exchange; however, every new variation created will enhance the richness of Japanese civilization.

Politico-economic advantages.

The larger the area brought under one political control, the less the handicap of internal friction and the greater its economic independence. Vast territory has enabled the United States to maintain with advantage a protective tariff, chiefly because the free trade within its own borders was extensive. The natural law of the territorial growth of states and peoples means an extension of the areas in which peace and coöperation are preserved, a relative reduction of frontiers and of the military forces necessary to defend them,316 diminution in the sum total of conflicts, and a wider removal of the border battle fields. In place of the continual warfare between petty tribes which prevailed in North America four hundred years ago, we have to-day the peaceful competition of the three great nations which have divided the continent among them. The political unification of the Mediterranean basin under the Roman Empire restricted wars to the remote land frontiers. The foreign wars of Russia, China, and the United States in the past century have been almost wholly confined to the outskirts of their big domains, merely scratching the rim and leaving the great interior sound and undisturbed. Russia's immense area is the military ally on which she can most surely count. The long road to Moscow converted Napoleon's victory into a defeat; and the resistless advance of the Japanese from Port Arthur to the Sungari River led only to a peace robbed of the chief fruits of victory. The numerous wars of the British Empire have been limited to this or that corner, and have scarcely affected the prosperity of the great remainder, so that their costs have been readily borne and their wounds rapidly healed.

The larger the area under one political control, the less internal friction there is and the more economic independence it has. The vast territory of the United States allows it to effectively maintain a protective tariff, mainly because there is extensive free trade within its own borders. The natural progression of territorial growth for states and peoples results in broader areas where peace and cooperation are upheld, a relative decrease in borders, and fewer military forces needed to defend them,316 a reduction in the overall number of conflicts, and a more significant distance from border battlefields. Instead of the constant warfare among small tribes that was common in North America four hundred years ago, today we see the peaceful competition among the three major nations that have divided the continent. The political unification of the Mediterranean region under the Roman Empire limited wars to distant land borders. The foreign wars involving Russia, China, and the United States over the last century have mostly been confined to the outskirts of their vast territories, merely touching the edges while leaving the main area intact and undisturbed. Russia's massive land is the military asset it relies on most. Napoleon's victory turned into a defeat on the long road to Moscow; and the unstoppable advance of the Japanese from Port Arthur to the Sungari River resulted only in a peace stripped of the main rewards of victory. The numerous wars of the British Empire have been localized and have hardly impacted the prosperity of the vast majority, allowing their costs to be easily managed and their injuries to heal quickly.

Political area and the national horizon.

The territorial expansion of peoples and states is attended by an evolution of their spacial conceptions and ideals. Primitive peoples, accustomed to dismemberment in small tribal groups, bear all the marks of territorial contraction. Their geographical horizon is usually fixed by the radius of a few days' march. Inter-tribal trade and intercourse reach only rudimentary development, under the prevailing conditions of mutual antagonism and isolation, and hence contribute little to the expansion of the horizon. Knowing only their little world, such primitive groups overestimate the size and importance of their own territory, and are incapable of controlling an extensive area. This is the testimony of all travellers who have observed native African states. Though the race or stock distribution may be wide, like that of the Athapascan and Algonquin Indians, and their war paths long, like the campaigns of the Iroquois against the Cherokees of the Tennessee River, yet the unit of tribal territory permanently occupied is never large.

The territorial expansion of people and states comes with a shift in their spatial beliefs and ideals. Primitive societies, used to being divided into small tribal groups, show clear signs of territorial limits. Their geographical awareness is typically defined by how far they can walk in a few days. Trade and interaction between tribes are very basic due to ongoing conflicts and isolation, which limits their broader understanding. Familiar only with their small world, these primitive groups tend to overestimate the size and significance of their own land and struggle to manage a larger area. This is the finding of all travelers who have examined indigenous African states. While the distribution of race or ethnicity may be extensive, as seen with the Athapascan and Algonquin tribes, and their routes for conflict expansive, like the Iroquois campaigns against the Cherokees along the Tennessee River, the area of territory occupied by each tribal unit is never substantial.

National estimates of area.

Small naturally defined regions, which take the lead in historical development because they counteract the primitive tendency towards excessive dispersal, are in danger of teaching too well their lesson of concentration. In course of time geographic enclosure begins to betray its limitations. The extent of a people's territory influences their estimate of area per se, determines how far land shall be made the basis of their national purposes, fixes the territorial scale of their conquests and their political expansion. This is a conspicuous psychological effect of a narrow local environment. A people embedded for centuries in a small district measure area with a short yardstick. The ancient Greeks devised a philosophic basis for the advantages of the small state, which is extolled in the writings of Plato and Aristotle.317 Aristotle wanted it small enough, "to be comprehended at one glance of the statesman's eye." Plato's ideal democracy, by rigid laws limiting the procreative period of women and men and providing for the death of children born out of this period or out of wedlock, restricted its free citizens to 5,040 heads of families,318 all living within reach of the agora, and all able to judge from personal knowledge of a candidate's fitness for office. This condition was possible only in dwarf commonwealths like the city-states of the Hellenic world. The failure of the Greeks to build up a political structure on a territorial scale commensurate with their cultural achievements and with the wide sphere of their cultural influence can be ascribed chiefly to their inability to discard the contracted territorial ideas engendered by geographic and political dismemberment. The little Judean plateau, which gave birth to a universal religion, clung with provincial bigotry to the narrow tribal creed and repudiated the larger faith of Christ, which found its appropriate field in Mediterranean Europe.

Small, naturally defined regions, which lead in historical development because they counteract the primitive tendency towards excessive scattering, risk teaching their lesson of concentration too effectively. Over time, geographic confinement starts to show its drawbacks. The size of a people's territory affects their perception of area per se, determines how much land becomes the foundation of their national objectives, and establishes the territorial scale of their conquests and political expansion. This is a clear psychological effect of a limited local environment. A people deeply rooted in a small area measure area with a short yardstick. The ancient Greeks created a philosophical basis for the advantages of small states, which is praised in the writings of Plato and Aristotle.317 Aristotle wanted it small enough "to be comprehended at one glance of the statesman's eye." Plato's ideal democracy, through strict laws limiting the reproductive period of both women and men and mandating the death of children born outside this period or out of wedlock, restricted its free citizens to 5,040 heads of families,318 all residing within reach of the agora and all capable of assessing a candidate's qualifications based on personal experience. This situation was only possible in tiny republics like the city-states of the Hellenic world. The Greeks' failure to establish a political structure on a scale that matched their cultural achievements and the broad scope of their cultural influence can primarily be attributed to their inability to move beyond the limited territorial concepts shaped by geographic and political fragmentation. The small Judean plateau, which gave rise to a universal religion, clung to the narrow tribal beliefs with provincial intolerance and rejected the broader faith of Christ, which found its rightful place in Mediterranean Europe.

Estimates of area in small maritime states.

Maritime peoples of small geographic base have a characteristic method of expansion which reflects their low valuation of area. Their limited amount of arable soil necessitates reliance upon foreign sources of supply, which are secured by commerce. Hence they found trading stations or towns among alien peoples on distant coasts, selecting points like capes or inshore islets which can be easily defended and which at the same time command inland or maritime routes of trade. The prime geographic consideration is location, natural and vicinal. The area of the trading settlement is kept as small as possible to answer its immediate purpose, because it can be more easily defended.319 Such were the colonies of the ancient Phoenicians and Greeks in the Mediterranean, of the Medieval Arabs and the Portuguese on the east coast of Africa and in India. This method reached its ultimate expression in point of small area, seclusion, and local autonomy, perhaps, in the Hanse factories in Norway and Russia.320 But all these widespread nuclei of expansion remained barren of permanent national result, because they were designed for a commercial end, and ignored the larger national mission and surer economic base found in acquisition of territory. Hence they were short-lived, succumbing to attack or abandoned on the failure of local resources, which were ruthlessly exploited.

Maritime communities with small geographic areas have a distinct way of expanding that shows they don’t place much importance on land. Their limited arable land requires them to depend on outside sources for supplies, which they get through trade. This is why they establish trading posts or towns among foreign populations on distant shores, choosing locations like capes or nearby islands that are easy to defend and at the same time control trade routes, whether inland or maritime. The main geographic consideration is location, both natural and nearby. The area of the trading settlement is kept as small as possible to serve its immediate purpose since it can be defended more easily. 319 Such were the colonies of the ancient Phoenicians and Greeks in the Mediterranean, as well as the Medieval Arabs and the Portuguese on the east coast of Africa and in India. This method reached its peak in terms of small area, seclusion, and local autonomy, perhaps in the Hanse factories in Norway and Russia. 320 However, all these widespread centers of expansion ended up yielding no lasting national outcomes because they were created for commercial purposes and overlooked the broader national goals and more stable economic foundation found in acquiring territory. As a result, they were short-lived, falling to attacks or being abandoned when local resources failed, which were heavily exploited.

Limitations of small territorial conceptions.

That precocious development characteristic of small naturally defined areas shows its inherent weakness in the tendency to accept the enclosed area as a nature-made standard of national territory. The earlier a state fixes its frontier without allowance for growth, the earlier comes the cessation of its development. Therefore the geographical nurseries of civilization were infected with germs of decay. Such was the history of Egypt, of Yemen, of Greece, Crete, and Phoenicia. These are the regions which, as Carl Ritter says, have given the whole fruit of their existence to the world for its future use, have conferred upon the world the trust which they once held, afterward to recede, as it were, from view.321 They were great in the past, and now they belong to those immortal dead whose greatness has been incorporated in the world's life—"the choir invisible" of the nations.

That early development typical of small, clearly defined areas reveals its fundamental weakness in the tendency to view the enclosed space as a natural standard for national territory. The sooner a state establishes its borders without considering future growth, the sooner its progress halts. As a result, the geographical cradles of civilization become tainted with signs of decline. This was the case for Egypt, Yemen, Greece, Crete, and Phoenicia. These areas, as Carl Ritter notes, have contributed the entirety of their existence to the world for its future benefit, bestowing upon it the trust they once held, only to fade, so to speak, from sight.321 They were great in the past, and now they are part of that immortal dead whose greatness has been woven into the fabric of the world's life—"the choir invisible" of the nations.

Evolution of territorial policies.

The advance from a small, self-dependent community to interdependent relations with other peoples, then to ethnic expansion or union of groups to form a state or empire is a great turning point in any history. Thereby the clan or tribe discards the old paralyzing seclusion of the primitive society and the narrow habitat, and joins that march of ethnic, political and cultural progress which has covered larger and larger areas, and by increase of common purpose has cemented together ever greater aggregates.

The shift from a small, self-sufficient community to interconnected relationships with other groups, and then to the expansion or union of these groups to create a state or empire is a significant milestone in any history. In this process, the clan or tribe moves away from the isolating confines of primitive society and its limited environment, joining in the journey of ethnic, political, and cultural progress that has spread over larger territories, and through shared goals has brought together increasingly larger collectives.

Nothing is more significant in the history of the English in America than the rapid evolution of their spacial ideals, their abandonment of the small territorial conception brought with them from the mother country and embodied, for example, in that munificent land grant, fifty by a hundred miles in extent, of the first Virginia charter in 1606, and their progress to schemes of continental expansion. Every accession of territory to the Thirteen Colonies and to the Republic gave an impulse to growth. Expansion kept pace with opportunity. Only in small and isolated New England did the contracted provincial point of view persist. It manifested itself in a narrow policy of concentration and curtailment, which acquiesced in the occlusion of the Mississippi River to the Trans-Allegheny settlements by Spain in 1787, and which later opposed the purchase of the Louisiana territory322 and the acquisition of the Philippines.

Nothing is more important in the history of the English in America than the quick changes in their ideas about space, their move away from the small territorial mindset they brought from the mother country, which was represented, for instance, in that generous land grant of fifty by a hundred miles from the first Virginia charter in 1606, and their development toward plans for continental expansion. Every addition of land to the Thirteen Colonies and later to the Republic fueled growth. Expansion kept pace with opportunity. Only in small and isolated New England did the limited provincial viewpoint remain. It showed up in a narrow policy of focusing inward and cutting back, which accepted the blockage of the Mississippi River to the Trans-Allegheny settlements by Spain in 1787 and later opposed the purchase of the Louisiana territory322 and the acquisition of the Philippines.

All peoples who have achieved wide expansion have developed in the process vast territorial policies. This is true of the pastoral nomads who in different epochs have inundated Europe, northern Africa and the peripheral lands of Asia, and of the great colonial nations who in a few decades have brought continents under their dominion. In nomadic hordes it is based upon habitual mobility and the possession of herds, which are at once incentive and means for extending the geographical horizon; but it suffers from the evanescent character of nomadic political organization, and the tendency toward dismemberment bred in all pastoral life by dispersal over scattered grazing grounds. Hence the empires set up by nomad conquerors like the Saracens and Tartars soon fall apart.

All groups that have greatly expanded have developed extensive territorial policies in the process. This applies to the pastoral nomads who, at different times, have flooded Europe, northern Africa, and the outskirts of Asia, as well as to the major colonial powers that have brought entire continents under their control in just a few decades. In nomadic tribes, this is rooted in their constant movement and the ownership of herds, which both drive and enable the expansion of their geographical reach. However, it struggles with the temporary nature of nomadic political organization and the tendency for disunity that arises from scattered livestock grazing. As a result, the empires created by nomadic conquerors like the Saracens and Tartars quickly break apart.

Colonial expansion.

Among highly civilized agricultural and industrial peoples, on the other hand, a vast territorial policy is at once cause and effect of national growth; it is at once an innate tendency and a conscious purpose tenaciously followed. It makes use of trade and diplomacy, of scientific invention and technical improvement, to achieve its aims. It becomes an accepted mark of political vigor and an ideal even among peoples who have failed to enlarge their narrow base. The model of Russian expansion on the Pacific was quickly followed by awakened Japan, stirred out of her insular complacence by the threat of Muscovite encroachment. Germany and Italy, each strengthened and enlarged as to national outlook by recent political unification, have elbowed their way into the crowded colonial field. The French, though not expansionists as individuals, have an excellent capacity for collective action when directed by government. The officials whom Louis XIV sent to Canada in the seventeenth century executed large schemes of empire reflecting the dilation of French frontiers in Europe. These ideals of expansion seem to have been communicated by the power of example, or the threat of danger in them, to the English colonists in Virginia and Pennsylvania, and later to Washington and Jefferson.

Among highly developed agricultural and industrial societies, a broad territorial policy is both a cause and a result of national growth; it is an innate inclination and a deliberate goal that is persistently pursued. It utilizes trade and diplomacy, along with scientific innovation and technological advancements, to achieve its objectives. It becomes a recognized sign of political strength and an aspiration even among those who have not managed to expand their limited scope. The example of Russian expansion in the Pacific was quickly mirrored by an awakened Japan, which was jolted out of its insular comfort by the threat of Russian advances. Germany and Italy, each bolstered by their recent political unification, have pushed their way into the competitive colonial arena. The French, while not individually expansionist, excel in collective action when driven by their government. The officials sent by Louis XIV to Canada in the seventeenth century carried out large-scale imperial projects that mirrored the expansion of French borders in Europe. These ideals of expansion appear to have been shared, either through the power of example or through the looming threat, with the English colonists in Virginia and Pennsylvania, and later with Washington and Jefferson.

The mind of colonials.

The best type of colonial expansion is found among the English-speaking people of America, Australia and South Africa. Their spacial ideas are built on a big scale. Distances do not daunt them. The man who could conceive a Cape-to-Cairo railroad, with all the schemes of territorial aggrandizement therein implied, had a mind that took continents for its units of measure; and he found a fitting monument in a province of imperial proportions whereon was inscribed his name. Bryce tells us that in South Africa the social circle of "the best people" includes Pretoria, Johannesburg, Kimberley, Bloemfontein and Cape Town—a social circle with a diameter of a thousand miles!323

The best kind of colonial expansion is seen among the English-speaking people of America, Australia, and South Africa. Their ideas about space are on a grand scale. Distances don’t intimidate them. The person who could envision a railroad from Cape to Cairo, along with all the associated plans for territorial expansion, had a mindset that measured in continents; he left a notable legacy in a vast province that bore his name. Bryce tells us that in South Africa, the social circle of "the best people" includes Pretoria, Johannesburg, Kimberley, Bloemfontein, and Cape Town—a social circle with a diameter of a thousand miles!323

The spirit of our western frontier, so long as there was a frontier, was the spirit of movement, of the conquest of space. It found its expression in the history of the Wilderness Road and the Oregon Trail. When the center of population in the United States still lingered on the shore of Chesapeake Bay, and the frontier of continuous settlement had not advanced beyond the present western boundary of Virginia and Pennsylvania, the spacious mind of Thomas Jefferson foresaw the Mississippi Valley as the inevitable and necessary possession of the American people, and looked upon the trade of the far-off Columbia River as a natural feeder of the Mississippi commerce.324

The spirit of our western frontier, as long as there was a frontier, was all about movement and conquering space. This was evident in the history of the Wilderness Road and the Oregon Trail. When the center of population in the United States was still hanging out by Chesapeake Bay, and the continuous settlement frontier hadn’t moved past what is now the western borders of Virginia and Pennsylvania, the forward-thinking Thomas Jefferson envisioned the Mississippi Valley as an essential and inevitable part of the American landscape. He also saw the trade of the distant Columbia River as a natural contributor to Mississippi commerce.324

Emerson's statement that the vast size of the United States is reflected in the big views of its people applies not only to political policy, which in the Monroe Doctrine for the first time in history has embraced a hemisphere; nor is it confined to the big scale of their economic processes. Emerson had in mind rather their whole conception of national mission and national life, especially their legislation,325 for which he anticipated larger and more Catholic aims than obtain in Europe, hampered as it is by countless political and linguistic boundaries and barred thereby from any far-reaching unity of purpose and action.

Emerson's idea that the vast size of the United States is reflected in the broad views of its people applies not just to political policies, like how the Monroe Doctrine marked the first time in history that a hemisphere has been embraced; it also extends to the large scale of their economic operations. Emerson was thinking more about their overall vision of national purpose and national life, especially their legislation,325 for which he envisioned broader and more inclusive goals than what exists in Europe, which is limited by numerous political and language barriers that prevent any significant unity of purpose and action.

Canada, British South Africa, Australia and the United States, though widely separated, have in common a certain wide outlook upon life, a continental element in the national mind, bred in their people by their generous territories. The American recognizes his kinship of mind with these colonial Englishmen as something over and above mere kinship of race. It consists in their deep-seated common democracy, the democracy born in men who till fields and clear forests, not as plowmen and wood-cutters, but as makers of nations. It consists in identical interests and points of view in regard to identical problems growing out of the occupation and development of new and almost boundless territories. Race questions, paucity of labor, highways and railroads, immigration, combinations of capital, excessive land holdings, and illegal appropriation of land on a large scale, are problems that meet them all. The monopolistic policy of the United States in regard to American soil as embodied in the Monroe Doctrine, and the expectation lurking in the mental background of every American that his country may eventually embrace the northern continent, find their echo in Australia's plans for wider empire in the Pacific. The Commonwealth of Australia has succeeded in getting into its own hands the administration of British New Guinea (90,500 square miles.) It has also secured from the imperial government the unusual privilege of settling the relations between itself and the islands of the Pacific, because it regards the Pacific question as the one question of foreign policy in which its interests are profoundly involved. In the same way the British in South Africa, sparsely scattered though they are, feel an imperative need of further expansion, if their far-reaching schemes of commerce and empire are to be realized.

Canada, British South Africa, Australia, and the United States, despite their vast distances, share a broad perspective on life, a continental mindset shaped by their expansive territories. Americans see a shared mentality with these colonial Englishmen that goes beyond mere racial connections. It’s rooted in their shared commitment to democracy, born from the labor of those who cultivate land and clear forests—not just as farmers and lumberjacks, but as nation-builders. They face similar interests and viewpoints concerning common challenges arising from the occupation and development of almost limitless lands. Issues like race relations, labor shortages, infrastructure development, immigration, business monopolies, large land ownership, and widespread illegal land claims affect them all. The United States' monopolistic approach to its territory, highlighted by the Monroe Doctrine, mirrors Australia’s ambitions for greater influence in the Pacific. Australia has managed to take charge of British New Guinea (90,500 square miles) and has been granted the unique privilege of managing its relationships with the Pacific islands, as it sees the Pacific question as its main foreign policy issue. Similarly, the British in South Africa, though few in number, feel a strong need for expansion to achieve their extensive commercial and imperial goals.

Colonials as road builders.

The effort to annihilate space by improved means of communication has absorbed the best intellects and energies of expanding peoples. The ancient Roman, like the Incas of Peru, built highways over every part of the empire, undaunted by natural obstacles like the Alps and Andes. Modern expansionists are railroad builders. Witness the long list of strategic lines, constructed or subsidized by various governments during the past half century—the Union Pacific, Central Pacific, Canadian Pacific, Trans-Siberian, Cairo-Khartoum, Cape Town-Zambesi, and now the proposed Trans-Saharan road, designed to unite the Mediterranean and Guinea colonies of French Africa. The equipment of the American roads, with their heavy rails, giant locomotives, and enormous freight cars, reveals adaptation to a commerce that covers long distances between strongly differentiated areas of production, and that reflects the vast enterprises of this continental country. The same story comes out in the ocean vessels which serve the trade of the Great Lakes, and in the acres of coal barges in a single fleet which are towed down the Ohio and Mississippi by one mammoth steel tug.

The effort to eliminate distance through better communication has captured the best minds and energies of growing populations. Just like the ancient Romans and the Incas of Peru built roads across their empires, undeterred by natural barriers like the Alps and Andes, today’s expansionists are focused on building railroads. Look at the long list of key railways built or funded by various governments over the past fifty years—the Union Pacific, Central Pacific, Canadian Pacific, Trans-Siberian, Cairo-Khartoum, Cape Town-Zambezi, and now the proposed Trans-Saharan road aimed at linking the Mediterranean with French Africa’s Guinea colonies. The infrastructure of American railroads, with their heavy tracks, powerful locomotives, and massive freight cars, shows that they are designed for commerce that spans long distances between distinct production areas, reflecting the vast enterprises of this continental nation. The same pattern can be seen in the ocean vessels that handle trade on the Great Lakes and in the hundreds of coal barges being pulled down the Ohio and Mississippi rivers by a single huge steel tug.

Practical bent of colonials.

The abundant natural resources awaiting development in such big new countries give to the mind of the people an essentially practical bent. The rewards of labor are so great that the stimulus to effort is irresistible. Economic questions take precedence of all others, divide political parties, and consume a large portion of national legislation; while purely political questions sink into the background. Civilization takes on a material stamp, becomes that "dollar civilization" which is the scorn of the placid, paralyzed Oriental or the old world European. The genius of colonials is essentially practical. Impatience of obstacles, short cuts aiming at quick returns, wastefulness of land, of forests, of fuel, of everything but labor, have long characterized American activities. The problem of an inadequate labor supply attended the sudden accession of territory opened for European occupation by the discovery of America, and caused a sudden recrudescence of slavery, which as an industrial system had long been outgrown by Europe. It has also given immense stimulus to invention, and to the formation of labor unions, which in the newest colonial fields, like Australia and New Zealand, have dominated the government and given a Utopian stamp to legislation.

The abundant natural resources ready for development in these large new countries give people a practical mindset. The rewards from hard work are so high that the drive to put in effort is unstoppable. Economic issues take priority over all others, divide political parties, and make up a large part of national legislation, while purely political issues fade into the background. Civilization develops a material focus, becoming what is often referred to as "dollar civilization," which is looked down upon by the calm, stagnant East or the old-world Europeans. The spirit of colonials is fundamentally practical. A dissatisfaction with obstacles, a tendency to seek shortcuts for quick gains, and a disregard for wasting land, forests, and fuel—except for labor—have long defined American endeavors. The challenge of having too few workers coincided with the rapid expansion of land available for European settlement following the discovery of America, leading to a revival of slavery, an industrial system that Europe had already outgrown. This situation also sparked significant innovation and the establishment of labor unions, which in the newest colonial areas, like Australia and New Zealand, have influenced the government and shaped idealistic legislation.

Yet underlying and permeating this materialism is a youthful idealism. Transplanted to conditions of greater opportunity, the race becomes rejuvenated, abandons outgrown customs and outworn standards, experiences an enlargement of vision and of hope, gathers courage and energy equal to its task, manages somehow to hitch its wagon to a star.

Yet underlying and permeating this materialism is a youthful idealism. Moved to better conditions of opportunity, the race becomes renewed, lets go of outdated customs and old standards, experiences a broader perspective and renewed hope, gathers the courage and energy needed for its challenges, and somehow manages to hitch its wagon to a star.


NOTES TO CHAPTER VI

Notes for Chapter VI


292.

Chamberlain and Salisbury, Geology, Vol. III, pp. 483-485. New York, 1906.

Chamberlain and Salisbury, Geology, Vol. III, pp. 483-485. New York, 1906.

293.

Ibid., p. 137 and map p. 138.

Ibid., p. 137 and map p. 138.

294.

Darwin, Origin of Species, Vol. I, chap. IV, pp. 124-132; Vol. II, chap; XII, p. 134. New York, 1895. H. W. Conn, The Method of Evolution, p. 54. London and New York, 1900.

Darwin, Origin of Species, Vol. I, chap. IV, pp. 124-132; Vol. II, chap. XII, p. 134. New York, 1895. H. W. Conn, The Method of Evolution, p. 54. London and New York, 1900.

295.

Ibid., pp. 194-197, 226-227, 239-242, 342-350.

Ibid., pp. 194-197, 226-227, 239-242, 342-350.

296.

Eatzel, Der Lebensraum, eine bio-geographische Studie, p. 51. Tubingen, 1901.

Eatzel, The Habitat: A Biogeographical Study, p. 51. Tübingen, 1901.

297.

D.G. Brinton, Races and Peoples, pp. 271, 293-295. Philadelphia, 1901.

D.G. Brinton, Races and Peoples, pp. 271, 293-295. Philadelphia, 1901.

298.

A. Heilprin, Geographical Distribution of Animals, pp. 57-61. London, 1894.

A. Heilprin, Geographical Distribution of Animals, pp. 57-61. London, 1894.

299.

W.Z. Ripley, Races of Europe, p. 39, maps pp. 43, 78. New York, 1899.

W.Z. Ripley, Races of Europe, p. 39, maps pp. 43, 78. New York, 1899.

300.

Darwin, Origin of Species, Vol. II, chap. XII, pp. 130-131. New York, 1895.

Darwin, Origin of Species, Vol. II, chap. XII, pp. 130-131. New York, 1895.

301.

Richard Semon, In the Australian Bush, p. 211. London, 1899.

Richard Semon, In the Australian Bush, p. 211. London, 1899.

302.

J.H.W. Stuckenburg, Sociology, Vol. I, p. 324. New York and London, 1903.

J.H.W. Stuckenburg, Sociology, Vol. I, p. 324. New York and London, 1903.

303.

E. G. Semple, The Influences of Geographic Environment on the Lower St. Lawrence. Bulletin American Geographical Society, Vol. XXXVI, pp. 464-465. 1904.

E. G. Semple, The Influences of Geographic Environment on the Lower St. Lawrence. Bulletin American Geographical Society, Vol. XXXVI, pp. 464-465. 1904.

304.

B. Limedorfer, Finland's Plight, Forum, Vol. XXXII, pp. 85-93.

B. Limedorfer, Finland's Plight, Forum, Vol. XXXII, pp. 85-93.

305.

Eleventh Census, Report on the Indians, p. 35. Washington, 1894.

Eleventh Census, Report on the Indians, p. 35. Washington, 1894.

306.

A.B. Wallace, Australasia, Vol. I, p. 454. London, 1893.

A.B. Wallace, Australasia, Vol. I, p. 454. London, 1893.

307.

W.S. Barclay, Life in Terra del Fuego, The Nineteenth Century, Vol. 55, p. 97. January, 1904.

W.S. Barclay, Life in Terra del Fuego, The Nineteenth Century, Vol. 55, p. 97. January, 1904.

308.

A.E. Wallace, Australasia, Vol. I, pp. 454-455. London, 1893.

A.E. Wallace, Australasia, Vol. I, pp. 454-455. London, 1893.

309.

Darwin, Origin of Species, Vol. II, chap. XIII, p. 178. New York, 1895.

Darwin, Origin of Species, Vol. II, chap. XIII, p. 178. New York, 1895.

310.

Ibid., Vol. II, chap. XII, p. 167-168.

Ibid., Vol. II, chap. XII, p. 167-168.

311.

Nesbit Bain, Finland and the Tsar, Fortnightly Review, Vol. 71, p. 735. E. Limedorfer, Finland's Plight, Forum, Vol. 32, pp. 85-93.

Nesbit Bain, Finland and the Tsar, Fortnightly Review, Vol. 71, p. 735. E. Limedorfer, Finland's Plight, Forum, Vol. 32, pp. 85-93.

312.

Archibald Geikie, The Scenery of Scotland, pp. 398-399. London, 1887.

Archibald Geikie, The Scenery of Scotland, pp. 398-399. London, 1887.

313.

Railways in Asia Minor, Littell's Living Age, Vol. 225, p. 196.

Railways in Asia Minor, Littell's Living Age, Vol. 225, p. 196.

314.

J. Ellis Barker, Modern Germany, pp. 38-66. London, 1907.

J. Ellis Barker, Modern Germany, pp. 38-66. London, 1907.

315.

The Polish Danger in Prussia, Westminster Review, Vol. 155, p. 375.

The Polish Danger in Prussia, Westminster Review, Vol. 155, p. 375.

316.

Heinrich von Treitschke, Politik, Vol. I, pp. 223-224. Leipzig, 1897.

Heinrich von Treitschke, Politics, Vol. I, pp. 223-224. Leipzig, 1897.

317.

Plato, Critias, 112. Aristotle, Politics, Book II, chap. VII; Book IV, chap. IV; Book VII, chap. IV.

Plato, Critias, 112. Aristotle, Politics, Book II, chapter VII; Book IV, chapter IV; Book VII, chapter IV.

318.

Plato, De Legibus, Book V, chaps. 8, 9, 10, 11.

Plato, De Legibus, Book V, chaps. 8, 9, 10, 11.

319.

Roscher, National-Oekonomik des Handels und Gewerbefleisses, pp. 180-187. Stuttgart, 1899.

Roscher, National-Oekonomik des Handels und Gewerbefleisses, pp. 180-187. Stuttgart, 1899.

320.

Blanqui, History of Political Economy, pp. 150-152. New York, 1880.

Blanqui, History of Political Economy, pp. 150-152. New York, 1880.

321.

Carl Ritter, Comparative Geography, p. 63. New York, 1865.

Carl Ritter, Comparative Geography, p. 63. New York, 1865.

322.

E. C. Semple, American History and its Geographic Conditions, pp. 42-43, 109, 110. Boston, 1903.

E. C. Semple, American History and its Geographic Conditions, pp. 42-43, 109, 110. Boston, 1903.

323.

James Bryce, Impressions of South Africa, pp. 405-6. New York, 1897.

James Bryce, Impressions of South Africa, pp. 405-6. New York, 1897.

324.

P. L. Ford, Writings of Thomas Jefferson, Vol. VIII. Letter to John Bacon, April 30, 1803; and Confidential Message to Congress on the Expedition to the Pacific, January 18, 1803.

P. L. Ford, Writings of Thomas Jefferson, Vol. VIII. Letter to John Bacon, April 30, 1803; and Confidential Message to Congress on the Expedition to the Pacific, January 18, 1803.

325.

Emerson, The Young American, in Nature Addresses and Lectures, pp. 369-371. Centenary Edition, Boston.

Emerson, The Young American, in Nature Addresses and Lectures, pp. 369-371. Centenary Edition, Boston.


Chapter VII—Geographical Boundaries

The boundary zone in nature.

Nature abhors fixed boundary lines and sudden transitions; all her forces combine against them. Everywhere she keeps her borders melting, wavering, advancing, retreating. If by some cataclysm sharp lines of demarcation are drawn, she straightway begins to blur them by creating intermediate forms, and thus establishes the boundary zone which characterizes the inanimate and animate world. A stratum of limestone or sandstone, when brought into contact with a glowing mass of igneous rock, undergoes various changes due to the penetrating heat of the volcanic outflow, so that its surface is metamorphosed as far as that heat reaches. The granite cliff slowly deposits at its base a rock-waste slope to soften the sudden transition from its perpendicular surface to the level plain at its feet. The line where a land-born river meets the sea tends to become a sandbar or a delta, created by the river-borne silt and the wash of the waves, a form intermediate between land and sea, bearing the stamp of each, fluid in its outlines, ever growing by the persistent accumulation of mud, though ever subject to inundation and destruction by the waters which made it. The alluvial coastal hems that edge all shallow seas are such border zones, reflecting in their flat, low surfaces the dead level of the ocean, in their composition the solid substance of the land; but in the miniature waves imprinted on the sands and the billows of heaped-up boulders, the master workman of the deep leaves his mark. [See map page 243.]

Nature hates fixed boundaries and abrupt changes; all her forces work against them. Everywhere, she keeps her borders shifting, changing, moving forward, and pulling back. If, due to some disaster, clear lines of division are created, she immediately starts to blur them by creating in-between forms, establishing the boundary zone that defines both the inanimate and living world. A layer of limestone or sandstone, when it encounters a hot mass of volcanic rock, undergoes various changes caused by the intense heat, transforming its surface as far as that heat reaches. The granite cliff gradually builds a rock waste slope at its base to ease the harsh transition from its steep face to the flat land below. The point where a river meets the sea tends to form a sandbar or delta, created by the sediment carried by the river and the action of the waves, a shape that lies between land and sea, reflecting the characteristics of both, always changing in its outlines, continually growing from the persistent accumulation of mud, yet always vulnerable to flooding and destruction by the very waters that formed it. The alluvial coastal strips that line all shallow seas are such border zones, showing in their flat and low surfaces the calm level of the ocean, while in their makeup, they reflect the solid material of the land; but in the small waves imprinted on the sands and in the piles of boulders, the master craftsman of the deep leaves his signature. [See map page 243.]

Under examination, even our familiar term coastline proves to be only an abstraction with no corresponding reality in nature. Everywhere, whether on margin of lake or gulf, the actual phenomenon is a coast zone, alternately covered and abandoned by the waters, varying in width from a few inches to a few miles, according to the slope of the land, the range of the tide and the direction of the wind. It has one breadth at the minimum or neap tide, but increases often two or three fold at spring tide, when the distance between ebb and flood is at its maximum. At the mouth of Cook's Inlet on the southern Alaskan coast, where the range of tides is only eight feet, the zone is comparatively narrow, but widens rapidly towards the head of the inlet, where the tide rises twenty-three feet above the ebb line, and even to sixty-five feet under the influence of a heavy southwest storm. On flat coasts we are familiar with the wide frontier of salt marshes, that witness the border warfare of land and sea, alternate invasion and retreat. In low-shored estuaries like those of northern Brittany and northwestern Alaska, this amphibian girdle of the land expands to a width of four miles, while on precipitous coasts of tideless sea basins it contracts to a few inches. Hence this boundary zone changes with every impulse of the mobile sea and with every varying configuration of the shore. Movement and external conditions are the factors in its creation. They make something that is only partially akin to the two contiguous forms. Here on their outer margins land and ocean compromise their physical differences, and this by a law which runs through animate and inanimate nature. Wherever one body moves in constant contact with another, it is subjected to modifying influences which differentiate its periphery from its interior, lend it a transitional character, make of it a penumbra between light and shadow. The modifying process goes on persistently with varying force, and creates a shifting, changing border zone which, from its nature, cannot be delimited. For convenience' sake, we adopt the abstraction of a boundary line; but the reality behind this abstraction is the important thing in anthropo-geography.

Upon closer inspection, even our common term "coastline" turns out to be just an idea without a real equivalent in nature. Everywhere, whether along the edge of a lake or a gulf, the actual phenomenon is a coastal zone, which is alternately covered and exposed by water, varying in width from just a few inches to several miles, depending on the slope of the land, the tide range, and the wind direction. It has one width at low (neap) tide, but often expands two or three times wider at high (spring) tide, when the difference between low and high water is greatest. At the mouth of Cook's Inlet on the southern Alaskan coast, where the tidal range is only eight feet, the zone is relatively narrow, but quickly widens toward the head of the inlet, where the tide can rise twenty-three feet above the low water mark, and even up to sixty-five feet during a strong southwest storm. On flat coasts, we see the broad expanse of salt marshes, marked by the ongoing struggle between land and sea, with continual invasion and retreat. In low-lying estuaries like those in northern Brittany and northwestern Alaska, this transitional area can stretch to four miles wide, while on steep coasts of tideless sea basins, it may shrink to just a few inches. Therefore, this boundary zone shifts with every movement of the dynamic sea and with every change in the shoreline's shape. Movement and external conditions play crucial roles in its formation. They create something that only partly resembles the two adjacent forms. Here, on their outer edges, land and ocean merge their physical differences, following a law that runs through both living and non-living nature. Whenever one entity is in constant contact with another, it undergoes changes that distinguish its outer edges from its inner part, giving it a transitional quality, creating a space between light and shadow. This process of change occurs continuously with varying intensity, forming a fluid, evolving boundary zone that, by its very nature, cannot be definitively marked. For ease, we use the concept of a boundary line; however, the reality behind this concept is what truly matters in anthropogeography.

Gradations in the boundary zone.

All so-called boundary lines with which geography has to do have this same character,—coastlines, river margins, ice or snow lines, limits of vegetation, boundaries of races or religions or civilizations, frontiers of states. They are all the same, stamped by the eternal flux of nature. Beyond the solid ice-pack which surrounds the North Pole is a wide girdle of almost unbroken drift ice, and beyond this is an irregular concentric zone of scattered icebergs which varies in breadth with season, wind and local current; a persistent decrease in continuity from solid pack to open sea. The line of perpetual snow on high mountains advances or retreats from season to season, from year to year; it drops low on chilly northern slopes and recedes to higher altitudes on a southern exposure; sends down long icy tongues in dark gorges, and leaves outlying patches of old snow in shaded spots or beneath a covering of rock waste far below the margin of the snow fields.

All the so-called boundaries related to geography share the same nature—coastlines, riverbanks, lines of ice or snow, boundaries of vegetation, divisions of races or religions or civilizations, and borders of states. They all reflect the constant change of nature. Beyond the solid ice surrounding the North Pole lies a wide band of nearly continuous drift ice, followed by an uneven concentric area of scattered icebergs that changes in width with the seasons, wind, and local currents; there’s a steady reduction in continuity from solid ice to open sea. The line of permanent snow on high mountains shifts forward or back with each season and year; it descends to lower altitudes on chilly northern slopes and rises to higher elevations on southern exposures; it sends down long icy tongues into dark gorges and leaves patches of old snow in shaded areas or under piles of rock debris far below the edge of the snowfields.

In the struggle for existence in the vegetable world, the tree line pushes as far up the mountain as conditions of climate and soil will permit. Then comes a season of fiercer storms, intenser cold and invading ice upon the peaks. Havoc is wrought, and the forest drops back across a zone of border warfare—for war belongs to borders—leaving behind it here and there a dwarfed pine or gnarled and twisted juniper which has survived the onslaught of the enemy, Now these are stragglers in the retreat, but are destined later in milder years to serve as outposts in the advance of the forest to recover its lost ground. Here we have a border scene which is typical in nature—the belt of unbroken forest, growing thinner and more stunted toward its upper edge, succeeded by a zone of scattered trees, which may form a cluster perhaps in some sheltered gulch where soil has collected and north winds are excluded, and higher still the whitened skeleton of a tree to show how far the forest once invaded the domain of the waste.

In the battle for survival in the plant world, the tree line extends as high up the mountain as climate and soil conditions allow. Then comes a season of stronger storms, colder temperatures, and encroaching ice on the peaks. Destruction follows, and the forest retreats across a zone of border conflict—because conflicts happen at borders—leaving behind a few stunted pines or twisted junipers that have survived the attack. These trees are the stragglers in the retreat but are meant to become outposts in better years when the forest tries to reclaim its lost territory. Here, we have a typical border scene in nature—the continuous forest gradually thinning and becoming more stunted towards its upper edge, succeeded by a zone of scattered trees, which might cluster in a sheltered gulch where soil has gathered and north winds are blocked, and even higher, the bleached skeleton of a tree shows how far the forest once reached into the barren land.

Oscillating boundaries

The habitable area of the earth everywhere shows its boundaries to be peripheral zones of varying width, now occupied and now deserted, protruding or receding according to external conditions of climate and soil, and subject to seasonal change. The distribution of human life becomes sparser from the temperate regions toward the Arctic Circle, foreshadowing the unpeopled wastes of the ice-fields beyond. The outward movement from the Tropics poleward halts where life conditions disappear, and there finds its boundary; but as life conditions advance or retreat with the seasons, so does that boundary. On the west coast of Greenland the Eskimo village of Etah, at about the seventy-eighth parallel, marks the northern limit of permanent or winter settlement; but in summer the Eskimo, in his kayak, follows the musk-ox and seal much farther north and there leaves his igloo to testify to the wide range of his poleward migration. Numerous relics of the Eskimo and their summer encampments have been found along Lady Franklin Bay in northern Grinnell Land (81° 50' N. L.), but in the interior, on the outlet streams of Lake Hazen, explorers have discovered remains of habitations which had evidently, in previous ages, been permanently occupied.326 The Murman Coast of the Kola Peninsula has in summer a large population of Russian fishermen and forty or more fishing stations; but when the catch is over at the end of August, and the Arctic winter approaches, the stations are closed, and the three thousand fishermen return to their permanent homes on the shores of the White Sea.327 Farther east along this polar fringe of Russia, the little village of Charbarova, located on the Jugor Strait, is inhabited in summer by a number of Samoyedes, who pasture their reindeer over on Vaygats Island, and by some Russians and Finns, who come from the White Sea towns to trade with the Samoyedes and incidentally to hunt and fish. But in the fall, when a new ice bridge across the Strait releases the reindeer from their enclosed pasture on the island, the Samoyedes withdraw southward, and the merchants with their wares to Archangel and other points. This has gone on for centuries.328 On the Briochov Islands at the head of the Yenisei estuary Nordenskiold found a small group of houses which formed a summer fishing post in 1875, but which was deserted by the end of August.329

The habitable areas of the earth show boundaries that are peripheral zones of varying widths, sometimes occupied and sometimes deserted, expanding or contracting based on climate and soil conditions, and subject to seasonal changes. The distribution of human life becomes sparser from the temperate regions toward the Arctic Circle, hinting at the unpopulated wastelands of the ice fields beyond. The outward movement from the Tropics toward the poles stops where conditions for life disappear, marking its limit; but as conditions change with the seasons, so does that limit. On the west coast of Greenland, the Eskimo village of Etah, located at about the seventy-eighth parallel, marks the northern boundary of permanent or winter settlements; however, in the summer, the Eskimo, in his kayak, follows the musk-ox and seal much farther north and leaves behind his igloo as proof of his extensive seasonal migration. Numerous remnants of the Eskimo and their summer camps have been found along Lady Franklin Bay in northern Grinnell Land (81° 50' N. L.), but in the interior, along the outlet streams of Lake Hazen, explorers have discovered signs of habitations that were evidently permanently occupied in earlier times.326 The Murman Coast of the Kola Peninsula has a large population of Russian fishermen and forty or more fishing stations during the summer; but when the catch is done at the end of August, and the Arctic winter approaches, the stations close, and the three thousand fishermen return to their permanent homes along the shores of the White Sea.327 Further east along Russia's polar fringe, the small village of Charbarova, located on the Jugor Strait, is populated in summer by a number of Samoyedes, who graze their reindeer on Vaygats Island, along with some Russians and Finns who come from the White Sea towns to trade with the Samoyedes and to hunt and fish. But in the fall, when a new ice bridge forms across the Strait and frees the reindeer from their enclosed pasture on the island, the Samoyedes move south, and the merchants take their goods back to Archangel and other places. This pattern has persisted for centuries.328 On the Briochov Islands at the head of the Yenisei estuary, Nordenskiold found a small group of houses that served as a summer fishing post in 1875, but which were abandoned by the end of August.329

Altitude boundary zones.

An altitude of about five thousand feet marks the limit of village life in the Alps; but during the three warm months of the year, the summer pastures at eight thousand feet or more are alive with herds and their keepers. The boundary line of human life moves up the mountains in the wake of spring and later hurries down again before the advance of winter. The Himalayan and Karakorum ranges show whole villages of temporary occupation, like the summer trading town of Gartok at 15,000 feet on the caravan route from Leh to Lhassa, or Shahidula (3,285 meters or 10,925 feet) on the road between Leh and Yarkand;330 but the boundary of permanent habitation lies several thousand feet below. Comparable to these are the big hotels that serve summer stage-coach travel over the Alps and Rockies, but which are deserted when the first snow closes the passes. Here a zone of altitude, as in the polar regions a zone of latitude, marks the limits of the habitable area.

An altitude of about five thousand feet marks the limit of village life in the Alps; but during the three warm months of the year, the summer pastures at eight thousand feet or more are bustling with herds and their handlers. The boundary line of human life moves up the mountains in the wake of spring and then hurries down again before winter arrives. The Himalayan and Karakorum ranges have entire villages of temporary settlement, like the summer trading town of Gartok at 15,000 feet along the caravan route from Leh to Lhassa, or Shahidula (3,285 meters or 10,925 feet) on the road between Leh and Yarkand;330 but the boundary of permanent habitation is several thousand feet lower. Similar to these are the large hotels that cater to summer stage-coach travelers over the Alps and Rockies, which are abandoned when the first snow closes the passes. Here, a zone of altitude, like a zone of latitude in polar regions, defines the limits of the habitable area.

"Wallace's Line" a typical boundary zone.

The distribution of animals and races shows the limit of their movements or expansion. Any boundary defining the limits of such movements can not from its nature be fixed, and hence can not be a line. It is always a zone. Yet "Wallace's Line," dividing the Oriental from the Australian zoological realm, and running through Macassar Strait southward between Bali and Lombok, is a generally accepted dictum. The details of Wallace's investigation, however, reveal the fact that this boundary is not a line, but a zone of considerable and variable width, enclosing the line on either side with a marginal belt of mixed character. Though Celebes, lying to the east of Macassar Strait, is included in the Australian realm, it has lost so large a proportion of Australian types of animals, and contains so many Oriental types from the west, that Wallace finds it almost impossible to decide on which side of the line it belongs.331 The Oriental admixture extends yet farther east over the Moluccas and Timor. Birds of Javan or Oriental origin, to the extent of thirty genera, have spread eastward well across Wallace's Line; some of these stop short at Flores, and some reach even to Timor,332 while Australian cockatoos, in turn, have been seen on the west coast of Bali but not in Java, Heilprin avoids the unscientific term line, because he finds his zoological realms divided by "transition regions," which are intermediate in animal types as they are in geographical location.333 Wallace notes a similar "debatable land" in the Rajputana Desert east of the Indus, which is the border district between the Oriental and Ethiopian realms.334

The distribution of animals and races highlights the limits of their movements or expansion. Any boundary that defines these limits can't be fixed by nature and therefore can't be a straight line. It’s always a zone. However, "Wallace's Line," which separates the Oriental from the Australian zoological realms and runs through the Macassar Strait southward between Bali and Lombok, is widely recognized. The details of Wallace's study show that this boundary isn't a line but rather a broad and variable zone, surrounded on both sides by a mix of characteristics. Although Celebes, located to the east of the Macassar Strait, is part of the Australian realm, it has lost many Australian animal types and has a lot of Oriental types from the west, making it very difficult for Wallace to determine which side of the line it belongs to.331 The Oriental mixture extends even further east over the Moluccas and Timor. Birds from Java or of Oriental origin, totaling thirty genera, have spread eastward well beyond Wallace's Line; some of these stop at Flores, and others go as far as Timor,332 while Australian cockatoos have been spotted on the west coast of Bali but not in Java. Heilprin avoids the unscientific term "line" because he finds that his zoological realms are divided by "transition regions," which have intermediate animal types, just as they do geographical locations.333 Wallace observes a similar "disputed area" in the Rajputana Desert east of the Indus, which lies at the border between the Oriental and Ethiopian realms.334

Boundaries as limits of movements or expansion.

Such boundaries mark the limits of that movement which is common to all animate things. Every living form spreads until it meets natural conditions in which it can no longer survive, or until it is checked by the opposing expansion of some competing form. If there is a change either in the life conditions or in the strength of the competing forms, the boundary shifts. In the propitious climate of the Genial Period, plants and animals lived nearer to the North Pole than at present; then they fell back before the advance of the ice sheet. The restless surface of the ocean denies to man a dwelling place; every century, however, the Dutch are pushing forward their northern boundary by reclamation of land from the sea; but repeatedly they have had to drop back for a time when the water has again overwhelmed their hand-made territory.

Such boundaries define the limits of movement that all living things share. Every living organism spreads until it hits environmental conditions where it can't survive anymore, or until it is stopped by the competing growth of another organism. If there's a change in either the life conditions or the strength of the competing forms, the boundary shifts. During the favorable climate of the Genial Period, plants and animals thrived closer to the North Pole than they do today; then they retreated as the ice sheet advanced. The restless surface of the ocean denies humans a permanent home; every century, though, the Dutch are pushing their northern boundary forward by reclaiming land from the sea; but they have repeatedly had to retreat when the water has once again flooded their man-made territory.

Peoples as barriers.

The boundaries of race and state which are subjected to greatest fluctuations are those determined by the resistance of other peoples. The westward sweep of the Slavs prior to eighth century carried them beyond the Elbe into contact with the Germans; but as these increased in numbers, outgrew their narrow territories and inaugurated a counter-movement eastward, the Slavs began falling back to the Oder, to the Vistula, and finally to the Niemen. Though the Mohawk Valley opened an easy avenue of expansion westward for the early colonists of New York, the advance of settlements up this valley for several decades went on at only a snail's pace, because of the compact body of Iroquois tribes holding this territory. In the unoccupied land farther south between the Cumberland and Ohio rivers the frontier went forward with leaps and bounds, pushed on by the expanding power of the young Republic. [See map page 156.]

The boundaries of race and state that experience the most changes are those shaped by the resistance of other groups. The westward movement of the Slavs before the eighth century took them beyond the Elbe, bringing them into contact with the Germans. However, as the Germans increased in number, expanded beyond their limited territories, and began a counter-movement eastward, the Slavs retreated to the Oder, the Vistula, and eventually to the Niemen. While the Mohawk Valley provided an easy path for early New York colonists to expand westward, the pace of settlement in this valley remained slow for several decades due to the strong presence of the Iroquois tribes in the area. Meanwhile, in the unoccupied land further south, between the Cumberland and Ohio Rivers, the frontier progressed rapidly, driven by the growing power of the young Republic. [See map page 156.]

Anything which increases the expanding force of a people—the establishment of a more satisfactory government by which the national consciousness is developed, as in the American and French revolutions, the prosecution of a successful war by which popular energies are released from an old restraint, mere increase of population, or an impulse communicated by some hostile and irresistible force behind—all are registered in an advance of the boundary of the people in question and a corresponding retrusion of their neighbor's frontier.

Anything that boosts the growth of a nation—the creation of a better government that fosters national awareness, like during the American and French revolutions, the conduct of a successful war that frees popular energies from old limits, a simple rise in population, or a driving force triggered by an external and unstoppable power—results in an expansion of the nation in question and a corresponding reduction of their neighbor's territory.

Boundary zone as index of growth or decline.

The border district is the periphery of the growing or declining race or state. It runs the more irregularly, the greater are the variations in the external conditions as represented by climate, soil, barriers, and natural openings, according as these facilitate or obstruct advance. When it is contiguous with the border of another state or race, the two form a zone in which ascendency from one side or the other is being established. The boundary fluctuates, for equilibrium of the contending forces is established rarely and for only short periods. The more aggressive people throws out across this debatable zone, along the lines of least resistance or greatest attraction, long streamers of occupation; so that the frontier takes on the form of a fringe of settlement, whose interstices are occupied by a corresponding fringe of the displaced people. Such was its aspect in early colonial America, where population spread up every fertile river valley across a zone of Indian land; and such it is in northern Russia to-day, where long narrow Slav bands run out from the area of continuous Slav settlement across a wide belt of Mongoloid territory to the shores of the White Sea and Arctic Ocean.335 [See maps pages 103 and 225.]

The border area is the edge of a growing or declining race or state. It becomes more irregular as external conditions vary, like climate, soil, barriers, and natural openings, which either help or hinder progress. When it borders another state or race, the two create a zone where dominance is being established from one side or the other. The boundary shifts because a balance between the competing forces is rarely achieved and only lasts for short periods. The more assertive group reaches out across this disputed zone, following paths of least resistance or greatest attraction, creating a fringe of settlements interspersed with a corresponding fringe of displaced people. This was evident in early colonial America, where the population spread into every fertile river valley across Indian land; it's also seen today in northern Russia, where long, narrow bands of Slavs extend from areas of continuous Slavic settlement across a wide expanse of Mongoloid territory to the shores of the White Sea and Arctic Ocean.335 [See maps pages 103 and 225.]

The border zone is further broadened by the formation of ethnic islands beyond the base line of continuous settlement, which then advances more or less rapidly, if expansion is unchecked, till it coalesces with these outposts, just as the forest line on the mountains may reach, under advantageous conditions, its farthest outlying tree. Such ethnic peninsulas and islands we see in the early western frontiers of the United States from 1790 to 1840, when that frontier was daily moving westward.336 [See map page 156.]

The border zone expands even more through the development of ethnic enclaves beyond the main area of continuous settlement, which then expands at different rates if left unchecked until it connects with these outposts, similar to how the tree line on mountains can extend, under favorable conditions, to its farthest reach. We can observe these ethnic peninsulas and islands in the early western frontiers of the United States from 1790 to 1840, during which the frontier was steadily moving west. 336 [See map page 156.]

Breadth of the boundary zone.

The breadth of the frontier zone is indicative of the activity of growth on the one side and the corresponding decline on the other, because extensive encroachment in the same degree disintegrates the territory of the neighbor at whose cost such encroachment is made. A straight, narrow race boundary, especially if it is nearly coincident with a political boundary, points to an equilibrium of forces which means, for the time being at least, a cessation of growth. Such boundaries are found in old, thickly populated countries, while the wide, ragged border zone belongs to new, and especially to colonial peoples. In the oldest and most densely populated seats of the Germans, where they are found in the Rhine Valley, the boundaries of race and empire are straight and simple; but the younger, eastern border, which for centuries has been steadily advancing at the cost of the unequally matched Slavs, has the ragged outline and sparse population of a true colonial frontier. Between two peoples who have had a long period of growth behind them, the oscillations of the boundary decrease in amplitude, as it were, and finally approach a state of rest. Each people tends to fill out its area evenly; every advance in civilization, every increase of population, increases the stability of their tenure, and hence the equilibrium of the pressure upon the boundary. Therefore, in such countries, racial, linguistic and cultural boundaries tend to become simpler and straighter.

The width of the frontier zone reflects the growth on one side and the corresponding decline on the other, because significant encroachment similarly breaks down the territory of the neighboring area at whose expense such encroachment happens. A straight, narrow racial boundary, especially if it closely aligns with a political boundary, indicates a balance of forces, which means, at least for now, a halt in growth. Such boundaries are typically found in old, densely populated countries, while wide, uneven border zones are characteristic of newer, particularly colonial peoples. In the oldest and most heavily populated regions of the Germans, like the Rhine Valley, the boundaries of race and empire are straightforward and simple; but the younger, eastern border, which has been steadily advancing for centuries at the expense of the less powerful Slavs, shows the irregular outline and sparse population of a true colonial frontier. Between two peoples that have had a long period of growth, the fluctuations of the boundary decrease in intensity and eventually reach a state of stability. Each group tends to fill out its area evenly; every advancement in civilization and every population increase enhances the stability of their hold, thereby balancing the pressure on the boundary. As a result, in such countries, racial, linguistic, and cultural boundaries tend to become more straightforward and uniform.

The broad frontier zone of active expansion.

The growth is more apparent, or, in other words, the border zone is widest and most irregular, where a superior people intrudes upon the territory of an interior race. Such was the broad zone of thinly scattered farms and villages amid a prevailing wilderness and hostile Indian tribes which, in 1810 and 1820, surrounded our Trans-Allegheny area of continuous settlement in a one to two hundred mile wide girdle. Such has been the wide, mobile frontier of the Russian advance in Siberia and until recently in Manchuria, which aimed to include within a dotted line of widely separated railway-guard stations, Cossack barracks, and penal colonies, the vast territory which later generations were fully to occupy. Similar, too, is the frontier of the Dutch and English settlements in South Africa, which has been pushed forward into the Kaffir country—a broad belt of scattered cattle ranches and isolated mining hives, dropped down amid Kaffir hunting and grazing lands. Broader still was that shadowy belt of American occupation which for four decades immediately succeeding the purchase of Louisiana stretched in the form of isolated fur-stations, lonely trappers' camps, and shifting traders' rendezvous from the Mississippi to the western slope of the Rockies and the northern watershed of the Missouri, where it met the corresponding nebulous outskirts of the far-away Canadian state on the St. Lawrence River.

The growth is more obvious; in other words, the border zone is widest and most irregular where a dominant group encroaches on the land of a local population. This was the broad area of sparsely populated farms and villages surrounded by a vast wilderness and hostile Native American tribes, which in 1810 and 1820 encircled our Trans-Allegheny region of continuous settlement in a belt one to two hundred miles wide. This has been the wide, shifting frontier of Russian expansion in Siberia and, until recently, in Manchuria, aiming to include within a dotted line of widely spaced railway guard stations, Cossack barracks, and penal colonies the vast territory that later generations would fully occupy. Similarly, the frontier of Dutch and English settlements in South Africa has pushed forward into the Kaffir territory—a broad strip of scattered cattle ranches and isolated mining camps nestled in Kaffir hunting and grazing lands. Even broader was the vague belt of American settlement that, for four decades after the Louisiana Purchase, stretched as a series of isolated fur stations, remote trappers' camps, and mobile traders' rendezvous from the Mississippi to the western slope of the Rockies and the northern watershed of the Missouri, where it met the indistinct borders of the far-off Canadian territory along the St. Lawrence River.

The same process with the same geographical character has been going on in the Sahara, as the French since 1890 have been expanding southward from the foot of the Atlas Mountains in Algeria toward Timbuctoo at the cost of the nomad Tuaregs. Territory is first subdued and administered by the military till it is fully pacified. Then it is handed over to the civil government. Hence the advancing frontier consists of a military zone of administration, with a civil zone behind it, and a weaker wavering zone of exploration and scout work before it.337 Lord Curzon in his Romanes lecture describes the northwest frontier of India as just such a three-ply border.

The same process with similar geographical aspects has been happening in the Sahara, as the French have been pushing southward from the foot of the Atlas Mountains in Algeria toward Timbuktu since 1890, at the expense of the nomadic Tuaregs. First, the military subdues and manages the territory until it’s completely pacified. Then, it’s handed over to the civil government. This means the advancing frontier consists of a military administration zone, a civil zone behind it, and a less stable zone of exploration and scouting in front of it.337 Lord Curzon, in his Romanes lecture, describes the northwest frontier of India as just such a three-layered border.

Economic factors in expanding frontiers.

The untouched resources of such new countries tempt to the widespread superficial exploitation, which finds its geographical expression in a broad, dilating frontier. Here the man-dust which is to form the future political planet is thinly disseminated, swept outward by a centrifugal force. Furthermore, the absence of natural barriers which might block this movement, the presence of open plains and river highways to facilitate it, and the predominance of harsh conditions of climate or soil rendering necessary a savage, extensive exploitation of the slender resources, often combine still further to widen the frontier zone. This was the case in French Canada and till recent decades in Siberia, where intense cold and abundant river highways stimulated the fur trade to the practical exclusion of all other activities, and substituted for the closely grouped, sedentary farmers with their growing families the wide-ranging trader with his Indian or Tunguse wife and his half-breed offspring. Under harsh climatic conditions, the fur trade alone afforded those large profits which every infant colony must command in order to survive; and the fur trade meant a wide frontier zone of scattered posts amid a prevailing wilderness. The French in particular, by the possession of the St. Lawrence and Mississippi rivers, the greatest systems in America, were lured into the danger of excessive expansion, attenuated their ethnic element, and failed to raise the economic status of their wide border district, which could therefore offer only slight resistance to the spread of solid English settlement.338 Yet more recently, the chief weakness of the Russians in Siberia and Manchuria—apart from the corruption of the national government—was the weakness of a too remote and too sparsely populated frontier, and of a people whose inner development had not kept pace with their rate of expansion.

The untouched resources of these new countries lead to widespread superficial exploitation, which shows up geographically as a broad, expanding frontier. Here, the population that will shape the future political landscape is spread thin, pushed outward by a centrifugal force. Moreover, the lack of natural barriers to this movement, the availability of open plains and river routes to facilitate it, and the challenging climate and soil conditions that require extensive and aggressive exploitation of limited resources all contribute to widening the frontier zone. This was true in French Canada and, until recent decades, in Siberia, where the severe cold and numerous riverways drove the fur trade to dominate all other activities. This resulted in replacing tightly-knit, settled farming communities with roaming traders and their Indigenous or Tungus wives and mixed-race children. In harsh climates, the fur trade was the only economic activity that could generate the substantial profits necessary for any fledgling colony’s survival, which meant there was a wide frontier zone filled with scattered trading posts in a vast wilderness. The French, in particular, with control over the St. Lawrence and Mississippi rivers—the largest river systems in America—were drawn into the risks of excessive expansion, diluted their ethnic identity, and failed to elevate the economic status of their vast border region, which consequently could offer only minimal resistance to the encroachment of solid English settlements.338 More recently, the main weaknesses of the Russians in Siberia and Manchuria—aside from the corruption in their national government—were the challenges of a far-removed and sparsely populated frontier, along with a population whose social development had not kept pace with their rapid expansion.

Value of barrier boundaries.

Wasteful exploitation of a big territory is easier than the economical development of a small district. This is one line of least resistance which civilized man as well as savage instinctively follows, and which explains the tendency toward excessive expansion characteristic of all primitive and nascent peoples. For such peoples natural barriers which set bounds to this expansion are of vastly greater importance than they are for mature or fully developed peoples. The reason is this: the boundary is only the expression of the outward movement or growth, which is nourished from the same stock of race energy as is the inner development. Either carried to an excess weakens or retards the other. If population begins to press upon the limits of subsistence, the acquisition of a new bit of territory obviates the necessity of applying more work and more intelligence to the old area, to make it yield subsistence for the growing number of mouths; the stimulus to adopt better economic methods is lost. Therefore, natural boundaries drawn by mountain, sea and desert, serving as barriers to the easy appropriation of new territory, have for such peoples a far deeper significance than the mere determination of their political frontiers by physical features, or the benefit of protection.

Wasteful exploitation of a large area is easier than the careful development of a small region. This is a path of least resistance that both civilized and primitive people instinctively follow, which explains the tendency for excessive expansion seen in all early and developing societies. For these societies, natural barriers that restrict this expansion are much more significant than they are for mature or fully developed ones. The reason is that the boundary is simply a reflection of outward growth, which comes from the same source of energy as internal development. If either one is taken to an extreme, it weakens or hinders the other. When the population starts to push against the limits of resources, acquiring a new piece of land makes it unnecessary to work harder or think smarter about the old area to provide for the increasing number of people; this diminishes the push to adopt better economic strategies. Therefore, natural boundaries like mountains, seas, and deserts serve as barriers to easily taking new territory, carrying much deeper meaning for these societies than just marking political borders or offering protection.

The land with the most effective geographical boundaries is a naturally defined region like Korea, Japan, China, Egypt, Italy, Spain, France or Great Britain—a land characterized not only by exclusion from without through its encircling barriers, but also by the inclusion within itself of a certain compact group of geographic conditions, to whose combined influences the inhabitants are subjected and from which they cannot readily escape. This aspect is far more important than the mere protection which such boundaries afford. They are not absolutely necessary for the development of a people, but they give it an early start, accelerate the process, and bring the people to an early maturity; they stimulate the exploitation of all the local geographic advantages and resources, the formation of a vivid tribal or national consciousness and purpose, and concentrate the national energies when the people is ready to overleap the old barriers. The early development of island and peninsula peoples and their attainment of a finished ethnic and political character are commonplaces of history. The stories of Egypt, Crete and Greece, of Great Britain and Japan, illustrate the stimulus to maturity which emanates from such confining boundaries. The wall of the Appalachians narrowed the westward horizon of the early English colonies in America, guarded them against the excessive expansion which was undermining the French dominion in the interior of the continent, set a most wholesome limit to their aims, and thereby intensified their utilization of the narrow land between mountains and sea. France, with its limits of growth indicated by the Mediterranean, Pyrenees, Atlantic, Channel, Vosges, Jura and Western Alps, found its period of adolescence shortened and, like Great Britain, early reached its maturity. Nature itself set the goal of its territorial expansion, and by crystallizing the political ideal of the people, made that goal easier to reach, just as the dream of "United Italy" realized in 1870 had been prefigured in contours drawn by Alpine range and Mediterranean shore-line.

The land with the most effective geographical boundaries is a naturally defined area like Korea, Japan, China, Egypt, Italy, Spain, France, or Great Britain. This type of land is defined not just by external barriers, but also by a compact set of geographic conditions that influence the people living there and from which they can't easily escape. This aspect is much more important than just the protection these boundaries provide. They aren’t absolutely essential for a people’s development, but they help kickstart that process, speed it up, and bring the people to maturity more quickly. They encourage the use of local geographic advantages and resources, foster a strong sense of tribal or national identity and purpose, and focus the national energy when the people are ready to push past old limits. The early development of island and peninsula peoples and their achievement of a distinct ethnic and political identity are well-documented in history. The histories of Egypt, Crete, Greece, Great Britain, and Japan show the growth that stems from such enclosing boundaries. The Appalachian Mountains narrowed the westward view of early English colonies in America, protecting them from the excessive expansion that was weakening French control in the interior, providing a healthy limit to their ambitions, and therefore encouraging them to make the most of the narrow land between mountains and the sea. France, with its growth boundaries marked by the Mediterranean, Pyrenees, Atlantic, Channel, Vosges, Jura, and Western Alps, saw its adolescence cut short and, like Great Britain, reached maturity early. Nature itself set the goal for its territorial expansion and by clarifying the political aspirations of the people, made that goal easier to achieve, just as the dream of "United Italy" realized in 1870 was hinted at by the shapes outlined by the Alpine range and Mediterranean coastline.

The sea as the absolute boundary

The area which a race or people occupies is the resultant of the expansive force within and the obstacles without, either physical or human. Insurmountable physical obstacles are met where all life conditions disappear, as on the borders of the habitable world, where man is barred from the unpeopled wastes of polar ice-fields and unsustaining oceans. The frozen rim of arctic lands, the coastline of the continents, the outermost arable strip on the confines of the desert, the barren or ice-capped ridge of high mountain range, are all such natural boundaries which set more or less effective limits to the movement of peoples and the territorial growth of states. The sea is the only absolute boundary, because it alone blocks the continuous, unbroken expansion of a people. When the Saxons of the lower Elbe spread to the island of Britain, a zone of unpeopled sea separated their new settlements from their native villages on the mainland. Even the most pronounced land barriers, like the Himalayas and Hindu Kush, have their passways and favored spots for short summer habitation, where the people from the opposite slopes meet and mingle for a season. Sandy wastes are hospitable at times. When the spring rains on the mountains of Abyssinia start a wave of moisture lapping over the edges of the Nubian desert, it is immediately followed by a tide of Arabs with their camels and herds, who make a wide zone of temporary occupation spread over the newly created grassland, but who retire in a few weeks before the desiccating heat of summer.339

The area occupied by a race or group of people is determined by the inner drive of that group and the external barriers they face, whether they are physical or human. Major physical barriers appear where conditions for life vanish, like at the edges of the habitable world, where humans are restricted from the uninhabited expanses of polar ice and barren oceans. The icy borders of Arctic regions, the coastlines of continents, the farthest cultivable land at the edges of deserts, and the desolate or ice-covered peaks of high mountain ranges are all natural boundaries that effectively limit the movement of people and the territorial growth of nations. The sea serves as the only absolute boundary since it solely halts the uninterrupted expansion of a population. When the Saxons from the lower Elbe migrated to the island of Britain, an unoccupied stretch of ocean separated their new settlements from their original villages on the mainland. Even the most formidable land barriers, such as the Himalayas and Hindu Kush, have their pathways and preferred spots for temporary summer habitation, where people from opposite slopes meet and interact for a season. Sandy deserts can sometimes be welcoming. When spring rains on the mountains of Abyssinia create a wave of moisture spreading into the Nubian desert, it is quickly followed by a surge of Arabs with their camels and livestock, who temporarily occupy the newly grown grassland but retreat within weeks as the summer's drying heat sets in.339

Natural boundaries as bases of ethnic and political boundaries.

Nevertheless, all natural features of the earth's surface which serve to check, retard or weaken the expansion of peoples, and therefore hold them apart, tend to become racial or political boundaries; and all present a zone-like character. The wide ice-field of the Scandinavian Alps was an unpeopled waste long before the political boundary was drawn along it. "It has not in reality been a definite natural line that has divided Norway from her neighbour on the east; it has been a band of desert land, up to hundreds of miles in width. So utterly desolate and apart from the area of continuous habitation has this been, that the greater part of it, the district north of Trondhjem, was looked upon even as recently as the last century as a common district. Only nomadic Lapps wandered about in it, sometimes taxed by all three countries. A parcelling out of this desert common district was not made toward Russia until 1826. Toward Sweden it was made in 1751."340 In former centuries the Bourtanger Moor west of the River Ems used to be a natural desert borderland separating East and West Friesland, despite the similarity of race, speech and country on either side of it. It undoubtedly contributed to the division of Germany and the Netherlands along the present frontier line, which has been drawn the length of this moor for a hundred kilometers.341

Nevertheless, all natural features of the earth's surface that help to check, slow down, or weaken the expansion of people, and therefore keep them separate, tend to become racial or political boundaries; and all show a zone-like character. The vast ice field of the Scandinavian Alps was an uninhabited wasteland long before the political boundary was established along it. "It has not actually been a definite natural line that has divided Norway from its neighbor to the east; it has been a band of barren land, up to hundreds of miles wide. So completely desolate and removed from areas of continuous habitation has this been, that for most of last century, the greater part of it, the area north of Trondhjem, was considered a common district. Only nomadic Lapps roamed there, sometimes taxed by all three countries. A division of this barren common district wasn't made toward Russia until 1826. Toward Sweden, it was established in 1751."340 In earlier centuries, the Bourtanger Moor west of the River Ems served as a natural desert border between East and West Friesland, despite the similarities in race, language, and region on either side of it. It undoubtedly played a role in the division of Germany and the Netherlands along the current border, which has been drawn the length of this moor for a hundred kilometers.341

Primitive waste boundaries.

Any geographical feature which, like this, presents a practically uninhabitable area, forms a scientific boundary, not only because it holds apart the two neighboring peoples and thereby reduces the contact and friction which might be provocative of hostilities, but also because it lends protection against attack. This motive, as also the zone character of all boundaries, comes out conspicuously in the artificial border wastes surrounding primitive tribes and states in the lower status of civilization. The early German tribes depopulated their borders in a wide girdle, and in this wilderness permitted no neighbors to reside. The width of this zone indicated the valor and glory of the state, but was also valued as a means of protection against unexpected attack.342 Cæsar learned that between the Suevi and Cherusci tribes dwelling near the Rhine "silvam esse ibi, infinita magnitudine quae appelletur Bacenis; hanc longe introrsus pertinere et pro nativo muro objectam Cheruscos ab Suevis Suevosque ab Cheruscis injuriis incursionibusque prohibere."343 The same device appears among the Huns. When Attila was pressing upon the frontier of the Eastern Empire in 448 A.D., his envoys sent to Constantinople demanded that the Romans should not cultivate a belt of territory, a hundred miles wide and three hundred miles long, south of the Danube, but maintain this as a March.344 When King Alfonso I. (751-764 A.D.) of mountain Asturias began the reconquest of Spain from the Saracens, he adopted the same method of holding the foe at arm's length. He seized Old Castile as far as the River Duoro, but the rest of the province south of that stream he converted into a waste boundary by transporting the Christians thence to the north side, and driving the Mohammedans yet farther southward.345 Similarly Xenophon found that the Armenian side of the River Kentrites, which formed the boundary between the Armenian plains and the highlands of Karduchia, was unpeopled and destitute of villages for a breadth of fifteen miles, from fear of the marauding Kurds.346 In the eastern Sudan, especially in that wide territory along the Nile-Congo watershed occupied by the Zandeh, Junker found the frontier wilderness a regular institution owing to the exposure of the border districts in the perennial intertribal feuds.347 The same testimony comes from Barth,348 Boyd Alexander,349 Speke,350 and other explorers in the Sudan and the neighboring parts of equatorial Africa.

Any geographical feature that creates a mostly uninhabitable area serves as a scientific boundary. This is not only because it separates neighboring peoples, which reduces contact and tension that could lead to conflicts, but also because it provides protection against attacks. This reason, along with the characteristic of boundaries as zones, is clearly seen in the artificial border wastelands surrounding primitive tribes and less developed states. The early German tribes cleared their borders widely, creating a wilderness where no neighbors were allowed to settle. The width of this zone signified the strength and pride of the state but was also appreciated as a protective measure against surprise attacks.342 Cæsar reported that between the Suevi and Cherusci tribes living near the Rhine, "there is a huge forest known as Bacenis; this extends far into the interior and acts as a natural wall, protecting the Cherusci from the Suevi and the Suevi from the Cherusci’s attacks."343 The same strategy was used by the Huns. When Attila was advancing on the Eastern Empire's border in 448 A.D., his messengers sent to Constantinople demanded that the Romans refrain from farming a territory one hundred miles wide and three hundred miles long south of the Danube, designating it as a buffer zone.344 When King Alfonso I of Asturias (751-764 A.D.) began the effort to reclaim Spain from the Saracens, he implemented the same tactic to keep the enemy at a distance. He took over Old Castile as far as the River Duoro but turned the rest of the province south of that river into a barren border by relocating Christians to the north side and forcing the Muslims further south.345 Similarly, Xenophon observed that the Armenian side of the River Kentrites, which marked the boundary between the Armenian plains and the highlands of Karduchia, was empty and lacked villages for fifteen miles, due to fears of marauding Kurds.346 In eastern Sudan, particularly in the extensive area along the Nile-Congo watershed occupied by the Zandeh, Junker found that frontier wastelands were a common feature because of the vulnerability of border areas during ongoing intertribal conflicts.347 Similar observations were made by Barth,348 Boyd Alexander,349 Speke,350 and other explorers in Sudan and nearby regions of equatorial Africa.

Border wastes of Indian lands.

The vast and fertile region defined by the Ohio and Tennessee rivers, lay as a debatable border between the Algonquin Indians of the north and the Appalachians of the south. Both claimed it, both used it for hunting, but neither dared dwell therein.351 Similarly the Cherokees had no definite understanding with their savage neighbors as to the limits of their respective territories The effectiveness of their claim to any particular tract of country usually diminished with every increase of its distance from their villages. The consequence was that a considerable strip of territory between the settlements of two tribes, Cherokees and Creeks for instance, though claimed by both, was practically considered neutral ground and the common hunting ground of both.352 The Creeks, whose most western villages from 1771 to 1798 were located along the Coosa and upper Alabama rivers,353 were separated by 300 miles of wilderness from the Chickasaws to the northwest, and by a 150-mile zone from the Choctaws. The most northern Choctaw towns, in turn, lay 160 miles to the south of the Chickasaw nation, whose compact settlements were located on the watershed between the western sources of the Tombigby and the head stream of the Yazoo.354 The wide intervening zone of forest and canebrake was hunted upon by both nations.355

The expansive and fertile area between the Ohio and Tennessee rivers served as a disputed border between the Algonquin Indians in the north and the Appalachians in the south. Both groups claimed it and used it for hunting, but neither dared to settle there.351 Similarly, the Cherokees didn't have a clear agreement with their fierce neighbors about the boundaries of their territories. The strength of their claim to any specific area usually decreased the farther it was from their villages. As a result, a significant section of land between the territories of two tribes, like the Cherokees and Creeks, while claimed by both, was effectively seen as neutral ground and shared hunting land.352 The Creeks, whose western villages from 1771 to 1798 were situated along the Coosa and upper Alabama rivers,353 were 300 miles away from the Chickasaws to the northwest, and 150 miles from the Choctaws. The northernmost Choctaw towns were located 160 miles south of the Chickasaw nation, whose closely packed settlements were found on the watershed between the western sources of the Tombigby and the headwaters of the Yazoo.354 The large intervening area of forest and canebrake was hunted by both nations.355

Sometimes the border is preserved as a wilderness by formal agreement. A classic example of this case is found in the belt of untenanted land, fifty to ninety kilometers wide, which China and Korea once maintained as their boundary. No settler from either side was allowed to enter, and all travel across the border had to use a single passway, where three times annually a market was held.356 On the Russo-Mongolian border south of Lake Baikal, the town of Kiakhta, which was established in 1688 as an entrepôt of trade between the two countries, is occupied in its northern half by Russian factories and in its southern by the Mongolian-Chinese quarters, while between the two is a neutral space devoted to commerce.357

Sometimes the border is kept as a wilderness by formal agreement. A classic example of this is the band of uninhabited land, fifty to ninety kilometers wide, that China and Korea once maintained as their boundary. No settler from either side was allowed to enter, and all travel across the border had to use a single pathway, where three times a year a market was held.356 On the Russo-Mongolian border south of Lake Baikal, the town of Kiakhta, which was established in 1688 as a trade hub between the two countries, is occupied in its northern half by Russian factories and its southern half by the Mongolian-Chinese quarters, while between the two is a neutral space dedicated to commerce.357

Alien intrusions into border wastes.

These border wastes do not always remain empty, however, even when their integrity is respected by the two neighbors whom they serve to divide; alien races often intrude into their unoccupied reaches. The boundary wilderness between the Sudanese states of Wadai and Dar Fur harbors several semi-independent states whose insignificance is a guarantee of their safety from conquest.358 Similarly in the wide border district between the Creeks on the east and the Choctaws on the west were found typical small, detached tribes—the Chatots and Thomez of forty huts each on the Mobile River, the Tensas tribe with a hundred huts on the Tensas River, and the Mobilians near the confluence of the Tombigby and Alabama.359 Along the desolate highland separating Norway and Sweden the nomadic Lapps, with their reindeer herds, have penetrated southward to 62° North Latitude, reinforcing the natural barrier by another barrier of alien race. From this point southward, the coniferous forests begin and continue the border waste in the form of a zone some sixty miles wide; this was unoccupied till about 1600, when into it slowly filtered an immigration of Finns, whose descendants to-day constitute an important part of the still thin population along the frontier to the heights back of Christiania. Only thirty miles from the coast does the border zone between Norway and Sweden, peopled chiefly by intruding foreign stocks, Lapps and Finns, contract and finally merge into the denser Scandinavian settlements.360

These borderlands don't always stay empty, even when the two neighboring countries respect their boundaries; foreign groups often move into these unoccupied areas. The wilderness along the border between the Sudanese states of Wadai and Dar Fur is home to several semi-independent states, whose lack of significance actually helps protect them from being conquered.358 Similarly, in the broad border area between the Creeks to the east and the Choctaws to the west, there are small, detached tribes—like the Chatots and Thomez, each with about forty huts along the Mobile River, the Tensas tribe with a hundred huts on the Tensas River, and the Mobilians near where the Tombigby and Alabama rivers meet.359 In the barren highlands separating Norway and Sweden, the nomadic Lapps, with their reindeer herds, have moved southward to 62° North Latitude, adding another foreign barrier to the natural one. From this point south, the coniferous forests begin and continue as a border wilderness that stretches about sixty miles wide; it remained unoccupied until around 1600, when Finnish immigrants gradually started to settle there, and their descendants now make up a significant part of the still sparse population along the frontier and the heights behind Christiania. Just thirty miles from the coast, the border zone between Norway and Sweden, primarily inhabited by these foreign groups—Lapps and Finns—narrows and eventually merges into the denser Scandinavian settlements.360 degrees

Where the border waste offers favorable conditions of life and the intruding race has reached a higher status of civilization, it multiplies in this unpeopled tract and soon spreads at the cost of its less advanced neighbors. The old No Man's Land between the Ohio and Tennessee was a line of least resistance for the expanding Colonies, who here poured in a tide of settlement between the northern and southern Indians, just as later other pioneers filtered into the vague border territory of weak tenure between the Choctaws and Creeks, and there on the Tombigby, Mobile and Tensas rivers, formed the nucleus of the State of Alabama.361

Where the border wasteland provides good living conditions and the encroaching population has reached a higher level of civilization, it thrives in this uninhabited area and quickly spreads at the expense of its less developed neighbors. The old No Man's Land between Ohio and Tennessee was an easy route for the expanding Colonies, which poured in a wave of settlers between the northern and southern Indians, just as later pioneers moved into the loosely defined border territory between the Choctaws and Creeks, where they established the foundation of the State of Alabama around the Tombigby, Mobile, and Tensas rivers.361

Politico-economic significance of the waste boundary.

This untenanted hem of territory surrounding so many savage and barbarous peoples reflects their superficial and unsystematic utilization of their soil, by reason of which the importance of the land itself and the proportion of population to area are greatly reduced. It is a part of that uneconomic and extravagant use of the land, that appropriation of wide territories by small tribal groups, which characterizes the lower stages of civilization, as opposed to the exploitation of every square foot for the support of a teeming humanity, which marks the most advanced states. Each stage puts its own valuation upon the land according to the return from it which each expects to get. The low valuation is expressed in the border wilderness, by which a third or even a half of the whole area is wasted; and also in the readiness with which savages often sell their best territory for a song.

This unoccupied land around so many savage and uncivilized peoples shows their shallow and disorganized use of their soil, which diminishes the land's significance and reduces the population density. It's part of the unproductive and wasteful use of land, where small tribal groups claim vast territories, characteristic of the earlier stages of civilization, unlike the efficient use of every piece of land to support a growing population seen in the most advanced societies. Each stage values land based on the returns it expects. This low value is shown in the border wilderness, where a third or even half of the total area is wasted, and in the eagerness of these tribes to sell their best land for very little.

For the same reason they leave their boundaries undefined; a mile nearer or farther, what does it matter? Moreover, their fitful or nomadic occupation of the land leads to oscillations of the frontiers with every attack from without and every variation of the tribal strength within. Their unstable states rarely last long enough in a given form or size to develop fixed boundaries; hence, the vagueness as to the extent of tribal domains among all savage peoples, and the conflicting land claims which are the abiding source of war. Owing to these overlapping boundaries—border districts claimed but not occupied—the American colonists met with difficulties in their purchase of land from the Indians, often paying twice for the same strip.

For the same reason they don’t define their boundaries; whether a mile closer or further away, what’s the difference? Additionally, their sporadic or wandering use of the land causes the borders to shift with every outside attack and every change in the tribal strength internally. Their unstable states rarely exist long enough in one shape or size to create fixed boundaries; this explains the ambiguity regarding the extent of tribal territories among all primitive peoples, along with the conflicting land claims that are a continuous source of conflict. Due to these overlapping boundaries—border areas claimed but not occupied—the American colonists faced challenges when buying land from the Native Americans, often paying for the same piece of land more than once.

Common boundary districts.

Even civilized peoples may adopt a waste boundary where the motive for protection is peculiarly strong, as in the half-mile neutral zone of lowland which ties the rock of Gibraltar to Spain. On a sparsely populated frontier, where the abundance of land reduces its value, they may throw the boundary into the form of a common district, as in the vast, disputed Oregon country, accepted provisionally as a district of joint occupancy between the United States and Canada from 1818 to 1846, or that wide highland border which Norway so long shared with Russia and Sweden. In South America, where land is abundant and population sparse, this common boundary belt is not rare. It suggests a device giving that leeway for expansion desired by all growing states. By the treaty of 1866, the frontier between Chile and Bolivia crossed the Atacama desert at 24° South Latitude; but the zone between 23° and 25° was left under the common jurisdiction of the two states, for exploitation of the guano deposits and mineral wealth.362 A common border district on a much larger scale is found between Brazil and the eastern frontier of French Guiana. It includes a belt 185 miles (300 kilometers) wide between the Oyapok and Arawary rivers, and is left as a neutral district till its fate is decided by arbitration.363 All these instances are only temporary phases in the evolution of a political frontier from wide, neutral border to the mathematically determined boundary line required by modern civilized states.

Even civilized nations might set a waste boundary where the need for protection is especially strong, like the half-mile neutral zone between Gibraltar and Spain. On a less populated frontier, where there’s lots of land making it less valuable, they might shape the boundary into a shared district, as seen in the vast, contested Oregon territory, which was temporarily recognized as a jointly occupied area by the United States and Canada from 1818 to 1846, or the large highland border that Norway shared with Russia and Sweden for so long. In South America, where land is plentiful and the population is low, this kind of common boundary is not uncommon. It hints at a strategy that allows for the expansion desired by all growing nations. According to the treaty of 1866, the border between Chile and Bolivia crossed the Atacama Desert at 24° South Latitude; however, the area between 23° and 25° was left under the shared jurisdiction of both countries for the exploitation of guano deposits and mineral resources.362 A much larger common border district exists between Brazil and the eastern border of French Guiana. It covers a 185-mile (300-kilometer) wide area between the Oyapok and Arawary rivers, and is considered a neutral zone until its future is settled through arbitration.363 All these examples are just temporary stages in the development of a political frontier, evolving from a broad, neutral border to the precise boundaries needed by modern civilized nations.

Tariff free zones.

Even when the boundary line has been surveyed and the boundary pillars set up, the frontier is prone to assert its old zonal nature, simply because it marks the limits of human movements. Rarely, for instance, does a customs boundary coincide with a political frontier, even in the most advanced states of Europe, except on the coasts. The student of Baedecker finds a gap of several miles on the same railroad between the customs frontier of Germany and France, or France and Italy. Where the border district is formed by a high and rugged mountain range, the custom houses recede farther and farther from the common political line upon the ridge, and drop down the slope to convenient points, leaving between them a wide neutral tariff zone, like that in Haute Savoie along the massive Mont Blanc Range between France and Italy.

Even after the boundary line has been surveyed and the boundary markers are in place, the frontier tends to revert to its original zonal character because it defines the limits of human movement. For example, a customs boundary rarely aligns with a political frontier, even in the most advanced countries in Europe, except along the coasts. A traveler using Baedecker might notice a gap of several miles on the same railroad line between the customs border of Germany and France, or France and Italy. In areas where the border is marked by a high and rugged mountain range, the customs houses move further away from the actual political line on the ridge, descending the slope to more convenient locations, creating a wide neutral tariff zone in areas like Haute Savoie along the imposing Mont Blanc Range between France and Italy.

Allied to this phase, yet differing from it, is the "Zona Libre" or Free Zone, 12 miles broad and 1,833 miles long, which forms the northern hem of Mexico from the Gulf to the Pacific. Here foreign goods pay only 18-1/2 per cent., formerly only 2-1/2 per cent., of the usual federal duties. Goods going on into the interior pay the rest of the tariff at the inner margin of the Zone. This arrangement was adopted in 1858 to establish some sort of commercial equilibrium between the Mexican towns of the Rio Grande Valley, which were burdened by excessive taxation on internal trade, and the Texas towns across the river, which at this time enjoyed a specially low tariff. Consequently prices of food and manufactured goods were twice or four times as high on the Mexican as on the American side. The result was persistent smuggling, extensive emigration from the southern to the northern bank, and the commercial decline of the frontier states of Mexico, till the Zona Libre adjusted the commercial discrepancy.364 Since 1816 a tariff free zone a league wide has formed the border of French Savoy along the Canton and Lake of Geneva, thus uniting this canton by a free passway with the Swiss territory at the upper end of the lake.365

Allied to this phase, but different from it, is the "Zona Libre" or Free Zone, 12 miles wide and 1,833 miles long, which makes up the northern part of Mexico from the Gulf to the Pacific. Here, foreign goods are taxed only 18.5%, compared to the previous 2.5% of the usual federal duties. Goods that move into the interior pay the rest of the tariff at the inner edge of the Zone. This setup was created in 1858 to establish some sort of commercial balance between the Mexican towns in the Rio Grande Valley, which faced excessive taxes on internal trade, and the Texas towns across the river, which at that time enjoyed a notably low tariff. As a result, prices for food and manufactured goods were two to four times higher on the Mexican side than on the American side. This led to ongoing smuggling, significant emigration from the southern bank to the northern bank, and a commercial decline in Mexico's border states until the Zona Libre helped correct the commercial imbalance.364 Since 1816, a tariff-free zone one league wide has formed the border of French Savoy along the Canton and Lake of Geneva, thereby connecting this canton with Swiss territory at the upper end of the lake.365

Boundary zones of mingled race elements.

When the political boundary has evolved by a system of contraction out of the wide waste zone to the nicely determined line, that line, nevertheless, is always encased, as it were, in a zone of contact wherein are mingled the elements of either side. The zone includes the peripheries of the two contiguous racial or national bodies, and in it each is modified and assimilated to the other. On its edges it is strongly marked by the characteristics of the adjacent sides, but its medial band shows a mingling of the two in ever-varying proportions; it changes from day to day and shifts backward and forward, according as one side or the other exercises in it more potent economic, religious, racial, or political influences.

When the political boundary has changed through a process of contraction from a vast, empty area to a clearly defined line, that line is always surrounded, in a way, by a contact zone where the elements from both sides mix. This zone includes the edges of the two neighboring racial or national groups, and within it, each is influenced and absorbed by the other. Its outer edges prominently display the traits of the neighboring sides, but the central area shows a blend of both in ever-changing proportions; it shifts from day to day and fluctuates back and forth depending on which side exerts more significant economic, religious, racial, or political influence.

Its peripheral character comes out strongly in the mingling of contiguous ethnic elements found in every frontier district. Here is that zone of transitional form which we have seen prevails so widely in nature. The northern borderland of the United States is in no small degree Canadian, and the southern is strongly Mexican. In the Rio Grande counties of Texas, Mexicans constituted in 1890 from 27 to 55 per cent. of the total population, and they were distributed in considerable numbers also in the second tier of counties. A broad band of French and English Canadians overlaps the northern hem of United States territory from Maine to North Dakota.366 In the New York and New England counties bordering on the old French province of Quebec, they constitute from 11 to 22 per cent. of the total population, except in two or three western counties of Maine which have evidently been mere passways for a tide of habitants moving on to more attractive conditions of life in the counties just to the south.367 But even these large figures do not adequately represent the British-American element within our boundaries, because they leave out of account the native-born of Canadian parents who have been crossing our borders for over a generation.

Its peripheral character is evident in the mix of neighboring ethnic groups found in every border area. This is that zone of transition that we see widely in nature. The northern border of the United States has a significant Canadian influence, while the southern border is heavily Mexican. In the Rio Grande counties of Texas, Mexicans made up 27 to 55 percent of the total population in 1890, and they were also found in significant numbers in the second tier of counties. A wide band of French and English Canadians stretches across the northern part of U.S. territory from Maine to North Dakota.366 In the New York and New England counties bordering the old French province of Quebec, they represent 11 to 22 percent of the total population, except in a couple of western counties in Maine that have clearly served as pathways for a wave of habitants moving on to better living conditions in the counties just south.367 However, even these large numbers do not fully capture the British-American presence within our borders, as they overlook the native-born children of Canadian parents who have been crossing into the United States for over a generation.

Ethnic border zones in the Alps.

If we turn to northern Italy, where a mountain barrier might have been expected to segregate the long-headed Mediterranean stock from the broad-headed Alpine stock, we find as a matter of fact that the ethnic type throughout the Po basin is markedly brachycephalic and becomes more pronounced along the northern boundary in the Alps, till it culminates in Piedmont along the frontier of France, where it becomes identical with the broad-headed Savoyards.368 More than this, Provençal French is spoken in the Dora Baltea Valley of Piedmont; and along the upper Dora Riparia and in the neighboring valleys of the Chisone and Pellice are the villages of the refugee Waldenses, who speak an idiom allied to the Provençal. More than this, the whole Piedmontese Italian is characterized by its approach to the French, and the idiom of Turin sounds very much like Provençal.369 To the north there is a similar exchange between Italy and Switzerland with the adjacent Austrian province of the Tyrol. In the rugged highlands of the Swiss Grisons bordering upon Italy, we find a pure Alpine stock, known to the ancients as the Rhaetians, speaking a degenerate Latin tongue called Romansch, which still persists also under the names of Ladino and Frioulian in the Alpine regions of the Tyrol and Italy. In fact, the map of linguistic boundaries in the Grisons shows the dovetailing of German, Italian, and Romansch in a broad zone.370 The traveller in the southern Tyrol becomes accustomed in the natives to the combination of Italian coloring, German speech, and Alpine head form; whereas, if on reaching Italy he visits the hills back of Vicenza, he finds the German settlements of Tredici and Sette Communi, where German customs, folklore, language, and German types of faces still persist, survivals from the days of German infiltration across the Brenner Pass.371

If we look at northern Italy, where we might expect a mountain range to separate the long-headed Mediterranean population from the broad-headed Alpine one, we actually find that the ethnic type throughout the Po basin is primarily brachycephalic, and this becomes even more pronounced along the northern border in the Alps, peaking in Piedmont near the French border, where it matches the broad-headed Savoyards.368 Additionally, Provençal French is spoken in the Dora Baltea Valley of Piedmont; along the upper Dora Riparia and in nearby valleys like Chisone and Pellice, there are villages of refugee Waldenses who speak a dialect related to Provençal. Moreover, the whole Piedmontese Italian has characteristics that resemble French, and the dialect spoken in Turin is very similar to Provençal.369 To the north, there's a similar interaction between Italy and Switzerland, along with the adjacent Austrian province of Tyrol. In the rugged highlands of the Swiss Grisons, which border Italy, we find a pure Alpine population, known in ancient times as the Rhaetians, speaking a simplified Latin language called Romansch, which still exists under the names Ladino and Frioulian in the Alpine regions of Tyrol and Italy. Indeed, the map of language boundaries in the Grisons shows a blend of German, Italian, and Romansch in a wide area.370 When traveling in southern Tyrol, one gets used to seeing a mix of Italian culture, German language, and Alpine physical features; however, if they head to the hills behind Vicenza, they’ll find the German settlements of Tredici and Sette Communi, where German customs, folklore, language, and typical German features still endure, remnants from the times of German migration across the Brenner Pass.371

Slav-German Boundary In Europe.

Slav-German Boundary In Europe.

Slav-German Boundary In Europe.

Slav-German Border In Europe.

The Slav-German boundary.

Where Slavs and Teutons come together in Central Europe, their race border is a zone lying approximately between 14 and 24 degrees East Longitude; it is crossed by alternate peninsulas of predominant Germans and Austrians from the one side, Czechs and Poles from the other, the whole spattered over by a sprinkling of the two elements. Rarely, and then only for short stretches, do political and ethnic boundaries coincide. The northern frontier hem of East Prussia lying between the River Niemen and the political line of demarcation is quite as much Lithuanian as German, while German stock dots the whole surface of the Baltic provinces of Russia as far as St. Petersburg, The eastern rim of the Kaiser's empire as far south as the Carpathians presents a broad band of the Polish race, averaging about fifty kilometers (30 miles) in width, sparsely sprinkled with German settlements; these are found farther east also as an ethnic archipelago dotting the wide Slav area of Poland. The enclosed basin of Bohemia, protected on three sides by mountain walls and readily accessible to the Slav stock at the sources of the Vistula, enabled the Czechs to penetrate far westward and there maintain themselves; but in spite of encompassing mountains, the inner or Bohemian slopes of the Boehmer Wald, Erz, and Sudetes ranges constitute a broad girdle of almost solid German population.372 In the Austrian provinces of Moravia and Silesia, which form the southeastward continuation of this Slav-German boundary zone, 60 per cent. of the population are Czechs, 33 per cent. are German, and 7 per cent., found in the eastern part of Silesia, are Poles.373

Where Slavs and Teutons come together in Central Europe, their racial border is a zone that lies roughly between 14 and 24 degrees East Longitude. This area is marked by alternating peninsulas of mostly Germans and Austrians on one side and Czechs and Poles on the other, with a mix of both groups scattered throughout. Political and ethnic boundaries rarely match up and usually only for short distances. The northern border of East Prussia, located between the River Niemen and the political boundary, is as much Lithuanian as it is German. German ancestry can be found across the Baltic provinces of Russia all the way to St. Petersburg. The eastern edge of the Kaiser’s empire, extending down to the Carpathians, shows a wide band of Polish people, averaging about fifty kilometers (30 miles) in width, with sparse German settlements sprinkled within; these can also be found farther east as an ethnic cluster throughout the large Slavic region of Poland. The enclosed basin of Bohemia, which is sheltered on three sides by mountain ranges and easily accessible to Slavic groups at the sources of the Vistula River, allowed the Czechs to move far west and establish themselves there. However, despite being surrounded by mountains, the inner slopes of the Boehmer Wald, Erz, and Sudetes ranges form a wide band of nearly solid German population. In the Austrian provinces of Moravia and Silesia, which continue southeastward from this Slav-German border zone, 60 percent of the population are Czechs, 33 percent are German, and 7 percent, found in the eastern part of Silesia, are Poles.

An ethnic map of the western Muscovite Empire in Europe shows a marked infiltration into White and Little Russia of West Slavs from Poland, and in the province of Bessarabia alternate areas of Russians and Roumanians. The latter in places form an unbroken ethnic expansion from the home kingdom west of the Pruth, extending in solid bands as far as the Dniester, and throwing out ethnic islands between this stream and the Bug.

An ethnic map of the western Muscovite Empire in Europe shows a significant influx of West Slavs from Poland into White and Little Russia, and in the province of Bessarabia, there are alternating areas of Russians and Romanians. The Romanians, in certain regions, create a continuous ethnic presence from their home kingdom west of the Pruth, extending in solid bands all the way to the Dniester and forming ethnic enclaves between this river and the Bug.

Ethnographical Map Of Russia. MONGOLOID: Kalmucks, Kirghis, Nogai, Tartars, Bashkirs, Voguls, Ostiaks, Samoyedes. ZIRIAN: Mingled Mongoloid and Finnish.

Ethnographical Map Of Russia. MONGOLOID: Kalmucks, Kirghis, Nogai, Tartars, Bashkirs, Voguls, Ostiaks, Samoyedes. ZIRIAN: Mingled Mongoloid and Finnish.

Ethnographical Map Of Russia.

Ethnographic Map of Russia.

MONGOLOID: Kalmucks, Kirghis, Nogai, Tartars, Bashkirs, Voguls, Ostiaks.

MONGOLOID: Kalmucks, Kirghiz, Nogai, Tatars, Bashkirs, Voguls, Ostiaks.

Samoyedes.

Samoyeds.

ZIRIAN: Mingled Mongoloid and Finnish.

ZIRIAN: Mixed Mongoloid and Finnish.

Assimilation of culture in boundary zones.

In the northern provinces of Russia, in the broad zone shared by the aboriginal Finns and the later-coming Slavs, Wallace found villages in every stage of Russification. "In one everything seemed thoroughly Finnish; the inhabitants had a reddish-olive skin, very high cheek bones, obliquely set eyes, and a peculiar costume; none of the women and very few of the men could understand Russian and any Russian who visited the place was regarded as a foreigner. In the second, there were already some Russian inhabitants; the others had lost something of their purely Finnish type, many of the men had discarded the old costume and spoke Russian fluently, and a Russian visitor was no longer shunned. In a third, the Finnish type was still further weakened; all the men spoke Russian, and nearly all the women understood it; the old male costume had entirely disappeared and the old female was rapidly following it; and intermarriage with the Russian population was no longer rare. In a fourth, intermarriage had almost completely done its work, and the old Finnish element could be detected merely in certain peculiarities of physiognomy and accent." This amalgamation extends to their religions—prayers wholly pagan devoutly uttered under the shadow of a strange cross, next the Finnish god Yumak sharing honors equally with the Virgin, finally a Christianity pure in doctrine and outward forms except for the survival of old pagan ceremonies in connection with the dead.374

In the northern provinces of Russia, in the wide area shared by the native Finns and the later-arriving Slavs, Wallace discovered villages at various stages of Russification. "In one, everything felt completely Finnish; the people had reddish-olive skin, very high cheekbones, slanted eyes, and a unique style of dress; none of the women and very few of the men could understand Russian, and any Russian who visited this village was seen as a foreigner. In another, there were already some Russian residents; others had lost some of their distinctly Finnish features, many of the men had abandoned the traditional clothing and spoke Russian fluently, and a Russian visitor was no longer avoided. In a third, the Finnish appearance was even further reduced; all the men spoke Russian, and nearly all the women understood it; the traditional male attire had completely vanished, and the traditional female attire was quickly following suit; intermarriage with the Russian population was becoming common. In a fourth village, intermarriage had nearly finished the transformation, and the old Finnish traits could only be seen in certain specific facial features and accents." This blending also affected their religions—prayers that were entirely pagan were devoutly offered under the shadow of a strange cross, alongside the Finnish god Yumak receiving equal honor with the Virgin, and finally, a Christianity that was pure in doctrine and outward appearance but still retained old pagan rituals related to the dead.374

At the confluence of the Volga and Kama rivers, this boundary zone of Russians and Finns meets the borderland of the Asiatic Mongols; and here is found an intermingling of races, languages, religions, and customs scarcely to be equalled elsewhere. Finns are infused with Tartar as well as Russian blood, and Russians show Tartar as well as Finnish traits. The Bashkirs, who constitute an ethnic peninsula running from the solid Mongolian mass of Asia, show every type of the mongrel.375 [See map page 225.]

At the meeting point of the Volga and Kama rivers, this border area of Russians and Finns meets the territory of the Asiatic Mongols; here, you find a mix of races, languages, religions, and customs that’s hard to match anywhere else. Finns have a combination of Tartar and Russian ancestry, and Russians display both Tartar and Finnish characteristics. The Bashkirs, who form an ethnic enclave extending from the solid Mongolian expanse of Asia, exhibit a wide variety of mixed heritage.375 [See map page 225.]

Boundary zones of assimilation in Asia.

If we turn to Asia and examine the western race boundary of the expanding Chinese, we find that a wide belt of mingled ethnic elements, hybrid languages, and antagonistic civilizations marks the transition from Chinese to Mongolian and Tibetan areas. The eastern and southern frontiers of Mongolia, formerly marked by the Great Wall, are now difficult to define, owing to the steady encroachment of the agricultural Chinese on the fertile edges of the plateau, where they have converted the best-watered pastures of the Mongols into millet fields and vegetable gardens, leaving for the nomad's herds the more sterile patches between.376 Every line of least resistance—climatic, industrial, commercial—sees the Chinese widening this transitional zone. He sprinkles his crops over the "Land of Grass," invades the trade of the caravan towns, sets up his fishing station on the great northern bend of the Hoangho in the Ordos country, three hundred miles beyond the Wall, to exploit the fishing neglected by the Mongols.377 The well-watered regions of the Nan-Shan ranges has enabled him to drive a long, narrow ethnic wedge, represented by the westward projection of Kansu Province between Mongolia and Tibet, into the heart of the Central Plateau. [See map page 103.] Here the nomad Si Fan tribes dwell side by side with Chinese farmers,378 who themselves show a strong infusion of the Mongolian and Tibetan blood to the north and south, and whose language is a medley of all three tongues.379

If we look at Asia and check out the western boundary of the expanding Chinese population, we see a broad area filled with mixed ethnic groups, hybrid languages, and competing civilizations that marks the shift from Chinese to Mongolian and Tibetan regions. The eastern and southern borders of Mongolia, once defined by the Great Wall, are now hard to pinpoint due to the constant advance of agricultural Chinese people into the fertile fringes of the plateau, where they've turned the best-watered pastures of the Mongols into millet fields and vegetable gardens, leaving the nomads' herds to the less fertile areas in between.376 Every easiest route—whether it's about climate, industry, or trade—sees the Chinese expanding this transitional area. They spread their crops across the "Land of Grass," invade the trade of the caravan towns, and set up a fishing station on the big northern bend of the Hoangho in the Ordos region, three hundred miles beyond the Wall, to take advantage of the fishing that the Mongols have ignored.377 The well-watered regions of the Nan-Shan mountains have allowed them to drive a long, narrow ethnic wedge, which is the westward extension of Kansu Province between Mongolia and Tibet, deep into the heart of the Central Plateau. [See map page 103.] Here, the nomadic Si Fan tribes live next to Chinese farmers,378 who themselves show a strong mix of Mongolian and Tibetan ancestry to the north and south, and whose language is a blend of all three tongues.379

Boundary zones of mountain Tibet.

In easternmost Tibet, in the elevated province of Minjak (2,600 meters or 8,500 feet), M. Hue found in 1846 a great number of Chinese from the neighboring Sze-Chuan and Yun-nan districts keeping shops and following the primary trades and agriculture. The language of the Tibetan natives showed the effect of foreign intercourse; it was not the pure speech of Lhassa, but was closely assimilated to the idiom of the neighboring Si Fan speech of Sze-Chuan and contained many Chinese expressions. He found also a modification of manners, customs, and costumes in this peripheral Tibet; the natives showed more of the polish, cunning, and covetousness of the Chinese, less of the rudeness, frankness, and strong religious feeling characteristic of the western plateau man.380 Just across the political boundary in Chinese territory, the border zone of assimilation shows predominance of the Chinese element with a strong Tibetan admixture both in race and civilization.381 Here Tibetan traders with their yak caravans are met on the roads or encamped in their tents by the hundred about the frontier towns, whither they have brought the wool, sheep, horses, hides and medicinal roots of the rough highland across that "wild borderland which is neither Chinese nor Tibetan." The Chinese population consists of hardy mountaineers, who eat millet and maize instead of rice. The prevailing architecture is Tibetan and the priests on the highways are the red and yellow lamas from the Buddhist monasteries of the plateau. "The Country is a cross between China and Tibet."382

In the far east of Tibet, in the high province of Minjak (2,600 meters or 8,500 feet), M. Hue discovered in 1846 a large number of Chinese from the nearby Sze-Chuan and Yun-nan areas running shops and engaging in primary trades and agriculture. The language of the local Tibetan people reflected the influence of outside interactions; it wasn't the pure language of Lhassa, but it closely resembled the Si Fan dialect of Sze-Chuan and included many Chinese phrases. He also observed changes in manners, customs, and clothing in this remote part of Tibet; the locals exhibited more of the polish, cunning, and greed of the Chinese, and less of the roughness, honesty, and intense religious feelings typical of those from the western plateau.380 Just across the political border in Chinese territory, the area of assimilation shows a predominance of the Chinese element with a significant Tibetan mix in both race and culture.381 Here, Tibetan traders with their yak caravans can be seen on the roads or camped in their tents by the hundreds around the border towns, where they have brought wool, sheep, horses, hides, and medicinal roots from the rugged highlands across that "wild borderland which is neither Chinese nor Tibetan." The Chinese population comprises tough mountaineers who eat millet and corn instead of rice. The dominant architecture is Tibetan, and the priests on the roads are the red and yellow lamas from the Buddhist monasteries of the plateau. "The country is a mix of China and Tibet."382

Even the high wall of the Himalayas does not suffice to prevent similar exchanges of ethnic elements and culture between southern Tibet and northern India. Lhassa and Giamda harbor many emigrants from the neighboring Himalayan state of Bhutan, allow them to monopolize the metal industry, in which they excel, and to practise undisturbed their Indian form of Buddhism.383 The southern side of this zone of transition is occupied by a Tibetan stock of people inhabiting the Himalayan frontiers of India and practising the Hindu religion.384 In the hill country of northern Bengal natives are to be seen with the Chinese queue hanging below a Hindu turban, or wearing the Hindu caste mark on their broad Mongolian faces. With these are mingled genuine Tibetans who have come across the border to work in the tea plantations of this region.385 [See map page 102.]

Even the towering wall of the Himalayas can't stop the exchange of ethnic groups and cultures between southern Tibet and northern India. Lhasa and Giamda have many immigrants from the nearby Himalayan state of Bhutan, who dominate the metal industry in which they excel and practice their version of Indian Buddhism without interference.383 The southern side of this transitional area is home to a Tibetan population living along the Himalayan borders of India and following the Hindu faith.384 In the hill country of northern Bengal, you can see locals with the Chinese queue hanging below a Hindu turban or sporting Hindu caste marks on their broad Mongolian faces. Alongside them are authentic Tibetans who have come across the border to work in the tea plantations in this region.385 [See map page 102.]

Relation of ethnic and cultural assimilation.

The assimilation of culture within a boundary zone is in some respects the result of race amalgamation, as, for instance, in costume, religion, manners and language; but in economic points it is often the result of identical geographic influences to which both races are alike subjected. For example, scarcity of food on the arid plateau of Central Asia makes the Chinese of western Kansu eat butter and curds as freely as do the pastoral Mongols, though such a diet is obnoxious to the purely agricultural Chinese of the lowlands.386 The English pioneer in the Trans-Allegheny wilderness shared with the Indians an environment of trackless forests and savage neighbors; he was forced to discard for a time many essentials of civilization, both material and moral. Despite a minimum of race intermixture, the men of the Cumberland and Kentucky settlements became assimilated to the life of the red man; they borrowed his scalping knife and tomahawk, adopted his method of ambush and extermination in war; like him they lived in great part by the chase, dressed in furs and buckskin, and wore the noiseless moccasin. Here the mere fact of geographical location on a remote frontier, and of almost complete isolation from the centers of English life on the Atlantic slope, and the further fact of persistent contact with a lower status of civilization, resulted in a temporary return to primitive methods of existence, till the settlements secured an increase of population adequate for higher industrial development and for defence.

The blending of cultures in a border area is partly due to the mixing of different races, evident in things like clothing, religion, customs, and language. However, in economic terms, it's often influenced by the same geographical factors that affect both groups. For instance, the lack of food on the dry plateau of Central Asia leads the Chinese in western Kansu to eat butter and curds just like the nomadic Mongols do, even though such a diet is unappealing to the strictly agricultural Chinese in the lowlands.386 The English settlers in the Trans-Allegheny wilderness shared a challenging environment with the Native Americans, facing dense forests and hostile neighbors; they had to give up many basic elements of civilization, both material and moral, for a time. Despite limited racial mixing, the people in the Cumberland and Kentucky settlements adapted to the lifestyle of the Native Americans; they borrowed their scalping knives and tomahawks, adopted their ambush tactics in warfare, and, like them, relied heavily on hunting for sustenance, dressed in furs and buckskin, and wore quiet moccasins. In this case, the geographical isolation on a remote frontier and the close contact with a less developed society led to a temporary reversion to more primitive ways of living, until the settlements grew in population enough to support industrial development and offer defense.

A race boundary involves almost inevitably a cultural boundary, often, too, a linguistic and religionary, occasionally a political boundary. The last three are subject to wide fluctuation, frequently overstepping all barriers of race and contrasted civilizations. Though one often accompanies another, it is necessary to distinguish the different kinds of boundaries and to estimate their relative importance in the history of a people or state. We may lay down the rule that the greater, more permanent, and deep-seated the contrasts on the two sides of a border, the greater is its significance; and that, on this basis, boundaries rank in importance, with few exceptions, in the following order: racial, cultural, linguistic, and political. The less marked the contrasts, in general, the more rapid and complete the process of assimilation in the belt of borderland.

A race boundary almost always involves a cultural boundary and often also a linguistic and religious one, and occasionally a political boundary. The last three can change a lot and frequently cross over all race and cultural differences. While one often comes with another, it’s important to distinguish between the different types of boundaries and to assess their relative importance in the history of a people or state. We can establish the rule that the greater, more permanent, and deeper the differences on either side of a border, the more significant it is; and based on this, boundaries generally rank in importance, with few exceptions, in the following order: racial, cultural, linguistic, and political. The less pronounced the differences are, the quicker and more complete the process of assimilation tends to be in the borderland area.

The boundary zone in political expansion.

The significance of the border zone of assimilation for political expansion lies in the fact that it prepares the way for the advance of the state boundary from either side; in it the sharp edge of racial and cultural antagonism is removed, or for this antagonism a new affinity may be substituted. The zone of American settlement, industry, and commerce which in 1836 projected beyond the political boundary of the Sabine River over the eastern part of Mexican Texas facilitated the later incorporation of the State into the Union, just as a few years earlier the Baton Rouge District of Spanish West Florida had gravitated to the United States by reason of the predominant American element there, and thus extended the boundary of Louisiana to the Pearl River. When the political boundary of Siberia was fixed at the Amur River, the Muscovite government began extending the border zone of assimilation far to the south of that stream by the systematic Russification of Manchuria, with a view to its ultimate annexation. Schleswig-Holstein and Alsace-Lorraine, by reason of their large German population, have been readily incorporated into the German Empire. Only in Lorraine has a considerable French element retarded the process. The considerable sprinkling of Germans over the Baltic provinces of Russia and Poland west of the Vistula, and a certain Teutonic stamp of civilization which these districts have received, would greatly facilitate the eastward extension of the German Empire; while their common religions, both Protestant and Roman Catholic, would help obliterate the old political fissure. Thus the borderland of a country, so markedly differentiated from its interior, performs a certain historical function, and becomes, as it were, an organ of the living, growing race or state.

The importance of the assimilation border zone for political expansion lies in its ability to pave the way for the state's boundary to move from either side; it helps to lessen the sharp divide of racial and cultural conflict, or it can introduce a new sense of connection in place of that conflict. The area of American settlement, industry, and commerce that in 1836 extended past the political boundary of the Sabine River into eastern Mexican Texas made it easier for that State to join the Union later, just as the Baton Rouge District of Spanish West Florida had aligned itself with the United States a few years earlier, thanks to the strong American presence there, thus expanding Louisiana's boundary to the Pearl River. When Siberia's political boundary was set at the Amur River, the Russian government began pushing the assimilation border zone further south through the systematic Russification of Manchuria, aimed at its eventual annexation. Schleswig-Holstein and Alsace-Lorraine, due to their large German populations, were easily absorbed into the German Empire. Only in Lorraine has a significant French population slowed down the process. The significant presence of Germans in the Baltic provinces of Russia and Poland west of the Vistula, along with a distinct Teutonic influence on civilization in these regions, would greatly ease the eastward expansion of the German Empire; shared religions, both Protestant and Roman Catholic, would help erase the old political divide. Therefore, the border area of a country, clearly different from its interior, plays an important historical role and becomes, in a sense, an extension of the living, evolving race or state.

Tendency toward defection along political frontiers.

Location on a frontier involves remoteness from the center of national, cultural, and political activities; these reach their greatest intensity in the core of the nation and exercise only an attenuated influence on the far-away borders, unless excellent means of communication keep up a circulation of men, commodities, and ideas between center and periphery. For the frontier, therefore, the centripetal force is weakened; the centrifugal is strengthened often by the attraction of some neighboring state or tribe, which has established bonds of marriage, trade, and friendly intercourse with the outlying community. Moreover, the mere infusion of foreign blood, customs, and ideas, especially a foreign religion, which is characteristic of a border zone, invades the national solidarity. Hence we find that a tendency to political defection constantly manifests itself along the periphery. A long reach weakens the arm of authority, especially where serious geographical barriers intervene; hence border uprisings are usually successful, at least for a time. When accomplished, they involve that shrinkage of the frontiers which we have found to be the unmistakable symptom of national decline.

Being located on a frontier means being far from the main national, cultural, and political activities; these activities are strongest at the heart of the nation and only have a limited influence on the distant borders unless there are effective means of communication allowing for the movement of people, goods, and ideas between the center and the outskirts. For the frontier, therefore, the pull towards the center is weaker; the push away from it is often strengthened by the allure of a nearby state or tribe, which has formed relationships through marriage, trade, and friendly interactions with the isolated community. Additionally, the influx of foreign blood, customs, and ideas, particularly a foreign religion, commonly seen in border areas, disrupts national unity. This is why we frequently observe a tendency towards political rebellion along the edges of the nation. A long distance dilutes the power of authority, especially when significant geographical barriers come into play; thus, uprisings along the borders typically succeed, at least temporarily. Once successful, they lead to a reduction of the frontiers, which we have identified as a clear sign of national decline.

This defection shows itself most promptly in conquered border tribes of different blood, who lack the bond of ethnic affinity, and whose remoteness emboldens them to throw off the political yoke. The decay of the Roman Empire, after its last display of energy under Trajan, was registered in the revolt of its peripheral districts beyond the Euphrates, Danube, and Rhine, as also in the rapid Teutonization of eastern Gaul, which here prepared the way for the assertion of independence. The border satraps of the ancient Persian Empire were constantly revolting, as the history of Asia Minor shows. Aragon, Old Castile, and Portugal were the first kingdoms in the Iberian Peninsula to throw off Saracen dominion. Mountain ranges and weary stretches of desert roads enabled the rebellions in Chinese Turkestan and the border districts of Sungaria in 1863 to be maintained for several years.387

This defection is most evident in conquered border tribes of different backgrounds, who lack a shared ethnic connection and are encouraged by their isolation to break free from political control. The decline of the Roman Empire, following its last burst of strength under Trajan, was marked by the uprisings in its peripheral regions beyond the Euphrates, Danube, and Rhine, as well as the rapid Teutonization of eastern Gaul, which set the stage for a claim to independence. The border governors of the ancient Persian Empire were frequently in revolt, as shown by the history of Asia Minor. Aragon, Old Castile, and Portugal were the first kingdoms on the Iberian Peninsula to shake off Saracen rule. Mountain ranges and exhausting stretches of desert roads allowed the rebellions in Chinese Turkestan and the border regions of Sungaria in 1863 to last for several years.387

Centrifugal forces on the frontier.

A feeble grasp upon remote peripheral possessions is often further weakened by the resistance of an immigrant population from beyond the boundary, which brings with it new ideas of government. This was the geographical history of the Texan revolt. A location on the far northern outskirts of Mexican territory, some twelve hundred miles from the capital, rendered impossible intelligent government control, the enforcement of the laws, and prompt defence against the Indians. Remoteness weakened the political cohesion. More than this, the American ethnic boundary lapped far over eastern Texas, forming that border zone of two-fold race which we have come to know. This alien stock, antagonistic to the national ideals emanating from the City of Mexico, dominant over the native population by reason of its intelligence, energy, and wealth, ruptured the feeble political bond and asserted the independence of Texas. Quite similar was the history of the "Independent State of Acre," which in 1899 grew up just within the Bolivian frontier under the leadership of Brazilian caoutchouc gatherers, resisted the collection of taxes by the Bolivian government, and four years later secured annexation to Brazil.388

A weak hold on distant possessions is often further weakened by the opposition of an immigrant population from outside the borders, which brings new ideas about governance. This was the historical background of the Texan revolt. Its location on the far northern edge of Mexican territory, about twelve hundred miles from the capital, made effective government control, law enforcement, and swift defense against Native American tribes impossible. This remoteness undermined political unity. Additionally, the American ethnic boundary extended deep into eastern Texas, creating a mixed racial zone that we recognize today. This foreign group, opposed to the national ideals coming from Mexico City, dominated the local population due to its intelligence, drive, and wealth, breaking the fragile political connection and asserting Texas's independence. A similar situation occurred with the "Independent State of Acre," which emerged in 1899 just within the Bolivian border under the leadership of Brazilian rubber gatherers, resisting tax collection by the Bolivian government, and four years later secured annexation to Brazil.388

Even when no alien elements are present to weaken the race bond, if natural barriers intervene to obstruct and retard communications between center and periphery, the frontier community is likely to develop the spirit of defection, especially if its local geographic, and hence social, conditions are markedly different from those of the governing center. This is the explanation of that demand for independent statehood which was rife in our Trans-Allegheny settlements from 1785 to 1795, and of that separatist movement which advocated political alliance with either the British colonies to the north or the Spanish to the west, because these were nearer and offered easier access to the sea. A frontier location and an intervening mountain barrier were important factors in the Whisky Rebellion in western Pennsylvania, just as similar conditions later suggested the secession of the Pacific States from the Union. Disaffection from the government was manifested by the Trek Boers of early South Africa, "especially by those who dwelt in the outlying districts where the Government had exerted and could exert little control." In 1795 the people of Graaf-Reinet, a frontier settlement of that time, revolted against the Dutch South African Company and set up a miniature republic.389

Even when there are no outside factors weakening the bond, if natural barriers get in the way and slow down communication between the central authority and the outskirts, the frontier community is likely to develop a desire for independence, especially if its local geographic and social conditions are very different from those of the governing center. This explains the demand for independent statehood that was prevalent in our Trans-Allegheny settlements from 1785 to 1795, as well as the separatist movement that pushed for political alliances with either the British colonies to the north or the Spanish to the west, since these regions were closer and provided easier access to the sea. Being on the frontier and having a mountain barrier were significant factors in the Whisky Rebellion in western Pennsylvania, just as similar conditions later contributed to the push for the Pacific States to secede from the Union. Discontent with the government was shown by the Trek Boers in early South Africa, particularly by those living in remote areas where the government had limited control. In 1795, the residents of Graaf-Reinet, a frontier settlement at that time, revolted against the Dutch South African Company and established a small republic.389

The spirit of colonial frontiers.

The spirit of the colonial frontier is the spirit of freedom, the spirit of men who have traveled far, who are surcharged with energy, enterprise and self-reliance, often with impatience of restraint. A severe process of elimination culls out for the frontier a population strikingly differentiated from the citizens of the old inhabited centers. Then remoteness of location and abundance of opportunity proceed to emphasize the qualities which have squeezed through the sieve of natural and social selection. This is the type bred upon our own frontier, which, West beyond West, has crossed the continent from the backwoods of the Allegheny Mountains to the Pacific. The Siberian frontier develops much the same type on the eastern edge of the Russian Empire. Here army officers find a compensation for their rough surrounding in the escape from the excessive bureaucracy of the capitals. Here is to be noted the independence, self-reliance and self-respect characteristic of other colonial frontiers. The Russian of the Asiatic border is proud to call himself a Siberian: he is already differentiated in his own consciousness. The force of Moscow tradition and discipline is faint when it reaches him, it has traveled so far. Even the elaborate observances of the orthodox Greek Church tend to become simplified on the frontier. The question naturally arises whether in the Russian Empire, as in the United States, the political periphery will in time, react upon the center, infuse it with the spirit of progress and youth.390

The spirit of the colonial frontier embodies freedom, representing people who have traveled great distances, filled with energy, initiative, and self-sufficiency, often impatient with limitations. A rigorous process of elimination shapes a population for the frontier that is markedly different from the residents of established urban areas. The isolation and abundance of opportunities further highlight the traits that have survived the natural and social selection process. This is the type that has emerged on our own frontier, which, moving westward, has journeyed from the backwoods of the Allegheny Mountains to the Pacific. The Siberian frontier produces a similar type on the eastern edge of the Russian Empire. Here, army officers find relief from the harsh environment by escaping the excessive bureaucracy of the capitals. Independence, self-reliance, and self-respect, typical of other colonial frontiers, can be observed here. Russians living along the Asian border take pride in identifying themselves as Siberians; they already see themselves as distinct. The influence of Moscow tradition and discipline is weak by the time it reaches them after such a long journey. Even the complex rituals of the Orthodox Greek Church tend to become simpler on the frontier. This raises the question of whether, in the Russian Empire, as in the United States, the political periphery will eventually influence the center, infusing it with the spirit of progress and youth.390

Free border states as political survivals.

When to a border situation is added a geographic location affording conditions of long-established isolation, this tendency to maintain political autonomy becomes very pronounced. This is the explanation of so many frontier mountain states that have retained complete or partial independence, such as Nepal, Bhutan, the Asturias, which successfully withstood Saracen attack, and Montenegro, which has repelled alike Venetian, Servian, and Turkish dominion. Europe especially has numerous examples of these unabsorbed border states, whose independence represents the equilibrium of the conflicting political attractions about them. But all these smallest fragments of political territory have either some commercial or semi-political union with one or another of their neighbors. The little independent principality of Liechtenstein, wedged in between Switzerland and the Tyrol, is included in the customs union of Austro-Hungary. The small, independent duchy of Luxemburg, which has been attached in turn to all the great states which have grown up along its borders, is included in the Zollverein of Germany. The republic of Andorra, far up in a lofty valley of the Pyrenees, which has maintained its freedom for a thousand years, acknowledges certain rights of suzerainty exercised by France and the Spanish bishopric of Urgel.391

When a geographic location that has a history of isolation is added to a border situation, the desire to maintain political autonomy becomes very strong. This explains why many frontier mountain states have held on to some level of independence, like Nepal, Bhutan, Asturias, which successfully resisted Saracen attacks, and Montenegro, which has defended itself against Venetian, Serbian, and Turkish rule. Europe, in particular, has many examples of these independent border states, whose sovereignty reflects the balance of conflicting political influences around them. However, all these small pieces of political territory have some commercial or semi-political connection with their neighbors. The tiny independent principality of Liechtenstein, nestled between Switzerland and Tyrol, participates in the customs union of Austro-Hungary. The small independent duchy of Luxembourg, which has been aligned with all the major states that border it, is part of the Zollverein of Germany. The republic of Andorra, located high in a valley in the Pyrenees, has maintained its freedom for a thousand years but recognizes certain rights of control exercised by France and the Spanish bishopric of Urgel.391

Guardians of the marches.

Oftentimes a state gains by recognizing this freedom-loving spirit of the frontier, and by turning it to account for national defence along an exposed boundary. In consequence of the long wars between Scotland and England, to the Scotch barons having estates near the Border were given the Wardenships of the Marches, offices of great power and dignity; and their clans, accustomed only to the imperfect military organization demanded by the irregular but persistent hostilities of the time and place, developed a lawless spirit. Prohibited from agriculture by their exposed location, they left their fields waste, and lived by pillage and cattle-lifting from their English and even their Scotch neighbors. The valor of these southern clans, these "reivers of the Border," was the bulwark of Scotland against the English, but their mutinous spirit resisted the authority of the king and led them often to erect semi-independent principalities.392

Often, a state benefits from recognizing the freedom-loving spirit of the frontier and using it for national defense along a vulnerable border. Due to the long wars between Scotland and England, the Scottish barons with estates near the border were given the Wardenships of the Marches, positions of significant power and respect. Their clans, used to the inadequate military organization needed by the inconsistent but ongoing conflicts of the time, developed a lawless attitude. Prevented from farming because of their exposed location, their fields lay fallow as they survived through raiding and stealing livestock from both their English and even their Scottish neighbors. The bravery of these southern clans, the "reivers of the Border," served as Scotland's defensive line against the English, but their rebellious nature frequently challenged the king's authority, leading them to create semi-independent territories.392

Border nomads as frontier police.

China has fringed her western boundaries with quasi-independent tribes whose autonomy is assured and whose love of freedom is a guarantee of guerilla warfare against any invader from Central Asia. The Mantze tribes in the mountain borders of Sze-Chuan province have their own rulers and customs, and only pay tribute to China.393 The highlands of Kansu are sprinkled with such independent tribes. Sometimes a definite bargain is entered into—a self-governing military organization and a yearly sum of money in return for defence of the frontier. The Mongol tribes of the Charkar country or "Borderland" just outside the Great Wall northwest of Pekin constitute a paid army of the Emperor to guard the frontier against the Khalkhas of northern Mongolia, the tribe of Genghis Khan.394 Similarly, semi-independent military communities for centuries made a continuous line of barriers against the raids of the steppe nomads along the southern and southeastern frontiers of Russia, from the Dnieper to the Ural rivers. There were the "Free Cossacks," located on the debatable ground between the fortified frontier of the agricultural steppe and marauding Crimean Tartars. Nominally subjects of the Czar, they obeyed him when it suited them, and on provocation rose in open revolt. The Cossacks of the Dnieper, who to the middle of the seventeenth century formed Poland's border defence against Tartar invasion, were jealous of any interference with their freedom. They lent their services on occasions to the Sultan of Turkey, and even to the Crimean Khan; and finally, in 1681, attached themselves and their territory to Russia.395 Here speaks that spirit of defection which is the natural product of the remoteness and independence of frontier life. The Russians also attached to themselves the Kalmucks located between the lower Volga and Don, and used them as a frontier defence against their Tartar and Kirghis neighbors.396 In this case, as in that of the Cossacks and the Charkars of eastern Mongolia, we have a large body of men living in the same arid grassland, leading the same pastoral life, and carrying on the same kind of warfare as the nomadic marauders whose pillaging, cattle-lifting raids they aim to suppress. The imperial orders to the Charkars limit them strictly to the life of herdmen, with the purpose of maintaining their mobility and military efficiency. So in olden times, for the Don Cossacks agriculture was prohibited on pain of death, lest they should lose their taste for the live-stock booty of a punitive raid. A still earlier instance of this utilization of border nomads is found in the first century after Christ, when the Romans made the Arabian tribe of Beni Jafre, dwelling on the frontier of Syria, the warders of the eastern marches of the Empire.397

China has bordered her western regions with semi-independent tribes whose freedom is respected, and their love for independence ensures guerrilla warfare against any intruders from Central Asia. The Mantze tribes in the mountainous borders of Sze-Chuan province have their own leaders and traditions, only paying tribute to China.393 The highlands of Kansu are dotted with similar independent tribes. Sometimes, they strike a clear deal—a self-governing military group receives a yearly payment in exchange for protecting the frontier. The Mongol tribes of the Charkar region or "Borderland," just outside the Great Wall northwest of Beijing, act as a paid army for the Emperor, guarding the border against the Khalkhas of northern Mongolia, the tribe of Genghis Khan.394 In the same way, semi-independent military communities have for centuries created a continuous barrier against the raids of steppe nomads along the southern and southeastern borders of Russia, from the Dnieper to the Ural rivers. The "Free Cossacks," positioned on the disputed land between the fortified frontier of the agricultural steppe and the marauding Crimean Tartars, were nominally subjects of the Czar but obeyed him when it suited them, rising in open revolt when provoked. The Cossacks of the Dnieper, who until the mid-seventeenth century defended Poland against Tartar invasions, were protective of their freedom. They occasionally offered their services to the Sultan of Turkey and even to the Crimean Khan, and finally, in 1681, they affiliated themselves and their territory with Russia.395 This reflects the spirit of defiance that comes naturally from the remoteness and independence of life on the frontier. The Russians also incorporated the Kalmucks living between the lower Volga and Don rivers, using them as a defense against their Tartar and Kirghis neighbors.396 In this situation, as with the Cossacks and the Charkars of eastern Mongolia, we see a large group of people sharing the same arid grassland, leading similar pastoral lives, and conducting the same style of warfare as the nomadic raiders they aim to control. Imperial orders to the Charkars strictly limit their activities to herding, intended to keep them mobile and militarily effective. In ancient times, agriculture was similarly banned for the Don Cossacks under threat of death to prevent them from losing interest in livestock raiding. An earlier example of using border nomads is found in the first century after Christ when the Romans made the Arabian tribe of Beni Jafre, living on the border of Syria, the guardians of the eastern borders of the Empire.397

Lawless citizens deported to frontiers.

The advancing frontier of an expanding people often carries them into a sparsely settled country where the unruly members of society can with advantage be utilized as colonists. After centralized and civilized Russia began to encroach with the plow upon the pastures of the steppe Cossacks, and finally suppressed these military republics, the more turbulent and obstinate remnants of them she colonized along the Kuban and Terek rivers, to serve as bulwarks against the incursions of the Caucasus tribes and as the vanguard of the advance southward.398

The growing frontier of an expanding population often takes them into a sparsely populated area where the more unruly members of society can effectively be used as settlers. After centralized and civilized Russia started to push into the grazing lands of the steppe Cossacks and ultimately suppressed these military republics, the more rebellious and stubborn remnants were settled along the Kuban and Terek rivers to act as a barrier against the incursions of the Caucasus tribes and as the leaders of the push southward.398

This is one principle underlying the transportation of criminals to the frontier. They serve to hold the new country. There these waste elements of civilization are converted into a useful by-product. They may be only political radicals or religious dissenters: if so, so much the better colonial material. The Russian government formerly transported the rebellious sect of the Molokans or Unitarians to the outskirts of the Empire, where the danger of contagion was reduced. Hence they are to be found to-day scattered in the Volga province of Samara, on the border of the Kirghis steppe, in the Crimea, the Caucasus, and Siberia, still faithful and still persecuted.399 Since 1709 the Russian advance into Siberia has planted its milestones in settlements formed of prisoners of war, political exiles, and worse offenders.400 Penal colonists located on the shores of Kamchatka helped build and man the crazy boats which set out for Alaska at the end of the eighteenth century. China settles its thieves and cheats among the villages of its own border provinces of Shensi401 and Kansu; but its worst criminals it transports far away to the Hi country on the western frontier of the Empire, where they have doubtless contributed to the spirit of revolt that has there manifested itself.402

This is one principle behind sending criminals to the frontier. They help establish the new territory. There, these undesirable individuals from civilization are turned into a useful resource. They might just be political radicals or religious dissenters; if that’s the case, even better colonial material. The Russian government used to send the rebellious Molokans or Unitarians to the outskirts of the Empire, where the risk of spreading their ideas was minimized. That’s why today you can find them scattered in the Volga province of Samara, on the edge of the Kirghis steppe, in the Crimea, the Caucasus, and Siberia, still loyal and still facing persecution.399 Since 1709, Russia’s expansion into Siberia has established settlements made up of prisoners of war, political exiles, and serious offenders.400 Penal colonists on the shores of Kamchatka helped build and crew the crazy boats that set off for Alaska at the end of the eighteenth century. China settles its thieves and con artists among its border provinces of Shensi401 and Kansu, but it sends its worst criminals far away to the remote areas on the western frontier of the Empire, where they have surely contributed to the spirit of rebellion that has emerged there.402

Drift of lawless elements to the frontiers.

The abundance of opportunity and lack of competition in a new frontier community, its remoteness from the center of authority, and its imperfect civil government serve to attract thither the vicious, as well as the sturdy and enterprising. The society of the early Trans-Allegheny frontier included both elements. The lawless who drifted to the border formed gangs of horse thieves, highwaymen, and murderers, who called forth from the others the summary methods of lynch law.403 North Carolina, which in its early history formed the southern frontier of Virginia, swarmed with ruffians who had fled thither to escape imprisonment or hanging, and whose general attitude was to resist all regular authority and especially to pay no taxes.404 Similarly, that wide belt of mountain forest which forms the waste boundary between Korea and Manchuria is the resort of bandits, who have harried both sides of the border ever since this neutral district was established in the thirteenth century.405 The frontier communities of the Russian Cossacks in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were regular asylums for runaway serfs and peasants who were fleeing from taxation; their hetmans were repeatedly fugitive criminals. The eastern border of Russia formed by the Volga basin in 1775 was described as "an asylum for malcontents and vagabonds of all kinds, ruined nobles, disfrocked monks, military deserters, fugitive serfs, highwaymen, and Volga pirates"—disorderly elements which contributed greatly to the insurrection led by the Ural Cossacks in that year.406 "The Debatable Land," a tract between the Esk and Sark rivers, formerly claimed by both England and Scotland, was long the haunt of thieves, outlaws and vagabonds, as indeed was the whole Border, subject as it was to the regular jurisdiction of neither side.407

The abundance of opportunities and the lack of competition in a new frontier community, along with its distance from the center of authority and its weak civil government, attract not only the hardworking and ambitious but also the unscrupulous. The society of the early Trans-Allegheny frontier was made up of both groups. The lawless individuals who moved to the border created gangs of horse thieves, robbers, and murderers, which prompted the more decent members of society to resort to lynch law. 403 North Carolina, which was the southern frontier of Virginia in its early days, was filled with criminals who had come there to escape imprisonment or execution, and their general attitude was to resist all forms of regular authority, especially when it came to paying taxes. 404 Similarly, the expansive mountain forests that separate Korea from Manchuria have long been a safe haven for bandits, who have terrorized both sides of the border since this neutral zone was established in the thirteenth century. 405 The frontier communities of the Russian Cossacks in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were regular havens for runaway serfs and peasants seeking to escape taxes; their leaders were often fugitives from the law. The eastern border of Russia, marked by the Volga basin in 1775, was described as "a refuge for discontented individuals and all types of outcasts, including ruined nobles, deposed monks, military deserters, escaped serfs, robbers, and Volga pirates"—all of whom contributed significantly to the uprising led by the Ural Cossacks that year. 406 "The Debatable Land," an area between the Esk and Sark rivers that was claimed by both England and Scotland, was notorious for being a hideout for thieves, outlaws, and vagabonds, just like the entire Border, which was not subject to the official authority of either side. 407

Asylums beyond the border.

Just beyond the political boundary, where police authority comes to an end and where pursuit is cut short or retarded, the fleeing criminal finds his natural asylum. Hence all border districts tend to harbor undesirable refugees from the other side. Deserters and outlaws from China proper sprinkle the eastern districts of Mongolia.408 Marauding bands of Apaches and Sioux, after successful depredations on American ranches, for years fled across the line into Mexico and Canada before the hammering hoof-beats of Texas Ranger and United States cavalry, until a treaty with Mexico in 1882, authorizing such armed pursuit to cross the boundary, cut off at least one asylum.409 Our country exchanges other undesirable citizens with its northern and southern neighbors in cases where no extradition treaty provides for their return; and the borders of the individual states are crossed and recrossed by shifty gentlemen seeking to dodge the arm of the law. The fact that so many State boundaries fall in the Southern Appalachians, where illicit distilling and feud murders provide most of the cases on the docket, has materially retarded the suppression of these crimes by increasing the difficulty both of apprehending the offender and of subpoenaing the reluctant witness.

Just beyond the political border, where police authority ends and pursuit is either halted or slowed down, the fleeing criminal finds their natural refuge. That's why border areas often shelter unwanted refugees from the other side. Deserters and outlaws from mainland China are scattered across the eastern regions of Mongolia. Marauding groups of Apaches and Sioux, after successful raids on American ranches, would flee into Mexico and Canada for years, evading the relentless chase of Texas Rangers and U.S. cavalry, until a treaty with Mexico in 1882 allowed armed pursuits to cross the border, cutting off at least one safe haven. Our country swaps other undesirable individuals with its northern and southern neighbors in cases where no extradition treaty exists for their return; and state lines are crossed and recrossed by shady characters trying to escape the law. The fact that many state boundaries are located in the Southern Appalachians, where illegal distilling and murders from feuds create most of the legal cases, has significantly slowed efforts to suppress these crimes by making it harder to catch offenders and summon unwilling witnesses.

Border refugees and ethnic mingling.

Dissatisfied, oppressed, or persecuted members of a political community are prone to seek an asylum across the nearest border, where happier or freer conditions of life are promised. There they contribute to that mixture of race which characterizes every boundary zone, though as an embittered people they may also help to emphasize any existing political or religious antagonism. The Revocation of the Edict of Nantes in 1685 was followed by an exodus of Huguenots from France to the Protestant states of Switzerland, the Palatinate of the Rhine, and Holland, as also across the Channel into southern England; just as in recent years the Slav borderland of eastern Germany has received a large immigration of Polish Jews from Russia. When the Polish king in 1571 executed the leader of the Dnieper Cossacks, thousands of these bold borderers left their country and joined the community of the Don; and in 1722 after the Dnieper community had been crushed by Peter the Great, a similar exodus took place across the southern boundary into the Crimea, whereby the Tartar horde was strengthened, just as a few years before, during an unsuccessful revolt of the Don Cossacks, some two thousand of the malcontents crossed the southern frontier to the Kuban River in Circassia.410 The establishment of American independence in 1783 saw an exodus of loyalists from the United States into the contiguous districts of Ontario, New Brunswick, and Spanish Florida, Five years later discontent with the Federal Government for its dilatory opposition to the occlusion of the Mississippi and the lure of commercial betterment sent many citizens of the early Trans-Allegheny commonwealths to the Spanish side of the Mississippi,411 while the Natchez District on the east bank of the river contained a sprinkling of French who had become dissatisfied with Spanish rule in Louisiana and changed their domicile.

Dissatisfied, oppressed, or persecuted members of a political community are likely to seek asylum across the nearest border, where they hope for better or freer living conditions. There, they contribute to the diverse mix of races that defines every border area, although as a resentful group, they may also exacerbate any existing political or religious conflicts. The Revocation of the Edict of Nantes in 1685 led to a mass departure of Huguenots from France to Protestant regions in Switzerland, the Palatinate of the Rhine, and Holland, as well as across the Channel to southern England; similarly, in recent years, the Slav borderlands of eastern Germany have seen a significant influx of Polish Jews from Russia. When the Polish king executed the leader of the Dnieper Cossacks in 1571, thousands of these fearless borderers left their homeland and joined the community of the Don; and in 1722, after the Dnieper community was crushed by Peter the Great, another exodus happened across the southern border into Crimea, strengthening the Tartar horde. A few years earlier, during an unsuccessful revolt by the Don Cossacks, about two thousand of the discontented crossed the southern border to the Kuban River in Circassia.410 The establishment of American independence in 1783 prompted an exodus of loyalists from the United States into the neighboring areas of Ontario, New Brunswick, and Spanish Florida. Five years later, dissatisfaction with the Federal Government's slow response to the closing of the Mississippi and the attraction of better commercial opportunities led many citizens from the early Trans-Allegheny commonwealths to move to the Spanish side of the Mississippi,411 while the Natchez District on the east bank of the river included some French who were unhappy with Spanish rule in Louisiana and decided to relocate.

These are some of the movements of individuals and groups which contribute to the blending of races along every frontier, and make of the boundary a variable zone, as opposed to the rigid artificial line in terms of which we speak.

These are some of the movements of individuals and groups that help mix races along every border, turning the boundary into a flexible area instead of the strict, artificial line we usually refer to.


NOTES TO CHAPTER VII

Notes for Chapter VII


326.

A.W. Greely, Report of the Lady Franklin Bay Expedition, Vol. I, pp. 28-33, 236. Misc. Doc. No. 393. Washington, 1888.

A.W. Greely, Report of the Lady Franklin Bay Expedition, Vol. I, pp. 28-33, 236. Misc. Doc. No. 393. Washington, 1888.

327.

A.P. Engelhardt, A Russian Province of the North, pp. 123-130. Translated from the Russian. London, 1899.

A.P. Engelhardt, A Russian Province of the North, pp. 123-130. Translated from Russian. London, 1899.

328.

Nordenskiold, Voyage of the Vega, pp. 60-62. New York, 1882.

Nordenskiold, Voyage of the Vega, pp. 60-62. New York, 1882.

329.

Ibid., pp. 146, 161.

Ibid., pp. 146, 161.

330.

Col. F.E. Younghusband, The Heart of a Continent, pp. 194-199. London, 1904.

Col. F.E. Younghusband, The Heart of a Continent, pp. 194-199. London, 1904.

331.

A.R. Wallace, Geographical Distribution of Animals, Vol. I, pp. 387-389, 426-431, 436-438. London, 1876.

A.R. Wallace, Geographical Distribution of Animals, Vol. I, pp. 387-389, 426-431, 436-438. London, 1876.

332.

Ibid., 409, 424.

Ibid., 409, 424.

333.

A. Heilprin, Geographical Distribution of Animals, pp. 105-108. London, 1894.

A. Heilprin, Geographical Distribution of Animals, pp. 105-108. London, 1894.

334.

A.R. Wallace, Geographical Distribution of Animals, Vol. I, pp. 313, 321-322. London, 1876.

A.R. Wallace, Geographical Distribution of Animals, Vol. I, pp. 313, 321-322. London, 1876.

335.

Anatole Leroy-Beaulieu, The Empire of the Tsars, Vol. I, ethnographical map. New York, 1893.

Anatole Leroy-Beaulieu, The Empire of the Tsars, Vol. I, ethnographic map. New York, 1893.

336.

Eleventh Census of the United States, Population, Part I., maps on pp. xviii-xxiii.

Eleventh Census of the United States, Population, Part I., maps on pp. xviii-xxiii.

337.

L. March Phillipps, In the Desert, pp. 64-68, 77. London, 1905.

L. March Phillipps, In the Desert, pp. 64-68, 77. London, 1905.

338.

Fully treated in E.C. Semple, American History and Its Geographic Conditions, pp. 22-31. Boston, 1903.

Fully discussed in E.C. Semple, American History and Its Geographic Conditions, pp. 22-31. Boston, 1903.

339.

Sir S.W. Baker, The Nile Tributaries of Abyssinia, pp. 88, 128-129, 135. Hartford, 1868.

Sir S.W. Baker, The Nile Tributaries of Abyssinia, pp. 88, 128-129, 135. Hartford, 1868.

340.

Norway, Official Publication for the Paris Exhibition, pp. 3-4 and map. Christiania, 1900.

Norway, Official Publication for the Paris Exhibition, pp. 3-4 and map. Oslo, 1900.

341.

J. Partsch, Central Europe, p. 297. London, 1903.

J. Partsch, Central Europe, p. 297. London, 1903.

342.

Cæsar, Bello Gallico, Book IV, chap. 3 and Book VI, chap. 23.

César, Bello Gallico, Book IV, chap. 3 and Book VI, chap. 23.

343.

Ibid., Book VI, chap. 10.

Ibid., Book 6, chap. 10.

344.

T. Hodgkin, Italy and Her Invaders, Vol. II, p. 56, Note I. Oxford, 1892.

T. Hodgkin, Italy and Her Invaders, Vol. II, p. 56, Note I. Oxford, 1892.

345.

Helmolt, History of the World, Vol. IV, p. 510. New York, 1902-1906.

Helmolt, History of the World, Vol. IV, p. 510. New York, 1902-1906.

346.

Grote, History of Greece, Vol. IX, chap. 70, pp. 99, 115. New York, 1859.

Grote, History of Greece, Vol. IX, chap. 70, pp. 99, 115. New York, 1859.

347.

Dr. Wilhelm Junker, Travels in Africa, pp. 18, 45, 79, 87, 115, 117, 138, 191, 192, 200, 308, 312, 325, 332. Translated from the German. London, 1892.

Dr. Wilhelm Junker, Travels in Africa, pp. 18, 45, 79, 87, 115, 117, 138, 191, 192, 200, 308, 312, 325, 332. Translated from the German. London, 1892.

348.

H. Barth, Human Society in North Central Africa, Journal Royal Geographical Society, Vol. XXX, pp. 123-124. London, 1860.

H. Barth, Human Society in North Central Africa, Journal Royal Geographical Society, Vol. XXX, pp. 123-124. London, 1860.

349.

Boyd Alexander, From the Niger to the Nile, Vol. II, pp. 163-164. London, 1907.

Boyd Alexander, From the Niger to the Nile, Vol. II, pp. 163-164. London, 1907.

350.

John H. Speke, Discovery of the Sources of the Nile, pp. 74, 89, 91, 94, 95, 173, 176-177, 197. New York, 1868.

John H. Speke, Discovery of the Sources of the Nile, pp. 74, 89, 91, 94, 95, 173, 176-177, 197. New York, 1868.

351.

Theodore Roosevelt, The Winning of the West, Vol. I, pp. 50, 70, 135. New York, 1895.

Theodore Roosevelt, The Winning of the West, Vol. I, pp. 50, 70, 135. New York, 1895.

352.

C. C. Royce, The Cherokee Nations of Indians, p. 140. Fifth Annual Report of the Bureau of Ethnology. Washington, 1884.

C. C. Royce, The Cherokee Nations of Indians, p. 140. Fifth Annual Report of the Bureau of Ethnology. Washington, 1884.

353.

Albert J. Pickett, History of Alabama, pp. 79-89, 113-115, 1851. Reprint, Birmingham, 1900. James Adair, History of the American Indians, p. 257. London, 1775.

Albert J. Pickett, History of Alabama, pp. 79-89, 113-115, 1851. Reprint, Birmingham, 1900. James Adair, History of the American Indians, p. 257. London, 1775.

354.

Ibid., pp. 252-3, 282.

Ibid., pp. 252-3, 282.

355.

Albert J. Pickett, History of Alabama, pp. 133-135. 1851. Reprint, Birmingham, 1900.

Albert J. Pickett, History of Alabama, pp. 133-135. 1851. Reprint, Birmingham, 1900.

356.

Archibald Little, The Far East, p. 249. Oxford, 1905.

Archibald Little, The Far East, p. 249. Oxford, 1905.

357.

M. Huc, Travels in Tartary, Thibet and China, 1844-1846, Vol. I, p. 74. Translated from the French. Reprint, Chicago, 1898.

M. Huc, Travels in Tartary, Thibet and China, 1844-1846, Vol. I, p. 74. Translated from the French. Reprint, Chicago, 1898.

358.

Nachtigal, Sahara und Sudan, Vol. I, pp. 102, 448; Vol. III, pp. 203-205, 314. Leipzig, 1889. Boyd Alexander, From the Niger to the Nile, Vol. II, p. 170. London, 1907.

Nachtigal, Sahara and Sudan, Vol. I, pp. 102, 448; Vol. III, pp. 203-205, 314. Leipzig, 1889. Boyd Alexander, From the Niger to the Nile, Vol. II, p. 170. London, 1907.

359.

Albert J. Pickett, History of Alabama, pp. 118-119. 1851. Reprint, Birmingham, 1900.

Albert J. Pickett, History of Alabama, pp. 118-119. 1851. Reprint, Birmingham, 1900.

360.

Norway, Official Publication for the Paris Exhibition, pp. 5, 83-84. Christiania, 1900.

Norway, Official Publication for the Paris Exhibition, pp. 5, 83-84. Oslo, 1900.

361.

Albert J. Pickett, History of Alabama, pp. 416, 417, 461, 467. 1857. Reprint, Birmingham, 1900.

Albert J. Pickett, History of Alabama, pp. 416, 417, 461, 467. 1857. Reprint, Birmingham, 1900.

362.

C. E. Akers, History of South America, 1854-1904, p. 435. New York, 1904.

C. E. Akers, History of South America, 1854-1904, p. 435. New York, 1904.

363.

H. R. Mill, International Geography, p. 883. New York, 1902.

H. R. Mill, International Geography, p. 883. New York, 1902.

364.

Matias Romero, Mexico and the United States, pp. 433-441. New York, 1898.

Matias Romero, Mexico and the United States, pp. 433-441. New York, 1898.

365.

E. Hertslet, The Map of Europe by Treaty, 1814-1875, Vol. I, pp. 422, 425, 426; Vol. II, p. 1430.

E. Hertslet, The Map of Europe by Treaty, 1814-1875, Vol. I, pp. 422, 425, 426; Vol. II, p. 1430.

366.

Eleventh Census of the United States, Population, Part I., map No. 10 and p. cxliii.

Eleventh Census of the United States, Population, Part I., map No. 10 and p. cxliii.

367.

Ibid. Based on comparison of Tables 15 and 33 for the States mentioned.

Ibid. Based on a comparison of Tables 15 and 33 for the mentioned States.

368.

W. Z. Ripley, Races of Europe, pp. 250-253. New York, 1899.

W. Z. Ripley, Races of Europe, pp. 250-253. New York, 1899.

369.

W. Deecke, Italy, pp. 325, 347, 349. Translated from the German. London, 1904.

W. Deecke, Italy, pp. 325, 347, 349. Translated from the German. London, 1904.

370.

Sydow-Wagner, Methodischer Schul-Atlas, Völker und Sprachenkarten, No. 13. Gotha, 1905. W. Z. Ripley, Races of Europe, pp. 282-284. New York, 1899.

Sydow-Wagner, Methodical School Atlas, Maps of Peoples and Languages, No. 13. Gotha, 1905. W. Z. Ripley, Races of Europe, pp. 282-284. New York, 1899.

371.

Ibid., pp. 255-257. W. Deecke, Italy, p. 357. London, 1904.

Ibid., pp. 255-257. W. Deecke, Italy, p. 357. London, 1904.

372.

Sydow-Wagner, Methodischer Schul-Atlas, Völker und Sprachenkarten No, 13. Gotha, 1905.

Sydow-Wagner, Methodical School Atlas, Ethnic and Language Maps No, 13. Gotha, 1905.

373.

Hugh R. Mill, International Geography, p. 309. New York, 1902.

Hugh R. Mill, International Geography, p. 309. New York, 1902.

374.

D. M. Wallace, Russia, pp. 151-155. New York, 1904.

D. M. Wallace, Russia, pp. 151-155. New York, 1904.

375.

W. Z. Ripley, Races of Europe, p. 362. New York, 1899.

W. Z. Ripley, Races of Europe, p. 362. New York, 1899.

376.

Archibald Little, The Far East. Map p. 8 and pp. 171-172. Oxford, 1905. M. Huc, Travels in Tartary, Thibet and China, 1844-1846. Vol. I, pp. 2-4, 21, 197-201, 284. Reprint, Chicago, 1898.

Archibald Little, The Far East. Map p. 8 and pp. 171-172. Oxford, 1905. M. Huc, Travels in Tartary, Tibet, and China, 1844-1846. Vol. I, pp. 2-4, 21, 197-201, 284. Reprint, Chicago, 1898.

377.

Ibid., Vol. I, pp. 166-170.

Ibid., Vol. 1, pp. 166-170.

378.

Ibid., Vol II, p. 23.

Ibid., Vol. 2, p. 23.

379.

Ibid., Vol. I, 312-313.

Ibid., Vol. 1, 312-313.

380.

Ibid., Vol. II, pp. 319-322, 327.

Ibid., Vol. II, pp. 319-322, 327.

381.

M. Huc, Journey through the Chinese Empire, Vol. I, p. 36. New York, 1871.

M. Huc, Journey through the Chinese Empire, Vol. I, p. 36. New York, 1871.

382.

Isabella Bird Bishop, The Yangtze Valley and Beyond, Vol. II, pp. 70-71, 88, 91, 92, 104-109, 113, 117, 133, 134, 155, 194, 195. London, 1900.

Isabella Bird Bishop, The Yangtze Valley and Beyond, Vol. II, pp. 70-71, 88, 91, 92, 104-109, 113, 117, 133, 134, 155, 194, 195. London, 1900.

383.

M. Huc, Travels in Tartary, Thibet and China, 1844-1846, Vol. II, pp. 155-156, 264. Reprint, Chicago, 1898.

M. Huc, Travels in Tartary, Thibet and China, 1844-1846, Vol. II, pp. 155-156, 264. Reprint, Chicago, 1898.

384.

C. A. Sherring, Western Tibet and the British Borderland, pp. 60, 65-73, 205, 347-358. London, 1906. Statistical Atlas of India, pp. 61-62, maps. Calcutta, 1895. Imperial Gazetteer of India, Vol. I, p. 295-296. Oxford, 1907.

C. A. Sherring, Western Tibet and the British Borderland, pp. 60, 65-73, 205, 347-358. London, 1906. Statistical Atlas of India, pp. 61-62, maps. Calcutta, 1895. Imperial Gazetteer of India, Vol. I, pp. 295-296. Oxford, 1907.

385.

Eliza E. Scidmore, Winter India, pp. 106-108. New York, 1903.

Eliza E. Scidmore, Winter India, pp. 106-108. New York, 1903.

386.

M. Huc, Travels in Tartary, Thibet, and China, 1844-1846, Vol. I, pp. 312-313. Reprint, Chicago, 1898.

M. Huc, Travels in Tartary, Tibet, and China, 1844-1846, Vol. I, pp. 312-313. Reprint, Chicago, 1898.

387.

Alexis Krausse, Russia in Asia, pp. 174-175. New York, 1899.

Alexis Krausse, Russia in Asia, pp. 174-175. New York, 1899.

388.

Charles E. Akers, History of South America, 1854-1904, p. 562. New York, 1904.

Charles E. Akers, History of South America, 1854-1904, p. 562. New York, 1904.

389.

James Bryce, Impressions of South Africa, pp. 108-109. New York, 1897.

James Bryce, Impressions of South Africa, pp. 108-109. New York, 1897.

390.

O. P. Crosby, Tibet and Turkestan, pp. 15-20.

O. P. Crosby, Tibet and Turkestan, pp. 15-20.

391.

H. R. Mill, International Geography, p. 378. New York, 1902. H. Spencer, A Visit to Andorra, Fortnightly Review, Vol. 67, pp. 44-60. 1897.

H. R. Mill, International Geography, p. 378. New York, 1902. H. Spencer, A Visit to Andorra, Fortnightly Review, Vol. 67, pp. 44-60. 1897.

392.

Wm. Robertson, History of Scotland, pp. 19-20. New York, 1831. The Scotch Borderers, Littell's Living Age, Vol 40, p. 180.

Wm. Robertson, History of Scotland, pp. 19-20. New York, 1831. The Scottish Borderers, Littell's Living Age, Vol 40, p. 180.

393.

Isabella Bird Bishop, The Yangtze Valley and Beyond, Vol. II, pp. 209-210. London, 1900.

Isabella Bird Bishop, The Yangtze Valley and Beyond, Vol. II, pp. 209-210. London, 1900.

394.

M. Huc, Travels in Tartary, Thibet and China, 1844-1846, Vol. I, pp. 41, 42, 97. Reprint, Chicago, 1898.

M. Huc, Travels in Tartary, Thibet and China, 1844-1846, Vol. I, pp. 41, 42, 97. Reprint, Chicago, 1898.

395.

D. M. Wallace, Russia, pp. 352-356. New York, 1904. Article on Cossacks in Encyclopedia Britannica.

D. M. Wallace, Russia, pp. 352-356. New York, 1904. Article on Cossacks in Encyclopedia Britannica.

396.

Pallas, Travels in Southern Russia, Vol. I, pp. 126-129; 442; Vol. II, pp. 330-331. London, 1812.

Pallas, Travels in Southern Russia, Vol. I, pp. 126-129; 442; Vol. II, pp. 330-331. London, 1812.

397.

G. Adam Smith, Historical Geography of the Holy Land, p. 9. New York, 1897.

G. Adam Smith, Historical Geography of the Holy Land, p. 9. New York, 1897.

398.

D. M. Wallace, Russia, p. 358. New York, 1904. Walter K. Kelly, History of Russia, Vol. II, pp. 394-395. London, 1881.

D. M. Wallace, Russia, p. 358. New York, 1904. Walter K. Kelly, History of Russia, Vol. II, pp. 394-395. London, 1881.

399.

D. M. Wallace, Russia, p. 298. New York, 1904.

D. M. Wallace, Russia, p. 298. New York, 1904.

400.

Alexis Krausse, Russia in Asia, pp. 43, 53. New York, 1899.

Alexis Krausse, Russia in Asia, pp. 43, 53. New York, 1899.

401.

Francis H. Nichol, Through Hidden Shensi, pp. 139-140. New York, 1902.

Francis H. Nichol, Through Hidden Shensi, pp. 139-140. New York, 1902.

402.

M. Hue, Travels in Tartary, Thibet and China, 1844-1846, Vol. I, p. 23. Reprint, Chicago, 1898.

M. Hue, Travels in Tartary, Thibet and China, 1844-1846, Vol. I, p. 23. Reprint, Chicago, 1898.

403.

Theodore Roosevelt, The Winning of the West, Vol. I, pp. 130-132. New York, 1895.

Theodore Roosevelt, The Winning of the West, Vol. I, pp. 130-132. New York, 1895.

404.

John Fiske, Old Virginia and Her Neighbors, Vol. II, pp. 311, 315-321. Boston, 1897.

John Fiske, Old Virginia and Her Neighbors, Vol. II, pp. 311, 315-321. Boston, 1897.

405.

Archibald Little, The Far East, p. 249. Oxford, 1905.

Archibald Little, The Far East, p. 249. Oxford, 1905.

406.

Alfred Rambaud, History of Russia, Vol. II, pp. 45, 199-200. Boston, 1886.

Alfred Rambaud, History of Russia, Vol. II, pp. 45, 199-200. Boston, 1886.

407.

Malcolm Lang, History of Scotland, Vol. I, pp. 42-43. London, 1800. The Scotch Borderland, Gentleman's Magazine, Vol. CCLX, p. 191. 1886.

Malcolm Lang, History of Scotland, Vol. I, pp. 42-43. London, 1800. The Scottish Borderland, Gentleman's Magazine, Vol. CCLX, p. 191. 1886.

408.

Friedrich Ratel, History of Mankind, Vol. III, p. 175, London, 1896.

Friedrich Ratel, History of Mankind, Vol. III, p. 175, London, 1896.

409.

A. B. Hart, Foundations of American Foreign Policy, pp. 81-82. New York, 1901.

A. B. Hart, Foundations of American Foreign Policy, pp. 81-82. New York, 1901.

410.

Alfred Rambaud, History of Russia, Vol. II, pp. 45, 50. Boston, 1886.

Alfred Rambaud, History of Russia, Vol. II, pp. 45, 50. Boston, 1886.

411.

Justin Winsor, The Westward Movement, p. 366. Boston, 1899.

Justin Winsor, The Westward Movement, p. 366. Boston, 1899.


Chapter VIII—Coast Peoples

The coast a zone of transition.

Of all geographical boundaries, the most important is that between land and sea. The coast, in its physical nature, is a zone of transition between these two dominant forms of the earth's surface; it bears the mark of their contending forces, varying in its width with every stronger onslaught of the unresting sea, and with every degree of passive resistance made by granite or sandy shore. So too in an anthropo-geographical sense, it is a zone of transition. Now the life-supporting forces of the land are weak in it, and it becomes merely the rim of the sea; for its inhabitants the sea means food, clothes, shelter, fuel, commerce, highway, and opportunity. Now the coast is dominated by the exuberant forces of a productive soil, so that the ocean beyond is only a turbulent waste and a long-drawn barrier: the coast is the hem of the land. Neither influence can wholly exclude the other in this amphibian belt, for the coast remains the intermediary between the habitable expanse of the land and the international highway of the sea. The break of the waves and the dash of the spray draw the line beyond which human dwellings cannot spread; for these the shore is the outermost limit, as for ages also in the long infancy of the races, before the invention of boat and sail, it drew the absolute boundary to human expansion. In historical order, its first effect has been that of a barrier, and for the majority of peoples this it has remained; but with the development of navigation and the spread of human activities from the land over sea to other countries, it became the gateway both of land and sea—at once the outlet for exploration, colonization, and trade, and the open door through which a continent or island receives contributions of men or races or ideas from transoceanic shores. Barrier and threshold: these are the rôles which coasts have always played in history. To-day we see them side by side. But in spite of the immense proportions assumed by transmarine intercourse, the fact remains that the greater part of the coasts of the earth are for their inhabitants only a barrier and not an outlet, or at best only a base for timorous ventures seaward that rarely lose sight of the shore.

Of all geographical boundaries, the most significant is between land and sea. The coast, physically, is a transition zone between these two dominant features of the earth's surface; it shows the impact of their competing forces, changing its width with every stronger push from the restless sea and every level of resistance from granite or sandy shores. In an anthropo-geographical sense, it is also a transition zone. At times, the life-sustaining forces of the land are weak here, making it just the edge of the sea; for its inhabitants, the sea provides food, clothing, shelter, fuel, trade, transport, and opportunity. When the coast is thriving with the rich resources of productive land, the ocean beyond appears as a chaotic emptiness and a long barrier: the coast becomes the edge of the land. Neither influence can completely dominate the other in this mixed zone, as the coast continues to serve as the link between the livable land and the global route of the sea. The crashing waves and the splashing spray mark the point beyond which human settlements can't expand; for them, the shore is the furthest boundary, just as, for ages in the early development of societies before boats and sails, it marked the ultimate limit to human growth. Historically, its initial role has been that of a barrier, and for most peoples, it has remained so; but with advancements in navigation and the expansion of human activity from land to sea and other nations, it became a gateway for both land and sea—serving as an outlet for exploration, colonization, and trade, and as an open door for a continent or island to receive people or ideas from across the ocean. Barrier and threshold: these are the roles coasts have always played in history. Today, we see both aspects together. But despite the vast scope of overseas interactions, the reality is that for most coastal inhabitants, the shores are primarily a barrier rather than a gateway, or at best, just a starting point for hesitant attempts at venturing out to sea, which seldom stray far from the shore.

German North Sea Coast.

German North Sea Coast.

German North Sea Coast.

German North Sea Coast.

Width of coastal zones.

As intermediary belt between land and sea, the coast becomes a peculiar habitat which leaves its mark upon its people. We speak of coast strips, coastal plains, "tidewater country," coast cities; of coast tribes, coast peoples, maritime colonies; and each word brings up a picture of a land or race or settlement permeated by the influences of the sea. The old term of "coastline" has no application to such an intermediary belt, for it is a zone of measurable width; and this width varies with the relief of the land, the articulation of the coast according as it is uniform or complex, with the successive stages of civilization and the development of navigation among the people who inhabit it.

As a connecting zone between land and sea, the coast becomes a unique environment that shapes its inhabitants. We talk about coastal strips, coastal plains, "tidewater country," coastal cities; about coastal tribes, coastal peoples, maritime colonies; and each term evokes an image of a land, culture, or settlement influenced by the sea. The old term "coastline" doesn’t apply to this connecting zone, as it has a measurable width that varies according to the landscape, the shape of the coast whether it's uniform or complex, the different stages of civilization, and the advancements in navigation among the people living there.

Along highly articulated coasts, showing the interpenetration of sea and land in a broad band of capes and islands separated by tidal channels and inlets, or on shores deeply incised by river estuaries, or on low shelving beaches which screen brackish lagoons and salt marshes behind sand reefs and dune ramparts, and which thus form an indeterminate boundary of alternate land and water, the zone character of the coast in a physical sense becomes conspicuous. In an anthropological sense the zone character is clearly indicated by the different uses of its inner and outer edge made by man in different localities and in different periods of history.

Along intricately shaped coastlines, where the sea and land blend in a wide range of capes and islands divided by tidal channels and inlets, or on shores deeply carved by river estuaries, or on gently sloping beaches that hide brackish lagoons and salt marshes behind sandbars and dune barriers, forming an unclear boundary between land and water, the zoned nature of the coast becomes evident. From an anthropological viewpoint, this zoned character is clearly reflected in the various ways people have used the inner and outer edges in different places and through different historical periods.

The inner edge.

The old German maritime cities of the North Sea and the Baltic were located on rivers from 6 to 60 miles from the open sea, always on the inner edge of the coastal belt. Though primarily trading towns, linked together once in the sovereign confederacy of the Hanseatic League, they fixed their sites on the last spurs of firm ground running out into the soft, yielding alluvium, which was constantly exposed to inundation. Land high enough to be above the ever threatening flood of river and storm-driven tide on this flat coast, and solid enough to be built upon, could not be found immediately on the sea. The slight elevations of sandy "geest" or detrital spurs were limited in area and in time outgrown. Hence the older part of all these river towns, from Bremen to Königsberg, rests upon hills, while in every case the newer and lower part is built on piles or artificially raised ground on the alluvium.412 So Utrecht, the Ultrajectum of the Romans, selected for its site a long raised spur running out from the solid ground of older and higher land into the water-soaked alluvium of the Netherlands. It was the most important town of all this region before the arts of civilization began the conquest by dike and ditch of the amphibian coastal belt which now comprises one-fourth of the area and holds one-half the population of the Netherlands.413 So ancient London marked the solid ground at the inner edge of the tidal flats and desolate marshes which lined the Thames estuary, as the Roman Camulodunum and its successor Colchester on its steep rise or dun overlooked the marshes of the Stour inlet.414 Farther north about the Wash, which in Roman days extended far inland over an area of fens and tidal channels, Cambridge on the River Cam, Huntingdon and Stamford on the Nen, and Lincoln on the Witham—all river seaports—defined the firm inner edge of this wide low coast. In the same way the landward rim of the tidal waters and salt marshes of the Humber inlet was described by a semicircle of British and Roman towns—Doncaster, Castleford, Todcaster, and York.415 On the flat or rolling West African coastland, which lines the long shores of the Gulf of Guinea with a band 30 to 100 miles wide, the sandy, swampy tracts immediately on the sea are often left uninhabited; native population is distributed most frequently at the limit of deep water, and here at head of ship-navigation the trading towns are found.416

The old German coastal cities along the North Sea and the Baltic were situated on rivers between 6 and 60 miles from the open sea, always on the inner edge of the coast. Though primarily trading towns that were once part of the sovereign confederacy of the Hanseatic League, they chose sites on the last solid ground pushing into the soft, flood-prone alluvium, which was constantly at risk of flooding. Land high enough to stay above the ongoing threat of river and storm-driven tides on this flat coast, and solid enough for construction, couldn't be found right by the sea. The slight elevations of sandy "geest" or detrital spurs were limited in area and soon became inadequate. Thus, the older parts of all these river towns, from Bremen to Königsberg, sit on hills, while the newer and lower sections are built on piles or elevated ground on the alluvium.412 Similarly, Utrecht, the Ultrajectum of the Romans, was established on a long raised spur extending from the solid terrain of older, higher land into the waterlogged alluvium of the Netherlands. It was the most significant town in this area before advances in civilization began to reclaim the amphibious coastal zone, which now makes up a quarter of the Netherlands' land area and houses half of its population.413 Ancient London marked the stable ground at the inner edge of the tidal flats and barren marshes lining the Thames estuary, much like the Roman Camulodunum and its successor Colchester on their steep rises or dun that overlooked the Stour inlet marshes.414 Farther north around the Wash, which in Roman times reached far inland across a landscape of fens and tidal channels, Cambridge on the River Cam, Huntingdon and Stamford on the Nen, and Lincoln on the Witham—all river seaports—defined the firm inner edge of this broad low coast. Similarly, the landward edge of the tidal waters and salt marshes of the Humber inlet was marked by a semicircle of British and Roman towns—Doncaster, Castleford, Todcaster, and York.415 On the flat or rolling West African coast, which lines the extensive shores of the Gulf of Guinea with a band 30 to 100 miles wide, the sandy, swampy areas right by the sea are often left uninhabited; the native population is usually found at the limits of deep water, and here, at the head of ship navigation, the trading towns emerge.416

Inner edge as head of sea navigation.

While, on low coasts at any rate, the inner edge tends to mark the limit of settlement advancing from the interior, as the head of sea navigation on river and inlet it has also been the goal of immigrant settlers from oversea lands. The history of modern maritime colonization, especially in America, shows that the aim of regular colonists, as opposed to mere traders, has been to penetrate as far as possible into the land while retaining communication with the sea, and thereby with the mother country. The small boats in use till the introduction of steam navigation fixed this line far inland and gave the coastal zone a greater breadth than it has at present, and a more regular contour. In colonial America this inner edge coincided with the "fall-line" of the Atlantic rivers, which was indicated by a series of seaport towns; or with the inland limit of the tides, which on the St. Lawrence fell above Quebec, and on the Hudson just below Albany.

While, at least on low coasts, the inner edge often marks the limit of settlement moving in from the interior, it has also been the target for immigrant settlers from across the seas as the head of sea navigation on rivers and inlets. The history of modern maritime colonization, particularly in America, shows that the goal of regular colonists, as opposed to just traders, has been to push as far into the land as possible while keeping communication with the sea and, by extension, with the home country. The small boats used until steam navigation was introduced set this boundary far inland, giving the coastal zone a larger area than it has now and a more consistent shape. In colonial America, this inner edge lined up with the "fall-line" of the Atlantic rivers, marked by a series of seaport towns; or with the inland limit of the tides, which on the St. Lawrence was above Quebec, and on the Hudson just below Albany.

Shifting of the inner edge.

With the recent increase in the size of vessels, two contrary effects are noticed. In the vast majority of cases, the inner edge, as marked by ports, moves seaward into deeper water, and the zone narrows. The days when almost every tobacco plantation in tidewater Virginia had its own wharf are long since past, and the leaf is now exported by way of Norfolk and Baltimore. Seville has lost practically all its sea trade to Cadiz, Rouen to Havre, and Dordrecht to Rotterdam. In other cases the zone preserves its original width by the creation of secondary ports on or near the outer edge, reserved only for the largest vessels, while the inner harbor, by dredging its channel, improves its communication with the sea. Thus arises the phenomenon of twin ports like Bremen and Bremerhaven, Dantzig and Neufahrwasser, Stettin and Swinemünde, Bordeaux and Pauillac, London and Tilbury. Or the original harbor seeks to preserve its advantage by canalizing the shallow approach by river, lagoon, or bay, as St. Petersburg by the Pantiloff canal through the shallow reaches of Kronstadt Bay; or Königsberg by its ship canal, carried for 25 miles across the Frisches Haff to the Baltic;417 or Nantes by the Loire ship canal, which in 1892 was built to regain for the old town the West Indian trade recently intercepted by the rising outer port of St. Nazaire, at the mouth of the Loire estuary.418 In northern latitudes, however, the outer ports on enclosed sea basins like the Baltic become dominant in the winter, when the inner ports are ice-bound. Otherwise the outer port sinks with every improvement in the channel between the inner port and the sea. Hamburg has so constantly deepened the Elbe passage that its outport of Cuxhaven has had little chance to rise, and serves only as an emergency harbor; while on the Weser, maritime leadership has oscillated between Bremen and Bremerhaven.419 So the whole German coast and the Russian Baltic have seen a more or less irregular shifting backward and forward of maritime importance between the inner and the outer edges.

With the recent increase in the size of ships, two opposite trends are observed. In most cases, the inner edge, marked by ports, moves seaward into deeper water, and the zone narrows. The days when almost every tobacco plantation in tidewater Virginia had its own wharf are long gone, and the leaf is now exported through Norfolk and Baltimore. Seville has lost nearly all its sea trade to Cadiz, Rouen to Havre, and Dordrecht to Rotterdam. In other cases, the zone keeps its original width by developing secondary ports on or near the outer edge, designated only for the largest vessels, while the inner harbor improves its connection to the sea by dredging its channel. This leads to the phenomenon of twin ports like Bremen and Bremerhaven, Danzig and Neufahrwasser, Stettin and Swinemünde, Bordeaux and Pauillac, London and Tilbury. Alternatively, the original harbor tries to maintain its advantage by canalizing the shallow approach via river, lagoon, or bay, as seen with St. Petersburg using the Pantiloff canal through the shallow reaches of Kronstadt Bay; or Königsberg with its ship canal, which extends for 25 miles across the Frisches Haff to the Baltic; or Nantes with the Loire ship canal, built in 1892 to reclaim the West Indian trade that had been taken over by the rising outer port of St. Nazaire at the mouth of the Loire estuary. In northern regions, however, the outer ports on enclosed seas like the Baltic become more dominant in winter, when the inner ports are ice-bound. Otherwise, the outer port declines with every improvement in the channel between the inner port and the sea. Hamburg has consistently deepened the Elbe passage, leaving its outport of Cuxhaven with little opportunity to grow and serving only as an emergency harbor, while on the Weser, maritime leadership has fluctuated between Bremen and Bremerhaven. Thus, the entire German coast and the Russian Baltic have experienced a somewhat irregular shifting of maritime significance between the inner and outer edges.

Artificial extension of inner edge.

The width of the coast zone is not only prevented from contracting by dredging and canaling, but it is even increased. By deepening the channel, the chief port of the St. Lawrence River has been removed from Quebec 180 miles upstream to Montreal, and that of the Clyde from Port Glasgow 16 miles to Glasgow itself, so that now the largest ocean steamers come to dock where fifty years ago children waded across the stream at ebb tide. Such artificial modifications, however, are rare, for they are made only where peculiarly rich resources or superior lines of communication with the hinterland justify the expenditures; but they find their logical conclusion in still farther extensions of sea navigation into the interior by means of ship canals, where previously no waterway existed. Instances are found in the Manchester ship canal and the Welland, which, by means of the St. Lawrence and the Great Lakes, makes Chicago accessible to ocean vessels. Though man distinguishes between sea and inland navigation in his definitions, in his practice he is bound by no formula and recognizes no fundamental difference where rivers, lakes, and canals are deep enough to admit his sea-going craft.

The width of the coastal zone isn't just kept from getting smaller by dredging and canal construction; it's actually getting bigger. By deepening the channel, the main port of the St. Lawrence River has moved 180 miles upstream from Quebec to Montreal, and the port of the Clyde has shifted 16 miles from Port Glasgow to Glasgow itself. Now, the largest ocean liners dock where, fifty years ago, kids played in the water at low tide. However, such changes are rare; they only happen where particularly valuable resources or better connections to the surrounding areas justify the costs. But they lead to even more extensions of sea navigation into the interior through ship canals where there was previously no waterway. Examples include the Manchester Ship Canal and the Welland, which, through the St. Lawrence and the Great Lakes, allow ocean vessels to reach Chicago. While people define sea and inland navigation differently, in practice, they don't stick to strict rules and see no real difference when rivers, lakes, and canals are deep enough for their ocean-going ships.

Such deep landward protrusions of the head of marine navigation at certain favored points, as opposed to its recent coastward trend in most inlets and rivers, increase the irregularity of the inner edge of the coast zone by the marked discrepancy between its maximum and minimum width. They are limited, however, to a few highly civilized countries, and to a few points in those countries. But their presence testifies to the fact that the evolution of the coast zone with the development of civilization shows the persistent importance of this inner edge.

Such deep extensions of the head of marine navigation at certain preferred locations, as opposed to its recent trend toward the coast in most inlets and rivers, increase the unevenness of the inner edge of the coastal zone due to the significant difference between its maximum and minimum widths. However, these extensions are limited to a few highly developed countries and to specific points within those countries. Yet their existence highlights the fact that the evolution of the coastal zone alongside the growth of civilization underlines the ongoing importance of this inner edge.

Outer edge in original settlement.

The outer edge finds its greatest significance, which is for the most part ephemeral, in the earlier stages of navigation, maritime colonization, and in some cases of original settlement. But this importance persists only on steep coasts furnishing little or no level ground for cultivation and barred from interior hunting or grazing land; on many coral and volcanic islands of the Pacific Ocean whose outer rim has the most fertile soil and furnishes the most abundant growth of coco palms, and whose limited area only half suffices to support the population; and in polar and sub-polar districts, where harsh climatic conditions set a low limit to economic development. In all these regions the sea must provide most of the food of the inhabitants, who can therefore never lose contact with its waters. In mountainous Tierra del Fuego, whose impenetrably forested slopes rise directly from the sea, with only here and there a scanty stretch of stony beach, the natives of the southern and western coasts keep close to the shore. The straits and channels yield them all their food, and are the highways for all their restless, hungry wanderings.420 The steep slopes and dense forests preclude travel by land, and force the wretched inhabitants to live as much in their canoes as in their huts. The Tlingit and Haida Indians of the mountainous coast of southern Alaska locate their villages on some smooth sheltered beach, with their houses in a single row facing the water, and the ever-ready canoe drawn up on shore in front. They select their sites with a view to food supply, and to protection in case of attack. On the treeless shores of Kadiak Island and of the long narrow Alaska Peninsula near by, the Eskimo choose their village location for an accumulation of driftwood, for proximity to their food supply, and a landing-place for their kayaks and bidarkas. Hence they prefer a point of land or gravel spit extending out into the sea, or a sand reef separating a salt-water lagoon from the open sea. The Aleutian Islanders regard only accessibility to the shell-fish on the beach and their pelagic hunting and fishing; and this consideration has influenced the Eskimo tribes of the wide Kuskokwin estuary to such an extent, that they place their huts only a few feet above ordinary high tide, where they are constantly exposed to overflow from the sea.421 Only among the great tidal channels of the Yukon delta are they distributed over the whole wide coastal zone, even to its inner edge.

The outer edge is most significant, mostly temporary, during the early stages of navigation, maritime colonization, and in some cases, original settlement. However, this importance continues only on steep coasts with little or no flat land for farming, which are cut off from inland hunting or grazing areas; on many coral and volcanic islands in the Pacific Ocean, where the outer rim has the richest soil and yields abundant coco palm growth, but where the limited space barely supports the population; and in polar and sub-polar regions, where harsh climate limits economic development. In all these areas, the sea must supply most of the food for the residents, who can never fully disconnect from its waters. In mountainous Tierra del Fuego, where thick forests rise straight from the sea, leaving only a few rocky beaches, the natives on the southern and western coasts stay close to the shore. The straits and channels provide all their food and serve as routes for their restless, hungry travels.420 The steep hills and thick forests make land travel impossible, forcing the struggling inhabitants to live as much in their canoes as in their huts. The Tlingit and Haida Indians along the mountainous coast of southern Alaska build their villages on smooth, sheltered beaches, with their houses arranged in a single row facing the water, ready to pull their canoes up on the shore. They choose their locations based on food sources and for protection in case of attacks. On the treeless shores of Kadiak Island and the nearby long, narrow Alaska Peninsula, the Eskimo select village sites for gathering driftwood, proximity to food supplies, and a place to land their kayaks and bidarkas. Therefore, they prefer spots of land or gravel bars extending into the sea or sandy reefs that separate a salt-water lagoon from the open ocean. The Aleutian Islanders focus only on access to shellfish along the beach and their pelagic hunting and fishing; this concern has influenced the Eskimo tribes of the expansive Kuskokwin estuary to the point that they build their huts just a few feet above the usual high tide, putting them at constant risk of flooding from the sea.421 Only among the large tidal channels of the Yukon delta do they spread out across the entire coastal zone, even reaching its inner edge.

The coast Chukches of northeastern Siberia locate their tent villages on the sand ramparts between the Arctic Ocean and the freshwater lagoons which line this low tundra shore. Here they are conveniently situated for fishing and hunting marine animals, while protected against the summer inundations of the Arctic rivers.422 The whole western side of Greenland, from far northern Upernivik south to Cape Farewell, shows both Eskimo and Danish settlements almost without exception on projecting points of peninsulas or islands, where the stronger effect of the warm ocean current, as well as proximity to the food supply, serve to fix their habitations; although the remains of the old Norse settlements in general are found in sheltered valleys with summer vegetation, striking off from the fiords some 20 miles back from the outer coast.423 Cæsar found that the ancient Veneti, an immigrant people of the southern coast of Brittany, built their towns on the points of capes and promontories, sites which gave them ready contact with the sea and protection against attack from the land side, because every rise of the tide submerged the intervening lowlands.424 Here a sterile plateau hinterland drove them for part of their subsistence to the water, and the continuous intertribal warfare of small primitive states to the sea-girt asylums of the capes.

The coastal Chukches of northeastern Siberia set up their tent villages on the sand ridges between the Arctic Ocean and the freshwater lagoons that line this flat tundra coast. This location is ideal for fishing and hunting marine animals while being protected from the summer flooding caused by the Arctic rivers.422 The entire western side of Greenland, from the far northern Upernivik down to Cape Farewell, features both Eskimo and Danish settlements, almost always found on the points of peninsulas or islands. This is because the stronger influence of the warm ocean current and the closeness to food sources make these locations favorable for habitation; however, the remnants of the old Norse settlements are typically found in sheltered valleys with summer vegetation, located about 20 miles inland from the outer coast along the fiords.423 Cæsar noted that the ancient Veneti, immigrants from the southern coast of Brittany, built their towns on the points of capes and promontories. These locations provided easy access to the sea and protection from attacks from the land, as each rise in tide flooded the lowlands in between.424 In this case, a barren plateau hinterland forced them to rely on the water for part of their sustenance, while ongoing intertribal warfare among small primitive states drove them to the sea-surrounded sanctuaries of the capes.

Outer edge in early navigation.

In the early history of navigation and exploration, striking features of this outer coast edge, like headlands and capes, became important sea marks. The promontory of Mount Athos, rising 6,400 feet above the sea between the Hellespont and the Thessalian coast, and casting its shadow as far as the market-place of Lemnos, was a guiding point for mariners in the whole northern Aegean.425 For the ancient Greeks Cape Malia was long the boundary stone to the unknown wastes of the western Mediterranean, just as later the Pillars of Hercules marked the portals to the mare tenebrosum of the stormy Atlantic. So the Sacred Promontory (Cape St. Vincent) of the Iberian Peninsula defined for Greeks and Romans the southwestern limit of the habitable world.426 Centuries later the Portuguese marked their advance down the west coast of Africa, first by Cape Non, which so long said "No!" to the struggling mariner, then by Cape Bojador, and finally by Cape Verde.

In the early days of navigation and exploration, prominent features along the outer coast, like headlands and capes, became key landmarks for sailors. The promontory of Mount Athos, standing 6,400 feet above the sea between the Hellespont and the Thessalian coast, cast its shadow all the way to the market-place of Lemnos, serving as a guiding point for mariners throughout the northern Aegean.425 For the ancient Greeks, Cape Malia marked the edge of the unknown regions of the western Mediterranean, just as later the Pillars of Hercules indicated the entrance to the mare tenebrosum of the stormy Atlantic. The Sacred Promontory (Cape St. Vincent) of the Iberian Peninsula defined the southwestern limit of the habitable world for both Greeks and Romans.426 Centuries later, the Portuguese signaled their progress down the west coast of Africa, first with Cape Non, which persistently told the struggling sailor "No!", then with Cape Bojador, and finally with Cape Verde.

In coastwise navigation, minor headlands and inshore islands were points to steer by; and in that early maritime colonization, which had chiefly a commercial aim, they formed the favorite spots for trading stations. The Phoenicians in their home country fixed their settlements by preference on small capes, like Sidon and Berytus, or on inshore islets, like Tyre and Aradus,427 and for their colonies and trading stations they chose similar sites, whether on the coast of Sicily,428 Spain, or Morocco.429 Carthage was located on a small hill-crowned cape projecting out into the Bay of Carthage. The two promontories embracing this inlet were edged with settlements, especially the northern arm, which held Utica and Hippo,430 the latter on the site of the modern French naval station of Bizerta.

In coastal navigation, small headlands and nearby islands were points to navigate by; during the early days of maritime colonization, which mainly focused on trade, these locations became popular for trading posts. The Phoenicians, in their homeland, preferred to establish their settlements on small capes, like Sidon and Berytus, or on nearby islets, like Tyre and Aradus,427 and for their colonies and trading posts, they selected similar locations, whether along the coasts of Sicily,428 Spain, or Morocco.429 Carthage was set up on a small, hill-topped cape jutting into the Bay of Carthage. The two headlands framing this inlet were lined with settlements, particularly the northern side, which housed Utica and Hippo,430 the latter located where the modern French naval base of Bizerta now stands.

Map Of Ancient Phoenician And Greek Colonies.

Map Of Ancient Phoenician And Greek Colonies.

Map Of Ancient Phoenician And Greek Colonies.

Map Of Ancient Phoenician And Greek Colonies.

Outer edge and piracy.

In this early Hellenic world, when Greek sea-power was in its infancy, owing to the fear of piracy, cities were placed a few miles back from the coast; but with the partial cessation of this evil, sites on shore and peninsula were preferred as being more accessible to commerce,431 and such of the older towns as were in comparatively easy reach of the seaboard established there each its own port. Thus we find the ancient urban pairs of Argos and Nauplia, Troezene and Pogon, Mycenæ and Eiones, Corinth commanding its Aegean port of Cenchreæ 8 miles away on the Saronic Gulf to catch the Asiatic trade, and connected by a walled thoroughfare a mile and a half long with Lechaeum, a second harbor on the Corinthian Gulf which served the Italian commerce.432 In the same group belonged Athens and its Piræus, Megara and Pegæ, Pergamus and Elaæ in western Asia Minor.433 These ancient twin cities may be taken to mark the two borders of the coast zone. Like the modern ones which we have considered above, their historical development has shown an advance from the inner toward the outer edge, though owing to different causes. However, the retired location of the Baltic and North Sea towns of Germany served as a partial protection against the pirates who, in the Middle Ages, scoured these coasts.434 Lubeck, originally located nearer the sea than at present, and frequently demolished by them, was finally rebuilt farther inland up the Trave River.435 Later the port of Travemünde grew up at the mouth of the little estuary.

In the early Greek world, when Greek naval power was just starting out, cities were built a few miles inland due to the threat of piracy. However, as the pirate problem lessened, sites closer to the shore and on peninsulas became more popular for trade,431 and older towns that were relatively easy to access from the sea created their own ports. This is why we see pairs of ancient cities like Argos and Nauplia, Troezene and Pogon, Mycenæ and Eiones, and Corinth, which had its Aegean port of Cenchreæ 8 miles away on the Saronic Gulf to tap into Asian trade, connected by a walled road a mile and a half long to Lechaeum, a second harbor on the Corinthian Gulf serving Italian trade.432 Athens and its port of Piraeus, Megara and Pegæ, and Pergamus and Elaæ in western Asia Minor also belong to this group.433 These ancient twin cities can be seen as marking the two ends of the coastal area. Like the modern examples discussed earlier, their historical development showed movement from the inner areas to the outer ones, though for different reasons. However, the sheltered locations of the Baltic and North Sea towns in Germany provided some protection against the pirates who raided these coasts during the Middle Ages.434 Lübeck, which was originally located closer to the sea and was often destroyed by pirates, was eventually rebuilt further inland along the Trave River.435 Later, the port of Travemünde developed at the mouth of the small estuary.

Outer edge in colonization.

The early history of maritime colonization shows in general two geographic phases: first, the appropriation of the islet and headland outskirts of the seaboard, and later—it may be much later—an advance toward the inner edge of the coast, or yet farther into the interior. Progress from the earlier to the maturer phase depends upon the social and economic development of the colonizers, as reflected in their valuation of territorial area. The first phase, the outcome of a low estimate of the value of land, is best represented by the Phoenician and earliest Greek colonies, whose purposes were chiefly commercial, and who sought merely such readily accessible coastal points as furnished the best trading stations on the highway of the Mediterranean and the adjacent seas. The earlier Greek colonies, like those of the Triopium promontory forming the south-western angle of Asia Minor, Chalcidice, the Thracian Chersonesus, Calchedon, Byzantium, the Pontic Heraclea, and Sinope, were situated on peninsulas or headlands, that would afford a convenient anchor ground; or, like Syracuse and Mitylene, on small inshore islets, which were soon outgrown, and from which the towns then spread to the mainland near by. The advantages of such sites lay in their accessibility to commerce, and in their natural protection against the attack of strange or hostile mainland tribes. For a nation of merchants, satisfied with the large returns but also with the ephemeral power of middlemen, these considerations sufficed. While the Phoenician trading posts in Africa dotted the outer rim of the coast, the inner edge of the zone was indicated by Libyan or Ethiopian towns, where the inhabitants of the interior bartered their ivory and skins for the products of Tyre.436 So that commercial expansion of the Arabs down the east coast of Africa in the first and again in the tenth century seized upon the offshore islands of Zanzibar, Pemba, and Mafia, the small inshore islets like Mombasa and Lamu, and the whole outer rim of the coast from the equator southward to the Rovuma River.437 The Sultan of Zanzibar, heir to this coastal strip, had not expanded it a decade ago, when he had to relinquish the long thread of his continental possessions.

The early history of maritime colonization generally shows two geographic phases: first, the occupation of coastal islets and headlands, and later—sometimes much later—an expansion toward the inner coast or even further inland. Progress from the earlier phase to the more developed phase depends on the social and economic growth of the colonizers, as reflected in how they value land. The first phase is marked by a low regard for land value, best represented by the Phoenician and earliest Greek colonies, which were mainly focused on trade and sought out the most accessible coastal locations that provided the best trading posts along the Mediterranean and nearby seas. The earlier Greek colonies, such as those at the Triopium promontory in the southwestern corner of Asia Minor, Chalcidice, the Thracian Chersonesus, Calchedon, Byzantium, the Pontic Heraclea, and Sinope, were situated on peninsulas or headlands that offered convenient anchorage; or, like Syracuse and Mitylene, on small inshore islets, which were quickly outgrown, leading the towns to spread to the nearby mainland. The benefits of these sites included easy access to trade and natural protection against attacks from unfamiliar or hostile mainland tribes. For a nation of traders, satisfied with the significant profits but also with the temporary power of middlemen, these factors were sufficient. While Phoenician trading posts in Africa lined the outer coast, the inner edge was defined by Libyan or Ethiopian towns where interior inhabitants exchanged their ivory and hides for products from Tyre.436 This commercial expansion of the Arabs down the east coast of Africa in the first and again in the tenth century took hold of the offshore islands of Zanzibar, Pemba, and Mafia, the small inshore islets like Mombasa and Lamu, and the entire outer coast from the equator south to the Rovuma River.437 The Sultan of Zanzibar, who inherited this coastal territory, had not expanded it just a decade ago when he had to give up his long stretch of continental possessions.

Inland advance of colonies.

But when a people has advanced to a higher conception of colonization as an outlet for national as well as commercial expansion, and when it sees that the permanent prosperity of both race and trade in the new locality depends upon the occupation of larger tracts of territory and the development of local resources as a basis for exchanges, their settlements spread from the outer rim of the coasts to its inner edge and yet beyond, if alluvial plains and river highways are present to tempt inland expansion. Such was the history of many later colonies of the Greeks438 and Carthaginians, and especially of most modern colonial movements, for these have been dominated by a higher estimate of the value of land.

But when a society reaches a more advanced understanding of colonization as a way for both national and economic growth, and when it realizes that the long-term success of both its people and trade in the new area relies on taking over larger areas and developing local resources to support exchanges, their settlements expand from the outer edges of the coasts to the interior and even further, especially if fertile plains and river routes encourage inland growth. This was the story of many later colonies of the Greeks438 and Carthaginians, and particularly of most modern colonial efforts, as these have been driven by a greater recognition of the value of land.

After the long Atlantic journey, the outposts of the American coast were welcome resting-places to the early European voyagers, but, owing to their restricted area and therefore limited productivity, they were soon abandoned, or became mere bases for inland expansion. The little island of Cuttyhunk, off southern Massachusetts, was the site of Gosnold's abortive attempt at colonization in 1602, like Raleigh's attempt on Roanoke Island in 1585, and the later one of Popham on the eastern headland of Casco Bay. The Pilgrims paused at the extremity of Cape Cod, and again on Clark's Island, before fixing their settlement on Plymouth Bay. Monhegan Island, off the Maine coast, was the site of an early English trading post, which, however, lasted only from 1623 to 1626;439 and the same dates fix the beginning and end of a fishing and trading station established on Cape Ann, and removed later to Salem harbor. The Swedes made their first settlement in America on Cape Henlopen, at the entrance of Delaware Bay; but their next, only seven years later, they located well up the estuary of the Delaware River. Thus for the modern colonist the outer edge of the coast is merely the gateway of the land. From it he passes rapidly to the settlement of the interior, wherever fertile soil and abundant resources promise a due return upon his labor.

After the long journey across the Atlantic, the outposts along the American coast were welcome stops for early European explorers. However, because of their small size and limited resources, they were quickly abandoned or turned into just bases for expanding into the interior. The little island of Cuttyhunk, off southern Massachusetts, was where Gosnold made his failed attempt at colonization in 1602, similar to Raleigh's attempt on Roanoke Island in 1585 and Popham's later effort on the eastern edge of Casco Bay. The Pilgrims stopped at the tip of Cape Cod and again on Clark's Island before settling at Plymouth Bay. Monhegan Island, off the coast of Maine, was home to an early English trading post, but it only lasted from 1623 to 1626;439 and those same years mark the start and end of a fishing and trading station set up on Cape Ann, which was later moved to Salem harbor. The Swedes established their first settlement in America on Cape Henlopen, at the entrance of Delaware Bay; just seven years later, they founded another settlement further up the Delaware River estuary. For the modern colonist, the outer edge of the coast is simply the gateway to the land. From there, they quickly move into the interior where fertile soil and abundant resources promise good returns on their labor.

Interpenetration of land and sea.

Since it is from the land, as the inhabited portion of the earth's surface, that all maritime movements emanate, and to the land that all oversea migrations are directed, the reciprocal relations between land and sea are largely determined by the degree of accessibility existing between the two. This depends primarily upon the articulation of a land-mass, whether it presents an unbroken contour like Africa and India, or whether, like Europe and Norway, it drops a fringe of peninsulas and a shower of islands into the bordering ocean. Mere distance from the sea bars a country from its vivifying contact; every protrusion of an ocean artery into the heart of a continent makes that heart feel the pulse of life on far-off, unseen shores. The Baltic inlet which makes a seaport of St. Petersburg 800 miles (1,300 kilometers) back from the western rim of Europe, brings Atlantic civilization to this half-Asiatic side of the continent. The solid front presented by the Iberian Peninsula and Africa to the Atlantic has a narrow crack at Gibraltar, whence the Mediterranean penetrates inland 2,300 miles (3,700 kilometers), and converts the western foot of the Caucasus and the roots of the Lebanon Mountains into a seaboard. By means of the Arabian Sea, the Indian Ocean runs northward 1,300 miles (2,200 kilometers) from Cape Comorin to meet the Indus delta; and then turns westward 700 miles farther through the Oman and Persian gulfs to receive the boats from the Tigris and Euphrates. Such marine inlets create islands and peninsulas; which are characterized by proximity to the sea on all or many sides; and in the interior of the continents they produce every degree of nearness, shading off into inaccessible remoteness from the watery highway of the deep.

Since all maritime activity originates from the land, which is the inhabited part of the Earth's surface, and all ocean migrations head toward the land, the relationship between land and sea is largely influenced by how accessible they are to each other. This accessibility primarily depends on the shape of the landmass—whether it has a continuous outline like Africa and India or features a mix of peninsulas and a number of islands like Europe and Norway. Simply being far from the sea limits a country’s connection to its revitalizing effects; any extension of a maritime route into the continent allows that region to feel the vibrancy of life from distant, unseen shores. The Baltic inlet that provides a seaport for St. Petersburg, located 800 miles (1,300 kilometers) inland from the western edge of Europe, brings Atlantic civilization to this semi-Asiatic part of the continent. The solid structure formed by the Iberian Peninsula and Africa facing the Atlantic has a narrow gap at Gibraltar, from where the Mediterranean extends inland 2,300 miles (3,700 kilometers), transforming the western base of the Caucasus and the roots of the Lebanon Mountains into a coastline. Through the Arabian Sea, the Indian Ocean travels northward for 1,300 miles (2,200 kilometers) from Cape Comorin to connect with the Indus delta and then turns westward for another 700 miles through the Oman and Persian gulfs to welcome boats coming from the Tigris and Euphrates rivers. These marine inlets create islands and peninsulas, characterized by their proximity to the sea on one or multiple sides; and within the interior of continents, they produce varying degrees of closeness, fading into remote areas that are difficult to access from the vast watery highway.

The success with which such indentations open up the interior of the continents depends upon the length of the inlets and the size of the land-mass in question. Africa's huge area and unbroken contour combine to hold the sea at arm's length, Europe's deep-running inlets open that small continent so effectively that Kazan, Russia's most eastern city of considerable size, is only 750 miles (1,200 kilometers) distant from the nearest White Sea, Baltic, and Azof ports. Asia, the largest of all the continents, despite a succession of big indentations that invade its periphery from Sinai peninsula to East Cape, has a vast inland area hopelessly far from the surrounding oceans.

The effectiveness of such indentations in accessing the interior of continents depends on how long the inlets are and the size of the landmass involved. Africa's massive area and continuous coastline keep the sea at a distance, while Europe's deep inlets allow for easy access—Kazan, Russia's easternmost significant city, is just 750 miles (1,200 kilometers) away from the nearest ports on the White Sea, Baltic Sea, and Sea of Azov. Asia, the largest continent, despite having several large indentations along its edges—from the Sinai Peninsula to the East Cape—has a vast inland area that is frustratingly far from the surrounding oceans.

Ratio of shoreline to area.

In order to determine the coast articulation of any country or continent, Carl Ritter and his followers divided area by shoreline, the latter a purely mathematical line representing the total contour length. By this method Europe's ratio is one linear mile of coast to 174 square miles of area, Australia's 1:224, Asia's 1:490, and Africa's 1:700. This means that Europe's proportion of coast is three times that of Asia and four times that of Africa; that a country like Norway, with a shoreline of 12,000 miles traced in and out along the fiords and around the larger islands,440 has only 10 square miles of area for every mile of seaboard, while Germany, with every detail of its littoral included in the measurement, has only 1,515 miles of shoreline and a ratio of one mile of coast to every 159 square miles of area.

To figure out the coastline ratio of any country or continent, Carl Ritter and his followers compared the area to the shoreline, which is just a mathematical line showing the total length of the coast. Using this method, Europe's ratio is one linear mile of coast for every 174 square miles of area, Australia’s is 1:224, Asia’s is 1:490, and Africa’s is 1:700. This means Europe has three times the coastline compared to Asia and four times compared to Africa; for example, Norway has a shoreline of 12,000 miles winding along the fiords and around its larger islands,440 giving it only 10 square miles of area for each mile of coast, while Germany, with every detail of its coastline included in the measurement, has just 1,515 miles of shore and a ratio of one mile of coast for every 159 square miles of area.

The criticism has been made against this method that it compares two unlike measures, square and linear, which moreover increase or decrease in markedly different degrees, according as larger or smaller units are used. But for the purposes of anthropo-geography the method is valid, inasmuch as it shows the amount of area dependent for its marine outline upon each mile of littoral. A coast, like every other boundary, performs the important function of intermediary in the intercourse of a land with its neighbors; hence the length of this sea boundary materially affects this function. Area and coastline are not dead mathematical quantities, but like organs of one body stand in close reciprocal activity, and can be understood only in the light of their persistent mutual relations. The division of the area of a land by the length of its coastline yields a quotient which to the anthropo-geographer is not a dry figure, but an index to the possible relations between seaboard and interior. A comparison of some of these ratios will illustrate this fact.

The criticism of this method is that it compares two different measures, square and linear, which change at noticeably different rates depending on whether larger or smaller units are used. However, for anthropo-geography, the method is valid since it indicates how much area relies on its marine outline for each mile of coastline. A coast, like any other boundary, plays a crucial role in facilitating interactions between a land and its neighbors; therefore, the length of this sea boundary significantly impacts this role. Area and coastline are not just static mathematical figures; they function like organs of a single body, interacting closely, and can only be understood through their ongoing mutual relationships. Dividing the area of a land by the length of its coastline produces a quotient that, for the anthropo-geographer, is not just a number, but a metric indicating the potential relationships between the coast and the interior. Comparing some of these ratios will illustrate this point.

Germany's shoreline, traced in contour without including details, measures 787 miles; this is just one-fifth that of Italy and two-fifths that of France, so that it is short. But since Germany's area is nearly twice Italy's and a little larger than that of France, it has 267 square miles of territory for every mile of coast, while Italy has only 28 square miles, and France 106. Germany has towns that are 434 miles from the nearest seaboard, but in Italy the most inland point is only 148 miles from the Mediterranean.441 If we turn now to the United States and adopt Mendenhall's estimate of its general or contour coastline as 5,705 miles, we find that our country has 530 square miles of area dependent for its outlet upon each mile of seaboard. This means that our coast has a heavy task imposed upon it, and that its commercial and political importance is correspondingly enhanced; that the extension of our Gulf of Mexico littoral by the purchase of Florida and the annexation of Texas were measures of self-preservation, and that the unbroken contour and mountain-walled face of our Pacific littoral is a serious national handicap.

Germany's coastline, measured without any details, is 787 miles long; this is only one-fifth of Italy's and two-fifths of France's, making it relatively short. However, since Germany's land area is nearly double that of Italy and slightly larger than France's, it has 267 square miles of territory for every mile of coast, while Italy has just 28 square miles and France has 106. In Germany, some towns are 434 miles from the nearest coast, while in Italy, the furthest inland point is only 148 miles from the Mediterranean. 441 If we now consider the United States and use Mendenhall's estimate of its overall coastline at 5,705 miles, we find that our country has 530 square miles of area reliant on each mile of coastline. This indicates that our coast bears a significant responsibility, which enhances its commercial and political importance; the extension of our Gulf of Mexico coastline through the purchase of Florida and the annexation of Texas were necessary actions for self-preservation, and the continuous coastline along with the mountain barriers of our Pacific coast presents a serious national challenge.

Criticism of this formula.

But this method is open to the legitimate and fundamental criticism that, starting from the conception of a coast as a mere line instead of a zone, it ignores all those features which belong to every littoral as a strip of the earth's surface—location, geologic structure, relief, area, accessibility to the sea in front and to the land behind, all which vary from one part of the world's seaboard to another, and serve to differentiate the human history of every littoral. Moreover, of all parts of the earth's surface, the coast as the hem of the sea and land, combining the characters of each, is most complex. It is the coast as a human habitat that primarily concerns anthropo-geography. A careful analysis of the multifarious influences modifying one another in this mingled environment of land and water reveals an intricate interplay of geographic forces, varying from inland basin to marginal sea, from marginal sea to open ocean, and changing from one historical period to another—an interplay so mercurial that it could find only a most inadequate expression in the rigid mathematical formula of Carl Ritter.

But this approach faces valid and fundamental criticism because it views a coast as just a line instead of a zone. This perspective overlooks all the characteristics that define every shoreline as a part of the earth’s surface—such as location, geological structure, relief, area, and accessibility to both the sea in front and the land behind. These factors vary from one stretch of coast to another and shape the unique human history of each. Additionally, of all the earth's surfaces, the coast—where the sea meets land, combining features of both—is the most complex. It’s the coastal area as a place for human habitation that is of primary interest in anthropo-geography. A detailed analysis of the numerous influences interacting in this blended land-and-water environment shows a complex interplay of geographic forces, ranging from inland basins to marginal seas, from marginal seas to the open ocean, and shifting from one historical period to another—an interplay so dynamic that it can only be inadequately captured by the rigid mathematical formula of Carl Ritter.

Accessibility of coasts from hinterland.

As the coast, then, is the border zone between the solid, inhabited land and the mobile, untenanted deep, two important factors in its history are the accessibility of its back country on the one hand, and the accessibility of the sea on the other. A littoral population barred from its hinterland by mountain range or steep plateau escarpment or desert tract feels little influence from the land; level or fertile soil is too limited in amount to draw inland the growing people, intercourse is too difficult and infrequent, transportation too slow and costly. Hence the inhabitants of such a coast are forced to look seaward for their racial and commercial expansion, even if a paucity of good harbors limits the accessibility of the sea; they must lead a somewhat detached and independent existence, so far as the territory behind them is concerned. Here the coast, as a peripheral organ of the interior, as the outlet for its products, the market for its foreign exchanges, and the medium for intercourse with its maritime neighbors, sees its special function impaired. But it takes advantage of its isolation and the protection of a long sea boundary to detach itself politically from its hinterland, as the histories of Phoenicia, the Aegean coast of Asia Minor, Dalmatia, the republics of Amalfi, Venice, and Genoa, the county of Barcelona, and Portugal abundantly prove. At the same time it profits by its seaboard location to utilize the more varied fields of maritime enterprise before it, in lieu of the more or less forbidden territory behind it. The height and width of the landward barrier, the number and practicability of the passways across it, and especially the value of the hinterland's products in relation to their bulk, determine the amount of intercourse between that hinterland and its mountain or desert barred littoral.

As the coastline serves as the border between solid, populated land and the open, uninhabited deep, two key factors shape its history: the accessibility of its inland areas and the access to the sea. A coastal population cut off from its hinterland by mountains, steep plateaus, or deserts feels little connection to the land; the limited fertile soil isn’t enough to attract the growing population inland, interaction is too challenging and infrequent, and transportation is slow and expensive. Consequently, the people living along such coasts are compelled to look to the sea for their growth and trade, even if a lack of good harbors makes access to the ocean difficult. They end up living somewhat independently from the land behind them. In this scenario, the coast, acting as a peripheral extension of the interior—serving as an outlet for its resources, a market for international trade, and a link with maritime neighbors—finds its role diminished. However, it takes advantage of its isolation and the protection offered by a long coastline to politically separate itself from the hinterland, as seen in the histories of Phoenicia, the Aegean coast of Asia Minor, Dalmatia, the republics of Amalfi, Venice, and Genoa, the county of Barcelona, and Portugal. At the same time, it benefits from its coastal location by pursuing the diverse opportunities of maritime trade instead of engaging with the less accessible territory behind it. The height and width of land barriers, the number and usability of pathways across them, and especially the value of the hinterland's goods in relation to their size all influence the level of interaction between that hinterland and its coastal areas restricted by mountains or deserts.

Mountain-barred hinterlands.

The interior is most effectively cut off from the periphery, where a mountain range or a plateau escarpment traces the inner line of the coastland, as in the province of Liguria in northern Italy, Dalmatia, the western or Malabar coast of India, most parts of Africa, and long stretches of the Pacific littoral of the Americas. The highland that backs the Norwegian coast is crossed by only one railroad, that passing through the Trondhjem depression; and this barrier has served to keep Norway's historical connection with Sweden far less intimate than with Denmark. The long inlet of the Adriatic, bringing the sea well into the heart of Southern Europe, has seen nevertheless a relatively small maritime development, owing to the wall of mountains that everywhere shuts out the hinterland of its coasts. The greatness of Venice was intimately connected with the Brenner Pass over the Alps on the one hand, and the trade of the eastern Mediterranean on the other. Despite Austro-Hungary's crucial interest in the northeast corner of the Adriatic as a maritime outlet for this vast inland empire, and its herculean efforts at Trieste and Fiume to create harbors and to connect them by transmontane railroads with the valley of the Danube, the maritime development of this coast is still restricted, and much of Austria's trade goes out northward by German ports.442 Farther south along the Dalmatian and Albanian coasts, the deep and sheltered bays between the half-submerged roots of the Dinaric Alps have developed only local importance, because they lack practicable connection with the interior. This was their history too in early Greek and Roman days, for they found only scant support in the few caravans that crossed by the Roman road to Dyrrachium to exchange the merchandise of the Aegean for the products of the Ionian Isles. Spain has always suffered from the fact that her bare, arid, and unproductive tableland almost everywhere rises steeply from her fertile and densely populated coasts; and therefore that the two have been unable to coöperate either for the production of a large maritime commerce or for national political unity. Here the diverse conditions of the littoral and the wall of the great central terrace of the country have emphasized that tendency to defection that belongs to every periphery, and therefore necessitated a strong centralized government to consolidate the restive maritime provinces with their diverse Galician, Basque, Catalonian, and Andalusian folk into one nation with the Castilians of the plateau.443

The interior is effectively separated from the outskirts, where a mountain range or a plateau cliff outlines the inner coast, like in Liguria in northern Italy, Dalmatia, the western Malabar coast of India, many parts of Africa, and long stretches of the Pacific coastline in the Americas. The highlands backing the Norwegian coast are only crossed by one railroad, which goes through the Trondhjem depression; this barrier has kept Norway's historical ties with Sweden much less close than those with Denmark. The long inlet of the Adriatic, which brings the sea deep into southern Europe, has seen relatively little maritime development due to the mountain wall that surrounds its coasts. Venice's greatness was closely linked to the Brenner Pass over the Alps on one side, and the trade of the eastern Mediterranean on the other. Despite Austro-Hungary's significant interest in the northeast corner of the Adriatic as a maritime outlet for this vast inland empire, and its massive efforts at Trieste and Fiume to create harbors and connect them via cross-mountain railroads to the Danube valley, maritime development along this coast is still limited, with much of Austria's trade going north through German ports.442 Further south along the Dalmatian and Albanian coasts, the deep and sheltered bays formed by the half-submerged roots of the Dinaric Alps have only gained local significance due to their lack of practical connections to the interior. This was also true in early Greek and Roman times, as they found little support from the few caravans that traveled along the Roman road to Dyrrachium to trade Aegean goods for products from the Ionian Isles. Spain has always struggled with the fact that her dry, barren, and unproductive plateau often rises steeply from her fertile and densely populated coasts; hence, the two regions have been unable to work together to create large maritime trade or achieve national political unity. Here, the varying conditions of the coastline and the barrier of the great central plateau have highlighted the tendency for the periphery to seek independence, requiring a strong centralized government to unify the restless coastal provinces and their diverse Galician, Basque, Catalonian, and Andalusian populations into one nation with the Castilians of the plateau.443

Accessible hinterlands.

Where mountain systems run out endwise into the sea, the longitudinal valleys with their drainage streams open natural highways from the interior to the coast. This structure has made the Atlantic side of the Iberian Peninsula far more open than its Mediterranean front, and therefore contributed to its leadership in maritime affairs since 1450. So from the shores of Thrace to the southern point of the Peloponnesus, all the valleys of Greece open out on the eastern or Asiatic side. Here every mountain-flanked bay has had its own small hinterland to draw upon, and every such interior has been accessible to the civilization of the Aegean; here was concentrated the maritime and cultural life of Hellas.444 The northern half of Andean Colombia, by way of the parallel Atrato, Rio Cauco, and Magdalena valleys, has supported the activities of its Caribbean littoral, and through these avenues has received such foreign influences as might penetrate to inland Bogota. In like manner, the mountain-ridged peninsula of Farther India keeps its interior in touch with its leading ports through its intermontane valleys of the Irawadi, Salwin, Menam, and Mekong rivers.

Where mountain ranges extend down to the sea, the long valleys with their rivers create natural paths from the interior to the coast. This setup has made the Atlantic side of the Iberian Peninsula much more accessible than its Mediterranean side, which has helped it take the lead in maritime activities since 1450. From the shores of Thrace to the southern tip of the Peloponnesus, all the valleys in Greece open toward the eastern or Asian side. Here, every bay surrounded by mountains has its own small region to rely on, and each of those areas has been reachable by Aegean civilization; this is where the maritime and cultural life of Greece was focused.444 The northern half of Andean Colombia, through the parallel valleys of the Atrato, Rio Cauca, and Magdalena, has supported the activities of its Caribbean coastline, and through these routes has welcomed foreign influences into inland Bogotá. Similarly, the mountain-studded peninsula of Southeast Asia connects its interior with its major ports through the valleys of the Irawadi, Salwin, Menam, and Mekong rivers.

Low coasts rising by easy gradients to wide plains, like those of northern France, Germany, southern Russia, and the Gulf seaboard of the United States, profit by an accessible and extensive hinterland. Occasionally, however, this advantage is curtailed by a political boundary reinforced by a high protective tariff, as Holland, Belgium, and East Prussia445 know to their sorrow.

Low coasts that gradually rise to broad plains, like those in northern France, Germany, southern Russia, and the Gulf coast of the United States, benefit from a reachable and vast inland area. However, this advantage is sometimes limited by a political border backed by a high protective tariff, as countries like Holland, Belgium, and East Prussia know all too well.

These low hems of the land, however, often meet physical obstructions to ready communications with the interior in the silted inlets, shallow lagoons, marshes, or mangrove swamps of the littoral itself. Here the larger drainage streams give access across this amphibian belt to the solid land behind. Where they flow into a tide-swept bay like the North Sea or the English Channel, they scour out their beds and preserve the connection between sea and land;446 but debouchment into a tideless basin like the Caspian or the Gulf of Mexico, even for such mighty streams as the Volga and the Mississippi, sees the slow silting up of their mouths and the restriction of their agency in opening up the hinterland. Thus the character of the bordering sea may help to determine the accessibility of the coast from the land side.

These low areas of land often face physical barriers that make it difficult to communicate with the interior, such as silted inlets, shallow lagoons, marshes, or mangrove swamps along the coast. Here, larger rivers provide access across this wetland area to the solid land behind. Where they empty into a tide-swept bay like the North Sea or the English Channel, they carve out their beds and maintain the link between sea and land;446 but when they flow into a tideless basin like the Caspian or the Gulf of Mexico, even powerful rivers like the Volga and the Mississippi experience slow silting of their mouths, limiting their ability to open up the inland areas. Therefore, the nature of the neighboring sea can influence how accessible the coast is from the land side.

Accessibility of coasts from the sea.

Its accessibility from the sea depends primarily upon its degree of articulation; and this articulation depends upon whether the littoral belt has suffered elevation or subsidence. When the inshore sea rests upon an uplifted bottom, the contour of the coast is smooth and unbroken, because most of the irregularities of surface have been overlaid by a deposit of waste from the land; so it offers no harbor except here and there a silted river mouth, while it shelves off through a broad amphibian belt of tidal marsh, lagoon, and sand reef to a shallow sea. Such is the coast of New Jersey, most of the Gulf seaboard of the United States and Mexico, the Coromandel coast of India, and the long, low littoral of Upper Guinea. Such coasts harbor a population of fishermen living along the strands of their placid lagoons,447 and stimulate a timid inshore navigation which sometimes develops to extensive coastwise intercourse, where a network of lagoons and deltaic channels forms a long inshore passage, as in Upper Guinea, but which fears the break of the surf outside.448

Its accessibility from the sea mostly depends on how well it connects to the coastline, which in turn is affected by whether the coastal area has risen or sunk. When the nearshore sea sits on an elevated seabed, the coastline is smooth and uninterrupted because most surface irregularities have been covered by sediment from the land. As a result, it presents no harbors except for a few silted river mouths, while it gradually slopes down through a wide area of tidal marsh, lagoon, and sandy reef to shallow waters. This is seen along the coast of New Jersey, much of the Gulf coast of the United States and Mexico, the Coromandel coast of India, and the long, low shoreline of Upper Guinea. These coasts are home to fishermen living along the shores of their calm lagoons,447 and they encourage cautious coastal navigation that sometimes leads to extensive trade along the coast, particularly where a network of lagoons and delta channels creates a lengthy passage close to shore, as in Upper Guinea, although they are wary of the waves breaking outside.448

The rivers draining these low uplifted lands are deflected from their straight path to the sea by coastwise deposits, and idly trail along for miles just inside the outer beach; or they are split up into numerous offshoots among the silt beds of a delta, to find their way by shallow, tortuous channels to the ocean, so that they abate their value as highways between sea and land. The silted mouths of the Nile excluded the larger vessels even of Augustus Cæsar's time and admitted only their lighters,449 just as to-day the lower Rufigi River loses much of its value to German East Africa because of its scant hospitality to vessels coming from the sea.

The rivers flowing from these low, elevated lands are redirected from their direct route to the ocean by coastal deposits, meandering for miles just inside the outer beach; or they break into many smaller channels among the silt beds of a delta, finding their way through shallow, winding pathways to the sea, which diminishes their usefulness as connections between land and sea. The silted mouths of the Nile blocked even the larger ships during the time of Augustus Cæsar, only allowing smaller vessels through,449 just like today, the lower Rufigi River loses much of its significance for German East Africa due to its limited access for ships coming from the ocean.

Embayed coasts.

The effect of subsidence, even on a low coastal plain, is to increase accessibility from the sea by flooding the previous river valleys and transforming them into a succession of long shallow inlets, alternating with low or hilly tongues of land. Such embayed coasts form our Atlantic seaboard from Delaware Bay, through Chesapeake Bay to Pamlico Sound, the North Sea face of England, the funnel-shaped "förden" or firths on the eastern side of Jutland and Schleswig-Holstein, and the ragged sounds or "Bodden" that indent the Baltic shore of Germany from the Bay of Lubeck to the mouth of the Oder River.450 Although the shallowness of the bordering sea and the sand-bars and sand reefs which characterize all flat coasts here also exclude the largest vessels, such coasts have nevertheless ample contact with both land and sea. They tend to develop, therefore, the activities appropriate to both. A fertile soil and abundant local resources, as in tidewater Maryland and Virginia, make the land more attractive than the sea; the inhabitants become farmers rather than sailors. On the other hand, an embayed coastland promising little return to the labor of tillage, but with abundant fisheries and a superior location for maritime trade, is sure to profit by the accessible sea, and achieve the predominant maritime activity which characterized the mediæval Hanse Towns of northern Germany and colonial New England.

The impact of subsidence, even on a low coastal plain, is that it enhances access from the sea by flooding former river valleys and turning them into a series of long, shallow inlets, alternating with low hills or stretches of land. These indented coasts make up our Atlantic coastline from Delaware Bay, through Chesapeake Bay to Pamlico Sound, as well as the North Sea coast of England, the funnel-shaped "förden" or firths on the eastern side of Jutland and Schleswig-Holstein, and the rough sounds or "Bodden" that cut into the Baltic coast of Germany from the Bay of Lubeck to the mouth of the Oder River.450 Although the shallow waters and the sandbars and reefs that are typical of all flat coasts here also prevent large vessels from entering, such coasts still maintain strong connections with both land and sea. As a result, they tend to develop activities suited to both environments. Fertile soil and rich local resources, as seen in tidewater Maryland and Virginia, make the land more appealing than the sea; the residents tend to become farmers rather than sailors. Conversely, a coastal area with limited agricultural potential but plentiful fisheries and a great location for maritime trade is likely to benefit from the accessible sea, leading to a focus on maritime activities similar to those that defined the medieval Hanse towns of northern Germany and colonial New England.

Maritime activity on steep embayed coasts.

Subsidence that brings the beat of the surf against the bolder reliefs of the land produces a ragged, indented coast, deep-water inlets penetrating far into the country, hilly or mountainous tongues of land running far out into the sea and breaking up into a swarm of islands and rocks, whose outer limits indicate approximately the old prediluvial line of shore.451 Such are the fiord regions of Norway, southern Alaska, British Columbia, Greenland, and southern Chile; the Rias or submerged river valley coast of northwestern Spain; and the deeply sunken mountain flank of Dalmatia, whose every lateral valley has become a bay or a strait between mainland and island. All these coasts are characterized by a close succession of inlets, a limited amount of level country for settlement or cultivation, and in their rear a steep slope impeding communication with their hinterland. Inaccessibility from the land, a high degree of accessibility from the sea, and a paucity of local resources unite to thrust the inhabitants of such coasts out upon the deep, to make of them fishermen, seamen, and ocean carriers. The same result follows where no barrier on the land side exists, but where a granitic or glaciated soil in the interior discourages agriculture and landward expansion, as in Brittany, Maine, and Newfoundland. In all these the land repels and the sea attracts. Brittany furnishes one-fifth of all the sailors in France's merchant marine,452 and its pelagic fishermen sweep the seas from Newfoundland to Iceland. Three-fifths of the maritime activity of the whole Austrian Empire is confined to the ragged coast of Dalmatia, which furnishes to-day most of the sailors for the imperial marine, just as in Roman days it manned the Adriatic fleet of the Cæsars.453 The Haida, Tsimshean, and Tlingit Indians of the ragged western coast of British Columbia and southern Alaska spread their villages on the narrow tide-swept hem of the land, and subsist chiefly by the generosity of the deep. They are poor landsmen, but excellent boat-makers and seamen, venturing sometimes twenty-five miles out to sea to gather birds' eggs from the outermost fringe of rocks.

Subsidence that causes the waves to crash against the rugged land creates a jagged, indented coastline, with deep-water inlets extending far inland and hilly or mountainous stretches of land jutting out into the ocean, breaking up into a cluster of islands and rocks, whose outer edges roughly mark the old prehistoric shoreline.451 Such are the fjord regions of Norway, southern Alaska, British Columbia, Greenland, and southern Chile; the Rias or submerged river valley coast of northwestern Spain; and the deeply submerged mountain slopes of Dalmatia, where every side valley has turned into a bay or a strait between the mainland and the islands. All these coasts have a series of inlets, limited flat land for settlement or farming, and a steep slope behind them that makes communication with the inland area difficult. Inaccessibility from the land, easy access from the sea, and a lack of local resources push the residents of these coasts out into the ocean, turning them into fishermen, seamen, and ocean traders. This same outcome happens where no barriers exist on the land side, but where granite or glaciated soil in the interior makes farming difficult and limits land expansion, as seen in Brittany, Maine, and Newfoundland. In all these areas, the land pushes you away while the sea draws you in. Brittany provides one-fifth of all the sailors in France's merchant marine,452 and its ocean fishermen roam the waters from Newfoundland to Iceland. Three-fifths of the maritime activity throughout the entire Austrian Empire is centered around the rugged coast of Dalmatia, which today supplies most of the sailors for the imperial navy, just as it did in Roman times when it manned the Adriatic fleet of the Caesars.453 The Haida, Tsimshean, and Tlingit tribes of the rugged western coast of British Columbia and southern Alaska have their villages along the narrow, tide-swept edge of the land and mostly rely on the generosity of the ocean for sustenance. They aren't great farmers, but they are skilled boat builders and sailors, sometimes venturing twenty-five miles off the coast to collect bird eggs from the farthest rocks.

Contrasted coastal belts.

As areas of elevation or subsidence are, as a rule, extensive, it follows that coasts usually present long stretches of smooth simple shoreline, or a long succession of alternating inlet and headland. Therefore different littoral belts show marked contrasts in their degree of accessibility to the sea, and their harbors appear in extensive groups of one type—fiords, river estuaries, sand or coral reef lagoons, and embayed mountain roots. A sudden change in relief or in geologic history sees one of these types immediately succeeded by a long-drawn group of a different type. Such a contrast is found between the Baltic and North Sea ports of Denmark and Germany, the eastern and southern seaboards of England, the eastern and western sides of Scotland, and the Pacific littoral of North America north and south of Juan de Fuca Strait, attended by a contrasted history.

As areas of elevation or subsidence are usually quite large, coasts typically have long stretches of smooth, simple shorelines or a long series of alternating inlets and headlands. This means that different coastal areas show significant differences in how accessible they are to the sea, and their harbors come in large groups of one type—like fjords, river estuaries, sand or coral reef lagoons, and embayed mountain roots. A sudden shift in landform or geological history results in one of these types being immediately followed by a lengthy group of a different type. Such contrasts can be seen between the Baltic and North Sea ports of Denmark and Germany, the eastern and southern coasts of England, the eastern and western sides of Scotland, and the Pacific coast of North America north and south of the Juan de Fuca Strait, each with its own distinctive history.

A common morphological history, marked by mountain uplift, glaciation, and subsidence, has given an historical development similar in not a few respects to the fiord coasts of New England, Norway, Iceland, Greenland, the Alaskan "panhandle," and southern Chile. Large subsidence areas on the Mediterranean coasts from the Strait of Gibraltar to the Bosporus have in essential features duplicated each other's histories, just as the low infertile shores of the Baltic from Finland to the Skager Rack have had much in common in their past development.

A shared geological history, characterized by mountain rising, glaciation, and sinking, has led to a similar historical development in several ways to the fjord coasts of New England, Norway, Iceland, Greenland, the Alaskan "panhandle," and southern Chile. Large sunken areas along the Mediterranean coasts from the Strait of Gibraltar to the Bosporus have mirrored each other's histories in key aspects, just as the low, infertile shorelines of the Baltic from Finland to the Skagerrak have shared a lot in their historical development.

Where, however, a purely local subsidence, as in Kamerun Bay and Old Calabar on the elsewhere low monotonous stretch of the Upper Guinea coast,454 or a single great river estuary, as in the La Plata and the Columbia, affords a protected anchorage on an otherwise portless shore, such inlets assume increased importance. In the long unbroken reach of our Pacific seaboard, San Francisco Bay and the Columbia estuary are of inestimable value; while, by the treaty of 1848 with Mexico, the international boundary line was made to bend slightly south of west from the mouth of the Gila River to the coast, in order to include in the United States territory the excellent harbor of San Diego. The mere nicks in the rim of Southwest Africa constituting Walfish Bay and Angra Pequena assume considerable value as trading stations and places of refuge along that 1,200-mile reach of inhospitable coast extending from Cape Town north to Great Fish Bay.455 It is worthy of notice in passing that, though both of these small inlets lie within the territory of German Southwest Africa, Walfish Bay with 20 miles of coast on either side is a British possession, and that two tiny islets which commands the entrance to the harbor of Angra Pequena, also belong to Great Britain. On the uniform coast of East Africa, the single considerable indentation formed by Delagoa Bay assumes immense importance, which, however, is due in part to the mineral wealth of its Transvaal hinterland. From this point northward for 35 degrees of latitude, a river mouth, like that fixing the site of Beira, or an inshore islet affording protected harborage, like that of Mombasa, serves as the single ocean gateway of a vast territory, and forms the terminus of a railroad—proof of its importance.

Where there is a purely local subsidence, like in Kamerun Bay and Old Calabar on the otherwise flat and featureless Upper Guinea coast,454 or a major river estuary, such as the La Plata and the Columbia, providing a protected anchorage on a coast that lacks natural harbors, these inlets become much more significant. On the long, uninterrupted stretch of the Pacific coastline, San Francisco Bay and the Columbia estuary are invaluable; likewise, through the treaty of 1848 with Mexico, the international boundary was adjusted slightly south of west from the mouth of the Gila River to the coast in order to include the excellent harbor of San Diego in U.S. territory. The small indentations on the rim of Southwest Africa, known as Walfish Bay and Angra Pequena, are quite valuable as trading posts and safe havens along the 1,200-mile stretch of harsh coast from Cape Town to Great Fish Bay.455 It's worth mentioning that although both of these small inlets are located within German Southwest Africa, Walfish Bay, with 20 miles of coastline on either side, is a British possession, and two tiny islands that guard the entrance to the harbor of Angra Pequena also belong to Great Britain. Along the uniform coast of East Africa, the significant indentation created by Delagoa Bay is tremendously important, partly due to the mineral wealth found in its Transvaal hinterland. From this point northward for 35 degrees of latitude, a river mouth, like the one at Beira, or an island close to shore providing safe anchorage, like Mombasa, serves as the sole ocean gateway to a vast territory and is the endpoint of a railroad—demonstrating its significance.

Evolution of ports.

The maritime evolution of all amply embayed coasts, except in Arctic and sub-Arctic regions inimical to all historical development, shows in its highest stage the gradual elimination of minor ports, and the concentration of maritime activity in a few favored ones, which have the deepest and most capacious harbors and the best river, canal, or railroad connection with the interior. The earlier stages are marked by a multiplicity of ports, showing in general activity nearly similar in amount and in kind. England's merchant marine in the fourteenth century was distributed in a large group of small but important ports on the southern coast, all which, owing to their favorable location, were engaged in the French and Flemish trade; and in another group on the east coast, reaching from Hull to Colchester, which participated in the Flemish, Norwegian, and Baltic trade.456 Most of these have now declined before the overpowering competition of a few such seaboard marts as London, Hull, and Southampton. The introduction of steam trawlers into the fishing fleets has in like manner led to the concentration of the fishermen in a few large ports with good railroad facilities, such as Aberdeen and Grimsby, while the fishing villages that fringed the whole eastern and southern coasts have been gradually depopulated.457 So in colonial days, when New England was little more than a cordon of settlements along that rock-bound littoral, almost every inlet had its port actively engaged in coastwise and foreign commerce in the West Indies and the Guinea Coast, in cod and mackerel fisheries, in whaling and shipbuilding, and this with only slight local variations. This widespread homogeneity of maritime activity has been succeeded by strict localization and differentiation, and reduction from many to few ports. So, for the whole Atlantic seaboard of the United States, evolution of seaports has been marked by increase of size attended by decrease of numbers.

The development of all well-protected coastlines, except in Arctic and sub-Arctic areas that hinder historical growth, demonstrates that, at its peak, minor ports have slowly disappeared, leading to a focus of maritime activity in a few key locations that have the deepest harbors and the best connections to the interior by river, canal, or railroad. The earlier phases are characterized by numerous ports, all showing relatively similar levels of activity. In the fourteenth century, England's merchant fleet was spread across a large number of small but significant ports along the southern coast, all of which thrived due to their advantageous locations and participated in trade with France and Flanders; another group on the east coast, stretching from Hull to Colchester, was involved in trade with Flanders, Norway, and the Baltic. Most of these have now diminished due to the dominant competition from a few coastal hubs like London, Hull, and Southampton. Similarly, the introduction of steam trawlers into the fishing fleets has led to the consolidation of fishermen in a handful of large ports with good railroad access, such as Aberdeen and Grimsby, while the fishing villages lining the eastern and southern coasts have gradually emptied out. In colonial times, when New England was mainly a series of settlements along that rugged coastline, nearly every inlet had its port engaged in coastal and foreign trade with the West Indies and the Guinea Coast, in cod and mackerel fisheries, whaling, and shipbuilding, with only minor local differences. This widespread uniformity of maritime activity has been replaced by strict localization and differentiation, resulting in a reduction from many ports to just a few. Thus, for the entire Atlantic coastline of the United States, the evolution of seaports has seen a rise in size accompanied by a decrease in numbers.

Offshore islands.

A well dissected coast, giving ample contact with the sea, often fails nevertheless to achieve historical importance, unless outlying islands are present to ease the transition from inshore to pelagic navigation, and to tempt to wider maritime enterprise. The long sweep of the European coast from northern Norway to Brittany has played out a significant part of its history in that procession of islands formed by Iceland, the Faroes, Shetland, Orkneys, Great Britain, Ireland and the Channel Isles, whether it was the navigator of ancient Armorica steering his leather-sailed boat to the shores of Cæsar's Britain, or the modern Breton fisherman pulling in his nets off the coasts of distant Iceland. The dim outline of mountainous Cyprus, seen against a far-away horizon from the slopes of Lebanon, beckoned the Phoenician ship-master thither to trade and to colonize, just as the early Etruscan merchants passed from their busy ironworks on the island of Elba over the narrow strait to visible Corsica.458 It was on the eastern side of Greece, with its deep embayments, its valleys opening out to the Aegean, with its 483 islands scattered thickly as stars in the sky, and its Milky Way of the Cyclades leading to the deep, rich soils of the Asia Minor coast, with its sea-made contact with all the stimulating influences and dangers emanating from the Asiatic littoral, that Hellenic history played its impressive drama. Here was developed the spirit of enterprise that carried colonies to far western Sicily and Italy, while the western or rear side had a confined succession of local events, scarce worthy the name of history. Neither mountain-walled Epirus nor Corcyra had an Hellenic settlement in 735 B.C., at a date when the eastern Greeks had reached the Ionian coast of the Aegean and had set up a lonely group of colonies even on the Bay of Naples. Turning to America, we find that the Antilles received their population from the only two tribes, first the Arawaks and later the Caribs, who ever reached the indented northern coast of South America between the Isthmus of Panama and the mouth of the Orinoco. Here the small islands of the Venezuelan coast, often in sight, lured these peoples of river and shore to open-sea navigation, and drew them first to the Windward Isles, then northward step by step or island by island, to Hayti and Cuba.459

A well-dissected coastline, providing plenty of access to the sea, often still doesn’t gain historical significance unless there are nearby islands to facilitate the shift from coastal to deep-sea navigation and to encourage broader maritime ventures. The long stretch of the European coast from northern Norway to Brittany has played an important role in its history, thanks to the chain of islands made up of Iceland, the Faroes, Shetland, Orkneys, Great Britain, Ireland, and the Channel Islands, whether it was the ancient navigator from Armorica steering his leather-sailed boat to the shores of Julius Caesar's Britain, or the modern Breton fisherman hauling in his nets off the coasts of far-off Iceland. The vague silhouette of mountainous Cyprus, seen from the slopes of Lebanon against a distant horizon, drew the Phoenician shipmaster there to trade and colonize, just like the early Etruscan traders moved from their bustling ironworks on the island of Elba across the narrow strait to visible Corsica.458 On the eastern side of Greece, with its deep bays, valleys leading to the Aegean, its 483 islands scattered like stars in the sky, and its Milky Way of the Cyclades guiding to the fertile soils of the Asia Minor coast—along with its maritime connections to all the stimulating influences and dangers from the Asian shore—Hellenic history unfolded its impressive narrative. Here, the spirit of enterprise developed, leading colonies to the far western reaches of Sicily and Italy, while the western side had a limited series of local events, barely deserving the title of history. Neither mountain-enclosed Epirus nor Corcyra had a Hellenic settlement in 735 B.C., at a time when the eastern Greeks had already reached the Ionian coast of the Aegean and established a solitary group of colonies even on the Bay of Naples. Turning to America, we find that the Antilles were populated by the only two tribes to ever reach the jagged northern coast of South America between the Isthmus of Panama and the mouth of the Orinoco: first the Arawaks and later the Caribs. Here, the small islands of the Venezuelan coast, often in view, tempted these river and shore-dwelling peoples to venture into open-sea navigation, leading them first to the Windward Isles and then northward, step by step or island by island, to Haiti and Cuba.459

Offshore islands as vestibules of the mainland.

In all these instances, offshore islands tempt to expansion and thereby add to the historical importance of the nearby coast. Frequently, however, they achieve the same result by offering advantageous footholds to enterprising voyagers from remote lands, and become the medium for infusing life into hitherto dead coasts. The long monotonous littoral of East Africa from Cape Guadafui to the Cape of Good Hope, before the planting here of Portuguese way-stations on the road to India in the sixteenth century, was destitute of historical significance, except that stretch opposite the islands of Zanzibar and Pemba, which Arab merchants in the tenth century appropriated as the basis for their slave and ivory trade. The East Indies and Ceylon have been so many offshore stations whence, first through the Portuguese, and later through the Dutch and English, European influences percolated into southeastern Asia. Asia, with its island-strewn shores, has diffused its influences over a broad zone of the western Pacific, and through the agency of its active restless Malays, even halfway across that ocean. In contrast, the western coast of the Americas, a stretch nearly 10,000 miles from Tierra del Fuego to the Aleutian chain, has seen its aboriginal inhabitants barred from seaward expansion by the lack of offshore islands, and its entrance upon the historical stage delayed till recent times.

In all these cases, offshore islands encourage expansion and increase the historical significance of the nearby coast. However, they often achieve this by providing advantageous footholds for adventurous voyagers from distant lands, becoming a means to bring life to previously lifeless coasts. The long, monotonous shoreline of East Africa from Cape Guadafui to the Cape of Good Hope was historically unimportant, except for the area opposite the islands of Zanzibar and Pemba, which Arab traders took control of in the tenth century as the foundation for their slave and ivory trade. The East Indies and Ceylon have served as offshore bases where European influences, initially through the Portuguese and later through the Dutch and English, spread into southeastern Asia. Asia, with its islands along the shores, has extended its influence over a wide area of the western Pacific, and through its dynamic Malays, even halfway across that ocean. In contrast, the western coast of the Americas, stretching nearly 10,000 miles from Tierra del Fuego to the Aleutian chain, has seen its native populations prevented from expanding seaward due to the absence of offshore islands, delaying their historical emergence until recent times.

In general it can be said that islandless seas attain a later historical development than those whose expanse is rendered less forbidding by hospitable fragments of land. This factor, as well as its location remote from the old and stimulating civilization of Syria and Asia Minor, operated to retard the development of the western Mediterranean long after the eastern basin had reached its zenith.

In general, we can say that seas without islands have a slower historical development than those made less daunting by welcoming bits of land. This factor, along with its distance from the rich and vibrant civilizations of Syria and Asia Minor, slowed the development of the western Mediterranean long after the eastern basin had reached its peak.

Previous habitat of coast-dwellers.

Coast-dwelling peoples exhibit every degree of intimacy with the water, from the amphibian life of many Malay tribes who love the wash of the waves beneath their pile-built villages, to the Nama Bushmen who inhabit the dune-walled coast of Southwest Africa, and know nothing of the sea. In the resulting nautical development the natural talents and habits of the people are of immense influence; but these in turn have been largely determined by the geographical environment of their previous habitat, whether inland or coastal, and by the duration in time, as well as the degree and necessity, of their contact with the sea. The Phoenicians, who, according to their traditions as variously interpreted, came to the coast of Lebanon either from the Persian Gulf or the Red Sea,460 brought to their favorable maritime location a different endowment from that of the land-trading Philistines, who moved up from the south to occupy the sand-choked shores of Palestine,461 or from that of the Jews, bred to the grasslands of Mesopotamia and the gardens of Judea, who only at rare periods in their history forced their way to the sea.462 The unindented coast stretching from Cape Carmel south to the Nile delta never produced a maritime people and never achieved maritime importance, till a race of experienced mariners like the Greeks planted their colonies and built their harbor moles on the shores of Sharon and Philistia.463 So on the west face of Africa, from the Senegal southward along the whole Guinea Coast to Benguela, all evidences of kinship and tradition among the local tribes point to an origin on the interior plains and a recent migration seaward,464 so that no previous schooling enabled them to exploit the numerous harbors along this littoral, as did later the sea-bred Portuguese and English.

People living along the coast have various connections to the water, from the amphibious lifestyle of many Malay tribes who enjoy the waves lapping beneath their stilted villages, to the Nama Bushmen who live along the sand-dune coast of Southwest Africa and are unfamiliar with the sea. The development of their maritime skills is greatly influenced by the natural abilities and habits of these people; however, these traits have largely been shaped by their geographical background, whether they lived inland or on the coast, and by how long and how much they interacted with the ocean. The Phoenicians, who, according to different interpretations of their legends, arrived on the coast of Lebanon from either the Persian Gulf or the Red Sea,460 had a different set of advantages from the land-trading Philistines, who migrated north to take over the sand-clogged shores of Palestine,461 or the Jews, who were raised in the grasslands of Mesopotamia and the gardens of Judea and only sporadically made their way to the sea.462 The unbroken coast from Cape Carmel south to the Nile delta never produced a maritime culture and never gained maritime significance until experienced sailors like the Greeks established colonies and built their harbors along the shores of Sharon and Philistia.463 Similarly, on the west coast of Africa, from Senegal down the entire Guinea Coast to Benguela, all signs of kinship and tradition among the local tribes indicate an origin from the interior plains and a recent migration toward the coast,464 meaning they had no prior knowledge to take advantage of the many harbors along this coastline, unlike the later sea-faring Portuguese and English.

Habitability of coasts as factor in maritime development.

Not only the accessibility of the coast from the sea, but also its habitability enters as a factor into its historical importance. A sandy desert coast, like that of Southwest Africa and much of the Peruvian littoral, or a sterile mountain face, like that of Lower California, excludes the people of the country from the sea. Saldanha Bay, the one good natural harbor on the west coast of Cape Colony, is worthless even to the enterprising English, because it has no supply of fresh water.465 The slowness of the ancient Egyptians to take the short step forward from river to marine navigation can undoubtedly be traced to the fact that the sour swamps, barren sand-dunes, and pestilential marshes on the seaward side of the Nile delta must have always been sparsely populated as they are to-day,466 and that a broad stretch of sandy waste formed their Red Sea littoral.

Not only does the accessibility of the coast from the sea matter, but its livability also plays a role in its historical significance. A sandy desert coast, like that of Southwest Africa and much of the Peruvian coastline, or a barren mountain face, like that of Lower California, keeps the local people away from the sea. Saldanha Bay, the only good natural harbor on the west coast of Cape Colony, is useless even to the resourceful English because it lacks a fresh water source.465 The ancient Egyptians' reluctance to advance from river travel to marine navigation likely stems from the fact that the sour swamps, barren sand dunes, and unhealthy marshes on the seaward side of the Nile delta must have always been sparsely populated, just as they are today,466 and a wide stretch of sandy wasteland formed their Red Sea coastline.

On the other hand, where the hem of the continents is fertile enough to support a dense population, a large number of people are brought into contact with the sea, even where no elaborate articulation lengthens the shoreline. When this teeming humanity of a garden littoral is barred from landward expansion by desert or mountain, or by the already overcrowded population of its own hinterland, it wells over the brim of its home country, no matter how large, and overflows to other lands across the seas. The congested population of the fertile and indented coast of southern China, though not strictly speaking a sea-faring people, found an outlet for their redundant humanity and their commerce in the tropical Sunda Islands. By the sixth century their trading junks were doing an active business in the harbors of Java, Sumatra, and Malacca; they had even reached Ceylon and the Persian Gulf, and a little later were visiting the great focal market of Aden at the entrance of the Red Sea.467 A strong infusion of Chinese blood improved the Malay stock in the Sunda Islands, and later in North Borneo and certain of the Philippines, whither their traders and emigrants turned in the fourteenth century, when they found their opportunities curtailed in the archipelago to the south by the spread of Islam.468 Now the "yellow peril" threatens the whole circle of these islands from Luzon to Sumatra.

On the other hand, where the edges of the continents are fertile enough to support a dense population, a lot of people come into contact with the sea, even if the coastline isn't overly complicated. When this bustling population of a rich coastal area is prevented from expanding landward by deserts or mountains, or by the already crowded population of its own hinterland, it spills over beyond its borders, no matter how large, and flows into other lands across the sea. The crowded population of the fertile and jagged coast of southern China, while not technically a seafaring people, found a way to manage their excess population and trade in the tropical Sunda Islands. By the sixth century, their trading boats were actively doing business in the ports of Java, Sumatra, and Malacca; they had even made it to Ceylon and the Persian Gulf, and shortly after, they were visiting the major market of Aden at the entrance of the Red Sea.467 A strong mix of Chinese ancestry improved the Malay population in the Sunda Islands, and later in North Borneo and parts of the Philippines, where their traders and migrants moved in the fourteenth century when opportunities were limited in the southern archipelago due to the spread of Islam.468 Now the "yellow peril" threatens the entire circle of these islands from Luzon to Sumatra.

Similarly India, first from its eastern, later from its western coast, sent a stream of traders, Buddhist priests, and colonists to the Sunda Islands, and especially to Java, as early as the fifth century of our era, whence Indian civilization, religion, and elements of the Sanskrit tongue spread to Borneo, Sumatra, Bali, Lombok, and even to some smaller islands among the Molucca group.469 The Hindus became the dominant commercial nation of the Indian Ocean long before the great development of Arabian sea power, and later shared the trade of the East African coast with the merchants of Oman and Yemen.470 To-day they form a considerable mercantile class in the ports of Mascat, Aden, Zanzibar, Pemba, and Natal.

Similarly, India, first from its eastern coast and later from its western coast, sent a steady stream of traders, Buddhist monks, and settlers to the Sunda Islands, especially to Java, as early as the fifth century AD. From there, Indian civilization, religion, and elements of the Sanskrit language spread to Borneo, Sumatra, Bali, Lombok, and even some smaller islands in the Molucca group.469 The Hindus became the leading commercial nation of the Indian Ocean long before the significant rise of Arabian sea power, and later shared the trade on the East African coast with merchants from Oman and Yemen.470 Today, they make up a substantial merchant class in the ports of Muscat, Aden, Zanzibar, Pemba, and Natal.

Geographic conditions for brilliant maritime development.

On the coasts of large fertile areas like China and India, however, maritime activity comes not as an early, but as an eventual development, assumes not a dominant, but an incidental historical importance. The coastlands appearing early on the maritime stage of history, and playing a brilliant part in the drama of the sea, have been habitable, but their tillable fields have been limited either in fertility, as in New England, or in amount, as in Greece, or in both respects, as in Norway. But if blessed with advantageous location for international trade and many or even a few fairly good harbors, such coasts tend to develop wide maritime dominion and colonial expansion.471

On the coasts of large fertile regions like China and India, however, maritime activity doesn’t emerge as an early development but rather as a later one, taking on an incidental historical significance rather than a dominant one. The coastlines that appeared early in maritime history and played a significant role in the narrative of the sea have been livable, but their arable land has been limited, either in fertility, like in New England, or in size, like in Greece, or in both, like in Norway. However, if they are situated advantageously for international trade and have many or even a few decent harbors, these coasts tend to develop extensive maritime influence and colonial expansion.471

Great fertility in a narrow coastal belt barred from the interior serves to concentrate and energize the maritime activities of the nation. The 20-mile wide plain stretching along the foot of the Lebanon range from Antioch to Cape Carmel is even now the garden of Syria.472 In ancient Phoenician days its abundant crops and vines supported luxuriant cities and a teeming population, which sailed and traded and colonized to the Atlantic outskirts of Europe and Africa. Moreover, their maritime ventures had a wide sweep as early as 1100 B. C. Quite similar to the Phoenician littoral and almost duplicating its history, is the Oman seaboard of eastern Arabia. Here again a fertile coastal plain sprinkled with its "hundred villages," edged with a few tolerable harbors, and backed by a high mountain wall with an expanse of desert beyond, produced a race of bold and skilful navigators,473 who in the Middle Ages used their location between the Persian Gulf and the Arabian Sea to make themselves the dominant maritime power of the Indian ocean. With them maritime expansion was typically wide in its sweep and rapid in its development. Even before Mohammed's time they had reached India; but under the energizing influences of Islam, by 758 they had established a flourishing trade with China, for which they set up way stations or staple-points in Canton and the Sunda Islands.474 First as voyagers and merchants, then as colonists, they came, bringing their wares and their religion to these distant shores. Marco Polo, visiting Sumatra in 1260, tells us the coast population was "Saracen," but this was probably more in religion than in blood.475 Oman ventures, seconded by those of Yemen, reached as far south as east. The trading stations of Madisha and Barawa were established on the Somali coast of East Africa in 908, and Kilwa 750 miles further south in 925. In the seventeenth century the Oman Arabs dislodged the intruding Portuguese from all this coast belt down to the present northern boundary of Portuguese East Africa. Even so late as 1850 their capital, Mascat, sent out fine merchantmen that did an extensive carrying trade, and might be seen loading in the ports of British India, in Singapore, Java, and Mauritius.

Great fertility in a narrow coastal strip separated from the interior helps to concentrate and energize the nation's maritime activities. The 20-mile wide plain stretching along the foot of the Lebanon range from Antioch to Cape Carmel is still the garden of Syria.472 During ancient Phoenician times, its abundant crops and vines supported thriving cities and a large population, which sailed, traded, and colonized the Atlantic edges of Europe and Africa. Their maritime ventures were extensive as early as 1100 B.C. A coastal region in eastern Arabia, similar to the Phoenician coastline and nearly mirroring its history, is the Oman seaboard. Here, once again a fertile coastal plain dotted with its "hundred villages," edged by a few decent harbors, and backed by a tall mountain range with stretches of desert beyond, produced a group of bold and skilled navigators,473 who in the Middle Ages leveraged their position between the Persian Gulf and the Arabian Sea to become the leading maritime power in the Indian Ocean. Their maritime expansion was typically broad and progressed rapidly. Even before Mohammed's time, they had reached India; but under the invigorating influence of Islam, by 758 they had established a thriving trade with China, creating way stations or trading posts in Canton and the Sunda Islands.474 Initially as voyagers and merchants, then as settlers, they arrived, bringing their goods and their faith to these distant shores. Marco Polo, visiting Sumatra in 1260, noted that the coastal population was "Saracen," although this likely referred more to religion than ethnicity.475 Oman's ventures, supported by those from Yemen, extended as far south as the east. Trading stations in Madisha and Barawa were established on the Somali coast of East Africa in 908, and Kilwa, 750 miles further south, in 925. In the seventeenth century, the Oman Arabs expelled the Portuguese from this coastal area all the way down to the current northern border of Portuguese East Africa. As recently as 1850, their capital, Mascat, sent out fine merchant ships that conducted an extensive carrying trade, loading goods in the ports of British India, Singapore, Java, and Mauritius.

Soil of coastlands as factor.

Brittany's active part in the maritime history of France is due not only to its ragged contour, its inshore and offshore islands, its forward location on the Atlantic which brought it near to the fisheries of Newfoundland and the trade of the West Indies, but also to the fact that the "Golden Belt," which, with but few interruptions, forms a band of fertility along the coast, has supported a denser population than the sterile granitic soils of the interior,476 while the sea near by varied and enriched the diet of the inhabitants by its abundance of fish, and in its limy seaweed yielded a valuable fertilizer for their gardens.477 The small but countless alluvial deposits at the fiord heads in Norway, aided by the products of the sea, are able to support a considerable number of people. Hence the narrow coastal rim of that country shows always a density of population double or quadruple that of the next density belt toward the mountainous interior, and contains seventeen out of Norway's nineteen towns having more than 5,000 inhabitants.478 It is this relative fertility of the coastal regions, as opposed to the sterile interior, that has brought so large a part of Norway's people in contact with the Atlantic and helped give them a prominent place in maritime history.

Brittany's significant role in France's maritime history comes not only from its rugged coastline, its offshore and inshore islands, and its strategic position on the Atlantic, which brought it close to the fisheries of Newfoundland and the trade routes of the West Indies, but also from the "Golden Belt." This largely uninterrupted band of fertile land along the coast has supported a larger population than the barren granitic soils found inland,476 while the nearby sea enriched the locals' diets with an abundance of fish and provided valuable fertilizer for their gardens through its limy seaweed.477 Similarly, the small but numerous alluvial deposits at the heads of fjords in Norway, combined with marine resources, can support a significant population. As a result, the narrow coastal strip of that country consistently shows a population density that is double or quadruple that of the next population zone toward the mountainous interior, and includes seventeen of Norway's nineteen towns with more than 5,000 residents.478 This relative fertility of the coastal areas, in contrast to the sterile interior, has drawn a large portion of Norway's population to the Atlantic and has played a key role in their maritime history.

Barren coast of fertile hinterland.

Occasionally an infertile and sparsely inhabited littoral bordering a limited zone of singular productivity, especially if favorably located for international trade, will develop marked maritime activity, both in trade and commercial colonization. Such was Arabian Yemen, the home of the ancient Sabæans on the Red Sea, stretching from the Straits of Bab-el-Mandeb north-westward for 500 miles. Here a mountain range, rising to 10,000 feet and bordering the plateau desert of central Arabia, condenses the vapors of the summer monsoon and creates a long-drawn oasis, where terraced coffee gardens and orchards blossom in the irrigated soil; but the arid coastal strip at its feet, harboring a sparse population only along its tricking streams, developed a series of considerable ports as outlets for the abundant products and crowded population of the highlands.479 A location on the busy sea lane leading from the Indian Ocean to the Mediterranean, near the meeting place of three continents, made the merchants of the Yemen coast, like the Oman Arabs to the north, middlemen in the trade of Europe with eastern Africa and India.480 Therefore, even in the second century these Sabæans had their trading stations scattered along the east coast of Africa as far south as Zanzibar.481 In 1502 Vasco da Gama found Arabs, either of Oman or Yemen, yet farther south in Sofala, the port for the ivory and gold trade. Some of them he employed as pilots to steer his course to India.482

Sometimes an underpopulated coastal area bordering a small zone of unique productivity, especially if well-positioned for international trade, will see significant maritime activity in both trade and commercial colonization. This was the case with Arabian Yemen, the homeland of the ancient Sabæans by the Red Sea, extending from the Straits of Bab-el-Mandeb northwest for 500 miles. Here, a mountain range that rises to 10,000 feet and borders the desert plateau of central Arabia captures the moisture from the summer monsoon and creates a long oasis, where terraced coffee gardens and orchards thrive in the irrigated soil; however, the dry coastal area at its base, with a sparse population only along its meandering streams, developed a series of important ports as outlets for the plentiful products and crowded population from the highlands.479 Being located on the busy sea route from the Indian Ocean to the Mediterranean, near the intersection of three continents, positioned the merchants of the Yemen coast, like the Omani Arabs to the north, as intermediaries in the trade between Europe and eastern Africa and India.480 Therefore, even in the second century, the Sabæans had set up trading stations along the east coast of Africa as far south as Zanzibar.481 When Vasco da Gama arrived in 1502, he found Arabs, either from Oman or Yemen, even further south in Sofala, the port for the ivory and gold trade. Some of them he hired as pilots to navigate his course to India.482

History makes one fact very plain: a people who dwell by the sea, and to whom nature applies some lash to drive them out upon the deep, command opportunity for practically unlimited expansion. In this way small and apparently ill-favored strips of the earth's surface have become the seats of wide maritime supremacy and colonial empire. The scattered but extensive seaboard possession of little Venice and Genoa in the latter centuries of the Middle Ages are paralleled in modern times by the large oversea dominions of the English and Dutch.

History makes one fact very clear: a people living by the sea, whom nature nudges to venture into the deep, have the chance for almost limitless growth. In this way, small and seemingly unremarkable pieces of land have turned into centers of vast maritime power and colonial empires. The scattered but extensive coastal holdings of little Venice and Genoa in the later centuries of the Middle Ages are mirrored today by the vast overseas territories of the English and Dutch.

Seaward expansions of peoples are always of great moment and generally of vast extent, whether they are the coastward movements of inland peoples to get a foothold upon the great oceanic highway of trade and civilization, as has been the case with the Russians notably since the early eighteenth century, and with numerous interior tribes of West Africa since the opening of the slave trade; or whether they represent the more rapid and extensive coastwise and oversea expansions of maritime nations like the English, Dutch, and Portuguese. In either event they give rise to widespread displacements of peoples and a bizarre arrangement of race elements along the coast. When these two contrary movements meet, the shock of battle follows, as the recent history of the Russians and Japanese in Manchuria and Korea illustrates, the wars of Swedes and Russians for the possession of the eastern Baltic littoral, and the numerous minor conflicts that have occurred in Upper Guinea between European commercial powers and the would-be trading tribes of the bordering hinterland.

Seaward expansions of populations are always significant and usually very large-scale, whether it's the movement of inland communities seeking to establish themselves along the major ocean trade routes, as seen with the Russians notably since the early 1700s, and various interior tribes in West Africa since the slave trade began; or whether they involve the faster and broader coastal and overseas expansions of maritime nations like the English, Dutch, and Portuguese. In both cases, these movements lead to widespread displacement of communities and a strange mix of different racial groups along the coast. When these two opposing movements collide, conflict often ensues, as demonstrated by the recent history of Russians and Japanese in Manchuria and Korea, the wars between Swedes and Russians for control of the eastern Baltic coast, and the many smaller skirmishes that have occurred in Upper Guinea between European commercial powers and the local trading tribes.

Ethnic contrast between coast and interior peoples.

A coast region is a peculiar habitat, inasmuch as it is more or less dominated by the sea. It is exposed to inundation by tidal wave and to occupation by immigrant fleets. It may be the base for out-going maritime enterprise or the goal of some oversea movement, the dispenser or the recipient of colonists. The contrast between coast-dwellers and the nearby inland people which exists so widely can be traced not only to a difference of environment, but often to a fundamental difference of race or tribe caused by immigration to accessible shores. The Greeks, crowded in their narrow peninsula of limited fertility, wove an Hellenic border on the skirts of the Black Sea and eastern Mediterranean lands, just as the Carthaginians added a fringe of aliens to North Africa, where the Punic people of the coast presented a marked contrast to the Berbers of the interior. [See map page 251.]

A coastal region is a unique habitat because it is largely influenced by the sea. It faces the risk of being flooded by tidal waves and is often settled by immigrant groups. It can serve as a starting point for maritime ventures or as a destination for overseas movements, acting as either a source or a destination for colonists. The differences between coastal dwellers and the people living inland can be attributed not only to contrasting environments but often to significant differences in race or tribe due to immigration to accessible shores. The Greeks, confined to their narrow peninsula with limited resources, established a Hellenic presence along the shores of the Black Sea and the eastern Mediterranean, just as the Carthaginians brought in various groups to North Africa, where the coastal Punic people were quite different from the Berbers in the interior. [See map page 251.]

An ethnographical map of Russia to-day shows a narrow but almost continuous rim of Germans stretching from the River Niemen north through the Baltic coast of Courland, Livland, and Esthland, as far as Revel; and again, a similar band of Swedes along the seaboard of Finland, from a point east of Helsingfors on the south around to Uleaborg on the north,483 dating from the time when Finland was a political dependency of Sweden, and influenced by the fact that the frozen Gulf of Bothnia every winter makes a bridge of ice between the two shores. [See map page 225.]

An ethnographic map of Russia today shows a narrow but nearly continuous line of Germans stretching from the Niemen River north along the Baltic coast of Courland, Livland, and Esthland, all the way to Revel; and again, a similar band of Swedes along the coast of Finland, from a point east of Helsinki in the south around to Uleaborg in the north,483 dating back to when Finland was a political dependency of Sweden, influenced by the fact that the frozen Gulf of Bothnia creates a bridge of ice between the two shores every winter. [See map page 225.]

Ethnic contrasts in the Pacific islands.

Everywhere in the Melanesian archipelago, where Papuans and Malays dwell side by side, the latter as the new-comers are always found in possession of the coast, while the darker aborigines have withdrawn into the interior. So in the Philippines, the aboriginal Negritos, pure or more often mixed with Malayan blood, as in the Mangyan tribe of central Mindoro, are found crowded back into the interior by the successive invasions of Malays who have encircled the coasts. [See map page 147.] The Zamboanga peninsula of Mindanao has an inland pagan population of primitive Malayan race called Subanon, who have been displaced from the littoral by the seafaring Samal Moros, Mohammedanized Malays from the east shores of Sumatra and the adjacent islands, who spread northward about 1300 under the energizing impulse of their new religion.484 Even at so late a date as the arrival of Magellan, the Subanon seem to have still occupied some points of the coast,485 just as the savage Ainos of the Island of Yezo touched the sea about Sapporo only forty years ago, though they are now surrounded by a seaboard rim of Japanese.486

Everywhere in the Melanesian archipelago, where Papuans and Malays live side by side, the Malays, as newcomers, have taken over the coast, while the darker indigenous people have retreated inland. Similarly, in the Philippines, the native Negritos, either pure or more commonly mixed with Malayan ancestry—like the Mangyan tribe in central Mindoro—have been pushed back into the interior by waves of Malay invasions that have surrounded the coast. [See map page 147.] The Zamboanga peninsula in Mindanao has a group of inland pagans from a primitive Malayan background called Subanon, who have been driven from the coastline by the seafaring Samal Moros, Muslim Malays from the eastern shores of Sumatra and nearby islands, who moved northward around 1300 due to the strong influence of their new religion.484 Even at the time of Magellan's arrival, the Subanon still occupied some areas along the coast,485 just as the savage Ainos of Yezo Island were near the sea around Sapporo just forty years ago, although they are now surrounded by a coastal edge of Japanese.486

Ethnic contrasts in the Americas.

If we turn to South America, we find that warlike Tupi, at the time of the discovery, occupied the whole Brazilian coast from the southern tropic north to eastern Guiana, while the highlands of eastern Brazil immediately in their rear were populated by tribes of Ges, who had been displaced by the coastwise expansion of the Tupi canoemen.487 [See map page 101.] And to-day this same belt of coastland has been appropriated by a foreign population of Europeans and Negroes, while the vast interior of Brazil shows a predominance of native Indian stocks, only broken here and there by a lonely enclave of Portuguese settlement. The early English and French territories in America presented this same contrast of coast and inland people—the colonists planting themselves on the hem of the continent to preserve maritime connection with the home countries, the aborigines forced back beyond reach of the tide.

If we look at South America, we see that the warlike Tupi occupied the entire Brazilian coast from the southern tropic up to eastern Guiana at the time of discovery. Behind them, the highlands of eastern Brazil were home to tribes of Ges, who had been pushed back by the Tupi canoemen's expansion along the coast.487 [See map page 101.] Today, this same stretch of coastline has been taken over by foreign populations of Europeans and Africans, while the vast interior of Brazil is mostly filled with indigenous Indian groups, only occasionally disrupted by isolated Portuguese settlements. The early English and French territories in America showed a similar contrast between coastal and inland peoples—the colonists settling along the edge of the continent to maintain maritime connections with their home countries, while the natives were pushed back out of reach of the tide.

Wherever an energetic seafaring people with marked commercial or colonizing bent make a highway of the deep, they give rise to this distinction of coast and inland people on whatever shores they touch. The expanding Angles and Saxons did it in the North Sea and the Channel, where they stretched their litus Saxonicum faintly along the coast of the continent to the apex of Brittany, and firmly along the hem of England from Southampton Water to the Firth of Forth;488 the sea-bred Scandinavians did it farther north in the Teutonic fringe of settlements which they placed on the shores of Celtic Scotland and Ireland.489

Wherever an energetic seafaring people with a strong commercial or colonizing spirit create a pathway across the sea, they establish a distinction between coastal and inland communities wherever they land. The expanding Angles and Saxons did this in the North Sea and the Channel, where they stretched their litus Saxonicum faintly along the continent's coast to the tip of Brittany and firmly along England's coastline from Southampton Water to the Firth of Forth;488 the sea-faring Scandinavians did the same further north in the Teutonic settlements they established on the shores of Celtic Scotland and Ireland.489

Older ethnic stock in coastlands.

As a rule it is the new-comers who hold the coast, but occasionally the coast-dwellers represent the older ethnic stock. In the Balkan Peninsula to-day the descendants of the ancient Hellenes are, with few exceptions, confined to the coast. The reason is to be found in the fact that the Slavs and other northern races who have intruded by successive invasions from the plains of southern Russia are primarily inland peoples, and therefore have occupied the core of the peninsula, forcing the original Greek population before them to the edge of the sea.490 This is the same anthropo-geographical process which makes so many peninsulas the last halting-place of a dislodged earlier race. But the Greeks who line the northern and western shores of Asiatic Turkey are such only in language and religion, because their prevailing broad head-form shows them to be Turks and Armenians in race stock.491

As a rule, it's the newcomers who occupy the coast, but sometimes the coastal residents belong to the older ethnic groups. Today in the Balkan Peninsula, the descendants of the ancient Greeks are, with few exceptions, limited to the coastal areas. This situation arises because the Slavs and other northern groups who have invaded from the plains of southern Russia are mainly inland peoples and have therefore taken over the center of the peninsula, pushing the original Greek population to the coastline.490 This is the same geographical process that makes many peninsulas the final refuge of a displaced earlier race. However, the Greeks living along the northern and western shores of Asiatic Turkey are only Greek in language and religion, as their dominant broad head shape indicates they are of Turkish and Armenian ancestry.491

Sometimes the distinction of race between coast and interior is obliterated so far as language and civilization are concerned, but survives less conspicuously in head-form and pigmentation. The outermost fringe of the Norwegian coast, from the extreme south to the latitude of Trondhjem in the north, is occupied by a broad-headed, round-faced, rather dark people of only medium height, who show decided affinities with the Alpine race of Central Europe, and who present a marked contrast to the tall narrow-headed blondes of pure Teutonic type, constituting the prevailing population from the inner edge of the coast eastward into Sweden. This brachycephalic, un-Germanic stock of the Norwegian seaboard seems to represent the last stand made by that once wide-spread Alpine race, which here has been shoved along to the rocky capes and islands of the outer edge by a later Teutonic immigration coming from Sweden.492 So the largest continuous area of Negrito stock in the Philippines is found in the Sierra Madre mountains defining the eastern coast of northern Luzon.493 Facing the neighborless wastes of the Pacific, whence no new settler could come, turned away from the sources of Malay immigration to the southwest, its location made it a retreat, rather than a gateway to incoming races. [See map page 147.]

Sometimes the difference in race between the coast and the interior is less clear when it comes to language and civilization, but it remains noticeable in skull shape and skin color. The outermost part of the Norwegian coast, from the southern tip to the latitude of Trondhjem in the north, is home to a broad-headed, round-faced, fairly dark people of average height, who share strong traits with the Alpine race from Central Europe. They stand in stark contrast to the tall, narrow-headed blondes of pure Teutonic type, who make up the main population from the inner part of the coast eastward into Sweden. This broad-headed, non-Germanic group on the Norwegian coast seems to be the last remnant of a once widespread Alpine race, pushed to the rocky edges and islands by a later wave of Teutonic migrants from Sweden.492 The largest continuous area of Negrito ancestry in the Philippines is located in the Sierra Madre mountains along the eastern coast of northern Luzon.493 Facing the empty stretches of the Pacific, where no new settlers could arrive, and cut off from the sources of Malay immigration to the southwest, this area became more of a retreat than a gateway for incoming populations. [See map page 147.]

Ethnic amalgamations in coastlands.

Where an immigrant population from oversea lands occupies the coastal hem of a country, rarely do they preserve the purity of their race. Coming at first with marauding or trading intent, they bring no women with them, but institute their trading stations or colonies by marriage with the women of the country. The ethnic character of the resultant population depends upon the proportion of the two constituent elements, the nearness or remoteness of their previous kinship, and the degree of innate race antagonism. The ancient Greek elements which crossed the Aegean from different sections of the peninsula to colonize the Ionian coast of Asia Minor mingled with the native Carian, Cretan, Lydian, Pelasgian, and Phoenician populations which they found there.494 On all the barbarian shores where the Greeks established themselves, there arose a mixed race—in Celtic Massilia, in Libyan Barca, and in Scythian Crimea—but always a race Hellenized, born interpreters and mercantile agents.495

Where an immigrant population from overseas settles along a country's coast, they rarely maintain the purity of their race. Initially coming with either raiding or trading intentions, they arrive without women and establish trading posts or colonies by marrying local women. The ethnic makeup of the resulting population depends on the ratio of the two groups, the closeness of their previous connections, and the level of inherent racial hostility. The ancient Greek groups that crossed the Aegean from various parts of the peninsula to colonize the Ionian coast of Asia Minor mixed with the native Carian, Cretan, Lydian, Pelasgian, and Phoenician populations they encountered there.494 In all the barbarian regions where the Greeks settled, a mixed race emerged—in Celtic Massilia, in Libyan Barca, and in Scythian Crimea—but it was always a Hellenized race, born interpreters and trade agents.495

A maritime people, engrossed chiefly with the idea of trade, moves in small groups and intermittently; hence it modifies the original coastal population less than does a genuine colonizing nation, especially as it prefers the smallest possible territorial base for its operations. The Arab element in the coast population of East Africa is strongly represented, but not so strongly as one might expect after a thousand years of intercourse, because it was scattered in detached seaboard points, only a few of which were really stable. The native population of Zanzibar and Pemba and the fringe of coast tribes on the mainland opposite are clearly tinged with Arab blood. These Swahili, as they are called, are a highly mixed race, as their negro element has been derived not only from the local coast peoples, but also from the slaves who for centuries have been halting here on their seaward journey from the interior of Africa.496 [See map page 105.]

A maritime people, primarily focused on trade, operates in small groups and on an irregular basis; as a result, it influences the original coastal population less than a true colonizing nation, especially since it prefers the smallest possible territorial base for its activities. The Arab presence in the coastal population of East Africa is significant, but not as strong as one might expect after a thousand years of interaction, because it was spread out across separate coastal areas, with only a few being truly stable. The native populations of Zanzibar and Pemba, along with the coastal tribes on the mainland across from them, clearly have some Arab ancestry. These people, known as Swahili, are a highly mixed race, as their African heritage comes not only from the local coastal tribes but also from the slaves who have stopped here for centuries on their journey from the interior of Africa.496 [See map page 105.]

Multiplicity of race elements on coasts.

Coast peoples tend to show something more than the hybridism resulting from the mingling of two stocks. So soon as the art of navigation developed beyond its initial phase of mere coastwise travel, and began to strike out across the deep, all coast peoples bordered upon each other, and the sea became a common waste boundary between. Unlike a land boundary, which is in general accessible from only two sides and tends to show, therefore, only two constituent elements in its border population, a sea boundary is accessible from many directions with almost equal ease; it therefore draws from many lands, and gives its population a variety of ethnic elements and a cosmopolitan stamp. This, however, is most marked in great seaports, but from them it penetrates into the surrounding country. The whole southern and eastern coast population of England, from Cornwall to the Wash, received during Elizabeth's reign valuable accessions of industrious Flemings and Huguenots, refugees from Catholic persecution in the Netherlands and France.497 Our North Atlantic States, whose population is more than half (50.9 per cent.) made up of aliens and natives born of foreign parents,498 have drawn these elements from almost the whole circle of Atlantic shores, from Norway to Argentine and from Argentine to Newfoundland. Even the Southern States, so long unattractive to immigrants on account of the low status of labor, show a fringe of various foreign elements along the Gulf coast, the deeper tint of which on the census maps fades off rapidly toward the interior. The same phenomenon appears with Asiatic and Australian elements in our Pacific seaboard states.499 The cosmopolitan population of New York, with its "Chinatown," its "Little Italy," its Russian and Hungarian quarters, has its counterpart in the mixed population of Mascat, peopled by Hindu, Arabs, Persians, Kurds, Afghans, and Baluchis, settled here for purposes of trade; or in the equally mongrel inhabitants of Aden and Zanzibar, of Marseilles, Constantinople, Alexandria, Port Said, and other Mediterranean ports.

Coastal communities tend to exhibit more than just the blending that comes from two different groups meeting. Once navigation advanced beyond basic coastal travel and started to explore the open sea, all coastal people began to interact with each other, with the ocean becoming a shared border. Unlike land boundaries, which can usually be approached from only two sides and therefore show just two main groups in their population, a sea boundary can be reached from many directions almost equally easily. This allows for a mix from various lands, giving the population a diverse ethnic makeup and a cosmopolitan vibe. This is most prominent in major seaports, but it also spreads into nearby areas. The entire southern and eastern coastal population of England, from Cornwall to the Wash, saw a significant influx of industrious Flemish and Huguenot refugees fleeing Catholic persecution in the Netherlands and France during Elizabeth's reign.497 Our North Atlantic States, with over half (50.9 percent) of the population composed of immigrants and natives born to foreign parents,498 have attracted these individuals from nearly the entire range of Atlantic shores, from Norway to Argentina and from Argentina to Newfoundland. Even the Southern States, which have historically been less appealing to immigrants due to low labor status, show a mix of various foreign groups along the Gulf coast, although the influence lessens quickly as you move inland. The same pattern is seen with Asian and Australian groups along our Pacific coast states.499 The diverse population of New York, with its "Chinatown," "Little Italy," and quarters for Russians and Hungarians, mirrors the mixed communities in Mascat, where Hindus, Arabs, Persians, Kurds, Afghans, and Baluchis live for trade; or in other cosmopolitan cities like Aden, Zanzibar, Marseille, Constantinople, Alexandria, Port Said, and other Mediterranean ports.

Lingua franca of coasts.

The cosmopolitanism and the commercial activity that characterize so many seaboards are reflected in the fact that, with rare exceptions, it is the coast regions of the world that give rise to a lingua franca or lingua geral. The original lingua franca arose on the coast of the Levant during the period of Italian commercial supremacy there. It consisted of an Italian stock, on which were grafted Greek, Arabic, and Turkish words, and was the regular language of trade for French, Spanish, and Italians.500 It is still spoken in many Mediterranean ports, especially in Smyrna, and in the early part of the nineteenth century was in use from Madagascar to the Philippines.501 From the coastal strip of the Zanzibar Arabs, recently transferred to German East Africa, the speech of the Swahili has become a means of communication over a great part of East Africa, from the coast to the Congo and the sources of the Nile. It is a Bantu dialect permeated with Arabic and Hindu terms, and sparsely sprinkled even with English and German words.502 "Pidgin English" (business English) performs the function of a lingua franca in the ports of China and the Far East. It is a jargon of corrupted English with a slight mixture of Chinese, Malay, and Portuguese words, arranged according to the Chinese idiom. Another mongrel English does service on the coast of New Guinea. The "Nigger English" of the West African trade is a regular dialect among the natives of the Sierra Leone coast. Farther east, along the Upper Guinea littoral, the Eboe family of tribes who extend across the Niger delta from Lagos to Old Calabar have furnished a language of trade in one of their dialects.503 The Tupi speech of the Brazilian coast Indians, with whom the explorers first came into contact, became, in the mouth of Portuguese traders and Jesuit missionaries, the lingua geral or medium of communication between the whites and the various Indian tribes throughout Brazil.504 The Chinook Indians, located on our Pacific coast north and south of the Columbia River, have furnished a jargon of Indian, French, and English words which serves as a language of trade throughout a long stretch of the northwest Pacific coast, not only between whites and Indians, but also between Indians of different linguistic stocks.505

The cosmopolitan nature and commercial activity that define many coastlines are evident in the fact that, with few exceptions, it's the coastal areas of the world that create a lingua franca or lingua geral. The original lingua franca emerged on the coast of the Levant during the time when Italians dominated trade there. It was primarily based on Italian, but included words from Greek, Arabic, and Turkish, and was commonly used for trade by French, Spanish, and Italians.500 It is still spoken in many Mediterranean ports, especially in Smyrna, and in the early nineteenth century, it was in use from Madagascar to the Philippines.501 From the coastal area of the Zanzibar Arabs, which was recently transferred to German East Africa, the language of Swahili has become a means of communication across much of East Africa, from the coast to the Congo and the sources of the Nile. It is a Bantu dialect infused with Arabic and Hindu terms, and even includes a few English and German words.502 "Pidgin English" (business English) serves as a lingua franca in the ports of China and the Far East. It is a mix of corrupted English with some Chinese, Malay, and Portuguese words, arranged according to Chinese syntax. Another variant of English is used along the coast of New Guinea. The "Nigger English" of the West African trade serves as a regular dialect among the natives of the Sierra Leone coast. Further east, along the Upper Guinea coast, the Eboe tribe, which spans the Niger delta from Lagos to Old Calabar, has provided a trade language in one of their dialects.503 The Tupi language of the Brazilian coastal Indians, who first encountered explorers, became, through Portuguese traders and Jesuit missionaries, the lingua geral or medium of communication between whites and various Indian tribes in Brazil.504 The Chinook Indians, located on our Pacific coast both north and south of the Columbia River, have created a jargon of Indian, French, and English words that acts as a trade language across a long stretch of the northwest Pacific coast, facilitating communication not only between whites and Indians, but also among Indians of different linguistic backgrounds.505

Coast-dwellers as middlemen.

The coast is the natural habitat of the middleman. One strip of seaboard produces a middleman people, and then sends them out to appropriate other littorals, if geographic conditions are favorable; otherwise it is content with the transit trade of its own locality. It breeds essentially a race of merchants, shunning varied production, nursing monopoly by secrecy and every method to crush competition. The profits of trade attract all the free citizens, and the laboring class is small or slave. Expansion landward has no attraction in comparison with the seaward expansion of commerce. The result is often a relative dearth of local land-grown food stuffs. King Hiram of Tyre, in his letter to King Solomon, promised to send him trees of cedar and cypress, made into rafts and conveyed to the coast of Philistia, and asked in return for grain, "which we stand in need of because we inhabit an island." The pay came in the form of wheat, oil, and wine. But Solomon furnished a considerable part of the laborers—30,000 of them—who were sent, 10,000 at a time, to Mount Lebanon to cut the timber, apparently under the direction of the more skilful Sidonian foresters.506 A type of true coast traders is found in the Duallas of the German Kamerun, at the inner angle of the Gulf of Guinea. Located along the lower course and delta of the Mungo River where it flows into the Kamerun estuary, they command a good route through a mountainous country into the interior. This they guard jealously, excluding all competition, monopolizing the trade, and imposing a transit duty on all articles going to and from the interior. They avoid agriculture so far as possible. Their women and slaves produce an inadequate supply of bananas and yams, but crops needing much labor are wholly neglected, so that their coasts have a reputation for dearness of provisions.507

The coast is the natural home of the middleman. One stretch of shoreline produces a community of middlemen, sending them out to exploit other coastlines when the geographic conditions are right; if not, they are content with the transit trade in their own area. This fosters a society of merchants who avoid diverse production, protecting their monopoly through secrecy and any means to eliminate competition. The profits from trade draw in all the free citizens, leaving a small or enslaved laboring class. Expanding inward doesn’t appeal compared to the commerce expanding outward toward the sea. As a result, there is often a relative shortage of locally grown food. King Hiram of Tyre, in his letter to King Solomon, promised to send cedar and cypress trees made into rafts to the coast of Philistia and asked for grain in return, stating, "which we need because we live on an island." The payment was in the form of wheat, oil, and wine. However, Solomon provided a significant portion of the labor—30,000 workers—who were sent, 10,000 at a time, to Mount Lebanon to harvest the timber, apparently under the supervision of the more skilled Sidonian foresters.506 A type of true coastal traders can be found among the Duallas of the German Kamerun, located at the inner angle of the Gulf of Guinea. Sitting along the lower stretch and delta of the Mungo River, where it meets the Kamerun estuary, they control a good route through mountainous terrain into the interior. They protect this route fiercely, excluding all competitors, monopolizing trade, and imposing a transit tax on all goods coming to and from the interior. They avoid agriculture as much as possible. Their women and slaves produce a minimal supply of bananas and yams, but labor-intensive crops are completely neglected, leading to their coasts being known for high food prices.507

Along the 4,500 miles of West African coast between the Senegal and the Kunene rivers the negro's natural talent for trade has developed special tribes, who act as intermediaries between the interior and the European stations on the seaboard. Among these we find the Bihenos and Banda of Portuguese Benguela, who fit out whole caravans for the back country; the Portuguese of Loanda rely on the Ambaquistas and the Mbunda middlemen. The slave trade particularly brought a sinister and abnormal activity to these seaboard tribes,508 just as it did to the East Coast tribes, and stimulated both in the exploitation of their geographic position as middlemen.509

Along the 4,500 miles of the West African coast between the Senegal and Kunene rivers, the African's natural talent for trade has led to the emergence of specific tribes that serve as intermediaries between the interior and the European trading posts along the coast. Among these are the Bihenos and Banda of Portuguese Benguela, who organize entire caravans for the inland regions; the Portuguese of Loanda depend on the Ambaquistas and Mbunda as middlemen. The slave trade particularly introduced a dark and abnormal activity to these coastal tribes,508 just as it did for the tribes along the East Coast, and spurred both groups in leveraging their geographic position as middlemen.509

Monopoly of trade with the hinterland.

The Alaskan coast shows the same development. The Kinik Indians at the head of Cook's Inlet buy skins of land animals from the inland Athapascans at the sources of the Copper River, and then make a good profit by selling them to the American traders of the coast. These same Athapascans for a long time found a similar body of middlemen in the Ugalentz at the mouth of the Copper River, till the Americans there encouraged the inland hunters to bring their skins to the fur station on the coast.510 The Chilcats at the head of Lynn Canal long monopolized the fur trade with the Athapascan Indians about Chilkoot Pass; these they would meet on the divide and buy their skins, which they would carry to the Hudson Bay Company agents on the coast. They guarded their monopoly jealously, and for fifty years were able to exclude all traders and miners from the passes leading to the Yukon.511

The Alaskan coast shows similar development. The Kinik Indians at the head of Cook's Inlet buy skins from land animals from the inland Athapascans at the sources of the Copper River, and then make a nice profit selling them to American traders on the coast. For a long time, these same Athapascans had another group of middlemen in the Ugalentz at the mouth of the Copper River, until Americans encouraged inland hunters to bring their skins to the fur station on the coast.510 The Chilcats at the head of Lynn Canal long dominated the fur trade with the Athapascan Indians near Chilkoot Pass; they would meet them on the divide and buy their skins, which they would then take to the Hudson Bay Company agents on the coast. They protected their monopoly fiercely, and for fifty years were able to keep all traders and miners out of the passes leading to the Yukon.511

The same policy of monopoly and exclusion has been pursued by the Moro coast dwellers of Mindanao in relation to the pagan tribes of the interior. They buy at low prices the forest and agriculture products of the inland Malays, whom they do not permit to approach either rivers or seaboard, for fear they may come into contact with the Chinese merchants along the coast. So fiercely is their monopoly guarded by this middleman race, that the American Government in the Philippines will be able to break it only by military interference.512

The same approach of monopolizing and excluding has been taken by the coastal inhabitants of Mindanao against the indigenous tribes inland. They purchase forest and agricultural products from the inland Malays at low prices, not allowing them to access rivers or the coast, fearing they might interact with the Chinese merchants along the shore. This middleman group guards their monopoly so fiercely that the American government in the Philippines can only dismantle it through military intervention.512

Differentiation of coast from inland people.

Differences of occupation, of food supply, and of climate often further operate to differentiate the coast from the inland people near by, and to emphasize the ethnic difference which is almost invariably present, either inconspicuously from a slight infusion of alien blood, or plainly as in an immigrant race. Sometimes the contrast is in physique. In Finisterre province of western Brittany, the people along the more fertile coastal strip are on the average an inch taller than the inhabitants of the barren, granitic interior. Their more generous food supply, further enriched by the abundant fisheries at their doors, would account for this increased stature; but this must also be attributed in part to intermixture of the local Celts with a tall Teutonic stock which brushed along these shores, but did not penetrate into the unattractive interior.513 So the negroes of the Guinea Coast, though not immune from fevers, are better nourished on the alluvial lowlands near the abundant fish of the lagoons, and hence are often stronger and better looking than the plateau interior tribes near by. But here, again, an advantageous blending of races can not be excluded as a contributing cause.514 Sometimes the advantage in physique falls to the inland people, especially in tropical countries when a highland interior is contrasted with a low coast belt. The wild Igorotes, inhabiting the mountainous interior of northern Luzon, enjoy a cooler climate than the lowlands, and this has resulted in developing in them a decidedly better physique and more industrious habits than are found in the civilized people of the coasts encircling them.515

Differences in occupation, food supply, and climate often serve to distinguish coastal communities from nearby inland populations, highlighting the ethnic differences that are usually there, whether subtly due to a slight mixing of different bloodlines or more obviously as in an immigrant group. Sometimes the difference is physical. In the Finisterre province of western Brittany, the people along the more fertile coastal area are, on average, an inch taller than those living in the barren, granitic interior. Their richer food supply, enhanced by the plentiful fish in their waters, could explain this taller stature; however, it can also be partially attributed to the mixing of the local Celts with a taller Teutonic population that passed through these shores but did not settle in the less appealing interior. 513 Similarly, the people of the Guinea Coast, while not free from fevers, are better nourished by the alluvial lowlands close to the abundant fish in the lagoons, making them often stronger and better-looking than the tribes in the nearby plateau interior. Yet again, the beneficial blending of races cannot be ruled out as a contributing factor. 514 Sometimes, the advantage in physical characteristics goes to the inland populations, especially in tropical regions where a highland interior is contrasted with a low coastal area. The wild Igorotes, living in the mountainous interior of northern Luzon, benefit from a cooler climate compared to the lowlands, resulting in a significantly better physique and more industrious habits than those found among the more civilized coastal communities surrounding them. 515

Early civilization of coasts.

Where a coast people is an immigrant stock from some remote oversea point, it brings to its new home a surplus of energy which was perhaps the basis of selection in the exodus from the mother country. Such a people is therefore characterized by greater initiative, enterprise, and endurance than the sedentary population which it left behind or that to which it comes; and these qualities are often further stimulated by the transfer to a new environment rich in opportunities. Sea-born in their origin, sea-borne in their migration, they cling to the zone of littoral, because here they find the conditions which they best know how to exploit. Dwelling on the highway of the ocean, living in easy intercourse with distant countries, which would have been far more difficult of access by land-travel over territories inhabited by hostile races, exchanging with these both commodities and ideas, food-stuffs and religions, they become the children of civilization, and their sun-burned seamen the sturdy apostles of progress. Therefore it may be laid down as a general proposition, that the coasts of a country are the first part of it to develop, not an indigenous or local civilization, but a cosmopolitan culture, which later spreads inland from the seaboard.

Where a coastal community is made up of immigrants from a distant overseas location, they bring with them a surplus of energy that likely played a role in their decision to leave their home country. This group of people tends to show more initiative, enterprise, and endurance compared to the settled population they left behind or the one they join; these traits are often further encouraged by their transition to a new environment filled with opportunities. Originating from the sea and migrating by sea, they stick to the coastal areas because that's where they find conditions they know how to make the most of. Living along the ocean's highway and maintaining easy connections with far-off countries—connections that would be much harder to achieve through land travel across territories occupied by hostile groups—they exchange both goods and ideas, food and religious beliefs, becoming part of a civilization, with their sun-tanned sailors acting as strong advocates of progress. Therefore, it can be said as a general principle that the coasts of a country are the first areas to develop not an indigenous or local civilization, but a cosmopolitan culture that later spreads inland from the seaside.

Retarded coastal peoples.

Exceptions to this rule are found in barren or inaccessible coasts like the Pacific littoral of Peru and Mexico, and on shores like those of California, western Africa and eastern Luzon, which occupy an adverse geographic location facing a neighborless expanse of ocean and remote from the world's earlier foci of civilization. Therefore the descent from the equatorial plateau of Africa down to the Atlantic littoral means a drop in culture also, because the various elements of civilization which for ages have uninterruptedly filtered into Sudan from the Mediterranean and the Red Sea, have rarely penetrated to the western rim of the highland, and hence never reached the coast. Moreover, this steaming lowland, from the Senegal River to the Kamerun Mountains, has been a last asylum for dislodged tribes who have been driven out by expanding peoples of the plateau. They have descended in their flight upon the original coast dwellers, adding to the general condition of political disruption, multiplying the number of small weak tribes, increasing the occasions for intertribal wars, and furthering the prevailing degradation. The seaboard lowlands of Sierra Leone, Liberia and the Ivory Coast have all suffered thus In historic times.516 All this region was the original home of the low, typical "Guinea Nigger" of the Southern plantation. The coasts of Oregon and California showed a parallel to this in their fragmentary native tribes of retarded development, whose level of culture, low at best, sank rapidly from the interior toward the seaboard. They seem to have been intruders from the central highlands, who further deteriorated in their weakness and isolation after reaching the coast. They bore every mark of degradation in their short stature, linguistic and tribal dismemberment, their low morals and culture, which ranked them little above the brutes. In contrast, all the large and superior Indian groups of North America belonged to the interior of the continent.517

Exceptions to this rule can be seen in barren or hard-to-reach coasts like the Pacific coastline of Peru and Mexico, as well as shores such as those in California, western Africa, and eastern Luzon, which are poorly positioned facing a vast ocean with no neighbors and are far from the world's early centers of civilization. As a result, the descent from the equatorial plateau of Africa to the Atlantic coast is also a decline in culture because the various elements of civilization that have continuously flowed into Sudan from the Mediterranean and the Red Sea have rarely made their way to the western edge of the plateau, and thus never reached the coastline. Additionally, this humid lowland, stretching from the Senegal River to the Kamerun Mountains, has served as a last refuge for displaced tribes driven out by expanding populations from the plateau. They have moved down in their flight upon the original coastal inhabitants, contributing to ongoing political instability, increasing the number of small, weak tribes, raising opportunities for intertribal conflicts, and worsening the prevailing decline. The coastal lowlands of Sierra Leone, Liberia, and the Ivory Coast have all experienced this during historical times.516 This entire area was the original home of the low, typical "Guinea Nigger" of the Southern plantation. The coasts of Oregon and California displayed a similar pattern with their fragmented native tribes of underdeveloped status, whose cultural level, already low, declined sharply from the inland areas to the coastline. They appeared to be intruders from the central highlands, who further deteriorated in their weakness and isolation after arriving at the coast. They exhibited all signs of decline in their short stature, fragmented languages and tribes, and their low morals and culture, which placed them just above animalistic behavior. In contrast, all the large and advanced Indian groups of North America were located in the interior of the continent.517

Cultural contrast of coast and interior.

The long, indented coast of the Mediterranean has in all ages up to modern times presented the contrast of a littoral more advanced in civilization than the inland districts. The only exception was ancient Egypt before Psammeticus began to exploit his mud-choked seaboard. This contrast was apparent, not only wherever Phoenicians or Greeks had appropriated the remote coast of an alien and retarded people, but even in near-by Thrace the savage habits of the interior tribes were softened only where these dwelt in close proximity to the Ionian colonies along the coast, a fact as noticeable in the time of Tacitus as in that of Herodotus five hundred years before.518 The ancient philosophers of Greece were awake to the deep-rooted differences between an inland and a maritime city, especially in respect to receptivity of ideas, activity of intellect, and affinity for culture.519

The long, indented coast of the Mediterranean has always shown a contrast between the more advanced civilization of its coastal areas and the less developed inland districts. The only exception was ancient Egypt before Psammeticus began to take advantage of its mud-covered coastline. This contrast was visible not only where Phoenicians or Greeks settled along the remote coast of a foreign and undeveloped people, but even in nearby Thrace, where the primitive ways of the interior tribes were softened only where they lived close to the Ionian colonies along the coast, a fact noticed by Tacitus just as it was by Herodotus five hundred years earlier.518 The ancient philosophers of Greece recognized the significant differences between inland and coastal cities, particularly regarding their openness to new ideas, intellectual activity, and cultural affinity.519

If we turn to the Philippines, we find that 65 per cent. of the Christian or civilized population of the islands live on or near the coast; and of the remaining 35 per cent. dwelling inland, by far the greater part represents simply the landward extension of the area of Christian civilization which had Manila Bay for a nucleus.520 Otherwise, all the interior districts are occupied by wild or pagan tribes. Mohammedanism, too, a religion of civilization, rims the southernmost islands which face the eastern distributing point of the faith in Java; it is confined to the coasts, except for its one inland area of expansion along the lake and river system of the Rio Grande of Mindanao, which afforded an inland extension of sea navigation for the small Moro boat. Even the Fiji Islands show different shades of savagery between coasts and interior.521

If we look at the Philippines, we see that 65 percent of the Christian or civilized population of the islands lives on or near the coast; and of the remaining 35 percent living inland, most represent simply the landward extension of the area of Christian civilization that had Manila Bay as its center.520 Otherwise, all the interior areas are occupied by wild or pagan tribes. Islam, which is also a religion of civilization, is found in the southernmost islands facing the eastern center of the faith in Java; it is limited to the coasts, except for one inland area that expands along the lake and river system of the Rio Grande of Mindanao, which provided an inland extension of sea navigation for the small Moro boat. Even the Fiji Islands show different levels of savagery between the coasts and the interior.521

Progress from thalassic to oceanic coasts.

Coasts are areas of out-going and in-coming maritime influences. The nature and amount of these influences depend upon the sea or ocean whose rim the coast in question helps to form, and the relations of that coast to its other tide-washed shores. Our land-made point of view dominates us so completely, that we are prone to consider a coast as margin of its land, and not also as margin of its sea, whence, moreover, it receives the most important contributions to its development. The geographic location of a coast as part of a thalassic or of an oceanic rim is a basic factor in its history; more potent than local conditions of fertility, irregular contour, or accessibility from sea and hinterland. Everything that can be said about the different degrees of historical importance attaching to inland seas and open oceans in successive ages applies equally to the countries and peoples along their shores; and everything that enhances or diminishes the cultural possibilities of a sea—its size, zonal location, its relation to the oceans and continents—finds its expression in the life along its coasts.

Coasts are areas influenced by both incoming and outgoing marine forces. The type and extent of these influences depend on the sea or ocean that the coast borders and its relationship with nearby shores. Our perspective, rooted in land, often leads us to see a coast primarily as a border of land rather than also as a border of sea, from which it receives crucial contributions to its development. The geographic position of a coast as part of a sea or ocean edge is a fundamental aspect of its history; it holds more significance than local factors like fertility, irregular shape, or accessibility from the sea and inland. Everything that can be said about the varying degrees of historical significance attached to inland seas and open oceans over time applies equally to the countries and peoples along their coastlines; and every factor that enhances or limits the cultural potential of a sea—its size, geographical location, and its relationship to oceans and continents—manifests in the lives of those who live along its shores.

The anthropo-geographical evolution which has passed from small to large states and from small to large seas as fields of maritime activity has been attended by a continuous change in the value of coasts, according as these were located on enclosed basins like the Mediterranean, Red, and Baltic; on marginal ones like the China and North seas; or on the open ocean. In the earlier periods of the world's history, a location on a relatively small enclosed sea gave a maritime horizon wide enough to lure, but not so wide as to intimidate; and by its seclusion led to a concentration and intensification of historical development, which in many of its phases left models for subsequent ages to wonder at and imitate. This formative period and formative environment outgrown, historical development was transferred to locations on the open oceans, according to the law of human advance from small to large areas. The historical importance of the Mediterranean and the Baltic shores was transitory, a prelude to the larger importance of the Atlantic littoral of Europe, just as this in turn was to attain its full significance only when the circumnavigation of Africa and South America linked the Atlantic to the World Ocean. Thus that gradual expansion of the geographic horizon which has accompanied the progress of history has seen a slow evolution in the value of seaboard locations, the transfer of maritime leadership from small to large basins, from thalassic to oceanic ports, from Lubeck to Hamburg, from Venice to Genoa, as earlier from the Piræus to Ostia, and later from England's little Cinque Ports to Liverpool and the Clyde.

The evolution of human geography has shifted from small to large states and from small to large seas as areas for maritime activity, accompanied by a constant change in the value of coastlines, depending on whether they were on enclosed seas like the Mediterranean, Red, and Baltic; on marginal seas like the China and North Seas; or on the open ocean. In earlier times, being located by a relatively small enclosed sea offered a maritime view that was enticing but not overwhelming, and its isolation led to a focus on and intensification of historical development, which produced models that later ages admired and emulated. After outgrowing this formative period and environment, historical development moved to locations on the open oceans, following the trend of human progress from smaller to larger areas. The historical significance of the Mediterranean and Baltic coasts was temporary, a precursor to the greater importance of the Atlantic coasts of Europe, which would only reach its full significance once the circumnavigation of Africa and South America connected the Atlantic to the World Ocean. Thus, the gradual broadening of geographic horizons that has paralleled historical progress has resulted in a slow evolution in the value of coastal locations, moving maritime leadership from smaller to larger basins, from coastal to ocean ports, from Lubeck to Hamburg, from Venice to Genoa, as previously from the Piræus to Ostia, and more recently from England's smaller Cinque Ports to Liverpool and the Clyde.

Geographic location of coasts.

Though the articulations of a coast determine the ease with which maritime influences are communicated to the land, nevertheless history shows repeated instances where an exceptional location, combined with restricted area, has raised a poorly indented seaboard to maritime and cultural preeminence. Phoenicia's brilliant history rose superior to the limitation of indifferent harbors, owing to a position on the Arabian isthmus between the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean at the meeting place of Europe, Asia, and Africa. Moreover, the advantages of this particular location have in various times and in various degrees brought into prominence all parts of the Syrian and Egyptian coasts from Antioch to Alexandria. So the whole stretch of coast around the head of the Adriatic, marking the conjunction of a busy sea-route with various land-routes over the encircling mountains from Central Europe, has seen during the ages a long succession of thriving maritime cities, in spite of fast-silting harbors and impeded connection with the hinterland. Here in turn have ruled with maritime sway Spina, Ravenna, Aquileia,522 Venice, and Trieste. On the other side of the Italian peninsula, the location on the northernmost inlet of the western Mediterranean and at the seaward base of the Ligurian Apennines, just where this range opens two passes of only 1,800 feet elevation to the upper Po Valley, made an active maritime town of Genoa from Strabo's day to the present. In its incipiency it relied upon one mediocre harbor on an otherwise harborless coast, a local supply of timber for its ships, and a road northward across the mountains.523 The maritime ascendency in the Middle Ages of Genoa, Pisa, Venice, and Barcelona proves that no long indented coast is necessary, but only one tolerable harbor coupled with an advantageous location.

Though the shape of a coastline influences how easily maritime conditions reach the land, history shows many cases where a unique location paired with a limited area has elevated a poorly shaped shoreline to maritime and cultural prominence. Phoenicia's remarkable history thrived despite having mediocre harbors, due to its position on the Arabian isthmus between the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean, at the crossroads of Europe, Asia, and Africa. Additionally, the benefits of this specific location have, at different times and varying degrees, highlighted all parts of the Syrian and Egyptian coasts from Antioch to Alexandria. Similarly, the entire stretch of coast around the head of the Adriatic, where a busy sea-route meets various land routes over the surrounding mountains from Central Europe, has seen a continuous line of prosperous maritime cities throughout the ages, even with fast-silting harbors and limited access to the interior. Here, notable maritime powers like Spina, Ravenna, Aquileia,522 Venice, and Trieste have flourished. On the opposite side of the Italian peninsula, the location at the northernmost inlet of the western Mediterranean and at the seaside base of the Ligurian Apennines, where this range provides two low passes at just 1,800 feet elevation to the upper Po Valley, has allowed Genoa to become an active maritime city from Strabo's time to today. In its early days, it depended on one average harbor on an otherwise harborless coast, a local supply of timber for its ships, and a road leading north over the mountains.523 The maritime dominance of Genoa, Pisa, Venice, and Barcelona during the Middle Ages proves that a long, indented coast is not necessary, but rather just one decent harbor combined with a strategic location.

Intermediate location between contrasted coasts.

Owing to the ease and cheapness of water transportation, a seaboard position between two other coasts of contrasted products due to a difference either of zonal location or of economic development or of both combined, insures commercial exchanges and the inevitable activities of the middleman. The position of Carthage near the center of the Mediterranean enabled her to fatten on the trade between the highly developed eastern basin and the retarded western one. Midway between the teeming industrial towns of medieval Flanders, Holland, and western Germany, and the new unexploited districts of retarded Russia, Poland, and Scandinavia, lay the long line of the German Hanseatic towns—Kiel, Lubeck, Wiemar, Rostock, Stralsund, Greifswald, Anclam, Stettin, and Colberg, the civitates maritimæ. For three centuries or more they made themselves the dominant commercial and maritime power of the Baltic by exchanging Flemish fabrics, German hardware, and Spanish wines for the furs and wax of Russian forests, tallow and hides from Polish pastures, and crude metals from Swedish mines.524 So Portugal by its geographical location became a staple place where the tropical products from the East Indies were transferred to the vessels of Dutch merchants, and by them distributed to northern Europe. Later New England, by a parallel location, became the middleman in the exchanges of the tropical products of the West Indies, the tobacco of Virginia, and the wheat of Maryland for the manufactured wares of England and the fish of Newfoundland.

Thanks to the convenience and low cost of water transportation, being located on the coast between two other coasts with different products—due to factors like climate or economic development—guarantees trade and the inevitable role of middlemen. Carthage's position near the center of the Mediterranean allowed it to thrive on trade between the well-developed eastern region and the slower western region. Midway between the bustling industrial cities of medieval Flanders, Holland, and western Germany, and the newly undeveloped areas of slower Russia, Poland, and Scandinavia, were the long line of German Hanseatic towns—Kiel, Lubeck, Wiemar, Rostock, Stralsund, Greifswald, Anclam, Stettin, and Colberg, the civitates maritimæ. For over three centuries, they established themselves as the leading commercial and maritime power of the Baltic by trading Flemish fabrics, German hardware, and Spanish wines for the furs and wax of Russian forests, tallow and hides from Polish farms, and raw metals from Swedish mines.524 Similarly, Portugal's geographical location became a key hub for transferring tropical products from the East Indies to Dutch merchant ships, which distributed them throughout northern Europe. Later, New England, due to a similar location, became the intermediary in the trade of tropical products from the West Indies, Virginia tobacco, and Maryland wheat in exchange for English manufactured goods and Newfoundland fish.

Historical decline of certain coasts.

Primitive or early maritime commerce has always been characterized by the short beat, a succession of middlemen coasts, and a close series of staple-places, such as served the early Indian Ocean trade in Oman, Malabar Coast, Ceylon, Coromandel Coast, Malacca, and Java. Therefore, many a littoral admirably situated for middleman trade loses this advantage so soon as commerce matures enough to extend the sweep of its voyages, and to bring into direct contact the two nations for which that coast was intermediary. This is only another aspect of the anthropo-geographic evolution from small to large areas. The decline of the Mediterranean coasts followed close upon the discovery of the sea-route to India; nor was their local importance restored by the Suez Canal. Portugal declined when the Dutch, excluded from the Tagus mouth on the union of Portugal with Spain, found their way to the Spice Isles. Ceylon, though still the chief port of call in the Indian Ocean, has lost its preëminence as chief market for all the lands between Africa and China, which it enjoyed in the sixth century, owing to the "long haul" of modern oceanic commerce.

Primitive or early maritime trade has always been marked by short trips, a series of middlemen along the coasts, and a close network of key trading spots, like those that supported the early Indian Ocean trade in Oman, the Malabar Coast, Ceylon, the Coromandel Coast, Malacca, and Java. Because of this, many coastal areas that were well-situated for middleman trade lose their advantage as commerce matures enough to broaden the scope of its voyages and create direct contact between the two nations for which that coast acted as a link. This is just another aspect of the anthropo-geographic shift from smaller to larger areas. The decline of the Mediterranean coasts closely followed the discovery of the sea route to India, and their local significance was not restored even with the Suez Canal. Portugal's decline happened when the Dutch, barred from the mouth of the Tagus due to the union of Portugal with Spain, found their way to the Spice Islands. Ceylon, while still the main port of call in the Indian Ocean, has lost its status as the primary market for all the regions between Africa and China that it held in the sixth century, due to the "long haul" nature of modern ocean trade.

Political factors in this decline.

Not only that far-reaching readjustment of maritime ascendency which in the sixteenth century followed the advance from thalassic to oceanic fields of commerce, but also purely local political events may for a time produce striking changes in the use or importance of coasts. The Piræus, which had been the heart of ancient Athens, almost wholly lost its value in the checkered political history of the country during the Middle Ages, when naval power and merchant marine almost vanished; but with the restoration of Grecian independence in 1832, much of its pristine activity was restored. Up to the beginning of the seventeenth century, Japan had exploited her advantageous location and her richly indented coast to develop a maritime trade which extended from Kamchatka to India; but in 1624 an imperial order withdrew every Japanese vessel from the high seas, and for over two hundred years robbed her busy littoral of all its historical significance. The real life of the Pacific coast of the United States began only with its incorporation into the territory of the Republic, but it failed to attain its full importance until our acquisition of Alaska, Hawaii, and the Philippines. So the coast of the Persian Gulf has had periods of activity alternating with periods of deathlike quiet. Its conquest by the Saracens in the seventh century inaugurated an era of intense maritime enterprise along its drowsy shores. What new awakening may it experience, if it should one day become a Russian littoral!

Not only did the significant shift in maritime dominance that occurred in the sixteenth century, moving from coastal to oceanic trade, make a difference, but also local political events can lead to dramatic changes in how coastal areas are used or valued. The Piraeus, once the heart of ancient Athens, lost much of its significance during the tumultuous political history of the Middle Ages, when naval power and commercial shipping nearly disappeared. However, with the restoration of Greek independence in 1832, much of its former vitality was regained. Until the early seventeenth century, Japan had taken advantage of its prime location and its intricately shaped coastline to build a maritime trade network that reached from Kamchatka to India. Yet, in 1624, an imperial decree pulled all Japanese vessels from the high seas, causing Japan's once-bustling shores to lose all historical relevance for over two hundred years. The true development of the Pacific coast of the United States started only when it became part of the Republic, but it didn’t reach its full significance until we acquired Alaska, Hawaii, and the Philippines. Similarly, the Persian Gulf coast has experienced cycles of activity and long periods of silence. Its conquest by the Saracens in the seventh century marked the beginning of a time of robust maritime activity along its quiet shores. What new revival might it experience if it were ever to become a Russian coastline!

Physical causes of decline.

Sometimes the decline in historical importance is due to physical modifications in the coast itself, especially when, the mud transported by a great river to the sea is constantly pushing forward the outer shoreline. The control of the Adriatic passed in turn from Spina to Adria, Ravenna, Aquileia, Venice, and Trieste, owing to a steady silting up of the coast.525 Strabo records that Spina, originally a port, was in his time 90 stadia, or 10 miles, from the sea.526 Bruges, once the great entrepôt of the Hanseatic League, was originally on an arm of the sea, with which it was later connected by canal, and which has been silted up since 1432, so that its commerce, disturbed too by local wars, was transferred to Antwerp on the Scheldt.527 Many early English ports on the coast of Kent and on the old solid rim of the Fenland marshes now lie miles inland from the Channel and the Wash.

Sometimes the decline in historical significance is due to changes in the coastline itself, especially when the sediment carried by a major river is constantly pushing the outer shoreline forward. Control of the Adriatic shifted from Spina to Adria, Ravenna, Aquileia, Venice, and Trieste due to ongoing silt buildup along the coast.525 Strabo notes that Spina, originally a port, was 90 stadia, or 10 miles, away from the sea in his time.526 Bruges, once the main trading hub of the Hanseatic League, was initially located on a branch of the sea, which was later linked by a canal and has silted up since 1432. This, combined with local wars, led to its commerce being moved to Antwerp on the Scheldt.527 Many early English ports along the coast of Kent and the solid edge of the Fenland marshes are now several miles inland from the Channel and the Wash.

A people never utilizes all parts of its coast with equal intensity, or any part with equal intensity in all periods of its development; but, according to the law of differentiation, it gradually concentrates its energies in a few favored ports, whose maritime business tends to become specialized. Then every extension of the subsidiary territory and intensification of production with advancing civilization increases the mass of men and wares passing through these ocean gateways. The shores of New York, Delaware, and Chesapeake bays are more important to the country now than they were in early colonial days, when their back country extended only to the watershed of the Appalachian system. Our Gulf coast has gained in activity with the South's economic advance from slave to free labor, and from almost exclusive cotton planting to diversified production combined with industries; and it will come into its own, in a maritime sense, when the opening of the Panama Canal will divert from the Atlantic outlets those products of the Mississippi basin which will be seeking Trans-Pacific markets.

A population doesn't use all parts of its coast equally, or any part equally at all times during its development. Instead, following the principle of differentiation, it gradually focuses its efforts on a few key ports, where maritime activities become more specialized. As civilization progresses, the expansion of surrounding areas and increased production boost the flow of people and goods through these ocean gateways. The shores of New York, Delaware, and Chesapeake bays are more significant to the country today than they were in the early colonial days when their hinterlands only reached the Appalachian watershed. Our Gulf coast has become busier as the South has shifted from slave labor to free labor and from mainly growing cotton to a diverse range of production alongside industries. It will further establish its maritime significance when the Panama Canal opens, directing products from the Mississippi basin seeking markets in the Trans-Pacific away from the Atlantic ports.

Interplay of geographic factors in coastlands.

A careful analysis of the life of coast peoples in relation to all the factors of their land and sea environment shows that these are multiform, and that none are negligible; it takes into consideration the extent, fertility, and relief of the littoral, its accessibility from the land as well as from the sea, and its location in regard to outlying islands and to opposite shores, whether near or far; it holds in view not only the small articulations that give the littoral ready contact with the sea, but the relation of the seaboard to the larger continental articulations, whether it lies on an outrunning spur of a continental mass, like the Malacca, Yemen, or Peloponnesian coast, or upon a retiring inlet that brings it far into the heart of a continent, and provides it with an extensive hinterland; and, finally, it never ignores the nature of the bordering sea, which furnishes the school of seamanship and fixes the scope of maritime enterprise.

A careful analysis of the life of coastal communities in relation to all the factors of their land and sea environment shows that these factors are diverse, and none can be overlooked. It takes into account the size, fertility, and features of the shoreline, its accessibility from both land and sea, and its position in relation to nearby islands and opposite shores, whether they are close or far away. It considers not just the small inlets that provide easy access to the sea, but also the relationship of the coastline to larger continental features, whether it is part of a protruding section of a continent, like the coasts of Malacca, Yemen, or Peloponnesus, or located in a recessed bay that stretches deep into the continent and gives it a large hinterland. Finally, it never overlooks the characteristics of the adjacent sea, which shapes the development of navigation skills and defines the extent of maritime activities.

All these various elements of coastal environment are further differentiated in their use and their influence according to the purposes of those who come to tenant such tide-washed rims of the land. Pirates seek intricate channels and hidden inlets for their lairs; a merchant people select populous harbors and navigable river mouths; would-be colonists settle upon fertile valleys opening into quiet bays, till their fields, and use their coasts for placid maritime trade with the mother country; interior peoples, pushed or pushing out to the tidal periphery of their continent, with no maritime history behind them, build their fishing villages on protected lagoons, and, unless the shadowy form of some outlying island lure them farther, there they tarry, deaf to the siren song of the sea.

All these different aspects of the coastal environment are shaped by how they're used and their impact based on the goals of those who inhabit these tide-washed edges of the land. Pirates look for complex channels and hidden inlets for their hideouts; merchants choose busy harbors and navigable river mouths; would-be colonists settle in fertile valleys that lead to calm bays, cultivating their fields and using their coasts for peaceful maritime trade with the mother country. Meanwhile, inland people, either being pushed or pushing outward to the tidal edges of their continent and lacking any maritime history, build their fishing villages on protected lagoons, and unless the mysterious shape of some distant island attracts them further, they stay there, oblivious to the enticing call of the sea.


NOTES TO CHAPTER VIII

Notes to Chapter 8


412.

Rudolph Reinhard, Die Wichtigsten Deutschen Seehandelstädte, pp. 24, 25. Stuttgart, 1901. Joseph Partsch, Central Europe, p. 291. London, 1903.

Rudolph Reinhard, The Most Important German Maritime Trade Cities, pp. 24, 25. Stuttgart, 1901. Joseph Partsch, Central Europe, p. 291. London, 1903.

413.

Ibid, p. 301.

Ibid, p. 301.

414.

John Richard Green, The Making of England, Vol. I, pp. 51-54; maps, pp. 36 and 54. London, 1904.

John Richard Green, The Making of England, Vol. I, pp. 51-54; maps, pp. 36 and 54. London, 1904.

415.

Ibid, Vol. I, pp. 12, 63; maps pp. xxii and 54.

Ibid, Vol. I, pp. 12, 63; maps pp. xxii and 54.

416.

Ratzel, History of Mankind, Vol. III, pp. 98, 139. London, 1896-1898.

Ratzel, History of Mankind, Vol. III, pp. 98, 139. London, 1896-1898.

417.

Joseph Partsch, Central Europe, pp. 284-288. London, 1903.

Joseph Partsch, Central Europe, pp. 284-288. London, 1903.

418.

H. B. Mill, International Geography, p. 251. New York, 1902.

H. B. Mill, International Geography, p. 251. New York, 1902.

419.

Rudolph Reinhard, Die Wichtigsten Deutschen Seehandelstädte, pp. 21-22. Stuttgart, 1901.

Rudolph Reinhard, The Most Important German Port Cities, pp. 21-22. Stuttgart, 1901.

420.

Fitz-Roy and Darwin, Voyage of the Beagle, Vol. II, pp. 140, 178; Vol. III, pp. 231-236. London, 1839.

Fitz-Roy and Darwin, Voyage of the Beagle, Vol. II, pp. 140, 178; Vol. III, pp. 231-236. London, 1839.

421.

Eleventh Census, Population and Resources of Alaska, pp. 166-171. Washington, 1893.

Eleventh Census, Population and Resources of Alaska, pp. 166-171. Washington, 1893.

422.

Nordenskiold, The Voyage of the Vega, pp. 327, 334, 335, 365, 366, 412, 416, 459, 467. New York, 1882.

Nordenskiold, The Voyage of the Vega, pp. 327, 334, 335, 365, 366, 412, 416, 459, 467. New York, 1882.

423.

G. Frederick Wright, Greenland Icefields, pp. 68-70, 100, 105. New York, 1896. For Eskimo of Hudson Bay and Baffin Land, see F. Boas, The Central Eskimo, pp. 419, 420, 460-462. Sixth Annual Report of the Bureau of Ethnology. Washington, 1888.

G. Frederick Wright, Greenland Icefields, pp. 68-70, 100, 105. New York, 1896. For the Eskimo of Hudson Bay and Baffin Land, see F. Boas, The Central Eskimo, pp. 419, 420, 460-462. Sixth Annual Report of the Bureau of Ethnology. Washington, 1888.

424.

Bella Gallico, Book III, chap. 12.

Bella Gallico, Book III, chap. 12.

425.

Ernst Curtius, History of Greece, Vol. I, p, 15. New York.

Ernst Curtius, History of Greece, Vol. I, p. 15. New York.

426.

Strabo's Geography, Book II, chap. V, 4. Book III, chap. I, 4.

Strabo's Geography, Book II, chap. V, 4. Book III, chap. I, 4.

427.

Grote, History of Greece, Vol. III, pp. 266-267. New York, 1857.

Grote, History of Greece, Vol. III, pp. 266-267. New York, 1857.

428.

Thucydides, Book VI, 2.

Thucydides, Book 6, 2.

429.

Grote, History of Greece, Vol. III, p. 273. New York, 1857.

Grote, History of Greece, Vol. III, p. 273. New York, 1857.

430.

Strabo's Geography, Book XVII, chap. III, 13, 14.

Strabo's Geography, Book XVII, chap. III, 13, 14.

431.

Thucydides, Book I, 5, 7, 8.

Thucydides, Book I, 5, 7, 8.

432.

Strabo, Book VIII, chap. VI, 2, 4, 13, 14, 22.

Strabo, Book VIII, chap. VI, 2, 4, 13, 14, 22.

433.

Grote, History of Greece, Vol. III, pp. 4, 191. New York, 1857.

Grote, History of Greece, Vol. III, pp. 4, 191. New York, 1857.

434.

J. Partsch, Central Europe, p. 291. London, 1903.

J. Partsch, Central Europe, p. 291. London, 1903.

435.

Rudolph Reinhard, Die Wichtigsten Deutschen Seehandelstädte, p. 23. Stuttgart, 1901.

Rudolph Reinhard, The Most Important German Maritime Trade Cities, p. 23. Stuttgart, 1901.

436.

Grote, History of Greece, Vol. III, p. 273. New York, 1857.

Grote, History of Greece, Vol. III, p. 273. New York, 1857.

437.

Bunbury, History of Ancient Geography, Vol. II, pp. 452-454, 610. London, 1883. Duarte Barbosa, East Africa and Malabar Coasts in the Sixteenth Century, p. 3-16. Hakluyt Society, London, 1866.

Bunbury, History of Ancient Geography, Vol. II, pp. 452-454, 610. London, 1883. Duarte Barbosa, East Africa and Malabar Coasts in the Sixteenth Century, pp. 3-16. Hakluyt Society, London, 1866.

438.

Ernst Curtius, History of Greece, Vol. I, pp. 433-434. New York.

Ernst Curtius, History of Greece, Vol. I, pp. 433-434. New York.

439.

W. B. Weeden, Economic and Social History of New England, Vol. I, p. 93. Boston, 1899.

W. B. Weeden, Economic and Social History of New England, Vol. I, p. 93. Boston, 1899.

440.

Norway, Official Publication, p. 1. Christiania, 1900.

Norway, Official Publication, p. 1. Oslo, 1900.

441.

Ratzel, Deutschland, pp. 150-151. Leipzig, 1898.

Ratzel, Germany, pp. 150-151. Leipzig, 1898.

442.

J. Partsch, Central Europe, pp. 227-230. London, 1903.

J. Partsch, Central Europe, pp. 227-230. London, 1903.

443.

Elisée Reclus, The Earth and Its Inhabitants; Europe, Vol. 1, pp. 370-372. New York, 1886.

Elisée Reclus, The Earth and Its Inhabitants; Europe, Vol. 1, pp. 370-372. New York, 1886.

444.

Ernst Curtius, History of Greece, Vol. I, pp. 15-20. New York.

Ernst Curtius, History of Greece, Vol. I, pp. 15-20. New York.

445.

Heinrich von Treitschke, Politik, Vol. 1, p. 215. Leipzig, 1897.

Heinrich von Treitschke, Politics, Vol. 1, p. 215. Leipzig, 1897.

446.

H. J. Mackinder, Britain and the British Seas, pp. 35, 40. London, 1902.

H. J. Mackinder, Britain and the British Seas, pp. 35, 40. London, 1902.

447.

William Morris Davis, Physical Geography, pp. 115-122. Boston, 1899.

William Morris Davis, Physical Geography, pp. 115-122. Boston, 1899.

448.

Ratzel, History of Mankind, Vol. III, p. 95. London, 1896-1898.

Ratzel, History of Mankind, Vol. III, p. 95. London, 1896-1898.

449.

Strabo, Book XVII, chap. I, 18. Diodorus Siculus, Book I, chap. III, p. 36. London, 1814.

Strabo, Book XVII, chap. I, 18. Diodorus Siculus, Book I, chap. III, p. 36. London, 1814.

450.

J. Partsch, Central Europe, pp. 96-98. London, 1903. Ratzel, Deutschland, pp. 143-144. Leipzig, 1898.

J. Partsch, Central Europe, pp. 96-98. London, 1903. Ratzel, Germany, pp. 143-144. Leipzig, 1898.

451.

For geomorphology of coasts, see William Morris Davis, Physical Geography, pp. 112-136, 347-383. Boston, 1899.

For the geomorphology of coasts, see William Morris Davis, Physical Geography, pp. 112-136, 347-383. Boston, 1899.

452.

Elisée Reclus, Europe, Vol. II, p, 252. New York, 1886.

Elisée Reclus, Europe, Vol. II, p. 252. New York, 1886.

453.

J. Partsch, Central Europe, p. 231. London, 1903.

J. Partsch, Central Europe, p. 231. London, 1903.

454.

G. G. Chisholm, Commercial Geography, pp. 44, 446. London, 1904.

G. G. Chisholm, Commercial Geography, pp. 44, 446. London, 1904.

455.

H.R. Mill, International Geography, p. 1012. New York, 1902. Hereford George, Historical Geography of the British Empire, pp. 278-279. London, 1904.

H.R. Mill, International Geography, p. 1012. New York, 1902. Hereford George, Historical Geography of the British Empire, pp. 278-279. London, 1904.

456.

J.E. Thorold Rogers, Six Centuries of Work and Wages, pp. 123-124. New York, 1884.

J.E. Thorold Rogers, Six Centuries of Work and Wages, pp. 123-124. New York, 1884.

457.

H.R. Mill, International Geography, p. 148. New York, 1902.

H.R. Mill, International Geography, p. 148. New York, 1902.

458.

Diodorus Siculus, Book V, chap. I, p. 304. London, 1814. Strabo, Book V, chap. VI, 6, 7.

Diodorus Siculus, Book V, chap. I, p. 304. London, 1814. Strabo, Book V, chap. VI, 6, 7.

459.

Helmolt, History of the World, Vol. I, pp. 188-189, 193-195. New York, 1902-1906.

Helmolt, History of the World, Vol. I, pp. 188-189, 193-195. New York, 1902-1906.

460.

Strabo, Book XVI, chap. III, 4, 27. Herodotus, Book I, chap. I; Book VII, chap. 89. J.T. Brent, The Bahrein Islands of the Persian Gulf, Proceedings of the Royal Geographical Society, Vol. XII, pp. 13-16. London, 1890.

Strabo, Book XVI, chap. III, 4, 27. Herodotus, Book I, chap. I; Book VII, chap. 89. J.T. Brent, The Bahrein Islands of the Persian Gulf, Proceedings of the Royal Geographical Society, Vol. XII, pp. 13-16. London, 1890.

461.

George Adam Smith, Historical Geography of the Holy Land, pp. 169-170. New York, 1897.

George Adam Smith, Historical Geography of the Holy Land, pp. 169-170. New York, 1897.

462.

Ibid., pp. 179, 185, 286.

Ibid., pp. 179, 185, 286.

463.

Ibid., pp. 127-131.

Ibid., pp. 127-131.

464.

Ratzel, History of Mankind, Vol. III, pp. 100-102, 132-145. London, 1896-1898.

Ratzel, History of Mankind, Vol. III, pp. 100-102, 132-145. London, 1896-1898.

465.

H.R. Mill, International Geography, p. 985. New York, 1902.

H.R. Mill, International Geography, p. 985. New York, 1902.

466.

D.G. Hogarth, The Nearer East, pp. 84, 166. London, 1902.

D.G. Hogarth, The Nearer East, pp. 84, 166. London, 1902.

467.

J. Naken, Die Provinz Kwangtung und ihre Bevölkerung, Petermanns Geographische Mittheilungen, Vol. 24, pp. 409, 420. 1878. Ferdinand von Richthofen, China, Vol. I, pp. 568-569. Berlin, 1877. Cathay and the Way Thither, Vol. I, p. lxxviii. Hakluyt Society, London, 1866.

J. Naken, The Province of Guangdong and Its Population, Petermann's Geographical Communications, Vol. 24, pp. 409, 420. 1878. Ferdinand von Richthofen, China, Vol. I, pp. 568-569. Berlin, 1877. Cathay and the Way Thither, Vol. I, p. lxxviii. Hakluyt Society, London, 1866.

468.

Ratzel, History of Mankind, Vol. I, p. 397. London, 1896-1898. Philippine Census, Vol. I, pp. 438, 481-491. Washington, 1905.

Ratzel, History of Mankind, Vol. I, p. 397. London, 1896-1898. Philippine Census, Vol. I, pp. 438, 481-491. Washington, 1905.

469.

Stanford's Australasia, Vol. II, pp. 103, 121, 126-135, 196. London, 1894. Helmolt, History of the World, Vol. II, p. 547. New York, 1902-1906.

Stanford's Australasia, Vol. II, pp. 103, 121, 126-135, 196. London, 1894. Helmolt, History of the World, Vol. II, p. 547. New York, 1902-1906.

470.

Ibid., Vol. III, pp. 431, 434. Vol. II, p. 603.

Ibid., Vol. III, pp. 431, 434. Vol. II, p. 603.

471.

Roscher, National-Oekonomik des Handels und Gewerbefleisses, pp. 78-79, 99-100. Stuttgart, 1899. Capt. A.T. Mahan, Influence of Sea Power upon History, pp. 26-28. Boston, 1902.

Roscher, National-Economics of Trade and Industry, pp. 78-79, 99-100. Stuttgart, 1899. Capt. A.T. Mahan, Influence of Sea Power on History, pp. 26-28. Boston, 1902.

472.

D.G. Hogarth, The Nearer East, pp. 111-112, 152. London, 1902.

D.G. Hogarth, The Nearer East, pp. 111-112, 152. London, 1902.

473.

Ibid., pp. 73-74, 139, 267.

Ibid., pp. 73-74, 139, 267.

474.

Cathay and the Way Thither, Vol. I, p. LXXX. Hakluyt Society. London, 1866. Helmolt, History of the World, Vol. II, p. 548. New York, 1902-1906.

Cathay and the Way Thither, Vol. I, p. LXXX. Hakluyt Society. London, 1866. Helmolt, History of the World, Vol. II, p. 548. New York, 1902-1906.

475.

The Book of Ser Marco Polo, edited by Sir Henry Yule, Vol. II, Book III, pp. 284, 288, 303. New York, 1903.

The Book of Ser Marco Polo, edited by Sir Henry Yule, Vol. II, Book III, pp. 284, 288, 303. New York, 1903.

476.

P. Vidal de la Blache, Géographie de la France, pp. 335-337. Paris, 1903.

P. Vidal de la Blache, Geography of France, pp. 335-337. Paris, 1903.

477.

Elisée Reclus, Europe, Vol. II, p. 252. New York, 1882.

Elisée Reclus, Europe, Vol. II, p. 252. New York, 1882.

478.

Norway, Official Publication, pp. 89-91, map p. 4. Christiania, 1900.

Norway, Official Publication, pp. 89-91, map p. 4. Oslo, 1900.

479.

D.G. Hogarth, The Nearer East, pp. 114, 140, 163-164, 202, 267. London, 1902.

D.G. Hogarth, The Nearer East, pp. 114, 140, 163-164, 202, 267. London, 1902.

480.

H.F. Tozer, History of Ancient Geography, pp. 276-280. Cambridge, 1897. Strabo, Book XVI, chap. IV, 2, 19.

H.F. Tozer, History of Ancient Geography, pp. 276-280. Cambridge, 1897. Strabo, Book XVI, chap. IV, 2, 19.

481.

Helmolt, History of the World, Vol. III, p. 433. New York, 1902-1906.

Helmolt, History of the World, Vol. III, p. 433. New York, 1902-1906.

482.

James Bryce, Impressions of South Africa, pp. 78-82, 99. New York, 1897.

James Bryce, Impressions of South Africa, pp. 78-82, 99. New York, 1897.

483.

Anatole Leroy-Beaulieu, The Empire of the Tsars, Vol. I, map p. 80. New York, 1893.

Anatole Leroy-Beaulieu, The Empire of the Tsars, Vol. I, map p. 80. New York, 1893.

484.

Census of the Philippine Islands, Vol. I, pp. 412-413, 481, 464, 562., Washington, 1905.

Census of the Philippine Islands, Vol. I, pp. 412-413, 481, 464, 562, Washington, 1905.

485.

Ibid., Vol. I, p. 416.

Ibid., Vol. 1, p. 416.

486.

Ratzel, History of Mankind, Vol. III, p. 449. London, 1896-1898.

Ratzel, History of Mankind, Vol. III, p. 449. London, 1896-1898.

487.

P. Ehrenreich, Die Eintheilung und Verbreitung der Völkerstämme Brasiliens, Petermanns Mittheilungen, Vol. 37, pp. 88-89. Gotha, 1891. Helmolt, History of the World, Vol. I, p. 185, map p. 189. New York, 1902-1906.

P. Ehrenreich, The Classification and Distribution of the People of Brazil, Petermann's Communications, Vol. 37, pp. 88-89. Gotha, 1891. Helmolt, History of the World, Vol. I, p. 185, map p. 189. New York, 1902-1906.

488.

John Richard Green, The Making of England, Vol. I, chap. I. London, 1904.

John Richard Green, The Making of England, Vol. I, Chap. I. London, 1904.

489.

H. J. Mackinder, Britain and the British Seas, p. 189. London, 1904. W. Z. Ripley, Races of Europe, pp. 312-315, map. New York, 1899.

H. J. Mackinder, Britain and the British Seas, p. 189. London, 1904. W. Z. Ripley, Races of Europe, pp. 312-315, map. New York, 1899.

490.

D. G. Hogarth, The Nearer East, p. 152. London, 1902. W. Z. Ripley, Races of Europe, pp. 402, 404, map. New York, 1899.

D. G. Hogarth, The Nearer East, p. 152. London, 1902. W. Z. Ripley, Races of Europe, pp. 402, 404, map. New York, 1899.

491.

Ibid., pp. 117, 404-405, 409-419.

Ibid., pp. 117, 404-405, 409-419.

492.

Ibid., pp. 206-208, 210-212. Norway, Official Publication, pp. 80-81. Christiania, 1900.

Ibid., pp. 206-208, 210-212. Norway, Official Publication, pp. 80-81. Christiania, 1900.

493.

Census of the Philippine Islands, Vol. II, p. 52, map p. 50. Washington, 1905.

Census of the Philippine Islands, Vol. II, p. 52, map p. 50. Washington, 1905.

494.

Grote, History of Greece, Vol. III, pp. 175-176, 186-189. New York, 1857.

Grote, History of Greece, Vol. III, pp. 175-176, 186-189. New York, 1857.

495.

Ernst Curtius, History of Greece, Vol. I, pp. 492-493. New York.

Ernst Curtius, History of Greece, Vol. I, pp. 492-493. New York.

496.

Ratzel, History of Mankind, Vol. II, pp. 530-533. London, 1896-1898.

Ratzel, History of Mankind, Vol. II, pp. 530-533. London, 1896-1898.

497.

H. D. Trail, Social England, Vol. III, pp. 367-368. London and New York, 1895.

H. D. Trail, Social England, Vol. III, pp. 367-368. London and New York, 1895.

498.

Twelfth Census, Bulletin No. 103, table 23. Washington, 1902.

Twelfth Census, Bulletin No. 103, table 23. Washington, 1902.

499.

E. C. Semple, American History and Its Geographic Conditions, pp. 314-328. Boston, 1903.

E. C. Semple, American History and Its Geographic Conditions, pp. 314-328. Boston, 1903.

500.

G. G. Chisholm, Commercial Geography, p. 58. London, 1904.

G. G. Chisholm, Commercial Geography, p. 58. London, 1904.

501.

Roscher, National-Oekonomik des Handels und Gewerbefleisses, p. 85, Note 18. Stuttgart, 1899.

Roscher, National Economy of Trade and Industry, p. 85, Note 18. Stuttgart, 1899.

502.

Ratzel, History of Mankind, Vol. II, p. 533. London, 1896-1898.

Ratzel, History of Mankind, Vol. II, p. 533. London, 1896-1898.

503.

Ibid., Vol. III, pp. 139, 145.

Ibid., Vol. III, pp. 139, 145.

504.

H. R. Mill, International Geography, p. 869. New York, 1902.

H. R. Mill, International Geography, p. 869. New York, 1902.

505.

D.G. Brinton, The American Race, p. 107. Philadelphia, 1901. H.H. Bancroft, The Native Races, p. 239, footnote p. 274. San Francisco, 1886.

D.G. Brinton, The American Race, p. 107. Philadelphia, 1901. H.H. Bancroft, The Native Races, p. 239, footnote p. 274. San Francisco, 1886.

506.

Josephus, Antiquities of the Jews, Book VIII, chap. II, 6, 7, 9.

Josephus, Antiquities of the Jews, Book VIII, chap. II, 6, 7, 9.

507.

J. Scott Keltie, The Partition of Africa, p. 327. London, 1895. Ratzel, History of Mankind, Vol. III, pp. 121-122. London, 1896-1898.

J. Scott Keltie, The Partition of Africa, p. 327. London, 1895. Ratzel, History of Mankind, Vol. III, pp. 121-122. London, 1896-1898.

508.

Ibid., Vol. III, pp. 121, 132-133.

Ibid., Vol. III, pp. 121, 132-133.

509.

Ibid., Vol. II, p. 239.

Ibid., Vol. 2, p. 239.

510.

Eleventh Census, Report on Alaska, p. 70. Washington, 1893.

Eleventh Census, Report on Alaska, p. 70. Washington, 1893.

511.

Ibid., p. 156. E.R. Scidmore, Guidebook to Alaska, p. 94. New; York, 1897.

Ibid., p. 156. E.R. Scidmore, Guidebook to Alaska, p. 94. New York, 1897.

512.

Census of the Philippine Islands, Vol. I, pp. 556-561, 575, 581-583. Washington, 1905.

Census of the Philippine Islands, Vol. I, pp. 556-561, 575, 581-583. Washington, 1905.

513.

W.Z. Ripley, Races of Europe, pp. 85-86, 99-101, map pp. 151-152. New York, 1899.

W.Z. Ripley, Races of Europe, pp. 85-86, 99-101, map pp. 151-152. New York, 1899.

514.

Ratzel, History of Mankind, Vol. III, pp. 97, 106. New York, 1896-1898.

Ratzel, History of Mankind, Vol. III, pp. 97, 106. New York, 1896-1898.

515.

Henry Gannett, The Peoples of the Philippines, in Report of the Eighth International Geographic Congress, p. 673. Washington, 1904.

Henry Gannett, The Peoples of the Philippines, in Report of the Eighth International Geographic Congress, p. 673. Washington, 1904.

516.

A.H. Keane, Africa, Stanford's Compendium, pp. 372-376, 385-388. London, 1895. Helmolt, History of the World, Vol. III, pp. 402, 456-457, 462. New York, 1902-1906.

A.H. Keane, Africa, Stanford's Compendium, pp. 372-376, 385-388. London, 1895. Helmolt, History of the World, Vol. III, pp. 402, 456-457, 462. New York, 1902-1906.

517.

H.H. Bancroft, The Native Races, Vol. I, pp. 440-441; Vol. III, pp. 325, 362. San Francisco, 1886. McGee and Thomas, Prehistoric North America, pp. 37-38, 78, 88-89, 95-98. Vol. XIX of History of North America. Philadelphia, 1905.

H.H. Bancroft, The Native Races, Vol. I, pp. 440-441; Vol. III, pp. 325, 362. San Francisco, 1886. McGee and Thomas, Prehistoric North America, pp. 37-38, 78, 88-89, 95-98. Vol. XIX of History of North America. Philadelphia, 1905.

518.

Grote, History of Greece, Vol. IV, p. 22. New York, 1857.

Grote, History of Greece, Vol. IV, p. 22. New York, 1857.

519.

Ibid., Vol. II, pp. 225, 226.

Ibid., Vol. II, pp. 225, 226.

520.

Census of the Philippine Islands, Vol. II, pp. 34, 35. Washington, 1905.

Census of the Philippine Islands, Vol. II, pp. 34, 35. Washington, 1905.

521.

Williams and Calvert, Fiji and the Fijians, pp. 81-82. New York, 1859.

Williams and Calvert, Fiji and the Fijians, pp. 81-82. New York, 1859.

522.

Strabo, Book V, chap. I, 7, 8.

Strabo, Book V, chap. I, 7, 8.

523.

Strabo, Book IV, chap. VI, 1, 2; Book V, chap. I, 11.

Strabo, Book IV, chap. VI, 1, 2; Book V, chap. I, 11.

524.

Dietrich Schäfer, Die Hansestädte und König Waldemar von Dänemark, pp. 184, 189. Jena, 1879.

Dietrich Schäfer, Die Hansestädte und König Waldemar von Dänemark, pp. 184, 189. Jena, 1879.

525.

W. Deecke, Italy, pp. 89-91. London, 1904.

W. Deecke, Italy, pp. 89-91. London, 1904.

526.

Strabo, Book III, chap. I, 2.

Strabo, Book III, chap. I, 2.

527.

Roscher, National-Oekonomik des Handels und Gewerbefleisses, p. 93, Note 1. Stuttgart, 1899.

Roscher, National Economics of Trade and Industry, p. 93, Note 1. Stuttgart, 1899.


Chapter IX—Oceans And Enclosed Seas

The water of the earth's surface, viewed from the standpoint of anthropo-geography, is one, whether it appears as atmospheric moisture, spring, river, lake, brackish lagoon, enclosed sea-basin or open ocean. Its universal circulation, from the falling of the dews to the vast sweep of ocean current, causes this inviolable unity. Variations in the geographical forms of water are superficial and constantly changing; they pass into one another by almost imperceptible gradations, shift their unstable outlines at the bidding of the mobile, restless element. In contrast to the land, which is marked by diversity of geologic structure and geographic form, the world of water is everywhere approximately the same, excepting only the difference in the mineral composition of sea water as opposed to that of spring and stream. Therefore, whenever man has touched it, it has moulded him in much the same way, given the same direction to his activities, dictated the use of the same implements and methods of navigation. As maritime trader or colonist, he has sailed to remote, unknown, yet familiar coasts, and found himself as much at home as on his native shores. He has built up maritime empires, the centre of whose dominion, race and commerce, falls somewhere in the dividing yet uniting sea.

The water on the earth’s surface, when looked at from an anthropogeographical perspective, is all one, whether it’s seen as atmospheric moisture, springs, rivers, lakes, brackish lagoons, enclosed seas, or the open ocean. Its universal circulation, from dew falling to the vast movement of ocean currents, creates this unbreakable unity. The different geographical forms of water are superficial and constantly changing; they merge into one another through nearly imperceptible transitions, shifting their outlines at the command of the restless, mobile element. In contrast to the land, which is marked by a variety of geological structures and geographic forms, the water world is roughly the same everywhere, with the only exception being the difference in mineral composition between seawater and that of springs and streams. Therefore, whenever humans have interacted with it, water has shaped them in much the same way, guiding their activities in similar directions and dictating the same tools and navigation methods they use. As maritime traders or colonists, they have sailed to distant, unknown, yet familiar shores, feeling just as at home there as on their native coasts. They have built maritime empires, the center of whose influence, ethnicity, and commerce lies somewhere in the dividing yet uniting sea.

The water a factor in man's mobility.

Man must be grouped with the air and water as part of the mobile envelope of the earth's surface. The mobility which maintains the unity of air and water has caused the unity of the human race. Abundant facilities of dispersal often give animal forms a wide or cosmopolitan distribution. Man, by appropriating the mobile forces in the air and water to increase his own powers of locomotion, has become a cosmopolitan being, and made the human race reflect the unity of atmosphere and hydrosphere.

Man should be seen alongside air and water as part of the dynamic layer of the Earth's surface. The movement that keeps air and water together has also fostered the unity of the human race. The plentiful opportunities for spreading often allow animals to have a wide or global presence. By harnessing the mobile forces in air and water to enhance his own ability to move, man has become a global being, making humankind mirror the unity of the atmosphere and the hydrosphere.

Always the eternal unrest of the moving waters has knocked at the door of human inertia to arouse the sleeper within; always the flow of stream and the ebb of tide have sooner or later stirred the curiosity of the land-born barbarian about the unseen destination of these marching waters. Rivers by the mere force of gravity have carried him to the shores of their common ocean, and placed him on this highway of the world. Then from his sea-girt home, whether island or continent, he has timidly or involuntarily followed the track which headland-dotted coast, or ocean current, or monsoon, or trade wind marked out for him across the pathless waters, so that at the gray dawn of history he appears as a cosmopolite, occupying every part of the habitable earth.

Always the restless movement of the waters has knocked at the door of human inertia to awaken the sleeper within; always the flow of rivers and the ebb of tides have eventually sparked the curiosity of the land-born individual about the unseen destination of these moving waters. Rivers, simply through the force of gravity, have carried people to the shores of their shared ocean and placed them on this global highway. From their sea-bound homes, whether on an island or a continent, they have shyly or involuntarily followed the path outlined by headland-dotted coasts, ocean currents, monsoons, or trade winds across the vast waters, so that at the dawn of history, they appear as citizens of the world, inhabiting every part of the habitable earth.

These sporadic oversea wanderings, with intervals of centuries or milleniums between, opened to his occupancy strange and remote lands, in whose isolation and new environment he developed fresh variations of mind, body and cultural achievements, to arm him with new weapons in the struggle for existence. The sea which brought him bars him for a few ages from his old home, till the tradition of his coming even is lost. Then with higher nautical development, the sea loses its barrier nature; movements of people, and trade recross its surface to unite those who have been long severed and much differentiated in their mutual remoteness. The ensuing friction and mingling weed out the less fit variations of each, and combine in the new race the qualities able to fortify a higher type of man. Not only seas and oceans, but also mountains and deserts serve to isolate the migrant people who once has crossed them; but wastes of water raise up the most effective barriers.

These occasional journeys overseas, with gaps of centuries or millennia in between, led him to occupy strange and distant lands. In that isolation and new environment, he developed new variations in his mind, body, and cultural achievements, equipping him with new tools for survival. The sea that brought him also kept him away from his old home for several ages until the memory of his arrival faded. Then, with better navigation techniques, the sea stopped being a barrier; the movement of people and trade crossed its surface again, reconnecting those who had been widely separated and changed by their distance. The resulting interactions eliminated the less fit variations from each group and combined them into a new race with qualities that could strengthen a higher type of humanity. Not just seas and oceans, but also mountains and deserts, serve to isolate the migrant people who once crossed them; however, expanses of water create the most effective barriers.

Oceans and seas in universal history.

The transformation of the ocean into a highway by the development of navigation is a late occurrence in the history of man and is perhaps the highest phase of his adaptation to environment, because an adaptation which has placed at his disposal that vast water area constituting three-fourths of the earth's surface from which he had previously been excluded. Moreover, it was adaptation to an alien and hostile element, whose violent displays of power recurrently stimulated the human adjustment between attack and defense.

The change of the ocean into a highway through the advancement of navigation is a relatively recent development in human history and is probably the peak of our ability to adapt to our surroundings. This advancement has opened up the vast body of water that makes up three-fourths of the Earth's surface, which we were previously unable to access. Additionally, it required adapting to a foreign and often dangerous environment, where frequent displays of power pushed humans to constantly adjust between offense and defense.

Because adaptation to the sea has been vastly more difficult than to the land, commensurate with the harder struggle it has brought greater intellectual and material rewards. This conquest of the sea is entitled to a peculiarly high place in history, because it has contributed to the union of the various peoples of the world, has formed a significant part of the history of man, whether that history is economic, social, political or intellectual. Hence history has always staged its most dramatic acts upon the margin of seas and oceans; here always the plot thickens and gives promise of striking development. Rome of the seven hills pales before England of the "Seven Seas."

Because adapting to the sea has been much harder than adapting to land, this tougher struggle has led to greater intellectual and material rewards. This mastery of the sea deserves a particularly important place in history because it has helped unite different peoples around the world and has played a critical role in human history, whether that history is economic, social, political, or intellectual. Therefore, history has often showcased its most dramatic events along the edges of seas and oceans; it's here that the tension rises and hints at exciting developments. The Rome of the seven hills looks insignificant compared to England of the "Seven Seas."

The sea in universal history.

Universal history loses half its import, remains an aggregate of parts, fails to yield its significance as a whole, if it does not continually take into account the unifying factor of the seas. Indeed, no history is entitled to the name of universal unless it includes a record of human movements and activities on the ocean, side by side with those on the land. Our school text-books in geography present a deplorable hiatus, because they fail to make a definite study of the oceans over which man explores and colonizes and trades, as well as the land on which he plants and builds and sleeps.

Universal history loses half its importance, remains just a collection of parts, and fails to show its significance as a whole if it doesn't constantly consider the unifying role of the seas. In fact, no history can truly be called universal unless it includes a record of human movements and activities on the ocean, alongside those on land. Our school textbooks in geography have a serious gap because they don't provide a thorough study of the oceans that people explore, colonize, and trade over, as well as the land where they plant, build, and rest.

The striking fact about the great World Ocean to-day is the manifold relations which it has established between the dwellers on its various coasts. Marine cables, steamer and sailing routes combine to form a network of paths across the vast commons of the deep. Over these the commercial, political, intellectual, or even purely migrant activities of human life move from continent to continent. The distinctive value of the sea is that it promotes many-sided relations as opposed to the one-sided relation of the land. France on her eastern frontier comes into contact with people of kindred stock, living under similar conditions of climate and soil to her own; on her maritime border she is open to intermittent intercourse with all continents and climes and races of the world. To this sea border must be ascribed the share that France has taken in the history of North and South America, the West Indies, North and Equatorial Africa, India, China and the South Seas. So we find the great maritime peoples of the world, from the Phoenicians to the English, each figuring in the history of the world of its day, and helping weave into a web of universal history the stories of its various parts.

The notable thing about the vast World Ocean today is the diverse connections it has created between the people living along its shores. Undersea cables, shipping routes, and sailing paths come together to form a network across the expansive ocean. Through these routes, the commercial, political, intellectual, and even purely migratory activities of human life flow from one continent to another. The unique advantage of the sea is that it fosters multiple relationships, unlike the more limited connections found on land. France, on its eastern border, interacts with people of similar heritage, living in comparable climate and soil conditions; meanwhile, its coastal borders allow for regular contact with all continents, climates, and races around the globe. This access to the sea accounts for France's involvement in the history of North and South America, the West Indies, North and Equatorial Africa, India, China, and the South Seas. Thus, we see the significant maritime cultures of the world, from the Phoenicians to the English, each playing a role in the history of their time and contributing to the rich tapestry of universal history.

Origin of navigation.

Man's normal contact with the sea is registered in his nautical achievements. The invention of the first primitive means of navigation, suggested by a floating log or bloated body of a dead animal, must have been an early achievement, of a great many peoples who lived near the water, or who in the course of their wanderings found their progress obstructed by rivers; it belongs to a large class of similar discoveries which answer urgent and constantly recurring needs. It was, in all probability, often made and as often lost again, until a growing habit of venturing beyond shore or river bank in search of better fishing, or of using the easy open waterways through the thick tangle of a primeval forest to reach fresh hunting grounds, established it as a permanent acquisition.

Man's regular interaction with the sea is reflected in his achievements in navigation. The creation of the first basic navigation tools, likely inspired by a floating log or a bloated carcass, must have been an early milestone for many communities living by the water or those who encountered rivers during their travels. This discovery falls into a broader category of similar innovations that meet urgent and recurring needs. It probably happened repeatedly, being discovered and then forgotten, until people developed a habit of venturing beyond the shore or riverbank to find better fishing spots or to use the open waterways through the dense undergrowth of ancient forests to reach new hunting areas, making it a lasting advancement.

Primitive forms.

The first devices were simply floats or rafts, made of light wood, reeds, or the hollow stems of plants woven together and often buoyed up by the inflated skins of animals. Floats of this character still survive among various peoples, especially in poorly timbered lands. The skin rafts which for ages have been the chief means of downstream traffic on the rivers of Mesopotamia, consist of a square frame-work of interwoven reeds and branches, supported by the inflated skins of sheep and goats;528 they are guided by oars and poles down or across the current. These were the primitive means by which Layard transported his winged bull from the ruins of Nineveh down to the Persian Gulf, and they were the same which he found on the bas-reliefs of the ancient capital, showing the methods of navigation three thousand years ago.529 Similar skin rafts serve as ferry boats on the Sutlej, Shajok and other head streams of the Indus.530 They reappear in Africa as the only form of ferry used by the Moors on the River Morbeya in Morocco; on the Nile, where the inflated skins are supplanted by earthen pots;531 and on the Yo River of semi-arid Sudan, where the platform is made of reeds and is buoyed up by calabashes fastened beneath.532

The first devices were essentially floats or rafts, made from lightweight wood, reeds, or hollow plant stems woven together, often kept afloat by inflated animal skins. Simple floats like these still exist among various peoples, especially in areas with few trees. The skin rafts, which have long been the primary means of downstream transport on the rivers of Mesopotamia, consist of a square frame made of intertwined reeds and branches, buoyed by inflated sheep and goat skins;528 guided by oars and poles across the current. These were the basic methods that Layard used to bring his winged bull from the ruins of Nineveh to the Persian Gulf, and they were also depicted in the bas-reliefs of the ancient capital, showing navigation techniques from three thousand years ago.529 Similar skin rafts are used as ferry boats on the Sutlej, Shajok, and other upper streams of the Indus.530 They can also be found in Africa as the only type of ferry used by the Moors on the River Morbeya in Morocco; on the Nile, where animal skins are replaced by clay pots;531 and on the Yo River in semi-arid Sudan, where the platform is made of reeds and supported by calabashes attached underneath.532

Primitive craft in arid lands.

In treeless lands, reeds growing on the margins of streams and lakes are utilized for the construction of boats. The Buduma islanders of Lake Chad use clumsy skiffs eighteen feet long, made of hollow reeds tied into bundles and then lashed together in a way to form a slight cavity on top.533 In the earliest period of Egyptian history this type of boat with slight variations was used in the papyrus marshes of the Nile,534 and it reappears as the ambatch boat which Schweinfurth observed on the upper White Nile.535 It is in use far away among the Sayads or Fowlers, who inhabit the reed-grown rim of the Sistan Lake in arid Persia.536 As the Peruvian balsa, it has been the regular means of water travel on Lake Titicaca since the time of the Incas, and in more primitive form it appears among the Shoshone Indians of the Snake River Valley of Idaho, who used this device in their treeless land to cross the streams, when the water was too cold for swimming.537 Still cruder rafts of reeds, without approach to boat form, were the sole vehicles of navigation among the backward Indians of San Francisco Bay, and were the prevailing craft among the coast Indians farther south and about the Gulf of Lower California.538 Trees abounded; but these remnant tribes of low intelligence, probably recent arrivals on the coast from the interior, equipped only with instruments of bone and stone, found the difficulty of working with wood prohibitive.

In treeless areas, reeds that grow along the edges of streams and lakes are used to make boats. The Buduma islanders of Lake Chad create awkward skiffs that are eighteen feet long, constructed from hollow reeds tied together in bundles and then fastened in a way that forms a slight dip on top.533 In the earliest period of Egyptian history, a similar type of boat, with minor variations, was used in the papyrus marshes of the Nile,534 and it appears again as the ambatch boat that Schweinfurth noted on the upper White Nile.535 This design is still in use among the Sayads or Fowlers, who live along the reed-filled shores of Sistan Lake in dry Persia.536 Like the Peruvian balsa, it has been a common means of traveling on Lake Titicaca since the Inca era, and in a more basic form, it can be found among the Shoshone Indians of the Snake River Valley in Idaho. They used this method to cross streams when the water was too cold to swim across.537 Even simpler rafts made of reeds, lacking any boat-like shape, were the only means of navigation for the less developed Indians of San Francisco Bay, and these were the main type of vessel used by the coastal Indians further south and around the Gulf of Lower California.538 Although trees were plentiful, these remaining tribes of low intelligence, likely recent arrivals from the interior, were limited to using tools made of bone and stone, finding it too difficult to work with wood.

The second step in the elaboration of water conveyance was made when mere flotation was succeeded by various devices to secure displacement. The evolution is obvious. The primitive raftsman of the Mesopotamian rivers wove his willow boughs and osiers into a large, round basket form, covered it with closely sewn skins to render it water-tight, and in it floated with his merchandise down the swift current from Armenia to Babylon. These were the boats which Herodotus saw on the Euphrates,539 and which survive to-day.540 According to Pliny, the ancient Britons used a similar craft, framed of wicker-work and covered with hide, in which they crossed the English and Irish channels to visit their kinsfolk on the opposite shores. This skin boat or coracle or currach still survives on the rivers of Wales and the west coast of Ireland, where it is used by the fishermen and considered the safest craft for stormy weather.541 It recalls the "bull-skin boat" used in pioneer days on the rivers of our western plains, and the skiffs serving as passenger ferries to-day on the rivers of eastern Tibet.542 It reappears among the Arikara Indians of the upper Missouri,543 and the South American tribes of the Gran Chaco.544 The first wooden boat was made of a tree trunk, hollowed out either by fire or axe. The wide geographical distribution of the dug-out and its survival in isolated regions of highly civilized lands point it out as one of those necessary and obvious inventions that must have been made independently in various parts of the world.

The second step in improving water transport happened when simple flotation was replaced with different methods to achieve displacement. The change is clear. The early raft builder on the Mesopotamian rivers wove willow branches and reeds into a large, round basket shape, covered it with tightly sewn animal skins to make it waterproof, and floated down the fast current carrying goods from Armenia to Babylon. These were the boats that Herodotus saw on the Euphrates,539 and they still exist today.540 According to Pliny, the ancient Britons used a similar vessel made of wicker and covered with hide to cross the English and Irish seas to visit relatives on the other side. This skin boat, known as a coracle or currach, still exists on the rivers of Wales and the west coast of Ireland, where it is used by fishermen and seen as the safest craft for rough weather.541 It is reminiscent of the "bull-skin boat" used in pioneering days on the rivers of our western plains, and the skiffs that serve as passenger ferries today on the rivers of eastern Tibet.542 It can also be found among the Arikara Indians of the upper Missouri,543 and the South American tribes of the Gran Chaco.544 The first wooden boat was made from a tree trunk, hollowed out by either fire or axe. The wide geographical distribution of the dug-out canoe and its survival in remote areas of highly developed countries highlight it as one of those essential and obvious inventions that must have been independently created in various parts of the world.

Relation of the river to marine navigation.

The quieter water of rivers and lakes offered the most favorable conditions for the feeble beginnings of navigation, but the step from inland to marine navigation was not always taken. The Egyptians, who had well-constructed river and marine boats, resigned their maritime commerce to Phoenicians and Greeks, probably, as has been shown, because the silted channels and swamps of the outer Nile delta held them at arm's length from the sea. Similarly the equatorial lakes of Central Africa have proved fair schools of navigation, where the art has passed the initial stages of development. The kingdom of Uganda on Victoria Nyanza, at the time of Stanley's visit, could muster a war fleet of 325 boats, a hundred of them measuring from fifty to seventy feet in length; the largest were manned by a crew of sixty-four paddlers and could carry as many more fighting men.545 The long plateau course of the mighty Congo has bred a race of river navigators, issuing from their riparian villages to attack the traveler in big flotillas of canoes ranging from fifty to eighty-five feet in length, the largest of them driven through the water by eighty paddlers and steered by eight more paddles in the stern.546 But the Congo and lake boats are barred from the coast by a series of cataracts, which mark the passage of the drainage streams down the escarpment of the plateau.

The calmer waters of rivers and lakes provided the best conditions for the early development of navigation, but the transition from inland to ocean navigation wasn't always made. The Egyptians, who had well-built river and ocean boats, left their maritime trade to the Phoenicians and Greeks, likely because the silted channels and swamps of the outer Nile delta kept them at a distance from the sea. Similarly, the equatorial lakes of Central Africa have been good training grounds for navigation, where the skill has moved beyond the initial stages of development. The kingdom of Uganda on Victoria Nyanza, during Stanley's visit, could gather a war fleet of 325 boats, with a hundred of them measuring between fifty to seventy feet long; the largest had a crew of sixty-four paddlers and could carry as many more soldiers.545 The long plateau route of the mighty Congo has produced a community of river navigators, who venture from their riverside villages to confront travelers in large flotillas of canoes ranging from fifty to eighty-five feet in length, the biggest of which are powered by eighty paddlers and steered by eight more at the stern.546 However, the boats of the Congo and the lakes are prevented from reaching the coast by a series of waterfalls, which mark the descent of drainage streams down the plateau's escarpment.

Retarded navigation.

There are peoples without boats or rafts of any description. Among this class are the Central Australians, Bushmen, navigation. Hottentots and Kaffirs of arid South Africa,547 and with few exceptions also the Damaras. Even the coast members of these tribes only wade out into the shallow water on the beach to spear fish. The traveler moving northward from Cape Town through South Africa, across its few scant rivers, goes all the way to Ngami Lake before he sees anything resembling a canoe, and then only a rude dugout. Still greater is the number of people who, though inhabiting well indented coasts, make little use of contact with the sea. Navigation, unknown to many Australian coast tribes, is limited to miserable rafts of mangrove branches on the northwest seaboard, and to imperfect bark canoes with short paddles on the south; only in the north where Malayan influences are apparent does the hollowed tree-stem with outrigger appear.548 This retardation is not due to fear, because the South Australian native, like the Fuegian, ventures several miles out to sea in his frail canoe; it is due to that deep-seated inertia which characterizes all primitive races, and for which the remote, outlying location of peninsular South America, Southern Africa and Australia, before the arrival of the Europeans, afforded no antidote in the form of stimulating contact with other peoples. But the Irish, who started abreast of the other northern Celts in nautical efficiency, who had advantages of proximity to other shores, and in the early centuries of their history sailed to the far-away Faroes and even to Iceland, peopled southern Scotland by an oversea emigration, made piratical descents upon the English coast, and in turn received colonies of bold Scandinavian mariners, suffered an arrested development in navigation, and failed to become a sea-faring folk.

There are groups of people without any boats or rafts. This includes the Central Australians, Bushmen, Hottentots, and Kaffirs of dry South Africa, with a few exceptions like the Damaras. Even the coastal members of these tribes only wade into the shallow water on the beach to catch fish. A traveler heading north from Cape Town through South Africa, crossing its few scarce rivers, won’t see anything like a canoe until reaching Ngami Lake, and even then it’s just a rough dugout. There are even more people who live along well-defined coastlines but barely interact with the sea. For many coastal tribes in Australia, navigation is practically nonexistent, relying on flimsy rafts made from mangrove branches along the northwest coast and basic bark canoes with short paddles in the south. It's only in the north, where Malayan influences are visible, that you find hollowed tree trunks with outriggers. This lack of progress isn’t because of fear; South Australian natives, like the Fuegians, venture several miles out to sea in their fragile canoes. It's due to the deep-rooted inertia typical of all primitive societies, which the isolated locations of peninsular South America, Southern Africa, and Australia didn’t remedy with stimulating contact with other peoples before the arrival of Europeans. In contrast, the Irish, who started off on par with other northern Celts in nautical skills, and who were close to other shores, managed to sail to far-off places like the Faroes and even Iceland in the early centuries of their history. They populated southern Scotland with maritime migration, launched pirate attacks on the English coast, and received colonies from adventurous Scandinavian sailors; yet they still experienced a stall in their development of navigation and never became a seafaring nation.

Regions of advanced navigation.

Turning from these regions of merely rudimentary navigation and inquiring where the highest efficiency in the art was obtained before the spread of Mediterranean and European civilization, we find that this distinction belongs to the great island world of the Pacific and to the neighboring lands of the Indian Ocean. Sailing vessels and outrigger boats of native design and construction characterize the whole sea-washed area of Indo-Malaysian civilization from Malacca to the outermost isles of the Pacific. The eastern rim of Asia, also, belongs to this wide domain of nautical efficiency, and the coast Indians of southern Alaska and British Columbia may possibly represent an eastern spur of the same,549 thrown out in very remote times and maintained by the advantageous geographic conditions of that indented, mountainous coast. Adjoining this area on the north is the long-drawn Arctic seaboard of the Eskimo, who unaided have developed in their sealskin kayak and bidarka sea-going craft unsurpassed for the purposes of marine hunting and fishing, and who display a fearlessness and endurance born of long and enforced intimacy with the deep. Driven by the frozen deserts of his home to seek his food chiefly in the water, the Eskimo, nevertheless, finds his access to the sea barred for long months of winter by the jagged ice-pack along the shore.

Turning from these areas of basic navigation and looking for where the highest efficiency in sailing was achieved before the spread of Mediterranean and European civilization, we discover that this distinction belongs to the vast island world of the Pacific and the nearby regions of the Indian Ocean. Traditional sailing vessels and outrigger boats define the entire sea-covered area of Indo-Malaysian civilization from Malacca to the farthest islands of the Pacific. The eastern edge of Asia also falls within this broad realm of nautical skill, and the coastal Native Americans of southern Alaska and British Columbia may represent an eastern extension of this, thrown out in very distant times and sustained by the favorable geographic conditions of that rugged, mountainous coast. North of this area lies the long Arctic coastline of the Eskimo, who have independently developed their sealskin kayak and bidarka sea-going crafts, which are unmatched for marine hunting and fishing. They exhibit a bravery and endurance that come from their long and intense connection with the ocean. Driven by the icy deserts of their home to find their food mainly in the water, the Eskimo still faces months of winter when access to the sea is blocked by the jagged ice-pack along the shoreline.

Geographic conditions in Polynesia.

The highest degree of intimacy is developed in that vast island-strewn stretch of the Pacific constituting Oceanica.550 Here where a mild climate enables the boatman race to make a companion of the deep, where every landscape is a seascape, where every diplomatic visit or war campaign, every trading journey or search for new coco-palm plantation means a voyage beyond the narrow confines of the home island, there dwells a race whose splendid chest and arm muscles were developed in the gymnasium of the sea; who, living on a paltry 515,000 square miles (1,320,300 square kilometers) of scattered fragments of land, but roaming over an ocean area of twenty-five million square miles, are not more at home in their palm-wreathed islets than on the encompassing deep. Migrations, voluntary and involuntary, make up their history. Their trained sense of locality, enabling them to make voyages several hundred miles from home, has been mentioned by various explorers in Polynesia. The Marshall Islanders set down their geographical knowledge in maps which are fairly correct as to bearings but not as to distances. The Ralick Islanders of this group make charts which include islands, routes and currents.551 Captain Cook was impressed by the geographical knowledge of the people of the South Seas. A native Tahitian made for him a chart containing seventy-four islands, and gave an account of nearly sixty more.552 Information and directions supplied by natives have aided white explorers to many discoveries in these waters. Quiros, visiting the Duff Islands in 1606, learned the location of Ticopia, one of the New Hebrides group, three hundred miles away. Not only the excellent seamanship and the related pelagic fishing of the Polynesians bear the stamp of their predominant water environment; their mythology, their conception of a future state, the germs of their astronomical science, are all born of the sea.

The deepest level of intimacy is found in the expansive, island-dotted area of the Pacific known as Oceanica.550 Here, where a mild climate allows boaters to bond with the ocean, every landscape is a seascape. Every diplomatic visit, military campaign, trading trip, or search for new coconut plantations involves traveling beyond the limits of the home island. This is the home of a people whose impressive chest and arm muscles have been shaped by their life at sea. They inhabit a mere 515,000 square miles (1,320,300 square kilometers) of scattered land but roam across an ocean area of twenty-five million square miles, feeling equally at home on their palm-fringed islands as they do in the vast ocean around them. Their history is marked by migrations, both voluntary and forced. Their developed sense of navigation allows them to journey hundreds of miles from home, a skill noted by various explorers in Polynesia. The Marshall Islanders recorded their geographic knowledge in maps that are fairly accurate in direction but not in distance. The Ralick Islanders of this group create charts that include islands, navigational routes, and currents.551 Captain Cook was struck by the advanced geographical knowledge of the people from the South Seas. A native Tahitian made a chart for him that featured seventy-four islands and described nearly sixty more.552 Information and directions provided by locals have helped European explorers make many discoveries in these waters. Quiros, who visited the Duff Islands in 1606, found out the location of Ticopia, part of the New Hebrides group, which was three hundred miles away. The exceptional sailing skills and deep-sea fishing practices of the Polynesians reflect their maritime environment; their mythology, beliefs about the afterlife, and the beginnings of their astronomical knowledge all stem from the ocean.

Though the people living on the uttermost boundaries of this island world are 6,000 miles (or 10,000 kilometers) apart, and might be expected to be differentiated by the isolation of their island habitats, nevertheless they all have the same fundamental characteristics of physique, language and culture from Guam to Easter Isle, reflecting in their unity the oneness of the encompassing ocean over which they circulate.553

Though the people living on the farthest edges of this island world are 6,000 miles (or 10,000 kilometers) apart and might be expected to be different due to the isolation of their island homes, they all share the same basic physical traits, language, and culture from Guam to Easter Island, reflecting their unity in the vastness of the ocean that surrounds them.553

Mediterranean versus Atlantic seamanship.

Midway between these semi-aquatic Polynesians and those Arctic tribes who are forced out upon the deep, to struggle with it rather than associate with it, we find the inhabitants of the Mediterranean islands and peninsulas, who are favored by the mild climate and the tideless, fogless, stormless character of their sea. While such a body of water invites intimacy, it does not breed a hardy or bold race of navigators; it is a nursery, scarcely a training school. Therefore, except for the far-famed Dalmatian sailors, who for centuries have faced the storms sweeping down from the Dinaric Alps over the turbulent surface of the Adriatic, Mediterranean seamanship does not command general confidence on the high seas. Therefore it is the German, English and Dutch steamship lines that are to-day the chief ocean carriers from Italian ports to East Africa, Asia, Australia, North and South America, despite the presence of native lines running from Genoa to Buenos Ayres. Montevideo and New York; just as it was the Atlantic states of Europe, and only these and all of these, except Germany, who, trained to venture out into the fogs and storms and unmarked paths of the mare tenebrosum, participated in the early voyages to the Americas. One after the other they came—Norwegians, Spaniards, Portuguese, English, French, Dutch, Swedes and Danes. The anthropo-geographical principle is not invalidated by the fact that Spain and England were guided in their initial trans-Atlantic voyages by Italian navigators, like Columbus, Cabot and Amerigo Vespucci. The long maritime experience of Italy and its commercial relations with the Orient, reaching back into ancient times, furnished abundant material for the researches and speculations of such practical theorists; but Italy's location fixed the shores of the Mediterranean as her natural horizon, narrowed her vision to its shorter radius. Her obvious interest in the preservation of the old routes to the Orient made her turn a deaf ear to plans aiming to divert European commerce to trans-Atlantic routes. Italy's entrance upon the high seas was, therefore, reluctant and late, retarded by the necessity of outgrowing the old circumscribed outlook of the enclosed basin before adopting the wider vision of the open ocean. Venice and Genoa were crippled not only by the discovery of the sea route to India, but also by their adherence to old thalassic means and methods of navigation inadequate for the high seas.554 However, these Mediterranean sea folk are being gradually drawn out of their seclusion, as is proved by the increase of Italian oceanic lines and the recent installation of an Hellenic steamship line between Piræus and New York.

Midway between these semi-aquatic Polynesians and the Arctic tribes who are forced out onto the open sea to wrestle with it rather than engage with it, we find the people living in the Mediterranean islands and peninsulas. They enjoy a mild climate and a sea that is calm, clear, and free from storms. While such a body of water encourages closeness, it doesn’t create a tough or adventurous group of navigators; it serves more as a place for growth than a training ground. Therefore, aside from the well-known Dalmatian sailors, who have bravely faced storms coming down from the Dinaric Alps across the choppy Adriatic for centuries, Mediterranean seamanship generally lacks confidence on the open oceans. As a result, today it is the German, English, and Dutch steamship companies that primarily transport goods from Italian ports to East Africa, Asia, Australia, and both North and South America, despite the presence of local lines operating from Genoa to Buenos Aires, Montevideo, and New York; much like it was only the Atlantic states of Europe, except for Germany, that ventured into the fogs, storms, and uncharted paths of the mare tenebrosum during the early voyages to the Americas. One after another, they arrived—Norwegians, Spaniards, Portuguese, English, French, Dutch, Swedes, and Danes. The anthropo-geographical principle still holds true, even though Spain and England were led in their initial trans-Atlantic voyages by Italian navigators like Columbus, Cabot, and Amerigo Vespucci. Italy’s long maritime experience and its trade relations with the East, going back to ancient times, provided ample material for the studies and theories of these practical thinkers. However, Italy's geographical position limited its horizons to the shores of the Mediterranean, narrowing its vision to a shorter range. Its clear interest in maintaining old routes to the East made it ignore plans to shift European trade to trans-Atlantic pathways. Italy's venture into the open sea was therefore slow and hesitant, hindered by the need to move beyond the narrow perspective of the enclosed basin before embracing the broader outlook of the open ocean. Venice and Genoa were weakened not only by the discovery of the sea route to India but also by clinging to old coastal navigation methods that were inadequate for the open seas.554 However, these Mediterranean sea people are gradually being pulled out of their isolation, as shown by the increase of Italian ocean lines and the recent launch of a Hellenic steamship line between Piraeus and New York.

Three geographic stages of maritime development.

The size of a sea or ocean is a definite factor in its power to attract or repel maritime ventures, especially in the earlier stages of nautical development. A broken, indented coast means not only a longer and broader zone of contact between the inhabitants and the sea; it means also the breaking up of the adjacent expanse of water into so many alcoves, in which fisherman, trader and colonist may become at home, and prepare for maritime ventures farther afield. The enclosed or marginal sea tempts earlier because it can be compassed by coastwise navigation; then by the proximity of its opposite shores and its usual generous equipment with islands, the next step to crosswise navigation is encouraged. For the earliest stages of maritime development, only the smaller articulations of the coast and the inshore fringe of sea inlets count. This is shown in the primitive voyages of the Greeks, before they had ventured into the Euxine or west of the forbidding Cape Malia; and in the "inside passage" navigation of the Indians of southern Alaska, British Columbia, and Chile, who have never stretched their nautical ventures beyond the outermost rocks of their skerry-walled coast.

The size of a sea or ocean is a key factor in its ability to attract or discourage maritime activities, especially during the early stages of nautical development. A rugged, indented coastline means not only a larger area of interaction between people and the sea; it also breaks the nearby waters into many coves, where fishermen, traders, and settlers can feel at home and prepare for ventures farther away. The enclosed or marginal sea is more tempting at first because it can be navigated along the coast; then, due to the closeness of its opposing shores and its usual abundance of islands, this encourages the next step toward open-sea navigation. In the earliest stages of maritime development, only the smaller features of the coastline and the inshore areas of sea inlets matter. This is evident in the early voyages of the Greeks, before they ventured into the Euxine or west of the daunting Cape Malia; as well as in the "inside passage" navigation of the Indigenous peoples of southern Alaska, British Columbia, and Chile, who have never extended their maritime activities beyond the outermost rocks of their rugged coast.

Influence of enclosed seas upon navigation.

A second stage is reached when an enclosed basin is at, hand to widen the maritime horizon, and when this larger field is exploited in all its commercial, colonial and industrial possibilities, as was done by the Phoenicians and Greeks in the Mediterranean, the Hanse Towns in the Baltic, the Dutch and English in the North Sea. The third and final stage is reached when the nursery of the inshore estuary or gulf and the elementary school of the enclosed basin are in turn outgrown, and the larger maritime spirit moves on to the open ocean for its field of operation. It is a significant fact that the Norse, bred to the water in their fiords and channels behind their protecting "skerry-wall," then trained in the stormy basins of the North and Irish Seas, were naturally the first people of Europe to cross the Atlantic, because the Atlantic of their shores, narrowing like all oceans and seas toward the north, assumes almost the character of an enclosed basin. The distance from Norway to Greenland is only 1,800 miles, little more than that across the Arabian Sea between Africa and India. We trace, therefore, a certain analogy between the physical subdivisions of the world of water into inlet, marginal sea and ocean, and the anthropo-geographical gradations in maritime development.

A second stage is reached when there’s an enclosed bay that broadens the maritime horizon, and when this larger area is fully utilized for its commercial, colonial, and industrial potential, just like the Phoenicians and Greeks did in the Mediterranean, the Hanse Towns in the Baltic, and the Dutch and English in the North Sea. The third and final stage occurs when the nurseries of the inshore estuary or gulf and the basic training grounds of the enclosed bay are outgrown, and the broader maritime spirit shifts to the open ocean for its operations. It's notable that the Norse, accustomed to the water in their fjords and channels surrounded by their protective "skerry-wall," and later trained in the rough waters of the North and Irish Seas, were naturally the first people in Europe to cross the Atlantic. This was because the Atlantic near their shores narrows like all oceans and seas toward the north, almost resembling an enclosed bay. The distance from Norway to Greenland is only 1,800 miles, just a bit more than the distance across the Arabian Sea between Africa and India. Thus, we can see a certain analogy between the physical divisions of the water world into inlets, marginal seas, and oceans, and the anthropo-geographical stages of maritime development.

The enclosed or marginal sea seems a necessary condition for the advance beyond coastwise navigation and the much later step to the open ocean. Continents without them, like Africa, except for its frontage upon the Mediterranean and the Red Sea, have shown no native initiative in maritime enterprise. Africa was further cursed by the mockery of desert coasts along most of her scant thalassic shores. In the Americas, we find the native races compassing a wide maritime field only in the Arctic, where the fragmentary character of the continent breaks up the ocean into Hudson's Bay, Davis Strait, Baffin Bay, Gulf of Boothia, Melville Sound and Bering Sea; and in the American Mediterranean of the Caribbean Sea and Gulf of Mexico. The excellent seamanship developed in the archipelagoes of southern Alaska and Chile remained abortive for maritime expansion, despite a paucity of local resources and the spur of hunger, owing to the lack of a marginal sea; but in the Caribbean basin, the Arawaks and later the Caribs spread from the southern mainland as far as Cuba.555 [See map page 101.]

The enclosed or marginal sea seems essential for moving beyond coastal navigation and eventually venturing into the open ocean. Continents without them, like Africa—except for its coastline along the Mediterranean and the Red Sea—haven't shown any native initiative in maritime activities. Africa also suffered from the challenge of desert coasts along most of its limited thalassic shores. In the Americas, we see native groups engaging in extensive maritime activities primarily in the Arctic, where the fragmented nature of the continent divides the ocean into Hudson's Bay, Davis Strait, Baffin Bay, Gulf of Boothia, Melville Sound, and Bering Sea; and in the American Mediterranean of the Caribbean Sea and Gulf of Mexico. The impressive seamanship developed in the archipelagos of southern Alaska and Chile didn’t lead to maritime expansion, despite a lack of local resources and the drive of hunger, due to the absence of a marginal sea; however, in the Caribbean basin, the Arawaks and later the Caribs spread from the southern mainland all the way to Cuba.555 [See map page 101.]

Enclosed seas as areas of ethnic and cultural assimilation.

Enclosed or marginal seas were historically the most important sections of the ocean prior to 1492. Apart from the widening of the maritime horizon which they give to their bordering people, each has the further advantage of constituting an area of close vicinal grouping and constant interchange of cultural achievements, by which the civilization of the whole basin tends to become elevated and unified. This unification frequently extends to race also, owing to the rapidity of maritime expansion and the tendency to ethnic amalgamation characteristic of all coast regions. We recognize an area of Mediterranean civilization from the Isthmus of Suez to the Sacred Promontory of Portugal, and in this area a long-headed, brunette Mediterranean race, clearly unified as to stock, despite local differentiations of culture, languages and nations in the various islands, peninsulas and other segregated coastal regions of this sea.556 The basin appears therefore as an historical whole; for in it a certain group of peoples concentrated their common efforts, which crossed and criss-crossed from shore to shore. Phoenicia's trade ranged westward to the outer coasts of Spain, and later Barcelona's maritime enterprises reached east to the Levant. Greece's commercial and colonial relations embraced the Crimea and the mouth of the Rhone, and Genoa's extended east to the Crimea again. The Saracens, on reaching the Mediterranean edge of the Arabian peninsula, swept the southern coasts and islands, swung up the western rim of the basin to the foot of the Pyrenees, and taught the sluggish Spaniards the art of irrigation practiced on the garden slopes of Yemen. The ships of the Crusaders from Venice, Genoa and Marseilles anchored in the ports of Mohammedanized Syria, brought the symbol of the cross back to its birthplace In Jerusalem, but carried away with them countless suggestions from the finished industries of the East. Here was give and take, expansion and counter-expansion, conquest and expulsion, all together making up a great sum of reciprocal relations embracing the whole basin, the outcome of that close geographical connection which every sharply defined sea establishes between the coasts which it washes.

Enclosed or marginal seas were historically the most important parts of the ocean before 1492. Besides expanding the maritime horizons for their surrounding communities, each sea offers the additional benefit of being a space for close-knit communities and constant cultural exchange, leading to the overall elevation and unification of civilization in the entire basin. This unification often extends to racial aspects as well, due to the rapid maritime growth and the tendency for ethnic mixing found in all coastal areas. We recognize an area of Mediterranean civilization stretching from the Isthmus of Suez to the Sacred Promontory of Portugal, where a long-headed, brunette Mediterranean race, clearly unified in their heritage, exists despite local variations in culture, languages, and nations across various islands, peninsulas, and other separate coastal regions of this sea.556 The basin thus appears as a historical whole, as a certain group of peoples concentrated their common efforts, which flowed back and forth across its shores. Phoenician trade extended west to the coasts of Spain, while later, maritime ventures from Barcelona reached east to the Levant. Greece's trade and colonization included the Crimea and the mouth of the Rhône, and Genoa's connections also extended east to Crimea. The Saracens, reaching the Mediterranean side of the Arabian Peninsula, spread across the southern coasts and islands, moved up the western rim of the basin to the Pyrenees, and taught the slower Spaniards the irrigation techniques used in the gardens of Yemen. The ships of the Crusaders from Venice, Genoa, and Marseilles docked in the ports of Islamic Syria, bringing back the symbol of the cross to its origins in Jerusalem, while also taking countless ideas from the advanced industries of the East. This exchange involved give and take, expansion and counter-expansion, conquest and displacement, all combining to form a significant network of reciprocal relations throughout the entire basin, a result of the close geographical connection established between the coasts by every well-defined sea.

North Sea and Baltic basins.

The same thing has come to pass in the North Sea. Originally Celtic on its western or British side, as opposed to its eastern or Germanic coast, it has been wholly Teutonized on that flank also from the Strait of Dover to the Firth of Tay, and sprinkled with Scandinavian settlers from the Firth of Tay northward to Caithness.557 The eleventh century saw this ethnic unification achieved, and the end of the Middle Ages witnessed the diffusion of the elements of a common civilization through the agency of commerce from Bruges to Bergen. The Baltic, originally Teutonic only on its northern and western shores, has in historical times become almost wholly Teutonic, including even the seaboard of Finland and much of the coast provinces of Russia.558 Unification of civilization attended this unification of race. In its period of greatest historical significance from the twelfth to the seventeenth century, the Baltic played the rôle of a northern Mediterranean.559 The countless shuttles of the Hanse ships wove a web of commercial intercourse between its remotest shores. Novgorod and Abö were in constant communication with Lübeck and Stralsund;560 and Wisby, on the island of Gotland at the great crossroads of the Baltic,561 had the focal significance of the Piræus in ancient Aegean trade.

The same situation has occurred in the North Sea. Originally Celtic on its western or British side, compared to its eastern or Germanic coast, it has been completely dominated by Germanic influences on that side as well, from the Strait of Dover to the Firth of Tay, and dotted with Scandinavian settlers from the Firth of Tay northward to Caithness.557 The eleventh century marked the achievement of this ethnic unification, and by the end of the Middle Ages, the spread of a common civilization occurred through trade from Bruges to Bergen. The Baltic, which was originally Teutonic only on its northern and western shores, has historically become almost entirely Teutonic, even including the coastline of Finland and much of Russia's coastal provinces.558 This unification of civilization accompanied the unification of race. During its most historically significant period from the twelfth to the seventeenth century, the Baltic acted as a northern Mediterranean.559 The numerous voyages of Hanseatic ships created a network of commercial exchange between its farthest shores. Novgorod and Abö were in regular contact with Lübeck and Stralsund;560 and Wisby, on the island of Gotland at the major crossroads of the Baltic,561 held the same central importance as the Piræus in ancient Aegean trade.

Bering Sea.

If we turn to Asia, we find that even the unfavorable Arctic location of Bering Sea has been unable to rob it entirely of historical significance. This is the one spot where a native American race has transplanted itself by its natural expansion to Asiatic shores. The circular rim and island-dotted surface have guided Eskimo emigrants to the coast of the Chukchian Peninsula, where they have become partly assimilated in dress and language to the local Chukches.562 The same conditions also facilitated the passage of a few Chukches across Bering Strait to the Alaskan side. At Pak (or Peck) on East Cape and on Diomed Island, situated in the narrowest part of Bering Strait, are the great intercontinental markets of the polar tribes. Here American furs have for many decades been exchanged for the reindeer skins of northern Siberia and Russian goods from far-away Moscow.563 Only the enclosed character of the sea, reported by the Danish explorer Vitus Bering, tempted the land-bred Russians, who reached the northeastern coast of Siberia at the middle of the eighteenth century, to launch their leaky boats of unseasoned timber, push across to the American continent, and make this whole Bering basin a Russian sea;564 just as a few decades before, when land exploration of Kamchatka had revealed the enclosed character of the Sea of Okhotsk, the Russian pioneers took a straight course across the water to their Pacific outpost of Petropavlovsk near the southern end of the peninsula. But even before the coming of the Slavs to its shores, the Sea of Okhotsk seems to have been an area of native commercial and ethnic intercourse from the Amur River in Siberia in a half circle to the east, through Sakhalin, Yezo, the Kurile Islands and southern Kamchatka,565 noticeably where the rim of the basin presented the scantiest supply of land and where, therefore, its meager resources had to be eked out by fisheries and trade on the sea.

If we look at Asia, we see that even the challenging Arctic location of the Bering Sea hasn't completely stripped it of historical importance. This is the only place where a Native American group has naturally expanded to the shores of Asia. The circular coastline and the many islands have led Eskimo emigrants to the coast of the Chukchian Peninsula, where they've begun to blend in with the local Chukches in terms of clothing and language.562 Similar conditions also allowed a few Chukches to cross the Bering Strait to the Alaskan side. At Pak (or Peck) on East Cape and on Diomed Island, located in the narrowest part of the Bering Strait, are major intercontinental markets for the polar tribes. Here, American furs have been traded for decades for the reindeer skins of northern Siberia and Russian goods from far-off Moscow.563 Only the enclosed nature of the sea, noted by the Danish explorer Vitus Bering, tempted the land-based Russians, who reached the northeastern coast of Siberia in the mid-eighteenth century, to set out in their leaky boats made from unseasoned wood, cross over to the American continent, and designate the entire Bering basin as a Russian sea;564 just as a few decades earlier, when land exploration of Kamchatka had revealed the enclosed nature of the Sea of Okhotsk, the Russian pioneers took a direct route across the water to their Pacific outpost of Petropavlovsk near the southern tip of the peninsula. But even before the Slavs arrived on its shores, the Sea of Okhotsk seems to have been a hub of native trade and ethnic interaction stretching from the Amur River in Siberia in a semicircle to the east, through Sakhalin, Yezo, the Kurile Islands, and southern Kamchatka,565 especially where the edge of the basin offered the least land and, therefore, its limited resources had to be supplemented by fishing and maritime trade.

Red Sea basin.

On the southwest margin of Asia, the Red Sea, despite its desert shores, has maintained the influence of its intercontinental location and linked the neighboring elements of Africa and Asia. Identity of climatic conditions on both sides of this long rift valley has facilitated ethnic exchanges, and made it the center of what Ratzel calls the "Red Sea group of peoples," related in race and culture.566 The great ethnic solvent here has been Semitic. Under the spur of Islam, the Arabs by 1514 had made the Red Sea an Arabian and Mohammedan sea. They had their towns or trading stations at Zeila on the African side of the Strait of Bab-el-Mandeb, at Dalaqua, the port of Abyssinia, at Massowa, Suakin, and other towns, so that this coast too was called Arabia Felix.567

On the southwest edge of Asia, the Red Sea, despite its desert shores, has kept the influence of its intercontinental location and connected the neighboring regions of Africa and Asia. The similar climate on both sides of this long rift valley has encouraged ethnic exchanges and made it the center of what Ratzel refers to as the "Red Sea group of peoples," linked by race and culture.566 The primary ethnic mix here has been Semitic. Fueled by Islam, by 1514 the Arabs had turned the Red Sea into an Arabian and Muslim sea. They established their towns or trading posts at Zeila on the African side of the Strait of Bab-el-Mandeb, at Dalaqua, the port of Abyssinia, at Massowa, Suakin, and other towns, so this coast was also referred to as Arabia Felix.567

Assimilation facilitated by ethnic kinship.

Vicinal location about an enclosed basin produces more rapidly a unification of race and culture, when some ethnic relationship and affinity already exists among the peoples inhabiting its shores. As in the ancient and medieval Mediterranean, so in the Yellow Sea of Asia, the working of this principle is apparent. The presence along its coasts of divergent but kindred peoples like the Chinese, Koreans and Japanese, allowed these to be easily assimilated to a Yellow Sea race and to absorb quickly any later infusion, like that of the Tatars and Manchus. China, by reason of its larger area, long-drawn coast, massive population, and early civilization, was the dominant factor in this basin; Korea and Japan were its culture colonies-a fact that justifies the phrase calling "China the Rome of the Far East." Historical Japan began on the island of Kiu-sui, facing the Yellow Sea. Like Korea, it derived its writing, its fantastic medical notions, its industrial methods, some features of its government administration, its Buddhism and its religion of Confucius from the people about the lower Hoangho.568 Three centuries ago Japan had its colony on Korean soil at Fusan, the Calais of the East.569 For purposes of piracy and smuggling Japanese penetrated far up the rivers of China. Korea has kept in touch with China by an active trade and diplomatic relations through the centuries.

Vicinal location around a closed basin leads to a quicker unification of race and culture, especially when there’s already some ethnic connection and affinity among the communities living along its shores. Just like in the ancient and medieval Mediterranean, this principle is evident in the Yellow Sea of Asia. The presence of diverse yet related groups like the Chinese, Koreans, and Japanese along its coasts allowed for an easy assimilation into a Yellow Sea race and a quick absorption of later influences, such as those from the Tatars and Manchus. China, due to its larger size, extensive coastline, huge population, and early civilization, was the main influence in this basin; Korea and Japan were like its cultural colonies—a fact that justifies the phrase calling "China the Rome of the Far East." Historical Japan began on the island of Kiu-sui, facing the Yellow Sea. Similar to Korea, it adopted its writing, remarkable medical ideas, industrial techniques, certain aspects of its government administration, Buddhism, and Confucianism from the people around the lower Hoangho.568 Three centuries ago, Japan had a colony on Korean land at Fusan, the Calais of the East.569 For the purposes of piracy and smuggling, Japanese ventured far up the rivers of China. Throughout the centuries, Korea has maintained connections with China through active trade and diplomatic relations.

But to-day China is going to school to Japan. Since Japan renounced her policy of seclusion in 1868 along with her antiquated form of government, and since Korea has been forced out of her hermit life, the potency of vicinal location around this enclosed sea has been suddenly restored. The enforced opening of the treaty ports of Japan, Korea and China simply prepared the way for this basin to reassert its power to unite, and to unite now more closely and effectively than ever before, under the law of increasing territorial areas. The stimulus was first communicated to the basin from without, from the trading nations of the Occident and that new-born Orient rising from the sea on the California shores. Japan has responded most promptly and most actively to these over-sea stimuli, just as England has, of all Europe, felt most strongly the reflex influences from trans-Atlantic lands. The awakening of this basin has started, therefore, from its seaward rim; its star has risen in the east. It is in the small countries of the world that such stars rise. The compressed energies of Japan, stirred by over-sea contact and an improved government at home, have overleaped the old barriers and are following the lines of slight resistance which this land-bound sea affords. Helped by the bonds of geographical conditions and of race, she has begun to convert China and Korea into her culture colonies. The on-looking world feels that the ultimate welfare of China and Korea can be best nurtured by Japan, which will thus pay its old debt to the Middle Kingdom.

But today, China is learning from Japan. Since Japan abandoned its isolationist policy in 1868 along with its outdated government, and since Korea has been forced out of its seclusion, the significance of the neighboring regions around this enclosed sea has been suddenly revived. The forced opening of treaty ports in Japan, Korea, and China has simply set the stage for this area to reassert its ability to unite, and to do so now more closely and effectively than ever before, under the principle of expanding territorial areas. The initial boost came from outside influences, from the trading nations of the West and the emerging East rising from the shores of California. Japan has responded the quickest and most energetically to these external influences, just as England has, of all European countries, felt the strongest impact from trans-Atlantic lands. Therefore, the awakening of this region has started from its coastal edge; its star has risen in the east. It is in the smaller countries of the world that such stars emerge. The concentrated energies of Japan, stimulated by international contact and a better government at home, have broken through the old barriers and are following the paths of least resistance that this landlocked sea provides. Supported by geographical and racial bonds, Japan has begun to transform China and Korea into its cultural colonies. The observing world believes that the ultimate welfare of China and Korea can be best nurtured by Japan, allowing it to repay its longstanding debt to the Middle Kingdom.

Chinese expansion seaward.

Despite the fact that China's history has always had a decidedly inland character, that its political expansion has been landward, that it has practiced most extensively and successively internal colonization, and that its policy of exclusion has tended to deaden its outlook toward the Pacific, nevertheless China's direct intercourse with the west and its westward-directed influence have never, in point of significance, been comparable with that toward the east and south. Here a succession of marginal seas offered easy water-paths, dotted with way stations, to their outermost rim in Japan, the Philippines and remote Australia. About the South China Sea, the Gulf of Siam, the Sulu, Celebes, and Java Seas, the coastal regions of the outlying islands have for centuries received Chinese goods and culture, and a blend of that obstinately assertive Chinese blood.

Even though China has always been more focused on its inland regions, with its political expansion primarily happening on land, and has largely engaged in internal colonization while maintaining an exclusionary approach that has limited its view of the Pacific, China's direct interactions and influence to the West have never been as significant as those directed towards the East and South. In this case, a series of marginal seas provided convenient water routes, filled with stopover points, extending all the way to Japan, the Philippines, and far-off Australia. For centuries, the coastal areas of the distant islands around the South China Sea, Gulf of Siam, Sulu, Celebes, and Java Seas have welcomed Chinese goods and culture, mixing in with a strong presence of assertive Chinese heritage.

The strength of these influences has decreased with every increase of distance from the indented coasts and teeming, seafaring population of South China, and with every decrease in race affinity. They have left only faint traces on the alien shores of far-away Australia. The divergent ethnic stock of the widespread Malay world has been little susceptible to these influences, which are therefore weak in the remoter islands, but clearly discernible on the coasts of the Philippines,570 Borneo, the nearer Sunda Islands, and the peninsula of Malacca, where the Chinese have had trading colonies for centuries.571 But in the eastern half of Farther India, which is grouped with China by land as well as by sea, and whose race stock is largely if not purely Mongolian, these influences are very marked, so that the whole continental rim of the South China Sea, from Formosa to the Isthmus of Malacca, is strongly assimilated in race and culture. Tongking, exposed to those modifying influences which characterize all land frontiers, as well as to coastwise intercourse, is in its people and civilization merely a transcript of China. The coast districts and islands of Annam are occupied by Chinese as far as the hills of Cambodia, and the name of Cochin China points to the origin of its predominant population. One-sixth of the inhabitants of Siam are Chinese, some of whom have filtered through the northern border; Bangkok, the capital, has a large Chinese quarter. The whole economic life and no small part of the intellectual life of the eastern face of Farther India south to Singapore is centered in the activity of the Chinese.572

The impact of these influences has diminished as one moves further away from the indented coasts and bustling, seafaring communities of South China, and as racial similarities decrease. They've left only faint marks on the distant shores of far-off Australia. The diverse ethnic groups of the widespread Malay world have been largely resistant to these influences, which are weaker in the more remote islands but clearly visible along the coasts of the Philippines,570 Borneo, the closer Sunda Islands, and the Malacca Peninsula, where the Chinese have maintained trading colonies for centuries.571 However, in the eastern part of Farther India, which is connected to China both by land and sea and whose population is largely, if not entirely, Mongolian, these influences are quite strong. As a result, the entire continental edge of the South China Sea, from Formosa to the Isthmus of Malacca, has been significantly assimilated in terms of race and culture. Tongking, influenced by the factors that affect all land borders and by coastal interactions, is essentially a reflection of China in its people and civilization. The coastal regions and islands of Annam are inhabited by Chinese as far as the hills of Cambodia, and the name Cochin China indicates the origins of its dominant population. One-sixth of Siam's residents are Chinese, some of whom have migrated through the northern border; Bangkok, the capital, has a large Chinese neighborhood. The entire economic landscape and a significant portion of the intellectual scene of the eastern side of Farther India down to Singapore is rooted in Chinese activities.572

Importance of zonal and continental location.

The historical significance of an enclosed sea basin depends upon its zonal location and its position in relation to the surrounding lands. We observe a steady decrease of historical importance from south to north through the connected series of the Yellow, Japan, Okhotsk, Bering Seas and the Arctic basin, miscalled ocean. The far-northern location of the Baltic, with its long winters of ice-bound ports and its glaciated lands, retarded its inclusion in the field of history, curtailed its important historical period, and reduced the intensity of its historical life, despite the brave, eager activity of the Hanseatic League. The Mediterranean had the advantage, not only of a more favorable zonal situation, but of a location at the meeting place of three continents and on the line of maritime traffic across the eastern hemisphere from the Atlantic to the Pacific.

The historical significance of an enclosed sea basin depends on its geographical location and its relationship to the surrounding land. We see a consistent decline in historical importance from south to north through the connected series of the Yellow, Japan, Okhotsk, Bering Seas, and the Arctic basin, which is mistakenly called an ocean. The far-northern location of the Baltic, with its long winters of ice-locked ports and glaciated lands, hindered its inclusion in the realm of history, shortened its important historical era, and lessened the vibrancy of its historical life, even with the brave and enthusiastic efforts of the Hanseatic League. The Mediterranean had the advantage not only of a better geographical location but also of being at the crossroads of three continents and along the main maritime route across the eastern hemisphere from the Atlantic to the Pacific.

Thalassic character of the Indian Ocean.

These advantages it shares in some degree with the Indian Ocean, which, as Ratzel justly argues, is not a true ocean, at best only half an ocean. North of the equator, where it is narrowed and enclosed like an inland sea, it loses the hydrospheric and atmospheric characteristics of a genuine ocean. Currents and winds are disorganized by the close-hugging lands. Here the steady northeast trade wind is replaced by the alternating air currents of the northeast and southwest monsoons, which at a very early date573 enabled merchant vessels to break away from their previous slow, coastwise path, and to strike a straight course on their voyage between Arabia or the east coast of Africa and India.574 Moreover, this northern half of the Indian Ocean looks like a larger Mediterranean with its southern coast removed. It has the same east and west series of peninsulas harboring differentiated nationalities, the same northward running recesses, but all on a larger scale. It has linked together the history of Asia and Africa; and by the Red Sea and Persian Gulf, it has drawn Europe and the Mediterranean into its sphere of influence. At the western corner of the Indian Ocean a Semitic people, the Arabs of Oman and Yemen, here first developed brilliant maritime activity, like their Phoenician kinsmen of the Lebanon seaboard. Similar geographic conditions in their home lands and a nearly similar intercontinental location combined to make them the middlemen of three continents. Just as the Phoenicians, by way of the Mediterranean, reached and roused slumberous North Africa into historical activity and became the medium for the distribution of Egypt's culture, so these Semites of the Arabian shores knocked at the long-closed doors of East Africa facing on the Indian basin, and drew this region into the history of southern Asia. Thus the Africa of the enclosed seas was awakened to some measure of historical life, while the Africa of the wide Atlantic slept on.

These advantages are somewhat similar to the Indian Ocean, which, as Ratzel correctly points out, isn't a true ocean—it's only really half of one. North of the equator, where it narrows and becomes more like an inland sea, it loses the hydrospheric and atmospheric traits of a real ocean. The currents and winds get disrupted by the nearby land. Here, the consistent northeast trade wind is swapped out for the alternating air currents of the northeast and southwest monsoons, which early on573 allowed merchant ships to change from their slow coastal routes and take a direct path on their journeys between Arabia or the east coast of Africa and India.574 Furthermore, this northern part of the Indian Ocean resembles a larger Mediterranean without its southern coast. It has the same series of peninsulas in the east and west, each with its distinct nationalities, and similar northward inlets, but all on a larger scale. It has connected the histories of Asia and Africa; and through the Red Sea and Persian Gulf, it has brought Europe and the Mediterranean into its sphere of influence. In the western part of the Indian Ocean, a Semitic group, the Arabs of Oman and Yemen, first developed impressive maritime activity, much like their Phoenician relatives along the Lebanon coast. Similar geographic conditions in their homelands and a nearly identical intercontinental location made them the intermediaries of three continents. Just as the Phoenicians used the Mediterranean to awaken dormant North Africa into historical action and became the channel for distributing Egypt's culture, these Semites of the Arabian shores knocked on the previously closed doors of East Africa that faced the Indian Ocean and brought this region into the history of southern Asia. Thus, the Africa of the enclosed seas began to experience some level of historical activity, while the Africa of the wide Atlantic remained in the background.

The sea route to the Orient.

From the dawn of history the northern Indian Ocean was a thoroughfare. Alexander the Great's rediscovery of the old sea route to the Orient sounds like a modern event in relation to the gray ages behind it. Along this thoroughfare Indian colonists, traders, and priests carried the elements of Indian civilization to the easternmost Sunda Isles; and Oriental wares, sciences and religions moved westward to the margin of Europe and Africa. The Indian Ocean produced a civilization of its own, with which it colored a vast semi-circle of land reaching from Java to Abyssinia, and more faintly, owing to the wider divergence of race, the further stretch from Abyssinia to Mozambique.

From the beginning of history, the northern Indian Ocean has been a major route for trade. Alexander the Great's rediscovery of the ancient sea path to the East feels like a contemporary event compared to the long, dull periods that preceded it. Along this route, Indian settlers, merchants, and priests brought aspects of Indian culture to the far eastern Sunda Islands, while goods, knowledge, and religions from the East traveled westward to the edges of Europe and Africa. The Indian Ocean fostered its own civilization, influencing a vast area of land that stretched from Java to Abyssinia, and, to a lesser extent due to the greater differences in ethnicity, from Abyssinia to Mozambique.

Thus the northern Indian Ocean, owing to its form, its location in the angle between Asia and Africa and the latitude where, round the whole earth, "the zone of greatest historical density" begins, and especially its location just southeast of the Mediterranean as the eastern extension of that maritime track of ancient and modern times between Europe and China, has been involved in a long series of historical events. From the historical standpoint, prior to 1492 it takes a far higher place than the Atlantic and Pacific, owing to its nature as an enclosed sea.575 But like all such basins, this northern Indian Ocean attained its zenith of historical importance in early times. In the sixteenth century it suffered a partial eclipse, which passed only with the opening of the Suez Canal. During this interval, however, the Portuguese. Dutch and English had rounded the Cape of Good Hope and entered this basin on its open or oceanic side. By their trading stations, which soon traced the outlines of its coasts from Sofala in South Africa around to Java, they made this ocean an alcove of the Atlantic, and embodied its events in the Atlantic period of history. It is this open or oceanic side which differentiates the Indian Ocean physically, and therefore historically, from a genuine enclosed sea.

Thus, the northern Indian Ocean, because of its shape, its position at the angle between Asia and Africa, and the latitude where "the zone of greatest historical density" starts around the globe, especially its location just southeast of the Mediterranean as the eastern extension of that maritime route used throughout history between Europe and China, has been part of a long series of historical events. From a historical perspective, before 1492, it holds much greater significance than the Atlantic and Pacific, due to being an enclosed sea.575 But like all such basins, this northern Indian Ocean reached its peak historical importance in ancient times. In the sixteenth century, it experienced a decline, which lasted only until the Suez Canal was opened. During this time, however, the Portuguese, Dutch, and English had navigated around the Cape of Good Hope and entered this basin from the open ocean side. Through their trading posts, which quickly defined the outlines of its coasts from Sofala in South Africa to Java, they turned this ocean into a nook of the Atlantic, incorporating its events into the Atlantic period of history. It is this open ocean side that physically, and therefore historically, distinguishes the Indian Ocean from a true enclosed sea.

Limitation of small area in enclosed seas.

The limitation of every enclosed or marginal sea lies in its small area and in the relatively restricted circle of its bordering lands. Only small peninsulas and islands can break its surface, and short stretches of coast combine to form its shores. It affords, therefore, only limited territories as goals for expansion, restricted resources and populations to furnish the supply and demand of trade. What lands could the Mediterranean present to the colonial outlook of the Greeks comparable to the North America of the expanding English or the Brazil of the Portuguese? Yet the Mediterranean as a colonial field had great advantages in point of size over the Baltic, which is only one-sixth as large (2,509,500 and 431,000 square kilometers respectively), and especially over the Red Sea and Persian Gulf, whose effective areas were greatly reduced by the aridity of their surrounding lands. But the precocious development and early cessation of growth marking all Mediterranean national life have given to this basin a variegated history; and in every period and every geographical region of it, from ancient Phoenicia to modern Spain and Italy, the early exhaustion of resources and dwarfing of political ideals which characterize most small areas become increasingly conspicuous. The history of Sweden, Denmark, and the Hanse Towns in the Baltic tells the same story, the story of a hothouse plant, forced in germination and growth, then stifled in the close air.

The limitation of every enclosed or marginal sea is its small size and the relatively narrow range of its surrounding lands. Only small peninsulas and islands can interrupt its surface, and short stretches of coast come together to form its shores. As a result, it offers only limited lands as opportunities for expansion and has restricted resources and populations to supply and demand trade. What lands could the Mediterranean offer to Greek colonial ambitions that would compare to North America for the expanding English or Brazil for the Portuguese? Yet, the Mediterranean had significant advantages in size compared to the Baltic, which is only one-sixth its area (2,509,500 and 431,000 square kilometers respectively), and especially compared to the Red Sea and Persian Gulf, whose effective areas are greatly reduced by the dryness of their surrounding lands. However, the rapid development and early stagnation that mark all Mediterranean national life have resulted in a varied history; in every period and geographical region, from ancient Phoenicia to modern Spain and Italy, the early depletion of resources and narrowing of political ideals that typically characterize small areas become more and more evident. The history of Sweden, Denmark, and the Hanseatic Cities in the Baltic tells the same tale—the story of a hothouse plant, forced to germinate and grow, only to be stifled in the confined space.

Successive maritime periods in history.

Growth demands space. Therefore, the progress of history has been attended by an advance from smaller to larger marine areas, with a constant increase in those manifold relations between peoples and lands which the water is able to establish. Every great epoch of history has had its own sea, and every succeeding epoch has enlarged its maritime field. The Greek had the Aegean, the Roman the whole Mediterranean, to which the Middle Ages made an addition in the North Sea and Baltic. The modern period has had the Atlantic, and the twentieth century is now entering upon the final epoch of the World Ocean. The gradual inclusion of this World Ocean in the widened scope of history has been due to the expansion of European peoples, who, for the past twenty centuries, have been the most far-reaching agents in the making of universal history. Owing to the location and structure of their continent, they have always found the larger outlet in a western sea. In the south the field widened from the Phoenician Sea to the Aegean, then to the Mediterranean, on to the Atlantic, and across it to its western shores; in the north it moved from the quiet Baltic to the tide-swept North Sea and across the North Atlantic. Only the South Atlantic brought European ships to the great world highway of the South Seas, and gave them the choice of an eastern or western route to the Pacific. Every new voyage in the age of discovery expanded the historical horizon; and every improvement in the technique of navigation has helped to eliminate distance and reduced intercourse on the World Ocean to the time-scale of the ancient Mediterranean.

Growth requires space. As a result, the course of history has seen a move from smaller to larger marine areas, continually increasing the various connections between people and lands that the water can facilitate. Each major historical period has had its own sea, and each following period has expanded its maritime territory. The Greeks had the Aegean Sea, the Romans controlled the entire Mediterranean, which the Middle Ages added to with the North Sea and the Baltic. The modern era has encompassed the Atlantic, and the twentieth century is now entering the final era of the World Ocean. The gradual incorporation of this World Ocean into the expanding narrative of history is due to the growth of European peoples, who, for the past two thousand years, have been the most influential in shaping universal history. Due to the geography and configuration of their continent, they've always found a broader outlet in a western sea. To the south, the area expanded from the Phoenician Sea to the Aegean, then to the Mediterranean, moving on to the Atlantic, and across to its western shores. To the north, it transitioned from the calm Baltic to the turbulent North Sea and across the North Atlantic. Only the South Atlantic directed European ships to the vast world route of the South Seas, offering them the option of an eastern or western path to the Pacific. Every new voyage during the Age of Discovery broadened the historical perspective; and every advancement in navigational techniques has helped to reduce distance, making interactions in the World Ocean comparable to those of the ancient Mediterranean.

It would be a mistake, however, to suppose that the larger oceanic horizon has meant a corresponding increase in the relative content and importance of history for the known world of each period. Such an intense, concentrated national life as occurred in those little Mediterranean countries in ancient times is not duplicated now, unless we find a parallel in Japan's recent career in the Yellow Sea basin. There was something as cosmic in the colonial ventures of the Greeks to the wind-swept shores of the Crimea or barbarous wilds of Massilia, as in the establishment of English settlements on the brimming rivers of Virginia or the torrid coast of Malacca. Alexander's conquest of the Asiatic rim of the Mediterranean and Rome's political unification of the basin had a significance for ancient times comparable with the Russification of northern Asia and the establishment of the British Empire for our day.

It would be a mistake, however, to think that the broader oceanic perspective has led to a comparable increase in the relevance and importance of history for the known world of each era. The intense, focused national life that existed in those small Mediterranean countries in ancient times isn't mirrored today, unless we find a parallel in Japan's recent developments in the Yellow Sea region. There was something just as grand in the colonial endeavors of the Greeks on the windswept shores of Crimea or the wilds of Massilia as there was in the establishment of English settlements along the thriving rivers of Virginia or the hot coast of Malacca. Alexander's conquest of the Asian edges of the Mediterranean and Rome's political unification of the basin had a significance for ancient times that is comparable to the Russification of northern Asia and the rise of the British Empire in our time.

The ocean has always performed one function in the evolution of history; it has provided the outlet for the exercise of redundant national powers. The abundance of opportunity which it presents to these disengaged energies depends upon the size, location and other geographic conditions of the bordering lands. These opportunities are limited in an enclosed basin, larger in the oceans, and largest in the northern halves of the oceans, owing to the widening of all land-masses towards the north and the consequent contraction of the oceans and seas in the same latitudes.

The ocean has always played a key role in shaping history; it has served as a way for excess national powers to assert themselves. The range of opportunities it offers to these untapped energies depends on the size, location, and other geographic features of the surrounding lands. These opportunities are restricted in enclosed basins, more abundant in the oceans, and most extensive in the northern parts of the oceans, due to the way land masses spread wider toward the north, causing the oceans and seas at the same latitudes to contract.

Contrasted historical rôthe Baltic played theles of northern and southern hemispheres.

A result of this grouping is the abundance of land in the northern hemisphere, and the vast predominance of water in the southern, by reason of which these two hemispheres have each assumed a distinct rôle in history. The northern hemisphere offers the largest advantages for the habitation of man, and significantly enough, contains a population five times that of the southern hemisphere. The latter, on the other hand, with its vast, unbroken water areas, has been the great oceanic highway for circum-mundane exploration and trade. This great water girdle of the South Seas had to be discovered before the spherical form of the earth could be proven. In the wide territory of the northern hemisphere civilization has experienced an uninterrupted development, first in the Old World, because this offered in its large area north of the equator the fundamental conditions for rapid evolution; then it was transplanted with greatest success to North America. The northern hemisphere contains, therefore, "the zone of greatest historical density," from which the track of the South Seas is inconveniently remote. Hence we find in recent decades a reversion to the old east-west path along the southern rim of Eurasia, now perfected by the Suez Canal, and to be extended in the near future around the world by the union of the Pacific with the Caribbean Sea at Panama; so that finally the northern hemisphere will have its own circum-mundane waterway, along the line of greatest intercontinental intercourse.

A result of this grouping is the abundant land in the northern hemisphere and the vast amount of water in the southern hemisphere, which is why these two hemispheres have each taken on a distinct role in history. The northern hemisphere provides the best conditions for human habitation and notably has a population five times larger than that of the southern hemisphere. The southern hemisphere, on the other hand, with its large, uninterrupted bodies of water, has served as the main ocean route for global exploration and trade. This significant waterway of the South Seas needed to be discovered before the spherical shape of the earth could be confirmed. In the expansive territory of the northern hemisphere, civilization has experienced continuous growth, first in the Old World, which had the essential conditions for rapid development in its large land area north of the equator; then it was successfully transplanted to North America. Therefore, the northern hemisphere contains "the zone of greatest historical density," from which the South Seas route is inconveniently distant. Consequently, in recent decades, there has been a return to the old east-west route along the southern edge of Eurasia, now improved by the Suez Canal, and soon to be extended globally through the connection of the Pacific and Caribbean Sea at Panama; thus, the northern hemisphere will eventually have its own global waterway, following the path of major intercontinental exchange.

Size of the oceans

The size of the ocean as a whole is so enormous, and yet its various subdivisions are so uniform in their physical aspect, that their differences of size produce less conspicuous historical effects than their diversity of area would lead one to expect. A voyage across the 177,000 square miles (453,500 square kilometers) of the Black Sea does not differ materially from one across the 979,000 square miles (2,509,500 square kilometers) of the Mediterranean; or a voyage across the 213,000 square miles (547,600 square kilometers) of the North Sea, from one across the three-hundredfold larger area of the Pacific. The ocean does not, like the land, wear upon its surface the evidences and effects of its size; it wraps itself in the same garment of blue waves or sullen swell, wherever it appears; but the outward cloak of the land varies from zone to zone. The significant anthropo-geographical influence of the size of the oceans, as opposed to that of the smaller seas, comes from the larger circle of lands which the former open to maritime enterprise. For primitive navigation, when the sailor crept from headland to headland and from island to island, the small enclosed basin with its close-hugging shores did indeed offer the best conditions. To-day, only the great tonnage of ocean-going vessels may reflect in some degree the vast areas they traverse between continent and continent. Coasting craft and ships designed for local traffic in enclosed seas are in general smaller, as in the Baltic, though the enormous commerce of the Great Lakes, which constitute in effect an inland sea, demands immense vessels.

The size of the ocean is so massive, and yet its various sections are so similar in their physical features, that their differences in size create less noticeable historical effects than you might expect based on their area diversity. A trip across the 177,000 square miles (453,500 square kilometers) of the Black Sea is not much different from one across the 979,000 square miles (2,509,500 square kilometers) of the Mediterranean; nor is a journey across the 213,000 square miles (547,600 square kilometers) of the North Sea any different from one across the three-hundred times larger Pacific. The ocean doesn’t show the signs of its size on its surface like the land does; it’s covered in the same blue waves or gloomy swells, no matter where it is; while the land's appearance changes from region to region. The important anthropo-geographical impact of the size of the oceans, compared to smaller seas, comes from the broader range of lands they connect for maritime activities. For early navigation, when sailors made their way from headland to headland and from island to island, the small enclosed basins with their nearby shores did provide the best conditions. Today, only the large capacity of ocean-going vessels reflects, to some extent, the vast areas they navigate between continents. Coastal boats and ships designed for local traffic in enclosed seas are generally smaller, like in the Baltic, though the enormous commerce of the Great Lakes, which essentially function as an inland sea, requires huge vessels.

Neutrality of the seas, its evolution.

The vast size of the oceans has been the basis of their neutrality. The neutrality of the seas is a recent idea in political history. The principle arose in connection with the oceans, and from them was extended to the smaller basins, which previously tended to be regarded as private political domains. Their limited area, which enabled them to be compassed, enabled them also to be appropriated, controlled and policed. The Greek excluded the Phoenician from the Aegean and made it an Hellenic sea. Carthage and Tarentum tried to draw the dead line for Roman merchantmen at the Lacinian Cape, the doorway into the Ionian Sea, and thereby involved themselves in the famous Punic Wars. The whole Mediterranean became a Roman sea, the mare nostrum. Pompey's fleet was able to police it effectively and to exterminate the pirates in a few months, as Cicero tells us in his oration for the Manilian Law. Venice, by the conquest of the Dalmatian pirates in 991 prepared to make herself dominatrix Adriatici maris, as she was later called. By the thirteenth century she had secured full command of the sea, spoke of it as "the Gulf," in her desire to stamp it as a mare clausum, maintained in it a powerful patrol fleet under a Capitan in Golfo, whose duty it was to police the sea for pirates and to seize all ships laden with contraband goods. She claimed and enforced the right of search of foreign vessels, and compelled them to discharge two-thirds of their cargo at Venice, which thus became the clearing house of the whole Adriatic. She even appealed to the Pope for confirmation of her dominion over the sea.576 Sweden and Denmark strove for a dominum maris Baltici; but the Hanse Towns of northern Germany secured the maritime supremacy in the basin, kept a toll-gate at its entrance, and levied toll or excluded merchant ships at their pleasure, a right which after the fall of the Hanseatic power was assumed by Denmark and maintained till 1857. "The Narrow Seas" over which England claimed sovereignty from 1299 to 1805, and on which she exacted a salute from every foreign vessel, included the North Sea as far as Stadland Cape in Norway, the English Channel, and the Bay of Biscay down to Cape Finisterre in northern Spain.577

The vastness of the oceans has been the foundation of their neutrality. The idea of neutral seas is a modern concept in political history. This principle originated with the oceans and was then applied to smaller bodies of water, which were once viewed as private political territories. Their limited size made them easier to navigate and allowed them to be claimed, controlled, and patrolled. The Greeks excluded the Phoenicians from the Aegean, declaring it a Hellenic sea. Carthage and Tarentum attempted to establish a boundary for Roman traders at the Lacinian Cape, the entrance to the Ionian Sea, leading to the well-known Punic Wars. The entire Mediterranean became known as a Roman sea, the mare nostrum. Pompey's fleet effectively patrolled it and eliminated the pirates within a few months, as Cicero mentioned in his oration for the Manilian Law. Venice, after defeating the Dalmatian pirates in 991, aimed to make herself dominatrix Adriatici maris, which she was later called. By the thirteenth century, she had gained complete control over the sea, referred to it as "the Gulf," aspiring to declare it a mare clausum, and maintained a strong patrol fleet under a Capitan in Golfo, whose responsibility was to patrol for pirates and seize any ships carrying illegal goods. She asserted and enforced the right to search foreign vessels, compelling them to unload two-thirds of their cargo in Venice, which then became the central hub for the entire Adriatic. She even appealed to the Pope for validation of her control over the sea.576 Sweden and Denmark pursued a dominum maris Baltici; however, the Hanseatic Towns of northern Germany achieved maritime dominance in the region, establishing a toll-gate at its entrance and charging tolls or excluding merchant ships as they wished, a right that Denmark took over following the decline of Hanseatic power and maintained until 1857. "The Narrow Seas" over which England claimed sovereignty from 1299 to 1805, demanding a salute from every foreign vessel, encompassed the North Sea as far as Stadland Cape in Norway, the English Channel, and the Bay of Biscay down to Cape Finisterre in northern Spain.577

At the beginning of the sixteenth century the Indian Ocean was a Portuguese sea. Spain was trying to monopolize the Caribbean and even the Pacific Ocean. But the immense areas of these pelagic fields of enterprise, and the rapid intrusion into them of other colonial powers soon rendered obsolete in practice the principle of the mare clausum, and introduced that of the mare liberum. The political theory of the freedom of the seas seems to have needed vigorous support even toward the end of the seventeenth century. At this time we find writers like Salmasius and Hugo Grotius invoking it to combat Portuguese monopoly of the Indian Ocean as a mare clausum. Grotius in a lengthy dissertation upholds the thesis that "Jure gentium quibusvis ad quosvis liberam esse navigationem," and supports it by an elaborate argument and quotations from the ancient poets, philosophers, orators and historians.578 This principle was not finally acknowledged by England as applicable to "The Narrow Seas" till 1805. Now, by international agreement, political domain extends only to one marine league from shore or within cannon range. The rest of the vast water area remains the unobstructed highway of the world.

At the start of the sixteenth century, the Indian Ocean was dominated by the Portuguese. Spain was focused on controlling the Caribbean and even the Pacific Ocean. However, the vastness of these expansive waters and the quick entry of other colonial empires soon made the idea of a closed sea, or mare clausum, practically irrelevant and introduced the concept of open sea, or mare liberum. The political idea of free seas seemed to need strong advocacy even by the late seventeenth century. During this time, we see thinkers like Salmasius and Hugo Grotius using it to challenge the Portuguese monopoly in the Indian Ocean, which was being treated as a mare clausum. Grotius, in a detailed dissertation, argues that "Jure gentium quibusvis ad quosvis liberam esse navigationem" and backs it up with extensive reasoning and references to ancient poets, philosophers, orators, and historians.578 This principle wasn't officially recognized by England as applicable to "The Narrow Seas" until 1805. Today, international agreements state that political territorial claims extend only one marine league from the shore or within cannon range. The rest of the vast ocean remains an open highway for the world.


NOTES TO CHAPTER IX

Notes for Chapter 9


528.

S.M. Zwemer, Arabia the Cradle of Islam, p. 135. New York, 1900.

S.M. Zwemer, Arabia the Cradle of Islam, p. 135. New York, 1900.

529.

A.H. Layard, Nineveh and Its Remains, Vol. I, p. 277; Vol. II, 79-81. New York, 1849.

A.H. Layard, Nineveh and Its Remains, Vol. I, p. 277; Vol. II, 79-81. New York, 1849.

530.

E.F. Knight, Where Three Empires Meet, pp. 257, 261. London, 1897.

E.F. Knight, Where Three Empires Meet, pp. 257, 261. London, 1897.

531.

Col. Lane Fox, Early Modes of Navigation, Journal of Anthropological Institute, Vol. IV, p. 423.

Col. Lane Fox, Early Modes of Navigation, Journal of Anthropological Institute, Vol. IV, p. 423.

532.

Boyd Alexander, From the Niger to the Nile, Vol. I, p. 167. London; 1907.

Boyd Alexander, From the Niger to the Nile, Vol. I, p. 167. London; 1907.

533.

Ibid., Vol. I, p. 324.

Ibid., Vol. 1, p. 324.

534.

James H. Breasted, History of Egypt, pp. 89, 91, 97. New York, 1905. Col. Lane Fox, Early Modes of Navigation, Journal of Anthropological Institute, Vol. IV, pp. 414-417.

James H. Breasted, History of Egypt, pp. 89, 91, 97. New York, 1905. Col. Lane Fox, Early Modes of Navigation, Journal of Anthropological Institute, Vol. IV, pp. 414-417.

535.

G. Schweinfurth, The Heart of Africa, Vol. I, p. 77. London, 1873.

G. Schweinfurth, The Heart of Africa, Vol. I, p. 77. London, 1873.

536.

E. Huntington, The Depression of Sistan in Eastern Persia, Bulletin of the American Geographical Society, Vol. 37, No. 5. 1905.

E. Huntington, The Depression of Sistan in Eastern Persia, Bulletin of the American Geographical Society, Vol. 37, No. 5. 1905.

537.

Schoolcraft, The Indian Tribes of the United States, Vol. I, p. 214. Philadelphia, 1853.

Schoolcraft, The Indian Tribes of the United States, Vol. I, p. 214. Philadelphia, 1853.

538.

H.H. Bancroft, The Native Races, Vol. I, pp. 382-383, 408, 564. San Francisco, 1886. D. G. Brinton, The American Race, pp. 110, 112. Philadelphia, 1901.

H.H. Bancroft, The Native Races, Vol. I, pp. 382-383, 408, 564. San Francisco, 1886. D. G. Brinton, The American Race, pp. 110, 112. Philadelphia, 1901.

539.

Herodotus, Book 1, Chap. 194.

Herodotus, Book 1, Ch. 194.

540.

S.M. Zwemer, Arabia the Cradle of Islam, p. 135. New York, 1900.

S.M. Zwemer, Arabia the Cradle of Islam, p. 135. New York, 1900.

541.

Cotterill and Little, Ships and Sailors, pp. ix-x, 38, London, 1868.

Cotterill and Little, Ships and Sailors, pp. ix-x, 38, London, 1868.

542.

M. Hue, Travels in Tartary, Thibet and China in 1846, Vol. II, p. 251. Chicago, 1898.

M. Hue, Travels in Tartary, Tibet, and China in 1846, Vol. II, p. 251. Chicago, 1898.

543.

Elliott Coues, History of the Lewis and Clark Expedition, Vol. I, p. 159. New York, 1893.

Elliott Coues, History of the Lewis and Clark Expedition, Vol. I, p. 159. New York, 1893.

544.

Col. Lane Fox, Early Modes of Navigation, Journal of Anthropological Institute, Vol. IV, pp. 423-425.

Col. Lane Fox, Early Modes of Navigation, Journal of Anthropological Institute, Vol. IV, pp. 423-425.

545.

H.M. Stanley, Through the Dark Continent, Vol. I, pp. 313-314. New York, 1879.

H.M. Stanley, Through the Dark Continent, Vol. I, pp. 313-314. New York, 1879.

546.

Ibid., Vol. II, pp. 184, 219-220, 270-272, 300.

Ibid., Vol. II, pp. 184, 219-220, 270-272, 300.

547.

Ratzel, History of Mankind, Vol. II, p. 288. London, 1896-1898.

Ratzel, History of Mankind, Vol. II, p. 288. London, 1896-1898.

548.

Ibid., Vol I, pp. 358-359. Spencer and Gillen, Northern Tribes of Central Australia, pp. 679-680. London, 1904.

Ibid., Vol I, pp. 358-359. Spencer and Gillen, Northern Tribes of Central Australia, pp. 679-680. London, 1904.

549.

Ratzel, History of Mankind, Vol. I, pp. 153-154; Vol. II, pp. 91, 100. London, 1896-1898.

Ratzel, History of Mankind, Vol. I, pp. 153-154; Vol. II, pp. 91, 100. London, 1896-1898.

550.

Ibid., Vol. I, pp. 166-170.

Ibid., Vol. 1, pp. 166-170.

551.

Captain Winkler, Sea Charts Formerly Used in the Marshall Islands, Smithsonian Report for 1899, translated from the Marine Rundschau. Berlin, 1898.

Captain Winkler, Sea Charts Previously Used in the Marshall Islands, Smithsonian Report for 1899, translated from the Marine Rundschau. Berlin, 1898.

552.

Captain James Cook, Journal of First Voyage Round the World, pp. 70, 105, 119, 221, 230. Edited by W.J.L. Wharton. London, 1893.

Captain James Cook, Journal of First Voyage Around the World, pp. 70, 105, 119, 221, 230. Edited by W.J.L. Wharton. London, 1893.

553.

Ratzel, History of Mankind, Vol. I, pp. 161, 174. London, 1896-1898.

Ratzel, History of Mankind, Vol. I, pp. 161, 174. London, 1896-1898.

554.

The Commercial and Fiscal Policy of the Venetian Republic, Edinburgh Review, Vol. 200, pp. 352-353. 1904.

The Commercial and Fiscal Policy of the Venetian Republic, Edinburgh Review, Vol. 200, pp. 352-353. 1904.

555.

H. Helmolt, History of the World, Vol. I, pp. 188-189, 193-195. New York, 1902-1906.

H. Helmolt, History of the World, Vol. I, pp. 188-189, 193-195. New York, 1902-1906.

556.

G. Sergi, The Mediterranean Race, pp. 29-37. New York, 1901. W.Z. Ripley, Races of Europe, pp. 128-130, 270-273, 387-390, 407, 444, 448. New York, 1899.

G. Sergi, The Mediterranean Race, pp. 29-37. New York, 1901. W.Z. Ripley, Races of Europe, pp. 128-130, 270-273, 387-390, 407, 444, 448. New York, 1899.

557.

H.J. Mackinder, Britain and the British Seas, pp. 189-190. London, 1904.

H.J. Mackinder, Britain and the British Seas, pp. 189-190. London, 1904.

558.

Sydow-Wagner Schul-Atlas, Völker und Sprachenkarten, No. 13. Gotha, 1905. A. Leroy-Beaulieu, The Empire of the Tsars, map p. 80. New York, 1897.

Sydow-Wagner School Atlas, Peoples and Language Maps, No. 13. Gotha, 1905. A. Leroy-Beaulieu, The Empire of the Tsars, map p. 80. New York, 1897.

559.

Helmolt, History of the World, Vol. VI, pp. 5-17. New York, 1902-1906.

Helmolt, History of the World, Vol. VI, pp. 5-17. New York, 1902-1906.

560.

E.C. Semple, The Development of the Hanse Towns in Relation to their Geographical Environment, Bulletin American Geographical Society, Vol. XXXI, No. 3, 1899.

E.C. Semple, The Development of the Hanse Towns in Relation to their Geographical Environment, Bulletin American Geographical Society, Vol. XXXI, No. 3, 1899.

561.

Helen Zimmern, The Hansa Towns, pp. 24-25, 54-55. New York, 1895.

Helen Zimmern, The Hansa Towns, pp. 24-25, 54-55. New York, 1895.

562.

Nordenskiold, The Voyage of the Vega, pp. 365, 588, 591. New York, 1882.

Nordenskiold, The Voyage of the Vega, pp. 365, 588, 591. New York, 1882.

563.

Ibid., pp. 375, 403, 405, 487, 563.

Ibid., pp. 375, 403, 405, 487, 563.

564.

Agnes Laut, The Vikings of the Pacific, pp. 62-105. New York, 1905.

Agnes Laut, The Vikings of the Pacific, pp. 62-105. New York, 1905.

565.

Ratzel, History of Mankind, Vol. III, pp. 446, 449-450. London, 1896-1898.

Ratzel, History of Mankind, Vol. III, pp. 446, 449-450. London, 1896-1898.

566.

Ibid., Vol. III, pp. 180-195.

Ibid., Vol. 3, pp. 180-195.

567.

Duarte Barbosa, The Coasts of East Africa and Malabar, pp. 17-18. Hakluyt Society Publications. London, 1866.

Duarte Barbosa, The Coasts of East Africa and Malabar, pp. 17-18. Hakluyt Society Publications. London, 1866.

568.

Ratzel, History of Mankind, Vol. III, pp. 443-444. London, 1896-1898.

Ratzel, History of Mankind, Vol. III, pp. 443-444. London, 1896-1898.

569.

Angus Hamilton, Korea, pp. 130-135. New York, 1904.

Angus Hamilton, Korea, pp. 130-135. New York, 1904.

570.

Census of the Philippine Islands, Vol. I, pp. 318-320, 478, 481-495. Washington, 1903.

Census of the Philippine Islands, Vol. I, pp. 318-320, 478, 481-495. Washington, 1903.

571.

Hans Helmolt, History of the World, Vol. II, pp. 544-545. New York, 1902-1906.

Hans Helmolt, History of the World, Vol. II, pp. 544-545. New York, 1902-1906.

572.

Ratzel, History of Mankind, Vol. III, pp. 407-412. London, 1896-1898.

Ratzel, History of Mankind, Vol. III, pp. 407-412. London, 1896-1898.

573.

Pliny, Natural History, Book VI, chap. 26.

Pliny, Natural History, Book VI, chap. 26.

574.

Bunbury, History of Ancient Geography, Vol. II, pp. 351, 417-418, 470, 471. London, 1883.

Bunbury, History of Ancient Geography, Vol. II, pp. 351, 417-418, 470, 471. London, 1883.

575.

For full discussion of Indian Ocean, see Helmolt, History of the World, Vol. II, pp. 580-584, 602-610. New York, 1902-1906. Duarte Barbosa, The Coasts of East Africa and Malabar, pp. 26-28, 41-42, 59-60, 67, 75, 79-80, 83, 166, 170, 174, 179, 184, 191-194, Hakluyt Society. London, 1866.

For a complete discussion of the Indian Ocean, refer to Helmolt, History of the World, Vol. II, pp. 580-584, 602-610. New York, 1902-1906. Duarte Barbosa, The Coasts of East Africa and Malabar, pp. 26-28, 41-42, 59-60, 67, 75, 79-80, 83, 166, 170, 174, 179, 184, 191-194, Hakluyt Society. London, 1866.

576.

Pompeo Molmenti, Venice in the Middle Ages, Vol. I, pp. 117, 121-123, 130. Chicago, 1906. The Commercial and Fiscal Policy of the Venetian Republic, Edinburgh Review, Vol. 200, pp. 341-344, 347. 1904.

Pompeo Molmenti, Venice in the Middle Ages, Vol. I, pp. 117, 121-123, 130. Chicago, 1906. The Commercial and Fiscal Policy of the Venetian Republic, Edinburgh Review, Vol. 200, pp. 341-344, 347. 1904.

577.

H.J. Mackinder, Britain and the British Seas, p. 24, note. London, 1904.

H.J. Mackinder, Britain and the British Seas, p. 24, note. London, 1904.

578.

Hugonis Grotii, Mare Liberum sive de jure quod Batavis competit ad Indicana commercia dissertatio, contained in his De Jure Belli et Pacis. Hagae Comitis, 1680.

Hugo Grotius, Mare Liberum or On the Law that the Dutch Have to Indian Trade, included in his On the Law of War and Peace. The Hague, 1680.


Chapter X—Man's Relation To The Water

Despite the extensive use which man makes of the water highways of the world, they remain to him highways, places for his passing and repassing, not for his abiding. Essentially a terrestrial animal, he makes his sojourn upon the deep only temporary, even when as a fisherman he is kept upon the sea for months during the long season of the catch, or when, as whaler, year-long voyages are necessitated by the remoteness and expanse of his field of operations. Yet even this rule has its exceptions. The Moro Bajan are sea gypsies of the southern Philippines and the Sulu archipelago, of whom Gannett says "their home is in their boats from the cradle to the grave, and they know no art but that of fishing." Subsisting almost exclusively on sea food, they wander about from shore to shore, one family to a boat, in little fleets of half a dozen sail; every floating community has its own headman called the Captain Bajan, who embodies all their slender political organization. When occasionally they abandon their rude boats for a time, they do not abandon the sea, but raise their huts on piles above the water on some shelving beach. Like the ancient lake-dwellers of Switzerland and Italy, only in death do they acknowledge their ultimate connection with the solid land. They never bury their dead at sea, but always on a particular island, to which the funeral cortege of rude outrigged boats moves to the music of the paddle's dip.579

Despite the widespread use of the world's waterways, to humans they remain just routes for travel, not places to settle down. As primarily land animals, humans only stay on the water temporarily, even when fishermen may spend months at sea during the long fishing season, or when whalers embark on year-long journeys due to the vastness of their hunting grounds. Still, there are exceptions to this. The Moro Bajan are sea gypsies from the southern Philippines and the Sulu archipelago, and Gannett describes them as having "their home in their boats from the cradle to the grave, and they know no craft but that of fishing." Relying almost entirely on seafood, they roam from shore to shore, with one family in each boat, forming small fleets of six or so. Each floating community is led by a headman called the Captain Bajan, who represents their minimal political structure. When they occasionally leave their makeshift boats, they don’t forget the sea; instead, they build huts on stilts above the water on sloping beaches. Similar to the ancient lake dwellers of Switzerland and Italy, they only recognize their connection to solid ground in death. They never bury their dead at sea, but always on a specific island, where a procession of simple outrigged boats carries them to the sound of the paddles dipping.579

Protection of a water frontier.

The margin of river, lake and sea has always attracted the first settlements of man because it offered a ready food supply in its animal life and an easy highway for communication. Moreover, a water front made a comparatively safe frontier for the small, isolated communities which constituted primitive societies. The motive of protection, dominant in the savage when selecting sites for his villages, led him to place them on the pear-shaped peninsula formed by a river loop, or on an island in the stream or off the coast; or to sever his connection with the solid land, whence attack might come, and provide himself with a boundary waste of water by raising his hut on piles above the surface of lake, river or sheltered seacoast, within easy reach of the shore. In this location the occupant of the pile dwelling has found all his needs answered—fishing grounds beneath and about his hut, fields a few hundred feet away on shore, easily reached by his dug-out canoe, and a place of retreat from a land enemy, whether man or wild beast.

The edges of rivers, lakes, and seas have always attracted the first human settlements because they offered an easy food supply from animals and a convenient way to communicate. Additionally, a waterfront provided a relatively safe boundary for the small, isolated communities that made up early societies. The desire for protection, which was crucial for early humans when choosing where to set up their villages, led them to build on the pear-shaped peninsula created by a river bend, on an island in the water, or off the coast; or they would distance themselves from solid land, where attacks could come from, and create a water barrier by raising their homes on stilts above the surface of lakes, rivers, or along sheltered coastlines, all while remaining close to the shore. In this type of location, the person living in a stilt house has all of their needs met—fishing areas below and around their home, fields just a few hundred feet away on land, easily accessible by their canoe, and a safe retreat from any land threats, whether from other humans or wild animals.

Ancient pile villages.

Such pile dwellings, answering the primary need of protection, have had wide distribution, especially in the Tropics, and persist into our own times among retarded peoples living in small, isolated groups too weak for effective defence. They were numerous in the lakes of Switzerland580 and northern Italy down to the first century of our era, and existed later in slightly modified form in Ireland, Scotland, England and southern Wales.581 In ancient Ireland they were constructed on artificial islands, raised in shallow spots of lakes or morasses by means of fascines weighted down with gravel and clay, and moored to the bottom by stakes driven through the mass. Such groups of dwellings were called Crannogs; they existed in Ireland from the earliest historical period and continued in use down to the time of Queen Elizabeth. In the turbulent twelfth century, the warring lords of the soil adopted them as places of refuge and residence.582 Herodotus describes a pile village of the ancient Thracians in Lake Prasias near the Hellespont, built quite after the Swiss type, with trap doors in the floor for fishing or throwing out refuse. Its inhabitants escaped conquest by the Persians under King Darius, and avoided the fate of their fellow tribesmen on land, who were subdued and removed as colonists to Asia.583

Such pile dwellings, which primarily served the need for protection, have been widely found, especially in tropical regions, and still exist today among isolated groups that are too weak for effective defense. They were common in the lakes of Switzerland580 and northern Italy until the first century AD, and later appeared in slightly modified forms in Ireland, Scotland, England, and southern Wales.581 In ancient Ireland, these structures were built on artificial islands, created in shallow areas of lakes or marshes by using bundles of sticks weighted down with gravel and clay, and anchored to the bottom with stakes driven through the mass. These groups of houses were called Crannogs; they existed in Ireland from the earliest historical period and continued to be used until the time of Queen Elizabeth. During the tumultuous twelfth century, the warring local lords used them as places of refuge and residence.582 Herodotus describes a pile village of the ancient Thracians in Lake Prasias near the Hellespont, built similarly to the Swiss models, featuring trap doors in the floor for fishing or discarding waste. Its inhabitants managed to evade conquest by the Persians under King Darius and avoided the fate of their fellow tribesmen on land, who were subdued and taken as colonists to Asia.583

Present distribution.

Among Europeans such pile villages belong to primitive stages of development, chiefly to the Stone, Bronze, and early Iron Ages. They are widely distributed in modern times among retarded peoples, who in this way seek compensation for their social and economic weakness. In South America, the small timid tribe of the native Warraus till quite recently built their dwellings on platforms over the water in the river network of the Orinoco delta and along the swamp coast as far as the Essequibo. These pile villages, "fondata sopra l'acqua come Venezia," as Vespuccius says, suggested to him the name of Venezuela or little Venice for this coast.584 A pile village in Jull Lake, a lacustrine expansion in a tributary of the upper Salwin River, is inhabited by the Inthas, apparently an alien colony in Burma. They have added a detail in their floating gardens, rafts covered with soil, on which they raise tomatoes, watermelons and gourds.585

Among Europeans, these pile villages are seen as primitive stages of development, mainly belonging to the Stone, Bronze, and early Iron Ages. Today, they are commonly found among marginalized communities, who use this method to compensate for their social and economic disadvantages. In South America, the small and shy Warrau tribe used to build their homes on platforms over the water in the river network of the Orinoco delta and along the swampy coast up to the Essequibo. These pile villages, "fondata sopra l'acqua come Venezia," as Vespucci noted, inspired him to name this region Venezuela or little Venice. A pile village in Jull Lake, a lake expansion in a tributary of the upper Salwin River, is inhabited by the Inthas, who seem to be an outside colony in Burma. They have added a unique feature to their floating gardens, which are rafts covered with soil where they grow tomatoes, watermelons, and gourds.

In little Lake Mohrya, located near the upper Lualaba River, a southern headstream of the Congo, Cameron found numerous pile dwellings, whose owners moved about in dug-out canoes and cultivated fields on land,586 as did their Swiss confrères of twenty centuries ago. Livingstone, in descending from Lake Nyassa by the Shire River, found in the lakelet of Pamalombe, into which the stream widened, similar water huts inhabited by a number of Manganja families, who had been driven from their homes by slave raiders. The slender reeds of the papyrus thicket, lining the shore in a broad band, served as piles, number compensating for the lack of strength; the reeds, bent downward and fastened together into a mat, did indeed support their light dwellings, but heaved like thin ice when the savages moved from hut to hut. The dense forest of papyrus left standing between village and shore effectually screened their retreat, and the abundant fish in the lake provided them with food.587

In little Lake Mohrya, near the upper Lualaba River, a southern tributary of the Congo, Cameron discovered many pile dwellings, where the inhabitants traveled in dug-out canoes and farmed nearby land, just like their Swiss counterparts from two thousand years ago. When Livingstone descended from Lake Nyassa along the Shire River, he found similar floating huts in the small lake of Pamalombe, where several Manganja families lived after being forced from their homes by slave raiders. The narrow reeds of the papyrus thicket that lined the shore formed a wide barrier, compensating for the lack of strength in their construction; the reeds, woven together and bent down, did support their light homes but swayed like thin ice as the inhabitants moved from hut to hut. The dense papyrus forest separating the village from the shore effectively concealed their escape, and the plentiful fish in the lake provided them with food.

Malayan pile dwellings.

In the vast island world of Indonesia, where constant contact with the sea has bred the amphibian Malay race, we are not surprised to find that the typical Malay house is built on piles above the water; and that when the coast Malay is driven inland by new-comers of his own stock and forced to abandon his favorite occupations of trade, piracy and fishing, he takes to agriculture but still retains his sea-born architecture and raises his hut on poles above the ground, beyond the reach of an enemy's spear-thrust. The Moro Samal Laut of the southern Sulu Archipelago avoid the large volcanic islands of the group, and place their big villages over the sea on low coral reefs. The sandy beaches of the shore hold their coco-palms, whose nuts by their milk eke out the scanty supply of drinking water, and whose fronds shade the tombs of the dead.588 The sea-faring Malays of the Sunda Islands, in thickly populated points of the coast, often dwell in permanently inhabited rafts moored near the pile dwellings. Palembang on the lower swampy course of the River Musi has a floating suburb of this sort. It is called the "Venice of Sumatra," just as Banjarmasin, a vast complex of pile and raft dwellings, is called the "Venice of Borneo," and Brunei to the north is the "Venice of the East."589 Both these towns are the chief commercial centers of their respective islands. The little town of Kilwaru, situated on a sandbank off the eastern end of Ceram, seems to float on the sea, so completely has it surrounded and enveloped with pile-built houses the few acres of dry land which form its nucleus. It is a place of busy traffic, the emporium for commerce between the Malay Archipelago and New Guinea.590

In the vast island world of Indonesia, where constant interaction with the sea has shaped the amphibious Malay culture, it’s no surprise that the typical Malay house is raised on stilts above the water. When a coastal Malay is pushed inland by newcomers of his own ethnicity and is forced to give up his preferred activities of trade, piracy, and fishing, he turns to farming but still keeps his seaside-inspired architecture, elevating his hut on stilts above the ground to avoid enemy attacks. The Moro Samal Laut of the southern Sulu Archipelago steer clear of the larger volcanic islands and instead establish their large villages over the sea on low coral reefs. The sandy shores are lined with coconut palms, whose fruits provide a crucial source of drinking water and whose leaves shade the graves of the deceased.588 The seafaring Malays of the Sunda Islands, particularly in densely populated coastal areas, often live on permanently anchored rafts near these stilt houses. Palembang, located along the lower, swampy stretch of the River Musi, has a floating neighborhood of this kind. It’s referred to as the "Venice of Sumatra," just as Banjarmasin, a large network of stilt and raft dwellings, is dubbed the "Venice of Borneo," and Brunei to the north is known as the "Venice of the East."589 Both of these towns serve as the main commercial hubs of their respective islands. The small town of Kilwaru, located on a sandbank at the eastern end of Ceram, appears to float on the sea, so thoroughly has it covered the few acres of dry land at its center with stilt houses. It is a bustling center, serving as the trade hub between the Malay Archipelago and New Guinea.590

In Melanesia.

Farther east in Melanesia, whose coast regions are more or less permeated by Malayan stock and influences, pile dwellings, both over water and on land form a characteristic feature of the scenery. The village of Sowek in Geelvink Bay, on the northern coast of Dutch New Guinea, consists of thirty houses raised on piles above the water, connected with each other by tree trunks but having only boat connection with the shore. Similar villages are found hovering over the lapping waves of Humboldt Bay, all of them recalling with surprising fidelity the prehistoric lake-dwellings of Switzerland.591 The Papuan part of Port Moresby, on the southern coast of British New Guinea, covers the whole water-front of the town with pile dwellings. In the vicinity are similar native pile villages, such as Tanobada, Hanuabada, Elevara and Hula, the latter consisting of pile dwellings scattered about over the water in a circuit of several miles and containing about a thousand inhabitants. Here, too, the motive is protection against the attacks of inland mountain tribes, with whom the coast people are in constant war.592

Further east in Melanesia, where the coastal areas are influenced by Malayan culture, pile dwellings, both over water and on land, are a common sight. The village of Sowek in Geelvink Bay, on the northern coast of Dutch New Guinea, has thirty houses elevated on stilts above the water, connected by tree trunks and accessible only by boat from the shore. Similar villages can be found above the gentle waves of Humboldt Bay, all reminiscent of the ancient lake-dwellings of Switzerland. 591 The Papuan area of Port Moresby, located on the southern coast of British New Guinea, features a waterfront filled with pile dwellings. Nearby, there are similar native villages like Tanobada, Hanuabada, Elevara, and Hula, the last consisting of pile homes scattered over the water across several miles and housing around a thousand residents. Here, too, the purpose is to safeguard against attacks from the inland mountain tribes, with whom the coastal inhabitants are in continual conflict. 592

The Malay fisherman, trader and pirate, with the love of the sea in his blood, by these pile dwellings combines security from his foe and proximity to his familiar field of activity. The same objects are achieved by white traders on the west coast of Africa by setting up their dwellings and warehouses on the old hulks of dismasted vessels, which are anchored for this purpose in the river mouths. They afford some protection against both fever and hostile native, and at the same time occupy the natural focus of local trade seeking foreign exchanges.

The Malay fisherman, trader, and pirate, who has a passion for the sea, finds safety from his enemies and closeness to his usual activities in these pile dwellings. White traders on the west coast of Africa achieve similar goals by building their homes and warehouses on the old hulks of dismasted ships anchored in the river mouths for this purpose. These provide some protection against both illness and hostile locals while also serving as a central point for local trade looking for foreign exchanges.

River dwellers in populous lands.

When advancing civilization has eliminated the need for this form of protection, water-dwellers may survive or reappear in old and relatively over-populated countries, as we find them universally on the rivers of China and less often in Farther India. Here they present the phenomenon of human life overflowing from the land to the streams of the country; because these, as highways of commerce, afford a means of livelihood, even apart from the food supply in their fish, and offer an unclaimed bit of the earth's surface for a floating home. Canton has 250,000 inhabitants living on boats and rafts moored in the river, and finding occupation in the vast inland navigation of the Empire, or in the trade which it brings to this port of the Si-kiang. Some of the boats accommodate large families, together with modest poultry farms, crowded together under their low bamboo sheds. Others are handsome wooden residences ornamented with plants, and yet others are pleasure resorts with their professional singing girls.593 In the lakes and swamp-bordered rivers of southern Shantung, a considerable fishing population is found living in boats, while the land shows few inhabitants. This population enjoys freedom from taxation and unrestricted use of the rivers and fisheries. To vary their scant and monotonous diet, they construct floating gardens on rafts of bamboo covered with earth, on which they plant onions and garlic and which they tow behind their boats. They also raise hundreds of ducks, which are trained to go into the water to feed and return at a signal,594 thus expanding the resources of their river life. Bangkok has all its business district afloat on the Menam River—shops, lumber yards, eating-houses and merchants' dwellings. Even the street vendor's cart is a small boat, paddled in and out among the larger junks.595

When advanced civilization doesn't need this type of protection anymore, water-dwellers may continue to live or come back in older, more populated countries, as we see them widely on the rivers in China and less frequently in further India. Here, they showcase the phenomenon of human life spilling over from the land to the country's streams; these waterways, acting as trade routes, provide a livelihood beyond just the fish they supply and offer an unclaimed piece of land for floating homes. Canton has 250,000 residents living on boats and rafts anchored in the river, working in the expansive inland navigation of the Empire or in the trade that flows into this port of the Si-kiang. Some boats house large families alongside small poultry farms, all crowded together under their low bamboo roofs. Others are elegant wooden homes decorated with plants, and some serve as leisure spots featuring professional singers. In the lakes and swampy rivers of southern Shantung, a significant fishing community lives on boats, while the land has few residents. This community enjoys no taxes and free access to the rivers and fisheries. To diversify their limited and monotonous diet, they create floating gardens on bamboo rafts covered with soil, where they plant onions and garlic, towing them behind their boats. They also raise hundreds of ducks that are trained to feed in the water and return on command, thus enhancing their river life resources. Bangkok has its entire business area floating on the Menam River—shops, lumber yards, eateries, and merchants’ homes. Even the street vendor's cart is a small boat, maneuvered in and out among the larger junks.

A far more modern type of river-dwellers is found in the "shanty-boat" people of the western rivers of the United States. They are the gypsies of our streams, nomads who float downstream with the current, tying up at intervals along the bank of some wooded island or city waterfront, then paying a tug to draw their house-boat upstream. The river furnishes them with fish for their table and driftwood for their cooking-stove, and above all is the highway for the gratification of their nomad instincts. There is no question here of trade and overpopulation.

A much more modern type of river-dweller can be found among the "shanty-boat" people of the western rivers in the United States. They are the gypsies of our streams, nomads who float downstream with the current, stopping periodically along the shore of some wooded island or city waterfront, and then hiring a tug to pull their houseboat upstream. The river provides them with fish for their meals and driftwood for their cooking stove, and most importantly, it serves as the route for satisfying their nomadic instincts. There’s no issue of trade or overpopulation here.

Reclamation of land from the sea.

Pile dwellings and house-boats are a paltry form of encroachment upon the water in comparison with that extensive reclamation of river swamps and coastal marshes which in certain parts of the world has so increased the area available for human habitation. The water which is a necessity to man may become his enemy unless it is controlled. The alluvium which a river deposits in its flood-plain, whether in some flat stretch of its middle course or near the retarding level of the sea, attracts settlement because of its fertility and proximity to a natural highway; but it must be protected by dikes against the very element which created it. Such deposits are most extensive on low coasts at or near the river's mouth, just where the junction of an inland and oceanic waterway offers the best conditions for commerce. Here then is a location destined to attract and support a large population, for which place can be made only by steady encroachment upon the water of both river and sea. Diking is necessitated not only by the demand for more land for the growing population, but also by the constant silting up of the drainage outfalls, which increases the danger of inundation while at the same time contributing to the upbuilding of the land. Conditions here institute an incessant struggle between man and nature;596 but the rewards of victory are too great to count the cost. The construction of sea-walls, embankment of rivers, reclamation of marshes, the cutting of canals for drains and passways in a water-soaked land, the conversion of lakes into meadow, the rectification of tortuous streams for the greater economy of this silt-made soil, all together constitute the greatest geographical transformation that man has brought about on the earth's surface.597

Pile dwellings and houseboats are a minor intrusion on the water compared to the large-scale reclamation of river swamps and coastal marshes that has significantly expanded living space in some parts of the world. Water, which is essential to humans, can also turn against them if not managed properly. The sediment that a river deposits in its floodplain, whether in a flat area along its main course or close to sea level, attracts people because it's fertile and located near a natural transportation route; however, it must be protected by dikes from the very element that created it. These deposits are most abundant on low coastlines at or near the river's mouth, where the confluence of inland and ocean waterways provides the best conditions for trade. This spot is naturally inclined to draw and sustain a large population, which can only be accommodated by gradually encroaching on the waters of both the river and the sea. Diking is necessary not only to provide more land for the expanding population but also to counteract the continuous silting of drainage outfalls, which raises the risk of flooding while also aiding in land formation. The situation here creates an ongoing battle between humans and nature; however, the benefits of success are too significant to ignore the costs involved. The building of seawalls, river embankments, marsh reclamation, the digging of canals for drainage and access in a waterlogged area, the transformation of lakes into fields, and the straightening of winding streams for better management of this fertile soil collectively represent the most monumental geographical changes that humans have made on the planet.

The struggle with the water.

Though the North Sea lowland of Europe has suffered from the serious encroachment of the sea from the thirteenth to the sixteenth century, when the Zuyder Zee, the Dollart and Jade Bay were formed, nevertheless the counter encroachment of the land upon the water, accomplished through the energy and intelligence of the inhabitants, has more than made good the loss. Between the Elbe and Scheldt more than 2,000 square miles (5,000 square kilometers) have been reclaimed from river and sea in the past three hundred years. Holland's success in draining her large inland waters, like the Haarlem Meer (70 square miles or 180 square kilometers) and the Lake of Ij, has inspired an attempt to recover 800 square miles (2,050 square kilometers) of fertile soil from the borders of the Zuyder Zee and reduce that basin to nearly one-third of its present size.598 One-fourth of the Netherlands lies below the average of high tides, and in 1844 necessitated 9,000 windmills to pump the waste water into the drainage canals.599

Though the North Sea lowland of Europe faced serious flooding from the sea between the thirteenth and sixteenth centuries, resulting in the formation of the Zuyder Zee, the Dollart, and Jade Bay, the reclamation of land by the inhabitants has more than compensated for the loss. Over the past three hundred years, more than 2,000 square miles (5,000 square kilometers) have been reclaimed from rivers and the sea between the Elbe and Scheldt. Holland's successful drainage of its large inland waters, such as the Haarlem Meer (70 square miles or 180 square kilometers) and the Lake of Ij, has led to efforts to recover 800 square miles (2,050 square kilometers) of fertile soil from the edges of the Zuyder Zee, aiming to reduce that basin to nearly one-third of its current size.598 One-fourth of the Netherlands is below the average high tide level, which in 1844 required 9,000 windmills to pump waste water into drainage canals.599

The Netherlands, with all its external features of man's war against the water, has its smaller counterpart in the 1,200 square miles of reclaimed soil about the head of the Wash, which constitute the Fenland of England. Here too are successive lines of sea-wall, the earliest of them attributed to the Romans, straightened and embanked rivers, drainage canals, windmills and steam pumps, dikes serving as roads, lines of willows and low moist pastures dotted with grazing cattle. No feature of the Netherlands is omitted. The low southern part of Lincolnshire is even called Holland, and Dutch prisoners from a naval battle of 1652 were employed there on the work of reclamation, which was begun on a large scale about this time.600 In the medieval period, the increase of population necessitated measures to improve the drainage and extend the acreage; but there was little co-operation among the land owners, and the maintenance of river dikes and sea-walls was neglected, till a succession of disasters from flooding streams and invading tides in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries led to severe measures against defaulters. One culprit was placed alive in a breach which his own neglect or criminal cutting had caused, and was built in, by way of educating the Fenlanders to a sense of common responsibility.601

The Netherlands, known for its battle against water, has a smaller version in the 1,200 square miles of reclaimed land at the head of the Wash, which makes up England's Fenland. Here, you'll also find lines of sea walls, the earliest dating back to the Romans, straightened and embanked rivers, drainage canals, windmills and steam pumps, dikes that double as roads, rows of willows, and low, damp pastures filled with grazing cattle. All the features of the Netherlands are present. The low southern part of Lincolnshire is even called Holland, and Dutch prisoners from a naval battle in 1652 were used for the reclamation work that began on a larger scale around this time.600 During the medieval period, the growing population required improvements in drainage and expansion of farmland; however, there was little cooperation among landowners, and maintaining river dikes and sea walls was neglected. This oversight led to a series of disasters from flooding rivers and encroaching tides in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, resulting in strict measures against those responsible. One offender was buried alive in a breach caused by his own negligence or intentional damage, as a way to educate the Fenlanders about their shared responsibility.601

The fight against the water on the coast begins later than that against rivers and swamps in the interior of the land; it demands greater enterprise and courage, because it combats two enemies instead of one; but its rewards are correspondingly greater. The Netherlands by their struggle have acquired not only territory for an additional half million population, but have secured to themselves a strategic position in the maritime trade of the world.

The battle against coastal waters starts later than the fight against rivers and swamps inland; it requires more effort and bravery because it faces two foes instead of just one. However, the rewards are likewise much greater. Through their struggle, the Netherlands have gained not only land for an extra half million residents but also secured a strategic role in global maritime trade.

Mound villages in river flood-plains.

The abundant fertility of river flood-plains inevitably attracts population and necessitates some kind of artificial protection against inundation. The most primitive form of this protection is obvious and widespread, restricted in neither locality nor race. When the flood season converts the flat plain of the White Nile below Gondokora (7° N. Lat.) into an extensive marsh, countless hills of the white ant emerge over the waters. During the dry season, the ants build up their hills to about ten feet, and then live in safety in the upper section during the flood. They greatly surpass in intelligence and constructive ability the human occupants of the valley, the low and wretched Kytch tribe of the Dinka Negroes, who like the ants are attracted by the natural vegetation of the flood-plain, and who use the ant-hills as refuge stations for themselves and their cattle during the flood.602 Elsewhere in Africa the natives are more intelligent, for flood-plain villages built on artificial mounds have existed from the earliest times. Diodorus Siculus tells us that those of ancient Egypt, when the Nile was high, looked like the Cyclades Islands.603 Similar ones are constructed by the Barotse tribe on the upper Zambesi.604 The Niger River, rising in the Foota Jallon and Kong Mountains which form a region of heavy rainfall from February to July, inundates a plain of several thousand square miles for a distance of 250 miles above Timbuctoo. Here again the villages of the agricultural Song-hoi duplicate those of Egypt, built on the same clay mounds, wreathed in the same feathery palms, and communicating with one another only by small boats.605 The same picture is presented by the Yangtze Kiang plain during the summer overflow—low artificial hills rising from the expanse of muddy water and topped with trees and villages, while sampans moored to their base show the means of communication.606 In the broad flood-plain of the lower Mississippi River, the chronicles of the De Soto expedition state that the Indian villages visited stood "on mounds made by art." The Yazoo River Indians, at the commencement of the eighteenth century, had their cabins dispersed over the low deltaic land on earthen mounds made by their own hands. There is also strong evidence that some of the works of the Mound-builders in the "bottoms" of the middle and lower Mississippi served as protected sites for the dwellings of their chiefs.607

The rich fertility of river floodplains naturally draws people and requires some form of man-made protection against flooding. The most basic type of this protection is clear and common, found in various places and among different races. When the flood season turns the flat plain of the White Nile below Gondokora (7° N. Lat.) into a vast marsh, countless hills built by white ants rise above the waters. During the dry season, these ants construct their hills to about ten feet tall and find safety in the upper part during the floods. They are significantly smarter and more skilled at building than the human residents of the valley, the lowly and unfortunate Kytch tribe of the Dinka people, who, like the ants, are drawn to the natural growth of the floodplain and use the ant hills as safe spots for themselves and their cattle during flooding.602 In other parts of Africa, the locals are more advanced, as floodplain villages built on artificial mounds have been around for a long time. Diodorus Siculus mentions that ancient Egyptian villages, when the Nile was high, resembled the Cyclades Islands.603 Similar structures are made by the Barotse tribe along the upper Zambesi.604 The Niger River, which rises in the Foota Jallon and Kong Mountains that experience heavy rainfall from February to July, floods a plain spanning several thousand square miles for 250 miles above Timbuktu. Here as well, the agricultural Song-hoi villages mirror those of Egypt, built on the same clay mounds, surrounded by the same feathery palms, and connected by small boats.605 The same scene occurs on the Yangtze Kiang plain during summer floods, with low artificial hills emerging from a wide expanse of muddy water, topped with trees and villages, while sampans tied to their bases show how people get around.606 In the extensive floodplain of the lower Mississippi River, records from the De Soto expedition state that the Indian villages they encountered were built "on mounds made by art." In the early eighteenth century, the Yazoo River Indians had their homes scattered across the low delta land on earthen mounds they created themselves. There is also substantial evidence that some structures built by the Mound-builders in the "bottoms" of the middle and lower Mississippi served as secure sites for their leaders' homes.607

Diking of rivers.

Such meager provisions against inundation suffice for the sparse population characterizing the lower stages of civilization, but they must be supplemented for the increasing density of higher stages by the embankment of the stream, to protect also the adjacent fields. Hence the process of confining rivers within dikes goes back into gray antiquity. Those of the Po and its tributaries were begun before the political history of the Lombardy plains commenced. Strabo mentions the canals and dikes of Venetia, whereby a part of the country was drained and rendered tillable.608 The main Po has been embanked for centuries as far up as Cremona, a distance of 600 miles, and the Adige to Verona.609 But the most gigantic dike system in the world is that of the Hoangho, by which a territory the size of England is won from the water for cultivation.610 The cost of protecting the far spread crops against the autumn floods has been a large annual expenditure and unceasing watchfulness; and this the Chinese have paid for two thousand years, but have not always purchased immunity. Year by year the Yellow River mounts higher and higher on its silted bed above the surrounding lowlands, increasing the strain on the banks and the area of destruction, when its fury is uncaged. The flood of 1887 covered an area estimated at 50,000 square miles, wiped out of existence a million people, and left a greater number a prey to famine.611 So the fertile Chengtu plain of the Min River, supporting four millions of people on its 2,500 square miles of area, owes its prosperity to the embanking and irrigating works of the engineer heroes, Li Ping and his son, who lived before the Christian era. On the temple in their honor in the city of Kuan Hsien is Li Ping's motto, incised in gold: "Dig the bed deep, keep the banks low." For twenty-one centuries these instructions have been carried out. The stone dikes are kept low to permit a judicious amount of flooding for fertilization, and every year five to six feet of silt are removed from the artificial channel of the Min. To this work the whole population of the Chengtu plain contributes.612 [See map page 8.]

Such minimal measures against flooding are enough for the small populations typical of lower stages of civilization, but they need to be enhanced for the denser populations of higher stages by building river embankments to also protect the nearby fields. This practice of confining rivers with dikes dates back to ancient times. The construction of dikes on the Po and its tributaries began long before the political history of the Lombardy plains started. Strabo mentions the canals and dikes of Venetia, which drained and made part of the land arable.608 The main Po has been embanked for centuries as far up as Cremona, covering a distance of 600 miles, and the Adige to Verona.609 However, the largest dike system in the world is that of the Hoangho, which has converted an area the size of England from water to farmland.610 The cost of safeguarding the widespread crops from autumn floods has resulted in significant annual expenses and constant vigilance; the Chinese have been investing in this for two thousand years, but they haven’t always avoided disaster. Every year, the Yellow River rises higher and higher on its silted bed above the surrounding lowlands, increasing the stress on the banks and the area of devastation when it unleashes its fury. The flood of 1887 covered an estimated area of 50,000 square miles, destroyed the lives of a million people, and left many more vulnerable to famine.611 Thus, the fertile Chengtu plain of the Min River, which supports four million people across its 2,500 square miles, owes its success to the embankment and irrigation efforts of engineering heroes, Li Ping and his son, who lived before Christ. On the temple honoring them in the city of Kuan Hsien, Li Ping's motto is inscribed in gold: "Dig the bed deep, keep the banks low." For twenty-one centuries, these instructions have been followed. The stone dikes are maintained low to allow for some flooding for fertilization, and every year, five to six feet of silt is removed from the Min's artificial channel. The entire population of the Chengtu plain participates in this work.612 [See map page 8.]

Social gain by control of the water.

In such organized struggles to reduce the domain of the water and extend that of the dry land, the material gain is not all: more significant by far is the power to co-operate that is developed in a people by a prolonged war against overwhelming sea or river. A common natural danger, constantly and even regularly recurring, necessitates for its resistance a strong and sustained union, that draws men out of the barren individualism of a primitive people, and forces them without halt along the path of civilization. It brings a realizing sense of the superiority of common interests over individual preferences, strengthens the national bond, and encourages voluntary subservience to law.

In organized efforts to reduce water surfaces and increase land areas, the material benefits are just part of the story: even more important is the ability to work together that develops in a community through a prolonged struggle against the powerful forces of the sea or river. A shared natural threat that occurs consistently creates the need for a strong and lasting unity, pulling people away from the isolating individualism of a primitive society and pushing them continuously toward civilization. It fosters an understanding of how common interests are more important than personal preferences, strengthens national unity, and promotes a willingness to follow the law.

This is the social or political gain; but this is not all. The danger emanating from natural phenomena has its discoverable laws, and therefore leads to a first empirical study of winds, currents, seasonal rainfall and the whole science of hydraulics. With deep national insight, the Greeks embodied in their mythology the story of Perseus and his destruction of the sea monster who ravaged the coast, and Hercules' killing of the many-headed serpent who issued from the Lernean Marshes to lay waste the country of Argos. Even so early a writer as Strabo states that yet earlier authorities interpreted Hercules' victory over the river god of the Achelous as the embankment of that stream and the draining of its inundated delta tract by the national benefactor.613 So the Chinese, whose land abounds in swamps and devastating rivers, have a long list of engineer heroes who embanked and drained for the salvation and benefit of mankind. It is highly probable that the communal work involved in the construction of dikes and canals for the control of the Hoangho floods cemented the Chinese nationality of that vast lowland plain, and supplied the cohesive force that developed here at a very remote period a regularly organized state and an advancing civilization.

This represents social or political benefit, but that's not all. The dangers from natural events have identifiable laws, which leads to the initial empirical study of winds, currents, seasonal rainfall, and the entire field of hydraulics. With keen national awareness, the Greeks incorporated into their mythology the tale of Perseus and his defeat of the sea monster that terrorized the coast, and Hercules' slaying of the multi-headed serpent that emerged from the Lernean Marshes to devastate the region of Argos. Even an early writer like Strabo noted that prior authorities interpreted Hercules' triumph over the river god Achelous as the embankment of that river and the draining of its flooded delta by this national hero.613 Similarly, the Chinese, whose land is filled with swamps and destructive rivers, have a long list of engineering heroes who built embankments and drained areas for the welfare of humanity. It’s highly likely that the collective efforts involved in constructing dikes and canals to control the Hoangho floods strengthened the Chinese identity in that expansive lowland area and provided the bonding force that helped establish a structured state and an advancing civilization at a very early stage.

Control of water as factor in early civilizations of arid lands.

The history of Egypt shows a similar effect of the yearly inundation of the Nile Valley. Here, as in all rainless countries where irrigation must be practiced, the water becomes a potent factor of political union and civilization. Its scarcity necessitates common effort in the construction and maintenance of irrigation works, and a central control to secure fair distribution of the water to the fields of the inhabitants. A stimulus to progress is found in the presence of a problem, perennial as the yearly threatenings of the Hoangho, which demands the application of human intelligence and concerted labor for its solution. Additional arable land for the growing population can be secured only by the wider distribution of the fructifying water; this in turn depends upon corporate effort wisely directed and ably controlled. Every lapse in governmental efficiency means an encroachment of the desert upon the alluvial fields and finally to the river bank, as to-day in Mesopotamia.

The history of Egypt shows a similar impact from the annual flooding of the Nile Valley. Like all areas without regular rainfall that rely on irrigation, water becomes a crucial factor for political unity and civilization. Its scarcity requires a collective effort to build and maintain irrigation systems, along with central oversight to ensure fair distribution of water to the farmers' fields. The ongoing challenge, as constant as the yearly threats from the Hoangho, drives progress, requiring human intelligence and teamwork to find solutions. Additional farmland for the growing population can only be achieved through better distribution of the fertile water, which depends on collaborative effort that is well-planned and effectively managed. Every failure in government efficiency leads to the desert gradually encroaching on the fertile fields and ultimately reaching the riverbank, just as we see today in Mesopotamia.

The fact that the earliest civilizations have originated in the sub-tropical rainless districts of the world has been ascribed solely to the regular and abundant returns to tillage under irrigation, as opposed to the uncertain crops under variable meteorological conditions; to the consequent accumulation of wealth, and the emancipation of man for other and higher activities, which follows his escape from the agricultural vicissitudes of an uncertain climate. When Draper says: "Civilization depends on climate and agriculture," and "the civilization of Egypt depended for its commencement on the sameness and stability of the African climate," and again, "agriculture is certain in Egypt and there man first became civilized,"614 he seizes upon the conspicuous fact of a stable food supply as the basis of progress, failing to detect those potent underlying social effects of the inundations—social and political union to secure the most effective distribution of the Nile's blessings and to augment by human devices the area accessible to them, the development of an intelligent water economy, which ultimately produced a long series of intellectual achievements.615

The fact that the earliest civilizations started in the sub-tropical rainless regions of the world is mainly attributed to the reliable and plentiful returns from irrigated agriculture, compared to the unpredictable crops due to varying weather conditions. This led to the accumulation of wealth and allowed people to engage in other, more advanced activities after they escaped the hardships of farming in an unstable climate. When Draper states, "Civilization depends on climate and agriculture," and "the civilization of Egypt depended for its beginning on the consistency and stability of the African climate," and again, "agriculture is certain in Egypt and there man first became civilized,"614 he points out the obvious fact that a stable food supply is the foundation of progress. However, he overlooks the significant social effects of the floods—such as social and political unity to effectively distribute the Nile's resources and to expand their availability through human innovation, and the advancement of a smart water management system, which ultimately led to a long series of intellectual achievements.615

Cultural areas in primitive America.

This unifying and stimulating national task of utilizing and controlling the water was the same task which in various forms prompted the early civilization of the Hoangho and Yangtze basins, India, Mesopotamia, Persia, Peru, Mexico, and that impressive region of prehistoric irrigation canals found in the Salt, Gila River, and upper Rio Grande valleys.616 Here the arid plateaus of the Cordilleras between the Pueblo district and Central America had no forests in which game might be found; so that the Indian hunter had to turn to agriculture and a sedentary life beside his narrow irrigated fields. Here native civilization reached its highest grade in North America. Here desert agriculture achieved something more than a reliable food supply. It laid the foundation of the first steady integration of wandering Indian hordes into a stable, permanently organized society. Elsewhere throughout the North American continent, we see only shifting groups of hunter and fisher folk, practising here and there a half nomadic agriculture to supplement the chase.

This unifying and motivating national effort to harness and manage water was the same challenge that various early civilizations faced in places like the Hoangho and Yangtze basins, India, Mesopotamia, Persia, Peru, Mexico, and the remarkable area of prehistoric irrigation canals found in the Salt, Gila River, and upper Rio Grande valleys.616 In this region, the dry plateaus of the Cordilleras between the Pueblo area and Central America didn't have forests where game could be found, so the Native American hunter had to shift towards agriculture and a settled life next to his small irrigated fields. Here, native civilization reached its peak in North America. This form of desert agriculture provided more than just a consistent food supply; it laid the groundwork for the first stable integration of wandering Native American groups into a permanent society. In other parts of North America, we only see shifting groups of hunters and fishermen, who occasionally practiced semi-nomadic agriculture to supplement their hunting.

The primitive American civilization that arose among the Pueblo Indians of New Mexico and Arizona, the only strictly sedentary tribes relying exclusively on agriculture north of the Mexican plateau, was primarily a result of the pressure put upon these people by a restricted water supply.617 Though chiefly offshoots of the wild Indians of the northern plains, they have been markedly differentiated from their wandering Shoshone and Kiowa kindred by local environment.618 Scarcity of water in those arid highlands and paucity of arable land forced them to a carefully organized community life, made them invest their labor in irrigation ditches, terraced gardens and walled orchards, whereby they were as firmly rooted in their scant but fertile fields as were their cotton plants and melon vines;619 while the towering mesas protected their homes against marauding Ute, Navajo and Apache.620 This thread of a deep underlying connection between civilization and the control of water can be traced through all prehistoric America, as well as through the earliest cultural achievements in North Africa and Asia.

The early American civilization that developed among the Pueblo Indians of New Mexico and Arizona, the only truly settled tribes that depended entirely on farming north of the Mexican plateau, mainly emerged due to the limited water supply they faced.617 Although they are primarily descendants of the wild Indians from the northern plains, they have become significantly different from their nomadic Shoshone and Kiowa relatives due to their local environment.618 The lack of water in those dry highlands and the limited amount of arable land forced them into a well-organized community life, leading them to invest their efforts in irrigation ditches, terraced gardens, and walled orchards, which grounded them firmly in their limited but fertile fields, much like their cotton plants and melon vines;619 while the towering mesas shielded their homes from attacking Ute, Navajo, and Apache tribes.620 This strong connection between civilization and water management can be traced throughout all prehistoric America, as well as in the earliest cultural advancements in North Africa and Asia.

Economy of the water: fisheries.

The economy of the water is not confined to its artificial distribution over arid fields, but includes also the exploitation of the mineral and animal resources of the vast world of waters, whether the production of salt from the sea, salt lakes and brine springs, the cultivation of oyster beds, or the whole range of pelagic fisheries. The animal life of the water is important to man owing not only to its great abundance, but also to its distribution over the coldest regions of the globe. It furnishes the chief food supply of polar and sub-polar peoples, and therefore is accountable for the far-northern expansion of the habitable world. Even the reindeer tribes of Arctic Eurasia could hardly subsist without the sea food they get by barter from the fishermen of the coast. Norway, where civilization has achieved its utmost in exploiting the limited means of subsistence, shows a steady increase from south to north in the proportion of the population dependent upon the harvest of the deep. Thus the fisheries engross 44 per cent. of the rural population in Nordland province, which is bisected by the Arctic Circle; over 50 per cent. in Tromso, and about 70 per cent. in Finmarken. If the towns also be included, the percentages rise, because here fishing interests are especially prominent.621 Proximity to the generous larder of the ocean has determined the selection of village sites, as we have seen among the coast Indians of British Columbia and southern Alaska, among all the Eskimo, and numerous other peoples of Arctic lands. [See map page 153.]

The economy of water isn't just about its artificial distribution over dry fields; it also includes the exploitation of the mineral and animal resources found in our vast bodies of water. This covers everything from harvesting salt from the sea, salt lakes, and brine springs, to farming oyster beds and a wide range of ocean fisheries. The aquatic life is crucial to humans because not only is it abundant, but it can also be found in the coldest parts of the planet. It provides the main food source for polar and sub-polar populations, significantly impacting the expansion of habitable areas in the far north. Even the reindeer herders of Arctic Eurasia rely heavily on seafood they obtain through trade with coastal fishermen. In Norway, where society has maximized its use of limited resources, there's a noticeable increase in the population depending on deep-sea fishing as you move north. For instance, in Nordland province, across the Arctic Circle, 44 percent of the rural population is involved in fisheries; this rises to over 50 percent in Tromso and about 70 percent in Finmarken. When towns are included, these figures increase further, as fishing significantly influences local economies. The abundance of ocean resources has shaped the locations of villages, as we’ve seen with the coastal Indigenous peoples of British Columbia and southern Alaska, all Eskimos, and many other Arctic communities. [See map page 153.]

Fisheries as factors in maritime expansion.

Not only in polar but also in temperate regions, the presence of abundant fishing grounds draws the people of the nearest coast to their wholesale exploitation, especially if the land resources are scant. Fisheries then become the starting point or permanent basis of a subsequent wide maritime development, by expanding the geographical horizon. It was the search for the purple-yielding murex that first familiarized the Phoenicians with the commercial and colonial possibilities of the eastern Mediterranean coasts.622 The royal dye of this marine product has through all the ages seemed to color with sumptuous magnificence the sordid dealings of those Tyrian traders, and constituted them an aristocracy of merchants. The shoals of tunny fish, arriving every spring in the Bosporus, from the north, drew the early Greeks and Phoenicians after them into the cold and misty Euxine, and furnished the original impulse to both these peoples for the establishment of fishing and trading stations on its uncongenial shores.623 To the fisheries of the Baltic and especially to the summer catch of the migratory herring, which in vast numbers visited the shores of Pomerania and southern Sweden to spawn, the Hanse Towns of Germany owed much of their prosperity. Salt herring, even in the twelfth century, was the chief single article of their exchanges with Catholic Europe, which made a strong demand for the fish, owing to the numerous fast days. When, in 1425, by one of those unexplained vagaries of animal life, the herring abandoned the Baltic and selected the North Sea for its summer destination, a new support was given to the wealth of the Netherlands.624 There is a considerable amount of truth in the saying that Amsterdam was built on herrings. New England, with an unproductive soil at home, but near by in the sea a long line of piscine feeding grounds in the submarine banks stretching from Cape Cod to Cape Race and beyond, found her fisheries the starting point and base of her long round of exchanges, a constant factor in her commercial and industrial evolution.625

Not just in polar regions but also in temperate areas, having rich fishing grounds attracts people from the nearby coast to fully exploit them, especially when land resources are limited. Fisheries end up becoming the foundation or a constant source for broader maritime development by expanding geographical perspectives. It was the quest for the purple-producing murex that first introduced the Phoenicians to the commercial and colonial opportunities along the eastern Mediterranean coasts.622 The royal dye from this marine product has always seemed to enhance the sordid trades of those Tyrian merchants with a luxurious flair, making them a merchant aristocracy. The schools of tunny fish, arriving every spring in the Bosporus from the north, attracted early Greeks and Phoenicians into the chilly, foggy Euxine, inspiring both groups to establish fishing and trading posts along its unwelcoming shores.623 The fisheries of the Baltic, especially the summer catch of migratory herring that flocked to the shores of Pomerania and southern Sweden to spawn, greatly contributed to the prosperity of the Hanse Towns of Germany. Salted herring, even in the twelfth century, was the primary item in their trades with Catholic Europe, which demanded the fish due to numerous fasting days. In 1425, when the herring inexplicably left the Baltic for the North Sea for summer, it provided a new source of wealth for the Netherlands.624 There’s a significant truth in the saying that Amsterdam was built on herring. New England, with its poor soil, but nearby in the ocean a long stretch of fish-rich submarine banks from Cape Cod to Cape Race and beyond, found its fisheries to be the starting point and foundation of its continuous trade, serving as a constant factor in its commercial and industrial growth.625

Fisheries as nurseries of seamen.

Fisheries have always been the nurseries of seamen, and hence have been encouraged and protected by governments as providing an important element of national strength. The Newfoundland Banks were the training school which supplied the merchant marine and later the Revolutionary navy of colonial New England;626 ever since the establishment of the Republic, they have been forced into prominence in our international negotiations with the United Kingdom, with the object of securing special privileges, because the government has recognized them as a factor in the American navy. The causal connection between fisheries and naval efficiency was recognized in England in the early years of Elizabeth's reign, by an act aiming to encourage fisheries by the remission of custom duties to native fishermen, by the imposition of a high tariff on the importation of foreign fish in foreign vessels, and finally by a legislative enforcement of fasts to increase the demand for fish, although any belief in the religious efficacy of fasts was frankly disclaimed. Thus an artificial demand for fish was created, with the result that a report on the success of the Fishery Acts stated that a thousand additional men had been attracted to the fishing trade, and were consequently "ready to serve in Her Majesty's ships."627

Fisheries have always been the training grounds for sailors, and as a result, they have been supported and protected by governments for their crucial role in national strength. The Newfoundland Banks served as a training school that provided crew for the merchant marine and later the Revolutionary navy of colonial New England;626 since the establishment of the Republic, they have been highlighted in our international negotiations with the United Kingdom to secure special privileges, as the government has recognized them as a key component of the American navy. The link between fisheries and naval capability was acknowledged in England during the early years of Elizabeth's reign, through legislation aimed at promoting fisheries by waiving custom duties for local fishermen, imposing high tariffs on foreign fish brought in foreign vessels, and enforcing fast days to boost the demand for fish, despite openly rejecting any belief in the spiritual significance of fasts. This resulted in an artificial demand for fish, leading to a report on the success of the Fishery Acts claiming that an additional thousand men were drawn to the fishing industry, and were thus "ready to serve in Her Majesty's ships."627

The fishing of the North Sea, especially on the Dogger Bank, is participated in by all the bordering countries, England, the Netherlands, Germany and Belgium; and is valued equally on account of the food supply which it yields and as a school of seamen.628 The Pomors or "coasters" of Arctic Russia, who dwell along the shores of the White Sea and live wholly by fisheries, have all their taxes remitted and receive free wood from the crown forests for the construction of their ships, on the condition that they serve on call in the imperial navy.629 The history of Japan affords the most striking illustration of the power of fisheries alone to maintain maritime efficiency; for when by the seclusion act of 1624 all merchant vessels were destroyed, the marine restricted to small fishing and coasting vessels, and intercourse confined to Japan's narrow island world, the fisheries nevertheless kept alive that intimacy with the sea and preserved the nautical efficiency that was destined to be a decisive factor in the development of awakened Japan.

The fishing in the North Sea, especially at Dogger Bank, involves all the surrounding countries: England, the Netherlands, Germany, and Belgium. It is valued both for the food supply it provides and for training seamen.628 The Pomors, or "coasters," of Arctic Russia, who live along the shores of the White Sea and rely entirely on fishing, have all their taxes waived and receive free wood from the crown forests to build their ships, as long as they are available to serve in the imperial navy when needed.629 Japan's history offers a striking example of how fisheries alone can maintain maritime efficiency. After the seclusion act of 1624 destroyed all merchant vessels and limited marine activity to small fishing and coasting boats, while confining interactions to Japan's narrow island world, the fisheries continued to foster a connection with the sea and preserved the nautical skills that would play a critical role in Japan's revival.

Anthropo-geographic importance of navigation.

The resources of the sea first tempted man to trust himself to its dangerous surface; but their rewards were slight in comparison with the wealth of experiences and influences to which he fell heir, after he learned to convert the barrier of the untrod waste into a highway for his sail-borne keel. It is therefore true, as many anthropologists maintain, that after the discovery of fire the next most important step in the progress of the human race was the invention of the boat. No other has had such far-reaching results. Since water covers three-fourths of the earth's surface and permits the land-masses to rise only as islands here and there, it presents to man for his nautical ventures three times the area that he commands for his terrestrial habitat. On every side, the break of the waves and the swell of the tides block his wanderings, unless he has learned to make the water carry him to his distant goal. Spacially, therefore, the problem and the task of navigation is the most widespread and persistent in the history of mankind. The numerous coaling-stations which England has scattered over the world are mute witnesses to this spacial supremacy of the water, to the length of ocean voyages, and the power of the ocean to divide and unite. But had the proportion of land and water been reversed, the world would have been poorer, deprived of all these possibilities of segregation and differentiation, of stimulus to exchange and far-reaching intercourse, and of ingenious inventions which the isolating ocean has caused. Without this ramifying barrier between the different branches of the human family, these would have resembled each other more closely, but at the cost of development. The mere multiplicity of races and sub-races has sharpened the struggle for existence and endowed the survivors with higher qualities. But it was navigation that released primitive man from the seclusion of his own island or continent, stimulated and facilitated the intercourse of peoples, and enabled the human race to establish itself in every habitable part of the world.

The resources of the sea first tempted people to venture onto its perilous surface, but the rewards were minimal compared to the wealth of experiences and influences they gained once they learned to turn the barrier of the uncharted waters into a pathway for their sailing vessels. Thus, it's true, as many anthropologists suggest, that after the discovery of fire, the invention of the boat was the next major advancement in human progress. No other innovation has had such far-reaching consequences. Since water covers three-fourths of the Earth's surface and allows land to rise only as scattered islands, it offers humanity three times the area for maritime endeavors compared to land. Everywhere, the crashing waves and the rising tides hinder exploration unless people have learned to use water to reach distant destinations. Therefore, navigation presents the most widespread and enduring challenge in human history. The numerous coaling stations that England has set up around the globe stand as silent proof of the supremacy of the sea, the length of ocean trips, and the ocean's ability to both divide and unite. But if the balance of land and water had been inverted, the world would have been poorer, lacking the possibilities for separation and diversity, the stimulus for trade and extensive communication, and the clever inventions brought about by the isolating ocean. Without this connecting barrier between different branches of humanity, they would have been more alike but at the cost of development. The sheer diversity of races and sub-races has intensified the struggle for survival and equipped the survivors with greater abilities. However, it was navigation that freed early humans from the isolation of their own islands or continents, encouraged and facilitated the interaction of peoples, and allowed humankind to populate every habitable corner of the world.


NOTES TO CHAPTER X

Notes for Chapter X


579.

Census of the Philippine Islands, Vol. I, pp. 465, 563-567, 573. Washington, 1905.

Census of the Philippine Islands, Vol. I, pp. 465, 563-567, 573. Washington, 1905.

580.

Sir John Lubbock, Prehistoric Times, pp. 173-223. New York, 1872.

Sir John Lubbock, Prehistoric Times, pp. 173-223. New York, 1872.

581.

Ferdinand Keller, Lake Dwellings, Vol. I, pp. 2-7, 576. London, 1876. English Lake Dwellings, Westminster Review, pp. 337-347. 1887.

Ferdinand Keller, Lake Dwellings, Vol. I, pp. 2-7, 576. London, 1876. English Lake Dwellings, Westminster Review, pp. 337-347. 1887.

582.

P.W. Joyce, A Social History of Ancient Ireland, Vol. II, pp. 65-66. London, 1903.

P.W. Joyce, A Social History of Ancient Ireland, Vol. II, pp. 65-66. London, 1903.

583.

Herodotus, V. 16.

Herodotus, Book V, Verse 16.

584.

Alexander von Humboldt, Aspects of Nature, pp. 148-149. Translated by Mrs. Sabine, Philadelphia, 1849. E.F. im Thurn, Among the Indians of Guiana, p. 203. London, 1883.

Alexander von Humboldt, Aspects of Nature, pp. 148-149. Translated by Mrs. Sabine, Philadelphia, 1849. E.F. im Thurn, Among the Indians of Guiana, p. 203. London, 1883.

585.

Sir Thomas Holdich, India, p. 184. London, 1905.

Sir Thomas Holdich, India, p. 184. London, 1905.

586.

Verney L. Cameron, Across Africa, pp. 332-334. London, 1885.

Verney L. Cameron, Across Africa, pp. 332-334. London, 1885.

587.

David and Charles Livingstone, Narrative of Expedition to the Zambezi, p. 414. New York, 1866.

David and Charles Livingstone, Narrative of Expedition to the Zambezi, p. 414. New York, 1866.

588.

Census of the Philippine Islands, Vol. I, pp. 464-466, 565. Washington, 1905.

Census of the Philippine Islands, Vol. I, pp. 464-466, 565. Washington, 1905.

589.

Stanford's Australasia, Vol. II, pp. 256-257. London, 1894.

Stanford's Australasia, Vol. II, pp. 256-257. London, 1894.

590.

A.R. Wallace, The Malay Archipelago, pp. 368, 381. New York, 1869.

A.R. Wallace, The Malay Archipelago, pp. 368, 381. New York, 1869.

591.

Ratzel, History of Mankind, Vol. I, pp. 262-263, 344. London, 1896-1898.

Ratzel, History of Mankind, Vol. I, pp. 262-263, 344. London, 1896-1898.

592.

Richard Semon, In the Australian Bush, pp. 340-342, 347. London, 1899.

Richard Semon, In the Australian Bush, pp. 340-342, 347. London, 1899.

593.

John L. Stoddard, Lectures, Vol. III, p. 311. Boston, 1903.

John L. Stoddard, Lectures, Vol. III, p. 311. Boston, 1903.

594.

John Barrows, Travels in China, pp. 377-379. Philadelphia, 1805.

John Barrows, Travels in China, pp. 377-379. Philadelphia, 1805.

595.

William M. Wood, Fankwei, pp. 169-174. New York, 1859.

William M. Wood, Fankwei, pp. 169-174. New York, 1859.

596.

Edmondo de Amicis, Holland and Its People, pp. 4-13. New York, 1890.

Edmondo de Amicis, Holland and Its People, pp. 4-13. New York, 1890.

597.

G.P. Marsh, The Earth as Modified by Human Action, chap. IV, pp. 330-352. New York, 1871.

G.P. Marsh, The Earth as Modified by Human Action, ch. IV, pp. 330-352. New York, 1871.

598.

J. Partsch, Central Europe, pp. 106-108. London, 1903.

J. Partsch, Central Europe, pp. 106-108. London, 1903.

599.

Roscher, National-Oekonomik des Ackerbaues, p. 127, Note 1. Stuttgart, 1888.

Roscher, National Economics of Agriculture, p. 127, Note 1. Stuttgart, 1888.

600.

Elisée Reclus, Europe, Vol. IV, pp. 222-223. New York, 1886. Miller and Skertchley, The Fenland, Past and Present, pp. 7-9. London, 1878.

Elisée Reclus, Europe, Vol. IV, pp. 222-223. New York, 1886. Miller and Skertchley, The Fenland, Past and Present, pp. 7-9. London, 1878.

601.

Ibid., pp. 145-147.

Ibid., pp. 145-147.

602.

Sir Samuel W. Baker, The Albert Nyanza, Great Basin of the Nile, pp. 49-50. London and Philadelphia, 1866.

Sir Samuel W. Baker, The Albert Nyanza, Great Basin of the Nile, pp. 49-50. London and Philadelphia, 1866.

603.

Diodorus Siculus, Book I, chap. III, p. 41. Translated by G. Booth. London, 1814.

Diodorus Siculus, Book I, chap. III, p. 41. Translated by G. Booth. London, 1814.

604.

David Livingstone, Missionary Travels in Africa, pp. 234-236, 239, 272. New York, 1858.

David Livingstone, Missionary Travels in Africa, pp. 234-236, 239, 272. New York, 1858.

605.

Felix Dubois, Timbuctoo, pp. 51-55, 145. New York, 1896.

Felix Dubois, Timbuctoo, pp. 51-55, 145. New York, 1896.

606.

Isabella B. Bishop, The Yangtze Valley and Beyond., Vol. I, pp. 8, 10, 97. London and New York, 1900.

Isabella B. Bishop, The Yangtze Valley and Beyond., Vol. I, pp. 8, 10, 97. London and New York, 1900.

607.

Cyrus Thomas, Mound Explorations, pp. 626, 650-653. Twelfth Annual Report Bureau of Ethnology, Washington, 1894.

Cyrus Thomas, Mound Explorations, pp. 626, 650-653. Twelfth Annual Report Bureau of Ethnology, Washington, 1894.

608.

Strabo, Book V, chap. I, 4.

Strabo, Book V, chap. I, 4.

609.

W. Deecke, Italy, pp. 88-89. London, 1904.

W. Deecke, Italy, pp. 88-89. London, 1904.

610.

John Barrows, Travels in China, p. 349. Philadelphia, 1805.

John Barrows, Travels in China, p. 349. Philadelphia, 1805.

611.

Meredith Townsend, Asia and Europe, pp. 278-284. New York, 1904.

Meredith Townsend, Asia and Europe, pp. 278-284. New York, 1904.

612.

Isabella B. Bishop, The Yangtze Valley and Beyond, Vol. II, pp. 72-73 76-81. New York and London, 1900. For the future of land reclamation, see N.S. Shaler, Man and the Earth, chap. V. New York, 1906.

Isabella B. Bishop, The Yangtze Valley and Beyond, Vol. II, pp. 72-73 76-81. New York and London, 1900. For future land reclamation, see N.S. Shaler, Man and the Earth, chap. V. New York, 1906.

613.

Strabo, Book X, chap. II, 19.

Strabo, Book X, chap. II, 19.

614.

John W. Draper, Intellectual Development of Europe, Vol. I, pp. 84-86. New York, 1876.

John W. Draper, Intellectual Development of Europe, Vol. I, pp. 84-86. New York, 1876.

615.

Winwood Reade, The Martyrdom of Man, pp. 9-17. Eighth Edition, New York.

Winwood Reade, The Martyrdom of Man, pp. 9-17. Eighth Edition, New York.

616.

Irrigation, Thirteenth Report of the U.S. Geological Survey, Part III, pp. 133-135. Washington, 1895. J.W. Powell, Twenty-third Annual Report of the Bureau of Ethnology, pp. XII, XIII. Washington, 1904. Cosmos Mindeleff, Aboriginal Remains in the Verde Valley, Arizona, pp. 187, 192-194, 238-245. Thirteenth Annual Report of Bureau of Ethnology. Washington, 1896. V. Mindeleff, Pueblo Architecture, pp. 80, 216-217. Eighth Annual Report of Bureau of Ethnology. Washington, 1891. F. W. Hodge, Prehistoric Irrigation in Arizona, American Anthropologist, July, 1893.

Irrigation, Thirteenth Report of the U.S. Geological Survey, Part III, pp. 133-135. Washington, 1895. J.W. Powell, Twenty-third Annual Report of the Bureau of Ethnology, pp. XII, XIII. Washington, 1904. Cosmos Mindeleff, Aboriginal Remains in the Verde Valley, Arizona, pp. 187, 192-194, 238-245. Thirteenth Annual Report of Bureau of Ethnology. Washington, 1896. V. Mindeleff, Pueblo Architecture, pp. 80, 216-217. Eighth Annual Report of Bureau of Ethnology. Washington, 1891. F. W. Hodge, Prehistoric Irrigation in Arizona, American Anthropologist, July, 1893.

617.

McGee and Thomas, Prehistoric North America, pp. 105-106, 113, 118, 120-144, 478. Philadelphia, 1905.

McGee and Thomas, Prehistoric North America, pp. 105-106, 113, 118, 120-144, 478. Philadelphia, 1905.

618.

Eleventh Census, Report on the Indians, pp. 49, 161, 415. Washington, 1894. D.G. Brinton, The American Race, pp. 116-117. Philadelphia, 1901.

Eleventh Census, Report on the Indians, pp. 49, 161, 415. Washington, 1894. D.G. Brinton, The American Race, pp. 116-117. Philadelphia, 1901.

619.

Ibid., pp. 161, 181, 182, 188, 191, 193, 198, 410, 441-445. M.C. Stevenson, The Zuni Indians, pp. 351-354. Twenty-third Annual Report of Bureau of Ethnology, Washington, 1904.

Ibid., pp. 161, 181, 182, 188, 191, 193, 198, 410, 441-445. M.C. Stevenson, The Zuni Indians, pp. 351-354. Twenty-third Annual Report of Bureau of Ethnology, Washington, 1904.

620.

Ibid., pp. 13-14. H.H. Bancroft, The Native Races, Vol. I, pp. 539-547. San Francisco, 1886.

Ibid., pp. 13-14. H.H. Bancroft, The Native Races, Vol. I, pp. 539-547. San Francisco, 1886.

621.

Norway, Official Publication, pp. 99-100. Christiania, 1900.

Norway, Official Publication, pp. 99-100. Oslo, 1900.

622.

Ernst Curtius, History of Greece, Vol. I, pp. 49-50. New York.

Ernst Curtius, History of Greece, Vol. I, pp. 49-50. New York.

623.

Ibid., Vol. I, p. 440.

Ibid., Vol. 1, p. 440.

624.

Dietrich Schaefer, Die Hansestädte und König Waldemar von Dänemark, pp. 255-257. Jena, 1879. Helen Zimmern, Story of the Hansa Towns, pp. 26-27. New York, 1895.

Dietrich Schaefer, The Hanseatic Cities and King Waldemar of Denmark, pp. 255-257. Jena, 1879. Helen Zimmern, Story of the Hansa Towns, pp. 26-27. New York, 1895.

625.

W.B. Weeden, Social and Economic History of New England, Vol. I, pp. 17, 18, 90, 91, 128-135, 139. Boston, 1899.

W.B. Weeden, Social and Economic History of New England, Vol. I, pp. 17, 18, 90, 91, 128-135, 139. Boston, 1899.

626.

Ibid., Vol. I, p. 245.

Ibid., Vol. 1, p. 245.

627.

H.D. Traill, Social England, Vol. III, pp. 363-364, 540. London and New York, 1895.

H.D. Traill, Social England, Vol. III, pp. 363-364, 540. London and New York, 1895.

628.

J. Partsch, Central Europe, p. 311. London, 1903.

J. Partsch, Central Europe, p. 311. London, 1903.

629.

Alexander P. Engelhardt, A Russian Province of the North, pp. 54-71. From the Russian. London, 1899.

Alexander P. Engelhardt, A Russian Province of the North, pp. 54-71. From the Russian. London, 1899.


Chapter XI—The Anthropo-Geography Of Rivers

Rivers as intermediaries between land and sea.

To a large view, rivers appear in two aspects. They are either part of the general water envelope of the earth, extensions of seas and estuaries back into the up-hill reaches of the land, feeders of the ocean, roots which it spreads out over the surface of the continents, not only to gather its nourishment from ultimate sources in spring and glacier, but also to bring down to the coast the land-born products of the interior to feed a sea-born commerce; or rivers are one of the land forms, merely water filling valley channels, serving to drain the fields and turn the mills of men. In the first aspect their historical importance has been both akin and linked to that of the ocean, despite the freshness and smaller volume of their waters and the unvarying direction of their currents. The ocean draws them and their trade to its vast basin by the force of gravity. It unites with its own the history of every log-stream in Laurentian or Himalayan forest, as it formerly linked the beaver-dammed brooks of wintry Canada with the current of trade following the Gulf Stream to Europe.

Rivers can be seen in two main ways. They either form part of the Earth's overall water system, extending seas and estuaries back into the upland areas, feeding the ocean, and acting like roots that spread across continents, not only sourcing their nutrients from springs and glaciers but also transporting land-based products from the interior to support coastal trade; or rivers are simply landforms, just water filling valley channels that help drain fields and power mills. In the first view, their historical significance has been closely connected to that of the ocean, despite their fresher, smaller waters and consistent current directions. The ocean pulls them and their trade into its vast basin through gravity. It intertwines with the history of every river originating in the Laurentian or Himalayan forests, just as it once connected the beaver-dammed streams of snowy Canada to the trade currents flowing toward Europe via the Gulf Stream.

Where sea and river meet, Nature draws no sharp dividing line. Here the indeterminate boundary zone is conspicuous. The fresh water stream merges into brackish estuary, estuary into saltier inlet and inlet into briny ocean. Closely confined sea basins like the Black and Baltic, located in cool regions of slight evaporation and fed from a large catchment basin, approach in their reduced salinity the fresh water lakes and coastal lagoons in which rivers stretch out to rest on their way to the ocean. The muddy current of the Yangtze Kiang colors the Yellow Sea, and warns incoming Chinese junks of the proximity of land many hours before the low-lying shores can be discerned.630 Columbus, sailing along the Caribbean coast of South America off the Orinoco mouth, found the ocean waters brackish and surmised the presence of a large river and therefore a large continent on his left.631

Where the sea and river meet, nature doesn't draw a clear line. Here, the blurry boundary zone is obvious. The freshwater stream blends into the brackish estuary, the estuary into the saltier inlet, and the inlet into the salty ocean. Sea basins that are closely confined, like the Black and Baltic Seas, which are in cooler regions with low evaporation and supplied by a large watershed, have salinity levels that are closer to those of freshwater lakes and coastal lagoons where rivers stretch out before flowing into the ocean. The muddy current of the Yangtze Kiang colors the Yellow Sea, warning incoming Chinese fishing boats of nearby land long before the low-lying shores come into view.630 Columbus, sailing along the Caribbean coast of South America near the mouth of the Orinoco, found the ocean waters brackish and guessed there was a large river and therefore a large continent to his left.631

The transitional form between stream and pelagic inlet found in every river mouth is emphasized where strong tidal currents carry the sea far into these channels of the land. The tides move up the St. Lawrence River 430 miles (700 kilometers) or half way between Montreal and Quebec, and up the Amazon 600 miles (1,000 kilometers). Owing to their resemblance to pelagic channels, the estuaries of the American rivers with their salty tide were repeatedly mistaken, in the period of discoveries, for the Northwest Passage to the Pacific. Newport in 1608 explored the broad sluggish course of the James River in his search for a western ocean. Henry Hudson ascended the Hudson River almost as far as Albany, before he discovered that this was no maritime pathway, like the Bosporus or Dardanelles, leading to an ulterior sea. The long tidal course of the St. Lawrence westward into the heart of the continent fed La Salle's dream of finding here a water route to the Pacific, and fixed his village of "La Chine" above the rapids at Montreal as a signpost pointing the way to the Indies and Cathay. In the same way a tidal river at the head of Cook's Inlet on the Alaskan coast was mistaken for a Northeast Passage, not by Captain Cook but by his fellow officers, on his Pacific voyage of 1776-1780; and it was followed for several days before its character as a river was established.632

The transitional area between rivers and open coastal waters at every river mouth is highlighted where strong tidal currents push the sea deep into these inland channels. The tides travel up the St. Lawrence River for 430 miles (700 kilometers), which is about halfway between Montreal and Quebec, and up the Amazon for 600 miles (1,000 kilometers). Because estuaries resemble open ocean channels, the estuaries of American rivers with their salty tides were often mistaken during the age of exploration for the Northwest Passage to the Pacific. In 1608, Newport explored the wide, slow-moving James River in his quest for a western ocean. Henry Hudson traveled up the Hudson River nearly to Albany before realizing it wasn’t a maritime route like the Bosporus or Dardanelles leading to another sea. The lengthy tidal stretch of the St. Lawrence River westward into the continent fueled La Salle's dream of finding a water route to the Pacific and established his village of "La Chine" above the rapids at Montreal as a landmark pointing toward the Indies and Cathay. Similarly, a tidal river at the head of Cook's Inlet on the Alaskan coast was misidentified as a Northeast Passage, not by Captain Cook but by his fellow officers, during his Pacific voyage from 1776 to 1780; it was followed for several days before its true nature as a river was recognized.632

Sea navigation merges into river navigation.

Rivers have always been the great intermediaries between land and sea, for in the ocean all find their common destination. Until the construction of giant steamers in recent years, sea navigation has always passed without break into river navigation. Sailing vessels are carried by the trade wind 600 miles up the Orinoco to San Fernando. Alexander's discovery of the Indus River led by almost inevitable sequence to the rediscovery of the Eastern sea route, which in turn ran from India through the Strait of Oman and the Persian Gulf up the navigable course of the Euphrates to the elbow of the river at Thapsacus. Enterprising sea folk have always used rivers as natural continuations of the marine highway into the land. The Humber estuary and its radiating group of streams led the invading Angles in the sixth century into the heart of Britain.633 The long navigable courses of the rivers of France exposed that whole country to the depredations of the piratical Northmen in the ninth and tenth centuries. Up every river they came, up the Scheldt into Flanders, the Seine to Paris and the Marne to Meaux; up the Loire to Orleans, the Garonne to Toulouse and the Rhone to Valence.634 So the Atlantic rivers of North America formed the lines of European exploration and settlement. The St. Lawrence brought the French from the ocean into the Great Lakes basin, whose low, swampy watershed they readily crossed in their light canoes to the tributaries of the Mississippi; and scarcely had they reached the "Father of Waters" before they were planting the flag of France on the Gulf of Mexico at its mouth. The Tupi Indians of South America, a genuine water-race, moved from their original home on the Paraguay headstream of the La Plata down to its mouth, then expanded northward along the coast of Brazil in their small canoes to the estuary of the Amazon, thence up its southern tributary, the Tapajos, and in smaller numbers up the main stream to the foot of the Andes, where detached groups of the race are still found.635 So the migrations of the Carib river tribes led them from their native seats in eastern Brazil down the Xingu to the Amazon, thence out to sea and along the northern coast of South America, thence inland once more, up the Orinoco to the foot of the Andes, into the lagoon of Maracaibo and up the Magdalena. Meanwhile their settlements at the mouth of the Orinoco threw off spores of pirate colonies to the adjacent islands and finally, in the time of Columbus, to Porto Rico and Haiti.636 [See map page 101.]

Rivers have always served as major links between land and sea, as everything ultimately ends up in the ocean. Before the advent of large steamships in recent years, sea travel seamlessly transitioned into river travel. Sailing boats are carried by the trade winds 600 miles up the Orinoco River to San Fernando. Alexander's discovery of the Indus River almost inevitably led to the rediscovery of the eastern sea route, which connected India through the Strait of Oman and the Persian Gulf, following the navigable course of the Euphrates River to Thapsacus. Adventurous seafarers have always utilized rivers as natural extensions of maritime routes into the land. The Humber estuary and its network of streams guided the invading Angles into the core of Britain in the sixth century.633 The extensive navigable rivers in France made the country vulnerable to the raids of the Northmen in the ninth and tenth centuries. They traveled up every river: the Scheldt into Flanders, the Seine to Paris, and the Marne to Meaux; up the Loire to Orleans, the Garonne to Toulouse, and the Rhone to Valence.634 Similarly, the Atlantic rivers of North America marked the path for European exploration and settlement. The St. Lawrence River brought the French from the ocean into the Great Lakes basin, which they easily crossed in their light canoes to reach the tributaries of the Mississippi; and as soon as they arrived at the "Father of Waters," they planted the French flag at its mouth in the Gulf of Mexico. The Tupi Indians of South America, who were true water-dwellers, migrated from their original home on the Paraguay River down to its mouth, then expanded northward along the Brazilian coast in their small canoes to the Amazon estuary, then up its southern tributary, the Tapajos, and in smaller numbers up the main river to the Andes foothills, where small groups of them can still be found.635 Likewise, the migrations of the Carib river tribes took them from their homelands in eastern Brazil down the Xingu to the Amazon, out to sea and along the northern South American coast, then back inland, up the Orinoco to the Andes foothills, into the lagoon of Maracaibo and up the Magdalena. Meanwhile, their settlements at the mouth of the Orinoco spawned pirate colonies on nearby islands and eventually, during Columbus's time, to Puerto Rico and Haiti.636 [See map page 101.]

Historical importance of seas and oceans influenced by their debouching streams.

So intimate is this connection between marine and inland waterways, that the historical and economic importance of seas and oceans is noticeably influenced by the size of their drainage basins and the navigability of their debouching rivers. This is especially true of enclosed seas. The only historical importance attached to the Caspian's inland basin is that inherent in the Volga's mighty stream. The Mediterranean has always suffered from its paucity of long river highways to open for it a wide hinterland. This lack checked the spread of its cultural influences and finally helped to arrest its historical development. If we compare the record of the Adriatic and the Black seas, the first a sharply walled cul de sac, the second a center of long radiating streams, sending out the Danube to tap the back country of the Adriatic and the Dnieper to draw on that of the Baltic, we find that the smaller sea has had a limited range of influence, a concentrated brilliant history, precocious and short-lived as is that of all limited areas; that the Euxine has exercised more far-reaching influences, despite a slow and still unfinished development. The Black Sea rivers in ancient times opened their countries to such elements of Hellenic culture as might penetrate from the Greek trading colonies at their mouths, especially the Greek forms of Christianity. It was the Danube that in the fourth century carried Arianism, born of the philosophic niceties of Greek thought, to the barbarians of southern Germany, and made Unitarians of the Burgundians and Visigoths of southern Gaul.637 The Dnieper carried the religion of the Greek Church to the Russian princes at Kief, Smolensk, and Moscow. Owing to the southward course of its great rivers, Russia has found the crux of her politics in the Black Sea, ever since the tenth century when the barbarians from Kiev first appeared before Constantinople. This sea has had for her a higher economic importance than the Baltic, despite the latter's location near the cultural center of western Europe.

The connection between marine and inland waterways is so close that the historical and economic significance of seas and oceans is clearly affected by the size of their drainage basins and how navigable their rivers are. This is particularly true for enclosed seas. The only historical importance of the Caspian's inland basin comes from the powerful Volga River. The Mediterranean has always struggled due to its lack of long river routes that could open up a large hinterland. This limitation hindered the spread of its cultural influence and eventually stunted its historical progress. If we compare the records of the Adriatic and Black Seas, with the Adriatic being a sharply walled cul de sac and the Black Sea being a hub for long, sprawling rivers like the Danube and Dnieper that reach deeper inland, we see that the smaller Adriatic Sea had a limited influence but a concentrated, vibrant history that was brief, just like all small areas; meanwhile, the Black Sea has had more extensive influence, even though its development has been slow and is still ongoing. In ancient times, the rivers of the Black Sea opened their regions to aspects of Hellenic culture that could reach them from the Greek trading colonies at their mouths, particularly Greek forms of Christianity. It was the Danube that, in the fourth century, brought Arianism, which emerged from the philosophical subtleties of Greek thought, to the tribes of southern Germany, turning the Burgundians and Visigoths of southern Gaul into Unitarians. The Dnieper carried Greek Orthodox Christianity to the Russian princes in Kiev, Smolensk, and Moscow. Due to the southward flow of its major rivers, Russia has found the heart of its politics in the Black Sea since the tenth century when the barbarians from Kiev first appeared at Constantinople. This sea has held greater economic significance for her than the Baltic, despite the Baltic's proximity to the cultural hub of Western Europe.

Baltic and White Sea rivers.

In other seas, too, rivers play the same part of extending their tributary areas and therefore enhancing their historical significance. The disadvantages of the Baltic's smaller size and far-northern location, as compared with the Mediterranean, were largely compensated for by the series of big streams draining into it from the south, and bringing out from a vast hinterland the bulky necessaries of life. Hence the Hanseatic League of the Middle Ages, which had its origin among the southern coast towns of the Baltic from Lubeck to Riga, throve on the combined trade of sea and river.638 The mouths of the Scheldt, Rhine, Weser, Elbe and Thames long concentrated in themselves the economic, cultural and historical development of the North Sea basin. So the White Sea, despite its sub-polar location, is valuable to Russia for two reasons; it affords a politically open port, and it receives the Northern Dwina, which is navigable for river steamers from Archangel south to Vologda, a distance of six hundred miles, and carries the export trade of a large territory.639 Similarly in recent years, Bering Sea has gained unwonted commercial activity because the Yukon River serves as a waterway 1,370 miles long to the Klondike gold fields.

In other seas, rivers also play a crucial role in expanding their tributary areas and, as a result, enhancing their historical importance. The disadvantages of the Baltic's smaller size and northern location, compared to the Mediterranean, were largely offset by the major rivers flowing into it from the south, which brought essential supplies from a vast hinterland. Thus, the Hanseatic League of the Middle Ages, which originated among the southern coastal towns of the Baltic from Lübeck to Riga, thrived on the combined trade of sea and river.638 The mouths of the Scheldt, Rhine, Weser, Elbe, and Thames have long been the center of economic, cultural, and historical development in the North Sea region. Similarly, the White Sea, despite its sub-polar location, is valuable to Russia for two reasons: it provides a politically accessible port and it receives the Northern Dwina, which is navigable for river boats from Archangel south to Vologda, covering a distance of six hundred miles, and handles the export trade of a large area.639 In recent years, Bering Sea has seen increased commercial activity because the Yukon River serves as a 1,370-mile-long waterway to the Klondike gold fields.

Atlantic and Pacific rivers.

If we compare the Atlantic and Pacific oceans in respect to their rivers, we find that the narrow Atlantic has a drainage basin of over 19,000,000 square miles as opposed to the 8,660,000 square miles of drainage area commanded by the vastly larger Pacific. The Pacific is for the most part rimmed by mountains, discharging into the ocean only mad torrents or rapid-broken streams. The Atlantic, bordered by gently sloping plains of wide extent, receives rivers that for the most part pursue a long and leisurely course to the sea. Therefore, the commercial and cultural influences of the Atlantic extend from the Rockies and Andes almost to the heart of Russia, and by the Nile highway they even invade the seclusion of Africa. Through the long reach of its rivers, therefore, the Atlantic commands a land area twice as great as that of the Pacific; and by reason of this fundamental geographic advantage, it will retain the historical preëminence that it so early secured. The development of the World Ocean will mean the exploitation of the Pacific trade from the basis of the Atlantic, the domination of the larger ocean by the historic peoples of the smaller, because these peoples have wider and more accessible lands as the base of their maritime operations.

If we compare the Atlantic and Pacific oceans in terms of their rivers, we see that the narrow Atlantic has a drainage basin of over 19,000,000 square miles, while the much larger Pacific only has 8,660,000 square miles of drainage area. The Pacific is mostly bordered by mountains, with rivers flowing into it only in wild torrents or rapid streams. In contrast, the Atlantic, lined by gently sloping plains, receives rivers that mostly take a long and leisurely route to the sea. As a result, the commercial and cultural influences of the Atlantic stretch from the Rockies and Andes almost to the heart of Russia, and through the Nile, they even reach into the secluded parts of Africa. Because of the extensive reach of its rivers, the Atlantic controls a land area that is twice as large as that of the Pacific; and due to this key geographic advantage, it will maintain the historical dominance it established early on. The development of the World Ocean will mean leveraging Pacific trade from the Atlantic, allowing the historic peoples of the smaller ocean to dominate the larger one, as they have broader and more accessible lands to support their maritime activities.

Lack of coast articulations supplied by rivers.

The geographic influence of abundant rivers navigable from the sea is closely akin to that of highly articulated coasts. The effect of the Hardanger or Sogne Fiord, admitting ocean steamers a hundred miles into the interior of Norway, is similar to that of the Elbe and Weser estuaries, which admit the largest vessels sixty miles upstream to Hamburg and Bremen. Since river inlets can, to a certain extent, supply the place of marine inlets, from the standpoint of anthropo-geographic theory and of human practice, a land dissected by navigable rivers can be grouped with one dissected by arms of the sea. South America and Africa are alike in the unbroken contour of their coasts, but strongly contrasted in the character of their rivers. Hence the two continents present the extremes of accessibility and inaccessibility. South America, most richly endowed of all the continents with navigable streams, receiving ocean vessels three thousand miles up the Amazon as far as Tabatinga in Peru, and smaller steamers up the Orinoco to the spurs of the Andes, was known in its main features to explorers fifty years after its discovery. Africa, historically the oldest of continents, but cursed with a mesa form which converts nearly every river into a plunging torrent on its approach to the sea, kept its vast interior till the last century wrapped in utmost gloom. China, amply supplied with smaller littoral indentations but characterized by a paucity of larger inlets, finds compensation in the long navigable course of the Yangtze Kiang. This river extends the landward reach of the Yellow Sea 630 miles inland to Hanchow, where ocean-going vessels take on cargoes of tea and silk for Europe and America,640 and pay for them in Mexican dollars, the coin of the coast. Hence it is lined with free ports all the way from Shanghai at its mouth to Ichang, a thousand miles up its course.641

The geographic impact of plentiful rivers that can be accessed from the sea is very similar to that of coastlines that are deeply indented. The effect of the Hardanger or Sogne Fjord, which allows ocean-going ships to travel a hundred miles inland in Norway, is comparable to the Elbe and Weser estuaries, which permit large vessels to reach Hamburg and Bremen sixty miles upstream. Since river inlets can partly replace marine inlets in terms of human geography and practical use, a land with navigable rivers can be considered similar to one that has arms of the sea. South America and Africa both have unbroken coastlines, but their rivers differ significantly. This leads to the two continents showcasing extremes of accessibility and inaccessibility. South America, the most richly blessed continent in terms of navigable rivers, allows ocean vessels to navigate three thousand miles up the Amazon to Tabatinga in Peru, and smaller boats can travel up the Orinoco to the Andes' foothills. This continent's main features were known to explorers just fifty years after its discovery. Africa, the oldest continent, suffers from a mesa-like geography that turns almost every river into a rushing torrent as it approaches the sea, keeping much of its vast interior shrouded in mystery until the last century. China, well-equipped with smaller coastal indentations but lacking larger inlets, is compensated by the long navigable stretch of the Yangtze River. This river extends the reach of the Yellow Sea 630 miles inland to Hangzhou, where ocean-going vessels load cargoes of tea and silk for Europe and America,640 and pay for them with Mexican dollars, the currency of the coast. As a result, it is lined with free ports from Shanghai at its mouth to Ichang, a thousand miles upstream.641

River highways as basis of commercial preeminence.

Navigable rivers opening passages directly from the sea are obviously nature-made gates and paths into wholly new countries; but the accessibility with which they endow a land becomes later a permanent factor in its cultural and economic development, a factor that remains constantly though less conspicuously operative when railroads have done their utmost to supplant water transportation. The importance of inland waterways for local and foreign trade and intercourse has everywhere been recognized. The peoples who have long maintained preëminence among the commercial and maritime nations of the world have owed this in no small part to the command of these natural highways, which have served to give the broad land basis necessary for permanent commercial ascendency. This has been the history of England, Holland, France and the recent record of Germany. The medieval League of the Rhine Cities flourished by reason of the Rhone-Rhine highway across western Europe. The Hanseatic League, from Bruges all the way east to Russian Novgorod, owed their brilliant commercial career, not only to the favorable maritime field in the enclosed sea basins in front of them, but also to the series of long navigable rivers behind them from the Scheldt to the Neva and Volchov. Wherefore we find the League, originally confined to coast towns, drawing into the federation numerous cities located far up these rivers, such as Ghent, Cologne, Magdeburg, Breslau, Cracow, Pskof and Novgorod.642

Navigable rivers that connect directly from the sea are clearly natural gates and pathways into entirely new lands. However, the accessibility they provide to an area becomes a lasting factor in its cultural and economic growth, a factor that remains active, though less visibly, even after railroads have largely replaced water transportation. The significance of inland waterways for local and international trade and communication has been recognized everywhere. Nations that have long held a leading position among the world's commercial and maritime powers have largely owed this to their control over these natural routes, which have provided the solid land base needed for enduring commercial dominance. This has been the history of England, Holland, France, and more recently, Germany. The medieval League of the Rhine Cities thrived due to the Rhone-Rhine route across Western Europe. The Hanseatic League, from Bruges all the way east to Russian Novgorod, had its remarkable commercial success not only because of the favorable maritime conditions in the enclosed sea basins in front of them but also due to the series of long navigable rivers behind them, from the Scheldt to the Neva and Volchov. This is why we see the League, initially limited to coastal towns, incorporating numerous cities located far up these rivers, such as Ghent, Cologne, Magdeburg, Breslau, Cracow, Pskof, and Novgorod.642

Importance of rivers in large countries.

In countries of large area, where commerce and intercourse must cover great distances, these natural and therefore cheap highways assume paramount importance, especially in the forest and agricultural stages of development, when the products of the land are bulky in proportion to their value. Small countries with deeply indented coasts, like Greece, Norway, Scotland, New England, Chile, and Japan, can forego the advantage of big river systems; but in Russia, Siberia, China, India, Canada, the United States, Venezuela, Brazil and Argentine, the history of the country, economic and political, is indissolubly connected with that of its great rivers. The storm center of the French and English wars in America was located on the upper Hudson, because this stream enabled the English colonies to tap the fur trade of the Great Lakes, and because it commanded the Mohawk Valley, the easiest and most obvious path for expansion into the interior of the continent. The Spanish, otherwise confining their activities in South America to the Caribbean district and the civilized regions of the Andean highlands, established settlements at the mouth of the La Plata River, because this stream afforded an approach from the Atlantic side toward the Potosi mines on the Bolivian Plateau. The Yangtze Kiang, that great waterway leading from the sea across the breadth of China and the one valuable river adjunct of maritime trade in the whole Orient, was early appropriated by the discerning English as the British "sphere of influence."

In large countries where trade and communication need to cover long distances, natural and inexpensive routes become very important, especially during the forest and agricultural stages of development, when the land's products are bulky compared to their value. Smaller countries with deeply indented coastlines, like Greece, Norway, Scotland, New England, Chile, and Japan, can do without the benefits of major river systems; however, in Russia, Siberia, China, India, Canada, the United States, Venezuela, Brazil, and Argentina, the nation's history—both economic and political—is closely tied to its major rivers. The main focus of the French and English wars in America was on the upper Hudson River, as this waterway allowed the English colonies to access the fur trade of the Great Lakes and controlled the Mohawk Valley, which was the easiest route for expansion into the continent's interior. The Spanish, who typically limited their activities in South America to the Caribbean and the civilized regions of the Andean highlands, set up settlements at the mouth of the La Plata River because this waterway provided access from the Atlantic toward the Potosi mines on the Bolivian Plateau. The Yangtze River, a major waterway that crosses China and the key river for maritime trade in the whole Orient, was quickly claimed by the insightful English as their "sphere of influence."

Rivers as highways of expansion.

No other equally large area of the earth is so generously equipped by nature for the production and distribution of the articles of commerce as southern Canada and that part of the United States lying east of the Rocky Mountains. The simple build of the North American continent, consisting of a broad central trough between distant mountain ranges, and characterized by gentle slopes to the Atlantic Ocean and the Gulf of Mexico, has generated great and small rivers with easy-going currents, that everywhere opened up the land to explorer, trader and settler. The rate of expansion from the "Europe-fronting shore" of the continent was everywhere in direct proportion to the length of the rivers first appropriated by the colonists. North of Chesapeake Bay the lure to landward advance was the fur trade. The Atlantic rivers of the coast pre-empted by the English were cut short by the Appalachian wall. They opened up only restricted fur fields which were soon exhausted, so that the migrant trapper was here early converted into the agricultural settler, his shifting camp fire into the hearthstone of the farmhouse. Expansion was slow but solid. The relatively small area rendered accessible by their streams became compactly filled by the swelling tide of immigrants and the rapid natural increase of population. In sharp contrast to this development, the long waterway of the St. Lawrence and the Great Lakes leading to the still vaster river system of the Mississippi betrayed the fur-trading French into excessive expansion, and enabled them to appropriate but not to hold a vast extent of territory. A hundred years after the arrival of Champlain at Montreal, they were planting their fur stations on Lake Superior and the Mississippi, 1,400 miles (2,300 kilometers) back from the coast, at a time when the English settlements had advanced little beyond tide-water. And when after 1770 the westward movement swept the backwoodsmen of the English colonies over the Appalachian barrier to the Ohio, Cumberland and Tennessee, these long westward flowing streams carried them rapidly on to the Mississippi, communicated the mobility and restlessness of their own currents to the eager pioneer, and their capacity to master great distances; so that in forty short years, by 1810, settlements were creeping up the western tributaries of the Mississippi. The abundant water communication in the Mississippi Valley, which even for present large river craft contains 15,410 miles of navigable streams and which had therefore a far greater mileage in the day of canoe and flatboat, afforded outlet for bulky, backwoods produce to the sea at New Orleans. When the English acquired Canada in 1763, they straightway fell under the sway of its harsh climate and long river systems, taking up the life of the fur trader; they followed the now scarcer pelts from the streams of Superior westward by Lake Winnipeg and along the path of the Saskatchewan River straight to the foot of the Rockies.

No other large area of the world is as well-equipped by nature for producing and distributing commercial goods as southern Canada and the eastern part of the United States, east of the Rocky Mountains. The straightforward shape of the North American continent, featuring a wide central valley between distant mountain ranges and gentle slopes down to the Atlantic Ocean and the Gulf of Mexico, has created numerous rivers with easy currents that opened up the land to explorers, traders, and settlers. The speed of expansion from the “Europe-facing shore” of the continent was directly related to the length of the rivers first claimed by the colonists. North of Chesapeake Bay, the motivation for moving inland was the fur trade. The Atlantic rivers claimed by the English were limited by the Appalachian Mountains. They opened only small fur regions that quickly became depleted, so the wandering trapper soon turned into an agricultural settler, transforming his campfire into the fireplace of a farmhouse. Expansion was slow but steady. The relatively small area made accessible by their rivers became densely populated by the growing wave of immigrants and the swift natural increase in population. In stark contrast, the long waterways of the St. Lawrence and the Great Lakes, leading to the even larger river system of the Mississippi, led the fur-trading French into excessive expansion, allowing them to claim a vast territory but unable to keep it. A hundred years after Champlain arrived in Montreal, they were establishing fur trading posts on Lake Superior and the Mississippi, 1,400 miles (2,300 kilometers) inland, while English settlements had barely moved beyond the coastal tidewaters. Then, after 1770, as the westward movement pushed the settlers from the English colonies over the Appalachian barrier to the Ohio, Cumberland, and Tennessee, these long, flowing streams quickly carried them to the Mississippi, transferring the energy and restlessness of their currents to the eager pioneers, enabling them to cover great distances. By 1810, in just forty years, settlements were already moving up the western tributaries of the Mississippi. The extensive water routes in the Mississippi Valley, which currently offer 15,410 miles of navigable rivers for large crafts, provided an outlet for bulky products from the backwoods to the sea at New Orleans. When the English took control of Canada in 1763, they immediately had to adapt to its harsh climate and extensive river systems, taking on the life of the fur trader; they followed the now-scarcer pelts from the streams of Superior westward by Lake Winnipeg and along the path of the Saskatchewan River straight to the foot of the Rockies.

Siberian rivers and Russian expansion.

Rivers have played the same part in expediting Russian expansion across the wide extent of Siberia. Here again a severe climate necessitated reliance on furs, the chief natural product of the country, as the basis of trade. These, as the outcome of savage economy, were gathered in from wide areas which only rivers could open up. Therefore, where the Siberian streams flatten out their upper courses east and west against the northern face of the Asiatic plateau, with low watersheds between, the Russian explorer and sable hunter struck their eastward water trail toward the Pacific. The advance, which under Yermak crossed the Ural Mountains in 1579, reached the Yenisei River in 1610 and planted there the town of Turuchansk as a sort of milestone, almost on the Arctic Circle opposite the mouth of the Lower Tunguska, a long eastern tributary. Up this they passed to the Lena in 1627, thence to Bering Sea by the Kolima and Anadyr rivers, because these arctic fields yielded sable, beaver and fox skins in greatest quantity.643 The Lena especially, from its source down to its eastern elbow at Yakutsk, that great rendezvous of Siberian fur traders, was a highway for trapper and Cossack tribute-gatherer.644 From the sources of the Yenisei in Lake Baikal to the navigable course of the Amur was a short step, taken in 1658, though the control of the river, which was claimed by China, was not secured till two hundred years later.645 [See map page 103.]

Rivers have been crucial in speeding up Russian expansion across the vast areas of Siberia. Here, a harsh climate meant dependence on furs, the country's main natural resource, as the foundation of trade. These furs, gathered through primitive methods, came from large regions that only rivers could access. So, where the Siberian rivers flatten out their upper courses east and west against the north side of the Asian plateau, with low ridges in between, Russian explorers and sable hunters forged their paths eastward toward the Pacific. The advance, which under Yermak crossed the Ural Mountains in 1579, reached the Yenisei River in 1610, where they established the town of Turuchansk as a key marker, almost on the Arctic Circle opposite the mouth of the Lower Tunguska, a long eastern tributary. They traveled up this river to the Lena in 1627, then to the Bering Sea via the Kolima and Anadyr rivers, since these Arctic areas produced the most sable, beaver, and fox skins. The Lena, in particular, from its source down to its eastern bend at Yakutsk, which became a major hub for Siberian fur traders, served as a thoroughfare for trappers and Cossack tax collectors. From the sources of the Yenisei in Lake Baikal to the navigable stretch of the Amur was a small leap made in 1658, although control of the river, claimed by China, wasn’t secured until two hundred years later. [See map page 103.]

As the only highways in new countries, rivers constitute lines of least resistance for colonial peoples encroaching upon the territory of inferior races. They are therefore the geographic basis of those streamers of settlement which we found making a fringe of civilization across the boundary zone of savagery or barbarism on the typical colonial frontier. Ethnic islands of the expanding people cluster along them like iron filings on a magnetized wire. Therefore in all countries where navigable rivers have fixed the lines of expansion, as in the United States, the northern part of the Russian Empire, and the eastern or colonial border of Germany and Austria, there is a strong anthropo-geographic resemblance in the frontiers of successive decades or centuries. But in arid or semi-arid regions like South Africa, the western plains of North America, the steppes of Russian and Chinese Turkestan, the river highway motif in expansion is lost in a variety of other geographic and geologic factors, though the water of the streams still attracts trail and settlement.

As the only main routes in new countries, rivers serve as the easiest paths for colonial groups moving into the lands of less advanced peoples. They therefore form the geographical foundation for the streams of settlement that create a border of civilization against the areas of savagery or barbarism typically found on colonial frontiers. Ethnic clusters of the expanding populations gather along these rivers like iron filings on a magnetized wire. Consequently, in all countries where navigable rivers have defined the paths of growth, such as the United States, the northern parts of the Russian Empire, and the eastern colonial borders of Germany and Austria, there is a noticeable anthropogeographic similarity in the frontiers over successive decades or centuries. However, in dry or semi-dry areas like South Africa, the western plains of North America, and the steppes of Russian and Chinese Turkestan, the river highway concept in expansion is overshadowed by various other geographical and geological factors, although the water from these streams still draws trails and settlements.

Determinants of routes in arid or semi-arid lands.

A river like the Nile, lower Volga, Irtysh or Indus, rising in highlands of abundant rainfall but traversing an arid or desert land, acquires added importance because it furnishes the sole means of water travel and of irrigation. The Nile has for ages constituted the main line of intercourse between the Mediterranean and Equatorial Africa. The Tigris, Euphrates, Indus, and the Niger where it makes its great northern bend into the Sahara near Timbuctoo,646 attest the value to local fertility and commerce inherent in these rivers of the deserts and steppes. Such rivers are always oasis-makers, whether on their way to the sea they periodically cover a narrow flood-plain like that of the Nile, or one ninety miles wide, like that of the Niger's inland delta above Timbuctoo;647 or whether they emerge into a silent sea of sand, like the Murghab of Russian Turkestan, which spreads itself out to water the gardens of Merv.

A river like the Nile, lower Volga, Irtysh, or Indus, which starts in highlands with plenty of rainfall but flows through dry or desert areas, gains extra significance because it provides the only way for water travel and irrigation. For centuries, the Nile has been the primary route of communication between the Mediterranean and Equatorial Africa. The Tigris, Euphrates, Indus, and the Niger, especially where it makes a big northern bend into the Sahara near Timbuktu,646 highlight the importance of these rivers in enhancing local fertility and commerce in desert and steppe regions. These rivers always create oases, whether they regularly flood a narrow floodplain like the Nile's, or a much wider area like the Niger's inland delta above Timbuktu;647 or whether they flow into a vast desert, like the Murghab in Russian Turkestan, which spreads out to irrigate the gardens of Merv.

Even where such rivers have a volume too scanty to float a raft, they yet point the highway, because they alone supply water for man and beast across the desert tract. The Oxus and Sir Daria have from time immemorial determined the great trade routes through Turkestan to Central Asia. The Platte, Arkansas, Cimarron and Canadian rivers fixed the course of our early western trails across the arid plains to the foot of the Rockies; and beyond this barrier the California Trail followed the long-drawn oasis formed by the Humboldt River across the Nevada Desert, the Gila River guided the first American fur-trapping explorers across the burning deserts of Arizona to the Pacific, and the succession of water-holes in the dry bed of the Mohave River gave direction to the Spanish Trail across the Mohave Desert towards Los Angeles. In the same way, Livingstone's route from the Orange River in South Africa to Lake Ngami, under the direction of native guides, ran along the margin of the Kalahari Desert up the dry bed of the Mokoko River, which still retained an irregular succession of permanent wells.648

Even when rivers are too small to float a raft, they still mark the way because they’re the only source of water for people and animals crossing the desert. The Oxus and Sir Daria have historically set the main trade routes through Turkestan to Central Asia. The Platte, Arkansas, Cimarron, and Canadian rivers determined the paths of our early western trails across the dry plains to the Rockies; beyond that barrier, the California Trail followed the long oasis formed by the Humboldt River across the Nevada Desert. The Gila River led the first American fur-trapping explorers through the scorching deserts of Arizona to the Pacific, and the series of water holes in the dry bed of the Mohave River guided the Spanish Trail across the Mohave Desert towards Los Angeles. Similarly, Livingstone's route from the Orange River in South Africa to Lake Ngami, under the guidance of local guides, followed the edge of the Kalahari Desert along the dry bed of the Mokoko River, which still had a sporadic supply of permanent wells.648

Wadi routes in arid lands.

In the trade-wind regions of the world, which are characterized by seasons of intense drought, we find rivers carrying a scant and variable amount of water but an abundance of gravel and sand; they are known in different localities as wadis, fiumares and arroyos. Their beds, dry for long periods of the year, become natural roads, paved with the gravel which the stream regularly deposits in the wet season. Local travel in Sicily, Italy649 and other Mediterranean countries uses such natural roads extensively. Trade routes across the plateau of Judea and Samaria follow the wadis, because these give the best gradient and the best footing for the ascent.650 Wadis also determine the line of caravan routes across the highlands of the Sahara. In the desert of Southwest Africa, the Khiuseb Is the first river north of the Orange to reach the Atlantic through the barrier dunes of the coast. Hence it has drawn to its valley the trade routes from a wide circle of inland points from Ot-tawe to Windhoek and Rehobeth, and given added Importance to the British coast of Walfish Bay, into which it debouches.651 But just to the north, the broad dry bed of the Swakop offered a natural wagon route into the interior, and has been utilized for the railroad of German Southwest Africa.

In the trade-wind regions of the world, which have seasons of intense drought, we find rivers that carry a small and inconsistent amount of water but a lot of gravel and sand; they're known in different places as wadis, fiumares, and arroyos. Their riverbeds, dry for long parts of the year, become natural pathways paved with the gravel that the streams regularly deposit during the wet season. Local travel in Sicily, Italy649 and other Mediterranean countries makes extensive use of these natural pathways. Trade routes across the plateau of Judea and Samaria follow the wadis because they provide the best gradient and footing for the climb.650 Wadis also influence the caravan routes across the highlands of the Sahara. In the desert of Southwest Africa, the Khiuseb is the first river north of the Orange to reach the Atlantic through the coastal barrier dunes. Because of this, it has attracted trade routes from a wide area of inland points from Ot-tawe to Windhoek and Rehobeth, enhancing the importance of the British coast at Walfish Bay, where it flows into.651 But just north, the wide dry bed of the Swakop provided a natural wagon route into the interior and has been used for the railroad in German Southwest Africa.

Increasing historical importance from source to mouth.

The historical importance of a river increases from its source toward its mouth. Its head springs, gushing from the ground, and the ramifying brooks of its highland course yield a widely distributed water supply and thereby exercise a strong influence in locating the dwellings of men; but they play no part in the great movements and larger activities of peoples. Only when minor affluents unite to form the main stream, enlarge it in its lower course by an increasing tribute of water, and extend constantly its tributary area, does a river assume real historical importance. It reaches its fullest significance at its mouth, where it joins the world's highway of the ocean. Here are combined the best geographical advantages—participation in the cosmopolitan civilization characteristic of coastal regions, opportunity for inland and maritime commerce, and a fertile alluvial soil yielding support for dense populations. The predominant importance of the debouchment stretch of a river is indicated by the presence of such cities as London, Rotterdam, Hamburg, Bremen, Bordeaux, Odessa, Alexandria, Calcutta, Rangoon, Bangkok, Hongkong, Canton, Nanking and Shanghai, Montreal and Quebec, New York, Philadelphia, New Orleans, Buenos Ayres and Montevideo. This debouchment stretch gains in practical value and hence in permanent historical importance if it is swept by a scouring tide, which enables the junction of inland and maritime routes to penetrate into the land. Even Strabo recognized this value of tidal reaches.652 Hence in tideless basins like the Baltic and Caribbean, the great river ports have to advance coastward to meet the sea; and the lower course of even mighty streams like the Volga and Nile achieve a restricted importance.653

The historical significance of a river grows from its source to its mouth. Its springs, bubbling up from the ground, and the branching streams in the highlands provide a widespread water supply, greatly influencing where people choose to live; however, they don’t really play a role in the major movements and activities of larger populations. A river only gains real historical importance when smaller tributaries come together to form the main river, increasing its flow with more water as it moves downstream and constantly expanding its drainage area. It reaches its peak significance at its mouth, where it meets the ocean's highway. Here, the best geographical advantages come together—engagement in the diverse civilization typical of coastal areas, opportunities for trade both inland and at sea, and rich alluvial soil that supports large populations. The critical importance of a river’s mouth is highlighted by the presence of cities like London, Rotterdam, Hamburg, Bremen, Bordeaux, Odessa, Alexandria, Calcutta, Rangoon, Bangkok, Hong Kong, Canton, Nanking, and Shanghai, as well as Montreal, Quebec, New York, Philadelphia, New Orleans, Buenos Aires, and Montevideo. This section gains practical value and thus lasting historical significance if it is affected by the tidal flow, which allows inland and maritime routes to reach further into the land. Even Strabo acknowledged the value of tidal areas.652 Therefore, in areas without tides like the Baltic and Caribbean, major river ports have to move closer to the coast to connect with the sea; and the lower sections of even powerful rivers like the Volga and Nile hold limited importance.653

The control of a river mouth becomes a desideratum or necessity to the upstream people. Otherwise they may be bottled up. Though history shows us countless instances of upstream expansion, nevertheless owing to the ease of downstream navigation and this increasing historical importance from source to mouth, the direction of a river's flow has often determined the course of commerce and of political expansion.

The control of a river mouth is crucial for the people living upstream. Otherwise, they might get cut off. While history shows many cases of expansion upstream, the ease of navigating downstream and the growing historical significance from the source to the mouth has often shaped the direction of trade and political growth based on how a river flows.

Location at hydrographic centers.

The possibility of radial expansion, which we have found to be the chief advantage of a central location, is greatly enhanced if that central location coincides with a hydrographic center of low relief. The tenth century nucleus of the Russian Empire was found about the low nodal watershed formed by the Valdai Hills, whence radiated the rivers later embodied in the Muscovite domain. Here In Novgorod at the head of the Volchov-Ladoga-Neva system, Pskof on the Velikaya, Tver at the head of the navigable Volga, Moscow on the Oka, Smolensk on the Dnieper, and Vitebsk on the Duna, were gathered the Russians destined to displace the primitive Finnish population and appropriate the wide plains of eastern Europe. Everywhere their conquests, colonization, and commercial relations have followed the downstream course of their rivers. The Dnieper carried the Rus of Smolensk and Kief to the Euxine, into contact with the Byzantine world, and brought thence religion, art, and architecture for the untutored empire of the north. The influence of the Volga has been irresistible. Down its current Novgorod traders in the twelfth century sought the commerce of the Caspian and the Orient; and later the Muscovite princes pushed their conquest of the Tartar hordes from Asia. The Northern Dwina, Onega, Mesen and Petchora have carried long narrow bands of Slav settlement northward to the Arctic Ocean. [See map page 225.] Medieval Russian trade from Hanseatic Pskof and Novgorod, and later Russian dominion followed the Narva and Neva to the Baltic. "The Dnieper made Russia Byzantine, the Volga made It Asiatic. It was for the Neva to make it European."654

The potential for radial growth, which we identified as the main benefit of a central location, is significantly boosted when that central point is near a low-lying hydrographic center. In the tenth century, the heart of the Russian Empire was located around the low nodal watershed created by the Valdai Hills, from which the rivers that later formed part of the Muscovite territory flowed. In Novgorod, at the source of the Volchov-Ladoga-Neva system, Pskof on the Velikaya, Tver at the beginning of the navigable Volga, Moscow on the Oka, Smolensk on the Dnieper, and Vitebsk on the Duna, gathered the Russians who would replace the native Finnish population and take over the expansive plains of Eastern Europe. Their conquests, colonization, and trade consistently moved along the downstream paths of their rivers. The Dnieper took the Rus from Smolensk and Kief to the Black Sea, connecting them with the Byzantine world, and brought back religion, art, and architecture to the less sophisticated northern empire. The influence of the Volga has been compelling. Traders from Novgorod in the twelfth century sought commerce in the Caspian Sea and the Orient along its waters; later, Muscovite princes advanced their conquest of the Tartar hordes from Asia. The Northern Dwina, Onega, Mesen, and Petchora have carried narrow bands of Slavic settlement north to the Arctic Ocean. [See map page 225.] Medieval Russian trade from the Hanseatic Pskof and Novgorod, and later Russian control, followed the Narva and Neva to the Baltic. "The Dnieper made Russia Byzantine, the Volga made it Asiatic. It was for the Neva to make it European."654

In the same way, when the early French explorers and traders of Canada reached the hydrographic center of the continent about Lakes Superior and Michigan, they quickly crossed the low rim of these basins southward to the Mississippi, and northward to the Rainy Lake and Winnipeg system draining to Hudson Bay.655 While it took them from 1608 to 1659 and 1662 to penetrate upstream from Quebec to this central watershed, only nine years elapsed from the time (1673) Marquette reached the westward flowing Wisconsin River to 1682, when La Salle reached the mouth of the Mississippi.

In the same way, when the early French explorers and traders in Canada reached the hydrographic center of the continent around Lakes Superior and Michigan, they quickly crossed the low rim of these basins southward to the Mississippi and northward to the Rainy Lake and Winnipeg system draining into Hudson Bay.655 While it took them from 1608 to 1659 and 1662 to move upstream from Quebec to this central watershed, only nine years passed from when Marquette reached the westward flowing Wisconsin River in 1673 to 1682, when La Salle arrived at the mouth of the Mississippi.

Effect of current upon trade and expansion.

The effect of mere current upon the course of trade and political expansion was conspicuous in the early history of the Mississippi Valley, before steam navigation began to modify the geographic influence of a river's flow. The wide forest-grown barrier of the Appalachian Mountains placed the western pioneers under the geographic control of the western waters. The bulkiness of their field and forest products, fitted only for water transportation, and the immense mass of downstream commerce called loudly for a maritime outlet and the acquisition from Spain of some port at the Mississippi mouth. For twenty years the politics of this transmontane country centered about the "Island of New Orleans," and in 1803 saw its dream realized by the Louisiana Purchase.

The impact of the natural current on trade and political growth was clearly evident in the early history of the Mississippi Valley, before steam navigation began to change how the river influenced geography. The expansive forested barrier of the Appalachian Mountains put the western pioneers under the geographic influence of the western waterways. The large size of their agricultural and forest products, which were only suitable for water transport, along with the massive amount of downstream commerce, created a strong demand for a maritime outlet and the acquisition of a port at the mouth of the Mississippi from Spain. For twenty years, the politics of this region focused on the "Island of New Orleans," and in 1803, their aspiration was realized with the Louisiana Purchase.

For the western trader, the Mississippi and Ohio were preeminently downstream paths. Gravity did the work. Only small boats, laden with fine commodities of small bulk and large value, occasionally made the forty day upstream voyage from New Orleans to Louisville. Flat boats and barges that were constructed at Pittsburg for the river traffic were regularly broken up for lumber at downstream points like Louisville and New Orleans; for the traders returned overland by the old Chickasaw Trail to the Cumberland and Ohio River settlements, carrying their profits in the form of gold. The same thing happens today, as it also happened two thousand years ago, on the Tigris and Euphrates. The highlander of Armenia or northern Mesopotamia floats down the current in his skin boat or on his brushwood raft, to sell his goods and the wood forming the frame-work of his primitive craft in timberless Bagdad and Busra, as formerly in treeless Babylon. He dries out his skins, loads them on his shoulders or on a mule brought down for the purpose, and returns on foot to his highland village.656 The same preponderance of downstream traffic appears to-day in eastern Siberia. Pedlers on the Amur start in the spring from Stretensk, 2025 miles up the river, with their wares in barges, and drift down with the current, selling at the villages en route, to the river's mouth at Nikolaievsk. Here they dispose of their remaining stock and also of their barges, the lumber of which is utilized for sidewalks, and they themselves return upstream by steamer. The grain barges of western Siberia, like the coal barges of the Mississippi, even within recent decades, are similarly disposed of at the journey's end.657 The tonnage of downstream traffic on the Ohio and Mississippi to-day greatly exceeds that upstream,. The fleet of 56 coal boats, carrying about 70,000 tons, which the great towboat Sprague takes in a single trip from Louisville down to New Orleans, all return empty. Of the 15,226,805 net tons of freight shipped in 1906 on the Ohio system, 13,980,368 tons of coal, stone, sand and lumber were carried in unrigged craft, fitted chiefly for downstream traffic.658

For the western trader, the Mississippi and Ohio rivers were primarily downstream routes. Gravity did the work. Only small boats, loaded with valuable but lightweight goods, occasionally made the forty-day journey upstream from New Orleans to Louisville. Flatboats and barges built in Pittsburgh for river transport were often dismantled for lumber at downstream locations like Louisville and New Orleans; traders would then return overland via the old Chickasaw Trail to the Cumberland and Ohio River settlements, carrying their profits in gold. This pattern continues today, just as it did two thousand years ago on the Tigris and Euphrates. The highlander from Armenia or northern Mesopotamia drifts down the river in his skin boat or brushwood raft to sell his goods and the wood from his makeshift craft in timberless Baghdad and Busra, just like in treeless Babylon. He dries out his skins, loads them on his shoulders or on a mule he brought down for the task, and walks back to his highland village.656 The same dominance of downstream traffic is evident today in eastern Siberia. Peddlers on the Amur river start in the spring from Stretensk, 2025 miles upstream, with their goods in barges, and float down with the current, selling at the villages en route, all the way to the river's mouth at Nikolaievsk. There, they sell the remaining stock and their barges, which are then used for sidewalks, and they return upstream by steamer. The grain barges of western Siberia, similar to the coal barges on the Mississippi, have also been disbanded at the journey's end in recent decades.657 The volume of downstream traffic on the Ohio and Mississippi rivers today far exceeds that of upstream traffic. The fleet of 56 coal boats, carrying around 70,000 tons, which the large towboat Sprague transports in a single trip from Louisville to New Orleans, all return empty. Of the 15,226,805 net tons of freight shipped in 1906 on the Ohio system, 13,980,368 tons of coal, stone, sand, and lumber were moved in unrigged vessels, mainly designed for downstream traffic.658

Importance of mouth to upstream people.

Owing to the strong pull exerted by a river's mouth upon all its basin, current, commerce and people alike tend to reach the ocean. For a nation holding the terrestrial course of a stream, the political fate of its tidal course or mouth must always be a matter of great concern. To the early westerner of the United States, before the acquisition of the Louisiana country, it was of vital importance whether belligerent France or more amenable Spain or the Republic itself should own the mouth of the Mississippi. Germany, which holds 240 miles (400 kilometers) of the navigable Danube,659 can never be indifferent to the political ownership of its mouth, or to the fact that a great power like Russia has edged forward, by the acquisition of Bessarabia in 1878, to the northern or Kilia debouchment channel.660 Such interest shows itself in sustained efforts either to gain political control of the mouth, or to secure the neutrality of the stream by having it declared an international waterway, and thus partially to deprive the state holding its mouth of the advantages of its transit location.

Due to the strong influence of a river's mouth on its entire basin, the current, commerce, and people all tend to flow toward the ocean. For a nation that controls the land route of a river, the political situation regarding its tidal mouth is always a major concern. For early settlers in the western United States, before acquiring the Louisiana territory, it was crucial whether the hostile France or the more agreeable Spain, or even the Republic itself, would own the mouth of the Mississippi. Germany, which controls 240 miles (400 kilometers) of the navigable Danube,659 can never overlook the political ownership of its mouth or the fact that a powerful country like Russia has advanced, by taking Bessarabia in 1878, to the northern or Kilia outlet channel.660 This interest is evident in ongoing efforts either to gain political control of the mouth or to ensure the river's neutrality by declaring it an international waterway, thus partially denying the state controlling its mouth the benefits of its transit location.

The only satisfactory solution is undivided political ownership. After France pushed eastward to the Rhine in 1648, she warred for three centuries to acquire its mouth. Napoleon laid claim to Belgium and Holland on the ground that their soil had been built up by the alluvium of French rivers. Germany's conquest of Schleswig-Holstein in 1864 was significant chiefly because it dislodged Denmark from the right bank of the lower Elbe, and secured undivided control of this important estuary. The Rhine, which traverses the Empire from north to south and constitutes its greatest single trade route, gives to Germany a more vital interest in Holland than ever France had. Her most important iron and coal mines and manufacturing industries are located on this waterway or its tributaries, the Ruhr, Mosel, Saar and Main. Hence the Rhine is the great artery of German trade and outlet for her enormous exports, which chiefly reach the sea through the ports of Belgium and Holland. These two countries therefore fatten on German commerce and reduce German profits. Hence the Empire, by the construction of the Emden-Dortmund canal, aims to divert its trade from Rotterdam and Antwerp to a German port, and possibly thereby put the screw on Holland to draw her into some kind of a commercial union with Germany.661 Heinrich von Treitschke, in his "Politik," deplores the fact that the most valuable part of the great German river has fallen into alien hands, and he declares it to be an imperative task of German policy to recover the mouth of that stream, "either by a commercial or political union." "We need the entrance of Holland into our customs union as we need our daily bread."662

The only satisfactory solution is complete political control. After France expanded eastward to the Rhine in 1648, it engaged in wars for three centuries to gain access to its mouth. Napoleon claimed Belgium and Holland on the basis that their land was created by French river sediment. Germany's conquest of Schleswig-Holstein in 1864 was significant mainly because it removed Denmark from the right bank of the lower Elbe and secured full control of this crucial estuary. The Rhine, which runs through the Empire from north to south and serves as its busiest trade route, gives Germany a more essential interest in Holland than France ever had. Its most important iron and coal mines and manufacturing industries are located along this waterway or its tributaries: the Ruhr, Mosel, Saar, and Main. Therefore, the Rhine is the main artery of German trade and the exit for its enormous exports, which mainly reach the sea through the ports of Belgium and Holland. These two countries thus benefit from German commerce and cut into German profits. Consequently, the Empire, through the construction of the Emden-Dortmund canal, aims to redirect its trade from Rotterdam and Antwerp to a German port, potentially putting pressure on Holland to enter into some sort of commercial union with Germany.661 Heinrich von Treitschke, in his "Politik," laments that the most valuable part of the great German river has fallen into foreign hands, and he states that it is an urgent task of German policy to recover the mouth of that river, "either through commercial or political union." "We need Holland to join our customs union as much as we need our daily bread."662

Prevention of monopoly of river mouth.

When the middle and upper course of a river system are shared by several nations, their common interest demands that the control of the mouth be divided, as in the case of the La Plata between Argentine and Uruguay; or held by a small state, like Holland, too weak to force the monopoly of the tidal course. The Treaty of Paris in 1856 extended the territory of Moldavia at the cost of Russia, to keep the Russian frontier away from the Danube.663 Her very presence was ominous. The temptation to giant powers to gobble up these exquisite morsels of territory is irresistible. Hence the advisability of neutralizing small states holding such locations, as in the case of Roumania; and making their rivers international waterways, as in the case of the Orinoco,664 Scheldt, Waal, Rhine and Danube.665 The Yangtze Kiang mouth, where already the treaty ports cluster thick, will probably be the first part of China to be declared neutral ground, and as such to be placed under the protection of the combined commercial powers,666 as is even now foreshadowed by the International Conservancy Board of 1910.667 The United States, by her treaty with Mexico in 1848, secured the right of free navigation on the lower or Mexican course of the Colorado River and the Gulf of California. The Franco-British convention, which in 1898 confirmed the western Sudan to France, also conceded the principle of making the Niger, the sole outlet of this vast and isolated territory, an international waterway, and created two French enclaves in British Nigeria to serve as river ports.668

When the middle and upper parts of a river system are shared by multiple countries, their shared interests require that control of the river's mouth be shared as well, like with the La Plata River between Argentina and Uruguay; or controlled by a small state, like the Netherlands, which is too weak to enforce a monopoly on the tidal section. The Treaty of Paris in 1856 expanded Moldavia's territory at Russia's expense to keep the Russian border away from the Danube.663 Her mere presence was alarming. The urge of powerful nations to seize these attractive pieces of land is hard to resist. Therefore, it's wise to neutralize small states in such areas, like Romania; and to make their rivers international waterways, such as the Orinoco,664 Scheldt, Waal, Rhine, and Danube.665 The mouth of the Yangtze Kiang, where treaty ports are already clustered, will likely be the first part of China declared neutral ground, and therefore placed under the protection of the combined commercial powers,666 as hinted at by the International Conservancy Board of 1910.667 The United States, through its treaty with Mexico in 1848, secured the right to free navigation on the lower, Mexican part of the Colorado River and the Gulf of California. The Franco-British convention of 1898, which confirmed France's claims in western Sudan, also established the principle of making the Niger, the only outlet of this vast and isolated territory, an international waterway, and created two French enclaves in British Nigeria to function as river ports.668

Motive for canals in lower course.

The mouth of a large river system is the converging point of many lines of inland and maritime navigation. The interests of commerce, especially in its earlier periods of development, demand that the contact here of river and sea be extensive as possible. Nature suggests the way to fulfill this requirement. The sluggish lowland current of a river, on approaching sea level, throws out distributaries that reach the coast at various points and form a network of channels, which can be deepened and rendered permanent by canalization. In such regions the opportunity for the improvement and extension of waterways has been utilized from the earliest times. The ancient Egyptians, Chaldeans, East Indians, and the Gauls of the lower Po for thousands of years canaled the waters of their deltas and coastal lowlands for the combined purpose of irrigation, drainage, and navigation. The great canal system of China, constructed in the seventh century primarily to facilitate Inland intercourse between the northern and central sections of the Empire, extends from the sea at Hangchow 700 miles northward through the coastal alluvium of the Yangtze Kiang, Hoang-ho and Pie-ho to Tientsin, the port of Peking. Only the canal system of the center, important both for the irrigation of the fertile but porous loess and for the transportation of crops, is still in repair. Here the meshes of the canal network are little more than half a mile wide; farmers dig canals to their barns and bring in their produce in barges instead of hay wagons.669 Holland, where the ancient Romans constructed channels in the Rhine delta and where the debouchment courses of the Rhine, Meuse and Scheldt present a labyrinth of waterways, has to-day 1903 miles (3069 kilometers) of canals, which together with the navigable rivers, have been important geographic factors in the historical preëminence of Dutch foreign commerce. So on the lower Mississippi, in the greatest alluvial area of the United States, the government has expended large sums for the improvement of the passes and bayous of the river. The Barataria, Atchafalaya, Terrebonne, Black, Teche and Lafourche bayous have been rendered navigable, and New Orleans has been given canal outlets to the sea through Lakes Salvador, Pontchartrain and Borgne.

The mouth of a large river system is where many inland and maritime navigation routes come together. The needs of commerce, especially in its early development, require that the interaction between river and sea be as extensive as possible. Nature provides a way to meet this need. The slow-moving current of a river, as it nears sea level, branches out into distributaries that reach the coast at different points and create a network of channels, which can be deepened and made permanent through canalization. In such areas, opportunities for improving and expanding waterways have been taken advantage of since ancient times. The ancient Egyptians, Chaldeans, East Indians, and the Gauls along the lower Po have been canalizing the waters of their deltas and coastal lowlands for thousands of years for irrigation, drainage, and navigation. The vast canal system in China, built in the seventh century mainly to improve trade between the northern and central regions of the Empire, stretches from the sea at Hangchow 700 miles north through the coastal alluvium of the Yangtze Kiang, Hoang-ho, and Pie-ho to Tientsin, the port of Peking. Only the central canal system, crucial for irrigating the fertile but porous loess and transporting crops, is still maintained. Here, the canals are just half a mile wide; farmers dig canals to their barns and transport their goods in barges instead of hay wagons.669 In Holland, where the ancient Romans built channels in the Rhine delta and the river mouths of the Rhine, Meuse, and Scheldt create a maze of waterways, there are today 1903 miles (3069 kilometers) of canals, which, along with navigable rivers, have been key geographical factors in the historical dominance of Dutch foreign trade. Similarly, on the lower Mississippi, in the largest alluvial area of the United States, the government has invested heavily in improving the river's passes and bayous. The Barataria, Atchafalaya, Terrebonne, Black, Teche, and Lafourche bayous have been made navigable, and New Orleans has been provided with canal access to the sea through Lakes Salvador, Pontchartrain, and Borgne.

Watershed canals.

As the dividing channels of the lower course point to the feasibility of amplifying the connection with the ocean highway, so the spreading branches of a river's source, which approach other head waters on a low divide, suggest the extension of inland navigation by the union of two such drainage systems through canals. Where the rivers of a country radiate from a relatively low central watershed, as from the Central Plateau of France and the Valdai Hills of Russia, nature offers conditions for extensive linking of inland waterways. Hence we find a continuous passway through Russia from the Caspian Sea to the Baltic by the canal uniting the Volga and Neva rivers; another from the Black Sea up the Dnieper, which by canals finds three different outlets to the Baltic through the Vistula, Niemen and Duna.670 The Northern Dwina, linked, by canals, with the Neva through Lakes Onega and Ladoga, unites the White Sea with the Baltic.671 Sully, the great minister of Henry IV. of France, saw that the relief of the country would permit the linking of the Loire, Seine, Meuse, Saône and Rhine, and the Mediterranean with the Garonne. All his plans were carried out by his successors, but he himself, at the end of the sixteenth century, began the construction of the Briare Canal between the Loire near Orleans and the Seine at Fontainebleau.672 Similarly in the eastern half of the United States, the long, low watershed separating the drainage basin of the St. Lawrence and Great Lakes from that of the Mississippi and the Hudson made feasible the succession of canals completing the "Great Belt" of inland navigation from St. Lawrence and New York bays to the Gulf. Albert Gallatin's famous report of 1808673 pointed out the adaptation of the three low divides to canal communication; but long before this, every line of possible canoe travel by river and portage over swamp or lake-dotted watershed had been used by savages, white explorers and French voyageurs, from Lake Champlain to Lake Winnebago, so that the canal engineer had only to select from the numerous portage paths already beaten out by the moccasined feet of Indian or fur-trader.

As the branching channels of the lower river suggest the possibility of enhancing the link with the ocean highway, so the spreading branches from a river’s source, which come close to other headwaters on a low divide, indicate the potential for expanding inland navigation by connecting two drainage systems via canals. When rivers in a country fan out from a relatively low central watershed, like those in the Central Plateau of France and the Valdai Hills of Russia, nature provides opportunities for extensive connections between inland waterways. This is why there is a continuous route through Russia from the Caspian Sea to the Baltic via the canal that links the Volga and Neva rivers; there’s another route from the Black Sea up the Dnieper, which connects to the Baltic through canals along the Vistula, Niemen, and Duna.670 The Northern Dwina, connected by canals to the Neva through Lakes Onega and Ladoga, links the White Sea with the Baltic.671 Sully, the great minister of Henry IV of France, recognized that the geography of the land would allow for the linking of the Loire, Seine, Meuse, Saône, Rhine, and the Mediterranean Sea with the Garonne. Although his successors implemented all his plans, he himself began the construction of the Briare Canal at the end of the sixteenth century, which connected the Loire near Orleans with the Seine at Fontainebleau.672 Similarly, in the eastern half of the United States, the long, low watershed separating the drainage basin of the St. Lawrence and Great Lakes from that of the Mississippi and the Hudson made it possible to create a series of canals that complete the "Great Belt" of inland navigation from St. Lawrence and New York bays to the Gulf. Albert Gallatin's famous report of 1808673 highlighted how the three low divides were suitable for canal communication; however, long before this, every path for possible canoe travel by river and portage across swampy or lake-dotted watersheds had been utilized by Native Americans, white explorers, and French voyageurs, from Lake Champlain to Lake Winnebago, so the canal engineer really only had to choose from the many portage routes already established by Native Americans or fur traders.

Rivers and railroads.

The cheapness and ease of river travel have tended to check or delay the construction of highroads and railways, where facilities for inland navigation have been abundant, and later to regulate railway freight charges. Conversely, riverless lands have everywhere experienced an exaggerated and precocious railroad development, and have suffered from its monopoly of transportation. Even canals have in most lands had a far earlier date than paved highroads. This has been true of Spain, France, Holland, and England.674 In the Hoang-ho Valley of northern China where waterways are restricted, owing to the rapid current and shallowness of this river, highroads are comparatively common; but they are very rare in central and southern China where navigable rivers and canals abound.675 New England, owing to its lack of inland navigation, was the first part of the United States to develop a complete system of turnpikes and later of railroads. On the other hand, the great river valleys of America have generally slighted the highroad phase of communication, and slowly passed to that of railroads. The abundance of natural waterways in Russia—51,800 miles including canals—has contributed to the retardation of railroad construction.676 The same thing is true in the Netherlands, where 4875 miles (7863 kilometers) of navigable waterways677 in an area of only 12,870 square miles (33,000 square kilometers) have kept the railroads down to a paltry 1818 miles (2931 kilometers); but smaller Belgium, commanding only 1375 miles (3314 kilometers) of waterway and stimulated further by a remarkable industrial and commercial development, has constructed 4228 miles (6819 kilometers) of railroad.

The low cost and convenience of traveling by river have generally slowed down the construction of highways and railroads in areas with good inland navigation options, and later influenced railway freight rates. In contrast, areas without rivers have often seen rapid and exaggerated railroad development, suffering from its control over transportation. In many places, canals were built before paved highways. This has been the case in Spain, France, Holland, and England.674 In the Hoang-ho Valley of northern China, where waterways are limited due to the fast current and shallow river, highways are relatively common; however, they are quite rare in central and southern China, where navigable rivers and canals are plentiful.675 New England, because it lacks inland navigation, was the first area in the United States to develop a complete system of toll roads and later railroads. On the other hand, the large river valleys in America have typically overlooked the highway phase of transportation and gradually moved towards railroads. The abundance of natural waterways in Russia—51,800 miles including canals—has slowed down railroad construction.676 The same is true in the Netherlands, where 4,875 miles (7,863 kilometers) of navigable waterways677 in an area of only 12,870 square miles (33,000 square kilometers) have kept railroads down to a mere 1,818 miles (2,931 kilometers); whereas smaller Belgium, with only 1,375 miles (3,314 kilometers) of waterways and further stimulated by remarkable industrial and commercial growth, has built 4,228 miles (6,819 kilometers) of railroads.

Relation of rivers to railroads in recent colonial lands.

If we compare the countries of Central and South America, where railroads are still mere adjuncts of river and coastwise routes, a stage of development prevalent in the United States till 1858, we find an unmistakable relation between navigable waterways and railroad mileage. The countries with ample or considerable river communication, like Brazil, Venezuela, Colombia and Paraguay, are all relatively slow in laying railroads as compared with Mexico and Argentine, even when allowance is made for differences of zonal location, economic development, and degree of European elements in their respective populations. Mexico and Argentine, having each an area only about one-fourth that of Brazil but a railroad mileage nearly one-fourth greater, have been pushed to this development primarily by a common lack of inland navigation. Similarly South Africa, stricken with poverty of water communication south of the Zambesi, has constructed 7500 miles of railroads678 in spite of the youth of the country and the sparsity of its white population. Similar geographic conditions have forced the mileage of Australian railways up to twice that of South Africa, in a country which is still in the pastoral and agricultural stage of development, and whose most densely populated province Victoria has only fourteen inhabitants to the square mile. In the almost unpeopled wastes of Trans-Caspia, where two decades ago the camel was the only carrier, the Russian railroad has worked a commercial revolution by stimulating production and affording an outlet for the irrigated districts of the encircling mountains.679 In our own Trans-Missouri country, where the scanty volume of the streams eliminated all but the Missouri itself as a dependable waterway, even for the canoe travel of the early western trappers, railroads have developed unchecked by the competition of river transportation.680 With no rival nearer than the Straits of Magellan and the Isthmus of Panama for transportation between the Mississippi and the Pacific coast, they have fixed their own charges on a monopoly basis, and have fought the construction of the Isthmian Canal.

If we look at the countries of Central and South America, where railroads are still just additions to river and coastal routes—similar to the situation in the United States until 1858—we can see a clear link between navigable waterways and railroad mileage. Countries with significant river systems, like Brazil, Venezuela, Colombia, and Paraguay, are generally slower to build railroads compared to Mexico and Argentina, even when we consider factors like geographic location, economic growth, and the amount of European descent in their populations. Mexico and Argentina, each covering about one-fourth the size of Brazil but having nearly one-fourth more railroad mileage, have developed this way mainly due to their lack of inland waterways. Likewise, South Africa, lacking good water routes south of the Zambezi River, has built 7,500 miles of railroads678 despite being a young country with a low white population density. Similar geographic factors have driven the railroad mileage in Australia to be double that of South Africa, in a nation that is still largely pastoral and agricultural, where the most populated area, Victoria, has only fourteen people per square mile. In the largely uninhabited areas of Trans-Caspia, where two decades ago the camel was the only means of transport, the Russian railroad has sparked a commercial revolution by boosting production and providing a way to market the irrigated regions surrounding the mountains.679 In our own Trans-Missouri region, where the limited flow of rivers made all but the Missouri an unreliable waterway—even for canoe travel by early western trappers—railroads have flourished without competition from river transport.680 With no rival closer than the Straits of Magellan and the Isthmus of Panama for transport between the Mississippi and the Pacific coast, they have set their own prices on a monopoly basis and have opposed the building of the Isthmian Canal.

Unity of a river system.

A river system is a system of communication. It therefore makes a bond of union between the people living among its remoter sources and those settled at its mouth. Every such river system forms geographically an unbroken whole. Only where a wild, torrent-filled gorge, like the Brahmaputra's path through the Himalayas, interrupts communication between the upper and lower course, is human life in the two sections divorced. But such cases are rare. Even the River Jhelam, which springs with mad bounds from the lofty Vale of Kashmir through the outer range of the Himalayas down to its junction with the Indus, carries quantities of small logs to be used as railway sleepers; and though it shatters a large per cent. of them, it makes a link between the lumber men of the Kashmir forests and British railroad engineers in the treeless plains of the Indus.681

A river system is a way to connect people. It creates a bond between those living near its distant sources and those settled at its mouth. Each river system forms a complete geographical unit. Only in places with a rough, torrent-filled gorge, like the Brahmaputra's route through the Himalayas, does communication break down between the upper and lower parts, leading to a disconnect in human life. But these situations are rare. Even the River Jhelum, which rushes down from the high Vale of Kashmir through the outer Himalayas to where it joins the Indus, transports small logs for use as railway sleepers; and while many of them break, it still serves as a link between the lumber workers in the Kashmir forests and British railroad engineers in the treeless plains of the Indus.681

The effect of common water supply in arid lands.

In arid lands, where the scant and variable streams are useless for navigation, but invaluable for irrigation, a rival interest in the limited water supply leads almost inevitably to conflict, and often to the political union of the peoples holding the upper and lower courses, in order to secure adjustment of their respective claims. The ancient Salassi of the upper Doria Baltea Valley in the Alps drew off all the water of the stream for washing gold, and thus deprived the agricultural people lower down the valley of the water necessary for irrigation. The result was frequent wars between the two tribes.682 The offensive is taken by the downstream people, whose fields and gardens suffer from every extension of tillage or increase of population in the settlements above them. Occasionally a formal agreement is a temporary expedient. The River Firenze and other streams watering southern Trans-Caspia have their sources in the mountains of northern Persia; hence the Russians, in the boundary convention with Persia of 1881, stipulated that no new settlement be established along these streams within Persian territory, no extension of land under cultivation beyond the present amount, and no eduction of the water beyond that necessary to irrigate the existing fields.683 Russia's designs upon Afghanistan aim not only at access to India, but also at the control of the upper Murghab River, on whose water depends the prosperity of the Pendjeh and Merv oases.684 In such regions the only logical course is the extension of the political frontier to the watershed, a principle which Russia is applying in western Asia, and which California applied in drawing her eastern boundary to include even Goose Lake.

In dry areas where the few and unpredictable streams aren’t useful for navigation but are essential for irrigation, competing interests over the limited water supply almost always lead to disputes and often to political alliances between the communities in the upper and lower parts of the river, in order to resolve their claims. The ancient Salassi of the upper Doria Baltea Valley in the Alps diverted all the water from the stream to wash gold, leaving the agricultural communities downstream without the water they needed for irrigation. This resulted in frequent conflicts between the two tribes.682 The initiative is taken by the downstream communities, whose fields and gardens suffer from any increase in farming or population growth in the areas upstream from them. Sometimes, a formal agreement serves as a temporary solution. The River Firenze and other streams that water southern Trans-Caspia originate in the mountains of northern Persia; therefore, in the boundary agreement with Persia in 1881, the Russians required that no new settlements be established along these streams within Persian territory, no expansion of farmland beyond the current amount, and no extraction of water beyond what is needed to irrigate the existing fields.683 Russia's interest in Afghanistan is not just about gaining access to India but also about controlling the upper Murghab River, as the water from this river is crucial for the prosperity of the Pendjeh and Merv oases.684 In such areas, the only reasonable approach is to extend the political boundary to the watershed, a principle that Russia is applying in western Asia, and that California used to define its eastern border to include even Goose Lake.

Union of opposite river banks.

Rivers unite. Ancient Rome grew up on both banks of the Tiber, and extended her commercial and political supremacy up and down stream. Both sides of the Rhine were originally occupied by the Gallic tribes, whose villages were in some instances bisected by the river. Cæsar found the Menapii, a Belgian people on the lower Rhine, with their fields, farmhouses and villages on both banks.685 Then the westward advance of the Teutonic tribes gradually transformed the Rhine into a German river, from the island of Batavia at its mouth up to the great elbow at the foot of the Jura Mountains.686 To the American Indians even the widest rivers were no barriers. Christopher Gist, exploring the Ohio in 1751, found a Shawnee village situated on both sides of the river below the mouth of the Scioto, with about a hundred houses on the north bank and forty on the south.687 The small and unique nation of the Mandan Indians were found by Lewis and Clark near the northern bend of the Missouri in 1804, in two groups of villages on opposite sides of the river. They had previously in 1772 occupied nine villages lower down the stream, two on the east bank and seven on the west.688 The Connecticut River settlers of early colonial days laid out all their towns straight across the valley, utilizing the alluvial meadows on both banks for tillage, the terraces for residence sites, and the common river for intercourse.689

Rivers bring people together. Ancient Rome was built on both sides of the Tiber and expanded its commercial and political power upstream and downstream. The Gallic tribes originally settled on both banks of the Rhine, with some of their villages split by the river. Cæsar encountered the Menapii, a Belgian tribe on the lower Rhine, with their fields, farmhouses, and villages on both sides.685 Then, as the Teutonic tribes began to move westward, they gradually turned the Rhine into a German river, from the island of Batavia at its mouth up to the big bend at the base of the Jura Mountains.686 For American Indians, even the widest rivers were no obstacles. Christopher Gist, exploring the Ohio in 1751, found a Shawnee village located on both sides of the river below the mouth of the Scioto, with about a hundred homes on the north bank and forty on the south.687 The small and distinct Mandan nation was discovered by Lewis and Clark near the northern bend of the Missouri in 1804, with two groups of villages on opposite sides of the river. Previously, in 1772, they had occupied nine villages further down the stream, with two on the east bank and seven on the west.688 The settlers along the Connecticut River in early colonial days laid out all their towns straight across the valley, using the fertile meadows on both banks for farming, the terraces for homes, and the shared river for communication.689

Tendency toward ethnic and cultural unity in a river valley.

Every river tends to become a common artery feeding all the life of its basin, and gradually obliterating ethnic and cultural differences among the peoples of its valley. The Nile, with its narrow hem of flood-plain on either bank and barrier sands beyond, has so linked race and history in Egypt and Nubia, that the two countries cannot be separated. A common highway from mountains to sea, a common frontier of trackless desert have developed here a blended similarity of race, language and culture from the delta to Kordofan. The Hamitic race seems to have originated in the south and migrated northward down the Nile towards the delta. Later the whole valley, north and south, received the same Semitic or Arab immigration, which spread from Cairo to the old Sudanese capital of Sennar, while a strain of negro blood has filtered in from the equatorial black belt and followed the current down to the sea.690 The culture of the valley originated in Lower Egypt, and, with that easy transmissibility which characterizes ideas, it moved upstream into Ethiopia, which never evolved a culture of its own. Just as noticeable is the political interplay. The rule of the Pharaohs extended far up the Nile, at times to the Third Cataract at 20° N.L.; and at one period Ethiopian kings extended their sway over Egypt. At another, a large body of mutinous Egyptian soldiers abandoned their country and their wives, and emigrated along the one line of slight resistance open to them into Ethiopia, to found there a new state and new families by marriage with native women, thus contributing to the amalgamation of races in the valley.

Every river tends to become a main lifeline for all the life in its basin, gradually blending the ethnic and cultural differences among the people in its valley. The Nile, with its narrow strip of floodplain on either side and desert sands beyond, has so intertwined race and history in Egypt and Nubia that the two regions can't be separated. A shared route from mountains to sea, along with a common boundary of vast desert, has fostered a mixed similarity in race, language, and culture from the delta to Kordofan. The Hamitic race appears to have originated in the south and migrated northward down the Nile toward the delta. Later, the entire valley, both north and south, experienced the same Semitic or Arab immigration, which spread from Cairo to the old Sudanese capital of Sennar, while a trace of black ancestry has filtered in from the equatorial region and traveled downstream to the sea.690 The culture of the valley began in Lower Egypt and, with the natural flow of ideas, moved upstream into Ethiopia, which never developed its own unique culture. The political dynamics were equally significant. The rule of the Pharaohs stretched far up the Nile, at times reaching the Third Cataract at 20° N.L.; and there was a period when Ethiopian kings exerted control over Egypt. At another time, a large group of rebellious Egyptian soldiers deserted their homeland and their families, migrating along the only path of minimal resistance into Ethiopia, where they established a new state and formed new families by marrying local women, thereby contributing to the mixing of races in the valley.

Identity of country with river valley.

The most pronounced types of the identity of a country with a river valley are found where strongly marked geographical boundaries, like deserts and mountains, emphasize the inner unity of the basins by accentuating their isolation from without. This is especially the case in high mountain regions; here canton or commune or county coincides with the river valley. Population hugs the margins of the streams where alone is soil fit for cultivation, and fairly level land suitable for dwellings. Above are the unoccupied heights, at once barrier and boundary. In the Alps, Salzburg is approximately identical with the valley of the Salzach, Uri with that of the Reuss, the Valais with the upper Rhone, the Engadine with the upper Inn, Glarus with the Linth, Graubünden or Grisons with the upper Rhine, Valtellina with the Adda. So in the great upheaved area of the Himalayas, the state of Kashmir was originally the valley of the upper Jhelam River, while Assam, in its correct delimitation, is the valley of the Brahmaputra between the Himalayan gorge and the swamps of Bengal.691

The most distinct types of a country's identity with a river valley are found in places where clear geographical boundaries, like deserts and mountains, highlight the inner unity of the basins by emphasizing their isolation. This is especially true in high mountain areas; here, a canton, commune, or county aligns with the river valley. People live along the edges of the streams where the soil is suitable for farming, and there is relatively flat land appropriate for homes. Above them are the uninhabited heights, acting as both a barrier and boundary. In the Alps, Salzburg closely resembles the valley of the Salzach, Uri aligns with the Reuss, Valais matches the upper Rhone, the Engadine correlates with the upper Inn, Glarus with the Linth, and Graubünden or Grisons with the upper Rhine, while Valtellina is associated with the Adda. Similarly, in the dramatically raised area of the Himalayas, the state of Kashmir originally corresponded to the valley of the upper Jhelam River, while Assam, when correctly defined, is the valley of the Brahmaputra between the Himalayan gorge and the swamps of Bengal.691

In mountain regions which are also arid, the identity of a district with a stream basin becomes yet more pronounced, because here population must gather about the common water supply, must organize to secure its fair distribution, and cooperate in the construction of irrigation channels to make the distribution as economical and effective as possible. Thus in Chinese Turkestan, the districts of Yarkand, Kashgar, Aksu and Kut-sha are identical with as many mountain tributaries of the Tarim, whose basin in turn comprises almost the whole of Chinese Turkestan.

In dry mountain areas, the connection between a region and its river basin becomes even more obvious. People need to come together around the shared water source, organize to make sure everyone gets their fair share, and work together to build irrigation channels to make the distribution as efficient as possible. For example, in Chinese Turkestan, the areas of Yarkand, Kashgar, Aksu, and Kut-sha correspond to several mountain tributaries of the Tarim River, which, in turn, covers nearly all of Chinese Turkestan.

Enclosed river valleys.

In all such desert and mountain-rimmed valleys, the central stream attracts to its narrow hem of alluvial soil the majority of the population, determines the course of the main highroad, and is itself often the only route through the encompassing barriers. Hence the importance attached to the river by the inhabitants, an importance reflected in the fact that the river often gives its name to the whole district. To the most ancient Greeks Aigiptos meant the river, whose name was later transferred to the whole land; for the narrow arable strip which constituted Egypt was "the gift of the Nile." The Aryans, descending into India through the mountains on its northwest border, gave the name of Sindhu, "the flood" or "the ocean," to the first great river they met. In the mouth of Persians and Greeks the name was corrupted into Indus, and then applied to the whole country; but it still survives in its original form in the local designation of the Sind province, which comprises the valley of the Indus below the confluence of the five rivers, which again formed and named the original Punjab. Significantly enough the western political boundary of the Sind extends into the barren foothills of Baluchistan only so far as the affluents of the Indus render the land arable by irrigation; for the Indus performs for the great province of the Sind, by annual inundation and perennial irrigation, the same service that the Nile does for Egypt.

In all those desert and mountain-surrounded valleys, the main river draws most of the population to its narrow strip of fertile land, shapes the primary highway, and often serves as the only route through the surrounding barriers. This gives the river a significant role for the local people, which is evident as the river often names the entire region. To the ancient Greeks, Aigiptos meant the river, and that name later referred to the entire land; the narrow farming area that made up Egypt was known as "the gift of the Nile." The Aryans, coming down into India through the mountains on its northwest side, named the first major river they encountered Sindhu, meaning "the flood" or "the ocean." The name was changed by Persians and Greeks to Indus and then used for the entire country; however, it still exists in its original form in the local name for the Sind province, which includes the valley of the Indus below where the five rivers come together, and those rivers originally formed and named Punjab. Interestingly, the western political border of Sind extends into the barren foothills of Baluchistan only as far as the tributaries of the Indus make the land farmable through irrigation; the Indus provides for the large province of Sind through annual flooding and constant irrigation, just like the Nile does for Egypt.

The segregation of such districts, and the concentration of their interests and activities along the central streams have tended to develop in the population an intense but contracted national consciousness, and to lend them a distinctive history. Their rivers become interwoven with their mythology and religion, are gods to be worshipped or appeased, become goals of pilgrimages, or acquire a peculiar sanctity. The Nile, Ganges, Jamna, Jordan, Tiber and Po are such sacred streams, while the Rhine figures in German mythology.

The separation of these areas and the focus of their interests and activities along the main rivers have led to a strong yet narrow sense of national identity among the people, giving them a unique history. Their rivers become deeply connected to their myths and religions, treated as gods that need to be worshipped or appeased, becoming destinations for pilgrimages, or gaining a special sacredness. The Nile, Ganges, Yamuna, Jordan, Tiber, and Po are such holy rivers, while the Rhine is significant in German mythology.

Rivers as boundaries of races and peoples.

From the uniting power of rivers it follows that they are poor boundaries. Only mountains and seas divide sharply enough to form scientific frontiers. Rivers may serve as political lines of demarcation and therefore fix political frontiers; but they can never take the place of natural boundaries. A migrating or expanding people tend always to occupy both slopes of a river valley. They run their boundary of race or language across the axis of their river basin, only under exceptional circumstances along the stream itself. The English-French boundary in the St. Lawrence Valley crosses the river in a broad transitional zone of mingled people and speech in and above the city of Montreal. The French-German linguistic frontier in Switzerland crosses the upper Rhone Valley just above Sierre, but the whole canton of Valais above the elbow of the river at Martigny shows fundamental ethnic unity, indicated by identity of head form, stature and coloring.692 Where the Elbe flows through the low plains of North Germany, its whole broad valley is occupied by a pure Teutonic population—fair, tall, long-headed; a more brunette type occupies its middle course across the uplands of Saxony, and speaks German like the downstream folk; but its upper course, hemmed in by the Erz and Riesen Mountains, shows the short, dark and broad-headed people of the Bohemian basin, speaking the Czech language.693 On the Danube, too, the same thing is true. The upper stream is German in language and predominantly Alpine in race stock down to the Austro-Hungarian boundary; from this point to the Drave mouth it is Hungarian; and from the Drave to the Iron Gate it is Serbo-Croatian on both banks.694 Lines of ethnic demarcation, therefore, cut the Elbe and Danube transversely, not longitudinally. [See map page 223.]

From the unifying power of rivers, it follows that they make poor boundaries. Only mountains and seas divide sharply enough to create clear scientific frontiers. Rivers can serve as political lines of division and therefore establish political borders; but they cannot replace natural boundaries. A migrating or expanding population tends to occupy both sides of a river valley. They define their boundary of race or language across the axis of their river basin, only in exceptional cases along the river itself. The English-French boundary in the St. Lawrence Valley crosses the river in a broad transitional area of mixed people and languages in and around the city of Montreal. The French-German linguistic boundary in Switzerland crosses the upper Rhone Valley just above Sierre, but the whole canton of Valais above the bend of the river at Martigny shows fundamental ethnic unity, indicated by similarities in head shape, stature, and coloring.692 Where the Elbe flows through the low plains of North Germany, its entire wide valley is occupied by a pure Teutonic population—fair, tall, long-headed; a more brunette type lives in its middle section across the uplands of Saxony, speaking German like the downstream people; but its upper section, surrounded by the Erz and Riesen Mountains, shows the short, dark, and broad-headed people of the Bohemian basin, speaking the Czech language.693 The same is true for the Danube. The upper stream is German-speaking and predominantly Alpine in racial background down to the Austro-Hungarian boundary; from this point to the mouth of the Drave, it is Hungarian; and from the Drave to the Iron Gate, it is Serbo-Croatian on both banks.694 Therefore, lines of ethnic division cut across the Elbe and Danube, rather than along them. [See map page 223.]

The statements of Cæsar and Pliny that the Seine and Marne formed the boundary between the Gauls and Belgians, and the Garonne that between the Gauls and Aquitanians, must be accepted merely as general and preliminary; for exceptions are noted later in the text. Parisii, for instance, were represented as holding both banks of the Seine and Marne at their confluence, and the Gallic Bituriges were found on the Aquitanian side of the Garonne estuary.

The statements by Caesar and Pliny that the Seine and Marne rivers separated the Gauls and Belgians, and that the Garonne separated the Gauls and Aquitanians, should be regarded as general and initial observations, as exceptions are mentioned later in the text. For example, the Parisii were noted to occupy both banks of the Seine and Marne where they meet, and the Gallic Bituriges were located on the Aquitanian side of the Garonne estuary.

Scientific river boundaries.

Only under peculiar conditions do rivers become effective as ethnic, tribal or political boundaries. Most often it is some physiographic feature which makes the stream an obstacle to communication, and lends it the character of a scientific boundary. The division of the Alpine foreland of southern Germany first into tribal and later into political provinces by the Iller, Lech, Inn, and Salzach can be ascribed in part to the tumultuous course of these streams from the mountains to the Danube, which renders them useless for communication.695 The lower Danube forms a well maintained linguistic boundary between the Bulgarians and Roumanians, except in the northwest corner of Bulgaria, where the hill country between the Timok River and the Danube has enticed a small group of Roumanians across to the southern side. From this point down the stream, a long stretch of low marshy bank on the northern side, offering village sites only at the few places where the loess terrace of Roumania comes close to the river, exposed to overflows, strewn with swamps and lakes, and generally unfit for settlement, has made the Danube an effective barrier.696 Similarly, the broad, sluggish Shannon River, which spreads out to lake breadth at close intervals in its course across the boggy central plain of Ireland, has from the earliest times proved a sufficient barrier to divide the plain into two portions, Connaught and Meath,697 contrasted in history, in speech and to some extent even in race elements.698 A different cause gave the Thames its unique rôle among the larger English rivers as a boundary between counties from source to mouth. London's fortified position at the head of the Thames estuary closed this stream as a line of invasion to the early Saxons, and forced them to make detours to the north and south of the river, which therefore became a tribal boundary.699

Only under specific conditions do rivers serve as effective ethnic, tribal, or political boundaries. More often, it's some geographical feature that makes the river an obstacle to communication, giving it the role of a scientific boundary. The splitting of the Alpine foreland in southern Germany first into tribal and later into political provinces by the Iller, Lech, Inn, and Salzach can partly be attributed to the turbulent paths these rivers take from the mountains to the Danube, which makes them impractical for communication.695 The lower Danube creates a well-defined linguistic boundary between Bulgarians and Romanians, except in the northwest corner of Bulgaria, where the hilly area between the Timok River and the Danube has attracted a small group of Romanians to the southern bank. From this point downriver, a long stretch of low, marshy land on the northern side, providing village sites only at the few places where the loess terrace of Romania comes close to the river, which is prone to flooding, scattered with swamps and lakes, and generally unsuitable for settlement, has made the Danube an effective barrier.696 Similarly, the broad, slow-moving Shannon River, which widens to lake size at intervals across the boggy central plain of Ireland, has from ancient times served as a sufficient barrier to split the plain into two parts, Connaught and Meath,697 which are different in history, language, and even to some extent in ethnic composition.698 The Thames, however, has a distinct reason for its notable role among the major English rivers as a boundary between counties from its source to its mouth. London's fortified position at the mouth of the Thames cut this river off as a route for invasion to the early Saxons, forcing them to detour to the north and south of the river, which then became a tribal boundary.699

Where navigation is peculiarly backward, a river may present a barrier. An instructive instance is afforded by the River Yo, which flows eastward through northern Bornu into Lake Chad, and serves at once as boundary and protection to the agricultural tribes of the Kanuri against the depredations of the Tibbu robbers living in the Sahara or the northern grassland. But during the dry season from April to August, when the trickling stream is sucked up by the thirsty land and thirstier air, the Tibbu horsemen sweep down on the unprotected Kanuri and retreat with their booty across the vanished barrier. The primitive navigation by reed or brushwood rafts, practiced in this almost streamless district, affords no means of retreat for mounted robbers; so the raiding season opens with the fall of the river.700

Where navigation is particularly poor, a river can become a barrier. A good example is the River Yo, which flows eastward through northern Bornu into Lake Chad, serving as both a boundary and a protection for the farming tribes of the Kanuri against the raids of the Tibbu thieves from the Sahara or the northern grasslands. However, during the dry season from April to August, when the small stream is absorbed by the parched land and thirsty air, the Tibbu horsemen attack the vulnerable Kanuri and escape with their plunder over the disappeared barrier. The basic navigation using reed or brushwood rafts, practiced in this nearly dry area, doesn't allow any escape for mounted thieves; thus, the raiding season begins with the fall of the river.700

Rivers as political boundaries.

For political boundaries, which are often adopted with little reference to race distribution, rivers serve fairly well. They are convenient lines of demarcation and strategic lines of defense, as is proved by the military history of the Rhine, Danube, Ebro, Po, and countless other streams. On the lower Zambesi Livingstone found the territories of the lesser chiefs defined by the rivulets draining into the main river. The leader of the Makololo formally adopted the Zambesi as his political and military frontier, though his people spread and settled beyond the river.701 Long established political frontiers may become ethnic boundaries, more or less distinct, because of protracted political exclusion. To the Romans, the Danube and Rhine as a northeastern frontier had the value chiefly of established lines in an imperfectly explored wilderness, and of strategic positions for the defense of an oft assailed border; but the long maintenance of this political frontier resulted in the partial segregation and hence differentiation of the people dwelling on the opposite banks.

For political boundaries, which are often set with little regard for the distribution of races, rivers work pretty well. They provide convenient lines of separation and strategic defensive positions, as shown by the military histories of the Rhine, Danube, Ebro, Po, and numerous other rivers. On the lower Zambesi, Livingstone discovered that the territories of the lesser chiefs were defined by the streams flowing into the main river. The leader of the Makololo officially recognized the Zambesi as his political and military border, even though his people spread and settled beyond it.701 Long-established political boundaries can turn into ethnic borders, more or less clear, due to prolonged political exclusion. To the Romans, the Danube and Rhine served primarily as established borders in a poorly explored wilderness and as strategic points for defending a frequently attacked border; however, the long duration of this political boundary led to the partial segregation and thus differentiation of the people living on opposite banks.

Poor as a scientific boundary, a river is not satisfactory even as a line of demarcation, because of its tendency to shift its bed in every level stretch of its course. A political boundary that follows a river, therefore, is often doomed to frequent surveys. The plantations on the meanders of the lower Mississippi are connected now with one, now with the other of the contiguous states, as the great stream straightens its course after the almost annual overflow.702 The Rio Grande has proved a troublesome and expensive boundary between the United States and Mexico. Almost every rise sees it cutting a new channel for itself, now through Texas, now through Mexican territory, occasioning endless controversies as to the ownership of the detached land, and demanding fresh surveys. Recent changes in the lower course of the Helmund between Nasralabad and the Sistan Swamp, which was adopted in 1872 as the boundary between Afghanistan and Persia, have necessitated a new demarcation of the frontier; and on this task a commission is at present engaged.703 In a like manner Strabo tells us that the River Achelous, forming the boundary between ancient Acarnania and Aetolia in western Hellas, by overflowing its delta region, constantly obliterated the boundaries agreed upon by the two neighbors, and thereby gave rise to disputes that were only settled by force of arms.704

Poor as a scientific boundary, a river isn't even a good line of separation because it tends to change its course in every flat stretch along its path. A political boundary that follows a river is often destined for constant revisions. The plantations on the bends of the lower Mississippi are sometimes connected to one state and sometimes to another, as the river straightens its course after almost annual flooding.702 The Rio Grande has proven to be a troublesome and costly boundary between the United States and Mexico. With almost every rise, it carves out a new path for itself, sometimes through Texas and sometimes through Mexican territory, leading to endless disputes about who owns the newly detached land and requiring new surveys. Recent changes in the lower course of the Helmund between Nasralabad and the Sistan Swamp, which became the boundary between Afghanistan and Persia in 1872, have required a new demarcation of the border; a commission is currently working on this task.703 Similarly, Strabo tells us that the River Achelous, which formed the boundary between ancient Acarnania and Aetolia in western Greece, constantly erased the borders agreed upon by the two neighbors due to flooding its delta region, leading to disputes that were only resolved through armed conflict.704

Fluvial settlements and peoples.

Rivers tend always to be centers of population, not outskirts or perimeters. They offer advantages that have always attracted settlement—fertile alluvial soil, a nearby water supply, command of a natural highway for intercourse with neighbors and access to markets. Among civilized peoples fluvial settlements have been the nuclei of broad states, passing rapidly through an embryonic development to a maturity in which the old center can still be distinguished by a greater density of population. Only among savages or among civilized people who have temporarily reverted to primitive conditions in virgin colonial lands, do we find genuine riverine folk, whose existence is closely restricted to their bordering streams. The river tribes of the Congo occupy the banks or the larger islands, while the land only three or four miles back from the stream is held by different tribes with whom the riverine people trade their fish. The latter are expert fishermen and navigators, and good agriculturists, raising a variety of fruits and vegetables. On the river banks at regular intervals are market greens, neutral ground, whither people come from up and down stream and from the interior to trade. Their long riparian villages consist of a single street, thirty feet wide and often two miles long, on which face perhaps three hundred long houses,705 Fisher and canoe people line the Welle, the great northern tributary of the Congo.706 The same type appeared in South America in the aboriginal Caribs and Tupis dwelling along the southern tributaries of the Amazon and the affluents of the Paraguay. These were distinctly a water race, having achieved a meager development only in navigation, fishing and the cultivation of their alluvial soil.707 The ancient mound-builders of America located their villages chiefly, though not exclusively, along the principal watercourses, like the Mississippi, Illinois, Miami, Wabash, Wisconsin, and Fox,708 on the very streams later dotted by the trading posts of the French voyageurs.

Rivers have always been hubs of population, not just edge areas. They provide benefits that have consistently drawn people to settle—fertile soil, a nearby water source, control of a natural route for communication with neighbors, and access to markets. In developed societies, river settlements have been the heart of large states, moving quickly from early development to a stage where the original center can still be recognized by its higher population density. Genuine river communities, who live closely tied to their adjacent streams, can only be found among primitive tribes or among civilized people who have temporarily returned to basic conditions in untouched colonial areas. The river tribes of the Congo inhabit the banks or larger islands, while land just three or four miles inland is held by different tribes, with whom the river people trade their fish. These river dwellers are skilled fishermen, navigators, and farmers, growing various fruits and vegetables. Along the riverbanks, there are regular market spots, neutral grounds where people come from upstream, downstream, and from inland to trade. Their long riverside villages have a single street, about thirty feet wide and often two miles long, lined with around three hundred longhouses.705 Fishermen and canoe people populate the Welle, the major northern tributary of the Congo.706 A similar group existed in South America among the indigenous Caribs and Tupis who lived along the southern tributaries of the Amazon and the affiliates of the Paraguay. They were definitely a water-oriented community, achieving only limited development in navigation, fishing, and farming their fertile land.707 The ancient mound-builders of America primarily, though not exclusively, settled their villages along major waterways like the Mississippi, Illinois, Miami, Wabash, Wisconsin, and Fox,708 right on the very rivers that later featured trading posts established by French explorers.

Riparian villages of French Canada.

The presence of the great waterways of Canada and the demand of the fur trade for extensive and easy communication made the early French colonists as distinctly a riverine people as the savage Congo tribes. Like these, they stretched out their villages in a single line of cabins and clearings, three or four miles long, facing the river, which was the King's highway. Such a village was called a côte. One côte ran into the next, for their expansion was always longitudinal, never lateral. These riparian settlements lined the main watercourses of French Canada, especially the St. Lawrence, whose shores from Beaupre, fifteen miles below Quebec, up to Montreal at an early date presented the appearance of a single street. Along the river passed the stately trading ship from France with its cargo of wives and merchandise for the colonists, the pirogue of the habitant farmer carrying his onions and grain to the Quebec market, the birchbark canoe of the adventurous voyageur bringing down his winter's hunt of furs from the snow-bound forests of the interior, and the fleet of Jesuit priests bound to some remote inland mission.

The vast waterways of Canada and the fur trade's need for easy communication made the early French colonists as much a river people as the wild tribes of the Congo. Like them, they arranged their villages in a long line of cabins and clearings, stretching three or four miles along the river, which served as the main route. This type of village was called a côte. One côte connected to the next, as they always expanded in length rather than width. These riverside settlements lined the main waterways of French Canada, especially the St. Lawrence, where the banks from Beaupre, fifteen miles below Quebec, all the way to Montreal early on looked like a single street. Along the river sailed the grand trading ships from France with their cargo of wives and goods for the colonists, the small boats of the habitant farmers transporting onions and grain to the Quebec market, the birchbark canoes of the intrepid voyageur bringing down their winter harvest of furs from the snow-covered forests of the interior, and the group of Jesuit priests heading to some distant inland mission.

The Riparian Villages Of The Lower St. Lawrence.

The Riparian Villages Of The Lower St. Lawrence.

The Riparian Villages Of The Lower St. Lawrence.

The Riparian Villages of the Lower St. Lawrence.

On this water thoroughfare every dwelling faced. Hence land on the river was at a premium, while that two miles back was to be had for the taking. The original grants measured generally 766 feet in width and 7,660 in depth inland; but when bequeathed from generation to generation, they were divided up along lines running back at right angles to the all important waterway. Hence each habitant farm measured its precious river-front by the foot and its depth by the mile, while the cabins were ranged side by side in cosy neighborliness. The côte type of village, though eminently convenient for the Indian trade, was ill adapted for government and defense against the savages; but the need for the communication supplied by the river was so fundamental, that it nullified all efforts of the authorities to concentrate the colonists in more compact settlements. Parkman says: "One could have seen almost every house in Canada by paddling a canoe up the St. Lawrence and Richelieu."709 The same type of land-holding can be traced to-day on the Chaudiere River, where the fences run back from the stream like the teeth of a comb. It is reproduced on a larger scale in the long, narrow counties ranged along the lower St. Lawrence, whose shape points to the old fluvial nuclei of settlement. Similarly the early Dutch grants on the Hudson gave to the patroons four miles along the river and an indefinite extension back from the stream. In the early Connecticut River settlements, the same consideration of a share in the river and its alluvial bottoms distributed the town lots among the inhabitants in long narrow strips running back from the banks.710

On this waterway, every house faced the river. As a result, land on the river was highly sought after, while land two miles back was easy to obtain. The original grants were typically 766 feet wide and 7,660 feet deep inland; however, when passed down through generations, they were divided along lines that ran back at right angles to the crucial waterway. Therefore, each resident's farm measured its valuable riverfront by the foot and its depth by the mile, while the cabins were lined up next to each other in friendly closeness. The village structure, while very convenient for trade with the Native Americans, was poorly suited for governance and protection against threats; yet the need for river access was so essential that it negated any attempts by authorities to gather the colonists into more compact communities. Parkman states: "One could have seen almost every house in Canada by paddling a canoe up the St. Lawrence and Richelieu."709 This same pattern of landholding can still be seen today on the Chaudiere River, where the fences stretch back from the stream like the teeth of a comb. It appears on a larger scale in the long, narrow counties along the lower St. Lawrence, whose shape reflects the old river-based centers of settlement. Similarly, the early Dutch grants along the Hudson River allowed the patroons four miles along the river with an endless stretch back from the stream. In the early settlements along the Connecticut River, a share of the river and its fertile floodplains also led to the distribution of town lots among residents in long, narrow strips extending back from the banks.710

Boatmen tribes or castes.

In undeveloped countries, where rivers are the chief highways, we occasionally see the survival of a distinct race of boatmen amid an intruding people of different stock, preserved in their purity by their peculiar occupation, which has given them the aloofness of a caste. In the Kwang-tung province of southern China are 40,000 Tanka boat people, who live in boats and pile-dwellings in the Canton River. The Chinese, from whom they are quite distinct, regard them as a remnant of the original population, which was dislodged by their invasion and forced to take refuge on the water. They gradually established intercourse with the conquerors of the land, but held themselves aloof. They marry only among themselves, have their own customs, and enjoy a practical monopoly of carrying passengers and messages between the steamers and the shore at Macao, Hongkong and Canton.711 In the same way, the middle Niger above Gao possesses a distinct aquatic people, the Somnos or Bosos, who earn their living as fishermen and boatmen on the river. They spread their villages along the Niger and its tributaries, and occupy separate quarters in the large towns like Gao and Timbuctoo. They are creatures of the river rather than of the land, and show great skill and endurance in paddling and poling their narrow dugouts on their long Niger voyages.712

In developing countries, where rivers serve as the main routes for transportation, we sometimes see the survival of a unique group of boatmen who maintain their identity despite being surrounded by people of different backgrounds. This distinct identity is preserved through their unique way of life, which has given them a sense of separation like a social class. In the Kwang-tung province of southern China, there are 40,000 Tanka boat people, who live on boats and in stilt houses along the Canton River. The Chinese, who are quite different from them, view the Tanka as a remnant of the original inhabitants, displaced by their invasion and forced to seek refuge on the water. They slowly began to interact with the land conquerors but kept their distance. They only marry within their own community, have their own customs, and have a practical monopoly on transporting passengers and messages between the steamers and the shore at Macao, Hong Kong, and Canton.711 Similarly, in the middle Niger above Gao, there is a distinct water-based community, the Somnos or Bosos, who make their living as fishermen and boaters on the river. Their villages line the Niger and its tributaries, and they have their own quarters in the larger towns like Gao and Timbuktu. They are more connected to the river than to the land and demonstrate great skill and endurance in paddling and propelling their narrow dugout canoes on long journeys along the Niger.712

Reference has been made before to the large river population of China who live on boats and rafts, and forward the trade of the vast inland waterways. These are people, differentiated not in race, but in occupation and mode of life, constantly recruited from the congested population of the land. Allied to them are the trackers or towing crews whose villages form a distinctive feature of the turbulent upper Yangtze, and who are employed, sometimes three hundred at a time, to drag junks up the succession of rapids above Ichang.713 Similarly the complex of navigable waterways centering about Paris, as far back as the reign of Tiberius Cæsar, gave rise to the Nautae Parisii or guild of mariners, from whom the city of Paris derived its present coat of arms—a vessel under full sail. These Lutetian boatmen handled the river traffic in all the territory drained by the Seine, Marne, and Oise. Later, in the reign of Louis the Fat, they were succeeded by the Mercatores aquae Parisiaci, and from them sprang the municipal body appointed to regulate the river navigation and commerce.714

Reference has been made before to the large population of boat-dwellers in China who live on boats and rafts, supporting trade along the vast inland waterways. These people are not distinguished by race but by their jobs and way of life, constantly drawn from the overcrowded land population. Connected to them are the trackers or towing crews, whose villages are a notable aspect of the turbulent upper Yangtze, and who are sometimes employed in groups of three hundred to pull junks up the series of rapids above Ichang.713 Similarly, the network of navigable waterways around Paris, as far back as the reign of Tiberius Caesar, led to the creation of the Nautae Parisii or guild of mariners, from whom the city of Paris got its current coat of arms—a boat under full sail. These Lutetian boatmen managed the river traffic in all the areas drained by the Seine, Marne, and Oise. Later, during the reign of Louis the Fat, they were followed by the Mercatores aquae Parisiaci, and from them emerged the municipal body designated to oversee river navigation and commerce.714

River islands as protected sites.

The location of the ancient tribe of the Parisii is typical of many other weak riverine folk who seek in the islands of a river a protected position to compensate for their paucity of number. The Parisii, one of the smallest of the Gallic tribes, ill-matched against their populous neighbors, took refuge on ten islands and sandbars of the Seine and there established themselves.715 Stanley found an island in the Congo near the second cataract of Stanley Falls occupied by five villages of the Baswa, who had taken refuge there from the attacks of the bloodthirsty Bakuma.716 During the Tartar invasions of Russia in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, bands of refugees from the surrounding country gathered for mutual defense on the islands of the Dnieper River, and became the nucleus of the Dnieper Cossacks.717 The Huron tribe of American Indians, reduced to a mere fragment by repeated Iroquois attacks, fled first to the islands of St. Joseph and Michilimackinac in Lake Huron, and in 1856 to the Isle of Orleans in the St. Lawrence. But even this location under the guns of their French allies in Quebec failed to protect them, for the St. Lawrence was a highway for the war fleets of their implacable foe.718

The location of the ancient tribe of the Parisii is typical of many other small river communities that seek refuge in the islands of a river for protection due to their low numbers. The Parisii, one of the smallest Gallic tribes, outmatched by their populous neighbors, took shelter on ten islands and sandbars of the Seine and settled there.715 Stanley discovered an island in the Congo near the second cataract of Stanley Falls, occupied by five villages of the Baswa, who had fled there from the attacks of the ruthless Bakuma.716 During the Tartar invasions of Russia in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, groups of refugees from the surrounding areas gathered on the islands of the Dnieper River for mutual defense, forming the core of the Dnieper Cossacks.717 The Huron tribe of American Indians, reduced to a small group by repeated Iroquois attacks, first fled to the islands of St. Joseph and Michilimackinac in Lake Huron, and in 1856 to the Isle of Orleans in the St. Lawrence. However, even this location, under the protection of their French allies in Quebec, couldn't keep them safe, as the St. Lawrence was a route used by the war fleets of their relentless enemy.718

River and lake islands as robber strongholds.

A river island not only confers the negative benefit of protection, but affords a coign of vantage for raids on the surrounding country, being to some extent proof against punitive attacks. It offers special facilities for depredations on parties crossing the river; here the divided current, losing something of its force, is less of an obstacle, and the island serves as a resting place on the passage. Immunity from punishment breeds lawlessness. The Ba Toka who, fifty years ago, inhabited the islands in the great southern bend of the Zambesi, utilized their location to lure wandering tribes on to their islands, under the pretext of ferrying them across, and then to rob them, till Sebituane, the great Makololo chief, cleaned out their fastnesses and opened the river for trade.719 The islands in the wide stretches of the Lualaba River in the Babemba country were described to Livingstone as harboring a population of marauders and robbers, who felt themselves safe from attack.720 The same unenviable reputation attaches to the Budumas of the Lake Chad islands. A weak, timid, displaced people, they nevertheless lose no chance of raiding the herds of the Sudanese tribes inhabiting the shores of the Lake, and carrying off the stolen cattle on their wretched rafts to their island retreats.721

A river island not only provides a sense of protection but also serves as a strategic spot for launching raids on the surrounding lands, being somewhat resistant to retaliatory strikes. It offers unique advantages for attacking parties crossing the river; here, the split current, losing some of its strength, is less of a barrier, and the island acts as a stopover during the journey. Safety from consequences fosters lawlessness. The Ba Toka, who lived on the islands in the great southern bend of the Zambesi fifty years ago, took advantage of their position to trick wandering tribes onto their islands under the guise of ferrying them across, then robbed them until Sebituane, the great Makololo chief, cleared them out and opened the river for trade.719 The islands in the wide stretches of the Lualaba River in the Babemba country were reported to Livingstone as home to a population of bandits and thieves who felt secure from attack.720 The same unfortunate reputation is held by the Budumas of the Lake Chad islands. A weak, timid, displaced people, they still seize every opportunity to raid the herds of the Sudanese tribes living along the shores of the Lake, taking the stolen cattle on their flimsy rafts back to their island hideouts.721

River peninsulas as protected sites.

The protection of an island location is almost equalled in the peninsulas formed by the serpentines or meanders of a river. Hence these are choice sites for fortress or settlement in primitive communities, where hostilities are always imminent and rivers the sole means of communication. The defensive works of the mound-builders in great numbers occupied such river peninsulas. The neck of the loop was fortified by a single or double line of ditch and earthen wall, constructed from bank to bank of the encircling stream.722 This was exactly the location of Vesontio, now Besançon, once the ancient stronghold of the Sequani in eastern Gaul. It was situated in a loop of the Dubis, so nearly a circle that its course seems to have been "described by a compass," Cæsar says, while fortifications across the isthmus made the position of the town almost impregnable.723 Verona, lying at the exit of the great martial highway of the Brenner Pass, occupies just such a loop of the Adige, as does Capua on the Volturno, and Berne on the Aare. Shrewsbury, in the Middle Ages an important military point for the preservation of order on the marches of Wales, is almost encircled by the River Severn, while a castle on the neck of the peninsula completes the defense on the land side.724 Graaf Reinett, at one time an exposed frontier settlement of the Dutch in Cape Colony, had a natural moat around it in the Sunday River, which here describes three-fourths of a circle.

The advantage of an island location is almost matched by the peninsulas formed by the twists and turns of a river. Therefore, these spots are prime sites for forts or settlements in early communities, where conflicts are always a threat and rivers are the only means of transport. The defensive structures built by the mound-builders were numerous on these river peninsulas. The narrow part of the loop was protected by a single or double line of ditch and earthen wall, built from one bank to the other of the surrounding stream.722 This was the exact site of Vesontio, now Besançon, which was once the ancient stronghold of the Sequani in eastern Gaul. It was located in a loop of the Dubis, shaped so nearly like a circle that its path appears to have been "drawn with a compass," as Caesar said, while walls across the isthmus made the town's position nearly unbeatable.723 Verona, located at the exit of the major military route through the Brenner Pass, occupies a similar loop of the Adige, just like Capua on the Volturno and Berne on the Aare. Shrewsbury, which was an important military stronghold in the Middle Ages for maintaining order along the borders of Wales, is nearly surrounded by the River Severn, while a castle on the neck of the peninsula completes the defense on the land side.724 Graaf Reinett, once an exposed frontier settlement for the Dutch in Cape Colony, had a natural moat formed by the Sunday River, which here makes three-quarters of a circle.

River islands as sites of trading posts and colonies.

The need of protection felt by all colonists in new countries amid savage or barbarous people whom encroachment sooner or later makes hostile, leads them if possible to place their first trading posts and settlements on river islands, especially at the mouth of the streams, where a delta often affords the site required, and where the junction of ocean and river highway offers the best facilities for trade. A river island fixed the location of the English settlement at Jamestown in Virginia, the French at Montreal and New Orleans, the Dutch at Manhattan and Van Renssellær Island in the Hudson, the Swedes at Tinicum Island in the Delaware River a few miles below the mouth of the Schuylkill.725 St. Louis, located on a delta island of the Senegal River, is one of the oldest European towns in West Africa;726 and Bathurst, founded in 1618 on a similar site at the mouth of the Gambia, has for centuries now been the safe outlet for the trade of this stream.727 Such island settlements at river mouths are a phenomenon of the outer edge of every coastal region; but inland stations for trade or military control also seek the protection of an island site. The Russians in the seventeenth century secured their downstream conquest of the Amur by a succession of river island forts,728 which recall Colonel Byrd's early frontier post on an island in the Holston River, and George Rogers Clark's military stockade on Corn Island in the Ohio, which became the nucleus of the later city of Louisville.

The need for protection felt by all colonists in new territories surrounded by hostile or aggressive groups, which eventually leads to conflict, drives them to establish their first trading posts and settlements on river islands whenever possible. This is especially true at river mouths, where a delta often provides the necessary land, and where the meeting point of ocean and river offers the best opportunities for trade. A river island determined the location of the English settlement at Jamestown in Virginia, the French at Montreal and New Orleans, the Dutch at Manhattan and Van Rensselaer Island in the Hudson, and the Swedes at Tinicum Island in the Delaware River, just a few miles below the Schuylkill.725 St. Louis, situated on a delta island of the Senegal River, is one of the oldest European towns in West Africa;726 and Bathurst, established in 1618 on a similar site at the mouth of the Gambia, has been a reliable trade outlet for this river for centuries.727 Such island settlements at river mouths are common at the frontiers of every coastal region; however, inland trade or military posts also seek the safety of island locations. In the seventeenth century, the Russians secured their conquest downstream of the Amur River by building a series of island forts,728 reminiscent of Colonel Byrd's early frontier post on an island in the Holston River, and George Rogers Clark's military stockade on Corn Island in the Ohio, which later became the core of the city of Louisville.

Swamps as barriers and boundaries.

More effective than rivers in the protection which they afford are swamps. Neither solid land nor navigable water, their sluggish, passive surface raises an obstacle of pure inertia to the movements of mankind. Hence they form one of those natural boundaries that segregate. In southern England, Ronmey Marsh, reinforced by the Wealden Forest, fixed the western boundary of the ancient Saxon kingdom of Kent by blocking expansion in that direction, just as the bordering swamps of the Lea and Colne rivers formed the eastern and western boundaries of Middlesex.729 The Fenland of the Wash, which extended in Saxon days from the highland about Lincoln south to Cambridge and Newmarket, served to hem in the Angles of Norfolk and Suffolk on the west, so that the occupation of the interior was left to later bands who entered by the estuaries of the Humber and Forth.730 In northern Germany, the low cross valleys of the Spree, Havel and Netze rivers, bordered by alder swamps, were long a serious obstacle to communication, and therefore became boundaries of districts,731 just as the Bourtanger Moor drew the dividing line between Holland and Hanover.

More effective than rivers in providing protection are swamps. Neither solid ground nor easy-to-navigate water, their slow-moving, passive surface creates a barrier of pure inertia to human activity. As a result, they form one of those natural boundaries that create separation. In southern England, Romney Marsh, supported by the Wealden Forest, set the western edge of the ancient Saxon kingdom of Kent by blocking expansion in that direction, just like the neighboring swamps of the Lea and Colne rivers defined the eastern and western boundaries of Middlesex.729 The Fenland of the Wash, which stretched in Saxon times from the highlands around Lincoln down to Cambridge and Newmarket, helped contain the Angles of Norfolk and Suffolk on the west, leaving the interior open for later groups that arrived through the estuaries of the Humber and Forth.730 In northern Germany, the low cross valleys of the Spree, Havel, and Netze rivers, lined with alder swamps, were for a long time a significant barrier to communication and thus became boundaries of regions,731 just as the Bourtanger Moor marked the division between Holland and Hanover.

Swamps as regions of survival.

Swamp-bordered regions, as areas of natural isolation, guard and keep intact the people which they hold. Therefore they are regions of survival of race and language. The scattered islets of the Fens of England furnished an asylum to the early British Celts from Teutonic attacks,732 and later protected them against dominant infusion of Teutonic blood. Hence to-day in the Fenland and in the district just to the south we find a darker, shorter people than in the country to the east or west.733 Similarly the White Russians, occupying the poor, marshy region of uncertain watershed between the sources of the Duna, Dnieper and Volga, have the purest blood of all the eastern Slavs, though this distinction is coupled with poverty and retarded culture,734 a combination that anthropo-geography often reveals. Wholly distinct from the Russians and segregated from them by a barrier of swampy forests, we find the Letto-Lithuanians in the Baltic province of Courland, speaking the most primitive form of flectional languages classed as Aryan. The isolation which preserved their archaic speech, of all European tongues the nearest to the Sanskrit, made them the last European people to accept Christianity.735 The great race of the Slavic Wends, who once occupied all northern Germany between the Vistula and Elbe, has left only a small and declining remnant of its language in the swampy forests about the sources of the Spree.736 [See ethnographical map, p. 223.] The band of marshlands stretching through Holland from the shallow Zuyder Zee east to the German frontier, has given to Friesland and the coast islands of Holland a peculiar isolation, which has favored the development and survival of the peculiar Friesian dialect, that speech so nearly allied to Saxon English, and has preserved here the purest type of the tall, blond Teuton among the otherwise mixed stock of the Netherlands.737

Swamp-bordered areas, serving as natural barriers, protect and maintain the communities they contain. As a result, these regions preserve distinct races and languages. The scattered islets of the Fens in England provided refuge for early British Celts from Teutonic invasions,732 and later shielded them from the overwhelming influx of Teutonic ancestry. Consequently, today in the Fenland and the nearby areas to the south, we encounter a people who are shorter and darker compared to those in the surrounding regions to the east or west.733 Similarly, the White Russians, who inhabit the impoverished, marshy territory surrounded by the sources of the Duna, Dnieper, and Volga rivers, retain the purest lineage among the eastern Slavs, though this distinction comes with poverty and a lack of cultural development,734 a situation often highlighted by anthropo-geography. Completely separate from the Russians and isolated by a barrier of swampy forests, we find the Letto-Lithuanians in the Baltic province of Courland, who speak the most ancient version of inflectional languages classified as Aryan. The isolation that preserved their archaic language, which is the closest to Sanskrit among all European tongues, made them the last European group to adopt Christianity.735 The large group of Slavic Wends, who once occupied all of northern Germany between the Vistula and Elbe rivers, has left behind only a small and diminishing trace of its language in the swampy forests near the sources of the Spree.736 [See ethnographical map, p. 223.] The band of marshlands stretching across Holland from the shallow Zuyder Zee to the German border has created a unique isolation for Friesland and the coastal islands of Holland, allowing the development and preservation of the distinctive Frisian dialect, a language closely related to Saxon English, and has maintained the purest example of the tall, blonde Teuton amidst the otherwise mixed population of the Netherlands.737

Swamps as places of refuge.

Inaccessible to all except those familiar with their treacherous paths and labyrinthine channels, swamps have always afforded a refuge for individuals and peoples; and therefore as places of defense they have played no inconspicuous part in history. What the Dismal Swamp of North Carolina and the cypress swamps of Louisiana were to the run-away slaves, that the Everglades of Florida have been to the defeated Seminoles. In that half-solid, half-fluid area, penetrable only to the native Indian who poles his canoe along its tortuous channels of liquid mud, the Seminoles have set up their villages on the scattered hummocks of solid land, and there maintained themselves, a tribe of 350 souls, despite all efforts of the United States government to remove them to the Indian Territory. The swamps of the Nile delta have been the asylum of Egyptian independence from the time King Amysis took refuge there for fifty years during an invasion of the Ethiopians,738 to the retreat thither of Amyrtaeus, a prince of Sais, after his unsuccessful revolt against the Persian conqueror Artaxerxes I.739 The Isle of Athelney among the marshes of the Parret River afforded a refuge to Alfred the Great and a band of his followers during the Danish invasion of Wessex in 878,740 while the Isle of Ely in the Fenland was another point of sustained resistance to the invaders. It was the Fenland that two hundred years later was the last stronghold of Saxon resistance to William of Normandy. Here on the Isle of Ely the outlawed leader Hereward maintained Saxon independence, till the Conqueror at last constructed a long causeway across the marshes to the "Camp of Refuge."741

Inaccessible to everyone except those familiar with their dangerous paths and winding channels, swamps have always served as a refuge for individuals and groups; and as places of defense, they have played a significant role in history. What the Dismal Swamp in North Carolina and the cypress swamps in Louisiana meant to runaway slaves, the Everglades in Florida have meant to the defeated Seminoles. In that area, which is part solid ground and part liquid, only native Indians can navigate its twisting channels of mud in a canoe. The Seminoles established their villages on the scattered patches of firm land and have persisted as a tribe of 350 people, despite the U.S. government's attempts to relocate them to Indian Territory. The swamps of the Nile Delta have offered shelter for Egyptian independence since King Amysis took refuge there for fifty years during an Ethiopian invasion, to the retreat of Amyrtaeus, a prince of Sais, after his failed revolt against the Persian conqueror Artaxerxes I. The Isle of Athelney among the marshes of the Parret River provided refuge for Alfred the Great and his followers during the Danish invasion of Wessex in 878, while the Isle of Ely in the Fenland was another stronghold against the invaders. Two hundred years later, the Fenland was the last bastion of Saxon resistance against William of Normandy. Here on the Isle of Ely, the outlawed leader Hereward maintained Saxon independence until the Conqueror finally built a long causeway across the marshes to the "Camp of Refuge."

The spirit of the marshes.

The spirit of the marshlands is the spirit of freedom. Therefore these small and scarcely habitable portions of the land assume an historical dignity and generate stirring historical events out of all proportion to their size and population. Their content is ethical rather than economic. They attract to their fastnesses the vigorous souls protesting against conquest or oppression, and then by their natural protection sustain and nourish the spirit of liberty. It was the water-soaked lowlands of the Rhine that enabled the early Batavians,742 Ditmarscher and Frieslanders to assert and to maintain their independence, generated the love of Independence among the Dutch and helped them defend their liberty against the Spanish743 and French. So the Fenland of England was the center of resistance to the despotism of King John, who therefore fixed his headquarters for the suppression of the revolt at Lincoln and his military depôt at Lynn. Later in the conflict of the barons with Henry III, Simon de Montfort and other disaffected nobles entrenched themselves in the islands of Ely and Axholm, till the Provisions of Oxford in 1267 secured them some degree of constitutional rights.744 Four centuries later the same spirit sent many Fenlanders to the support of Cromwell.

The spirit of the marshlands represents freedom. As a result, these small and barely livable areas gain historical significance and create impactful historical events that far exceed their size and population. Their essence is more about ethics than economics. They draw in strong-minded individuals who oppose conquest or oppression, and their natural defenses support and nurture the spirit of liberty. It was the waterlogged lowlands of the Rhine that allowed the early Batavians,742 Ditmarscher and Frieslanders to assert and maintain their independence, inspired a love for Independence among the Dutch, and helped them defend their freedom against the Spanish743 and French. Likewise, the Fenland of England became the hub of resistance to King John's tyranny, leading him to establish his headquarters for quelling the revolt in Lincoln and his military depot at Lynn. Later, during the conflict between the barons and Henry III, Simon de Montfort and other disgruntled nobles fortified themselves in the islands of Ely and Axholm until the Provisions of Oxford in 1267 granted them some level of constitutional rights.744 Four centuries later, the same spirit inspired many Fenlanders to support Cromwell.

Economic and political importance of lakes.

A river that spreads out into the indeterminate earthform of a marsh is an effective barrier; but one that gathers waters into a natural basin and forms a lake retains the uniting power of a navigable stream and also, by the extension of its area and elimination of its current, approaches the nature of an enclosed sea. Mountain rivers, characterized by small volume and turbulent flow, first become navigable when they check their impetuosity and gather their store of water in some lake basin. The whole course of the upper Rhone, from its glacier source on the slope of Mount Furca to its confluence with the Saône at Lyon, is unfit for navigation, except where it lingers in Lake Geneva. The same thing is true of the Reuss in Lake Lucerne, the upper Rhine in Lake Constance, the Aare in Thun and Brienze, and the Linth in Lake Zurich. Hence such torrent-fed lakes assume economic and political importance in mountainous regions, owing to the paucity of navigable waterways. The lakes of Alpine Switzerland and Italy and of Highland Scotland form so many centers of intercourse and exchange. Even such small bodies of water as the Alpine lakes have therefore become goals of expansion, so that we find the shores of Geneva, Maggiore, Lugano, and Garda, each shared by two countries. Switzerland, the Austrian Tyrol, and the three German states of Baden, Wurtemberg and Bavaria, have all managed to secure a frontage upon Lake Constance. Lake Titicaca, lying 12,661 feet (3854 meters) above sea level but affording a navigable course 136 miles (220 kilometers) long, is an important waterway for Peru and Bolivia. In the central Sudan, where aridity reduces the volume of all streams, even the variable and indeterminate Lake Chad has been an eagerly sought objective for expanding boundaries. Twenty years ago it was divided among the native states of Bornu, Bagirmi and Kanem; today it is shared by British Nigeria, French Sudan, and German Kamerun. The erratic northern extension of the German boundary betrays the effort to reach this goal.

A river that spreads out into the undefined shape of a marsh acts as a solid barrier; however, one that collects water into a natural basin and forms a lake maintains the unifying power of a navigable stream and, by increasing its area and slowing its current, resembles an enclosed sea. Mountain rivers, known for their small volume and turbulent flow, only become navigable when they calm down and store their water in a lake basin. The entire course of the upper Rhône, from its glacier source on the slope of Mount Furca to where it joins the Saône at Lyon, isn’t navigable except where it flows through Lake Geneva. The same goes for the Reuss in Lake Lucerne, the upper Rhine in Lake Constance, the Aare in Thun and Brienze, and the Linth in Lake Zurich. Therefore, these lakes fed by torrents become economically and politically significant in mountainous areas, because of the lack of navigable rivers. The lakes in Alpine Switzerland and Italy, along with those in Highland Scotland, serve as hubs for communication and trade. Even the smaller Alpine lakes have turned into points of expansion, leading to shared shorelines for Geneva, Maggiore, Lugano, and Garda across two countries. Switzerland, the Austrian Tyrol, and three German states—Baden, Württemberg, and Bavaria—have all secured access to Lake Constance. Lake Titicaca, standing at 12,661 feet (3,854 meters) above sea level and offering a navigable stretch of 136 miles (220 kilometers), is a vital waterway for Peru and Bolivia. In Central Sudan, where dryness reduces the flow of streams, even the unpredictable Lake Chad has become a target for boundary expansion. Twenty years ago, it was divided among the local states of Bornu, Bagirmi, and Kanem; today, it is shared by British Nigeria, French Sudan, and German Kamerun. The irregular northern extension of the German boundary reflects the effort to reach this goal.

Lakes as nuclei of states.

The uniting power of lakes manifests itself in the tendency of such basins to become the nuclei of states. Attractive to settlement in primitive times, because of the protected frontier they afford—a motive finding its most emphatic expression in the pile villages of the early lake-dwellers—later because of the fertility of their bordering soil and the opportunity for friendly intercourse, they gradually unite their shores in a mesh of reciprocal relations, which finds its ultimate expression in political union. It is a significant fact that the Swiss Confederation originated in the four forest cantons of Lucerne, Schwyz, Uri and Unterwalden, which are linked together by the jagged basin of Lake Lucerne or the Lake of the Four Forest Cantons, as the Swiss significantly call it, but are otherwise divided by mountain barriers. So we find that Lake Titicaca was the cradle of the Inca Empire, just as Lake Tezcoco was that of the Toltecs in Mexico and an island in Lake Chalco later that of the Aztec domain.745 The most stable of the short-lived native states of Africa have apparently found an element of strength and permanence in a protected lake frontier. Such are the petty kingdoms of Bornu, Bagirmi and Kanem on Lake Chad, and Uganda on Victoria Nyanza.

The uniting power of lakes shows in how these bodies of water often become the centers of states. In ancient times, they were attractive for settlement due to the safe borders they provided—something clearly seen in the pile villages of early lake-dwellers. Later on, their fertile soil and opportunities for friendly interactions led to a gradual intertwining of their shores in a network of mutual relationships, ultimately resulting in political unions. It's noteworthy that the Swiss Confederation began in the four forest cantons of Lucerne, Schwyz, Uri, and Unterwalden, which are connected by the rugged basin of Lake Lucerne, also known as the Lake of the Four Forest Cantons, but otherwise separated by mountains. Similarly, Lake Titicaca was the birthplace of the Inca Empire, just as Lake Tezcoco was for the Toltecs in Mexico, and an island in Lake Chalco eventually became part of the Aztec territory.745 The most stable of the short-lived native states in Africa seem to have found strength and durability in a protected lake border. Examples include the small kingdoms of Bornu, Bagirmi, and Kanem on Lake Chad, along with Uganda on Lake Victoria.

Large lakes, which include in their area islands, peninsulas, tides, currents, fiords, inlets, deltas, and dunes, and present every geographical feature of an enclosed sea, approach the latter too in historical importance. Some of the largest, however, have long borne the name of seas. The Caspian, which exceeds the Baltic in area, and the Aral, which outranks Lake Michigan, show the closest physical resemblance to thalassic basins, because of their size, salinity and enclosed drainage systems; but their anthropo-geographical significance is slight. The very salinity which groups them with the sea points to an arid climate that forever deprives them of the densely populated coasts characteristic of most enclosed seas, and hence reduces their historical importance. Their tributary streams, robbed of their water by irrigation canals, like "the shorn and parcelled Oxus", renounce their function of highways into the interior. To this rule the Volga is a unique exception. Finally, cut off from union with the ocean, these salt lakes lose the supreme historical advantage which is maintained by freshwater lakes, like Ladoga, Nyassa, Maracaibo and the Great Lakes of North America, all lying near sea level.

Large lakes, which include islands, peninsulas, tides, currents, fjords, inlets, deltas, and dunes, and have every geographical feature of an enclosed sea, also share historical importance similar to seas. However, some of the largest have long been called seas. The Caspian, which is larger than the Baltic, and the Aral, which surpasses Lake Michigan, closely resemble ocean basins in size, salinity, and enclosed drainage systems; yet their cultural significance is minimal. The salinity that connects them to the sea indicates an arid climate that prevents them from having the densely populated shores typical of most enclosed seas, thus diminishing their historical importance. Their tributaries, drained of water by irrigation canals, like "the shorn and parcelled Oxus," lose their role as highways into the interior. The Volga is a notable exception to this. Ultimately, cut off from the ocean, these salt lakes lack the historical advantages that freshwater lakes, such as Ladoga, Nyassa, Maracaibo, and the Great Lakes of North America, which are all near sea level, maintain.

Lakes as fresh water seas.

Lakes as part of a system of inland waterways may possess commercial importance surpassing that of many seas. This depends upon the productivity, accessibility and extent of their hinterland, and this in turn depends upon the size and shape of the inland basin. The chain of the five Great Lakes, which together present a coastline of four thousand miles and a navigable course as long as the Baltic between the Skager Rack and the head of the Gulf of Bothnia, constitutes a freshwater Mediterranean. It has played the part of an enclosed sea in American history and has enabled the Atlantic trade to penetrate 1400 miles inland to Chicago and Duluth. Its shores have therefore been a coveted object of territorial expansion. The early Dutch trading posts headed up the Hudson and Mohawk toward Lake Ontario, as did the English settlements which succeeded them. The French, from their vantage point at Montreal, threw out a frail casting-net of fur stations and missions, which caught and held all the Lakes for a time. Later the American shores were divided among eight of our states. The northern boundaries of Indiana and Illinois were fixed by Congress for the express purpose of giving these commonwealths access to Lake Michigan. Pennsylvania with great difficulty succeeded in protruding her northwestern frontier to cover a meager strip of Erie coast, while New York's frontage on the same lake became during the period of canal and early railroad construction, a great factor in her development.

Lakes, as part of a network of inland waterways, can be commercially more important than many seas. This depends on how productive they are, how accessible they are, and the size of their surrounding regions, which in turn is influenced by the size and shape of the inland basin. The five Great Lakes together have a coastline of four thousand miles and a navigable route as long as the Baltic Sea between the Skager Rack and the head of the Gulf of Bothnia, creating a freshwater Mediterranean. They have served as an enclosed sea in American history and allowed Atlantic trade to reach 1,400 miles inland to Chicago and Duluth. This made their shores a desired target for territorial expansion. Early Dutch trading posts moved up the Hudson and Mohawk Rivers towards Lake Ontario, followed by English settlements. The French, from their position in Montreal, established a network of fur trading posts and missions that temporarily secured control over all the Lakes. Eventually, the American shores were divided among eight states. Congress specifically set the northern boundaries of Indiana and Illinois to give these states access to Lake Michigan. Pennsylvania struggled to extend its northwestern frontier to include a small stretch of the Erie coast, while New York's access to the same lake became critical for its development during the canal and early railroad eras.

In 1901, the tonnage of our merchant vessels on the Great Lakes was half that of our Pacific, Atlantic and Gulf coasts combined, 746 constituting a freshwater fleet greater than the merchant marine of either France or sea-bred Norway. A remote but by no means faint echo of this fact is found in the five hundred or more boats, equally available for trade or war, which Henry M. Stanley saw the Uganda prince muster on the shore of Victoria Nyanza Lake. Ocean, sea, bay, estuary, river, swamp, lake: here is Nature's great circle returning upon itself, a circle faintly notched into arcs, but one in itself and one in man's uses.

In 1901, the total weight of our merchant ships on the Great Lakes was half that of our combined Pacific, Atlantic, and Gulf coasts, 746 making it a freshwater fleet larger than the merchant navy of either France or seafaring Norway. A distant but still significant reminder of this fact is found in the five hundred or more boats, equally ready for trade or combat, that Henry M. Stanley witnessed being gathered by the Ugandan prince on the shores of Lake Victoria Nyanza. Ocean, sea, bay, estuary, river, swamp, lake: here is Nature's great cycle coming back to itself, a cycle gently shaped into arcs, yet unified and essential to human purposes.


NOTES TO CHAPTER XI

Notes on Chapter XI


630.

Isabella B. Bishop, The Yangtze Valley and Beyond, Vol. I, pp. 26-27. New York and London, 1900.

Isabella B. Bishop, The Yangtze Valley and Beyond, Vol. I, pp. 26-27. New York and London, 1900.

631.

Fiske, Discovery of America, Vol. I, p. 492. Boston, 1892.

Fiske, Discovery of America, Vol. I, p. 492. Boston, 1892.

632.

Capt. James Cook, Voyage to the Pacific Ocean, 1776-1780, Vol. II, pp. 321-332. New York, 1796.

Capt. James Cook, Voyage to the Pacific Ocean, 1776-1780, Vol. II, pp. 321-332. New York, 1796.

633.

John Richard Green, The Making of England, Vol. I, pp. 63-66, 84-86, 95, 96. London, 1904.

John Richard Green, The Making of England, Vol. I, pp. 63-66, 84-86, 95, 96. London, 1904.

634.

E. Lavisse, Histoire de France, Vol. II, Part I, pp. 374-375, 378-379, 381-382, 385-386. Paris, 1903.

E. Lavisse, Histoire de France, Vol. II, Part I, pp. 374-375, 378-379, 381-382, 385-386. Paris, 1903.

635.

Helmolt, History of the World, Vol. I, pp. 189-191, map. New York, 1902-1906.

Helmolt, History of the World, Vol. I, pp. 189-191, map. New York, 1902-1906.

636.

Ibid., Vol. I, pp. 192-194.

Ibid., Vol. 1, pp. 192-194.

637.

G.W. Kitchen, History of France, Vol. I, pp. 59-60. Oxford, 1892.

G.W. Kitchen, History of France, Vol. I, pp. 59-60. Oxford, 1892.

638.

Dietrich Schaeffer, Die Hansestädte und König Waldemar von Dänemark, p. 36. Jena, 1879.

Dietrich Schaeffer, The Hanseatic Cities and King Waldemar of Denmark, p. 36. Jena, 1879.

639.

G.G. Chisholm, Commercial Geography, p. 311. London, 1904.

G.G. Chisholm, Commercial Geography, p. 311. London, 1904.

640.

Capt. A.T. Mahan, The Problem of Asia, pp. 41, 60, 120. New York, 1900.

Capt. A.T. Mahan, The Problem of Asia, pp. 41, 60, 120. New York, 1900.

641.

Isabella B. Bishop, The Yangtze Valley and Beyond, Vol. I, pp. 97-98. New York and London, 1900.

Isabella B. Bishop, The Yangtze Valley and Beyond, Vol. I, pp. 97-98. New York and London, 1900.

642.

E.C. Semple, Development of the Hanse Towns in Relation to their Geographic Environment, Bulletin Amer. Geog. Soc., Vol. 31. No. 3. 1899.

E.C. Semple, Development of the Hanse Towns in Relation to their Geographic Environment, Bulletin Amer. Geog. Soc., Vol. 31. No. 3. 1899.

643.

Nordenskiold, Voyage of the Vega, pp. 519-530, 552. New York, 1882. Anatole Leroy-Beaulieu, The Empire of the Tsars, Vol. I, Note pp. 278-281. New York, 1902.

Nordenskiold, Voyage of the Vega, pp. 519-530, 552. New York, 1882. Anatole Leroy-Beaulieu, The Empire of the Tsars, Vol. I, Note pp. 278-281. New York, 1902.

644.

Agnes Laut, Voyagers of the Northern Ocean, Harper's Magazine, January, 1906.

Agnes Laut, Voyagers of the Northern Ocean, Harper's Magazine, January 1906.

645.

Alexis Krausse, Russia in Asia, pp. 21-54. New York, 1899.

Alexis Krausse, Russia in Asia, pp. 21-54. New York, 1899.

646.

Felix Dubois, Timbuctoo, pp. 198-190, 251-257. New York, 1896.

Felix Dubois, Timbuctoo, pp. 198-190, 251-257. New York, 1896.

647.

Ibid., p. 38.

Ibid., p. 38.

648.

D. Livingstone, Missionary Travels, pp. 71, 177. New York, 1858.

D. Livingstone, Missionary Travels, pp. 71, 177. New York, 1858.

649.

W. Deecke, Italy, p. 87. London, 1904.

W. Deecke, Italy, p. 87. London, 1904.

650.

G. Adam Smith, Historical Geography of the Holy Land, map facing p. 167; also pp. 287, 327-328. New York, 1897.

G. Adam Smith, Historical Geography of the Holy Land, map facing p. 167; also pp. 287, 327-328. New York, 1897.

651.

F.M. Stapff, Karte des unteren Khiusebthal, Petermanns Mitteilungen, p. 202. July, 1885.

F.M. Stapff, Map of the Lower Khiuseb Valley, Petermann's Communications, p. 202. July, 1885.

652.

Strabo, Book III, chap. II, 4.

Strabo, Book III, chap. II, 4.

653.

For full discussion, see Roscher, National-Oekonomik des Handels und Gewerbefleisses. Stuttgart, 1889.

For complete discussion, see Roscher, National-Oekonomik des Handels und Gewerbefleisses. Stuttgart, 1889.

654.

Rambaud, History of Russia, Vol. I, pp. 24-28. Boston, 1886.

Rambaud, History of Russia, Vol. I, pp. 24-28. Boston, 1886.

655.

A.B. Hulbert, Historic Highways of America, Vol. VII, Portage Paths, pp. 182-183, 187-188. Cleveland, 1903.

A.B. Hulbert, Historic Highways of America, Vol. VII, Portage Paths, pp. 182-183, 187-188. Cleveland, 1903.

656.

Herodotus, Book I, 194. A.H. Layard, Nineveh and Its Remains, Vol. II, pp. 79-81. New York, 1849.

Herodotus, Book I, 194. A.H. Layard, Nineveh and Its Remains, Vol. II, pp. 79-81. New York, 1849.

657.

Charles W. Hawes, The Uttermost East, p. 60. New York, 1904.

Charles W. Hawes, The Uttermost East, p. 60. New York, 1904.

658.

Transportation by Water in 1906, Table 30, p. 181. Report of Department of Commerce and Labor, Washington, 1908.

Transportation by Water in 1906, Table 30, p. 181. Report of Department of Commerce and Labor, Washington, 1908.

659.

G.G. Chisholm, Commercial Geography, p. 277. London, 1904.

G.G. Chisholm, Commercial Geography, p. 277. London, 1904.

660.

E.A. Freeman, Historical Geography of Europe, p. 466. London. 1882.

E.A. Freeman, Historical Geography of Europe, p. 466. London. 1882.

661.

J. Ellis Barker, Modern Germany, pp. 68-85. London, 1907.

J. Ellis Barker, Modern Germany, pp. 68-85. London, 1907.

662.

Heinrich von Treitschke, Politik, Vol. I, p. 218. Leipzig, 1897.

Heinrich von Treitschke, Politik, Vol. I, p. 218. Leipzig, 1897.

663.

E.A. Freeman, Historical Geography of Europe, p. 466. London, 1882.

E.A. Freeman, Historical Geography of Europe, p. 466. London, 1882.

664.

G.G. Chisholm, Commercial Geography, p. 511. London, 1904.

G.G. Chisholm, Commercial Geography, p. 511. London, 1904.

665.

J. Partsch, Central Europe, p. 318. London, 1903.

J. Partsch, Central Europe, p. 318. London, 1903.

666.

Ratzel, Politische Geographie, pp. 739-740. Munich, 1903.

Ratzel, Political Geography, pp. 739-740. Munich, 1903.

667.

Annual Register for 1901, p. 358. New Series, London and New York, 1902.

Annual Register for 1901, p. 358. New Series, London and New York, 1902.

668.

H.R. Mill, International Geography, p. 958. New York, 1902.

H.R. Mill, International Geography, p. 958. New York, 1902.

669.

Ratzel, History of Mankind, Vol. III, p. 473. London, 1896-1898.

Ratzel, History of Mankind, Vol. III, p. 473. London, 1896-1898.

670.

H.R. Mill, International Geography, p. 406. New York, 1902.

H.R. Mill, International Geography, p. 406. New York, 1902.

671.

G.G. Chisholm, Commercial Geography, map p. 312. London, 1904.

G.G. Chisholm, Commercial Geography, map p. 312. London, 1904.

672.

Blanqui, History of Political Economy, pp. 273, 277, 296. New York, 1880.

Blanqui, History of Political Economy, pp. 273, 277, 296. New York, 1880.

673.

Albert Gallatin, American State Papers, Misc. Doc., Vol. I, No. 250. Washington, 1834.

Albert Gallatin, American State Papers, Misc. Doc., Vol. I, No. 250. Washington, 1834.

674.

Roscher, National-Oekonomik des Handels und Gewerbefleisses, pp. 449, 453-454. Stuttgart, 1889.

Roscher, National Economics of Trade and Industry, pp. 449, 453-454. Stuttgart, 1889.

675.

H.R. Mill, International Geography, pp. 530-531. New York, 1902.

H.R. Mill, International Geography, pp. 530-531. New York, 1902.

676.

G.G. Chisholm, Commercial Geography, pp. 310, 312. London, 1904.

G.G. Chisholm, Commercial Geography, pp. 310, 312. London, 1904.

677.

J. Partsch, Central Europe, p. 314. London, 1903.

J. Partsch, Central Europe, p. 314. London, 1903.

678.

Statesman's Yearbook for 1907.

Statesman's Yearbook 1907.

679.

Henry Norman, All the Russias, pp. 254-255, 285-292. New York, 1902.

Henry Norman, All the Russias, pp. 254-255, 285-292. New York, 1902.

680.

E.C. Semple, American History and Its Geographic Conditions, pp. 251-255. Boston, 1903.

E.C. Semple, American History and Its Geographic Conditions, pp. 251-255. Boston, 1903.

681.

E.F. Knight, Where Three Empires Meet, p. 6. London, 1897.

E.F. Knight, Where Three Empires Meet, p. 6. London, 1897.

682.

Strabo, Book IV, chap. VI, 7.

Strabo, Book IV, chap. VI, 7.

683.

Alexis Krausse, Russia in Asia, pp. 361-362. New York, 1899.

Alexis Krausse, Russia in Asia, pp. 361-362. New York, 1899.

684.

Angus Hamilton, Afghanistan, pp. 137-141. New York and London, 1906. Henry Norman, All the Russias, pp. 276-277. New York, 1902.

Angus Hamilton, Afghanistan, pp. 137-141. New York and London, 1906. Henry Norman, All the Russias, pp. 276-277. New York, 1902.

685.

Bella Gallico, Book IV, chap. IV.

Bella Gallico, Book IV, chap. IV.

686.

Ibid., Book I, chap. XXXI; Book II, chap. III; Book IV, chap. I.

Same as above., Book I, chap. 31; Book II, chap. 3; Book IV, chap. 1.

687.

Journals of Dr. Thomas Walker and Christopher Gist, p. 129. Filson Club Publications, Louisville, 1898.

Journals of Dr. Thomas Walker and Christopher Gist, p. 129. Filson Club Publications, Louisville, 1898.

688.

H.R. Schoolcraft, Indian Tribes of the United States, Vol. III, pp. 248-249. Philadelphia, 1853.

H.R. Schoolcraft, Indian Tribes of the United States, Vol. III, pp. 248-249. Philadelphia, 1853.

689.

Martha K. Genthe, The Valley Towns of Connecticut, Bull. of Amer. Geog. Society, Vol. 39, pp. 1-7. New York, 1907.

Martha K. Genthe, The Valley Towns of Connecticut, Bull. of Amer. Geog. Society, Vol. 39, pp. 1-7. New York, 1907.

690.

Ratzel, History of Mankind, Vol. III, pp. 181-182, 192. London, 1898.

Ratzel, History of Mankind, Vol. III, pp. 181-182, 192. London, 1898.

691.

H.R. Mill, International Geography, p. 495. New York, 1902.

H.R. Mill, International Geography, p. 495. New York, 1902.

692.

W.Z. Ripley, Races of Europe, pp. 284-285. New York, 1899.

W.Z. Ripley, Races of Europe, pp. 284-285. New York, 1899.

693.

Ibid., Maps pp. 222, 340, 350.

Same source., Maps pp. 222, 340, 350.

694.

Ibid., Maps pp. 402, 429.

Ibid., Maps pp. 402, 429.

695.

J. Partsch, Central Europe, pp. 43, 241. London, 1903.

J. Partsch, Central Europe, pp. 43, 241. London, 1903.

696.

Ibid., p. 69. Sydow-Wagner, Methodischer Schul-Atlas, compare maps No. 13 and No. 25.

Ibid., p. 69. Sydow-Wagner, Methodischer Schul-Atlas, compare maps No. 13 and No. 25.

697.

Elisée Reclus, Europe, Vol. IV, pp. 380, 389-390. New York, 1882.

Elisée Reclus, Europe, Vol. IV, pp. 380, 389-390. New York, 1882.

698.

W.Z. Ripley, Races of Europe, p. 318, map. New York, 1899.

W.Z. Ripley, Races of Europe, p. 318, map. New York, 1899.

699.

H.J. Mackinder, Britain and the British Seas, pp. 202-203. London, 1904.

H.J. Mackinder, Britain and the British Seas, pp. 202-203. London, 1904.

700.

Boyd Alexander, From the Niger to the Nile, Vol. I, pp. 168, 169, 232, 306-307. London, 1907.

Boyd Alexander, From the Niger to the Nile, Vol. I, pp. 168, 169, 232, 306-307. London, 1907.

701.

Livingstone, Missionary Travels, pp. 102, 642. New York, 1858.

Livingstone, Missionary Travels, pp. 102, 642. New York, 1858.

702.

See Century Atlas, maps of Mississippi, Louisiana and Arkansas for boundary line of 1850.

See Century Atlas, maps of Mississippi, Louisiana, and Arkansas for the boundary line of 1850.

703.

Sir Thomas Holdich, India, p. 57. London, 1905.

Sir Thomas Holdich, India, p. 57. London, 1905.

704.

Strabo, Book X, chap. II, 19.

Strabo, Book X, chap. II, 19.

705.

Henry M. Stanley, Through the Dark Continent, Vol. II, pp. 120-124, 155-158, 168, 169, 173, 176, 177, 182, 266-274, 327. New York, 1879.

Henry M. Stanley, Through the Dark Continent, Vol. II, pp. 120-124, 155-158, 168, 169, 173, 176, 177, 182, 266-274, 327. New York, 1879.

706.

Boyd Alexander, From the Niger to the Nile, Vol. II, pp. 252, 269-270. London, 1907.

Boyd Alexander, From the Niger to the Nile, Vol. II, pp. 252, 269-270. London, 1907.

707.

Helmolt, History of the World, Vol. I, pp. 189, 192-194. New York, 1902-1906.

Helmolt, History of the World, Vol. I, pp. 189, 192-194. New York, 1902-1906.

708.

Cyrus Thomas, Mound Explorations, pp. 526-527, 531, 551. Twelfth Annual Report of Bureau of Ethnology, Washington, 1894.

Cyrus Thomas, Mound Explorations, pp. 526-527, 531, 551. Twelfth Annual Report of Bureau of Ethnology, Washington, 1894.

709.

Parkman, The Old Regime in Canada, pp. 292-303. Boston, 1904. E.C. Semple, The Influences of Geographic Environment on the Lower St. Lawrence, Bull. of Amer. Geog. Society, Vol. 36, pp. 449-466. 1904.

Parkman, The Old Regime in Canada, pp. 292-303. Boston, 1904. E.C. Semple, The Influences of Geographic Environment on the Lower St. Lawrence, Bull. of Amer. Geog. Society, Vol. 36, pp. 449-466. 1904.

710.

Martha Krug Genthe, Valley Towns of Connecticut, pp. 10-12, figures V. and VI, Bull. of Amer. Geog. Society, Vol. 39, 1907.

Martha Krug Genthe, Valley Towns of Connecticut, pp. 10-12, figures V. and VI, Bull. of Amer. Geog. Society, Vol. 39, 1907.

711.

J. Nacken, Die Provinz Kwantung und ihre Bevölkerung, Petermanns Mitteilungen, Vol. 24, p. 421, 1878. W.M. Wood, Fankwei, pp. 276-277. New York, 1859.

J. Nacken, The Province of Kwantung and Its People, Petermann's Communications, Vol. 24, p. 421, 1878. W.M. Wood, Fankwei, pp. 276-277. New York, 1859.

712.

Felix Dubois, Timbuctoo, pp. 19-22, 38. New York, 1896.

Felix Dubois, Timbuktu, pp. 19-22, 38. New York, 1896.

713.

Isabella B. Bishop, The Yangtze Valley and Beyond, Vol. I, pp. 164, 174-175, 179, 182, 189, 215. London and New York, 1900.

Isabella B. Bishop, The Yangtze Valley and Beyond, Vol. I, pp. 164, 174-175, 179, 182, 189, 215. London and New York, 1900.

714.

William Walton, Paris, Vol. I, pp. 31-32, 35. Philadelphia, 1899.

William Walton, Paris, Vol. I, pp. 31-32, 35. Philadelphia, 1899.

715.

Cæsar, Bella Gallico, Book VIII, chaps, 57, 58.

César, Gallic Wars, Book VIII, chapters 57, 58.

716.

Henry M. Stanley, Through the Dark Continent, Vol. II, pp. 227-228. New York, 1879.

Henry M. Stanley, Through the Dark Continent, Vol. II, pp. 227-228. New York, 1879.

717.

Article, Cossack, Encyclopedia Britannica.

Cossack Article, Encyclopedia Britannica.

718.

Parkman, The Jesuits in North. America, pp. 292-303, 498-505, 534, 535. Boston, 1904.

Parkman, The Jesuits in North America, pp. 292-303, 498-505, 534, 535. Boston, 1904.

719.

Livingstone, Missionary Travels, pp. 100, 102. New York, 1858.

Livingstone, Missionary Travels, pp. 100, 102. New York, 1858.

720.

Livingstone, Last Journals, Vol. I, p. 359. London, 1874.

Livingstone, Last Journals, Vol. I, p. 359. London, 1874.

721.

Heinrich Barth, Travels in North and Central Africa, Vol. II, pp. 64, 66, 233. New York, 1857. Boyd Alexander, From the Niger to the Nile, Vol. I, pp. 237, 303-304, 320, 331-336; Vol. II, pp. 54, 56-58, 67-68, 96-99, 104-105. London, 1907.

Heinrich Barth, Travels in North and Central Africa, Vol. II, pp. 64, 66, 233. New York, 1857. Boyd Alexander, From the Niger to the Nile, Vol. I, pp. 237, 303-304, 320, 331-336; Vol. II, pp. 54, 56-58, 67-68, 96-99, 104-105. London, 1907.

722.

J.P. McLean, The Mound Builders, p. 20. Cincinnati, 1904. Squier and Davis, Ancient Monuments of the Mississippi Valley, pp. 6, 9, 10. New York, 1848.

J.P. McLean, The Mound Builders, p. 20. Cincinnati, 1904. Squier and Davis, Ancient Monuments of the Mississippi Valley, pp. 6, 9, 10. New York, 1848.

723.

Cæsar, Bello Gallico, Book I, chaps. 38, 39.

Cæsar, Commentaries on the Gallic War, Book I, chaps. 38, 39.

724.

Elisée Reclus, Europe, Vol. IV, pp. 101-102. New York, 1882.

Elisée Reclus, Europe, Vol. IV, pp. 101-102. New York, 1882.

725.

John Fiske, Dutch and Quaker Colonies in America, Vol. I, p. 241. Boston.

John Fiske, Dutch and Quaker Colonies in America, Vol. I, p. 241. Boston.

726.

H.E. Mill, International Geography, p. 956. New York, 1902.

H.E. Mill, International Geography, p. 956. New York, 1902.

727.

H.B. George, Historical Geography of the British Empire, pp. 259-260. London, 1904.

H.B. George, Historical Geography of the British Empire, pp. 259-260. London, 1904.

728.

Alexis Krausse, Russia in Asia, pp. 30-33, 50. New York, 1899.

Alexis Krausse, Russia in Asia, pp. 30-33, 50. New York, 1899.

729.

H.J. Mackinder, Britain and the British Seas, pp. 198-199. London, 1904.

H.J. Mackinder, Britain and the British Seas, pp. 198-199. London, 1904.

730.

John Richard Green, The Making of England, Vol. I, pp. 63, 66. London, 1904.

John Richard Green, The Making of England, Vol. I, pp. 63, 66. London, 1904.

731.

J. Partsch, Central Europe, p. 102. London, 1903.

J. Partsch, Central Europe, p. 102. London, 1903.

732.

Miller and Skertchley, The Fenland Past and Present, pp. 10, 11, 27-30. London, 1878.

Miller and Skertchley, The Fenland Past and Present, pp. 10, 11, 27-30. London, 1878.

733.

W.Z. Ripley, Races of Europe, pp. 322-323. Map p. 327. New York, 1899.

W.Z. Ripley, Races of Europe, pp. 322-323. Map p. 327. New York, 1899.

734.

Anatole Leroy-Beaulieu, The Empire of the Tsars, Vol. I, p. 108. New York, 1893.

Anatole Leroy-Beaulieu, The Empire of the Tsars, Vol. I, p. 108. New York, 1893.

735.

Ibid., pp. 104-106. W.Z. Ripley, Races of Europe, pp. 340-342, 352, 365. New York, 1899.

Ibid., pp. 104-106. W.Z. Ripley, Races of Europe, pp. 340-342, 352, 365. New York, 1899.

736.

J. Partsch, Central Europe, p. 135. London, 1903.

J. Partsch, Central Europe, p. 135. London, 1903.

737.

Ibid., p. 133. W.Z. Ripley, Races of Europe, pp. 294-295. New York, 1899.

Ibid., p. 133. W.Z. Ripley, Races of Europe, pp. 294-295. New York, 1899.

738.

Herodotus, II, 137, 140.

Herodotus, II, 137, 140.

739.

Thucydides, I, 110. Brugsch-Bey, History of Egypt, Vol. II, p. 333. London, 1881.

Thucydides, I, 110. Brugsch-Bey, History of Egypt, Vol. II, p. 333. London, 1881.

740.

John Richard Green, History of the English People, Vol. I, chap. III, p. 71.

John Richard Green, History of the English People, Vol. I, chap. III, p. 71.

741.

Miller and Skertchley, The Fenland Past and Present, pp. 83, 101, 104, 107, 108. London, 1878.

Miller and Skertchley, The Fenland Past and Present, pp. 83, 101, 104, 107, 108. London, 1878.

742.

Tacitus, History of the Germans, Book VI, chap. VI. Motley, Rise of the Dutch Republic, Vol. I, pp. 2-5, 13. New York, 1885.

Tacitus, History of the Germans, Book VI, chap. VI. Motley, Rise of the Dutch Republic, Vol. I, pp. 2-5, 13. New York, 1885.

743.

J. Partsch, Central Europe, p. 299. London, 1903.

J. Partsch, Central Europe, p. 299. London, 1903.

744.

Miller and Skertchley, The Fenland Past and Present, pp. 113-114. London, 1878.

Miller and Skertchley, The Fenland Past and Present, pp. 113-114. London, 1878.

745.

Edward John Payne, History of the New World Called America, Vol. I, pp. 327-328, 502-503. Oxford, 1892. Ratzel, History of Mankind, Vol. II, p. 163. London, 1896-1898.

Edward John Payne, History of the New World Called America, Vol. I, pp. 327-328, 502-503. Oxford, 1892. Ratzel, History of Mankind, Vol. II, p. 163. London, 1896-1898.

746.

U.S. Report of Commission of Navigation, p. 10. Washington, 1901.

U.S. Report of the Commission of Navigation, p. 10. Washington, 1901.


Chapter XII—Continents And Their Peninsulas

Insularity of the land-masses.

The division of the earth's surface into 28 per cent. land and 72 per cent. water is an all important fact of physical geography and anthropo-geography. Owing to this proportion, the land-masses, which alone provide habitats for man, rise as islands out of the three-fold larger surface of the uninhabitable ocean. Consequently, the human species, like the other forms of terrestrial life, bears a deeply ingrained insular character. Moreover, the water causes different degrees of separation between the land-masses, according as it appears as inlet, strait, sea, an island-strewn or islandless ocean; it determines the grouping of the habitable areas and consequently the geographic basis of the various degrees of ethnic and cultural kinship between the divisions of land. Finally, since the sea is for man only a highway to some ulterior shore, this geography of the land-masses in relation to the encompassing waters points the routes and goals of human wanderings.

The division of the Earth's surface into 28% land and 72% water is a crucial fact in physical and human geography. Because of this ratio, the landmasses, which are the only places that can support human life, rise like islands from the three times larger area of the uninhabitable ocean. As a result, humans, like other forms of life on land, have a deeply rooted insular nature. Additionally, water creates varying degrees of separation between landmasses, depending on whether it appears as an inlet, strait, sea, or an ocean filled with or lacking islands; this shapes how habitable areas are grouped and, consequently, influences the ethnic and cultural relationships between different regions of land. Lastly, since the sea serves as a pathway for humans to reach distant shores, the geography of landmasses in relation to surrounding waters directs the routes and destinations of human journeys.

Each fragment of habitable land, large or small, continent or islet, means a corresponding group or detachment of the vast human family. Its size fixes the area at the service of the group which occupies it. Its location, however, may either endow it with a neighborliness like that subsisting between Africa and Europe and involving an interwoven history; or remoteness like that of South America from Australia, so complete that even the close net of intercourse thrown by modern commerce over the whole world has scarcely sufficed to bring them into touch. Therefore the highly irregular distribution of the land areas, here compactly grouped, there remote, deserves especial attention, since it produces far-reaching results. Finally, continents and islands, by their zonal situation, their land forms, rainfall, river systems, flora and fauna, produce for man varied life conditions, which in their turn are partially dependent upon the size and grouping of the land-masses.

Each piece of land that can be inhabited, whether large or small, continent or island, represents a segment of the vast human family. Its size determines how much space is available for the group living there. Its location can create close connections, like the historical ties between Africa and Europe, or can result in isolation, like the distance between South America and Australia, so significant that even the extensive global trade networks of today barely connect them. Therefore, the uneven distribution of land—some areas closely grouped and others far apart—is important to consider, as it leads to significant consequences. Finally, continents and islands, due to their geographic locations, landforms, rainfall, river systems, and the variety of plants and animals, provide humans with different living conditions, which are also influenced by the size and arrangement of land masses.

Classification of land-masses according to size and location.

A comparison of the large and small land-masses of the from the standpoint of both physical and anthropological geography yields a classification based upon size and location on the one hand, and historical influences on the other. The following table indicates the relation between the two.

A comparison of the large and small land masses from the perspective of both physical and anthropological geography leads to a classification based on size and location on one side, and historical influences on the other. The following table shows the relationship between the two.

I. Independent Land-masses.

I. Independent Landmasses.

A. Continents. Independent by reason of size, which enables them to support a large number of people and afford the conditions for civilization.

A. Continents. They are independent due to their size, which allows them to support a large population and provide the necessary conditions for civilization.

(a) Insular continents, whose primitive and modern development are marked by remoteness. Australia.

(a) Isolated continents, whose early and current development are characterized by distance. Australia.

(b) Neighboring continents, separated by narrow seas and showing community of historical events. Europe and Africa. Asia and North America around Bering Sea.

(b) Neighboring continents, divided by narrow seas and sharing a history of events. Europe and Africa. Asia and North America around the Bering Sea.

B. Islands. Independent by reason of location.

B. Islands. Independent because of their location.

(a) Oceanic islands, characterized by greatest remoteness from continents and other islands, and also by independent or detached history. St. Helena and Iceland.

(a) Oceanic islands, known for being the most remote from continents and other islands, also have their own unique and separate histories. St. Helena and Iceland.

(b) Member of a group of oceanic islands, therefore less independent. Hawaii, Fayal in the Azores, Tongatabu.

(b) Member of a group of ocean islands, so less independent. Hawaii, Fayal in the Azores, Tongatabu.

(c) Large islands, approaching by reason of size the independence of continents and thereby finding compensation for a less independent location. New Guinea, Borneo, Madagascar; in a cultural sense, Great Britain and Japan.

(c) Large islands that are almost as big as continents and thus gain some benefits from their size despite being less independent. New Guinea, Borneo, Madagascar; in a cultural sense, Great Britain and Japan.

II. Dependent Land-masses.

II. Dependent Landmasses.

(a) Inshore or coast islands, whose history is intimately connected with that of the nearby mainland. Euboea, Long Island, Vancouver, Sakhalin, Ceylon.

(a) Inshore or coastal islands, whose history is closely linked to that of the nearby mainland. Euboea, Long Island, Vancouver, Sakhalin, Ceylon.

(b) Neighboring islands, showing less intimate historical relations. Formosa, the Canaries, Ireland in contrast to Great Britain.

(b) Neighboring islands with less close historical connections. Taiwan, the Canary Islands, and Ireland compared to Great Britain.

(c) Islands of enclosed or marginal seas, contained in a circle of lands and exposed to constant intercourse from all sides. Jamaica, Java, Crete, Sicily, Zealand, Gotland, St. Lawrence in Bering Sea.

(c) Islands of enclosed or marginal seas, surrounded by land and constantly engaged in interaction from all sides. Jamaica, Java, Crete, Sicily, Zealand, Gotland, St. Lawrence in Bering Sea.

(d) Island groups not to be considered apart from other groups. Samoa, Fiji and Friendly Isles; Philippine, Sulu and Sunda Islands; Greater and Lesser Antilles.

(d) Island groups not to be considered separately from other groups. Samoa, Fiji, and the Friendly Isles; the Philippine, Sulu, and Sunda Islands; Greater and Lesser Antilles.

Effect of size of land-masses.

As the homes of man, these land-masses vary greatly owing to difference of size. Only the six continents have been large enough to generate great bodies of people, to produce differentiated branches of the human family, and to maintain them in such numerical force that alien intermixtures were powerless essentially to modify the gradually developing ethnic type. The larger continents are marked by such diversity of climate, relief and contour, that they have afforded the varied environments and the area for the development of several great types or sub-types of mankind. Australia has been just large enough to produce one distinct native race, the result of a very ancient blend of Papuan and Malayan stocks. But prevailing aridity has cast a mantle of monotony over most of the continent, nullifying many local geographic differences in highland and lowland, curtailing the available area of its already restricted surface, and hence checking the differentiation that results either from the competition of large numbers or from a varied environment. We find Australia characterized above all other continents by monotony of culture, mode of life, customs, languages, and a uniform race type from the Murray River to York peninsula. 747 The twin continents of the Americas developed a race singularly uniform in its physical traits,748 if we leave out of account the markedly divergent Eskimos, but displaying a wide range of political, social and economic developments, from the small, unorganized groups of wandering savages, like the desert Shoshones and coast Fuegians, to the large, stable empire of the Incas, with intensive agriculture, public works, a state religion and an enlightened government.

As the homes of humans, these landmasses vary greatly in size. Only the six continents are large enough to support significant populations, produce distinct branches of the human family, and sustain them in such numbers that outside intermixing had little impact on the slowly forming ethnic types. The larger continents feature such diverse climates, landscapes, and shapes that they have provided the varied environments necessary for the development of several great types or sub-types of humanity. Australia is just large enough to have developed one unique native race, resulting from an ancient mix of Papuan and Malayan ancestry. However, the widespread dryness has created a sense of uniformity over much of the continent, diminishing many local geographical differences between highlands and lowlands, reducing the already limited area of its surface, and thus hindering the differentiation that comes either from the competition of large populations or from a varied environment. Australia is primarily characterized by cultural monotony, lifestyle, customs, languages, and a uniform racial type from the Murray River to York Peninsula. 747 The two continents of the Americas developed a race that is notably uniform in physical features,748 excluding the distinctly different Eskimos, but showing a wide range of political, social, and economic developments. These range from small, unorganized groups of nomadic tribes, like the desert Shoshones and coastal Fuegians, to the large, stable empire of the Incas, which featured intensive agriculture, public works, a state religion, and an enlightened government.

Even the largest islands of the world, such as Borneo, New Guinea and Madagascar, show no such independent ethnic development. This is the distinguishing characteristic of the largest land-masses. Europe, except on the basis of its size and peninsula form, has no title to the name of continent; certainly not on anthropo-geographical grounds. Its classification as a continent arose in the Mediterranean among the Greeks, as a geographical expression of the antagonism between themselves and their Carian, Phoenician and Persian enemies across the Aegean; the idea had therefore a political origin, and was formed without knowledge of that vast stretch of plains between the Black Sea and the Arctic Ocean, where Asia's climate and races lap over into Europe, and where to-day we find the Muscovite Empire, in point of geographic conditions, its underlying ethnic stock and form of government, as much Asiatic as European. The real or western Europe, which the Roman Empire gradually added to the narrow Europe of the Greeks, and which is strikingly contrasted to Asia in point of size, relief, contour, climate and races, only served to maintain the distinction between the two continents in men's minds. But from a geographical standpoint the distinction is an error. It has confused the interpretation of the history of the Greeks and the development of the Russians. It has brought disorder into the question of the European or Asiatic origin of the Aryan linguistic family, which the anthropo-geographer would assign to the single continent of Eurasia. The independent development that falls to the lot of great world islands like the Americas and Australia is impossible in a peninsular continent like Europe, large as it is.

Even the largest islands in the world, like Borneo, New Guinea, and Madagascar, do not show any independent ethnic development. This is the main feature of the largest landmasses. Europe, aside from its size and peninsula-like shape, doesn't really qualify as a continent; certainly not on anthropo-geographical grounds. Its classification as a continent originated in the Mediterranean among the Greeks, as a geographical term reflecting their opposition to the Carian, Phoenician, and Persian enemies across the Aegean; thus, the concept had a political origin and was created without awareness of the vast plains between the Black Sea and the Arctic Ocean, where Asia's climate and ethnic groups merge into Europe, and where today we find the Muscovite Empire, whose geographic conditions, ethnic roots, and government structure are as much Asiatic as they are European. The so-called western Europe, which the Roman Empire gradually expanded from the narrow Europe of the Greeks, and which is clearly different from Asia in size, relief, shape, climate, and ethnic groups, only helped to reinforce the distinction between the two continents in people's minds. However, from a geographical perspective, this distinction is misleading. It has muddled the understanding of Greek history and the development of Russians. It has confused the debate regarding the European or Asiatic origins of the Aryan language family, which anthropo-geographers would assign to the single continent of Eurasia. The independent development found in major world islands like the Americas and Australia is not feasible on a peninsular continent like Europe, no matter how large it is.

Independence of location versus independence of size.

The independence of a land-mass is based not alone on size: there is also an independence of location. This, owing to the spherical form of the earth, tends to be neutralized by the independence based upon large area. The larger a land-mass is, the nearer it approaches to others. Eurasia, the largest of all the continents, comes into close proximity and therefore close relations with Africa, North America, and even Australia; whereas Australia is at once the smallest and the most isolated of the continents. The remote oceanic islands of the Atlantic Ocean, measuring only a few square miles in area, have a location so independent of other inhabited lands, that before the period of the great discoveries they had never appeared on the horizon of man.

The independence of a landmass isn’t just about its size; it’s also about its location. This, because of the Earth’s spherical shape, tends to be balanced out by the independence that comes with a large area. The bigger a landmass is, the closer it gets to others. Eurasia, the largest continent, is very close to Africa, North America, and even Australia; while Australia is both the smallest and the most isolated continent. The remote oceanic islands in the Atlantic, only a few square miles in size, are situated so far away from other inhabited lands that they didn’t show up on anyone’s radar until the age of great discoveries.

The case of Asia.

Asia's size and central location to the other continents were formerly taken as an argument for its correspondingly significant position in the creation and history of man. Its central location is reflected in the hypothesis of the Asiatic origin of the Indo-European linguistic group of peoples; and though the theory has been justly called into question, these peoples have undoubtedly been subjected to Asiatic influences. The same thing is true of the native American race, both as to Asiatic origin and influences; because the approximation of Siberia to Alaska is too close to exclude human relations between the two continents. The Malays, too, were probably sprung from the soil of southeastern Asia and spread thence over their close-packed Archipelago. Even the native Australians betray a Malayan and therefore Asiatic element in their composition,749 while the same element can be traced yet more distinctly in the widely scattered Polynesians and the Hovas of Madagascar. This radiation of races seems to reflect Asia's location at the core of the land-masses. Yet the capacity to form such centers of ethnic distribution is not necessarily limited to the largest continents; history teaches us that small areas which have early achieved a relatively dense population are prone to scatter far their seeds of nations.

Asia's size and central position relative to other continents have long been viewed as evidence of its important role in human development and history. Its central location supports the theory that the Indo-European languages originated in Asia; even though this theory has been fairly challenged, it’s clear that these peoples were influenced by Asia. The same applies to the Native American race, regarding both their Asian origins and influences, because the closeness of Siberia to Alaska makes it hard to deny any human connections between the two continents. The Malays likely originated from southeastern Asia and then spread throughout their densely packed archipelago. Even the Indigenous Australians show a Malayan and, therefore, Asian influence in their makeup, while this influence is even more evident among the widely scattered Polynesians and the Hovas of Madagascar. This spread of races seems to highlight Asia's role at the center of landmasses. However, the ability to create such centers of ethnic distribution isn’t just confined to the largest continents; history shows us that smaller regions with early dense populations often manage to spread their nations widely.

Location of hemispheres and ethnic kinship.

The continents harbor the most widely different races where they are farthest apart; where they converge most nearly, they show the closest ethnic kinships. The same principle becomes apparent in their plants and animals. The distribution of the land-masses over the earth is conspicuous for their convergence in the north and divergence in long peninsular forms toward the south. The contrasted grouping is reflected in both, the lower animals and the peoples inhabiting these respectively vicinal and remote lands. Only where North America and Eurasia stretch out arms to one another around the polar sea do Eastern and Western Hemisphere show a community of mammalian forms. These are all strictly Arctic animals, such as the reindeer, elk, Arctic fox, glutton and ermine.750 This is the Boreal sub-region of the Holoarctic zoological realm, characterized by a very homogeneous and very limited fauna. 751 In contrast, the portion of the hemispheres lying south of the Tropic of Cancer is divided into four distinct zoological realms, corresponding to Central and South America, Africa south of Sahara, the two Indian peninsulas with the adjacent islands, and Australia.752 But when we consider the continental extremities projecting beyond the Tropic of Capricorn, where geographic divergence reaches a climax, we find their faunas and floras utterly dissimilar, despite the fact that climate and physical conditions are very similar.753 We find also widely divergent races in the southern sections of Africa, Australia or Tasmania and South America, while Arctic Eurasia and America come as near meeting ethnically as they do geographically. Here and here only both Eastern and Western Hemisphere show a strong affinity of race. The Eskimo, long classed as Mongoloid, are now regarded as an aberrant variety of the American race, owing to their narrow headform and linguistic affinity; though in Alaska even their headform closely approximates the Mongoloid Siberian type.754 But in stature, color, oblique eyes, broad flat face, and high cheek bones, in his temperament and character, artistic productions and some aspects of his culture, he groups with the Asiatic Hyperboreans across the narrow sixty miles of water forming Bering Strait.755 In the northern part of the earth's land area, the distribution of floras, faunas, and races shows interdependence, intercourse; in the southern, separation, isolation.

The continents hold the most diverse races where they are farthest apart; where they come closest together, they show the strongest ethnic ties. The same idea applies to their plants and animals. The layout of the continents is notable for their clustering in the north and spreading out in long peninsula shapes toward the south. This contrasting grouping is evident in both the lower animals and the people living in these nearby and distant regions. Only where North America and Eurasia reach out to each other around the polar sea do the Eastern and Western Hemispheres display a connection in mammal species. These are all strictly Arctic animals, such as reindeer, elk, Arctic fox, wolverine, and stoat.750 This is the Boreal sub-region of the Holoarctic zoological realm, marked by a very similar and quite limited set of animals. 751 In contrast, the parts of the hemispheres south of the Tropic of Cancer are divided into four distinct zoological realms, corresponding to Central and South America, Africa south of the Sahara, the two Indian peninsulas and their nearby islands, and Australia.752 However, when we look at the continental edges extending beyond the Tropic of Capricorn, where geographic divergence is at its peak, we find their animals and plants completely different, even though the climate and physical conditions are very similar.753 We also see significant differences in races in the southern parts of Africa, Australia or Tasmania, and South America, while Arctic Eurasia and America are as close to meeting ethnically as they are geographically. Here, and only here, do both the Eastern and Western Hemispheres show a strong racial similarity. The Eskimo, once classified as Mongoloid, are now viewed as a unique variety of the American race, due to their narrow head shape and linguistic similarities; although in Alaska, their head shape is quite similar to the Mongoloid Siberian type.754 But in terms of height, skin color, slanted eyes, broad flat face, high cheekbones, temperament and character, artistic creations, and some cultural aspects, they align more with the Asiatic Hyperboreans across the narrow sixty miles of water that is the Bering Strait.755 In the northern part of the earth's land area, the distribution of plants, animals, and races shows connection and interaction; in the southern part, there is separation and isolation.

Continental convergence and ethnic kinship.

What is true where the hemispheres come together is true also where continents converge. The core of the Old World is found in the Mediterranean basin where Europe, Asia and Africa form a close circle of lands and where they are inhabited by the one white Mediterranean race. Contrast their racial unity about this common center with the extremes of ethnic divergence in their remote peripheries, where Teutons, Mongols, Malays and Negroes differ widely from the Mediterranean stock and from each other. Eastern Australia represents the ethnic antipodes of western Asia, in harmony with the great dividing distance between them, but the sides of these continents facing each other across the bridge of the Sunda Islands are sparsely strewn with a common Malay element.

What is true at the meeting point of the hemispheres is also true where continents come together. The heart of the Old World is in the Mediterranean basin, where Europe, Asia, and Africa create a close circle of lands inhabited by the single white Mediterranean race. Compare their racial unity around this common center with the vast ethnic differences found in their distant edges, where Teutons, Mongols, Malays, and Black people vary greatly from both the Mediterranean population and from one another. Eastern Australia represents the ethnic opposite of western Asia, reflecting the significant distance between them, but the sides of these continents facing each other across the bridge of the Sunda Islands are lightly sprinkled with a common Malay element.

Africa's location.

Africa's early development was never helped by the fact that the continent lay between Asia and South America. It was subjected to strong and persistent Asiatic Influences, but apparently to no native American ones. From that far-off trans-Atlantic shore came no signs of life. Africa appears in history as an appendage of Asia, a cultural peninsula of the larger continent. This was due not only to the Suez Isthmus and the narrowness of the Red Sea rift, but to its one-sided invasion by Asiatic races and trade from the east, while the western side of the continent lay buried in sleep, unstirred by any voice from the silent shores of America. Semitic influences, in successive waves, spread over the Dark Continent as far as Morocco, the Senegal, Niger, Lake Chad, Nyanza, Tanganyika and Nyassa, and gave it such light as it had before the 16th century. Only after the Atlantic gulf was finally crossed did influences from the American side of the ocean begin to impinge upon the West African coast, first in the form of the slave and rum trade, then in the more humane aspect of the Liberian colony. But with the full development of the Atlantic period in history, we see all kinds of Atlantic influences, though chiefly from the Atlantic states of Europe, penetrating eastward into the heart of Africa, and there meeting other commercial and political activities pressing inland from the Indian Ocean.

Africa's early development was never boosted by the fact that the continent lies between Asia and South America. It faced strong and ongoing influences from Asia, but apparently none from native America. From that far-off trans-Atlantic shore, there were no signs of life. Africa appears in history as an extension of Asia, a cultural peninsula of the larger continent. This was due not only to the Suez Isthmus and the narrowness of the Red Sea rift but also to its one-sided invasion by Asiatic races and trade from the east, while the western side of the continent remained dormant, unstirred by any voice from the silent shores of America. Semitic influences spread across the Dark Continent in successive waves as far as Morocco, Senegal, Niger, Lake Chad, Nyanza, Tanganyika, and Nyassa, providing it with some light before the 16th century. It was only after the Atlantic gulf was finally crossed that influences from the American side began to affect the West African coast, first through the slave and rum trade, and later in the more humane aspect of the Liberian colony. But with the full development of the Atlantic period in history, we see various Atlantic influences, primarily from the Atlantic states of Europe, penetrating eastward into the heart of Africa, where they intersect with other commercial and political activities coming inland from the Indian Ocean.

The Atlantic abyss.

The long Atlantic rift between the Eastern and Western Hemispheres, which was such a potent factor in the primitive retardation of Africa is, from the standpoint of anthropo-geography, the most important feature in the distribution of the land-masses over the globe. Not till the discovery of America bridged this abyss did the known world become a girdle round the earth. Except the Norse ventures to the American continent by way of Iceland and Greenland between 1000 and 1347, no account of pre-Columbian intercourse between the two shores of the Atlantic has ever been substantiated. Columbus found the opposite land unfamiliar in race as in culture. He described the people as neither whites nor blacks, the two ethnic types which he knew on the eastern side of the Atlantic abyss. He and his successors found in the Americas only a Stone Age culture, a stage already outgrown by Europe and Africa. These continents from Lapland to the Hottentot country were using iron. Prior to the voyage of the great Genoese, Europe gave nothing to America and received nothing from it, except the Gulf Stream's scanty cargo of driftwood stranded on bleak Icelandic shores. The Tertiary land-bridge across the North Atlantic between Norway and Greenland may possibly have guided a pre-Caucasic migration to America and given that continent part of its aboriginal population.756 However, no trace of any European stock remains.

The long Atlantic divide between the Eastern and Western Hemispheres, which significantly hindered Africa's development, is, from an anthropo-geographical perspective, the most crucial factor in the global distribution of land masses. It wasn't until the discovery of America that this gap was bridged, allowing the known world to encircle the Earth. Aside from the Norse expeditions to the American continent via Iceland and Greenland between 1000 and 1347, there is no evidence of pre-Columbian connections between the two sides of the Atlantic. Columbus encountered a land that was unfamiliar in both race and culture. He described the people as neither white nor black, the two ethnic groups he recognized on the eastern side of the Atlantic divide. He and his successors found that the Americas only had a Stone Age culture, a stage that Europe and Africa had already surpassed. From Lapland to the Hottentot region, these continents were using iron. Before the voyage of the great Genoese, Europe contributed nothing to America and received nothing in return, aside from the Gulf Stream's meager offering of driftwood washed up on the desolate shores of Iceland. The ancient land bridge across the North Atlantic between Norway and Greenland might have facilitated a pre-Caucasian migration to America, contributing to its original population.756 However, there is no evidence of any European ancestry remaining.

Atlantic islands uninhabited.

The collapse of the bridge at the close of the Glacial Epoch left the Atlantic abyss effectually dividing the two hemispheres. Its islands, few and far between, were helpless to maintain intercourse between the opposite shores; this is proven by the fact that all of them from Greenland to Tristan da Cunha, excepting only the Canaries, were uninhabited at the time of their discovery. History records when the first bold voyagers came upon them in that unmarked waste of waters, and gave them their first occupants. The political upheavals of Norway in King Harfagr's time (872) sent to the Faroes and Iceland their first settlers, though these islands were previously known to the Celts of Ireland. The Norse colonists who went to Greenland in the year 1000 seem to have been the first regular settlers on those inhospitable coasts. They found no native inhabitants, but numerous abandoned dwellings, fragments of boats and stone implements,757 which doubtless recorded the intermittent voyages thither of the Eskimo, preliminary to permanent occupation. The Scandinavians did not encounter natives on the island till the 12th century, when Greenland probably received its first Eskimo immigration.758

The collapse of the bridge at the end of the Ice Age effectively split the Atlantic Ocean between the two hemispheres. Its islands, few and scattered, couldn’t support communication between the opposite shores; this is shown by the fact that all of them from Greenland to Tristan da Cunha, except for the Canaries, were uninhabited at the time they were discovered. History notes when the first daring explorers found them in that unmarked stretch of ocean and gave them their first inhabitants. The political upheavals in Norway during King Harfagr's reign (872) led to the Faroes and Iceland receiving their first settlers, though these islands were already known to the Celts of Ireland. The Norse settlers who arrived in Greenland around the year 1000 seem to have been the first permanent inhabitants of those harsh coasts. They found no native people there, but plenty of abandoned homes, remnants of boats, and stone tools,757 which likely recorded the sporadic trips made by the Eskimo in advance of a permanent settlement. The Scandinavians didn’t encounter natives on the island until the 12th century, when Greenland probably saw its first wave of Eskimo immigration.758

Geographical character of the Pacific.

While the Atlantic thus formed a long north-and-south rift across the inhabited world at the period of the great discoveries, the Pacific, strewn with islands and land-rimmed at its northern extremity by the peninsulas of Alaska and eastern Siberia, spread a nebula of population from the dense centers of Asia across to the outskirts of America. The general Mongoloid character of the American Indians as a race, the stronger Asiatic stamp of the Western Eskimo, the unmistakeable ethnic and cultural affinities of the Northwest Coast tribes both with southern Polynesians and Asiatics,759 all point to America as the great eastern wing of the Mongoloid or Asiatic area, and therefore as the true Orient of the world.

While the Atlantic created a long north-south divide across the populated world during the age of exploration, the Pacific, dotted with islands and bordered to the north by the peninsulas of Alaska and eastern Siberia, spread a population blend from the dense centers of Asia to the fringes of America. The overall Mongoloid characteristics of the American Indians, the stronger Asian features of the Western Eskimos, and the clear ethnic and cultural connections of the Northwest Coast tribes with both southern Polynesians and Asiatics,759 all indicate that America serves as the great eastern extension of the Mongoloid or Asian region, making it the true Orient of the world.

Geographic conditions have made this possible or even probable. The winds and currents of the North Pacific set from Japan straight toward the American coast. Junks blown out to sea from China or Japan have been carried by the Kuro Siwo and the prevailing westerlies across the Pacific to our continent. There is record of a hundred instances of this occurrence.760

Geographic conditions have made this possible or even likely. The winds and currents of the North Pacific flow from Japan directly toward the American coast. Boats blown out to sea from China or Japan have been carried by the Kuro Siwo and the prevailing westerlies across the Pacific to our continent. There are records of a hundred instances of this happening.760

Pacific affinities of North American Indians.

The broken bridge across Bering Strait formed by East Cape, Cape Prince of Wales and the Diomede Islands between, and further south the natural causeway of the Commander and Aleutian Islands leading from the peninsula of Kamchatka to that of Unalaska, have facilitated intercourse between Asia and America.761 Justin Winsor says, "There is hardly a stronger demonstration of such connection between the two continents than the physical resemblances of the peoples now living on opposite sides of the Pacific Ocean in these upper latitudes."762 This resemblance is by no means confined to the Eskimo and Chukches, who have exchanged colonists across Bering Sea. Recent investigations have revealed a wider kinship. The population of northern Siberia speaks in general Ural-Altaic languages, but it includes a few scattered tribes whose singular speech excludes them from this linguistic group, and who have therefore been placed by ethnologists in a distinct class called "paleasiatics" or "hyperboreans." This class is composed of the Ostyak and Kot on the Yenisei River, the Gilyak and Ainos at the mouth of the Amur and on the Kurile, Sakhalin and Yezo islands, the Kamchadal and Koryak of Kamchatka, and the Chukches and Yukaghir of extreme northeastern Siberia. As far back as 1850, the eminent philologist Robert Latham noted a marked linguistic agreement, both in structure and verbal affinity, between our Northwest Coast tribes and the peoples of the islands and peninsulas fringing northeastern Asia. "Koriak is notably American," he said.763 The recent Jesup Expedition to the Northwest Coast of America and the nearby coast of Asia investigated the Koryak, to determine whether in the past there had been any connection between the cultures and ethnic types of the Old and New World. These investigations have proved beyond doubt a kinship of culture, attributable either to a remote common origin or to former contact, long and close, between these isolated Siberian tribes and the American aborigines. They show that the Koryak are one of the Asiatic tribes standing nearest to the northwestern American Indian.764 [See map page 103.]

The damaged bridge over the Bering Strait, formed by East Cape, Cape Prince of Wales, and the Diomede Islands in between, along with the natural land connection of the Commander and Aleutian Islands stretching from the Kamchatka Peninsula to Unalaska, has made it easier for people to travel between Asia and America.761 Justin Winsor states, "There is hardly a stronger demonstration of such connection between the two continents than the physical similarities of the people living on opposite sides of the Pacific Ocean in these northern regions."762 This similarity isn't limited to the Eskimo and Chukches, who have shared colonists across the Bering Sea. Recent studies have uncovered a broader kinship. The population of northern Siberia generally speaks Ural-Altaic languages, but it also includes a few scattered tribes with unique languages that don't fit into this linguistic group, and thus have been categorized by ethnologists as a distinct class called "paleasiatics" or "hyperboreans." This group includes the Ostyak and Kot on the Yenisei River, the Gilyak and Ainos at the mouth of the Amur and on the Kurile, Sakhalin, and Yezo islands, the Kamchadal and Koryak of Kamchatka, and the Chukches and Yukaghir of extreme northeastern Siberia. As early as 1850, the renowned philologist Robert Latham noted a significant linguistic similarity, both in structure and word usage, between the tribes of our Northwest Coast and the peoples of the islands and peninsulas near northeastern Asia. "Koriak is notably American," he remarked.763 The recent Jesup Expedition to the Northwest Coast of America and the adjacent coast of Asia studied the Koryak to see if there was any connection in the past between the cultures and ethnic groups of the Old and New Worlds. These studies have undeniably demonstrated a cultural kinship, linked either to a distant common origin or to past close contact between these isolated Siberian tribes and the native Americans. They reveal that the Koryak are one of the Asian tribes most closely related to the northwestern American Indians.764 [See map page 103.]

Polynesian affinities.

W.H. Dall finds the inhabitants of the Pacific slope of North America conspicuously allied with Oceanica in cultural achievements, whose origin he therefore assigns to that vast congeries of islands stretching from Asia toward South America in latitude 25° south. These islands, closely clustered as far as the Paumota group, straggle along with widening spaces between, through Easter Isle, which carries the indestructible memorials of a strange civilization, through Sala-y-Gomez, San Felix, and St. Ambrose almost to the threshold of the Peruvian coast. It is to be noted that these islands lie just outside the westward-bearing Equatorial Current and trade-winds, on the margin of the South Pacific anti-cyclonic winds and a southern current which sets towards the Peruvian coast.765 A more probable avenue for the introduction of these Polynesian or Malayan elements of culture is found in O.T. Mason's theory, that primitive mariners of the southwestern Pacific, led into migration by the eternal food quest, may have skirted the seaboard of East Asia and Northwest America, passing along a great-circle route through the succession of marginal seas and archipelagoes to various ports of entry on the Pacific front of America. Such a route, favored by the prevailing marine currents and winds from the southwest, and used repeatedly during long periods of time, might have introduced trans-Pacific elements of race and culture into the western side of America.766

W.H. Dall observes that the people living along the Pacific coast of North America are notably connected to Oceania in terms of cultural achievements, which he believes originated from the vast collection of islands that stretch from Asia to South America at about 25° south latitude. These islands, clustered together as far as the Paumota group, extend with increasing gaps between them, including Easter Island, known for its enduring reminders of a mysterious civilization, as well as Sala-y-Gomez, San Felix, and St. Ambrose, reaching nearly to the edge of the Peruvian coast. It's important to note that these islands are just outside the westward-flowing Equatorial Current and trade winds, situated on the edge of the South Pacific’s anti-cyclonic winds and a southern current that moves toward the Peruvian coastline.765 A more likely path for the introduction of these Polynesian or Malayan cultural elements is proposed by O.T. Mason's theory, suggesting that early sailors from the southwestern Pacific, driven by the constant search for food, may have traveled along the coast of East Asia and Northwest America, following a great-circle route through various marginal seas and archipelagos to different entry points along the Pacific coast of America. This route, supported by the prevailing marine currents and winds from the southwest and used repeatedly over long periods, could have brought trans-Pacific elements of race and culture to the western side of America.766

The real Orient of the World.

Moreover, primitive America resembled Oceanica and northern Asia in its ignorance of iron, in its Stone Age civilization, and its retarded social and political development. Such affinities as it shows were predominantly Pacific or trans-Pacific.767 On its Atlantic side, it stood out in striking contrast to the contemporaneous civilizations and races in Europe and Africa; this was its unneighbored shore, lying on the eastern margin of that broad zone of habitation which stretched hence westward on and on around the world, to the outermost capes of Europe and Africa. The Atlantic abyss formed the single gap in this encircling belt of population, to which Columbus at last affixed the clasp. The Atlantic face of the Americas formed therefore the drowsy unstirred Orient of the inhabited world, which westward developed growing activity—dreaming a civilization in Mexico and Peru, roused to artistic and maritime achievement in Oceanica and the Malay Archipelago, to permanent state-making and real cultural development in Asia, and attaining the highest civilization at last in western Europe. There was the sunset margin of the inhabited world, the area of achievement, the adult Occident, facing across the dividing ocean that infant Orient beyond. Here the Old World, the full-grown world, had accumulated in Columbus' time the matured forces of a hemisphere; it was searching for some outlet across the shoreless distances of the Atlantic, waiting for some call from its voiceless beyond.

Moreover, primitive America was similar to Oceania and northern Asia in its lack of iron, its Stone Age culture, and its slow social and political progress. The similarities it did have were mostly with the Pacific or across the Pacific.767 On its Atlantic side, it sharply contrasted with the contemporary civilizations and peoples in Europe and Africa; it was an unneighborly shore, lying on the eastern edge of a vast area of settlement that stretched westward around the globe, reaching all the way to the farthest points of Europe and Africa. The Atlantic Ocean created the only gap in this surrounding belt of population, which Columbus eventually connected. The Atlantic side of the Americas was essentially the sleepy, untouched East of the inhabited world, while to the west, activity was increasing—envisioning a civilization in Mexico and Peru, stimulated by artistic and maritime accomplishments in Oceania and the Malay Archipelago, establishing lasting states and real cultural growth in Asia, and ultimately achieving the highest civilization in western Europe. This was the western edge of the inhabited world, the area of achievement—the developed West—facing across the vast ocean to the young East beyond. At that time, the Old World, the mature world, had gathered the developed forces of a hemisphere; it was searching for a way across the endless Atlantic, waiting for some signal from its silent beyond.

The Atlantic abyss in historic movements of peoples.

This deep, unbridged chasm of the Atlantic, closed only four hundred years ago, must be taken into account in all investigations of the geographical distribution of races, whether in prehistoric or historic times. The influences of those ages when it formed an impassable gulf are still operative in directing the movements of the peoples to-day inhabiting its shores, because that barrier maintained the continents of America as a vast territorial reserve, sparsely inhabited by a Stone Age people, and affording a fresh field for the superior, accumulated energies of Europe.

This deep, unbridgeable gap in the Atlantic, which only closed off four hundred years ago, needs to be considered in any research about the geographical distribution of races, whether in prehistoric or historical times. The effects of that era, when it was an impassable divide, are still influencing the movements of the people living along its shores today, because that barrier kept the continents of America as a vast, mostly empty area, inhabited by a Stone Age society, and provided a new opportunity for the advanced, accumulated energies of Europe.

Races and continents.

Australia and the double continent of America show each the coincidence of an ethnic realm with an isolated continent. In contrast, when we come to the Old World triad of Europe, Asia and Africa, we find three races, to be sure, but races whose geographical distribution ignores the boundaries of the continents. The White race belongs to all three, and from time immemorial has made the central basin of the Mediterranean the white man's sea. The Mongolian, though primarily at home in Asia, stretches along the coast of the Arctic Ocean to the Atlantic shores of Norway, and in historical times has penetrated up the Danube to the foot of the Alps. Nor was the Negroid stock confined to Africa, though Africa has always been its geographical core. The Indian Peninsula and Malay Archipelago, once peopled by a primitive Negroid race, but now harboring only remnants of them in the Deccan, Malacca, the Philippines and elsewhere, bridge the distance to the other great Negroid center in Melanesia and the derivative or secondary Negroid area of Australia.768 The Negroid race belongs essentially to the long southern land pendants of the Eastern Hemisphere; and wherever it has bordered on the lighter northern stocks, it has drawn a typical boundary zone of mingled tints which never diverges far from the Equator, from the Atlantic shores of the Sudan to Pacific Fiji.769 [See map page 105.]

Australia and the two continents of America each have a unique ethnic region that corresponds to their isolation. However, when we look at the trio of Europe, Asia, and Africa in the Old World, we see three distinct races, but their geographical distribution crosses continental borders. The White race is present in all three continents and has historically viewed the central Mediterranean basin as the White man’s sea. The Mongolian race, while primarily based in Asia, extends along the Arctic coast down to the Atlantic shores of Norway and has historically moved up the Danube River to the Alps. The Negroid race isn’t limited to Africa, even though Africa has always been its central location. The Indian Peninsula and the Malay Archipelago were once populated by a primitive Negroid race, with only remnants remaining now in the Deccan, Malacca, the Philippines, and elsewhere, linking them to another major Negroid center in Melanesia and a secondary Negroid region in Australia.768 The Negroid race primarily belongs to the long southern land masses of the Eastern Hemisphere; wherever it comes into contact with lighter-skinned northern populations, it creates a distinct boundary zone of mixed colors that typically stays close to the Equator, from the Atlantic shores of Sudan to the Pacific island of Fiji.769 [See map page 105.]

The effort of the old ethnology, as represented by Blumenbach, to make a five-fold division of the races in agreement with the five continents was a mistake. To distinguish between the continents is one thing and to distinguish between the races is another. Neither bio-geography nor anthropo-geography can adopt the continents as geographical provinces, although floras, faunas and races the world over give evidence of partial or temporary restriction to a certain continent, whence they have overflowed to other lands. A ground-plan for the geographical classification of races is to be found, as Tylor says, in the fact that they are not found scattered indiscriminately over the earth's surface, but that certain races belong to certain regions, in whose peculiar environment they have developed their type, and whence they have spread to other lands, undergoing modifications from race intermixture and successive changes of environment on the way.770

The old approach to ethnology, like that of Blumenbach, which aimed to categorize races into five groups based on the five continents, was misguided. Distinguishing between continents is one thing, but distinguishing between races is quite another. Neither bio-geography nor anthropo-geography can treat continents as geographical areas, even though the plants, animals, and races worldwide show signs of being restricted to specific continents before spreading to other regions. According to Tylor, the basis for classifying races geographically lies in the fact that they aren't randomly distributed across the planet; instead, certain races are associated with specific areas, where their unique environments shaped their characteristics, and from there, they migrated to other places, adapting through racial mixing and changes in their surroundings along the way.770

Contrast of the northern and southern continents.

From this general law of race movements it follows that certain groups of land-masses, favored by location and large area, play a great imperial rôle, holding other lands as appanages. The Eastern Hemisphere, as we have seen, enjoys this advantage over the Western. Still more the Northern Hemisphere, blessed with an abundance of land and a predominant Temperate Zone location, is able to lord it over the Southern, so insular in its poverty of land. The history of the Northern Hemisphere is marked by far-reaching historical influences and wide control; that of the Southern, by detachment, aloofness and impotence, due to the small area and isolation of its land-masses. A subordinate rôle is its fate. Australia will always follow in the train of Eurasia, whence alone it has derived its incentives and means of progress. Neither the southern half of Africa nor South America has ever in historical times struck out a road to advancement unaided by its northern neighbors. Primitive South America developed the only independent civilization that ever blossomed in the Southern Hemisphere, but the Peruvian achievements in progress were inferior to those of Mexico and Central America.771

From this general principle of population movements, it follows that certain groups of land masses, because of their advantageous locations and large sizes, play a significant imperial role, controlling other territories as dependencies. The Eastern Hemisphere, as we have noted, has this advantage over the Western Hemisphere. Even more so, the Northern Hemisphere, blessed with an abundance of land and a prominent location in the Temperate Zone, is able to dominate the Southern Hemisphere, which is so limited in its land resources. The history of the Northern Hemisphere is characterized by significant historical impacts and extensive control, while the Southern Hemisphere's history is marked by detachment, isolation, and lack of power, stemming from its smaller area and the isolation of its land masses. It is destined for a subordinate role. Australia will always be reliant on Eurasia, from which it has drawn its motivation and means for progress. Neither the southern part of Africa nor South America has ever, in historical times, forged a path to advancement without help from their northern neighbors. Primitive South America developed the only independent civilization that ever emerged in the Southern Hemisphere, but the achievements of Peru were inferior to those of Mexico and Central America.771

Isolation of the southern continents.

This subordination of the southern continents is partly due to the fact that they have only one side of contact or neighborhood with any other land, that is, on the north; yet even here the contact is not close. In Australia the medium of communication is a long bridge of islands; in America, a winding island chain and a mountainous isthmus; in Africa, a broad zone of desert dividing the Mediterranean or Eurasian from the tropical and Negroid part of the continent. Intercourse was not easy, and produced clear effects only in the case of Africa. Enlightenment filtering in here was sadly dimmed as it spread. Moreover it was delayed till the introduction from Asia of the horse and camel, which were not native to Africa, and which, as Ratzel points out, alone made possible the long journey across the Sahara. The opposite or peninsular sides, running out as great spurs from the compacter land-masses of the north, look southward into vacant wastes of water, find no neighbors in those Antarctic seas. Owing to this unfavorable location on the edge of things, they were historically dead until four centuries ago, when oceanic navigation opened up the great sea route of the Southern Hemisphere, and for the first time included them in the world's circle of communication. But even when lifted by the ensuing Europeanizing process, they only emphasize the fundamental dependence of the Southern Hemisphere upon the superior geographical endowments of the Northern.

This subordination of the southern continents is partly because they only have one side of contact or proximity with any other land, which is to the north; yet even there, the connection is not strong. In Australia, communication relies on a long chain of islands; in America, it’s a twisting chain of islands and a hilly isthmus; in Africa, a wide strip of desert separates the Mediterranean or Eurasian regions from the tropical and Negroid parts of the continent. Interaction was not easy, and it only had significant effects in the case of Africa. The spread of enlightenment here was unfortunately weak as it expanded. Moreover, it was delayed until the introduction of the horse and camel from Asia, which were not native to Africa, and which, as Ratzel points out, were essential for long journeys across the Sahara. The opposite or peninsular sides, extending as significant spurs from the more compact landmasses of the north, look southward into empty stretches of water, finding no neighbors in those Antarctic seas. Because of this unfavorable location on the periphery, they were historically stagnant until four centuries ago when oceanic navigation opened up the major sea route of the Southern Hemisphere, finally including them in the world's network of communication. Even when elevated by the subsequent European influence, they only highlight the Southern Hemisphere's fundamental dependence on the superior geographical advantages of the Northern Hemisphere.

Effect of continental structure upon historical development.

The build of the land-masses influences fundamentally the movements and hence the development of the races who inhabit them. A simple continental structure gives to those movements a few simple features and a wide monotonous distribution which checks differentiation. A manifold, complex build, varied in relief and ragged in contour, breaks up the moving streams of peoples, turns each branch into a different channel, lends it a distinctive character through isolation, finally brings it up in a cul de sac formed by a peninsula or mountain-rimmed basin, where further movement is checked and the process of local individualization begins. Therefore great simplicity of continental build may result in historical poverty, as in the flat quadrangle of European Russia, the level plateau of Africa, and the smooth Atlantic slope of North America, with its neatly trimmed outline. Complexity, abounding in contrasted environments, tends to produce a varied wealth of historical development. Africa lies on the surface of the ocean, a huge torso of a continent, headless, memberless, inert. Here is no diversity of outward form, no contrast of zonal location, no fructifying variety of geographic conditions. Humanity has forgotten to grow in its stationary soil. Only where the Suez Isthmus formed an umbilical cord uniting ancient Egypt to the mother continent of Asia was Africa vitalized by the pulse of another life. European influences penetrated little beyond the northern coast.

The layout of the land greatly affects the movements and, consequently, the development of the races that inhabit it. A simple continental shape provides these movements with a few basic features and a wide, monotonous spread that hinders differentiation. A complex, varied landscape, with uneven terrain and jagged coastlines, disrupts the flow of people, steers each group into different paths, gives them a unique identity through isolation, and ultimately traps them in a cul de sac formed by a peninsula or mountain-bound basin, where further movement is restricted and the process of local individualization starts. Therefore, a highly simplistic continental structure can lead to historical stagnation, as seen in the flat quadrangle of European Russia, the level plateau of Africa, and the smooth Atlantic slope of North America, with its neatly defined borders. Complexity, rich in contrasting environments, tends to foster a diverse wealth of historical development. Africa is like a massive, unformed torso of a continent—headless, limb-less, and stagnant. There’s no variety in its physical shape, no contrast in its geographical zones, no fertile mix of geographic conditions. Humanity has stopped evolving in its unchanging environment. Only where the Suez Isthmus connected ancient Egypt to the mother continent of Asia did Africa experience the influence of another force. European impacts barely reached beyond the northern coast.

Asia, on the other hand, radiating great peninsulas, festooned with islands, supporting the vast corrugations of its highlands and lowlands, its snow-capped mountains and steaming valleys, stretching from the Equator through all the zones to the ice-blocked shores of the Arctic, knowing drought and deluge, tundra waste and teeming jungle, has offered the manifold environment and segregated areas for individualized civilizations, which have produced such far-reaching historical results. The same fact is true of Europe, and that in an intensified degree. Here a complex development of mountains and highlands built on diverse axes, peninsulas which comprise 27 per cent. and Islands which comprise nearly 8 per cent. of the total area,772 vast thalassic inlets cleaving the continent to the core, have provided an abundance of those naturally defined regions which serve as cradles of civilization and, reacting upon the continent as a whole, endow it with lasting historical significance.773 Even Strabo saw this. He begins his description of the inhabited world with Europe, because, as he says, it has such a "polymorphous formation" and is the region most favorable to the mental and social ennoblement of man.774

Asia, on the other hand, shines with its vast peninsulas and numerous islands, supporting the rolling landscapes of its mountains and plains, its snow-capped peaks and tropical valleys, stretching from the Equator all the way to the ice-covered coasts of the Arctic. It experiences both drought and floods, barren tundra and lush jungles, offering diverse environments and isolated areas for unique civilizations, which have created profound historical impacts. The same is true for Europe, but even more so. Here, a complex array of mountains and highlands, positioned on different axes, along with peninsulas making up 27 percent and islands comprising nearly 8 percent of the total area,772 with vast coastal inlets cutting deep into the continent, have generated many naturally defined regions that act as the cradles of civilization, influencing the continent as a whole and giving it enduring historical importance.773 Even Strabo recognized this. He starts his description of the inhabited world with Europe because, as he notes, it has a "polymorphous formation" that makes it the most conducive area for the intellectual and social uplift of humanity.774

Structure of North and South America.

In North and South America, great simplicity of continental build gave rise to a corresponding simplicity of native ethnic and cultural condition. There is only one marked contrast throughout the length of this double continent, that between its Atlantic and Pacific slopes. On the Atlantic side of the Cordilleras, a vast trough extends through both land-masses from the Arctic Ocean to Patagonia; this has given to migration in each a longitudinal direction and therefore constantly tended to nullify the diversities arising from contrasted zonal conditions. On the Pacific side of North America, there has been an unmistakeable migration southward along the accessible coast from Alaska to the Columbia River, and down the great intermontane valleys of the western highlands from, the Great Basin to Honduras;775 while South America shows the same meridional movement for 2,000 miles along the Pacific coast and longitudinal valleys of the Andes system. There was little encouragement to cut across the grain of the continents. The eastern range of the Cordilleras drew in general a dividing line between the eastern and western tribes.776 Though Athapascans from the east overstepped it at a few points in North America, the Great Divide has served effectually to isolate the two groups from one another and to draw that line of linguistic cleavage which Major Powell has set down in Ms map of Indian linguistic stocks. Consequently, Americanists recognize a distinct resemblance among the members of the North Atlantic group of Indians, as among those of the South Atlantic group; but they note an equally distinct contrast between each of them and its corresponding Pacific group. Nor is this contrast superficial; it extends to physical traits, temperament and culture,777 and appears in the use of the vigesimal system of enumeration in primitive Mexico, Central America, among the Tlingits of the Northwest coast and the Eskimo as also among the Chukches and Ainus of Asia, while in the Atlantic section of North America the decimal system, with one doubtful exception, was alone in use.778

In North and South America, the straightforward nature of the continent's structure led to a similarly straightforward ethnic and cultural landscape. The main difference across this entire double continent is between the Atlantic and Pacific sides. On the Atlantic side of the Cordilleras, a vast valley stretches through both landmasses from the Arctic Ocean to Patagonia; this has caused migration in a north-south direction and has reduced the differences that arise from varying environmental conditions. On the Pacific side of North America, there has been a clear southward migration along the accessible coast from Alaska to the Columbia River, and down the major valleys of the western mountains from the Great Basin to Honduras;775 while South America displays the same southward movement for 2,000 miles along the Pacific coast and the valleys of the Andes. There was little motivation to cross the grain of the continents. The eastern range of the Cordilleras generally acted as a dividing line between the eastern and western tribes.776 Although Athapascans from the east crossed this line at a few points in North America, the Great Divide effectively isolated the two groups from each other and created a language divide as illustrated on Major Powell's map of Indian language families. As a result, Americanists see a clear similarity among the members of the North Atlantic group of Indigenous peoples and those of the South Atlantic group; however, they also observe a distinct contrast between each group and its corresponding Pacific counterpart. This contrast is not just superficial; it includes physical characteristics, temperament, and culture,777 and is reflected in the use of the vigesimal counting system in ancient Mexico, Central America, among the Tlingits of the Northwest coast, and among the Eskimos, Chukches, and Ainus of Asia, while in the Atlantic region of North America, the decimal system was predominantly used, with one uncertain exception.778

Cultural superiority of the Pacific slope Indians.

To the anthropo-geographer, the significant fact is that all the higher phases of native civilization are confined to the Pacific slope group of Indians, which includes the Mexican and Isthmian tribes. From the elongated center of advanced culture stretching from the Bolivian highlands northward to the Anahuac Plateau, the same type shades off by easy transitions through northern Mexico and the Pueblo country, vanishes among the lower intrusive stocks of Oregon and California, only to reappear among the Haidas and Tlingits of British Columbia and Alaska, whose cultural achievements show affinity to those of the Mayas in Yucatan.779 Dall found certain distinguishing customs or characteristics spread north and south along the western slope of the continent in a natural geographical line of migration. They included labretifery, tattooing the chin of adult women, certain uses of masks, a certain style of conventionalizing natural objects, the use of conventional signs as hieroglyphics, a peculiar facility in carving wood and stone, a similarity of angular designs on their pottery and basketry, and of artistic representations connected with their common religious or mythological ideas. Many singular forms of carvings and the method of superimposing figures of animals one upon another in their totem poles are found from Alaska to Panama, except in California. These distinguishing features of an incipient culture are found nowhere else in North America, even sporadically. Dall therefore concludes that "they have been impressed upon the American aboriginal world from without," and on the ground of affinities, attributes their origin to Oceanica.780

To the anthropo-geographer, what's important is that all the advanced forms of native civilization are limited to the group of Indians living along the Pacific slope, which includes the tribes of Mexico and the Isthmus. From the long center of advanced culture that extends from the highlands of Bolivia north to the Anahuac Plateau, this type gradually transitions through northern Mexico and the Pueblo region, disappearing among the lower groups in Oregon and California, only to show up again among the Haidas and Tlingits in British Columbia and Alaska. Their cultural achievements are similar to those of the Mayas in Yucatan.779 Dall identified certain unique customs or traits that spread north and south along the western slope of the continent in a natural line of migration. These included wearing labrets, tattooing the chins of adult women, specific uses of masks, a distinctive style of representing natural objects, the use of conventional signs as hieroglyphics, a unique skill in carving wood and stone, similarities in angular designs on their pottery and basketry, and artistic representations tied to their shared religious or mythological beliefs. Many unique carvings and the way of stacking figures of animals on their totem poles are found from Alaska to Panama, except in California. These distinguishing features of an emerging culture are not found anywhere else in North America, even occasionally. Dall concludes that "they have been impressed upon the American aboriginal world from outside," and based on these connections, he attributes their origin to Oceania.780

Cyrus Thomas, on the basis of the character and distribution of the archeological remains in North America, concurs in this opinion. He finds that these remains fall into two classes, one east of the Rocky Mountain watershed and the other west. "When those of the Pacific slope as a whole are compared with those of the Atlantic slope, there is a dissimilarity which marks them as the products of different races or as the result of different race influences." He emphasizes the resemblance of the customs, arts and archeological remains of the west coast to those of the opposite shores and islands of the Pacific, and notes the lack of any resemblance to those of the Atlantic; and finally leans to the conclusion that the continent was peopled from two sources, one incoming stream distributing itself over the Atlantic slope, and the other over the Pacific, the two becoming gradually fused into a comparatively homogeneous race by long continental isolation. Yet these two sources may not necessarily include a trans-Atlantic origin for one of the contributing streams; ethnic evidence is against such a supposition, because the characteristics of the American race and of the archeological remains point exclusively to affinity with the people of the Pacific.781 John Edward Payne also reaches the same conclusion, though on other grounds.782

Cyrus Thomas, based on the characteristics and distribution of archaeological remains in North America, agrees with this view. He finds that these remains can be classified into two groups: one east of the Rocky Mountain watershed and the other west. "When comparing the remains of the Pacific slope as a whole with those of the Atlantic slope, there is a difference that indicates they are products of different races or influenced by different racial factors." He highlights the similarities in customs, arts, and archaeological remains between the west coast and the opposite shores and islands of the Pacific, while noting the absence of any similarities to those of the Atlantic. Ultimately, he concludes that the continent was populated by two sources: one stream settling in the Atlantic slope and the other in the Pacific, with the two gradually merging into a relatively homogeneous race due to long periods of continental isolation. However, these two sources do not necessarily imply a trans-Atlantic origin for one of the streams; ethnic evidence argues against that assumption because the traits of the American population and the archaeological remains exclusively suggest connections to the people of the Pacific.781 John Edward Payne also arrives at the same conclusion, albeit for different reasons.782

Lack of segregated districts.

The one strong segregating feature in primitive America was the Cordilleras, which held east and west apart. In the natural pockets formed by the high intermontane valleys of the Andes and the Anahuac Plateau, and in the constricted isthmian region, the continent afforded a few secluded localities where civilization found favorable conditions of development. But in general, the paucity of large coast articulations, and the adverse polar or subpolar location of most of these, the situation of the large tropical islands along that barren Atlantic abyss, and the lack of a broken or varied relief, have prevented the Americas from developing numerous local centers of civilization, which might eventually have lifted the cultural status of the continents.783

The main dividing feature in early America was the Cordilleras, which kept the east and west separated. In the natural pockets created by the high intermontane valleys of the Andes and the Anahuac Plateau, along with the narrow isthmian region, the continent offered a few secluded areas where civilization could thrive. However, overall, the lack of large coastal connections, the challenging polar or subpolar locations of most of these areas, the presence of large tropical islands in that desolate Atlantic expanse, and the absence of varied landscapes have hindered the Americas from developing many local centers of civilization, which could have potentially raised the cultural status of the continents.783

Coast articulations of continents.

It is necessary to distinguish two general classes of continental articulations; first, marginal dependences, like the fringe of European peninsulas and islands, resulting from a deeply serrated contour; and second, surface subdivisions of the interior, resulting from differences of relief or defined often by enclosing mountains or deserts, like the Tibetan Plateau, the Basin of Bohemia, the Po River trough, or the sand-rimmed valley of the Nile. The first class is by far the more important, because of the intense historical activity which results from the vitalizing contact with the sea. But in considering coast articulations, anthropo-geography is led astray unless it discriminates between these on the basis of size and location. Without stopping to discuss the obvious results of a contrasted zonal location, such as that between Labrador and Yucatan, the Kola Peninsula and Spain, it is necessary to keep in mind always the effect of vicinal location. An outlying coastal dependency like Ireland has had its history impoverished by excessive isolation, in contrast to the richer development of England, Jutland, and Zealand in the same latitude, because these have profited from the closer neighborhood of other peripheral regions. So from ancient times, Greece has had a similar advantage over the Crimea, the Tunisian Peninsula of North Africa over Spain, the Cotentin Peninsula of France over Brittany, and Kent over Cornwall or Caithness in Great Britain.

It’s important to recognize two main types of continental features: first, marginal dependencies, like the edges of European peninsulas and islands, which come from a highly jagged coastline; and second, internal surface divisions, created by differences in elevation or often defined by surrounding mountains or deserts, like the Tibetan Plateau, the Basin of Bohemia, the Po River valley, or the sand-bordered Nile Valley. The first type is significantly more important due to the historical activity generated by the vital connection with the sea. However, when examining coastal features, geographic studies can mislead if they don’t differentiate between these based on size and location. Without going into the obvious outcomes of contrasting geographical positions, such as between Labrador and Yucatan, or the Kola Peninsula and Spain, it’s always crucial to consider the impact of nearby locations. A remote coastal area like Ireland has experienced a less rich history due to its isolation, unlike the more developed regions of England, Jutland, and Zealand at the same latitude, which have benefited from nearby peripheral areas. Throughout history, Greece has had a similar advantage over the Crimea, the Tunisian Peninsula over Spain, the Cotentin Peninsula over Brittany, and Kent over Cornwall or Caithness in Great Britain.

Importance of size in continental articulations.

Articulations on a vast scale, like the southern peninsulas of Asia, produce quite different cultural and historical effects from small physical sub-divisions, like the fiord promontories and "skerries" of Norway and southern Alaska, or the finger peninsulas of the Peloponnesus. The significant difference lies in the degree of isolation which the two types yield. Large continental dependencies of the Asiatic class resemble small continents in their power to segregate; while overgrown capes like ancient Attica and Argolis or the more bulky Peloponnesus have their exclusiveness tempered by the mediating power of the small marine inlets between them. Small articulations, by making a coast accessible, tend to counteract the excessive isolation of a large articulation. They themselves develop in their people only minor or inner differentiations, which serve to enrich the life of the island or peninsula as a whole, but do not invade its essential unity. The contrast in the history of Hellas and the Peloponnesus was due largely to their separation from one another; yet neither was able to make of its people anything but Greeks. Wales and Cornwall show in English history the same contrast and the same underlying unity.

Articulations on a large scale, like the southern peninsulas of Asia, create quite different cultural and historical effects compared to smaller physical subdivisions, like the fjord promontories and "skerries" of Norway and southern Alaska, or the finger peninsulas of the Peloponnesus. The key difference lies in the level of isolation that these two types produce. Large continental areas of the Asiatic kind function like small continents in their ability to create separation; meanwhile, larger capes like ancient Attica and Argolis or the bulkier Peloponnesus have their exclusivity lessened by the smaller marine inlets between them. Small articulations, by providing access along the coast, help to reduce the excessive isolation of a large articulation. They tend to develop in their inhabitants only minor or internal differences, which enrich the life of the island or peninsula as a whole, but do not disrupt its essential unity. The difference in the history of Hellas and the Peloponnesus was largely due to their separation; yet neither could transform its people into anything but Greeks. Wales and Cornwall reflect this same contrast and underlying unity in English history.

Historical contrast of large and small peninsulas.

In discussing continental articulations, therefore, it makes a great difference whether we draw our deductions from small projections of the coast, like Wales, the Peloponnesus, Brittany and the Crimea, whose areas range from 7442 to 10,023 square miles (19,082 to 25,700 square kilometers); or the four Mediterranean peninsulas, which range in size from the 58,110 square miles (149,000 square kilometers) of the Apennine Peninsula to the 197,600 square miles (506,-600 square kilometers) of Asia Minor and the 227,700 square miles (584,000 square kilometers) of the Iberian; or the vast continental alcoves of southern Asia, like Farther India with its 650,000 square miles (1,667,000 square kilometers), Hither India with 814,320 square miles (2,088,000 square kilometers) and Arabia with 1,064,700 square miles (2,730,-000 square kilometers).784 The fact that the large compound peninsula of western Europe which comprises Spain, Portugal, France, Jutland, Belgium, Holland, Switzerland, Italy and western Germany, and has its base in the stricture between the Adriatic and the Baltic, is about the size of peninsular India, suggests how profound may be the difference in geographic effects between large and small peripheral divisions. The three huge extremities which Asia thrusts forward into the Indian Ocean are geographical entities, which in point of size and individualization rank just below the continents; and in relation to the solid mass of Central Asia, they have exhibited in many respects an aloofness and self-sufficiency, that have resulted in an historical divergence approximating that of the several continents. India, which has more productive territory than Australia and a population not much smaller than that of Europe, becomes to the administrators of its government "the Continent of India," as it is regularly termed in the Statistical Atlas published at Calcutta. Farther India has in the long-drawn pendant of Malacca a sub-peninsula half as large again as Italy. The Deccan has in Ceylon an insular dependency the size of Tasmania. The whole scale is continental. It appears again somewhat diminished, in the largest articulations of Europe, in Scandinavia, the British Isles, the Iberian and Balkan peninsulas. This continental scale stamps also the anthropo-geography of such large individualized fields. They are big enough for each to comprise one or even several nations, and isolated enough to keep their historical processes for long periods at a time to a certain extent detached from those of their respective continents.

In discussing continental features, it significantly matters whether we base our conclusions on small coastal areas like Wales, the Peloponnesus, Brittany, and the Crimea, which range from 7,442 to 10,023 square miles (19,082 to 25,700 square kilometers); or the four Mediterranean peninsulas, which vary from the 58,110 square miles (149,000 square kilometers) of the Apennine Peninsula to the 197,600 square miles (506,600 square kilometers) of Asia Minor and the 227,700 square miles (584,000 square kilometers) of the Iberian Peninsula; or the vast continental regions of southern Asia, such as Farther India with its 650,000 square miles (1,667,000 square kilometers), Hither India with 814,320 square miles (2,088,000 square kilometers), and Arabia with 1,064,700 square miles (2,730,000 square kilometers). The fact that the extensive compound peninsula of western Europe, which includes Spain, Portugal, France, Jutland, Belgium, Holland, Switzerland, Italy, and western Germany, and has its base between the Adriatic and the Baltic, is roughly the size of peninsular India, suggests how significant the differences in geographical impact can be between large and small peripheral divisions. The three massive projections that Asia extends into the Indian Ocean are geographical entities that rank just below the continents in terms of size and individuality; in relation to the solid mass of Central Asia, they demonstrate a notable degree of isolation and self-sufficiency, resulting in a historical divergence similar to that of the various continents. India, which has more arable land than Australia and a population only slightly smaller than that of Europe, is referred to by its government administrators as "the Continent of India," as noted in the Statistical Atlas published in Calcutta. Farther India features the long, narrow peninsula of Malacca, which is one and a half times the size of Italy. The Deccan has Ceylon as an insular dependency the size of Tasmania. The overall scale is continental. It seems slightly reduced in the largest formations of Europe, such as Scandinavia, the British Isles, the Iberian Peninsula, and the Balkan Peninsula. This continental scale also influences the anthropo-geography of such large, distinct areas. They are substantial enough to encompass one or even multiple nations and isolated enough to allow their historical developments to remain somewhat separate from those of their respective continents for extended periods.

Peninsular conditions most favorable to historical development.

The most favorable conditions for historical development obtain where the two classes of marginal articulation are combined, and where they occur in groups, as we find them in the Mediterranean and the North Sea-Baltic basin. Here the smaller indentations multiply contact with the sea, and provide the harbors, bays and breakwaters of capes and promontories which make the coast accessible. The larger articulations, by their close grouping, break up the sea into the minor thalassic basins which encourage navigation, and thus insure the exchange of their respective cultural achievements. In other words, such conditions present the pre-eminent advantages of vicinal location around an enclosed sea.

The best conditions for historical development occur when two types of marginal features come together in groups, as seen in the Mediterranean and the North Sea-Baltic region. Here, the smaller inlets increase contact with the sea and provide the harbors, bays, and breakwaters formed by capes and promontories that make the coastline accessible. The larger features, by being closely clustered, divide the sea into smaller basins that promote navigation, ensuring the exchange of cultural achievements among the regions. In simpler terms, these conditions offer significant advantages of being near an enclosed sea.

The enormous articulations of southern Asia suffer from their paucity of small indentations, all the more because of their vast size and sub-tropical location. The Grecian type of peninsula, with its broken shoreline, finds here its large-scale homologue only in Farther India, to which the Sunda Islands have played in history the part of a gigantic Cyclades. The European type of articulation is found only about the Yellow-Japan Sea, where the island of Hondo and the peninsulas of Shangtung and Korea reproduce approximately the proportions of Great Britain, Jutland and Italy respectively. Arabia and India, like the angular shoulder of Africa which protrudes into the Indian Ocean, measure an imposing length of coastline, but this length shrinks in comparison with the vast area of the peninsulas. The contour of a peninsula is like the surface of the brain: in both it is convolutions that count. Southern Asia has had lobes enough but too few convolutions. For this reason, the northern Indian Ocean, despite its exceptional location as the eastward extension of the Mediterranean route to the Orient, found its development constantly arrested till the advent of European navigators.

The huge coastlines of southern Asia lack enough small bays, especially considering their massive size and subtropical location. The Grecian-style peninsula, with its jagged shore, has a large counterpart in Farther India, while the Sunda Islands have historically served like a giant version of the Cyclades. The European-style coast can only be found around the Yellow-Japan Sea, where the island of Hondo and the peninsulas of Shangtung and Korea closely resemble the sizes of Great Britain, Jutland, and Italy, respectively. Arabia and India, much like the angular protrusion of Africa into the Indian Ocean, boast a significant length of coastline, but this length seems small compared to the vast area of the peninsulas. The shape of a peninsula is reminiscent of the brain's surface: both rely on their folds. Southern Asia has plenty of divisions but lacks enough folds. Because of this, the northern Indian Ocean, despite its ideal position as the eastern extension of the Mediterranean route to the East, saw limited development until European explorers arrived.

Length of coastline.

Although the peripheral articulations of a continent differ anthropo-geographically according to their size, their zonal and vicinal location, yet large and small, arctic and tropical, are grouped indiscriminately together in the figures that state the length of coastlines. For this reason, statistics of continental coastlines have little value. For instance, the fact that Eurasia has 67,000 miles (108,000 kilometers) and North America 46,500 miles (75,000 kilometers) of contact with the ocean is not illuminating; these figures do not reveal the fact that the former has its greatest coastal length on its tropical and sub-tropical side, while the latter continent has wasted inlets and islands innumerable in the long, bleak stretch from Newfoundland poleward around to Bering Sea.

Although the coastal features of a continent vary based on their size and geographical location, both large and small, arctic and tropical, are lumped together when calculating the length of coastlines. Because of this, statistics on continental coastlines aren't very useful. For example, while Eurasia has 67,000 miles (108,000 kilometers) and North America has 46,500 miles (75,000 kilometers) of coastline, these numbers don't really clarify anything; they don't show that Eurasia's longest coastlines are on its tropical and subtropical sides, whereas North America has many wasted inlets and countless islands along the long, desolate stretch from Newfoundland north to the Bering Sea.

The continental base of the peninsulas.

Peninsulas are accessible from the sea according to the configuration of their coasts, but from their hinterland, according to the length and nature of their connection with the same. This determines the degree of their isolation from the land-mass. If they hang from the continent by a frayed string, as does the Peloponnesus, Crimea, Malacca, Indian Gutjerat, and Nova Scotia, they are segregated from the life of the mainland almost as completely as if they were islands. The same effects follow where the base of a peninsula is defined by a high mountain barrier, as in all the Mediterranean peninsulas, in the two Indias, and in Korea; or by a desert like that which scantily links Arabia to Egypt, Syria and Mesopotamia; or by a blur of swamps and lakes such as half detaches Scandinavia, Courland, Estland and Finland from Russia.

Peninsulas can be reached from the sea based on the shape of their shores, but from the land based on the length and type of their connections to it. This affects how isolated they are from the mainland. If they are connected to the continent by a thin link, like Peloponnesus, Crimea, Malacca, the Indian state of Gujarat, and Nova Scotia, they are almost completely cut off from the mainland's activities, just like islands. The same isolation occurs when a peninsula’s base is blocked by a tall mountain range, as seen in all the Mediterranean peninsulas, in both Indias, and in Korea; or by a desert that barely connects Arabia to Egypt, Syria, and Mesopotamia; or by a mix of swamps and lakes that nearly separates Scandinavia, Courland, Estland, and Finland from Russia.

Held to their continents by bonds that often fail to bind, subjected by their outward-facing peripheral location to every centrifugal force, feeling only slightly the pull of the great central mass behind, peninsulas are often further detached economically and historically by their own contrasted local conditions. A sharp transition in geological formation and therefore in soil, a difference of climate, rainfall, drainage system, of flora or fauna, serve greatly to emphasize the lack of community of interests with the continental interior, and therefore produce an inevitable diversity of historical development.785 Hence, many peninsulas insulate their people as completely as islands. It is hard to say whether the Pyrenean peninsula or Sicily, Scandinavia or Great Britain, has held itself more aloof from the political history of remaining Europe; whether Korea is not more entitled to its name of the Hermit Kingdom than island Japan could ever be; whether the Peloponnesus or Euboea was more intimately associated with the radiant life of ancient Hellas. These questions lead to another, namely, whether a high mountain wall like the Pyrenees, or a narrow strait like that of Messina is the more effective geographical boundary.

Held to their continents by ties that often don't really connect, and impacted by their outer position facing away from the center, peninsulas feel only a slight pull from the large landmass behind them. They're often further isolated economically and historically due to their own unique local situations. A sharp change in geological structure and, therefore, in soil, as well as differences in climate, rainfall, drainage systems, and plant or animal life, greatly highlight the disconnection from the continental interior, creating an inevitable diversity in historical development.785 As a result, many peninsulas isolate their inhabitants as completely as islands do. It's hard to determine whether the Pyrenean peninsula or Sicily, Scandinavia or Great Britain, has distanced itself more from the political history of the rest of Europe; whether Korea deserves its title of the Hermit Kingdom more than island Japan ever could; or whether the Peloponnesus or Euboea was more deeply connected to the vibrant life of ancient Greece. These questions lead to another one: is a high mountain range like the Pyrenees, or a narrow strait like the one at Messina, a more effective geographical barrier?

Continental base a zone of transition.

Peninsulas not infrequently gain in breadth as they approach the continent; here they tend to abate their distinctive character as lobes of the mainland, together with the ethnic and historical marks of isolation. Here they form a doubtful boundary zone of mingled continental and peninsular development. Such peninsulas fall naturally, therefore, into a continental and a peninsular section, and reveal this segmentation in the differentiated history of the two portions. That great military geographer Napoleon distinguished the Italy of the Po basin as Italie continentale, and the Apennine section as Presqu'ile. Not only is the former broader, but, expanding like a tree trunk near the ground, it sends its roots well back into the massive interior of the continent; it is dominated more by the Alps than by the Apennines; it contains a lowland and a river of continental proportions, for which there is no space on the long, narrow spur of southern Italy. If its geographical character approximates that of the mainland, so does its ethnic and historical. The Po basin is a well defined area of race characterization, in which influences have made for intermixture. South of the crest of the Apennines the Italian language in its purity begins, in contrast to the Gallo-Italian of the north. This mountain ridge has also held apart the dark, short dolichocephalic stock of the Mediterranean race from the fairer, taller, broad-headed Celts, who have moved down into the Po basin from the Alps, and the Germans and Illyrians who have entered it from the northeast.786 Northern Italy is therefore allied ethnically, as it has often been united politically, to the neighboring countries abutting upon the Alps, so that it has experienced only in a partial degree that detachment which has stamped the history of the Apennine section.

Peninsulas often get wider as they get closer to the mainland; here they start to lose their unique characteristics as extensions of the mainland, along with the ethnic and historical signs of isolation. This creates an uncertain boundary zone where continental and peninsular development mix. As a result, these peninsulas can be naturally divided into continental and peninsular sections, which show this separation in their different histories. That great military geographer Napoleon labeled the Italy of the Po basin as Italie continentale and the Apennine area as Presqu'ile. Not only is the former broader, resembling a tree trunk that widens at the base, but it also sends its roots deep into the massive interior of the continent; it's influenced more by the Alps than by the Apennines. It includes a lowland and a river of continental size, which doesn't fit on the long, narrow southern spur of Italy. If its geographical features are similar to those of the mainland, so are its ethnic and historical ones. The Po basin is a clearly defined area known for its racial characteristics, shaped by various influences that have led to mixing. South of the Apennines, the pure Italian language begins, contrasting with the Gallo-Italian spoken in the north. This mountain range has also kept apart the shorter, darker dolichocephalic stock of the Mediterranean race from the taller, fairer, broad-headed Celts who have come down into the Po basin from the Alps, along with the Germans and Illyrians who have entered from the northeast.786 Northern Italy is therefore ethnically connected, as it has often been politically united, with the neighboring countries along the Alps, leading to a lesser degree of detachment compared to the history of the Apennine section.

Historical contrast between base and extremity.

The Balkan Peninsula tells much the same story of contrasted geographic conditions and development in its continental and peninsular sections. Greece proper, in ancient as in modern times, reached its northern confines where the peninsula suddenly widens its base through Macedonia and Thrace. In this narrow southern section to-day, especially in isolated Peloponnesus, Attica, and the high-walled garden of Thessaly, are found people of the pure, long-headed, Hellenic type, and here the Greek language prevails.787 But that broad and alien north, long excluded from the Amphictyonic Council and a stranger to Aegean culture in classical times, is occupied to-day by a congeries of Slavs, who form a southwestern spur of the Slav stock covering eastern Europe. Its political history shows how often it has been made a Danubian or continental state, by Alexander of Macedon, by the Romans, Bulgarians, and Ottoman Turks,788 as it may be some day by Russia; and also how often its large and compact form has enabled it to dominate the tapering peninsular section to the south.

The Balkan Peninsula tells a similar story of contrasting geographic conditions and development in its continental and peninsular areas. Greece, both in ancient times and today, reaches its northern borders where the peninsula suddenly expands through Macedonia and Thrace. In this narrow southern part today, especially in the isolated Peloponnesus, Attica, and the walled garden of Thessaly, you can find people of the pure, long-headed Hellenic type, and the Greek language is predominant.787 But that broad and foreign northern region, which was long excluded from the Amphictyonic Council and unfamiliar with Aegean culture in classical times, is currently inhabited by a mix of Slavs, who form a southwestern branch of the Slavic population spread across eastern Europe. Its political history reveals how frequently it has been turned into a Danubian or continental state, whether by Alexander of Macedon, the Romans, Bulgarians, or Ottoman Turks,788 and potentially could be again by Russia; and also highlights how often its large and compact shape has allowed it to dominate the narrowing peninsular area to the south.

In the same way, the vast Ganges and Indus basins, which constitute the continental portion of India, have received various Tibetan, Scythian, Aryan, Pathan, and Mongol-Tartar ingredients from Central Asia; and by reason of the dense populations supported by these fruitful river plains, it has been able to dominate politically, religiously and culturally the protruding triangle of the Deccan. [See maps pages 8 and 102.] The continental side of Arabia, the Mesopotamian valley which ties the peninsula to the highlands of Persia and Armenia, has received into its Semitic stock constant infiltrations of Turanian and Aryan peoples from the core of Asia. This process has been going on from the ancient Elamite and Persian conquests of Mesopotamia down to the Ottoman invasion and the present periodic visits of Kurdish shepherds to the pastures of the upper Tigris.789 Here we have the same contrast of geographic conditions as in Italy and India, a wide, populous alluvial plain occupying the continental section of the peninsula, and a less attractive highland or mountainous region in the outlying spur of land.

In a similar way, the vast Ganges and Indus river basins, which make up the continental part of India, have absorbed various influences from Tibet, Scythia, Arya, Pathans, and Mongol Tartars from Central Asia. Because of the dense populations supported by these fertile river plains, India has been able to dominate the Deccan Triangle politically, religiously, and culturally. [See maps pages 8 and 102.] The continental side of Arabia, along with the Mesopotamian valley that connects the peninsula to the highlands of Persia and Armenia, has consistently experienced the influx of Turanian and Aryan peoples into its Semitic population from Central Asia. This has been happening since the ancient Elamite and Persian conquests of Mesopotamia, continuing through the Ottoman invasion and into the present with periodic visits from Kurdish shepherds to the pastures along the upper Tigris.789 Here we see the same contrast in geographic conditions as in Italy and India, with a wide, populated alluvial plain in the continental area of the peninsula and a less appealing highland or mountainous region in the surrounding area.

Continental base a scene of invasion and war.

These continental sections of peninsulas become therefore strongly marked as areas of ethnic characterization and differentiated historical development. Their threshold location, by reason of which they first catch any outward migration from the core of the continent, and their fertility, which serves as a perennial lure to new comers, whether peaceful or warlike, combine to give them intense historical activity. They catch the come and go between their wide hinterland and the projection of land beyond, the stimulus of new arrivals and fresh blood. But tragedy too is theirs. The Po Valley has been called "the cockpit of Europe." Even the little Eider, which marks the base of Jutland, has been the scene of war between Danes and Germans since the tenth century.790 The Indus Valley has again and again felt the shock of conflict with invading hordes from the central highlands, and witnessed the establishment of a succession of empires. Peace at the gates of the Balkan Peninsula has never been of long duration, and the postern door of Korea has been stormed often enough.

These continental sections of peninsulas are clearly defined as areas with unique ethnic identities and distinct historical developments. Their strategic locations make them the first to experience outward migration from the continent's core, and their fertile land continually attracts newcomers, whether they arrive peacefully or with hostility, resulting in significant historical activity. They facilitate constant movement between their vast surrounding areas and the land extending beyond them, energized by new arrivals and fresh perspectives. However, tragedy also marks their history. The Po Valley has been referred to as "the cockpit of Europe." Even the small Eider, which sits at the base of Jutland, has been a battleground between Danes and Germans since the tenth century.790 The Indus Valley has repeatedly experienced the impact of conflicts with invading forces from the central highlands and has witnessed the rise and fall of various empires. There has never been lasting peace at the gates of the Balkan Peninsula, and the eastern door of Korea has been attacked often enough.

Peninsular extremities as areas of isolation.

In contrast to these continental sections which stand in contact with the solid land-mass behind, the extremities of the peninsulas are areas of isolation and therefore generally of ethnic unity. They often represent the last stand of displaced people pressed outward into these narrow quarters by expanding races in their rear. The vast triangle of the Deccan, which forms the essentially peninsular part of India, is occupied, except in the more exposed northwest corner, by the Dravidian race which once occupied all India, and afterward was pushed southward by the influx of more energetic peoples.791 Here they have preserved their speech and nationality unmixed and live in almost primitive simplicity.792 In the peninsular parts of Great Britain, in northern Scotland. Wales and Cornwall, we find people of Celtic speech brought to bay on these remote spurs of the land, affiliating little with the varied folk which occupied the continental side of the island, and resisting conquest to the last.793 The mountainous peninsula of western Connaught in Ireland has been the rocky nucleus of the largest Celtic-speaking community in the island.794 Brittany, with a similar location, became the last refuge of Celtic speech on the mainland of Europe,795 the seat of resistance to Norman and later to English conquest, finally the stronghold of conservatism in the French Revolution.

In contrast to the continental areas that connect with the solid land behind them, the ends of the peninsulas are isolated zones and generally showcase ethnic unity. They often represent the last refuge of displaced people forced into these narrow spaces by expanding populations behind them. The large triangle of the Deccan, which makes up the essentially peninsular part of India, is inhabited, except for the exposed northwest corner, by the Dravidian people, who once populated all of India and were later pushed southward by the arrival of more dominant groups.791 Here, they have maintained their language and nationality without mixing and live in nearly primitive simplicity.792 In the peninsular regions of Great Britain, particularly in northern Scotland, Wales, and Cornwall, we find people of Celtic heritage isolated on these remote land extensions, largely disconnected from the diverse groups occupying the continental side of the island and resisting conquest until the end.793 The mountainous peninsula of western Connaught in Ireland has been the rocky heart of the largest Celtic-speaking community on the island.794 Brittany, located in a similar way, became the last stronghold of the Celtic language on the European mainland,795 serving as a center of resistance to Norman and later English conquest, and eventually becoming the bastion of conservatism during the French Revolution.

Ethnic unity of peninsulas.

The northern wall of the Apennines and the outpost barrier of the Alps have combined to protect peninsular Italy from extensive ethnic infusions from the direction of the continent. This portion of the country shows therefore, as the anthropological maps attest, a striking uniformity of race. It has been a melting-pot in which foreign elements, filtering through the breaches of the Apennines or along the southern coast, have been fused into the general population under the isolating and cohesive influences of a peninsular environment.796 The population of the Iberian Peninsula is even more unified, probably the most homogeneous in Europe. Here the long-headed Mediterranean race is found in the same purity as in island Corsica and Sardinia.797 Spain's short line of contact with France and its sharp separation by the unbroken wall of the Pyrenees robs the peninsula of any distinctly continental section, and consequently of any transitional area of race and culture; hence the unity of Spain as opposed to that twofold balanced diversity which we find in Italy and India. The Balkan Peninsula, on the other hand, owing to the great predominance of its continental section and the confused relief of the country, has not protected its distinctively peninsular or Greek section from the southward migrations of Slavs, Albanians, Wallachians, and other continental peoples.798 It has been like a big funnel with a small mouth; the pressure from above has been very great. Hellas and even the Peloponnesus have had their peninsularity impaired and their race mixed, owing to the predominant continental section to the north.

The northern wall of the Apennines and the barrier of the Alps have combined to shield peninsular Italy from significant ethnic influxes from the continent. This part of the country shows, as the anthropological maps confirm, a remarkable uniformity of race. It has acted as a melting pot where foreign elements, flowing through the gaps of the Apennines or along the southern coast, have blended into the general population under the isolating and unifying influences of a peninsular environment.796 The population of the Iberian Peninsula is even more uniform, likely the most homogeneous in Europe. Here the long-headed Mediterranean race exists in the same purity as in the islands of Corsica and Sardinia.797 Spain's brief contact with France and its clear separation by the continuous wall of the Pyrenees prevent the peninsula from having any distinctly continental section, and, as a result, any transitional area of race and culture; thus, Spain displays a unity that contrasts with the dual diversity found in Italy and India. The Balkan Peninsula, however, due to the strong predominance of its continental part and the complex topography of the region, has not safeguarded its distinctly peninsular or Greek section from the southward migrations of Slavs, Albanians, Wallachians, and other continental peoples.798 It has functioned like a large funnel with a small opening; the pressure from above has been very intense. Hellas and even the Peloponnesus have seen their peninsularity compromised and their race mixed, due to the dominant continental region to the north.

Peninsulas as intermediaries.

Peninsulas, so far as they project from their continents, are areas of isolation; but so far as they extend also toward some land beyond, they become intermediaries. The isolating and intermediary aspects can be traced in the anthropo-geographical effects of every peninsula, even those which, like Brittany and Cornwall, project into the long uncharted waste of the Atlantic. In the order of historical development, a peninsula first isolates, until in its secluded environment it has molded a mature, independent people; then, as that people outgrows its narrow territory, the peninsula becomes a favorable base for maritime expansion to distant lands, or becomes a natural avenue for numerous reciprocal relations with neighboring lands beyond. Korea was the bridge for Mongolian migration from continental Asia to the Japan islands, and for the passage thither of Chinese culture, whether intellectual, esthetic, industrial or religious.799 It has been the one country conspicuous in the foreign history of Japan. Conquered by the island empire in 1592, it paid tribute for nearly three centuries and yielded to its foreign master the southeastern port of Fusan, the Calais of Korea.800 Since the treaty of Portsmouth in 1905 made it subject to Japan, it has become the avenue of Japanese expansion to the mainland and the unwilling recipient of the modern civilization thrust upon it by these English of the East. In like manner the Pyrenean peninsula has always been the intermediary between Europe and northwest Africa. Its population, as well as its flora and fauna, group with those of the southern continent. It has served as transit land between north and south for the Carthaginians, Vandals and Saracens; and in modern times it has maintained its character as a link by the Portuguese occupation of the Tangiers peninsula in the fifteenth century,801 and the Spanish possession of Ceuta and various other points along the Moroccan coast from the year 709 A.D. to the present.802

Peninsulas, as they extend from their continents, are areas of separation; but when they reach toward land beyond, they become bridges. You can see both the isolating and bridging aspects in the anthropo-geographical impact of every peninsula, even those like Brittany and Cornwall that stretch into the vast, uncharted Atlantic. In terms of historical development, a peninsula initially isolates, allowing the secluded environment to shape a mature, independent community. Then, as the community outgrows its limited space, the peninsula becomes a favorable base for maritime expansion to distant lands or serves as a natural route for various reciprocal relationships with neighboring lands. Korea acted as the link for Mongolian migration from continental Asia to Japan's islands, and for the movement of Chinese culture—whether intellectual, artistic, industrial, or religious.799 It has been the one country notably present in Japan's foreign history. Conquered by the island empire in 1592, it paid tribute for nearly three centuries and ceded to its foreign ruler the southeastern port of Fusan, the Calais of Korea.800 Since the Treaty of Portsmouth in 1905 made it subject to Japan, it has become a route for Japanese expansion into the mainland and an unwilling recipient of the modern civilization imposed on it by these "English of the East." Similarly, the Pyrenean peninsula has consistently been the link between Europe and northwest Africa. Its people, as well as its flora and fauna, associate with those of the southern continent. It has served as transit land between the north and south for the Carthaginians, Vandals, and Saracens; and in modern times, it has preserved its role as a link through the Portuguese occupation of the Tangiers peninsula in the fifteenth century,801 and the Spanish control of Ceuta and other locations along the Moroccan coast from 709 A.D. to the present.802

Peninsulas of intercontinental location.

This rôle of intermediary is inevitably thrust upon all peninsulas which, like Spain, Italy, Greece, Asia Minor, Arabia, Farther India, Malacca, Chukchian Siberia, and Alaska, occupy an intercontinental location. Arabia especially in its climate, flora, races and history shows the haul and pull now of Asia, now of Africa. From it Asiatic influences have spread over Africa to Morocco and the Niger River on the west, and to Zanzibar on the south, permeated Abyssinia, and penetrated to the great Equatorial Lakes, whether in the form of that Mecca-born worship of Allah, or the creeping caravans and slave-gangs of Arab trader. Of all such intercontinental peninsulas, Florida alone seems to have had no rôle as an intermediary. Its native ethnic affinities were wholly with its own continent. It has given nothing to South America and received nothing thence. The northward expansion of Arawak and Carib tribes from Venezuela in historic times ceased at Cuba and Hayti. The Straits drew a dividing line. Local conditions in Florida itself probably furnish the explanation of this anomaly. Extensive swamps made the central and southern portion of the peninsula inhospitable to colonization from either direction, transformed it from a link into a barrier.

This role of intermediary is inevitably placed on all peninsulas that, like Spain, Italy, Greece, Asia Minor, Arabia, Farther India, Malacca, Chukchian Siberia, and Alaska, sit at an intercontinental crossroads. Arabia, in particular, with its climate, plants, peoples, and history, shows the influence of both Asia and Africa. From there, Asian cultures have spread across Africa to Morocco and the Niger River in the west, and to Zanzibar in the south, influencing Abyssinia and reaching the great Equatorial Lakes, whether through the Mecca-born worship of Allah or the traveling caravans and slave-traders of Arab merchants. Among all these intercontinental peninsulas, Florida seems to have had no role as an intermediary. Its native ethnic ties were completely with its own continent. It has given nothing to South America and received nothing in return. The northward movement of Arawak and Carib tribes from Venezuela in historical times halted at Cuba and Haiti. The Straits formed a dividing line. Local conditions in Florida likely explain this oddity. Extensive swamps made the central and southern parts of the peninsula unwelcoming for colonization from either direction, turning it from a link into a barrier.

Atlantic peninsulas of Europe

Peninsulas which conspicuously lack an intercontinental location must long await their intermediary phase of development, but do not escape it. The Cornish, Breton and Iberian peninsulas were all prominent in the trans-Atlantic enterprises of Europe from the end of the fifteenth century. The first French sailors to reach the new world were Breton and Norman fishermen. Plymouth, as the chief port of the Cornish peninsula, figures prominently in the history of English exploration and settlement in America. It seems scarcely accidental that most of Queen Elizabeth's great sea captains were natives of this district—Sir Francis Drake, Sir John Hawkins, Sir Humphrey Gilbert, and Sir Walter Raleigh, the latter holding the office of vice-admiral of Cornwall and Devon. It was the peninsula-like projection of South America about Cape St. Roque, twenty degrees farther east than Labrador, that welcomed the ships of Cabral and Americus Vespucius, and secured to Portugal a foothold in the Western Hemisphere.

Peninsulas that clearly lack an intercontinental location must wait a long time for their transitional development phase, but they can’t avoid it. The Cornish, Breton, and Iberian peninsulas played significant roles in Europe’s trans-Atlantic ventures starting in the late fifteenth century. The first French sailors to arrive in the New World were Breton and Norman fishermen. Plymouth, as the main port of the Cornish peninsula, is key in the history of English exploration and settlement in America. It’s hardly a coincidence that most of Queen Elizabeth's great sea captains came from this area—Sir Francis Drake, Sir John Hawkins, Sir Humphrey Gilbert, and Sir Walter Raleigh, who served as vice-admiral of Cornwall and Devon. It was the peninsula-like projection of South America around Cape St. Roque, which is twenty degrees farther east than Labrador, that welcomed the ships of Cabral and Americus Vespucius, granting Portugal a foothold in the Western Hemisphere.


NOTES TO CHAPTER XII

Notes for Chapter 12


747.

Ratzel, History of Mankind, Vol. I, p. 336. London, 1896-1898.

Ratzel, History of Mankind, Vol. I, p. 336. London, 1896-1898.

748.

D.G. Brinton, The American Race, p. 41. Philadelphia, 1901.

D.G. Brinton, The American Race, p. 41. Philadelphia, 1901.

749.

D.G. Brinton, Races and Peoples, pp. 239-240. Philadelphia, 1901. Ratzel, History of Mankind, Vol. I, p. 336. London, 1896-1898.

D.G. Brinton, Races and Peoples, pp. 239-240. Philadelphia, 1901. Ratzel, History of Mankind, Vol. I, p. 336. London, 1896-1898.

750.

A.E. Wallace, Island Life, p. 14. New York, 1892.

A.E. Wallace, Island Life, p. 14. New York, 1892.

751.

A. Heilprin, Geographical Distribution of Animals, p. 69, map. 1887.

A. Heilprin, Geographical Distribution of Animals, p. 69, map. 1887.

752.

Ibid., pp. 78, 82, 90, 100.

Ibid., pp. 78, 82, 90, 100.

753.

Darwin, Origin of Species, Chap. XII. New York, 1895. A.R. Wallace, Island Life, p. 6. New York, 1892.

Darwin, Origin of Species, Chap. XII. New York, 1895. A.R. Wallace, Island Life, p. 6. New York, 1892.

754.

W.Z. Ripley, Races of Europe, Map on p. 43. New York, 1899.

W.Z. Ripley, Races of Europe, Map on p. 43. New York, 1899.

755.

Ibid., pp. 39, 50, 80. Ratzel, History of Mankind, Vol. II, pp. 100-110. London, 1896-1898.

Ibid., pp. 39, 50, 80. Ratzel, History of Mankind, Vol. II, pp. 100-110. London, 1896-1898.

756.

A.H. Keane, Ethnology, pp. 231-232, 362. Cambridge, 1896.

A.H. Keane, Ethnology, pp. 231-232, 362. Cambridge, 1896.

757.

McGee and Thomas, Prehistoric North America, p. 56, Vol. XIX of History of North America. Philadelphia, 1905.757

McGee and Thomas, Prehistoric North America, p. 56, Vol. XIX of History of North America. Philadelphia, 1905.757

758.

Fiske, Discovery of America, Vol. I, p. 224. Boston, 1893.

Fiske, Discovery of America, Vol. I, p. 224. Boston, 1893.

759.

For various Asiatic and Oceanic elements, see Franz Boas, The Indians of British Columbia, Bull. of the Amer. Geog. Society Vol. 28, p. 229. The Northwest Coast Tribes, Science, Vol. XII, pp. 194-196. Niblack, The Indians of the Northwest Coast, p. 385, Washington. H.H. Bancroft, The Native Races, Vol. I, pp. 177, 178, footnote; pp. 210, 225. San Francisco, 1886. W.Z. Ripley, Races of Europe, map p. 42. New York, 1899.

For various Asian and Pacific elements, see Franz Boas, The Indians of British Columbia, Bull. of the Amer. Geog. Society Vol. 28, p. 229. The Northwest Coast Tribes, Science, Vol. XII, pp. 194-196. Niblack, The Indians of the Northwest Coast, p. 385, Washington. H.H. Bancroft, The Native Races, Vol. I, pp. 177, 178, footnote; pp. 210, 225. San Francisco, 1886. W.Z. Ripley, Races of Europe, map p. 42. New York, 1899.

760.

T.W. Higginson and William Macdonald, History of the United States, p. 21. New York and London, 1905.

T.W. Higginson and William Macdonald, History of the United States, p. 21. New York and London, 1905.

761.

Edward John Payne, History of the New World Called America, Vol. II, pp. 64-68, 74-77, 305, 388-389. Oxford, 1899.

Edward John Payne, History of the New World Called America, Vol. II, pp. 64-68, 74-77, 305, 388-389. Oxford, 1899.

762.

Justin Winsor, Narrative and Critical History, Vol. I, p. 60. Boston, 1889.

Justin Winsor, Narrative and Critical History, Vol. I, p. 60. Boston, 1889.

763.

Cited by E.J. Payne, History of the New World Called America, Vol. II, p. 292, footnote p. 294. Oxford, 1899.

Cited by E.J. Payne, History of the New World Called America, Vol. II, p. 292, footnote p. 294. Oxford, 1899.

764.

Waldemar Jochelson, The Mythology of the Koryak, The American Anthropologist, Vol. VI, pp. 415-416, 421-425. 1904.

Waldemar Jochelson, The Mythology of the Koryak, The American Anthropologist, Vol. VI, pp. 415-416, 421-425. 1904.

765.

W.D. Dall, Masks, Labrets, and Certain Aboriginal Customs, Third Annual Report of Bureau of Ethnology, pp. 46-147. Washington, 1884.

W.D. Dall, Masks, Labrets, and Certain Aboriginal Customs, Third Annual Report of Bureau of Ethnology, pp. 46-147. Washington, 1884.

766.

O.T. Mason, Migration and the Food Quest, pp. 275-292. Washington, 1894.

O.T. Mason, Migration and the Food Quest, pp. 275-292. Washington, 1894.

767.

McGee and Thomas, Prehistoric North America, pp. 51, 58-82. Philadelphia, 1905. Ratzel, History of Mankind, Vol. I, pp. 5-7, 145-147, 153-154. London, 1896-1898.

McGee and Thomas, Prehistoric North America, pp. 51, 58-82. Philadelphia, 1905. Ratzel, History of Mankind, Vol. I, pp. 5-7, 145-147, 153-154. London, 1896-1898.

768.

Ripley, Races of Europe, map p. 42, pp. 43-44. New York, 1899.

Ripley, Races of Europe, map p. 42, pp. 43-44. New York, 1899.

769.

Ratzel, History of Mankind, Vol. I, p. 7. London, 1896-1898.

Ratzel, History of Mankind, Vol. I, p. 7. London, 1896-1898.

770.

Tylor, Anthropology, pp. 86-87. New York, 1881.

Tylor, Anthropology, pp. 86-87. New York, 1881.

771.

E.J. Payne, History of the New World Called America, Vol. II, pp. 554-555. Oxford, 1899.

E.J. Payne, History of the New World Called America, Vol. II, pp. 554-555. Oxford, 1899.

772.

Justus Perthes, Taschen Atlas, p. 17. Gotha, 1905.

Justus Perthes, Taschen Atlas, p. 17. Gotha, 1905.

773.

Carl Ritter, Comparative Geography, pp. 188-212. Translated by W.L. Gage, Philadelphia, 1865. N.S. Shaler, Nature and Man in America, pp. 11-18, 151-165. New York, 1896.

Carl Ritter, Comparative Geography, pp. 188-212. Translated by W.L. Gage, Philadelphia, 1865. N.S. Shaler, Nature and Man in America, pp. 11-18, 151-165. New York, 1896.

774.

Strabo, Book II, chap. V. 26.

Strabo, Book II, chap. V. 26.

775.

McGee and Thomas, Prehistoric North America, p. 3, map. Philadelphia, 1905.

McGee and Thomas, Prehistoric North America, p. 3, map. Philadelphia, 1905.

776.

D.G. Brinton, Races and Peoples, pp. 248-249. Philadelphia, 1901.

D.G. Brinton, Races and Peoples, pp. 248-249. Philadelphia, 1901.

777.

D.G. Brinton, The American Race, pp. 58, 103-104. Philadelphia, 1901. McGee and Thomas, Prehistoric North America, p. 86. Philadeladelphia, 1905 Ratzel, History of Mankind, Vol. I, pp. 5-7, 145-147, 153.

D.G. Brinton, The American Race, pp. 58, 103-104. Philadelphia, 1901. McGee and Thomas, Prehistoric North America, p. 86. Philadelphia, 1905 Ratzel, History of Mankind, Vol. I, pp. 5-7, 145-147, 153.

778.

Ibid., p. 293. E.J. Payne, History of the New World Called America, Vol. II, p. 315. Oxford, 1899.

Ibid., p. 293. E.J. Payne, History of the New World Called America, Vol. II, p. 315. Oxford, 1899.

779.

Ibid., Vol. II, pp. 412-417. McGee and Thomas, Prehistoric North America, pp. 72-75. Philadelphia, 1905.

Ibid., Vol. II, pp. 412-417. McGee and Thomas, Prehistoric North America, pp. 72-75. Philadelphia, 1905.

780.

W.H. Dall, Masks, Labrets, and Certain Aboriginal Customs, Third Annual Report of Bureau of Ethnology, pp. 146-147. Washington, 1884.

W.H. Dall, Masks, Labrets, and Certain Aboriginal Customs, Third Annual Report of the Bureau of Ethnology, pp. 146-147. Washington, 1884.

781.

Cyrus Thomas, Report of Mound Explorations, pp. 522-523, 722-728. Twelfth Annual Report of the Bureau of Ethnology, Washington, 1894.

Cyrus Thomas, Report of Mound Explorations, pp. 522-523, 722-728. Twelfth Annual Report of the Bureau of Ethnology, Washington, 1894.

782.

E.J. Payne, History of the New World Called America, Vol. II, pp. 382-383. Oxford, 1899.

E.J. Payne, History of the New World Called America, Vol. II, pp. 382-383. Oxford, 1899.

783.

N.S. Shaler, Nature and Man in America, pp. 151, 168-173. New York, 1891.

N.S. Shaler, Nature and Man in America, pp. 151, 168-173. New York, 1891.

784.

Justus Perthes, Taschen Atlas, p. 9. Gotha, 1905.

Justus Perthes, Taschen Atlas, p. 9. Gotha, 1905.

785.

Carl Ritter, Comparative Geography, pp. 191-192. Translated by W. L. Gage, Philadelphia, 1865.

Carl Ritter, Comparative Geography, pp. 191-192. Translated by W. L. Gage, Philadelphia, 1865.

786.

W.Z. Ripley, Races of Europe, pp. 247-258. New York, 1899.

W.Z. Ripley, Races of Europe, pp. 247-258. New York, 1899.

787.

Ibid., pp. 403-409.

Ibid., pp. 403-409.

788.

E.A. Freeman, Historical Geography of Europe, Atlas, Maps, 34, 49. London, 1882.

E.A. Freeman, Historical Geography of Europe, Atlas, Maps, 34, 49. London, 1882.

789.

For race elements in Mesopotamia, see D.G. Hogarth, The Nearer East, Maps, pp. 173 and 176. London, 1903.

For race elements in Mesopotamia, see D.G. Hogarth, The Nearer East, Maps, pp. 173 and 176. London, 1903.

790.

E.A. Freeman, Historical Geography of Europe, pp. 201-202, 506-508, 535-536, 541. London, 1882.

E.A. Freeman, Historical Geography of Europe, pp. 201-202, 506-508, 535-536, 541. London, 1882.

791.

Imperial Gazetteer of India, Vol. I, pp. 293-297. Oxford, 1907.

Imperial Gazetteer of India, Vol. I, pp. 293-297. Oxford, 1907.

792.

Sir Thomas Holdich, India, Ethnographical map, p. 201, pp. 202, 213-216. London, 1905. B.H. Baden-Powell, The Indian Village Community, pp. 111, 116, 119, 161. London, 1896.

Sir Thomas Holdich, India, Ethnographical map, p. 201, pp. 202, 213-216. London, 1905. B.H. Baden-Powell, The Indian Village Community, pp. 111, 116, 119, 161. London, 1896.

793.

W.Z. Ripley, Races of Europe, pp. 312-321. New York, 1899. E. Reclus, Europe, Vol. IV, pp. 73, 83-84. New York, 1882.

W.Z. Ripley, Races of Europe, pp. 312-321. New York, 1899. E. Reclus, Europe, Vol. IV, pp. 73, 83-84. New York, 1882.

794.

H.J. Mackinder, Britain and the British Seas, Ethnographic map, p. 184, and p. 306. London, 1904.

H.J. Mackinder, Britain and the British Seas, Ethnographic map, p. 184, and p. 306. London, 1904.

795.

W.Z. Ripley, Races of Europe, pp. 22, 23, 150-151. New York, 1899.

W.Z. Ripley, Races of Europe, pp. 22, 23, 150-151. New York, 1899.

796.

Ibid., pp. 248, 258, 272.

Ibid., pp. 248, 258, 272.

797.

Ibid., pp. 247, 273.

Ibid., pp. 247, 273.

798.

Ibid., pp. 403-409, and map.

, pp. 403-409, and map.

799.

F. Brinkley, Japan, Vol. I, pp. 38-42, 70, 75-80, 83-84, 126. Boston and Tokyo, 1901. W.E. Griffis, The Mikado's Empire, Vol. I, pp. 73, 83. New York, 1903.

F. Brinkley, Japan, Vol. I, pp. 38-42, 70, 75-80, 83-84, 126. Boston and Tokyo, 1901. W.E. Griffis, The Mikado's Empire, Vol. I, pp. 73, 83. New York, 1903.

800.

Henry Dyer, Dai Nippon, pp. 59, 69. New York, 1904.

Henry Dyer, Dai Nippon, pp. 59, 69. New York, 1904.

801.

E.A. Freeman, Historical Geography of Europe, p. 558. London, 1882.

E.A. Freeman, Historical Geography of Europe, p. 558. London, 1882.

802.

Ibid., pp. 559, 561. Gibbon, Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, Vol. V, p. 248. New York, 1858.

Ibid., pp. 559, 561. Gibbon, Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, Vol. V, p. 248. New York, 1858.


Chapter XIII—Island Peoples

Physical relationship between islands and peninsulas.

The characteristics which mark peninsulas, namely, ample contact with the sea, small area as compared with that of the continents, peripheral location, more or less complete isolation, combined, however, with the function of bridge or passway to yet remoter lands, are all accentuated in islands. A list of the chief peninsulas of the world, as compared with the greatest islands, shows a far larger scale of areas for the former, even if the latter be made to include the vast ice-capped land-mass of Greenland (2,170,000 square kilometers or 846,000 square miles). New Guinea, the largest habitable island, has only one-fourth the area of Arabia, the largest of the peninsulas.803 Therefore, both the advantages and disadvantages incident to a restricted area may be expected to appear in an intensified degree in islands.

The features that define peninsulas, such as their extensive contact with the sea, smaller size compared to continents, edge location, relative isolation, yet serving as a bridge to more distant lands, are even more pronounced in islands. A comparison of the main peninsulas in the world to the largest islands reveals that the former have significantly greater areas, even when considering Greenland's massive ice-covered land of 2,170,000 square kilometers (or 846,000 square miles). New Guinea, the biggest inhabited island, is only about one-fourth the size of Arabia, the largest peninsula. Therefore, both the benefits and drawbacks of having a limited area are likely to be more intensified in islands.

Peninsulas are morphologically transition forms between mainland and islands; by slight geological changes one is converted into the other. Great Britain was a peninsula at the end of the Tertiary period, before subsidence and the erosion of Dover Channel combined to sever it from the continent. It bears to-day in its flora and fauna the evidence of its former broad connection with the mainland.804 In Pliocene times, Sicily and Sardinia were united by a land bridge with the Tunisian projection of North Africa; and they too, in their animal and plant life, reveal the old connection with the southern continent.805 Sometimes man himself for his own purposes converts a peninsula into an island. Often he constructs a canal, like that at Kiel or Corinth, to remove an isthmian obstruction to navigation; but occasionally he transforms his peninsula into an island for the sake of greater protection. William of Rubruquis tells us that in 1253 he found the neck of the Crimea cut through by a ditch from sea to sea by the native Comanians, who had taken refuge in the peninsula from the Tartar invaders, and in this way had sought to make their asylum more secure.806

Peninsulas are transitional landforms between the mainland and islands; a few geological changes can turn one into the other. Great Britain was a peninsula at the end of the Tertiary period, before sinking and the erosion of the Dover Channel combined to separate it from the continent. Today, its flora and fauna show the evidence of its previous extensive connection with the mainland.804 In Pliocene times, Sicily and Sardinia were joined by a land bridge to the Tunisian part of North Africa; and they too, in their animal and plant life, show signs of their old connection with the southern continent.805 Sometimes, humans create islands from peninsulas for their own reasons. They often dig canals, like those at Kiel or Corinth, to eliminate an isthmian barrier to navigation; but sometimes they turn their peninsula into an island for better protection. William of Rubruquis tells us that in 1253 he found the neck of the Crimea cut through by a ditch from sea to sea, made by the local Comanians, who had taken refuge in the peninsula from the Tartar invaders, seeking to make their hiding place more secure.806

The reverse process in nature is quite as common. The Shangtung Peninsula rises like a mountainous island from the sea-like level of alluvial plains about it, suggesting that remote time when the plains were not yet deposited and an arm of the Yellow Sea covered the space between Shangtung and the highlands of Shansi.807 The deposition of silt, aided often by slight local elevation of the coast, is constantly tying continental islands to the mainland. The Echinades Archipelago off the southwest coast of ancient Acarnania, opposite the mouth of the Achelous River, Strabo tells us, was formerly farther from shore than in his time, and was gradually being cemented to the mainland by Achelous silt. Some islets had already been absorbed in the advancing shoreline, and the same fate awaited others.808 Farther up this western coast of Greece, the island of Leukas has been converted into a peninsula by a sickle-shaped sandbar extending across the narrow channel.809 Nature is working in its leisurely way to attach Sakhalin to the Siberian coast. The strong marine current which sets southward from the Okhotsk Sea through the Strait of Tartary carries silt from the mouth of the heavy laden Amur River, and deposits it in the "narrows" of the strait between Capes Luzarev and Pogobi, building up sandbars that come dangerously near the surface in mid channel.810 Here the water is so shallow that occasionally after long prevailing winds, the ground is left exposed and the island natives can walk over to Asia.811 The close proximity of Sakhalin to the mainland and the ice bridge covering the strait in winter rob the island of much of its insular character and caused it to pass as a peninsula until 1852. Yet that five-mile wide stretch of sea on its western coast determined its selection as the great penal station of the Russian Empire. The fact that peninsular India accords in so many points of flora, fauna and even primitive ethnic stock with Madagascar and South Africa, indicates its former island nature, which has been geographically cloaked by its union with the continent of Asia.

The reverse process in nature is just as common. The Shangtung Peninsula rises like a mountainous island from the flat alluvial plains surrounding it, hinting at a time long ago when the plains hadn’t formed yet and a branch of the Yellow Sea covered the area between Shangtung and the highlands of Shansi.807 The buildup of silt, often helped by slight local rises in the coast, is constantly connecting continental islands to the mainland. The Echinades Archipelago off the southwest coast of ancient Acarnania, across from the mouth of the Achelous River, Strabo tells us, used to be farther from the shore than it was in his time, and it was gradually being joined to the mainland by silt from the Achelous. Some islets had already been taken in by the advancing shoreline, and the same fate awaited others.808 Further up this western coast of Greece, the island of Leukas has become a peninsula due to a sickle-shaped sandbar stretching across the narrow channel.809 Nature is slowly working to connect Sakhalin to the Siberian coast. The strong marine current flowing south from the Okhotsk Sea through the Strait of Tartary carries silt from the heavily loaded Amur River and deposits it in the "narrows" of the strait between Capes Luzarev and Pogobi, creating sandbars that come dangerously close to the surface in the middle of the channel.810 Here the water is so shallow that sometimes, after strong winds have blown for a long time, the ground is left exposed and the island natives can walk over to Asia.811 The close distance of Sakhalin to the mainland and the ice bridge covering the strait in winter take away much of its island character and allowed it to be considered a peninsula until 1852. However, that five-mile-wide stretch of sea on its western coast determined its designation as the major penal colony of the Russian Empire. The fact that peninsular India has many similarities in flora, fauna, and even early ethnic groups with Madagascar and South Africa suggests its former island status, which has been geographically masked by its connection with the continent of Asia.

Character of insular flora and fauna.

Islands, because of their relatively limited area and their clearly defined boundaries, are excellent fields for the study of floral, faunal, and ethnic distribution. Small area and isolation cause in them poverty of animal and plant forms and fewer species than are found in an equal continental area. This is the curse of restricted space which we have met before. The large island group of New Zealand, with its highly diversified relief and long zonal stretch, has only a moderate list of flowering plants, in comparison with the numerous species that adorn equal areas in South Africa and southwestern Australia.812 Ascension possessed originally less than six flowering plants. The four islands of the Greater Antilles form together a considerable area and have all possible advantages of climate and soil; but there are probably no continental areas equally big and equally favored by nature which are so poor in all the more highly organized groups of animals.813 Islands tend to lop off the best branches. Darwin found not a single indubitable case of terrestrial mammals native to islands situated more than three hundred miles from the mainland.814 The impoverishment extends therefore to quality as well as quantity, to man as well as to brute. In the island continent of Australia, the native mammalia, excepting some bats, a few rodents, and a wild dog, all belong to the primitive marsupial sub-class; its human life, at the time of the discovery, was restricted to one retarded negroid race, showing in every part of the island a monotonous, early Stone Age development. The sparsely scattered oceanic islands of the Atlantic, owing to excessive isolation, were all, except the near-lying Canaries, uninhabited at the time of their discovery; and the Canary Islanders showed great retardation as compared with their parent stock of northern Africa. [See map page 105.]

Islands, due to their relatively small size and clearly defined borders, are great places for studying the distribution of plants, animals, and cultures. Their limited area and isolation lead to fewer species of plants and animals compared to the same size of mainland areas. This is the drawback of having restricted space that we've discussed before. The large island group of New Zealand has a diverse landscape and a wide range of climates but only a moderate number of flowering plants compared to the many species found in similarly sized areas of South Africa and southwestern Australia.812 Ascension originally had fewer than six flowering plants. The four islands of the Greater Antilles cover a significant area and have all the advantages of good climate and soil; however, there are no equally large and favorably situated continental areas that are as poor in more advanced animal groups.813 Islands often miss out on the best species. Darwin discovered not a single clear case of native terrestrial mammals on islands more than three hundred miles from the mainland.814 This lack of diversity affects both quality and quantity, impacting both animals and humans. In the island continent of Australia, the native mammals, aside from some bats, a few rodents, and a wild dog, are mostly primitive marsupials. When discovered, its human population was limited to one underdeveloped Black race, showing a uniformly early Stone Age way of life throughout the island. The widely scattered oceanic islands of the Atlantic, due to extreme isolation, were all uninhabited at the time of their discovery except for the nearby Canaries, and the Canary Islanders were significantly less advanced than their northern African ancestors. [See map page 105.]

Endemic forms.

Despite this general poverty of species, island life is distinguished by a great proportion of peculiar or endemic forms, and a tendency toward divergence, which is the effect of isolation and which becomes marked in proportion to the duration and effectiveness of isolation. Isolation, by reducing or preventing the intercrossing which holds the individual true to the normal type of the species, tends to produce divergences.815 Hence island life is more or less differentiated from that of the nearest mainland, according to the degree of isolation. Continental islands, lying near the coast, possess generally a flora and fauna to a large extent identical with that of the mainland, and show few endemic species and genera; whereas remote oceanic islands, which isolation has claimed for its own, are marked by intense specialization and a high percentage of species and even genera found nowhere else.816 Even a narrow belt of dividing sea suffices to loosen the bonds of kinship. Recent as are the British Isles and near the Continent, they show some biological diversity from the mainland and from each other.817

Despite the overall lack of species, island life is notable for having a high number of unique or endemic forms, along with a tendency towards divergence. This divergence is a result of isolation, becoming more pronounced the longer and more effective the isolation is. Isolation reduces or prevents the interbreeding that keeps individuals similar to the typical type of their species, leading to variances.815 As a result, island life differs to varying degrees from that of the nearest mainland, depending on how isolated it is. Continental islands, which are close to the coast, generally have a flora and fauna that closely resemble those of the mainland, with few endemic species and genera. In contrast, remote oceanic islands that have been isolated exhibit significant specialization and a high percentage of species and even genera that aren't found anywhere else.816 Even a narrow stretch of ocean can weaken the bonds of kinship. The British Isles, though recent and relatively close to the continent, still display some biological diversity compared to the mainland and among themselves.817

Paradoxical influences of island habitats upon man.

The influence of an island habitat upon its human occupants resembles that upon its flora and fauna, but is less marked. The reason for this is twofold. The plant and animal life are always the older and therefore have longer felt the effects of isolation; hence they bear its stamp in an intensified degree. Man, as a later comer, shows closer affinity to his kin in the great cosmopolitan areas of the continents. More than this, by reason of his inventiveness and his increasing skill in navigation, he finds his sea boundary less strictly drawn, and therefore evades the full influence of his detached environment, though never able wholly to counteract it. For man in lowest stages of civilization, as for plants and animals, the isolating influence is supreme; but with higher development and advancing nautical efficiency, islands assume great accessibility because of their location on the common highway of the ocean. They become points of departure and destination of maritime navigation, at once center of dispersal and goal, the breeding place of expansive national forces seeking an outlet, and a place of hospitality for wanderers passing those shores. Yet all the while, that other tendency of islands to segregate their people, and in this aloofness to give them a peculiar and indelible national stamp, much as it differentiates its plant and animal forms, is persistently operative.

The impact of an island environment on its human inhabitants is similar to that on its plants and animals, but it's less pronounced. This is for two main reasons. The plant and animal life has existed longer and has thus experienced the effects of isolation more intensely. Humans, being later arrivals, are more closely related to their counterparts in the bustling urban areas of the continents. Additionally, due to human creativity and growing navigation skills, the sea boundary is less restrictive for them, allowing them to escape some of the full effects of their isolated surroundings, though they can never completely overcome it. For those in the early stages of civilization, just like with plants and animals, the isolating influence is overwhelming; however, as people develop more advanced skills and navigation techniques, islands become much more reachable because of their position along the ocean's highways. They turn into key points for maritime travel, acting as both departure and arrival locations, hubs of dispersal, and destinations for expansive national ambitions seeking expression, as well as welcoming stops for travelers crossing those waters. Nevertheless, the tendency of islands to isolate their inhabitants remains strong, and this separation creates a distinct and lasting national identity, similar to how it differentiates their plant and animal species.

Conservative and radical tendencies.

These two antagonistic influences of an island environment may be seen working simultaneously in the same people, now one, now the other being dominant; or a period of undisturbed seclusion or exclusion may suddenly be followed by one of extensive intercourse, receptivity or expansion. Recall the contrast in the early and later history of the Canaries, Azores, Malta, England, Mauritius and Hawaii, now a lonely, half-inhabited waste, now a busy mart or teeming way-station. Consider the pronounced insular mind of the globe-trotting Englishman, the deep-seated local conservatism characterizing that world-colonizing nation, at once the most provincial and cosmopolitan on earth. Emerson says with truth, "Every one of these islanders is an island himself, safe, tranquil, incommunicable."818 Hating innovation, glorifying their habitudes, always searching for a precedent to justify and countenance each forward step, they have nevertheless led the world's march of progress. Scattered by their colonial and commercial enterprises over every zone, in every clime, subjected to the widest range of modifying environments, they show in their ideals the dominant influence of the home country. The trail of the Oxford education can be followed over the Empire, east to New Zealand and west to Vancouver. Highschool students of Jamaica take Oxford examinations in botany which are based upon English plant life and ignore the Caribbean flora! School children in Ceylon are compelled to study a long and unfamiliar list of errors in English speech current only in the London streets, in order to identify and correct them on the Oxford papers, distributed with Olympian impartiality to all parts of the Empire. Such insularity of mind seems to justify Bernard Shaw's description of Britain as an island whose natives regard its manners and customs as laws of nature. Yet these are the people who in the Nile Valley have become masters of irrigation, unsurpassed even by the ancient Egyptians; who, in the snow-wrapped forests of Hudson Bay, are trappers and hunters unequalled by the Indians; who, in the arid grasslands of Australia, pasture their herds like nomad shepherd or American cowboy, and in the Tropics loll like the natives, but somehow manage to do a white man's stint of work.

These two opposing influences of an island environment can be seen working at the same time in the same people, with one or the other taking the lead; or a time of quiet seclusion can suddenly be followed by a period of social interaction, openness, or growth. Think about the differences in the early and later histories of the Canaries, Azores, Malta, England, Mauritius, and Hawaii, which can be desolate and sparsely populated one minute and a bustling hub or busy stopover the next. Consider the distinctive island mentality of the world-traveling Englishman, marked by a strong local conservatism that defines that world-conquering nation, which is both the most provincial and cosmopolitan place on earth. Emerson truthfully states, "Every one of these islanders is an island himself, safe, tranquil, incommunicable." Hating change, celebrating their traditions, and always looking for past examples to justify each step forward, they have nonetheless led the world's progress. Scattered by their colonial and business ventures across every region, in every climate, and exposed to the most varied influences, their ideals still show a clear influence from their home country. The reach of an Oxford education can be traced throughout the Empire, from New Zealand in the east to Vancouver in the west. High school students in Jamaica take Oxford exams in botany that focus on English plant life while ignoring Caribbean flora! School children in Ceylon have to study a long and unfamiliar list of English speech errors that are only common in London, just to correctly identify and fix them on the Oxford papers, which are distributed to all parts of the Empire with impartiality. This insularity seems to support Bernard Shaw’s portrayal of Britain as an island whose inhabitants consider its customs as the laws of nature. Yet these are the same people who have mastered irrigation in the Nile Valley, surpassing even the ancient Egyptians; who are trappers and hunters in the snow-covered forests of Hudson Bay, unrivaled by the Native Americans; who tend their herds across the dry grasslands of Australia like nomadic shepherds or American cowboys, and in the tropics lounge like the locals but still manage to do the work that’s expected of them.

The case of Japan.

In Japan, isolation has excluded or reduced to controllable measure every foreign force that might break the continuity of the national development or invade the integrity of the national ideal. Japan has always borrowed freely from neighboring Asiatic countries and recently from the whole world; yet everything in Japan bears the stamp of the indigenous. The introduction of foreign culture into the Empire has been a process of selection and profound modification to accord with the national ideals and needs.819 Buddhism, coming from the continent, was Japanized by being grafted on to the local stock of religious ideas, so that Japanese Buddhism is strongly differentiated from the continental forms of that religion.820 The seventeenth century Catholicism of the Jesuits, before it was hospitably received, had to be adapted to Japanese standards of duty and ritual. Modern Japanese converts to Christianity wish themselves to conduct the local missions and teach a national version of the new faith.821 But all the while, Japanese religion has experienced no real change of heart. The core of the national faith is the indigenous Shinto cult, which no later interloper has been permitted to dislodge or seriously to transform; and this has survived, wrapped in the national consciousness, wedded to the national patriotism, lifted above competition. Here is insular conservatism.

In Japan, isolation has kept out or limited every foreign influence that could disrupt the nation’s development or threaten its core ideals. Japan has always borrowed freely from neighboring Asian countries and, more recently, from the entire world; however, everything in Japan reflects the local culture. The introduction of foreign culture into the country has involved careful selection and significant modification to align with national ideals and needs.819 Buddhism, which came from the continent, was adapted by merging with local religious beliefs, making Japanese Buddhism distinct from its continental counterparts.820 The Catholicism brought by the Jesuits in the seventeenth century had to be adjusted to fit Japanese notions of duty and ritual before being accepted. Modern Japanese converts to Christianity prefer to lead local missions and promote a Japanese version of the faith.821 Yet, Japanese religion has not undergone any true transformation. The heart of the national faith remains the indigenous Shinto religion, which no later intruder has managed to displace or significantly alter; it has persisted, integrated into national identity, intertwined with patriotism, and elevated above competition. This exemplifies insular conservatism.

Japan's sudden and complete abandonment of a policy of seclusion which had been rigidly maintained for two hundred and fifty years, and her entrance upon a career of widespread intercourse synchronously with one of territorial expansion and extensive emigration, form one of those apparently irreconcilable contradictions constantly springing from the isolation and world-wide accessibility of an island environment; yet underlying Japan's present receptivity of new ideas and her outwardly indiscriminate adoption of western civilization is to be detected the deep primal stamp of the Japanese character, and an instinctive determination to preserve the core of that character intact.

Japan's sudden and complete shift away from a policy of seclusion that had been strictly enforced for two hundred and fifty years, along with its new path of extensive interaction, territorial expansion, and significant emigration, represents one of those seemingly contradictory outcomes that often arise from the isolation and global reach of an island setting. However, beneath Japan's current openness to new ideas and its seemingly indiscriminate embrace of Western culture lies a strong foundational element of the Japanese identity, coupled with an instinctive drive to keep the essence of that identity intact.

Islands as nurseries and disseminators of distinctive civilizations.

It is this marked national individuality, developed by isolation and accompanied often by a precocious civilization, in combination with the opposite fact of the imminent possibility of an expansive unfolding, a brilliant efflorescence followed by a wide dispersal of its seeds of culture and of empire, which has assigned to islands in all times a great historical rôle. Rarely do these wholly originate the elements of civilization. For that their area is too small. But whatever seed ripen in the wide fields of the continents the islands transplant to their own forcing houses; there they transform and perfect the flower. Japan borrowed freely from China and Korea, as England did from continental Europe; but these two island realms have brought Asiatic and European civilization to their highest stage of development. Now the borrowers are making return with generous hand. The islands are reacting upon the continents. Japanese ideals are leavening the whole Orient from Manchuria to Ceylon. English civilization is the standard of Europe. "The Russian in his snows is aiming to be English," says Emerson. "England has inoculated all nations with her civilization, intelligence and tastes."822

It’s this distinct national identity, shaped by isolation and often paired with an advanced civilization, along with the contrast of an impending opportunity for expansive growth and a vibrant blossoming followed by a broad spread of cultural and imperial influence, that has historically given islands a significant role. Rarely do these islands fully generate the elements of civilization themselves because their land is too limited. However, they take whatever seeds mature in the vast fields of the continents and transplant them into their own environment, where they refine and enhance the outcome. Japan took influences from China and Korea, just as England did from continental Europe; yet both of these island nations have elevated Asian and European civilization to their peak. Now, these borrowers are giving back generously. The islands are influencing the continents. Japanese ideals are spreading throughout the entire East, from Manchuria to Ceylon. English civilization sets the standard in Europe. "The Russian in his snows is trying to be English," Emerson says. "England has infected all nations with her civilization, intelligence, and tastes." 822

Ancient Cretan civilization.

The recent discoveries in Crete show beyond doubt that the school of Aegean civilization was in that island. Ancient Phoenicia, Argos, even Mycenae and Tiryns put off their mask of age and appear as rosy boys learning none too aptly of their great and elderly master. Borrowing the seeds of culture from Asia and Egypt,823 Crete nursed and tended them through the Neolithic and Bronze Age, transformed them completely, much as scientific tillage has converted the cotton tree into a low shrub. The precocity of this civilization is clear. At early as 3000 B.C. it included an impressive style of architecture and a decorative art naturalistic and beautiful in treatment as that of modern Japan.824 From this date till the zenith of its development in 1450 B.C., Crete became a great artistic manufacturing and distributing center for stone carving, frescoes, pottery, delicate porcelain, metal work, and gems.825 By 1800 B. C., seven centuries before Phoenician writing is heard of, the island had matured a linear script out of an earlier pictographic form.826 This script, partly indigenous, partly borrowed from Libya and Egypt, gives Crete the distinction of having invented the first system of writing ever practised in Europe.827

The recent discoveries in Crete clearly show that the heart of Aegean civilization was on that island. Ancient Phoenicia, Argos, even Mycenae and Tiryns shed their ancient facades and seem like young boys trying to learn from their wise and aged mentor. By taking cultural influences from Asia and Egypt,823 Crete nurtured and developed them throughout the Neolithic and Bronze Age, transforming them entirely, much like scientific farming has turned the cotton tree into a low shrub. The advanced nature of this civilization is evident. As early as 3000 B.C., it showcased impressive architecture and decorative arts that were as realistic and beautifully crafted as those of modern Japan.824 From this point until its peak in 1450 B.C., Crete emerged as a major center for art manufacturing and distribution, specializing in stone carving, frescoes, pottery, fine porcelain, metalwork, and gems.825 By 1800 B.C., seven centuries before we hear of Phoenician writing, the island had developed a linear script from an earlier pictographic form.826 This script, partly original and partly influenced by Libya and Egypt, gives Crete the honor of having created the first writing system ever used in Europe.827

Yet all this wealth of achievement bore the stamp of the indigenous; nearly every trace of its remote Asiatic or Egyptian origin was obliterated. Here the isolation of an island environment did thoroughly its work of differentiation, even on this thalassic isle which maintained constant intercourse with Egypt, the Cyclades, the Troad and the Greek peninsula.828 Minoan art has a freshness, vivacity, and modernity that distinguishes it fundamentally from the formal products of its neighbors. "Many of the favorite subjects, like the crocus and wild goat, are native to the islands.... Even where a motive was borrowed from Egyptian life, it was treated in a distinctive way," made tender, dramatic, vital. "In religion, as in art generally, Crete translated its loans into indigenous terms, and contributed as much as it received."829 The curator of Egyptian antiquities in the New York Metropolitan Art Museum examined five hundred illustrations of second and third millenium antiquities from Gournia and Vasiliki in Crete, made by Mrs. Harriet Boyd Hawes during her superintendence of the excavations there, and pronounced them distinctly un-Egyptian, except one vase, probably an importation.830 All this was achieved by a small insular segment of the Mediterranean race, in their Neolithic and Bronze Age, before the advent of those northern conquerors who brought in an Aryan speech and the gift of iron. It was in Crete, therefore, that Aegean civilization arose. On this island it had a long and brilliant pre-Hellenic career, and thence it spread to the Greek mainland and other Aegean shores.831

Yet all this wealth of achievement showed the mark of the locals; nearly every hint of its remote Asian or Egyptian origins was erased. The isolation of this island environment did its job of differentiation, even on this coastal isle that maintained constant communication with Egypt, the Cyclades, the Troad, and the Greek mainland.828 Minoan art has a freshness, liveliness, and modernity that fundamentally sets it apart from the formal works of its neighbors. "Many of the popular subjects, like the crocus and wild goat, are native to the islands.... Even when a theme was borrowed from Egyptian life, it was approached in a unique way," made tender, dramatic, and vibrant. "In religion, as in art in general, Crete translated its influences into local terms and contributed as much as it received."829 The curator of Egyptian antiquities at the New York Metropolitan Art Museum reviewed five hundred illustrations of second and third millennium artifacts from Gournia and Vasiliki in Crete, created by Mrs. Harriet Boyd Hawes during her time overseeing the excavations there, and declared them distinctly un-Egyptian, except for one vase, likely an import.830 All this was accomplished by a small islander segment of the Mediterranean population during their Neolithic and Bronze Ages, before the northern conquerors arrived who introduced an Aryan language and the use of iron. Therefore, Aegean civilization originated in Crete. On this island, it had a long and remarkable pre-Hellenic history, and from there it spread to the Greek mainland and other Aegean shores.831

Limitation of small area in insular history.

A small cup soon overflows. Islands may not keep; they are forced to give, live by giving. Here lies their historical significance. They dispense their gifts of culture in levying upon the resources of other lands. But finally more often than not, the limitation of too small a home area steps in to arrest the national development, which then fades and decays. To this rule Great Britain and Japan are notable exceptions, owing partly to the unusual size of their insular territory, partly to a highly advantageous location. Minoan Crete, in that gray antiquity when Homeric history was still unborn, gave out of its abundance in art, government, laws and maritime knowledge to the eastern Mediterranean world, till the springs of inspiration in its own small land were exhausted, and its small population was unable to resist the flood of northern invasion. Then the dispenser of gifts had to become an alms-taker from the younger, larger, more resourceful Hellenic world.

A small cup quickly overflows. Islands may not be sustainable; they have to give, surviving by sharing. This is where their historical importance lies. They share their cultural gifts by drawing on the resources of other lands. But often, the limitations of their small territory hinder national development, leading to decline and decay. Great Britain and Japan are notable exceptions to this rule, partly due to the unusual size of their land and partly because of their advantageous locations. Minoan Crete, in that distant past when Homeric history was still unfolding, shared its wealth in art, governance, laws, and maritime knowledge with the eastern Mediterranean world, until the sources of inspiration in its own small territory were depleted, and its small population couldn't withstand the wave of northern invasions. Then, the giver of gifts had to become a receiver of charity from the younger, larger, and more resourceful Greek world.

The same story of early but short lived preëminence comes from other Aegean islands. Before the rise of Athens, Samos under the great despot Polykrates became "the first of all cities, Hellenic or barbaric," a center of Ionian manners, luxury, art, science and culture, the seat of the first great thalassocracy or sea-power after that of Cretan Minos, a distributing point for commerce and colonies. 832 Much the same history and distinction attached to the island of Rhodes long before the first Olympiad,833 and to the little island of Aegina.834 If we turn to the native races of America, we find that the Haida Indians of the Queen Charlotte Archipelago are markedly superior to their Tlingit and Tsimshean kinsmen of the nearby Alaskan and British Columbian coast. In their many and varied arts they have freely borrowed from their neighbors; but they have developed these loans with such marvelous skill and independence that they greatly surpass their early masters, and are accredited with possessing the creative genius of all this coast. 835 Far away, on the remote southeastern outskirts of the island world of the Pacific, a parallel is presented by little Easter Isle. Once it was densely populated and completely tilled by a people who had achieved singular progress in agriculture, religion, masonry, sculpture in stone and wood carving, even with obsidian tools, and who alone of all the Polynesians had devised a form of hieroglyphical writing. 836 Easter Isle to-day shows only abandoned fields, the silent monuments of its huge stone idols, and the shrunken remnant of a deteriorated people.837

The same story of early but short-lived dominance comes from other Aegean islands. Before Athens rose to power, Samos, under the powerful ruler Polykrates, became "the first of all cities, whether Greek or non-Greek," a hub of Ionian culture, luxury, art, science, and education, as well as the first major sea power after Cretan Minos, serving as a trade center for commerce and colonies. 832 A similar history and status also applied to the island of Rhodes long before the first Olympic Games,833 and to the small island of Aegina.834 If we look at native groups in America, we see that the Haida Indians of the Queen Charlotte Archipelago are noticeably ahead of their Tlingit and Tsimshean relatives from the nearby Alaskan and British Columbian coasts. In their diverse arts, they have taken many ideas from their neighbors; however, they have adapted these influences with such extraordinary skill and creativity that they far exceed their original sources and are recognized for their innovative contributions along the entire coast. 835 On the far southeastern edges of the Pacific island world, a similar case is seen in little Easter Island. It was once densely populated and fully cultivated by a people who had made significant advancements in agriculture, religion, masonry, stone sculpture, and wood carving, even using obsidian tools, and who, unlike any other Polynesians, created a form of hieroglyphic writing. 836 Today, Easter Island exhibits only neglected fields, the silent remnants of its massive stone idols, and the dwindling remains of a declining population.837

Sources of ethnic stock of islands.

Isolation and accessibility are recorded in the ethnic stock of every island. Like its flora and fauna, its aboriginal population shows an affinity to that of the nearest mainland, and this generally in proportion to geographical proximity. The long line of deposit islands, built of the off-scourings of the land, and fringing the German and Netherland coast from Texel to Wangeroog, is inhabited by the same Frisian folk which occupies the nearby shore. The people of the Channel Isles, though long subject to England, belong to the Franco-Gallic stock and the langue d'oïl linguistic family of northern France. The native Canary Islanders, though giving no evidence of previous communication with any continental land at the time of their discovery, could be traced, through their physical features, speech, customs and utensils, to a remote origin in Egypt and the Berber regions of North Africa prior to the Mohammedan conquest.838 Sakhalin harbors to-day, besides the immigrant Russians, five different peoples—Ainos, Gilyaks, Orochons, Tunguse, and Yakuts, all of them offshoots of tribes now or formerly found on the Siberian mainland a few miles away.839

Isolation and accessibility are present in the ethnic background of every island. Similar to its plants and animals, its native population shows a connection to that of the closest mainland, usually in proportion to how geographically close they are. The long chain of deposit islands, formed from the runoff of the land, and bordering the German and Dutch coasts from Texel to Wangeroog, is inhabited by the same Frisian people that live on the nearby shore. The people of the Channel Islands, although having been under English rule for a long time, are part of the Franco-Gallic heritage and belong to the langue d'oïl language family of northern France. The native Canary Islanders, despite showing no signs of contact with any mainland territories at the time of their discovery, can be traced, through their physical traits, language, customs, and tools, back to an ancient origin in Egypt and the Berber regions of North Africa before the Muslim conquest.838 Nowadays, Sakhalin has, in addition to the immigrant Russians, five different groups of people—Ainos, Gilyaks, Orochons, Tungus, and Yakuts—all of whom are descendants of tribes that are currently or were once found on the Siberian mainland just a few miles away.839

Ethnic divergence with increased isolation.

Where the isolation of the island is more pronounced, owing either to a broader and more dangerous channel, as in the case of Madagascar and Formosa, or to the nautical incapacity of the neighboring coast peoples, as in the case of Tasmania and the Canary Islands, the ethnic influence of the mainland is weak, and the ethnic divergence of the insular population therefore more marked, even to the point of total difference in race. But this is generally a case of survival of a primitive stock in the protection of an unattractive island offering to a superior people few allurements to conquest, as illustrated by the ethnic history of the Andaman and Kurile Isles.

Where the island's isolation is more noticeable, whether due to a wider and more dangerous channel, like Madagascar and Formosa, or due to the sailing limitations of the nearby coastal people, like Tasmania and the Canary Islands, the ethnic influence from the mainland is weak. As a result, the ethnic differences among the island's population are often more pronounced, sometimes even leading to entirely different races. However, this usually reflects the survival of a primitive group in the safety of an unattractive island that offers a more advanced people little temptation for conquest, as shown by the ethnic history of the Andaman and Kurile Islands.

Differentiation of peoples and civilizations on islands.

The sea forms the sharpest and broadest boundary; it makes in the island which it surrounds the conditions for differentiation. Thus while an insular population is allied in race and civilization to that of the nearest continent, it nevertheless differs from the same more than the several sub-groups of its continental kindred differ from each other. In other words, isolation makes ethnic and cultural divergence more marked on islands than on continents. The English people, despite their close kinship and constant communication with the Teutonic peoples of the European mainland, deviate from them more than any of these Germanic nations deviate from each other. The Celts of Great Britain and Ireland are sharply distinguished from the whole body of continental Celts in physical features, temperament, and cultural development. In Ireland the primitive Catholic Church underwent a distinctive development. It was closely bound up in the tribal organization of the Irish people, lacked the system, order and magnificence of the Latinized Church, had its peculiar tonsure for monks, and its own date for celebrating Easter for nearly three hundred years after the coming of St. Patrick.840 The Japanese, in their physical and mental characteristics, as in their whole national spirit, are more strikingly differentiated from the Chinese than the agricultural Chinese from the nomadic Buriat shepherds living east of Lake Baikal, though Chinese and Japanese are located much nearer together and are in the same stage of civilization. The Eskimo, who form one of the most homogeneous stocks, and display the greatest uniformity in language and cultural achievements of all the native American groups, have only one differentiated offshoot, the Aleutian Islanders. These, under the protection and isolation of their insular habitat from a very remote period, have developed to a greater extent than their Eskimo brethren of the mainland. The difference is evident in their language, religious ceremonies, and in details of their handiwork, such as embroidery and grass-fiber weaving.841 The Haidas of the Queen Charlotte Archipelago show such a divergence in physique and culture from the related tribes of the mainland, that they have been accredited with a distinct origin from the other coast Indians.842

The sea creates the clearest and widest boundary; it shapes the island it surrounds by fostering conditions for differentiation. So, while an insular population shares racial and cultural ties with the nearest continent, it still differs from it more than the various sub-groups of its continental relatives differ from one another. In other words, isolation results in more pronounced ethnic and cultural divergence on islands than on continents. The English, despite their close connections and ongoing interactions with the Teutonic peoples of mainland Europe, differ from them more than any of these Germanic nations differ from each other. The Celts of Great Britain and Ireland are distinctly different from all continental Celts in physical characteristics, temperament, and cultural development. In Ireland, the early Catholic Church experienced a unique evolution. It was deeply intertwined with the tribal organization of the Irish people, lacking the system, order, and grandeur of the Latinized Church, featuring its own tonsure for monks, and had a different date for celebrating Easter for nearly three hundred years after St. Patrick's arrival.840 The Japanese, in their physical and mental traits, as well as their overall national spirit, are more noticeably different from the Chinese than agricultural Chinese are from the nomadic Buriat shepherds living east of Lake Baikal, even though Chinese and Japanese are much closer to each other and share the same stage of civilization. The Eskimo, who represent one of the most homogeneous groups and show the greatest uniformity in language and cultural achievements among all Native American groups, have only one distinct offshoot, the Aleutian Islanders. These Islanders, under the protection and isolation of their insular environment for a long time, have developed more than their mainland Eskimo relatives. The differences can be seen in their language, religious ceremonies, and in the specifics of their crafts, such as embroidery and grass-fiber weaving.841 The Haidas of the Queen Charlotte Archipelago demonstrate such diversity in physique and culture from related tribes on the mainland that they have been credited with a distinct origin from the other coastal Indians.842

Differentiation of language in islands.

The differentiating influence is conspicuous in the speech of island people, which tends to form a distinct language or dialect or, in an archipelago, a group of dialects. The Channel Isles, along with their distinctive breeds of cattle, has each its own variant of the langue d'oïl.843 According to Boccaccio's narrative of a Portuguese voyage to the Canaries in 1341, the natives of one island could not understand those from another, so different were their languages. The statement was repeated by a later authority in 1455 in regard to the inhabitants of Lancerote, Fuerteventura, Gomera and Ferro, who had then been Christianized. A partial explanation is supplied by the earlier visitors, who found the Canary Guanches with no means of communication between the several islands except by swimming.844 In the Visayan group of the Philippines, inhabited exclusively by the civilized Visayan tribes except for the Negritos in the mountainous interior, the people of Cebu can not understand their brethren in the adjacent islands; in Cuyos and Calmanianes, dialects of the Visayan are spoken.845 [See map page 147.]

The influence of geography is clear in the speech of islanders, which often develops into a unique language or dialect, or in the case of an archipelago, a collection of dialects. The Channel Islands, along with their unique breeds of cattle, each have their own version of the langue d'oïl.843 Boccaccio recounts a Portuguese journey to the Canaries in 1341, noting that the natives of one island couldn’t understand those from another due to the stark differences in their languages. This observation was echoed by another source in 1455 regarding the residents of Lanzarote, Fuerteventura, Gomera, and Ferro, who had already been Christianized by that time. A partial explanation comes from earlier visitors, who observed that the Canary Guanches had no way to communicate between the islands except by swimming.844 In the Visayan group of the Philippines, home to the civilized Visayan tribes with the exception of the Negritos in the mountainous areas, people from Cebu cannot understand their relatives on nearby islands; in the Cuyos and Calamianes, different dialects of Visayan are spoken.845 [See map page 147.]

The differentiation of language from the nearby continental speech may be due to a higher development, especially on large islands affording very advantageous conditions, such as Great Britain and Japan. Japanese speech has some affinity with the great Altaic linguistic family, but no close resemblance to any sub-group.846 It presents marked contrasts to the Chinese because it has passed beyond the agglutinative stage of development, just as English has sloughed off more of its inflectional forms than the continental Teutonic languages.

The distinction of language from the surrounding continental speech might be due to a more advanced development, especially on large islands that provide very favorable conditions, like Great Britain and Japan. Japanese has some connection to the larger Altaic language family, but it doesn't closely resemble any specific sub-group.846 It shows significant differences from Chinese because it has moved beyond the agglutinative stage of development, similar to how English has shed more of its inflectional forms compared to the continental Germanic languages.

Archaic forms of speech in islands.

More often the difference is due to the survival of archaic forms of speech. This is especially the case on very small or remote islands, whose limited area or extreme isolation or both factors in conjunction present conditions for retardation. The speech of the Sardinians has a strong resemblance to the ancient Latin, retains many inflectional forms now obsolete in the continental Romance languages; but it has also been enlivened by an infusion of Catalan words, which came in by the bridge of the Balearic Islands during the centuries of Spanish rule in Sardinia.847 Again, it is in Minorca and Majorca that this Catalan speech is found in its greatest purity to-day. On its native soil in eastern Spain, especially in Barcelona, it is gradually succumbing to the official Castilian, and probably in a few centuries will be found surviving only in the protected environment of the Balearic Isles. Icelandic and the kindred dialects of the Shetland and Faroe Islands had their origin in the classic Norse of the ninth century, and are divergent forms of the speech of the Viking explorers.848 The old Frisian tongue of Holland, sister speech to Anglo-Saxon, survives to-day only in West Friesland beyond the great marshlands, and in the long-drawn belt of coastal islands from Terschelling through Helgoland to Sylt, as also on the neighboring shores of Schleswig-Holstein.849 This region of linguistic survival, insulated partially by the marshes or completely by the shallow "Wattenmeer" of this lowland coast, reminds us of the protracted life of the archaic Lithuanian speech within a circle of sea and swamp in Baltic Russia, and the survival of the Celtic tongue in peninsular Brittany, Cornwall, Wales, in Ireland, and the Highlands and islands of Scotland.

More often, the difference comes from the survival of outdated ways of speaking. This is particularly true on very small or remote islands, where limited space or extreme isolation, or both, create conditions that slow down language evolution. The speech of Sardinia closely resembles ancient Latin and keeps many inflectional forms that are now lost in the mainland Romance languages; however, it has also been refreshed with an influx of Catalan words, which entered through the Balearic Islands during centuries of Spanish rule in Sardinia.847 Similarly, on Minorca and Majorca, this Catalan speech is found in its most authentic form today. In its native region in eastern Spain, especially in Barcelona, it is gradually being replaced by the official Castilian, and likely in a few centuries will only survive in the safe environment of the Balearic Isles. Icelandic and the related dialects of the Shetland and Faroe Islands originated from the classical Norse of the ninth century and are different forms of the language spoken by Viking explorers.848 The old Frisian language of Holland, a sibling of Anglo-Saxon, survives today only in West Friesland beyond the vast marshlands, and in the extended chain of coastal islands from Terschelling to Helgoland to Sylt, as well as on the neighboring shores of Schleswig-Holstein.849 This area of linguistic survival, partially insulated by the marshes or completely by the shallow "Wattenmeer" of this lowland coast, reminds us of the long-lasting presence of archaic Lithuanian speech within a region of sea and swamp in Baltic Russia, as well as the endurance of the Celtic language in peninsular Brittany, Cornwall, Wales, Ireland, and the Highlands and islands of Scotland.

Unification of race in islands.

Islanders are always coast dwellers with a limited hinterland. Hence their stock may be differentiated from the mainland race in part for the same reason that all coastal folk in regions of maritime development are differentiated from the people of the back country, namely, because contact with the sea allows an intermittent influx of various foreign strains, which are gradually assimilated. This occasional ethnic intercrossing can be proved in greater or less degree of all island people. Here is accessibility operating against the underlying isolation of an island habitat. The English to-day represent a mixture of Celts with various distinct Teutonic elements, which had already diverged from one another in their separate habitats—Jutes, Angles, Saxons, Danes, Norse and Norman French. The subsequent detachment of these immigrant stocks by the English Channel and North Sea from their home people, and their arrival in necessarily small bands enabled them to be readily assimilated, a process which was stimulated further by the rapid increase of population, the intimate interactive life and unification of culture which characterizes all restricted areas. Hence islands, like peninsulas, despite ethnic admixtures, tend to show a surprising unification of race; they hold their people aloof from others and hold them in a close embrace, shut them off and shut them in, tend to force the amalgamation of race, culture and speech. Moreover, their relatively small area precludes effective segregation within their own borders, except where a mountainous or jungle district affords a temporary refuge for a displaced and antagonized tribe. Hence there arises a preponderance of the geographic over the ethnic and linguistic factors in the historical equation.

Islanders are always people who live by the coast with limited land behind them. Because of this, their population can be different from the mainland population for the same reason that all coastal communities in maritime regions differ from those in the interior: contact with the sea brings in a mix of different foreign influences that are gradually blended into the local culture. This occasional mixing of ethnicities can be seen to varying degrees in all island populations. Here we see accessibility working against the isolation typical of island life. Today, the English are a mix of Celts and various distinct Teutonic groups that had already separated in their original areas—Jutes, Angles, Saxons, Danes, Norse, and Norman French. The separation of these immigrant groups by the English Channel and North Sea from their home populations, along with their arrival in small groups, allowed them to assimilate easily. This process was further encouraged by the rapid population growth, the close-knit interactions, and the cultural unification that characterize all confined areas. Therefore, islands, like peninsulas, despite their mixed ethnic backgrounds, tend to display a surprising unity of race; they keep their populations separate from others while also closely connecting them, forcing the blending of race, culture, and language. Additionally, their relatively small size makes it hard to maintain distinct groups within their own borders, except in mountainous or jungle areas that provide temporary refuge for displaced and opposing tribes. As a result, geographical factors tend to outweigh ethnic and linguistic factors in the historical context.

The uniformity in cranial type prevailing all over the British Isles is amazing; it is greater than in either Spain or Scandinavia. The cephalic indices range chiefly between 77 and 79, a restricted variation as compared with the ten points which represents the usual range for Central Europe, and the thirteen between the extremes of 75 and 88 found in France and Italy.850 Japan stands in much the same ethnic relation to Asia as Britain to Europe. She has absorbed Aino, Mongolian, Malay and perhaps Polynesian elements, but by reason of her isolation has been left free to digest these at her leisure, so that her population is fairly well assimilated, though evidences of the old mixture can be discerned.851 In Corsica and Sardinia a particularly low cephalic index, dropping in some communes to 73, and a particularly short stature point to a rare purity of the Mediterranean race,852 and indicate the maintenance here of one ethnic type, despite the intermittent intrusion of various less pure stocks from the Italian mainland, Africa, Phoenicia, Arabia, and Spain. The location of the islands off the main routes of the basin, their remoteness from shore, and the strong spirit of exclusiveness native to the people,853 bred doubtless from their isolation, have combined to reduce the amount of foreign intermixture.

The uniformity in skull shape found throughout the British Isles is remarkable; it's greater than in either Spain or Scandinavia. The head shape measurements mainly range between 77 and 79, which shows a narrow variation compared to the usual ten-point range found in Central Europe, and the thirteen-point range between 75 and 88 seen in France and Italy.850 Japan shares a similar ethnic relationship to Asia as Britain does to Europe. It has incorporated Aino, Mongolian, Malay, and possibly Polynesian elements, but due to its isolation, it has been able to assimilate these at its own pace, resulting in a relatively well-integrated population, although traces of the original mixture can still be seen.851 In Corsica and Sardinia, a notably low head shape measurement, dropping in some towns to 73, and a particularly short stature suggest a rare purity of the Mediterranean race,852 indicating the preservation of a single ethnic type here, despite the occasional influx of various less pure groups from the Italian mainland, Africa, Phoenicia, Arabia, and Spain. The islands' location away from major trade routes, their distance from the mainland, and the strong sense of exclusivity among the people,853 likely stemming from their isolation, have all contributed to limiting foreign intermixing.

Remoter sources of island populations.

Islands do not necessarily derive their population from the land that lies nearest to them. A comparatively narrow strait may effectively isolate, if the opposite shore is inhabited by a nautically inefficient race; whereas a wide stretch of ocean may fail to bar the immigration of a seafaring people. Here we find a parallel to the imperfect isolation of oceanic islands for life forms endowed with superior means of dispersal, such as marine birds, bats and insects.854 Iceland, though relatively near Greenland, was nevertheless peopled by far away Scandinavians. These bold sailors planted their settlements even in Greenland nearly two centuries before the Eskimo. England received the numerically dominant element of its population from across the wide expanse of the North Sea, from the bare but seaman-breeding coasts of Germany, Denmark and Norway, rather than from the nearer shores of Gaul. So the Madeira and Cape Verde Isles had to wait for the coming of the nautical Portuguese to supply them with a population; and only later, owing to the demand for slave labor, did they draw upon the human stock of nearby Africa, but even then by means of Portuguese ships.

Islands don’t always get their population from the land closest to them. A relatively narrow strait can effectively separate them, especially if the other side is inhabited by people not skilled in navigation; on the other hand, a wide expanse of ocean might not stop the migration of a seafaring population. This is similar to the incomplete isolation of oceanic islands for life forms that have better ways to spread, like marine birds, bats, and insects.854 Iceland, although it’s fairly close to Greenland, was settled by Scandinavians from much farther away. These adventurous sailors established their colonies in Greenland nearly two centuries before the arrival of the Eskimos. England primarily received its larger population from across the wide North Sea, coming from the sparsely populated yet seafaring coasts of Germany, Denmark, and Norway, rather than from the closer shores of France. Similarly, the Madeira and Cape Verde Islands had to wait for the arrival of the skilled Portuguese sailors to populate them; it was only later, because of the demand for slave labor, that they turned to the nearby African population, but still through Portuguese ships.

Double sources.

Owing to the power of navigation to bridge the intervening spaces of water and hence to emphasize the accessibility rather than the isolation of these outlying fragments of land, we often find islands facing two or three ways, as it were, tenanted on different sides by different races, and this regardless of the width of the intervening seas, where the remote neighbors excel in nautical skill. Formosa is divided between its wild Malay aborigines, found on the eastern, mountainous side of the island, and Chinese settlers who cultivate the wide alluvial plain on the western side.855 Fukien Strait, though only eighty miles wide, sufficed to bar Formosa to the land-loving northern Chinese till 1644, when the island became an asylum for refugees from the Manchu invaders; but long before, the wider stretches of sea to the south and north were mere passways for the sea-faring Malays, who were the first to people the island, and the Japanese who planted considerable colonies on its northern coasts at the beginning of the fifteenth century. [See map page 103.]

Because navigation allows people to cross the gaps in the water, making these distant pieces of land more accessible instead of isolated, we often see islands influenced by different cultures from multiple directions. This happens regardless of how wide the surrounding seas are, especially when the neighboring communities excel in seafaring. Formosa is home to both its wild Malay indigenous people, who inhabit the mountainous eastern side of the island, and Chinese settlers who farm the vast alluvial plain on the western side.855 The Fukien Strait, although only eighty miles wide, kept the land-loving northern Chinese away from Formosa until 1644, when the island became a refuge for those fleeing the Manchu invaders. However, long before that, the larger seas to the south and north were simply pathways for the seafaring Malays, who were the first to settle the island, and for the Japanese, who established significant colonies on the northern coasts at the start of the fifteenth century. [See map page 103.]

In a similar way Madagascar is divided between the Malayan Hovas, who occupy the eastern and central part of the island, and the African Sakalavas who border the western coast. [See map page 105.] This distribution of the ethnic elements corresponds to that of the insect life, which is more African on the western side and more Indo-Malayan on the eastern.856 Though the population shows every physical type between Negro and Malayan, and ethnic diversity still predominates over ethnic unity in this vast island, nevertheless the close intercourse of an island habitat has even in Madagascar produced unification of language. Malayan speech of an ancient form prevails everywhere, and though diversified into dialects, is everywhere so much alike that all Malagasies can manage to understand one another.857 The first inhabitants were probably African; but the wide Mozambique Current (230 miles), with its strong southward flow, was a serious barrier to fresh accessions from the mainland, especially as the nautical development of the African tribes was always low. Meanwhile, however, successive relays of sea-bred Malay-Polynesians crossed the broad stretch of the Indian Ocean, occupied the island, and finally predominated over the original Negro stock.858 Then in historic times came Arabs, Swahilis, and East Indians to infuse an Asiatic element into the population of the coasts, while Portuguese, English, Dutch, and French set up short-lived colonies on its shores. But despite this intermittent foreign immigration, the fundamental isolation of Madagascar, combined with its large area, enabled it to go its own slow historical gait, with a minimum of interference from outside, till France in 1895 began to assume control of the island.

In a similar way, Madagascar is split between the Malayan Hovas, who live in the eastern and central parts of the island, and the African Sakalavas who border the western coast. [See map page 105.] This division of ethnic groups matches the insect life distribution, which is more African on the western side and more Indo-Malayan on the eastern. 856 Although the population displays a mix of physical types from Negro to Malayan, and ethnic diversity still outweighs ethnic unity on this vast island, the close interactions typical of island life have led to a unification of language even in Madagascar. The ancient form of Malayan speech is prevalent everywhere, and although it has various dialects, it is similar enough that all Malagasies can understand each other. 857 The first inhabitants were likely African; however, the broad Mozambique Current (230 miles), with its strong southward flow, created a significant barrier to further arrivals from the mainland, especially given the generally low nautical skills of the African tribes. In the meantime, various groups of sea-faring Malay-Polynesians crossed the wide Indian Ocean, settled on the island, and eventually became the dominant population over the original Negro inhabitants. 858 Then, in historic times, Arabs, Swahilis, and East Indians introduced an Asian element to the coastal population, while the Portuguese, English, Dutch, and French established short-lived colonies along its shores. But despite this occasional foreign immigration, Madagascar's fundamental isolation, along with its large size, allowed it to follow its own slow historical development, with minimal outside interference, until France began to take control of the island in 1895.

Mixed population of small thalassic isles.

Small thalassic islands, at an early date in their history, lose their ethnic unity and present a highly mixed population. The reasons for this are two. The early maritime development characterizing enclosed seas covers them with a network of marine routes, on which such islands serve as way stations and mid-sea markets for the surrounding shores. Sailors and traders, colonists and conquerors flock to them from every side. Such a nodal location on commercial routes insures to islands a cosmopolitanism of race, as opposed to the ethnic differentiation and unity which follows an outlying or oceanic situation. Here the factor of many-sided accessibility predominates over isolation.

Small coastal islands, early in their history, lose their ethnic unity and end up with a very mixed population. There are two main reasons for this. The early development of maritime activities in enclosed seas creates a network of sea routes, with these islands acting as way stations and mid-sea markets for the nearby shores. Sailors, traders, colonists, and conquerors come to them from all directions. This strategic position on commercial routes ensures that islands become cosmopolitan in terms of race, unlike the ethnic diversity and unity that typically arise in more isolated or oceanic areas. In this case, the factor of easy access outweighs the aspect of isolation.

The prevailing small area of such thalassic islands, moreover, involves a population so small that it is highly susceptible to the effects of intercrossing. Too restricted to absorb the constant influx of foreign elements, the inhabitants tend to become a highly mixed, polyglot breed. This they continue to be by the constant addition of foreign strains, so long as the islands remain foci of trade or strategic points for the control of the marine highways. Diomede Island in Bering Strait is the great market place of the polar tribes. Here Siberian Chukches and Alaskan Eskimos make their exchanges. The Eskimo of St. Lawrence Island in Bering Sea, from long intercourse, have adopted certain articles of dress, the boats and part of the vocabulary of the Chukches.859 Kilwauru, located on a sand-bank at the eastern end of Ceram, on the border between Malayan and Papuan island districts, is the metropolis of native traders in the Far East. Here gather the praus of the sea-faring Bugis bringing manufactured goods from Singapore, and boats laden with the natural products of New Guinea.860 The smaller these island marts and the wider their circle of trade, the more mixed is their population. Thursday Isle, an English coaling-station in Torres Strait, is a port of call for all steamers bound from Europe or China for east Australian ports, besides being a center of a big local trade in pearl shell and tripang. Hence its population of 526 souls comprises 270 Europeans of various nationalities, including British, Germans, Scandinavians, Danes, Spanish, Portuguese, French and Australians of European origin, besides 256 South Sea Islanders, Papuans, Africans, Philippines, Chinese and other Asiatics.861

The small size of these islands means that their populations are also small, making them very vulnerable to the effects of mixing. Because they're too limited to handle the constant arrival of outsiders, the locals tend to become a mixed, diverse group. They continue to be this way due to the ongoing influx of foreign elements, as long as the islands remain trade hubs or key locations for controlling sea routes. Diomede Island in the Bering Strait is a major marketplace for polar tribes, where Siberian Chukches and Alaskan Eskimos trade. The Eskimos of St. Lawrence Island in the Bering Sea, through long interactions, have adopted some clothing styles, boats, and parts of the Chukches' vocabulary.859 Kilwauru, located on a sandbank at the eastern end of Ceram, at the boundary between Malayan and Papuan island regions, is the hub of native traders in the Far East. Here, the praus of the seafaring Bugis arrive, bringing manufactured goods from Singapore, while boats arrive loaded with natural products from New Guinea.860 The smaller these island markets are and the broader their trade network, the more mixed their populations become. Thursday Isle, a British coaling station in Torres Strait, is a stop for all steamers traveling from Europe or China to eastern Australian ports, while also being a center for a significant local trade in pearl shell and tripang. This gives it a population of 526 people, which includes 270 Europeans of various nationalities such as British, Germans, Scandinavians, Danes, Spanish, Portuguese, French, and Australians of European descent, as well as 256 South Sea Islanders, Papuans, Africans, Filipinos, Chinese, and other Asians.861

Mixed population of island markets.

Antiquity shows the same thing on a smaller scale, which grew, however, with the expansion of the circle of commerce. Ancient Aegina in the Saronic Gulf received inhabitants from Crete, Argos, Epidaurus in eastern Argolis and Athens; it became a central maritime market and its people sea-traders, whose goods of a certain small kind became known as "Aegina wares."862 Delos at the crossroads of the Aegean was the center of longer radii. It became the inn for travelers and merchants sailing from Asia and Egypt to Italy and Greece, and hence drew to itself the trade and people of the whole Mediterranean basin.863 The northwestern Indian Ocean had a similar emporium in the ancient Dioscoridis, (Sokotra) which focused on itself the trade between Arabia and eastern Africa.864

Antiquity demonstrates the same phenomenon on a smaller scale, which, however, grew with the expansion of trade. Ancient Aegina in the Saronic Gulf attracted people from Crete, Argos, Epidaurus in eastern Argolis, and Athens; it became a major maritime market and its residents were sea-traders, whose goods of a particular small type became known as "Aegina wares."862 Delos, located at the crossroads of the Aegean, was the center of broader trade networks. It served as an inn for travelers and merchants sailing from Asia and Egypt to Italy and Greece, thereby attracting trade and people from across the entire Mediterranean basin.863 The northwestern Indian Ocean had a similar trading hub in ancient Dioscoridis (Sokotra), which facilitated trade between Arabia and eastern Africa.864

Ceylon's location made it in ancient and medieval times the common meeting place for Arab traders from the west and Chinese merchants from the east; it thus became the Sicily of the semi-enclosed North Indian Ocean. To-day its capital Colombo is "the Clapham Junction of the Eastern Seas," where passengers change steamers for China, India and Australia; a port of call for vessels passing from the Straits of Malacca to the Persian Gulf or Mediterranean. Hence Ceylon's solid nucleus of Singhalese and Tamil population, protected against absorption by the large area of the island (25,365 square miles) is interspersed in the coastal districts with Arabs, Portuguese, Eurasians dating from the old Portuguese occupation, and some ten thousand Europeans.865 The island of Gotland, located at the crossroads of the Baltic, was early adopted by the Hanseatic merchants as their maritime base for the exploitation of Swedish, Finnish, and Russian trade. Here were "peoples of divers tongues," so the old chronicles say, while the archeological finds of Byzantine, Cufic, Roman, Anglo-Saxon and German coins testify to the wide circle of trade whose radii focused at this nodal point of the Baltic.866

Ceylon's location made it a common meeting place for Arab traders from the west and Chinese merchants from the east in ancient and medieval times; it thus became the Sicily of the semi-enclosed North Indian Ocean. Today, its capital Colombo is referred to as "the Clapham Junction of the Eastern Seas," where passengers switch steamers for China, India, and Australia; a port of call for vessels traveling from the Straits of Malacca to the Persian Gulf or Mediterranean. Therefore, Ceylon has a solid population of Sinhalese and Tamils, protected against absorption by the large area of the island (25,365 square miles) and interspersed in the coastal districts with Arabs, Portuguese, Eurasians from the old Portuguese occupation, and some ten thousand Europeans.865 The island of Gotland, located at the crossroads of the Baltic, was early adopted by the Hanseatic merchants as their maritime base for exploiting Swedish, Finnish, and Russian trade. Here were "peoples of divers tongues," as the old chronicles say, while the archaeological finds of Byzantine, Cufic, Roman, Anglo-Saxon, and German coins testify to the wide circle of trade whose radii focused at this nodal point of the Baltic.866

Significant location of island way stations.

The great importance of such islands has been due solely to their location. Their size and resources are negligible quantities, but their natural position as way stations lent them preeminence so long as navigation held to short "laps," and was restricted to enclosed seas. In the wide expanse of the open ocean, similar sparsely scattered isles, like Ascension, St. Helena, the Canaries and Hawaii, assumed importance in proportion to their scarcity. Though never the centers of rife intercourse like Delos and Gotland, those lying conspicuously in the track of commerce have succeeded in drawing to themselves the typical polyglot nodal population. Mauritius, located at the southwestern entrance of the Indian Ocean about equally distant from Aden, Ceylon, Bombay, Singapore and West Australia, and possessing the best harbor within many hundred miles, has been held successively by Dutch, French and English, and to-day has a dense population of French, English and Hindus.867 A situation at the northeast entrance to the Caribbean Sea, keystone of the vast arch formed by the Greater and Lesser Antilles, made the island of St. Thomas a natural distributing point for this whole basin. Facing that much traveled Virgin Passage, and forming the first objective of vessels bound from Europe to Panama, it became a great ship rendezvous, and assumed strategic and commercial importance from early times. We find the same political owners here as in Mauritius and in the same order—Dutch, French and English, though in 1671 the island was occupied by the Danes, then from 1807 to 1815 by the English again, and finally secured by the Danes.868 The history of the Falkland Islands is a significant reflection of their location on the south oceanic trade route, where they command the entrance to the Magellan Straits and the passage round the Horn, Here on the outskirts of the world, where they form the only break in the wide blank surface of the South Atlantic, they have been coveted and held in turn by the chief European powers having colonies in the Orient,—by France, Spain, England, Spain again, England again, by Argentine in 1820, and finally by England since 1833. Their possession was of especial advantage to Great Britain, which had no other base in this part of the world intermediate between England and New Zealand.

The great importance of these islands mainly comes from their location. Their size and resources are minimal, but their natural position as way stations gave them significance as long as navigation was limited to short "laps" and confined to enclosed seas. In the vast open ocean, similar sparsely scattered islands, like Ascension, St. Helena, the Canaries, and Hawaii, gained importance due to their rarity. Although they were never the centers of bustling trade like Delos and Gotland, those that stood out in the path of commerce managed to attract a diverse, multicultural population. Mauritius, positioned at the southwestern entrance of the Indian Ocean, roughly equidistant from Aden, Ceylon, Bombay, Singapore, and West Australia, and featuring the best harbor within hundreds of miles, has been controlled in succession by the Dutch, French, and English, and today has a dense population of French, English, and Hindus.867 The island of St. Thomas, situated at the northeast entrance to the Caribbean Sea and pivotal to the vast arch formed by the Greater and Lesser Antilles, became a natural distribution point for the entire region. Facing the heavily traveled Virgin Passage and serving as the first destination for ships heading from Europe to Panama, it emerged as a major shipping hub and gained strategic and commercial importance from early on. The political ownership of this island mirrors that of Mauritius, following the same sequence—Dutch, French, and English—though in 1671, the island was occupied by the Danes, then by the English again from 1807 to 1815, before finally being secured by the Danes.868 The history of the Falkland Islands highlights their location on the southern ocean trade route, where they control the entrance to the Magellan Straits and the passage around the Horn. Here, on the outskirts of the world, where they create the only interruption in the vast, empty expanse of the South Atlantic, they have been coveted and alternately held by the major European powers with colonies in the East—France, Spain, England, back to Spain, then England again, Argentina in 1820, and finally by England since 1833. Their control has been particularly advantageous for Great Britain, which lacked any other base in this part of the world between England and New Zealand.

Thalassic islands as goals of expansion.

Islands located in enclosed seas display the transitional character of border districts. They are outposts of the surrounding shores, and become therefore the first objective of every expanding movement, whether commercial or political, setting out from the adjacent coasts. Such islands are swept by successive waves of conquest or colonization, and they carry in their people and language evidences of the wrack left behind on their shores. This has been the history of Aegina, Cyprus, Rhodes, Crete, Malta, Corfu, Sicily and Sardinia. That of Cyprus is typical. It was the first island base for the ancient Tyrian fleets, and had its Phoenician settlements in 1045 B. C. From that time it was one of the many prizes in the Mediterranean grab-bag for the surrounding nations. After the decline of Tyre, it was occupied by Greeks, then passed in turn to Assyrians, Egyptians, Persians, Romans, Saracens, Byzantines, and in 1191 was seized by the Crusaders. Later it fell to Egypt again; but in 1373 was taken by Genoa, in 1463 by Venice, in 1571 by the Turks, and finally in 1878 was consigned to England. 869 All these successive occupants have left their mark upon its people, speech, culture and architecture. In the same way Sicily, located at the waist of the Mediterranean, has received the imprint of Greeks, Carthagenians, Romans, Saracens, Normans, Spaniards and Italians. 870 Its architectural remains bear the stamp of these successive occupants in every degree of purity and blending. The Sicilians of to-day are a mixture of all these intrusive stocks and speak a form of Italian corrupted by the infusion of Arabic words.871 In 1071 when the Normans laid siege to Palermo, five languages were spoken on the island,—Greek, Latin, Hebrew, Arabic and vulgar Sicilian, evidence enough that it was the meeting ground of the nations of Europe, Asia and North Africa.872 Polyglot Malta to-day tells the same story of successive conquests, the same shuttlecock history.873 Almost every language of Europe is spoken here; but the native Maltese speech is a corrupt form of Arabic mixed with modern Italian and ancient Phoenician words.874 The whole island is ethnographically a border hybrid of Europe and North Africa. The Channel Isles are to-day the only spot in Europe where French and English survive side by side as official and commercial languages. French and Italian meet on equal terms in Corsica. Chinese, Japanese and Malays have traded and warred and treated on the debatable land of Formosa. The Aru, Ke, and other small archipelagoes of the Banda Sea link together the pure Malay and the pure Papuan districts, between which they lie.

Islands in enclosed seas show the transitional nature of border regions. They serve as outposts of the nearby shores and thus become the primary targets of any expanding movement, whether commercial or political, that starts from the adjacent coasts. These islands are impacted by waves of conquest or colonization, and their people and languages carry the remnants of what has washed ashore. This has been the story of Aegina, Cyprus, Rhodes, Crete, Malta, Corfu, Sicily, and Sardinia. The history of Cyprus is typical. It was the first island base for the ancient Tyrian fleets and had its Phoenician settlements established in 1045 B.C. From that point, it became one of the many prizes in the Mediterranean for surrounding nations. After the fall of Tyre, it was occupied by Greeks, then successively passed to Assyrians, Egyptians, Persians, Romans, Saracens, Byzantines, and in 1191 was taken by the Crusaders. Later, it was again under Egyptian control; in 1373 it was seized by Genoa, in 1463 by Venice, in 1571 by the Turks, and finally in 1878 handed over to England. 869 All these successive occupants have left their mark on its people's language, culture, and architecture. Similarly, Sicily, located in the middle of the Mediterranean, bears the influence of Greeks, Carthaginians, Romans, Saracens, Normans, Spaniards, and Italians. 870 Its architectural remains reflect the impact of these various occupants in different degrees of purity and blending. Today's Sicilians are a mix of all these groups and speak a form of Italian infused with Arabic vocabulary.871 In 1071, when the Normans besieged Palermo, five languages were spoken on the island: Greek, Latin, Hebrew, Arabic, and vulgar Sicilian, clearly indicating it was a meeting point for the nations of Europe, Asia, and North Africa.872 Multilingual Malta today tells a similar story of repeated conquests and its dynamic history.873 Almost every European language is spoken here; however, the native Maltese language is a corrupted form of Arabic mixed with modern Italian and ancient Phoenician terms.874 The entire island represents an ethnographic blend of Europe and North Africa. The Channel Islands are currently the only place in Europe where French and English coexist as official and commercial languages. French and Italian coexist equally in Corsica. Chinese, Japanese, and Malays have traded and fought over the contested land of Formosa. The Aru, Ke, and other small archipelagos in the Banda Sea connect the distinct Malay and Papuan areas between them.

From the border character of many islands there follow often far-reaching historical effects. Like all border regions they are natural battlegrounds. Their historical episodes are small, often slow and insidious in their movement, but large in their final content; for they are prone to end in a sudden dramatic denouement that draws the startled gaze of all the neighboring world. It was the destiny of Sicily to make and unmake the fortunes of ancient Carthage. Ceylon, from the dawn of history, lured traders who enriched and conquerors who oppressed peninsular India. The advance of Spain to the Canary Isles was the drowsy prologue to the brilliant drama of American discovery. The island of Tsushima in the Korean Strait was seized by the forces of Kublai Khan in 1280 as the base of their attack upon Japan;875 and when in 1857 the Russian bear tried to plant a foot on this island, Japan saw danger in the movement and ordered him off.876 Now we find Japan newly established in Sakhalin, the Elliot Islands and Formosa, by means of which and her own archipelago she blankets the coast of Asia for twenty-two hundred miles. This geographical situation may be productive of history.

From the border status of many islands, there often come significant historical consequences. Like all border areas, they serve as natural battlegrounds. Their historical events are often minor, slow, and subtle in their progression, but substantial in their outcomes; they tend to culminate in a sudden dramatic denouement that catches the attention of the surrounding world. Sicily’s fate was to shape and reshape the fortunes of ancient Carthage. Since the beginning of history, Ceylon attracted traders who enriched it and conquerors who oppressed the Indian peninsula. Spain's expansion to the Canary Islands was a sleepy prelude to the exciting story of American discovery. The island of Tsushima in the Korean Strait was taken by Kublai Khan's forces in 1280 as a base for their attack on Japan;875 and when the Russian bear attempted to set foot on this island in 1857, Japan perceived a threat in the move and ordered them to leave.876 Now, Japan is newly established in Sakhalin, the Elliot Islands, and Formosa, through which and its own archipelago it covers the Asian coast for over two thousand miles. This geographical position has the potential to shape history.

Political detachability of islands.

Islands are detached areas physically and readily detached politically. Though insularity gives them some measure of protection, their relatively small size and consequently small populations make them easy victims for a conquering sea power, and easy to hold in subjection. The security of an island habitat against aggression therefore, increases with its size, its efficiency in naval warfare, and its degree of isolation, the last of which factors depends in turn upon its location as thalassic or oceanic. Islands of enclosed seas, necessarily small and never far from the close encircling lands, are engulfed by every tide of conquest emanating from the nearby shores. Oesel and Dago have been held in succession by every Baltic power, by the Teutonic Orders, Denmark, Sweden and Russia. Gotland has acknowledged allegiance to the Hanseatic League, to Denmark and Sweden. Sardinia, occupying the center of the western Mediterranean, has figured in a varied series of political combinations,—with ancient Carthage, Rome, the Saracens of North Africa, with Sicily, Pisa, Aragon, Piedmont, and finally now with united Italy.877 To the land-bred Teutonic hordes which swept over western Europe in the early centuries of our era, a narrow strip of sea was some protection for Sicily, Corsica, Sardinia, Malta and the Balearic Isles. Hence we find these islands slow in succumbing to their non-maritime conquerors, and readily regained by the energetic Justinian. Later they fell victim to the sea-wise Saracens, but again gravitated back to their closer and more natural European connections.

Islands are separate areas that are physically and politically isolated. While their isolation offers some protection, their small size and populations make them easy targets for conquering maritime powers, making them simple to dominate. The security of an island against aggression increases with its size, its naval capabilities, and its degree of isolation, which is influenced by whether it is in a confined sea or an open ocean. Islands in enclosed seas are small and close to surrounding lands, making them vulnerable to every wave of conquest from nearby territories. Oesel and Dago have been controlled by various Baltic powers, including the Teutonic Orders, Denmark, Sweden, and Russia. Gotland has pledged allegiance to the Hanseatic League, Denmark, and Sweden. Sardinia, located in the center of the western Mediterranean, has been involved in many political alliances—first with ancient Carthage, then Rome, the Saracens of North Africa, Sicily, Pisa, Aragon, Piedmont, and now with unified Italy.877 For the land-based Teutonic tribes that invaded western Europe in the early centuries, a narrow body of water provided some protection for Sicily, Corsica, Sardinia, Malta, and the Balearic Islands. This is why these islands were slow to fall to non-maritime invaders and easily reclaimed by the determined Justinian. Later, they became victims of the sea-savvy Saracens but eventually returned to their closer and more natural European ties.

Insular weakness due to small area.

More often the small area of an island facilitates its retention in bondage, when the large and less isolated continental districts have thrown off an unwelcome yoke. Athens, with her strong navy, found it an easy task to whip back into the ranks of the Delian Confederacy her recalcitrant island subjects like Naxos, Samos and Thasos; but her mutinous cities in peninsular Chalcidice and isthmian Megara, incited to revolt and aided by their neighbors,878 were less at her mercy. This principle was recognized by Thucydides,879 and taken advantage of by the Lacedæmonians during the great war for Spartan supremacy. England has been able to hold Ireland in a vise. Of all her former French territory, she retains only the Channel Isles. Cuba and Porto Rico remained in the crushing grasp of Spain sixty-four years after Mexico and the continental states of Central and South America, by mutual help and encouragement, had secured independence. The islands found that the isolation which confers protection from outside aggression meant for them detachment from friendly sources of succor on the mainland. The desultory help of filibuster expeditions, easily checked at the port of departure or landing, availed little to supplement the inadequate forces of rebellion pent up on their relatively small areas. By contrast, Mexico's larger area and population, continually stirred by American example and encouragement, reinforced by American volunteers and even by United States army officers, found revolt from 1812 to 1824 a comparatively easy task.

More often, the small size of an island makes it easier to keep it in bondage, while larger and less isolated continental areas have managed to break free from unwanted control. Athens, with her powerful navy, found it easy to bring back rebellious island subjects like Naxos, Samos, and Thasos into the Delian Confederacy. However, her rebellious cities in peninsular Chalcidice and isthmian Megara, urged to revolt and supported by their neighbors,878 were less under her control. Thucydides recognized this principle,879 and the Lacedæmonians exploited it during the great war for Spartan dominance. England has managed to keep Ireland tightly controlled. Of all her former French territories, she only holds onto the Channel Islands. Cuba and Puerto Rico remained firmly under Spain's control for sixty-four years after Mexico and the mainland countries of Central and South America had achieved independence through mutual support and encouragement. The islands discovered that while their isolation protected them from outside threats, it also cut them off from friendly assistance from the mainland. The sporadic help from filibuster expeditions, easily stopped at their departure or landing points, did little to strengthen the inadequate rebel forces confined to their relatively small territories. In contrast, Mexico's larger size and population, constantly inspired by American examples and support, backed by American volunteers and even U.S. army officers, found it relatively easy to revolt from 1812 to 1824.

Cuba suffered from its geographic aloofness. So did little Crete, which submitted to Turkish oppression sixty years after the continental Greeks had made good their claim to freedom. Nor was this the first time that Cretan liberty had suffered from the detachment of an island environment. Aristotle recognized the principle when he wrote: "The people of Crete have hitherto submitted to the rule of the leading families as Cosmi, because the insular situation of Crete cuts off the interference of strangers or foreigners which might stir up rebellion against the unjust or partial government." And then he adds that this insular exclusion of outside incitement long rendered the fidelity of the Perioeci or serf-like peasants of Crete a striking contrast to the uneasy spirit of the Spartan Helots, who were constantly stirred to revolt by the free farmers of Argos, Messinia and Arcadia.880 Thus ancient like modern Crete missed those beneficient stimuli which penetrate a land frontier, but are cut off by the absolute boundary of the sea.

Cuba faced challenges due to its geographic isolation. The same was true for small Crete, which fell under Turkish rule sixty years after the mainland Greeks had secured their freedom. This wasn’t the first time Cretan liberty was impacted by its island setting. Aristotle pointed this out when he wrote: "The people of Crete have previously accepted the authority of the dominant families as Cosmi, because Crete's island location prevents interference from outsiders that could incite rebellion against an unfair or biased government." He also noted that this isolation from external influences kept the loyalty of the Perioeci, or serf-like peasants of Crete, in sharp contrast to the restless Helots of Sparta, who were frequently urged to revolt by the free farmers of Argos, Messinia, and Arcadia.880 Therefore, like ancient Crete, modern Crete missed out on the beneficial influences that come from land borders but are blocked by the complete barrier of the sea.

Island remains of broken empires.

Island fragments of broken empires are found everywhere. They figure conspicuously in that scattered location indicative of declining power. Little St. Pierre and Miquelon are the last geographical evidences of France's former dominion in Canada. The English Bermudas and Bahamas point back to the time when Great Britain held the long-drawn opposite coast. The British, French, Dutch, Danish, as once even Swedish, holdings in the Lesser Antilles are island monuments to lost continental domains, as recently were Cuba and Porto Rico to Spain's once vast American empire. Of Portugal's widespread dominion in the Orient there remain to her only the island fragments of Timor, Kambing, Macao and Diu, besides two coastal points on the western face of peninsular India. All the former continental holdings of the Sultan of Zanzibar have been absorbed into the neighboring German and British territories, and only the islands of Zanzibar and Pemba remain to him by the temporary indulgence of his strong neighbors. The Sheik of the Bahrein Islands originally held also the large kingdom of El Hasa on the nearby Persian Gulf littoral of Arabia; but he lost this to the Turks in 1840, and now retains the Bahrein Islands as the residuum of his former territories.881

Islands of broken empires are found everywhere. They stand out in places that show signs of declining power. Little St. Pierre and Miquelon are the last remnants of France's past rule in Canada. The English Bermuda and Bahamas remind us of the time when Great Britain controlled the distant opposite coast. The British, French, Dutch, Danish, and once even Swedish territories in the Lesser Antilles are reminders of lost land holdings, just like Cuba and Puerto Rico were for Spain's former vast American empire. From Portugal's extensive empire in the East, only the island remnants of Timor, Kambing, Macao, and Diu remain, along with two coastal points on the western side of peninsular India. All the previous territories of the Sultan of Zanzibar have been taken over by neighboring German and British lands, leaving only the islands of Zanzibar and Pemba as a temporary concession from his powerful neighbors. The Sheikh of the Bahrain Islands originally controlled the large kingdom of El Hasa on the nearby Persian Gulf coast of Arabia; however, he lost this to the Turks in 1840 and now holds the Bahrain Islands as the last vestige of his former territories.881

Security of such remnants merely passive.

The insular remnants of empires are tolerated, because their small size, when unsupported by important location, usually renders them innocuous; and their geographic isolation removes them from international entanglements, unless some far-reaching anthropo-geographic readjustment lends them a new strategic or commercial importance. The construction of the Suez Canal gave England a motive for the acquisition of Cyprus in 1878, as a nearer base than Malta for the protection of Port Said, just as the present Panama Canal project led the United States to re-open negotiations for the purchase of the Danish Isles. One cannot get away from the impression that the law of political detachability will operate again to make some new distribution of the parti-colored political holdings in the Lesser Antilles. The small size of these islands, and their thalassic location commanding approaches to a large region of only partially developed resources and to the interoceanic passway across it, will pitch them into the dice-box on the occasion of every naval war between their sovereign powers.

The small remnants of empires are tolerated because their limited size, especially when they lack significant strategic locations, usually makes them harmless. Their geographic isolation also keeps them out of international conflicts, unless some major global changes give them new strategic or commercial value. The construction of the Suez Canal motivated England to acquire Cyprus in 1878, as it was a closer base than Malta for protecting Port Said, just as the current Panama Canal project prompted the United States to restart talks about purchasing the Danish Isles. It seems likely that the principle of political detachability will come into play again to rearrange the diverse political territories in the Lesser Antilles. The small size of these islands, along with their strategic location overseeing approaches to a largely undeveloped region and the interoceanic route through it, will put them at risk during every naval conflict involving their governing powers.

The shifting fate of political detachability becomes moderated in islands of the open ocean, because of their remoteness from the colonizing or conquering movements emanating from the continents. In contrast to the changing political connections of thalassic isles, consider the calm or monotonous political history of outlying islands like the Shetland, Faroes, Iceland, Canaries, Madeira, Cape Verde, Azores, St. Helena, Ascension and Hawaii. The Norse colony of Iceland, as a republic, maintained loose connections with its mother country from 874 to 1264; then for nearly six centuries it followed the political fate of Norway till 1814, when an oversight left it in the hands of Denmark on the dissolution of the union of Denmark and Norway. The Azores have known no history except that which came to them from Portugal; even their discovery goes back to a Saracen navigator who, in 1147, sailed from the mouth of the Tagus a thousand miles straight into the sunset.882 For two hundred years thereafter extreme isolation kept them outside the pale of history till their rediscovery by Prince Henry, the Navigator.

The changing political independence of different regions is less intense in remote ocean islands due to their distance from colonizing or conquering forces from the continents. Unlike the evolving political ties of maritime islands, consider the steady or uneventful political histories of distant islands like Shetland, the Faroes, Iceland, the Canaries, Madeira, Cape Verde, the Azores, St. Helena, Ascension, and Hawaii. The Norse colony of Iceland, as a republic, kept loose ties with its homeland from 874 to 1264; then, for almost six centuries, it followed Norway's political course until 1814, when an oversight left it under Denmark after the breakup of the Denmark-Norway union. The Azores have only known history that came from Portugal; even their discovery is credited to a Saracen navigator who, in 1147, sailed a thousand miles into the sunset from the mouth of the Tagus. For two hundred years after that, their extreme isolation kept them out of history until they were rediscovered by Prince Henry the Navigator.

Political autonomy of islands based upon area and location.

Land-masses, as we have found, are independent by location or independent by size. Large islands, especially where they occupy an outskirt location, may long succeed in maintaining an independent national existence; but to render this permanent, they must supplement their area by the acquisition of continental lands, according to the law of increasing territorial aggregates. Great Britain and Japan, though ethnically and culturally appendages of the nearby mainland, were large enough, aided by the dividing sea, to maintain political autonomy. They absorbed all the insular fragments lying about them to extend their areas, and then each in turn entered upon a career of continental expansion. To Japan this movement as a determined policy came late, only when she faced the alternative of absorbing territory or being absorbed by all-devouring Russia. The isolation of Madagascar resulted in only slight community of race with Africa, and combined with large area, has kept the island to a great extent distinct from the political history of Africa. The impulses which swept the eastern coast of the continent reached the outlying island with abated force. Arab, Portuguese, Dutch and English only scratched its rim. The character of its western coasts, of its vigorous Malayan population, and of the intervening Mozambique Current rendered conquest difficult from the African shore. Its large size, with the promise of abundant resources, offered a bait to conquest, yet put a barrier in its way. Hence we find that not till 1895, when the partition of continental Africa was almost accomplished, did the French conquest of Madagascar occur.

Land masses, as we've discovered, can be independent based on their location or their size. Large islands, especially those on the outskirts, can often manage to sustain an independent national existence for a long time; however, to make this permanent, they need to expand their territory by acquiring mainland lands, following the principle of increasing territorial size. Great Britain and Japan, while culturally and ethnically linked to the nearby mainland, were substantial enough to maintain political independence, aided by the surrounding sea. They absorbed various nearby islands to enlarge their territories, and each began a process of expansion onto the continent. For Japan, this strategy came later, only when she had to choose between taking over territory or being consumed by the ever-expanding Russia. Madagascar's isolation led to minimal racial connection with Africa, and combined with its large size, it has mostly remained separate from Africa’s political history. The movements that impacted the eastern coast of the continent had reduced effect on the distant island. The Arabs, Portuguese, Dutch, and English only made superficial contacts with it. The nature of Madagascar's western coasts, its strong Malayan population, and the Mozambique Current made conquest difficult from the African side. Its vast size and potential for rich resources made it an attractive target for invasion, yet also created obstacles. Therefore, it wasn't until 1895, when the division of continental Africa was nearly complete, that the French were able to conquer Madagascar.

By contrast, the closely grouped East Indies, long coveted for their tropical products, suffered a contagion of conquest. The large size of these islands, so far from granting them immunity, only enabled the epidemic of Portuguese and Dutch dominion to pass from one to the other more readily, and that even when the spice and pepper trade languished from a plethora of products. But even here the size of the islands, plus the sub-equatorial climate which bars genuine white colonization, has restricted the effective political dominion of Europeans to the coasts, and thus favored the survival of the natives undisturbed in the interior, with all their primitive institutions. The largest islands, like Borneo and Sumatra, have vast inland tracts still unexplored and devoted to savagery, thus illustrating the contrast between center and periphery. When Australia, the largest of all the Pacific island group, became an object of European expansion, its temperate and sub-tropical location adapted it for white colonization, and the easy task of conquering its weak and retarded native tribes encouraged its appropriation; but the natural autonomy which belongs to large area and detached location asserted itself in the history of British Australia. The island continent is now erected into a confederation of states, enjoying virtual independence. In New Zealand, we find the recent colonists taking advantage of their isolation to work out undisturbed certain unique social theories. Here, against a background of arrested aboriginal development, another race evinces a radical spirit of progress; and to these contrasted results equally the detached island environment has contributed its share.

In contrast, the closely grouped East Indies, long desired for their tropical products, faced a wave of conquest. The large size of these islands didn’t provide immunity; instead, it allowed the spread of Portuguese and Dutch rule to move easily from one island to another, even when the spice and pepper trade slowed down due to an abundance of other products. However, the size of the islands, along with the sub-equatorial climate that prevents significant white colonization, has limited the political control of Europeans to the coasts, allowing the natives to thrive peacefully in the interior, maintaining their primitive institutions. The largest islands, like Borneo and Sumatra, still have vast unexplored regions filled with wilderness, highlighting the divide between the center and the outskirts. When Australia, the biggest of all the Pacific islands, became a target for European expansion, its temperate and sub-tropical environment made it suitable for white colonization. The easy task of conquering its weak and underdeveloped native tribes encouraged its takeover; yet the natural independence that comes from its size and isolated location revealed itself in the history of British Australia. The island continent is now formed into a confederation of states, enjoying near independence. In New Zealand, we see the recent settlers using their isolation to develop unique social theories without interruption. Here, against a backdrop of stagnant indigenous development, another race shows a strong spirit of progress; and both these contrasting outcomes have been influenced by the isolated island environment.

Historical effects of island isolation; primitive retardation.

The historical development of island peoples bears always in greater or less degree the stamp of isolation; but this isolation may lead to opposite cultural results. It may mean in one case retardation, in another accelerated development. Its geographical advantages are distinctly relative, increasing rapidly with a rising scale of civilization. Therefore in an island habitat the race factor may operate with or against the geographic factor in producing a desirable historical result. If the isolation is almost complete, the cultural status of the inhabitants low, and therefore their need of stimulation from without very great, the lack of it will sink them deeper in barbarism than their kinsmen on the mainland. The negroes of Africa, taken as a whole, occupy a higher economic and cultural rank than the black races of Australia and Melanesia; and for this difference one cause at least is to be found in the difference of their habitats. The knowledge of iron, stock-raising, and many branches of agriculture were continental achievements, which belonged to the great eastern land-mass and spread from Egypt over Africa even to the Hottentot country; the lack of them among the Australians must be attributed to their insularity, which barred them from this knowledge, just as the ignorance of iron and other metals among the native Canary Islanders883 can only be ascribed to a sea barrier fifty-two miles wide. The scant acquaintance of the Balearic Islanders with iron in Roman days884 points to insular detachment. The lack of native domesticable animals in the Pacific archipelagoes illustrates another limitation incident to the restricted fauna of islands, though this particular lack also retarded the cultural development of primitive North America.

The historical development of island communities has always been marked by varying degrees of isolation; however, this isolation can lead to different cultural outcomes. In some cases, it may slow development, while in others, it can speed it up. The geographical advantages are definitely relative and tend to increase as civilization advances. Thus, in an island setting, the racial factor can either work with or against the geographical factor in creating a favorable historical outcome. If the isolation is nearly complete, the cultural level of the inhabitants is low, and their need for external stimulation is very high, the absence of that stimulation can push them further into barbarism compared to their counterparts on the mainland. Overall, Black Africans rank higher economically and culturally than the Black populations of Australia and Melanesia; one reason for this difference can be found in the variation of their environments. Knowledge of iron, cattle raising, and various agricultural practices were achievements of the mainland that originated from the great eastern landmass and spread from Egypt throughout Africa, even reaching the Hottentots; the absence of these advancements among Australians can be attributed to their island status, which kept them from acquiring such knowledge, just as the lack of understanding of iron and other metals among the native Canary Islanders883 can only be explained by a sea barrier fifty-two miles wide. The limited familiarity of the Balearic Islanders with iron during Roman times884 indicates their insular separation. The absence of native domesticated animals in the Pacific archipelagos highlights another restriction related to the limited fauna of islands, though this specific deficiency also hindered the cultural advancement of early North America.

Later stimulation of development.

On the other hand, people who have already secured the fundamental elements of civilization find the partial seclusion of an island environment favorable to their further progress, because it permits their powers to unfold unhindered, protects them from the friction of border quarrels, from the disturbance and desolation of invading armies, to which continental peoples are constantly exposed. But even here the advantage lies in insulation but not in isolation,885 in a location like that of England or Japan, near enough to a continent to draw thence culture, commerce and occasional new strains of blood, but detached by sea-girt boundaries broad enough to ward off overwhelming aggressions. Such a location insures enough segregation for protection, but also opportunity for universal contact over the vast commons of the sea.

On the other hand, people who have already secured the basic elements of civilization find that the relative isolation of an island environment is beneficial for their continued development, as it allows their abilities to grow freely and protects them from the conflicts of border disputes and the chaos of invading armies, which continental populations constantly face. However, even in this context, the benefit lies in being insulated but not isolated,885 in places like England or Japan, close enough to a continent to access culture, trade, and occasional new bloodlines, yet separated by wide sea barriers that help fend off major threats. Such a location provides enough separation for safety, while also allowing for opportunities for global interaction across the vast ocean.

Excessive isolation.

Excessive isolation may mean impoverishment in purse and progress even for an advanced race. Ireland has long suffered from its outskirt location. It lies too much in the shadow of England, and has been barred by the larger island from many warming rays of immigration, culture and commerce that would have vitalized its national existence. The "round barrow" men of the Bronze Age, the Romans, and the Normans never carried thither their respective contributions to civilization. The Scandinavians infused into its population only inconsiderable strains of their vigorous northern blood.886 In consequence the Irish are to-day substantially the same race as in Cæsar's time, except for the small, unassimilated group of antagonistic English and Lowland Scotch, both Teutonic, in Ulster.887 Barred by Great Britain from direct contact with the Continent and all its stimulating influences, suffering from unfavorable conditions of climate and topography, Ireland's political evolution progressed at a snail's pace. It tarried in the tribal stage till after the English conquest, presenting a primitive social organization such as existed nowhere in continental Europe. Property was communal till the time of the Tudors, and all law was customary.888 Over-protected by excessive isolation, it failed to learn the salutary lesson of political co-operation and centralization for defense, such as Scotland learned from England's aggressions, and England from her close continental neighbors. Great Britain, meanwhile, intercepted the best that the Continent had to give, both blows and blessings, and found an advantage in each. The steady prosecution of her continental wars demanded the gradual erection of a standing army, which weakened the power of feudalism; and the voting of funds for the conduct of these same wars put a whip into the hand of Parliament.

Excessive isolation can lead to a lack of wealth and development, even for a more advanced society. Ireland has suffered from its remote location for a long time. It is overshadowed by England and has been prevented by the larger island from experiencing many enriching waves of immigration, culture, and commerce that could have energized its national identity. The Bronze Age "round barrow" builders, the Romans, and the Normans never brought their cultural contributions there. The Scandinavians contributed only a small amount of their strong northern heritage to the population.886 As a result, the Irish today are largely the same ethnic group as they were in Cæsar's time, apart from the small, unassimilated groups of opposing English and Lowland Scots, both Teutonic, in Ulster.887 Restricted by Great Britain from direct contact with the Continent and all its invigorating influences, and hampered by unfavorable climate and landscape, Ireland's political development moved incredibly slowly. It remained in a tribal stage until after the English conquest, showing a primitive social structure that was unmatched in continental Europe. Property was held in common until the time of the Tudors, and all laws were based on tradition.888 Overprotected by extreme isolation, it didn’t learn the important lesson of political cooperation and centralization for defense that Scotland gained from England's invasions, and which England learned from its close neighbors on the continent. Great Britain, in the meantime, intercepted the best of what the Continent had to offer, both in challenges and opportunities, and turned each to its advantage. The ongoing wars on the continent required the gradual establishment of a standing army, which weakened the power of feudalism; and funding these wars gave Parliament more control.

The case of Iceland.

The history of Iceland illustrates the advantage and subsequently the drawback of isolation. The energetic spirits who, at the end of the ninth century, resented the centralization of political power in Norway and escaped from the turmoil and oppression of the home country to the remote asylum offered by Iceland, maintained there till 1262 the only absolutely free republic in the world.889 They had brought with them various seeds of culture and progress, which grew and flowered richly in this peaceful soil. Iceland became the center of brilliant maritime and colonial achievements, the home of a native literature which surpassed that of all its contemporaries except Dante's Italy.890 But after the decay of the Greenland colonies converted Iceland from a focal into a remote terminal point, and after the progress of the world became based upon complex and far-reaching commercial relations, the blight of extreme isolation settled upon the island; peace became stagnation.

The history of Iceland shows the benefits and then the downsides of being isolated. The spirited individuals who, at the end of the ninth century, were unhappy with the centralization of political power in Norway and fled from the chaos and oppression of their homeland to the distant refuge of Iceland, maintained the only truly free republic in the world until 1262.889 They brought with them various seeds of culture and progress, which thrived and flourished in this peaceful environment. Iceland became the center of remarkable maritime and colonial achievements, home to a native literature that surpassed all its contemporaries except for Dante's Italy.890 But after the decline of the Greenland colonies turned Iceland from a focal point into a distant endpoint, and as the world's progress began to rely on complex and extensive commercial connections, the curse of extreme isolation fell upon the island; peace turned into stagnation.

Protection of an island environment.

The concomitant of isolation is protection. Though this protection, if the result of extreme isolation, may mean an early cessation of development, history shows that in the lower stages of civilization, when the social organism is small and weak, and its germs of progress easily blighted, islands offer the sheltered environment in which imported flowers of culture not only survive but improve; in less protected fields they deteriorate or disappear. When learning and Christianity had been almost wiped out on the continent of Europe by the ravages of barbarian invasion between 450 and 800 A. D., in Ireland they grew and flourished. In the seventh and eighth centuries, the high scholarship of the Irish monks and their enthusiastic love of learning for its own sake drew to their schools students of the noblest rank from both England and France.891 It was from Irish teachers that the Picts of Scotland and the Angles of northern England received their first lessons in Christianity. These fixed their mission stations again on islands, on Iona off southwestern Scotland and on Lindisfarne or Holy Isle near the east coast of Northumbria.892 It was in the protected environment of the medieval Iceland that Scandinavian literature reached its highest development.

The downside of isolation is that it can provide protection. However, if that protection comes from extreme isolation, it might mean that development stops early. History shows that in the early stages of civilization, when the social structure is small and fragile, and the seeds of progress can easily be stifled, islands provide a safe space where imported cultural influences not only survive but thrive; in less sheltered places, they tend to weaken or vanish. When learning and Christianity were nearly wiped out in Europe due to the invasions of barbarians between 450 and 800 A.D., they actually grew and thrived in Ireland. In the seventh and eighth centuries, the impressive scholarship of Irish monks and their passion for learning attracted students of noble birth from both England and France. It was from Irish teachers that the Picts of Scotland and the Angles of northern England received their first lessons in Christianity. They established their mission stations once again on islands, like Iona off southwestern Scotland and Lindisfarne or Holy Isle near the east coast of Northumbria. It was in the secure environment of medieval Iceland that Scandinavian literature reached its peak.

Insular protection was undoubtedly a factor in the brilliant cultural development of Crete. The progress of the early civilization from the late Stone Age through the Bronze Age was continuous; it bears no trace of any strong outside influence or sudden transition, no evidence of disturbance like an invasion or conquest by an alien people till 1200 B. C. when the latest stage of Minoan art was crushed by barbarian incursion from the north.893

Insular protection was definitely a factor in the amazing cultural development of Crete. The advancement of early civilization from the late Stone Age through the Bronze Age was steady; it shows no signs of significant outside influence or abrupt changes, and no evidence of disruption like an invasion or takeover by foreign people until 1200 B.C., when the final stage of Minoan art was destroyed by barbarian attacks from the north.893

Factor of protection in Ceylon and Japan.

The early history of the Singhalese monarchy in Ceylon from 250 B. C. to 416 A. D., when even the narrow moat of Palk Strait discouraged Tamil invasions from the mainland, shows the brilliant development possible under even a slight degree of protection.894 However, in the case of these Ceylon Aryans, as in that of the Icelandic Norse, we must keep in mind the fact that the bearers of this culture were picked men, as are early maritime colonists the world over. The sea selects and then protects its island folk. But the seclusion of Ceylon was more favorable to progress than the mainland of India, with its incessant political and religious upheavals. Japan, in contrast to China's long list of invasions, shows the peace of an insular location. She never suffered any overwhelming influx of alien races or any foreign conquest. The armada sent by Kublai Khan in 1281 to subdue the islands paralleled the experience of the famous Spanish fleet three centuries later in English waters. This is the only attempt to invade Japan that recorded history shows.895 In the original peopling of the island by Mongolian stock at the cost of the Aino aborigines, there is evidence of two distinct and perhaps widely separated immigrations from the mainland, one from Korea and another from more northern Asia. Thus Japan's population contained two continental elements, which seem to have held themselves in the relation of governing and governed class, much as Norman and Saxon did in England, while the Ainos lingered in the geographical background of mountain fastness and outlying islands, as the primitive Celts did in the British Isles.896 In the case both of England and Japan, the island location made the occupation by continental races a fitful, piecemeal process, not an inundation, because only small parties could land from time to time. The result was gradual or partial amalgamation of the various stocks, but nowhere annihilation.

The early history of the Sinhalese monarchy in Ceylon from 250 B.C. to 416 A.D., when even the narrow Palk Strait discouraged Tamil invasions from the mainland, demonstrates the impressive development possible with even a little protection.894 However, in the case of these Ceylon Aryans, like the Icelandic Norse, we should remember that the people carrying this culture were elite individuals, similar to early maritime colonists everywhere. The sea chooses and then safeguards its island communities. But Ceylon’s isolation was more conducive to progress than mainland India, which faced constant political and religious turmoil. Japan, unlike China, which has faced numerous invasions, benefits from the peace of its island location. It never experienced significant waves of foreign races or conquests. The armada sent by Kublai Khan in 1281 to conquer the islands mirrors the experience of the famous Spanish fleet three centuries later in English waters. This is the only documented attempt to invade Japan.895 In the initial settlement of the island by Mongolian groups at the expense of the Ainu aborigines, there’s evidence of two distinct and possibly separated waves of immigration from the mainland, one from Korea and another from further northern Asia. Thus, Japan's population consisted of two continental elements that seemed to maintain a governing and governed relationship, similar to the Norman and Saxon dynamic in England, while the Ainu remained in the background of mountains and outlying islands, much like the primitive Celts in the British Isles.896 In both England and Japan, the island setting made the occupation by continental races a sporadic, gradual process rather than a flood, as only small groups could land from time to time. The result was a slow or partial blending of the various groups, but nowhere was there total annihilation.

Character of the invaders as factor.

But island location was not the sole factor in the equation. Similarity of race and relative parity of civilization between the successive immigrants and the original population, as well as the small numbers of the Invaders, made the struggle for the ownership of the island not wholly one-sided, and was later favorable to amalgamation in England as in Japan; whereas very small bands of far-coming Spaniards in the Canaries, Cuba, and Porto Rico resulted in the extinction of the original inhabitants, by the process operating now in New Zealand and Australia. Prior to the arrival of the Europeans in the Antilles, the conquest of these islands by South American Caribs had resulted in race intermixture. These sea-marauders brought no women with them in their small boats from the distant mainland, so they killed off the men and married the Arawak women of the islands. Here again insular location plus similarity of race and culture produced amalgamation, as opposed to extermination of the vanquished by over-sea invaders.

But being on an island wasn’t the only reason for what happened. The similar backgrounds and level of civilization between the new immigrants and the original inhabitants, along with the small numbers of the invaders, made the fight for control of the island not completely one-sided, which later allowed for blending in England as well as in Japan. In contrast, very small groups of Spaniards arriving from far away in the Canaries, Cuba, and Puerto Rico led to the extinction of the original populations, similar to what’s happening now in New Zealand and Australia. Before Europeans arrived in the Caribbean, the conquest of these islands by South American Caribs had already mixed the races. These sea raiders didn’t bring any women with them in their small boats from the mainland, so they killed the men and married the Arawak women of the islands. Again, the island's location combined with similarities in race and culture led to blending rather than the extermination of the defeated by overseas invaders.

While the insular security of a primitive folk like the Tasmanians, Hawaiians and Malagasies is only passive, that of a civilized people like the English and modern Japanese is active, consciously utilized and reinforced. It is therefore more effective, and productive of more varied political and cultural results. Such people can allow themselves extensive contact with other nations, because they know it is in their power to control or check such contact at will. Japan took refuge in its medieval period in a policy of seclusion suggested by its island habitat,897 relying on the passive protection of isolation. England, on the other hand, from the time of King Alfred, built up a navy to resist invasion. The effect, after the political unification of Great Britain, was a guarantee of protection against foreign attack, the concentration of the national defenses in a navy,898 the elimination of the standing army which despotic monarchs might have used to crush the people, the consequent release of a large working force from military service, and the application of these to the development of English Industry.899

While the insular security of isolated groups like the Tasmanians, Hawaiians, and Malagasies is just passive, the security of a civilized people such as the English and modern Japanese is active, intentionally applied, and strengthened. As a result, it's more effective and leads to a wider range of political and cultural outcomes. These societies can engage in extensive interaction with other nations because they know they have the power to manage or limit that interaction whenever they choose. Japan, influenced by its island environment, adopted a seclusion policy reminiscent of its medieval era, depending on the passive protection of isolation. In contrast, England, starting with King Alfred, developed a navy to fend off invasions. After the political unification of Great Britain, this approach ensured protection against foreign threats, focused national defense on a navy, eliminated the standing army that tyrannical monarchs could have used to suppress the people, released a large workforce from military duty, and directed these resources toward advancing English industry.

Islands as places of refuge.

Islands, as naturally protected districts, are often sought places of refuge by the weak or vanquished, and thus are drawn into the field of historical movement. We find this principle operating also in the animal world. The fur seals of the North Pacific have fled from the American coasts and found an asylum on the Pribiloff Islands of Bering Sea, where their concentration and isolation have enabled them to become wards of the United States government, though this result they did not foresee. The last Rhytina or Arctic sea-cow was found on an island in Bering Strait.900 So the Veneti of Northern Italy in the fifth century sought an asylum from the desolating Huns and, a century later, from the Lombards, in the deposit islands at the head of the Adriatic, and there found the geographic conditions for a brilliant commercial and cultural development. Formosa got its first contingent of Chinese settlers in the thirteenth century in refugees seeking a place of safety from Kublai Khan's armies; and its second in 1644 in a Chinese chief and his followers who had refused to submit to the victorious Manchus. In 1637 Formosa was an asylum also for Japanese Christians, who escaped thither from the persecutions attending the discovery of Jesuit conspiracies against the government.901 The Azores, soon after their rediscovery in 1431, were colonized largely by Flemish refugees,902 just as Iceland was peopled by rebellious Norwegians. To such voluntary exiles the dividing sea gives a peculiar sense of security, this by a psychological law. Hence England owing to its insular location, and also to its free government, has always been an asylum for the oppressed. The large body of Huguenot refugees who sought her shores after the revocation of the Edict of Nantes added a valuable element to her population.

Islands, as naturally protected areas, are often sought after as safe havens by the weak or defeated, and thus become part of historical movements. We see this principle at work in the animal kingdom as well. The fur seals from the North Pacific have retreated from the American coasts and found refuge on the Pribiloff Islands in the Bering Sea, where their concentration and isolation have allowed them to become protected by the United States government, though they didn’t anticipate this outcome. The last Rhytina, or Arctic sea cow, was discovered on an island in the Bering Strait.900 Similarly, the Veneti of Northern Italy sought refuge from the devastating Huns in the fifth century and, a century later, from the Lombards, on the islands at the head of the Adriatic, where they found the geographic conditions for remarkable commercial and cultural growth. Formosa received its first group of Chinese settlers in the thirteenth century, comprised of refugees seeking safety from Kublai Khan's armies; and the second group in 1644 included a Chinese chief and his followers who refused to bow to the victorious Manchus. In 1637, Formosa also served as an asylum for Japanese Christians fleeing persecutions related to the discovery of Jesuit conspiracies against the government.901 The Azores, shortly after their rediscovery in 1431, were largely settled by Flemish refugees,902 just as Iceland was populated by rebellious Norwegians. For these voluntary exiles, the surrounding sea provides a unique sense of security due to a psychological principle. Consequently, England, because of its insular position and free government, has always been a haven for the oppressed. The significant number of Huguenot refugees who arrived on her shores after the revocation of the Edict of Nantes enriched her population.

Convict islands.

Islands find their populations enriched by the immigration of this select class who refuse to acquiesce in oppression and injustice. But the geographic conditions which make islands natural asylums make them also obvious places of detention for undesirable members of society; these conditions render segregation complete, escape difficult or impossible, and control easy. Hence we find that almost all the nations of the world owning islands have utilized them as penal stations. From the gray dawn of history the Isles of the Blessed have been balanced by the isles of the cursed. The radiant Garden of Hesperides has found its antithesis in the black hell of Norfolk Isle, peopled by the "doubly condemned" criminals whom not even the depraved convict citizens of Botany Bay could tolerate.903 There is scarcely an island of the Mediterranean without this sinister vein in its history. The archipelagoes of the ancient Aegean were constantly receiving political exiles from continental Greece. Augustus Cæsar confined his degenerate daughter Julia, the wife of Tiberius, on the island of Pandateria, one of the Ponza group; and banished her paramour, Sempronius Gracchus, to Cercina in the Syrtis Minor off the African coast.904 Other Roman matrons of high degree but low morals and corrupt officials were exiled to Corsica, Sardinia, Seriphos, Amorgos and other of the Cyclades. 905 To-day Italy has prisons or penal stations in Ischia, the Ponza group, Procida, Nisida, Elba, Pantellaria, Lampedusa, Ustica, and especially in the Lipari Isles, where the convicts are employed in mining sulphur, alum and pumice from the volcanic cones.906

Islands have their populations enriched by the immigration of a select group who refuse to accept oppression and injustice. However, the geographic conditions that make islands natural refuges also make them obvious places to detain undesirable members of society; these conditions facilitate complete segregation, make escape challenging or impossible, and allow for easy control. Thus, we see that almost every nation in the world with islands has used them as penal colonies. From the early days of history, the Isles of the Blessed have been counterbalanced by the isles of the cursed. The beautiful Garden of Hesperides has its opposite in the dark hell of Norfolk Isle, populated by the "doubly condemned" criminals whom even the depraved convicts of Botany Bay could not tolerate.903 There's hardly an island in the Mediterranean that doesn't have this dark part of its history. The archipelagos of the ancient Aegean were constantly receiving political exiles from continental Greece. Augustus Caesar exiled his disreputable daughter Julia, the wife of Tiberius, to the island of Pandateria, one of the Ponza islands; and banished her lover, Sempronius Gracchus, to Cercina in the Syrtis Minor off the African coast.904 Other Roman women of high status but low morals, along with corrupt officials, were exiled to Corsica, Sardinia, Seriphos, Amorgos, and other islands in the Cyclades. 905 Today, Italy has prisons or penal colonies in Ischia, the Ponza group, Procida, Nisida, Elba, Pantelleria, Lampedusa, Ustica, and especially in the Lipari Isles, where convicts are employed in mining sulfur, alum, and pumice from the volcanic cones.906

Penal colonies on uninhabited islands.

In modern times many remote oceanic islands have gotten their first or only white settlers from this criminal class. Such are the citizens whom Chile has sent to Easter Isle twenty-five hundred miles away out in the Pacific.907 The inhabitants of Fernando Noronha, 125 miles off the eastern point of South America, are convicts from Brazil, together with the warders and troops who guard them.908 In 1832 Ecuador began to use the uninhabited Gallapagos Islands, lying 730 miles west of its coast, as a penal settlement.909 The history of St. Helena is typical. Its first inhabitants were some Portuguese deserters who in punishment were marooned here from a Portuguese ship with a supply of seed and cattle. They proved industrious and had cultivated a good deal of the land when four years later they were removed to Portugal. The next inhabitants were a few slaves of both sexes who escaped from a slave ship that had stopped here for wood and water. These multiplied, worked and restored the overgrown plantations of their predecessors, till a Portuguese vessel about twenty years later was sent to exterminate them. A few escaped to the woods, however, and were found there in prosperity in 1588.910 From 1815 till 1821 St. Helena was the prison of Napoleon.

In modern times, many remote oceanic islands have received their first or only white settlers from this group of criminals. Such are the citizens that Chile has sent to Easter Island, located twenty-five hundred miles out in the Pacific.907 The inhabitants of Fernando Noronha, 125 miles off the eastern coast of South America, are convicts from Brazil, along with the guards and troops who watch over them.908 In 1832, Ecuador started using the uninhabited Galapagos Islands, situated 730 miles west of its coast, as a penal settlement.909 The history of St. Helena is typical. Its first inhabitants were Portuguese deserters who, as punishment, were stranded here from a Portuguese ship with some seeds and cattle. They were hard-working and managed to cultivate a significant amount of land when, four years later, they were sent back to Portugal. The next inhabitants were a few enslaved individuals of both genders who escaped from a slave ship that had stopped here for supplies. They thrived, worked, and revived the overgrown plantations of their predecessors until a Portuguese ship was sent to eradicate them about twenty years later. However, a few escaped to the woods and were found thriving there in 1588.910 From 1815 until 1821, St. Helena was the prison of Napoleon.

Many of these penal islands seem chosen with a view to their severe or unhealthy climate, which would forever repel free immigration and therefore render them useless for any other purpose. This is true of the French Isles du Salut off the Guiana coast, of Spanish Fernando Po in the Gulf of Guinea, of the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, notoriously unhealthy, which receive the criminals of British India,911 and of numerous others. A bleak climate and unproductive soil have added to the horror of exile life in Sakhalin, as they overshadowed existence in the Falkland Islands, when these were a penal colony of Spain and later of Argentine.912

Many of these penal islands seem to have been chosen for their harsh or unhealthy climates, which would always discourage free immigration and make them useless for any other purpose. This is true for the French Isles du Salut off the Guiana coast, Spanish Fernando Po in the Gulf of Guinea, the notoriously unhealthy Andaman and Nicobar Islands, which receive criminals from British India,911 and many others. A harsh climate and poor soil have made life in exile on Sakhalin even more miserable, much like the experience in the Falkland Islands when they were a penal colony of Spain and later Argentina.912

Island prisons for political offenders.

In the case of political offenders and incorrigibles, the island prison is as remote and inaccessible as possible. The classic example is Napoleon's consignment to Elba and subsequently to St. Helena, whence escape was impossible. Spain has sent its rebellious subjects, even university professors of independent views, to Fernando Po in the Gulf of Guinea and Teneriffe in the Canaries.913 Russian political offenders of the most dangerous class are confined first in the Schlüsselberg prison, situated on a small island in Lake Ladoga near the effluence of the Neva. There they languish in solitary confinement or are transferred to far-off Sakhalin, whose very name is taboo in St. Petersburg.914 During our Civil War, one of the Dry Tortugas, lying a hundred miles west of the southern point of Florida and at that time the most isolated island belonging to the American government, was used as a prison for dangerous Confederates; and here later three conspirators in the assassination of President Lincoln were incarcerated.915 Far away to the southeast, off the coast of South America, are the Isles du Salut, a French penal station for criminals of the worst class. The Isle du Diable, ominous of name, lies farthest out to sea. This was for five years the prison of Dreyfus. Its other inhabitants are lepers. Isles of the cursed indeed!

In the case of political offenders and unmanageable individuals, the island prison is as isolated and inaccessible as possible. A classic example is Napoleon’s exile to Elba and later to St. Helena, from which escape was impossible. Spain has sent its rebellious citizens, including university professors with independent ideas, to Fernando Po in the Gulf of Guinea and Tenerife in the Canaries.913 Russian political offenders of the most serious kind are initially held in Schlüsselberg prison, located on a small island in Lake Ladoga near the mouth of the Neva. There, they suffer in solitary confinement or are moved to distant Sakhalin, a name that is taboo in St. Petersburg.914 During our Civil War, one of the Dry Tortugas, lying a hundred miles west of southern Florida and at that time the most isolated island owned by the American government, was used as a prison for dangerous Confederates; later, three conspirators in the assassination of President Lincoln were held there.915 Far to the southeast, off the coast of South America, are the Isles du Salut, a French prison for the most dangerous criminals. The Isle du Diable, ominous by name, is the farthest out to sea. This was Dreyfus's prison for five years. Its other residents are lepers. Isles of the cursed indeed!

Islands as places of survival.

What islands have they tend to hold, to segregate, secrete from meddling hands, preserve untouched and unaltered. Owing to this power to protect, islands show a large percentage of rare archaic forms of animal and plant life. The insular fauna of Australia, Tasmania, New Guinea and Madagascar display a succession of strange, ancestral forms going back to the biological infancy of the world. The Canaries in the Atlantic and Celebes In the Pacific are museums of living antiquities, some of them dating probably from Miocene times.916 Such survivals are found elsewhere only in high mountains, whose inaccessible slopes also offer protection against excessive competition. Hence some of the antiquated species of insular Celebes, Formosa, Japan and Hainon occur again on the Asiatic mainland only in the Himalayas.917

What islands have they tended to hold, to keep separate, hidden from meddling hands, preserving them untouched and unaltered? Because of this ability to protect, islands showcase a high percentage of rare, ancient forms of animal and plant life. The wildlife of Australia, Tasmania, New Guinea, and Madagascar displays a series of unusual, ancestral forms that date back to the early biological stages of the world. The Canaries in the Atlantic and Celebes in the Pacific are like museums of living history, with some species likely dating back to the Miocene era.916 Such survivors are found elsewhere only in high mountains, where their hard-to-reach slopes also provide protection against excessive competition. Therefore, some of the ancient species from Celebes, Formosa, Japan, and Hainon appear again on the Asian mainland only in the Himalayas.917

For man, too, islands and their sister areas of isolation, mountains, are areas of survivals. The shrinking remnants of that half-dwarf Negrito stock which may have formed the aboriginal population of southern Asia are found to-day only in the mountains of peninsular India and in island groups like the Andaman and the Philippines. But even in the Philippines, they are confined either to the mountainous interiors of the larger islands, or to little coastal islets like Polillo, Alabat, Jomalig, and others.918 [See map page 147.] Yezo, Sakhalin and the Kurile Isles harbor the last feeble remnants of the Ainos, a primitive people who formerly occupied a long stretch of the Asiatic coast south of the Amur mouth. The protected environment of these islands has postponed the doom of extinction toward which the Ainos are hastening.919 With insular conservatism they dress, live and seek their food on the sea to-day, just as depicted in Japanese art and literature at the dawn of history.920 [See map page 103.]

For humans, islands and their neighboring isolated areas, like mountains, are places of survival. The dwindling remnants of the Negrito population, which may have been the original inhabitants of southern Asia, are now found only in the mountains of peninsular India and in island groups like the Andaman Islands and the Philippines. However, even in the Philippines, they are limited to the mountainous regions of the larger islands or to small coastal islets like Polillo, Alabat, Jomalig, and others.918 [See map page 147.] Yezo, Sakhalin, and the Kurile Islands are home to the last remaining members of the Ainos, a primitive group that once lived along a long stretch of the Asian coast south of the Amur River mouth. The protective environment of these islands has delayed the inevitable extinction that the Ainos are facing.919 With their insular traditions, they still dress, live, and hunt for food from the sea today, just as shown in Japanese art and literature from the beginning of history.920 [See map page 103.]

Insular survivals of manners and customs.

It is chiefly on islands of harsh climatic conditions, like Sakhalin, or of peculiarly restricted resources and area, like the Andaman, or of remote, side-tracked location, like Iceland, Sardinia and Cape Breton, that the stamp of the primitive or antiquated is strongest. Even when not apparent in race stock, owing to the ubiquitous colonization of maritime peoples, it marks the language and customs of even these late-coming occupants, because an island environment asserts always some power to isolate. This is due not only to the encircling moat of sea, but also to the restricted insular area, too small to attract to itself the great currents of human activity which infuse cosmopolitan ideas and innovations, and too poor to buy the material improvements which progress offers. If the tourist in Sicily finds the women of Taormina or Girgenti spinning with a hand spindle, and the express trains moving only twelve miles an hour, he can take these two facts as the product of a small, detached area, although this island lies at the crossroads of the Mediterranean. Corsica and Sardinia, lying off the main routes of travel in this basin, are two of the most primitive and isolated spots of Europe. Here the old wooden plow of Roman days is still in common use as it is in Crete, and feudal institutions of the Middle Ages still prevail to some extent921 ,—a fact which recalls the long survival of feudalism in Japan. The little Isle of Man, almost in sight of the English coast, has retained an old Norse form of government. Here survives the primitive custom of orally proclaiming every new law from the Tynwald Hill before it can take effect,922 and the other ancient usage of holding the court of justice on the same hill under the open sky. The Faroe Islands and Iceland are museums of Norse antiquities. The stamp of isolation and therefore conservatism is most marked in the remoter, northern islands. Surnames are rare in Iceland, and such as exist are mostly of foreign origin. In their place, Christian names followed by the patronymic prevail; but in the Faroes, these patronymics have in a great many cases become recognized as surnames. So again, while the Faroese women still use a rude spinning-wheel introduced from Scotland in 1671, in Iceland this spinning-wheel was still an innovation in 1800, and even to-day competes with spindles. Hand-querns for grinding wheat, stone hammers for pounding fish and roots, the wooden weighing-beam of the ancient Northmen, and quaint marriage customs give the final touch of aloofness and antiquity to life on these remote islands.923

It is mainly on islands with harsh climates, like Sakhalin, or with uniquely limited resources and land, like the Andaman Islands, or in isolated locations, like Iceland, Sardinia, and Cape Breton, that the signs of primitiveness or antiquity are strongest. Even if not obvious in the population's heritage, due to the widespread colonization by maritime cultures, it influences the language and customs of these later arrivals, because island environments always have a certain isolating effect. This is not just because of the surrounding sea, but also due to the small size of the islands, which makes it hard to attract the significant flows of human activity that bring cosmopolitan ideas and innovations, and too poor to afford the material improvements that progress offers. If a tourist in Sicily sees the women of Taormina or Girgenti spinning with a hand spindle, and trains only moving at twelve miles an hour, he can understand these two aspects as products of a small, detached area, even though this island is at the crossroads of the Mediterranean. Corsica and Sardinia, situated away from the main travel routes in this region, are two of the most primitive and secluded places in Europe. Here, the old wooden plow from Roman times is still commonly used, as it is in Crete, and feudal practices from the Middle Ages still exist to some extent—a fact that echoes the long survival of feudalism in Japan. The small Isle of Man, nearly visible from the English coast, has kept an old Norse style of government. Here, the old custom of orally announcing every new law from Tynwald Hill before it can take effect still exists, and there is also the ancient tradition of holding court under the open sky on the same hill. The Faroe Islands and Iceland are like museums of Norse history. The effect of isolation and conservatism is especially pronounced in the more remote northern islands. Surnames are uncommon in Iceland, and those that do exist are mostly of foreign origin. Instead, first names followed by the patronymic are common; however, in the Faroes, many of these patronymics have become recognized as surnames. Similarly, while Faroese women still use a simple spinning wheel introduced from Scotland in 1671, in Iceland, this spinning wheel was still a new idea in 1800, and even today it competes with spindles. Hand querns for grinding wheat, stone hammers for pounding fish and roots, the wooden weighing beam of the ancient Norse, and unique marriage customs give a final touch of remoteness and antiquity to life on these isolated islands.

Effects of small area in islands.

As all island life bears more or less the mark of isolation, so it betrays the narrow area that has served at its base. Though islands show a wide variation in size from the 301,000 square miles (771,900 square kilometers) of New Guinea or the 291,000 square miles (745,950 square kilometers) of Borneo to the private estates like the Scilly Isles, Gardiner and Shelter islands off Long Island, or those small, sea-fenced pastures for sheep and goats near the New England coast and in the Aegean, yet small islands predominate; the large ones are very few. Islands comprise a scant seven per cent. of the total land area of the earth, and their number is very great,—nine hundred, for instance, in the Philippine group alone. Therefore small area is a conspicuous feature of islands generally. It produces in island people all those effects which are characteristic of small, naturally defined areas, especially early or precocious social, political and cultural development. The value of islands in this respect belongs to the youth of the world, as seen in the ancient Mediterranean, or in the adolescence of modern primitive races; it declines as the limitations rather than the advantages of restricted territory preponderate in later historical development.

As all island life reflects some degree of isolation, it also reveals the limited size that has shaped it. While islands vary greatly in size, from New Guinea's 301,000 square miles (771,900 square kilometers) and Borneo's 291,000 square miles (745,950 square kilometers) to smaller estates like the Scilly Isles, Gardiner and Shelter Islands off Long Island, or tiny, sea-enclosed pastures for sheep and goats near the New England coast and in the Aegean, small islands are the majority; the larger ones are quite rare. Islands make up only about seven percent of the Earth's total land area, and their numbers are significant—there are nine hundred, for example, in the Philippine archipelago alone. As a result, small size is a prominent feature of islands in general. This small size leads to effects characteristic of compact, naturally defined areas, particularly swift social, political, and cultural development. The significance of islands in this regard is evident in the youth of the world, as seen in the ancient Mediterranean or in the early stages of modern primitive societies; it diminishes as the drawbacks of limited territory begin to outweigh the benefits in later historical development.

Political dominion of small islands.

This early maturity, combined with the power to expend the concentrated national or tribal forces in any given direction, often results in the domination of a very small island over a large group. In the Society Islands, Cook found little Balabola ruling over Ulietea (Raitea) and Otaha, the former of these alone being over twice the size of Balabola, whose name commanded respect as far as Tahiti.924 The Fiji Archipelago was ruled in pre-Christian days by the little islet of Mbau, scarcely a mile long, which lies like a pebble beside massive Viti Levu. It was the chief center of political power and its supremacy was owned by nearly all the group. The next important political center was Rewa, no larger than Mbau, which had for its subject big Mbengga.925 In the same way, the Solomon group was ruled by Mongusaie and Simbo, just as tiny New Lauenberg lorded it over the larger islands of the Bismarck Archipelago.926 When the Dutch in 1613 undertook the conquest of the coveted Spice Isles, they found there two rival sultans seated in the two minute islets of Ternate and Tidore off the west coast of Gilolo. Their collective possessions, which the Dutch took, comprised all the Moluccas, the Ke and Banda groups, the whole of northwestern New Guinea, and Mindanao of the Philippines.927

This early development, combined with the ability to direct concentrated national or tribal forces in any direction, often leads to a small island dominating a larger territory. In the Society Islands, Cook discovered that tiny Balabola controlled Ulietea (Raitea) and Otaha, with the former being more than twice the size of Balabola, whose name was respected even as far as Tahiti.924 The Fiji Archipelago was governed in pre-Christian times by the small islet of Mbau, barely a mile long, which sits like a pebble next to the massive Viti Levu. It was the main center of political power, recognized by nearly everyone in the group. The next significant political center was Rewa, just as small as Mbau, which held dominion over the larger Mbengga.925 Similarly, the Solomon Islands were ruled by Mongusaie and Simbo, just as the tiny New Lauenberg held sway over the larger islands of the Bismarck Archipelago.926 When the Dutch set out to conquer the coveted Spice Isles in 1613, they encountered two rival sultans on the tiny islets of Ternate and Tidore off the west coast of Gilolo. Their joint territories, which the Dutch captured, included all of the Moluccas, the Ke and Banda groups, the entirety of northwestern New Guinea, and Mindanao in the Philippines.927

It was no unusual thing for classic Aegean isles to control and exploit goodly stretches of the nearest coast, or to exercise dominion over other islands. Aristotle tells us that Crete's location across the southern end of the Aegean Sea confirmed to it by nature the early naval empire of the Hellenic world. Minos conquered some of the islands, colonized others,928 and, according to the story of Theseus and the Minotaur, laid Athens under tribute; but his suppression of piracy in these waters and his conspicuous leadership in the art of navigation point to a yet more significant supremacy. So insular Venice ruled and exploited large dependencies. The island of Zealand, strategically located at the entrance to the Baltic, has been the heart and head and strong right arm of the Danish dominion, through all its long history of fluctuating boundaries. England's insularity has been the strongest single factor in the growth of her vast colonial empire and in the maintenance of its loyal allegiance and solidarity. The widely strewn plantation of her colonies is the result of that teeming island seed-bed at home; while the very smallness of the mother country is the guarantee of its supremacy over its dependencies, because it is too small either to oppress them or to get along without them. Now an Asiatic variant of English history is promised us by growing Japan.

It was not unusual for classic Aegean islands to control and exploit significant portions of the closest coast, or to dominate other islands. Aristotle tells us that Crete's position at the southern end of the Aegean Sea naturally gave it an early naval empire in the Greek world. Minos conquered some islands, settled others,928 and, according to the story of Theseus and the Minotaur, forced Athens to pay tribute; but his crackdown on piracy in these waters and his prominent role in navigation indicate an even more important dominance. Similarly, insular Venice ruled and exploited large territories. The island of Zealand, strategically positioned at the entrance to the Baltic, has been the center and stronghold of Danish power throughout its long history of changing borders. England's insularity has been the main factor in the development of its vast colonial empire and in keeping its loyalty and unity intact. The widespread establishment of its colonies is a result of the thriving island environment at home; while the very small size of the mother country ensures its control over its dependencies, as it is too small to either oppress them or function independently of them. Now, a unique version of English history is emerging with the rise of Japan.

Economic limitations of their small area.

Though political supremacy is possible even to an island of insignificant size, both the advantages arid the grave disadvantages of small area are constantly asserting themselves. Some developments peculiar to large territory are here eliminated at the start. For instance, robbery and brigandage, which were so long a scourge in peninsular Greece, were unheard of on the small Aegean islands. Sheep-raising was at an early date safer in England than on the Continent, because wolves were earlier exterminated there. Bio-geography shows an increasing impoverishment in the flora and fauna, of small islands with distance from the mainland. In the Pacific Ocean, this progressive impoverishment from west to east has had great influence upon human life in the islands. In Polynesia, therefore, all influences of the chase and of pastoral life are wanting, while in Melanesia, with its larger islands and larger number of land animals, hunting still plays an important part, and is the chief source of subsistence for many New Guinea villages.929 Therefore a corresponding decay of projectile weapons is to be traced west to east, and is conspicuous in those crumbs of land constituting Polynesia and Micronesia. The limit of the bow and arrow includes the northeastern portion of the Philippine group, cuts through the Malay Archipelago so as to include the Moluccas and Flores, includes Melanesia as far as Tonga or the Friendly Isles, but excludes Micronesia, Polynesia and Australia, Even in Melanesia, however, bows and arrows are not universal; they are lacking in peripheral islands like New Caledonia and New Ireland.930

Though political dominance is possible even for a small island, both the benefits and serious drawbacks of limited size are consistently evident. Some developments that typically occur in larger territories are absent here from the outset. For example, theft and banditry, which were a major problem in peninsular Greece, were non-existent on the small Aegean islands. Sheep farming was safer in England earlier on than on the continent because wolves were eradicated there sooner. Biogeography indicates a gradual decline in the plant and animal life on small islands as you move away from the mainland. In the Pacific Ocean, this ongoing decline from west to east has significantly impacted human life on the islands. In Polynesia, therefore, there are no influences of hunting or pastoral life, while in Melanesia, with its larger islands and greater number of land animals, hunting remains crucial and is the main source of food for many villages in New Guinea. Therefore, a decline in projectile weapons can be seen from west to east, clearly noticeable on the small lands that make up Polynesia and Micronesia. The range of the bow and arrow includes the northeastern part of the Philippine group, extends through the Malay Archipelago to include the Moluccas and Flores, reaches Melanesia as far as Tonga or the Friendly Isles, but excludes Micronesia, Polynesia, and Australia. Even in Melanesia, bows and arrows are not universal; they are absent on outer islands like New Caledonia and New Ireland.

The restriction of trees, also, with the exception of the coco-palm and pandanus, has had its effect upon boat making. This general impoverishment is unmistakably reflected in the whole civilization of the smaller islands of Polynesia and Micronesia, especially in the Paumota and Pelew groups. In the countless coralline islands which strew the Pacific, another restricting factor is found in their monotonous geological formation. Owing to the lack of hard stone, especially of flint, native utensils and weapons have to be fashioned out of wood, bones, shells, and sharks' teeth.931

The restriction on trees, except for the coconuts and pandanus, has impacted boat building. This overall decline is clearly reflected in the entire culture of the smaller islands in Polynesia and Micronesia, particularly in the Paumota and Pelew groups. In the many coral islands scattered across the Pacific, another limiting factor is their uniform geological structure. Due to the lack of hard stone, especially flint, local tools and weapons have to be made from wood, bones, shells, and shark teeth.931

Poverty of alluvial lowlands in islands.

Nor does the geographical limitation end here. Islands have proportionately a scanter allowance of fertile alluvial lowlands than have continents. This follows from their geological history, except in the case of those low deposit islands built up from the waste of the land. Most islands are summits of submerged mountain ranges, like Corsica and Sardinia, the Aegean archipelagoes, the Greater Antilles, Vancouver, and the countless fiord groups; or they are single or composite volcanic cones, like the Canaries, Azores, Lipari, Kurile, Fiji, Ascension, St. Helena and the Lesser Antilles; or they are a combination of highland subsidence and volcanic out-thrust, like Japan, the Philippines, the long Sunda chain and Iceland. Both geologic histories involve high reliefs, steep slopes, a deep surrounding sea, and hence rarely a shallow continental shelf for the accumulation of broad alluvial lowlands. Among the Aegean Isles only Naxos has a flood plain; all the rest have steep coasts, with few sand or gravel beaches, and only small deposit plains at the head of deep and precipitous embayments. Japan's area of arable soil is to-day only 15.7 per cent. of its total surface, even after the gentler slopes of its mountains have been terraced up two thousand feet. Some authorities put the figure lower, at 10 and 12 per cent.

Nor do the geographical limitations stop here. Islands typically have a smaller amount of fertile alluvial lowlands compared to continents. This is due to their geological history, except for those low-lying islands formed from land waste. Most islands are the peaks of submerged mountain ranges, like Corsica and Sardinia, the Aegean islands, the Greater Antilles, Vancouver, and many fiord groups; or they are single or composite volcanic cones, like the Canaries, Azores, Lipari, Kurile Islands, Fiji, Ascension, St. Helena, and the Lesser Antilles; or they are a mix of highland sinking and volcanic formation, like Japan, the Philippines, the long Sunda chain, and Iceland. Both geological histories feature high elevations, steep slopes, a deep surrounding sea, and therefore rarely have a shallow continental shelf for the accumulation of extensive alluvial lowlands. Among the Aegean Islands, only Naxos has a floodplain; the others have steep coasts with few sandy or gravelly beaches and only small flat areas at the ends of deep, steep embayments. Currently, Japan's arable land is only 15.7 percent of its total surface area, even after the gentler slopes of its mountains have been terraced up to two thousand feet. Some experts estimate this figure to be lower, at 10 to 12 percent.

Dense populations of islands.

Yet in spite of limited area and this paucity of local resources, islands constantly surprise us by their relatively dense populations. More often than not they show a density exceeding that of the nearest mainland having the same zonal location, often the same geologic structure and soil. Along with other small, naturally defined areas, they tend to a closer packing of the population. Yet side by side with this relative over-population, we find other islands uninhabited or tenanted only by sheep, goats and cattle.

Yet despite their small size and lack of local resources, islands often surprise us with their relatively high populations. More often than not, their population density exceeds that of the nearest mainland that shares the same climate zone, often the same geological makeup and soil. Like other small, naturally defined areas, they tend to have a more concentrated population. However, alongside this relative overpopulation, we find other islands that are uninhabited or only home to sheep, goats, and cattle.

In the wide Pacific world comprising Australia and Oceanica, islands take up fifteen per cent. of the total land area, but they contain forty-four per cent. of the population.932 The insular empire of Japan, despite the paucity of its arable soil, has a density of population nearly twice that of China, nearly three times that of Korea, and exceeding that of any political subdivision of continental Asia; but Japan, in turn, is surpassed in congestion only by Java, with a density of 587 to the square mile,933 which almost equals that of Belgium (643) and England (600). Great Britain has a density of population (453 to the square mile) only exceeded in continental Europe by that of Belgium, but surpassed nearly threefold by that of the little Channel Isles, which amounts to 1254 to the square mile.934 If the average density of the United Kingdom is greatly diminished in Ireland, just as Italy's is in Sardinia and France's in Corsica, this fact is due primarily to a side-tracked or overshadowed location and adverse topography, combined with misgovernment.

In the vast Pacific region that includes Australia and Oceania, islands make up fifteen percent of the total land area, but they hold forty-four percent of the population.932 Japan's insular empire, despite having very little arable land, has a population density that's nearly double that of China, almost three times that of Korea, and higher than any political area in continental Asia; however, Japan is only outdone in density by Java, which has 587 people per square mile,933 nearly matching Belgium (643) and England (600). Great Britain has a population density of 453 per square mile, which is only surpassed in continental Europe by Belgium, but is almost three times less than that of the small Channel Isles, which has a density of 1254 per square mile.934 The average population density of the United Kingdom is much lower in Ireland, similar to how Italy's is in Sardinia and France's in Corsica; this is mainly due to being in a less favorable location, challenging geography, and poor governance.

If we compare countries which are partly insular, partly continental, the same truth emerges. The kingdom of Greece has fifteen per cent of its territory in islands. Here again population reaches its greatest compactness in Corfu and Zante, which are nearly thrice as thickly inhabited as the rest of Greece.935 Similarly the islands which constitute so large a part of Denmark have an average density of 269 to the square mile as opposed to the 112 of Jutland. The figures rise to 215 to the square mile in the Danish West Indies, but drop low in the bleak, subarctic insular dependencies of Greenland, Iceland and the Faroes. Portugal's density is tripled in the Madeiras936 and doubled in the Azores,937 but drops in the badly placed Cape Verde Island, exposed to tropical heat and the desiccating tradewinds blowing off the Sahara. Spain's average rises twenty-five per cent. in the Canary Islands, which she has colonized, and France's nearly doubles in the French West Indies. The British West Indies, also, with the exception of the broken coral bank constituting the Bahamas, show a similar surprising density of population, which in Bermuda and Barbadoes surpasses that of England, and approximates the teeming human life of the Channel Isles.

If we compare countries that are partly islands and partly on the mainland, the same truth comes to light. Greece has fifteen percent of its land made up of islands. Here again, the population is most concentrated in Corfu and Zante, which have almost three times the population density of the rest of Greece.935 Similarly, the islands that make up a large part of Denmark have an average population density of 269 people per square mile, compared to 112 people per square mile in Jutland. The density increases to 215 people per square mile in the Danish West Indies but drops significantly in the harsh, subarctic islands of Greenland, Iceland, and the Faroe Islands. In Portugal, the population density is tripled in the Madeiras936 and doubled in the Azores,937 but decreases in the poorly situated Cape Verde Islands, which are subjected to tropical heat and the drying trade winds from the Sahara. Spain's average density rises by twenty-five percent in the Canary Islands, which it has colonized, and France's density nearly doubles in the French West Indies. The British West Indies, too, except for the scattered coral islands of the Bahamas, show a similarly high population density, with Bermuda and Barbados exceeding that of England and coming close to the densely populated Channel Islands.

Density of population in Polynesia.

This general tendency toward a close packing of the population in the smaller areas of land comes out just as distinctly in islands inhabited by natural peoples in the lower stages of development. Despite the retarded economic methods peculiar to savagery and barbarism, the Polynesian islands, for instance, often show a density of population equal to that of Spain and Greece (100 to the square mile) and exceeding that of European Turkey and Russia. "Over the whole extent of the South Sea," says Robert Louis Stevenson, "from one tropic to another, we find traces of a bygone state of over-population, when the resources of even a tropical soil were taxed, and even the improvident Polynesian trembled for the future."938 He calls the Gilbert atolls "warrens of men."939 One of them, Drummond's Island, with, an area of about twenty square miles, contained a population of 10,000 in 1840, and all the atolls were densely populated.940 To-day they count 35,000 inhabitants in less than 200 square miles. The neighboring Marshall group has 15,000 on its 158 square miles of area. The Caroline and Pelew archipelagoes show a density of 69 to the square mile, the Tonga or Friendly group harbor about 60 and the French holdings of Futuma and Wallis (or Uea) the same.941 So the Bismarck Archipelago, Solomon, Hawaiian, Samoan and Marianne islands have to-day populations by no means sparse, despite the blight that everywhere follows the contact of superior with primitive peoples.

This general trend towards a dense population in smaller areas of land is clearly evident in islands inhabited by indigenous peoples in earlier stages of development. Despite the outdated economic practices characteristic of primitive and barbaric societies, the Polynesian islands, for example, often have a population density similar to that of Spain and Greece (100 people per square mile) and even surpass that of European Turkey and Russia. "Throughout the South Sea," Robert Louis Stevenson states, "from one tropic to another, we find evidence of a former state of overpopulation, when even the resources of tropical soil were strained, and the careless Polynesian feared for the future." 938 He refers to the Gilbert atolls as "warrens of men." 939 One of them, Drummond's Island, which covers about twenty square miles, had a population of 10,000 in 1840, and all the atolls were densely populated. 940 Today, they boast 35,000 residents in less than 200 square miles. The nearby Marshall Islands have 15,000 people across 158 square miles. The Caroline and Pelew archipelagos show a density of 69 per square mile, the Tonga or Friendly group hosts about 60, and the French territories of Futuna and Wallis (or Uea) have the same. 941 Thus, the Bismarck Archipelago, Solomon Islands, Hawaiian Islands, Samoan Islands, and Mariana Islands have populations that are certainly not sparse, despite the negative effects that often follow the interaction of advanced and primitive cultures.

Various causes of this density.

In all these cases, if economic status be taken into account, we have a density bordering on congestion; but the situation assumes a new aspect if we realize that the crowded inhabitants of small islands often have the run of the coco plantations and fishing grounds of an entire archipelago. The smaller, less desirable islands are retained as fish and coco-palm preserves to be visited only periodically. Of a low, cramped, monotonous coral group, often only the largest and most productive is inhabited,942 but that contains a population surprising in view of the small base, restricted resources and low cultural status of its inhabitants. The population of the wide-strewn Paumota atolls was estimated as about 10,000 in 1840. Of these fully one-half lived on Anaa or Chain Island, and one-fourth on Gambier, but they levied on the resources of the other islands for supplies.943 The Tonga Islands at the same time were estimated to have 20,000 inhabitants, about half of whom were concentrated on Tongatabu, while Hapai and Varao held about 4,000 each.944

In all these cases, when we consider economic status, we see a density that's almost like congestion. However, the situation looks different when we realize that the crowded residents of small islands often have access to the coconut plantations and fishing grounds of an entire archipelago. The smaller, less desirable islands are kept as fish and coconut-palm reserves that are only visited occasionally. In a low, cramped, and monotonous coral group, typically only the largest and most productive island is inhabited,942 but it has a surprisingly large population, given the small size, limited resources, and low cultural status of its inhabitants. The population of the widely scattered Paumota atolls was estimated to be around 10,000 in 1840. Half of these people lived on Anaa or Chain Island, and a quarter lived on Gambier, but they relied on resources from other islands for supplies.943 At the same time, the Tonga Islands were estimated to have 20,000 inhabitants, roughly half of whom were concentrated on Tongatabu, while Hapai and Varao each held about 4,000.944

Crowded and vacant islands.

This is one of the sharp contrasts in island life,—here density akin to congestion, there a few miles away a deserted reef or cone rising from the sea, tenanted only by sheep or goats or marine birds, its solitude broken only by the occasional crunching of a boat's keel upon its beach, as some visitant from a neighboring isle comes to shear wool, gather coco-nuts, catch birds or collect their eggs. All the 500 inhabitants of the Westman Isles off the southern coast of Iceland live in one village on Heimey, and support themselves almost entirely by fishing and fowling birds on the wild crags of the archipelago.945 An oceanic climate, free contact with the Gulf Stream, and remoteness from the widespread ice fields of Iceland give them an advantage over the vast island to the north. Only twenty-seven of the ninety islands composing the Orkney group are inhabited, and about forty smaller ones afford natural meadows for sheep on their old red sandstone soil;946 but Pomona, the largest Orkney has 17,000 inhabitants on its 207 square miles of territory or 85 to the square mile. The Shetlands tell the same story—29 out of 100 islands inhabited, some of the holms or smaller islets serving as pastures for the sturdy ponies and diminutive cattle, and Mainland, the largest of the group, showing 58 inhabitants to the square mile. This is a density far greater than is reached in the nearby regions of Scotland, where the county of Sutherland can boast only 13 to the square mile, and Invernesshire 20. Here again insularity and contracted area do their work of compressing population.

This is one of the striking contrasts in island life—here, you have density that feels like congestion, while just a few miles away, there's a deserted reef or cone rising from the sea, inhabited only by sheep, goats, or seabirds. Its solitude is interrupted only by the occasional crunch of a boat's keel on its beach as visitors from nearby islands come to shear sheep, gather coconuts, catch birds, or collect their eggs. All 500 residents of the Westman Isles off the southern coast of Iceland live in one village on Heimey, relying almost entirely on fishing and hunting birds on the wild cliffs of the archipelago.945 The oceanic climate, direct contact with the Gulf Stream, and isolation from the vast ice fields of Iceland give them an advantage over the larger island to the north. Only twenty-seven of the ninety islands in the Orkney group are inhabited, and about forty smaller ones provide natural meadows for sheep on their ancient red sandstone soil;946 but Pomona, the largest Orkney island, has 17,000 residents on its 207 square miles, or 85 people per square mile. The Shetlands tell a similar story—29 out of 100 islands are inhabited, with some of the smaller islets serving as pastures for the hardy ponies and small cattle, and Mainland, the largest of the group, has a density of 58 residents per square mile. This is a much higher density than in the nearby regions of Scotland, where Sutherland County can only claim 13 people per square mile, and Invernesshire 20. Here again, isolation and a small area lead to increased population density.

The causes of this insular density of population are not far to seek. Islands can always rely on the double larder of land and sea. They are moreover prone to focus in themselves the fishing industry of a large continental area, owing to their ample contact with the sea. Shetland is now the chief seat of the Scotch herring fishery, a fact which contributes to its comparatively dense population. The concentration of the French export trade of Newfoundland fish in little St. Pierre and Miquelon accounts for the relatively teeming population (70 to the square mile) and the wealth of those scraps of islands. So the Lofoden Islands of Norway, like Iceland, Newfoundland and Sakhalin, balance a generous sea against an ungenerous soil, and thus support a population otherwise impossible.

The reasons for the dense population on islands are quite clear. Islands can always depend on the resources of both land and sea. They also tend to centralize the fishing industry from a large surrounding area, thanks to their great access to the ocean. Shetland is currently the main hub for the Scottish herring fishery, which helps increase its relatively high population density. The concentration of the French export trade in Newfoundland fish at the small islands of St. Pierre and Miquelon explains their relatively high population (70 people per square mile) and the wealth of those islands. Similarly, the Lofoten Islands in Norway, like Iceland, Newfoundland, and Sakhalin, benefit from a rich sea despite having poor soil, allowing them to support a population that would otherwise be unfeasible.

Oceanic climate as factor.

For these far northern islands, the moderating effect of an oceanic climate has been a factor in making them relatively populous, just as it is on tropical isles by mitigating heat and drought. The prosperity and populousness of the Bermuda Islands are to be explained largely by the mild, equable climate which permits the raising of early vegetables and flowers for English and American markets. Like climatic conditions and a like industry account for the 2,000 souls living on the inhabited islands of the Scilly group. Here intensive horticulture supports a large force of workmen and yields a profit to the lord proprietor. Syros in the Cyclades fattens on its early spring vegetable trade with Athens and Constantinople.947

For these far northern islands, the moderating influence of an ocean climate has been a key factor in keeping their populations relatively high, just like on tropical islands where it eases heat and drought. The wealth and population of the Bermuda Islands can largely be attributed to the mild, stable climate that allows for the cultivation of early vegetables and flowers for markets in England and America. Similar climate conditions and industries explain the 2,000 residents living on the inhabited islands of the Scilly group. Here, intensive gardening provides jobs for many workers and brings profits to the landowner. Syros in the Cyclades thrives on its early spring vegetable trade with Athens and Constantinople.947

In the Mediterranean lands, where drought and excessive heat during the growing season offer adverse conditions for agriculture, the small islands, especially those of fertile volcanic soil, show the greatest productivity and hence marked density of population. Though the rainfall may be slight, except where a volcanic peak rises to condense moisture, heavy dews and the thick mists of spring quicken vegetation. This is the case in Malta, which boasts a population of 2,000 to the square mile, exclusive of the English garrison.948 Little Limosa and Pantellaria, the merest fragments of land out in the mid-channel of the Mediterranean, have a population of 200 to the square mile.949 The Lipari group north of Sicily average nearly 400 on every square mile of their fertile soil;950 but this average rises in Salina to 500, and in Lipari itself, as also in Ponza of the Pontine group, to nearly 1300. Here fertile volcanic slopes of highly cultivated land lift vineyards, orchards of figs, and plantations of currants to the sunny air. But nearby Alicuri, almost uncultivated, has a sparse population of some five hundred shepherds and fishermen. Panaria and Filicuri are in about the same plight. Here again we find those sharp island contrasts.

In the Mediterranean region, where drought and high temperatures during the growing season create tough conditions for farming, the small islands—especially those with rich volcanic soil—show the highest productivity and, consequently, a marked population density. Although the rainfall may be minimal, except where a volcanic peak rises to capture moisture, heavy dews and thick spring mists boost plant growth. This is true for Malta, which has a population density of 2,000 people per square mile, excluding the English garrison.948 Little Limosa and Pantellaria, tiny landmasses in the Mediterranean's central area, have a population density of 200 per square mile.949 The Lipari islands north of Sicily host nearly 400 people per square mile of their fertile land;950 but this number increases to 500 in Salina and nearly 1,300 in Lipari itself, as well as in Ponza from the Pontine group. Here, the lush volcanic slopes of well-tended land nurture vineyards, fig orchards, and currant plantations under the sunny sky. However, nearby Alicuri, which is almost untouched, has a sparse population of around five hundred shepherds and fishermen. Panaria and Filicuri are in a similar situation. Once again, we observe stark contrasts between these islands.

Relation of density to area.

The insular region of the Indian Ocean, which is inhabited by peoples quite different in race and cultural status from those of the Mediterranean, yet again demonstrates the power of islands to attract, preserve, multiply and concentrate population. This is especially true of the smaller islands, which in every case show a density of population many times that of the neighboring mainland of Africa. Only vast Madagascar, continental in size, repeats the sparsity of the continent. An oceanic climate increases the humidity of the islands as compared with the mainland lying in the same desiccating tradewind belt. Moreover their small area has enabled them to be permeated by incoming Arab, English, and French influences, which have raised their status of civilization and therewith the average density of population. This culminates in English Mauritius, which shows 540 inhabitants to the square mile, occupied in the production of sugar, molasses, rum, vanilla, aloes, and copra. In Zanzibar this density is 220 to the square mile; in Reunion 230; in Mayotte, the Comores and Seychelles, the average varies from 100 to 145 to the square mile, though Mahe in the Seychelles group has one town of 20,000 inhabitants.951

The isolated region of the Indian Ocean is home to people who are quite different in race and culture from those in the Mediterranean, and it shows how islands can attract, maintain, grow, and concentrate populations. This is particularly true for the smaller islands, which consistently have a population density many times higher than that of the nearby African mainland. Only the vast Madagascar, which is continental in size, exhibits the same low population density as the continent. An oceanic climate increases the humidity of the islands compared to the mainland that lies in the same dry trade wind zone. Additionally, their small size has allowed them to absorb incoming Arab, English, and French influences, which have enhanced their level of civilization and raised their population density. This is most evident in English Mauritius, which has 540 people per square mile, primarily engaged in producing sugar, molasses, rum, vanilla, aloes, and copra. In Zanzibar, the density is 220 people per square mile; in Reunion, it’s 230; and in Mayotte, the Comoros, and Seychelles, the average ranges from 100 to 145 people per square mile, although Mahé in the Seychelles has one town with 20,000 residents.951

In the Malay Archipelago, an oceanic climate and tropical location have combined to stimulate fertility to the greatest extent; but this local wealth has been exploited in the highest degree in the smaller islands having relatively the longest coastline and amplest contact with the sea. The great continent-like areas of Borneo, New Guinea and Sumatra show a correspondingly sparse population; Java, smaller than the smallest of these and coated with mud from its fertilizing volcanoes, supports 587 inhabitants to the square mile; but this exceptional average is due to rare local productivity. Java's little neighbors to the east, Bali and Lombok, each with an area of only about 2100 square miles, have a density respectively of 338 and 195 to the square mile. This density rises suddenly in small Amboina (area 264 square miles), the isle of the famous clove monopoly, to 1000,952 drops in the other Moluccas, where Papuan influences are strong, even to 20, but rises again in the pure Malayan Philippines to 69. In the Philippines a distinct connection is to be traced between the density of population and smallness of area. The explanation lies in the attraction of the coast for the sea-faring Malay race, and the mathematical law of increase of shoreline with decrease of insular area. Since 65 per cent. of the whole Philippine population inhabits coastal municipalities, it is not surprising that the 73 islands from ten to a hundred square miles in area count 127 inhabitants to the square mile, and those of less than ten square miles, of which there are nearly a thousand, have a density of 238.953

In the Malay Archipelago, the oceanic climate and tropical location have created extremely fertile conditions; however, this local wealth has been exploited most in the smaller islands with relatively longer coastlines and greater access to the sea. The large continental regions of Borneo, New Guinea, and Sumatra have a corresponding sparse population; Java, though smaller than the smallest of these, enriched by volcanic mud, supports 587 residents per square mile; this exceptional average is due to its unique productivity. Java's nearby neighbors to the east, Bali and Lombok, each covering about 2,100 square miles, have densities of 338 and 195 residents per square mile, respectively. This density dramatically increases in the small island of Amboina (area 264 square miles), known for its clove monopoly, to 1,000,952 decreasing in the other Moluccas, where Papuan influences are strong, down to 20, but rising again in the pure Malayan Philippines to 69. In the Philippines, a clear connection can be seen between population density and the size of the area. The explanation lies in the draw of the coast for the sea-faring Malay people, as well as the mathematical principle that as the coastline increases, the island area decreases. Since 65 percent of the entire Philippine population lives in coastal municipalities, it’s not surprising that the 73 islands ranging from ten to a hundred square miles in area have an average of 127 residents per square mile, while those with less than ten square miles, nearly a thousand in total, have a density of 238.953

This same insular density, supported by fertility, fisheries and trade, appears again in the West Indies, and also the contrast in density between large and small islands down to a certain limit of diminutiveness. The Greater Antilles increase in density from Cuba through smaller Haiti and Jamaica down to little Porto Rico, which boasts 264 inhabitants to the square mile. In the smaller area of the Danish Indies and Guadeloupe about this same density (215 and 274) reappears; but it mounts to 470 in Martinique and to 1160 in Barbadoes.954

This same isolated density, supported by fertile land, fishing, and trade, is also seen in the West Indies, highlighting the difference in density between larger and smaller islands down to a certain size. The Greater Antilles show increasing density from Cuba through smaller Haiti and Jamaica down to tiny Puerto Rico, which has 264 people per square mile. In the smaller area of the Danish West Indies and Guadeloupe, similar densities (215 and 274) are observed; however, it rises to 470 in Martinique and 1160 in Barbados.954

Island resorts.

Climate advantages often encourage density of population on islands, by attracting to them visitors who make a local demand for the fruits of the soil and thereby swell the income of the islands. For instance, about the densely populated region of the Gulf of Naples, Procida has 14,000 inhabitants on its one and a half square miles of area, while fertile Ischia and Capri have 1400 to the square mile. Here a rich volcanic soil, peaks which attract rain by their altitude and visitors by their beauty, and a mild oceanic climate delightful in winter as in summer, all contribute to density of population. Sicily, Malta and Corfu also gain in the same way in winter. The Isle of Man owes some of its recent increase of population, now 238 to the square mile, to the fact that it has become the summer playground for the numerous factory workers of Lancashire in England.

Climate benefits often lead to higher population density on islands, as they draw in visitors who create local demand for agricultural products, boosting the islands' income. For example, in the densely populated Gulf of Naples region, Procida has 14,000 residents on just one and a half square miles, while the more fertile Ischia and Capri have 1,400 people per square mile. Rich volcanic soil, high peaks that attract rainfall and visitors with their beauty, and a mild oceanic climate that is pleasant in both winter and summer all contribute to the population density. Sicily, Malta, and Corfu also experience similar benefits in the winter. The Isle of Man has seen a recent population increase, now at 238 people per square mile, partly because it has become a summer retreat for many factory workers from Lancashire in England.

Density of population affected by focal location for trade.

Sometimes climatic advantages are reinforced by a favorable focal point, which brings the profits of trade to supplement those of agriculture. This factor of distributing and exporting center has undoubtedly contributed to the prosperity and population of Reunion, Mahe, Mauritius and Zanzibar, as it did formerly to that of ancient Rhodes and modern St. Thomas at the angle of the Antilles. Barbadoes, by reason of its outpost location to the east of the Windward Isles, is the first to catch incoming vessels from England, and is therefore a focus of steamship lines and a distributing point for the southern archipelago, so that we find here the greatest density of any island in the West Indies.955 The 9405 inhabitants of Charlotte Amalie on St. Thomas and the 15,000 of Willemsted on Curaçao give these also a characteristic insular density. Samos, blessed with good soil, an excellent position on Aegean maritime routes, and virtual autonomy, supports a population of 300 to the square mile.956

Sometimes, the benefits of climate are boosted by a good location, which enhances trade profits alongside agricultural ones. This aspect of being a distribution and export hub has definitely played a role in the prosperity and population growth of Reunion, Mahe, Mauritius, and Zanzibar, just as it once did for ancient Rhodes and modern St. Thomas at the angle of the Antilles. Barbados, due to its position to the east of the Windward Islands, is the first to welcome incoming ships from England, making it a hub for steamship lines and a distribution point for the southern islands, resulting in the highest population density of any island in the West Indies.955 The 9,405 residents of Charlotte Amalie on St. Thomas and the 15,000 of Willemstad on Curaçao also reflect a notable insular density. Samos, with its rich soil, excellent location on Aegean shipping routes, and near-autonomy, supports a population of 300 people per square mile.956

Focal location alone can often achieve this density. Syros, one of the smallest and by nature the most barren of the Cyclades, though well tilled is the great commercial and shipping center of the Aegean, and has in Hermupolis with its 17,700 population by far the largest town of the archipelago.957 This development has come since Greece achieved its independence. It reminds us of the distinction and doubtless also population that belonged to Delos in ancient days. Advantageous commercial location and density of population characterize Kilwauru and Singapore at the east and west extremities of the Malay Archipelago. The Bahrein Islands, which England has acquired in the Persian Gulf, serve as an emporium of trade with eastern Arabia and have a local wealth in their pearl fisheries. These facts account for the 68,000 inhabitants dwelling on their 240 square miles (600 square kilometers) of sterile surface.958

Focal location alone can often achieve this density. Syros, one of the smallest and most barren islands in the Cyclades, is well-farmed and serves as the major commercial and shipping hub in the Aegean, featuring Hermupolis, which with its 17,700 residents is the largest town in the archipelago.957 This growth has happened since Greece gained its independence. It reminds us of the importance and likely population that Delos had in ancient times. Favorable commercial location and population density are also seen in Kilwauru and Singapore at the east and west ends of the Malay Archipelago. The Bahrain Islands, which England has taken control of in the Persian Gulf, act as a trading center with eastern Arabia and have local wealth from their pearl fisheries. These factors explain the 68,000 residents living on their 240 square miles (600 square kilometers) of barren landscape.958

Overflow of island population to the mainland.

The concentration of population in these favored spots of land with inelastic boundaries, and the tendency of that population to increase under the stimulating, interactive life make the restriction of area soon felt. For this reason, so many colonies which are started on inshore islets from motives of protection have to be transferred to the mainland to insure a food supply. A settlement of Huguenots, made in 1535 on an island in the harbor of Rio Janeiro, found its base too small for cultivation, but feared the attack of the hostile Indians and Portuguese on the mainland. After three years of a struggling existence, it fell a prey to the Portuguese,959 De Monts' short-lived colony on an island in the mouth of the St. Croix River in 1604 had an excellent site for defence, but was cut off by the drifting ice in winter from mainland supplies of wood, water and game, while no cultivation was possible in the sandy soil.960

The concentration of people in these desirable areas with fixed boundaries, combined with the population’s tendency to grow in an engaging, lively environment, quickly makes the limited space feel cramped. Because of this, many colonies that start on coastal islands for protection often have to move to the mainland to secure a reliable food supply. For example, a settlement of Huguenots established in 1535 on an island in the harbor of Rio de Janeiro found that their land was too small for farming but was afraid of attacks from hostile Indigenous people and the Portuguese on the mainland. After three years of struggling to survive, it ultimately fell victim to the Portuguese. De Monts' short-lived colony on an island at the mouth of the St. Croix River in 1604 had a great location for defense but was cut off from mainland supplies of wood, water, and game during the winter due to drifting ice, and farming wasn't feasible in the sandy soil.

Such sites suffice for mere trading posts, but are inadequate for the larger social group of a real colony. The early Greek colonists, with their predilection for insular locations, recognized this limitation and offset it by the occupation of a strip of the nearest mainland, cultivated and defended by fortified posts, as an adjunct to the support of the islands. Such a subsidiary coastal hem was called a Paraea. The ancient Greek colonies on the islands of Thasos and Samothrace each possessed such a Paraea.961 The Aeolian inhabitants of Tenedos held a strip of the opposite Troad coast north of Cape Lekton, while those of Lesbos appropriated the south coast of the Troad.962 In the same way Tarentum and Syracuse, begun on inshore islands, soon overflowed on to the mainland. Sometimes the island site is abandoned altogether and the colony transferred to the mainland. The ancient Greek colony of Cyrene had an initial existence on the island of Platea just off the Libyan coast, but, not flourishing there, was moved after an interval of several years to the African mainland, where "the sky was perforated" by the mountains of Barca.963 De Monts' colony was removed from its island to Port Royal in Nova Scotia.

Such locations are fine for simple trading posts, but they aren't enough for the larger social group of a real colony. The early Greek colonists, who preferred island locations, recognized this limitation and addressed it by taking over a strip of the closest mainland, which was cultivated and protected by fortified posts, to support the islands. This coastal area was called a Paraea. The ancient Greek colonies on the islands of Thasos and Samothrace each had a Paraea.961 The Aeolian people of Tenedos controlled a stretch of the opposite Troad coast north of Cape Lekton, while the inhabitants of Lesbos claimed the southern coast of the Troad.962 Similarly, Tarentum and Syracuse, which began on nearby islands, quickly expanded onto the mainland. Sometimes the island site is completely abandoned and the colony is moved to the mainland. The ancient Greek colony of Cyrene initially existed on the island of Platea just off the Libyan coast, but after not thriving there for several years, it was relocated to the African mainland, where "the sky was perforated" by the mountains of Barca.963 De Monts' colony was taken from its island to Port Royal in Nova Scotia.

Precocious development of island agriculture.

Where an island offers in its climate and soil conditions favorable to agriculture, tillage begins early to assume an intensive, scientific character, to supply the increasing demand for food. The land, fixed in the amount of area, must be made elastic in its productivity by the application of intelligence and industry. Hence in island habitats, an early development of agriculture, accompanied by a parallel skill in exploiting the food resources of the sea, is a prevailing feature. In Oceanica, agriculture is everywhere indigenous, but shows greatest progress in islands like Tonga and Fiji, where climate and soil are neither lavish nor niggardly in their gifts, but yield a due return for the labor of tillage. The Society964 and Samoan Islands, where nature has been more prodigal, rank lower in agriculture, though George Forster found in Tahiti a relatively high degree of cultivation.965 The small, rocky, coralline Paumotas rank lower still, but even here plantains, sugar-cane, sweet potatoes, yams, taro and solanum are raised. The crowded atolls of the Gilbert group show pains-taking tillage. Here we find coco-palms with their roots fertilized with powdered pumice, and taro cultivated in trenches excavated for the purpose and located near the lagoons, so that the water may percolate through the coral sand to the thirsty roots.966 To lonely Easter Isle nature has applied a relentless lash. At the time of Cook's visit it was woodless and boatless except for one rickety canoe, and therefore was almost excluded from the food supplies of the sea. Hence its destitute natives, by means of careful and often ingenious tillage, made its parched and rocky slopes support excellent plantations of bananas and sugar-cane.967

Where an island has favorable climate and soil conditions for agriculture, farming starts early and becomes more intensive and scientific to meet the growing demand for food. The land’s area is fixed, but its productivity must be increased through skill and hard work. Therefore, in island environments, the early development of agriculture, along with the ability to utilize marine food resources, is a common trait. In Oceania, agriculture is widely practiced, but shows the most advancement in islands like Tonga and Fiji, where the climate and soil provide a balanced return for farming efforts. The Society964 and Samoan Islands, where nature has provided more generously, rank lower in agriculture, although George Forster noted a relatively high level of cultivation in Tahiti.965 The small, rocky, coral-laden Paumotas rank even lower, but they still cultivate plantains, sugar-cane, sweet potatoes, yams, taro, and solanum. The densely populated atolls of the Gilbert group show careful farming methods. Here, we find coconut palms with their roots nourished by powdered pumice and taro grown in trenches dug for the purpose, located near lagoons so that water can seep through the coral sand to the thirsty roots.966 On the isolated Easter Island, nature has been harsh. At the time of Cook's visit, it was devoid of trees and boats except for one rickety canoe, making it almost cut off from sea food supplies. Thus, its impoverished inhabitants, through diligent and often clever farming techniques, managed to cultivate excellent plantations of bananas and sugar-cane on its dry and rocky slopes.967

The islands of Melanesia show generally fenced fields, terrace farming on mountain sides, irrigation canals, fertilized soils, well trimmed shade trees and beautiful flower gardens,968 proof that the cultivation of the ground has advanced to the aesthetic stage, as it has in insular Japan. In Tonga the coco-palm plantations are weeded and manured. Here, after a devastating war, the victorious chief devotes his attention to the cultivation of the land, which soon assumes a beautiful and flourishing appearance.969 In Tongatabu, which is described by the early visitors as one big garden, Cook found officials appointed to inspect all produce of the island and to enforce the cultivation of a certain quota of land by each householder.970 Here agriculture is a national concern.

The islands of Melanesia typically feature fenced fields, terraced farming on mountainsides, irrigation canals, enriched soil, neatly trimmed shade trees, and beautiful flower gardens,968 showing that farming has reached an aesthetic level, similar to that in insular Japan. In Tonga, coconut palm plantations are weeded and fertilized. After a devastating war, the victorious chief focuses on improving the land, which soon becomes beautiful and fruitful.969 In Tongatabu, described by early visitors as one large garden, Cook discovered officials assigned to inspect all the island's produce and ensure that each household cultivates a specific amount of land.970 Here, agriculture is a national priority.

Melanesian agriculture.

In the minute land fragments which constitute Micronesia, fishing is the chief source of subsistence; agriculture, especially for the all important taro, is limited to the larger islands like the Pelews. In the vast islands of western Melanesia, agriculture is on the whole less advanced. New Guinea, where the chase yields support to many villages, has large sections still a wilderness, though some parts are cultivated like a garden. In the smaller Melanesian islands, such as New Hebrides, New Britain and the Solomon group, we find extensive plantations laid out on irrigated terraces, In New Hebrides and the Banks Islands every single village has its flowers and aromatic herbs.971 But it is in Fiji that native island agriculture seems to culminate. Here a race of dark, frizzly haired savages, addicted to cannibalism, have in the art of tillage taken a spurt forward in civilization, till in this respect they stand abreast of the average European. The German asparagus bed is not cultivated more carefully than the yam plants of Fiji; these also are grown in mounds made of soil which has been previously pulverized by hand. The variety and excellence of their vegetable products are amazing, and find their reflection in an elaborate national cuisine, strangely at variance with the otherwise savage life.972

In the small land fragments that make up Micronesia, fishing is the main source of livelihood; agriculture, especially for the essential taro, is limited to larger islands like the Pelews. In the vast islands of western Melanesia, farming is generally less advanced. New Guinea, where hunting supports many villages, still has large areas that remain wilderness, although some parts are cultivated like gardens. In the smaller Melanesian islands, such as the New Hebrides, New Britain, and the Solomon Islands, there are extensive plantations set up on irrigated terraces. In the New Hebrides and the Banks Islands, every single village has its flowers and aromatic herbs.971 But it’s in Fiji that native island agriculture seems to reach its peak. Here, a group of dark-skinned, curly-haired people, known for their past cannibalism, have made significant progress in farming, reaching a level comparable to the average European. The German asparagus bed is not tended to more carefully than the yam plants of Fiji; these are also grown in mounds made of soil that has been manually crushed. The variety and quality of their vegetables are astonishing and are reflected in a rich national cuisine, which is surprisingly different from their otherwise primitive lifestyle.972

West of Melanesia, the Malay Archipelago shows a high average of tillage. The inhabitants of Java, Madura, Bali, Lombok and Sumbawa are skilled agriculturists and employ an elaborate system of irrigation,973 but the natives of Timor, on the other hand, have made little progress. In the Philippines a rich and varied agriculture has been the chief source of wealth since the Spanish conquest early in the sixteenth century, proving a native aptitude which began to develop long before.974

West of Melanesia, the Malay Archipelago has a high average of farming. The people of Java, Madura, Bali, Lombok, and Sumbawa are skilled farmers and use a sophisticated irrigation system,973 but the inhabitants of Timor, in contrast, have made little progress. In the Philippines, a rich and diverse agriculture has been the main source of wealth since the Spanish conquest in the early sixteenth century, demonstrating a local talent that began to develop long before.974

Intensive tillage.

The dense population of the Mediterranean islands is the concomitant of an advanced agriculture. The connection between elaborate tillage and scant insular area is indicated in the earliest history of classic Aegina. The inhabitants of this island were called Myrmidons, Strabo tells us, because by digging like ants they covered the rocks with earth to cultivate all the ground; and in order to economize the soil for this purpose, lived in excavations under ground and abstained from the use of bricks.975 To-day, terraced slopes, irrigation, hand-made soils, hoe and spade tillage, rotation of crops, and a rich variety of field and garden products characterize the economic history of most Mediterranean islands, whether Elba, the Lipari, Ponza, Procida, Capri, Ischia, Pantellaria, Lampedusa,976 or the Aegean groups. The sterile rock of Malta has been converted for two-thirds of its area into fertile gardens, fields and orchards. The upper stratum of rock has been pulverized and enriched by manure; the surface has been terraced and walled to protect it against high winds. In consequence, the Maltese gardens are famous throughout the Mediterranean.977 In the Cyclades every patch of tillable ground is cultivated by the industrious inhabitants. Terraced slopes are green with orchards of various southern fruits, and between the trees are planted melons and vegetables. Fallow land and uncultivated hillsides, as well as the limestone islands fit only for pastures, are used for flocks of sheep and goats.978

The dense population of the Mediterranean islands goes hand in hand with advanced agriculture. The link between intensive farming and the small area of these islands is evident in the early history of classic Aegina. The people of this island were called Myrmidons, as Strabo tells us, because by digging like ants, they covered the rocks with soil to cultivate all the land. To conserve soil for this purpose, they lived in underground burrows and avoided using bricks.975 Today, terraced slopes, irrigation, handmade soil, hoe and spade farming, crop rotation, and a wide variety of field and garden products define the economic history of most Mediterranean islands, whether it's Elba, the Lipari islands, Ponza, Procida, Capri, Ischia, Pantellaria, Lampedusa,976 or the Aegean islands. The barren rock of Malta has been transformed into fertile gardens, fields, and orchards across two-thirds of its area. The top layer of rock has been ground down and enriched with manure; the surface has been terraced and walled to shield it from strong winds. As a result, the Maltese gardens are renowned throughout the Mediterranean.977 In the Cyclades, every bit of arable land is farmed by the hardworking locals. Terraced slopes are lush with orchards of various southern fruits, and melons and vegetables are grown between the trees. Uncultivated fields and hillsides, as well as the limestone islands that are only suitable for grazing, are home to flocks of sheep and goats.978

Japanese agriculture.

It is in Japan that agriculture has attained a national and aesthetic importance reached nowhere else. Of the 150,000 square miles constituting Japan proper, two-thirds are mountains; large tracts of lowlands are useless rock wastes, owing to the detritus carried down by inundating mountain torrents.979 Hence to-day arable land forms only 15.7 per cent. of the whole area. During the two hundred and fifty years of exclusion when emigration and foreign trade were forbidden, a large and growing population had to be supplied from a small insular area, further restricted by reason of the configuration of the surface. Here the geographical effects of a small, naturally defined area worked out to their logical conclusion, Consequently agriculture progressed rapidly and gave the farmer a rank in the social scale such as he attained nowhere else.980 His methods of tillage are much the same as in overcrowded China, but his national importance and hence his ranking in society is much higher. In Japan to-day farming absorbs 60 per cent. of the population. The system of tillage, in many respects primitive, is yet very thorough, and by means of skilful manuring makes one plot of ground yield two or three crops per annum.981 Every inch of arable land is cultivated in grain, vegetables and fruits. Mountains and hills are terraced and tilled far up their slopes. Meadows are conspicuously absent, as are also fallow fields. Land is too valuable to lie idle. Labor is chiefly manual and is shared by the women and children; mattock and hoe are more common than the plow.982 Such elaborate cultivation and such pressure of population eventuate in small holdings. In Japan one hectar (2 1-2 acres) is the average farm per family.

Japan is where agriculture has become both nationally and aesthetically significant like nowhere else. Out of the 150,000 square miles that make up Japan, two-thirds are mountains, and large areas of lowlands are just useless rocky wasteland due to debris washed down by overflowing mountain rivers.979 As a result, only 15.7 percent of the entire area is arable land today. During the 250 years of isolation when emigration and foreign trade were banned, a large and growing population had to be supported from a small island area, made even smaller by the landscape. Here, the geographical effects of a small, defined area reached their logical conclusion. Consequently, agriculture advanced quickly, giving farmers a social standing that was unmatched anywhere else.980 The farming techniques used are quite similar to those in overcrowded China, but the national significance and social ranking of Japanese farmers are much higher. Today, 60 percent of Japan's population is involved in farming. The farming methods, although primitive in many ways, are very thorough, and skilled fertilization allows one piece of land to produce two or three crops a year.981 Every inch of arable land is used for growing grains, vegetables, and fruits. Mountains and hills are terraced and cultivated all the way up their slopes. Meadows are notably absent, as are fallow fields. Land is too valuable to waste. Labor is mostly manual, shared among women and children; hand tools like hoes and mattocks are more common than plows.982 This detailed farming and high population density lead to small farms. In Japan, the average farm size is about one hectare (2.5 acres) per family.

The case of England.

While Japan's agriculture reflected the small area of an island environment, and under its influence reached a high development, England's from the beginning of the fifteenth century declined before the competition of English commerce, which gained ascendency owing to the easy accessibility of Great Britain to the markets of Europe. The ravages of the Black Death in the latter half of the fourteenth century produced a scarcity of agricultural laborers and hence a prohibitive increase of wages. To economize labor, the great proprietors resorted to sheep farming and the raising of wool, which, either in the raw state or manufactured into cloth, became the basis of English foreign trade. A distinct deterioration in agriculture followed this reversion to a pastoral basis of economic life, supplemented by a growing commerce which absorbed all the enterprise of the country. The steady contraction of the area under tillage threw out of employment the great mass of agricultural laborers, made them paupers and vagrants.983 Hence England entered the period of maritime discoveries with a redundant population. This furnished the raw material for her colonies, and made her territorial expansion assume a solid, permanent character, unknown to the flimsy trading stations which mark the mere extension of a field of commerce.

While Japan's agriculture reflected the limited space of an island environment and developed highly because of it, England's agriculture began to decline in the early fifteenth century due to the rise of English commerce, which thrived due to Great Britain's easy access to European markets. The devastation of the Black Death in the late fourteenth century led to a shortage of agricultural laborers and a significant increase in wages. To save on labor costs, large landowners turned to sheep farming and wool production, which, whether in raw form or made into cloth, became the foundation of English foreign trade. This shift back to a pastoral economy resulted in a noticeable decline in agriculture, paired with an expanding commerce that consumed all the country's enterprise. The ongoing reduction in arable land left many agricultural workers unemployed, turning them into the poor and homeless. 983 As a result, England entered the era of maritime discoveries with an excess population. This provided the raw material for her colonies and allowed her territorial expansion to take on a solid, permanent character, unlike the fragile trading posts that simply represented an extension of commerce.

Emigration and colonization from islands.

Even when agriculture, fisheries and commerce have done their utmost, in the various stages of civilization, to increase the food supply, yet insular populations tend to outgrow the means of subsistence procurable from their narrow base. Hence islanders, like peninsula peoples, are prone to emigrate and colonize. This tendency is encouraged by their mobility, born of their nautical skill and maritime location. King Minos of Crete, according to Thucydides and Aristotle, colonized the Cyclades.984 Greece, from its redundant population, peopled various Aegean and Ionian islands, which in turn threw off spores of settlements to other isles and shores. Corcyra, which was colonized from the Peloponnesus, sent out a daughter colony to Epidamnos on the Illyrian coast. Andros, one of the Cyclades, as early as 654 B.C., colonized Acanthus and Stagirus in Chalcidice.985 Paros, settled first by Cretans and then by Ionians, at a very early date sent colonies to Thasos and to Parium on the Propontis, while Samos was a perennial fountain emitting streams of settlement to Thrace, Cilicia, Crete, Italy and Sicily. [Map page 251.]

Even when agriculture, fishing, and trade have done their best at different points in civilization to boost food supply, island populations often outstrip the resources available from their limited environment. As a result, islanders, like people from peninsulas, often feel the urge to migrate and establish new colonies. This tendency is supported by their mobility, which stems from their seafaring skills and coastal locations. King Minos of Crete, as mentioned by Thucydides and Aristotle, colonized the Cyclades.984 Greece, due to its surplus population, settled several Aegean and Ionian islands, which then led to the establishment of communities on other islands and coasts. Corcyra, which was colonized from the Peloponnesus, founded a daughter colony in Epidamnos on the Illyrian coast. Andros, one of the Cyclades, colonized Acanthus and Stagirus in Chalcidice as early as 654 B.C.985 Paros, initially settled by Cretans and later by Ionians, very early on sent colonies to Thasos and Parium on the Propontis, while Samos consistently produced settlers for Thrace, Cilicia, Crete, Italy, and Sicily. [Map page 251.]

This moving picture of Greek emigration is duplicated in the Malay Archipelago, especially in the smaller eastern islands. Almost every Malay tribe has traditions based upon migrations. The southern Philippines derived the considerable Mohammedan element of their populations from the Samal Laut, who came from Sumatra and the islands of the Strait of Malacca.986 A Malayan strain can be traced through Polynesia to far-off Easter Isle. Sometimes the emigration is a voluntary exile from home for a short period and a definite purpose. The inhabitants of Bouton, Binungku, and the neighboring islets, all of them located southeast of Celebes, have for the past twenty-five years come in great numbers to the larger islands of Ceram, Buru, Amboina and Banda, where they have laid out and carefully cultivated plantations of maize, tobacco, bananas and coco-palms. Generally only the men come, work two years, save their profits and then return home. These ambitious tillers look like savages, are shy as wild things of the woods, and work naked to the waist.987

This depiction of Greek emigration mirrors what happens in the Malay Archipelago, especially in the smaller eastern islands. Almost every Malay tribe has stories based on migrations. The southern Philippines gained a significant Muslim population from the Samal Laut, who came from Sumatra and the islands in the Strait of Malacca.986 A Malay influence can be traced through Polynesia all the way to distant Easter Island. Sometimes, the emigration is a voluntary departure from home for a short time and a specific purpose. For the past twenty-five years, the inhabitants of Bouton, Binungku, and nearby islets, all located southeast of Celebes, have come in large numbers to the larger islands of Ceram, Buru, Amboina, and Banda, where they have established and carefully tended plantations of maize, tobacco, bananas, and coconut palms. Generally, only the men make the journey, work for two years, save their earnings, and then return home. These ambitious farmers may appear wild, are as shy as forest creatures, and work bare-chested.987

Polynesia, Melanesia and Micronesia, where every condition of land and sea tends to develop the migratory spirit, form a region of extensive colonization.988 Settlements of one race are scattered among the island groups of another, making the ethnic boundaries wide penumbras. In some smaller islands of Melanesia the Polynesian colonists have exterminated or expelled the original inhabitants, and are found there now with all their distinctive race characteristics; but in the larger islands, they have been merged in the resident population, and their presence is only to be surmised from the existence of Polynesian customs, such as father-right in New Hebrides and Solomon Island side by side with the prevailing Melanesian mother-right.989 In small islands, like Tongatabu, Samoa and Fiji, emigration becomes habitual, a gradual spilling over of the redundant population and hence not a formidable inundation. In all this insular region of the Pacific, the impulse to emigration is so persistent, that the resulting inter-insular colonization obliterates sharp distinctions of race; it annuls the segregation of an island environment, and makes everywhere for amalgamation and unification, rather than differentiation.990

Polynesia, Melanesia, and Micronesia, where the conditions of land and sea encourage a migratory spirit, create a region with extensive colonization. 988 Settlements of one group are mixed among the island groups of another, resulting in broad ethnic boundaries. In some smaller islands of Melanesia, Polynesian colonists have either wiped out or forced out the original inhabitants and are now there with all their distinct racial traits; in the larger islands, they have blended into the local population, and their presence is only hinted at through Polynesian customs, such as father-right in the New Hebrides and Solomon Islands, which exist alongside the dominant Melanesian mother-right. 989 In smaller islands like Tongatabu, Samoa, and Fiji, emigration becomes a regular practice, a slow overflow of the excess population and thus not a massive flood. Throughout this insular region of the Pacific, the drive to emigrate is so strong that the resulting inter-island colonization blurs distinct racial lines; it eliminates the separation of an island environment and promotes amalgamation and unification over differentiation. 990

Modern emigration from islands.

Among highly civilized peoples, where better economic methods bring greater density of population and set at the same time a higher standard of living, emigration from islands is especially marked. Japan has seen a formidable exodus since an end was put to its long period of compression. This has taken the form of widespread emigration to various foreign lands, notably the Hawaiian Islands and the United States, and also of internal colonization in its recently acquired territory in Formosa and Korea.991 The Maltese have spread from their congested island, and are found to-day as gardeners, sailors and traders along all the Mediterranean coasts.992 Majorca and the more barren Cyclades993 tell the same story. The men of Capri go in considerable numbers to South America, but generally return home again. The Icelanders often pull themselves out of the stagnation of their lonely, ungenerous island to become thrifty citizens of western Canada.

Among highly developed societies, where improved economic practices result in a denser population and a higher standard of living, emigration from islands is particularly significant. Japan has experienced a substantial migration wave since it ended a long period of restriction. This migration has largely manifested as widespread movement to various foreign countries, especially the Hawaiian Islands and the United States, as well as internal relocation in its newly acquired territories in Taiwan and Korea.991 The Maltese have spread from their crowded island and are now found as gardeners, sailors, and traders along all the Mediterranean coasts.992 Majorca and the more barren Cyclades993 tell the same story. The men from Capri travel in significant numbers to South America but generally return home afterward. The Icelanders often break free from the stagnation of their isolated, harsh island to become industrious citizens of western Canada.

Maritime enterprise as outlet.

Emigration from islands readily throws itself into the channel of navigation and foreign trade. The northern Sporades, especially Skiathos and Skopelos, are the home of sailors who can be found over all the world.994 In this appetency for a nautical career, small inshore islets are often distinguished from the nearby mainland. Nearly all the masculine population of the Frisian Islands were seamen prior to 1807. In the eighteenth century a third of the Hamburg vessels were commanded by captains from the little island of Sylte, and a third of the Greenland fleet of the Netherlands by natives of Föhr.995

Emigration from islands easily connects to the channels of navigation and international trade. The northern Sporades, particularly Skiathos and Skopelos, are home to sailors who can be found all over the world.994 This desire for a nautical career often sets small offshore islets apart from the nearby mainland. Almost all the men from the Frisian Islands were seamen before 1807. In the eighteenth century, a third of the ships from Hamburg were captained by individuals from the small island of Sylte, and a third of the Greenland fleet of the Netherlands was led by people from Föhr.995

In England the exodus took the form of trading expeditions and the foundation of commercial colonies long before the food resources of the island had been even considerably developed. The accessible sea offered lines of least resistance, while the monopoly of the land by a privileged aristocracy and the fiercely defended corn laws made the limitations of a small area more oppressive. In Ireland, a landless peasantry in a grainless land, dulled by deprivation of opportunity, found in emigration an escape from insupportable evils.

In England, the mass departure took the shape of trading trips and the establishment of trading colonies long before the island's food resources were significantly developed. The open sea provided easier options, while the privileged aristocracy's control over the land and the heavily protected corn laws made the constraints of a small area even more stifling. In Ireland, a peasantry without land in a barren region, worn down by a lack of opportunities, saw emigration as a way out of unbearable hardships.

Artificial checks to population.

While emigration draws off the surplus population, there tend to develop in islands, as also in barren highlands where population early reaches the point of saturation, various devices to restrict natural increase. The evils of congestion are foreseen and guarded against. Abbé Raynal, writing of islanders in general, remarked as far back as 1795, "It is among these people that we trace the origin of that multitude of singular institutions which retards the progress of population. Anthropophagy, the castration of males, the infibulation of females, late marriages, the consecration of virginity, the approbation of celibacy, the punishments exercised against girls who become mothers at too early an age," he enumerates as such checks. Malthus, in his Essay on Population, commenting on this statement, notes that the bounds to the number of inhabitants on islands, especially small ones, are so narrow and so obvious that no one can ignore them.996

While emigration helps alleviate the excess population, various methods to limit natural growth often arise in islands and desolate highlands where the population quickly saturates. The negative effects of overcrowding are anticipated and mitigated. Abbé Raynal, discussing islanders in general, noted back in 1795, "It is among these people that we trace the origin of that multitude of unique institutions which slow down population growth. Practices like cannibalism, male castration, female infibulation, delayed marriages, the reverence of virginity, the acceptance of celibacy, and punishments for girls who become mothers too young," he lists as these restrictions. Malthus, in his Essay on Population, reflects on this observation, pointing out that the limits to the number of inhabitants on islands, especially small ones, are so tight and apparent that no one can overlook them.996

The checks to population practiced on islands are either preventive or positive. The extreme measure to restrict marriage is found among the wretched Budumas who inhabit the small, marshy islands of Lake Chad. Tribal custom allows only the chiefs and headmen to have wives. A brass crescent inserted in the ear of a boy indicates the favored one among a chief's sons destined to carry on his race. For his brothers this is made physically impossible; they become big, dull, timid creatures contributing by their fishing to the support of the thinly populated villages. The natives of the Shari River delta on the southern shore of Lake Chad use Buduma as a term of contempt for a man.997

The population controls practiced on islands are either preventive or positive. A drastic measure to limit marriage is seen among the unfortunate Budumas who live on the small, marshy islands of Lake Chad. Tribal customs allow only the chiefs and leaders to have wives. A brass crescent worn in the ear of a boy signifies the chosen one among a chief's sons who is meant to continue his lineage. For his brothers, this is made physically impossible; they become large, dull, timid individuals who contribute to the support of the sparsely populated villages through fishing. The locals of the Shari River delta on the southern shore of Lake Chad use "Buduma" as a derogatory term for a man.997

Polyandry.

In islands, as in unproductive highlands where hunger stalks abroad, marriage readily takes the form of polyandry. On the Canary Islands, at the time of their conquest in 1402, polyandry existed in Lancerote and possibly in Fuerteventura, often assigning one woman to three husbands; but in the other islands of the group monogamy was strictly maintained.998 In Oceanica polygamy, monogamy or polyandry prevails according to a man's means, the poverty of the islands, and the supply of women. A plurality of wives is always the privilege of the chiefs and the wealthy, but all three forms of marriage may be found on the same island. Scarcity of women gives rise to polyandry in Tahiti,999 and consigns one woman to four or five men. In old Hawaii, where there were four or five men to one woman a kind of incipient polyandry arose by the addition of a countenanced paramour to the married couple's establishment.1000 Robert Louis Stevenson found the same complaisant arrangement a common one in the Marquesas, where the husband's deputy was designated by the term of pikio in the native vocabulary.1001 Polyandry existed in Easter Isle, among whose stunted and destitute population the men far exceeded the women, and children were few, according to reports of the early visitors.1002 Numerous other instances make this connection between island habitat, deficiency of women, need of checking increase, and polyandrous marriages an obvious one.1003

In islands, as in unproductive highlands where hunger is common, marriage often takes the form of polyandry. On the Canary Islands, at the time of their conquest in 1402, polyandry was present in Lancerote and possibly in Fuerteventura, usually involving one woman with three husbands; but on the other islands in the group, monogamy was strictly upheld.998 In Oceania, polygamy, monogamy, or polyandry depends on a man’s resources, the islands’ poverty, and the number of available women. Having multiple wives is generally reserved for chiefs and the wealthy, but all three types of marriage can be found on the same island. The shortage of women leads to polyandry in Tahiti,999 sometimes involving one woman with four or five men. In old Hawaii, where there were four or five men for every woman, a form of budding polyandry developed with an accepted paramour joining the married couple's household.1000 Robert Louis Stevenson noted that this accommodating arrangement was common in the Marquesas, where the husband's deputy was referred to as pikio in the native language.1001 Polyandry existed on Easter Island, where the limited and impoverished population of men far outnumbered the women, and children were scarce, according to reports from early visitors.1002 Many other examples highlight the link between island living, the lack of women, the need to control population growth, and polyandrous marriages.1003

Infanticide.

This disproportion of the sexes in Oceanica is due to the murder of female infants, too early child-bearing, overwork, privation, licentiousness, and the violence of the men.1004 The imminence of famine dictates certain positive checks to population, among which infanticide and abortion are widespread in Oceanica. In some parts of the New Hebrides and the Solomon groups it is so habitual, that in some families all children are killed, and substitutes purchased at will.1005 In the well-tilled Fiji Islands, a pregnant girl is strangled and her seducer slain. The women make a practice of drinking medicated waters to produce sterility. Failing in this, the majority kill their children either before or after birth. In the island of Vanua Levu infanticide reaches from one-half to two-thirds of all children conceived; here it is reduced to a system and gives employment to professional murderers of babies, who hover like vultures over every child-bed. All destroyed after birth are females.1006 And yet here, as on many other islands of Melanesia and Polynesia, such offspring as are spared are treated with foolish fondness and indulgence.1007 The two facts are not incompatible.

This imbalance of genders in Oceania is caused by the killing of baby girls, early childbirth, excessive workloads, poverty, promiscuity, and male violence.1004 The threat of famine leads to certain strong measures to control population, among which infanticide and abortion are common in Oceania. In some areas of the New Hebrides and the Solomon Islands, it's so routine that in some families all children are killed, and substitutes are bought when needed.1005 In the well-farmed Fiji Islands, a pregnant girl is strangled and her seducer is killed. Women often drink medicated waters to become infertile. When this fails, most end up killing their children either before or after birth. On the island of Vanua Levu, infanticide occurs in half to two-thirds of all conceptions; it's organized into a system, employing professional baby killers who lurk like vultures over every delivery. All babies that are killed after birth are girls.1006 Yet, here, as in many other islands of Melanesia and Polynesia, the few children that survive are treated with over-the-top affection and indulgence.1007 These two facts are not mutually exclusive.

Approved by the state.

Geographic conditions made infanticide a state measure in these crowded communities. On the small coral atolls, where the food supply was scantest, it was enforced by law. On Vaitupu, in the Ellice group, only two children were allowed to a couple; on Nukufelau, only one. Any violation of this unique sumptuary law was punished by a fine.1008 On the congested Gilbert atolls, a woman rarely had more than two children, never more than three. Abortion, produced by a regular midwife, disposed of any subsequent offspring. Affection for children was very strong here, and infanticide of the living was unknown.1009 In Samoa, also, Turner found the practice restricted to the period before birth; but in Tahiti and elsewhere it was enforced by the tribal village authorities on the born and unborn.1010 In pre-Christian Hawaii, two-thirds of all children, and especially girls, were killed by their parents either before or after birth. The result was a decay of the maternal instinct and the custom of farming out children to strangers. This contributed to the excess of infant mortality, the degeneration of morals and the instability of the family.1011 So in Japan the pressure of population led to infanticide and the sale of daughters to a life of ignominy, which took them out of the child-bearing class.1012 Nor was either custom under the ban.

Geographic conditions made infanticide a state measure in these densely populated communities. On the small coral atolls, where food was especially limited, it was enforced by law. On Vaitupu, in the Ellice group, couples were only allowed to have two children; on Nukufelau, only one. Any violation of this unique regulation was punished with a fine.1008 On the crowded Gilbert atolls, a woman typically had no more than two children and never more than three. Abortion, performed by a regular midwife, took care of any additional pregnancies. Affection for children was very strong here, and infanticide of living infants was unheard of.1009 In Samoa, Turner also found that the practice was limited to the time before birth; however, in Tahiti and other places, tribal village authorities enforced it regarding both born and unborn children.1010 In pre-Christian Hawaii, around two-thirds of all children, especially girls, were killed by their parents either before or after birth. This led to a decline in maternal instinct and a custom of sending children to live with strangers. This contributed to high infant mortality rates, a deterioration of morals, and unstable family structures.1011 Thus, in Japan, population pressure resulted in infanticide and the selling of daughters into lives of shame, which removed them from childbearing roles.1012 Neither practice was prohibited.

The result is a deterioration of morals, an invasion of the family bond, and a decay of the finer sentiments therewith connected. Captain Cook in 1770 found in Tahiti Eareeoie or Arreoys societies, which were free-love associations including in their number "over half of the better sort of the inhabitants." The children begotten of these promiscuous unions were smothered at birth. Obscene conversations, indecent dances and frank unchastity on the part of girls and women were the attendant evils of these loose morals.1013 Cook was sure that "these societies greatly prevent the increase of the superior classes of people of which they are composed." Malthus reports a similar association in the Marianne Islands, distinguished by a similar name, devoted to race suicide.1014 Everywhere in Oceanica marriage is unstable, and with few exceptions unchastity prevails. Stevenson thinks it chiefly accountable for the decline of population in the islands.1015 However, in the detailed taboos laid upon women in Fiji, Marquesas, and other Polynesian islands we have the survival of an early measure to increase reserve between the sexes, long after regard for chastity has vanished.1016

The result is a decline in morals, a breakdown of family ties, and a loss of the deeper feelings associated with them. Captain Cook, in 1770, discovered in Tahiti societies known as Eareeoie or Arreoys, which were free-love groups that included "over half of the better sort of the inhabitants." The children born from these casual unions were suffocated at birth. Obscene conversations, indecent dances, and open promiscuity among girls and women were the negative consequences of these loose morals.1013 Cook believed that "these societies greatly prevent the increase of the superior classes of people of which they are composed." Malthus reported a similar group in the Marianne Islands, recognized by a similar name and committed to population decline.1014 Throughout Oceania, marriage is unstable, and with few exceptions, promiscuity is common. Stevenson believes this is primarily responsible for the population decline in the islands.1015 However, in the specific taboos placed on women in Fiji, Marquesas, and other Polynesian islands, we see the remnants of earlier efforts to encourage restraint between the sexes, long after any regard for chastity has faded away.1016

Low valuation of human life.

The constant pressure of population upon the limits of subsistence throughout Oceanica has occasioned a low valuation of human life. Among natural peoples the helpless suffer first. The native Hawaiians, though a good-natured folk, were relentless towards the aged, weak, sick, and insane. These were frequently stoned to death or allowed to perish of hunger.1017 In Fiji, the aged are treated with such contempt, that when decrepitude or illness threatens them, they beg their children to strangle them, unless the children anticipate the request.1018 In Vate (or Efate) of the New Hebrides, old people are buried alive, and their passage to another world duly celebrated by a feast.1019 However, in the Tonga Islands and in New Zealand, great respect and consideration are shown the aged as embodying experience.1020 The harsher custom recalls an ancient law of Aegean Ceos, which, ordained that all persons over sixty years of age should be compelled to drink hemlock, in order that there might be sufficient food for the rest.1021

The ongoing pressure of population on the limits of available resources throughout Oceania has led to a low appreciation for human life. Among traditional societies, the vulnerable are the first to suffer. The native Hawaiians, despite being a friendly people, were harsh toward the elderly, weak, sick, and mentally ill. These individuals were often stoned to death or left to die of starvation.1017 In Fiji, the elderly are treated with such disregard that when old age or illness approaches, they beg their children to strangle them, unless the children take it upon themselves to do so first.1018 In Vate (or Efate) of the New Hebrides, old people are buried alive, and their transition to another world is marked by a celebratory feast.1019 However, in the Tonga Islands and New Zealand, the elderly are treated with great respect and consideration due to their life experience.1020 The harsher customs resemble an ancient law from Aegean Ceos, which mandated that all individuals over sixty years old should be forced to drink hemlock, so that there would be enough food for the rest.1021

Cannibalism in islands.

Many customs of Oceanica can be understood only in the light of the small value attached to human life in this island world. The overpopulation which lies back of their colonization explains the human sacrifices in their religious orgies and funeral rites, as also the widespread practice of cannibalism. This can be traced in vestigial forms, or as an occasional or habitual custom from one end of the Pacific to the other, from the Marquesas to New Guinea and from New Zealand to Hawaii. All Melanesia is tainted with it, and Micronesia is not above suspicion. The cause of this extensive practice, Stevenson attributes to the imminence of famine and the craving for flesh as food in these small islands, which are destitute of animals except fowls, dogs and hogs. In times of scarcity cannibalism threatens all; it strikes from within or without the clan.1022 Ratzel leans to the same opinion.1023 Captain Cook thought the motive of a good full meal of human flesh was often back of the constant warfare in New Zealand, and was sometimes the only alternative of death by hunger. Cannibalism was not habitual in the Tonga Islands, but became conspicuous during periods of famine.1024 In far-away Tierra del Fuego, where a peculiarly harsh climate and the low cultural status of the natives combine to produce a frightful infant mortality and therefore to repress population, cannibalism within the clan is indulged in only at the imperious dictate of mid-winter hunger. The same thing is true in the nearby Chonos Archipelago.1025

Many customs of Oceania can only be understood in light of the low value placed on human life in this island world. The overpopulation behind their colonization explains the human sacrifices in their religious ceremonies and funerals, as well as the widespread practice of cannibalism. This can be seen in various forms, whether occasional or habitual, from one end of the Pacific to the other, from the Marquesas to New Guinea and from New Zealand to Hawaii. All of Melanesia is affected by it, and Micronesia is also not free from suspicion. Stevenson attributes this widespread practice to the threat of famine and the craving for meat as food in these small islands, which are lacking in animals except for chickens, dogs, and pigs. During times of scarcity, cannibalism is a threat to everyone; it can strike from within or outside the clan.1022 Ratzel shares a similar viewpoint.1023 Captain Cook believed that the desire for a decent meal of human flesh often fueled the ongoing warfare in New Zealand and was sometimes the only alternative to dying of hunger. Cannibalism wasn’t common in the Tonga Islands, but it became noticeable during famine periods.1024 In far-off Tierra del Fuego, where a particularly harsh climate and the low cultural status of the natives lead to extreme infant mortality and suppress population growth, cannibalism within clans is only practiced when hunger during mid-winter is dire. The same is true in the nearby Chonos Archipelago.1025

These are the darker effects of an island habitat, the vices of its virtues. That same excessive pressure of population which gives rise to infanticide also stimulates agriculture, industry and trade; it develops ingenuity in making the most of local resources, and finally leads to that widespread emigration and colonization which has made islanders the great distributors of culture, from Easter Isle to Java and from ancient Crete to modern England.

These are the negative consequences of living on an island, the drawbacks of its benefits. The same high population pressure that leads to infanticide also boosts agriculture, industry, and trade; it encourages creativity in utilizing local resources and ultimately results in the extensive emigration and colonization that has turned islanders into major distributors of culture, from Easter Island to Java and from ancient Crete to modern England.


NOTES TO CHAPTER XIII

Notes for Chapter 13


803.

Table of areas of peninsulas and islands, Justus Perthes, Taschen Atlas, p. 9. Gotha, 1905.

Table of areas of peninsulas and islands, Justus Perthes, Taschen Atlas, p. 9. Gotha, 1905.

804.

H.J. Mackinder, Britain and the British Seas, pp. 105-108. London, 1904.

H.J. Mackinder, Britain and the British Seas, pp. 105-108. London, 1904.

805.

W. Deecke, Italy, p. 45. London, 1904.

W. Deecke, Italy, p. 45. London, 1904.

806.

Journey of William de Rubruquis, pp. 187, 204, Hakluyt Society Publication, London, 1903.

Journey of William de Rubruquis, pp. 187, 204, Hakluyt Society Publication, London, 1903.

807.

Archibald Little, The Far East, pp. 35, 45. Oxford, 1905.

Archibald Little, The Far East, pp. 35, 45. Oxford, 1905.

808.

Strabo, Book X, chap. II, 19.

Strabo, Book X, chap. II, 19.

809.

Ratzel, Die Erde und das Leben, Vol. I. pp. 312-313. Leipzig, 1901.

Ratzel, Die Erde und das Leben, Vol. I, pp. 312-313. Leipzig, 1901.

810.

Charles H. Hawes, In the Uttermost East, p. 103. New York, 1904.

Charles H. Hawes, In the Uttermost East, p. 103. New York, 1904.

811.

W.E. Griffis, The Mikado's Empire, Vol. I, pp. 26-27. New York, 1904.

W.E. Griffis, The Mikado's Empire, Vol. I, pp. 26-27. New York, 1904.

812.

Darwin, Origin of Species, Vol. II, chap. XIII, p, 178. New York, 1895.

Darwin, Origin of Species, Vol. II, chap. XIII, p. 178. New York, 1895.

813.

A.R. Wallace, Geographical Distribution of Animals, Vol. II, p. 61. London, 1876.

A.R. Wallace, Geographical Distribution of Animals, Vol. II, p. 61. London, 1876.

814.

Darwin, Origin of Species, Vol. II, chap. XIII, p. 183. New York, 1895.

Darwin, Origin of Species, Vol. II, chap. XIII, p. 183. New York, 1895.

815.

Ibid., Vol. II, chap. XIII, pp. 178-180.

Same source., Vol. II, chap. XIII, pp. 178-180.

816.

A.R. Wallace, Island Life, pp. 331-332, 338-389, 393, 402, 409-410, 449, 456-463. New York, 1893.

A.R. Wallace, Island Life, pp. 331-332, 338-389, 393, 402, 409-410, 449, 456-463. New York, 1893.

817.

Ibid., 342, 370-371.

Ibid., 342, 370-371.

818.

Emerson, English Traits, chap. VI.

Emerson, English Traits, ch. 6.

819.

Capt. F. Brinkley, Japan, Vol. I, p. 50. Boston and Tokyo, 1901.

Capt. F. Brinkley, Japan, Vol. I, p. 50. Boston and Tokyo, 1901.

820.

W.E. Griffis, The Mikado's Empire, Vol. I, p. 198. New York, 1904.

W.E. Griffis, The Mikado's Empire, Vol. I, p. 198. New York, 1904.

821.

Arthur M. Knapp, Feudal and Modern Japan, Vol. I, pp. 211, 220, 221. New York, 1900.

Arthur M. Knapp, Feudal and Modern Japan, Vol. I, pp. 211, 220, 221. New York, 1900.

822.

Emerson, English Traits, chap. III.

Emerson, English Traits, ch. 3.

823.

Ronald M. Burrows, The Discoveries in Crete, pp. 134-136, 141, 162, 177. New York, 1907.

Ronald M. Burrows, The Discoveries in Crete, pp. 134-136, 141, 162, 177. New York, 1907.

824.

Ibid., chapters IV and V.

Ibid., chapters 4 and 5.

825.

Ibid., p. 179. Angelo Mosso, The Palaces of Crete, pp. 46, 54-55, 61-62, 81. London, 1907.

Ibid., p. 179. Angelo Mosso, The Palaces of Crete, pp. 46, 54-55, 61-62, 81. London, 1907.

826.

Ronald M. Burrows, The Discoveries in Crete, pp. 64-65, 82, 84, 147-150. New York, 1907. James Baikie, The Sea Kings of Crete, pp. 235-237. London, 1910.

Ronald M. Burrows, The Discoveries in Crete, pp. 64-65, 82, 84, 147-150. New York, 1907. James Baikie, The Sea Kings of Crete, pp. 235-237. London, 1910.

827.

J.B. Bury, History of Greece, pp. 8-10. New York,1909.

J.B. Bury, History of Greece, pp. 8-10. New York, 1909.

828.

R.M. Burrows, The Discoveries in Crete, pp. 36, 44-46, 50-51, 85, 149-150, 179. New York, 1907.

R.M. Burrows, The Discoveries in Crete, pp. 36, 44-46, 50-51, 85, 149-150, 179. New York, 1907.

829.

Ibid., 136-137.

Ibid., 136-137.

830.

Private communication from Mrs. Harriet Boyd Hawes.

Private message from Mrs. Harriet Boyd Hawes.

831.

Recent Discoveries in Crete, The Chautauquan, Vol. 43, p. 220. 1906. R.M. Burrows, The Discoveries in Crete, pp. 103, 162. New York, 1907.

Recent Discoveries in Crete, The Chautauquan, Vol. 43, p. 220. 1906. R.M. Burrows, The Discoveries in Crete, pp. 103, 162. New York, 1907.

832.

Grote, History of Greece, Vol. IV, pp. 244-245. New York, 1857.

Grote, History of Greece, Vol. IV, pp. 244-245. New York, 1857.

833.

Strabo, Book XIV, chap. II, 7-13.

Strabo, Book XIV, chap. II, 7-13.

834.

Strabo, Book VII, chap. VI, 16.

Strabo, Book VII, chap. VI, 16.

835.

A.P. Niblack, Coast Indians of Southern Alaska and Northern British Columbia, pp. 382-384. House Misc. Doc. 142. Washington. Dr. George Dawson, The Haidas, Harper's Monthly, August, 1882.

A.P. Niblack, Coast Indians of Southern Alaska and Northern British Columbia, pp. 382-384. House Misc. Doc. 142. Washington. Dr. George Dawson, The Haidas, Harper's Monthly, August, 1882.

836.

Ratzel, History of Mankind, Vol. I, p. 180. London, 1896-1898.

Ratzel, History of Mankind, Vol. I, p. 180. London, 1896-1898.

837.

Article, The National Academy of Sciences, Nation, Vol. LXXX, p. 328. 1905. Capt. James Cook, A Voyage Towards the South Pole, 1772-1775, Vol. I, p. 284, 288-296. London. 1777. George Forster, Voyage Round the World, Vol. I, pp. 566-567, 580-581, 586-591. London, 1777.

Article, The National Academy of Sciences, Nation, Vol. 80, p. 328. 1905. Capt. James Cook, A Voyage Towards the South Pole, 1772-1775, Vol. 1, p. 284, 288-296. London. 1777. George Forster, Voyage Round the World, Vol. 1, pp. 566-567, 580-581, 586-591. London, 1777.

838.

G. Sergi, The Mediterranean Race, chap. VII. London and New York, 1901. Helmolt, History of the World, Vol. IV, pp. 222-223. New York, 1902-1906.

G. Sergi, The Mediterranean Race, chap. VII. London and New York, 1901. Helmolt, History of the World, Vol. IV, pp. 222-223. New York, 1902-1906.

839.

Charles W. Hawes, The Uttermost East, pp. 113-116. New York, 1904.

Charles W. Hawes, The Uttermost East, pp. 113-116. New York, 1904.

840.

William Bright, Early English Church History, pp. 224-234. Oxford. 1897. P. W. Joyce, Social History of Ireland, Vol. I, pp. 320, 389, 390. London, 1903.

William Bright, Early English Church History, pp. 224-234. Oxford. 1897. P. W. Joyce, Social History of Ireland, Vol. I, pp. 320, 389, 390. London, 1903.

841.

W.H. Dall, Masks and Labrets, p. 137. Third Annual Report of Bureau of Ethnology, Washington, 1884.

W.H. Dall, Masks and Labrets, p. 137. Third Annual Report of Bureau of Ethnology, Washington, 1884.

842.

A.P. Niblack, Coast Indians of Southern Alaska and Northern British Columbia, pp. 236-382. Washington.

A.P. Niblack, Coast Indians of Southern Alaska and Northern British Columbia, pp. 236-382. Washington.

843.

H.R. Mill, International Geography, p. 187. New York, 1902.

H.R. Mill, International Geography, p. 187. New York, 1902.

844.

A.B. Ellis, The West African Islands, p. 202. London, 1885. History of the Conquest of the Canaries, Introduction, pp. XIII, XVII, XXXIII, XXXIV. Hakluyt Society, London, 1872.

A.B. Ellis, The West African Islands, p. 202. London, 1885. History of the Conquest of the Canaries, Introduction, pp. XIII, XVII, XXXIII, XXXIV. Hakluyt Society, London, 1872.

845.

Henry Gannett, People of the Philippines, Report of the Eighth International Geographical Congress, Washington, 1904.

Henry Gannett, People of the Philippines, Report of the Eighth International Geographical Congress, Washington, 1904.

846.

H.R. Mill, International Geography, p. 549. New York, 1903.

H.R. Mill, International Geography, p. 549. New York, 1903.

847.

W. Deecke, Italy, p. 451. London, 1904.

W. Deecke, Italy, p. 451. London, 1904.

848.

Nelson Annandale, The Faroes and Iceland, p. 14. Oxford, 1905.

Nelson Annandale, The Faroes and Iceland, p. 14. Oxford, 1905.

849.
J. Partsch, Central Europe, Map, p. 131, and p. 133. London, 1903.

850.

W.Z. Ripley, Races of Europe, pp. 272, 304, 305, 317. New York, 1899.

W.Z. Ripley, Races of Europe, pp. 272, 304, 305, 317. New York, 1899.

851.

Ibid., p. 303.

Ibid., p. 303.

852.

Ibid., Map, p. 251, and p. 253.

Ibid., Map, p. 251, and p. 253.

853.

W. Deecke, Italy, p. 451. London, 1904.

W. Deecke, Italy, p. 451. London, 1904.

854.

Darwin, Origin of Species, Vol. II, chap. XIII, pp. 179, 180, 184. New York, 1895. A. E. Wallace, Island Life, pp. 284-285, 290-291. London and New York, 1892.

Darwin, Origin of Species, Vol. II, chap. XIII, pp. 179, 180, 184. New York, 1895. A. E. Wallace, Island Life, pp. 284-285, 290-291. London and New York, 1892.

855.

H.R. Mill, International Geography, p. 554. New York, 1902.

H.R. Mill, International Geography, p. 554. New York, 1902.

856.

Ratzel, Die Erde und das Leben, Vol. I, p. 364. Leipsig, 1901.

Ratzel, Die Erde und das Leben, Vol. I, p. 364. Leipzig, 1901.

857.

Ratzel, History of Mankind, Vol. I, pp. 454-456. London, 1896-1898. H.R. Mill, International Geography, p. 1018. New York, 1902.

Ratzel, History of Mankind, Vol. I, pp. 454-456. London, 1896-1898. H.R. Mill, International Geography, p. 1018. New York, 1902.

858.

Ratzel, History of Mankind, Vol. I, p. 456. London, 1896-1898.

Ratzel, History of Mankind, Vol. I, p. 456. London, 1896-1898.

859.

Nordenskiold, Voyage of the Vega, pp. 563, 588, 591. New York, 1882.

Nordenskiold, Voyage of the Vega, pp. 563, 588, 591. New York, 1882.

860.

A.R. Wallace, Malay Archipelago, pp. 368, 380, 381. New York, 1869.

A.R. Wallace, Malay Archipelago, pp. 368, 380, 381. New York, 1869.

861.

Richard Semon, In the Australian Bush, pp. 277-278. London,1899.

Richard Semon, In the Australian Bush, pp. 277-278. London, 1899.

862.

Strabo, Book VIII, chap. VI, 16.

Strabo, Book VIII, chap. VI, 16.

863.

Pliny, Naturalis Historia, Book IV, 12.

Pliny, *Natural History*, Book IV, 12.

864.

Ibid., Book VI, chap, 32.

Ibid., Book VI, chap. 32.

865.

Hereford George, Historical Geography of the British Empire, pp. 130-133. London, 1904.

Hereford George, Historical Geography of the British Empire, pp. 130-133. London, 1904.

866.

Dietrich Schaefer, Die Hansestädte und König Waldemar von Dänemark, pp. 37-44. Jena, 1879.

Dietrich Schaefer, The Hanseatic Cities and King Waldemar of Denmark, pp. 37-44. Jena, 1879.

867.

Hereford George, Historical Geography of the British Empire, pp. 127-128. London, 1904.

Hereford George, Historical Geography of the British Empire, pp. 127-128. London, 1904.

868.

The Danish West Indies, pp. 2767, 2769. Summary of Commerce and Finance for January, 1902. Washington.

The Danish West Indies, pp. 2767, 2769. Summary of Commerce and Finance for January 1902. Washington.

869.

E.A. Freeman, Historical Geography of Europe, pp. 22, 29, 37, 65, 77, 384, 412-415, 419, 426, 465. London, 1882.

E.A. Freeman, Historical Geography of Europe, pp. 22, 29, 37, 65, 77, 384, 412-415, 419, 426, 465. London, 1882.

870.

Ibid., 35, 48, 49, 54-55, 80, 379, 382-385, 409, 411, 556, 557. E.A. Freeman, Sicily, chaps. I, II. New York and London, 1894.

Ibid., 35, 48, 49, 54-55, 80, 379, 382-385, 409, 411, 556, 557. E.A. Freeman, Sicily, chaps. I, II. New York and London, 1894.

871.

W. Deecke, Italy, pp. 132, 445. London, 1904. W.Z. Ripley, Races of Europe, p. 271. New York, 1899.

W. Deecke, Italy, pp. 132, 445. London, 1904. W.Z. Ripley, Races of Europe, p. 271. New York, 1899.

872.

Elisée Reclus, Europe, Vol. I, p. 320. New York, 1886.

Elisée Reclus, Europe, Vol. I, p. 320. New York, 1886.

873.

W. Deecke, Italy, pp. 448, 453. London, 1904.

W. Deecke, Italy, pp. 448, 453. London, 1904.

874.

H.R. Mill, International Geography, p. 367. New York, 1902.

H.R. Mill, International Geography, p. 367. New York, 1902.

875.

David Murray, Story of Japan, p. 156. New York, 1894.

David Murray, Story of Japan, p. 156. New York, 1894.

876.

Henry Dyer. Dai Nippon, p. 61. New York, 1904.

Henry Dyer. Dai Nippon, p. 61. New York, 1904.

877.

E.A. Freeman, Historical Geography of Europe, pp. 55, 245, 252, 257, 258, 264, 556. London, 1882.

E.A. Freeman, Historical Geography of Europe, pp. 55, 245, 252, 257, 258, 264, 556. London, 1882.

878.

Thucydides I, 114; IV, 57-59, 62.

Thucydides I, 114; IV, 57-59, 62.

879.

Ibid., IV, 120-122.

Ibid., IV, 120-122.

880.

Aristotle, Politics, Book XI, chaps. 7, 8.

Aristotle, Politics, Book XI, chaps. 7, 8.

881.

J.T. Bent, The Bahrein Islands in the Persian Gulf, Proceedings of the Roy. Geog. Soc., Vol. XII, p. 1. London, 1890.

J.T. Bent, The Bahrein Islands in the Persian Gulf, Proceedings of the Roy. Geog. Soc., Vol. XII, p. 1. London, 1890.

882.

W.F. Walker, The Azores, p. 22. London, 1886.

W.F. Walker, The Azores, p. 22. London, 1886.

883.

A.B. Ellis, West African Islands, p. 203. London, 1885.

A.B. Ellis, West African Islands, p. 203. London, 1885.

884.

Strabo, Book III, chap. V, 1.

Strabo, Book III, chap. V, 1.

885.

H.J. Mackinder, Britain and the British Seas, pp. 10-12. London, 1904.

H.J. Mackinder, Britain and the British Seas, pp. 10-12. London, 1904.

886.

W.Z. Ripley, Races of Europe, pp. 301, 311. New York, 1899.

W.Z. Ripley, Races of Europe, pp. 301, 311. New York, 1899.

887.

H.B. George, Historical Geography of the British Empire, pp. 100, 103, 104. London, 1904.

H.B. George, Historical Geography of the British Empire, pp. 100, 103, 104. London, 1904.

888.

J.R. Green, The Making of England, Vol. II, pp. 30, 31, 35. London, 1904.

J.R. Green, The Making of England, Vol. II, pp. 30, 31, 35. London, 1904.

889.

James Bryce, Holy Roman Empire, p. 185. London, 1890. George Webbe Dasent, The Story of Burnt Njal, or Life in Iceland at the End of the Tenth Century, Vol. I, pp. LII-LXVIII. Edinburgh, 1861.

James Bryce, Holy Roman Empire, p. 185. London, 1890. George Webbe Dasent, The Story of Burnt Njal, or Life in Iceland at the End of the Tenth Century, Vol. I, pp. LII-LXVIII. Edinburgh, 1861.

890.

Dahlmann, Geschichte van Dänemark, Vol. II, pp. 265-268. Hamburg, 1857. James Bryce, Introduction to Helmolt, History of the World, Vol. I, p. XXII. New York, 1902.

Dahlmann, History of Denmark, Vol. II, pp. 265-268. Hamburg, 1857. James Bryce, Introduction to Helmolt, History of the World, Vol. I, p. XXII. New York, 1902.

891.

George T. Stokes, Ireland and the Celtic Church, pp. 206-230. London, 1886.

George T. Stokes, Ireland and the Celtic Church, pp. 206-230. London, 1886.

892.

J.R. Green, History of the English People, Vol. I, pp. 48-49.

J.R. Green, History of the English People, Vol. I, pp. 48-49.

893.

Recent Discoveries in Crete, The Chautauquan, Vol. XLIII, p. 220. 1906. Angelo Mosso, The Palaces of Crete, p. 325. London, 1907.

Recent Discoveries in Crete, The Chautauquan, Vol. 43, p. 220. 1906. Angelo Mosso, The Palaces of Crete, p. 325. London, 1907.

894.

Helmolt, History of the World, Vol. II, pp. 496-504 New York 1902-6.

Helmolt, History of the World, Vol. II, pp. 496-504 New York 1902-6.

895.

David Murray, Story of Japan, p. 156. New York, 1894. W.E. Griffis, The Mikado's Empire, Vol. I, pp. 176-181. New York, 1903.

David Murray, Story of Japan, p. 156. New York, 1894. W.E. Griffis, The Mikado's Empire, Vol. I, pp. 176-181. New York, 1903.

896.

J.R. Green, History of the English People, Vol. I, pp. 30-33. New York.

J.R. Green, History of the English People, Vol. I, pp. 30-33. New York.

897.

Capt. F. Brinkley, Japan, Vol. I, p. 8. Boston and Tokyo, 1901.

Capt. F. Brinkley, Japan, Vol. I, p. 8. Boston and Tokyo, 1901.

898.

Capt. A.T. Mahan, Influence of Sea Power upon History, p. 29. New York, 1902.

Capt. A.T. Mahan, Influence of Sea Power on History, p. 29. New York, 1902.

899.

H.J. Mackinder, Britain and the British Seas, pp. 341, 343. London, 1904.

H.J. Mackinder, Britain and the British Seas, pp. 341, 343. London, 1904.

900.

Ratzel, Die Erde und das Leben, Vol. I, p. 362. Leipzig, 1901.

Ratzel, The Earth and Life, Vol. I, p. 362. Leipzig, 1901.

901.

W.E. Griffis, The Mikado's Empire, Vol. I, p. 258. New York, 1903.

W.E. Griffis, The Mikado's Empire, Vol. I, p. 258. New York, 1903.

902.

W.F. Walker, The Azores, p. 2. London, 1886.

W.F. Walker, The Azores, p. 2. London, 1886.

903.

F.W. Wines, Punishment and Reformation, pp. 166-167, 184-188. New York, 1895.

F.W. Wines, Punishment and Reformation, pp. 166-167, 184-188. New York, 1895.

904.

Tacitus, Annals, Book I, chap. XIII.

Tacitus, Annals, Book I, chap. XIII.

905.

Ibid., Book IV, chaps. III, XV. Book II, chap. XIX.

Ibid., Book IV, ch. III, XV. Book II, ch. XIX.

906.

W. Deecke, Italy, pp. 270, 410, 413, 448, 450. London, 1904.

W. Deecke, Italy, pp. 270, 410, 413, 448, 450. London, 1904.

907.

Longmans Gazetteer of the World, Article Easter Isle.

Longmans Gazetteer of the World, Article Easter Island.

908.

Darwin and Fitzroy, Voyage of the Beagle, Vol. II, p. 59. London, 1839.

Darwin and Fitzroy, Voyage of the Beagle, Vol. II, p. 59. London, 1839.

909.

Ibid., Vol. II, pp. 490-492.

Ibid., Vol. 2, pp. 490-492.

910.

A.B. Ellis, West African Islands, pp. 1-3. London, 1885.

A.B. Ellis, West African Islands, pp. 1-3. London, 1885.

911.

Longmans Gazetteer of the World, Andaman and Nicobar.

Longmans Gazetteer of the World, Andaman and Nicobar.

912.

Darwin and Fitzroy, Voyage of the Beagle, Vol. III, p. 245. London, 1839.

Darwin and Fitzroy, Voyage of the Beagle, Vol. III, p. 245. London, 1839.

913.

A.B. Ellis, West African Islands, pp. 72, 73, 241. London, 1885.

A.B. Ellis, West African Islands, pp. 72, 73, 241. London, 1885.

914.

Charles H. Hawes, The Uttermost East, p. 345. New York, 1904.

Charles H. Hawes, The Uttermost East, p. 345. New York, 1904.

915.

The Dry Tortugas, Harper's Monthly, Vol. 37, p. 260. 1868.

The Dry Tortugas, Harper's Monthly, Vol. 37, p. 260. 1868.

916.

A.R. Wallace, Island Life, pp. 332, 371, 410, 457, 460-461, 464. London, 1892.

A.R. Wallace, Island Life, pp. 332, 371, 410, 457, 460-461, 464. London, 1892.

917.

Ibid., pp. 407, 408, 410, 462.

Ibid., pp. 407, 408, 410, 462.

918.

Census of the Philippine Islands of 1903, Vol. I, p. 456. Washington, 1905.

Census of the Philippine Islands of 1903, Vol. I, p. 456. Washington, 1905.

919.

Ratzel, History of Mankind, Vol. III, pp. 446, 449, 451. London, 1896-1898.

Ratzel, History of Mankind, Vol. III, pp. 446, 449, 451. London, 1896-1898.

920.

W.E. Griffis, The Mikado's Empire, Vol. I, pp. 30-31. New York, 1903.

W.E. Griffis, The Mikado's Empire, Vol. I, pp. 30-31. New York, 1903.

921.

W.Z. Ripley, Races of Europe, p. 271. New York, 1899.

W.Z. Ripley, Races of Europe, p. 271. New York, 1899.

922.

Hereford George, Historical Geography of the British Empire, pp. 106-107. London, 1904.

Hereford George, Historical Geography of the British Empire, pp. 106-107. London, 1904.

923.

Nelson Annandale, The Faroes and Iceland, pp. 19, 20, 33, 37, 64-65, 148, 193-194, 198, 206, 208. Oxford, 1905.

Nelson Annandale, The Faroes and Iceland, pp. 19, 20, 33, 37, 64-65, 148, 193-194, 198, 206, 208. Oxford, 1905.

924.

Capt. James Cook, Voyage to the Pacific Ocean, 1776-1780, Vol. II, pp. 69-70, 75-78. New York, 1796.

Capt. James Cook, Voyage to the Pacific Ocean, 1776-1780, Vol. II, pp. 69-70, 75-78. New York, 1796.

925.

Williams and Calvert, Fiji and the Fijians, pp. 5-7, 14, 15. New York, 1859. Basil Thomson, The Fijians, pp. 23-32. London, 1908.

Williams and Calvert, Fiji and the Fijians, pp. 5-7, 14, 15. New York, 1859. Basil Thomson, The Fijians, pp. 23-32. London, 1908.

926.

Mahler, Siedelungsgebiete und Siedelungslage in Ozeanien. Melching Staatenbildung in Melanesien, Leipzig, Dissertations, 1897.

Mahler, Siedelungsgebiete und Siedelungslage in Ozeanien. Melching Staatenbildung in Melanesien, Leipzig, Dissertations, 1897.

927.

H.R. Mill, International Geography, p. 570. New York, 1902.

H.R. Mill, International Geography, p. 570. New York, 1902.

928.

Aristotle, Politics, Book II, chap. 8.

Aristotle, Politics, Book II, chap. 8.

929.

Ratzel, History of Mankind, Vol. I, 297-299. London, 1896-1898.

Ratzel, History of Mankind, Vol. I, 297-299. London, 1896-1898.

930.

Ibid., Vol. I, Map, p. 145, pp. 234, 251.

Ibid., Vol. I, Map, p. 145, pp. 234, 251.

931.

Ibid., Vol. I, pp. 204-214.

Ibid., Vol. 1, pp. 204-214.

932.

Justus Perthes, Taschen Atlas, p. 67. Gotha, 1910.

Justus Perthes, Taschen Atlas, p. 67. Gotha, 1910.

933.

Ibid., p. 60.

Ibid., p. 60.

934.

Ibid., p. 37.

Ibid., p. 37.

935.

Ibid., p. 51.

Ibid., p. 51.

936.

Ibid., pp. 37, 67.

Ibid., pp. 37, 67.

937.

Lippincott's New Gazetteer of the World, Madeira and Azores.

Lippincott's New Gazetteer of the World, Madeira and Azores.

938.

R.L. Stevenson, The South Seas, p. 37. New York, 1903.

R.L. Stevenson, The South Seas, p. 37. New York, 1903.

939.

Ibid., p. 222.

Ibid., p. 222.

940.

J.S. Jenkins, United States Exploring Squadron under Capt. Wilkes, 1838-1842, pp. 401-403. New York, 1855.

J.S. Jenkins, United States Exploring Squadron led by Capt. Wilkes, 1838-1842, pp. 401-403. New York, 1855.

941.

Justus Perthes, Taschen Atlas, p. 70. Gotha, 1905.

Justus Perthes, Taschen Atlas, p. 70. Gotha, 1905.

942.

Ratzel, History of Mankind, Vol. I, pp. 158, 179. London, 1896-1898.

Ratzel, History of Mankind, Vol. I, pp. 158, 179. London, 1896-1898.

943.

J.S. Jenkins, United States Exploring Squadron under Capt. Wilkes, 1838-1842, p. 462. New York, 1855.

J.S. Jenkins, United States Exploring Squadron under Captain Wilkes, 1838-1842, p. 462. New York, 1855.

944.

Ibid., p. 314.

Ibid., p. 314.

945.

Nelson Annandale, The Faroes and Iceland, pp. 93-129. Oxford, 1905.

Nelson Annandale, The Faroes and Iceland, pp. 93-129. Oxford, 1905.

946.

Elisée Reclus, Europe, Vol. IV, p. 344. New York, 1886.

Elisée Reclus, Europe, Vol. IV, p. 344. New York, 1886.

947.

John Murray, Handbook to Greece and the Ionian Isles, p. 329. London, 1872.

John Murray, Handbook to Greece and the Ionian Isles, p. 329. London, 1872.

948.

Hereford George, Historical Geography of the British Empire, p. 119. London, 1904.

Hereford George, Historical Geography of the British Empire, p. 119. London, 1904.

949.

W. Deecke, Italy, pp. 449-450. London, 1904.

W. Deecke, Italy, pp. 449-450. London, 1904.

950.

Ibid., pp. 447-448, 410-411.

Ibid., pp. 447-448, 410-411.

951.

Statistics from Justus Perthes, Taschen Atlas, p. 65. Gotha, 1910.

Statistics from Justus Perthes, Taschen Atlas, p. 65. Gotha, 1910.

952.

Longmans Gazetteer of the World, Amboina.

Longmans Gazetteer of the World, Amboina.

953.

Census of the Philippine Islands of 1903. Vol. II, p. 30. Washington, 1905.

Census of the Philippine Islands of 1903. Vol. II, p. 30. Washington, 1905.

954.

Justus Perthes, Taschen Atlas, pp. 75, 77. Gotha, 1910.

Justus Perthes, Taschen Atlas, pp. 75, 77. Gotha, 1910.

955.

Hereford George, Historical Geography of the British Empire, pp. 238-240. London, 1904.

Hereford George, Historical Geography of the British Empire, pp. 238-240. London, 1904.

956.

D.G. Hogarth, The Nearer East, pp. 243-244. London, 1902.

D.G. Hogarth, The Nearer East, pp. 243-244. London, 1902.

957.

Dr. A. Philippson, The Greek Islands of the Aegean, Scottish Geographical Magazine, Vol. XIII, p. 489. 1897.

Dr. A. Philippson, The Greek Islands of the Aegean, Scottish Geographical Magazine, Vol. XIII, p. 489. 1897.

958.

J.T. Brent, The Bahrein Islands in the Persian Gulf, Proceedings of the Roy. Geog. Society, Vol. XII, pp. 1-19, 1890; and Justus Perthes, Taschen Atlas, p. 55. Gotha, 1910.

J.T. Brent, The Bahrein Islands in the Persian Gulf, Proceedings of the Roy. Geog. Society, Vol. XII, pp. 1-19, 1890; and Justus Perthes, Taschen Atlas, p. 55. Gotha, 1910.

959.

Parkman, Pioneers of France in the New World, pp. 26-32. Boston, 1900.

Parkman, Pioneers of France in the New World, pp. 26-32. Boston, 1900.

960.

Ibid., pp. 253-262.

Ibid., pp. 253-262.

961.

Thucydides, I, 100, 101. Herodotus, VII, 108, 109.

Thucydides, I, 100, 101. Herodotus, VII, 108, 109.

962.

Grote, History of Greece, Vol. III, pp. 195, 197. New York, 1857.

Grote, History of Greece, Vol. III, pp. 195, 197. New York, 1857.

963.

Ibid., Vol. IV, pp. 30-33.

Ibid., Vol. IV, pp. 30-33.

964.

Capt. James Cook, Voyage to the Pacific Ocean, 1776-1780, Vol. II, pp. 85-86, 88. New York. 1796.

Capt. James Cook, Voyage to the Pacific Ocean, 1776-1780, Vol. II, pp. 85-86, 88. New York. 1796.

965.

George Forster, Voyage Round the World, Vol. I, p. 274, 280, 281, 285. London, 1777.

George Forster, Voyage Around the World, Vol. I, p. 274, 280, 281, 285. London, 1777.

966.

J.S. Jenkins, United States Exploring Squadron under Capt. Wilkes, 1838-1842, p. 402. New York, 1855.

J.S. Jenkins, United States Exploring Squadron under Capt. Wilkes, 1838-1842, p. 402. New York, 1855.

967.

George Forster, Voyage Round the World, Vol. I, pp. 571, 578, 587, 595. London, 1777.

George Forster, Voyage Around the World, Vol. I, pp. 571, 578, 587, 595. London, 1777.

968.

R.H. Codrington, The Melanesians, pp. 303-304. Oxford, 1891.

R.H. Codrington, The Melanesians, pp. 303-304. Oxford, 1891.

969.

William Mariner, Natives of the Tonga Islands, Vol. II, p. 30. Edinburgh, 1827.

William Mariner, Natives of the Tonga Islands, Vol. II, p. 30. Edinburgh, 1827.

970.

Capt. James Cook, Voyage to the Pacific Ocean, 1776-1780, Vol. I, p. 302. New York, 1796.

Capt. James Cook, Voyage to the Pacific Ocean, 1776-1780, Vol. I, p. 302. New York, 1796.

971.

Ratzel, History of Mankind, Vol. I, pp. 254-256. London, 1896-1898.

Ratzel, History of Mankind, Vol. I, pp. 254-256. London, 1896-1898.

972.

Williams and Calvert, Fiji and the Fijians, pp. 8, 46-49. New York, 1859. Basil Thomson, The Fijians, p. 339. London, 1908.

Williams and Calvert, Fiji and the Fijians, pp. 8, 46-49. New York, 1859. Basil Thomson, The Fijians, p. 339. London, 1908.

973.

H.R. Mill, International Geography, pp. 562, 564, 572. New York, 1902.

H.R. Mill, International Geography, pp. 562, 564, 572. New York, 1902.

974.

Census of the Philippine Islands of 1903, Vol. IV, pp. 1-2. Washington, 1905.

Census of the Philippine Islands of 1903, Vol. IV, pp. 1-2. Washington, 1905.

975.

Strabo, Book VIII, chap. VI, 16.

Strabo, Book VIII, chap. VI, 16.

976.

W. Deecke, Italy, pp. 380, 448-450. London, 1904.

W. Deecke, Italy, pp. 380, 448-450. London, 1904.

977.

Ibid., p. 452.

Ibid., p. 452.

978.

Dr. A. Philippson, The Greek Islands of the Aegean, Scottish Geographical Magazine, Vol. XIII, pp. 489-490. 1897. John Murray, Handbook to Greece and the Ionian Isles. London, 1872.

Dr. A. Philippson, The Greek Islands of the Aegean, Scottish Geographical Magazine, Vol. XIII, pp. 489-490. 1897. John Murray, Handbook to Greece and the Ionian Isles. London, 1872.

979.

W.E. Griffis, The Mikado's Empire, Vol. I, pp. 17-20. New York, 1904.

W.E. Griffis, The Mikado's Empire, Vol. I, pp. 17-20. New York, 1904.

980.

Henry Dyer, Dai Nippon, pp. 238-244. New York, 1903. Arthur M. Knapp, Feudal and Modern Japan, Vol. I, pp. 78, 79, 116, 117. New York, 1900.

Henry Dyer, Dai Nippon, pp. 238-244. New York, 1903. Arthur M. Knapp, Feudal and Modern Japan, Vol. I, pp. 78, 79, 116, 117. New York, 1900.

981.

Alfred Stead, Japan by the Japanese, p. 413. London, 1904.

Alfred Stead, Japan by the Japanese, p. 413. London, 1904.

982.

Sir Rutherford Alcock, Three Years in Japan, Vol. I, pp. 83, 84, 283-286. New York, 1868.

Sir Rutherford Alcock, Three Years in Japan, Vol. I, pp. 83, 84, 283-286. New York, 1868.

983.

H.D. Traill, Social England, Vol. II, pp. 243-246, 547-554; Vol. III, pp. 114-121, 239-241, 253-255, 351-359. London, 1905.

H.D. Traill, Social England, Vol. II, pp. 243-246, 547-554; Vol. III, pp. 114-121, 239-241, 253-255, 351-359. London, 1905.

984.

Thucydides, Book I, 4. Aristotle, Politics, Book II, chap. 7, 2. Herodotus, Book VII, 170.

Thucydides, Book I, 4. Aristotle, Politics, Book II, chap. 7, 2. Herodotus, Book VII, 170.

985.

Thucydides, Book IV, chaps. 84, 88.

Thucydides, Book IV, chaps. 84, 88.

986.

Census of the Philippine Islands in 1903, Vol. I, pp. 412-414. Washington, 1905.

Census of the Philippine Islands in 1903, Vol. I, pp. 412-414. Washington, 1905.

987.

Richard Semon, In the Australian Bush, p. 517. London, 1899.

Richard Semon, In the Australian Bush, p. 517. London, 1899.

988.

Ratzel, History of Mankind, Vol. I, pp. 174-177. London, 1896-98.

Ratzel, History of Mankind, Vol. I, pp. 174-177. London, 1896-98.

989.

Ibid., Vol. I, pp. 178-179.

Ibid., Vol. 1, pp. 178-179.

990.

Ibid., Vol. I, pp. 157-161, 165.

Ibid., Vol. I, pp. 157-161, 165.

991.

Henry Dyer, Dai Nippon, pp. 250-257, 266. New York, 1904.

Henry Dyer, Dai Nippon, pp. 250-257, 266. New York, 1904.

992.

Elisée Reclus, Europe, Vol. I, p. 337. New York, 1886. Hereford George, Historical Geography of the British Empire, pp. 118-119. London, 1904.

Elisée Reclus, Europe, Vol. I, p. 337. New York, 1886. Hereford George, Historical Geography of the British Empire, pp. 118-119. London, 1904.

993.

D.G. Hogarth, The Nearer East, p. 244. London, 1902.

D.G. Hogarth, The Nearer East, p. 244. London, 1902.

994.

Dr. A. Philippson, The Greek Islands of the Aegean, Scottish Geographical Magazine, Vol. XIII, p. 488. 1897.

Dr. A. Philippson, The Greek Islands of the Aegean, Scottish Geographical Magazine, Vol. XIII, p. 488. 1897.

995.

Jensen, Die Nordfrieschen Inseln, p. 133. 1891.

Jensen, The North Frisian Islands, p. 133. 1891.

996.

Malthus, Essay on Population, Book I, chap. V, p. 67. London, 1826. This whole chapter on "Checks to Population in the Islands of the South Seas" is valuable.

Malthus, Essay on Population, Book I, chap. V, p. 67. London, 1826. This entire chapter on "Checks to Population in the Islands of the South Seas" is significant.

997.

Boyd Alexander, From the Niger to the Nile, Vol. II, pp. 108-110. London, 1907.

Boyd Alexander, From the Niger to the Nile, Vol. II, pp. 108-110. London, 1907.

998.

History of the Conquest of the Canaries, p. xxxix. Hakluyt Society, London, 1872.

History of the Conquest of the Canaries, p. xxxix. Hakluyt Society, London, 1872.

999.

Ratzel, History of Mankind, Vol. I, pp. 273, 299-300. London, 1896-98.

Ratzel, History of Mankind, Vol. I, pp. 273, 299-300. London, 1896-98.

1000.

Ibid., Vol. I, pp. 270, 274-275. Adolf Marcuse, Die Hawaiischen Inseln, p. 108. Berlin, 1894.

Ibid., Vol. I, pp. 270, 274-275. Adolf Marcuse, Die Hawaiischen Inseln, p. 108. Berlin, 1894.

1001.

R.L. Stevenson, The South Seas, pp. 138-139. New York, 1903.

R.L. Stevenson, The South Seas, pp. 138-139. New York, 1903.

1002.

George Forster, Voyage Round the World, Vol. I, p. 564, 569, 572, 577, 584, 586, 596. London, 1777.

George Forster, Voyage Around the World, Vol. I, p. 564, 569, 572, 577, 584, 586, 596. London, 1777.

1003.

Westermarck, History of Human Marriage, pp. 116, 441, 462-463, 450-452, 454, 457. London, 1891.

Westermarck, History of Human Marriage, pp. 116, 441, 462-463, 450-452, 454, 457. London, 1891.

1004.

Ratzel, History of Mankind, Vol. I, p. 270. London, 1896-1898.

Ratzel, History of Mankind, Vol. I, p. 270. London, 1896-1898.

1005.

R.H. Codrington, The Melanesians, p. 229. Oxford, 1891.

R.H. Codrington, The Melanesians, p. 229. Oxford, 1891.

1006.

Basil Thomson, The Fijians, pp. 221-227. London, 1908. Williams and Calvert, Fiji and the Fijians, pp. 132, 142. New York, 1859.

Basil Thomson, The Fijians, pp. 221-227. London, 1908. Williams and Calvert, Fiji and the Fijians, pp. 132, 142. New York, 1859.

1007.

Ibid., p. 130. R.L. Stevenson, The South Seas, pp. 38, 40. New York, 1903.

Ibid., p. 130. R.L. Stevenson, The South Seas, pp. 38, 40. New York, 1903.

1008.

Ibid., p. 38.

Ibid., p. 38.

1009.

J.S. Jenkins, United States Exploring Squadron under Capt. Wilkes, 1838-1842, pp. 404-405. New York, 1855.

J.S. Jenkins, United States Exploring Squadron led by Capt. Wilkes, 1838-1842, pp. 404-405. New York, 1855.

1010.

Ratzel, History of Mankind, Vol. I, pp. 270, 299. London, 1896-98.

Ratzel, History of Mankind, Vol. I, pp. 270, 299. London, 1896-98.

1011.

Adolf Marcuse, Die Hawaiischen Inseln, p. 109. Berlin, 1894.

Adolf Marcuse, The Hawaiian Islands, p. 109. Berlin, 1894.

1012.

G.W. Knox, Japanese Life in Town and Country, p. 188. New York, 1905.

G.W. Knox, Japanese Life in Town and Country, p. 188. New York, 1905.

1013.

Capt. Cook's Journal, First Voyage Round the World in the Endeavor, 1768-1771, pp. 95, 96. Edited by W.J.L. Wharton. London, 1893.

Capt. Cook's Journal, First Voyage Around the World in the Endeavor, 1768-1771, pp. 95, 96. Edited by W.J.L. Wharton. London, 1893.

1014.

Malthus, Essay on Population, Book I, chap. V.

Malthus, Essay on Population, Book I, chap. V.

1015.

R.L. Stevenson, The South Seas, p. 39. New York, 1903.

R.L. Stevenson, The South Seas, p. 39. New York, 1903.

1016.

Ibid., p. 52.

, p. 52.

1017.

Adolf Marcuse, Die Hawaiischen Inseln, p. 109. Berlin, 1894.

Adolf Marcuse, The Hawaiian Islands, p. 109. Berlin, 1894.

1018.

Williams and Calvert, Fiji and the Fijians, pp. 144-146. New York, 1859.

Williams and Calvert, Fiji and the Fijians, pp. 144-146. New York, 1859.

1019.

Ratzel, History of Mankind, Vol. I, p. 330. London, 1896-1898.

Ratzel, History of Mankind, Vol. I, p. 330. London, 1896-1898.

1020.

William Mariner, Natives of the Tonga Islands, Vol. II, pp. 95, 134-135. Edinburgh, 1827. Capt. Cook's Journal, First Voyage Round the World in the Endeavor, 1768-1771, pp. 220-221. Edited by W.J.L. Wharton. London, 1893.

William Mariner, Natives of the Tonga Islands, Vol. II, pp. 95, 134-135. Edinburgh, 1827. Capt. Cook's Journal, First Voyage Round the World in the Endeavor, 1768-1771, pp. 220-221. Edited by W.J.L. Wharton. London, 1893.

1021.

Strabo, Book X, chap. V, 6.

Strabo, Book X, chap. V, 6.

1022.

R.L. Stevenson, The South Seas, pp. 98-104. New York, 1903.

R.L. Stevenson, The South Seas, pp. 98-104. New York, 1903.

1023.

Ratzel, History of Mankind, Vol. I, pp. 297-299. London, 1896-1898.

Ratzel, History of Mankind, Vol. I, pp. 297-299. London, 1896-1898.

1024.

William Mariner, Natives of the Tonga Islands, Vol. II, pp. 108-109. Edinburgh, 1827.

William Mariner, Natives of the Tonga Islands, Vol. II, pp. 108-109. Edinburgh, 1827.

1025.

Darwin and Fitzroy, Voyage of the Beagle, Vol. II, pp. 183, 189-190. London, 1839.

Darwin and Fitzroy, Voyage of the Beagle, Vol. II, pp. 183, 189-190. London, 1839.


Chapter XIV—Plains, Steppes And Deserts

Relief of the sea floor.

Anthropo-geography has to do primarily with the forms and relief of the land. The relief of the sea floor influences man only indirectly. It does this by affecting the forms of the coast, by contributing to the action of tides in scouring out river estuaries, as on the flat beaches of Holland and England, by determining conditions for the abundant littoral life of the sea, the fisheries of the continental shelf which are factors in the food quest and the distribution of settlements. Moreover, the ocean floor enters into the problem of laying telegraph cables, and thereby assumes a certain commercial and political importance. The name of the Telegraph Plateau of the North Atlantic, crossed by three cables, points to the relation between these and submarine relief. So also does the erratic path of the cable from southwestern Australia to South Africa via Keeling Island and Mauritius.

Anthropo-geography mainly focuses on the shapes and contours of the land. The layout of the ocean floor impacts humans only in an indirect way. It influences the coastal shape, contributes to tidal patterns that erode river mouths, like on the flat beaches of Holland and England, and shapes conditions for abundant coastal marine life, including the fisheries on the continental shelf that play a role in food supply and settlement distribution. Additionally, the ocean floor is significant for laying telegraph cables, which gives it a certain economic and political importance. The North Atlantic's Telegraph Plateau, which is crossed by three cables, highlights the connection between these cables and underwater terrain. Similarly, the winding route of the cable from southwestern Australia to South Africa, passing through Keeling Island and Mauritius, illustrates this relationship as well.

Submarine reliefs have yet greater significance in their relation to the distribution of the human race over the whole earth; for what is now a shallow sea may in geologically recent times have been dry land, on which primitive man crossed from continent to continent. It is vital to the theory of the Asiatic origin of the American Indian that in Miocene times a land bridge spanned the present shallows of Bering Sea. Hence the slight depth of this basin has the same bio-geographical significance as that of the British seas, the waters of the Malay Archipelago, and the Melanesian submarine platform. The impressive fact about "Wallace's Line" is the depth of the narrow channel which it follows through Lombok and Macassar Straits and which, in recent geological times, defined the southeastern shore of Asia. In all these questions of former land connection, anthropo-geography follows the lead of bio-geography, whose deductions, based upon the dispersal of countless plant and animal forms, point to the paths of human distribution.

Submarine reliefs are even more important when it comes to how humans are spread across the Earth. What is now a shallow sea may have been dry land in recent geological history, allowing early humans to move between continents. This is essential to the theory that American Indians originated in Asia, as during Miocene times a land bridge connected what is now the shallow Bering Sea. Therefore, the shallow depth of this area is just as significant for biogeography as that of the British seas, the waters of the Malay Archipelago, and the Melanesian underwater platform. The notable aspect of "Wallace's Line" is the depth of the narrow channel it follows through the Lombok and Macassar Straits, which, in recent geological times, marked the southeastern coast of Asia. In exploring these earlier land connections, anthropogeography takes cues from biogeography, which, through the study of how various plants and animals spread, reveals the routes of human migration.

Mean elevations of the continents.

The mean elevation of the continents above sea level indicates the average life conditions of their populations as dependent upon relief. The 1010 meters (3313 feet) of Asia indicate its predominant highland character. The 330 meters (1080 feet) representing the average height of Europe, and the 310 meters (1016 feet) of Australia indicate the preponderance of lowlands. Nevertheless, anthropo-geography rarely lends itself to a mathematical statement of physical conditions. Such a statement only obscures the facts. The 660 meters (2164 feet) mean elevation of Africa indicates a relief higher than Europe, but gives no hint of the plateau character of the Dark Continent, in which lowlands and mountains are practically negligible features; while the almost identical figure (650 meters or 2133 feet) for both North and South America is the average derived from extensive lowlands in close juxtaposition to high plateaus capped by lofty mountain ranges. Such mathematical generalizations indicate the general mass of the continental upheaval, but not the way this mass is divided into low and high reliefs.1026

The average height of the continents above sea level reflects the typical living conditions for their populations based on the terrain. Asia’s mean elevation of 1010 meters (3313 feet) shows its mostly mountainous nature. Europe’s average height of 330 meters (1080 feet) and Australia’s 310 meters (1016 feet) highlight their dominance of lowlands. However, anthropogeography rarely translates into a clear mathematical representation of physical conditions. Such representations can obscure the reality. Africa’s mean elevation of 660 meters (2164 feet) suggests it has higher terrain than Europe, but doesn’t reveal the continent’s plateau-like habitat, where lowlands and mountains are nearly insignificant; while the almost identical average of 650 meters (2133 feet) for both North and South America reflects a mix of extensive lowlands next to high plateaus topped by tall mountain ranges. These mathematical averages show the overall structure of the continents but not how that structure is organized into low and high areas.1026

The method of anthropo-geography is essentially analytical, and therefore finds little use for general orometric statements, which may be valuable to the science of geo-morphology with its radically different standpoint. For instance, geo-morphology may calculate from all the dips and gaps in the crest of a mountain range the average height of its passes, Anthropo-geography, on the other hand, distinguishes between the various passes according as they open lines of greater or less resistance to the historical movement across the mountain barriers. It finds that one deep breach in the mountain wall, like the Mohawk Depression1027 and Cumberland Gap in the Appalachian system,1028 Truckee Pass in the Sierra Nevada1029 and the Brenner in the Alps,1030 has more far-reaching and persistent historical consequences than a dozen high-laid passes that only notch the crest. Pack-trail, road and railroad seek the former, avoid the latter; one draws from a wide radius, while the other serves a restricted local need. Therefore anthropo-geography, instead of clumping the passes, sorts them out, and notes different relations in each.

The method of anthropo-geography is essentially analytical, so it doesn't really rely on general orometric statements, which might be useful for geo-morphology that has a completely different viewpoint. For example, geo-morphology can calculate the average height of mountain passes based on all the dips and gaps in a mountain range's crest. In contrast, anthropo-geography differentiates between various passes depending on how much resistance they provide to historical movements across mountain barriers. It identifies that one deep gap in the mountain wall, like the Mohawk Depression1027, Cumberland Gap in the Appalachian system,1028, Truckee Pass in the Sierra Nevada1029, and the Brenner in the Alps,1030 has more significant and lasting historical impacts than a dozen higher passes that simply cut into the crest. Pack-trails, roads, and railroads aim for the former and avoid the latter; one covers a wide area, while the other meets a limited local need. Therefore, anthropo-geography, instead of clustering the passes together, organizes them and notes the different relationships in each.

Distribution of reliefs.

In continents and countries the anthropo-geographer looks to see not what reliefs are present, but how they are distributed; whether highlands and lowlands appear in unbroken masses as in Asia, or alternate in close succession as in western Europe; whether the transition from one to the other is abrupt as in western South America, or gradual as in the United States. A simple and massive land structure lends the same trait of the simple and massive to every kind of historical movement, because it collects the people into large groups and starts them moving in broad streams, as it were. This fact explains the historical preponderance of lowland peoples and especially of steppe nomads over the small, scattered groups inhabiting isolated mountain valleys. The island of Great Britain illustrates the same principle on a small scale in the turbid, dismembered history of independent Scotland, with its Highlanders and Lowlanders, its tribes and clans separated by mountains, gorges, straits, and fiords,1031 in contrast to the smoother, unified course of history in the more uniform England. Carl Ritter compares the dull uniformity of historical development and relief in Africa with the variegated assemblage of highlands and lowlands, nations and peoples, primitive societies and civilized states in the more stimulating environment of Asia.1032

In different continents and countries, the anthropo-geographer looks not just at the landforms present, but at how they are arranged; whether highlands and lowlands form large, continuous areas like in Asia, or alternate closely like in Western Europe; whether the shift from one to the other is sudden, as in Western South America, or gradual, like in the United States. A simple and massive land structure contributes to a straightforward and substantial nature of historical movements, since it gathers people into large groups and sets them in motion like broad streams. This explains why lowland populations, particularly steppe nomads, have historically been more dominant than the small, scattered communities in isolated mountain valleys. The island of Great Britain showcases this idea on a smaller scale through the complicated, fragmented history of independent Scotland, with its Highlanders and Lowlanders, and its tribes and clans divided by mountains, gorges, straits, and fjords,1031 compared to the more streamlined and cohesive history of the more uniform England. Carl Ritter draws a parallel between the monotonous uniformity of historical development and landforms in Africa and the diverse mix of highlands and lowlands, nations and peoples, and primitive societies and civilized states in the richer environment of Asia.1032

Homologous relief and homologous histories.

The chief features of mountain relief reappear on a large scale in the continents, which are simply big areas of upheaval lifted above sea level. The continents show therefore homologous regions of lowlands, uplands, plateaus and mountains, each district sustaining definite relations to the natural terrace above or below it, and displaying a history corresponding to that of its counterpart in some distant part of the world, due to a similarity of relations. This appears first in a specialization of products in each tier and hence in more or less economic interdependence, especially where civilization is advanced. The tendency of conquest to unite such obviously complementary districts is persistent. Hence the Central Highland of Asia is fringed with low peripheral lands like Manchuria, China, India and Mesopotamia, into whose history it has repeatedly entered as a disturbing force. All the narrow Pacific districts of the Americas from Alaska to Patagonia are separated by the Cordilleras from the lowlands on the Atlantic face of the continents; all reveal in their history the common handicap arising from an overwhelming preponderance of plateau and mountain and a paucity of lowlands. Colombia, Ecuador and Peru have in the past century been stretching out their hands eastward to grasp sections of the bordering Amazon lowlands, where to-day is the world's great field of conflicting boundary claims. Chile would follow its geographical destiny if it should supplement its high, serrated surface by the plateaus and lowlands of Bolivia, as Cyrus the Persian married the Plateau of Iran to the plains of the Tigris and Euphrates, and Romulus joined the Alban hills to the alluvial fields of the Tiber.

The main features of mountain landscapes show up on a larger scale in the continents, which are simply large areas of uplifted land above sea level. Therefore, the continents have similar regions of lowlands, uplands, plateaus, and mountains, with each area maintaining specific relationships to the natural terraces above or below it, and having a history that parallels that of its counterpart in some distant part of the world, due to similar relationships. This is first noticeable in the specialization of products in each tier, leading to varying degrees of economic interdependence, especially in areas where civilization is more advanced. The tendency for conquest to bring together such complementary regions is strong. As a result, the Central Highlands of Asia are surrounded by lowlands like Manchuria, China, India, and Mesopotamia, which have repeatedly interacted with it as a disruptive force throughout history. All the narrow Pacific regions of the Americas, from Alaska to Patagonia, are separated by the Cordilleras from the lowlands on the Atlantic side of the continents; all show in their histories the shared challenge of having a dominant amount of plateau and mountain land with few lowlands. In the past century, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru have been reaching eastward to claim parts of the adjacent Amazon lowlands, which are currently the site of significant boundary disputes. Chile would be following its geographical path if it were to add the plateaus and lowlands of Bolivia to its high, jagged terrain, much like how Cyrus the Persian united the Plateau of Iran with the plains of the Tigris and Euphrates, and Romulus connected the Alban hills to the fertile lands of the Tiber.

Anthropo-geography of lowlands.

Well-watered lowlands invite expansion, ethnic, commercial and political. In them the whole range of historical movements meet few obstacles beyond the waters gathering in their runnels and the forests nourished in their rich soils. Limited to 200 meters (660 feet) elevation, lowlands develop no surface features beyond low hills and undulating swells of land. Uniformity of life conditions, monotony of climate as of relief, except where grades of latitude intervene to chill or heat, an absence of natural boundaries, and constant encouragement to intercourse, are the anthropo-geographic traits of lowlands, as opposed to the arresting, detaining grasp of mountains and highland valleys. Small, isolated lowlands, like the mountain-rimmed plains of Greece and the Aegean coast of Asia Minor, the Nile flood-plain, Portugal, and Andalusia in Spain, may achieve precocious and short-lived historical importance, owing to the fertility of their alluvial soils, their character as naturally defined districts, and their advantageous maritime location; but while in these restricted lowlands the telling feature has been their barrier boundaries of desert, mountains and sea, the vast level plains of the earth have found their distinctive and lasting historical importance in the fact of their large and unbounded surface.

Well-watered lowlands encourage growth—ethnically, commercially, and politically. In these areas, the full range of historical movements encounters few obstacles aside from the water that collects in their channels and the forests thriving in their fertile soils. Limited to 200 meters (660 feet) in elevation, lowlands don’t develop any surface features beyond gentle hills and rolling land. The uniformity of living conditions, the monotony of climate and terrain, except where differences in latitude create colder or hotter conditions, a lack of natural boundaries, and a constant facilitation of interaction define lowlands, unlike the compelling and isolating presence of mountains and high valleys. Small, isolated lowlands, like the plains surrounded by mountains in Greece and the Aegean coast of Asia Minor, the Nile floodplain, Portugal, and Andalusia in Spain, may achieve significant yet brief historical importance due to the fertility of their alluvial soils, their character as clearly defined regions, and their favorable maritime positions; however, while these smaller lowlands are notably marked by their barrier boundaries of desert, mountains, and sea, the expansive flat plains of the earth have gained their distinctive and enduring historical significance from their vast and unrestricted area.

Such plains have been both source and recipient of every form of historical movement. Owing to their prevailing fitness for agriculture, trade and intercourse, they are favored regions for the final massing of a sedentary population. The areas of greatest density of population in the world, harboring 150 or more to the square kilometer (385 to the square mile), are found in the lowlands of China, the alluvial plains of India, and similar level stretches in the Neapolitan plain and Po Valley, the lowlands of France, Germany, Holland, Belgium, England and Scotland. Such a density is found in upland districts (660 to 2000 feet, or 200 to 600 meters) bordering agricultural lowlands, only where industries based upon mineral wealth cause a concentration of population. [See maps pages 8, 9, 559.]

Such plains have been both a source and a destination for every kind of historical movement. Because they are so suitable for farming, trade, and interaction, they are preferred areas for establishing large, settled populations. The regions with the highest population density in the world, hosting 150 or more people per square kilometer (385 per square mile), can be found in the lowlands of China, the fertile plains of India, and similar flat areas in the Neapolitan plain and Po Valley, as well as the lowlands of France, Germany, Holland, Belgium, England, and Scotland. Such high density occurs in upland regions (660 to 2000 feet, or 200 to 600 meters) adjacent to agricultural lowlands only when industries based on mineral resources lead to a concentration of people. [See maps pages 8, 9, 559.]

Extensive plains unfavorable to early development.

The level or undulating surface of extensive lowlands is not favorable to the early development of civilization. Not only do their wide extent and absence of barriers postpone the transition from nomadism to sedentary life, but their lack of contrasting environments and contrasted developments, which supplement and stimulate, puts chains upon progress. A flat, monotonous relief produces a monotonous existence, necessarily one-sided, needing a complement in upland or mountain. To the pioneer settlers in the lowlands of Missouri the Ozark Plateau was a boon, because its streams furnished water-power for much needed saw and flour mills. Treeless Egypt even before 2500 B. C. depended upon the cedars of the Lebanon Mountains for the construction of its ships; so that the conquest of Lebanon, begun by Thutmose I. and completed by Thutmose III. in about 1470 B. C., had a sound geographical basis.1033 Similarly the exploitation of the copper, malachite, turquoise and lapis-lazuli of Mount Sinai, minerals not found in the Nile plain, led the ancient Egyptians into extensive mining operations there before 3000 B. C., and resulted in the establishment of Egyptian political supremacy in 2900 B. C., as a measure to protect the mines against the depredations of the neighboring Bedouin tribes.1034 Lowlands lack the distinctive advantages of highlands found in diversity of climate, water-power, generally in more abundant forests and minerals. The latter are earlier discovered and worked in the tilted strata of mountains and uplands.

The flat or rolling terrain of large lowland areas isn’t conducive to the early rise of civilization. Their vastness and lack of natural barriers delay the shift from a nomadic lifestyle to settled living, and the absence of varied environments and developments, which usually encourage growth, hampers progress. A flat, dull landscape leads to a dull existence that is inherently one-dimensional, requiring the balance provided by higher ground or mountains. For the early settlers in Missouri's lowlands, the Ozark Plateau was a blessing, as its rivers supplied the water power needed for vital saw and flour mills. Even before 2500 B.C., the treeless region of Egypt relied on the cedars from the Lebanon Mountains to build its ships; thus, the conquest of Lebanon, initiated by Thutmose I and finished by Thutmose III around 1470 B.C., had solid geographical reasoning. Similarly, the mining of copper, malachite, turquoise, and lapis lazuli from Mount Sinai—resources absent from the Nile plain—led ancient Egyptians to launch extensive mining operations there before 3000 B.C., ultimately solidifying Egyptian political dominance in 2900 B.C. as a way to protect the mines from the raids of neighboring Bedouin tribes. Lowlands lack the unique advantages of highlands, such as climate diversity, water power, and generally more abundant forests and minerals. These resources are usually discovered and exploited earlier in the sloped layers of mountains and uplands.

Plain countries suffer particularly from a paucity of varied geographic conditions and of resulting contrasts in their population. Their national characters tend to be less richly endowed; their possibilities for development are blighted or retarded, because even racial differences are rapidly obliterated in the uniform geographic environment, A small diversified country like Crete, Great Britain, Italy, Portugal, Saxony, or Japan, is a geographical multum in parvo. The western half of Europe bears the same stamp, endowing each country and nation with marked individuality born of partial isolation and a varied combination of environment. The larger eastern half of the continent embraced in the plains of Poland and Russia shows monotony in every aspect of human life. This comes out anthropologically in the striking similarity of head-form found everywhere north and east of the Carpathian Mountains, except in the secluded districts of Lithuania and Crimea, which shelter remnants of distinct races. Over all this vast territory the range of cephalic variation is only five units or one-third that in the restricted but diversified territory of western Europe. Italy, only one-eighteenth the size of European Russia, has a range of fifteen units, reflecting in the variety of its human types the diversity of its environment.1035

Flat countries struggle especially due to a lack of diverse geographic conditions and the resulting differences in their populations. Their national identities tend to be less richly developed; their potential for growth is hindered because even racial distinctions quickly fade in a uniform geographic setting. A small, varied country like Crete, Great Britain, Italy, Portugal, Saxony, or Japan is a geographical multum in parvo. The western half of Europe bears this same characteristic, giving each country and nation a distinct individuality that arises from partial isolation and a mix of environments. In contrast, the larger eastern half of the continent, particularly in the plains of Poland and Russia, shows a lack of variety in every aspect of human life. This is evident anthropologically in the notable similarity of head shapes found everywhere north and east of the Carpathian Mountains, except in the isolated regions of Lithuania and Crimea, which retain remnants of distinct races. Across this vast area, the range of head shape variation is only five units, or one-third of the range found in the limited but varied territory of western Europe. Italy, which is only one-eighteenth the size of European Russia, has a range of fifteen units, reflecting a diversity of human types that corresponds to its varied environment.1035

Conditions for fusion in plains.

In the plains geography makes for fusion. Russia shows this marked homogeneity, despite a motley collection of race ingredients which have entered into the make-up of the Russian people. Without boundary or barrier, the country has stood wide open to invasion; but the intruders found no secluded corners where they could entrench themselves and preserve their national individuality.1036 They dropped into a vast melting-pot, which has succeeded in amalgamating the most diverse elements. The long-drawn Baltic-North Sea plain of Europe shows the same power to fuse. Here is found a prevailing blond, long-headed stock from the Gulf of Finland to the Somme River in France.1037 Yet this natural boulevard has been a passway for races. Prehistoric evidences show that the dark, broad-headed Celtic folk once overspread this plain east to the Weser;1038 it still tends to trickle down from the southern uplands into the Baltic lowland, and modify the Teutonic type along its southern margin throughout Germany.1039 The Slavs in historic times reached as far west as the Weser, while the expansion of the Teutons has embraced the whole maritime plain from Brittany to the Finnish Gulf. Here it is difficult to draw an ethnic boundary on the basis of physical differences. The eastern Prussians are Slavonized Teutons, and the adjacent Poles seem to be Teutonized Slavs, while the purest type of Letto-Lithuanian at the eastern corner of the Baltic coast approximates closely to the Anglo-Saxon type which sprang from the western corner.1040 A similar amalgamation of races and peoples has taken place in the lowlands of England and Scotland, while diversity still lingers in the highlands. In the Lowlands of Scotland, Picts in small numbers, Britons, Scots from Ireland, Angles, Frisians, Northmen and Danes have all been blended and assimilated in habits, customs and speech.1041

In the plains, geography leads to a mix of cultures. Russia demonstrates this clear homogeneity, despite the diverse backgrounds that have shaped the Russian people. The country has been open to invasions without any boundaries or barriers; however, the invaders found no hidden places to settle and maintain their national identity. They fell into a vast melting pot that successfully combined the most varied elements. The extended Baltic-North Sea plain of Europe shows the same ability to blend. Here, you find a dominant blond, long-headed group from the Gulf of Finland to the Somme River in France. Yet this natural highway has been a passage for different races. Evidence from prehistoric times shows that the dark, broad-headed Celtic people once spread across this plain as far east as the Weser; it still tends to flow down from the southern highlands into the Baltic lowlands, altering the Teutonic type along its southern edge throughout Germany. The Slavs, in historical times, reached as far west as the Weser, while the expansion of the Teutons has included the entire maritime plain from Brittany to the Finnish Gulf. Here, it's hard to draw an ethnic boundary based on physical differences. The eastern Prussians are Slavic Teutons, and the nearby Poles appear to be Teutonic Slavs, while the purest type of Letto-Lithuanian in the eastern corner of the Baltic coast closely resembles the Anglo-Saxon type that originated from the western corner. A similar blending of races and cultures has occurred in the lowlands of England and Scotland, while diversity still exists in the highlands. In the Lowlands of Scotland, small groups of Picts, Britons, Scots from Ireland, Angles, Frisians, Northmen, and Danes have all mixed and assimilated in terms of habits, customs, and language.

Retardation due to monotonous environment.

This uniformity is advantageous to early development in a small plain, because of the juxtaposition of contrasted environments, but is stultifying to national life in an immense expanse of monotony like that of Russia. Here sameness leaves its stamp on everything. Language is differentiated with only two dialects, that of the Great Russians of the north and the Little Russians of the southern steppes, who were so long exposed to Tartar influences. Most other languages of Europe, though confined to much smaller areas, show far greater diversity.1042 While the Russian of Kazan or Archangel can converse readily with the citizen of Riga or St. Petersburg, Germans from highland Bavaria and Swabia are scarcely intelligible to Prussian and Mecklenberger. And whereas Germany a few decades ago could count over a hundred different kinds of national dress or Tracht, Great Russia alone, with six times the area, had only a single type with perhaps a dozen slight variations. Leroy-Beaulieu comments upon this eternal sameness. "The cities are all alike; so are the peasants, in looks, habits, in mode of life. In no country do people resemble one another more; no other country is so free from political complexity, those oppositions in type and character, which even yet we encounter in Italy and Spain, in France and Germany. The nation is made in the likeness of the country; it shows the same unity, we might say the same monotony, as the plains on which it dwells."

This uniformity benefits early development in a small plain due to the contrast of different environments, but it stifles national life in a vast, monotonous expanse like Russia. Here, sameness affects everything. The language has only two dialects: that of the Great Russians in the north and the Little Russians in the southern steppes, who were long influenced by Tartars. Most other European languages, despite being limited to much smaller areas, show much greater diversity. 1042 While a Russian from Kazan or Archangel can easily converse with someone from Riga or St. Petersburg, Germans from highland Bavaria and Swabia are often barely understandable to Prussians and Mecklenbergers. Just a few decades ago, Germany had over a hundred different types of traditional dress or Tracht, while Great Russia, with six times the area, had only one type with perhaps a dozen minor variations. Leroy-Beaulieu remarks on this unending sameness: "The cities are all alike; so are the peasants, in appearance, habits, and lifestyle. In no other country do people resemble each other more; no other country is so devoid of political complexity, those contrasts in type and character, which we still find in Italy and Spain, in France and Germany. The nation reflects the landscape; it displays the same unity, we might say the same monotony, as the plains on which it resides."

Influence of soils in low plains.

The more flat and featureless a lowland is, the more important become even the slightest surface irregularities which can draw faint dividing lines among the population. Here a gentle land-swell, river, lake, forest, or water-soaked moor serves as boundary. Especially apparent is the differentiating influence of difference of soils. Gravel and alluvium, sand and clay, chalk and more recent marine sediments, emphasize small geographical differences throughout the North German lowland and its extension through Belgium and Holland; here various soils differentiate the distribution of population. In the Netherlands we find the Frisian element of the Dutch people inhabiting chiefly the clay soils and low fens of the west and northwest, the Saxon in the diluvial tracts of the east, and the Frankish in the river clays and diluvium of the south. All the types have maintained their differences of dialect, styles of houses, racial character, dress and custom.1043 The only distinctive region in the great western lowland of France, which comprises over half of the country, is Brittany, individualized in its people and history by its peninsula form, its remote western location, and its infertile soil of primary rocks. Within the sedimentary trough of the Paris Basin, a slight Cretacean platform like the meadow land of Perche1044 (200 to 300 meters elevation) introduces an area of thin population devoted to horse and cattle raising in close proximity to the teeming urban life of Paris. The eastern lowland of England also can be differentiated economically and historically chiefly according to differences of underlying rocks, Carboniferous, Triassic, Jurassic, chalk, boulder clays, and alluvium, which also coincide often with slight variations of relief.1045 In Russia the contrast between the glaciated surface of the north and the Black Mould belt of the south makes the only natural divisions of that vast country, unless we distinguish also the arid southeastern steppes on the basis of a purely climatic difference. [See map page 484.]

The flatter and more featureless a lowland is, the more significant even the smallest surface irregularities become, which can create subtle boundaries among the population. Here, a gentle rise in the land, a river, lake, forest, or marsh serves as a divider. The impact of different soil types is especially noticeable. Gravel and alluvium, sand and clay, chalk and newer marine sediments highlight small geographical differences throughout the North German lowland and its extension into Belgium and Holland; here, various soil types influence where people settle. In the Netherlands, the Frisian part of the Dutch population primarily inhabits the clay soils and low wetlands of the west and northwest, while the Saxons are found in the glacial deposits of the east, and the Franks inhabit the river clays and glacial outwash of the south. All these groups have maintained distinct dialects, architectural styles, racial characteristics, clothing, and customs.1043 The only notable area in the large western lowland of France, which accounts for more than half the country, is Brittany, defined in terms of its people and history by its peninsula shape, isolated western location, and poor soil made up of primary rocks. Within the sedimentary basin of the Paris Basin, a slight Cretaceous platform like the meadows of Perche1044 (200 to 300 meters above sea level) creates a sparsely populated area focused on horse and cattle farming, close to the bustling urban life of Paris. The eastern lowlands of England can also be differentiated economically and historically mainly based on the types of underlying rocks—Carboniferous, Triassic, Jurassic, chalk, boulder clays, and alluvium—which often align with minor variations in the landscape.1045 In Russia, the contrast between the glacial terrain of the north and the fertile black earth belt of the south establishes the main natural divisions of this vast country, unless we also categorize the dry southeastern steppes based on purely climatic differences. [See map page 484.]

The broad coastal plain of our South Atlantic States contains only low reliefs; but it is diversified by several soil belts, which exert a definite control over the industries of the inhabitants, and thereby over the distribution of the negro population. In Georgia, for instance, the rich alluvial soil of the swampy coast is devoted to the culture of rice and sea-island cotton, and contains over 60 per cent. of negroes in its population. This belt, which is only 25 miles wide, is succeeded inland by a broader zone of sandy pine barrens, where the proportion of negroes drops to only 20 or 30 per cent. of the total. Yet further inland is another fertile belt, devoted chiefly to the cultivation of upland cotton and harboring from 35 to over 60 per cent. of negroes in its population.1046 Alabama shows a similar stratification of soils and population from north to south over its level surface. Along the northern border of the state the cereal belt coincides with the deep calcareous soil of the Tennessee River Valley, where negroes constitute from 35 to 60 per cent. of the inhabitants. Next comes the mineral belt, covering the low foot-hills of the Appalachian Mountains. It contains the densest population of the state, less than 17 per cent. of which is negro. South of this is the broad cotton belt of various rich soils, chiefly deep black loam of the river bottoms, which stretches east and west across the state and includes over 60 per cent. of negroes in its population. This is succeeded by the low, coastal timber belt, marked by a decline in the quality of the soil and the proportion of negro inhabitants.1047

The wide coastal plain of our South Atlantic States has only low elevations; however, it's varied by several soil types, which significantly influence the local industries and, in turn, the distribution of the Black population. In Georgia, for instance, the fertile alluvial soil of the swampy coast is used for growing rice and sea-island cotton, and this area has over 60% Black residents. This belt, which is just 25 miles wide, is followed inland by a larger zone of sandy pine barrens, where the percentage of Black residents drops to only 20 or 30%. Even further inland is another fertile belt, mainly used for growing upland cotton and home to 35% to over 60% Black residents.1046 Alabama has a similar pattern of soils and population distribution from north to south across its flat landscape. Along the northern border, the cereal belt aligns with the rich calcareous soil of the Tennessee River Valley, where Black residents make up 35% to 60% of the population. Next is the mineral belt, covering the lower foothills of the Appalachian Mountains, which has the highest population density in the state, with less than 17% being Black. South of this is the wide cotton belt with various fertile soils, mainly deep black loam from the river bottoms, stretching east and west across the state and including over 60% of Black residents in its population. Following this is the low coastal timber belt, characterized by a decline in soil quality and the percentage of Black inhabitants.1047

Value of slight elevations.

In the dead level of extensive plains even slight elevations are seized upon for special uses, or acquire peculiar significance. The Kurgans or burial mounds of the prehistoric inhabitants of Russia, often twenty to fifty feet high, serve to-day as watch-towers for herdsmen tending their flocks.1048 Similarly the Bou-bous, inhabiting the flat grasslands of the French Congo between the Shari and Ubangui Rivers, use the low knolls dotted over their country, probably old ant-hills, as lookout points against raiders.1049 The sand hills and ridges which border the southern edges of the North German lowland form districts sharply contrasted to the swampy, wooded depressions of the old deserted river valleys just to the north. Early occupied by a German stock, they furnished the first German colonists to displace the primitive Slav population surviving in those unattractive, inaccessible regions, as seen in the Spreewald near Kottbus to-day.

In the flat expanse of vast plains, even minor elevations are utilized for specific purposes or gain special significance. The Kurgans, or burial mounds, of the ancient people of Russia, often ranging from twenty to fifty feet tall, now serve as watchtowers for herdsmen looking after their flocks.1048 Similarly, the Bou-bous, who live in the flat grasslands of the French Congo between the Shari and Ubangui Rivers, use the low knolls scattered across their land, likely old ant hills, as lookout points against raiders.1049 The sand hills and ridges that line the southern edges of the North German lowland create areas that sharply contrast with the swampy, wooded depressions of the old abandoned river valleys just to the north. Early settled by German families, they provided the first German colonists who displaced the primitive Slav population remaining in those unattractive, hard-to-reach regions, as seen in the Spreewald near Kottbus today.

Plains and political expansion.

The boundless horizon which is unfavorable to a nascent people endows them in their belated maturity with the power of mastering large areas. Political expansion is the dominant characteristic of the peoples of the plains. Haxthausen observed that handicapped and retarded Russia commands every geographic condition and national trait necessary for virile and expansive political power.1050 Muscovite expansion eastward across the lowlands of Europe and Asia is paralleled by the rapid spread of American settlement and dominion across the plains and prairies of the Mississippi Valley, and Hungarian domination of the wide Danubian levels from the foot-hills of the Austrian Alps to the far Carpathian watershed. It was the closely linked lowlands of the Seine and Loire which formed the core of political expansion and centralization in France. Nearly the whole northern lowland of Germany has been gradually absorbed by the kingdom of Prussia, which now comprises in its territory almost two-thirds of the total area of the Empire. Prussian statesmen formulated the policy of German unification and colonial expansion, and to Prussia fell the hereditary headship of the Empire.

The endless horizon that challenges a developing nation ultimately gives it the ability, in its later maturity, to control vast areas. Political expansion is the main feature of the people living on the plains. Haxthausen noted that struggling and slow-to-develop Russia possesses every geographic feature and national characteristic needed for strong and expansive political power.1050 The eastward expansion of Moscow across the lowlands of Europe and Asia is similar to the rapid growth of American settlements and influence across the plains and prairies of the Mississippi Valley, as well as Hungarian dominance over the expansive Danubian plains from the foothills of the Austrian Alps to the distant Carpathian watershed. The closely connected lowlands of the Seine and Loire formed the center of political growth and unification in France. Almost the entire northern lowland of Germany has been gradually taken in by the Kingdom of Prussia, which now makes up nearly two-thirds of the total area of the Empire. Prussian leaders developed the strategy for German unification and colonial expansion, and Prussia inherited the leadership of the Empire.

Lowland states tend to stretch out and out to boundaries which depend more upon the reach of the central authority than upon physical features. We have seen American settlement and dominion overleap one natural boundary after another between the Mississippi River and the Pacific, from 1804 to 1848. Russia in an equally short period has pushed forward its Asiatic frontier at a dozen points, despite all barriers of desert and mountain. Argentina, blessed with extensive plains, fertile soil and temperate climate, which have served to augment its population both by natural increase and steady immigration (one-fourth of its population is foreign), has expanded across the Rio Negro over the grasslands of the Patagonian plain, and thereby enlarged its area by 259,620 square miles since 1881. The statesman of the plains is a nature-made imperialist; he nurses wide territorial policies and draws his frontiers for the future. To him a "far-flung battle line" is significant only as a means to secure a far-flung boundary line.

Lowland states often extend their boundaries more based on the authority of the central government rather than on physical features. We’ve seen American settlement and control leap over one natural barrier after another between the Mississippi River and the Pacific from 1804 to 1848. Similarly, Russia has rapidly pushed its Asian frontier forward at multiple points, overcoming the challenges posed by deserts and mountains. Argentina, with its vast plains, fertile land, and temperate climate—which have helped boost its population through natural growth and steady immigration (with one-fourth of its population being foreign)—has expanded across the Rio Negro into the grasslands of the Patagonian plain, adding 259,620 square miles since 1881. The statesman from the plains is a natural-born imperialist; he fosters expansive territorial policies and plans his borders for the future. For him, a "far-flung battle line" is only important as a means to establish a far-reaching boundary line.

Arid plains.

From these low, accessible plains of adequate rainfall, which at first encourage primitive nomadism but finally make it yield to sedentary life and to dense populations spreading their farms and cities farther and farther over the unresisting surface of the land, we turn to those boundless arid steppes and deserts which Nature has made forever the homes of restless, rootless peoples. Here quiescence is impossible, the Völkerwanderung is habitual, migration is permanent. The only change is this eternal restlessness. While the people move, progress stands still. Everywhere the sun-scorched grasslands and waterless waste have drawn the dead-line to the advance of indigenous civilization. They permit no accumulation of productive wealth beyond increasing flocks and herds, and limit even their growth by the food supply of scanty, scattered pasturage. The meager rainfall eliminates forests and therewith a barrier to migrations; it also restricts vegetation to grasses, sedges and those forms which can survive a prolonged summer drought and require a short period of growth.

From these low, accessible plains with enough rainfall, which initially promote primitive nomadism but eventually lead to settled life and dense populations spreading their farms and cities further across the unyielding land, we shift to those vast, arid steppes and deserts that Nature has made eternal homes for restless, rootless peoples. Here, stillness is impossible; migration is a constant, and movement is continuous. The only thing that changes is this unending restlessness. As people move, progress halts. Everywhere, the sun-baked grasslands and waterless wastelands mark the limits of local civilization's expansion. They allow no buildup of productive wealth beyond growing flocks and herds, and even that growth is constrained by the limited food supply from sparse, scattered pastures. The little rainfall prevents forests from forming, removing a barrier to migration, and it also restricts vegetation to grasses, sedges, and those types that can endure a long summer drought and have a short growing period.

Annual Rainfall Of The World.

Annual Rainfall Of The World.

Annual Rainfall Of The World.

Global Annual Rainfall.

Distribution and extent of arid plains.

The union of arid plains and steppe vegetation is based upon climate, and is therefore a widely distributed phenomenon. These plains, whether high or low, are found in their greatest extent in the dry trade-wind belts, as in the deserts and steppes of Arabia, Persia, Sudan, the Sahara, South Africa and Central Australia; and in vast continental interiors, where the winds arrive robbed of their moisture in passing intervening highlands, as in the grasslands of our western plains, the llanos and pampas of South America, and the steppes of Central Asia. But wherever they occur, whether in Argentina or Russian Turkestan or the higher plains of Mongolia and Tibet, they present the same general characteristics of land surface, climate, flora and fauna, and the same nomadic populations of pastoral or hunting tribes. In them the movement of peoples reaches its culminating point, permanent settlement its nil point. Here the hunting savage makes the widest sweep in pursuit of buffalo or antelope, and pauses least to till a field; here the pastoral nomad follows his systematic wandering in search of pasturage and his hardly less systematic campaigns of conquest. It is the vast area and wide distribution of these arid plains, combined with the mobility which they impose on native human life, that has lent them historical importance, and reproduced in all sections of the world that significant homologous relation of arid and well-watered districts.

The combination of dry plains and steppe vegetation is determined by the climate, making it a common occurrence around the world. These plains, whether at high or low elevations, are most extensive in the dry trade-wind regions, like the deserts and steppes of Arabia, Persia, Sudan, the Sahara, South Africa, and Central Australia; and in large continental interiors, where winds lose their moisture as they cross intervening highlands, like the grasslands of our western plains, the llanos and pampas of South America, and the steppes of Central Asia. No matter where they are found, whether in Argentina, Russian Turkestan, or the higher plains of Mongolia and Tibet, they share the same general characteristics in terms of land surface, climate, flora and fauna, and the same nomadic populations of pastoral or hunting tribes. In these areas, the movement of people reaches its peak, while permanent settlement is virtually nonexistent. Here, the hunting tribes roam far and wide in search of buffalo or antelope, rarely stopping to farm; here, the pastoral nomads continue their systematic travels in search of grazing land and engage in equally organized conquest campaigns. It’s the vast size and widespread presence of these dry plains, along with the mobility they create in native human life, that gives them historical significance and illustrates the important relationship between arid and well-watered regions worldwide.

Pastoral life.

The grasslands of the old world developed historical importance only after the domestication of cattle, sheep, goats, asses, horses, camels and yaks. This step in progress resulted in the evolution of peoples who renounced the precarious subsistence of the chase and escaped the drudgery of agriculture, to devote themselves to pastoral life. It was possible only where domesticable animals were present, and where the intelligence of the native or the peculiar pressure exerted by environment suggested the change from a natural to an artificial basis of subsistence. Australia lacked the type of animal. Though North America had the reindeer and buffalo, and South America the guanaco, llama and alpaca, only the last two were domesticated in the Andean highlands; but as these were restricted to altitudes from 10,000 to 14,000 feet, where pasturage was limited, stock raising in primitive South America was merely an adjunct to the sedentary agriculture of the high intermontane valleys, and never became the basis for pastoral nomadism on the grassy plains. However, when the Spaniards introduced horses and cattle into South America, the Indians and half-breeds of the llanos and pampas became regular pastoral nomads, known as llaneros and gauchos. They are a race of horsemen, wielding javelin and lasso and bola, living on meat, often on horse-flesh like the ancient Huns, dwelling in leather tents made on a cane framework, like those of the modern Kirghis and medieval Tartars, dressed in cloaks of horsehide sewn together, and raiding the Argentinian frontier of white settlement for horses, sheep and cattle, with the true marauding instinct of all nomads.1051

The grasslands of the old world gained historical significance only after people started domesticating cattle, sheep, goats, donkeys, horses, camels, and yaks. This advancement led to the development of societies that moved away from the unstable lifestyle of hunting and avoided the hard work of farming to focus on herding animals. This shift was only possible in areas where domesticable animals were available, and the local people or specific environmental pressures encouraged a transition from natural to artificial food sources. Australia did not have suitable animals. North America had reindeer and buffalo, while South America had guanacos, llamas, and alpacas, but only the last two were domesticated in the Andes. Since these were confined to altitudes between 10,000 and 14,000 feet, where grazing land was limited, herding in ancient South America was only a supplementary activity to the settled farming in the high valleys and never formed a basis for nomadic herding on the grassy plains. However, when the Spaniards brought horses and cattle to South America, the Indigenous people and mestizos of the llanos and pampas became true pastoral nomads, known as llaneros and gauchos. They are a people of horsemen, using javelins, lassos, and bolas, living on meat, often eating horse meat similar to the ancient Huns, residing in leather tents built on a cane framework, like those of the modern Kirghis and medieval Tartars, dressed in cloaks made from horsehide, and raiding the Argentinian frontier of white settlements for horses, sheep, and cattle, displaying the classic raiding instincts of all nomads.1051

Pastoral nomads of Arctic plains.

Aridity is not the only climatic condition condemning a people to nomadic life. Excessive cold, producing the tundra wastes of the far north, has the same effect. Therefore, throughout Arctic Eurasia, from the Lapp district of Norway to the Inland Chukches of eastern Siberia, we have a succession of Hyperborean peoples pasturing their herds of reindeer over the moss and lichen tundra, and supplementing their food supply with hunting and fishing. The reindeer Chukches once confined themselves to their peninsula, so long as the grazing grounds were unexhausted; but they now range as far west as Yakutsk on the Lena River, The Orochones of the Kolima River district in eastern Siberia, who live chiefly by their reindeer, have small herds. A well-to-do person will have 40 to 100 animals, and the wealthiest only 700, while the Chukches with herds of 10,000 often seek the pasture of the Kolima tundra.1052 Farther west, the Samoyedes of northern Siberia and Russia and the Zirians of the Petchora River range with their large herds northward to the Yalmal Peninsula and Vaygats Isle in summer, and southward in winter. [See map pages 103, 225.] Here a herd of fifty head, which just suffices for the support of one family of four souls, requires 10 square versts, or 4.44 square miles of tundra pasturage.1053 Hence population must forever remain too sparse ever to attain historical significance. [See map page 8.] The Russian Lapps, too, lead a semi-nomadic life. Each group has a particular summer and winter settlement. The winter village is located usually inland in the Kola Peninsula, where the forests lend shelter to the herds, and the summer one near the tundra of the coast, where fishing is accessible. In winter, like the nomads of the deserts, they add to their slender income by the transport of goods by their reindeer and by service at the post stations.1054

Aridity isn’t the only climate that forces people into a nomadic lifestyle. Extreme cold, which creates the tundra wastelands of the far north, has the same impact. So, across Arctic Eurasia, from the Lapp region in Norway to the Inland Chukches in eastern Siberia, we see a variety of Hyperborean peoples herding their reindeer over the moss and lichen-covered tundra, and supplementing their diets with hunting and fishing. The reindeer Chukches used to stay on their peninsula as long as the grazing areas were plentiful; now, they travel as far west as Yakutsk on the Lena River. The Orochones near the Kolima River in eastern Siberia rely mostly on their reindeer and have small herds. A wealthy person may own 40 to 100 animals, and the richest may have only 700, whereas the Chukches, with herds of 10,000, often seek grazing land in the Kolima tundra.1052 Further west, the Samoyedes of northern Siberia and Russia and the Zirians along the Petchora River move with their large herds northward to the Yalmal Peninsula and Vaygats Isle in summer, and southward in winter. [See map pages 103, 225.] A herd of fifty reindeer, which is enough to support a family of four, requires 10 square versts, or about 4.44 square miles, of tundra for grazing.1053 Thus, the population will always remain too sparse to gain historical significance. [See map page 8.] The Russian Lapps also live a semi-nomadic life, with each group having specific summer and winter settlements. The winter village is usually inland in the Kola Peninsula, where forests provide shelter for the herds, and the summer settlement is closer to the coastal tundra for easier access to fishing. In winter, like the desert nomads, they boost their limited income by transporting goods with their reindeer and providing service at post stations.1054

Historical importance of steppe nomads.

These nomads of the frozen north, scattered sparsely over the remote periphery of the habitable world, have lacked the historical importance which in all times has attached to the steppe nomads, owing to their central location. The broad belt of deserts and grasslands which crosses the old world diagonally between 10° and 60° North Latitude from the Atlantic in Africa to the Pacific in Asia, either borders or encompasses the old domains of culture found in river oases, alluvial lowlands or coastal plains of the Torrid and Temperate Zones. The restless, mobile, unbound shepherds of the arid lands have never long been contained by the country which bred them. They have constantly encroached upon the territory of their better placed neighbors, invading, conquering, appropriating their fields and cities, disturbing but at the same time acquiring their culture, lording it over the passive agriculturists, and at the same time putting iron into their weaker blood. It is the geographical contact between arid steppes and moist river valley, between land of poverty and land of plenty, that has made the history of the two inseparable.1055

These nomads of the frozen north, spread thinly across the remote edges of the livable world, haven't had the historical significance that has always been associated with the steppe nomads due to their central location. The wide belt of deserts and grasslands that crosses the old world diagonally between 10° and 60° North Latitude, from the Atlantic in Africa to the Pacific in Asia, either borders or encompasses the ancient cultural areas found in river oases, alluvial lowlands, or coastal plains of the Tropics and Temperate Zones. The restless, mobile, free-spirited shepherds of the dry lands have never been contained for long by the land that raised them. They've continually pushed into the territories of their better-located neighbors, invading, conquering, and taking over their fields and cities, disrupting yet simultaneously absorbing their culture, dominating the passive farmers, and at the same time infusing strength into their weaker blood. It is the geographical link between arid steppes and fertile river valleys, between areas of scarcity and abundance, that has intertwined the histories of the two.1055

Cultural Regions Of Africa And Arabia.

Cultural Regions Of Africa And Arabia.

Cultural Regions Of Africa And Arabia.

Cultural Regions of Africa and Arabia.

Mobility of pastoral nomads.

Every aspect of human life in the steppes bears the stamp of mobility. The nomad tolerates no clog upon his movements. His dwelling is the tent of skin or felt as among Kalmucks and Kirghis, or the tent wagon of the modern Boer1056 and the ancient Scythian as described by Herodotus.1057 "This device has been contrived by them as the country is fit for it," he says,—level, grassy, treeless. The temporary settlement of shepherd tribes is the group of tents, or the ancient carrago camp of the nomadic Visigoths,1058 or the laager of the pastoral Boers, both a circular barricade or corral of wagons.

Every part of life in the steppes reflects a sense of mobility. The nomad refuses to be held back in his movements. His home is a tent made of skin or felt, like those of the Kalmucks and Kirghis, or a tent wagon like that of the modern Boer1056 and the ancient Scythians as described by Herodotus.1057 "This setup was designed by them because the land is suitable for it," he notes—flat, grassy, and without trees. The temporary settlements of shepherd tribes consist of a group of tents, or the ancient carrago camp of the nomadic Visigoths,1058 or the laager of the pastoral Boers, both of which form a circular barricade or corral of wagons.

Tendency to trek.

Constant movement reduces the impedimenta to a minimum. The Orochones, a Tunguse nomadic tribe of eastern Siberia, have no furniture in their tents, and keep their meager supply of clothing and utensils neatly packed on sledges, as if to start at a moment's notice.1059 The only desirable form of capital is that which transports itself, namely, flocks and herds. Beyond that, wealth is limited to strictly portable forms, preferably silver, gold and jewels. It was in terms of these, besides their herds, that the riches of Abraham and Lot were rated in the Bible. That the Israelites when traveling through the wilderness should have had the gold to make the golden calf accords strictly with the verisimilitude of pastoral life.1060 Moreover, that these enslaved descendants of the Sheik Abraham, with their traditions of pastoral life, should have simply trekked-ruptured the frail ties of recently acquired habit which bound them to the Nile soil, is also in keeping with their inborn nomadic spirit. Similar instances occur among modern peoples. The Great Trek of the South African Boers in 1836, by which they renounced not only their unwelcome allegiance to England, but also their land,1061 was another exodus in accordance with the instinct of a pastoral people. They adopted no strange or difficult course, but traveled with their families as they were wont in their every day life of cattle-tenders, took all their chattels with them, and headed for the thin pastures of the far-reaching veldt. The Russian government has had to contend with a like fluidity in her Cossack tribes of the steppes, who have been up and off when imperial authority became oppressive. In the summer of 1878 West Siberia lost about 9000 Kirghis, who left the province Semipalatinsk to seek Mongolia.

Constant movement keeps things simple. The Orochones, a nomadic Tunguse tribe from eastern Siberia, have no furniture in their tents and keep their limited clothes and tools neatly packed on sleds, ready to leave at a moment’s notice.1059 The only valuable possessions are those that can move with them, like flocks and herds. Beyond that, wealth is mostly in easily portable forms, preferably silver, gold, and jewels. This is how the riches of Abraham and Lot were measured in the Bible, alongside their herds. It's believable that the Israelites, traveling through the wilderness, had enough gold to create the golden calf, as it aligns with their pastoral lifestyle.1060 Furthermore, it makes sense that these enslaved descendants of Sheik Abraham, with their traditions of pastoral living, would easily break the fragile connections to the Nile soil they had recently formed, as it reflects their natural nomadic spirit. Similar situations can be seen in modern times. The Great Trek of the South African Boers in 1836, where they rejected not only their unwanted loyalty to England but also their land,1061 was another example of this instinct among pastoral people. They didn’t choose a complicated route; instead, they traveled with their families as they were accustomed to as cattle herders, took all their belongings with them, and headed for the sparse pastures of the vast veldt. The Russian government has also faced similar challenges with its Cossack tribes on the steppes, who have been quick to leave when imperial authority became oppressive. In the summer of 1878, West Siberia lost around 9,000 Kirghis, who left the Semipalatinsk province to seek refuge in Mongolia.

Seasonal migrations.

Environment determines the nomadic habits of the dweller of desert and steppe. The distribution of pasture and water fixes the scope and the rate of his wandering; these in turn depend upon geographic conditions and vary with the season. The Papago Indians of southern Arizona range with their cattle over a territory 100 by 150 miles in extent, and wander across the border into Mexico. When their main water supply, derived from wells or artificial reservoirs near their summer villages, is exhausted, they migrate to the water-holes, springs or streams in the cañons. There the cattle graze out on the plains and return to the cañons to drink.1062 Every Mongol tribe and clan has its seasonal migration. In winter the heavier precipitation and fuller streams enable them to collect in considerable groups in protected valleys; but the dry summer disperses them over the widest area possible, in order to utilize every water-hole and grass spot. The hotter regions of the plains are abandoned in summer for highlands, where the short period of warmth yields temporary pastures and where alone water can be found. The Kirghis of Russian Turkestan resort in summer to the slopes and high valleys of the Altai Mountains, where their auls or tent villages may be seen surrounded by big flocks of sheep, goats, camels, horses and cattle.1063 The Pamir in the warm months is the gathering place for the nomads of Central Asia. The naked desert of Arabia yields a rare herbage during the rainy season, when the Bedouin tribes resort to it for pasturage;1064 but during the succeeding drought they scatter to the hills of Yemen, Syria and Palestine,1065 or migrate to the valley of the Nile and Euphrates.1066 The Arabs of the northern Sahara, followed by small flocks of sheep and goats, vibrate between the summer pastures on the slopes of the Atlas Mountains and the scant, wiry grass tufts found in winter on the borders of the desert.1067 When the equatorial rains begin in June, the Arabs of the Atbara River follow them north-westward into the Nubian desert, and let their camel herds graze on the delicate grass which the moisture has conjured up from the sandy soil. The country about Cassala, which is flooded during the monsoon rains by the rivers from the Abyssinian Mountains, is reserved for the dry season.1068 In the same way the Tartar tribes of the Dnieper, Don, Volga and Ural Rivers in the thirteenth century moved down these rivers in winter to the sea coast, and in summer up-stream to the hills and mountains.1069 So for the past hundred years the Boers of the South African grasslands have migrated in their tent wagons from the higher to the lower pastures, according to the season of the year, invading even the Karroo Desert after the short summer rains.1070

The environment shapes the nomadic lifestyles of those living in deserts and steppes. The availability of pasture and water determines how far and how often they move; these factors depend on geographic conditions and change with the seasons. The Papago Indians in southern Arizona travel with their cattle across an area that measures 100 by 150 miles, even crossing into Mexico. When their primary water source, usually from wells or artificial reservoirs near their summer villages, runs out, they move to water holes, springs, or streams in the canyons. There, their cattle graze on the plains and return to the canyons to drink.1062 Each Mongol tribe and clan has its own seasonal migration. In winter, when there’s more precipitation and fuller streams, they gather in large groups in sheltered valleys; but during the dry summer, they spread out over the widest possible area to take advantage of every water hole and patch of grass. The hotter plains are abandoned in summer in favor of the highlands, where the brief warm period provides temporary pastures and water sources. The Kirghis of Russian Turkestan go to the slopes and high valleys of the Altai Mountains in summer, where their auls or tent villages are surrounded by large flocks of sheep, goats, camels, horses, and cattle.1063 The Pamir serves as a meeting point for the nomads of Central Asia during the warm months. The barren desert of Arabia produces limited grass during the rainy season, prompting the Bedouin tribes to use it for grazing;1064 but once the drought hits, they scatter to the hills of Yemen, Syria, and Palestine,1065 or migrate to the valley of the Nile and Euphrates.1066 The Arabs in the northern Sahara, accompanied by small flocks of sheep and goats, alternate between summer grazing on the slopes of the Atlas Mountains and the sparse, wiry grass tufts in the desert borders during winter.1067 When the equatorial rains start in June, the Arabs living along the Atbara River follow the rains northwest into the Nubian desert, allowing their camel herds to graze on the tender grass that the moisture has brought up from the sandy soil. The area around Cassala, which floods during the monsoon rains from the Abyssinian Mountains, is set aside for the dry season.1068 Similarly, the Tartar tribes along the Dnieper, Don, Volga, and Ural Rivers in the thirteenth century moved down these rivers to the coastline in winter and traveled upstream to the hills and mountains in summer.1069 For the past hundred years, the Boers of the South African grasslands have migrated in their tent wagons from higher to lower pastures based on the season, even moving into the Karroo Desert after the brief summer rains.1070

Marauding expeditions.

This systematic movement of nomads within their accepted boundaries leads, on slight provocation, to excursions beyond their own frontiers into neighboring territories. The growing herd alone necessitates the absorption of more land, more water-holes, because the grazed pastures renew their grass slowly under the prevailing conditions of drought. An area sufficient for the support of the tribe is inadequate for the sustenance of the herd, whose increase is a perennial expansive force. Soon the pastures become filled with the feeding flocks, and then herdsmen and herds spill over into other fields. Often a season of unusual drought, reducing the existing herbage which is scarcely adequate at best, gives rise to those irregular, temporary expansions which enlarge the geographical horizon of the horde, and eventuate in widespread conquest. Such incursions, like the seasonal movements of nomads, result from the helpless dependence of shepherd tribes upon variations of rainfall.

This organized movement of nomads within their set boundaries often leads to trips beyond their own borders into nearby lands with even the slightest provocation. The increasing herd requires more land and more watering holes because the grazed pastures take their time to recover under the ongoing drought conditions. An area that can support the tribe isn’t enough to feed the herd, which constantly grows and pushes outward. Before long, the pastures become overcrowded with grazing flocks, and herders and their animals spill into other fields. A particularly dry season can reduce the already limited vegetation, prompting those irregular, temporary expansions that stretch the territory of the group and can lead to extensive conquests. These invasions, much like the seasonal movements of nomads, stem from the constant vulnerability of herding tribes to changes in rainfall.

The nomad's basis of life is at best precarious. He and want are familiar friends. A pest among his herds, diminished pasturage, failing wells, all bring him face to face with famine, and drive him to robbery and pillage.1071 Marauding tendencies are ingrained in all dwellers of the deserts and steppes.1072 Since the days of Job, the Bedouins of Arabia have been a race of marauders; they have reduced robbery to a system. Predatory excursions figure conspicuously in the history of all the tribes. Robber is a title of honor.1073 Pliny said that the Arabs were equally addicted to theft and trade. They pillaged caravans and held them for ransom, or gave them safe conduct across the desert for a price. Formerly the Turkoman tribes of the Trans-Caspian steppes levied on the bordering districts, notably the northern part of Khorasan, which belonged more to the Turkomans, Yomut and Goklan tribes of the adjoining steppe than to the resident Persians. The border districts of Herat, Khiva, Merv and Bukhara used to suffer in the same way from the raids of the Tekkes, till the Russians checked the evil.1074 The Tekkes had depopulated whole districts, invaded Persian towns of considerable size, and carried off countless families into slavery. Both Turkomans and Kirghis tribes prior to 1873 raided caravans and carried off the travelers to the slave markets of Bukhara and Samarkand.1075 [See map page 103.]

The nomad's way of life is pretty unstable. He is very familiar with hunger. Pests among his herds, shrinking grazing land, and dry wells all force him to confront starvation and push him towards stealing and looting.1071 Raiding seems to be a natural trait for anyone living in the deserts and steppes.1072 Since the time of Job, the Bedouins of Arabia have been known as a band of raiders; they have turned stealing into an organized practice. Attacks are prominently featured in the histories of various tribes. Being a thief is seen as a mark of honor.1073 Pliny noted that the Arabs were just as likely to steal as they were to trade. They would rob caravans and hold them for ransom or provide safe passage through the desert for a fee. In the past, the Turkoman tribes from the Trans-Caspian steppes would raid nearby regions, especially the northern part of Khorasan, which belonged more to the Turkomans, Yomut, and Goklan tribes of the adjacent steppe than to the local Persians. The border areas of Herat, Khiva, Merv, and Bukhara also used to be heavily affected by raids from the Tekkes until the Russians put a stop to it.1074 The Tekkes depopulated entire regions, invaded fairly large Persian towns, and took countless families into slavery. Both the Turkomans and Kirghis tribes prior to 1873 would raid caravans and sell captured travelers into slavery at the markets in Bukhara and Samarkand.1075 [See map page 103.]

Among these tribes no young man commanded respect in his community till he had participated in a baranta or cattle-raising.1076 For centuries the nomadic hordes of the Russian steppes systematically pillaged the peaceful agricultural Slavs, who were threatening to encroach upon their pasture lands. The sudden, swift descent and swift retreat of the mounted marauders with the booty into the pathless grasslands, whither pursuit was dangerous, their tendency to rob and conquer but never to colonize, involved Russia in a long struggle, which ceased only with the extension of Muscovite dominion over the steppes.1077

Among these tribes, no young man gained respect in his community until he had taken part in a baranta or cattle-raising.1076 For centuries, the nomadic groups of the Russian steppes repeatedly raided the peaceful agricultural Slavs, who were threatening to encroach on their grazing lands. The sudden, quick attacks and fast retreats of the mounted raiders with their plunder into the vast grasslands, where pursuing them was risky, along with their habit of stealing and conquering but never settling, led Russia into a long conflict, which only ended with the expansion of Muscovite control over the steppes.1077

Depredation and conquests of African nomads.

All the Saharan tribes are marauders, whether Arabs, Berber Tuaregs, or Negroid Tibbus. The desert has made them so. The Tuaregs are chronic freebooters; they keep the Sahara and especially the caravan routes in constant insecurity. They stretch a cordon across these routes from Ghadames and Ghat in the east to the great oases of Insalah and Twat in the west; and from the oases and hills forming their headquarters they spread for pasturage and blackmail over the desert.1078 They exact toll over and over again from a caravan, provide it with a military escort of their own tribesmen, and then pillage it on the way.1079 This has been the experience of Barth1080 and other explorers. Caravans have not been their only prey. The agricultural peoples in the Niger flood-plain, the commerce on the river, and the markets of Timbuctoo long suffered from the raids of the Tuaregs of the Sahara. They collected tribute in the form of grain, salt, garments, horses and gold, typical needs of a desert people, imposed tolls on caravans and on merchant fleets passing down the Niger to Timbuctoo. In 1770 they began to move from the desert and appropriate the fertile plains in the northern part of the Niger Valley, and in 1800 they conquered Timbuctoo; but soon they had to yield to another tribe of pastoral nomads, the Fulbes from the Senegal, who in 1813 established a short-lived but well organized empire on the ruins of the Tuareg dominion.1081 [See map page 105.] The other agricultural states of the Sudan have had the same experience. The Tibbus, predatory nomads of the French Sahara just north of Lake Chad and the River Yo, mounted on camels and ponies, cross the shrunken river in the dry season and raid Bornu for cattle, carry off women and children to sell as slaves, pillage the weekly markets on the Yo, and plunder caravans of pilgrims moving eastward to Mecca.1082 Nowhere can desert nomads and the civilized peoples of agricultural plains dwell side by side in peace. Raids, encroachments, reprisals, finally conquest from one side or the other is the formula for their history. [See map page 487.]

All the tribes in the Sahara are raiders, whether they are Arabs, Berber Tuaregs, or Negroid Tibbus. The desert has shaped them this way. The Tuaregs are notorious for being constant plunderers; they keep the Sahara, especially the caravan routes, in a state of perpetual danger. They set up a barrier along these routes from Ghadames and Ghat in the east to the large oases of Insalah and Twat in the west; from these oases and hills that serve as their base, they venture out to graze their animals and extort from travelers across the desert. They repeatedly demand fees from caravans, offer them a military escort made up of their own tribesmen, and then rob them along the way. This has been the experience of Barth and other explorers. Caravans haven’t been their only targets. The farming communities in the Niger floodplain, the trade along the river, and the markets of Timbuktu have long been victims of the raids conducted by the Saharan Tuaregs. They collected taxes in the form of grain, salt, clothing, horses, and gold, which are the typical needs of desert people, and imposed fees on caravans and merchant fleets traveling down the Niger River to Timbuktu. In 1770, they began to move out of the desert and take over the fertile lands in the northern part of the Niger Valley, and by 1800 they had conquered Timbuktu; however, they soon had to give way to another tribe of nomadic herders, the Fulbes from Senegal, who established a short-lived but well-organized empire in 1813 on the ruins of Tuareg rule. The other agricultural states of the Sudan have faced similar challenges. The Tibbus, predatory nomads of the French Sahara just north of Lake Chad and the River Yo, riding on camels and ponies, cross the dwindling river in dry seasons to raid Bornu for cattle, capture women and children for sale as slaves, disrupt weekly markets along the Yo, and plunder caravans of pilgrims heading east to Mecca. Nowhere can desert nomads and settled agricultural communities coexist peacefully. Raids, territorial encroachments, retaliation, and ultimately conquest from one side or the other underscore their historical interactions. [See map page 105.] [See map page 487.]

Forms of defense against nomad depredations.

The raided territory, if a modern civilized state, organizes its border communities into a native mounted police, as the English have done in Bornu, Sokoto and the Egyptian Sudan, and as the Russians did with their Cossack riders along the successive frontiers of Muscovite advance into the steppes; or it takes into its employ, as we have seen, the nearest nomad tribes to repress or punish every hostile movement beyond. Among the ancient states the method was generally different. Since the nomad invaders came with their flocks and herds, a barrier often sufficed to block their progress. For this purpose Sesostris built the long wall of 1500 stadia from Pelusium to Heliopolis as a barricade against the Arabians.1083 Ancient Carthage constructed a ditch to check the depredations of the nomads of Numidia.1084 The early kings of Assyria built a barrier across the plains of the Euphrates above Babylon to secure their dominion from the incursions of the desert Medes.1085 In the fifth century of our era, the "Red Wall" was constructed near the northern frontier of Persia as a bulwark against the Huns. It stretched for a hundred and fifty miles from the Caspian Sea at the ancient port of Aboskun eastward to the mountains, and thus enclosed the populous valley of the Gurgen River.1086 In remote ages the neck of the Crimean Peninsula was fortified by a wall against the irruptions of the Tauro-Scythians.1087 The Russians early in their national history used the same means of defense against Tartar incursions. One wall was built from Pensa on the Sura River to Simbirsk on the Volga, just south of Kazan; another, further strengthened by a foss and palisades, extended from the fortress of Tsaritzin at the southern elbow of the Volga across the fifty-mile interval to the Don, and was still defended in 1794 by the Cossacks of the Don against the neighboring Kirghis hordes.1088 The classic example of such fortifications against pastoral nomads, however, is the Great Wall of China.

The invaded territory, if it were a modern civilized nation, would organize its border communities into a local mounted police, as the English did in Bornu, Sokoto, and Egyptian Sudan, and as the Russians did with their Cossack riders along the frontiers as they expanded into the steppes; or it would hire the closest nomadic tribes to suppress or punish any hostile movements beyond. In ancient states, the approach was often different. Since the nomadic invaders arrived with their flocks and herds, a barrier was usually enough to block their advance. For this reason, Sesostris built the long wall of 1500 stadia from Pelusium to Heliopolis as a barricade against the Arabians.1083 Ancient Carthage created a ditch to deter the raids of the Numidian nomads.1084 The early kings of Assyria constructed a barrier across the plains of the Euphrates above Babylon to protect their territory from the desert Medes' incursions.1085 In the fifth century AD, the "Red Wall" was built near the northern frontier of Persia as a defense against the Huns. It spanned a hundred and fifty miles from the Caspian Sea at the ancient port of Aboskun eastward to the mountains, effectively enclosing the populous valley of the Gurgen River.1086 In ancient times, the neck of the Crimean Peninsula was reinforced with a wall against the incursions of the Tauro-Scythians.1087 The Russians, early in their national history, used the same defensive strategy against Tartar invasions. One wall was constructed from Pensa on the Sura River to Simbirsk on the Volga, just south of Kazan; another, further fortified by a ditch and palisades, extended from the fortress of Tsaritzin at the southern bend of the Volga across the fifty-mile gap to the Don, and was still defended in 1794 by the Cossacks of the Don against the nearby Kirghis hordes.1088 The classic example of such fortifications against pastoral nomads, however, is the Great Wall of China.

Pastoral life as a training for soldiers.

The nomad is economically a herdsman, politically a conqueror, and chronically a fighter. Strife over pasturage and wells meets us in the typical history of Abraham, Lot and Isaac;1089 it exists within and without the clan. The necessity of guarding the pastures, which are only intermittently occupied, involves a persistent military organization. The nation is a quiescent army, the army a mobilized nation.1090 It carries with it a self-transporting commissariat in its flocks and herds. Constant practice in riding, scouting and the use of arms, physical endurance tested by centuries of exertion and hardship, make every nomad a soldier. Cavalry and camel corps add to the swiftness and vigor of their onslaught, make their military strategy that of sudden attack and swifter retreat, to be met only by wariness and extreme mobility. The ancient Scythians of the lower Danubian steppes were all horse archers, like the Parthians. "If the Scythians were united, there is no nation which could compare with them or would be capable of resisting them; I do not say in Europe, but even in Asia," said Thucydides.1091 In this opinion Herodotus concurred.1092 The nomad's whole existence breeds courage. The independent, hazardous life of the desert makes the Arab the bravest of mankind, but the settled, agricultural Arab of Egypt and Mohammedan Spain lost most of his fighting qualities.1093

The nomad is primarily a herdsman in terms of economy, a conqueror in politics, and a constant fighter. Conflicts over grazing land and water sources are central to the stories of Abraham, Lot, and Isaac;1089 and these struggles happen both within and outside the tribe. The need to protect pasturelands, which are only occasionally used, requires a continuous military setup. The nation functions as a peaceful army, while the army is a nation on standby.1090 It carries a self-sustaining supply system through its livestock. Regular training in riding, scouting, and weaponry, along with physical endurance built over centuries of challenges, turn every nomad into a soldier. Cavalry and camel units enhance their speed and strength, enabling military tactics characterized by sudden strikes and quick retreats, which require opponents to be cautious and extremely agile. The ancient Scythians of the lower Danube region were all mounted archers, similar to the Parthians. "If the Scythians were united, there isn't a nation that could compare to them or would be able to resist them; I'm not just talking about Europe, but even Asia," said Thucydides.1091 Herodotus agreed with this view.1092 The nomadic lifestyle fosters bravery. The independent, risky life in the desert makes Arabs some of the bravest people, but the settled, farming Arabs of Egypt and Muslim Spain have lost most of their fighting spirit.1093

Military organization of nomads.

The daily life of a nomad horde is a training school for military organization. In the evening the flocks and herds are distributed with system around the camp to prevent confusion. The difficult art of a well ordered march, of making and breaking camp, and of foraging is practiced almost daily in their constant migrations.1094 The usual order of the Bedouin march could scarcely be surpassed by an army. In advance of the caravan moves a body of armed horsemen, five or seven kilometers ahead; then follows the main body of the tribesmen mounted on horses and camels, then the female camels, and after these the beasts of burden with the women and children. The encampment of tents with the places for men, arms and herds is also carefully regulated. More than this, the horde is organized into companies with their superior and subordinate leaders.1095 John de Carpini describes Genghis Khan's military organization of his vast Tartar horde by tens, hundreds and thousands, his absolute dominion over his conquered subjects, and prompt absorption of them into his fighting force, by the compulsory enlistment of soldiers out of every freshly subjugated nation.1096 In the same way the Hebrew tribes, when preparing for the conquest of Canaan, adopted from the desert Midianites the organization of the horde into tens, hundreds and thousands under judges, who were also military leaders in time of war.

The everyday life of a nomadic group serves as a training ground for military organization. In the evening, the flocks and herds are systematically arranged around the camp to avoid chaos. The challenging skills of maintaining a well-ordered march, setting up and breaking down camp, and foraging are practiced almost daily during their continuous migrations.1094 The typical order of the Bedouin march is nearly unparalleled by any army. Ahead of the caravan, there’s a unit of armed horsemen, five or seven kilometers in front; then comes the main group of tribespeople riding on horses and camels, followed by female camels and then the pack animals carrying the women and children. The arrangement of tents, including designated areas for men, weapons, and herds, is also carefully organized. Additionally, the group is divided into companies with their leaders at various levels.1095 John de Carpini describes Genghis Khan's military structure for his vast Tartar horde, organized into tens, hundreds, and thousands, along with his complete control over his conquered subjects and the swift incorporation of them into his military force, which included the compulsory enlistment of soldiers from each newly subjugated nation.1096 Similarly, the Hebrew tribes, when getting ready to conquer Canaan, borrowed the organizational structure of the nomadic Midianites, grouping into tens, hundreds, and thousands under judges who also served as military leaders during wartime.

Capacity for conquest and political consolidation.

Thus certain geographic conditions produce directly the habitual and systematic migration of the nomads, and through this indirectly that military and political organization which has given the shepherd races of the earth their great historical mission of political consolidation. Agriculture, though underlying all permanent advance in civilization, is handicapped by the lack of courage, mobility, enterprise and large political outlook characterizing early tillers of the soil. All these qualities the nomad possesses. Hence the union of these two elements, imperious pastor superimposed upon peaceful tiller, has made the only stable governments among savage and semi-civilized races.1097 The politically invertebrate peoples of dark Africa have secured the back-bone to erect states only from nomad conquerors. The history of the Sudan cannot be understood apart from a knowledge of the Sahara and its peoples. All the Sudanese states were formed by invaders from the northern desert, Hamitic or Semitic. [See map page 487.] The Galla or Wahuma herdsmen of East Africa founded and maintained the relatively stable states of Uganda, Kittara, Karague, and Uzinza in the equatorial district; the conquerors remained herders while they lorded it over the agricultural aborigines.1098 In prehistoric times when the various peoples of the Aryan linguistic family were spreading over Europe and southern Asia, the superiority of the shepherd races must have been especially marked, because in that era only the unobstructed surface of the steppes permitted the concentration of men on a vast scale for migration and conquest. Everywhere else regions of broken relief and dense forests harbored small, isolated peoples, to whom both the idea and the technique of combined movement were foreign.

Certain geographic conditions lead to the regular and systematic movement of nomads, which indirectly influences the military and political organization that has given the shepherd cultures of the world their significant historical role in political unification. While agriculture forms the foundation for lasting advancements in civilization, it is limited by the hesitation, lack of mobility, resourcefulness, and broader political perspective typically found in early farmers. The nomads possess all these traits. As a result, the combination of these two elements—assertive herders alongside peaceful farmers—has established the only stable governments among primitive and semi-civilized societies. The politically weak peoples of dark Africa have relied on nomadic conquerors to develop the framework for states. Understanding the history of the Sudan requires knowledge of the Sahara and its inhabitants. All Sudanese states were formed by invaders from the northern desert, either Hamitic or Semitic. [See map page 487.] The Galla or Wahuma herders in East Africa established and sustained the relatively stable states of Uganda, Kittara, Karague, and Uzinza in the equatorial region; the conquerors continued to be herders even while dominating the agricultural natives. In prehistoric times, as the various peoples of the Aryan linguistic family spread across Europe and southern Asia, the superiority of the shepherd cultures must have been particularly apparent because only the open terrain of the steppes allowed for large-scale migration and conquest. In contrast, other regions with rugged terrain and dense forests sheltered small, isolated communities that were unfamiliar with both the idea and the practice of coordinated movement.

Scope of nomad conquests.

The rapidity and wide scope of such conquests is explained largely by the fact that nomads try to displace only the ruling classes in the subjugated territory, leaving the mass of the population practically undisturbed. Thus they spread themselves thin over a wide area. How lasting are the results of such conquests depends upon the degree of social evolution attained by the herdsmen. Genghis Khan and Tamerlane, after the manner of overlords, organized their conquered nations, but left them under the control of local princes,1099 while their tribute gatherers annually swept the country like typical nomad marauders. The Turks are still only encamped in Europe. They too make taxation despoliation. And though their dominion has produced no assimilation between victor and vanquished, it has given political consolidation to a large area occupied by varied peoples. The Hyksos conquest of Egypt found the Nile Valley divided into several petty principalities under a nominal king. The nomad conquerors possessed political capacity and gave to Egypt a strong, centralized government, which laid the basis for the power and glory of the Eighteenth Dynasty. The Tartars in 1279 A.D. and the Manchus in 1664 conquered China, extended its boundaries, governed the country as a ruling class, and left the established order of things undisturbed. The Saracen conquest of North Africa and Spain showed for a time organization and a permanence due to the advanced cultural status of the sedentary Arabs drawn into the movement by religious enthusiasm. The environment of Spain tended to conserve the knowledge of agriculture, industry, architecture, and science which they brought in and which might have cemented Spaniard and Moor, had it not been for the intense religious antagonism existing between the two races.

The speed and broad extent of these conquests can be largely attributed to the fact that nomads typically aim to replace just the ruling classes in the conquered areas, leaving the majority of the population largely untouched. This allows them to spread out over a wide territory. How lasting these conquests are depends on the level of social development achieved by the herders. Genghis Khan and Tamerlane, behaving like overlords, organized the nations they conquered but kept them under the rule of local leaders,1099 form while their tax collectors roamed the land like typical nomadic raiders. The Turks still only maintain a presence in Europe, where they also treat taxation as plundering. Although their rule has not led to any mixing between the conquerors and the conquered, it has created political unity in a large area filled with diverse populations. The Hyksos conquest of Egypt found the Nile Valley split into several small principalities under a nominal king. The nomadic conquerors had political skills and established a strong, centralized government in Egypt, laying the groundwork for the power and glory of the Eighteenth Dynasty. The Tartars in 1279 A.D. and the Manchus in 1664 conquered China, expanded its borders, ruled as a governing class, and kept the established order intact. The Saracen conquest of North Africa and Spain initially showed organization and permanence due to the advanced cultural status of the sedentary Arabs who joined the movement out of religious zeal. The environment of Spain helped preserve the knowledge of agriculture, industry, architecture, and science they brought with them, which could have united Spaniards and Moors had it not been for the deep religious conflict between the two groups.

The history of nomad conquerors shows that they become weakened by the enervating climate and the effeminating luxury of the moist and fertile lowlands. They lose eventually their warlike spirit, like the Fellatah or Fulbe founders of the Sudanese states,1100 and are either displaced from their insecure thrones by other conquerors sprung from the same nomad-breeding steppe, as the Aryan princes of India by the Mongol Emperor, and the Saracen invaders of Mesopotamia by the victorious Turkomans; or they are expelled in time by their conquered subjects, as the Tartars were from Russia, the Moors from Spain, and the Turks from the Danube Valley.

The history of nomadic conquerors shows that they become weakened by the draining climate and the indulgent luxury of the moist and fertile lowlands. They eventually lose their fighting spirit, like the Fellatah or Fulbe founders of the Sudanese states,1100 and are either overthrown from their unstable thrones by other conquerors who come from the same nomadic-breeding steppe, like the Aryan princes of India by the Mongol Emperor, and the Saracen invaders of Mesopotamia by the victorious Turkomen; or they are eventually driven out by their conquered subjects, as the Tartars were from Russia, the Moors from Spain, and the Turks from the Danube Valley.

Centralization versus decentralization in nomadism.

Nomad hordes unite for concerted action to resist encroachment upon their pastures, or for marauding expeditions, or for widespread conquest; but such unions are from their nature temporary, though a career of conquest may be sustained for decades. The geographically determined mobility which facilitates such concentration favors also dispersal, decentralization. This is the paradox in nomadism. Geographic conditions in arid lands necessitate sparse distribution of population and of herds. Pastoral life requires large spaces and small social groups. When Abraham and Lot went to Canaan from Egypt, "the land was not able to bear them that they might dwell together, for their substance was great." Strife for the pasturage ensued between their respective herdsmen, so the two sheiks separated, Lot taking the plains of Jordan and Abraham the hill pastures of Hebron. Jacob and Esau separated for the same reason. The encampment of the Kirghis shepherds rarely averages over five or six tents, except on the best grazing grounds at the best season of the year. The flow of spring, well or stream also helps to regulate their size. The groups of Mongol yurts or felt tents along the piedmont margin of the Gobi vary from four tents to a large encampment, according to water and grass.1101 Prevalsky mentions a population of 70 families or 300 souls in the Lob Nor district distributed in 11 villages, or less than 28 in each group.1102 Barth noticed the smallness of all the oasis towns of the Sahara, even those occupying favorable locations for trade on the caravan routes.1103

Nomadic groups come together for joint efforts to defend their grazing lands, for raiding missions, or for large-scale conquests; however, these alliances are inherently temporary, although a period of conquest can last for many years. The geographic mobility that allows for this concentration also supports scattering and decentralization. This is the paradox of nomadism. The geographical conditions in dry areas require a sparse distribution of both population and livestock. A pastoral lifestyle needs wide spaces and small social groups. When Abraham and Lot traveled to Canaan from Egypt, "the land was not able to bear them that they might dwell together, for their substance was great." Conflict over grazing rights arose between their herdsmen, leading to the two leaders parting ways, with Lot taking the Jordan plains and Abraham choosing the hill pastures of Hebron. Jacob and Esau also separated for the same reason. The encampment of the Kirghis shepherds usually has no more than five or six tents, except in prime grazing areas during the best season. The availability of spring water, wells, or streams also influences their size. The groups of Mongol yurts or felt tents along the foothills of the Gobi range from four tents to larger encampments, depending on water and grass availability.1101 Prevalsky notes a population of 70 families or 300 individuals in the Lob Nor district spread across 11 villages, which is less than 28 in each group.1102 Barth observed the small size of all the oasis towns in the Sahara, even those in advantageous locations for trade along caravan routes.1103

Spirit of independence among nomads.

The nature-made necessity of scattering in small groups to seek pasturage induces in the nomad a spirit of independence. The Bedouin is personally free. The power of the sheik is only nominal,1104 and depends much upon his personal qualities. The gift of eloquence among the ancient Arabs has been attributed to the necessity of persuading a people to whom restraint was irksome.1105 Political organization is conspicuously lacking among the Tibbus of the Sahara1106 and the Turkoman tribes of the Trans-Caspian steppes. "We are a people without a head," they say. The title of sheik is an empty one. Custom and usage are their rulers.1107 Though the temporary union of nomadic tribes forms an effective army, the union is short-lived. Groups form, dissolve and re-form, with little inner cohesion. The Boers in South African grasslands showed the same development. The government of the Dutch East India Company in Cape Colony found it difficult to control the wandering cattlemen of the interior plateau. They loved independence and isolation; their dissociative instincts, bred by the lonely life of the thin-pastured veldt, were overcome only by the necessity of defense against the Bushmen. Then they organized themselves into commandos and sallied out on punitive expeditions, like the Cossack tribes of the Don against marauding Tartars. Scattered over wide tracts of pasture land, they were exempt from the control of either Dutch or English authority; but when an energetic administration pursued them into their widespread ranches, they eluded control by trekking.1108 Here was the independent spirit of the steppe, reinforced by the spirit of the frontier.

The natural need to break into small groups for grazing leads nomads to develop a sense of independence. The Bedouin are personally free. The sheik's authority is mostly symbolic, and it largely relies on his personal qualities. The ancient Arabs' talent for persuasive speech is thought to have come from the need to convince a people who found restraint uncomfortable. Political structure is noticeably absent among the Tibbus of the Sahara and the Turkoman tribes of the Trans-Caspian steppes. "We are a people without a leader," they say. The title of sheik is meaningless. Tradition and custom are their true rulers. While the temporary alliance of nomadic tribes creates a powerful army, these unions are short-lived. Groups form, break apart, and reassemble with little internal unity. The Boers in South African grasslands exhibited a similar pattern. The Dutch East India Company struggled to govern the wandering cattlemen of the interior plateau. They valued their independence and solitude; their instinct to separate, shaped by the solitary life in the sparse veldt, was only challenged by the need for defense against the Bushmen. They then organized into commandos and launched punitive campaigns, similar to the Cossack tribes of the Don against raiding Tartars. Spread out across vast pasturelands, they avoided control from either Dutch or English authorities; but when a determined administration chased them into their expansive ranches, they escaped by moving to new areas. Here lay the independent spirit of the steppe, strengthened by the frontier mentality.

Resistance to conquest.

Though the desert and steppe have bred conquerors, they are the last parts of the earth's surface to yield to conquest from without. The untameable spirit of freedom in the shepherd tribes finds an ally against aggression in the trackless sands, meager water and food supply of their wilderness. Pursuit of the retreating tribesmen is dangerous and often futile. They need only to burn off the pasture and fill up or pollute the water-holes to cripple the transportation and commissariat of the invading army. This is the way the Damaras have fought the German subjugation of Southwest Africa.1109 Moreover, the paucity of economic and political possibilities in deserts and grasslands discourages conquest. Conquest pays only where it is a police measure to check depredations on the bordering agricultural lands, or where such barren areas are transit lands to a desirable territory beyond. It is chiefly the "Gates of Herat" and the lure of India which have drawn Russian dominion across the scorched plains of Turkestan. France has assumed the big task of controlling the Sahara to secure a safe passway between French Tunisia and the rich Niger basin of the French Sudan. The recent British-Egyptian expansion southward across the Nubian steppes had for its objective the better watered districts of the upper Nile above Khartum. This desert advance is essentially a latter day phenomenon, the outcome of modern territorial standards; it is attended or secured by the railroad. To this fact the projected Trans-Saharan line is the strongest witness.

Though deserts and steppes have produced conquerors, they are the last places on Earth to submit to outside conquest. The untamed spirit of freedom in the shepherd tribes finds support against aggression in the vast sands and limited water and food resources of their land. Chasing after the retreating tribes is risky and often pointless. They only need to burn the grasslands and fill or contaminate the waterholes to cripple the transportation and supply lines of the invading army. This is how the Damaras resisted the German takeover in Southwest Africa.1109 Furthermore, the lack of economic and political opportunities in deserts and grasslands makes conquest less appealing. Conquest is only worthwhile when it serves as a police action to curb raids on nearby farmland or when these barren areas act as passageways to more desirable lands beyond. It’s mainly the "Gates of Herat" and the allure of India that have drawn Russian influence across the scorched plains of Turkestan. France has taken on the significant task of controlling the Sahara to ensure a safe route between French Tunisia and the affluent Niger basin of French Sudan. The recent British-Egyptian expansion southward across the Nubian steppes aimed at the better-watered regions of the upper Nile above Khartum. This desert push is primarily a modern development, a result of current territorial standards; it is supported or enabled by the railroad. The proposed Trans-Saharan line is the strongest evidence of this.

Nature everywhere postpones, obstructs, jeopardizes the political conquest of arid lands. The unstable, fanatical tribesmen of the Egyptian Sudan, temporarily but effectively united under the Mahdi, made it necessary for Kitchener to do again in 1898 the work of subjugation which Gordon had done thirty years before. The body of the Arabian people is still free. The Turkish sovereignty over them to-day is nominal, rather an alliance with a people whom it is dangerous to provoke and difficult to attack. Only the coast provinces of Hejaz, Yemen and Hasa are subject to Turkey, while the tribes of the interior and of the southeastern seaboard are wholly independent.1110 The Turkoman tribes of Trans-Caspia have been subordinated to Russia largely by a process of extermination.1111 China is satisfied with a nominal dominion over the roaming populations of Mongolia and Chinese Turkestan. The French pacification and control of Northwest Africa meets a peculiar problem, due to the extreme restlessness and restiveness of the dominant Arab race. The whole population is unstable as water; a disturbance or movement in one tribe is soon communicated to the whole mass.1112

Nature consistently delays, hinders, and threatens the political domination of dry lands. The unpredictable, fanatical tribesmen of the Egyptian Sudan, briefly but effectively united under the Mahdi, forced Kitchener to carry out once again in 1898 the subjugation that Gordon had managed thirty years earlier. The Arabian people are still free. Today's Turkish sovereignty over them is merely nominal, more of a partnership with a group that is both dangerous to provoke and challenging to confront. Only the coastal provinces of Hejaz, Yemen, and Hasa are under Turkey's control, while the tribes in the interior and along the southeastern coast are completely independent.1110 The Turkoman tribes of Trans-Caspia have been brought under Russian control largely through a process of extermination.1111 China is content with a nominal dominance over the nomadic populations of Mongolia and Chinese Turkestan. The French efforts to establish peace and control in Northwest Africa face a unique challenge due to the extreme restlessness and agitation of the dominant Arab population. The entire population is as unstable as water; any disturbance or movement in one tribe quickly spreads to the entire group.1112

Curtailment of nomadism.

The steppe or desert policy for the curtailment of nomadism, and the reclamation of both land and people is to encourage or enforce sedentary life. The French, to settle the wandering tribes on the Atlas border of the Sahara, have opened a vast number of artesian wells through the agency of skillful engineers, and thus created oases in which the fecund sands support abundant date-palm groves.1113 The method pursued energetically by the Russians is to compress the tribes into ever narrowing limits of territory, taking away their area of plunder and then so restricting their pasture lands, that they are forced to the drudgery of irrigation and tillage. In this way the Yomuts and Goklans occupying the Caspian border of Trans-Caspia have been compelled to abandon their old marauding, nomadic life and become to some extent agriculturists.1114 The method of the Chinese is to push forward the frontier of agricultural settlement into the grasslands, dislodging the shepherd tribes into poorer pastures. They have thus reclaimed for grain and poppy fields considerable parts of the Ordos country in the great northern bend of the Hoangho, which used to be a nursery for nomadic invaders. A similar substitution of agriculture for pastoral nomadism of another type has in recent decades taken place in the semi-arid plains of the American West. Sheep-grazing on open range was with difficulty dislodged from the San Joaquin Valley of California by expanding farms in the sixties. More recently "dry farming" and scientific agriculture adapted to semi-arid conditions have "pushed the desert off the map" in Kansas, and advanced the frontier of tillage across the previous domain of natural pastures to the western border of the state.

The steppe or desert strategy to reduce nomadism and reclaim both land and people focuses on promoting or enforcing settled living. The French have drilled numerous artesian wells along the Atlas border of the Sahara to settle wandering tribes, creating oases where fertile sands support lush date-palm groves.1113 The Russians actively push tribes into smaller and smaller areas, taking away their lands for raiding and restricting their grazing grounds, forcing them into the hard work of irrigation and farming. As a result, the Yomuts and Goklans around the Caspian border of Trans-Caspia have had to give up their old raiding, nomadic lifestyle and become, to some extent, farmers.1114 The Chinese approach involves advancing agricultural settlement into the grasslands, pushing shepherd tribes into less fertile pastures. They have transformed significant parts of the Ordos region in the great northern bend of the Hoangho, which used to be a hotbed for nomadic invaders, into fields for grain and poppies. A similar shift from pastoral nomadism to agriculture has occurred in the semi-arid plains of the American West in recent decades. Sheep-grazing on open range was gradually driven out of California's San Joaquin Valley by expanding farms in the sixties. More recently, "dry farming" and scientific agriculture suited to semi-arid conditions have "pushed the desert off the map" in Kansas, extending the farming frontier into what was once natural pasture land up to the western border of the state.

Pastoral nomadism has been gradually dislodged from Europe, except in the salt steppes of the Caspian depression, where a vast tract, 300,000 square miles in area and wholly unfit for agriculture, still harbors a sparse population of Asiatic Kalmuck and Kirghis hordes, leading the life of the Asiatic steppes.1115 In Asia, too, the regions of pastoral nomadism have been curtailed, but in Africa they still maintain for the most part the growing, expanding geographical forms which they once showed in Europe, when nomadism prevailed as far as the Alps and the Rhine. In Africa shepherd tribes cover not only the natural grasslands, but lap over into many districts destined by nature for agriculture. Hence it is safe to predict that a conspicuous part of the future economic and cultural history of the Dark Continent will consist in the release of agricultural regions from nomad occupancy and dominion.

Pastoral nomadism has gradually disappeared from Europe, except in the salt steppes of the Caspian depression, where a vast area of 300,000 square miles, completely unsuitable for farming, still supports a sparse population of Asiatic Kalmuck and Kirghis groups, who live the traditional life of the Asiatic steppes.1115 In Asia, the areas of pastoral nomadism have also diminished, but in Africa, they largely maintain the growing, expanding geographical forms that were once seen in Europe, where nomadism extended as far as the Alps and the Rhine. In Africa, shepherd tribes inhabit not only the natural grasslands but also encroach into many areas that are naturally suited for agriculture. Therefore, it is reasonable to predict that a significant part of the future economic and cultural history of the Dark Continent will involve the transition of agricultural regions from nomadic control and influence.

Supplementary agriculture of pastoral nomads.

Though agriculture is regarded with contempt and aversion by pastoral nomads and is resorted to for a livelihood only when they lose their herds by a pest or robbery, or find their pasture lands seriously curtailed, nevertheless nomadism yields such a precarious and monotonous subsistence that it is not infrequently combined with a primitive, shifting tillage. The Kalmucks of the Russian steppes employ men to harvest hay for the winter feeding. The Nogai Tartars practice a little haphazard tillage on the alluvial hem of the steppe streams.1116 Certain Arab tribes living east of the Atbara and Gash Rivers resort with their herds during the dry season to the fruitful region of Cassala, which is inundated by the drainage streams from Abyssinia, and there they cultivate dourra and other grains.1117 The Bechuana tribes inhabiting the rich, streamless grassland of the so-called Kalahari Desert rear small herds of goats and cultivate melons and pumpkins; among the other Bechuana tribes on the eastern margin of the desert, the men hunt, herd the cattle and milk the cows, while the women raise dourra, maize, pumpkins, melons, cucumbers and beans.1118 [Compare maps pages 105, 487.]

Although farming is looked down upon and disliked by pastoral nomads and is only used for a living when they lose their herds due to disease or theft or when their grazing lands become severely limited, nomadism still provides a risky and monotonous way of living that often leads to some basic, temporary farming. The Kalmucks in the Russian steppes hire workers to cut hay for winter feed. The Nogai Tartars do a bit of random farming along the fertile edges of the steppe rivers. Certain Arab tribes living east of the Atbara and Gash Rivers move with their herds to the productive area of Cassala during the dry season, which is fed by streams from Abyssinia, and they grow dourra and other grains there. The Bechuana tribes living in the rich, waterless grasslands of the so-called Kalahari Desert keep small herds of goats and grow melons and pumpkins; among other Bechuana tribes on the eastern edge of the desert, men hunt, take care of the cattle, and milk the cows, while women grow dourra, maize, pumpkins, melons, cucumbers, and beans. [Compare maps pages 105, 487.]

Such supplementary agriculture usually shifts with the nomad group. But where high mountains border rainless tracts, their piedmont districts regularly develop permanent cultivation. Here periodic rains or melting snows on the ranges fill the drainage streams, whose inundation often converts their alluvial banks into ready-made fields. The reliability of the water supply anchors here the winter villages of the nomads, which become centers of a limited agriculture, while the pasture lands beyond the irrigated strips support his flocks and herds. Where the piedmont of the Kuen Lun Mountains draws a zone of vegetation around the southern rim of the Takla Makan Desert, Mongol shepherds raise some wheat, maize and melons as an adjunct to their cattle and sheep; but their tillage is often rendered intermittent by the salinity of the irrigating streams.1119 Along the base of the Tian Shan Mountains, the felt yurt of the Gobi nomad gives place to Turki houses with wheat and rice fields, and orchards of various fruits; so that the whole piedmont highway from Hami to Yarkand presents an alternation of desert and oasis settlement.1120 Even the heart of arid Arabia shows fertile oases under cultivation where the lofty Nejd Plateau, with its rain-gathering peaks over five thousand feet high, varies its wide pastures with well tilled valleys abounding in grain fields and date-palm groves.1121 Along the whole Saharan slope of the Atlas piedmont a series of parallel wadis and, farther out in the desert, a zone of artesian wells, sunk to the underground bed of hidden drainage streams from the same range, form oases which are the seat of permanent agriculture and more or less settled populations. The Saharan highlands of Tibesti, whose mountains rise to 8,300 feet, condense a little rain and permit the Tibbus to raise some grain and dates in the narrow valleys.1122

Such supplementary agriculture usually moves with the nomad group. However, where high mountains border dry areas, their foothill regions often develop permanent farming. Here, periodic rains or melting snow from the mountains fill the streams, which can sometimes flood their alluvial banks, turning them into ready-made fields. The reliability of the water supply allows winter villages of the nomads to settle, becoming centers of limited agriculture, while the pasture lands beyond the irrigated areas support their flocks and herds. In the foothills of the Kuen Lun Mountains, a strip of vegetation grows around the southern edge of the Takla Makan Desert, where Mongol shepherds cultivate some wheat, corn, and melons alongside their cattle and sheep; however, their farming is often inconsistent due to the salinity of the irrigation streams.1119 Along the base of the Tian Shan Mountains, the felt tents of the Gobi nomads are replaced by Turki houses with fields of wheat and rice, and orchards of various fruits; thus, the entire road from Hami to Yarkand alternates between desert and oasis settlements.1120 Even in the heart of dry Arabia, there are fertile oases under cultivation where the high Nejd Plateau, with its rain-catching peaks over five thousand feet, has extensive pastures and well-tended valleys filled with grain fields and date-palm groves.1121 Along the entire Saharan slope of the Atlas foothills, a series of parallel wadis and, further out in the desert, a zone of artesian wells, drilled down to the underground bed of hidden streams from the same range, create oases that host permanent farming and settled populations. The Saharan highlands of Tibesti, with mountains rising to 8,300 feet, collect a bit of rain and allow the Tibbus to grow some grain and dates in the narrow valleys.1122

Irrigation and horticulture.

The few and limited spots where the desert or steppe affords water for cultivation require artificial irrigation, the importation of plants, and careful tillage, to make the limited area support even a small social group. Hence they could have been utilized by man only after he had made considerable progress in civilization.1123 Oasis agriculture is predominantly intensive. Gardens and orchards tend to prevail over field tillage. The restricted soil and water must be forced to yield their utmost. While on the rainy or northern slope of the Atlas in Algiers and Tunis farms abound, on the Saharan piedmont are chiefly plantations of vegetables, orchards and palm groves.1124 In Fezzan at the oasis of Ghat, Barth found kitchen gardens of considerable extent, large palm groves, but limited fields of grain, all raised by irrigation; and in the flat hollow basin forming the oasis of Murzuk, he found also fig and peach trees, vegetables, besides fields of wheat and barley cultivated with much labor.1125 In northern Fezzan, where the mountains back of Tripoli provide a supply of water, saffron and olive trees are the staple articles of tillage. The slopes are terraced and irrigated, laid out in orchards of figs, pomegranates, almonds and grapes, while fields of wheat and barley border the lower courses of the wadis.1126 In the "cup oases" or depressions of the Sahara, the village is always built on the slope, because the alluvial soil in the basin is too precious to be used for house sites.1127

The few and limited areas where the desert or steppe provides water for farming need artificial irrigation, the introduction of plants, and careful cultivation in order to support even a small community. Therefore, humans could only utilize these places after making significant advancements in civilization.1123 Oasis agriculture is mainly intensive. Gardens and orchards tend to dominate over field farming. The limited soil and water must be maximized for production. While there are plenty of farms on the rainy or northern slopes of the Atlas in Algiers and Tunis, the Saharan piedmont mainly features vegetable plantations, orchards, and palm groves.1124 In Fezzan, at the oasis of Ghat, Barth discovered extensive kitchen gardens, large palm groves, but limited grain fields, all supported by irrigation. In the flat hollow basin of the oasis of Murzuk, he also found fig and peach trees, vegetables, as well as fields of wheat and barley cultivated with considerable effort.1125 In northern Fezzan, where the mountains behind Tripoli supply water, saffron and olive trees are the main crops. The slopes are terraced and irrigated, arranged into orchards of figs, pomegranates, almonds, and grapes, while fields of wheat and barley line the lower courses of the wadis.1126 In the "cup oases" or depressions of the Sahara, villages are always built on the slopes because the alluvial soil in the basin is too valuable to be used for building sites.1127

Effect of diminishing water supply.

The water supply in deserts and steppes, on which permanent agriculture depends, is so scant that even a slight diminution causes the area of tillage to shrink. Here a fluctuation of snowfall or rainfall that in a moist region would be negligible, has conspicuous or even tragic results. English engineers who examined the utilization of the Afghan streams for irrigation reported that the natives had exploited their water supply to the last drop; that irrigation converted the Kabul River and the Heri-rud at certain seasons of the year into dry channels.1128 In the Turkoman steppes it has been observed that expanding tillage, by the multiplication of irrigation canals, increased the loss of water by evaporation, and hence diminished the supply. Facts like these reveal the narrow margin between food and famine, which makes the uncertain basis of life for the steppe agriculturist. Even slight desiccation contracts the volume and shortens the course of interior drainage streams; therefore it narrows the piedmont zone of vegetation and the hem of tillage along the river banks. The previous frontier of field and garden is marked by abandoned hamlets and sand-buried cities, like those which border the dry beds of the shrunken Khotan rivers of the Tarim basin.1129 The steppe regions in the New World as well as the Old show great numbers of these ruins. Barth found them in the northern Sahara, dating from Roman days.1130 They occur in such numbers in the Syrian Desert, in the Sistan of Persia, in Baluchistan, the Gobi, Takla Makan Desert, Turfan and the Lop Nor basin, that they indicate a marked but irregular desiccation of central and western Asia during the historical period.1131

The water supply in deserts and steppes, which is essential for permanent agriculture, is so limited that even a small decrease causes the farming area to shrink. In these regions, a change in snowfall or rainfall that would be insignificant elsewhere can have noticeable or even tragic consequences. British engineers who examined how Afghan streams are used for irrigation reported that the locals used up their water supply completely; at certain times of the year, irrigation turned the Kabul River and the Heri-rud into dry channels.1128 In the Turkoman steppes, it has been noted that increased farming, through the creation of more irrigation canals, led to greater water loss through evaporation, which in turn reduced the water supply. These facts highlight the slim margin between food and famine, creating an unstable way of life for farmers in the steppe. Even slight dryness diminishes the volume and shortens the length of inland drainage streams, which reduces the area of vegetation and cultivated land along riverbanks. The former boundaries of fields and gardens are marked by abandoned villages and cities buried in sand, similar to those near the dry beds of the reduced Khotan rivers in the Tarim basin.1129 The steppe regions in both the New World and the Old have many of these ruins. Barth found them in the northern Sahara, dating back to Roman times.1130 They are found in such abundance in the Syrian Desert, in Sistan of Persia, in Baluchistan, the Gobi, the Takla Makan Desert, Turfan, and the Lop Nor basin, that they suggest a notable but uneven drying out of central and western Asia throughout history.1131

Scant diet of nomads.

If a scant water supply places sedentary agriculture in arid lands upon an insecure basis, it makes the nomad's sources of subsistence even more precarious. It keeps him persistently on low rations, while the drought that burns his pastures and dries up well and wadi brings him face to face with famine. The daily food of the Bedouin is meal cooked in sour camel's milk, to which bread and meat are added only when guests arrive. His moderation in eating is so great that one meal of a European would suffice for six Arabs.1132 The daily food of the shepherd agriculturists on the Kuen Lun margin of the Takla Makan Desert is bread and milk; meat is indulged in only three or four times a month.1133 The Tartars, even in their days of widest conquest, showed the same habitual frugality. "Their victuals are all things that may be eaten, for we saw some of them eat lice." The flesh of all animals dying a natural death is used as food; in summer it is sun-dried for winter use, because at that time the Tartars live exclusively on mare's milk which is then abundant. A cup or two of milk in the morning suffices till evening, when each man has a little meat. One ram serves as a meal for fifty or a hundred men. Bones are gnawed till they are burnished, "so that no whit of their food may come to naught." Genghis Khan enacted that neither blood nor entrails nor any other part of a beast which might be eaten should be thrown away.1134 Scarcity of food among the Tibetan and Mongolian nomads is reflected in their habit of removing every particle of meat from the bone when eating.1135 A thin decoction of hot tea, butter and flour is their staple food. Many Turkoman nomads, despite outward appearance of wealth, eat only dried fish, and get bread only once a month, while for the poor wheat is prohibited on account of its cost.1136 The Saharan Tibbus, usually on a starvation diet, eat the skin and powdered bones of their dead animals.1137

If a limited water supply puts sedentary farming in dry areas on shaky ground, it makes the nomad's means of survival even more uncertain. It keeps him constantly on minimal rations, while the drought that scorches his pastures and dries up wells and streams brings him closer to starvation. The Bedouin's daily food consists of bread cooked in sour camel's milk, with meat added only when guests arrive. He eats so little that one meal for a European is enough for six Arabs.1132 The daily diet of the shepherd-farmers at the Kuen Lun edge of the Takla Makan Desert is bread and milk; meat is only enjoyed three or four times a month.1133 The Tartars, even during their peak of conquest, displayed the same consistent frugality. "Their food consists of anything that can be eaten, for we saw some of them eat lice." The meat of all animals that die naturally is consumed; in summer, it is sun-dried for winter use, as at that time the Tartars exclusively consume mare's milk, which is plentiful. A cup or two of milk in the morning is enough until evening when each person has a little meat. One ram can feed fifty to a hundred men. Bones are gnawed until polished so that no part of their food goes to waste. Genghis Khan decreed that no blood, entrails, or any other edible part of an animal should be discarded.1134 The lack of food among Tibetan and Mongolian nomads is evident in their practice of removing every bit of meat from the bones when they eat.1135 A thin mixture of hot tea, butter, and flour is their main food. Many Turkoman nomads, despite seeming wealthy, eat only dried fish and get bread only once a month, while the poor are prohibited from accessing wheat because of its high price.1136 The Saharan Tibbus, often on a starvation diet, consume the skin and powdered bones of their deceased animals.1137

The privations and hardships of life in the deserts and steppes discourage obesity. The Koko-Nor Mongols of the high Tibetan plateau are of slight build, never fat.1138 The Bedouin's physical ideal of a man is spare, sinewy, energetic and vigorous, "lean-sided and thin," as the Arab poet expresses it.1139 The nomadic tribesmen throughout the Sahara, whether of Hamitic, Semitic or Negro race, show this type, and retain it even after several generations of settlement in the river valleys of the Sudan. The Bushmen, who inhabit the Kalahari Desert, have thin wiry forms and are capable of great exertion and privations.1140

The hardships and challenges of life in the deserts and steppes prevent obesity. The Koko-Nor Mongols from the high Tibetan plateau are lean and never overweight.1138 The Bedouin's ideal of a man is someone who is slim, muscular, energetic, and strong, described as "lean-sided and thin," according to an Arab poet.1139 The nomadic tribes across the Sahara, whether of Hamitic, Semitic, or Black descent, fit this description and maintain it even after living in the river valleys of Sudan for several generations. The Bushmen, who live in the Kalahari Desert, have lean, wiry bodies and are capable of enduring great effort and hardship.1140

Checks to population.

Though the conquering propensities of nomadic tribes make large families desirable, in order to increase the military strength of the horde, and though shepherd folk acquiring new and rich pastures develop patriarchal families, as did the Jews after the conquest of Canaan, nevertheless the limited water and food supply of desert and grassland, as well as the relatively low-grade economy of pastoral life, impose an iron-bound restriction upon population, so that as a matter of fact patriarchal families are rare. When natural increase finds no vent in emigration and dispersal, marriage among nomads becomes less fruitful.1141 Artificial limitation of population occurs frequently among desert-dwellers. In the Libyan oasis of Farafeah, the inhabitants never exceed eighty males, a limit fixed by a certain Sheik Murzuk.1142 Poverty of food supply explains the small number of children in the typical Turkoman family. Among the Koko-Nor Tibetans, monogamy is the rule, polygamy the exception and confined to the few rich, while families never include more than two or three children.1143 According to Burckhardt, three children constitute a large family among the Bedouins, much to the regret of the Bedouins themselves. Mohammedans though they are, few practice polygamy, while polyandry and female infanticide existed in heathen times.1144 Desert peoples seem to be naturally monogamous.1145

Though the conquering tendencies of nomadic tribes make larger families desirable to boost the military strength of the group, and though herding communities that acquire new and rich grazing lands tend to form patriarchal families, like the Jews did after conquering Canaan, the limited availability of water and food in deserts and grasslands, along with the generally low-level economy of pastoral life, place strict limits on population growth, making patriarchal families quite rare. When natural population growth doesn't lead to emigration and dispersal, marriage among nomads becomes less productive. Artificial population control is common among desert residents. In the Libyan oasis of Farafeah, the population doesn’t exceed eighty males, a limit set by a certain Sheik Murzuk. The lack of food explains the small number of children in typical Turkoman families. Among the Koko-Nor Tibetans, monogamy is the standard, while polygamy is rare and limited to a few wealthy individuals; families generally have no more than two or three children. According to Burckhardt, three children are considered a large family among the Bedouins, much to their own disappointment. Although they are Muslims, few practice polygamy, while polyandry and female infanticide were noted in pagan times. Desert communities seem to be naturally monogamous.

Trade of nomads.

The prevailing poverty, monotony and unreliability of subsistence in desert and steppe, as well as the low industrial status, necessitate trade with bordering agricultural lands. The Bedouins of Arabia buy flour, barley for horse feed, coffee and clothing, paying for them largely with butter and male colts. The northern tribes resort every year to the confines of Syria, when they are visited by pedlers from Damascus and Aleppo.1146 The tribes from Hasa and the Nejd pasture land bring horses, cattle and sheep to the city of Koweit at the head of the Persian Gulf to barter for dates, clothing and firearms; and large encampments of them are always to be seen near this town.1147 Arabia and the Desert of Kedar sold lambs, rams and goats to the markets of ancient Tyre.1148 The pastoral tribes of ancient Judea in times of scarcity went to Egypt for grain, which they purchased either with money or cattle. The picture of Jacob's sons returning from Egypt to Canaan with their long lines of asses laden with sacks of corn is typical for pastoral nomads; so is their ultimate settlement, owing to protracted famine, in the delta land of Goshen. The Kirghis of the Russian and Asiatic steppes barter horses and sheep for cereals, fine articles of clothing, and coarse wooden utensils in the cities of Bukhara and the border districts of Russia. Occasionally the land of the nomad yields other products than those of the flocks and herds, which enter therefore into their trade. Such is the salt of the Sahara, secured at Taudeni and Bilma, the gums of the Indus desert, and balm of Gilead from the dry plateau east of Jordan.

The ongoing poverty, monotony, and unpredictability of living off the land in the desert and steppe, along with the low level of industrial activity, make trade with neighboring agricultural areas essential. The Bedouins of Arabia purchase flour, barley for feeding horses, coffee, and clothing, mostly paying for them with butter and male colts. Each year, the northern tribes travel to the borders of Syria, where they are visited by peddlers from Damascus and Aleppo.1146 The tribes from Hasa and the Nejd pasture land bring horses, cattle, and sheep to the city of Kuwait at the head of the Persian Gulf to trade for dates, clothing, and firearms, and there are always large groups of them near this town.1147 Arabia and the Desert of Kedar sold lambs, rams, and goats in the markets of ancient Tyre.1148 The pastoral tribes of ancient Judea used to go to Egypt for grain during times of scarcity, which they bought either with money or cattle. The image of Jacob's sons returning from Egypt to Canaan with their long lines of donkeys loaded with sacks of corn is typical of pastoral nomads; so is their eventual settlement in the delta land of Goshen due to a long-lasting famine. The Kirghis from the Russian and Asian steppes trade horses and sheep for grain, fine clothing, and rough wooden utensils in the cities of Bukhara and the border regions of Russia. Occasionally, the nomadic lands produce other goods beyond livestock, which are also part of their trade. This includes the salt of the Sahara, sourced from Taudeni and Bilma, the gums from the Indus desert, and balm of Gilead from the dry plateau east of Jordan.

Pastoral nomads as middlemen.

The systematic migrations of nomads, their numerous beasts of burden, and the paucity of desert and steppe products determine pastoral tribes for the office of middlemen;1149 and as such they appear in all parts of the world. The contrast of products in arid regions and in the bordering agricultural land, as also in the districts on opposite sides of these vast barriers, stimulates exchanges. This contrast may rest on a difference of geographic conditions, or of economic development, or both. The reindeer Chukches of Arctic Siberia take Russian manufactured wares from the fur stations on the Lena River to trade at the coast markets on Bering Sea for Alaskan pelts. The sons of Jacob, pasturing their flocks on the Judean plateau, saw "a company of Ishmaelites come from Gilead with their camels bearing spicery and balm and myrrh, going to carry it down to Egypt."1150 This caravan of Arabian merchants purchased Joseph as a slave, a characteristic commodity in desert commerce from ancient times to the present. The predatory expeditions of nomads provide them with abundant captives, only few of which can be utilized as slaves in their pastoral economy. In the same way the Kirghis manage the caravan trade between Russia and Bukhara, sometimes adding captured travelers to their other wares. In ancient times Nubian shepherd folk acted as migrant middlemen between Egypt and Meroe near the junction of the Atbara River and the Nile, as did also the desert tribe of the Nasamones between Carthage and interior Africa.1151 From remote ages an active caravan trade was carried on between the productive districts of Arabia Felix and the cities of Mesopotamia, Syria and Egypt. Mohammed himself was a caravan leader; in the faith which he established religious pilgrimages and commercial ventures were inextricably united, while to the mercantile spirit it gave a fresh and vigorous impetus.1152 The caravan trade of the Sahara was first organized by Moorish and Arab tribes who dwelt on the northern margin of the desert, rearing herds of camels. These they hired to merchants for the journey between Morocco and Timbuctoo, in return for cereals and clothing. Hence Morocco has been the chief customer of the great desert town near the Niger, and sends thither numerous caravans from Tendouf (Taredant) Morocco, Fez and Tafilet. Algiers dominates the less important route via the oasis of Twat, and Tripolis that through Ghadames to the busy towns in the Lake Chad basin.1153

The systematic movements of nomads, their many pack animals, and the lack of products in the desert and steppe make pastoral tribes perfect for acting as middlemen;1149 and they appear in every part of the world. The difference in products from arid areas and neighboring agricultural regions, as well as from districts on opposite sides of these vast barriers, encourages trade. This difference may be due to variations in geographic conditions, economic development, or both. The reindeer Chukches of Arctic Siberia take Russian-made goods from the fur stations on the Lena River to trade at coastal markets on the Bering Sea for Alaskan furs. The sons of Jacob, grazing their flocks on the Judean plateau, saw "a group of Ishmaelites coming from Gilead with their camels carrying spices, balm, and myrrh, heading to Egypt."1150 This caravan of Arabian merchants bought Joseph as a slave, a common item in desert trade from ancient times to today. The raiding expeditions of nomads provide them with many captives, of which only a few can be used as slaves in their pastoral lifestyle. Similarly, the Kirghis handle the caravan trade between Russia and Bukhara, sometimes adding captured travelers to their other goods. In ancient times, Nubian shepherds acted as migratory middlemen between Egypt and Meroe near the junction of the Atbara River and the Nile, as did the desert tribe of the Nasamones between Carthage and the interior of Africa.1151 For ages, an active caravan trade existed between the productive areas of Arabia Felix and the cities of Mesopotamia, Syria, and Egypt. Mohammed himself was a caravan leader; in the faith he established, religious pilgrimages and commercial endeavors were closely linked, while it provided a fresh and vigorous boost to the mercantile spirit.1152 The caravan trade in the Sahara was initially organized by Moorish and Arab tribes living on the northern edge of the desert, raising herds of camels. They rented these camels to merchants for journeys between Morocco and Timbuktu, receiving grains and clothing in return. Therefore, Morocco has been the main buyer from the great desert town near the Niger, sending many caravans from Tendouf (Taredant) Morocco, Fez, and Tafilet. Algiers controls the less significant route via the oasis of Twat, and Tripolis that through Ghadames to the bustling towns in the Lake Chad basin.1153

Desert markets.

If the camel is "the ship of the desert," the market towns on the margin of the sandy wastes are the ports of the desert. Their bazaars hold everything that the nomad needs. Their suburbs are a shifting series of shepherd encampments or extensive caravanseries for merchant and pack animal, like the abaradion of Timbuctoo, which receives annually from fifty to sixty thousand camels.1154 Their industries develop partly in response to the demand of the desert or trans-desert population. The fine blades of Damascus reflected the Bedouin's need of the best weapon. Each city has its sphere of desert influence. The province of Nejd in Central Arabia is commercially subservient to Bagdad, Busrah, Koweit and Bahrein.1155 The bazaars of Samarkand and Tashkent exist largely for the scattered nomads of Turkestan. Ancient Gaza1156 and Askelon fattened on the Egyptian trade across the Desert of Shur, as Petra, Bostra and Damascus on the thin but steady streams of nomad products flowing in from the Syrian Desert.

If the camel is "the ship of the desert," then the market towns on the edge of the sandy wastelands are the desert's ports. Their bazaars provide everything that nomads need. Their outskirts are a constantly changing series of shepherd camps or large caravans for merchants and pack animals, like the abaradion of Timbuctoo, which receives between fifty and sixty thousand camels each year.1154 Their industries grow partly in response to the needs of the desert or the populations beyond it. The fine blades of Damascus fulfilled the Bedouin's demand for top-quality weapons. Each city has its own area of influence in the desert. The province of Nejd in Central Arabia depends commercially on Bagdad, Busrah, Koweit, and Bahrein.1155 The bazaars of Samarkand and Tashkent mainly serve the scattered nomads of Turkestan. Ancient Gaza1156 and Askelon thrived on Egyptian trade across the Desert of Shur, just as Petra, Bostra, and Damascus benefited from the small but steady flow of nomadic products coming in from the Syrian Desert.

Nomad industries.

The abundant leisure of nomadic life encourages the beginning of industry, but rarely advances it beyond the household stage, owing to the thin, family-wise dispersion of population which precludes division of labor. Such industry as exists consists chiefly in working up the raw materials yielded by the herds. Among the Bedouins, blacksmiths and saddlers are the only professional artisans; these are regarded with contempt and are never of Bedouin stock.1157 In the ancient world, industry reached its zero point in Arabia, and in modern times shows meager development there. On the other hand the Saharan Arabs developed an hereditary guild of expert well-makers, which seems to date back to remote times, and is held in universal honor.1158

The ample free time in nomadic life fosters the start of industry, but rarely pushes it beyond household production due to the sparse, family-based spread of the population that prevents specialization of labor. The existing industry primarily focuses on processing the raw materials obtained from the herds. Among the Bedouins, blacksmiths and saddlers are the only skilled tradespeople; they are looked down upon and are never of Bedouin descent.1157 In ancient times, industry was practically nonexistent in Arabia, and it has shown little growth in modern times. In contrast, the Saharan Arabs established a hereditary guild of skilled well-makers that appears to have origins in ancient history and is universally respected.1158

Oriental rugs.

It is to the tent-dwellers of the world, however, that we apparently owe the oriental rug. This triumph of the weaver's art seems to have originated among pastoral nomads, who developed it in working up the wool and hair of their sheep, goats and camels; but it early became localized as a specialized industry in the towns and villages of irrigated districts on the borders of the grazing lands, where the nomads had advanced to sedentary life. Therefore in the period of the Caliphate, from 632 to 1258, we find these brilliant flowers of the loom, blooming like the Persian gardens, in Persian Farsistan, Khusistan, Kirman and Khorasan. We find them spreading the mediæval fame of Shiraz, Tun, Meshed, Amul, Bukhara and Merv. The secret of this preeminence lay partly in the weaver's inherited aptitude and artistic sense for this textile work, derived from countless generations of shepherd ancestors; partly in their proximity to the finest raw materials, whose quality was equalled nowhere else, because it depended upon the character of the pasturage, probably also upon the climatic conditions affecting directly the flocks and herds.1159

It seems that we owe the beautiful oriental rug to the tent-dwellers of the world. This amazing creation of weaving likely started with pastoral nomads, who crafted it from the wool and hair of their sheep, goats, and camels. However, it quickly turned into a specialized industry in the towns and villages of irrigated areas bordering grazing lands, where these nomads settled down. During the Caliphate period, from 632 to 1258, these vibrant rugs flourished like the Persian gardens in Persian Farsistan, Khusistan, Kirman, and Khorasan. They also spread the medieval reputation of Shiraz, Tun, Meshed, Amul, Bukhara, and Merv. The secret to their excellence was partly due to the weaver's natural talent and artistic ability passed down from generations of shepherd ancestors, and partly because they had access to the best raw materials, unmatched in quality due to the nature of the pastures and the local climate that directly affected the herds.1159

A map showing the geographical distribution of Eastern rug-making reveals the relation of the industry to semi-arid or saline pastures, and makes the mind revert at once to the blankets of artistic design and color, woven by the Navajo Indians of our own rainless Southwest. Rug weaving in the Old World reached its finest development in countries like Persia, Turkestan, western Afghanistan, Baluchistan, western India and the plateau portions of Asia Minor, countries where the rainfall varies from 10 to 20 inches or even less, [See map page 484.] where nomadism claims a considerable part of the population, and where the ancestry of all traces back to some of the great shepherd races, like Turkomans and Tartars. These peoples are hereditary specialists in the care, classification, and preparation of wools.1160 Weavers of rugs form an industrial class in the cities of Persia and Asia Minor, where they obey largely the taste of the outside world in regard to design and color;1161 whereas the nomads, weaving for their own use, adhere strictly to native colors and designs. Their patterns are tribal property, each differing from that of the other; and though less artistic than those of the urban workers, are nevertheless interesting and consistent, while the nomad's intuitive sense of color is fine.1162

A map showing the geographical distribution of Eastern rug-making highlights the connection between the industry and semi-arid or saline pastures, instantly bringing to mind the beautifully designed and colorful blankets woven by the Navajo Indians in our own dry Southwest. Rug weaving in the Old World reached its peak in places like Persia, Turkestan, western Afghanistan, Baluchistan, western India, and the plateau regions of Asia Minor, where the annual rainfall ranges from 10 to 20 inches or even less, [See map page 484.] where a significant portion of the population is nomadic, and where all ancestry can be traced back to great shepherding cultures like the Turkomans and Tartars. These groups are traditional experts in the care, classification, and preparation of wools.1160 Rug weavers make up an industrial class in the cities of Persia and Asia Minor, where they largely cater to the tastes of the outside world in terms of design and color;1161 while the nomads, weaving for their own needs, stick closely to native colors and designs. Their patterns are unique to each tribe, with each one differing from the others; and although they are less artistic than those of the urban workers, they are still interesting and consistent, while the nomad's natural sense of color is excellent.1162

Architecture of nomad conquerors.

The principles of design and color which these tent-dwellers had developed in their weaving, they applied, after their conquest of agricultural lands, to stone and produced the mosaic, to architecture and produced the Alhambra and the Taj Mahal.1163 Whether Saracens of Spain or Turkoman conquerors of India, they were ornamentists whose contribution to architecture was decoration. Working in marble, stone, metals or wood, they wrought always in the spirit of color and textile design, rather than in the spirit of form. The walls of their mosques, palaces and tombs reproduce the beauty of the rugs once screening the doors of their felt tents. The gift of color they passed on to the West, first through the Moors of Sicily and Spain, later through Venetian commerce. Their influence can be seen in the exquisite mosaic decoration in the cloister of Mont Reale of once Saracenic Palermo, and in the Ducal Palace and St. Mark's Cathedral of beauty-loving Venice.1164 This has been almost their sole contribution to the art of the world.

The design and color principles that these tent-dwellers developed in their weaving were applied, after they conquered agricultural lands, to stone, creating mosaics, and to architecture, resulting in masterpieces like the Alhambra and the Taj Mahal.1163 Whether they were the Saracens of Spain or the Turkoman conquerors of India, they were artists focused on decoration, enhancing architecture. Working with marble, stone, metals, or wood, they always embraced color and textile design over strict forms. The walls of their mosques, palaces, and tombs reflect the beauty of the rugs that once adorned the entrances of their felt tents. They passed their colorful legacy to the West, first through the Moors of Sicily and Spain, and later through Venetian trade. Their influence is evident in the stunning mosaic decorations in the cloister of Mont Reale from what was once Saracenic Palermo, and in Venice’s Ducal Palace and St. Mark's Cathedral, which celebrated beauty.1164 This has been nearly their only contribution to the art of the world.

Pastoral nomads can give political union to civilized peoples; they can assimilate and spread ready-made elements of civilization, but to originate or develop them they are powerless. Between the art, philosophy and literature of China on the one side, and of the settled districts of Persia on the other, lies the cultural sterility of the Central Asia plateau. Its outpouring hordes have only in part acquired the civilization of the superior agricultural peoples whom they have conquered; from Kazan and Constantinople to Delhi, from Delhi to Peking they have added almost nothing to the local culture.

Pastoral nomads can bring political unity to civilized societies; they can adopt and share ready-made aspects of culture, but they can't create or advance them. Between the art, philosophy, and literature of China on one side and the settled regions of Persia on the other lies the cultural emptiness of the Central Asian plateau. Its roaming groups have only partially absorbed the culture of the more advanced agricultural peoples they have conquered; from Kazan and Constantinople to Delhi, and from Delhi to Peking, they have contributed almost nothing to the local culture.

Arid lands as areas of arrested development.

Deserts and steppes lay an arresting hand on progress. Their tribes do not develop; neither do they grow old. They are the eternal children of the world. Genuine nomadic peoples show no alteration in their manners, customs or mode of life from millennium to millennium. The interior of the Arabian desert reveals the same social and economic status,1165 whether we take the descriptions of Moses or Mohammed or Burckhardt or more recent travelers. The Bedouins of the Nubian steppes adhere strictly to all their ancient customs, and reproduce to-day the pastoral nomadism of Abraham and Jacob.1166 Genealogies were not more important to the biblical house of David and stem of Jesse than they are for the modern Kirghis tribesman, who as a little child learns to recite the list of his ancestors back to the seventh generation. The account which Herodotus gives of the nomads of the Russian steppes agrees in minute details with that of Strabo written five centuries later,1167 with that of William de Rubruquis in 1253, and with modern descriptions of Kalmuck and Kirghis life. The Gauchos or Indian pastoral halfbreeds of the Argentine plains were found by Wappäus in 1870 to accord accurately with Avara's description of them at the end of the eighteenth century.1168 The restless tenants of the grasslands come and go, but their type never materially changes. Their culture is stationary amid persistent movement. Only when here or there in some small and favored spot they are forced to make the transition to agriculture, or when they learn by long and close association with sedentary nations the lesson of drudgery and progress, do the laws of social and economic development begin to operate in them. As a rule, they must first escape partly or wholly the environment of their pasture lands, either by emigration or by the intrusion into their midst of alien tillers of the soil.

Deserts and steppes have a strong grip on progress. Their tribes don’t evolve; they also don’t age. They remain the eternal children of the world. True nomadic people show no change in their behaviors, customs, or way of life from one millennium to the next. The heart of the Arabian desert shows the same social and economic status,1165 whether we look at the accounts of Moses, Mohammed, Burckhardt, or more recent travelers. The Bedouins of the Nubian steppes stick closely to their ancient customs, continuing the pastoral nomadism of Abraham and Jacob to this day.1166 Genealogies were just as significant to the biblical house of David and the line of Jesse as they are for the modern Kirghis tribesman, who learns to recite his ancestry back to the seventh generation as a child. The account that Herodotus gives of the nomads of the Russian steppes aligns in detailed specifics with Strabo's narrative written five centuries later,1167 with that of William de Rubruquis in 1253, and with modern descriptions of Kalmuck and Kirghis life. The Gauchos or Indian pastoral mixed-bloods of the Argentine plains were found by Wappäus in 1870 to match Avara's description of them from the late eighteenth century.1168 The restless inhabitants of the grasslands move around, but their type never significantly changes. Their culture remains unchanged despite their constant movement. Only when they are forced, in some small and favorable location, to transition to agriculture, or when they learn the values of hard work and progress through long associations with sedentary societies, do the forces of social and economic development start to take effect in them. Generally, they must first partly or fully escape from the environment of their grazing lands, either through emigration or through the encroachment of outside farmers into their territory.

But while the migrant shepherd originates nothing, he plays an historical rôle as a transmitter of civilization. Asiatic nomads have sparsely disseminated the culture of China, Persia, Egypt and Yemen over large areas of the world. The Semite shepherds of the Red Sea deserts, through their merchants and conquerors, long gave to the dark Sudan the only light of civilization which it received, Mohammed, a Bedouin of the Ishmaelite tribe, caravan leader on the desert highways between Mecca and Syria, borrowed from Jerusalem the simple tenets of a monotheistic religion, and spread them through his militant followers over a large part of Africa and Asia.

But while the migrant shepherd doesn't create anything new, he plays an important role in passing on civilization. Nomadic groups from Asia have spread the cultures of China, Persia, Egypt, and Yemen across vast regions of the world. The Semitic shepherds of the deserts near the Red Sea, through their traders and conquerors, provided the dark Sudan with its only glimpse of civilization, which came from Mohammed, a Bedouin from the Ishmaelite tribe. As a caravan leader traveling the desert routes between Mecca and Syria, he took the simple principles of a monotheistic religion from Jerusalem and shared them with his dedicated followers across much of Africa and Asia.

Mental and moral qualities of nomads.

The deserts and grasslands breed in their sons certain qualities and characteristics-courage, hardihood, the stiff-necked pride of the freeman, vigilance, wariness, sense of locality,1169 keen powers of observation stimulated by the monotonous, featureless environment, and the consequent capacity to grasp every detail.1170 Though robbery abroad is honorable and marauder a term with which to crown a hero, theft at home is summarily dealt with among most nomads. The property of the unlocked tent and the far-ranging herd must be safeguarded.1171 The Tartars maintained a high standard of honesty among themselves and punished theft with death.1172 Wide dispersal in small groups is reflected in the diversity of dialects among desert peoples;1173 in the practice of hospitality, whether among Bedouins of the Nejd, Kirghis of the Central Asia plateau,1174 or semi-nomadic Boers of South Africa;1175 in the persistence of feuds and of the duty of blood revenge, which is sanctioned by the Koran.

The deserts and grasslands shape their people with certain qualities and traits—courage, resilience, the stubborn pride of a free person, alertness, caution, a strong sense of place, keen observational skills sharpened by the dull, featureless landscape, and the ability to notice every detail. Although stealing from outside is seen as honorable and gaining the title of marauder can make someone a hero, theft at home is usually punished harshly among most nomads. The possessions within an unlocked tent and the widely scattered herd need to be protected. The Tartars upheld a strict standard of honesty among themselves and dealt with theft by imposing the death penalty. The wide dispersal into small groups is reflected in the variety of dialects among desert communities; in the tradition of hospitality, whether among the Bedouins of the Nejd, the Kirghis of the Central Asia plateau, or the semi-nomadic Boers of South Africa; and in the ongoing feuds and the obligation for blood revenge, which is supported by the Koran.

Isolation tends to breed among nomads pride of race and a repugnance to intermixture. The ideal of the pastoral Israelites was a pure ethnic stock, protected by stern inhibition of intermarriage with other tribes. Therefore, Moses enjoined upon them the duty of exterminating the peoples of Canaan whom they dispossessed.1176 While the urban Arabs show a medley of breeds, dashed with a strain of negro blood, among the nomad Bedouins, mixture is exceptional and is regarded as a disgrace.1177 The same thing is true among the nomad Arabs of Algeria, and there it has placed a stumbling block in the way of the French colonial administration, by preventing the appearance of half-breeds who might bridge the gap between the colonials and natives. Where pastoral Semites have settled in agricultural lands, intermixture on a wide scale has followed, as in the Sudan from Niger to Nile; but even here, when a tribe or clan has retained a strictly pastoral life in the grassland, and has held itself aloof from the agricultural districts of the Negro villages, relatively pure survivals are to be found, as among the Cow or Bush Fulani of Bornu.1178 On the other hand, the Hausa, a migrant trading folk of mingled Arab and Negro blood, spread northward along the trans-Saharan caravan route to the oasis of Air before the fourteenth century, and there have infused into the local Berber stock a strong Negro strain.1179 Among the nomads of Central Asia, one wave of race movement has so often followed and overtaken another, that it has produced a confused blending of breeds. The mixtures are so numerous that pure types are exceptional,1180 and the exclusiveness of the desert Semites disappears.

Isolation tends to create in nomads a pride in their ethnicity and a dislike for mixing with other groups. The ideal among the pastoral Israelites was to maintain a pure ethnic lineage, protected by strict rules against intermarriage with other tribes. Because of this, Moses instructed them to eliminate the peoples of Canaan whom they displaced.1176 While urban Arabs display a mix of ethnic backgrounds, often with some African ancestry, among the nomadic Bedouins, mixing is rare and seen as shameful.1177 The same is true for the nomadic Arabs of Algeria, which has created obstacles for the French colonial administration by preventing the emergence of mixed-race individuals who could connect the colonizers and the local population. Where pastoral Semites have settled down to farm, significant intermixing has occurred, as seen in the Sudan from the Niger to the Nile; but even in these cases, if a tribe or clan has maintained a strictly pastoral lifestyle in the grasslands, avoiding contact with agricultural areas of the Black villages, relatively pure bloodlines can still be found, like among the Cow or Bush Fulani of Bornu.1178 Conversely, the Hausa, a mobile trading group of blended Arab and African descent, moved north along the trans-Saharan trade routes to the oasis of Air before the fourteenth century, where they have introduced a significant African ancestry into the local Berber population.1179 In Central Asia, one wave of migration has frequently followed and replaced another, resulting in a complex mixture of races. The variety of mixtures is so vast that pure types are rare,1180 and the exclusivity of the desert Semites fades away.

Religion of pastoral nomads.

Though all these desert-born characteristics and customs have a certain interest for the sociologist, they possess only minor importance in comparison with the religious spirit of pastoral nomads, which is always fraught with far-reaching historical results. The evidence of history shows us that there is such a thing as a desert-born genius for religion. Huc and Gabin testify to the deeper religious feeling of the Buddhist nomads of the Central Asia plateaus, as compared with the lowland Chinese. The three great monotheistic religions of the world are closely connected in their origin and development with the deserts of Syria and Arabia. The area of Mohammedism embraces the steppe zone of the Old World1181 from Senegambia and Zanzibar in Africa to the Indus, Tarim and the upper Obi, together with some well watered lands on its margins. It comprises in this territory a variety of races—Negroes, Hamites, Semites, Iranians, Indo-Aryans, and a long list of Mongoloid tribes. Here is a psychological effect of environment. The dry, pure air stimulates the faculties of the desert-dweller, but the featureless, monotonous surroundings furnish them with little to work upon. The mind, finding scant material for sustained logical deduction, falls back upon contemplation. Intellectual activity is therefore restricted, narrow, unproductive; while the imagination is unfettered but also unfed. First and last, these shepherd folk receive from the immense monotony of their environment the impression of unity.1182 Therefore all of them, upon outgrowing their primitive fetish and nature worship, gravitate inevitably into monotheism. Their religion is in accord with their whole mental make-up; it is a growth, a natural efflorescence. Therefore it is strong. Its tenets form the warp of all their intellectual fabrics, permeate their meager science and philosophy, animate their more glorious poetry. It has moreover the fanaticism and intolerance characterizing men of few ideas and restricted outlook upon life. Therewith is bound up a spirit of propaganda. The victories of the Jews in Palestine, Syria and Philistia were the victories of Jehovah; the conquests of Saladin were the conquests of Allah; and the domain of the Caliphate was the dominion of Islam.

Though all these desert-born traits and customs are somewhat interesting for sociologists, they hold only minor significance compared to the deep religious spirit of pastoral nomads, which often leads to significant historical outcomes. Historical evidence shows that there is indeed a desert-born talent for religion. Huc and Gabin note the stronger religious feelings of the Buddhist nomads from the Central Asian plateaus, especially when compared to the lowland Chinese. The three major monotheistic religions of the world have their origins and developments closely tied to the deserts of Syria and Arabia. The realm of Islam spans the steppe regions of the Old World, from Senegambia and Zanzibar in Africa to the Indus, Tarim, and the upper Obi, including some well-watered lands along its edges. This area is home to a diverse range of races — Negroes, Hamites, Semites, Iranians, Indo-Aryans, and various Mongoloid tribes. Here, the environment has a psychological impact. The dry, clean air enhances the abilities of desert dwellers, but the bland, monotonous landscape provides little for them to engage with. As a result, the mind, struggling to find material for deep logical reasoning, turns to contemplation. Intellectual activity thus becomes limited, narrow, and unproductive, while the imagination is free yet also starved. Ultimately, these shepherd people draw from the overwhelming uniformity of their environment a sense of unity. As they move beyond their basic fetishistic and nature-based worship, they inevitably gravitate toward monotheism. Their religion aligns with their entire mental framework; it evolves naturally and becomes a strong presence in their lives. Its principles weave through all their intellectual endeavors, permeate their sparse science and philosophy, and inspire their more impressive poetry. It also carries the fanaticism and intolerance typical of those with limited ideas and narrow views on life. Along with this comes a spirit of propagation. The victories of the Jews in Palestine, Syria, and Philistia were victories for Jehovah; the conquests of Saladin were triumphs for Allah; and the realm of the Caliphate was the territory of Islam.

Distribution Of Religions In The Old World (World map showing distribution of Christians, Mohammedans, Brahmans, Buddhists, and Heathen).

Distribution Of Religions In The Old World (World map showing distribution of Christians, Mohammedans, Brahmans, Buddhists, and Heathen).

Distribution Of Religions In The Old World (World map showing distribution of Christians, Mohammedans, Brahmans, Buddhists, and Heathen).

Distribution of Religions in the Old World (World map showing the distribution of Christians, Muslims, Hindus, Buddhists, and Non-religious people).

Fanaticism as a force in nomad expansion.

The desert everywhere, sooner or later, drives out its brood, ejects its people and their ideas, like those exploding seed-pods which at a touch cast their seed abroad. The religious fanaticism of the shepherd tribes gives that touch; herein lies its historical importance. Mohammedism, fierce and militant, conduced to those upheavals of migration and conquest which since the seventh century have so often transformed the political geography of the Old World. The vast empire of the Caliphate, from its starting point in Arabia, spread in eighty years from the Oxus River to the Atlantic Ocean.1183 The rapid rise and spread between 1745 and 1803 of the Wahaby clan and sect, the Puritans of Islam, which resulted for a time in their political and religious domination of much of Arabia from their home in the Nejd, recalls the stormy conquests of Mohammed's followers. Islam is to-day a persistent source of ferment in Algeria, the Sahara, and the Sudan, On the other hand. Buddhism serves to cement together the diverse nomadic tribes of the Central Asia plateaus, and keep them in spiritual subjection to the Grand Lama of Lhassa. The Chinese government makes political use of this fact by dominating the Lama and employing him as a tool to secure quiet on its long frontier of contact with its restless Mongol neighbors. Moreover the religion of Buddha has restrained the warlike spirit of the nomads, and by its institution of celibacy has helped keep down population below the boiling-point. [Compare maps pages 484 and 513.]

The desert eventually drives out its inhabitants and their ideas, much like seed pods that burst open and scatter their seeds at the slightest touch. The religious zeal of the shepherd tribes provides that touch; this is where its historical significance lies. Islam, intense and combative, contributed to the waves of migration and conquest that have frequently reshaped the political map of the Old World since the seventh century. The vast Caliphate empire, starting in Arabia, expanded within eighty years from the Oxus River to the Atlantic Ocean.1183 The swift rise of the Wahhabi clan and sect, the Puritans of Islam, between 1745 and 1803, led to their political and religious control over much of Arabia from their base in Nejd, reminiscent of the tumultuous conquests of Mohammed's followers. Today, Islam remains a significant source of unrest in Algeria, the Sahara, and Sudan. Meanwhile, Buddhism helps unify the various nomadic tribes of the Central Asian plateaus, keeping them spiritually submissive to the Grand Lama of Lhasa. The Chinese government takes advantage of this by controlling the Lama and using him as a means to maintain peace along its extensive border with its restless Mongol neighbors. Additionally, Buddhism has tempered the warlike nature of the nomads, and its practice of celibacy has helped keep the population below critical levels. [Compare maps pages 484 and 513.]

The faith of the desert.

The faith of the desert tends to be stern, simple and austere. The indulgence which Mohammed promised his followers in Paradise was only a reflex of the deprivation under which they habitually suffered in the scant pastures of Arabia. The lavish beauty of the Heavenly City epitomized the ideals and dreams of the desert-stamped Jew. The active, simple, uncramped life of the grasslands seems essential to the preservation of the best virtues of the desert-bred. These disappear largely in sedentary life. The Bedouin rots when he takes root. City life contaminates, degrades him. His virile qualities and his religion both lose their best when he leaves the desert. Contact with the cities of Philistia and the fertile plains of the Canaanites, with their sensual agricultural gods, demoralized the Israelites.1184 The prophets were always calling them back to the sterner code of morals and the purer faith of their days of wandering. Jeremiah in despair holds up to them as a standard of life the national injunction of the pastoral Rechabites, "Neither shall ye build house nor sow corn nor plant vineyard, but all your days ye shall dwell in tents."1185 The ascent in civilization made havoc with Hebrew morals and religion, because ethics and religion are the finest and latest flower of each cultural stage. Transition shows the breaking down of one code before the establishment of another.

The faith of the desert is often serious, straightforward, and strict. The pleasures that Mohammed promised his followers in Paradise were merely a reflection of the hardships they regularly faced in the sparse pastures of Arabia. The stunning beauty of the Heavenly City represented the ideals and dreams of the desert-rooted Jew. The active, simple, and unrestricted life of the grasslands seems crucial to maintaining the best qualities of those raised in the desert. These qualities largely disappear in settled life. The Bedouin deteriorates when he settles down. Urban life corrupts and degrades him. His strong traits and his faith both lose their strength when he leaves the desert. Interaction with the cities of Philistia and the fertile lands of the Canaanites, along with their indulgent agricultural gods, demoralized the Israelites.1184 The prophets consistently urged them to return to the stricter moral code and the purer faith of their wandering days. Jeremiah, in his despair, raises as a standard of living the national command of the pastoral Rechabites, "Neither shall ye build house nor sow corn nor plant vineyard, but all your days ye shall dwell in tents."1185 Progress in civilization wreaked havoc on Hebrew morals and religion because ethics and religion are the finest and latest products of each cultural stage. Transition reveals the collapse of one code before the establishment of another.

Judaism has always suffered from its narrow local base. Even when transplanted to various parts of the earth, it has remained a distinctly tribal religion. Intense conservatism in doctrine and ceremonial it still bears as the heritage of its desert birth. Islam too shows the limitations of its original environment. It embodies a powerful appeal to the peoples of arid lands, and among these it has spread and survives as an active principle. But it belongs to an arrested economic and social development, lacks the germs of moral evolution which Christianity, born in the old stronghold of Hebraic monotheism, but impregnated by all the cosmopolitan influences of the Mediterranean basin and the Imperium Romanum, amply possesses.

Judaism has always faced challenges due to its limited local focus. Even when it has spread to different parts of the world, it has remained a distinctly tribal religion. It continues to hold onto a strong conservatism in beliefs and rituals, which comes from its origins in the desert. Islam also reflects the constraints of its original setting. It has a powerful appeal to people in dry regions, where it has expanded and remains a vibrant force. However, it is tied to a stagnant economic and social development and lacks the seeds of moral progress that Christianity has, which emerged from the ancient center of Hebraic monotheism but was influenced by all the diverse cultures of the Mediterranean and the Imperium Romanum.


NOTES TO CHAPTER XIV

Notes for Chapter 14


1026.

Figures taken from Albrecht Penck, Morphologie der Erdoberfläche, Vol. I, p. 151. Stuttgart, 1894.

Figures taken from Albrecht Penck, Morphology of the Earth's Surface, Vol. I, p. 151. Stuttgart, 1894.

1027.

A.P. Brigham, Geographic Influences in American History, Chap. IV. Boston, 1903.

A.P. Brigham, Geographic Influences in American History, Chapter IV. Boston, 1903.

1028.

E.C. Semple, American History and Its Geographic Conditions, pp. 65-69, 230, 288, 385. Boston, 1903.

E.C. Semple, American History and Its Geographic Conditions, pp. 65-69, 230, 288, 385. Boston, 1903.

1029.

Ibid., pp. 218, 221, 393.

Ibid., pp. 218, 221, 393.

1030.

H.R. Mill, International Geography, p. 127. New York, 1902.

H.R. Mill, International Geography, p. 127. New York, 1902.

1031.

Henry Buckle, History of Civilization in England, Vol. II, pp. 126-136. New York, 1871.

Henry Buckle, History of Civilization in England, Vol. II, pp. 126-136. New York, 1871.

1032.

Carl Ritter, Comparative Geography, pp. 191-192, 201. Philadelphia, 1865.

Carl Ritter, Comparative Geography, pp. 191-192, 201. Philadelphia, 1865.

1033.

J.H. Breasted, History of Egypt, pp. 142, 144, 261-265, 293-302, 513-517. New York, 1905.

J.H. Breasted, History of Egypt, pp. 142, 144, 261-265, 293-302, 513-517. New York, 1905.

1034.

Ibid., 6, 48, 93, 114, 119, 127, 134, 136, 163, 164, 182, 190, 191, 507.

Ibid., 6, 48, 93, 114, 119, 127, 134, 136, 163, 164, 182, 190, 191, 507.

1035.

W.Z. Ripley, Races of Europe, pp. 340-343, map. New York, 1899.

W.Z. Ripley, Races of Europe, pp. 340-343, map. New York, 1899.

1036.

Anatole Leroy-Beaulieu, The Empire of the Tsars, Vol. I, pp. 57-60. New York, 1893.

Anatole Leroy-Beaulieu, The Empire of the Tsars, Vol. I, pp. 57-60. New York, 1893.

1037.

W.Z. Ripley, Races of Europe, Maps, pp. 53 and 66. New York, 1899.

W.Z. Ripley, Races of Europe, Maps, pp. 53 and 66. New York, 1899.

1038.

Hans Helmolt, History of the World, Vol. VI, p. 130, map of ancient distribution of Germans and Celts. New York, 1907.

Hans Helmolt, History of the World, Vol. VI, p. 130, map of ancient distribution of Germans and Celts. New York, 1907.

1039.

W.Z. Ripley, Races of Europe, pp. 216-218. New York, 1899.

W.Z. Ripley, Races of Europe, pp. 216-218. New York, 1899.

1040.

Ibid., 344-347, 356, 365.

Ibid., 344-347, 356, 365.

1041.

Elisée Reclus, Europe, Vol. IV, pp. 309-310. New York, 1882.

Elisée Reclus, Europe, Vol. IV, pp. 309-310. New York, 1882.

1042.

Anatole Leroy-Beaulieu, Empire of the Tsars, Vol. I, p. 107. New York, 1893.

Anatole Leroy-Beaulieu, Empire of the Tsars, Vol. I, p. 107. New York, 1893.

1043.

H.R. Mill, International Geography, pp. 220-222. New York, 1902.

H.R. Mill, International Geography, pp. 220-222. New York, 1902.

1044.

Vidal-Lablache, Atlas Général, Maps pp. 63, 64, 93. Paris, 1909.

Vidal-Lablache, Atlas Général, Maps pp. 63, 64, 93. Paris, 1909.

1045.

H.R. Mill, International Geography, 174, 177-182. New York, 1902.

H.R. Mill, International Geography, 174, 177-182. New York, 1902.

1046.

Twelfth Census, Bulletin of Agriculture No. 181, p. 2, compared with Eleventh Census, Statistics of Population, map of negro distribution, p. XCVII. Washington, 1895.

Twelfth Census, Bulletin of Agriculture No. 181, p. 2, compared with Eleventh Census, Statistics of Population, map of Black distribution, p. XCVII. Washington, 1895.

1047.

Twelfth Census, Bulletin of Agriculture, No. 155, p. 2. Washington, 1902.

Twelfth Census, Bulletin of Agriculture, No. 155, p. 2. Washington, 1902.

1048.

W.Z. Ripley, Races of Europe, p. 353. New York, 1899.

W.Z. Ripley, Races of Europe, p. 353. New York, 1899.

1049.

Boyd Alexander, From the Niger to the Nile, Vol. II, p. 238. London, 1907.

Boyd Alexander, From the Niger to the Nile, Vol. II, p. 238. London, 1907.

1050.

Haxthausen, Studien, Vol. I, p. 309. Die ländliche Verfassung Russlands, pp. 3, 7. Leipzig, 1866.

Haxthausen, Studien, Vol. I, p. 309. The Rural Constitution of Russia, pp. 3, 7. Leipzig, 1866.

1051.

Ratzel, History of Mankind, Vol. II, pp. 79-83. London, 1896-1898. J. Wappaüs, Handbuch der Geographie und Statistik des ehemaligen spanischen Mittel- und Sud-Amerika, pp. 978-980, 1019. Leipzig, 1863-1870.

Ratzel, History of Mankind, Vol. II, pp. 79-83. London, 1896-1898. J. Wappaüs, Handbook of Geography and Statistics of Former Spanish Central and South America, pp. 978-980, 1019. Leipzig, 1863-1870.

1052.

Ratzel, History of Mankind, Vol. II, pp. 206-208. London, 1896-1898.

Ratzel, History of Mankind, Vol. II, pp. 206-208. London, 1896-1898.

1053.

Nordenskiold, Voyage of the Vega, pp. 60, 156, 452. New York, 1882. Alexander P. Engelhardt, A Russian Province of the North, pp. 291-295. London, 1899.

Nordenskiold, Voyage of the Vega, pp. 60, 156, 452. New York, 1882. Alexander P. Engelhardt, A Russian Province of the North, pp. 291-295. London, 1899.

1054.

Ibid., pp. 83, 88-91.

Ibid., pp. 83, 88-91.

1055.

Ratzel, History of Mankind, Vol. III, pp. 166-167. London. 1896-1898.

Ratzel, History of Mankind, Vol. III, pp. 166-167. London. 1896-1898.

1056.

James Bryce, Impressions of South Africa, p. 107. New York, 1897.

James Bryce, Impressions of South Africa, p. 107. New York, 1897.

1057.

Herodotus, Melpomene, 19, 46.

Herodotus, Melpomene, 19, 46.

1058.

Thomas Hodgkin, Italy and Her Invaders, Vol. I, p. 262. Oxford, 1892.

Thomas Hodgkin, Italy and Her Invaders, Vol. I, p. 262. Oxford, 1892.

1059.

Ratzel, History of Mankind, Vol. II, p. 220. London, 1896-1898.

Ratzel, History of Mankind, Vol. II, p. 220. London, 1896-1898.

1060.

Genesis, XIII, 2, 5.

Genesis 13:2, 5.

1061.

James Bryce, Impressions of South Africa, p. 474. New York, 1897.

James Bryce, Impressions of South Africa, p. 474. New York, 1897.

1062.

Eleventh Census, Indian Report, pp. 143-144. Washington, 1894.

Eleventh Census, Indian Report, pp. 143-144. Washington, 1894.

1063.

Sven Hedin, Central Asia and Tibet, Vol. I, pp. 18-20. London and New York, 1903.

Sven Hedin, Central Asia and Tibet, Vol. I, pp. 18-20. London and New York, 1903.

1064.

J.L. Burckhardt, Notes on the Bedouins and Wahabys, Vol. I, pp. 32-33. London, 1831.

J.L. Burckhardt, Notes on the Bedouins and Wahabys, Vol. I, pp. 32-33. London, 1831.

1065.

George Adam Smith, Historical Geography of the Holy Land, pp. 8-10. New York, 1897.

George Adam Smith, Historical Geography of the Holy Land, pp. 8-10. New York, 1897.

1066.

Gibbon, Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, Vol. V, pp. 78-79. New York, 1858.

Gibbon, Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, Vol. V, pp. 78-79. New York, 1858.

1067.

L. March Phillipps, In the Desert, p. 95. London, 1905.

L. March Phillipps, In the Desert, p. 95. London, 1905.

1068.

Sir Samuel W. Baker, The Nile Tributaries of Abyssinia, pp. 88, 128, 129, 135. Hartford, 1868.

Sir Samuel W. Baker, The Nile Tributaries of Abyssinia, pp. 88, 128, 129, 135. Hartford, 1868.

1069.

Journey of John de Carpini and William de Rubruquis in 1253, pp. 8, 217. Hakluyt Society, London, 1903.

Journey of John de Carpini and William de Rubruquis in 1253, pp. 8, 217. Hakluyt Society, London, 1903.

1070.

James Bryce, Impressions of South Africa, pp. 107, 421. New York, 1897.

James Bryce, Impressions of South Africa, pp. 107, 421. New York, 1897.

1071.

Wilhelm Roscher, National-Oekonomik des Ackerbaues, p. 44. Stuttgart, 1888.

Wilhelm Roscher, National Economics of Agriculture, p. 44. Stuttgart, 1888.

1072.

A full discussion in Malthus, Principles of Population, Book I, chap. 7.

A complete discussion can be found in Malthus, Principles of Population, Book I, chap. 7.

1073.

J.L. Burckhardt, Notes on the Bedouins and Wahabys, Vol. I, pp. 133-144, 157-160. London, 1831. S.M. Zwemer, Arabia, The Cradle of Islam, 155-157. New York, 1900.

J.L. Burckhardt, Notes on the Bedouins and Wahabys, Vol. I, pp. 133-144, 157-160. London, 1831. S.M. Zwemer, Arabia, The Cradle of Islam, 155-157. New York, 1900.

1074.

Vambery, Reise in Mittelasien, pp. 285, 289-297. Leipzig, 1873.

Vambery, Journey Through Central Asia, pp. 285, 289-297. Leipzig, 1873.

1075.

Alexis Krausse, Russia in Asia, pp. 127-129. New York, 1899.

Alexis Krausse, Russia in Asia, pp. 127-129. New York, 1899.

1076.

Ratzel, History of Mankind, Vol. III, pp. 174-175. London, 1896-1898.

Ratzel, History of Mankind, Vol. III, pp. 174-175. London, 1896-1898.

1077.

Wallace, Russia, pp. 340-342. New York, 1904.

Wallace, Russia, pp. 340-342. New York, 1904.

1078.

L. March Phillipps, In the Desert, pp. 17, 63-66. London, 1905.

L. March Phillipps, In the Desert, pp. 17, 63-66. London, 1905.

1079.

Felix Dubois, Timbuctoo, pp. 256, 324-325. Translated from the French, New York, 1896.

Felix Dubois, Timbuktu, pp. 256, 324-325. Translated from the French, New York, 1896.

1080.

Heinrich Barth, Travels in North and Central Africa, Vol. I, pp. 287-288, 293, 305. New York, 1857.

Heinrich Barth, Travels in North and Central Africa, Vol. I, pp. 287-288, 293, 305. New York, 1857.

1081.

Felix Dubois, Timbuctoo, pp. 133-134, 203, 206-207, 229, 232, 239-245. New York, 1896.

Felix Dubois, Timbuctoo, pp. 133-134, 203, 206-207, 229, 232, 239-245. New York, 1896.

1082.

Boyd Alexander, From the Niger to the Nile, Vol. II, pp. 1-2, 6, 16-18, 80. London, 1907.

Boyd Alexander, From the Niger to the Nile, Vol. II, pp. 1-2, 6, 16-18, 80. London, 1907.

1083.

Gibbon, Decline and Fall of the Roman. Empire, Vol. V, p. 87. New York, 1858.

Gibbon, Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, Vol. V, p. 87. New York, 1858.

1084.

Pliny, Historia Naturalis, V, 3.

Pliny, *Natural History*, V, 3.

1085.

Gibbon, Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, Vol. II, p. 495. New York, 1858.

Gibbon, Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, Vol. II, p. 495. New York, 1858.

1086.

Ellsworth Huntington, The Pulse of Asia, p. 340. Boston, 1907.

Ellsworth Huntington, The Pulse of Asia, p. 340. Boston, 1907.

1087.

Pallas, Travels in the Southern Provinces of Russia in 1793-1794, Vol. II, p. 4. London, 1812.

Pallas, Travels in the Southern Provinces of Russia in 1793-1794, Vol. II, p. 4. London, 1812.

1088.

Ibid., Vol. I, pp. 94, 256.

Ibid., Vol. I, pp. 94, 256.

1089.

Genesis, XIII, 7-8; XXI, 25-30; XXVI, 15-22.

Genesis 13:7-8; 21:25-30; 26:15-22.

1090.

Herbert Spencer, Principles of Sociology, Vol. I, p. 545. New York, 1887.

Herbert Spencer, Principles of Sociology, Vol. I, p. 545. New York, 1887.

1091.

Thucydides, Book II, 96.

Thucydides, Book 2, 96.

1092.

Herodotus, IV, 46.

Herodotus, Book IV, Section 46.

1093.

Meredith Townsend, Asia and Europe, Chapter on Arab Courage. New York, 1904.

Meredith Townsend, Asia and Europe, Chapter on Arab Courage. New York, 1904.

1094.

Wilhelm Roscher, National-Oekonomik des Ackerbaues, p. 44. Stuttgart, 1888.

Wilhelm Roscher, National Economics of Agriculture, p. 44. Stuttgart, 1888.

1095.

J.L. Burckhardt, Notes on the Bedouins and Wahabys, Vol. I, pp. 35-36. London, 1831.

J.L. Burckhardt, Notes on the Bedouins and Wahabys, Vol. I, pp. 35-36. London, 1831.

1096.

John de Plano Carpini, Journey to the Northeast, pp. 114-117, 120-125. Hakluyt Society, London, 1904.

John de Plano Carpini, Journey to the Northeast, pp. 114-117, 120-125. Hakluyt Society, London, 1904.

1097.

Ratzel, History of Mankind, Vol. I, p. 28. London, 1896-1898.

Ratzel, History of Mankind, Vol. I, p. 28. London, 1896-1898.

1098.

J.H. Speke, Discovery of the Source of the Nile, pp. 241-244. New York, 1868.

J.H. Speke, Discovery of the Source of the Nile, pp. 241-244. New York, 1868.

1099.

Journey of William de Rubruquis, pp. 18-27, Hakluyt Society, London, 1900.

Journey of William de Rubruquis, pp. 18-27, Hakluyt Society, London, 1900.

1100.

Jerome Dowd, The Negro Races, Vol. I, pp. 225-232. New York, 1907.

Jerome Dowd, The Black Races, Vol. I, pp. 225-232. New York, 1907.

1101.

Sir Francis Younghusband, The Heart of a Continent, pp. 85-98. London, 1904.

Sir Francis Younghusband, The Heart of a Continent, pp. 85-98. London, 1904.

1102.

Ratzel, History of Mankind, Vol. I, p. 170. London, 1896-1898.

Ratzel, History of Mankind, Vol. I, p. 170. London, 1896-1898.

1103.

Heinrich Barth, Travels in North and Central Africa, Vol. I, pp. 148, 152, 204, 210, 303. New York, 1857.

Heinrich Barth, Travels in North and Central Africa, Vol. I, pp. 148, 152, 204, 210, 303. New York, 1857.

1104.

J.L. Burckhardt, Notes on the Bedouins and Wahabys, Vol. I, pp. 115-119, 284-286, 296-300. London, 1831.

J.L. Burckhardt, Notes on the Bedouins and Wahabys, Vol. I, pp. 115-119, 284-286, 296-300. London, 1831.

1105.

Gibbon, Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, Vol. V, pp. 85-87. New York, 1857.

Gibbon, Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, Vol. V, pp. 85-87. New York, 1857.

1106.

Jerome Dowd, The Negro Races, Vol. I, pp. 234-235. New York,1907.

Jerome Dowd, The Negro Races, Vol. I, pp. 234-235. New York, 1907.

1107.

Vambery, Reise in Mittel Asien, pp. 288-290. Leipzig, 1873.

Vambery, Journey in Central Asia, pp. 288-290. Leipzig, 1873.

1108.

James Bryce, Impressions of South Africa, pp. 108, 128, 129, 155, 199, 452-453. New York, 1897.

James Bryce, Impressions of South Africa, pp. 108, 128, 129, 155, 199, 452-453. New York, 1897.

1109.

For vivid description of desert defensive warfare, see Gustav Frensen, Peter Moore's Journey to Southwest Africa. Translated from the German, 1908. Based upon interviews with hundreds of returning German soldiers from the Damara campaign.

For a vivid description of desert defensive warfare, check out Gustav Frensen, Peter Moore's Journey to Southwest Africa. Translated from German, 1908. Based on interviews with hundreds of returning German soldiers from the Damara campaign.

1110.

H.B. Mill, International Geography, p. 454. New York, 1902.

H.B. Mill, International Geography, p. 454. New York, 1902.

1111.

Henry Norman, All the Russias, p. 273. New York, 1902.

Henry Norman, All the Russias, p. 273. New York, 1902.

1112.

L. March Phillipps, In the Desert, pp. 54-56. London, 1905.

L. March Phillipps, In the Desert, pp. 54-56. London, 1905.

1113.

Ibid., pp. 181-164.

Ibid., pp. 181-164.

1114.

Ratzel, History of Mankind, Vol. III, p. 177. London, 1896-1898.

Ratzel, History of Mankind, Vol. III, p. 177. London, 1896-1898.

1115.

Anatole Leroy-Beaulieu, The Empire of the Tsars, Vol. I, pp. 29-30. New York, 1893.

Anatole Leroy-Beaulieu, The Empire of the Tsars, Vol. I, pp. 29-30. New York, 1893.

1116.

Pallas, Travels through the Southern Provinces of Russia, Vol. I, pp. 532-533. London, 1812.

Pallas, Travels through the Southern Provinces of Russia, Vol. I, pp. 532-533. London, 1812.

1117.

Sir S.W. Baker, Nile Tributaries of Abyssinia, p. 88. Hartford, 1868.

Sir S.W. Baker, Nile Tributaries of Abyssinia, p. 88. Hartford, 1868.

1118.

David Livingstone, Missionary Travels, pp. 53-56, 169. New York, 1858.

David Livingstone, Missionary Travels, pp. 53-56, 169. New York, 1858.

1119.

Sven Hedin, Central Asia and Tibet, Vol. I, pp. 96, 136, 359, New York and London, 1903. Ellsworth Huntington, The Pulse of Asia, pp. 193, 202, 212, 213. Boston, 1907.

Sven Hedin, Central Asia and Tibet, Vol. I, pp. 96, 136, 359, New York and London, 1903. Ellsworth Huntington, The Pulse of Asia, pp. 193, 202, 212, 213. Boston, 1907.

1120.

Sir Francis Younghusband, The Heart of a Continent, pp. 103, 104, 107, 112-116, 120, 125-128, 137, 138, 143. London, 1904.

Sir Francis Younghusband, The Heart of a Continent, pp. 103, 104, 107, 112-116, 120, 125-128, 137, 138, 143. London, 1904.

1121.

S.W. Zwemer, Arabia the Cradle of Islam, pp. 147, 151. New York, 1900. D.G. Hogarth, The Nearer East, pp. 185, 195. 265. London, 1902.

S.W. Zwemer, Arabia the Cradle of Islam, pp. 147, 151. New York, 1900. D.G. Hogarth, The Nearer East, pp. 185, 195. 265. London, 1902.

1122.

Nachtigal, Sahara und Sudan, Vol. I, pp. 214-218, 267-269. Berlin, 1879.

Nachtigal, Sahara und Sudan, Vol. I, pp. 214-218, 267-269. Berlin, 1879.

1123.

Ratzel, History of Mankind, Vol. III, p. 168. London, 1896-1898.

Ratzel, History of Mankind, Vol. III, p. 168. London, 1896-1898.

1124.

H.R. Mill, International Geography, pp. 906, 914. New York, 1902.

H.R. Mill, International Geography, pp. 906, 914. New York, 1902.

1125.

H. Barth, Travels in North and Central Africa, Vol. I, pp. 152, 207, 210, 211. New York, 1857.

H. Barth, Travels in North and Central Africa, Vol. I, pp. 152, 207, 210, 211. New York, 1857.

1126.

Ibid., 41-44, 52, 61-64, 67, 76, 93, 95, 99, 103, 105.

Ibid., 41-44, 52, 61-64, 67, 76, 93, 95, 99, 103, 105.

1127.

L. March Phillipps, In the Desert, p. 174. London, 1905.

L. March Phillipps, In the Desert, p. 174. London, 1905.

1128.

Sir Thomas Holdich, India, pp. 91-93. London, 1905.

Sir Thomas Holdich, India, pp. 91-93. London, 1905.

1129.

M.A. Stein, The Sand-Buried Ruins of Khotan, pp. 275-324, 354-408. London, 1903.

M.A. Stein, The Sand-Buried Ruins of Khotan, pp. 275-324, 354-408. London, 1903.

1130.

H. Barth, Travels in North and Central Africa, Vol. I, chap. III. New York, 1857.

H. Barth, Travels in North and Central Africa, Vol. I, chap. III. New York, 1857.

1131.

Ellsworth Huntington, The Pulse of Asia, pp. 160-190, 209, 304, 309-310, 315, 367. Boston, 1907.

Ellsworth Huntington, The Pulse of Asia, pp. 160-190, 209, 304, 309-310, 315, 367. Boston, 1907.

1132.

J.L, Burckhardt, Notes on the Bedouins and Wahabys, Vol. I, pp. 57-64, 238-242. London, 1831.

J.L. Burckhardt, Notes on the Bedouins and Wahabys, Vol. I, pp. 57-64, 238-242. London, 1831.

1133.

E. Huntington, The Pulse of Asia, pp. 137-138. Boston, 1907.

E. Huntington, The Pulse of Asia, pp. 137-138. Boston, 1907.

1134.

John de Plano Carpini, Journey to the Northeast, pp. 109-111, 120. Hakluyt Society, London, 1904. Journey of William de Rubruquis, pp. 191-193, 203, 224. Hakluyt Society, London, 1903.

John de Plano Carpini, Journey to the Northeast, pp. 109-111, 120. Hakluyt Society, London, 1904. Journey of William de Rubruquis, pp. 191-193, 203, 224. Hakluyt Society, London, 1903.

1135.

W.W. Rockhill, The Land of the Lamas, p. 80. New York, 1891.

W.W. Rockhill, The Land of the Lamas, p. 80. New York, 1891.

1136.

Vambery, Reise in Mittel Asien, p. 295. Leipzig, 1873.

Vambery, Journey in Central Asia, p. 295. Leipzig, 1873.

1137.

Nachtigal, Sahara und Sudan, Vol. I, pp. 257, 268. Berlin, 1879.

Nachtigal, Sahara und Sudan, Vol. I, pp. 257, 268. Berlin, 1879.

1138.

E. Huntington, The Pulse of Asia, p. 74. Boston, 1907.

E. Huntington, The Pulse of Asia, p. 74. Boston, 1907.

1139.

L. March Phillipps, In the Desert, pp. 198-201. London, 1905.

L. March Phillipps, In the Desert, pp. 198-201. London, 1905.

1140.

D. Livingstone, Travels and Researches in South Africa, p. 55. New York, 1859.

D. Livingstone, Travels and Researches in South Africa, p. 55. New York, 1859.

1141.

W. Roscher, Grundlagen der Nationalökonomik, Book VI, chap. II, p. 244. Stuttgart, 1886.

W. Roscher, Foundations of Political Economy, Book VI, chap. II, p. 244. Stuttgart, 1886.

1142.

Ratzel, History of Mankind, Vol. III, p. 170. London, 1896-98.

Ratzel, History of Mankind, Vol. III, p. 170. London, 1896-98.

1143.

W.W. Rockhill, Land of the Lamas, p. 80. New York, 1891.

W.W. Rockhill, Land of the Lamas, p. 80. New York, 1891.

1144.

J.L. Burckhardt, Notes on the Bedouins and Wahabys, Vol. I, pp. 106, 187. London, 1831. S.M. Zwemer, Arabia the Cradle of Islam, pp. 162, 268. New York, 1900.

J.L. Burckhardt, Notes on the Bedouins and Wahabys, Vol. I, pp. 106, 187. London, 1831. S.M. Zwemer, Arabia the Cradle of Islam, pp. 162, 268. New York, 1900.

1145.

Westermarck, History of Human Marriage, p. 429, notes 2 and 5, p. 440, note 2, p. 507. London, 1891.

Westermarck, *History of Human Marriage*, p. 429, notes 2 and 5, p. 440, note 2, p. 507. London, 1891.

1146.

J.L. Burckhardt, Notes on the Bedouins and Wahabys, Vol. I, pp. 47, 48, 70, 71, 191-192, 239. London, 1831.

J.L. Burckhardt, Notes on the Bedouins and Wahabys, Vol. I, pp. 47, 48, 70, 71, 191-192, 239. London, 1831.

1147.

S.M. Zwemer, Arabia the Cradle of Islam, p. 128. New York, 1900.

S.M. Zwemer, Arabia the Cradle of Islam, p. 128. New York, 1900.

1148.

Ezekiel, Chap. XXVII, 21.

Ezekiel 27:21.

1149.

For economic principle, see W. Roscher, Handel und Gewerbefleiss, pp. 141-147. Stuttgart, 1899.

For economic principles, see W. Roscher, Handel und Gewerbefleiss, pp. 141-147. Stuttgart, 1899.

1150.

Genesis, Chap. XXXVII, 25-28, 36.

Genesis 37:25-28, 36.

1151.

W. Roscher, National-Oekonomik des Ackerbaues, p. 39, Note 11. Stuttgart, 1888.

W. Roscher, National Economics of Agriculture, p. 39, Note 11. Stuttgart, 1888.

1152.

S.P. Scott, History of the Moorish Empire in Europe, Vol. III, p. 616. Philadelphia, 1904.

S.P. Scott, History of the Moorish Empire in Europe, Vol. III, p. 616. Philadelphia, 1904.

1153.

Felix Dubois, Timbuctoo, pp. 251-252. New York, 1896.

Felix Dubois, Timbuktu, pp. 251-252. New York, 1896.

1154.

Ibid., pp. 257-264.

Ibid., pp. 257-264.

1155.

S.M. Zwemer, Arabia the Cradle of Islam, p. 151. New York, 1900.

S.M. Zwemer, Arabia the Cradle of Islam, p. 151. New York, 1900.

1156.

George Adam Smith, Historical Geography of the Holy Land, pp. 182-184. New York, 1897.

George Adam Smith, Historical Geography of the Holy Land, pp. 182-184. New York, 1897.

1157.

J.L. Burckhardt, Notes on the Bedouins and Wahabys, Vol. I, p. 65. London, 1831.

J.L. Burckhardt, Notes on the Bedouins and Wahabys, Vol. I, p. 65. London, 1831.

1158.

L. March Phillipps, In the Desert, pp. 130-134. London, 1903.

L. March Phillipps, In the Desert, pp. 130-134. London, 1903.

1159.

F.R. Martin, A History of Oriental Carpets before 1800, pp. 9, 29, 69 et seq., 101, 121. Vienna, 1908. G. LeStrange, Land of the Eastern Caliphates, pp. 37, 293-294, 353, 363, 471. Cambridge, 1905.

F.R. Martin, A History of Oriental Carpets before 1800, pp. 9, 29, 69 et seq., 101, 121. Vienna, 1908. G. LeStrange, Land of the Eastern Caliphates, pp. 37, 293-294, 353, 363, 471. Cambridge, 1905.

1160.

J.K. Mumford, Oriental Rugs, pp. 23-40, 100-111. New York, 1895.

J.K. Mumford, Oriental Rugs, pp. 23-40, 100-111. New York, 1895.

1161.

D.G. Hogarth, The Nearer East, pp. 197-198. London, 1902.

D.G. Hogarth, The Nearer East, pp. 197-198. London, 1902.

1162.

J.K. Mumford, Oriental Rugs, p. 61. New York, 1895.

J.K. Mumford, Oriental Rugs, p. 61. New York, 1895.

1163.

J. Ferguson, History of Architecture, Vol. II, pp. 277-278, 499, 500. New York. J. Ferguson, History of Indian and Eastern Architecture, Vol. II, pp. 210-214. New York, 1891.

J. Ferguson, History of Architecture, Vol. II, pp. 277-278, 499, 500. New York. J. Ferguson, History of Indian and Eastern Architecture, Vol. II, pp. 210-214. New York, 1891.

1164.

Wilhelm Bode, Vorderasiatische Knüpfteppiche, pp. 3-4. Leipzig.

Wilhelm Bode, Vorderasiatische Knüpfteppiche, pp. 3-4. Leipzig.

1165.

Gibbon, Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, Vol. V, p. 78. New York, 1858.

Gibbon, Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, Vol. V, p. 78. New York, 1858.

1166.

Sir S.W. Baker, Exploration of the Nile Tributaries of Abyssinia, pp. 148-152. Hartford, 1868.

Sir S.W. Baker, Exploration of the Nile Tributaries of Abyssinia, pp. 148-152. Hartford, 1868.

1167.

Strabo, Book VII, chap. III, 7, 17; chap. IV, 6. Book XI, chap. II, 1, 2, 3.

Strabo, Book VII, ch. III, 7, 17; ch. IV, 6. Book XI, ch. II, 1, 2, 3.

1168.

J. Wappaüs, Handbuch der Geographie und Statistik des chemaligen spanischen Mittel- und Sud-Amerika, p. 1019. Leipzig, 1863-1870.

J. Wappaüs, Handbook of Geography and Statistics of the Former Spanish Central and South America, p. 1019. Leipzig, 1863-1870.

1169.

Sir F. Younghusband, The Heart of a Continent, pp. 72, 74. London, 1904. Alfred Kirchoff, Man and Earth, pp. 58-71. London.

Sir F. Younghusband, The Heart of a Continent, pp. 72, 74. London, 1904. Alfred Kirchoff, Man and Earth, pp. 58-71. London.

1170.

J.L. Burckhardt, Notes on the Bedouins and Wahabys, Vol. I, pp. 374-377. London, 1831. L. March Phillipps, In the Desert, pp. 98-100. London, 1905.

J.L. Burckhardt, Notes on the Bedouins and Wahabys, Vol. I, pp. 374-377. London, 1831. L. March Phillipps, In the Desert, pp. 98-100. London, 1905.

1171.

Exodus, Chap. XXII, 1-4, 23.

Exodus 22:1-4, 23.

1172.

John de Plano Carpini, Journey to the Northeast in 1246, pp. 110, 111, 113. Hakluyt Society, London, 1904.

John de Plano Carpini, Journey to the Northeast in 1246, pp. 110, 111, 113. Hakluyt Society, London, 1904.

1173.

Gibbon, Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, Vol. V, p. 89. New York, 1858. H. Barth, Travels in North and Central Africa, Vol. I, p. 144. New York, 1857.

Gibbon, Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, Vol. V, p. 89. New York, 1858. H. Barth, Travels in North and Central Africa, Vol. I, p. 144. New York, 1857.

1174.

E. Huntington, The Pulse of Asia, pp. 121-123. Boston, 1907.

E. Huntington, The Pulse of Asia, pp. 121-123. Boston, 1907.

1175.

James Bryce, Impressions of South Africa, p. 422. New York, 1897.

James Bryce, Impressions of South Africa, p. 422. New York, 1897.

1176.

Deuteronomy, VII, 1-3.

Deuteronomy 7:1-3.

1177.

Ratzel, History of Mankind, Vol. III, p. 184. London, 1896-1898.

Ratzel, History of Mankind, Vol. III, p. 184. London, 1896-1898.

1178.

Boyd Alexander, From the Niger to the Nile, Vol. I, pp. 190-197. London, 1907.

Boyd Alexander, From the Niger to the Nile, Vol. I, pp. 190-197. London, 1907.

1179.

H. Barth, Travels in North and Central Africa, Vol. I, pp. 202, 277-281. New York, 1857.

H. Barth, Travels in North and Central Africa, Vol. I, pp. 202, 277-281. New York, 1857.

1180.

Ratzel, History of Mankind, Vol. III, p. 173. London, 1896-1898.

Ratzel, History of Mankind, Vol. III, p. 173. London, 1896-1898.

1181.

Ibid., Vol. III, Chapter on Islam, pp. 195-204.

Ibid., Vol. III, Chapter on Islam, pp. 195-204.

1182.

George Adam Smith, Historical Geography of the Holy Land, pp. 28-30. New York, 1897. L. March Phillipps, In the Desert, pp. 101-105. London, 1905.

George Adam Smith, Historical Geography of the Holy Land, pp. 28-30. New York, 1897. L. March Phillipps, In the Desert, pp. 101-105. London, 1905.

1183.

E.A. Freeman, Historical Geography of Europe, pp. 114-116. London, 1882.

E.A. Freeman, Historical Geography of Europe, pp. 114-116. London, 1882.

1184.

George Adam Smith, Historical Geography of the Holy Land, pp. 88-90. New York, 1897.

George Adam Smith, Historical Geography of the Holy Land, pp. 88-90. New York, 1897.

1185.

Jeremiah, Chap. XXXV, 6-14.

Jeremiah 35:6-14.


Chapter XV—Mountain Barriers And Their Passes

Man as part of the mobile envelope of the earth.

The important characteristic of plains is their power to facilitate every phase of historical movement; that of mountains is their power to retard, arrest, or deflect it. Man, as part of the mobile envelope of the earth, like air and water feels always the pull of gravity. From this he can never fully emancipate himself. By an output of energy he may climb the steepest slope, but with every upward step the ascent becomes more difficult, owing to the diminution of warmth and air and the increasing tax upon the heart.1186 Maintenance of life in high altitudes is always a struggle. The decrease of food resources from lower to higher levels makes the passage of a mountain system an ordeal for every migrating people or marching army that has to live off the country which it traverses. Mountains therefore repel population by their inaccessibility and also by their harsh conditions of life, while the lowlands attract it, both in migration and settlement. Historical movement, when forced into the upheaved areas of the earth, avoids the ridges and peaks, seeks the valleys and passes, where communication with the lowlands is easiest.

The key feature of plains is their ability to support every stage of historical movement; mountains, on the other hand, tend to slow down, stop, or redirect it. Humans, as part of the earth's dynamic environment, like air and water, constantly feel the pull of gravity. They can never completely free themselves from it. Through effort, they can climb the steepest slopes, but with each upward step, the ascent becomes tougher, due to the drop in warmth and air and the increasing strain on the heart.1186 Surviving in high altitudes is always challenging. The decrease in food sources from lower to higher elevations makes traversing a mountain range a tough experience for any migrating group or marching army relying on the land they pass through. As a result, mountains deter population growth due to their inaccessibility and harsh living conditions, while lowlands draw people in, both for migration and settlement. Historical movement, when pushed into the elevated areas of the earth, avoids the ridges and peaks and instead seeks out the valleys and passes, where connecting with the lowlands is easiest.

Inaccessibility of mountains.

High massive mountain systems present the most effective barriers which man meets on the land surface of the earth. To the spread of population they offer a resistance which long serves to exclude settlers. The difficulty of making roads up steep, rocky slopes and through the forests usually covering their rain-drenched sides, is deterrent enough; but in addition to this, general infertility, paucity of arable land, harsh climatic conditions, and the practical lack of communication with the outside world offer scant basis for subsistence. Hence, as a rule, only when pressure of population in the lowlands becomes too great under prevailing economic methods, do clearings and cabins begin to creep up the slopes. Mountains are always regions of late occupation. Even in the Stone Age, we find the long-headed race of Mediterranean stock, who originally populated Europe, distributed over the continent close up to the foot of the high Alps, but not in the mountains themselves, and only scantily represented in the Auvergne Plateau of France. The inhospitable highlands of Switzerland, the German Alps, and the Auvergne received their first population later when the Alpine race began to occupy western Europe.1187 The Mittelgebirge of Germany were not settled till the Middle Ages. In the United States, the flood of population had spread westward by 1840 to the ninety-fifth meridian and the north-south course of the Missouri River; but out of this sea of settlement the Adirondack Mountains, a few scattered spots in the Appalachians, and the Ozark Highlands rose as so many islands of uninhabited wilderness, and they remain to-day areas of sparser population. In 1800, the "bare spots" in the eastern mountains were more pronounced. [See map page 156.] Great stretches of the Rocky Mountains, of the Laurentian Highlands of Canada, like smaller patches in the Scandinavian and Swiss Alps, are practically uninhabited.

High, massive mountain systems create the most effective barriers that people encounter on Earth's land surface. They resist population spread, often preventing settlers from moving in for a long time. The challenges of building roads up steep, rocky slopes and through the forests that usually cover their rain-soaked sides are discouraging enough; additionally, the general infertility, lack of arable land, harsh climate, and limited communication with the outside world provide little support for survival. As a result, it’s usually only when the pressure of population in the lowlands becomes too great under the current economic systems that clearings and cabins start to move up the slopes. Mountains are typically areas of late settlement. Even during the Stone Age, we see the long-headed Mediterranean race, who first populated Europe, distributed throughout the continent right up to the foot of the high Alps, but not in the mountains themselves, and only sparsely found in the Auvergne Plateau of France. The harsh highlands of Switzerland, the German Alps, and the Auvergne were not populated until later, when the Alpine race began to settle in western Europe.1187 The Mittelgebirge of Germany were settled only during the Middle Ages. In the United States, the population had spread westward by 1840 to the ninety-fifth meridian and the north-south route of the Missouri River; however, within this sea of settlement, the Adirondack Mountains, a few scattered areas in the Appalachians, and the Ozark Highlands remained as islands of uninhabited wilderness, and they continue to have lower population densities today. In 1800, the "bare spots" in the eastern mountains were much more noticeable. [See map page 156.] Large areas of the Rocky Mountains and the Laurentian Highlands of Canada, along with smaller patches in the Scandinavian and Swiss Alps, are practically uninhabited.

Mountains as transit regions.

Mountain regions, like deserts and seas, become mere transit districts, which man traverses as quickly as possible. Hence they often lie as great inert areas in the midst of active historical lands, and first appear upon the historical stage in minor rôles, when they are wanted by the plains people as a passway to desirable regions beyond. Then, as a rule, only their transit routes are secured, while the less accessible regions are ignored. Cæsar makes no mention of the Alps, except to state that he has crossed them, until some of the mountain tribes try to block the passage of Roman merchants or armies; then they become important enough to be conquered. It was not till after the Cimbri in 102 B.C. invaded Italy by the Brenner route, that the Romans realized the value of Rhaetia (Tyrol) as a thoroughfare from Italy to Germany, and began its conquest in 36 B.C. This was the same value which the Tyrol so long had for the old German Empire and later for Austria,—merely to secure connection with the Po Valley. The need of land communication with the Rhone Valley led the Romans to attack the Salyes, who inhabited the Maritime Alps, and after eighty years of war to force from them the concession of a narrow transit strip, twelve stadia or one and a half miles wide, for the purpose of making a road to Massilia.1188 The necessity of controlling such transit lands has drawn British India into the occupation of mountain Baluchistan, Kashmir and Sikkim, just as it has caused the highlands of Afghanistan to figure actively in the expansion policy of both India and Russia. The conquest of such transit lands has always been attended by road building, from the construction of the Roman highway through the Brenner Pass to the modern Russian military road through the Pass of Dariel across the Caucasus, and the yet more recent Indian railroad to Darjeeling, with the highway extension beyond to the Tibetan frontier through Himalayan Sikkim.

Mountain regions, like deserts and seas, turn into just transit areas that people cross as quickly as they can. As a result, they often end up as large, inactive spaces surrounded by active historical lands and only show up on the historical scene in minor roles when the people from the plains need them as pathways to preferred regions beyond. Usually, only the routes for crossing are established, while the harder-to-reach areas are overlooked. Caesar mentions the Alps only to say that he crossed them, until some mountain tribes attempt to block the passage of Roman merchants or armies; then they become significant enough to be conquered. It wasn't until the Cimbri invaded Italy via the Brenner route in 102 B.C. that the Romans recognized the importance of Rhaetia (Tyrol) as a route from Italy to Germany and began its conquest in 36 B.C. This was the same importance the Tyrol held for the old German Empire and later for Austria—merely to ensure a connection with the Po Valley. The need for land communication with the Rhone Valley led the Romans to attack the Salyes, who lived in the Maritime Alps, and after eighty years of war, they forced them to allow a narrow transit strip, twelve stadia or one and a half miles wide, to build a road to Massilia.1188 The need to control such transit lands has led British India to occupy mountain regions like Baluchistan, Kashmir, and Sikkim, just as it has made the highlands of Afghanistan an important part of the expansion policies of both India and Russia. The conquest of these transit lands has always included road building, from the construction of the Roman highway through the Brenner Pass to the modern Russian military road through the Pass of Dariel across the Caucasus, and the more recent Indian railroad to Darjeeling, with the highway extending beyond to the Tibetan border through Himalayan Sikkim.

Such mountain regions attain independent historical importance when their population increases enough to form the nucleus of a state, and to acquire additional territory about the highland base either by conquest or voluntary union, while they utilize their naturally protected location and their power to grant safe transit to their allies, as means to secure their political autonomy. Therefore to mountain regions so often falls the rôle of buffer states. Such were medieval Burgundy and modern Savoy, which occupied part of the same territory, Navarre which in the late Middle Ages controlled the important passway around the western end of the Pyrenees, and Switzerland which commands the passes of the central Alps. The position of such mountain states is, however, always fraught with danger, owing to the weakness inherent in their small area and yet smaller allowance of productive soil, to their diverse ethnic elements, and the forces working against political consolidation in their deeply dissected surface. Political solidarity has a hard, slow birth in the mountains.

Mountain regions gain significant historical importance when their populations grow enough to establish the foundation of a state and acquire additional territory around their highland base, either through conquest or voluntary union. They leverage their naturally protected locations and the ability to provide safe passage to their allies to secure their political autonomy. Thus, mountain regions often serve as buffer states. Examples include medieval Burgundy and modern Savoy, which shared part of the same territory, Navarre, which controlled the crucial pathway around the western end of the Pyrenees during the late Middle Ages, and Switzerland, which oversees the passes of the central Alps. However, the position of these mountain states is always precarious due to the limitations of their small land area and even smaller amount of arable soil, the mix of diverse ethnic groups, and the challenges to political unity presented by their rugged terrain. Political cohesion develops slowly and with difficulty in mountainous areas.

Transition forms of relief between highlands and lowlands.

In view of the barrier character of mountains, a fact of immense importance to the distribution of man and his activities is the rarity of abrupt, ungraded forms of relief on the earth's surface. The physiographic cause lies in the elasticity of the earth's crust and the leveling effect of weathering and denudation. Everywhere mountains are worn down and rounded off, while valleys broaden and fill up to shallow trough outlines. Transition forms of relief abound. Human intercourse meets therefore few absolute barriers on the land; but these few reveal the obstacles to historical movement in perpendicular reliefs. The mile-high walls of the Grand Cañon of the Colorado are an insuperable obstacle to intercourse for a stretch of three hundred miles. The glacier-crowned ridge of the Bernese Alps is crossed by no wagon road between the Grimsel Pass and the upper Rhone highway around their western end, a distance of 100 kilometers (62 miles). The Pennine Alps have no pass between the Great St. Bernard and the Simplon, a distance of 90 kilometers (54 miles).

Given that mountains create barriers, it's crucial to note the significant rarity of steep, ungraded landforms on the Earth's surface when considering how people and their activities are distributed. The physical reason for this is the flexibility of the Earth's crust and the leveling effects of weathering and erosion. Everywhere mountains are eroded and smoothed, while valleys widen and fill in to shallow shapes. There are plenty of transitional landforms. Therefore, human movement encounters few absolute obstacles on land; however, those few do highlight the challenges to historical movement in steep landscapes. The mile-high cliffs of the Grand Canyon of the Colorado create an impassable barrier for a stretch of three hundred miles. The glacier-topped ridge of the Bernese Alps has no wagon road between the Grimsel Pass and the upper Rhône highway around their western side, a distance of 100 kilometers (62 miles). The Pennine Alps lack a pass between the Great St. Bernard and the Simplon, covering a distance of 90 kilometers (54 miles).

Importance of transition slopes.

Gentle transition slopes or terrace lands facilitate almost everywhere access to the lowest, most habitable and therefore, from the human standpoint, most important section of mountains. They combine the ease of intercourse characteristic of plains with many advantages of the mountains, and especially in warm climates they unite in a narrow zone both tropical and temperate vegetation. The human value of these transition slopes holds equally of single hills, massive mountain systems, and continental reliefs. The earth as a whole owes much of its habitability to these gently graded slopes. Continents and countries in which they are meagerly developed suffer from difficulty of intercourse, retarded development and poverty of the choicest habitable areas. This is one disadvantage of South Africa, emphasized farther by a poor coastline. The Pacific face of Australia would gain vastly in historical importance, if the drop from the highlands to the ocean were stretched out into a broad slope, like that which links our Atlantic coastal plain with the Appalachian highlands. There each river valley shows three characteristic anthropo-geographical sub-divisions—the active seaports and tide-water tillage of its lower course, the contrasted agriculture of its hilly course, the upland farms, waterpower industries and mines of its headstream valleys, each landscape giving its population distinctive characteristics. The same natural features, with the same effect upon human activities and population, appear in the long seaward slopes of France, Germany and northern Italy.

Gentle transition slopes or terraced lands provide easy access everywhere to the lowest, most livable, and therefore most significant part of mountains from a human perspective. They combine the ease of movement found in plains with many benefits of mountainous areas, and especially in warm climates, they bring together both tropical and temperate vegetation in a narrow zone. The human significance of these transition slopes applies equally to single hills, large mountain ranges, and continent-wide landforms. The earth owes much of its habitability to these gently graded slopes. Continents and countries where they are poorly developed struggle with accessibility, slower development, and a lack of prime habitable areas. This is one disadvantage of South Africa, which is made worse by a poor coastline. The Pacific coast of Australia would gain significant historical importance if the drop from the highlands to the ocean were spread out into a wide slope, like the one that connects our Atlantic coastal plain with the Appalachian highlands. In this region, each river valley shows three distinct geographical divisions—the bustling seaports and tidal agriculture of its lower sections, the varied farming of its hilly terrains, and the upland farms, waterpower industries, and mines of its upper valleys, with each landscape shaping its population's unique characteristics. The same natural features, with similar impacts on human activities and populations, can be seen in the long coastal slopes of France, Germany, and northern Italy.

Piedmont belts as boundary zones.

At the base of the mountains themselves, where the bold relief begins, is always a piedmont zone of hilly surface but gentler grade, at whose inner or upland edge every phase of the historical movement receives a marked check. Here is a typical geographical boundary, physical and human. It shifts slightly in different periods, according to the growing density of population in the plains below and improved technique in industry and road-making. It is often both an ethnic and cultural boundary, because at the rim of the mountains the geologic and economic character of the country changes.1189 The expanding peoples of the plains spread over the piedmont so far as it offers familiar and comparatively favorable geographic conditions, scatter their settlements along the base of the mountains, and here fix their political frontier for a time, though later they may advance it to the crest of the ridge, in order to secure a more scientific boundary. The civilized population of the broad Indus Valley spread westward up the western highlands, only so far as the shelving slopes of the clay and conglomerate foothills, which constitute the piedmont of the Suleiman and Kirthar Mountains, afforded conditions for their crops. Thus from the Arabian Sea for 600 miles north to the Gomal River, the political frontier of India was defined by the line of relief dividing the limestone mountains from the alluvial plain, the marauding Baluch and Afghan hill tribes from the patient farmers of the Sind.1190 This line remained the border of India from pre-British days till the recent annexation of Baluchistan.

At the base of the mountains, where the rugged terrain starts, there's always a hilly area with a gentler slope. At its inner or upper edge, every phase of historical developments encounters a significant barrier. Here lies a typical geographical boundary, both physical and human. It shifts slightly over different periods, based on the increasing population density in the plains below and advancements in industry and road construction. This boundary often reflects both ethnic and cultural divides, as the geological and economic characteristics of the land change at the mountain’s edge. The expanding populations from the plains move into the piedmont as far as it provides familiar and relatively favorable geographic conditions, scattering their settlements along the mountain base, and temporarily establishing their political frontier there. However, they may later push it up to the ridge's crest to secure a more defined border. The settled communities of the broad Indus Valley expanded westward into the western highlands, only as far as the sloping terrain of the clay and conglomerate foothills—the piedmont of the Suleiman and Kirthar Mountains—supported their crops. Thus, from the Arabian Sea for 600 miles north to the Gomal River, India’s political frontier was marked by the line of relief separating the limestone mountains from the alluvial plain, and the raiding Baluch and Afghan hill tribes from the hardworking farmers of the Sind. This line served as the border of India from pre-British times until the recent annexation of Baluchistan.

These piedmont boundaries are most clearly defined in point of race and civilization, where superior peoples from the lowlands are found expanding at the cost of retarded mountain folk. Romans and Rhaetians once met along a line skirting the foot of the eastern Alps, as Russians to-day along the base of the Caucasus adjoin the territories of the heterogeneous tribes occupying that mountain area.1191 [See map page 225.] The plains-loving Magyars of Hungary have pushed up to the rim of mountainous Siebenburgen or Transylvania from Arad on the Maros River to Sziget on the upper Theiss, while the highland region has a predominant Roumanian population. A clearly defined linguistic and cultural boundary of Indo-Aryan speech and religion, both Hindu and Mohammedan, follows the piedmont edges of the Brahmaputra Valley, and separates the lowland inhabitants from the pagans of Tibeto-Burman speech occupying the Himalayan slope to the north and the Khasia Mountains to the south. The highland race is Mongoloid, while the Bengali of an Aryan, Dravidian and Mongoloid blend fill the river plain.1192 Such piedmont boundary lines tend to blur into bands or zones of ethnic intermixture and cultural assimilation. The western Himalayan foothills show the blend of Mongoloid and Aryan stocks, where the vigorous Rajputs of the plains have encroached upon the mountaineer's land.1193 Of almost every mountain folk it can be assumed that they once occupied their highlands to the outermost rim of the piedmont, and retired to the inner rim of this intermediary slope only under compulsion from without.

These foothill boundaries are most clearly defined in terms of race and civilization, where more advanced groups from the lowlands are expanding at the expense of the less developed mountain communities. Romans and Rhaetians once met along a line at the foot of the eastern Alps, just as Russians today are located at the base of the Caucasus near the territories of the diverse tribes living in that mountain area.1191 [See map page 225.] The plains-loving Magyars of Hungary have moved to the edge of the mountainous region of Siebenburgen or Transylvania from Arad on the Maros River to Sziget on the upper Theiss, while the highland area has a majority Roumanian population. A clearly defined linguistic and cultural boundary of Indo-Aryan speech and religion, both Hindu and Muslim, runs along the foothills of the Brahmaputra Valley, separating the lowland inhabitants from the Tibeto-Burman-speaking pagans who occupy the northern Himalayan slope and the Khasia Mountains to the south. The highland people are Mongoloid, while the Bengali population, which is a mix of Aryan, Dravidian, and Mongoloid ancestry, inhabits the river plain.1192 These foothill boundary lines tend to merge into bands or zones of ethnic mixing and cultural assimilation. The western Himalayan foothills show a blend of Mongoloid and Aryan backgrounds, where the strong Rajputs from the plains have encroached upon the mountaineers' land.1193 It can be assumed for almost every mountain group that they once occupied their highlands all the way to the outermost edge of the foothills and retreated to the inner edge of this transitional slope only because of outside pressures.

Density of population in piedmont belts.

The piedmont boundary also divides two areas of contrasted density of population. Mountain regions are, as a rule, more sparsely settled than plains. The piedmont is normally a transition region in this respect; but where high mountains rise as climatic islands of adequate water supply out of desert and steppes, they concentrate on their lower slopes all the sedentary population, making their piedmonts zones of greatest density. Low mountains in arid regions become centers of population; here their barrier nature vanishes. In the Sudanese state of Darfur, the Marra Mountains are the district best watered and most thickly populated. Nowhere higher than 6000 feet (1850 meters), they afford running water at 4000 feet elevation and water pools in the sandy beds of their wadis at 3200 feet. Below this, water disappears from the surface, and can be found only in wells whose depth and scarcity increase with distance from the central mountains.1194 The neighboring kingdom of Wadai shows similar conditions and effects.1195 In the heart of Australia, where utter desert reigns, the Macdonnell Ranges form the nucleus of the northern area occupied by the Arunta tribe of natives; farther north the Murchison Range, usually abounding in water-holes, is the center and stronghold of the Warramunga tribe.1196

The piedmont boundary also separates two areas with different population densities. Generally, mountain regions are less populated than plains. The piedmont usually acts as a transition area in this regard; however, where tall mountains rise like climatic islands with enough water in deserts and steppes, they attract the settled population to their lower slopes, turning their piedmonts into zones with the highest density. Low mountains in dry regions become population hubs; in these areas, their barrier nature disappears. In Sudan's Darfur region, the Marra Mountains are the best-watered and most densely populated district. Reaching no higher than 6,000 feet (1,850 meters), they provide running water at an elevation of 4,000 feet and water pools in the sandy beds of their wadis at 3,200 feet. Below this elevation, water is absent from the surface and can only be found in wells, which become deeper and scarcer as you move away from the central mountains.1194 The nearby Kingdom of Wadai experiences similar conditions and effects.1195 In central Australia, where the desert is overwhelming, the Macdonnell Ranges are the core of the northern area inhabited by the Arunta tribe; further north, the Murchison Range, often filled with water holes, serves as the center and stronghold of the Warramunga tribe.1196

Mineral wealth or waterpower in the mountains serves to collect an urban and industrial population along their rim, as we see it about the base of the Erz Mountains in Saxony, the Riesen range in Silesia, the coal-bearing Pennine Mountains of northwestern England, and the highlands of southern Wales, all which piedmont zones show a density of over 150 to the square kilometer (385 to the square mile). Hence the original Swiss Confederation, which included only the mountain cantons of Schwyz, Uri and Unterwalden, was greatly strengthened by the accession of the piedmont cantons of Lucerne, Zurich, Zug and Bern in the early fourteenth century, as later by St. Gall, Aargau and Geneva. These marginal cantons to-day show a density of population exceeding 385 to the square mile, and rising to 1356 in the canton of Geneva.

Mineral resources or water power in the mountains attract a growing urban and industrial population along their edges, as we can see at the base of the Erz Mountains in Saxony, the Riesen range in Silesia, the coal-rich Pennine Mountains of northwestern England, and the highlands of southern Wales, all of which have a population density of over 150 per square kilometer (385 per square mile). Therefore, the original Swiss Confederation, which included only the mountain cantons of Schwyz, Uri, and Unterwalden, was significantly strengthened by the inclusion of the piedmont cantons of Lucerne, Zurich, Zug, and Bern in the early 14th century, followed later by St. Gall, Aargau, and Geneva. Today, these peripheral cantons have a population density exceeding 385 per square mile, with Geneva's density reaching up to 1356.

Piedmont towns and roads.

Piedmont belts tend strongly towards urban development, even where rural settlement is sparse. Sparsity of population and paucity of towns within the mountains cause main of traffic to keep outside the highlands, but close enough to their base to tap their trade at every valley outlet. On the alluvial fans or plains of these valley outlets, where mountain and piedmont road intersect, towns grow up. Some of them develop into cities, when they command transverse routes of communication quite across the highlands. The ancient Via Aemilia traced the northern base of the Apennines from Ariminum on the Adriatic to Dertona at the foot of the Ligurian range back of Genoa, and connected a long line of Roman colonies. The modern railroad follows almost exactly the course of the old Roman road,1197 while a transverse line southward across the Apennines, following an ancient highway over the Poretta Pass to the Arno Valley, has maintained the old preëminence of Bologna. A line of towns, connected by highways or railroads, according to the economic development of the section, defines the bases of the Pyrenees, Alps, Jura, Apennines, Harz, Vosges, Elburz and numerous other ranges. Along the Elburz piedmont runs the imperial road of Persia from Tabriz through Teheran to Meshed. In arid regions these piedmont roads are an unfailing feature, but their towns shrink to rural settlements, except at the junction of transmontane routes.

Piedmont areas tend to focus on urban development, even in places where rural settlements are limited. The low population and few towns in the mountains mean that most traffic stays outside the highlands but remains close enough to connect with trade at every valley outlet. Towns grow at the alluvial fans or plains of these valley outlets, where mountain and piedmont roads meet. Some of these towns develop into cities when they serve as hubs for routes that cross the highlands. The ancient Via Aemilia ran along the northern base of the Apennines from Ariminum on the Adriatic to Dertona at the foot of the Ligurian range behind Genoa, linking a series of Roman colonies. The modern railroad closely follows the path of this old Roman road,1197 while a southward route across the Apennines, taking an ancient highway over the Poretta Pass to the Arno Valley, has preserved the historical significance of Bologna. A line of towns connected by highways or railroads, based on the economic development of the area, defines the bases of the Pyrenees, Alps, Jura, Apennines, Harz, Vosges, Elburz, and many other mountain ranges. Along the Elburz piedmont, the main road of Persia runs from Tabriz through Tehran to Mashhad. In dry regions, these piedmont roads are a consistent feature, but the towns reduce to rural settlements, except at the junctions of cross-mountain routes.

Piedmont termini of transmontane routes.

Piedmont cities draw their support from plain, mountain and transmontane region, relying chiefly on the fertile soil of the level country to feed their large populations. Sometimes they hug the foot of the mountains, as Bologna, Verona, Bergamo, Zurich, Denver and Pittsburg do; sometimes, like Milan, Turin, and Munich, they drop down into the plain, but keep the mountains in sight. They flourish in proportion to their local resources, in which mineral wealth is particularly important, and to the number and practicability of their transmontane connections. Hence they often receive their stamp from the mountains behind them as well as from the bordering plain. The St. Gotthard route is flanked by Lucerne on the north and Milan on the south. The Brenner has its urban outlets at Munich and Verona. Narbonne and Barcelona form the termini of the route over the eastern Pyrenees; Toulouse commands the less used central passes, and Bayonne the western. Tiflis is situated in the great mountain trough connecting the Black Sea and the Caspian; but over the Caucasus by the Pass of Dariel come the influences which make it a Russian town. Peshawar, situated in the mountain angle of the Punjab, depends more upon the Khaibar Pass and its connections thereby with Central Asia than upon the plains of the Indus; its population, in appearance and composition nearly as much Central Asiatic as Indian, is engaged in traffic between the Punjab and the whole trans-Hindu Kush country.1198

Piedmont cities get their support from plains, mountains, and areas beyond the mountains, mainly relying on the fertile soil of the flatlands to feed their large populations. Sometimes they sit at the base of the mountains, like Bologna, Verona, Bergamo, Zurich, Denver, and Pittsburgh; other times, like Milan, Turin, and Munich, they extend into the plains but keep the mountains in view. They thrive based on their local resources, particularly mineral wealth, and the number and accessibility of their connections beyond the mountains. As a result, they often reflect the influence of the nearby mountains as well as the adjacent plains. The St. Gotthard route is bordered by Lucerne to the north and Milan to the south. The Brenner connects to urban centers at Munich and Verona. Narbonne and Barcelona mark the endpoints of the route over the eastern Pyrenees; Toulouse controls the underutilized central passes, while Bayonne oversees the western ones. Tiflis is located in the great mountain valley that links the Black Sea to the Caspian; however, influences coming over the Caucasus through the Pass of Dariel make it a Russian town. Peshawar, positioned in the mountainous region of Punjab, relies more on the Khaibar Pass and its connections to Central Asia than on the plains of the Indus; its population, in looks and makeup, is almost as Central Asian as Indian and engages in trade between Punjab and the entire trans-Hindu Kush region.1198

Where a mountain system describes a semi-circular course, its transit routes tend to converge on the inner side, and at their foci fix the sites of busy commercial centers. Turin draws on a long series of Alpine and Apennine routes from the Pass of Giovi (1548 feet or 472 meters) leading up from Genoa on the south, to the Great St. Bernard on the north. Milan gets immense support from the St. Gotthard and Simplon railroads over the Alps, besides wagon routes over several minor passes. Kulm, Balkh and Kunduz in the piedmont of northern Afghanistan are fed by twenty or more passes over the Hindu Kush and Pamir. Bukhara is the remoter focus of all these routes, and also of the valley highways of the western Tian Shan. It therefore occupies a location which would make it one of the great emporiums of the world, were it not for the expanse of desert to the west and the scantiness of its local water supply, which is tapped farther upstream for the irrigation of Samarkand. In its bazaars are found drugs, dyes and teas from India; wool, skins and dried fruit from Afghanistan; woven goods, arms, and books from Persia; and Russian wares imported by rail and caravan. English goods, which formerly came in by the Kabul route from India, have been excluded since Russia established a protectorate over the province of Bukhara. Across the highlands to the east, the cities of Kashgar and Yarkand, situated in that piedmont zone of vegetation where mountain and desert meet, are enclosed by a vast amphitheater formed by the Tian Shan, the Pamir Highlands, and the Karakorum range. Stieler's atlas marks no less than six trade routes over the passes of these mountains from Kashgar to the headstreams of the Sir-daria and Oxus, and six from Yarkand to the Oxus and Indus. Kashgar is a meeting ground of many nationalities. To its bazaars come traders from China, India, Afghanistan, Bukhara, and Russian Turkestan.1199 The Russian railway up the Sir-daria to Andizhan brings European goods within relatively easy reach of the Terek Davan Pass, and makes serious competition for English wares entering by the more difficult Karakorum Pass from India.1200

Where a mountain range follows a semi-circular path, the trade routes tend to come together on the inner side, leading to busy commercial centers. Turin connects with a long series of Alpine and Apennine routes from the Pass of Giovi (1548 feet or 472 meters) coming up from Genoa in the south to the Great St. Bernard in the north. Milan benefits greatly from the St. Gotthard and Simplon railroads through the Alps, as well as wagon routes over several smaller passes. Kulm, Balkh, and Kunduz in northern Afghanistan are served by more than twenty passes through the Hindu Kush and Pamir mountains. Bukhara is the more distant hub for all these routes, as well as the valley roads of the western Tian Shan. This gives it a position that could make it one of the great trade centers in the world, if not for the large desert to the west and its limited local water supply, which is directed upstream for the irrigation of Samarkand. In its markets, you can find medicines, dyes, and teas from India; wool, hides, and dried fruits from Afghanistan; textiles, weapons, and books from Persia; and Russian products brought in by rail and caravan. Goods from England, which used to arrive via the Kabul route from India, have been shut out since Russia took control of Bukhara. Further east across the highlands, the cities of Kashgar and Yarkand, located in the fertile area where the mountains meet the desert, are surrounded by a massive amphitheater created by the Tian Shan, Pamir Highlands, and Karakorum range. Stieler's atlas shows at least six trade routes over the mountain passes from Kashgar to the source rivers of the Sir-daria and Oxus, and six more from Yarkand to the Oxus and Indus. Kashgar is a melting pot of various nationalities. Traders from China, India, Afghanistan, Bukhara, and Russian Turkestan flock to its markets.1199 The Russian railway along the Sir-daria to Andizhan brings European goods within relatively easy reach of the Terek Davan Pass, creating serious competition for English products that come through the more challenging Karakorum Pass from India.1200

Cities of coastal piedmonts.

Where mountains drop off into a desert, as these Central Asiatic ranges do, their piedmont cities are confined to a narrow zone between mountains and arid waste. Bordering two transit regions of scant population and through travel, they become natural outfitting points, centers of exchange rather than production. Where mountains drop off into the sea and the piedmont therefore becomes a coastal belt, again it borders two transit regions; but here the ports of the desert are replaced by maritime ports, which command the world thoroughfare of the ocean. They therefore tend to concentrate population and commerce wherever a good harbor coincides with the outlet of a transmontane route, as in Genoa and Bombay.

Where mountains meet the desert, like they do in Central Asia, their foothill cities are squeezed into a narrow area between the mountains and the dry land. They sit between two regions with sparse populations and limited travel, making them natural supply points and hubs of trade rather than production. When mountains descend to the sea, creating a coastal area, they also border two transit zones; however, here the desert ports are replaced by maritime ports that control the world's ocean routes. This leads to a concentration of population and commerce wherever a good harbor lines up with the exit of a mountain route, as seen in Genoa and Bombay.

Piedmonts as colonial or backwoods frontiers.

Since mountains are inhospitable to every phase of the historical movement, they long remain regions of retardation. Hence to their bordering plains they sustain the relation of young undeveloped lands, so that life in their piedmont belts tends to show for a long time all the characteristics of a new colonial frontier. The rim of the Southern Appalachians abundantly illustrates this principle even to-day. During the westward expansion of the American people from 1830 to 1850, the eastern rim of the Rocky Mountains was dotted with trading posts like that of the Missouri Fur Company at the forks of the Missouri River, Forts Laramie and Platte on the North Fork of the Platte, Vrain's Fort and Fort Lancaster on the South Fork, Bent's Fort at the mountain exit of the Arkansas River, and Barclay's in the high Mora Valley of the upper Canadian. These posts gathered in the rich pelts which formed the one product of this highland area susceptible of bearing the cost of transportation to the far away Missouri River. Though they developed into way-stations on the overland trails, when the movement of population to California and Oregon in the forties and fifties made the Rocky Mountains a typical highland transit region, yet they long remained frontier posts.1201 Later the abundant water supply of this piedmont district, as compared with the arid plains below, and the mineral wealth of the mountains concentrated here an agricultural and industrial population.

Since mountains are harsh and challenging for historical movement, they often remain places where progress slows down. Therefore, the surrounding plains are seen as new and undeveloped lands, so life in the foothills tends to have the traits of a new colonial frontier for a long time. The edge of the Southern Appalachians clearly demonstrates this principle even today. During the westward expansion of the American people from 1830 to 1850, the eastern edge of the Rocky Mountains was filled with trading posts like the Missouri Fur Company at the Missouri River forks, Forts Laramie and Platte on the North Fork of the Platte, Vrain's Fort and Fort Lancaster on the South Fork, Bent's Fort at the Arkansas River's mountain exit, and Barclay's in the high Mora Valley of the upper Canadian. These posts collected the valuable pelts that became the one product of this mountainous area that could afford the cost of transport to the distant Missouri River. Even though they became way-stations on the overland trails when the population moved to California and Oregon in the forties and fifties, making the Rocky Mountains a typical highland transit region, they still remained frontier posts for a long time.1201 Later, the plentiful water supply in this foothill region, compared to the dry plains below, and the mineral wealth of the mountains attracted an agricultural and industrial population.

In Sze Chuan province of western China, the piedmont of a vast highland hinterland shows a similar development. Here the towns of Matang, Sungpan, Kuan Hsien, and even the capital Chengtu, situated in the high Min Valley at the foot of the mountains walling them in on the west, are emporiums for trade with the Tibetans, who bring hither furs, hides and wool from their plateau pastures, and musk from the musk deer on the Koko Nor plains.1202 Just to the north, Sian (Singan), capital of the highland province of Shensi, concentrates the fur trade of a large mountain wilderness to the west. Several blocks on the main street form a great fur market for the sale of mink and other skins used to line the official robes of mandarins.1203

In Sichuan province of western China, the foothills of a vast highland area show a similar development. Here, the towns of Matang, Sungpan, Kuan Hsien, and even the capital, Chengdu, located in the high Min Valley at the base of the mountains to the west, serve as trading hubs with the Tibetans, who bring furs, hides, and wool from their plateau pastures, along with musk from the musk deer on the Koko Nor plains.1202 Just to the north, Xi'an (Singan), the capital of the highland province of Shaanxi, serves as the center for the fur trade from a large mountain wilderness to the west. Several blocks on the main street make up a large fur market for selling mink and other skins used to line the official robes of mandarins.1203

Mountain carriers.

Like seas, deserts, and other geographical transit regions, mountains too under primitive conditions develop their professional carriers. These collect in the piedmont, where highway and mule train cease, and where the steep track admits only human beasts of burden, trained by their environment to be climbers and packers. These mountain carriers are found on the Pacific face of the coast ranges of North and South America from the peninsula of Alaska to the Straits of Magellan. They are able to pack from 100 to 160 pounds up a steep grade. The Chilkoot Indians, men, women and children, did invaluable service on the White Horse and Chilkoot passes during the early days of the Klondike rush. They had devised a well-arranged harness, which enabled them better to carry their loads. Farther south in British Columbia the piedmont tribes had once a like importance; there they operated especially from the town of Hope on the lower Frazer River as a distributing center. The Mexican carrier is so efficient and so cheap that he enters into serious competition with modern schemes to improve transportation, especially as the rugged relief of this country makes those schemes expensive.1204 The Indians of the eastern slope of the Andes pack India rubber, in loads of 150 pounds each, from the upper Purus and Madeira rivers up to the Andean plateau at a height of 15,000 feet, and there transfer their burdens to mules for transport down to the Peruvian port of Mollendo.1205

Like seas, deserts, and other geographical transit areas, mountains also develop their own specialized carriers under basic conditions. These carriers gather in the foothills, where roads and mule trains end, and where the steep paths only allow for human pack animals, trained by their surroundings to be climbers and carriers. These mountain carriers can be found on the Pacific side of the coastal ranges of North and South America, from the Alaskan peninsula to the Straits of Magellan. They can carry loads of 100 to 160 pounds up a steep incline. The Chilkoot Indians, including men, women, and children, provided essential help on the White Horse and Chilkoot passes during the early days of the Klondike gold rush. They created a well-designed harness that made it easier for them to transport their loads. Further south in British Columbia, the foothill tribes once played a similar important role, especially operating from the town of Hope on the lower Fraser River as a distribution center. The Mexican carrier is so effective and affordable that he seriously competes with modern efforts to improve transportation, particularly since the rough landscape in this area makes those efforts costly.1204 The Indians on the eastern slope of the Andes carry rubber, with loads of 150 pounds each, from the upper Purus and Madeira rivers up to the Andean plateau at an elevation of 15,000 feet, where they transfer their loads to mules for transport down to the Peruvian port of Mollendo.1205

The retarded mountain peoples on the borders of the Central Asia plateau employ the same primitive means of transportation. The roads leading from the Sze Chuan province of western China over the mountain ranges to Tibet are traversed by long lines of porters, men, women and children, laden with bales of brick tea,1206 the strongest of them shouldering 350 pounds. The Bhutia coolies of Sikkim act as carriers on military and commercial expeditions on the track across the Himalayas between Darjeeling and Shigatze. Colonel Younghusband found that these Bhutias, who were paid by the job, would carry a pack of 250 to 300 pounds, or three times the usual burden of a Central Asia carrier. Landon cites the case of a Bhutia lady who was said to have carried a piano on her head from the plains up to Darjeeling (7150 feet).1207 In Nepal, women and girls, less often men, have long been accustomed to carry travellers and merchandise over the Himalayan ranges.1208 In the marginal valleys of the Himalayas, like Kashmir and Baltistan, the natives are regularly impressed for begar or carrier service on the English military roads to strategic points on the high mountain frontier of the Indian Empire.1209 So the Igorots of the Luzon province of Benguet pack all goods and supplies from Naguilian in the lowlands up 4000 feet in a distance of 25 miles to their little capital of Baguio; for this service they are now paid one peso (46 cents in 1901) a day with food, or ten times as much as under the Spanish rule.1210

The mountain communities on the edges of the Central Asia plateau use the same basic forms of transportation. The routes from the Sze Chuan province in western China over the mountain ranges to Tibet are filled with groups of porters—men, women, and children—carrying loads of brick tea, with the strongest among them shouldering up to 350 pounds. The Bhutia laborers from Sikkim serve as carriers on military and commercial trips along the path through the Himalayas between Darjeeling and Shigatse. Colonel Younghusband noted that these Bhutias, who were paid per job, could carry packs weighing 250 to 300 pounds, which is three times the typical load for a carrier in Central Asia. Landon mentions a Bhutia woman who was reputed to have carried a piano on her head from the plains up to Darjeeling (7150 feet). In Nepal, women and girls, and to a lesser extent men, have long been used to transporting travelers and goods over the Himalayan ranges. In the border valleys of the Himalayas, such as Kashmir and Baltistan, locals are routinely conscripted for begar or carrier service on the English military roads leading to key points on the high mountain frontier of the Indian Empire. Similarly, the Igorots from the Luzon province of Benguet transport all goods and supplies from Naguilian in the lowlands, climbing 4000 feet over a distance of 25 miles to their small capital of Baguio. For this work, they now earn one peso (46 cents in 1901) a day along with food, which is ten times what they received under Spanish rule.

Power of mountain barriers to block or deflect.

If the historical movement slackens its pace at the piedmont slope, higher up the mountain it comes to a halt. Only when human invention has greatly improved communication across the barrier are its obstacles in part overcome. The great highland wall stretching across southern Europe from the Bay of Biscay to the Black Sea long cut off the solid mass of the continent from the culture of the Mediterranean lands. Owing to these mountains Central Europe came late into the foreground of history, not till the Middle Ages. Even the penetrating civilization of Greece reached it only by long detours around the ends of the mountain barrier; by Massilia and the Rhone, by Istria and the Danube, Greek commerce trickled through to the interior of the continent.

If the historical movement slows down on the foothills, it completely stops higher up the mountain. Only when human innovation significantly enhances communication across the barrier are some of its challenges partially overcome. The great mountain range stretching across southern Europe from the Bay of Biscay to the Black Sea long separated the solid mass of the continent from the culture of the Mediterranean regions. Because of these mountains, Central Europe appeared late in the historical narrative, not until the Middle Ages. Even the advanced civilization of Greece reached it only through lengthy detours around the edges of the mountain barrier; through Massilia and the Rhône, and through Istria and the Danube, Greek trade managed to seep into the interior of the continent.

Where mountains fail to check, they deflect the historical movement. The wall of the Carpathians, bulwark of Central Europe, split the westward moving Slav hordes in the 6th century, diverting one southward up the Danube Valley to the Eastern Alps, and turning one northward along the German lowlands.1211 The northward expansion of the Romans, rebuffed by the high double wall of the Central Alps, was bent to the westward over the Maritime, Cottine and Savoy Alps, where the barrier offered the shortest and easiest transmontane routes. Hence Germany received the elements of Mediterranean culture indirectly through Gaul, second-hand and late. The ancient Helvetians, moving southward from northern Switzerland into Gaul, took a route skirting the western base of the Alps by the gap at Geneva, and thus threatened Roman Provincia. Cæsar's campaigns into northern Gaul were given direction by the massive Central Plateau of France.1212 The rugged and infertile area of the Catskills long retarded the westward movement in colonial New York and deflected it northward through the Mohawk depression, which therefore had its long thin line of settlements when the neighboring Catskills were still a "bare spot."

Where mountains don’t stop progress, they redirect historical movements. The Carpathians, a stronghold of Central Europe, divided the Slav hordes advancing westward in the 6th century, sending one group southward along the Danube Valley to the Eastern Alps and pushing another northward across the German lowlands.1211 The Romans, unable to push northward because of the steep Central Alps, were instead forced to head westward over the Maritime, Cottine, and Savoy Alps, where the barriers provided the shortest and easiest mountain routes. As a result, Germany absorbed Mediterranean culture indirectly through Gaul, receiving it second-hand and later. The ancient Helvetians, moving south from northern Switzerland into Gaul, took a path that went around the western foothills of the Alps at the gap near Geneva, threatening Roman Provincia. Cæsar's campaigns in northern Gaul were shaped by the vast Central Plateau of France.1212 The rough and barren terrain of the Catskills significantly delayed westward expansion in colonial New York and redirected it northward through the Mohawk valley, which ended up with a long, thin line of settlements while the neighboring Catskills remained a "bare spot."

Significance of mountain valleys.

In their valleys, mountains lose something of their barrier nature, and approximate the level of the plains. Here they harbor oases of denser population and easier intercourse. Valleys favor human settlement through the milder climate of their lower elevation, the accumulation of soil on their floors, their sheltered environment, and their command of such routes of communication as the highlands afford. They are the avenues into and within a mountain system, and therefore radically influence its history by their direction and location. The Central Plateau of France, through the valleys of the Alliers and upper Loire, is most accessible from the north; therefore in that direction it has maintained its most important historical connections,1213 from the days of Cæsar and Vercingetorix. The massive highland region of Transylvania, which opens long accessible valleys westward toward the plains of the Theiss and Danube, has since the eleventh century received thence Hungarian immigration and political dominion.1214 Its dominant Roumanian population, however, seems to have fled thither from the Tartar-swept plains to the southeast.

In their valleys, mountains lose some of their barrier nature and get closer to the level of the plains. Here, they support oases of denser population and easier interaction. Valleys encourage human settlement thanks to their milder climate, the buildup of soil on their floors, their sheltered environment, and their access to communication routes provided by the highlands. They serve as pathways into and within a mountain system, significantly shaping its history by their direction and location. The Central Plateau of France, through the valleys of the Alliers and upper Loire, is most accessible from the north; as a result, it has maintained its most important historical connections from the days of Caesar and Vercingetorix. The vast highland region of Transylvania, which opens long accessible valleys westward toward the plains of the Tisza and Danube, has since the eleventh century welcomed Hungarian immigration and political influence. Its predominant Romanian population, however, appears to have fled there from the Tartar-invaded plains to the southeast.

The anthropo-geography of mountain valleys depends upon the structure of the highlands themselves, whether they are fold mountains, whose ranges wall in longitudinal valleys, or dissected plateaus, whose valleys are mostly transverse river channels leading from the hydrographic center out to the rim of the highlands. Longitudinal valleys are not only long, but also broad as a rule and often show a nearly level floor.1215 They therefore form districts of considerable size, fertility, and individuality, and play distinct historical rôles in the history of their respective highlands. Such are the upper Rhone Valley with its long line of flourishing towns and villages, the Hither Rhine, the Inn of the Tyrol and the Engadine, the fertile trough of the meandering Isère above Grenoble,1216 the broad Orontes-Leontes valley between the Lebanon and Anti-Lebanon where Kadesh and Baalbec were once the glory of northern Syria. Such is the central trough of the Appalachian Mountains, known as the Great Appalachian Valley, seventy-five miles wide, subdivided into constituent valleys of similar character by parallel, even-crested ridges following the trend of the mountains. These are drained by broad, leisurely rivers, bordered by fertile farms and substantial towns. Transverse valleys, on the other hand, are generally narrow, with steep slopes rising almost from the river's edge and supporting only small villages and farms. A comparison of the spacious, smooth-floored valley of Andermatt with the wild Reuss gorge, of the fertile and populous Shenandoah Valley in the Southern Appalachians with the canon of the Kanawha in the Cumberland Plateau, makes the contrast striking enough.

The geography of mountain valleys is influenced by the structure of the highlands themselves, whether they are fold mountains that create long valleys or dissected plateaus with valleys that mostly consist of cross rivers flowing from the hydrographic center out to the edges of the highlands. Longitudinal valleys are typically long and wide, often featuring a nearly level floor.1215 This allows them to form large, fertile, and distinct areas that play significant historical roles in the history of their highlands. Examples include the upper Rhone Valley, lined with thriving towns and villages; the Hither Rhine; the Inn in Tyrol; the Engadine; and the rich valley of the winding Isère above Grenoble,1216 as well as the broad Orontes-Leontes valley between Lebanon and Anti-Lebanon, where Kadesh and Baalbec were once the pride of northern Syria. Another example is the central area of the Appalachian Mountains, called the Great Appalachian Valley, which is seventy-five miles wide and divided into smaller valleys of similar nature by parallel, smooth-topped ridges that follow the mountains’ trend. These valleys are drained by wide, slow-moving rivers, surrounded by fertile farms and substantial towns. In contrast, transverse valleys are usually narrow, with steep slopes rising almost from the riverbank and only supporting small villages and farms. A comparison between the spacious, flat valley of Andermatt and the rugged Reuss gorge, or the fertile and populated Shenandoah Valley in the Southern Appalachians and the canyon of the Kanawha in the Cumberland Plateau, highlights this striking difference.

Longitudinal valleys.

Longitudinal valleys, by reason of their length and their branching lateral valleys, are the natural avenues of communication within the mountains themselves. They therefore give a dominant direction to such phases of the historical movement as succeed in passing the outer barrier. The series of parallel ranges which strike off from the eastern end of the Tibetan plateau southward into Farther India have directed along their valleys the main streams of Mongolian migration and expansion, heading them toward the river basins of Burma and Indo China, and away from India itself.1217 While Tibetan elements have during the ages slowly welled over the high Himalayan brim and trickled down toward the Gangetic plain, Burma has been deluged by floods of Mongolians pouring down the runnels of the land. A carriage road follows the axis of the Central Alps from Lake Geneva to Lake Constance by means of the upper Rhone, Andermatt, and upper Rhine valleys, linked by the Furca and Oberalp passes. The Roman and Medieval routes northward across the Central Alps struck the upper Rhine Valley above Coire, (the ancient Curia Rhaetorum); this natural groove gave them a northeastward direction, and made them emerge from the mountains directly south of Ulm, which thereby gained great importance. The trade routes from Damascus and Palmyra which once entered the Orontes-Leontes trough in the Lebanon system found their Mediterranean termini south near Tyre or north near Antioch, and thus contributed to the greatness of those ancient emporiums. The Great Appalachian Valley used to be a highway for the Iroquois Indians, when they took the warpath against the Cherokee tribes of Tennessee. Later it gave a distinct southwestward trend to pioneer movements of population within the mountains, blending in its common channel the Quakers, Germans and Scotch-Irish from Pennsylvania, with the English and Huguenot French of the more southern colonies. In the Civil War its fertile fields were swept by marching armies, all the way from Chattanooga to Gettysburg.

Long valleys, because of their length and their branching side valleys, serve as natural routes for communication within the mountains. They consequently guide the major phases of historical movements that manage to cross the outer barrier. The series of parallel mountain ranges that extend from the eastern tip of the Tibetan plateau south into further India have channeled the main streams of Mongolian migration and expansion through their valleys, directing them toward the river basins of Burma and Indo China, and away from India itself.1217 Over time, Tibetan groups have gradually flowed over the high Himalayan edge and descended toward the Gangetic plain, while Burma has been inundated by waves of Mongolians streaming down the land's channels. A road connects the Central Alps from Lake Geneva to Lake Constance via the upper Rhone, Andermatt, and upper Rhine valleys, joined by the Furca and Oberalp passes. The Roman and medieval routes heading north across the Central Alps entered the upper Rhine Valley above Coire (the ancient Curia Rhaetorum); this natural path gave them a northeast direction and allowed them to exit the mountains just south of Ulm, which then became significantly important. The trade routes from Damascus and Palmyra that once reached the Orontes-Leontes trough in the Lebanon system found their Mediterranean endpoints either south near Tyre or north near Antioch, thus enhancing the prominence of those ancient trading hubs. The Great Appalachian Valley once served as a highway for the Iroquois Indians during their conflicts against the Cherokee tribes of Tennessee. Later, it shaped a clear southwest trend for the movement of pioneers within the mountains, merging groups like the Quakers, Germans, and Scotch-Irish from Pennsylvania with the English and Huguenot French from the southern colonies. During the Civil War, its rich fields were trampled by marching armies all the way from Chattanooga to Gettysburg.

Passes in mountain barriers.

The barrier nature of mountains depends upon their height and structure, whether they are massive, unbroken walls like the Scandinavian Alps and the Great Smoky range; or, like the Welsh Highlands and the Blue Ridge, are studded with low passes. The Pyrenees, Caucasus and Andes, owing to the scarcity and great height of their passes, have always been serious barriers. The Pyrenees divide Spain from France more sharply than the Alps divide Italy from France; owing to their rampart character, they form the best and most definite natural boundary in Europe.1218 Epirus and Aetolia, fenced in by the solid Pindus range, took little part in the common life of ancient Greece; but the intermittent chains of Thessaly offered a passway between Macedon and Hellas. The Alps have an astonishing number of excellent passes, evenly distributed for the most part. These, in conjunction with the great longitudinal valleys of the system, offer transit routes from side to side in any direction. The Appalachian system is some three hundred miles broad and thirteen hundred miles long, but it has many easy gaps among its parallel ranges, so that it offered natural though circuitous highways to the early winners of the West. The long line (400 miles) of the Hindu Kush range, high as it is, forms no strong natural boundary to India, because it is riddled with passes at altitudes from 12,500 to 19,000 feet.1219 The easternmost group of these passes lead down to Kashmir, and therefore lend this state peculiar importance as guardian of these northern entrances to India.1220 The Suleiman Mountains along the Indo-Afghan frontier are an imperfect defence for the same reason. They are indented by 289 passes capable of being traversed by camels. The mountain border of Baluchistan contains 75 more, the most important of which focus their roads upon Kandahar. Hence the importance to British India of Kandahar and Afghanistan. Across this broken northwest barrier have come almost all the floods of invasion and immigration that have contributed their varied elements to the mixed population of India. Tradition, epic and history tell of Asiatic highlanders ever sweeping down into the warm valley of the Indus through these passes; Scythians, Aryans, Greeks, Assyrians, Medes, Persians, Turks, Tartars, and Mongols have all traveled these rocky roads, to rest in the enervating valleys of the peninsula.1221

The barrier nature of mountains depends on their height and structure, whether they are massive, continuous walls like the Scandinavian Alps and the Great Smoky range, or, like the Welsh Highlands and the Blue Ridge, dotted with low passes. The Pyrenees, Caucasus, and Andes, due to the scarcity and great height of their passes, have always posed significant barriers. The Pyrenees separate Spain from France more distinctly than the Alps separate Italy from France; because of their rampart-like formation, they provide the best and clearest natural boundary in Europe.1218 Epirus and Aetolia, surrounded by the solid Pindus range, had little involvement in the common life of ancient Greece; but the intermittent chains of Thessaly provided a pathway between Macedon and Hellas. The Alps boast an impressive number of excellent passes, mostly evenly distributed. These, along with the major longitudinal valleys of the system, create routes for travel in any direction. The Appalachian system is about three hundred miles wide and thirteen hundred miles long, but it has many easy gaps among its parallel ranges, allowing for natural though winding highways for the early settlers of the West. The lengthy (400 miles) Hindu Kush range, despite its height, does not create a strong natural boundary to India, as it is filled with passes ranging from 12,500 to 19,000 feet.1219 The easternmost group of these passes leads down to Kashmir, giving this state unique importance as the guardian of these northern entrances to India.1220 The Suleiman Mountains along the Indo-Afghan frontier are an inadequate defense for the same reason. They have 289 passes that can be crossed by camels. The mountain border of Baluchistan has 75 more, the most important of which direct their routes toward Kandahar. Hence the significance of Kandahar and Afghanistan to British India. Across this broken northwest barrier, almost all waves of invasion and immigration have come, contributing their diverse elements to India's mixed population. Tradition, epic tales, and history recount how Asiatic highlanders have continuously moved into the warm valley of the Indus through these passes; Scythians, Aryans, Greeks, Assyrians, Medes, Persians, Turks, Tartars, and Mongols have all traveled these rocky paths, resting in the lush valleys of the peninsula.1221

Breadth of mountain barriers.

Mountains folded into a succession of parallel ranges are greater obstructions than a single range like the Erz, Black Forest, and Vosges, or a narrow, compact system like the Western Alps, which can be crossed by a single pass. Owing to this simple structure the Western Alps were traversed by four established routes in the days of the Roman Empire. These were: I. The Via Aurelia between the Maritime Alps and the sea, where now runs the Cornice Road. II. The Mons Matrona (Mont Genevre Pass, 6080 feet or 1854 meters [Transcriber's Note: printer's error incorrectly printed as kilometers]) between the headstream of the Dora Riparia and that of the Durance, which was the best highway for armies. III. The Little St. Bernard (7075 feet or 2157 meters), from Aosta on the Dora Baltea over to the Isère and down to Lugdunum (Lyons). IV. The Great St. Bernard (8109 feet or 2472 meters) route, which led northward from Aosta over the Pennine Alps to Octodurus at the elbow of the upper Rhone, where Martigny now stands. Across the broad double rampart of the Central Alps the Roman used chiefly the Brenner route, which by a low saddle unites the deep reëntrant valleys of the Adige and Inn rivers, and thus surmounts the barrier by a single pass. However, a short cut northward over the Chalk Alps by the Fern Pass made closer connection with Augusta Vindelicorum (Augsburg). The Romans seem to have been ignorant of the St. Gotthard, which, though high, is the summit of an unbroken ascent from Lake Maggiore up the valley of the Ticino on one side, and from Lake Lucerne up the Reuss on the other.

Mountains arranged in a series of parallel ranges create bigger obstacles than a single range like the Erz, Black Forest, and Vosges, or a narrow, compact system like the Western Alps, which can be crossed by one pass. Because of this straightforward structure, the Western Alps had four main routes during the Roman Empire. These were: I. The Via Aurelia between the Maritime Alps and the sea, which is now the Cornice Road. II. The Mons Matrona (Mont Genevre Pass, 6080 feet or 1854 meters [Transcriber's Note: printer's error incorrectly printed as kilometers]) between the headstream of the Dora Riparia and that of the Durance, which was the best road for armies. III. The Little St. Bernard (7075 feet or 2157 meters), from Aosta on the Dora Baltea over to the Isère and down to Lugdunum (Lyons). IV. The Great St. Bernard (8109 feet or 2472 meters) route, which led northward from Aosta over the Pennine Alps to Octodurus at the bend of the upper Rhone, where Martigny now is. Across the wide double rampart of the Central Alps, the Romans mainly used the Brenner route, which connects the deep valleys of the Adige and Inn rivers through a low saddle, allowing passage by a single pass. However, a shortcut northward over the Chalk Alps via the Fern Pass provided a closer link to Augusta Vindelicorum (Augsburg). The Romans seemed to be unaware of the St. Gotthard, which, despite being high, is the peak of an uninterrupted climb from Lake Maggiore up the Ticino valley on one side and from Lake Lucerne up the Reuss on the other.

Mountains which spread out on a broad base in a series of parallel chains, and through which no long transverse valleys offer ready transit, form serious barriers to every phase of intercourse. The lofty boundary wall of the Pyrenees, a folded mountain system of sharp ranges and difficult passes, has successfully separated Spain from continental Europe; it has given the Iberian Peninsula, in the course of a long history, closer relations with Morocco than with its land neighbor France. It thus justifies the French saying that "Africa begins at the Pyrenees." The Andalusian fold mountains stretching across southern Spain in a double wall from Trafalgar to Cape Nao, accessible only by narrow and easily defended passes, enabled the Moors of Granada to hold their own for centuries against the Spaniard Christians. The high thin ridges of the folded Jura system, poor in soil and sparsely populated, broken by occasional "cluses" or narrow water-gaps admitting the rivers from one elevated longitudinal valley to another, have always been a serious hindrance to traffic.1222

Mountains that spread out on a wide base in a series of parallel lines, with no long valleys crossing them for easy travel, create significant barriers to all forms of interaction. The towering wall of the Pyrenees, a complex mountain range with sharp peaks and challenging passes, has effectively separated Spain from mainland Europe; it has led the Iberian Peninsula, throughout its long history, to have closer ties with Morocco than with its land neighbor, France. This supports the French saying that "Africa begins at the Pyrenees." The Andalusian fold mountains, which stretch across southern Spain like a double wall from Trafalgar to Cape Nao and are only accessible through narrow and easily defended passes, allowed the Moors of Granada to maintain their position for centuries against Christian Spaniards. The high, thin ridges of the folded Jura system, which have poor soil and are sparsely populated, are interrupted by occasional "cluses" or narrow water gaps that allow rivers to flow from one elevated valley to another, always making traffic difficult.1222

Circuitous routes through folded mountains.

Such mountains can be crossed only by circuitous routes from pass to pass, ascending and descending each range of the system. The Central Alps, grooved by the longitudinal valleys of the upper Rhone, Rhine and Inn, make transit travel a series of ups and downs. The northern range must be crossed by some minor pass like the Gemmi, (7553 feet) or Panixer (7907 feet) to the longitudinal valleys, and the southern range again by the Simplon (6595 feet), San Bernadino (6768 feet), Splügen (6946 feet) or Septimer (7582 feet) to the Po basin. Across the corrugated highland of the Hindu Kush, lying between the plains of the Indus and the Oxus, the caravans of western Asia seek the market of the Punjab by a circuitous route through the Hajikhak Pass (12,188 feet) or famous Gates of Bamian over the main range of the Hindu Kush, by the Unai Pass over the Paghman Mountains to Kabul at 5740 feet, and then by gorges of the Kabul River and the Khaibar Pass (6825 feet) down to Peshawar. This road presents so many difficulties that caravans from Turkestan to India prefer another route from Merv up the valley of the Heri-Rud through the western hills of the Hindu Kush to Herat, thence diagonally southeast across Afghanistan to Kandahar, and thence by the Bolan Pass down to the Sind. The broad, low series of forested mountains consisting of the Vindhyan and Kaimur Hills, reinforced by the Satpura, Kalabet, Gawilgarh ranges, Mahadeo Hills, Maikal Range and Chutia Nagpur Plateau as a secondary ridge to the south, forms a double barrier across the base of peninsular India. It divides the Deccan from Hindustan so effectually that it has sufficed to set limits to any Aryan advance en masse southward. It kept southern India isolated, and admitted only later Aryan influences which filtered through the barrier. To people accustomed to treeless plains, these wide belts of wooded hills were barrier enough. Even a few years ago their passes were dreaded by cartmen; most of the carriage of the country was effected by pack-bullocks. Even when roads were cleared through the forests, they were likely to be rendered impassable by torrential rains.1223

Such mountains can only be crossed by winding routes from pass to pass, climbing and descending each range of the system. The Central Alps, shaped by the long valleys of the upper Rhône, Rhine, and Inn, turn travel into a series of ups and downs. The northern range can be crossed by smaller passes like the Gemmi (7,553 feet) or Panixer (7,907 feet), leading to the long valleys, while the southern range is crossed by the Simplon (6,595 feet), San Bernardino (6,768 feet), Splügen (6,946 feet), or Septimer (7,582 feet) toward the Po basin. Over the rugged highlands of the Hindu Kush, situated between the plains of the Indus and the Oxus, caravans from western Asia head to the Punjab market via a winding route through the Hajikhak Pass (12,188 feet) or the famous Gates of Bamian over the main range of the Hindu Kush, then through the Unai Pass over the Paghman Mountains to Kabul at 5,740 feet, and finally through the gorges of the Kabul River and the Khyber Pass (6,825 feet) down to Peshawar. This route presents numerous challenges, leading caravans from Turkestan to India to prefer an alternate path from Merv up the Heri-Rud valley, through the western hills of the Hindu Kush to Herat, then diagonally southeast across Afghanistan to Kandahar, and down through the Bolan Pass to Sind. The broad, low series of forested mountains made up of the Vindhyan and Kaimur Hills, along with the Satpura, Kalabet, Gawilgarh ranges, Mahadeo Hills, Maikal Range, and the Chutia Nagpur Plateau as a secondary ridge to the south, forms a double barrier across the base of peninsular India. It effectively separates the Deccan from Hindustan, limiting any mass movement of Aryan people southward. It kept southern India isolated, only allowing later Aryan influences to filter through the barrier. For those used to treeless plains, these wide belts of wooded hills were barrier enough. Even a few years ago, their passes were feared by cart drivers; most transport in the country was done using pack-bullocks. Even when roads were cleared through the forests, they could easily become impassable due to heavy rains.1223

Dominant trans-montane routes.

Where a broad, complex mountain system contracts to narrow compass, or is cut by deep reentrant valleys leading up to a single pass, the transmontane route here made by nature assumes great historical importance. The double chain of the mighty Caucasus, from 120 to 150 miles wide and 750 miles long, stretches an almost insuperable barrier between the Black Sea and the Caspian. But nearly midway between these two seas it is constricted to only 60 miles by a geographical and geological gulf, which penetrates from the steppes of Russia almost to the heart of the system.1224 This gulf forms the high valley of the Terek River, beyond whose headstream lies the Dariel defile (7503 feet or 2379 meters), which continues the natural depression across to the short southern slope. All the other passes of the Caucasus are 3000 meters or more high, lie above snow line and are therefore open only in summer. The Dariel Pass alone is open all the year around.1225 Here runs the great military road from Vladicaucas to Tiflis, which the Russians have built to control their turbulent mountaineer subjects; and here are located the Ossetes, the only people among the variegated tribes of the whole Caucasus who occupy both slopes. All the other tribes and languages are confined to one side or the other.1226 Moreover, the Ossetes, occupying an exposed location in their highway habitat, lack the courage of the other mountaineers, and yielded without resistance to the Russians. In this respect they resemble the craven-spirited Kashmiri, whose mountain-walled vale forms a passway from Central Asia down to the Punjab.

Where a broad, complex mountain range narrows or is cut by deep valleys leading to a single pass, the natural transmontane route becomes historically significant. The double chain of the mighty Caucasus, spanning 120 to 150 miles wide and 750 miles long, creates a nearly impassable barrier between the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea. However, nearly halfway between these two seas, it narrows to just 60 miles due to a geographical and geological gap that stretches from the steppes of Russia almost to the core of the range.1224 This gap forms the high valley of the Terek River, beyond which lies the Dariel Pass (7503 feet or 2379 meters), continuing the natural depression down to the short southern slope. All other passes in the Caucasus are over 3000 meters high, above the snow line, and are only accessible in summer. The Dariel Pass is the only one that's open year-round.1225 A major military road runs here from Vladicaucas to Tiflis, built by the Russians to manage their unruly mountain residents; and the Ossetes, the only group among the diverse tribes of the Caucasus who inhabit both sides, are also located here. All the other tribes and languages are limited to one side or the other.1226 Furthermore, the Ossetes, living in an exposed position in their travel corridor, lack the bravery of the other mountain people and submitted to the Russians without a fight. In this way, they are similar to the timid Kashmiri, whose mountain-enclosed valley provides a pathway from Central Asia to the Punjab.

Brenner route.

The Pass of Dariel, owing to its situation in a retarded Brenner corner of Asia, has never attained the historical importance which attaches to the deep saddle of the Brenner Pass (4470 feet) in the Central Alps. Uniting the reëntrant valleys of the Inn and Adige rivers only 2760 feet above the Inn's exit from the mountains upon the Bavarian plateau, it forms a low, continuous line of communication across the Central Alps. The Brenner was the route of the Cimbri invading the Po Valley, and later of the Roman forces destined for frontier posts of the Empire on the upper Danube. In the Middle Ages it was the route for the armies of the German Emperors who came to make good their claim to Italy. By this road came the artists and artisans of the whole north country to learn the arts and crafts of beauty-loving Venice. From the Roman road-makers to the modern railroad engineer, with the concomitant civilization of each, the Brenner has seen the march of human progress.

The Pass of Dariel, because of its location in a secluded corner of Asia, has never reached the historical significance that the deep saddle of the Brenner Pass (4470 feet) does in the Central Alps. Connecting the valleys of the Inn and Adige rivers just 2760 feet above the Inn's outlet from the mountains onto the Bavarian plateau, it provides a low, continuous route across the Central Alps. The Brenner was the path taken by the Cimbri when they invaded the Po Valley, and later by Roman forces heading to the Empire's frontier posts on the upper Danube. In the Middle Ages, it was the route for the armies of the German Emperors trying to assert their claim to Italy. This road also allowed artists and craftsmen from northern regions to travel to and learn the artistic skills of beauty-loving Venice. From the Roman road builders to the modern railroad engineers, along with the accompanying advancements of each era, the Brenner has witnessed the progress of humanity.

Pass of Belfort.

Farther to the west, the wall of highlands stretching across southern Europe is interrupted by a deep groove formed by the mountain-flanked Rhone Valley and the Pass of Belfort, or Burgundian Gate, which lies between the Vosges and Jura system, and connects the Rhone road with the long rift valley of the middle Rhine. This pass, broad and low (350 meters or 1148 feet) marks the insignificant summit in the great historic route of travel between the Mediterranean and the North Sea, from the days of ancient Etruscan merchants to the present. This was the route of the invading Teuton hordes which the Roman Marius defeated at Aquae Sextiae, and later, of the Germans under Ariovistus, whom Cæsar defeated near the present Mühlhausen. Four centuries afterward came the Alamannians, Burgundians and other Teutonic stocks, who infused a tall blond element into the population of the Rhone Valley.1227 The Pass of Belfort is the strategic key to Central Europe. Here Napoleon repeatedly fixed his military base for the invasion of Austria, and hither was directed one division of the German army in 1870 for the invasion of France. The gap is traversed to-day by a canal connecting the Doubs and the Rhine and by a railroad, just as formerly by the tracks of migrating barbarians.

Farther west, the highlands stretching across southern Europe are interrupted by a deep groove created by the mountain-surrounded Rhone Valley and the Pass of Belfort, or Burgundian Gate, which lies between the Vosges and Jura mountains and connects the Rhone road with the lengthy rift valley of the middle Rhine. This pass, wide and low (350 meters or 1148 feet), marks the minor summit in the significant historic travel route between the Mediterranean and the North Sea, dating back to the days of ancient Etruscan merchants and continuing to the present. This was the path of the invading Teuton tribes that the Roman general Marius defeated at Aquae Sextiae, and later, the Germans led by Ariovistus, whom Caesar defeated near modern Mühlhausen. Four centuries later, the Alamannians, Burgundians, and other Germanic groups brought a tall, fair-haired element into the population of the Rhone Valley.1227 The Pass of Belfort is the strategic key to Central Europe. Here, Napoleon repeatedly established his military base for the invasion of Austria, and one division of the German army was directed here in 1870 for the invasion of France. Today, the gap is crossed by a canal connecting the Doubs and the Rhine and by a railroad, just as it once was by the paths of migrating barbarians.

Mohawk route.

The natural depression of the Mohawk Valley, only 445 feet (136 meters) above sea level, is the only decided break across the entire width of the long Appalachian system. This fact, together with its ready accessibility from the Hudson on the east and Lake Ontario on the west, lent it importance in the early history of the colonies, as well as in the later history of New York. It was an easy line of communication with the Great Lakes, and gave the colonists access to the fur trade of the Northwest, then in the hands of the French. So when French and English fought for supremacy in the New World, the Mohawk and Hudson valleys were their chief battleground; elsewhere the broad Appalachian barrier held them apart. Again in the Revolution, control of the Mohawk-Hudson route was the objective of the British armies mobilized on the Canadian frontier, because it alone would enable them to co-operate with the British fleet blockading the coast cities of the colonies. In the War of 1812, it was along this natural transmontane highway that supplies were forwarded to the remote frontier, to support Perry's fight for control of the Great Lakes. The war demonstrated the strategic necessity of a protected, wholly American line of water communication between the Hudson and our western frontier, while the commercial and political advantage was obvious. Hence a decade after the conclusion of the war, this depression was traced by the Erie Canal, through which passed long lines of boats to build up the commercial greatness of New York City.

The natural depression of the Mohawk Valley, just 445 feet (136 meters) above sea level, is the only significant break across the entire width of the long Appalachian range. This fact, along with its easy access from the Hudson River to the east and Lake Ontario to the west, made it important in the early history of the colonies and later in New York's history. It provided a straightforward line of communication to the Great Lakes, allowing the colonists to tap into the fur trade in the Northwest, which was then controlled by the French. So, when the French and English fought for dominance in the New World, the Mohawk and Hudson valleys became their main battleground; elsewhere, the broad Appalachian barrier kept them apart. Again, during the Revolution, control of the Mohawk-Hudson route was the goal of the British armies coming from the Canadian frontier, as it was the only way for them to coordinate with the British fleet blockading the colonial coastal cities. In the War of 1812, this natural route was used to send supplies to the remote frontier to support Perry’s battle for control of the Great Lakes. The war highlighted the strategic need for a secure, entirely American waterway linking the Hudson River with our western frontier, and the commercial and political advantages were clear. Therefore, a decade after the war ended, this depression was traced by the Erie Canal, which enabled long lines of boats that contributed to the commercial success of New York City.

Height in mountain barriers.

Other structural features being the same, mountains are barriers also in proportion to their height; for, with few exceptions, the various anthropo-geographic effects of upheaved areas are intensified with increase of elevation. Old, worn-down mountains, like the Appalachians and the Ural, broad as they are, have been less effective obstacles than the towering crests of the Alps and Caucasus. The form of the elevation also counts. Easy slopes and flat or rounded summits make readier transit regions than high, thin ridges with escarpment-like flanks. Mountains of plateau form, though reaching a great altitude, may be relatively hospitable to the historical movement and even have a regular nomadic population in summer. The central and western Tian Shan system is in reality a broad, high plateau, divided into a series of smoothly floored basins and gently rolling ridges lying at an elevation of 10,000 to 12,000 feet above the sea. Its pamirs or plains of thick grass, nourished by the relatively heavy precipitation of this high altitude, and forming in summer an island of verdure in the surrounding sea of sun-scorched waste, attract the pastoral nomads from all the bordering steppes and deserts.1228 Thus it is a meeting place for a seasonal population, sparse and evanescent, but its uplifted mass holds asunder the few sedentary peoples fringing its piedmont. The corrugated dome of the Pamir highland, whose valley floors lie at an elevation of 11,000 to 13,000 feet, draws to its summer pastures Kirghis shepherds from north, east and west; and their flocks in turn attract the raids of the marauding mountaineers occupying the Hunza Valley to the south. The Pamir, high but accessible, was a passway in the tenth century for Chinese caravans bound from "Serica" or the "Land of Silk" to the Oxus River and the Caspian. Here Marco Polo and many travelers after him found fodder for their pack animals and food for themselves, because they could always purchase meat from the visiting shepherds. The possibilities of the Pamir as a transit region are apparent to Russia, who in 1886 annexed most of it to the government of Bukhara.

Other structural features being the same, mountains act as barriers also in relation to their height; for, with few exceptions, the various anthropogeographic effects of uplifted areas become stronger with increased elevation. Old, eroded mountains, like the Appalachians and the Urals, although wide, have proven to be less effective obstacles than the towering peaks of the Alps and the Caucasus. The shape of the elevation also matters. Gentle slopes and flat or rounded summits provide easier transit areas than high, narrow ridges with steep sides. Mountains that form plateaus, despite reaching great altitudes, may be relatively welcoming to historical movements and even host a regular nomadic population in the summer. The central and western Tian Shan system is essentially a broad, high plateau, divided into a series of smoothly floored basins and gently rolling ridges that sit at elevations of 10,000 to 12,000 feet above sea level. Its pamirs, or plains of thick grass, nourished by the relatively heavy rainfall typical of this altitude, form a green oasis in the surrounding arid landscape during summer, attracting pastoral nomads from all neighboring steppes and deserts.1228 Thus, it becomes a gathering place for a seasonal population, sparse and fleeting, but its elevated terrain keeps apart the few sedentary peoples living near its foothills. The undulating dome of the Pamir highland, with valley floors at 11,000 to 13,000 feet, draws Kirghiz shepherds to its summer pastures from the north, east, and west; and their flocks, in turn, attract raids from marauding mountaineers occupying the Hunza Valley to the south. The Pamir, high but accessible, served as a route in the tenth century for Chinese caravans traveling from "Serica" or the "Land of Silk" to the Oxus River and the Caspian Sea. Here, Marco Polo and many travelers who followed found fodder for their pack animals and food for themselves, as they could always buy meat from the visiting shepherds. The potential of the Pamir as a transit region is evident to Russia, which annexed most of it to the government of Bukhara in 1886.

Contrasted accessibility of opposite slopes.

Mountains are seldom equally accessible from all sides. Rarely does the crest of a system divide it symmetrically. This means a steep, difficult approach to the summit from one direction, and a longer, more gradual, and hence easier ascent from the other. It means also in general a wide zone of habitation and food supply on the gentler slope, a better commissary and transport base whence to make the final ascent, whether in conquest, trade or ethnic growth. Mountain boundaries are therefore rarely by nature impartial. They do not umpire the great game of expansion fairly. They lower the bars to the advancing people on one side, and hold them relentlessly in place to the other. To the favored slope they give the strategic advantage of a swift and sudden descent beyond the summit down the opposite side. The political boundary of France along the watershed of the Vosges Mountains is backed by a long, gradual ascent from the Seine lowland and faces a sharp drop to the rift valley of the middle Rhine, Its boundary along the crest of the Alps from Mont Blanc to the Mediterranean brings over two-thirds of the upheaved area within the domain of France, and gives to that country great advantages of approach to the Alpine passes at the expense of Italy. With the exception of the ill-matched conflict between the civilized Romans and the barbarian Gauls, it is a matter of history that from the days of Hannibal to Napoleon III, the campaigns over the Alps from the north have succeeded, while those from the steep-rimmed Po Valley have miscarried. The Brenner route favored alike the Cimbri hordes in 102 B.C. and later the medieval German Emperors invading Italy from the upper Danube. The drop from the Brenner Pass to Munich is 2800 feet; to Rovereto, an equally distant point on the Italian side, the road descends 3770 feet.

Mountains are rarely accessible from all sides. The peak of a mountain range seldom divides it evenly. This results in a steep, challenging climb to the summit from one side, while the other side offers a longer, gentler, and therefore easier ascent. Generally, this means there’s a wide area for settlement and food supply on the gentler slope, providing a better base for supplies and transport to reach the peak, whether for conquest, trade, or cultural expansion. Mountain boundaries are usually not neutral. They don’t evenly regulate the competition for growth. They lower obstacles for advancing groups on one side while firmly restricting them on the other. The favored slope allows for a quick and surprising descent beyond the summit on the opposite side. The political boundary of France along the Vosges Mountains is supported by a long, gradual ascent from the Seine lowland and faces a steep drop into the Rhine rift valley. Its boundary along the crest of the Alps from Mont Blanc to the Mediterranean incorporates more than two-thirds of the elevated area into France, granting that country significant advantages in accessing the Alpine passes, to the detriment of Italy. Except for the uneven battle between the civilized Romans and the barbarian Gauls, history shows that from Hannibal's time to Napoleon III, campaigns across the Alps from the north have been successful, while those from the steep Po Valley have failed. The Brenner route benefited both the Cimbri tribes in 102 B.C. and later the medieval German Emperors invading Italy from the upper Danube. The drop from the Brenner Pass to Munich is 2,800 feet; to Rovereto, an equally distant point on the Italian side, the road descends 3,770 feet.

Its ethnic effects.

The inequality of slope has ethnic as well as political effects, especially where a latitudinal direction also makes a sharp contrast of climate on the two sides of the mountain system. Except in the Roman period, the southern face of the Alps has been an enclosing wall to the Italians. The southern cultivator penetrated its high but sunny valleys only when forced by poverty, while the harsh climate on the long northern slope effectively repelled him. On the other hand, Switzerland has overstepped the Alpine crest in the province of Ticino and thrust its political boundary in a long wedge down to the lowland of the Po near Como; and the Alpine race, spilling everywhere over the mountain rim into the inviting Po basin, has given to this lowland population a relatively broad skull, blond coloring and tall figure, sharply contrasted with the pure Mediterranean race beyond the crest of the Apennines.1229

The uneven slope has both ethnic and political implications, especially where a north-south direction sharply contrasts the climate on either side of the mountain range. Except during the Roman period, the southern side of the Alps has acted as a barrier for the Italians. Southern farmers only ventured into its high but sunny valleys when poverty pushed them, while the harsh climate on the long northern slope kept them away. In contrast, Switzerland has crossed over the Alpine crest in the Ticino region and extended its political boundary as a long wedge down to the Po lowland near Como. The Alpine population has spilled over the mountain edge into the appealing Po basin, giving this lowland population a relatively broad skull, fair skin, and tall stature, which stands in stark contrast to the pure Mediterranean race beyond the Apennines crest.1229

The long northward slope of the Alps in Switzerland and Tyrol, and the easy western grade toward France, have enabled Germanic and Gallic influences of various kinds to permeate the mountains. A strong element of blond, long-headed Germans mingles in the population of the Aar and Rhine valleys up to the ice-capped ridge of the Glarner and Bernese Alps,1230 while the virile German speech has pushed yet farther south to the insuperable barrier of the Monte Rosa group. The abrupt southward slope of the Himalayas has repelled ethnic expansion from the river lowlands of northern India, except in the mountain valleys of the Punjab streams and Nepal, where the highland offered asylum to the Rajput race when dislodged by a later Aryan invasion, or when trying their energies in expansion and conquest.1231 The Tibetan people, whose high plateaus rise almost flush with the Himalayan passes, have everywhere trickled through and given a Mongoloid mountain border to Aryan India,1232 even though their speech has succumbed to the pervasive Aryan language of the piedmont, and thus confused the real ethnic boundary. [See map page 102.] The retarded and laborious approach of British "influence" up this steep ascent to Lhassa, as opposed to the long established suzerainty of the Chinese Emperor in Tibet, can be attributed in part to the contrasted accessibility from north and south.

The long slope of the Alps stretching northward through Switzerland and Tyrol, along with the gentle western gradient toward France, has allowed various Germanic and Gallic influences to seep into the mountains. A significant population of blond, long-headed Germans is mixed into the residents of the Aar and Rhine valleys, reaching up to the icy peaks of the Glarner and Bernese Alps,1230 while the strong German language has pushed even further south, hitting the formidable barrier of the Monte Rosa group. The steep southward slope of the Himalayas has prevented ethnic expansion from the river lowlands of northern India, except in the mountain valleys of the Punjab and Nepal, where the highlands provided refuge to the Rajput people when they were displaced by a later Aryan invasion or when they sought to expand and conquer.1231 The Tibetan populace, whose elevated plateaus nearly align with the Himalayan passes, have spread throughout and given a Mongoloid mountain edge to Aryan India,1232 even though their language has given way to the dominant Aryan tongue of the foothills, thereby blurring the true ethnic boundaries. [See map page 102.] The slow and difficult advance of British "influence" up this steep incline to Lhassa, compared to the long-standing control of the Chinese Emperor in Tibet, can be partly attributed to the contrasting accessibility from the north and south.

Persistence of barrier nature.

Mountains influence the life of their inhabitants and their neighbors fundamentally and variously, but always reveal their barrier nature. For the occupants of one slope they provide an abundant rainfall, hold up the clouds, and rob them of their moisture; to the leeward side they admit dry winds, and only from the melting snow or the precipitation on their summits do they yield a scanty supply of water. The Himalayas are flanked by the teeming population of India and the scattered nomadic tribes of Tibet. Mountains often draw equally clear cut lines of cleavage in temperature. The Scandinavian range concentrates upon Norway the warm, soft air of the Atlantic westerlies, while just below the watershed on the eastern side Sweden feels all the rigor of a sub-Arctic climate. In history, too, mountains play the same part as barriers. They are always a challenge to the energies of man. Their beauty, the charm of the unknown beyond tempts the enterprising spirit; the hardships and dangers of their roads daunt or baffle the mediocre, but by the great ones whose strength is able to dwarf these obstacles is found beyond a prize of victory. Such were Hannibal, Napoleon, Suvaroff, Genghis Khan, and those lesser heroes of the modern work-a-day world who toiled across the Rockies and Sierras in the feverish days of '49, or who faced the snows of Chilkoot Pass for the frozen gold-fields of the Yukon.

Mountains have a huge impact on the lives of the people who live in and around them, acting as barriers in many ways. For those on one side, they bring plenty of rainfall, capture clouds, and drain them of moisture; meanwhile, the opposite side experiences dry winds and gets only a little water from melting snow or rain at the peaks. The Himalayas border India's dense population and the scattered nomadic tribes of Tibet. Mountains also create distinct differences in temperature. The Scandinavian mountains trap the warm, moist air from the Atlantic westerlies in Norway, while just down the slope on the eastern side, Sweden faces a harsh sub-Arctic climate. Historically, mountains have served as barriers as well. They always present a challenge to human effort. Their beauty and the allure of the unknown beyond attract adventurous spirits; the difficulties and risks of their paths may intimidate or confuse the average person, but those with great strength can overcome these challenges to find success. This was true for figures like Hannibal, Napoleon, Suvarov, Genghis Khan, and the lesser-known heroes of the everyday world who crossed the Rockies and Sierras during the rush of '49, or who braved the snowy Chilkoot Pass in search of gold in the Yukon.

Importance of mountain passes.

For migrating, warring and trading humanity therefore, the interest of the mountains is centered in the passes. These are only dents or depressions in the great up-lifted crest, or gaps carved out by streams, or deeper breaches in the mountain wall; but they point the easiest pathway to the ultramontane country, and for this reason focus upon themselves the travel that would cut across the grain of the earth's wrinkled crust. Their influence reaches far. The Brenner, by its medieval trade, made the commercial greatness of Augsburg, Ratisbon, Nuremberg, and Leipzig to the north, and promoted the growth of Venice to the south. The Khaibar Pass and the Gates of Herat in Afghanistan have for long periods dominated the Asiatic policy of Russia and British India. The Mohawk depression and Cumberland Gap for decades gave direction to the streams of population moving westward into the Mississippi basin in the early history of the Republic. Where Truckee Pass (7017 feet) makes a gash in the high ridge of the Sierra Nevada, the California Trail in 1844 sought the line of least resistance across the barrier mass, and deposited its desert-worn immigrants about the Sacramento Valley and San Francisco Bay. There they made a nucleus of American population in Mexican California, and in 1846 became the center of American revolt.

For migrating, warring, and trading humanity, the mountains are mainly about the passes. These are just notches or dips in the raised landscape, or gaps carved by rivers, or deeper breaks in the mountain barrier; but they mark the easiest routes into the lands beyond the mountains, which is why they attract the travel that would otherwise disrupt the earth's uneven surface. Their impact is significant. The Brenner Pass, through its medieval trade, contributed to the commercial success of Augsburg, Ratisbon, Nuremberg, and Leipzig to the north, and helped Venice thrive to the south. The Khaibar Pass and the Gates of Herat in Afghanistan have long influenced the policies of Russia and British India. The Mohawk depression and Cumberland Gap guided the movement of people heading west into the Mississippi basin during the early history of the Republic. Where Truckee Pass (7017 feet) cuts through the high ridge of the Sierra Nevada, the California Trail in 1844 sought the easiest path across this obstacle, bringing its weary immigrants to the Sacramento Valley and San Francisco Bay. There, they formed a core community of American settlers in Mexican California, and in 1846, became the center of the American uprising.

Persistent influence of passes.

Though modern engineering skill, especially when backed by a political policy, may cause certain passes to gain in historical importance at the cost of others, the rule holds that passes are never quite insignificant. Their influence is persistent through the ages. They are nature-made thoroughfares, traversed now by undisciplined hordes of migrating barbarians, now by organized armies, now by the woolly flocks and guardian dogs of the nomad shepherd, now by the sumpter mule of the itinerant merchant, now by the wagon-trains of over-mountain settlers, now by the steam engine panting up the steep grade. Nowhere does history repeat itself so monotonously, yet so interestingly as in these mountain gates. In the Pass of Roncesvalles, notching the western Pyrenees between Pamplona in Spain and St. Etienne in France, fell the army of Charlemagne surprised and beset by the mountain tribes in 778;1233 through this breach the Black Prince in 1367 led his troops to the victory of Navarette; in the Peninsular War a division of Wellington's army in 1813 moved northward up this valley, driving the French before them; and by this route Soult advanced southward across the frontier for the relief of the French forces shut up in Pamplona. The history of Palestine may be read in epitome in the annals of the Vale of Jezreel, where the highlands of Palestine sink to a natural trough before rising again to the hill country of Galilee and the mountain range of high Lebanon. This was the avenue for war and trade between the Nile and Euphrates, between Africa and Asia. Here the Canaanites expanded eastward from the coast, cutting off northern Israel in Galilee from Samaria and Judea. Here Gideon turned back the incursions of the Midianites or western Arabs. Here was the open road for Assyrians, Egyptians, for Greek armies under Antiochus, and Roman armies under Pompey, Mark Antony, Vespasian and Titus. Hither came the Saracens from the east in 634 A. D. to rout the Greek army, and later the Crusaders from the west, to secure with castle and fortress this key to the Holy Land. Finally, hither came Napoleon from Egypt in 1799 on his way to the Euphrates.1234

Though modern engineering, especially when supported by political policies, may elevate certain mountain passes in historical significance over others, the fact remains that passes are never truly unimportant. Their impact endures through the ages. They are natural routes, crossed now by unruly groups of migrating peoples, now by organized armies, now by the fluffy flocks and herding dogs of nomadic shepherds, now by the pack mules of traveling merchants, now by the wagon trains of settlers moving over mountains, and now by steam engines huffing up steep inclines. Nowhere does history repeat itself so consistently yet so intriguingly as at these mountain gateways. In the Pass of Roncesvalles, cutting through the western Pyrenees between Pamplona in Spain and St. Etienne in France, Charlemagne's army was caught off guard and attacked by mountain tribes in 778;1233 through this gap, the Black Prince led his troops to victory at Navarette in 1367; during the Peninsular War in 1813, a division of Wellington's army advanced north through this valley, pushing the French back; and this was the path Soult took heading south across the border to help the French forces trapped in Pamplona. The history of Palestine can be summarized in the records of the Vale of Jezreel, where the highlands of Palestine slope down to a natural depression before rising again to the hills of Galilee and the mountainous region of high Lebanon. This was the route for war and trade connecting the Nile and Euphrates, Africa and Asia. Here, the Canaanites moved eastward from the coast, isolating northern Israel in Galilee from Samaria and Judea. Here Gideon repelled the attacks of the Midianites, or western Arabs. This was the clear path for Assyrians, Egyptians, Greek forces under Antiochus, and Roman armies led by Pompey, Mark Antony, Vespasian, and Titus. It was also where the Saracens arrived from the east in 634 A.D. to defeat the Greek army, followed by the Crusaders from the west, who fortified this crucial access to the Holy Land. Finally, Napoleon came through on his way to the Euphrates from Egypt in 1799.1234

Geographic factors in the historical importance of passes.

The historical importance of passes tends to increase with the depth of the depression, since the lowest gap in a range relegates the others to only occasional or local use; and with their rarity, in consequence of which intercourse between opposite slopes is concentrated upon one or two defiles. The low dips of the Central American Cordilleras to 262 feet (80 meters) at Panama, 151 feet (46 meters) in the Nicaraguan isthmus, and 689 feet (210 meters) at Tehuantepec, present a striking contrast both orographically and historically to the South American Andes, where from the equator to the Uspallata or Bermejo Pass (12,562 feet or 3842 meters) back of Valparaiso, a stretch measuring 33 degrees of latitude, the passes all reach or exceed 10,000 feet or 3000 meters. The southern or Pennine range of the Alps, stretching as a snow-wrapped barrier from Mont Blanc 90 miles to the central Alpine dome of the St. Gotthard, is notched only by the Great St. Bernard and Simplon passes, which have therefore figured conspicuously in war and trade, since very early times. The Pass of Thermopylæ, as the only route southward along the flank of the Pindus system, figures in every land invasion of Greece from Xerxes to the Greek war of independence. All movements back and forth across the Caucasus wall have been confined to the Pass of Dariel and the far lower Pass of Derbent, or Pylæ Albaniæ; of the ancients, which lies between the Caspian and the last low spurs of the mountains as they drop down to the sea. The latter, as the easier of the two passes, has had a longer and richer history. It alone enabled the ancient Persians temporarily to force a wedge of conquest to the northern foot of the Caucasus, and it has been in all ages a highway for peoples entering Persia and Georgia from the north. It has so far been the only practicable route for a railway from the Russian steppes to the southern base of the Caucasus. While Vladicaucas and Tiflis have direct connection by the military highway over the Pass of Dariel, the railroad between these two points makes a detour of 300 miles to the east.

The historical significance of passes tends to grow with the depth of the depression, as the lowest gap in a range makes the others only occasionally or locally useful. Their rarity means that travel between opposite slopes is focused on just one or two defiles. The low dips of the Central American Cordilleras—262 feet (80 meters) at Panama, 151 feet (46 meters) in the Nicaraguan isthmus, and 689 feet (210 meters) at Tehuantepec—provide a striking contrast both in geography and history to the South American Andes. From the equator to the Uspallata or Bermejo Pass (12,562 feet or 3,842 meters) behind Valparaiso, all passes over a stretch of 33 degrees of latitude reach or exceed 10,000 feet (3,000 meters). The southern or Pennine range of the Alps, which stretches as a snow-covered barrier from Mont Blanc for 90 miles to the central Alpine dome of St. Gotthard, is only notched by the Great St. Bernard and Simplon passes. As a result, these passes have played a significant role in war and trade since ancient times. The Pass of Thermopylæ, being the only route southward along the Pindus system, has been involved in every land invasion of Greece, from Xerxes to the Greek War of Independence. All movements across the Caucasus wall have been limited to the Pass of Dariel and the lower Pass of Derbent, or Pylæ Albaniæ; of the ancients, which lies between the Caspian and the last low spurs of the mountains as they descend to the sea. The latter is the easier of the two passes and has a longer and richer history. It alone allowed the ancient Persians to temporarily extend their conquest to the northern foot of the Caucasus and has historically been a highway for people entering Persia and Georgia from the north. It has been the only feasible route for a railway from the Russian steppes to the southern base of the Caucasus. While Vladicaucas and Tiflis are directly connected by the military highway over the Pass of Dariel, the railroad between these two points takes a detour of 300 miles to the east.

Intermarine mountains.

Intermarine mountains as a rule offer the easiest passways where they sink to meet the flanking seas. The Pyrenees are crossed by only two railroads, the Bayonne-Burgos line, along the shore of the Bay of Biscay, and the Narbonne-Barcelona line, overlooking the Mediterranean. Between these extremities the passes are very high and only two are practicable for carriages, the Col de la Perche (5280 feet or 1610 meters) between the valleys of the Tet and the upper Segre, and the Port de Canfranc (7502 feet or 2288 meters) on the old Roman road from Saragossa to Oloron. The coastal road around the eastern end of the Cheviot Hills has been the great intermediary between England and Scotland. It was the avenue for early Teutonic expansion into the Scotch Lowlands, the thoroughfare for all those armies which for centuries made Berwick a chronic battleground.

Intermarine mountains usually provide the easiest routes where they dip down to meet the surrounding seas. The Pyrenees are crossed by only two rail lines: the Bayonne-Burgos line, which runs along the Bay of Biscay, and the Narbonne-Barcelona line, which looks over the Mediterranean. Between these two points, the passes are very high and only two are suitable for carriages: the Col de la Perche (5280 feet or 1610 meters) between the valleys of the Tet and upper Segre, and the Port de Canfranc (7502 feet or 2288 meters) on the ancient Roman road from Zaragoza to Oloron. The coastal route around the eastern end of the Cheviot Hills has served as the main link between England and Scotland. It was the path for the early Teutonic expansion into the Scottish Lowlands and the thoroughfare for all the armies that turned Berwick into a constant battlefield for centuries.

For purposes of trade these intermarine mountains are less serious barriers, because they can be avoided by an easier and cheaper sea route. Hence on each side of such ranges grow up active ports, like Narbonne and Barcelona, Bayonne and Bilbao with San Sebastian, on the piedmont seaboard of the Pyrenees; Petrovsk and Baku on the Caspian rim of the Caucasus, balancing the Crimean ports and Poti with Trebizond on the Black Sea. Analogous is the position of Genoa and Marseilles in relation to the Maritime Alps. Such ports are inevitably the object of attack in time of hostilities. In the Peninsular War almost the first act of the French was to seize Barcelona, San Sebastian and Bilbao; and throughout the seven years of the conflict these points were centers of battle, blockade and siege. If Russia ever tries to wrench the upper Euphrates Valley from Turkey, Trebizond will repeat the history of Barcelona in the Peninsular War.

For trade purposes, these coastal mountains are less of a barrier because there's a simpler and cheaper sea route to get around them. As a result, active ports have developed on both sides of these ranges, like Narbonne and Barcelona, Bayonne and Bilbao, with San Sebastian along the foothill coast of the Pyrenees; and Petrovsk and Baku on the Caspian side of the Caucasus, balancing the ports of Crimea and Poti with Trebizond on the Black Sea. Similarly, Genoa and Marseilles are positioned in relation to the Maritime Alps. These ports are always targets during wartime. In the Peninsular War, one of the first actions taken by the French was to capture Barcelona, San Sebastian, and Bilbao; throughout the seven years of conflict, these locations were focal points of battles, blockades, and sieges. If Russia ever attempts to take the upper Euphrates Valley from Turkey, Trebizond will experience a situation similar to Barcelona during the Peninsular War.

Pass roads between regions of contrasted production

As the world's roads are used primarily for commerce, pass routes rank in importance according to the amount of trade which they forward; and this in turn is decided by the contrast in the lands which they unite. The passes of the Alps and the Pass of Belfort have been busy thoroughfares from the early Middle Ages, because they facilitate exchanges between the tropical Mediterranean and the temperate regions of Central Europe. Or the contrast may be one of economic and social development. The Mohawk depression forwards the grain of the agricultural Northwest in return for the manufactured wares of the Atlantic seaboard. The passes of the Asiatic ranges connect the industrial and agricultural lowlands of India and China with the highland pastures of Mongolia, Tibet, Afghanistan and Russian Turkestan. Hence they forward the wool, skins, felts, cloth and carpets of the wandering shepherds in exchange for the food stuffs and industrial products of the fertile, crowded lowlands. Where passes open a highway for inland countries to the sea, their sphere of influence is greatly increased. San Francisco, New York, Marseilles, Genoa, Venice, Beirut and Bombay are seaports which owe their importance in no small degree to dominant pass routes into their hinterland.

As the world's roads are mainly used for trade, the importance of routes is determined by the volume of commerce they support, which is influenced by the differences in the regions they connect. The Alpine passes and the Pass of Belfort have been busy routes since the early Middle Ages because they enable trade between the warm Mediterranean and the temperate areas of Central Europe. Alternatively, the differences could be in economic and social development. The Mohawk depression transports grain from the agricultural Northwest in exchange for manufactured goods from the Atlantic coast. The passes of the Asian mountains link the industrial and agricultural lowlands of India and China with the highland pastures of Mongolia, Tibet, Afghanistan, and Russian Turkestan. This exchange provides wool, skins, felts, cloth, and carpets from the nomadic shepherds in return for food and industrial products from the fertile, densely populated lowlands. When passes create a route for inland regions to access the sea, their influence expands significantly. Cities like San Francisco, New York, Marseilles, Genoa, Venice, Beirut, and Bombay have gained much of their significance from the major pass routes that connect to their hinterlands.

Passes determine transmontane roads.

In plains and lowlands highways may run in any direction expediency suggests, but in mountain regions the pass points the road. In very high ranges there is no appeal from this law; but in lower systems and especially in old mountains which have been rounded and worn down by ages of denudation, economic and social considerations occasionally transcend orographical conditions in fixing the path of highways. Scarcely less important than pass or gap is the avenue of approach to the same. This is furnished by lateral or transverse valleys of erosion. The deeper their reentrant angles cut back into the heart of the highlands, the more they facilitate intercourse and lend historical importance to the pass route. The Alpine passes which are approached by a single valley from each side are those crossed by railroads to-day,—Mont Cenis, Simplon, St. Gotthard and the Brenner. The Alpine chain is trenched on its inner or southern side by a series of transverse erosion valleys, such as the Dora Baltea, Sesia, Tosa, Ticino, Adda, Adige, and Tagliamento, which carry roads up to the chief Alpine passes. The coincidence of the Roman and medieval roads over the Alps with the modern railroads is striking, except in the single point of elevation. Railroads tend to follow lower levels. Modern engineering skill enables them to tunnel the crest, to cut galleries in the perpendicular walls of gorges, and to embank mountain torrents against the spring inundation of the roadbed, where it drops to the valley floor.

In flatland and lowland areas, highways can run in any direction that makes sense, but in mountainous regions, the passes determine the roads. In very high ranges, this rule is absolute; however, in lower mountain systems and especially in older mountains that have been worn down over time, economic and social factors can sometimes take priority over geographic features when deciding the route of highways. Almost as important as the pass itself is the access route to it. This access is provided by side or cross-valleys created by erosion. The deeper these valleys cut into the mountains, the easier they facilitate travel and enhance the historical significance of the pass. The Alpine passes that are approached by a single valley from each side are the ones that have railroads crossing them today—like Mont Cenis, Simplon, St. Gotthard, and the Brenner. On the southern side of the Alpine chain, a series of transverse erosion valleys, such as the Dora Baltea, Sesia, Tosa, Ticino, Adda, Adige, and Tagliamento, create routes leading to the main Alpine passes. It’s striking how the routes of Roman and medieval roads over the Alps coincide with the modern railroads, except for their elevation; railroads tend to stay at lower levels. Modern engineering allows railroads to tunnel through mountain peaks, carve out paths in the steep walls of gorges, and support the embankments against mountain floods that threaten the roadway where it drops to the valley floor.

Navigable river approaches to passes.

Where gaps are low and the approaching waters are navigable, at least for the small craft of early days, they combine to enhance the historical importance of their routes. The Mohawk River, navigable for the canoe of Indian and fur trader, greatly increased travel and traffic through the Mohawk depression. The Pass of Belfort is the greatest historic gateway of western Europe, chiefly because it unites the channels of the Rhone, Saône and Rhine. Lake Lucerne brings the modern tourist by boat to the foot of the railroad ascent to the St. Gotthard Pass, as the long gorge of Lake Maggiore receives him at the southern end. Lake Maggiore is the water outlet also of the Simplon Pass from the upper Rhone, the Lukmanier (6288 feet or 1917 meters) from the Hither Rhine, and the San Bernadino (6766 feet or 2063 meters) from the Hinter Rhine.1235 This geographical fact explains the motive of Swiss expansion in the fifteenth century in embracing the Italian province of Ticino and the upper end of Lake Maggiore. A significance like that of the Swiss and Italian lakes for the Alpine passes appears emphasized in the Sogne Fiord of Norway. This carries a marine highway a hundred miles into the land; from its head, roads ascend to the only two dents in the mountain wall south of the wide snowfield of the Jotun Fjeld, and they lead thence by the valleys of Hallingdal and Valders down to the plains of Christiania.

Where the gaps are low and the approaching waters are navigable, at least for the small boats of earlier times, they enhance the historical significance of their routes. The Mohawk River, which can be navigated by the canoes of Native Americans and fur traders, greatly increased travel and traffic through the Mohawk valley. The Pass of Belfort is the most significant historic gateway in Western Europe, mainly because it connects the channels of the Rhône, Saône, and Rhine rivers. Lake Lucerne brings modern tourists by boat to the base of the railroad leading up to the St. Gotthard Pass, just as the long gorge of Lake Maggiore welcomes them at the southern end. Lake Maggiore is also the water outlet for the Simplon Pass from the upper Rhône, the Lukmanier Pass (6,288 feet or 1,917 meters) from the Hither Rhine, and the San Bernardino Pass (6,766 feet or 2,063 meters) from the Hinter Rhine.1235 This geographic fact explains the motive behind Swiss expansion in the fifteenth century, which included the Italian province of Ticino and the upper end of Lake Maggiore. A significance similar to that of the Swiss and Italian lakes for the Alpine passes is seen in Norway's Sogne Fjord. This fjord extends a marine highway a hundred miles inland; from its head, roads rise to the only two dents in the mountain wall south of the expansive snowfield of the Jotun Fjeld, leading through the valleys of Hallingdal and Valders down to the plains of Christiania.

Types of settlements in the valley approaches.

Genuine mountain passes have only emergency inhabitants—the monks and dogs of the hospice, the road-keepers in their refuge huts or cantonière, or the garrison of a fort guarding these important thoroughfares. The flanking valleys of approach draw to themselves the human life of the mountains. Their upper settlements show a certain common physiognomy, born of their relation to the barren transit region above, except in those few mountain districts of advanced civilization where railroads have introduced through traffic over the barrier. At the foot of the final ascent to the pass, where often the carriage road ends and where mule-path or foot-trail begins, is located a settlement that lives largely by the transmontane travel. It is a place of inns, hostelries, of blacksmith shops, where in the busy season the sound of hammer and anvil is heard all night; of stables and corrals crowded with pack and draft animals; of storehouses where the traveler can provide himself with food for the journey across the barren, uninhabited heights. It is the typical outfitting point such as springs up on the margin of any pure transit region, whether mountain or desert. Such places are Andermatt and Airolo, lying at an altitude of 4000 feet or more on the St. Gotthard road, St. Moritz below the Maloja Pass, Jaca near the Pass de Canfranc over the Pyrenees, Kugiar and Shahidula1236 at an elevation of 10,775 feet or 3285 meters on the road up to the Karakorum Pass (18,548 feet or 5655 meters), which crosses the highest range of the Himalayas between Leh in the upper Indus Valley and Yarkand in Chinese Turkestan.

Genuine mountain passes only have a few emergency residents—the monks and dogs at the hospice, the road crews in their shelter huts, or the soldiers guarding these important routes. The neighboring valleys attract the mountain communities. Their upper settlements share a similar look due to their connection with the barren transit area above, except in a few advanced mountain regions where railroads have enabled through traffic across the barrier. At the base of the final climb to the pass, where the car road often ends and the mule paths or hiking trails begin, there's a settlement that survives mainly on travelers crossing the mountains. It’s a place with inns, guesthouses, and blacksmith shops, where the sounds of hammering can be heard all night during busy seasons; stables and corrals filled with pack and draft animals; and storehouses where travelers can stock up on food for the journey across the uninhabited heights. It’s a typical outfitting spot that appears at the edge of any major transit area, whether it’s in the mountains or the desert. Such locations include Andermatt and Airolo, situated at over 4,000 feet on the St. Gotthard road, St. Moritz below the Maloja Pass, Jaca near the Pass de Canfranc across the Pyrenees, and Kugiar and Shahidula1236 located at an elevation of 10,775 feet or 3,285 meters on the road to the Karakorum Pass (18,548 feet or 5,655 meters), which crosses the highest range of the Himalayas between Leh in the upper Indus Valley and Yarkand in Chinese Turkestan.

Lower settlements.

Farther down the transverse valley the type of settlement changes where side valleys, leading down from other passes, converge and help build up a distributing center for a considerable highland area. Such a point is Chiavenna in northern Italy, located above the head of Lake Como at the junction of the Mera and Liro valleys, which lead respectively to the Splügen and Maloja passes. It lies at an altitude of 1090 feet (332 meters) and has a population of 4000. Such a point is Aosta (1913 feet or 583 meters elevation) in the Dora Baltea Valley, commanding the Italian approaches to the Great St. Bernard Pass, and the less important Col de Fenêtre leading to the upper Rhone, the Little St. Bernard highway to the valley of the Isère, and Col de la Seigne path around the Mont Blanc range to the valley of the Arve. Aosta was an important place in the Roman period and has to-day a population of about 8000. Kokan, in the upper Sir-Daria Valley in Russian Turkestan, commands the approach to the passes of the western Tian Shan and the northern Pamir. Its well-stocked bazaars, containing goods from Russia, Persia and India, testify to its commercial location.

Farther down the transverse valley, the type of settlement changes where side valleys, coming down from other passes, come together and create a distributing center for a large highland area. One such place is Chiavenna in northern Italy, located at the head of Lake Como where the Mera and Liro valleys meet, leading to the Splügen and Maloja passes, respectively. It sits at an altitude of 1,090 feet (332 meters) and has a population of 4,000. Another notable location is Aosta (1,913 feet or 583 meters elevation) in the Dora Baltea Valley, overseeing the Italian routes to the Great St. Bernard Pass and the less prominent Col de Fenêtre leading to the upper Rhône, the Little St. Bernard highway to the Isère valley, and the Col de la Seigne path around the Mont Blanc range to the Arve valley. Aosta was significant during the Roman era and today has a population of about 8,000. Kokan, in the upper Sir-Daria Valley in Russian Turkestan, controls the approach to the passes of the western Tian Shan and the northern Pamir. Its well-stocked bazaars, filled with goods from Russia, Persia, and India, highlight its commercial importance.

Pass cities and their markets.

When the highland area is very broad and therefore necessitates long transit journeys, genuine pass cities develop at high altitudes, and become the termini of the transmontane trade. Such is the Leh (11,280 feet or 3439 meters) on the caravan route from Central Asia over the Karakorum Pass down to Kashmir, and such is Srinagar (5252 feet or 1603 meters) in Kashmir. To their markets come caravans from Chinese Turkestan, laden with carpets and brick tea, and Tibetan merchants from Lhassa, bringing wool from their highland pastures to exchange for the rice and sugar of lowland India.1237 Leh is conveniently situated about half way between the markets of India and Central Asia. Therefore it is the terminus for caravans arriving from both regions, and exchange place for products from north and south. Seldom do caravans from either direction go farther than this point. Here the merchants rest for a month or two and barter their goods. Tents of every kind, camels, yaks, mules and horses, coolie transports of various races, men of many languages and many religions, give to this high-laid town a truly cosmopolitan stamp in the summer time when the passes are open.1238 Kabul, which lies at an altitude of nearly 6000 feet near the head of the Kabul River, is the focus of numerous routes over the Hindu Kush, and dominates all routes converging on the northwest frontier of the Punjab.1239 It is therefore the military and commercial key to India. Its narrow winding streets are obstructed by the picturesque kafilas of Oriental merchants, stocked with both Russian goods from the Oxus districts and British goods from India in evidence of its intermediary location.1240

When the highland area is very expansive and requires long journey times, real pass cities emerge at high elevations and become the endpoints of transmontane trade. An example is Leh (11,280 feet or 3,439 meters) on the caravan route from Central Asia over the Karakorum Pass down to Kashmir, and another is Srinagar (5,252 feet or 1,603 meters) in Kashmir. Caravans from Chinese Turkestan arrive at their markets, loaded with carpets and brick tea, while Tibetan traders from Lhasa bring wool from their highland pastures to exchange for the rice and sugar of lowland India.1237 Leh is conveniently located about halfway between the markets of India and Central Asia, making it the stopping point for caravans arriving from both regions and a trading hub for products from the north and south. Caravans seldom travel beyond this point in either direction. Here, merchants rest for a month or two and trade their goods. Tents of all kinds, along with camels, yaks, mules, and horses, bustling transporters of various ethnicities, and people speaking numerous languages and practicing different religions give this high-altitude town a truly cosmopolitan vibe during the summer when the passes are open.1238 Kabul, situated at nearly 6,000 feet near the Kabul River, is the center of many routes over the Hindu Kush and dominates all routes converging on the northwestern frontier of the Punjab.1239 It is therefore the military and commercial key to India. Its narrow, winding streets are filled with the colorful kafilas of Eastern merchants, showcasing both Russian products from the Oxus regions and British goods from India, a testament to its intermediary position.1240

Occasionally a very high market develops for purely local use. The Indian Himalayan province of Kumaon contains the market town of Garbyang, at an elevation of 10,300 feet or about 3000 meters, on the Kali River road leading by the Lipu Lekh Pass (16,780 feet or 5115 meters) over to Tibet. It has grown up as a trade center for the Dokpa Tibetans, who will not descend below 10,000 feet because their yak and sheep die at a lower altitude.1241 Farther east in the Sikkim border, Darjeeling (7150 feet or 2180 meters elevation) is center of the British wool trade with Tibet.

Occasionally, a very high market develops for purely local use. The Indian Himalayan province of Kumaon has the market town of Garbyang, sitting at an elevation of 10,300 feet or about 3,000 meters, along the Kali River road leading to the Lipu Lekh Pass (16,780 feet or 5,115 meters) into Tibet. It has become a trade center for the Dokpa Tibetans, who won't go below 10,000 feet because their yak and sheep die at lower altitudes.1241 Further east, near the Sikkim border, Darjeeling (7,150 feet or 2,180 meters elevation) is the center of the British wool trade with Tibet.

Often the exchange point moves nearer the summit of the pass, dividing the journey more equally between the two areas of production. Here develops the temporary summer market. High up on the route between Leh and Yarkand is Sasar, a place of unroofed enclosures for the deposit of cotton, silk and other goods left there by the caravans plying back and forth between Leh and Sasar, or Sasar and Yarkand.1242 Nearly midway on the much frequented trade route between Leh and Lhassa, at a point 15,100 feet (nearly 500 meters) above sea level, just below the Schako Pass, lies Gartok in western Tibet, in summer a busy market surrounded by a city of tents, and the summer residence of the two Chinese viceroys, who occupy the only two substantial dwellings in the place. Here at the end of August is held a great annual fair, which is attended by traders from India, Kashmir, Mongolia, Chinese Turkestan, China proper, and Lhassa; but by November the place is deserted. The traders disperse, and the few residents of Gartok, together with the viceroys, retire down the Indus Valley to the more sheltered village of Gargunza (14,140 feet or 4311 meters elevation), which represents the limits of permanent settlement in these altitudes.1243 The Sutlej Valley route from the Punjab to Lhassa is capped near its summit at an altitude of about 5000 meters by the summer market, of Gyanema, whose numerous types of tents indicate the various homes of the traders from Lhassa to India.1244

Often, the exchange point moves closer to the peak of the pass, balancing the journey between the two production areas. This is where the temporary summer market develops. High along the route between Leh and Yarkand is Sasar, a location with open enclosures for storing cotton, silk, and other goods left there by caravans traveling back and forth between Leh and Sasar, or Sasar and Yarkand.1242 Almost halfway on the heavily used trade route between Leh and Lhassa, at an altitude of 15,100 feet (nearly 500 meters) below the Schako Pass, lies Gartok in western Tibet, a lively market in the summer surrounded by a city of tents, and the summer home of the two Chinese viceroys, who reside in the only substantial buildings in the area. At the end of August, a large annual fair is held here, attracting traders from India, Kashmir, Mongolia, Chinese Turkestan, China, and Lhassa; but by November, the place becomes deserted. The traders disperse, and the few residents of Gartok, along with the viceroys, retreat down the Indus Valley to the more sheltered village of Gargunza (14,140 feet or 4311 meters elevation), which marks the limits of permanent settlement at these altitudes.1243 The Sutlej Valley route from the Punjab to Lhassa is capped near its peak at an altitude of about 5000 meters by the summer market of Gyanema, where the variety of tents reflects the diverse homes of traders from Lhassa to India.1244

Pass peoples.

Natural thoroughfares, whether river highways or mountain pass routes, draw to themselves migration, travel, trade and war. They therefore early assume historical importance. Hence we find that peoples controlling transmontane routes have always been able to exert an historical influence out of proportion to their size and strength; and that in consequence they early become an object of conquest to the people of the lowlands, as soon as these desire to control such transit routes. The power of these pass tribes is often due to the trade which they command and which compensates them for the unproductive character of their country. In the eastern Himalayas the Tomos of the Chumbi Valley are intermediaries of trade between Darjeeling and Tibet, In the western Himalayas, the Kumaon borderland of northern India, which commands some of the best passes, has made its native folk or Bhutias bold merchants who jealously monopolize the trade over the passes to the Tibetan markets. They stretch for a zone of thirty miles south of the boundary from Nepal to Garhwal along the approach to every pass, each sub-group having its particular trade route.1245

Natural pathways, whether rivers or mountain passes, attract migration, travel, trade, and conflict. Because of this, they quickly gain historical significance. As a result, we see that groups controlling mountain routes have always been able to exert historical influence that's much greater than their size and strength; consequently, they often become targets of conquest by lowland peoples who want to gain control over these transit routes. The power of these mountain tribes often comes from the trade they control, which compensates for the unproductive nature of their land. In the eastern Himalayas, the Tomos of the Chumbi Valley act as traders between Darjeeling and Tibet. In the western Himalayas, the Kumaon borderland of northern India, which has some of the best passes, has turned its local people, the Bhutias, into shrewd merchants who carefully maintain a monopoly over trade routes to the Tibetan markets. They occupy a thirty-mile zone south of the boundary from Nepal to Garhwal, each subgroup having its own specific trade route.1245

Transit duties.

It is always possible for such pass tribes to levy a toll or transit duty on merchandise, or in lieu of this to rob. Cæsar made war upon the Veragri and Seduni, who commanded the northern end of the Great St. Bernard Pass, in order to open up the road over the Alps, which was traversed by Roman merchants magno cum periculo magnisque cum portoriis.1246 The Salassi, who inhabited the upper Dora Baltea Valley and hence controlled the Little St. Bernard wagon road leading over to Lugdunum or Lyons, regularly plundered or taxed all who attempted to cross their mountains. On one occasion they levied a toll of a drachm per man on a Roman army, and on another plundered the treasure of Cæsar himself. After a protracted struggle they were crushed by Augustus, who founded Aosta and garrisoned it with a body of Praetorian cohorts to police the highway.1247 The Iapodes in the Julian Alps controlled the Mount Ocra or Peartree Pass, which carried the Roman wagon road from Aquileia over the mountains down to the valley of the Laibach and the Save. This strategic position they exploited to the utmost, till Augustus brought them to subjection as a preliminary to Roman expansion on the Danube.1248

It is always possible for such pass tribes to charge a toll or transit fee on goods, or alternatively, to rob. Caesar went to war against the Veragri and Seduni, who controlled the northern end of the Great St. Bernard Pass, in order to open the road over the Alps, which was traveled by Roman merchants magno cum periculo magnisque cum portoriis.1246 The Salassi, who lived in the upper Dora Baltea Valley and controlled the Little St. Bernard wagon road leading to Lugdunum or Lyons, frequently plundered or taxed everyone trying to cross their mountains. One time they charged a toll of a drachm per man to a Roman army, and on another occasion, they stole Caesar's treasure. After a long struggle, they were defeated by Augustus, who founded Aosta and stationed a unit of Praetorian cohorts there to monitor the highway.1247 The Iapodes in the Julian Alps controlled the Mount Ocra or Peartree Pass, which carried the Roman wagon road from Aquileia over the mountains down to the valley of the Laibach and the Save. They fully exploited this strategic position until Augustus subdued them in preparation for Roman expansion along the Danube.1248

Turning to another part of the world, we find that the Afghan tribes commanding the passes of the Suleiman Mountains have long been accustomed to impose transit duties upon caravans plying between Turkestan and India. The merchants have regularly organized themselves into bands of hundreds or even thousands to resist attack or exorbitant exactions. The Afghans have always enforced their right to collect tolls in the Khaibar and Kohat passes, and have thus blackmailed every Indian dynasty for centuries. In 1881 the British government came to terms with them by paying them an annual sum to keep these roads open.1249 Just to the south the Gomal Pass, which carries the main traffic road over the border mountains between the Punjab and the Afghan city of Ghazni, is held by the brigand tribe of Waziris, and is a dangerous gauntlet to be run by every armed caravan passing to and from India.1250 The Ossetes of the Caucasus, who occupy the Pass of Dariel and the approaching valleys, regularly preyed upon the traffic moving between Russia and Georgia, till the Muscovite government seized and policed the road.1251

Turning to another part of the world, we see that the Afghan tribes controlling the passes of the Suleiman Mountains have long been used to charging transit fees for caravans traveling between Turkestan and India. Merchants have often banded together in groups of hundreds or even thousands to fend off attacks or unreasonable charges. The Afghans have consistently asserted their right to collect tolls in the Khaibar and Kohat passes, effectively extorting every Indian dynasty for centuries. In 1881, the British government reached an agreement with them by paying an annual fee to keep these roads open.1249 Just to the south, the Gomal Pass, which is the main traffic route over the border mountains between Punjab and the Afghan city of Ghazni, is controlled by the bandit tribe of Waziris, making it a risky passage for any armed caravan traveling to and from India.1250 The Ossetes of the Caucasus, who occupy the Pass of Dariel and the surrounding valleys, regularly attacked the traffic moving between Russia and Georgia until the Russian government took control and secured the road.1251

Strategic power of pass states.

The strategic importance of pass peoples tends early to assume a political aspect. The mountain state learns to exploit this one advantage of its ill-favored geographical location. The cradle of the old Savoyard power in the late Middle Ages lay in the Alpine lands between Lake Geneva and the western tributaries of the Po River. This location controlling several great mountain routes between France and Italy gave the Savoyard princes their first importance.1252 The autonomy of Switzerland can be traced not less to the citadel character of the country and the native independence of its people, than to their political exploitation of their strategic position. They profited, moreover, by the wish of their neighbors that such an important transit region between semi-tropical and temperate Europe should be held by a power too weak to obstruct its routes. The Amir of Kabul, backed by the rapacious Afridi tribes of the Suleiman Mountains, has been able to play off British India against Russia, and thereby to secure from both powers a degree of consideration not usually shown to inferior nations. Similarly in colonial America, the Iroquois of the Mohawk depression, who commanded the passway from the Hudson to the fur fields of the Northwest and also the avenue of attack upon the New York settlements for the French in Canada, were early conciliated by the English and used by them as allies, first in the French wars and afterward in the Revolution.

The strategic importance of mountain passes tends to take on a political angle early on. The mountain state learns to leverage this one advantage of its challenging geographical location. The origins of the old Savoyard power in the late Middle Ages were in the Alpine areas between Lake Geneva and the western tributaries of the Po River. This location, which controls several major mountain routes between France and Italy, gave the Savoyard princes their initial significance.1252 Switzerland's autonomy can be attributed not only to the fortress-like nature of the country and the inherent independence of its people but also to their strategic exploitation of their location. They also benefited from their neighbors' desire that such an important transit region between semi-tropical and temperate Europe be held by a power too weak to obstruct its routes. The Amir of Kabul, supported by the greedy Afridi tribes of the Suleiman Mountains, has managed to play British India off against Russia, thus gaining a level of respect usually not extended to lesser nations. Similarly, in colonial America, the Iroquois of the Mohawk Valley, who controlled the route from the Hudson to the fur fields of the Northwest and the avenue of attack on the New York settlements for the French in Canada, were early on won over by the English and used as allies, first in the French wars and later in the Revolution.


NOTES TO CHAPTER XV

Notes for Chapter 15


1186.

For physical effects, see Angelo Mosso, Life of Man on the High Alps. Translated from the Italian. London, 1898.

For physical effects, see Angelo Mosso, Life of Man on the High Alps. Translated from the Italian. London, 1898.

1187.

W.Z. Ripley, Races of Europe, pp. 463-465. New York, 1899.

W.Z. Ripley, Races of Europe, pp. 463-465. New York, 1899.

1188.

Strabo, Book IV, chap. VI, 3.

Strabo, Book IV, chap. VI, 3.

1189.

W.Z. Ripley, Races of Europe, pp. 31-32. New York, 1899.

W.Z. Ripley, Races of Europe, pp. 31-32. New York, 1899.

1190.

Sir Thomas Holdich, India, pp. 32-33. London, 1905.

Sir Thomas Holdich, India, pp. 32-33. London, 1905.

1191.

W.Z. Ripley, The Races of Europe, Map p. 439. New York, 1899.

W.Z. Ripley, The Races of Europe, Map p. 439. New York, 1899.

1192.

Imperial Gazetteer of India, Vol. I, pp. 294-295. Oxford, 1907. Sir Thomas Holdich, India, relief map on p. 171 compared with linguistic map p. 201. London, 1905.

Imperial Gazetteer of India, Vol. I, pp. 294-295. Oxford, 1907. Sir Thomas Holdich, India, relief map on p. 171 compared with linguistic map p. 201. London, 1905.

1193.

Census of India for 1901, Risley and Gait, Vol. I, Part I, p. 2. Calcutta, 1903. B.H. Baden-Powell, The Indian Village Community, pp. 40, 130, 131. London, 1896.

Census of India for 1901, Risley and Gait, Vol. I, Part I, p. 2. Calcutta, 1903. B.H. Baden-Powell, The Indian Village Community, pp. 40, 130, 131. London, 1896.

1194.

Count Gleichen, The Egyptian Sudan, Vol. I, pp. 184, 185, 190. London, 1905.

Count Gleichen, The Egyptian Sudan, Vol. I, pp. 184, 185, 190. London, 1905.

1195.

Gustav Nachtigal, Sahara und Sudan, Vol. III, pp. 178, 188-192. Leipzig, 1889.

Gustav Nachtigal, Sahara und Sudan, Vol. III, pp. 178, 188-192. Leipzig, 1889.

1196.

Spencer and Gillen, The Northern Tribes of Central Australia, pp. 6, 13. London, 1904.

Spencer and Gillen, The Northern Tribes of Central Australia, pp. 6, 13. London, 1904.

1197.

W. Deecke, Italy, p. 365. London, 1904.

W. Deecke, Italy, p. 365. London, 1904.

1198.

Sir Thomas Holdich, India, pp. 295-296. London, 1905. G.W. Steevens, In India, pp. 202-204. New York, 1899.

Sir Thomas Holdich, India, pp. 295-296. London, 1905. G.W. Steevens, In India, pp. 202-204. New York, 1899.

1199.

Francis Younghusband, The Heart of a Continent, pp. 138, 140, 145, 272-273. London, 1904.

Francis Younghusband, The Heart of a Continent, pp. 138, 140, 145, 272-273. London, 1904.

1200.

E. Huntington, The Pulse of Asia, p. 87. Boston, 1907.

E. Huntington, The Pulse of Asia, p. 87. Boston, 1907.

1201.

E.C. Semple, American History and Its Geographic Conditions, pp. 184-185. Boston, 1903.

E.C. Semple, American History and Its Geographic Conditions, pp. 184-185. Boston, 1903.

1202.

Isabella Bird Bishop, The Yangtze Valley and Beyond, Vol. II, pp. 70-72, 88, 91. London, 1900.

Isabella Bird Bishop, The Yangtze Valley and Beyond, Vol. II, pp. 70-72, 88, 91. London, 1900.

1203.

Francis H. Nichols, Through Hidden Shensi, pp. 170-171. New York, 1902.

Francis H. Nichols, Through Hidden Shensi, pp. 170-171. New York, 1902.

1204.

Otis T. Mason, Primitive Travel and Transportation, pp. 450-454, 474-475. Smithsonian Report, Washington, 1896.

Otis T. Mason, Primitive Travel and Transportation, pp. 450-454, 474-475. Smithsonian Report, Washington, 1896.

1205.

Col. George E. Church, The Acre Territory and the Caoutchouc Regions of Southwestern Amazonia, Geog. Jour. May, 1904. London.

Col. George E. Church, The Acre Territory and the Caoutchouc Regions of Southwestern Amazonia, Geog. Jour. May, 1904. London.

1206.

M. Huc, Journey through the Chinese Empire, pp. 39-40. New York, 1871.

M. Huc, Journey through the Chinese Empire, pp. 39-40. New York, 1871.

1207.

Perceval Landon, The Opening of Tibet, pp. 54-55. New York, 1905.

Perceval Landon, The Opening of Tibet, pp. 54-55. New York, 1905.

1208.

Jean Baptiste Tavernier, Travels in India. Vol. II, p. 264. Translated from the French of 1676. London, 1889.

Jean Baptiste Tavernier, Travels in India. Vol. II, p. 264. Translated from the French of 1676. London, 1889.

1209.

E.F. Knight, Where Three Empires Meet, pp. 231, 274, 276, 286-289. London, 1897.

E.F. Knight, Where Three Empires Meet, pp. 231, 274, 276, 286-289. London, 1897.

1210.

Census of the Philippine Islands, Vol. I, p. 544. Washington, 1905.

Census of the Philippine Islands, Vol. I, p. 544. Washington, 1905.

1211.

Joseph Partsch, Central Europe, p. 134. London, 1903.

Joseph Partsch, Central Europe, p. 134. London, 1903.

1212.

M.S.W. Jefferson, Cæsar and the Central Plateau of France, Journal of Geog., Vol. VI, p. 113. New York, 1897.

M.S.W. Jefferson, Caesar and the Central Plateau of France, Journal of Geog., Vol. VI, p. 113. New York, 1897.

1213.

P. Vidal de la Blache, Tableau de la Géographie de la France, p. 276. Paris, 1903.

P. Vidal de la Blache, Tableau de la Géographie de la France, p. 276. Paris, 1903.

1214.

E.A. Freeman, Historical Geography of Europe, Vol. I, p. 450-453. London, 1882.

E.A. Freeman, Historical Geography of Europe, Vol. I, p. 450-453. London, 1882.

1215.

William Morris Davis, Physical Geography, p. 183. Boston, 1899.

William Morris Davis, Physical Geography, p. 183. Boston, 1899.

1216.

P. Vidal de la Blache, Tableau de la Géographie de la France, p. 260, map p. 261. Paris, 1903.

P. Vidal de la Blache, Tableau de la Géographie de la France, p. 260, map p. 261. Paris, 1903.

1217.

Indian Census for 1901, Risley and Gait, Vol. I, Part I, pp. 1, 2, Calcutta, 1905.

Indian Census for 1901, Risley and Gait, Vol. I, Part I, pp. 1, 2, Calcutta, 1905.

1218.

Hans Helmolt, History of the World, Vol. IV, p. 479. New York, 1902.

Hans Helmolt, History of the World, Vol. IV, p. 479. New York, 1902.

1219.

Sir Thomas Holdich, India, p. 67, cartogram of Hindu Kush orography. London, 1905.

Sir Thomas Holdich, India, p. 67, cartogram of Hindu Kush orography. London, 1905.

1220.

Ibid., pp. 102-104.

Ibid., pp. 102-104.

1221.

Ibid., p. 26.

Ibid., p. 26.

1222.

J. Partsch, Central Europe, p. 27. London, 1903.

J. Partsch, Central Europe, p. 27. London, 1903.

1223.

B.H. Baden-Powell, The Indian Village Community, pp. 40-45, 111, 116. London, 1896.

B.H. Baden-Powell, The Indian Village Community, pp. 40-45, 111, 116. London, 1896.

1224.

H.R. Mill, International Geography, pp. 394-395. New York, 1902.

H.R. Mill, International Geography, pp. 394-395. New York, 1902.

1225.

Gottfried Merzbacher, Aus den Hochregionen des Kaukasus, pp. 73-78. Leipzig, 1901.

Gottfried Merzbacher, From the High Regions of the Caucasus, pp. 73-78. Leipzig, 1901.

1226.

W.Z. Ripley, The Races of Europe, p. 438. New York, 1899.

W.Z. Ripley, The Races of Europe, p. 438. New York, 1899.

1227.

Ibid., Maps pp. 143, 147, text p. 148.

Ibid., Maps pp. 143, 147, text p. 148.

1228.

E. Huntington, The Pulse of Asia, pp. 106-109. Boston, 1907.

E. Huntington, The Pulse of Asia, pp. 106-109. Boston, 1907.

1229.

W.Z. Ripley, The Races of Europe, pp. 249-253. New York, 1899.

W.Z. Ripley, The Races of Europe, pp. 249-253. New York, 1899.

1230.

Ibid., p. 282 and cartogram, p. 284.

Ibid., p. 282 and cartogram, p. 284.

1231.

Sir Thomas Holdich, India, p. 201. London, 1905. Imperial Gazetteer of India, Vol. I, p. 295. Oxford, 1907.

Sir Thomas Holdich, India, p. 201. London, 1905. Imperial Gazetteer of India, Vol. I, p. 295. Oxford, 1907.

1232.

Census of India, 1901, Ethnographic Appendices, Vol. I, p. 60, by H. H. Risley, Calcutta, 1903. C. A. Sherring, Western Tibet and the British Borderland, pp. 341-353. London, 1906.

Census of India, 1901, Ethnographic Appendices, Vol. I, p. 60, by H. H. Risley, Calcutta, 1903. C. A. Sherring, Western Tibet and the British Borderland, pp. 341-353. London, 1906.

1233.

B. Lavisse, Histoire de France, Vol. II, Part 1, p. 294. Paris, 1903.

B. Lavisse, Histoire de France, Vol. II, Part 1, p. 294. Paris, 1903.

1234.

George Adam Smith, Historical Geography of the Holy Land, pp. 383, 384, 391-400, 407, 409. New York, 1897.

George Adam Smith, Historical Geography of the Holy Land, pp. 383, 384, 391-400, 407, 409. New York, 1897.

1235.

Wilhelm Deecke, Italy, pp. 20, 21. London, 1904.

Wilhelm Deecke, Italy, pp. 20, 21. London, 1904.

1236.

Francis Younghusband, The Heart of a Continent, pp. 150, 194, 199. London, 1904.

Francis Younghusband, The Heart of a Continent, pp. 150, 194, 199. London, 1904.

1237.

E.F. Knight, Where Three Empires Meet, pp. 12, 88, 157-159, 231. London, 1897.

E.F. Knight, Where Three Empires Meet, pp. 12, 88, 157-159, 231. London, 1897.

1238.

Ibid., pp. 173, 177.

Ibid., pp. 173, 177.

1239.

Sir Thomas Holdich, India, map p. 85, pp. 86, 89. London, 1905.

Sir Thomas Holdich, India, map p. 85, pp. 86, 89. London, 1905.

1240.

Vambery, Reise in Mittelasien, pp. 371-375. Leipzig, 1973.

Vambery, Travel in Central Asia, pp. 371-375. Leipzig, 1973.

1241.

C.A. Sherring, Western Tibet and the British Borderland, p. 136. London, 1906.

C.A. Sherring, Western Tibet and the British Borderland, p. 136. London, 1906.

1242.

O.P. Crosby, Tibet and Turkestan, pp. 112-116. New York, 1903.

O.P. Crosby, Tibet and Turkestan, pp. 112-116. New York, 1903.

1243.

Elisée Reclus, Asia, Vol. II, pp. 50-51. C.A. Sherring, Western Tibet and the British Borderland, pp. 146-148, 152, 157, 300-303. London, 1906.

Elisée Reclus, Asia, Vol. II, pp. 50-51. C.A. Sherring, Western Tibet and the British Borderland, pp. 146-148, 152, 157, 300-303. London, 1906.

1244.

Ibid., pp. 326-327.

Ibid., pp. 326-327.

1245.

Ibid., pp. 4, 61-64, 310-311.

Ibid., pp. 4, 61-64, 310-311.

1246.

Bella Gallico, Book III, chap. I.

Book III, chap. I.

1247.

Strabo, Book IV, chap. VI, 1, 11.

Strabo, Book IV, chap. VI, 1, 11.

1248.

Strabo, Book IV, chap. VI, 10.

Strabo, Book IV, chap. VI, 10.

1249.

Sir Thomas Holdich, The Indian Borderland, p. 48. London, 1909.

Sir Thomas Holdich, The Indian Borderland, p. 48. London, 1909.

1250.

H.R. Mill, International Geography, p. 467. New York, 1902.

H.R. Mill, International Geography, p. 467. New York, 1902.

1251.

Pallas, Travels Through the Southern Provinces of Russia, Vol. I, p. 431. London, 1812.

Pallas, Travels Through the Southern Provinces of Russia, Vol. I, p. 431. London, 1812.

1252.

E.A. Freeman, Historical Geography of Europe, Vol. I, pp. 286-287. London, 1882.

E.A. Freeman, Historical Geography of Europe, Vol. I, pp. 286-287. London, 1882.

1253.

Heinrich von Treitschke, Politik, Vol. I, p. 218. Leipzig, 1897.

Heinrich von Treitschke, Politik, Vol. I, p. 218. Leipzig, 1897.

1254.

For full discussion, see H.R. Mill, International Geography, pp. 79-81. New York, 1902.

For a complete discussion, see H.R. Mill, International Geography, pp. 79-81. New York, 1902.


Chapter XVI—Influences Of A Mountain Environment

Zones of altitude.

There are zones of latitude and zones of altitude. To every mountain region both these pertain, resulting in a nice interplay of geographic factors. Every mountain slope from summit to piedmont is, from the anthropo-geographical standpoint, a complex phenomenon. When high enough, it may show a graded series of contrasted complementary locations, closely interdependent grouping of populations and employments, every degree of density from congestion to vacancy, every range of cultural development from industrialism to nomadism. The southern slope of the Monte Rosa Alps, from the glacier cap at 4500 meters to the banks of the Po River, yields within certain limits a zonal epitome of European life from Lapland to the Mediterranean. The long incline from the summit of Mount Everest (8840 meters) in the eastern Himalayas, through Darjeeling down to sea level at Calcutta, comprises in a few miles the climatic and cultural range of Asia from Arctic to Tropic.

There are latitude zones and altitude zones. Both are relevant to every mountain region, creating an interesting interaction of geographic factors. Each mountain slope, from the peak to the foothills, is a complex phenomenon from a human geography perspective. At higher elevations, it can present a graduated array of contrasting complementary areas, closely linked communities and occupations, varying from crowded to empty, and covering every level of cultural development from industrialization to nomadic lifestyles. The southern slope of the Monte Rosa Alps, from the glacier cap at 4500 meters down to the banks of the Po River, provides a zonal snapshot of European life from Lapland to the Mediterranean within certain limits. The long descent from the summit of Mount Everest (8840 meters) in the eastern Himalayas, through Darjeeling down to sea level at Calcutta, encompasses in just a few miles the climatic and cultural diversity of Asia from the Arctic to the Tropics.

Politico-economic value of varied relief.

For the state, a territory of varied relief is highly beneficial, because it combines manifold forms of economic activity, a wide range of crops, areas of specialized production mutually interdependent. It induces a certain balance of urban and lief, rural life, which contributes greatly to the health of the state.1253 The steep slopes of Dai Nippon, fertile only under spade tillage, will forever insure Japan the persistence of a numerous peasantry. For geological and geographical reasons, as from national motives, therefore, Japan will probably never sacrifice its farmer to its industrial class, as England has done. On the other hand, contrasted reliefs on a great territorial scale tend to invade political solidarity. Tidewater and mountain Virginia were poor running-mates for a century before the Civil War, and then the mountain region broke out of harness. Geographical contrasts made the unification of Germany difficult, and yet they have added to the economic and national strength of the Empire. The history of Switzerland shows the high Alpine cantons always maintaining a political tug of war with the cantons of the marginal plain, and always suffering a defeat which was their salvation.

For a state, a varied landscape is really beneficial because it supports different types of economic activities, a wide variety of crops, and specialized production areas that depend on one another. It creates a certain balance between urban and rural life, which greatly contributes to the overall health of the state.1253 The steep slopes of Dai Nippon, which only thrive under manual farming, will always ensure Japan has a large peasant population. Due to geological, geographical, and national reasons, Japan will likely never sacrifice its farmers for its industrial class like England has done. However, significant geographical differences can disrupt political unity. Tidewater and mountain Virginia struggled to connect for a century before the Civil War, when the mountain region finally broke away. Geographical contrasts made the unification of Germany tough, yet they have strengthened the economic and national power of the Empire. The history of Switzerland illustrates how the high Alpine cantons consistently engaged in a political struggle with the flatland cantons, often facing defeats that ultimately benefited them.

Relief and climate.

The chief effect of a varied relief is a varied climate. This changes with altitude in much the same way as with latitude. Heat and absolute humidity diminish, generally speaking, as height increases, while rainfall becomes greater up to a certain level. The effect of ascending and descending currents of air is to diminish the range of temperature on mountain slopes and produce rather an oceanic type of climate. The larger and more uniform a climatic district, the more conspicuously do even slight elevations form climatic islands, like the Harz Mountains in the North German lowlands. A land of monotonous relief has a uniform climate, while a region rich in vertical articulations is rich also in local varieties of climate.1254 A highland of considerable elevation forms a cold district in the Temperate Zone, a temperate one in the Tropics, and a moist one in a desert or steppe. Especially in arid and torrid belts does the value of elevation for human life increase.

The main impact of a varied landscape is a varied climate. This changes with altitude just like it changes with latitude. Generally, as you go higher, heat and absolute humidity decrease, while rainfall increases up to a certain point. The effect of rising and falling air currents is to reduce temperature ranges on mountain slopes, creating a climate that feels more oceanic. In larger and more uniform climatic areas, even small elevations can create distinct climatic zones, like the Harz Mountains in the North German lowlands. A land with flat terrain tends to have a consistent climate, while a region with varied elevations has a diverse mix of local climates. A highland that is significantly elevated produces a cold climate in the Temperate Zone, a temperate climate in the Tropics, and a moist climate in a desert or steppe. The importance of elevation for human life especially increases in dry and hot regions.

Altitude zones of economic and cultural development.

The highlands of Mexico, South America and the Himalayan rim of India show stratified zones of tropical, temperate, and arctic climate, to which plant, animal and human life conform. The response is conspicuous in the varying density of population in the successive altitude zones. Central Asia shows a threefold cultural stratification of its population, each attended by the appropriate density, according to location in steppe, piedmont and mountain. The steppes have their scattered pastoral nomads; the piedmonts, with their irrigation streams, support sedentary agricultural peoples, concentrated at focal points in commercial and industrial towns; the higher reaches of the mountains are occupied by sparse groups of peasants and shepherds, wringing from upland pasture and scant field a miserable subsistence. The same stratification appears in the Atlas Mountains, intensified on the southern slope by the contrast between the closely populated belt of the piedmont and the wandering Tuareg tribes of the Sahara on the one hand, and the sparse Berber settlements of the Atlas highlands on the other. The long slope of Mount Kilimanjaro in German East Africa descends to a coastal belt of steppe and desert, inhabited by Swahili cattle-breeders. Its piedmont, from 1000 feet above the plain up to 2400 feet, constitutes a zone of rich irrigated plantations and gardens, densely populated by peaceful folk of mingled Bantu and Hamitic blood. At 6000 feet, where forests cease, are found the kraals, cattle, sheep and goats of the semi-nomadic Masai of doubtful Hamitic stock, who raid the coastal lowlands for cattle, and purchase all their vegetable food from the tillage belt.1255 [See maps page 105 and 487.]

The highlands of Mexico, South America, and the Himalayan region of India feature distinct zones of tropical, temperate, and arctic climates, which influence the plant, animal, and human life found there. This is evident in the varying population density across different altitude zones. Central Asia displays a three-tiered cultural stratification among its people, with each layer having the appropriate density based on whether they are located in the steppe, the piedmont, or the mountains. The steppes are home to scattered pastoral nomads; the piedmont areas, with their irrigation streams, support settled agricultural communities concentrated in commercial and industrial towns; while the higher mountain areas are occupied by small groups of peasants and shepherds, struggling to scrape by from upland pastures and limited fields. This same stratification can be seen in the Atlas Mountains, where the contrast between the densely populated piedmont and the wandering Tuareg tribes of the Sahara on one side, and the sparse Berber settlements of the Atlas highlands on the other, is even more pronounced. The long slope of Mount Kilimanjaro in German East Africa descends toward a coastal region of steppe and desert, home to Swahili cattle herders. Its piedmont, rising from 1,000 feet above the plain to 2,400 feet, is a zone of rich irrigated plantations and gardens, densely populated by peaceful people of mixed Bantu and Hamitic ancestry. At 6,000 feet, where the forests end, you find the kraals, cattle, sheep, and goats of the semi-nomadic Masai, whose lineage is uncertain, as they raid the coastal lowlands for cattle and buy all their vegetable food from the cultivated areas.1255 [See maps page 105 and 487.]

Density Of Population In Italy.

Density Of Population In Italy.

Density Of Population In Italy.

Population Density in Italy.

This stratification assumes marked variations in the different geographical zones. In Greenland life is restricted to the piedmont coastal belt; above this rises the desert waste of the ice fields. Norway shows a tide-washed piedmont, containing a large majority of the population; above this, a steep slope sparsely inhabited; and higher still, a wild plateau summit occupied in summer only by grazing herds or migrant reindeer Lapps. Farther south the Alps show successive tiers of rural economy, again with their appropriate density of settlement. On their lower slope is found the vineyard belt, a region of highly intensive tillage, large returns upon labor, and hence of closely distributed settlement. Above that is the zone of field agriculture, less productive and less thickly peopled. Higher still is the wide zone of hay farming and stock-raising, supporting a sparse, semi-nomadic population and characterized by villages which diminish with the altitude and cease beyond 2000 meters. On Aetna, located in the tropical Mediterranean, three girdles of altitude have long been recognized,—the girdle of agriculture, the forest belt, and the desert summit. But the tourist who ascends Aetna, passes from the coast through a zone of orange and lemon groves, which are protected by temporary matting roofs against occasional frosts; then through vineyards and olive orchards which rise to 800 meters; then through a belt of summer crops rising to 1550 meters, and varied between 1400 and 1850 meters elevation by stretches of chestnut groves, whose green expanse is broken here and there by the huts of the forest guards, the highest tenants of the mountain. From these lonely dwellings down to the sea, density of population increases regularly to a maximum of over 385 to the square mile (150 to the square kilometer) near the coast.

This stratification recognizes significant differences in various geographical areas. In Greenland, life is confined to the coastal area at the foot of the mountains; above this lies the barren expanse of the ice fields. Norway features a tide-washed coastal region that houses most of the population; above that, there’s a steep slope that’s sparsely populated; and even higher, there’s a rugged plateau that only sees grazing herds or migrating reindeer herders in the summer. Further south, the Alps showcase a series of rural economies with corresponding settlement densities. The lower slopes have vineyard areas, known for their intensive farming, high returns on labor, and closely packed settlements. Above this, you find the agricultural zone, which is less productive and less densely populated. Even higher is the broad area for hay farming and livestock raising, which supports a sparse, semi-nomadic population and features villages that shrink with the altitude, disappearing beyond 2000 meters. On Mount Etna, located in the tropical Mediterranean, three altitude zones are well-established: the agricultural zone, the forest zone, and the desert summit. However, for tourists ascending Etna, the journey starts at the coast, going through an area of orange and lemon groves shielded by temporary matting roofs from occasional frosts; then through vineyards and olive orchards that rise to 800 meters; followed by a belt of summer crops that reaches up to 1550 meters, interspersed with chestnut groves between 1400 and 1850 meters, where the green expanse is occasionally interrupted by the huts of forest guards, the highest residents of the mountain. From these isolated homes down to the sea, the population density steadily increases to a peak of over 385 people per square mile (150 people per square kilometer) close to the coast.

Altitude and density belts in tropical highlands.

In the tropical highlands of Mexico, Central and South America, on the other hand, concentration of population and its concomitant cultural development begin to appear above the 2000 meter line. Here are the chief seats of population. Mexico has three recognized altitude zones, the cold, the temperate and the hot, corresponding to plateau, high slopes and coastal piedmont up to 1000 meters or 3300 feet; but the first two contain nine-tenths of the people. While the plateau has in some sections a population dense as that of France, the lowlands are sparsely peopled by wild Indians and lumbermen. Ecuador has three-fourths of its population crowded into the plateau basins (mean elevation 8000 feet or 2500 meters), enclosed by the ranges of the Andes. Peru presents a similar distribution, with a comparatively dense population on a plateau reaching to 11,000 feet (3500 meters) or more, though its coastal belt, being healthful, dry, and fairly well supplied with irrigation streams from the Andes, is better developed than any other similar district in tropical America.1256 In Bolivia, 72 per cent of the total population live at an altitude of 6000 to 14,000 feet, while five out of the nine most densely peopled provinces lie at elevations over 11,000 feet.1257 [See map page 9.]

In the tropical highlands of Mexico, Central and South America, the population concentration and corresponding cultural development start to become noticeable above 2000 meters. This is where the main population centers are located. Mexico has three recognized altitude zones: cold, temperate, and hot, which correspond to plateau, high slopes, and coastal regions up to 1000 meters (3300 feet); however, the first two zones hold about 90% of the population. While some parts of the plateau have a population density similar to that of France, the lowlands are sparsely populated by indigenous peoples and lumbermen. In Ecuador, three-quarters of its population is concentrated in the plateau basins (average elevation 8000 feet or 2500 meters), surrounded by the Andes mountains. Peru shows a similar pattern, with a relatively dense population on a plateau reaching 11,000 feet (3500 meters) or more, although its coastal region, which is healthy, dry, and well-irrigated by streams from the Andes, is more developed than any other similar area in tropical America.1256 In Bolivia, 72% of the total population lives at altitudes of 6000 to 14,000 feet, while five out of the nine most densely populated provinces are at elevations over 11,000 feet.1257 [See map page 9.]

From Mexico to central Chile, the heavy rains from the trade-winds clothe the slopes with dense forests, except on the lee side of the high Andean wall of Peru and Chile, and reduce much of the piedmont to malarial swamp and jungle. The discouragement to primitive tillage found in the unequal fight with a tropical forest, the dryer, more bracing and healthful climate of the high intermontane basins, their favorable conditions for agriculture by irrigation, and their naturally defined location stimulating to early cultural development, all combined to concentrate the population of prehistoric America upon the high valleys and plateaus. In historic times these centers have persisted, because the civilized or semi-civilized districts could be best exploited by the Spanish conquerors and especially because they yielded rich mineral wealth. Furthermore, the white population which has subsequently invaded tropical America has to a predominant degree reinforced the native plateau populations, while the imported negroes and mulattoes have sought the more congenial climatic conditions found in the hot lowlands.

From Mexico to central Chile, heavy rains from the trade winds cover the slopes with dense forests, except on the sheltered side of the high Andes in Peru and Chile, which turns much of the foothills into malarial swamps and jungles. The challenges of farming in the face of a tropical forest, the drier, more refreshing, and healthier climate of the high mountain basins, their favorable conditions for agricultural irrigation, and their naturally defined locations that encourage early cultural development all contributed to concentrating the population of prehistoric America in the high valleys and plateaus. In historic times, these centers have continued to thrive because they were the most exploitable by the Spanish conquerors and especially because they provided rich mineral resources. Additionally, the white population that has since settled in tropical America has largely reinforced the native plateau populations, while the imported Africans and mixed-race individuals have favored the more hospitable climates of the lowlands.

Increasing density with motive of protection.

The relativity of geographical advantages in different historical periods warns us against assuming in all times a sparsity of population in mountains, even when the adjoining lowlands offer many attractions of climate and soil. In ages of incessant warfare, when the motive of safety has strongly influenced distribution of population, protected mountain sites have attracted settlement from the exposed plains, and thus increased the relative density of population on the steep slopes. The corrugated plateau of Armenia and Kurdistan, located on the uneasy political frontier of Russia, Persia and Asiatic Turkey, exposed for centuries to nomadic invasion from the east, shows a sparser population on its broad intermontane plains than on the surrounding ranges. Security makes the latter the choicer places of residence. Hence they are held by the overbearing and marauding Kurds, late-comers into the land, while the older and numerically weaker Armenians cower down on the lower levels.1258 Here is an inversion of the usual order. The militantly stronger intruders, with no taste for agriculture, have seized the safer and commanding position on the hills, descending in winter with their cattle and horses to pasture and prey upon field and granary of the valley folk, whose better soil is a questionable advantage.

The relativity of geographical advantages across different historical periods warns us against assuming that mountains always have a small population, even when the nearby lowlands offer attractive climate and soil. In times of constant warfare, when safety strongly influences where people settle, protected mountain areas have drawn residents from the vulnerable plains, increasing the population density on the steep slopes. The rugged plateau of Armenia and Kurdistan, located on the volatile political borders of Russia, Persia, and Asia Minor, which has faced nomadic invasions from the east for centuries, shows a lower population on its vast intermontane plains compared to the surrounding mountains. The latter are preferred for living because they offer security. As a result, they are occupied by the dominant and raiding Kurds, who are relatively new to the area, while the older and fewer Armenians live on the lower levels. Here is an inversion of the usual order. The militarily stronger invaders, who have no interest in farming, have taken over the safer and higher ground in the hills, moving down in winter with their cattle and horses to graze and raid the fields and granaries of the valley residents, whose richer soil is a questionable advantage.

Motive of protection in primitive peoples.

Instances of this sort, rare in modern times, because of of general economic and social progress, multiply when we go into the history of primitive or ancient peoples. The Cherokee Indians of the Southern Appalachians, surrounded by powerful neighbors in the Chickasaws, Creeks and the encroaching whites of the seaboard colonies, attacked by war parties of Shawnees and Iroquois from the north, located the bulk of their nation in the mountains. The Overhill and Middle towns, numbering together thirty-three and situated wholly in the mountains, comprised four-fifths of their fighting force in 1775, while the nine towns distributed in the flat lands of Georgia and South Carolina were small and unimportant. The Indians themselves distinguished these two divisions of their country, the one as Otarre or mountainous, and the others as Ayrate or low.1259 Similarly in ancient Gaul the three strongest tribes, the Sequani, Aedui, and Arverni, all had a large mountain nucleus. The Sequani held the Jura range with part of the Saône Valley; the Aedui held the northeast corner of the Central Plateau and some lands on the Saône, while the Arverni inhabited the western and central portion of the same highland. In a period of constant tribal migrations and war, the occupants of these high, protected locations were better able to defend themselves, and they maintained an adequate food supply by holding some of the adjoining lowland. Archaeologists generally agree that in central and southern Italy settlement first took place in the mountains, gradually extending thence down into the plains. The superiority of the upland climate, the more abundant rainfall, the greater security against attack offered by mountain sites, and the excellent soil for agriculture resulting from the geological make-up of the Apennines, all combined to draw thither primitive and later settlement.1260 [See map page 559.] Similarly in Britain of the Bronze Age, before the peoples of Aryan speech began to swarm over the island, the primitive inhabitants, involved in constant clan or tribal warfare, placed their villages on the hills, and left in the indestructible terraces on their slopes the evidences of a vanished race and an outgrown social order.1261

Instances like this, which are rare in modern times due to general economic and social progress, become more frequent when we look back at the history of primitive or ancient peoples. The Cherokee Indians of the Southern Appalachians, surrounded by strong neighbors like the Chickasaws, Creeks, and the encroaching white settlers of the seaboard colonies, as well as attacked by war parties from the Shawnees and Iroquois in the north, located most of their nation in the mountains. The Overhill and Middle towns, which together had thirty-three towns situated entirely in the mountains, made up four-fifths of their fighting force in 1775. In contrast, the nine towns located in the flatlands of Georgia and South Carolina were small and insignificant. The Indians themselves referred to these two areas of their territory as Otarre or mountainous, and Ayrate or low.1259 Similarly, in ancient Gaul, the three strongest tribes—the Sequani, Aedui, and Arverni—also had a substantial mountain core. The Sequani occupied the Jura range along with parts of the Saône Valley; the Aedui controlled the northeast corner of the Central Plateau and some lands along the Saône, while the Arverni lived in the western and central parts of that highland. During a time of constant tribal migrations and warfare, those residing in these elevated, protective locations were better equipped to defend themselves and ensured a steady food supply by utilizing some of the neighboring lowlands. Archaeologists generally agree that in central and southern Italy, early settlement first emerged in the mountains, gradually spreading down into the plains. The better climate of the uplands, increased rainfall, greater security against attacks offered by mountain locales, and the fertile soil for agriculture resulting from the geological features of the Apennines all attracted early and later settlements.1260 [See map page 559.] Similarly, in Bronze Age Britain, before the Aryan-speaking peoples began to flood the island, the original inhabitants, engaged in continuous clan or tribal warfare, established their villages on the hills, leaving behind the enduring terraces on their slopes as evidence of a vanished race and an outdated social order.1261

Geographic conditions affecting density of mountain population.

The advance of civilization, which brought the ancient pirate-ridden city from the inner edge of the coastal zone down to the wave-washed strand, also drew the hill town down to the plain, and the mountain population from their inaccessible strongholds to the more accessible and productive valleys. These facts contain a hint. The future investigation of archaeological remains in high mountain districts may reveal at considerable elevations the oldest and hence lowest strata of prehistoric development, strata which, in the more attractive valleys, have been obliterated or overlaid by later invasions of peoples and cultures. Ignoring this temporary attraction of population to protected mountain locations in ages of persistent warfare, we find that a comparison of many countries reveals a decreasing food supply and decreasing density of population, with every increase of height above a certain altitude, except in favored mining regions and in some tropical lands, where better climatic conditions and freedom from malaria distribute settlements far above the steaming and forest-choked lowlands. The density of population in mountains is influenced also by the composition of the soil, which affects its fertility; by the grade and exposure of the slopes, which determine the ease and success of tillage; by the proximity of the highlands to teeming centers of lowland population, and by the general economic development of the people.

The rise of civilization, which moved the ancient pirate-infested city from the inner edge of the coast down to the beach, also brought the hill town down to the plains and the mountain population from their inaccessible strongholds to the more accessible and productive valleys. These facts suggest a clue. Future studies of archaeological remains in high mountain areas may uncover at significant elevations the oldest and therefore lowest layers of prehistoric development, layers that, in more attractive valleys, have been erased or covered by later invasions of peoples and cultures. Setting aside this temporary draw of people to protected mountain locations during times of constant warfare, a comparison across many countries shows a decreasing food supply and lower population density with every rise in altitude above a certain level, except in favored mining regions and some tropical areas, where better climate conditions and lack of malaria allow settlements to be established well above the hot, forest-filled lowlands. Population density in the mountains is also influenced by soil composition, which affects fertility; by the slope's grade and exposure, which determine how easy and successful farming is; by how close the highlands are to bustling lowland population centers; and by the overall economic development of the people.

In Great Britain, the sparsest population is found in the sterile highland moors of Scotland, where the county of Sutherland has only 11 inhabitants to the square mile, Inverness only 20.1262 These figures reveal also the remoteness of a far northern location. In the southern half of the island the sparsest populations are found in the Welsh county of Radnor, with 49 to the square mile, and in English Westmoreland with 85, both of them mountain regions, but reflecting in their larger figures their close proximity to the teeming industrial centers of South Wales and Lancashire respectively. In France the most thinly settled départements are Basses-Alpes with 43 to the square mile and Hautes-Alpes with 50, which again owe even these figures in part to their situation on the margin of the densely populated valley of the middle Rhone. [See map page 559.] Norway, almost wholly a mountain country, averages only 18 souls to the square mile. Less than a thousand square miles of its territory are under cultivation, and these are distributed in small deltas at the heads of the fiords, in low strips here and there along its western coasts, or in the openings of its mountain valleys to the southeast. Here too is massed the larger part of its inhabitants. A barren granitic soil, unfavorable zonal location, excessive rainfall, paucity of level land, leaving the "upright farm" predominant, and remoteness from any thickly settled areas, together with the resulting enormous emigration, have combined to keep down Norway's population.

In Great Britain, the least populated areas are found in the barren highland moors of Scotland, where the county of Sutherland has only 11 people per square mile, and Inverness has just 20.1262 These numbers also highlight the remoteness of such a northern location. In the southern part of the island, the sparsest populations are in the Welsh county of Radnor, with 49 people per square mile, and in English Westmoreland with 85. Both regions are mountainous but show higher population densities due to their proximity to the bustling industrial centers of South Wales and Lancashire. In France, the least populated départements are Basses-Alpes with 43 people per square mile and Hautes-Alpes with 50, which owe these figures partly to their location on the edges of the densely populated middle Rhone Valley. [See map page 559.] Norway, which is nearly all mountains, averages only 18 people per square mile. Fewer than a thousand square miles of its land are cultivated, and these are found in small deltas at the heads of the fjords, in narrow strips along some of the western coast, or in the openings of mountain valleys to the southeast. These areas also hold the majority of the population. Poor, rocky soil, an unfavorable climate, excessive rainfall, a lack of flat land leading to the prevalence of "upright farms," and distance from densely populated areas, combined with significant emigration, have all contributed to keeping Norway's population low.

Sparsity of population in the Alps.

If we turn to Switzerland, a country poor in the resources of its land but rich in the resourcefulness of its people, we find a high average density, 218 to the square mile; but this is due to the surprising industrial development of the marginal plains, which show in the Canton of Geneva 1356 to the square mile, and in Canton Zurich 705, while the rugged upland of Graubünden (Grisons) shows only 38 to the square mile, Uri only 48, and Wallis (Valais) only 59. How limited is the food supply of the country is evident from the fact that only 2400 square miles, or fifteen per cent. of its area, can be ranked as arable land, fit for garden, orchard or grain field, while a larger proportion, or twenty-eight per cent. is made wholly useless by watercourses, glaciers, rock and detritus. One half of the entire country lies above the region where agriculture is possible. In the Cantons of Uri and Valais, more than half the area is absolutely unproductive, scarcely less in the Grisons, and a third even in sunny Ticino.1263 The three strictly Alpine provinces of Austria, Tyrol, Salzburg and Carinthia, reproduce approximately these geographic conditions. Nearly half of their area is uninhabited, and only one-seventh consists of arable land. In consequence they support only 75 inhabitants to the square mile, while just outside the mountains, in the piedmont or Alpine foreland, this density is doubled.1264 Many tracts of the Carpathians, especially about the sources of the Theiss and Pruth and the wooded mountain borders of Transylvania, are among the most sparsely inhabited parts of Europe.1265 Japan, ridged by steep volcanic ranges, drenched by mountain-born rains, strewn with detritus from plunging torrents, can cultivate only 15.7 per cent. of its area, and is forced to leave 59 per cent. in forest reserves.1266

If we look at Switzerland, a country that lacks natural resources but is rich in creativity and ingenuity, we find a high average population density of 218 people per square mile. This is largely due to the surprising industrial growth in the low-lying areas, with the Canton of Geneva showing 1,356 people per square mile and Canton Zurich showing 705. In contrast, the rugged highlands of Graubünden (Grisons) have only 38 people per square mile, Uri has 48, and Wallis (Valais) has 59. The limited food supply in the country is clear when we see that only 2,400 square miles, or 15 percent, of its land can be classified as arable land suitable for gardens, orchards, or crops. A larger portion, 28 percent, is completely useless due to rivers, glaciers, rocks, and debris. Half of the country is above the agricultural zone. In the Cantons of Uri and Valais, more than half of the land is completely unproductive, with similar conditions in the Grisons, and a third even in sunny Ticino.1263 The three strictly Alpine provinces of Austria—Tyrol, Salzburg, and Carinthia—have similar geographic conditions. Almost half of their area is uninhabited, and only one-seventh is arable land. As a result, they support only 75 inhabitants per square mile, while just outside the mountains, in the foothills or Alpine foreland, this density doubles.1264 Many areas in the Carpathians, particularly around the sources of the Theiss and Pruth rivers and the forested mountain borders of Transylvania, are among the least populated parts of Europe.1265 Japan, with its steep volcanic ranges and heavy rains from the mountains, which washes debris from rushing torrents, can only cultivate 15.7 percent of its land and has to leave 59 percent as forest reserves.1266

Terrace agriculture.

These figures tell of the hard conditions of life characteristic of most mountain regions. Population under normal circumstances settles in the narrow valleys between the ranges and along the borders of their drainage stream. Soon, however, the food supply becomes inadequate for the growing numbers, so that artificial means have to be employed to expand the area of arable land. The soil on the mountain slopes is so thin that it yields only a scanty return to the labor of tillage. Moreover, under the operations of ploughing and harrowing, it is exposed to the danger of washing; so that after a few croppings the underlying rock of the mountain side may be laid bare, and all that was valuable in the quondam field deposited in the valley as silt or swept away to enrich the distant delta of the nearest trunk river.

These figures highlight the tough living conditions typical of most mountain areas. People usually settle in the narrow valleys between the ranges and along the edges of their rivers. However, the food supply quickly becomes insufficient for the increasing population, forcing them to find ways to expand the amount of land available for farming. The soil on the mountain slopes is so thin that it provides only a meager return for the effort put into farming. Additionally, plowing and harrowing make it vulnerable to erosion, so after a few harvests, the underlying rock may become exposed, and everything valuable in the former field may end up as silt in the valley or be washed away to enrich the distant delta of the nearest major river.

To obviate this difficulty and to secure the desired increase of arable land, mountain peoples the world over have resorted to terrace agriculture. This means hand-made fields. Parallel walls, one above the other, are constructed on horizontal lines across the face of the steep slopes, and the intervals between are filled with earth, carried thither in baskets on the peasants' backs. The soil must be constantly renewed and enriched by manure in the same way, and the masonry of the retaining walls kept in repair. Whenever possible these costly terraced fields are located by preference on southward facing slopes, where the tilt of the land makes the fields catch the rays of the sun almost at right angles and thus counteracts the chill of the higher altitude, while the mountain behind protects the growing crops from cold northern winds. Good arable land, being limited in amount, commands a high price; and especially do choice terraced fields in vine-growing countries, since they make the best vineyards. Such fields in Switzerland will bring from $300 to $2,000 an acre, and are estimated to produce annually two bottles of wine for every square foot.1267

To overcome this challenge and create more farmland, mountain communities around the world have turned to terrace farming. This involves creating hand-built fields. Parallel walls are built one above the other on flat lines across the steep slopes, and the spaces in between are filled with soil, carried there in baskets on the backs of farmers. The soil needs to be regularly replenished and enriched with manure in the same way, and the walls need to be maintained. When possible, these valuable terraced fields are preferably located on south-facing slopes, where the angle of the land allows the fields to capture sunlight almost directly, helping to offset the cold of the higher elevation, while the mountains behind shield the crops from chilly northern winds. Good farmland is limited and therefore quite expensive, especially prime terraced fields in wine-producing regions, as they make the best vineyards. In Switzerland, such fields can sell for between $300 and $2,000 per acre and are estimated to produce two bottles of wine for every square foot annually.1267

Geographical distribution.

Terrace agriculture, rare in new countries, in the more densely populated Old World is widely distributed in mountainous areas. In Germany, where it is nearly identical with the culture of the vine, it is found along the steep slopes overlooking the valley of the Moselle and the Rhine; also in the Vosges Mountains, the Black Forest and the Swabian Jura, to the limited altitude in which the vine will flourish in these northern regions. In the Alps it is widespread, and not confined to the culture of the vine. The traveler passing along the upper Rhone through the sunny Canton of Valais follows these terraced fields almost as far as Fiesch (altitude 3458 feet), beyond which agriculture proper becomes more and more restricted on account of the elevation, and passes rapidly into the mere hay-making of a pastoral community. Between Leak and Sierre, not only the mountain sides, but also the steep gravel hills constituting the old terminal moraine deposited by the receding Rhone glacier across the valley floor, are terraced to their very tops.

Terrace farming, uncommon in new countries, is quite common in the densely populated Old World, especially in mountainous regions. In Germany, where it's almost identical to grape cultivation, it can be found on the steep slopes overlooking the Moselle and Rhine rivers, as well as in the Vosges Mountains, the Black Forest, and the Swabian Jura, up to the point where the vine can grow in these northern areas. In the Alps, it is widespread and not limited to grape cultivation. A traveler traveling along the upper Rhône through the sunny Canton of Valais can see these terraced fields almost all the way to Fiesch (elevation 3,458 feet), beyond which traditional farming becomes increasingly limited due to the height and quickly transitions into just hay-making for a pastoral lifestyle. Between Leuk and Sierre, both the mountain sides and the steep gravel hills formed by the old terminal moraine left by the retreating Rhône glacier across the valley floor are terraced all the way to their peaks.

Terrace cultivation prevails in the mountains of Italy; it is utilized not only for the vine, but for olives, maize, oats, hemp, rye and flax. On the gentler declivities of the Apennines, the terraced walls are wider apart and lower than on the steep slopes of the Ligurian Apennines and along the Riviera of the Maritime Alps, where the mountains rise abruptly from the margin of the sea.1268 Careful and laborious terrace cultivation has produced in Italy a class of superior gardeners. The Genoese are famous for their skill in this sort of culture. The men from the Apennine plateau of the Abruzzi readily find positions in the lowlands as expert gardeners.1269

Terrace farming is common in the mountains of Italy; it’s used not just for grapes, but also for olives, corn, oats, hemp, rye, and flax. On the gentler slopes of the Apennines, the terrace walls are spaced farther apart and are shorter than on the steep slopes of the Ligurian Apennines and along the Riviera of the Maritime Alps, where the mountains rise sharply from the edge of the sea.1268 Careful and hardworking terrace farming has created in Italy a group of top-notch gardeners. The people from Genoa are renowned for their expertise in this type of cultivation. Those from the Abruzzi plateau in the Apennines easily find jobs in the lowlands as skilled gardeners.1269

Terrace culture of the Saracens.

The Saracens of Spain in the tenth century converted every mountain slope into a succession of green terraces. They built walls of heavy masonry, and brought water, loam, and fertilizing materials from great distances. The slopes of Granada back of Malaga and Almeria were covered with vineyards. Every foot of land susceptible of cultivation was turned to account, every drop of water from the ill-timed winter rains was conserved for the growing season. The application of intelligence and labor to tillage enabled the Hispano-Arab provinces to support a dense population.1270 These Saracen cultivators had come from the severest training school in all Eurasia. Where the arid tableland of Arabia is buttressed on the southwestern front by high coast ranges (6000 to 10,500 feet or 2000 to 3200 meters) is Yemen, rich in its soil of disintegrated trap rock, adequately watered by the dash of the southwest monsoons against its towering ridges; but practically the whole country is atilt. Consequently the mountains have been terraced from the base often up to 6000 feet. The country presents the aspect of vast agricultural amphitheaters, in which the narrow paths of ancient paving zigzag up and up through successive zones of production. Here is a wide range of fruits—oranges, lemons, figs, dates, bananas and coffee; then apricots, apples, plums, grapes, quinces, peaches, together with grains of various zonal distribution, such as millet, maize, wheat and barley. The terrace walls are from five to eight feet high, but toward the top of the mountains they often increase to fifteen feet. Though laid without mortar, they are kept in perfect repair. Reservoirs filled with water from the two rainy seasons, supply the irrigation channels.1271 In the narrow valleys of the Nejd plateau in central Arabia and on the mountain slopes of Oman are found the same irrigated gardens and terraced plantations. This laborious tillage underlay the prosperity of the ancient Sabaean monarchy of Yemen, as it explains the population of 35,000 souls who occupy the modern capital of Sanaa, located at an altitude of 7600 feet (2317 meters).1272

The Saracens in Spain during the tenth century transformed every mountain slope into a series of green terraces. They constructed sturdy stone walls and brought water, soil, and fertilizers from great distances. The slopes of Granada behind Malaga and Almeria were filled with vineyards. Every bit of land that could be cultivated was put to use, and every drop of water from the unseasonable winter rains was saved for the growing season. The combination of intelligence and hard work in farming allowed the Hispano-Arab regions to support a large population.1270 These Saracen farmers had come from one of the most rigorous training grounds in all of Eurasia. Where the dry highlands of Arabia are backed on the southwestern side by tall coastal ranges (6000 to 10,500 feet or 2000 to 3200 meters) lies Yemen, rich in fertile soil from broken trap rock, adequately watered by the southwest monsoon rains crashing against its steep ridges. However, the entire country is slanted. As a result, the mountains have been terraced from the base often up to 6000 feet. The land looks like vast agricultural amphitheaters, with narrow, ancient paved paths winding upward through various farming zones. Here you can find a wide range of fruits—oranges, lemons, figs, dates, bananas, and coffee; followed by apricots, apples, plums, grapes, quinces, and peaches, alongside grains that vary by region, such as millet, maize, wheat, and barley. The terrace walls are between five to eight feet high, but near the mountain tops, they often rise to fifteen feet. Though built without mortar, they are kept in excellent condition. Reservoirs filled with water from the two rainy seasons feed the irrigation channels.1271 In the narrow valleys of the Nejd plateau in central Arabia and on the mountain slopes of Oman, similar irrigated gardens and terraced farms can be found. This intense farming was the foundation of the prosperity of the ancient Sabaean kingdom of Yemen, which helps explain the 35,000 residents of the modern capital, Sanaa, located at an altitude of 7600 feet (2317 meters).1272

In the Himalayas.

Turning eastward, we find terrace agriculture widely distributed in Himalayan lands. The steep mountain sides of the Vale of Kashmir are cultivated thus to a considerable height. The terraces are irrigated by contour channels constructed along the hillsides, which bring the water for miles from distant snow-fed streams. Their shelf-like fields are green with fruit orchards and almond groves, with vineyards and grain fields.1273 The terraced slopes about the Himalayan hill-station of Simla (elevation 7100 to 8000 feet) feed the summer population of English, who there take refuge from the deadly heat of the plains. The mountain sections of the native states of Nepal and Bhutan present the view of slopes cut into gigantic stairs, each step a field of waving rice kept saturated by irrigating streams from abundant mountain springs. Farther north, where Himalayas and Hindu Kush meet, terrace agriculture is combined with irrigation in the high Gilgit valleys, and farther still along that mere gash running down from the Pamir dome, called the Hunza Valley. Here live the once lawless robber tribes of the Hunzas and Nagaris, whose conquest cost the British a dangerous and expensive campaign in 1892, but whose extensive terraces of irrigated fields and evidences of skillful tillage gave the whole country an appearance of civilization strangely at variance with the barbarous character of its inhabitants.1274

Turning east, we see terrace farming widely practiced in the Himalayan regions. The steep slopes of the Vale of Kashmir are cultivated up to significant heights. The terraces are watered by contour channels built along the hillsides, bringing water for miles from distant snow-fed streams. Their shelf-like fields are lush with fruit orchards and almond groves, along with vineyards and grain fields.1273 The terraced slopes around the Himalayan hill station of Simla (elevation 7100 to 8000 feet) provide food for the English summer residents seeking refuge from the intense heat of the plains. The mountain areas of the native states of Nepal and Bhutan showcase slopes carved into giant stairs, each step a field of swaying rice kept saturated by flowing streams from plentiful mountain springs. Further north, where the Himalayas meet the Hindu Kush, terrace agriculture is paired with irrigation in the high Gilgit valleys, and even further along the narrow gorge descending from the Pamir dome known as the Hunza Valley. This is home to the once lawless tribes of Hunzas and Nagaris, whose conquest cost the British a dangerous and costly campaign in 1892, but whose extensive irrigated terraces and signs of skilled farming give the region an unexpectedly civilized look that contrasts sharply with the savage nature of its inhabitants.1274

In Tibet and China.

North of the outer Himalayan range, near the sources of the Indus and Sutlej rivers in Ladak or Western Tibet, this same form of cultivation has been resorted to by the retarded and isolated Mongolian inhabitants. Here at an altitude of 11,000 feet or more (3354 meters), along mountain ranges of primitive rock yielding only a scant and sterile soil, terraces are laboriously constructed; their surfaces are manured with burnt remains of animal excrements, which must first serve as fuel in this timberless land before they are applied to the ground. In this stronghold of Buddhism almost every lamasery has its terraced fields yielding good crops of grain and fruit.1275 In the densely populated Sze Chuan province of western China, cultivation has climbed from the fertile basins of the Min and upper Yangtze rivers far up the surrounding mountains, where it is carried on terraces to the foot of vertical cliffs.1276 Farther north where the mountain province of Shensi occupies the rise of land from the Chinese lowlands to the central highlands of Asia, terraces planted with wheat or other grains cover the mountain slopes.1277

North of the outer Himalayan range, near the sources of the Indus and Sutlej rivers in Ladak or Western Tibet, the local Mongolian inhabitants have adopted this style of farming. At an altitude of over 11,000 feet (3354 meters), along mountain ranges of primitive rock that produce only sparse and rocky soil, they painstakingly build terraces. These terraces are fertilized with burnt animal waste, which has to be used as fuel in this treeless area before being spread on the land. In this stronghold of Buddhism, nearly every lamasery has terraced fields that produce good crops of grain and fruit.1275 In the densely populated Sze Chuan province of western China, farming has extended from the fertile basins of the Min and upper Yangtze rivers up into the surrounding mountains, where it is practiced on terraces at the base of vertical cliffs.1276 Further north, in the mountain province of Shensi, terraces planted with wheat and other grains cover the mountain slopes as the land rises from the Chinese lowlands to the central highlands of Asia.1277

In ancient Peru.

Terrace tillage is rare in new countries of extensive plains, like the United States and Canada, where the level lands still suffice for the agricultural needs of the people; but in the confined mountain basins and valleys which made up the Inca's territory in ancient Peru, every available natural field was utilized for cultivation, and terraces brought the obstinate mountain sides under the dominion of the Andean peasant. They were constructed, a hundred or more in number, rising 1000 or 1500 feet above the floor of the highland valley, contracting in width as they rose, till the uppermost one was a narrow shelf only two feet broad. These were extended by communal labor year after year, with increase of population, just as to-day in Java and the neighboring islands, and became the property of the Inca. Streams from the higher slopes were conducted in canals and distributed from terrace to terrace, to irrigate and fertilize. These terraces therefore yielded the best crops of potatoes, maize and pulse. The cultivable area was further extended by floating gardens, consisting of rafts covered with earth, which floated on the surface of lakes.1278 They existed in ancient Mexico also,1279 and are used to-day in the lakes and streams of Tibet and Kashmir1280 and the rivers of overcrowded China.

Terrace farming is uncommon in new countries with large plains, like the United States and Canada, where the flat land still meets the agricultural needs of the population. However, in the narrow mountain basins and valleys that made up the Inca's territory in ancient Peru, every possible natural field was used for farming, and terraces helped bring the steep mountainsides under the control of the Andean peasants. They were built, often numbering over a hundred, rising 1,000 to 1,500 feet above the valley floor, getting narrower as they ascended, until the top one was just a two-foot-wide shelf. These were expanded through community labor year after year, as the population grew, similar to the practices seen today in Java and nearby islands, and became the property of the Inca. Water from the higher slopes was channeled into canals and distributed from terrace to terrace for irrigation and fertilization. As a result, these terraces produced the best crops of potatoes, maize, and legumes. The arable area was further increased by floating gardens, which were rafts covered with earth that floated on the lakes' surfaces.1278 They also existed in ancient Mexico,1279 and are still used today in the lakes and streams of Tibet and Kashmir1280 and the rivers of overcrowded China.

Terrace agriculture in mountainous islands.

Mountainous islands, born of volcanic forces or the partial submergence of coastal ranges, have steep surfaces and scant lowlands. Their inhabitants command limited area at best. Driven to agriculture by their isolation, drawn to it by the favorable oceanic climate, such islands develop terrace tillage in its most pronounced form. On the precipitous pitch of Teneriffe, every particle of alluvial soil is collected to make gardens. Long lines of camels, laden with boxes of earth, may be seen coming almost daily into the town of Santa Cruz, bringing soil for the terraces.1281 This is desperate agriculture. Irrigated terraces scar the steep slopes of many Polynesian islands.1282 They are highly developed among the Malay Battaks of Sumatra, especially for rice culture.1283 In Java, Bali and Lombok they reach a perfection hardly equalled elsewhere in the world. In Java they begin at an altitude of 1000 feet, cutting main and branch valleys into amphitheaters, and covering hundreds of square miles.1284 On the volcanic slopes of Lombok the terrace plots vary from many acres to a few square yards, according to the grade, while a complete system of irrigation uses every brook to water the terraces. Here as in Java the work began at a very early period, when it was probably introduced among the native Malays by Brahmans from India.1285 Japan, two-thirds of whose area is mountainous, has terraced its steep valley walls often up to 2000 feet or more, and utilized every patch of ground susceptible of tillage.1286

Mountainous islands, formed by volcanic activity or the partial sinking of coastal ranges, have steep landscapes and very little flat land. Their inhabitants have a limited amount of space at best. Isolated and drawn to agriculture by the favorable coastal climate, these islands excel in terrace farming. On the steep slopes of Teneriffe, every bit of alluvial soil is gathered to create gardens. Long lines of camels carrying boxes of soil can be seen almost daily arriving in the town of Santa Cruz, delivering soil for the terraces.1281 This is a desperate form of agriculture. Irrigated terraces mark the steep slopes of many Polynesian islands.1282 They are highly developed among the Malay Battaks of Sumatra, particularly for rice cultivation.1283 In Java, Bali, and Lombok, they are perfected to a level rarely matched anywhere else in the world. In Java, they start at an altitude of 1,000 feet, carving main and side valleys into amphitheaters and covering hundreds of square miles.1284 On the volcanic slopes of Lombok, the terrace fields vary from several acres to just a few square yards, depending on the slope, while a comprehensive irrigation system harnesses every stream to water the terraces. Here, as in Java, this practice began a long time ago, likely introduced among the native Malays by Brahmans from India.1285 Japan, two-thirds of which is mountainous, has terraced its steep valley walls often up to 2,000 feet or more, making use of every piece of land suitable for cultivation.1286

Among mountain savages.

A mountain environment often occasions a forced development in the form of agriculture among peoples who otherwise still linger in a low stage of barbarism or savagery. The wild, head-hunting Igorots, inhabiting the Cordilleras of north central Luzon, have levelled the face of their mountains into a series of platforms, held by retaining walls from twenty to thirty feet high. On these they cultivate upland rice at an altitude of 5000 feet. The Igorot province of Bontoc contains valleys in which every available foot of land is terraced for rice, and which present artificial landscapes vividly recalling Japan. Labor is the heritage of each inhabitant. Every man, woman and child down to ten years of age shares in the work of providing food.1287 Africa shows parallel cases. The Angoss people, a savage negro tribe who occupy part of the Murchison Range in northern Nigeria, have mapped out all their sloping land into little terraces, sometimes only a foot or two wide. One of their peaks, 4135 feet high, has its plateau top covered with populous villages, owing to the protection of the site, and every inch of its slope cut into terraces planted with millet and guinea corn.1288 A more primitive form of this tillage is found in the country of the Marunga negroes, who occupy the steep western face of the rift valley filled by Lake Tanganyika. Here Cameron found the surface not regularly terraced, but retaining walls of loose stones disposed at intervals, which served to hold the soil in place, without greatly altering the natural slope. The scene recalled the terraced heights of Switzerland, and the people working there looked like flies on a wall.1289 In the semi-arid country of Sudanese Darfur, where only the mountain districts are well watered and thickly populated, small terraces for grain and melons cover all the slopes.1290

A mountainous environment often leads to agriculture developing among groups that might otherwise remain in a more primitive state. The wild, head-hunting Igorots, who live in the Cordilleras of north central Luzon, have flattened their mountains into a series of platforms supported by retaining walls that are twenty to thirty feet high. On these platforms, they grow upland rice at an elevation of 5,000 feet. The Igorot province of Bontoc has valleys where every available inch of land is terraced for rice, creating artificial landscapes that remind one of Japan. Labor is a shared responsibility among the community. Every man, woman, and child as young as ten contributes to the work of providing food.1287 Africa has similar examples. The Angoss people, a primitive tribe in the Murchison Range of northern Nigeria, have divided their sloping land into small terraces that are sometimes only a foot or two wide. One of their peaks, standing 4,135 feet tall, features a plateau covered with densely populated villages because of its sheltered location, and every inch of its slopes is terraced and planted with millet and guinea corn.1288 A more basic form of this farming can be seen with the Marunga people, who occupy the steep western side of the rift valley by Lake Tanganyika. Here, Cameron observed that the surface wasn’t regularly terraced; instead, retaining walls made of loose stones were placed at intervals to hold the soil in place, without significantly altering the natural slope. The scene resembled the terraced heights of Switzerland, and the people working there looked like tiny insects on a wall.1289 In the semi-arid region of Sudanese Darfur, where only the mountain areas are well-watered and densely populated, small terraces for grain and melons cover all the slopes.1290

Fertilizing

Mountain agriculture is necessarily laborious. The paucity of arable land precludes the possibility of letting fields lie fallow. These, to prevent exhaustion, must be constantly and abundantly fertilized, all the more as conditions of excessive subærial denudation found in the steep slope and usual heavy rainfall of mountains, as well as possible glacial scouring of the land in the past, have greatly attenuated the layer of soil called upon to support plant life. The Swiss or Tyrolese farmer cherishes his manure pile as at once source and badge of his wealth. After harvest it is carted or carried in baskets not only to the terraces, but also to the wide alluvial fan that grows his oats and rye, to his meadows and hay fields. Both in Mexico and Peru the soil received a dressing of poudrette. Manuring was most extensive where population was densest, as in the isolated mountain valleys opening out upon the desert coast of Peru. Every kind of organic refuse was utilized, and fish was buried with the kernels of maize as a fertilizer. The deposits of guano found on the headlands and off-shore islands were used from the remotest times. Different guano beds were assigned to the several provinces, and the breeding places of the birds were protected by law.1291 Ashes and decayed wood were employed for the same purpose, or plants were dug into the soil, while human manure was in Mexico a marketable commodity as in China.1292

Mountain agriculture is definitely hard work. The lack of arable land means fields can't be left unused. To avoid depleting the soil, they must be constantly and richly fertilized, especially since the steep slopes and frequent heavy rainfall of mountains can lead to significant soil erosion, and past glacial activity has also reduced the soil layer available for supporting plant life. The Swiss or Tyrolean farmer values his manure pile as both a source and a sign of his wealth. After harvest, it's transported to the terraces, as well as to the large alluvial fan that grows his oats and rye, and to his meadows and hay fields. In Mexico and Peru, the soil was treated with poudrette. Manuring was most intensive in areas with higher populations, like the isolated mountain valleys leading to the desert coast of Peru. All kinds of organic waste were used, and fish was buried with maize kernels as a fertilizer. The guano deposits found on headlands and offshore islands have been used since ancient times. Different guano beds were assigned to various provinces, and the breeding grounds of the birds were protected by law.1291 Ashes and decayed wood were also used for fertilization, or plants were buried in the soil, while human manure was a marketable product in Mexico, just like in China.1292

Economy of level land for houses and villages.

In all mountain regions where population has begun to press upon the meager limits of subsistence, level land and soil are at a premium. In ancient Peru space was begrudged for the dead.1293 Cities covered considerable space on the roomy intermontane plateaus; but in the narrow lateral valleys, houses and temples were built on rocks, in order to reserve every fertile spot for agriculture.1294 The traveler notices the same thing throughout the Alps. Compact villages cling to the mountain sides, leaving the alluvial hem of the stream or level glacial terrace free for the much needed fields. Only in broad longitudinal valleys, like that of Andermatt, do the settlements complacently spread out their skirts, or on wide alluvial fans where transverse valleys debouch upon the plains. The mountaineers of the Crimea construct their houses against the precipices, excavating into their face and building up the front, with stones, and thus reserve the gentler slopes for vineyards and gardens.1295 In the Kangra, Kumaon, and Garhwal districts of the British Himalayas, the large Indian villages of the plains give place to small hamlets or detached homesteads, scattered here and there wherever occasional patches of soil on a hillside or in a narrow valley offer hope of sustenance. These hamlets or dwellings are located on the sides of the mountains, because level spots which can be irrigated must be reserved for rice fields.1296 The high site is also freer from malaria.

In all mountain regions where the population has started to push against the scarce limits of survival, flat land and soil are highly sought after. In ancient Peru, space for the dead was tightly controlled.1293 Cities occupied a lot of area on the spacious intermontane plateaus, but in the narrow side valleys, houses and temples were built on rocks to keep every fertile spot available for farming.1294 Travelers notice the same trend throughout the Alps. Compact villages cling to the mountainsides, leaving the alluvial edges of streams or flat glacial terraces open for the essential fields. Only in broad longitudinal valleys, like Andermatt, do settlements comfortably spread out, or on wide alluvial fans where transverse valleys open up onto the plains. The mountain residents of Crimea build their homes against cliffs, digging into their sides and constructing facades with stones, thus keeping the gentler slopes for vineyards and gardens.1295 In the Kangra, Kumaon, and Garhwal areas of the British Himalayas, the large Indian villages from the plains are replaced by small hamlets or isolated homesteads, scattered wherever occasional patches of soil on a hillside or in a narrow valley promise sustenance. These hamlets or dwellings are situated on the mountain slopes because flat spots that can be irrigated need to be reserved for rice fields.1296 The elevated locations are also less prone to malaria.

Perpendicular villages

In the high Himalayan province of Ladak or Western Tibet, this principle of land economy reaches a climax. All settlement is on the perpendicular. The abrupt mountain sides are honey-combed with tombs, villages and Buddhist lamaseries in the detached localities where population occurs. A pleasure walk through one of these Tibetan towns means a climb by steep flights of steps hewn out of the rock, varied by a saunter up ladders, where the sheer face of a cliff must be surmounted to reach the houses on a ledge above.1297 Pictures of these recall forcibly the cliff-dwellings of the Pueblo Indians. Even the important market city of Leh covers the lower slope of the mountain at an altitude of 11,500 feet, and from its height overlooks the cultivated fields in the sandy valley bed below, made fertile by irrigating streams from debouching cañons.1298 The Ladak villages always shun the plains. The desire to economize level arable land does not alone dictate this choice of sites, however; the motive of protection against inundation, when the snows melt and the streams swell, and also, to some degree, against hostile attack, is an additional factor. In the mountainous parts of overcrowded China, again, the food problem is the dominant motive. In the rugged highland province of Shensi, a village of several hundred people covers only a few acres, and rises in closely packed tiers of houses against the mountain side.1299 In the wilder, half-conquered parts of Sze Chuan the villages crown the lower peaks, cling to the base of the mountains, or are perched on ledges of rock overlooking the gorges. Among the steep cliffs bordering the upper Yangtze, occupied chiefly by the timid, displaced Mantze aborigines, at an altitude of 10,000 feet, small platforms resting on beams projecting from the sheer mountain face support minute houses, whose backs burrow into the cliff behind. The small children are tied to the door post, to keep them from falling into the millet field below. The house is accessible only by bolts driven into the cliff. Above and below is the farm—small patches of tilled soil, often not larger than a bath towel, to which the cultivator lowers himself by a rope.1300 Here life hovers on the brink of death and despair.

In the high Himalayan region of Ladakh, or Western Tibet, the concept of land usage reaches its peak. All settlements are built vertically. The steep mountain slopes are filled with tombs, villages, and Buddhist monasteries in the isolated areas where people live. A leisurely walk through one of these Tibetan towns means climbing steep stairs carved from the rock, mixed with going up ladders, as you have to scale a sheer cliff to reach the homes perched on a ledge above.1297 These scenes are reminiscent of the cliff dwellings of the Pueblo Indians. Even the significant market city of Leh is located on the lower slope of the mountain at an elevation of 11,500 feet, overseeing the cultivated fields in the sandy valley below, which are made fertile by irrigation streams flowing from canyons.1298 The villages in Ladakh always avoid the plains. The desire to make the most of flat, arable land doesn’t solely drive this choice of locations; the need to protect against flooding when the snow melts and the streams rise, as well as some level of defense against attacks, is also a key factor. In the mountainous areas of overcrowded China, the struggle for food is the main concern. In the rugged highland province of Shensi, a village of several hundred people occupies only a few acres and rises in tightly packed tiers of houses against the mountainside.1299 In the rough, semi-conquered regions of Sichuan, the villages sit atop the lower peaks, cling to the mountain bases, or are perched on ledges of rock overlooking the deep gorges. Among the steep cliffs by the upper Yangtze, mainly inhabited by the timid, displaced Mantze native people at an altitude of 10,000 feet, tiny platforms supported by beams extending from the sheer mountain face hold small houses, with their backs embedded into the cliff. The small children are tied to the doorpost to prevent them from falling into the millet field below. The house can only be accessed by bolts anchored into the cliff. Above and below lies the farmland—small patches of cultivated soil, often no bigger than a bath towel, which the farmer lowers themselves down to by a rope.1300 Here, life is precariously close to death and despair.

Mountain pastures and stock-raising.

Paucity of arable land in mountain regions leads to the utilization of the untillable slopes for stock grazing. This industry is always a valuable ally to mountain agriculture on account of the manure which it yields; but in high altitudes, where the steepness or rockiness of the soil, cold and the brevity of the growing season restrict or eliminate cereal crops, it becomes the dominant occupation of the inhabitants, while agriculture takes a subordinate place, limited to the production of hay and fodder for the winter feeding of the stock. Above the line of tree growth flourish the natural summer pastures up to the border of perpetual snow; and just below lies a zone which, if cleared of its forests, supports a thick carpet of grass and herbage, though too cold to ripen grain.

The lack of farmland in mountain areas leads to the use of the unusable slopes for grazing livestock. This industry is always a valuable partner to mountain farming because of the manure it produces; but at high altitudes, where the steepness or rocky terrain, cold temperatures, and short growing season limit or prevent cereal crops, it becomes the main livelihood for the locals, while farming takes a backseat, focused only on producing hay and feed for the winter months. Above the tree line, natural summer pastures thrive up to the edge of permanent snow; and just below that is a zone that, if cleared of trees, supports a thick layer of grass and plants, though it's too cold to grow grain.

The high pastures are particularly nourishing. Cows feeding here in the Alps give better milk than the "home" or valley cows, though a smaller quantity. Sheep and goats do equally well, but swine are profitable only as a by-product, to utilize the refuse of the cheese and butter industry. The area of these pastures far exceeds that of arable land in mountain regions. In Switzerland they comprise about 27 per cent. of the total productive area; hay meadows 24 per cent., but fields and gardens only 20 per cent.1301 In the Austrian province of Salzburg, pastures make up 13.3 per cent., hay meadows 34.5 per cent., and tilled fields only 11.7 per cent. of the total productive area. In the Tyrol the figures are much the same.1302 Since Norway has over 67 per cent. of its total area in bare mountains, snow fields, bogs and lakes, it is not surprising to find only 7.6 per cent. in pastures, 2.2 per cent. in meadows, and 0.7 per cent. in grain fields; but here the pastures are ten times the arable area.1303 The season of the summer feeding on the grass lands is short. In the so-called High Alps it frequently lasts only six or seven weeks, in the Grisons at most thirteen weeks1304 and in Norway from two to three months.1305

The high pastures are especially nourishing. Cows grazing here in the Alps produce better milk than the local valley cows, even though in smaller amounts. Sheep and goats thrive just as well, but pigs are only profitable as a secondary source, helping to make use of the leftovers from the cheese and butter production. The area covered by these pastures is much larger than that of farmland in mountainous regions. In Switzerland, they account for about 27 percent of the total productive land; hay meadows make up 24 percent, while fields and gardens only represent 20 percent.1301 In the Austrian province of Salzburg, pastures constitute 13.3 percent, hay meadows 34.5 percent, and cultivated fields only 11.7 percent of the total productive area. The figures are quite similar in Tyrol.1302 Since Norway has over 67 percent of its total area covered in bare mountains, snowfields, bogs, and lakes, it’s not surprising that only 7.6 percent is in pastures, 2.2 percent in meadows, and 0.7 percent in grain fields; however, the pastures are ten times the size of the arable land here.1303 The summer grazing season on the grasslands is short. In the so-called High Alps, it often lasts only six or seven weeks, while in Grisons, it lasts at most thirteen weeks1304 and in Norway, from two to three months.1305

High mountain regions, practically restricted to this Graswirthschaft, soon reach their maximum of prosperity and population. The amount of hay secured for the winter feeding limits the number of cattle, and the number of the cattle, through their manure, fixes the valley hay supply. Alpine pastures cannot be enlarged, and they may be reduced by accidents of nature, such as landslides, devastating torrents, or advance of ice fields or glaciers. They cannot be improved by capital and labor, and they may deteriorate chemically by exhaustion. The constant export of butter and cheese from Alpine pastures in recent times, without substitution by any fertilizer beyond the local manure, has caused the diminution of phosphoric acid in the soil and hence impoverishment. Canton Glarus has shown a steady decline since 1630 in the number of cows which its mountain pastures can support.1306 Many other Alpine districts show the same deterioration.

High mountain areas, mainly limited to this Graswirthschaft, quickly reach their peak in prosperity and population. The amount of hay gathered for winter feeding restricts the number of cattle, and the number of cattle, through their manure, determines the hay supply in the valley. Alpine pastures can’t be expanded and may be reduced by natural events like landslides, destructive floods, or the encroachment of ice fields or glaciers. They can't be improved with money and hard work, and they might chemically deteriorate due to depletion. The ongoing export of butter and cheese from Alpine pastures in recent times, without any fertilizers other than local manure, has led to a reduction of phosphoric acid in the soil, causing degradation. Canton Glarus has seen a steady decline since 1630 in the number of cows its mountain pastures can support.1306 Many other Alpine regions show a similar decline.

Mountain herdsman and shepherds.

The remoteness of these highland pastures from the permanent villages necessitates Sennenwirthschaft, or the maintenance of out-farms and shepherds on the mountains during the grazing season. This involves a semi-nomadic existence for such inhabitants as serve as herdmen. In June, as soon as the high pastures begin to grow green, cattle, sheep and goats ascend step by step in the wake of summer, as she climbs the slope, and they return in autumn to the valleys. There they feed on the stubble of hay and grain fields, till the increasing cold confines them to their low stables. The hut of the Senner or Saeter, as the herdsman is variously called in Switzerland and Norway, consists of a living room and a smaller apartment for making butter and cheese, while against the steep slope is a rude stone shelter for the cattle and goats. The predominance of summer pastures has made cattle-raising a conspicuous part of agriculture in the Alps and in Norway. In many parts of Switzerland, cattle are called "wares" and the word cheese is used as a synonym for food, as we use bread. A Swiss peasant who has a reputation for cheese making is popular with the girls.1307 Here even Cupid turns dairy expert.

The isolation of these highland pastures from permanent villages requires Sennenwirthschaft, or the management of out-farms and shepherds in the mountains during grazing season. This leads to a semi-nomadic lifestyle for those who work as herders. In June, as soon as the high pastures start to turn green, cattle, sheep, and goats gradually ascend with the onset of summer, following her up the slope, and they come back down to the valleys in autumn. There, they graze on the leftover hay and grain until the cold weather forces them back into their low stables. The hut of the Senner or Saeter, as the herdsman is called in Switzerland and Norway, has a living room and a smaller room for making butter and cheese, along with a simple stone shelter for the cattle and goats against the steep slope. The importance of summer pastures has made cattle-raising a significant part of agriculture in the Alps and Norway. In many parts of Switzerland, cattle are referred to as "wares," and the word cheese is used interchangeably with food, just like we use bread. A Swiss farmer known for making cheese is quite popular with the women.1307 Here even Cupid becomes a dairy expert.

Communal ownership of mountain pastures.

Since it is scarcely practicable to divide these highland pastures, they have generally remained communal property, whether in Norway,1308 Switzerland, the Bavarian Alps, the British Himalayan districts,1309 Nepal and Bhutan,1310 or Kashmir.1311 In Europe their use is generally regulated. As a rule, a Swiss villager may keep on the Allmende during the summer as many head of cattle as he is able to stall-feed during the winter. Any in excess of this number must be paid for at a fixed rate to the village or commune treasury.1312 Hay-sheds and herdsmen's huts mark these districts of temporary occupation near the altitude limits of human life throughout Europe. In Asia, likewise, are to be found small villages, inhabited only in summer by herdsmen tending their flocks. Such is the hamlet of Minemerg, located at an altitude of about 8000 feet at the southern entrance to the Borzil Pass over the Western Himalayas, and Sonamerg (altitude 8650 feet or 2640 meters) just below the Zogi La Pass, both of them surrounded by rich meadows on the northern rim of the Vale of Kashmir.1313

Since it’s hardly practical to split these highland pastures, they have mostly stayed communal property, whether in Norway,1308 Switzerland, the Bavarian Alps, the British Himalayan regions,1309 Nepal and Bhutan,1310 or Kashmir.1311 In Europe, their use is typically regulated. Usually, a Swiss villager can keep as many head of cattle on the Allmende during the summer as he can feed in stalls during the winter. Any animals over that limit must be paid for at a set rate to the village or commune treasury.1312 Hay sheds and shelters for herdsmen mark these temporary occupation areas near the altitude limits of human life across Europe. Similarly, in Asia, small villages populated only in the summer by herdsmen with their flocks can also be found. One example is the hamlet of Minemerg, located at an altitude of about 8000 feet at the southern entrance to the Borzil Pass over the Western Himalayas, and Sonamerg (altitude 8650 feet or 2640 meters) just below the Zogi La Pass, both surrounded by lush meadows on the northern edge of the Vale of Kashmir.1313

The utilization of mountain pastures for stock raising is almost universal. In the arid highlands of Central Asia, it is the essential supplement to the pastoral nomadism of the steppes and deserts, and to the limited sedentary agriculture found along the irrigated piedmont slopes. Here and elsewhere the animal raised varies widely-the llama and vicuna in Peru, which thrive best at 10,000 to 13,000 feet elevation, and multiply rapidly on the ichu or coarse grass which clothes the slopes of the higher Andes up to snow line; sheep, goats, yaks and herds of dzo, a useful hybrid between yak and cow, in the highland districts of Sze Chuan. Here the Mantze mountaineers lock their houses and leave their villages deserted, while they camp with their herds on the high pastures at 10,000 feet or more.1314 Only economical, ingenious Japan has failed to develop stock raising, though mountains comprise two-thirds of its area. The explanation has often been sought in Buddhism, which inhibits the use of animal food; but this religious rule probably found ready acceptance in Japan, just because the paucity of animal food made its observance easy, for the fish industry of the Empire never suffered from the inhibition. The reason is probably to be sought elsewhere. The native grass of Japan, which relentlessly crowds out all imported grazing crops, is a bamboo grass with sharp, hard, serrated edges, and is said to cut the entrails of horses and sheep.1315

The use of mountain pastures for raising livestock is almost everywhere. In the dry highlands of Central Asia, it’s a crucial addition to the pastoral nomadism found in the steppes and deserts, as well as the limited settled agriculture along the irrigated foothill slopes. Here and in other places, the animals raised vary significantly—the llama and vicuna in Peru, which thrive best at elevations between 10,000 and 13,000 feet, and reproduce quickly on the ichu or coarse grass that covers the higher Andes up to the snow line; sheep, goats, yaks, and herds of dzo, a valuable hybrid of yak and cow, in the highland regions of Sze Chuan. In these areas, the Mantze mountain dwellers lock their houses and leave their villages empty while they camp with their herds on the high pastures at 10,000 feet or higher.1314 Only resourceful, innovative Japan has not developed livestock farming, even though mountains make up two-thirds of its land. The reason is often attributed to Buddhism, which discourages the use of animal products; however, this religious guideline likely gained traction in Japan because the scarcity of animal food made it easy to follow, while the fishing industry in the Empire was not affected by this restriction. The real reason probably lies elsewhere. The native grass of Japan, which aggressively outcompetes all imported grazing crops, is a type of bamboo grass with sharp, hard, serrated edges, and is said to harm the insides of horses and sheep.1315

Haymaking in high mountains.

While the high pastures are ample for the summer feeding, the chief problem of mountain stock-farmers is to secure feed for the winter support of their animals. This taxes their industry and ingenuity to the utmost. While the herdsmen are away tending their charges on the heights, the rest of the population are kept busy at home, getting fodder for the six or seven months of stall-feeding. This includes the cultivation of hardy crops like oats, rye and barley, which will mature at a great altitude, hay-making and collecting twigs and even leaves for the less fastidious goats. In Switzerland as in Norway the art of mowing has reached its highest pitch. Grass only three inches high is cut thrice yearly. The Norwegian peasant gathers a small hay harvest from the roofs of his house and barns, and from the edges of the highways. In Switzerland not a spear of grass escapes. In places inaccessible to cattle and goats, the peasant gathers hay by the handful with crampons on his feet, generally from the ledges of cliffs. He stacks it in one spot, and brings it down to the valley by sledge in winter. He is the Wildheuer or wild hay gatherer. His life is so dangerous, that the law permits only one Wildheuer to a family.1316 In high Alpine cantons this office is the privilege of the poor.1317 The traveler in Norway frequently sees huge bundles of hay sliding down to the valley on wires stretched from some high point on the precipitous fiord wall. This represents the harvest from isolated spots or from the field of the summer shepherd. In the vicinity of every saeter hut, a plot of ground is fenced in, enriched with the manure gathered during the summer, and utilized to grow fine nourishing grass, which is mown and transported down to the valley farm.1318 Here economy of vegetative resources reaches its climax.

While the high pastures provide plenty of feed in summer, the main challenge for mountain farmers is making sure their animals have enough food to last through winter. This really tests their resourcefulness and hard work. While the herders are up in the heights taking care of their livestock, the rest of the community stays busy at home preparing feed for the six or seven months of stall-feeding. They grow tough crops like oats, rye, and barley, which can thrive at high altitudes, make hay, and collect twigs and even leaves for the less picky goats. In Switzerland, as in Norway, the skill of mowing has reached its peak. Grass that’s only three inches tall is cut three times a year. Norwegian farmers even gather a little hay from the roofs of their houses and barns, as well as from the edges of the roads. In Switzerland, not a single blade of grass goes to waste. In areas where cattle and goats can’t go, farmers gather hay by hand with crampons on their feet, usually from ledges on cliffs. They stack it in one place and bring it down to the valley on sledges in winter. This person is known as the Wildheuer or wild hay gatherer. Their life is so risky that the law allows only one Wildheuer per family.1316 In high Alpine regions, this role is reserved for the less fortunate.1317 Travelers in Norway often see large bundles of hay sliding down to the valley on wires stretched from high points on steep fjord cliffs. This is the harvest from remote areas or from the fields of summer shepherds. Around every saeter hut, there’s a fenced plot of land, enriched with manure collected during the summer, that’s used to grow rich, nourishing grass, which is mowed and transported down to the valley farm.1318 Here, the efficient use of plant resources reaches its peak.

Methods of curing hay in mountains.

In mountain regions of heavy rainfall, thick dew and numerous cloudy days, it becomes a problem to get the hay dried and stored before a drenching shower comes. In many parts of Switzerland, therefore, the peasant on a clear morning cuts a limited amount of grass. This, with the help of his wife and children, he diligently turns and tosses at short intervals all day long, thus subjecting it to a rapid curing process by the action of the wind and the sun, whose rays are doubly effective in the rarefied air of the heights. In the evening the hay is made up into bundles and carried on his back to the barn. In other parts of Switzerland the green hay is hung on horizontal poles arranged against the sunny side of the chalet and under its projecting roof, thus exposed to the heat and protected from the rain till cured. In Norway the same purpose is achieved by setting up in the fields racks supporting long horizontal bars, over which the newly cut grass is hung. There it is exposed to the gentle fanning of the wind and penetrated by the warmth of the sun, in the short intervals when the sky is not overcast; and during a shower it sheds the water immediately, so that a minimum of harm is done. In the mountains of Germany, the hay is stacked on cone-shaped racks made of poles, with lateral projections which support the grass; thus the air can circulate freely inside the hollow cone, which is lifted well above the ground. Elsewhere sharpened stakes provided with cross bars are simply driven into the ground, and on these the hay is draped till cured.

In mountainous areas with heavy rainfall, frequent dew, and many cloudy days, drying and storing hay before a downpour becomes a challenge. In many parts of Switzerland, farmers cut a small amount of grass on clear mornings. With the help of their families, they actively turn and toss it throughout the day, quickly curing it with the wind and sunlight, which are particularly effective in the thinner air at higher altitudes. By evening, they bundle the hay and carry it to the barn on their backs. In other areas of Switzerland, they hang the green hay on horizontal poles placed against the sunny side of the chalet, protected by its overhang, allowing it to dry in the heat while keeping it safe from rain. In Norway, similar racks with long horizontal bars are set up in the fields to hang the freshly cut grass. This method allows the gentle wind to fan the hay and the sun to warm it during breaks in the cloudy weather, while the grass sheds rain quickly, minimizing damage. In the German mountains, hay is stacked on cone-shaped racks made of poles, with extensions to hold the grass, allowing air to circulate freely inside the hollow cone elevated above the ground. In other places, sharpened stakes with crossbars are simply driven into the ground to drape hay over until it dries.

Mountain hay-making leaves nothing to chance; too much depends upon the crop. In fact, at high altitudes it becomes the only crop. Cereal culture drops off with every increase of elevation. Norway has few fields above 1600 feet;1319 even barley fails to ripen above 2600 feet. In the mountains of Würtenberg we find pure Graswirthschaft at 3000 feet elevation, with only a small garden patch near the dwelling.1320 It is interesting to take a tramp up one of the longitudinal or lateral valleys of the Alps, and observe the economic basis of life gradually change from agriculture to hay-making, till in some high-laid Alpine cirque, like Bad Leuk or Barmaz at the head of the Val d'Ilez, one sees only meadows and an occasional potato patch, which impresses the lowlander as a last despairing effort in the struggle for existence.

Mountain hay-making leaves nothing to chance; too much relies on the crop. In fact, at high altitudes, it becomes the only crop. Cereal farming decreases with each increase in elevation. Norway has few fields above 1600 feet;1319 even barley fails to ripen above 2600 feet. In the mountains of Württemberg, we find pure Graswirthschaft at 3000 feet elevation, with only a small garden patch near the home.1320 It’s interesting to hike up one of the valleys of the Alps and watch the economic basis of life gradually shift from agriculture to hay-making, until in some high Alpine cirque, like Bad Leuk or Barmaz at the head of the Val d'Ilez, you see only meadows and an occasional potato patch, which impresses those from lower elevations as a last desperate attempt to survive.

Winter industries of mountain peoples.

Where climate and soil do so little for the support of life, man must do much. Work must in some way be made to compensate for an ungenerous Nature. The closely housed existence necessitated by the long severe winters of high altitudes stimulates industries in the home. The winter feeding of the stock involves little labor, so the abundant leisure would otherwise be wasted. Hence it is no accident that we find almost everywhere native mountain industries in a high state of development, and often characterized by an artistic beauty which seems to be the one flower of this barren environment. They are naturally based upon the local raw materials of the mountains, such as wood, metals, clays, and especially the wool of sheep and goats. Moreover, their products are articles of small bulk and large value, adapted to costly mountain transportation. Those of Kashmir are typical-carved wood, artistic metal work in silver and copper, puttoo cloth, carpets and the famous Kashmir shawls.1321 The stark life of Tibet shows in its industries an unexpected richness and beauty. The men spin and weave wool into puttoo cloth of all grades; some of it is extraordinarily fine in texture and color, and is exported by caravan in considerable quantity to northern China and Mongolia. Pastil sticks, made of aromatic wood and impregnated with musk and gold-dust, are a conspicuous commodity in the trade with Peking. Tibet is rich in metals, especially silver and gold. Even the nomad shepherds of the tablelands know how to purify gold-dust over a fire of argols; hence it is not surprising that the settlements in the irrigated mountain valleys should develop real artists in metallurgy.1322 The province of Dèrgè, which excels in metal work, produces swords, guns, teapots, bells and seals of extremely artistic design and perfect finish.1323 The jewelry of Tibet suggests Byzantine work. It includes ear-rings and charm boxes of gold and carved turquoise, and is marked by the same delicate finish. But whether the Tibetan is working in wood, gold, brass, or wool, he uses native designs of real merit, and shows the expert craftsman's hand.1324 His activities recall the metal work of the Caucasus and the famous rugs of Daghestan.

Where the climate and soil offer little support for life, people must do a lot. Work needs to somehow balance out an unyielding Nature. The cramped living situations caused by the long, harsh winters at high altitudes spark industries at home. The winter feeding of livestock requires minimal effort, so all the free time would otherwise go to waste. Therefore, it’s no surprise that we find native mountain industries almost everywhere, highly developed and often marked by an artistic beauty that seems to be the only flourishing aspect of this desolate environment. These industries are naturally built on the local resources of the mountains, like wood, metals, clays, and especially the wool from sheep and goats. Furthermore, their products are small and valuable, suitable for expensive mountain transportation. The goods from Kashmir are representative—carved wood, artistic metalwork in silver and copper, puttoo cloth, carpets, and the famous Kashmir shawls.1321 The harsh lifestyle in Tibet showcases an unexpected richness and beauty in its industries. The people spin and weave wool into puttoo cloth of various qualities; some of it is incredibly fine in both texture and color, and is exported in significant amounts by caravan to northern China and Mongolia. Pastil sticks, made of fragrant wood and infused with musk and gold dust, are a notable commodity traded with Peking. Tibet is abundant in metals, especially silver and gold. Even the nomadic shepherds in the highlands know how to purify gold dust over a fire made from argol; so it’s not surprising that the settlements in the irrigated mountain valleys produce talented metallurgists.1322 The province of Dèrgè, which excels in metal work, creates swords, guns, teapots, bells, and seals that are extremely artistically designed and expertly crafted.1323 Tibetan jewelry resembles Byzantine creations. It includes earrings and charm boxes made of gold and carved turquoise, marked by the same fine craftsmanship. But whether Tibetans are working with wood, gold, brass, or wool, they employ native designs of true merit, demonstrating the expertise of skilled artisans.1324 Their work evokes the metal craftsmanship of the Caucasus and the renowned rugs of Daghestan.

Turning to Europe we find watch and clock making in the Black Forest and the Jura, wood-carving in the Swiss and Norwegian mountains, bobbin lace in the Erz range and in Alpine Appenzell, and the far more beautiful Italian product of the rugged Abruzzi and the Frioulian Alps. The Slovaks of highland Hungary are expert in wire-drawing,1325 and the peasant of the central Apennines makes from the gut of his goats the finest violin strings in the world, the so-called Roman strings.1326 The low Thuringian and Franconian Forests, which harbor denser populations, have by a minute subdivision of labor turned their local resources to the making of dolls, which they supply to the markets of the world. Here too the manufacture of glass articles, porcelains, majolica and terra-cotta flourishes.1327 Most of these mountain industries merely supplement the scant agricultural resources; they represent the efforts of industrious but hard pressed people to eke out their meager subsistence.

Looking at Europe, we see watch and clock making in the Black Forest and the Jura, wood-carving in the Swiss and Norwegian mountains, bobbin lace in the Erz range and Alpine Appenzell, and the much more beautiful Italian products from the rugged Abruzzi and the Frioulian Alps. The Slovaks in highland Hungary are skilled in wire-drawing,1325 and the peasants of the central Apennines create the finest violin strings in the world from goat gut, known as Roman strings.1326 The low Thuringian and Franconian Forests, which have denser populations, have specialized their local resources to produce dolls, which they sell in global markets. Here, the production of glass items, porcelain, majolica, and terra-cotta also thrives.1327 Most of these mountain industries mainly supplement the limited agricultural resources; they represent the efforts of hardworking but struggling people to make a living.

Overpopulation and emigration.

The application of steam to industry has converted mountain regions of abundant mineral wealth into centers of production for the markets of the world. But this is the history of only the last century, and of only favored mountain regions. The utilization of waterpower for electricity in factories is transforming the piedmont belts of the Alps and Apennines; but life in the interior of these ranges remains unaltered by the denser population at their base, except for the increased demand for the butter, milk and cheese of the highland pastures. For the world at large, therefore, the obvious and persistent fact of mountain economy is a scanty food supply secured by even the most intelligent and untiring labor, and a fixed tendency to overpopulation. The simplest remedy for this evil is emigration, a fact which Malthus observed.1328 Hence emigration is an almost universal phenomenon in highland regions. Sometimes it is only seasonal. It takes place in the fall after the field work is over, and is due to the paucity of industries possible in the mountains during the winter. It seems to be a recurrence of that nomadic note in the motif of mountain life—that migration in summer upward to the borders of the snow, in winter downward to the sun-warmed plains. In autumn the Swiss descend from the Jura and Alps in great numbers to cities, seeking positions as servants or pastry-cooks. The Auvergnats leave their home by the thousand in the fall, when snow covers the mountains, to work in the cities as hewers of stone and drawers of water, then return in summer to resume their tasks in field and pasture, bringing back sums of money which noticeably enrich the home districts.1329

The use of steam in industry has turned mountain regions rich in minerals into production hubs for global markets. But this is a story from just the last century and only for certain favored mountain areas. Now, harnessing water power for electricity in factories is changing the foothills of the Alps and Apennines, yet life in the interior of these mountains has not changed, despite the growing population below them, except for the increased demand for butter, milk, and cheese from the highland pastures. For most of the world, the stark reality of mountain economies is a minimal food supply obtained through even the most skilled and relentless labor and a consistent trend toward overpopulation. The simplest solution to this issue is emigration, as noted by Malthus.1328 So, emigration is almost a common occurrence in highland regions. Sometimes it’s just seasonal, happening in the fall after harvest when there are few industries in the mountains during winter. It resembles that nomadic aspect of mountain life—migration in the summer up toward the snowy borders and in the winter down to the sun-soaked plains. In autumn, many Swiss people leave the Jura and the Alps for the cities, looking for jobs as servants or pastry chefs. Thousands of Auvergnats depart their homes in the fall when snow blankets the mountains to work in the cities as stonecutters and water carriers, then return in the summer to continue their work in the fields and pastures, bringing back money that noticeably boosts their home communities.1329

Forms of temporary emigration.

This seasonal emigration often assumes the form of peddling, in order to dispose of small home-made wares. From the Basilicata and Modena Apennines the young men follow the pedler's trade, but the Basilicata village of Viggiano furnishes Italy with many wandering musicians.1330 The Kabyles of the Atlas Mountains go out in parties of two or three in the fall, and hawk every kind of goods, bringing back from their journey quantities of wool for home weaving.1331 The emigration may last for several years, but finally the love of home generally calls the mountaineer back to his rugged hills. The Galicians of the Cantabrian Mountains of northern Spain leave their poor country for a time for the richer provinces of Portugal and Spain, where they become porters, water-carriers and scavengers, and are known as boorish, but industrious and honest. The women from the neighboring mountain province of Asturias are the professional wet-nurses of Spain. They are to be seen in every aristocratic household of Madrid, but return to the mountains with their savings when their period of service ends.1332 In mountainous Basutoland, the Kaffir Switzerland of South Africa, arable land and pastures are utilized as completely as local methods of husbandry permit; and yet the native Kaffirs go in large numbers—28,000 out of a total population of 220,000 in 1895—to work in the mines of Kimberley and the Witwatersrand. They also return in time with their savings.1333 Similarly the Battaks of the rugged mountain-rimmed plateau of western Sumatra emigrate in increasing numbers to the lowlands, and hire themselves out for a term of years on the Dutch plantations.1334

This seasonal migration often takes the form of selling small handmade goods. Young men from the Basilicata and Modena Apennines become peddlers, while the village of Viggiano in Basilicata provides Italy with many wandering musicians.1330 The Kabyles from the Atlas Mountains go out in groups of two or three each fall, selling all sorts of products and returning home with quantities of wool for weaving.1331 This migration can last for several years, but ultimately the allure of home usually draws the mountaineers back to their rugged hills. The Galicians from the Cantabrian Mountains in northern Spain temporarily leave their impoverished area for the wealthier provinces of Portugal and Spain, where they work as porters, water-carriers, and cleaners, earning a reputation for being coarse but hardworking and honest. Women from the neighboring mountain region of Asturias serve as professional wet-nurses throughout Spain. They are found in nearly every aristocratic household in Madrid, but return to their mountains with their savings once their term of service ends.1332 In mountainous Basutoland, known as the Kaffir Switzerland of South Africa, farmland and pastures are fully utilized within the limits of local farming techniques; still, many native Kaffirs—28,000 out of a total population of 220,000 in 1895—migrate to work in the mines of Kimberley and the Witwatersrand. They also come back over time with their earnings.1333 Similarly, the Battaks from the rugged mountain plateau of western Sumatra are migrating in greater numbers to the lowlands, taking jobs on Dutch plantations for periods of years.1334

Another interesting and once rather widespread phase of this temporary emigration appears in the mercenary troops formerly drawn from mountain regions. After the Burgundian wars of the fifteenth century, the Swiss became the mercenaries of Europe, and in 1503 were first employed as papal life-guards. They served the kings of France from Louis XL till the tragedy of the Tuileries in 1792; and in that country and elsewhere they made the name "Switzer" a synonym for guard or attendant,1335 till in 1848 the mercenary system was abolished. The pressure of population at home and the military spirit of the Scotch Highlanders once led the young Gaels to seek their fortunes in military service abroad, as in the army of Gustavus Adolphus of Sweden.1336 Gurkhas from Himalayan Nepal, an independent state, are employed in considerable numbers in the Indian army to-day, and constitute one of the most reliable divisions of the native troops. In January, 1901, there were 12,797 Gurkhas drawing pay from the Indian government as soldiers, besides 6000 more employed as military police, porters, and in other capacities.1337 Similarly ancient Arcadia, the mountain core of Peloponnesus, was a constant hive of mercenaries.

Another interesting and once quite common phase of this temporary emigration can be seen in the mercenary troops that were once recruited from mountain regions. After the Burgundian wars in the fifteenth century, the Swiss became Europe’s mercenaries, first being employed as papal life-guards in 1503. They served the kings of France from Louis XL until the tragedy at the Tuileries in 1792; in France and elsewhere, the name "Switzer" became synonymous with guard or attendant,1335 until the mercenary system was abolished in 1848. The growing population at home and the military spirit among the Scottish Highlanders once encouraged young Gaels to pursue their fortunes in military service abroad, like in the army of Gustavus Adolphus of Sweden.1336 Gurkhas from the Himalayan region of Nepal, which is an independent state, are still employed in large numbers in the Indian army today, making up one of the most reliable divisions of native troops. In January 1901, there were 12,797 Gurkhas receiving pay from the Indian government as soldiers, in addition to 6,000 more who worked as military police, porters, and in other roles.leet Similarly, ancient Arcadia, the mountainous heart of Peloponnesus, was continually buzzing with mercenaries.

Permanent emigration.

Often, however, permanent emigration is the result, robbing the mountain population of its most enterprising element, Piedmontese, Bergamese, and Frioulians from the Italian Alps leave their country in large numbers. Many of them find work in Marseilles and other towns of southern France, infusing an Italian strain into the population there and making serious competition for the local French. A proverb says there is no country in the world without sparrows and Bergamese.1338 Geneva, once the citadel of Calvinism, is to-day a Catholic town, owing to the influx of Catholic laborers from Alpine Savoy. The overflow of the redundant population of this mountain province has given the Swiss canton a character diametrically opposed to its traditions.1339 The Chinese provinces of Chili and Manchuria have been largely populated by immigrants from the barren mountain peninsula of Shantung; Manchuria has thereby been converted from an alien into a native district.1340

Often, however, permanent emigration occurs, taking away the most ambitious people from the mountain communities. Piedmontese, Bergamese, and Friulians from the Italian Alps leave their country in large numbers. Many find work in Marseilles and other towns in southern France, adding an Italian influence to the local population and becoming serious competition for the French residents. There’s a saying that there’s no place in the world without sparrows and Bergamese.1338 Geneva, once the stronghold of Calvinism, is now a Catholic city, thanks to the influx of Catholic workers from Alpine Savoy. The overflow of the excess population from this mountain region has given the Swiss canton a character completely opposite to its traditions.1339 The Chinese provinces of Chili and Manchuria have been largely settled by immigrants from the barren mountain peninsula of Shantung; this has transformed Manchuria from an alien territory into a native district.1340

Emigration on so large a scale exercises far reaching economic and historical influences. Norse colonization contributed interesting chapters to the history of Europe in the ninth and tenth centuries. Norwegians who have flocked to America have made a deep impress upon our Northwestern States. Switzerland in 1902 and 1903 gave as 9500 of its subjects, a valuable contribution. Scotchmen of Highland birth are scattered over the whole world, carrying with them everywhere their sturdy qualities of character. Even the stay-at-home French lose emigrants from their mountain districts. The people of the Basses-Alps go to Mexico, and the Basques from the French Pyrenees seek Argentine.1341 The honesty, industry, and frugality of these mountain emigrants make them desirable elements in any colonial population, and insure their success when they seek their fortunes in the uncrowded western world.

Emigration on such a large scale has far-reaching economic and historical impacts. Norse colonization added interesting chapters to European history in the ninth and tenth centuries. Norwegians who have migrated to America have made a significant mark on our Northwestern States. In 1902 and 1903, Switzerland contributed 9,500 of its citizens. Scots from the Highlands are spread across the globe, taking their strong character traits with them wherever they go. Even the French who stay behind lose residents from their mountain areas. People from Basses-Alps head to Mexico, while Basques from the French Pyrenees seek opportunities in Argentina.1341 The honesty, hard work, and frugality of these mountain emigrants make them valuable members of any colonial population and ensure their success as they pursue their fortunes in the vast western world.

The alternative to overpopulation and its remedy emigration is found in preventive checks to increase. These sometimes take the form of restricted or late marriages, as Malthus found to be the case in Norway and Switzerland in 1799,1342 before the introduction of steam or electric motive power had stimulated the industries of these countries or facilitated emigration thence. The same end is achieved by the widespread religious celibacy which sometimes characterizes mountain communities. In the barren Auvergne Plateau of France, the number of younger sons who become priests is extraordinary. Many daughters become nuns. Celibacy, seconded by extensive emigration, clears the field for the eldest son and the system of primogeniture which the poverty of this rugged highland has established as a fixed institution in the Auvergne.1343 A careful statistical investigation of the geographical origins of the Catholic priesthood in Europe might throw interesting light on the influences of environment. The harsh conditions of mountain life make the monastery a line of least resistance, while geographical isolation nourishes the religions nature and benumbs the intellectual activities.

The alternative to overpopulation, along with the solution of emigration, lies in preventive checks on growth. These can sometimes be seen in delayed or limited marriages, as Malthus noted in Norway and Switzerland in 1799,1342 before steam or electric power had boosted the industries of these countries or made emigration easier. A similar outcome is achieved through widespread religious celibacy that often marks mountain communities. In the barren Auvergne Plateau of France, an extraordinary number of younger sons become priests, and many daughters become nuns. Celibacy, supported by significant emigration, clears the way for the eldest son and the system of primogeniture that poverty has established as a fixed institution in the Auvergne.1343 A detailed statistical study of the geographical origins of the Catholic priesthood in Europe could provide interesting insights into environmental influences. The harsh conditions of mountain life make monastic life an easier choice, while geographical isolation fosters religious sentiment and stifles intellectual engagement.

It is in the corrugated highland of Tibet, chilled to barrenness by an elevation of 12,000 feet or more (4000 meters), sterile and treeless from aridity, carved by cañon-cutting streams into deep gorges offering a modicum of arable soil for irrigation, that monasticism has developed into an effective system to keep down population. Buddhism, with its convents and lamaseries, naturally recommended itself to a country where asceticism was obviously expedient. The world shows nowhere else so large a celibate class. In Tibet, monks are estimated at 175,000 to 500,000 in a total population of three millions. Archibald Little estimates their number at one-third of the total male population.1344 Derge, which is the most productive district both agriculturally and industrially of eastern Tibet and is also most densely inhabited, counts at least 10,000 lamas in a total population of about 42,000.1345 Not less than one-sixth of the inhabitants of Ladak are in religious houses as monks and nuns.1346 Families in Tibet are small, yet each devotes one or more children to convent or monastic life.1347 In western Tibet, especially about Taklakot in the Himalayan border, one boy in every family is invariably devoted to the priesthood, and one or more daughters must become nuns. But the nun generally resides with her family or lives in some monastery—with unspeakable results.1348

It is in the rugged highlands of Tibet, barren from an elevation of 12,000 feet or more (4000 meters), dry and treeless from lack of water, carved by canyons into deep gorges that provide a little arable land for irrigation, that monasticism has evolved into an effective way to control the population. Buddhism, with its monasteries and lamaseries, naturally suited a region where asceticism was clearly practical. Nowhere else in the world is there such a large celibate class. In Tibet, the number of monks is estimated to be between 175,000 and 500,000 out of a total population of three million. Archibald Little estimates they make up one-third of the total male population.1344 Derge, the most productive area both agriculturally and industrially in eastern Tibet and also the most densely populated, has at least 10,000 lamas in a total population of around 42,000.1345 No less than one-sixth of the residents of Ladak are in religious houses as monks and nuns.1346 Families in Tibet are small, yet each typically dedicates one or more children to monastic life.1347 In western Tibet, especially around Taklakot near the Himalayan border, one boy in every family is usually devoted to the priesthood, and one or more daughters are expected to become nuns. However, the nun often lives with her family or stays in a monastery—with often terrible consequences.1348

Polyandry.

The Tibetans seem to be enthusiastic Malthusians, with all the courage of their convictions. Religious celibacy among them is only an adjunct to another equally effective social device for restricting population. This is the institution of polyandry, which crops out in widely distributed mountain regions of limited resources, just as it appears not infrequently in primitive island societies. Its sporadic occurrence in extensive lowlands, as among the Warraus of Guiana and certain tribes of the Orinoco, is extremely rare, as also its occasional appearance among pastoral steppe-dwellers, like the Hottentots and Damaras.1349 It is often associated with polygamy where wealth exists, and is never the exclusive form of marriage, yet its frequency among mountain peoples is striking. Strabo describes fraternal polyandry as it existed in mountainous Yemen. There among a Semitic people, as to-day in Mongolian Tibet and among the aboriginal Todas of the Nilgiri Hills in peninsular India, the staff of one husband left at the door of the house excluded the others.1350 In modern times the institution is found throughout Tibet, and in the Himalayan and sub-Himalayan districts adjoining it, as in Ladak, Kunawar, Kumaon, Garhwal, Spiti, Sirmur, among the Miris, Daphlas, Abors and Bhutias occupying the southern slope of the Himalayans eastward from Sikkim, and the Murmese tribes of the Khasia Hills just to the south. The same practice occurs among the Coorgs of the Western Ghats, among the Nairs at the coastal piedmont of this range, among the Todas of the mountain stronghold known as the Nilgiri Hills (peaks 8000 feet or 2630 meters), and it crops out sporadically among certain mountain Bantu tribes of South Africa.1351

The Tibetans seem to be enthusiastic supporters of Malthusian ideas, fully committed to their beliefs. Religious celibacy among them is just one way to effectively manage population growth. Another significant practice is polyandry, which appears in various mountainous regions with limited resources, similar to its occurrence in some primitive island societies. Its rare appearances in extensive lowlands, such as among the Warraus of Guiana and certain tribes along the Orinoco, as well as its occasional presence among pastoral steppe communities like the Hottentots and Damaras, are noteworthy. It is often linked to polygamy where wealth is present, though it is never the only form of marriage. However, its prevalence among mountain communities is remarkable. Strabo noted fraternal polyandry in mountainous Yemen. There, among a Semitic population, as is still seen today in Mongolian Tibet and among the indigenous Todas of the Nilgiri Hills in southern India, the staff of one husband left at the entrance of the home excluded the others. In modern times, this practice is found throughout Tibet and in the nearby Himalayan and sub-Himalayan regions, including Ladak, Kunawar, Kumaon, Garhwal, Spiti, Sirmur, and among the Miris, Daphlas, Abors, and Bhutias on the southern slopes of the Himalayas extending east from Sikkim, as well as among the Murmese tribes of the Khasia Hills just to the south. The same tradition is observed among the Coorgs of the Western Ghats, among the Nairs along the coastal foothills of this range, and among the Todas of the Nilgiri Hills (peaks 8000 feet or 2630 meters), with sporadic instances among certain mountain Bantu tribes in South Africa.

Female infanticide.

There seems little doubt that polyandry, as Herbert Spencer maintains, has been adopted as an obvious and easy check upon increase of population in rugged countries.1352 It is generally coupled with other preventive checks. In the Nilgiri Hills, as we found also to be the case on many Polynesian islands, it is closely associated with female infanticide.1353 The Todas in 1867 showed a proportion of two men to one woman, but later, with the decline of infanticide under British rule, a proportion of 100 men to 75 women, and a resulting modification of the institution of polyandry.1354 It may well be that the paucity of women suggested this form of marriage, whose expediency as an ally to infanticide in checking population later became apparent. The Todas are a very primitive folk of herdsmen, living on the produce of their buffaloes, averse to agriculture, though not inhibited from it by the nature of their country, therefore prone to seek any escape from that uncongenial employment,1355 and relying on the protected isolation of their habitat to compensate for the weakness inherent in the small number of the tribe.

There’s little doubt that polyandry, as Herbert Spencer argues, has been adopted as a clear and easy way to control population growth in harsh regions.1352 It is usually combined with other preventive measures. In the Nilgiri Hills, as we also found on many Polynesian islands, it is closely linked to female infanticide.1353 The Todas in 1867 had a ratio of two men for every woman, but later, as infanticide declined under British rule, the ratio became 100 men to 75 women, leading to changes in the polyandry practice.1354 It's possible that the shortage of women led to this type of marriage, which was beneficial alongside infanticide in controlling population growth. The Todas are a very primitive group of herdsmen who rely on their buffaloes for sustenance, are not keen on farming, though they aren’t prevented from it by their environment, and tend to look for any way to avoid that undesirable work,1355 depending on the isolated nature of their surroundings to make up for the vulnerability that comes with having a small tribe.

Throughout Tibet and Ladak polyandry works hand in hand with the lamaseries in limiting population. The conspicuous fact in Tibetan polyandry is its restriction to the agricultural portion of the population. The pastoral nomads of the country, depending on their yaks, sheep and goats, wandering at will over a very wide, if desolate territory, practice monogamy and polygamy.1356 The sedentary population, on the other hand, is restricted to tillable lands so small that each farm produces only enough for one family. Subdivision under a divided inheritance would be disastrous to these dwarf estates, especially owing to possible complications growing out of irrigating rights.1357 Polyandry leaves the estate and the family undivided, and by permitting only one wife to several fraternal husbands restricts the number of children. It does this also in another way by diminishing the fertility of the mothers; for all travelers comment upon the paucity of children in polyandrous families.

Throughout Tibet and Ladakh, polyandry works closely with the lama series to control the population. The notable aspect of Tibetan polyandry is that it is limited to the agricultural part of the population. The pastoral nomads, relying on their yaks, sheep, and goats, roam freely over a vast, though barren, area, practicing monogamy and polygamy.1356 In contrast, the sedentary population is confined to such small arable land that each farm produces only enough for one family. Dividing the inheritance would be disastrous for these tiny estates, especially with potential complications arising from irrigation rights.1357 Polyandry keeps the estate and family intact, and by allowing only one wife for several brothers, it limits the number of children. It also reduces mothers' fertility; travelers often note the scarcity of children in polyandrous families.

Westermarck lays stress upon the fact that polyandry prevails chiefly in sterile countries. He regards it less as a conscious device to check increase of population than a result of the disproportion of males to females in polyandrous communities. The preponderance of male births he attributes to the excessive endogamy bordering on inbreeding which tends to prevail in all isolated mountain valleys; and also, as a possibility, to the undernourished condition of the parents caused by scanty food supplies, which Düsing found to be productive of a high percentage of male births in proportion to female.1358 The motive of restricting population seems entitled to more weight than Westermarck concedes to it; for he slurs over the fact that in Tibet polyandry gives rise to a large number of superfluous women who fill the nunneries,1359 while in the Nilgiri Hills redundant females were eliminated by infanticide. The fact seems to be that in the institution of polyandry we have a social and psychological effect of environment, reinforced by a physiological effect.

Westermarck emphasizes that polyandry is mostly found in infertile regions. He sees it more as a natural outcome of the imbalance between males and females in polyandrous societies rather than a deliberate strategy to control population growth. He believes the higher number of male births is due to intense endogamy, which nearly leads to inbreeding in isolated mountain valleys. Additionally, he suggests that the poor nutrition of parents resulting from limited food resources might also contribute to a higher ratio of male to female births, which Düsing observed. The reason for limiting population seems to deserve more consideration than Westermarck gives it; he overlooks that in Tibet, polyandry results in many surplus women who end up in nunneries, while in the Nilgiri Hills, excess females were removed through infanticide. Essentially, polyandry reflects both a social and psychological impact of the environment, supported by a physiological influence.

Effects of polyandry and polygamy.

A comparison of social conditions in the adjoining provinces of Baltistan and Ladak, which together comprise the Himalayan valley of the Indus, reveals the character of polyandry as a response to geographic environment. Both provinces are inhabited by a Mongolian stock, but the Ladaki living on the uppermost stretch of the basin near Tibet are Buddhists and polyandrists, while the Baltis farther down the valley are Mussulmen and polygamists. The Baltis, with their plurality of wives and numerous children, are wretchedly poor and live in squalor on the verge of starvation; but as the elevation of their valley ranges only from 4000 to 8500 feet, they are inured to heat, and therefore emigrate in large numbers to the neighboring Mohammedan province of the Punjab, where they work as coolies and navvies. The Ladakis, on the other hand, living 9000 to 13,000 feet above the sea, die of bilious fever when they reach the lowlands. Cut off from emigration, they curtail population by means of polyandry and lamaseries. Consequently they show signs of prosperity, are well fed, well clothed and comfortably housed.1360 Baltistan's social condition illustrates in a striking way the power of an idea like an alien creed, assimilated as the result of close vicinal location, to counteract for a time the influences of local geographic conditions.

A comparison of social conditions in the neighboring provinces of Baltistan and Ladakh, which together make up the Himalayan valley of the Indus, shows how polyandry is a response to the geographic environment. Both provinces are inhabited by a Mongolian ethnic group, but the Ladakis, living in the upper part of the basin near Tibet, are Buddhists and practice polyandry, while the Baltis farther down the valley are Muslims and practice polygamy. The Baltis, with their multiple wives and many children, are extremely poor and live in squalor on the brink of starvation. However, since their valley's elevation ranges from 4000 to 8500 feet, they are used to heat and therefore migrate in large numbers to the nearby Muslim province of Punjab, where they work as laborers and builders. The Ladakis, on the other hand, live at elevations of 9000 to 13,000 feet, and suffer from bilious fever when they go to the lowlands. Cut off from migration, they control their population through polyandry and lamaseries. As a result, they show signs of prosperity, are well-fed, well-clothed, and live in comfortable homes. 1360 Baltistan's social condition strikingly illustrates how an idea, like an alien belief system, can temporarily counteract the effects of local geographic conditions due to close proximity.

Marauding tendencies in mountaineers

The less civilized mountain peoples, whose tastes or low economic status unfit them for emigration, solve the problem of a deficient food supply by raiding the fields and stores of their richer neighbors. Predatory expeditions fill the history of primitive mountain peoples, and of the ancient occupants of highland regions which are now devoted to honest industry. The ancient Alpine tribes were one and all, from the Mediterranean to the Danube, "poor and addicted to robbery," as Strabo says. He analyzes their condition with nice discrimination. "The greater part [of the Alps], especially the summits of the mountains inhabited by robbers, are barren and unfruitful, both on account of the frost and the ruggedness of the land. Because of the want of food and other necessaries, the mountaineers have sometimes been obliged to spare the inhabitants of the plains, that they might have some people to supply them."1361 The freebooters usually descended into the lowlands of Italy, Gaul and Helvetia, but the pass peoples lay in wait for their prey on the mountain roads. Strabo described the same marauding habits arising from the same cause among the mountaineers of northern Spain,1362 the Balkan range,1363 and the highlands encircling the Mesopotamian plains.1364

The less developed mountain communities, whose tastes or low economic status prevent them from emigrating, tackle the issue of limited food supply by raiding the farms and supplies of their wealthier neighbors. Predatory raids are a significant part of the history of primitive mountain societies and the ancient inhabitants of highland areas that are now engaged in legitimate industry. According to Strabo, all the ancient Alpine tribes, from the Mediterranean to the Danube, were "poor and addicted to robbery." He examines their situation with keen insight: "The greater part [of the Alps], especially the mountain peaks inhabited by robbers, are barren and unfruitful, both due to the frost and the ruggedness of the land. Because of the lack of food and other essentials, the mountaineers have sometimes had to spare the inhabitants of the plains to ensure they have some people to provide for them." 1361 The bandits typically raided the lowlands of Italy, Gaul, and Helvetia, but the people living near the passes waited for their prey on the mountain roads. Strabo noted the same plundering behaviors arising from similar circumstances among the mountaineers of northern Spain,1362 the Balkan range,1363 and the highlands surrounding the Mesopotamian plains.1364

Hunger is usually the spur. The tribesmen who inhabit the Hunza gorge were notorious robbers till their recent conquest by the British. Despite the most careful terrace tillage, their country was much overpopulated. The supply of grain was so inadequate, that during the summer the people subsisted wholly on fruit, reserving the grain for winter use. Therefore, when early summer opened the passes of the Karakorum and Himalayan ranges, and caravans began to move over the trade route between Kashmir and Yarkand, when the Kirghis nomads from the plains sought the pastures of the Pamir, the Hunza tribesmen found raiding caravans and herds, and pillaging the Gilgit Valley of Baltistan the easiest means of supplementing their slender resources. Hardy mountaineers as they were, and born fighters, they always conducted their forays successfully, and returned to the shelter of their fastnesses, laden with plunder and driving their captive flocks before them. The perpetual menace of these Hunza raids caused large districts in the Gilgit Valley to be abandoned by their inhabitants, and cultivated land to lapse into wilderness,1365 while the Chilas to the south pillaged the Astor Valley of Baltistan, carrying away crops and cattle, enslaving women and children.1366

Hunger is often the motivation. The tribes living in the Hunza gorge were infamous thieves until they were recently conquered by the British. Despite careful terrace farming, their land was heavily overpopulated. The supply of grain was so low that during the summer, people survived entirely on fruit, saving the grain for winter. So, when early summer opened the passes of the Karakoram and Himalayan ranges, and caravans began traveling the trade route between Kashmir and Yarkand, and when the Kirghis nomads from the plains sought the pastures of the Pamir, the Hunza tribesmen saw raiding caravans and herds, and looting the Gilgit Valley of Baltistan as the easiest way to supplement their limited resources. Tough mountaineers and natural fighters, they always conducted their raids successfully and returned to their retreats, weighed down with loot and driving their captured flocks ahead of them. The constant threat of these Hunza raids caused many areas in the Gilgit Valley to be abandoned by their residents, and arable land turned into wilderness,1365 while the Chilas to the south plundered the Astor Valley of Baltistan, taking crops and cattle and enslaving women and children.1366

Cattle-lifting.

Marauding propensities are marked among all retarded mountain peoples of modern times. The cattle-lifting clans of the Scotch Highlands, who preyed upon the Lowlands, have their counterpart in the Pathans of the Suleiman and Baluch mountain border who, till curbed by the British power in India, systematically pillaged the plains of the Sind.1367 The forest Bhils of the Vindhyan and Satpura ranges are scarcely yet married to agriculture; so when in time of drought their crops fail and the game abandons the hill forests to seek water in the lowland jungles, the Bhils cheerfully revert to their ancestral habit of cattle-lifting.1368

Marauding tendencies are common among all marginalized mountain communities today. The cattle-stealing clans of the Scottish Highlands, who preyed on the Lowlands, have their equivalent in the Pathans of the Suleiman and Baluch mountain border who, until restrained by British authority in India, routinely pillaged the plains of Sind.1367 The forest-dwelling Bhils of the Vindhyan and Satpura ranges are hardly involved in agriculture; so when drought strikes and their crops fail, forcing game to leave the hill forests for the lowland jungles in search of water, the Bhils readily return to their traditional practice of cattle-stealing.1368

The Caucasus was long a breeding place for robber tribes who made their forays into the pastures and fields of southern Russia. Robbery was part of the education of every Circassian prince, while one group of the Abassines conferred their chieftainship upon the most successful robber or the man of largest family.1369 The Kurdish hillmen of the Armenian ranges descend with their herds of horses in winter to the warmer plains, where they exhaust the pastures and subject the Armenian villages to a regular system of blackmail.1370 The wide grassy plains about Koukou Nor Lake, near the Chinese border of Tibet, attract numerous Mongol nomads with their herds; but these rich pastures are exposed to the depredation of Si Fan brigand tribes, who have their haunts in the deep, impenetrable gorges of the neighboring mountains, and carefully guard all the approaches to the same. They are Buddhists, but worship a special Divinity of Brigandage, to whom their lamas offer prayers for the success of every foray.1371 Hence, among mountain as among desert peoples, robbery tends to become a virtue; environment dictates their ethical code.

The Caucasus has long been a breeding ground for robber tribes that raid the pastures and fields of southern Russia. Robbery was part of the upbringing of every Circassian prince, while one group of the Abassines granted their leadership to the most successful thief or the man with the biggest family.1369 The Kurdish hillmen from the Armenian mountains move down with their herds of horses in winter to the warmer plains, where they exhaust the pastures and impose a regular system of extortion on the Armenian villages.1370 The expansive grassy plains around Koukou Nor Lake, near the Chinese border of Tibet, attract many Mongol nomads with their herds; however, these fertile pastures are vulnerable to attacks from the Si Fan brigand tribes, who hide in the deep, impenetrable gorges of the nearby mountains and meticulously guard all the access points. They are Buddhists but worship a specific deity of robbery, to whom their lamas pray for success in every raid.1371 Therefore, among both mountain and desert peoples, robbery tends to be seen as a virtue; their environment shapes their ethical code.

Historical results of mountain raiding.

These depredations reflect to a great degree the complementary relation of highlands and lowlands. The plains possess what the mountains lack. This is a fundamental fact of economic geography, and inevitably leads to historical results. The marauding expeditions of mountain peoples first acquire historical importance, either when the raids after long continuance end in the conquest of the lowlands, and thus augment the resources and population of the highland state; or, as is often the case, the raiders call down upon themselves the vengeance of the plainsmen, are subdued, and embodied in the lowland state. The conquest of ancient Assyria and the destruction of Nineveh by the mountain Medes seems to have been a process of this kind. Long before their descent upon Mesopotamia, they were known as the "dangerous Medes," were constantly threatening the Assyrian frontiers and occupying isolated tracts.1372 The predatory incursions of the Samnites of the Apennines into the fertile fields of Campania eventuated in the conquest of ancient Capua and other cities, and greatly strengthened the Samnite Confederacy. But this encroachment of the mountain tribes upon the plains aroused the cupidity and alarm of the Romans, who in turn bent their energies toward the final subjugation of the Samnites.1373 Himalayan Nepal, after the unification of its petty Rajah states by the Gurkha conquest between 1768 and 1790, began encroachments and ravages upon the Indian Terai or fertile alluvial lowland at the foot of the mountains; and finally by 1858 had acquired title to a considerable strip of it, which by its rice fields and forests greatly strengthened the geographic and economic base of the highland state.1374 The Malay Hovas, inhabiting the central plateau of Madagascar, braced to effort by its temperate climate and not over-generous soil, have almost everywhere subdued the better fed but sluggish lowlanders of the coast.1375 There can be little doubt that the beneficent effects of an invigorating mountain climate, especially in tropical and subtropical latitudes, have helped the hardy, active hill people to make easy conquest of the enervated plainsmen.

These destructive acts largely highlight the complementary relationship between highlands and lowlands. The plains have what the mountains lack. This is a key fact of economic geography and inevitably leads to historical consequences. The raiding activities of mountain peoples become historically significant, either when the raids, after a long period, result in the conquest of the lowlands, thereby increasing the resources and population of the highland state; or, as is often the case, the raiders provoke the wrath of the plainsmen, are defeated, and absorbed into the lowland state. The conquest of ancient Assyria and the destruction of Nineveh by the mountain Medes appears to be an example of this process. Long before they invaded Mesopotamia, they were known as the "dangerous Medes," constantly threatening the Assyrian borders and occupying isolated areas.1372 The predatory raids of the Samnites from the Apennines into the fertile fields of Campania resulted in the conquest of ancient Capua and other cities, significantly strengthening the Samnite Confederacy. However, this encroachment by the mountain tribes onto the plains sparked the greed and concern of the Romans, who then focused their efforts on ultimately conquering the Samnites.1373 Himalayan Nepal, after unifying its small Rajah states through the Gurkha conquest between 1768 and 1790, began to encroach on and ravage the Indian Terai or fertile alluvial lowlands at the foot of the mountains; by 1858, it had gained rights to a substantial strip of land, which, with its rice fields and forests, significantly boosted the geographic and economic foundation of the highland state.1374 The Malay Hovas, living in the central plateau of Madagascar, motivated by its temperate climate and not overly generous soil, have largely subdued the better-fed but sluggish lowlanders of the coast.1375 There's little doubt that the beneficial effects of a refreshing mountain climate, especially in tropical and subtropical regions, have helped the hardy, active hill people easily conquer the weakened plainsmen.

Conquest of mountain regions

It is more often the case, however, that the scant resources, small number, and divided political condition of the mountain tribes make such conquest impossible. Their depredations provoke reprisals from the stronger states of the plain, who bring the mountain region under subjection, merely to police their frontier. Strabo makes it clear that the Romans, having secured certain passes over the Alps, neglected the conquest of the ranges, till the increase of Roman colonies along the piedmont rim excited the cupidity of the mountaineers. Muscovite dominion was extended over the Caucasus, both in order to check the persistent raids of its tribes into the Russian plains, and to secure control of its passes. The state of Kashmir, guided by a purely local policy, for years tried to conquer the robber tribes on its northwestern frontier, merely to protect its own border provinces. Then the British authorities of the Indian Empire began the same process, but from a radically different motive. They saw the Gilgit and Hunza valleys, like the Chitral to the west, as highways through a mountain transit land, whose opposite approaches were held by the Russians.1376

It’s usually the case that the limited resources, small numbers, and split political situation of the mountain tribes make conquest impossible. Their pillaging triggers retaliation from the stronger nations on the plains, who subdue the mountain regions just to secure their borders. Strabo points out that after the Romans secured some routes over the Alps, they ignored conquering the mountain ranges until the growth of Roman settlements along the foothills sparked the greed of the mountaineers. Russian control expanded over the Caucasus to curb the continual raids from those tribes into the Russian plains and to secure the mountain passes. The state of Kashmir, following a strictly local agenda, spent years attempting to conquer the bandit tribes on its northwestern border just to protect its own provinces. Then the British authorities in the Indian Empire began a similar effort, but for entirely different reasons. They viewed the Gilgit and Hunza valleys, like Chitral to the west, as key routes through a mountainous transit area, with the opposite ends controlled by the Russians.1376

Such conquests, whatever be their motive, profit the vanquished in the end more than the victor. They result in the systematic and intelligent development of the mountain resources, and the maintenance of ampler social and economic relations between highland and lowland through the construction of roads, which must always represent the reach of the governing authority. The conquest of mountain peoples means always expensive and protracted campaigns. The invader has always two enemies to fight, Nature and the armed foe. There is a saying in India that "In Gilgit a small army is annihilated and a large army starves to death." Hunger is king in high altitudes, and comes always to the defense of mountain independence. Moreover, the inaccessibility of such districts, the difficulty of maintaining lines of communication, ignorance of by-paths and trails which forever offer strategic opportunities to the natives or escape at a crisis, all serve to protract the war. The independent spirit of the mountaineer, his endurance of hardships, his mastery of mountain tactics, and his obstinate resistance after repeated defeat, give always a touch of heroism to highland warfare. Consequently, history abounds in examples of unconquered mountain peoples, or of long sustained resistance, like that which for sixty years under the heroic leadership of Kadi Mulah and Shamyl used up the treasure and troops of Russia in the impregnable defiles of the Caucasus. In the end, however, the highland tribes succumb to numbers and the road-making engineer.

Such conquests, no matter the reason behind them, ultimately benefit the defeated more than the victor. They lead to the organized and intelligent development of mountain resources and foster broader social and economic connections between the highlands and lowlands through the construction of roads, which always symbolize the reach of the governing authority. Conquering mountain people usually involves costly and lengthy campaigns. The invader faces two foes: nature and the armed enemy. There's a saying in India that "In Gilgit a small army is wiped out, and a large army starves to death." Hunger reigns in high altitudes and consistently defends mountain independence. Additionally, the inaccessibility of these areas, the challenges of maintaining communication lines, and the natives' familiarity with by-paths and trails that present strategic advantages or routes of escape all extend the duration of the conflict. The independent spirit of the mountain dweller, their resilience in the face of hardship, their expertise in mountain warfare, and their stubborn resistance even after repeated defeats all give a sense of heroism to highland battles. Thus, history is filled with examples of mountain peoples who remain unconquered or show prolonged resistance, like the sixty-year struggle led by Kadi Mulah and Shamyl, which exhausted Russian resources and troops in the virtually unreachable passes of the Caucasus. However, in the end, the highland tribes inevitably fall to sheer numbers and the road-building engineer.

Political dismemberment of mountain peoples.

Political dismemberment, lack of cohesion due to the presence of physical barriers impeding intercourse, is the inherent weakness of mountain peoples. Political consolidation is never voluntary. It is always forced upon them from without, either by foreign conquest or by the constant menace of such conquest, which compels the mountain clans to combine for common defense of their freedom. The combination thus made is reluctant, loose, easily broken, generally short-lived. It becomes close and permanent only under a constant pressure from without, and then assumes a form allowing to the constituent parts the greatest possible measure of independence. The Swiss canton and commune are the result of a segregating environment; the Swiss Republic is the result of threatened encroachments by the surrounding states. It owed its first genuine federal constitution to Napoleon.

Political dismemberment and the lack of unity due to physical barriers that hinder interaction are the natural weaknesses of mountain communities. Political consolidation never happens willingly. It's always imposed from the outside, either through foreign conquest or the constant threat of such conquest, which forces the mountain clans to come together for the common defense of their freedom. This alliance is made reluctantly, is loose, easily broken, and generally short-lived. It only becomes close and permanent under ongoing external pressure, and then it takes a form that allows the individual parts the most independence possible. The Swiss cantons and communes are a result of a segregated environment; the Swiss Republic emerged from threatened encroachments by neighboring states. Its first real federal constitution was thanks to Napoleon.

A report on the situation in the Caucasus, addressed to Czar Nicholas in 1829, contains an epitome of the history of mountain peoples. It runs as follows: "The Circassians bar out Russia from the south, and may at their pleasure open or close the passage to the nations of Asia. At present their intestine dissensions, fostered by Russia, hinder them from uniting under one leader; but it must not be forgotten that, according to traditions religiously preserved among them, the sway of their ancestors extended as far as to the Black Sea. * * * The imagination is appalled at the consequence which their union under one leader might have for Russia, which has no other bulwark against their ravages than a military line, too extensive to be very strong."1377 Here we have the whole story—a mountain people pillaging the lowlands, exercising a dangerous and embarrassing control over the passes, and thereby calling down upon themselves conquest from without; weakened by a contracting territory within the highlands and a shrinking area of plunder without, doomed to eventual defeat by the yet more ominous weakness of political dismemberment.

A report on the situation in the Caucasus, addressed to Czar Nicholas in 1829, summarizes the history of the mountain peoples. It goes like this: "The Circassians block Russia from the south and can decide when to open or close the route to the nations of Asia. Right now, their internal conflicts, encouraged by Russia, prevent them from uniting under a single leader; however, we must remember that, according to traditions they carefully preserve, their ancestors' influence reached all the way to the Black Sea. * * * It's terrifying to think about what their unity under one leader could mean for Russia, which relies only on a military line, too long to be really strong, as their defense against raiding." 1377 Here we have the whole story—a mountain people raiding the lowlands, holding dangerous and awkward control over the passes, bringing conquest upon themselves from the outside; weakened by a shrinking territory within the highlands and a diminishing area to plunder beyond, destined for eventual defeat by the even more troubling weakness of political fragmentation.

Individualism and independence

Mountain tribes are always like a pack of hounds on the leash, each straining in a different direction. Wall-like barriers, holding them apart for centuries, make them almost incapable of concerted action, and restive under any authority but their own. Clan and tribal societies, feudal and republican rule, always on a small scale, characterize mountain sociology. All these are attended by an exaggerated individualism and its inevitable concomitant, the blood feud. Mountain policy tends to diminish the power of the central authority to the vanishing point, giving individualism full scope. Social and economic retardation, caused by extreme isolation and encouraged by protected location, tend to keep the social body small and loosely organized. Every aspect of environment makes against social integration.

Mountain tribes are always like a pack of dogs on a leash, each pulling in a different direction. Walls that have kept them apart for centuries make it almost impossible for them to work together, and they resist any authority except their own. Clan and tribal societies, whether under feudal or republican systems, are usually on a small scale, which defines mountain sociology. This leads to an exaggerated sense of individualism and the inevitable result, the blood feud. Mountain politics tends to weaken the power of central authority to almost nothing, allowing individualism to thrive. Social and economic stagnation, caused by extreme isolation and aided by their protected locations, keeps these communities small and loosely structured. Every aspect of their environment works against social integration.

The broken relief of ancient Greece produced the small city state; but in the rugged mountains of Arcadia the principle of physical and political subdivision went farther. Here, for four centuries after the first Olympiad, the population, poorest and rudest of all Greece, was split up into petty hill villages, each independent of the other.1378 The need of resisting Spartan aggression led for the first time, in 371 B.C., to the formation of a commune Arcadum, a coalescence of all the fractional groups constituting the Arcadian folk;1379 but even this union, effected only by the masterly manipulation of the Theban Epaminondas, proved short-lived and incomplete. What was true of the Arcadian villages was true of the city states of Greece. The geography of the land instilled into them the principle of political aloofness, except when menaced by foreign conquest. Cooperation is efficient only when it springs from a habit of mind. Greek union against the Persians was very imperfect; and against the Roman, the feeble leagues were wholly ineffective. The influence of this dismembering environment still persists. As ancient Greece was a complex of city states, modern Greece is a complex of separate districts, each of which holds chief place in the minds of its citizens, and unconsciously but steadily operates against the growth of a national spirit in the modern sense.1380

The fragmented landscape of ancient Greece led to the creation of small city-states, but in the rugged mountains of Arcadia, the idea of physical and political division went even further. For four centuries after the first Olympic Games, the population, the poorest and most primitive in all of Greece, was divided into small hill villages, each independent from the others.1378 The need to resist Spartan aggression finally resulted, in 371 B.C., in the formation of a commune Arcadum, a unification of all the various groups that made up the Arcadian people;1379 but even this alliance, achieved only through the skillful efforts of the Theban leader Epaminondas, was short-lived and incomplete. What was true for the Arcadian villages was also true for the city-states of Greece. The geography of the land instilled in them a principle of political isolation, except when threatened by foreign invasion. Cooperation is effective only when it arises from a mindset. Greek unity against the Persians was very limited, and against the Romans, the weak alliances were completely ineffective. The impact of this fragmented environment still exists. Just as ancient Greece was a collection of city-states, modern Greece is a collection of separate regions, each of which holds a dominant place in the minds of its citizens, and unintentionally but consistently hinders the development of a national spirit in the contemporary sense.1380

Types of mountain states.

A mountain environment encourages political disunion in several forms. Sometimes it favors the survival of a turbulent feudal nobility, based upon clan organization, as among the medieval Scotch, who were not less rebellious toward their own kings than toward the English conquerors.1381 Feudal rule seems congenial to the mountaineer, whose conservative nature, born of isolation, clings to hereditary chiefs and a long established order. Feudal communities and dwarf republics exist side by side in the northern Caucasus,1382 attended by that primitive assertion of individual right, the blood feud.1383 Often the two forms of government are combined, but the feudal element is generally only a dwindling survival from a remote past. The little Republic of Andorra, which for a thousand years has preserved its existence in the protection of a high Pyrenean valley, is a self-governing community, organized strictly along the lines of a Tyrolese or Swiss commune; but the two viguiers or agents, who in some matters outrank the president, are official appointments tracing back to feudal days, when Andorra was a seigneurie of the Comté of Urgel.1384 Tyrol offers a striking parallel to this. In its local affairs it has in effect a republican form of government, enjoying as high degree of autonomy as any Swiss canton; but the great Brenner route, which could confer both power and wealth on its possessor, made the Tyrol an object of conquest to the feudal nobles of the early Middle Ages. Their hereditary dominion is now vested in the archdukes of Austria, to whom the Tyrolese have shown unfailing fidelity, but from whom they have exacted complete recognition of their rights.1385

A mountain environment often leads to political divisions in various ways. Sometimes, it supports the persistence of a turbulent feudal nobility based on clan structures, as seen with the medieval Scots, who were just as rebellious toward their own kings as they were against the English conquerors.1381 Feudal rule appears to suit the mountaineer, whose conservative nature, shaped by isolation, holds onto hereditary chiefs and a long-established order. Feudal communities and small republics exist side by side in the northern Caucasus,1382 accompanied by the primitive assertion of individual rights known as the blood feud.1383 Often, these two types of governance are mixed together, but the feudal aspect is usually just a fading remnant of a distant past. The small Republic of Andorra, which has maintained its existence for a thousand years in the protection of a high Pyrenean valley, is a self-governing community, organized in a manner similar to a Tyrolean or Swiss commune; however, the two viguiers or agents, who outrank the president in some matters, are official appointments that trace back to feudal times, when Andorra was a seigneurie of the Comté of Urgel.1384 Tyrol presents a similar example. In its local affairs, it effectively has a republican form of government, enjoying as much autonomy as any Swiss canton; however, the significant Brenner route, which could bring both power and wealth to its owner, made Tyrol a target for conquest by the feudal nobles of the early Middle Ages. Their hereditary rule is now held by the archdukes of Austria, to whom the Tyrolese have shown unwavering loyalty, but from whom they have demanded full recognition of their rights.1385

Tyrol's neighbor Switzerland illustrates the pure form of commune, canton and republic, which is the logical result of a rugged mountain relief. Here commune and canton are the real units of government. In the federal power at Bern the Swiss peasant takes little interest, often not even knowing the name of the national president. In the highest ranges a canton coincides with a mountain-rimmed valley—Valais with the basin of the upper Rhone, Glarus with the upper Linth, Uri with the Reuss, Graubünden with the upper Rhine, to which is joined by many pass routes the sparsely peopled Engadine, Ticino with the drainage basin of upper Lake Maggiore, Unterwalden with the southern drainage valleys of Lake Lucerne. Where the mountains are lower, or where passes connect valleys of high levels, cantonal boundaries may overstep geographical barriers. A commune generally consists of the villages strung along a narrow lateral valley, isolated and sufficient unto itself politically. A close parallel to the Alpine commune is found among the Kabyles of the Atlas Mountains. Their political structure is based upon the Jemaa or commune, a small sovereign republic whose independence is fiercely defended. It enjoys complete local autonomy, is governed by an assembly of all the adult male inhabitants, and grants this body the usual functions except the administration of justice, which, characteristically, is replaced by blood feuds as the inalienable right of the individual. Romans, Arabs, Turks and French have in turn exercised over these mountain Berbers only nominal control, except when their internal dissensions made them vulnerable.1386

Tyrol's neighbor Switzerland showcases the true essence of community, canton, and republic, a natural outcome of its rugged mountain terrain. In this region, the community and canton are the primary forms of governance. The Swiss peasant is generally indifferent to the federal government in Bern, often unaware of who the national president is. In the highest mountain areas, a canton aligns with a valley surrounded by peaks—Valais with the upper Rhône basin, Glarus with the upper Linth, Uri with the Reuss, and Graubünden with the upper Rhine, which is connected by several mountain passes to the sparsely populated Engadine, Ticino with the upper Lake Maggiore basin, and Unterwalden with the southern drainages of Lake Lucerne. In areas where the mountains are lower or where passes link high-altitude valleys, cantonal borders can cross natural barriers. A community typically consists of villages located along a narrow side valley, which are politically isolated yet self-sufficient. A close counterpart to the Alpine community is found among the Kabyles of the Atlas Mountains. Their political system is based on the Jemaa or commune, a small sovereign republic whose independence is fiercely protected. It enjoys total local autonomy, governed by an assembly of all adult male members, which performs the usual functions except for administering justice, which, significantly, is replaced by blood feuds as the indivisible right of the individual. Romans, Arabs, Turks, and French have all held only nominal control over these mountain Berbers, except when their internal conflicts made them vulnerable.1386

Significance of their small size.

The mountains, by the segregating power of their ridges and ranges, first produce these little independent communities, and then, throwing around them strong protecting arms, enfold them in an embrace which long provides security to them in their weakness. These minute mountain states, therefore, tend to reflect in their size the isolation of their environment, and indirectly the weakness of the surrounding nations. The original Swiss Eidgenossensschaft of the four forest cantons, embedded in the high Alps, braced against a mountain wall, held its own against the feeble feudal states of Austria and Germany. The rugged relief of Graubünden and the spirit of freedom cradled there enabled its peasants in the Middle Ages to overthrow the feudal lords, and to establish a federal republic. This typical mountain state was a league composed of three other leagues. Each component league consisted of a group of districts, having the power of sovereign states, and consisting in turn of a group of communes, which were quite independent in local affairs. This triune league formed in time an alliance with the Swiss Confederation, but did not become a member of it till the Vienna adjustment of 1815. Similar is the story of the mountain shepherds of Appenzell, who formed a little peasant republic, despite their bishop overlord of St. Gall; and who later during the Reformation, on the ground of religious differences, divided into two yet smaller states.1387 The relation between size and inaccessibility is most strikingly illustrated in the high Himalayan ranges west of Kashmir and north of the Punjab. Here is the Shinaka district, which includes the Chilas, Darel, Tanger and other valleys branching off from the Indus, and which is inhabited by Dards of Indo-European stock. Each Shinaka valley is a small cantonal republic, and each village of each republic is a commune managing its own affairs by an assembly. One settlement of only twelve houses enjoys complete autonomy. Besides the village assemblies there is a state parliament handling questions of general policy, to which each village sends representatives. One dissentient vote can defeat a measure. The majority cannot control the minority; for if one village of a state disagrees with the others, it is free to carry out its own policy, even in the matter of foreign alliances.1388 Here is home rule run to seed.

The mountains, with their separating ridges and ranges, initially create small independent communities, and then, by wrapping around them in a protective embrace, provide long-term security in their vulnerability. These tiny mountain states tend to reflect their size through the isolation of their surroundings, indirectly highlighting the weakness of the surrounding nations. The original Swiss Eidgenossenschaft of the four forest cantons, nestled in the high Alps and backed by a mountain wall, stood strong against the weak feudal states of Austria and Germany. The tough terrain of Graubünden and the spirit of freedom there allowed its peasants in the Middle Ages to overthrow the feudal lords and establish a federal republic. This typical mountain state formed a league consisting of three other leagues. Each league was made up of a group of districts with the power of sovereign states, which in turn comprised a collection of communes that were quite independent in local matters. Over time, this threefold league allied with the Swiss Confederation, but it didn’t officially join until the Vienna adjustments of 1815. A similar story unfolds with the mountain shepherds of Appenzell, who established a small peasant republic, despite being under the authority of their bishop from St. Gall; and who later, during the Reformation, split into two even smaller states due to religious differences.1387 The relationship between size and inaccessibility is clearly highlighted in the high Himalayan ranges west of Kashmir and north of the Punjab. This includes the Shinaka district, which encompasses the Chilas, Darel, Tanger, and other valleys branching off from the Indus, inhabited by Dards of Indo-European descent. Each Shinaka valley acts as a small cantonal republic, and each village within those republics manages its own affairs through an assembly. One settlement with only twelve houses enjoys complete autonomy. Alongside the village assemblies, there is a state parliament that addresses general policy issues, with each village sending representatives. A single dissenting vote can block a proposal. The majority cannot overrule the minority; if one village disagrees with the others, it can pursue its own policies, even regarding foreign alliances.1388 This is home rule taken to the extreme.

Slight power of mountain chiefs.

Small size is sometimes coupled with monarchical rule, degenerating occasionally into despotism among aggressive robber tribes. The inaccessible Hunza Valley is occupied on opposite sides of its deep gorge by two rival states, the Hunzas and the Nagaris, whose combined population amounts to scarcely 25,000 souls. Hostile to each other, they unite only to resist an invading force. While the Hunza Thum is a tyrant, the Nagari ruler has little voice in the government. The Tibeto-Burman hill folk of the eastern Himalayas are divided into clans, and concede a mild authority to a chief who rules a group of clan villages, but only rarely is able to secure power over a larger district. The Khasia Hills of Assam are broken up into twenty-three petty states, each under its own Rajah or chief, who has, however, little authority beyond the administration of justice.1389

Small size sometimes goes hand in hand with royal leadership, occasionally leading to tyranny among aggressive raiding tribes. The isolated Hunza Valley is divided on either side of its steep gorge by two rival states, the Hunzas and the Nagaris, whose total population is barely 25,000 people. They are hostile to one another and only come together to fight off an invading force. While the Hunza Thum is a tyrant, the Nagari leader has little say in the government. The Tibeto-Burman hill people of the eastern Himalayas are split into clans and grant limited authority to a chief who oversees a group of clan villages, but is rarely able to gain control over a larger area. The Khasia Hills of Assam are divided into twenty-three small states, each led by its own Rajah or chief, who has little power beyond handling justice.1389

Everywhere in mountain regions appears this repugnance to centralized authority. Protection by environment obviates the necessity of protection through combination. The spirit of clan exclusiveness, the absence of a common national sentiment, characterize equally the tribesmen of mountainous Albania, of Persian Luristan,1390 and highland Kurdistan. Along the rugged upheaved area which forms the western boundary of India from the Khaibar Pass to the sea, British officials have had to negotiate with the native Pathan and Baluch "jirgahs," assemblies of the chief men of the countless clans into which the tribes are divided, as the only visible form of authority tolerated.1391 Combination must be voluntary and of a type to exact a modicum of submission. These requirements are best answered by the confederation, which may gradually assume a stable and elaborate form among an advanced people like the Swiss; or it may constitute a loose yet effective union, as in the famous Samnite confederacy of the central Apennines; or a temporary league like that of the ancient Arcadians, or the group of confederated sheiks of Bellad el Kobail, the "Country of the Highlanders" in mountainous Yemen, who in 1790 established a republican form of union for defense against their more powerful neighbors.1392

Everywhere in mountainous regions, there's a strong dislike for centralized authority. The natural environment provides enough protection, making it unnecessary to rely on combined forces for safety. The exclusive spirit of clans and the lack of a shared national identity are evident among the tribes of mountainous Albania, Persian Luristan,1390 and highland Kurdistan. In the rugged area that forms the western boundary of India from the Khyber Pass to the sea, British officials have had to work with local Pathan and Baluch "jirgahs," which are assemblies of the leading men from the many clans within these tribes, as they represent the only form of authority that is accepted.1391 Any kind of cooperation needs to be voluntary and should require some degree of submission. These needs are best met by a confederation, which can evolve into a stable and complex organization among more developed societies like the Swiss; or it can be a loose but effective alliance, similar to the well-known Samnite confederacy in the central Apennines; or a temporary league like that of the ancient Arcadians, or the combined chiefs of Bellad el Kobail, the "Country of the Highlanders" in mountainous Yemen, who formed a republican union in 1790 for defense against stronger neighbors.1392

Mountain isolation and differentiation.

The power of mountains to protect makes them asylums of refuge for displaced peoples. This fact explains the confused ethnology which often characterizes these isolated regions, especially when they lie near or across natural highways of human migration. As a tide of humanity sweeps around or across the mountains, a branch stream turns into a side valley, where it is caught and held. There it remains unaltered, crystallizing in its seclusion, subjected for ages to few modifying influences from without. Its people keep their own language and customs, little affected by a totally different race stock similarly placed in a neighboring alcove of the mountains. Lack of communication engenders an endless multiplication of dialects, as we find them in the Alps, the Caucasus, in Kafirstan of the Hindu Kush and in Nepal. Diversity of speech, itself a product of isolation, reacts upon that political and social aloofness of mountain folk, to emphasize and fix it.

The protective power of mountains makes them safe havens for displaced people. This reality explains the mixed ethnic identities that often define these remote areas, especially when they are located near or along natural routes of human migration. As waves of people move around or over the mountains, a branch stream becomes a side valley, where it gets trapped and held. There, it remains unchanged, crystallizing in its isolation and experiencing little outside influence for ages. Its inhabitants maintain their own language and customs, largely unaffected by a completely different ethnic group living in a neighboring valley of the mountains. Limited communication leads to an endless variety of dialects, as seen in the Alps, the Caucasus, Kafirstan in the Hindu Kush, and in Nepal. The diversity of language, arising from isolation, reinforces the political and social separation of mountain communities, making it even more pronounced and permanent.

Survival of primitive races in mountains.

From this principle it follows that the same highland region shows strong differentiation and marked social individuality from one district to another, and from one valley to the next, despite a prevailing similarity of local geographic conditions. In fact, the very similarity of those conditions, strong in their power to isolate, present the conditions for inevitable variation. A mountain region gets its population from diverse sources, or, which is quite as important, at different times from the same source. For instance, Nepal received contingents of Rajput conquerors, dislodged from the Punjab, in the seventh century, the eleventh, and finally the dominant Gurkhas at the end of the eighteenth. To-day these represent different degrees of amalgamation with the local Tibetan stock of Nepal. They are distinguished from each other by a diversity of languages, and a multiplicity of dialects, while the whole piedmont of the country shows a yet different blend with the Aryan Hindus of the Ganges valley, who have seeped into the Terai and been drawn up, as if by capillary attraction, into the hill valleys of the outer range. The Vindhyan Range and its associated highlands, long before the dawn of Indian history, caught and held in their careful embrace some of the fragile aboriginal tribes like the Kolarian Ho, Santals and Korkus. Centuries later the Dravidian Bhils and Gonds sought refuge here before the advancing Indo-Aryans, and found asylums in the secluded valleys.1393 Finally those same northern plains whence the Dravidians had come, after the Mohammedan conquest of central India in the sixteenth century, sent flying to the refuge of the hills a large contingent of Hindus of mingled Dravidian and Aryan stocks, but stamped with the culture of the Ganges basin. These occupied the richer valleys and the more accessible plateaus of the highlands, driving the primitive Gonds and Bhils back into the remoter recesses of the mountains.1394 Dravidians and aboriginal Kolarians survive in their purity in the wilder and more inaccessible regions, but in the lower valleys their upper classes show signs of mixtures with the Rajput invaders, while the lower classes betray little Aryan blood.1395

From this principle, it follows that the same highland area shows significant differences and strong social individuality from one district to another and from one valley to the next, even though the local geographic conditions are mostly similar. In fact, the very similarity of those conditions, which are powerful in their isolation, creates an environment for inevitable variation. A mountain region gets its population from various sources, or, which is equally important, at different times from the same source. For example, Nepal received groups of Rajput conquerors, displaced from the Punjab, in the seventh century, the eleventh, and finally the dominant Gurkhas at the end of the eighteenth. Today, these groups represent different levels of intermingling with the local Tibetan population of Nepal. They are distinguished by a variety of languages and many dialects, while the entire foothills of the country show a different mix with the Aryan Hindus of the Ganges valley, who have moved into the Terai and been drawn up, almost like through capillary action, into the hill valleys of the outer range. The Vindhyan Range and its surrounding highlands, long before Indian history began, captured and held some delicate aboriginal tribes like the Kolarian Ho, Santals, and Korkus. Centuries later, the Dravidian Bhils and Gonds sought refuge here from the advancing Indo-Aryans, finding shelter in the secluded valleys.1393 Finally, those same northern plains from which the Dravidians had come, after the Muslim conquest of central India in the sixteenth century, sent a large group of Hindus of mixed Dravidian and Aryan backgrounds to seek refuge in the hills, but with the culture of the Ganges basin. These groups settled in the richer valleys and the more accessible plateaus of the highlands, pushing the primitive Gonds and Bhils back into the more remote recesses of the mountains.1394 Dravidians and aboriginal Kolarians remain pure in the wilder and more inaccessible regions, but in the lower valleys, their upper classes show signs of mixing with the Rajput invaders, while the lower classes exhibit little Aryan ancestry.1395

Diversity of peoples and dialects.

Afghanistan, of disordered relief, set as a transit region between the plains of Mesopotamia, the Oxus and the Indus, has a confused ethnology in keeping with the tangle of dissected plateaus and mountain systems which constitute its surface. Here we find three distinct branches of the Indo-European race, divided up into various peoples of diverse tongues and subdivided further into countless tribes; and two branches of Mongol-Tartars scattered, as if out of a pepper box, from the Helmund to the Oxus, tossed in among diverse peoples of Iranic and Galcha origin in hopeless confusion. The various Afghan tribes, separated from each other by natural barriers and intervening alien stocks, though similar in physical type, speech, religion and culture, have no sense of unity, no common political aims, while the appalling list of tribes constituting the population of the country1396 offers little hope of Afghanistan ever developing national cohesion. Kafiristan alone, which lies in the Hindu Kush range for the most part at an altitude of 12,000 feet or more, harbors in its recesses many remnants of primitive peoples, speaking various languages and dialects, strangers alike to any native affinity or political union. It is a mere agglomeration of ethnic fragments, in which the people of one village are often unable to converse with those of the next.1397 Relief has fashioned the ethnology of the Caucasus in the same way. No other equally small area in the world contains such a variety of peoples and tongues, differing from one another in race, language, and customs so fundamentally as the Caucasus. From the heterogeneous survivals of extremely old ethnic stocks, lodged in the high valleys, to the intrusive Russians of the lower piedmont, the Caucasus might be called an ethnographical sample card.1398

Afghanistan, with its messy geography, serves as a transit area between the plains of Mesopotamia, the Oxus, and the Indus. It has a complex ethnology that reflects the tangled plateaus and mountain ranges that make up its landscape. Here, we find three distinct branches of the Indo-European race, divided into various peoples with different languages and further subdivided into countless tribes. Additionally, there are two branches of Mongol-Tartars scattered across the region from the Helmund to the Oxus, mixed in with diverse groups of Iranian and Galcha origin in a chaotic blend. The various Afghan tribes, separated by natural barriers and different ethnic groups, although similar in physical appearance, language, religion, and culture, lack a sense of unity and common political goals. The long list of tribes that make up the country's population1396 offers little hope for Afghanistan to achieve national cohesion. Kafiristan, located mostly in the Hindu Kush range at elevations of 12,000 feet or more, is home to many remnants of primitive peoples who speak various languages and dialects, and have no native ties or political alliance. It's simply a collection of ethnic fragments, where people from one village often cannot communicate with those from the next.1397 The geography has shaped the ethnology of the Caucasus in a similar way. No other small area in the world has such a wide variety of peoples and languages that differ fundamentally in race, language, and customs like the Caucasus does. From the diverse remnants of very old ethnic groups living in the high valleys to the Russian populations in the lower foothills, the Caucasus could be described as an ethnographical sample card.1398

The rugged configuration of the Alps, from the Rhone to the Danube, has preserved the broad-headed Alpine race, which was perhaps the primitive stock of Central Europe. The great river valleys leading into this massive highland, like the Rhine, Aar, Inn and Adige, show the intrusion of a long-headed race from both north and south; but lofty and remote valleys off the main routes of travel, like the Hither Rhine about Dissentis, the little Stanzerthal of the upper Inn, and the Passierthal of the upper Adige above Meran, show the race preserved in its purity by the isolating environment.1399 Here each segregated lateral valley becomes an area of marked linguistic and social differentiation; only where it opens into the wider longitudinal valleys are its peculiarities of speech and custom diluted by the intrusive current of another race. Switzerland has received three different streams of language, and broken them up into numerous rivulets of dialect. On its small area of 16,125 square miles (41,346 square kilometers) thirty-five dialects of German are spoken, sixteen of French, eight of Italian and five of Romansch, a primitive and degenerate Latin tongue, surviving from the ancestral days of Roman occupation.1400 The yet smaller territory of the Tyrol has all these languages except French, whose place is taken by various forms of Slavonic speech, which have entered by the western tributaries of the Danube.1401

The rugged landscape of the Alps, stretching from the Rhone to the Danube, has preserved the wide-headed Alpine people, who may have been the original inhabitants of Central Europe. The major river valleys leading into this vast highland, like the Rhine, Aar, Inn, and Adige, show the influence of a long-headed group from both the north and south; however, high and isolated valleys off the main travel routes, like the Hither Rhine around Dissentis, the small Stanzerthal of the upper Inn, and the Passierthal of the upper Adige north of Meran, have kept the population intact and pure due to their seclusion.1399 In these isolated side valleys, there’s a clear distinction in language and social customs; only as they connect to the larger longitudinal valleys do their unique speech and traditions get mixed with those of another group. Switzerland has absorbed three different language streams and fragmented them into many dialects. In its compact area of 16,125 square miles (41,346 square kilometers), thirty-five dialects of German are spoken, along with sixteen of French, eight of Italian, and five of Romansch, a primitive and declining Latin language that has survived from the time of Roman rule.1400 The even smaller region of Tyrol has all these languages except French, which is replaced by various forms of Slavic languages that have come in through the western tributaries of the Danube.1401

Constriction of mountain areas of ethnic survivals.

Rarely is a polyglot mountain population able to work out its own political salvation, as the Swiss have done. More often political union must be forced upon them from without. Oftener still, when the highlanders are primitive survivals, ill-matched against the superior invaders from the plain, they are doomed to a process of constriction of territory and deterioration of numbers, which proceeds slowly or rapidly according to the inaccessibility of their environment and the energy of the intruders. Deliberate, unenterprising nations, like the Chinese, Turks and Indo-Aryans long tolerate the presence of alien mountain tribes, who remain like enemies brought to bay in their isolated fortresses. The conquerors throw around them at their leisure a cordon of settlement, which, slowly ascending the piedmont, draws closer and closer about the mountaineers. The situation of many mountain tribes reminds one of a besieged stronghold. Russian wars against the Caucasus have rightly been described as protracted sieges. The heroic history of Switzerland in relation to its neighbors has been that of a skillfully conducted defense, both military and diplomatic. The territory of China is dotted over with detached groups of aborigines, who have survived wherever a friendly mountain has offered them an asylum. Variously known as Lolos, Mantze or Miaotse, they have preserved everywhere a semi-independence in pathless mountains, whither Chinese troops do not dare to follow them;1402 but the more numerous and patient Chinese agriculturalists are in many sections slowly encroaching upon their territories, driving them farther and farther into the recesses of their highlands. The same process goes on in Formosa, where the Chinese have gradually forced the native Malays into mountain fastnesses among the peaks which rise to 14,000 feet (4500 meters). There, split up by internecine feuds into numberless clans and tribes, ignorant of one another's languages, raiding each other's territories and the coastal plains tilled by Chinese colonists, they await their doom, while the piedmont zone between has already given birth to a typical border race of halfbreeds, more Chinese than Malay.1403

Rarely does a diverse mountain population manage to find its own political solutions like the Swiss have done. More often, political unity has to be imposed on them from the outside. Even more frequently, when the mountain people are primitive survivors, ill-equipped to deal with the stronger invaders from the plains, they face a gradual loss of territory and decline in numbers. This happens at varying speeds depending on how isolated their environment is and how aggressive the intruders are. Less adventurous nations, like the Chinese, Turks, and Indo-Aryans, often allow foreign mountain tribes to exist like cornered enemies in their isolated strongholds. The conquerors slowly encircle them with settlements that, gradually ascending the foothills, close in on the mountain dwellers. The situation of many mountain tribes is similar to that of a besieged fort. Russia's conflicts with the Caucasus have rightly been described as extended sieges. Switzerland’s heroic history in relation to its neighbors has involved a skillful defense, both militarily and diplomatically. China's territory contains scattered groups of indigenous people who have survived wherever friendly mountains provided them refuge. Known variously as Lolos, Mantze, or Miaotse, they have maintained a degree of autonomy in difficult-to-reach mountains where Chinese troops hesitate to pursue them; however, the more numerous and persistent Chinese farmers are gradually encroaching on their lands in many areas, pushing them further into the depths of their highlands. A similar situation exists in Formosa, where the Chinese have progressively driven the native Malays into mountain strongholds among peaks that rise to 14,000 feet (4,500 meters). There, divided by internal conflicts into countless clans and tribes, ignorant of each other's languages, raiding one another and the coastal plains cultivated by Chinese settlers, they await their fate, while the foothill zone has already given rise to a typical border population of mixed heritage, leaning more Chinese than Malay.

Isolation and retardation of mountain regions.

"To have and to hold" is the motto of the mountains. Like remote islands, they are often museums of social antiquities. Antiquated races and languages abound. The mountaineers of the Southern Appalachians speak to-day an eighteenth century English. Their literature is the ballad poetry of old England and Scotland, handed down from parent to child. Clan feuds settle questions of justice, as in the Caucasus and the Apennines. Religion is orthodox to the last degree, sectarianism is rigid, and Joshua's power over the sun remains in some lonely valleys undiscounted.1404 These are all the marks of isolation and retardation which appear in similar environments elsewhere. Especially religious dogmas tend to show in mountains a tenacity of life impossible in the plains. The Kafirs, inhabiting the high Hindu Kush Mountains of Badakshan, and apparently of Pelasgic, early Greek, or Persian origin, have a religion blended of paganism, Zoroastrianism and Brahmanism.1405 One intruding faith has been unable to dislodge the previous incumbent, so the three have combined. The great historical destiny of the small, barren, isolated Judean plateau was to hold aloof the chaste religion of the desert-bred Jews from the sensuous agricultural gods of the Canaanites; to conserve and fix it; if need be, to narrow it to a provincial tribal faith, to stamp it with exclusiveness, conservatism, and formalism, as its adherents with bigotry,1406 for this is always the effect of geographical seclusion. But when all these limitations of Judaism are acknowledged, the fact remains that that segregated mountain environment performed the inestimable service for the world of keeping pure and undefiled the first and last great gift of the desert, a monotheistic faith.

"To have and to hold" is the motto of the mountains. Like isolated islands, they often serve as museums of social history. Old races and languages thrive here. The people of the Southern Appalachians still speak an eighteenth-century English. Their literature consists of the ballad poetry from old England and Scotland, passed down from parent to child. Clan rivalries determine justice, much like in the Caucasus and the Apennines. Religion is strictly traditional, sectarianism is rigid, and some remote valleys still acknowledge Joshua's power over the sun.1404 These are all signs of isolation and stagnation found in similar environments elsewhere. Particularly, religious beliefs tend to have a stubborn persistence in mountainous regions that is hard to find in the plains. The Kafirs, who live in the high Hindu Kush Mountains of Badakshan and seem to stem from an ancient Greek, Pelasgic, or Persian background, have a religion that blends paganism, Zoroastrianism, and Brahmanism.1405 One encroaching faith hasn’t been able to replace the others, so the three have merged. The significant historical fate of the small, barren, isolated Judean plateau was to keep the pure religion of the desert-bred Jews separate from the sensual agricultural gods of the Canaanites; to preserve it, even if that meant reducing it to a provincial tribal faith, branding it with exclusiveness, conservatism, and strict rituals, just as its followers often exhibit bigotry,1406 for this is always the result of geographical isolation. Nevertheless, when we acknowledge the limitations of Judaism, the reality is that this secluded mountain setting did an invaluable service to the world by keeping intact and unblemished the first and last great gift of the desert: a belief in one God.

Buddhism, once the official religion of Korea but disestablished three centuries ago, has taken refuge in the Diamond Mountains, far from the main roads; there a dull, moribund form of the faith dozes on in the monasteries and monastic shrines of these secluded highlands.1407 Driven out of India, Buddhism survives only in the Himalayan border of the country among the local Tibeto-Burman peoples, and in Ceylon, whose mountain city of Kandy is its stronghold. The persecuted Waldenses, a heretic sect who fled in 1178 from the cities of France to the Alps, took refuge in the remote valleys of the Pellice, Chisone, and Augrogne some thirty miles southwest of Turin. There, protected equally against attack and modification, the Waldenses have maintained the old tenets and organization of their religion.1408

Buddhism, once Korea's official religion but disestablished three centuries ago, has found refuge in the Diamond Mountains, away from the main roads; there, a dull, declining version of the faith lingers in the monasteries and monastic shrines of these isolated highlands.1407 Driven out of India, Buddhism survives only in the Himalayan region of the country among the local Tibeto-Burman peoples, and in Ceylon, where the mountain city of Kandy serves as its stronghold. The persecuted Waldenses, a heretical sect that fled from France to the Alps in 1178, sought refuge in the remote valleys of the Pellice, Chisone, and Augrogne, about thirty miles southwest of Turin. There, safeguarded from both attack and change, the Waldenses have upheld the original tenets and organization of their religion.1408

Conservatism of mountain peoples.

The mountain-dweller is essentially conservative. There is little in his environment to stimulate him to change, and little reaches him from the outside world. The "spirit of the times" is generally the spirit of a past time, when it has penetrated to his remote upland. He is strangely indifferent to what goes on in the great outstretched plains below him. What filters in to him from the outside has little suggestion for him, because it does not accord with the established order which he has always known. Hence innovation is distasteful to him. This repugnance to change reaches its clearest expression, perhaps, in the development and preservation of national costumes. Tracht, which is crystallized style in dress, appears nowhere so widespread and so abundantly differentiated as in mountain districts. In Switzerland, every canton has its distinctive costume which has come down from a remote past. The peasants of Norway, of the German and Austrian Alps, of the Basque settlements in the Pyrenees, of mountain-bound Alsace and Bohemia, give local color to the landscape by the picturesqueness of their national dress.

The mountain dweller is fundamentally conservative. There isn’t much in his surroundings to encourage him to change, and he hears little from the outside world. The “spirit of the times” usually reflects a past era by the time it reaches his isolated mountain home. He’s oddly indifferent to what happens on the vast plains below him. What trickles in from outside holds little relevance for him because it doesn’t align with the established order he’s always known. As a result, he finds innovation unappealing. This aversion to change is most clearly seen in the development and preservation of traditional costumes. Tracht, which represents a fixed style in clothing, is nowhere as widespread and distinctly varied as in mountainous regions. In Switzerland, each canton has its unique costume that has persisted from a distant past. The peasants of Norway, the German and Austrian Alps, the Basque communities in the Pyrenees, and those in mountain-ridden Alsace and Bohemia add local color to the landscape with the charm of their traditional attire.

Mental and moral qualities.

With this conservatism of the mountaineer is generally coupled suspicion toward strangers, extreme sensitiveness to criticism, superstition, strong religious feeling, and an intense love of home and family. The bitter struggle for existence makes him industrious, frugal, provident; and, when the marauding stage has been outgrown, he is peculiarly honest as a rule. Statistics of crime in mountain regions show few crimes against property though many against person. When the mountain-bred man comes down into the plains, he brings with him therefore certain qualities which make him a formidable competitor in the struggle for existence,—the strong muscles, unjaded nerves, iron purpose, and indifference to luxury bred in him by the hard conditions of his native environment.

With this conservative mindset, mountain dwellers often harbor suspicion towards outsiders, are very sensitive to criticism, hold superstitions, possess a strong sense of religious devotion, and have a deep love for home and family. The harsh fight for survival makes them hardworking, frugal, and forward-thinking; and once they move past the stage of being marauders, they tend to be quite honest. Crime statistics in mountainous areas show few property crimes but many against individuals. When someone raised in the mountains comes down to the plains, they bring certain qualities that make them tough competitors in the struggle for survival—strong muscles, unyielding nerves, determination, and a lack of concern for luxury, all developed by the tough conditions of their homeland.


NOTES TO CHAPTER XVI

Notes for Chapter 16


1255.

J. Thomson, Through Masai Land, pp. 78-82, 113-115, 122, 140-141, 163-167, 406-407. London, 1885.

J. Thomson, Through Masai Land, pp. 78-82, 113-115, 122, 140-141, 163-167, 406-407. London, 1885.

1256.

J. Russell Smith, Plateaus in Tropical America, in Report of Eighth International Geographical Congress, pp. 829-831. Washington, 1905.

J. Russell Smith, Plateaus in Tropical America, in Report of Eighth International Geographical Congress, pp. 829-831. Washington, 1905.

1257.

Isaiah Bowman, The Distribution of Population in Bolivia, Bulletin American Geographical Society, pp. 74-78, Vol. VII. 1909.

Isaiah Bowman, The Distribution of Population in Bolivia, Bulletin American Geographical Society, pp. 74-78, Vol. VII. 1909.

1258.

D.G. Hogarth, The Nearer East, p. 157. London, 1902.

D.G. Hogarth, The Nearer East, p. 157. London, 1902.

1259.

Roosevelt, Winning of the West, Vol. I, pp. 52-56. New York, 1895. C.C. Royce, The Cherokee Nation of Indians, Fifth Annual Report of Bureau of Ethnology, pp. 140-143. Washington, 1887.

Roosevelt, Winning of the West, Vol. I, pp. 52-56. New York, 1895. C.C. Royce, The Cherokee Nation of Indians, Fifth Annual Report of Bureau of Ethnology, pp. 140-143. Washington, 1887.

1260.

W.Z. Ripley, The Races of Europe, pp. 253-254. New York, 1899.

W.Z. Ripley, The Races of Europe, pp. 253-254. New York, 1899.

1261.

G.L. Gomme, The Village Community, pp. 72, 75-95. New York, 1890.

G.L. Gomme, The Village Community, pp. 72, 75-95. New York, 1890.

1262.

H.R. Mill, International Geography, pp. 148, 154, 155. New York, 1902.

H.R. Mill, International Geography, pp. 148, 154, 155. New York, 1902.

1263.

J. Partsch, Central Europe, pp. 204, 207. London, 1903.

J. Partsch, Central Europe, pp. 204, 207. London, 1903.

1264.

H.R. Mill, International Geography, p. 304. New York, 1902.

H.R. Mill, International Geography, p. 304. New York, 1902.

1265.

J. Partsch, Central Europe, p. 221. London, 1903.

J. Partsch, Central Europe, p. 221. London, 1903.

1266.

Alfred Stead, Japan by the Japanese, p. 425. London, 1904. Henry Dyer, Dai Nippon, p. 241. New York, 1904.

Alfred Stead, Japan by the Japanese, p. 425. London, 1904. Henry Dyer, Dai Nippon, p. 241. New York, 1904.

1267.

Boyd Winchester, The Swiss Republic, pp. 307-308. Phila., 1891.

Boyd Winchester, The Swiss Republic, pp. 307-308. Phila., 1891.

1268.

Wilhelm Deecke, Italy, pp. 190, 358-361. London, 1904.

Wilhelm Deecke, Italy, pp. 190, 358-361. London, 1904.

1269.

Elisée Reclus, Europe, Vol. I, p. 284. New York, 1882.

Elisée Reclus, Europe, Vol. I, p. 284. New York, 1882.

1270.

S.P. Scott, History of the Moorish Empire in Spain, Vol. III, pp. 610-613. Philadelphia, 1904.

S.P. Scott, History of the Moorish Empire in Spain, Vol. III, pp. 610-613. Philadelphia, 1904.

1271.

M. Niebuhr, Travels Through Arabia, Vol. I, pp. 290-291, 300. Edinburgh, 1792. S.M. Zwemer, Arabia the Cradle of Islam, pp. 57, 68, 69, 415. New York, 1900.

M. Niebuhr, Travels Through Arabia, Vol. I, pp. 290-291, 300. Edinburgh, 1792. S.M. Zwemer, Arabia the Cradle of Islam, pp. 57, 68, 69, 415. New York, 1900.

1272.

D.G. Hogarth, The Nearer East, pp. 75, 140, 267. London, 1902.

D.G. Hogarth, The Nearer East, pp. 75, 140, 267. London, 1902.

1273.

E.F. Knight, Where Three Empires Meet, p. 10. London, 1897.

E.F. Knight, Where Three Empires Meet, p. 10. London, 1897.

1274.

Ibid., pp. 312, 460, 463, 468, 475.

Ibid., pp. 312, 460, 463, 468, 475.

1275.

Ibid., 118, 119, 160, 200.

Ibid., 118, 119, 160, 200.

1276.

Isabella Bird Bishop, The Yangtze Valley and Beyond, Vol. I, pp. 176, 183, 294; Vol. II, p. 107. New York and London, 1900.

Isabella Bird Bishop, The Yangtze Valley and Beyond, Vol. I, pp. 176, 183, 294; Vol. II, p. 107. New York and London, 1900.

1277.

F.H., Nichols, Through Hidden Shensi, pp. 51, 54. New York, 1902.

F.H. Nichols, Through Hidden Shensi, pp. 51, 54. New York, 1902.

1278.

E.J. Payne, History of the New World, Vol. I, pp. 375-378. Oxford, 1892.

E.J. Payne, History of the New World, Vol. I, pp. 375-378. Oxford, 1892.

1279.

Ratzel, History of Mankind, Vol. II, p. 162. London, 1896-1898.

Ratzel, History of Mankind, Vol. II, p. 162. London, 1896-1898.

1280.

E.F. Knight, Where Three Empires Meet, pp. 86-87. London, 1897.

E.F. Knight, Where Three Empires Meet, pp. 86-87. London, 1897.

1281.

A.B. Ellis, West African Islands, p. 248. London, 1885.

A.B. Ellis, West African Islands, p. 248. London, 1885.

1282.

Ratzel, History of Mankind, Vol. I, p. 254. London, 1896-1898.

Ratzel, History of Mankind, Vol. I, p. 254. London, 1896-1898.

1283.

Ibid., Vol. I, pp. 426-428.

Ibid., Vol. I, pp. 426-428.

1284.

A.E. Wallace, The Malay Archipelago, p. 122. New York, 1869.

A.E. Wallace, The Malay Archipelago, p. 122. New York, 1869.

1285.

Ibid., 174.

Ibid, 174.

1286.

W.E. Griffis, The Mikado's Empire, Vol. I, p. 90. New York, 1903.

W.E. Griffis, The Mikado's Empire, Vol. I, p. 90. New York, 1903.

1287.

Census of the Philippine Islands, Vol. I, pp. 458, 541, 543; and Vol. IV, pp. 88-89. Washington, 1905. Gazetteer of the Philippine Islands, photographs, pp. 352-353. Washington, 1902.

Census of the Philippine Islands, Vol. I, pp. 458, 541, 543; and Vol. IV, pp. 88-89. Washington, 1905. Gazetteer of the Philippine Islands, photographs, pp. 352-353. Washington, 1902.

1288.

Boyd Alexander, From the Niger to the Nile, Vol. I, pp. 96-97. London, 1907.

Boyd Alexander, From the Niger to the Nile, Vol. I, pp. 96-97. London, 1907.

1289.

V.L. Cameron, Across Africa, p. 221. London, 1885.

V.L. Cameron, Across Africa, p. 221. London, 1885.

1290.

Count Gleichen, The Egyptian Sudan, Vol. I, p. 190. London, 1905.

Count Gleichen, The Egyptian Sudan, Vol. I, p. 190. London, 1905.

1291.

Prescott, Conquest of Peru, Vol. I, pp. 134-136. New York, 1848.1291

Prescott, Conquest of Peru, Vol. I, pp. 134-136. New York, 1848.1291

1292.

Ratzel, History of Mankind, Vol. II, p. 176. London, 1896-1898.

Ratzel, History of Mankind, Vol. II, p. 176. London, 1896-1898.

1293.

Ibid., Vol. II, p. 176.

Ibid., Vol. II, p. 176.

1294.

E.J. Payne, History of the New World, Vol. I, p. 377. Oxford, 1892.

E.J. Payne, History of the New World, Vol. I, p. 377. Oxford, 1892.

1295.

Pallas, Travels Through the Southern Provinces of Russia, Vol. II, p. 346. London, 1812.

Pallas, Travels Through the Southern Provinces of Russia, Vol. II, p. 346. London, 1812.

1296.

B.H. Baden-Powell, The Indian Village Community, pp. 57, 58, 61. London, 1896.

B.H. Baden-Powell, The Indian Village Community, pp. 57, 58, 61. London, 1896.

1297.

E.F. Knight, Where Three Empires Meet, pp. 148, 151, 154, 163, 203, 238 et passim. London, 1897.

E.F. Knight, Where Three Empires Meet, pp. 148, 151, 154, 163, 203, 238 et passim. London, 1897.

1298.

Ibid., 70-73.

Ibid., 70-73.

1299.

F.H. Nichols, Through Hidden Shensi, p. 52. New York, 1902.

F.H. Nichols, Through Hidden Shensi, p. 52. New York, 1902.

1300.

Isabella Bird Bishop, The Yangtze Valley and Beyond, Vol. I, pp. 163, 176; Vol. II, pp. 126, 147. New York and London, 1900.

Isabella Bird Bishop, The Yangtze Valley and Beyond, Vol. I, pp. 163, 176; Vol. II, pp. 126, 147. New York and London, 1900.

1301.

Boyd Winchester, The Swiss Republic, p. 307. Philadelphia, 1891.

Boyd Winchester, The Swiss Republic, p. 307. Philadelphia, 1891.

1302.

Wilhelm Roscher, National-oekonomik des Ackerbaues, p. 656, Note 1. Stuttgart, 1888.

Wilhelm Roscher, National Economics of Agriculture, p. 656, Note 1. Stuttgart, 1888.

1303.

Norway, Official Publication, p. 307. Christiania, 1900.

Norway, Official Publication, p. 307. Oslo, 1900.

1304.

Roscher, National-oekonomik des Ackerbaues, p. 656, Note 4. Stuttgart, 1888.

Roscher, National Economics of Agriculture, p. 656, Note 4. Stuttgart, 1888.

1305.

Norway, Official Publication, p. 325. Christiania, 1900.

Norway, Official Publication, p. 325. Oslo, 1900.

1306.

Roscher, National-oekonomik des Ackerbaues, p. 657, Note 7. Stuttgart, 1888.

Roscher, National Economics of Agriculture, p. 657, Note 7. Stuttgart, 1888.

1307.

Ibid., p. 655, Note 1.

Ibid., p. 655, Note 1.

1308.

Norway, Official Publication, p. 310. Christiania, 1900.

Norway, Official Publication, p. 310. Oslo, 1900.

1309.

B.H. Baden-Powell, The Indian Village Community, pp. 58-59. London, 1896.

B.H. Baden-Powell, The Indian Village Community, pp. 58-59. London, 1896.

1310.

McCullough, Geographical Dictionary, Article Nepal. J.O. White, Journeys in Bhutan, Geographical Journal, Vol. 35, p. 33. London, 1910.

McCullough, Geographical Dictionary, Article Nepal. J.O. White, Journeys in Bhutan, Geographical Journal, Vol. 35, p. 33. London, 1910.

1311.

E.F. Knight, Where Three Empires Meet, p. 10. London, 1897.

E.F. Knight, Where Three Empires Meet, p. 10. London, 1897.

1312.

Boyd Winchester, The Swiss Republic, p. 310. Philadelphia, 1891. A. von Miaskowski, Die schweizerische Allmend, pp. 88-89, 155, 178, 179, 198. Staats- und socialwissenschaftliche Forschungen, Vol. II, No. 4, Leipzig, 1879.

Boyd Winchester, The Swiss Republic, p. 310. Philadelphia, 1891. A. von Miaskowski, Die schweizerische Allmend, pp. 88-89, 155, 178, 179, 198. Staats- und socialwissenschaftliche Forschungen, Vol. II, No. 4, Leipzig, 1879.

1313.

E.F. Knight, Where Three Empires Meet, pp. 98, 248, 329. London, 1897.

E.F. Knight, Where Three Empires Meet, pp. 98, 248, 329. London, 1897.

1314.

Isabella Bird Bishop, The Yangtze Valley and Beyond, Vol. II, pp. 181, 187, 224. London and New York, 1900.

Isabella Bird Bishop, The Yangtze Valley and Beyond, Vol. II, pp. 181, 187, 224. London and New York, 1900.

1315.

Carter Harrison, A Race with the Sun, p. 63. New York, 1889.

Carter Harrison, A Race with the Sun, p. 63. New York, 1889.

1316.

Boyd Winchester, The Swiss Republic, pp. 325-327. Phila. 1891.

Boyd Winchester, The Swiss Republic, pp. 325-327. Phila. 1891.

1317.

A von Miaskowski, Die schweizerische Allmend, pp. 164-166. Staats- und socialwissenschaftliche Forschungen, Vol. II, No. 4. Leipzig, 1879.

A von Miaskowski, The Swiss Commons, pp. 164-166. Research in State and Social Sciences, Vol. II, No. 4. Leipzig, 1879.

1318.

Norway, Official Publication, p. 325. Christiania, 1900.

Norway, Official Publication, p. 325. Oslo, 1900.

1319.

Ibid., p. 59.

Ibid., p. 59.

1320.

Roscher, National-oekonomik des Ackerbaues, p. 655, Note 1. Stuttgart, 1888.

Roscher, National Economics of Agriculture, p. 655, Note 1. Stuttgart, 1888.

1321.

E.F. Knight, Where Three Empires Meet, pp. 40, 41, 77. London, 1897.

E.F. Knight, Where Three Empires Meet, pp. 40, 41, 77. London, 1897.

1322.

M. Hue, Travels in Tartary, Thibet and China in 1846, Vol. II, pp. 151-156. Chicago, 1898.

M. Hue, Travels in Tartary, Thibet and China in 1846, Vol. II, pp. 151-156. Chicago, 1898.

1323.

W.W. Rockhill, The Land of the Lamas, p. 228. New York, 1891.

W.W. Rockhill, The Land of the Lamas, p. 228. New York, 1891.

1324.

Perceval Landon, The Opening of Tibet, pp. 110, 111, 205-206. New York, 1905.

Perceval Landon, The Opening of Tibet, pp. 110, 111, 205-206. New York, 1905.

1325.

J. Partsch, Central Europe, pp. 197, 248. London, 1903.

J. Partsch, Central Europe, pp. 197, 248. London, 1903.

1326.

Wilhelm Deecke, Italy, p. 220. London, 1904.

Wilhelm Deecke, Italy, p. 220. London, 1904.

1327.

J. Partsch, Central Europe, pp. 269-270. London, 1903.

J. Partsch, Central Europe, pp. 269-270. London, 1903.

1328.

Malthus, Essay on Population, Book II, chap. V.

Malthus, Essay on Population, Book II, chap. V.

1329.

Cliffe Leslie, Auvergne, Fortnightly Review, p. 741, Vol. XVI. 1874.

Cliffe Leslie, Auvergne, Fortnightly Review, p. 741, Vol. XVI. 1874.

1330.

Wilhelm Deecke, Italy, pp. 243, 409. London, 1904.

Wilhelm Deecke, Italy, pp. 243, 409. London, 1904.

1331.

Ratzel, History of Mankind, Vol. III, p. 252. London, 1896-1898.

Ratzel, History of Mankind, Vol. III, p. 252. London, 1896-1898.

1332.

L. Higgin, Spanish Life in Town and Country, pp. 27, 29, 292-293. New York, 1902.

L. Higgin, Spanish Life in Town and Country, pp. 27, 29, 292-293. New York, 1902.

1333.

James Bryce, Impressions of South Africa, p. 350. New York, 1897.

James Bryce, Impressions of South Africa, p. 350. New York, 1897.

1334.

Von Bremer, Land of the Battaks, Geographical Journal, Vol. VII, pp. 76-80. London, 1896.

Von Bremer, Land of the Battaks, Geographical Journal, Vol. VII, pp. 76-80. London, 1896.

1335.

B. Winchester, The Swiss Republic, pp. 229-232. Phila., 1891.

B. Winchester, The Swiss Republic, pp. 229-232. Phila., 1891.

1336.

James Logan, The Scottish Gael or Celtic Manners, p. 78. Hartford, 1849.

James Logan, The Scottish Gael or Celtic Manners, p. 78. Hartford, 1849.

1337.

Indian Census for 1901, Vol. I, Part I, p. 93, by Risley and Gait. Calcutta, 1903.

Indian Census for 1901, Vol. I, Part I, p. 93, by Risley and Gait. Calcutta, 1903.

1338.

Elisée Reclus, Europe, Vol. I, p. 219. New York, 1882.

Elisée Reclus, Europe, Vol. I, p. 219. New York, 1882.

1339.

Heinrich von Treitschke, Politik, Vol. I, p, 228. Leipzig, 1897.

Heinrich von Treitschke, Politics, Vol. I, p. 228. Leipzig, 1897.

1340.

Archibald Little, The Far East, pp. 47, 167. Oxford, 1905.

Archibald Little, The Far East, pp. 47, 167. Oxford, 1905.

1341.

H.R. Mill, International Geography, p. 243. New York, 1902.

H.R. Mill, International Geography, p. 243. New York, 1902.

1342.

Malthus, Essay on Population, Book II, chap. I.

Malthus, Essay on Population, Book II, chap. I.

1343.

Cliffe Leslie, Auvergne, Fortnightly Review, Vol. XVI, pp. 741-742. 1874.

Cliffe Leslie, Auvergne, Fortnightly Review, Vol. XVI, pp. 741-742. 1874.

1344.

Oscar P. Crosby, Tibet and Turkestan, pp. 153, 156. London and New York, 1905. A. Little, The Far East, p. 217. Oxford, 1905.

Oscar P. Crosby, Tibet and Turkestan, pp. 153, 156. London and New York, 1905. A. Little, The Far East, p. 217. Oxford, 1905.

1345.

W.W. Rockhill, The Land of the Lamas, p. 227. New York, 1891.

W.W. Rockhill, The Land of the Lamas, p. 227. New York, 1891.

1346.

E.F. Knight, Where Three Empires Meet, p. 218. London, 1897.

E.F. Knight, Where Three Empires Meet, p. 218. London, 1897.

1347.

W.W. Rockhill, The Land of the Lamas, p. 212. New York, 1891.

W.W. Rockhill, The Land of the Lamas, p. 212. New York, 1891.

1348.

G.A. Sherring, Western Tibet and the British Borderland, p. 188. London, 1906.

G.A. Sherring, Western Tibet and the British Borderland, p. 188. London, 1906.

1349.

Westermarck, History of Human Marriage, pp. 451, 452. London, 1891.

Westermarck, History of Human Marriage, pp. 451, 452. London, 1891.

1350.

Strabo, Book XVI, chap. IV, 25.

Strabo, Book XVI, chap. IV, 25.

1351.

For authorities, see Westermarck, History of Human Marriage, pp. 452-455. London, 1891. McLennan, Primitive Marriage, pp. 178-179, 184-189. Edinburgh, 1865. G.A. Sherring, Western Tibet and the British Borderland, pp. 14, 15, 88-89, 177, 305. London, 1906.

For sources, see Westermarck, History of Human Marriage, pp. 452-455. London, 1891. McLennan, Primitive Marriage, pp. 178-179, 184-189. Edinburgh, 1865. G.A. Sherring, Western Tibet and the British Borderland, pp. 14, 15, 88-89, 177, 305. London, 1906.

1352.

Spencer, Principles of Sociology, Vol. 1, pp. 646-649. New York, 1887.

Spencer, Principles of Sociology, Vol. 1, pp. 646-649. New York, 1887.

1353.

W.H.R. Rivers, The Todas, incorporated in W. I. Thomas' Source Book for Social Origins, pp. 485-486. Chicago, 1909.

W.H.R. Rivers, The Todas, included in W. I. Thomas' Source Book for Social Origins, pp. 485-486. Chicago, 1909.

1354.

Westermarck, History of Human Marriage, p. 463. London, 1891.

Westermarck, History of Human Marriage, p. 463. London, 1891.

1355.

Sir Thomas Holdich, India, pp. 216, 217. London, 1905.

Sir Thomas Holdich, India, pp. 216, 217. London, 1905.

1356.

W.W. Rockhill, The Land of the Lamas, pp. 211-212. New York, 1891.

W.W. Rockhill, The Land of the Lamas, pp. 211-212. New York, 1891.

1357.

Oscar P. Crosby, Tibet and Turkestan, pp. 148-151. New York and London, 1905.

Oscar P. Crosby, Tibet and Turkestan, pp. 148-151. New York and London, 1905.

1358.

Westermarck, History of Human Marriage, pp. 470-483, 547-548. London, 1891.

Westermarck, History of Human Marriage, pp. 470-483, 547-548. London, 1891.

1359.

Perceval Landon, The Opening of Tibet, p. 193. New York, 1905.

Perceval Landon, The Opening of Tibet, p. 193. New York, 1905.

1360.

E.F. Knight, Where Three Empires Meet, pp. 137-141. London, 1897.

E.F. Knight, Where Three Empires Meet, pp. 137-141. London, 1897.

1361.

Strabo, Book IV, chap. VI, 6, 7, 8, 10.

Strabo, Book IV, chap. VI, 6, 7, 8, 10.

1362.

Ibid., Book III, chap. III, 5, 7, 8.

Ibid., Book III, chap. III, 5, 7, 8.

1363.

Ibid, Book VII, chap. VI, 1.

Ibid, Book VII, chap. VI, 1.

1364.

Ibid, Book XI, chap. XII, 4; chap. XIII, 3, 6.

Ibid, Book XI, chap. XII, 4; chap. XIII, 3, 6.

1365.

E.F. Knight, Where Three Empires Meet, pp. 346-349, 460-464. London, 1897.

E.F. Knight, Where Three Empires Meet, pp. 346-349, 460-464. London, 1897.

1366.

Ibid, 280-282.

Ibid, 280-282.

1367.

Sir Thomas Holdich, India, p. 33. London, 1905.

Sir Thomas Holdich, India, p. 33. London, 1905.

1368.

Ibid, 219-221.

Ibid, 219-221.

1369.

Pallas, Travels Through the Southern Provinces of Russia, Vol. I, pp. 386-390, 406-407. London, 1812.

Pallas, Travels Through the Southern Provinces of Russia, Vol. I, pp. 386-390, 406-407. London, 1812.

1370.

D.G. Hogarth, The Nearer East, p. 246-249. London, 1902.

D.G. Hogarth, The Nearer East, pp. 246-249. London, 1902.

1371.

M. Hue, Travels in Tartary, Thibet, and China in 1846, Vol. II, pp. 90-93, 100-101, 129-132. Chicago, 1898.

M. Hue, Travels in Tartary, Thibet, and China in 1846, Vol. II, pp. 90-93, 100-101, 129-132. Chicago, 1898.

1372.

Hans Helmolt, History of the World, Vol. III, pp. 131, 133-135. New York and London, 1902-1906.

Hans Helmolt, History of the World, Vol. III, pp. 131, 133-135. New York and London, 1902-1906.

1373.

Strabo, Book V, chap. IV, II.

Strabo, Book V, chap. IV, II.

1374.

Arcticle Nepal, Encyclopædia Britannica.

Article Nepal, Encyclopædia Britannica.

1375.

C. Keller, Madagascar, pp. 24-26, 72, 85. London, 1901.

C. Keller, Madagascar, pp. 24-26, 72, 85. London, 1901.

1376.

E.F. Knight, Where Three Empires Meet, pp. 280, 288-289. London, 1897.

E.F. Knight, Where Three Empires Meet, pp. 280, 288-289. London, 1897.

1377.

Walter K. Kelly, History of Russia, Vol. II, p. 392. London, 1881.

Walter K. Kelly, History of Russia, Vol. II, p. 392. London, 1881.

1378.

Grote, History of Greece, Vol. II, p. 441. New York, 1859.

Grote, History of Greece, Vol. II, p. 441. New York, 1859.

1379.

Ibid., Vol. X, pp. 208, 215, 224-225.

Ibid., Vol. X, pp. 208, 215, 224-225.

1380.

D.G. Hogarth, The Nearer East, p. 235. London, 1902.

D.G. Hogarth, The Nearer East, p. 235. London, 1902.

1381.

Henry Buckle, History of Civilization in England, Vol. II, pp. 125, 136-137. New York, 1871.

Henry Buckle, History of Civilization in England, Vol. II, pp. 125, 136-137. New York, 1871.

1382.

W.K. Kelly, History of Russia, Vol. II, p. 394. London, 1881.

W.K. Kelly, History of Russia, Vol. II, p. 394. London, 1881.

1383.

Pallas, Travels Through the Southern Provinces of Russia, Vol. I, pp. 391, 404-405. London, 1812.

Pallas, Travels Through the Southern Provinces of Russia, Vol. I, pp. 391, 404-405. London, 1812.

1384.

H. Spencer, A Visit to Andorra, Fortnightly Review, Vol. 67, pp. 53-60. 1897.

H. Spencer, A Visit to Andorra, Fortnightly Review, Vol. 67, pp. 53-60. 1897.

1385.

Article Tyrol, Encyclopædia Britannica.

Article on Tyrol, Encyclopædia Britannica.

1386.

Ratzel, History of Mankind, Vol. III, pp. 253-254. London, 1896-1898.

Ratzel, History of Mankind, Vol. III, pp. 253-254. London, 1896-1898.

1387.

H.J. Mackinder, The Rhine, pp. 27-31, 47-49, 56, 57. London, 1908.

H.J. Mackinder, The Rhine, pp. 27-31, 47-49, 56, 57. London, 1908.

1388.

E.P. Knight, Where Three Empires Meet, pp. 305-306. London, 1897.

E.P. Knight, Where Three Empires Meet, pp. 305-306. London, 1897.

1389.

B.H. Baden-Powell, The Indian Village Community, pp. 136, 143-146. London, 1896.

B.H. Baden-Powell, The Indian Village Community, pp. 136, 143-146. London, 1896.

1390.

D.G. Hogarth, The Nearer East, pp. 229-231, 248, 252-253. London, 1902.

D.G. Hogarth, The Nearer East, pp. 229-231, 248, 252-253. London, 1902.

1391.

Sir Thomas Holdich, India, pp. 243-244. London, 1905.

Sir Thomas Holdich, India, pp. 243-244. London, 1905.

1392.

Niebuhr, Travels Through Arabia, Vol. II, pp. 50-51. Edinburgh, 1792.

Niebuhr, Travels Through Arabia, Vol. II, pp. 50-51. Edinburgh, 1792.

1393.

B.H. Baden-Powell, The Indian Village Community, pp. 40, 47, 110, 121, 151-154, 159. London, 1896.

B.H. Baden-Powell, The Indian Village Community, pp. 40, 47, 110, 121, 151-154, 159. London, 1896.

1394.

Captain J. Forsythe, The Highlands of Central India, pp. 10-15, 23-24, 123-125. London, 1889.

Captain J. Forsythe, The Highlands of Central India, pp. 10-15, 23-24, 123-125. London, 1889.

1395.

Ibid., 6, 7, 10-12, 141-147.

Ibid., 6, 7, 10-12, 141-147.

1396.

Angus Hamilton, Afghanistan, pp. 262-268. New York, 1906.

Angus Hamilton, Afghanistan, pp. 262-268. New York, 1906.

1397.

Sir Thomas Holdich, India, pp. 98-99. London, 1905.

Sir Thomas Holdich, India, pp. 98-99. London, 1905.

1398.

Merzbacher, Aus den Hochregionen des Kaukasus, Vol. I, pp. 55-56, 156. Leipzig, 1901.

Merzbacher, From the High Regions of the Caucasus, Vol. I, pp. 55-56, 156. Leipzig, 1901.

1399.

W.Z. Ripley, The Races of Europe, pp. 281-283, 289-290, map p. 285. New York, 1899.

W.Z. Ripley, The Races of Europe, pp. 281-283, 289-290, map p. 285. New York, 1899.

1400.

Ibid., 282.

Ibid., 282.

1401.

Article Tyrol, Encyclopædia Britannica.

Article Tyrol, Britannica.

1402.

Archibald Little, The Far East, 131-132. Oxford, 1905. Isabella Bird Bishop, The Yangtze Valley and Beyond, Vol. II, 132-133, 146-147, 166, 174, 207-210. New York and London, 1900. S. Wells Williams, The Middle Kingdom, Vol. I, p. 43, New York, 1904. J. Naken, Die Provinz Kwangtung und ihre Bevölkerung, Petermanns Geographische Mittheilungen, Vol. 24, p. 421. 1878.

Archibald Little, The Far East, 131-132. Oxford, 1905. Isabella Bird Bishop, The Yangtze Valley and Beyond, Vol. II, 132-133, 146-147, 166, 174, 207-210. New York and London, 1900. S. Wells Williams, The Middle Kingdom, Vol. I, p. 43, New York, 1904. J. Naken, Die Provinz Kwangtung und ihre Bevölkerung, Petermanns Geographische Mittheilungen, Vol. 24, p. 421. 1878.

1403.

Archibald Little, The Far East, pp. 307-308. Oxford, 1905.

Archibald Little, The Far East, pp. 307-308. Oxford, 1905.

1404.

E.C. Semple, The Anglo-Saxons of the Kentucky Mountains, Geographical Journal, Vol. XVII, pp. 588-623. London, 1901.

E.C. Semple, The Anglo-Saxons of the Kentucky Mountains, Geographical Journal, Vol. XVII, pp. 588-623. London, 1901.

1405.

Sir Thomas Holdich, The Origin of the Kafir of the Hindu Kush, Geographical Journal, Vol. VII, p. 42. London, 1896.

Sir Thomas Holdich, The Origin of the Kafir of the Hindu Kush, Geographical Journal, Vol. VII, p. 42. London, 1896.

1406.

George Adam Smith, Historical Geography of the Holy Land, pp. 259-261. New York, 1897.

George Adam Smith, Historical Geography of the Holy Land, pp. 259-261. New York, 1897.

1407.

Isabella Bird Bishop, Korea and Her Neighbors, pp. 21, 134-135, 140, 142. New York, 1897.

Isabella Bird Bishop, Korea and Her Neighbors, pp. 21, 134-135, 140, 142. New York, 1897.

1408.

Article Waldenses, Encyclopædia Britannica.

Article on Waldenses, Encyclopædia Britannica.


Chapter XVII—The Influence Of Climate

Importance of climatic influences.

Climate enters fundamentally into all consideration of geographic influences, either by implication or explicitly. It is a factor in most physiological and psychological effects of environment. It underlies the whole significance of zonal location, continental and insular. Large territorial areas are favorable to improved variation in men and animals partly because they comprise a diversity of natural conditions, of which a wide range of climates forms one. This is also one advantage of a varied relief, especially in the Tropics, where all the zones may be compressed into a small area on the slopes of high mountains like the Andes and Kilimanjaro. Climate fixes the boundaries of human habitation in Arctic latitudes and high altitudes by drawing the dead-line to all organic life. It dominates life in steppes and torrid deserts as in sub-polar wastes. It encourages intimacy with the sea in tropical Malays and Polynesians, and like a slave-driver, scourges on the fur-clad Eskimo to reap the harvest of the deep. It is always present in that intricate balance of geographic factors which produces a given historical result, throwing its weight now into one side of the scales, now into the other. It underlies the production, distribution and exchange of commodities derived from the vegetable and animal kingdoms, influences methods of agriculture, and the efficiency of human labor in various industries.1409 Hence it is a potent factor in the beginning and in the evolution of civilization, so far as this goes hand in hand with economic development.

Climate plays a fundamental role in all discussions about geographic influences, either directly or indirectly. It affects most physical and psychological impacts of the environment. It is central to the importance of zonal locations, whether on continents or islands. Large land areas are beneficial for improving variation among humans and animals, partly because they include diverse natural conditions, with a wide range of climates being one aspect. This diversity is also an advantage of varied topography, especially in the Tropics, where all climatic zones can be found in a small area on the slopes of high mountains like the Andes and Kilimanjaro. Climate determines where humans can live in Arctic regions and at high elevations by setting a limit for all organic life. It influences existence in plains and hot deserts just as it does in sub-polar regions. It fosters a close relationship with the sea for tropical Malays and Polynesians, and like a taskmaster, drives the fur-covered Eskimo to gather food from the ocean. Climate is always a part of the complex mix of geographic factors that lead to specific historical outcomes, sometimes tipping the scales in one direction or the other. It is central to the production, distribution, and exchange of goods from plants and animals, affects farming methods, and impacts the productivity of human labor across various industries.1409 Therefore, it is a significant factor in the rise and development of civilization, as it goes hand in hand with economic progress.

Climate in the interplay of geographic factors.

The foregoing chapters have therefore been indirectly concerned with climate to no small degree, but they have endeavored to treat the subject analytically, showing climate as working with or against or in some combination with other geographic factors. This course was necessary, because climatic influences are so conspicuous and so important that by the older geographers like Montesquieu1410 and others, they have been erected into a blanket theory, and made to explain a wide range of social and historical phenomena which were properly the effect of other geographic factors.

The previous chapters have indirectly dealt with climate to a significant extent, but they aimed to analyze the topic by showing how climate interacts with, opposes, or combines with other geographic factors. This approach was essential because the effects of climate are so obvious and critical that older geographers like Montesquieu1410 and others turned them into a broad theory used to explain a wide array of social and historical phenomena that were actually influenced by other geographic factors.

Direct and indirect effects of climate.

For a clear understanding of climatic influences, it is necessary to adhere to the chief characteristics of the atmosphere, such as heat and cold, moisture and aridity, and to consider the effect of zonal location, winds and relief in the production and distribution of these; also to distinguish between direct and indirect results of climate, temporary and permanent, physiological and psychological ones, because the confusion of these various effects breeds far-fetched conclusions. The direct modification of man by climate is partly an a priori assumption, because the incontestable evidences of such modification are not very numerous, however strong the probability may be. The effect of climate upon plant and animal life is obvious, and immediately raises the assumption that man has been similarly influenced. But there is this difference: in contrast to the helpless dependence upon environment of stationary plants and animals, whose range of movement is strictly determined by conditions of food and temperature, the great mobility of man, combined with his inventiveness, enables him to flee or seek almost any climatic condition, and to emancipate himself from the full tyranny of climatic control by substituting an indirect economic effect for a direct physical effect.

To clearly understand how climate affects us, we need to focus on the main characteristics of the atmosphere, like heat and cold, moisture and dryness, and take into account how location, winds, and terrain impact these factors. It's also important to differentiate between the direct and indirect effects of climate—temporary and permanent, as well as physiological and psychological—because mixing these different outcomes leads to unrealistic conclusions. The direct impact of climate on humans is somewhat of an assumption, as there aren't many undeniable examples of such changes, no matter how likely they seem. The influence of climate on plants and animals is obvious and suggests that humans might have been affected similarly. However, there’s a key difference: unlike stationary plants and animals, which rely heavily on their environment for food and temperature, humans have great mobility and creativity, allowing them to escape or adapt to almost any climatic condition and lessen the direct impact of climate by creating indirect economic responses.

The direct results of climate are various, though some are open to the charge of imperfect proof. Even the relation of nigrescence to tropical heat, which seems to be established by the geographical distribution of negroid races in the Old World, fails to find support from the facts of pigmentation among the American Indians from Alaska to Tierra del Fuego. Nevertheless climate undoubtedly modifies many physiological processes in individuals and peoples,1411 affects their immunity from certain classes of diseases and their susceptibility to others, influences their temperament, their energy, their capacity for sustained or for merely intermittent effort, and therefore helps determine their efficiency as economic and political agents.

The direct effects of climate are varied, although some might be criticized for lack of solid evidence. Even the connection between skin darkening and tropical heat, which seems to be supported by the geographical distribution of Black races in the Old World, doesn't hold up when looking at the pigmentation of Native Americans from Alaska to Tierra del Fuego. Still, it's clear that climate significantly influences many physiological processes in individuals and communities,1411 affects their immunity to certain diseases and their vulnerability to others, shapes their temperament, energy levels, and ability to maintain consistent or sporadic effort, and ultimately helps determine their effectiveness as economic and political players.

While producing these direct effects, climate also influences man indirectly by controlling the wide range of his life conditions dependent upon the plant and animal life about him. It dictates what crops he may raise, and has it in its power to affect radically the size of his harvest. It decides which flocks and herds are best suited to his environment, and therefore directs his pastoral activities, whether he keeps reindeer, camels, llamas, horses or horned cattle. By interdicting both agriculture and stock-raising, as in Greenland whose ice cap leaves little surface free even for reindeer moss, it condemns the inhabitants forever to the uncertain subsistence of the hunter. Where it encourages the growth of large forests which harbor abundant game and yield abundant fruits, as in the hot, moist equatorial belt and on rainy mountain slopes, it prolongs the hunter stage of development, retards the advance to agriculture. Climate thus helps to influence the rate and the limit of cultural development. It determines in part the local supply of raw material with which man has to work, and hence the majority of his secondary activities, except where these are expended on mineral resources. It decides the character of his food, clothing, and dwelling, and ultimately of his civilization.

While creating these direct effects, climate also impacts people indirectly by shaping the various life conditions dependent on the plant and animal life around them. It determines what crops they can grow, and it has the power to significantly affect the size of their harvests. It decides which flocks and herds are best suited to the environment, guiding their pastoral activities, whether they raise reindeer, camels, llamas, horses, or cattle. By restricting both agriculture and livestock raising, as seen in Greenland where the ice cap leaves little land suitable even for reindeer moss, it forces the inhabitants to rely on the unpredictable subsistence of hunting. Where it promotes the growth of large forests that support abundant game and produce plenty of fruits, like in the warm, moist equatorial region and on rainy mountain slopes, it prolongs the hunting stage of development and slows the transition to agriculture. Therefore, climate plays a role in influencing the pace and limits of cultural development. It partly determines the local supply of raw materials available for people to work with, and consequently shapes many of their secondary activities, except when these focus on mineral resources. It influences the nature of their food, clothing, and housing, and ultimately, their civilization.

Effect of climate upon relief.

The very ground under man's feet, moreover, feels the molding hand of climate. In one region a former age of excessive cold has glaciated the surface and scoured off the fertile loam down to the underlying rock, or left the land coated with barren glacial drift or more productive clays. In another, the cold still persists and caps the land with ice and snow, or, as in the tundra, underlays it with a stratum of frozen earth, which keeps the surface wet and chilled even in the height of summer. In yet other regions, abundant moisture combined with heat covers the ground with a pad of fertile humus, while some hundred miles away drying trade winds parch and crack the steppe vegetation, convert most of its organic substance into gases, and leave only a small residue to enrich the soil. Rain itself modifies the relief of the land, and therefore often decides in a slow, cosmic way what shall be the ultimate destination of its precious store of water. A heavy precipitation on the windward side of a mountain range, by increasing the mechanical force of its drainage streams, makes them bite their way back into the heart of the system and decapitate the rivers on the leeward side, thus diminishing the volume of water left to irrigate the rainless slope. Thus the hydra-headed Amazon has been spreading and multiplying its sources among the Andean valleys, to the detriment of agriculture on the dry Pacific slope; thus the torrents of the Western Ghats, gorged by the monsoon rains from the Indian Ocean, are slowly nipping off the streams of the ill-watered Deccan, [See map page 484.] All these direct and indirect effects of climate may combine to produce ultimate politico-geographical results which manifest themselves in the expansion, power and permanence of states.

The ground beneath our feet is shaped by climate. In some areas, a past era of extreme cold has frozen the surface, erasing the fertile soil down to solid rock, or leaving behind barren glacial debris or more productive clay. In others, the cold still reigns, covering the land in ice and snow, or, like in the tundra, underlying it with a layer of frozen earth that keeps the surface damp and cool even in the height of summer. In yet other places, plenty of moisture and heat create a layer of rich humus, while just a hundred miles away, dry trade winds wither the steppe vegetation, turning most of its organic matter into gases and leaving behind a small amount to enrich the soil. Rain itself changes the land's shape and often determines, in a slow, cosmic way, where its valuable water will ultimately go. Heavy rain on the windward side of a mountain range increases the power of drainage streams, carving a path back into the mountain and diminishing the rivers on the leeward side, reducing the amount of water available to irrigate the rainless slopes. This is how the multi-branched Amazon has been extending and multiplying its sources among the Andean valleys, negatively affecting agriculture on the dry Pacific side; thus, the torrents of the Western Ghats, fed by monsoon rains from the Indian Ocean, are gradually cutting off streams in the poorly watered Deccan. [See map page 484.] All these direct and indirect effects of climate can combine to create significant political and geographical results that show up in the growth, power, and stability of states.

Climate limits the habitable area.

Climatic conditions limit the habitable area of the earth. This is their most important anthropo-geographic effect. At either pole lurks an invincible foe, with whom expanding humanity must always reckon, and who brooks little encroachment upon his territory. His weapon is the restriction of organic life, without which man cannot exist. The geographical boundaries of organic life, however, are wider than those of human life. The consequence of this climatic control, therefore, is not only a narrowed distribution of the human race, but a concentration which intensifies the struggle for existence, forces the utilization of all the available area, and thereby in every locality stimulates adaptation to environment.

Climatic conditions limit the livable areas of the earth. This is their most significant impact on human geography. At each pole lies an unstoppable enemy that humanity must always consider, and this enemy allows little intrusion into its domain. Its weapon is the limitation of organic life, which is essential for human survival. However, the geographical limits of organic life are broader than those of human life. As a result of this climatic control, not only is the distribution of the human population reduced, but it also becomes concentrated, heightening the struggle for survival, forcing the use of all available land, and ultimately encouraging adaptation to the environment in every location.

Adaptability of man to climatic extremes.

Man ranks among the most adaptable organic beings on the earth. No climate is absolutely intolerable to him. Only the absence of food supply or of all marketable commodities will exclude him from the most inhospitable region. His dwellings are found from sea level up to an altitude of 5000 meters or more, where the air pressure is little over one half that on the coast.1412 Seventeen per cent. of the towns and cities of Bolivia are located at an elevation above 13,000 feet (4000 meters), while Aullagas occupies a site 15,700 feet or nearly 5000 meters above the sea.1413 Mineral wealth explains these high Bolivian settlements, just as it draws the Mexican sulphur miners to temporary residence in the crater of Popocatepetl at an altitude of 17,787 feet (5420 meters), from their permanent dwellings a thousand meters below.1414 The laborers employed in the construction of the Oroya railroad in Peru became rapidly accustomed to work in the rarefied air at an elevation of 4000 to 4800 meters. The trade routes over the Andes and Himalayan ranges often cross passes at similar altitudes; the Karakorum road mounts to 18,548 feet (5,650 meters). Yet these great elevations do not prevent men going their way and doing the day's work, although the unacclimated tenderfoot is liable to attacks of mountain sickness in consequence of the rarefied air.1415

Humans are among the most adaptable living beings on Earth. No climate is completely unbearable for them. Only the lack of food or essential resources will drive them away from the harshest regions. People have settled at elevations ranging from sea level to over 16,400 feet (5000 meters), where the air pressure is just above half of what it is at sea level.1412 Seventeen percent of towns and cities in Bolivia are situated above 13,000 feet (4000 meters), while Aullagas is located at 15,700 feet, nearly 5000 meters above sea level.1413 The area's mineral wealth accounts for these high-altitude Bolivian settlements, just as it attracts Mexican sulfur miners to temporarily live in the crater of Popocatepetl at 17,787 feet (5420 meters), while their permanent homes lie a thousand meters below.1414 Workers on the Oroya railroad in Peru quickly got used to the rarefied air at elevations between 13,000 to 15,748 feet (4000 to 4800 meters). Trade routes across the Andes and Himalayas often cross similar high passes; the Karakorum road reaches 18,548 feet (5,650 meters). Yet, these high altitudes don't stop people from going about their daily tasks, although those who are not acclimated may suffer from altitude sickness due to the thin air.1415

Man makes himself at home in any zone. The cold pole of the earth, so far as recorded temperatures show, is the town of Verkhoyansk in northeastern Siberia, whose mean January temperature is 54 F. below zero (-48 Centigrade). Massawa, one of the hottest spots in the furnace of Africa is the capital of the Italian colony of Eritrea. However, extremes both of heat and cold reduce the density of population, the scale and efficiency of economic enterprises. The greatest events of universal history and especially the greatest historical developments belong to the North Temperate Zone. The decisive voyages of discovery emanated thence, though the needs of trade and the steady winds of low latitudes combined to carry them to the Tropics. The coldest lands of the earth are either uninhabited, like Spitzenbergen, or sparsely populated, like northern Siberia. The hottest regions, also, are far from being so densely populated as many temperate countries.1416 [See maps pages 8, 9, and 612.] The fact that they are for the most part dependencies or former colonial possessions of European powers indicates their retarded economic and political development. The contrast between the Mongol Tunguse, who lead the life of hunters and herders in Arctic Siberia, and the related Manchus, who conquered and rule the temperate lands of China, shows how climates help differentiate various branches of the same ethnic stock; and this contrast only parallels that between the Eskimo and Aztec offshoots of the American Indians, the Norwegian and Italian divisions of the white race.

Humans adapt to living anywhere. The coldest place on Earth, based on recorded temperatures, is Verkhoyansk in northeastern Siberia, where the average January temperature drops to -54°F (-48°C). Massawa, one of the hottest areas in Africa, is the capital of the Italian colony of Eritrea. However, both extreme heat and cold result in lower population density and affect the scale and efficiency of economic activities. Major events in global history, especially significant developments, are mostly linked to the North Temperate Zone. Important voyages of discovery originated from this region, even though trade needs and steady winds in low latitudes eventually led them to the Tropics. The coldest areas of the planet are either uninhabited, like Spitsbergen, or sparsely populated, like northern Siberia. Similarly, the hottest regions are not nearly as populated as many temperate countries.1416 [See maps pages 8, 9, and 612.] The fact that these areas are mostly underdeveloped dependencies or former colonies of European powers suggests a lag in their economic and political growth. The difference between the Mongol Tunguse, who live as hunters and herders in Arctic Siberia, and the related Manchus, who conquered and rule over the temperate regions of China, illustrates how climate influences the differentiation of various branches of the same ethnic group; this is similar to the contrast between the Eskimo and Aztec descendants of American Indians, as well as between the Norwegian and Italian groups of the white race.

Mean Annual Isotherms And Heat Belts [Centigrade 0°C = 32°F. 20°C = 68°F. 30°C = 86°F.]

Mean Annual Isotherms And Heat Belts [Centigrade 0°C = 32°F. 20°C = 68°F. 30°C = 86°F.]

Mean Annual Isotherms And Heat Belts
[Centigrade 0°C = 32°F. 20°C = 68°F. 30°C = 86°F.]

Mean Annual Isotherms And Heat Belts
[Celsius 0°C = 32°F. 20°C = 68°F. 30°C = 86°F.]

Temperature as modified by oceans and winds.

The zonal location of a country indicates roughly the degree of heat which it receives from the sun. It would do this accurately if variations of relief, prevailing winds and proximity of the oceans did not enter as disturbing factors. Since water heats and cools more slowly than the land, the ocean is a great reservoir of warmth in winter and of cold in summer, and exercises therefore an equalizing effect upon the temperature of the adjacent continents, far as these effects can be carried by the wind. The ocean is also the great source of moisture, and this, too, it distributes over the land through the agency of the wind. Where warm ocean currents, like the Gulf Stream and Kuro Siwa, penetrate into temperate or sub-polar latitudes, or where cool ones, like the Peruvian and Benguela Currents wash the coasts of tropical regions, they enhance the power of the ocean and wind to mitigate the extremes of temperature on land. The warm currents, moreover, loading the air above them with vapor, provide a store of rain to the nearest wind-swept land. Hence both the rainfall and temperature of a given country depend largely upon its neighboring water and air currents, and its accessibility to the rain-bearing winds. If it occupies a marked central position in temperate latitudes, like eastern Russia or the Great Plains of our semi-arid West, it receives limited moisture and suffers the extreme temperatures of a typical continental climate. The same result follows if it holds a distinctly peripheral location, and yet lies in the rain-shadow of a mountain barrier, like western Peru, Patagonia and Sweden north of the sixtieth parallel. [See map page 484.]

The geographical location of a country gives a rough idea of how much sunlight it gets. This would be precise if not for factors like terrain, prevailing winds, and closeness to oceans. Water heats up and cools down more slowly than land, making the ocean a big source of warmth in winter and coolness in summer, thus balancing the temperatures of nearby continents as much as the winds allow. The ocean is also a major source of moisture, which it spreads over land through the wind. When warm ocean currents, like the Gulf Stream and Kuro Siwo, flow into temperate or sub-polar areas, or when cool currents, like the Peruvian and Benguela Currents, wash the shores of tropical regions, they strengthen the ocean and wind's ability to moderate temperature extremes on land. Additionally, warm currents, which carry moisture in the air above them, provide rain to the closest wind-blown land. Therefore, both the rainfall and temperature in a specific country depend heavily on nearby water and air currents, as well as its exposure to rain-bringing winds. If it is situated in a central position in temperate areas, like eastern Russia or the Great Plains of our semi-arid West, it gets limited moisture and experiences the extreme temperatures typical of a continental climate. The same effect occurs if it is in a distinctly peripheral location but is in the rain-shadow of a mountain range, like western Peru, Patagonia, and Sweden north of the sixtieth parallel. [See map page 484.]

Effect of the westerlies.

Owing to the prevalence of westerly winds in the Temperate Zones and particularly in the North Temperate Zone, the mean annual temperature is high on the western face of the northern continents, but drops rapidly toward the east.1417 This is especially true of winter temperatures, which even near the eastern coast show the severity of a continental climate. Sitka and New York, Trondhjem and Peking have the same mean January temperatures, though Peking lies in about the latitude of Madrid, over twenty-three degrees farther south.

Due to the common occurrence of westerly winds in the Temperate Zones, especially in the North Temperate Zone, the average annual temperature is higher on the western side of the northern continents but decreases quickly toward the east.1417 This is particularly evident in winter temperatures, which even near the eastern coast reflect the harshness of a continental climate. Sitka and New York, Trondhjem and Beijing share the same average January temperatures, even though Beijing is roughly at the latitude of Madrid, more than twenty-three degrees further south.

Europe's location in the path of the North Atlantic westerlies, swept by winds from a small and narrow ocean which has been super-heated by the powerful Gulf Stream, secures for that continent a more equable climate and milder winters than corresponding latitudes on the western coasts of North America, whose winds from the wide Pacific are not so warm.1418 Moreover, a coastal rampart of mountains from Alaska to Mexico restricts the beneficial influences of the Pacific climate to a narrow seaboard, excludes them from the vast interior, which by reason of cold or aridity or both must forever renounce great economic or historical significance, unless its mineral resources developed unsuspected importance. In Europe, the absence of mountain barriers across the course of these westerly winds from Norway to central Spain, and the unobstructed avenue offered to them by the Mediterranean Sea during fall and winter, enable all the Atlantic's mitigating influences of warmth and moisture to penetrate inland, and temper the climate of Europe as far east as St. Petersburg and Constantinople. Thus several factors have combined to give the western half of Europe an extraordinarily favorable climate. They have therefore greatly broadened its zone of historical intensity toward the north, pushed it up to the sixtieth parallel, while the corresponding zone in eastern Asia finds its northern limit at the fortieth degree.

Europe's location along the path of the North Atlantic westerlies, influenced by winds from a small, narrow ocean that has been heated by the powerful Gulf Stream, gives the continent a more moderate climate and milder winters compared to similar latitudes on the western coasts of North America, where the winds from the vast Pacific aren't as warm.1418 In addition, a mountain range stretching from Alaska to Mexico limits the positive effects of the Pacific climate to a narrow coastal strip, leaving the vast interior, which is either too cold or too dry—or both—without significant economic or historical relevance, unless its mineral resources become surprisingly important. In Europe, the lack of mountain barriers along the path of these westerly winds from Norway to central Spain, combined with the open access provided by the Mediterranean Sea during fall and winter, allows all of the Atlantic's warming and moistening influences to move inland, moderating Europe's climate as far east as St. Petersburg and Constantinople. These various factors have come together to create an exceptionally favorable climate in the western part of Europe. This has significantly expanded its zone of historical significance northward, pushing it to the sixtieth parallel, while the comparable zone in eastern Asia reaches its northern limit at the fortieth degree.

Rainfall.

Moisture and warmth are essential to all that life upon which human existence depends. Hence temperature and rainfall are together the most important natural assets of a country, because of their influence upon its productivity. The grazing capacity and wheat yield of southern Australia increase almost regularly with every added inch of rainfall.1419 The map of population for the Empire of India clearly shows that a high degree of density accompanies a high and certain rainfall. Exceptions occur only where hilly or mountainous tracts offer scant arable areas, or where plains and valleys are sparsely populated owing to political troubles or unhealthiness. Nearly three-tenths of the population are found crowded together on the one-tenth of India's level territory which is blessed with a rainfall above the average for the country.1420 Deserts which yield nothing are purely climatic phenomena. Steppes which facilitate the historical movement, and forests which block it, are products of scant or ample precipitation. The zonal distribution of rainfall, with its maxima in the Tropics and the Temperate Zones, and its minima in the trade-wind belts and polar regions, reinforces and emphasizes the influence of temperature in determining certain great cultural and economic zones.

Moisture and warmth are crucial for all forms of life essential to human existence. Therefore, temperature and rainfall are the most significant natural resources of a country because they directly impact its productivity. The grazing capacity and wheat yield in southern Australia tend to increase with every additional inch of rainfall.1419 The population map of the Empire of India clearly illustrates that higher population density corresponds with consistent and ample rainfall. Exceptions occur mainly in hilly or mountainous regions with limited arable land or in plains and valleys that are sparsely populated due to political issues or health concerns. Nearly thirty percent of the population is concentrated on just ten percent of India's flat land, which enjoys above-average rainfall.1420 Deserts that produce nothing are strictly a result of climate. Steppes that enable historical migration and forests that obstruct it arise from either insufficient or abundant precipitation. The geographic distribution of rainfall, peaking in the Tropics and Temperate Zones while dwindling in the trade-wind belts and polar areas, further highlights the role of temperature in shaping major cultural and economic regions.

In equatorial regions, which have an abundant rainfall throughout the year, agriculture is directed toward fruits and roots; only in certain districts can it include cereals, and then only rice and maize. The temperate grains demand some dry summer weeks for their maturity. Excessive moisture in Ireland has practically excluded wheat-growing, which in England and Scotland also is restricted chiefly to the drier eastern counties.1421 It thrives, on the other hand, in Manitoba and the Red River region even with a short season of scant rainfall, because this comes in the spring when moisture is most needed.1422 Most important to man, therefore, is the question how and when the rainfall is distributed, and with what regularity it comes. Monsoon and trade-wind districts labor under the disadvantage of a wet and dry season, and a variability which brings tragic results, since it easily reduces a barely adequate rainfall to disastrous drought. These are the lands where wind and weather lord it over man. If the rains hold off too long, or stop too soon, or withhold even a small portion of their accustomed gift, famine stalks abroad.

In equatorial regions, where there’s plenty of rain year-round, agriculture focuses on fruits and root vegetables; only in some areas can it include grains, and that’s mainly rice and corn. Temperate grains need a few dry weeks in summer to ripen. In Ireland, too much moisture has nearly eliminated wheat farming, which in England and Scotland is mostly limited to the drier eastern counties.1421 Conversely, it flourishes in Manitoba and the Red River region, even with a short growing season and low rainfall, because the rain falls in spring when moisture is most crucial.1422 So, what really matters for people is how and when the rain is distributed, and how consistently it arrives. Regions affected by monsoons and trade winds face the downside of having wet and dry seasons, along with unpredictability that can lead to serious consequences, as it can easily turn a barely sufficient rainfall into a devastating drought. These are the areas where nature reigns supreme over humanity. If the rains are delayed, end too early, or fail to provide even a small part of their usual supply, famine becomes a threat.

Temperature and zonal location.

Temperature, the other important element of climate, depends primarily upon zonal location, which has far different historical results from central and peripheral location, continental and insular. It determines the amount of heat received from the sun, though air and ocean currents may redistribute that heat within certain limits, and humidity or aridity modify its effects. Still zonal distinctions remain. The great climatic regions of the earth, like the hot, wet equatorial belt or the warm, dry trade-wind belts or the cool, well-watered temperate zones, constitute, through the medium of their economic products and their climatically imposed methods of production, so many socio-political areas, regardless of ethnic and political boundaries. The Berber nomads of the northern Sahara live much as the Semitic Bedouins of the Syrian desert or the Turkoman stock of arid Turkestan. They have the same tribal government, the same scattered distribution in small groups, the same economic basis of subsistence, though of different races and dominated respectively by France, Turkey and Russia. The history of the tropical Antilles has in both its economic and political features paralleled that of the East Indies since the early 16th century. Temperate South America promises to follow in the historical footsteps of temperate North America, South Africa in those of Europe and temperate Australia.

Temperature, another key part of climate, mainly depends on its geographical location, which has led to very different historical outcomes for central and peripheral areas, as well as continental and island regions. It influences how much heat is received from the sun, although air and ocean currents can spread that heat around to some extent, and humidity or dryness can change its impact. However, geographical distinctions still exist. The major climate regions of the earth, like the hot, humid equatorial zone, the warm, dry trade-wind belts, and the cool, well-watered temperate areas, create various socio-political regions through their economic products and the production methods shaped by the climate, regardless of ethnic and political borders. The Berber nomads of the northern Sahara live similarly to the Semitic Bedouins of the Syrian desert or the Turkoman people of arid Turkestan. They share the same tribal governance, a scattered presence in small groups, and a common subsistence economy, despite being from different races and being governed by France, Turkey, and Russia, respectively. Since the early 16th century, the economic and political history of the tropical Antilles has mirrored that of the East Indies. Temperate South America is likely to follow the historical patterns of temperate North America, while South Africa aligns with Europe, and temperate Australia does the same.

Reactions of contrasted zones.

While people of the same latitude live approximately under the same temperature conditions, those of contrasted zones are subjected to markedly different influences. They develop different degrees of civilization, wealth, economic efficiency, and density of population; hence they give rise to great historical movements in the form of migration, conquest, colonization, and commerce, which, like convection currents, seek to equalize the differences and reach an equilibrium. Nature has fixed the mutual destiny of tropical and temperate zones, for instance, as complementary trade regions. The hot belt produces numerous things that can never grow in colder countries, while a much shorter list of products, coupled, however, with greater industrial efficiency, is restricted to the Temperate Zone. This explains the enormous importance of the East Indian trade for Europe in ancient and medieval times, the value of tropical possessions for commercial countries like England and Holland. It throws light upon the persistence of the tropical plantation system in the Dutch East Indies and republican Mexico, as formerly in the sugar and cotton fields of the Southern States, with its relentless grip upon the throat of national life in hot lands.

While people at the same latitude generally experience similar temperature conditions, those from different zones face significantly different influences. They develop varying levels of civilization, wealth, economic efficiency, and population density; this leads to major historical movements like migration, conquest, colonization, and trade, which act like convection currents trying to balance the differences and achieve equilibrium. Nature has determined the interconnected fate of tropical and temperate zones as complementary trade regions. The tropical zone produces many goods that can’t be grown in colder areas, while the temperate zone has a much shorter list of products, but with higher industrial efficiency. This explains the immense significance of East Indian trade for Europe in ancient and medieval times, and the value of tropical possessions for trade-driven nations like England and Holland. It also sheds light on the ongoing tropical plantation system in the Dutch East Indies and republican Mexico, similar to what was seen in the sugar and cotton fields of the Southern States, with its unyielding grip on the lives of people in warmer regions.

Temperate products from tropical highlands.

Tropical regions, however, may profit by the fact that their mountains and plateaus permit the cultivation of temperate crops. India during the last century has introduced tea culture extensively on the Assam and Nilgiri Hills, and in the Himalayan valleys up to an altitude of 7000 feet.1423 Besides this temperate product, it has put large areas into cotton, chiefly in the peninsular plateau of the Deccan, and by means of these two crops has caused a considerable readjustment in world commerce.1424 Nevertheless, here the infringement of the principle of tropical production in the torrid zone is after all slight. In tropical America, on the other hand, the case is quite different; this region presents an interesting paradox in relation to its foreign commerce. Here the highlands are the chief seats of population. They contain, moreover, the most industrious and intelligent native stock, due to geographical and historical causes running back into the ancient civilizations, as well as the largest proportions of immigrant Europeans. This is true not only of the Cordilleran states from northern Mexico to the borders of Chile, but also of Brazil, whose center of population falls on the plateau behind Rio de Janeiro and Santos. The isolation of these high plateaus excludes them to a serious extent from foreign trade, while their great altitude permits only temperate products, with the exception of sub-tropical coffee, which is their only crop meeting a great demand. The world wants, on the other hand, the long list of lowland tropical exports which torrid America furnishes as yet in inadequate amounts, owing to the lack of an industrious and abundant lowland population. Commerce will eventually experience a readjustment in these localities to the natural basis of tropical production; but how soon or how effectively this change will take place depends upon the question of immigration of foreign tropical peoples, or the more difficult problem of white acclimatization.1425

Tropical regions, however, may benefit from the fact that their mountains and plateaus allow for the cultivation of temperate crops. Over the last century, India has widely introduced tea cultivation in the Assam and Nilgiri Hills, as well as in the Himalayan valleys up to an altitude of 7,000 feet.1423 In addition to this temperate product, large areas have been dedicated to cotton, mainly in the Deccan plateau, and these two crops have significantly shifted global trade.1424 Nonetheless, the breach of the principle of tropical production in the torrid zone remains relatively minor. In tropical America, on the other hand, the situation is quite different; this region presents an intriguing paradox concerning its foreign commerce. Here, the highlands are the primary centers of population. They also host the most industrious and educated native populations, due to geographical and historical factors stemming from ancient civilizations, as well as the largest numbers of immigrant Europeans. This is true not only for the Cordilleran states from northern Mexico to the borders of Chile, but also for Brazil, where the population center is located on the plateau behind Rio de Janeiro and Santos. The isolation of these high plateaus limits their foreign trade, while their high elevation permits only temperate products, except for subtropical coffee, which is their only crop that meets significant demand. Conversely, the world is looking for a long list of lowland tropical exports that torrid America still doesn't provide in sufficient quantities, due to the lack of a hardworking and plentiful lowland population. Trade will eventually adjust in these areas to align with the natural foundation of tropical production; however, how soon and how effectively this change occurs depends on immigration from foreign tropical peoples or the more complex issue of the acclimatization of white populations.1425

Isothermal lines in anthropo-geography.

Despite some purely climatological objections, anthropo-geography finds the division of climatic zones according to certain isothermal lines of mean annual temperature the most expedient one for its purpose. The hot zone may be taken as the belt north and south of the equator enclosed between the annual isotherms of 20° C. (68° F.) These hold a course generally far outside the two tropics, and in the northern continents frequently reach the thirty-fifth parallel. The temperate climatic zones extend from the annual isotherm of 20° C. to that of 0° C. (32° F.), which bears little relation to the polar circles forming the limits of the solar Temperate Zone. The north temperate climatic zone has been further sub-divided along the annual isotherm of 5° C. (41° F.), distinguishing thus the warmer southern belt, which forms preëminently the zone of greatest historical intensity. The areas beyond the annual isotherms of 0°C. belong to the barren cold zones. [See map page 612.]

Despite some purely climatological objections, anthropogeography finds that dividing climatic zones based on certain isothermal lines of mean annual temperature is the most useful for its purpose. The hot zone can be defined as the area north and south of the equator, located between the annual isotherms of 20° C. (68° F.). These typically run well outside the two tropics and often reach the thirty-fifth parallel in the northern continents. The temperate climatic zones extend from the annual isotherm of 20° C. to that of 0° C. (32° F.), which has little connection to the polar circles that mark the boundaries of the solar Temperate Zone. The north temperate climatic zone has been further divided along the annual isotherm of 5° C. (41° F.), distinguishing the warmer southern belt, which predominantly represents the zone of greatest historical intensity. Areas beyond the annual isotherms of 0°C. belong to the barren cold zones. [See map page 612.]

Historical effect of compressed isotherms.

This isothermal division of the climatic zones is abundantly justified, because the duration of a given degree of heat or cold in any region is a dominant factor in its human, animal, and plant life. A map of the mean annual isotherms of the earth is therefore eloquent of the relation between historical development and this one phase of climate. Where the lines run far apart, they enclose extensive areas of similar temperature; and where they approach, they group together regions of contrasted temperatures. The compression of climatic differences into a small area enlivens and accentuates the process of historical development. It produces the same sort of effect as the proximity of contrasted reliefs. Nowhere else in the world do the tropical and frigid climatic areas, as defined on the north and south by the annual isothermal lines of 20°C. and 0°C. respectively, lie so near together as in Labrador and northern Florida. Separated here by only twenty degrees of latitude, on the opposite side of the Atlantic they diverge so sharply as to include the whole western face of Europe, from Hammerfest and the North Cape down to the Canary Islands and the crest of the Atlas Mountains in Africa, a stretch of forty-two degrees of latitude. This approximation of contrasted climatic districts in North America was an immense force in stimulating the early economic development of the Thirteen Colonies, and in maturing them to the point of political autonomy. It gave New England commerce command of a nearby tropical trade in the West Indies, of sub-tropical products in the southern colonies, in close proximity to all the contrasted products of a cold climate—dense northern forests for naval stores and lumber, and an inexhaustible supply of fish from polar currents, which met a strong demand in Europe and the Antilles. The sudden southward drop of the 0°C. annual isothermal line toward the St. Lawrence and the Great Lakes brought the northwestern fur trade to the back gate of New York, where it opened on the Mohawk and upper Hudson, and brought prosperity to the young colony. Even to-day the center of collection for the Canadian fur fields is Quebec, located at 47° north latitude, while the corresponding point of concentration in Europe for the furs of Russia and Siberia is Nizhni-Novgorod, which lies ten degrees farther north.1426

This isothermal division of climatic zones is well justified because the length of time a specific temperature persists in any region significantly influences its human, animal, and plant life. A map showing the average annual isotherms of the Earth clearly illustrates the connection between historical development and this aspect of climate. Where the lines are spaced far apart, they cover large areas with similar temperatures, and where they are close together, they cluster regions with contrasting temperatures. The condensation of climatic differences into a small area enhances and highlights the process of historical development, creating a similar effect to the proximity of varying landforms. Nowhere else in the world do the tropical and frigid climatic zones, defined by the annual isothermal lines of 20°C and 0°C respectively, come as close together as in Labrador and northern Florida. Here, they are separated by just twenty degrees of latitude, while on the other side of the Atlantic, they diverge sharply, extending across the entire western coast of Europe, from Hammerfest and the North Cape down to the Canary Islands and the Atlas Mountains in Africa, a distance of forty-two degrees of latitude. This closeness of contrasting climatic regions in North America played a huge role in boosting the early economic development of the Thirteen Colonies and preparing them for political independence. It allowed New England's commerce to access nearby tropical trade in the West Indies and subtropical products in the southern colonies, while also being close to the diverse products of a colder climate—dense northern forests for shipbuilding materials and lumber, and an abundant supply of fish from polar currents, which were in high demand in Europe and the Caribbean. The sharp drop of the 0°C annual isothermal line toward the St. Lawrence and the Great Lakes brought the northwestern fur trade right to the doorstep of New York, opening up access via the Mohawk and upper Hudson rivers, and bringing prosperity to the young colony. Even today, the center for collecting furs from Canada is Quebec, located at 47° north latitude, while the corresponding collection point in Europe for furs from Russia and Siberia is Nizhni-Novgorod, which is ten degrees farther north.1426

Effect of slight climatic differences.

This compression of the isotherms emphasizes the differences of national characters produced in part by dissimilar climatic conditions. Contrasts in temperament, manner of life, and point of view, like that between the New Englander and Virginian, Chilean and Bolivian in the Americas, Breton and Provençal in France, Castilian and Andalusian in Spain, Gurkha and Bengali in India, seem to bleach out when they are located far apart, owing to many grades of transition between; but they become striking, stimulating, productive of important economic and political results, when close juxtaposition enables them to react sharply one upon the other. In effecting these nice differentiations of local types, climate is nearly always one of the factors at work, emphasizing perhaps an existing ethnic difference. Even the slight variations of temperature to be found in the same zone or the same climatic region produce distinct results, especially where they are harnessed, as is usually the case, with some other geographic condition of relief, area or soil, pulling in the same direction. Mexico, Peru, Italy, Switzerland, Greece and Asia Minor, with its high plateau interior and its contrasted Euxine and Aegean coasts, represent each a complex of climatic differences, which, reinforced by other geographic factors, have made in these regions a polychrome picture of national life.

This compression of the isotherms highlights the differences in national characteristics caused partly by varying climate conditions. Differences in temperament, lifestyle, and perspectives—like those between New Englanders and Virginians, Chileans and Bolivians in the Americas, Bretons and Provencals in France, Castilians and Andalusians in Spain, Gurkhas and Bengalis in India—seem to fade when they are far apart due to the many shades of transition in between. However, they become striking and influential, leading to significant economic and political outcomes, when they are close enough to interact directly with one another. In making these subtle distinctions in local types, climate is almost always a contributing factor, often highlighting existing ethnic differences. Even minor temperature variations within the same zone or climatic region can lead to distinct outcomes, especially when combined—as is usually the case—with other geographical factors like relief, area, or soil that align in the same direction. Mexico, Peru, Italy, Switzerland, Greece, and Asia Minor, with its high interior plateau and contrasting Euxine and Aegean coastlines, each represent a complex mix of climatic differences, which, supported by other geographical elements, have created a vibrant tapestry of national life in these regions.

Effect of climate upon distribution of immigration

Climatic contrasts aid differentiation also by influencing both natural and artificial selection in the distribution of peoples. This effect is conspicuous in the distribution of immigrants in all colonial lands like Africa, South America and in every part of the United States.1427 The warm, moist air of the Gulf and South Atlantic States is attracting back to the congenial habitat of the "black belt" the negroes of the North, where, moreover, their numbers are being further depleted by a harsh climate, which finds in them a large proportion of the unfit. The presence of a big negro laboring class in the South, itself primarily a result of climate, has long served to exclude foreign immigration, which sought therefore the unoccupied lands and the congenial climate of the more bracing North. Hence it is both a direct and indirect effect of climate that the North shows a large proportion of aliens, and the white population of the South an almost unadulterated English stock.

Climatic differences also help distinguish groups by affecting both natural and artificial selection in the distribution of populations. This effect is evident in the locations of immigrants in all colonial areas like Africa, South America, and throughout the United States.1427 The warm, humid air of the Gulf and South Atlantic States is drawing back to the favorable environment of the "black belt" the African Americans from the North, where their numbers are also decreasing due to a harsh climate, which impacts many of them negatively. The existence of a large African American working class in the South, largely due to climate, has long prevented foreign immigration, which instead sought the unoccupied lands and more pleasant climate of the cooler North. Therefore, both directly and indirectly, climate leads to a higher proportion of immigrants in the North, while the white population in the South remains predominantly of English descent.

Climate and race temperament.

The influence of climate upon race temperament, both as a direct and indirect effect, can not be doubted, despite an occasional exception, like the cheery, genial Eskimos, who seem to carry in their sunny natures an antidote to the cold and poverty of their environment. In general a close correspondence obtains between climate and temperament. The northern peoples of Europe are energetic, provident, serious, thoughtful rather than emotional, cautious rather than impulsive. The southerners of the sub-tropical Mediterranean basin are easy-going, improvident except under pressing necessity, gay, emotional, imaginative, all qualities which among the negroes of the equatorial belt degenerate into grave racial faults. If, as many ethnologists maintain, the blond Teutons of the north are a bleached out branch of the brunette Mediterranean race, this contrast in temperament is due to climate. A comparison of northern and southern peoples of the same race and within the same Temperate Zone reveals numerous small differences of nature and character, which can be traced back directly or indirectly to climatic differences, and which mount up to a considerable sum total. The man of the colder habitat is more domestic, stays more in his home. Though he is not necessarily more moderate or continent than the southerner, he has to pay more for his indulgences, so he is economical in expenditures. With the southerner it is "easy come, easy go." He therefore suffers more frequently in a crisis. The low cost of living keeps down his wages, so that as a laborer he is poorly paid. This fact, together with his improvidence, tends to swell the proletariat in warm countries of the Temperate Zone; and though here it does not produce the distressing impression of a proletariat in Dublin or Liverpool or Boston, it is always degrading. It levels society and economic status downward, while in the cooler countries of the Temperate Zone, the process is upward. The laborer of the north, owing to his providence and larger profits, which render small economies possible, is constantly recruited into the class of the capitalist.

The impact of climate on racial temperament, both directly and indirectly, is undeniable, despite some exceptions like the cheerful, friendly Eskimos, who appear to have a natural resilience against the cold and hardship of their surroundings. Generally, there is a strong link between climate and temperament. The northern peoples of Europe tend to be energetic, practical, serious, and more reflective than emotional, and cautious rather than impulsive. In contrast, the southerners of the sub-tropical Mediterranean region are laid-back, often careless unless under pressure, and display qualities that are cheerful, emotional, and imaginative—traits that, among the Black populations in the equatorial zone, can turn into significant racial shortcomings. If, as many anthropologists suggest, the fair-haired Teutons of the north are a lighter-skinned offshoot of the darker Mediterranean race, this difference in temperament can be attributed to climate. A comparison between northern and southern peoples of the same race and within the same Temperate Zone shows various slight differences in nature and character, all of which can be traced back to climatic variations, adding up to a notable impact overall. People in colder climates tend to be more focused on home life and stay indoors more often. Although they're not necessarily more restrained or disciplined than southerners, they have to spend more for their pleasures, which makes them more budget-conscious. For southerners, money comes and goes easily. As a result, they struggle more during tough times. The low cost of living results in lower wages, meaning that as workers, they are often underpaid. This reality, coupled with their lack of foresight, leads to a growing working class in warm regions of the Temperate Zone; while this doesn't create the same distressing situation as the working class in Dublin or Liverpool or Boston, it remains degrading. It pushes society and economic standing downward, whereas in cooler countries of the Temperate Zone, the trend is upward. Northern laborers, due to their prudence and higher earnings that allow for small savings, are consistently moving into the capitalist class.

Contrasted temperaments in the same nation.

Everywhere a cold climate puts a steadying hand on the human heart and brain. It gives an autumn tinge to life. Among the folk of warmer lands eternal spring holds sway. National life and temperament have the buoyancy and thoughtlessness of childhood, its charm and its weakness. These distinctions and contrasts meet us everywhere. The southern Chinese, and especially the Cantonese, is more irresponsible and hot-blooded than the Celestial of the north, though the bitter struggle for existence in the over-crowded Kwangtung province has made him quite as industrious; but on his holidays he takes his pleasure in singing, gambling, and various forms of dissipation. The southern Russian is described as more light-hearted than his kinsman of the bleaker north, though both are touched with the melancholy of the Slav. In this case, however, the question immediately arises, how far the dweller of the southern wheat lands owes his happy disposition to the easy conditions of life in the fertile Ukraine, as opposed to the fiercer struggle for subsistence in the glaciated lake and forest belt of the north. Similar distinctions of climate and national temperament exist in the two sections of Germany. The contrast between the energetic, enterprising, self-contained Saxon of the Baltic lowland and the genial, spontaneous Bavarian or Swabian is conspicuous, though the only geographical advantage possessed by the latter is a warmer temperature attended by a sunnier sky. He contains in his blood a considerable infusion of the Alpine stock and is therefore racially differentiated from the northern Teuton,1428 but this hardly accounts for the difference of temperament, because the same Alpine stock is plodding, earnest and rather stolid on the northern slope of the Alps, but in the warm air and sunshine of the southern slope, it abates these qualities and conforms more nearly to the Italian type of character. The North Italian, however, presents a striking contrast to the indolent, irresponsible, improvident citizens of Naples, Calabria and Sicily, who belong to the contrasted Mediterranean race, and have been longer subjected to the relaxing effects of sub-tropical heat.

Everywhere, a cold climate steadies the human heart and mind. It adds an autumn vibe to life. People in warmer regions experience an endless spring. Their national life and temperament reflect the naivety and charm of childhood, along with its weaknesses. These differences and contrasts are noticeable everywhere. The southern Chinese, especially the Cantonese, are generally more carefree and passionate than the northern Chinese, though the tough competition for survival in the crowded Kwangtung province has made them just as hardworking; however, during their holidays, they enjoy singing, gambling, and various forms of entertainment. The southern Russians are said to be more light-hearted than their counterparts in the harsher north, although both carry a hint of Slav melancholy. Here, the question arises about how much the happiness of the southern wheat farmers comes from the easier living conditions in the fertile Ukraine compared to the tougher fight for survival in the icy lakes and forests of the north. Similar distinctions of climate and national temperament can be seen in two regions of Germany. The contrast between the energetic, enterprising, self-sufficient Saxon from the Baltic lowlands and the warm, spontaneous Bavarian or Swabian is striking. The only geographical advantage the latter has is a warmer climate with sunnier skies. The Bavarian has a significant mix of Alpine ancestry, which differentiates him racially from the northern Teuton,1428 but this doesn’t fully explain their difference in temperament. The same Alpine stock exhibits a diligent, earnest, and somewhat stoic nature on the northern slope of the Alps, while on the southern slope, in warm air and sunshine, these traits soften and align more closely with the Italian character. However, the North Italians sharply contrast with the lazy, carefree, and unprepared citizens of Naples, Calabria, and Sicily, who belong to a different Mediterranean race and have long been under the calming effects of subtropical heat.

Complexity of the geographic problem.

Where the climatic difference is small, it is nevertheless often conspicuous enough to eclipse other concomitant factors which are at work, and hence to encourage the formation of some easy blanket theory of climatic influences. But just because the difference is slight, all attending geographic and ethnic circumstances ought to be scrutinized, to insure a correct statement of the geographical equation. The contrast between the light-hearted, gracious peasants of warm, sunny Andalusia and the reserved, almost morose inhabitants of cool and cloudy Asturias is the effect not only of climate but of the easy life in a fertile river plain, opposed to the bitter struggle for existence in the rough Cantabrian Mountains. Moreover, a strong infusion of Alpine blood has given this group of Spanish mountaineers the patience and seriousness which characterizes the race in other parts of continental Europe.1429 The conditions which have differentiated Scotch from English have been climate, relief, location, geologic composition of the soil, and ethnic composition of the two peoples. The divergent development of Northerners and Southerners in America arose from contrasts in climate, soil and area. It was not only the enervating heat and moisture of the Southern States, but also the large extent of their fertile area which necessitated slave labor, introduced the plantation system, and resulted in the whole aristocratic organization of society in the South.1430

Where the climatic difference is small, it is still often noticeable enough to overshadow other factors at play, leading to the creation of simplistic theories about climate's effects. However, just because the difference is minor, all related geographic and ethnic circumstances should be examined to ensure an accurate understanding of the geographical equation. The difference between the cheerful, friendly farmers of warm, sunny Andalusia and the reserved, almost gloomy residents of cool, cloudy Asturias is influenced not just by climate but also by the easier lifestyle in a fertile river valley, contrasted with the harsh struggle for survival in the rugged Cantabrian Mountains. Additionally, a significant mix of Alpine heritage has given this group of Spanish mountain dwellers the patience and seriousness that is characteristic of people in other parts of continental Europe.1429 The factors that have set Scotch apart from English include climate, terrain, location, soil composition, and the ethnic makeup of the two groups. The different developments of Northerners and Southerners in America stem from contrasts in climate, soil, and geography. It was not just the exhausting heat and humidity of the Southern States, but also the vast expanses of their fertile land that required slave labor, introduced the plantation system, and led to the entire aristocratic structure of Southern society.1430

Monotonous climatic conditions.

When one type of climate extends monotonously over a vast area, as in Russia. Siberia, Central Asia or immense tracts of Africa, the differences of temperature which prick and stimulate national endeavor in small climatic districts here lose much of their force. Their effects flatten out into insignificance, overwhelmed by the encounter with too large a territory. All the southern continents are handicapped by the monotony of their zonal location. The map of annual isotherms shows Africa quite enclosed between the two torrid lines of 20° Centigrade, except for a narrow sub-tropical belt along the Barbary coast in the north, and in the south an equally narrow littoral extending east and north from the Cape of Good Hope. At first glance, the large area of South Africa lying on the temperate side of the Tropic of Capricorn raises hopes for a rich economic, social and cultural development here; but these are dashed by an examination of the isotherms. Excessive heat lays its retarding touch upon everything, while a prevailing aridity (rainfall less than 10 inches or 25 centimeters), except on the narrow windward slope of the eastern mountains, gives the last touch of climatic monotony. The coastal belt of Cape Colony and Natal raise tropical and sub-tropical products1431 like all the rest of the continent, while the semi-arid interior is committed with little variations to pastoral life. [See maps pages 484 and 487.] Climatic monotony, operating alone, would have condemned South Africa to poverty of development, and will unquestionably always avail to impoverish its national life. South African history has been made by its mines and by its location on the original water route to India; the first have dominated its economic development, and the latter has largely determined its ethnic elements—English, Dutch, and French Huguenots, while the magnet of the mines has drawn other nationalities and especially a large Jewish contingent into the urban centers of the Rand.1432 In the background is the native Kaffir and Hottentot stocks, whose blood filters into the lower classes of the white population. The diversity of these ethnic elements may compensate in part for the monotony of climatic conditions, which promise to check differentiation. However, climatic control is here peculiarly despotic. We see how it has converted the urban merchants of Holland and the skillful Huguenot artisan of France into the crude pastoral Boer of the Transvaal.

When one type of climate stretches uniformly over a large area, like in Russia, Siberia, Central Asia, or vast regions of Africa, the differences in temperature that usually inspire national ambitions in smaller climatic areas lose much of their impact. Their effects diminish into insignificance when faced with such a large territory. All southern continents struggle with the monotony of their climatic zones. The map of annual temperature lines shows Africa is largely enclosed between the two hot zones of 20° Celsius, except for a narrow subtropical strip along the Barbary coast in the north and a similarly narrow coastal area extending east and north from the Cape of Good Hope in the south. Initially, the substantial area of South Africa lying on the temperate side of the Tropic of Capricorn raises hopes for rich economic, social, and cultural growth; however, these hopes are dashed upon closer inspection of the temperature lines. Intense heat hampers everything, while a prevailing dryness (with rainfall less than 10 inches or 25 centimeters), except on the narrow windward slopes of the eastern mountains, adds to the climatic uniformity. The coastal areas of Cape Colony and Natal produce tropical and subtropical goods like the rest of the continent, while the semi-arid interior is largely committed to pastoral life with little variation. [See maps pages 484 and 487.] Climatic uniformity alone would have sentenced South Africa to a lack of development, and it will undoubtedly continue to impoverish its national life. South African history has been shaped by its mines and its position on the original water route to India; the mines have dominated its economic development, while its location has significantly influenced its ethnic composition—English, Dutch, and French Huguenots—while the allure of the mines has attracted other nationalities, particularly a large Jewish population into the urban centers of the Rand.1432 In the background, there are the native Kaffir and Hottentot groups, whose lineage is present in the lower classes of the white population. The diversity of these ethnic groups may partly offset the monotony of the climate, which threatens to stifle differentiation. However, climatic control here is particularly oppressive. We can see how it has transformed the urban merchants of Holland and the skilled Huguenot artisans from France into the simple pastoral Boers of the Transvaal.

In contrast to South Africa, temperate South America has an immense advantage in its large area lying outside the 20°C. isotherm, and in the wide range of mean temperatures (from 20°C. to 5°C.) found between the Tropic of Capricorn and Tierra del Fuego. Climate and relief have combined to make the mouth of the La Plata River the site of the largest city of the southern hemisphere. Buenos Ayres, with a population of over a million, reflects its large temperate hinterland.

In contrast to South Africa, temperate South America has a significant advantage due to its vast area lying outside the 20°C isotherm and the wide range of average temperatures (from 20°C to 5°C) found between the Tropic of Capricorn and Tierra del Fuego. The combination of climate and geography has made the mouth of the La Plata River the location of the largest city in the southern hemisphere. Buenos Aires, with a population of over a million, reflects its extensive temperate surrounding areas.

The effects of Artic cold.

Frigid zones and the Tropics alike suffer from monotony, of Arctic the one of cold and the other of heat. The Arctic climatic belt, extending from the isotherm of 0°C. (32°F.) to the pole, includes inhabited districts where the mean annual temperature is less than -15°C. (or 5°F.), as at the Greenland village of Etah on Smith's Sound and the Siberian town of Verkhoyansk. Here the ground is covered with, ice or snow most of the year, and permanently frozen below the surface. Animal and plant life are reduced to a minimum on the land, so that man, with every poleward advance of his thin-strung settlements, is forced more and more to rely on the sea for his food. Hence he places his villages on narrow strips of coast, as do the Norse of Finmarken, the Eskimo and the Tunguse inhabiting the Arctic rim of Asia. Products of marine animals make the basis of his domestic economy. Farther inland, which means farther south, all tribes live by hunting and fishing. The Eurasian Hyperboreans find additional subsistence in their reindeer herds, which they pasture on the starchy lichen (Cladonia rangiferina) of the tundra. [See maps pages 103, 153.]

Frigid zones and the Tropics both experience monotony, with the Arctic characterized by cold and the Tropics by heat. The Arctic climate zone, ranging from the 0°C (32°F) isotherm to the North Pole, includes areas where the average yearly temperature is below -15°C (5°F), like the village of Etah in Greenland and the town of Verkhoyansk in Siberia. Here, the ground is covered in ice or snow for most of the year, and the soil is permanently frozen beneath the surface. Animal and plant life is minimal on land, forcing people, as they move their sparse settlements farther north, to rely increasingly on the sea for food. Therefore, they establish their villages along narrow coastal strips, similar to the Norse in Finmarken, the Eskimos, and the Tungus people inhabiting the Arctic edges of Asia. Marine animals form the foundation of their domestic economy. Further inland, which means further south, all tribes depend on hunting and fishing. The Eurasian Hyperboreans also find sustenance in their reindeer herds, which graze on the starchy lichen (Cladonia rangiferina) of the tundra. [See maps pages 103, 153.]

Similarity of cultural development.

Though these Arctic folk are sprung from diverse race stocks, close vicinal location around an enclosed sea has produced some degree of blood relationship. But whatever their origins, the harsh conditions of their life have imposed upon them all a similar civilization. All population is sparse and more or less nomadic, since agriculture alone roots settlement. They have the same food, the same clothing, the same types of summer and winter dwellings, whether it is the earth hut of the Eskimo or of the coast Lapp, the Siberian Yukagirs of the Kolima River, or the Samoyedes of northeastern Russia.1433 The spur of necessity has aroused their ingenuity to a degree found nowhere in the drowsy Tropics of Africa. Dread of cold led the Yakuts of the Lena Valley to glaze the windows of their huts with slabs of ice, which are better nonconductors of heat and cold, and can be made more perfectly air-tight than glass. Hence these windows have been adopted by Russian colonists. The Eskimo devised the oil lamp, an invention found nowhere else in primitive America, and fishing tackle so perfect that white men coming to fish in Arctic waters found it superior to their own.

Though these Arctic people come from various ethnic backgrounds, their close proximity around an enclosed sea has created some degree of shared ancestry. Regardless of their origins, the harsh conditions of their lives have led them all to develop a similar way of life. The population is sparse and mostly nomadic, as agriculture is the only thing that allows for permanent settlement. They share the same food, clothing, and types of homes for summer and winter, whether it's the earth hut of the Eskimo, the coastal Lapp, the Siberian Yukagirs of the Kolima River, or the Samoyedes of northeastern Russia.1433 The necessity of survival has sparked their creativity in ways that are not seen in the quiet tropics of Africa. The Yakuts of the Lena Valley, fearing the cold, have glazed their hut windows with slabs of ice, which are better insulators than glass and can be made more airtight. As a result, Russian colonists have adopted these windows. The Eskimo invented the oil lamp, a creation not found anywhere else in primitive America, along with fishing gear so advanced that white fishermen coming to Arctic waters discovered it to be superior to their own.

Owing to the inexorable restriction of their natural resources, contact with European commerce has impoverished the Hyperborean natives. It has caused the rapid and ruthless exploitation of their meager resources, which means eventual starvation. So long as the Ostyaks, before the coming of the Russians, were sole masters of the vast forests of the Obi Valley, they commanded a supply of fish and fur animals which sufficed for their sparse population. But the greed of the Russian fish dealers and fur traders, and the devastating work of the lumbermen have made double war upon Ostyak sources of subsistence.1434 The appearance of the white man in Alaskan waters was the signal for the indiscriminate killing of seal and other marine animals, till the Eskimo's supply of food and furs has been seriously invaded, from Greenland to the outermost Aleutian Islands. In all this wide territory, climatic conditions forbid any substitute for the original products, except the domesticated reindeer on the tundra of the mainland; but this would necessitate the transformation of the Eskimo from a hunting to a pastoral people. This task the government at Washington has undertaken, but with scant success.

Due to the relentless depletion of their natural resources, interaction with European trade has left the Hyperborean natives in poverty. It has led to the swift and harsh exploitation of their limited resources, ultimately resulting in starvation. Before the Russians arrived, the Ostyaks were the sole rulers of the vast forests of the Obi Valley, allowing them to sustain a supply of fish and furs that was enough for their small population. However, the greed of Russian fish dealers and fur traders, along with the destructive activities of lumbermen, has waged a double war on the Ostyak's means of survival.1434 The arrival of Europeans in Alaskan waters sparked the indiscriminate hunting of seals and other marine animals, seriously depleting the Eskimo's food and fur supplies from Greenland to the farthest Aleutian Islands. Throughout this vast area, the climate prohibits any alternatives to the original products, except for domesticated reindeer on the mainland tundra; but this would require changing the Eskimo way of life from a hunting society to a pastoral one. This is a task the government in Washington has taken on, but it has seen very little success.

Cold and health

In contrast to the numerous indirect effects of a frigid climate, no direct physiological effect can be positively ascribed to intense cold. It lays no bodily handicap on health and energy, as does the excessive heat of the Tropics. The coldest regions where tillage is possible are tolerable places of residence, because their winters are intensely dry. That of central Siberia, which is drier than the driest desert, makes tent life comfortable in the coldest season, provided the tenter be clad in furs. The low temperatures of the Canadian Northwest for the same reason have not repelled settlers even from the Southern States. Negroes, however, meet a climatic barrier in America at the isotherm of 5° Centigrade (41° F.). They are found in New England and Nova Scotia, generally with a large admixture of white blood; but there and farther north where the climate is moist as well as cold, they show a fatal tendency to pulmonary diseases.

In contrast to the many indirect effects of a cold climate, there are no direct physiological impacts that can be clearly linked to severe cold. It doesn't impose any physical limitations on health and energy like the extreme heat of the Tropics does. The coldest areas suitable for farming are actually livable, mainly because their winters are very dry. Central Siberia, which is drier than the driest desert, makes tent living comfortable in the coldest months, as long as the person is dressed in furs. Similarly, the low temperatures of the Canadian Northwest haven't deterred settlers, even those from the Southern States. However, Black people encounter a climatic limit in America at the isotherm of 5° Celsius (41° F). They can be found in New England and Nova Scotia, usually with a significant mix of white ancestry; but in those regions and further north, where the climate is both moist and cold, they have a higher risk of developing lung diseases.

The small amount of tropical emigration

The acclimatization of tropical people in temperate regions will never be a question of widespread importance. The negroes were involuntary immigrants to America, under conditions that can never recur. Their concentration in the "black belt," where they find the heat and moisture in which they thrive, and their climatically conditioned exclusion from the more northern states are matters of local significance. Economic and social retardation have kept the hot belt relatively underpopulated. The density map shows much the largest part of it with a population less than 25 to the square mile. Only the small portion contained in India, southernmost China, and Java shows a density over 125 to the square mile (or 50 to the square kilometer). This density has to rise to 500 or more to the square mile before emigration begins. The would-be exiles then have a wide choice of new homes in other tropical lands, where they find congenial climate and phases of economic development into which they will fit. East Indian coolies are found in Cape Colony, Natal, Zanzibar, Trinidad, and British Guiana, where they constitute 38 per cent. of the population.

The adaptation of tropical people in temperate regions is not a matter of great importance. The Black population was brought to America against their will, under circumstances that will never happen again. Their concentration in the "black belt," where they enjoy the heat and moisture that suit them, along with their climate-driven exclusion from the northern states, are locally relevant issues. Economic and social disadvantages have kept the hot belt relatively sparsely populated. The population density map shows that the majority of this area has less than 25 people per square mile. Only a small part in India, southernmost China, and Java has a density over 125 people per square mile (or 50 per square kilometer). It typically takes a density of 500 or more people per square mile before people start to emigrate. Those considering leaving then have many options for new homes in other tropical regions, where they can find a suitable climate and stages of economic development that they can integrate into. East Indian laborers are found in Cape Colony, Natal, Zanzibar, Trinidad, and British Guiana, making up 38 percent of the population there.

Effects of tropical climate.

The redundant population of crowded western and southern Europe also seek these sparsely inhabited Tropics, but they come heavily handicapped by the necessity of acclimatization. They leave their homes from Trondhjem and Stockholm in the north to the Mediterranean in the south, where the mean annual temperatures vary from 5° to 17° C, (41° to 63° F.), to seek the Torrid Zone which averages 25° C. or 77° F. over most of its territory. The effects of a tropical climate are due to intense heat, to its long duration without the respite conferred by a bracing winter season, and its combination with the high degree of humidity prevailing over most of the Torrid Zone. These are conditions advantageous to plant life, but hardly favorable to human development. They produce certain derangements in the physiological functions of heart, liver, kidneys and organs of reproduction. Bodily temperature rises, while susceptibility to disease and rate of mortality show an increase ominous for white colonization. The general effect is intense enervation; this starts a craving for stimulants and induces habits of alcoholism which are accountable for many bodily ills usually attributed to direct climatic influences. Transfer to the Tropics tends to relax the mental and moral fiber, induces indolence, self-indulgences and various excesses which lower the physical tone.1435 The social control of public opinion in the new environment is weak, while temptation, due to both climatic and social causes, is peculiarly strong. The presence of an inferior, more or less servile native population, relaxes both conscience and physical energy just when both need a tonic. The result is general enervation, deterioration both as economic and political agents.

The overcrowded population of western and southern Europe is also looking for the sparsely populated Tropics, but they face a tough challenge with the need for acclimatization. They leave their homes from Trondheim and Stockholm in the north to the Mediterranean in the south, where the average annual temperatures range from 5° to 17° C (41° to 63° F), in search of the Torrid Zone, which averages 25° C or 77° F across most of its areas. The effects of a tropical climate stem from the intense heat, its long duration without the relief of a refreshing winter season, and the high humidity that is common throughout most of the Torrid Zone. These conditions promote plant life, but they are not conducive to human development. They can disrupt physiological functions in the heart, liver, kidneys, and reproductive organs. Body temperature rises, while susceptibility to disease and mortality rates increase, creating a threat for white colonization. The overall effect is severe exhaustion; this leads to a craving for stimulants and encourages habits of alcoholism that are responsible for many health issues typically blamed on the climate. Moving to the Tropics tends to weaken mental and moral resolve, leading to laziness, self-indulgence, and various excesses that diminish physical vitality. The influence of public opinion in this new environment is weak, while temptation, fueled by both the climate and social factors, is particularly strong. The presence of an inferior, somewhat servile native population decreases both conscience and physical energy just when both are needed the most. The outcome is widespread lethargy and a decline in effectiveness as economic and political forces.

Historical significance of deterioration

This is the effect of climate which has had the most far-reaching and persistent historical consequences. Our study of the historical movements of peoples in the northern hemisphere revealed a steady influx from colder into tropical and sub-tropical lands, followed always by enervation and loss of national efficiency, due partly to the debilitating heat of the new habitat, partly to its easier conditions of living, whether the intruders came as conquerors and appropriated the fat of the land, or as immigrant colonists who dropped into slack methods of agriculture, because rain and sun and soil made their reluctant labor scarcely necessary. Everywhere in the Tropics the enervating effects of heat, moisture, and abundance make not only the natives averse to steady work, but start the energetic European immigrant down the same easy descent to Avernus. Passing over the deterioration of the Aryans in India, the Persians in Mesopotamia, and the Vandals in Africa, we find that modern instances show the transformation to be very rapid. The French who since 1715 have occupied the islands of Réunion and Mauritius have lost much of their thrift and energy, though their new homes lie just within the southern tropic, and are blessed with an oceanic climate. Yet the volunteer troops sent by Réunion to aid in the recent subjugation of the Hovas in Madagascar proved to be utterly useless.1436 The Spaniards who come to-day to Mexico have great energy, born of their former hard conditions of life in Spain. But their children are reared in a country whose mean annual temperature, even on the plateau, exceeds that of Spain by 10°C. (or 18°F.), a difference equal to that between Mobile and New York, or Madrid and Christiania. Hence they are less energetic and vigorous, while the third generation are typical Mexicans in their easy-going way of life.1437 The Germans who recently have colonized southern Brazil in great numbers show a similar deterioration under similar increase of mean annual temperature, combined with somewhat greater humidity, which intensifies the debilitating effects of the heat. An investigation made in 1900 by the International Harvester Company of America revealed the fact that the German farmer in the State of Santa Catharina rarely cultivated over one acre of grain.1438 Much of the iron in the blood and conscience of the New England missionary stock which went to Hawaii two generations ago has been dissolved out by the warm rain and balmy air of the islands.

This is the impact of climate that has had the most significant and lasting historical effects. Our exploration of the historical movements of people in the northern hemisphere showed a consistent migration from colder regions to tropical and subtropical areas, always followed by a decline in energy and national effectiveness, partly due to the exhausting heat of their new environment and partly because of the easier living conditions, whether the newcomers came as conquerors who took advantage of the land's resources or as immigrant settlers who adopted lax agricultural methods due to the generous rain, sun, and soil making their reluctant efforts almost unnecessary. In the Tropics, the draining effects of heat, humidity, and abundance not only make the locals reluctant to work steadily but also lead energetic European immigrants down the same easy path toward decline. Skipping over the decline of Aryans in India, Persians in Mesopotamia, and Vandals in Africa, we see that modern examples show this transformation happening very quickly. The French, who have occupied the islands of Réunion and Mauritius since 1715, have lost much of their diligence and energy, even though their new homes are just south of the tropic line and enjoy an oceanic climate. Yet, the volunteer troops sent from Réunion to assist in the recent conquest of the Hovas in Madagascar turned out to be completely ineffective.1436 The Spaniards who move to Mexico today bring a lot of energy, stemming from their previous tough living conditions in Spain. But their children grow up in a country where the average annual temperature, even on the plateau, is 10°C (or 18°F) higher than in Spain, a difference comparable to that between Mobile and New York or Madrid and Oslo. As a result, they are less energetic and vigorous, and by the third generation, they are typical Mexicans with their laid-back lifestyle.1437 The Germans who have recently colonized southern Brazil in large numbers show a similar decline under an increase in average annual temperature, coupled with slightly higher humidity, which enhances the draining effects of the heat. An investigation conducted in 1900 by the International Harvester Company of America found that the German farmer in Santa Catarina rarely cultivated more than one acre of grain.1438 Much of the iron in the blood and spirit of the New England missionary stock that went to Hawaii two generations ago has been washed away by the warm rain and gentle air of the islands.

The problem of acclimatization.

In all these instances the white race has been successfully transplanted. It has domiciled itself on the borders of the Tropics and has propagated its kind, though it has abated some of the vigorous qualities which characterized it in its temperate fatherland. In the real Tropics like India, Cochin China, the Malay Archipelago, and Central Africa, the whole perplexing and urgent problem of European colonization turns on the difficulty or impossibility of acclimatization; and this in turn affects the whole economic, ethnic and political destiny of present colonial holdings. If acclimatization is impossible, the alternative is an imported ruling class, constantly invalided and as constantly renewed, aided by a similar commercial body acting as superintendents of labor; the whole machine of government and economic exploitation is supported by a permanent servile native population, doing the preeminently tropical work of agriculture, which is so fatal to the white man in a torrid climate. This means that the conquering white race of the Temperate Zone is to be excluded by adverse climatic conditions from the productive but undeveloped Tropics, unless it consents to hybridization, like the Spaniards and Portuguese of tropical America. In that national struggle for existence which is a struggle for space, it means an added advantage for the Mediterranean peoples, that they are more tolerant of a torrid climate than the blond Teutons, whose disability in this regard is pronounced; it means that the aptitude of the Chinese for a wide range of climatic accommodation, from the Arctic circle to the equator, lends color to "the yellow peril."

In all these cases, the white race has successfully settled in new areas. It has established itself on the edges of the tropics and has reproduced, although it has lost some of the robust traits that defined it in its temperate homeland. In true tropical regions like India, Cochin China, the Malay Archipelago, and Central Africa, the entire complex and pressing issue of European colonization revolves around the challenges of acclimatization; this, in turn, impacts the economic, ethnic, and political future of current colonial territories. If acclimatization is not possible, the alternative is to have an imported ruling class that is often unwell but continually replaced, supported by a similar commercial group overseeing labor; the entire framework of government and economic exploitation relies on a permanent servile native population, handling the predominantly tropical agricultural work that is detrimental to white individuals in a hot climate. This indicates that the conquering white race from the Temperate Zone will be kept out of the productive but undeveloped tropics due to unfavorable climate conditions, unless it agrees to hybridization, as seen with the Spaniards and Portuguese in tropical America. In the national struggle for existence, which is a fight for territory, it gives an advantage to Mediterranean people, who are more tolerant of hot climates than the fair-skinned Teutons, whose inability in this respect is clear; it also suggests that the Chinese ability to adapt to a wide range of climates, from the Arctic to the equator, contributes to the narrative of "the yellow peril."

Historical importance of the temperate zones.

In contrast to the monotonous extremes of climate in the hot and cold zones, temperate lands are characterized by the intermediate degrees of annual temperature and marked seasonal diversity which are so favorable to human development. In Arctic lands labor is paralyzed by cold as it is by heat in the enervating and overproductive Tropics. In one, the growing season is too short and ill-favored; in the other, too long to stimulate man to sustained industry. Hence the Temperate Zones, whose climate avoids both these extremes and abounds in contrasts, whose summers are productive enough to supply food for the winter, and whose winters give both motive and energy for the summer's work, are richer in cultural possibilities and hence in historical importance.

In contrast to the extreme climates of hot and cold zones, temperate regions are defined by moderate annual temperatures and distinct seasonal variations, which are beneficial for human development. In Arctic areas, work is hindered by the cold, just as it is stifled by the heat in the intense and overly productive Tropics. In the Arctic, the growing season is too short and disadvantageous; in the Tropics, it’s too long to encourage sustained labor. Therefore, the Temperate Zones, with their balanced climate that steers clear of these extremes and features plenty of contrasts, have summers that are productive enough to provide food for the winter and winters that inspire and energize efforts for summer labor, making them richer in cultural opportunities and consequently more historically significant.

Effects of contrasted seasons.

The advantage of the Temperate Zone is not only its moderate and adequate allowance of heat, but its contrast of seasons. Beyond the range of a vertical sun, grades of temperature change rapidly from latitude to latitude and from summer to winter. The seasons bring variety of activities, which sharply react upon one another. Manufactures were in their origin chiefly winter industries, as they still are in small isolated communities. The modern factory system flourishes best in cooler parts of the Temperate Zone, where the agricultural demands of the summer, spreading over a shorter period, leave a longer time for winter work, and where that once long winter of the Glacial Period, by the scouring action of the ice cap, has reduced the fertile area of the northern fields. The factory system is also favored, as Heinrich von Treitschke maintains, by the predominance of cool or cold weather, which facilitates the concentration of numerous workmen in large buildings, and renders possible long labor hours the year round,1439 —conditions unthinkable in a warm climate. The iron and steel industries which have grown up about Birmingham, Alabama, find that the long hot summers and mild winters reduce the efficiency of their skilled labor imported from the North.

The benefit of the Temperate Zone isn't just its mild and sufficient warmth, but also its changing seasons. Outside the area with direct sunlight, temperatures shift quickly from one latitude to another and from summer to winter. The seasons offer a variety of activities that significantly influence each other. Initially, manufacturing mainly took place in the winter, and it still does in small, isolated communities. The modern factory system thrives best in the cooler parts of the Temperate Zone, where the shorter agricultural demands of summer allow for more winter work. The long winter during the Glacial Period has also shaped the fertile areas of northern fields due to the ice cap's erosion. Additionally, as Heinrich von Treitschke points out, the prevalence of cool or cold weather supports the gathering of many workers in large buildings, making it possible to maintain long working hours year-round—a reality that's unimaginable in warmer climates. The iron and steel industries that have developed around Birmingham, Alabama, find that the hot summers and mild winters impact the productivity of their skilled labor brought in from the North.

Effects of length of seasons.

Effect of long winters.

The length of the seasons is of conspicuous importance. It determines, for instance, whether a given climate permits continuous field work with summer and winter crops, whether field work is possible at all, and how long it is interrupted by excessive cold. Buckle maintains that climate not only enervates or invigorates man, but affects also the constancy of his work and his capacity for sustained labor throughout the year. He considers "that no people living in a very northern latitude have ever possessed that steady and unflinching industry for which the inhabitants of temperate regions are remarkable" and assigns as a reason "that the severity of the weather, and, at some seasons, the deficiency of light, render it impossible for the people to continue their usual out-of-door employments." The result of this he finds to be desultory habits of work, which help to make the national character fitful and capricious. He cites in illustration of his principle the people of the Scandinavian and Iberian peninsulas, whom he finds marked "by a certain instability and fickleness of character," owing to the fact that in Norway and Sweden agricultural labor experiences long interruptions, due to the severity of the winter and the shortness of the days; in Spain and Portugal owing to the heat and drought of summer.1440 The extreme continental climate of northern of Russia with its violent contrast of the seasons, its severe and protracted winters, enables Leroy-Beaulieu to make a safer application of this principle to the empire of the Czars, which, unlike Scandinavia, feels no ameliorating effect from the mild Atlantic winds and commands no alternative industries like dairy farming, fisheries, and maritime trade.1441 Hence Leroy-Beaulieu attributes the unsystematic, desultory habits of work prevailing among the northern peasants to the long intermission of labor in winter, and to the alternation of a short period of intense activity with a long period of enforced idleness. He finds them resembling southern peoples in their capacity for sudden spurts of energy rather than sustained effort, thinks them benumbed by the sloth of the far north, which is not unlike the sloth of the south.1442

The length of the seasons is really important. It decides, for example, if a specific climate allows for continuous farming with summer and winter crops, whether farming can happen at all, and how long it gets interrupted by extreme cold. Buckle argues that climate not only weakens or energizes people, but it also impacts their consistency in work and their ability to maintain steady labor throughout the year. He believes that "no people living in a very northern latitude have ever had that steady and unwavering industry for which the inhabitants of temperate regions are known" and gives the reason that "the harshness of the weather, and, at certain times, the lack of light, makes it impossible for people to keep up their usual outdoor jobs." As a result, he sees this as leading to irregular work habits, which contribute to making the national character inconsistent and unpredictable. He points to the people of the Scandinavian and Iberian peninsulas as examples, describing them as "marked by a certain instability and fickleness of character," because in Norway and Sweden, farm work faces long interruptions due to harsh winters and short days; in Spain and Portugal, it's due to the summer heat and drought.1440 The extreme continental climate of northern Russia, with its drastic seasonal changes and long, severe winters, allows Leroy-Beaulieu to apply this principle more safely to the empire of the Czars, which, unlike Scandinavia, doesn’t benefit from the mild Atlantic winds and lacks alternative industries like dairy farming, fishing, and maritime trade.1441 Therefore, Leroy-Beaulieu believes that the haphazard and sporadic work habits of the northern peasants come from the long break in labor during the winter and the switch between a short time of intense activity and a long time of forced inactivity. He thinks they resemble southern peoples in their ability for sudden bursts of energy rather than consistent effort, suggesting they are dulled by the laziness of the far north, which is similar to the laziness of the south.1442

The dominant continental and central location of Russia enables its climatic extremes to operate with little check. The peripheral location of Scandinavia in the path of the Atlantic winds modifies its climate to a mild oceanic type, and its dominant maritime situation gives its people the manifold resources of a typical coast land. Hence Buckle's estimate of national character in the Scandinavian Peninsula has little basis as to fact or cause. Irregularity of agricultural labor does not mean here cessation of all labor, and hence does not produce the far-reaching effect ascribed to it. Only about one-third of the Norwegian population is engaged in agriculture. The restriction of its arable and meadow land to 3 per cent. of the whole territory, and the fact that a large proportion of the people are employed in shipping and the fisheries,1443 are due to several geographic factors besides climate. The same thing is true of Sweden in a modified degree.

The central and continental position of Russia allows its extreme weather to function with little interruption. In contrast, Scandinavia's location on the edge of the Atlantic winds softens its climate to a mild oceanic one, and its strong maritime position provides its people with the diverse resources typical of coastal areas. Therefore, Buckle's evaluation of national character in the Scandinavian Peninsula is not well-supported by fact or reason. Irregular agricultural work does not equate to a complete stop in all labor and doesn’t have the wide-ranging impact that is often claimed. Only about one-third of Norway's population works in agriculture. The limitation of its farmland to just 3 percent of the total territory, along with a large portion of people involved in shipping and fisheries,1443 is influenced by several geographic factors beyond just climate. The same holds true for Sweden, though to a lesser extent.

Complexity of climatic effects.

Caution should be exercised in drawing conclusions from climate alone or from only one phase of its influence. The duration and intensity of the seasons affects not only the manner of work, but the whole mode of life of a people. On the Yukon, in Iceland, and the high mountain valleys of the Alps, winter puts a check not only upon out-of-door labor, but upon all public or community life. Intercourse stops or is greatly restricted. The outside world drops away. In Iceland, the law courts are in session only in summer when the roads by sea and land are open. In the Kentucky mountains the district schools close before Christmas, when the roads become impassable from rain and snow; the summer is the gala time for funeral services, for only then can the preacher or "circuit-rider" reach the graves made in the winter. Therefore the funerals in one community accumulate, so to speak, and finally, when leisure comes after the August harvest, they make the occasion for important social gatherings. Much of the influence of winter lies in its power to isolate.

Caution should be used when drawing conclusions from climate alone or from just one aspect of its impact. The length and intensity of the seasons affect not only how work is done but also the entire lifestyle of a community. In places like the Yukon, Iceland, and the high mountain valleys of the Alps, winter limits not just outdoor work but also all public or community activities. Interaction comes to a halt or is significantly restricted. The outside world fades away. In Iceland, the courts only operate in the summer when the roads by land and sea are accessible. In the Kentucky mountains, district schools close before Christmas when the roads become impossible to travel due to rain and snow; summer is the prime time for funerals because only then can the preacher or "circuit-rider" reach the graves dug in winter. As a result, funerals in a community tend to pile up, and eventually, when there’s free time after the August harvest, they turn into significant social events. A lot of winter's influence comes from its ability to isolate.

It is the economic effects of such periods of enforced idleness which are most obvious, both in their power to restrict national wealth and keep down density of population. When long, they limit subsistence to the products of a short growing season, except where local mining adds considerable sources of revenue. In the Russian government of Yaroslaf, located on the northernmost bend of the Volga within the agricultural belt, and containing the chief inland wheat market of the Empire, the field labor of four months must support the population for the remaining eight months of the year. The half of Russia included in the cold forest zone of the north maintains meagerly a sparse population, and can hope for an increase of the same only by the encouragement of Industrial pursuits. Here the long winter leisure has created the handicrafts on which so many villages rely, and which in turn have given rise to peddling,1444 as we have seen it do in high mountain regions where altitude intensifies and prolongs the winter season. Agricultural and industrial life are still undivorced, just as in primitive communities. The resulting population has also the primitive mark of great sparsity, so that modern industry, which depends upon a concentrated labor force, is here inhibited. Hence Russian manufactures, which are so active in the governments of Vladimir, Moscow, and St. Petersburg, cease beyond the sixtieth parallel, which defines the northern limit of the agricultural belt and the beginning of the forest and the fur zone.1445 [See maps pages 8 and 612.]

The economic effects of these periods of forced inactivity are the most noticeable, as they limit national wealth and population density. When these periods are lengthy, they restrict subsistence to the produce of a short growing season, except where local mining provides significant revenue. In the Russian government of Yaroslaf, located at the northernmost bend of the Volga within the agricultural belt and home to the Empire's main inland wheat market, fieldwork for four months must sustain the population for the remaining eight months of the year. The northern half of Russia, which falls into the cold forest zone, barely supports a sparse population and can only hope for growth by promoting industrial activities. The long winter downtime has fostered the handicrafts that many villages depend on, leading to peddling, as we've seen happen in high mountain areas where altitude extends and intensifies the winter season. Agricultural and industrial life remain intertwined, much like in primitive societies. This results in a population that is also characterized by significant sparsity, which inhibits modern industry that relies on a concentrated labor force. Consequently, Russian manufacturing, which thrives in the governments of Vladimir, Moscow, and St. Petersburg, diminishes beyond the sixtieth parallel, which marks the northern edge of the agricultural belt and the start of the forest and fur zones. [See maps pages 8 and 612.]

Social effects of long winters.

The rigorous climate of Russia was undoubtedly one cause for the attachment of the peasants to the soil in 1593. This measure was resorted to at a time when the Muscovite dominion from its center in Great Russia had recently been extended at the expense of the Tartars, and had thus embraced fertile southern lands, which tempted the northern peasant away from his unfruitful fields.1446 This attraction, coupled with the free and hopeful life of the frontier, met the migrant instinct bred in the peasant by the wide plains and far horizon of Russia, so that the north threatened to be left without cultivators. Later, the harsh climatic conditions of the north were advanced as an argument against the abolition of serfdom, on the ground that this system alone secured to the landed proprietor a steady labor supply, and guaranteed to the peasant his maintenance during the long, idle winter.

The harsh climate of Russia was definitely one reason why peasants felt a strong connection to the land in 1593. This action was taken at a time when Muscovite control had recently expanded from its base in Great Russia into the fertile southern territories, enticing northern peasants away from their unproductive fields. This attraction, along with the free and hopeful lifestyle of the frontier, sparked the migration urge within peasants, shaped by the vast plains and endless horizon of Russia, making it likely that the north would be left without farmers. Later on, the severe climatic conditions of the north were used as a reason against ending serfdom, arguing that this system was the only way to ensure a reliable labor force for landowners and to provide peasants with the means to survive the long, idle winter.

The duration and severity of the cold season has put a drag upon the wheel of enterprise in Canada, as opposed to the warmer United States. The prairies of the Canadian Northwest, whose fertile soil should early have attracted settlement, were a closed land till railroads could pour into it every summer from the warmer south and east a seasonal tide of laborers. These follow the harvest as it advances from point to point, and then withdraw in autumn either to the lumber camps of eastern Canada, Minnesota and Wisconsin, or to seek other forms of out-door labor in the more southern states, thus lifting from the Canadian farmer the burden of their winter support.

The length and intensity of the cold season have slowed down business in Canada compared to the warmer United States. The prairies of the Canadian Northwest, with their rich soil, should have attracted settlers much earlier, but the land remained untouched until railroads could bring in a seasonal influx of workers every summer from the warmer south and east. These workers follow the harvest as it moves from place to place and then leave in the fall either for the lumber camps in eastern Canada, Minnesota, and Wisconsin, or to find other outdoor jobs in the southern states, relieving Canadian farmers of the burden of supporting them through the winter.

In the lower latitudes of the Temperate Zones, where the growing season is long and the dormant period correspondingly short and mild, we find agriculture based upon clearly distinguished winter and summer crops, as in the northern Punjab (30° to 34° N. L.);1447 or producing a quick succession of valuable crops, where the fertility of the soil can be maintained by manures or irrigating streams, as in many of the warmer Southern States and in Spain1448 respectively. In Argentine, where tillage is extensive, land abundant, and population sparse, where, in fact, "skimp farming" is the rule, the shrewd cultivator takes advantage of the long growing season to stretch out his period of sowing and reaping, and thus tills a larger area. The International Harvester Company of America, investigating the reason for the small number of reaping machines employed in Argentine in proportion to the area under cultivation, found that the simple climatic condition of a long growing season enabled one reaper to serve about twice the acreage usual in the United States, because it could work twice as long.1449

In the lower latitudes of the Temperate Zones, where the growing season is long and the dormant period is short and mild, we see agriculture based on clearly defined winter and summer crops, like in northern Punjab (30° to 34° N. L.);1447 or producing a quick succession of valuable crops, where soil fertility is maintained through fertilizers or irrigation, as in many of the warmer Southern States and in Spain1448. In Argentina, where farming is extensive, land is plentiful, and the population is sparse, "skimp farming" is the norm. Here, the savvy farmer takes advantage of the long growing season to extend his sowing and harvesting period, allowing him to cultivate a larger area. The International Harvester Company of America, looking into why there are so few reaping machines used in Argentina compared to the area under cultivation, discovered that the long growing season allows one reaper to cover about twice the acreage typically managed in the United States, as it can operate for twice as long.1449

Zones of culture.

Over and beyond slight local variations of climate and season within the same zone, which contribute their quota to economic and historical results, it is the fundamental differences between the hot, cold and temperate climatic zones that produce the most conspicuous and abiding effects. These broad belts, each with its characteristic climatic conditions and appropriate civilization, form so many girdles of culture around the earth. They have their dominant features of heat and cold, variously combined with moisture and aridity, which give a certain zonal stamp to human temperature and development.

Aside from minor local climate and seasonal differences within the same area, which add to economic and historical outcomes, the main differences between the hot, cold, and temperate climates create the most noticeable and lasting impacts. These broad regions, each with its unique climate and suitable civilization, act as belts of culture around the planet. They show distinct characteristics of heat and cold, mixed with varying levels of moisture and dryness, which influence the way humans adapt and develop within those zones.

The two cold belts have little claim to the name of cultural zones, since their inability to support more than an insignificant population has made them almost a negligible factor in history. [Compare maps pages 8, 9, and 612.] The discoveries and settlements of the Northmen in Greenland remained a barren historical event, though the vikings' ships reached a new hemisphere. Iceland is the only land in this sub-arctic region which ever figured upon the stage of history; and its rôle was essentially passive. Such prominence as it acquired was due to its island nature and its situation in a swirl of the Gulf Stream, which ameliorates the worst climatic effects of its far northern location, and brings it just within the upper limit of the temperate belt. The wide sub-arctic lowlands of Russia and Siberia, which, from the Ural Mountains to the lower Amur River, stretch the cold zone well below the sixtieth parallel, have at times in the last three centuries and especially in the past decade thrown their great mass into the scale of eastern Asiatic history. This has been possible because the hot summer characteristic of continental climates forces the July isotherm of 20°C. northward over the vast heated surface of Asia nearly to the sixtieth parallel, well within the borders of Siberia. It gives that belt the short but warm growing season with protracted hours of sunshine which is so favorable to cereals, lending to Omsk, Tomsk, Vitimsk and all the stretch of Russian settlements in Siberia, an admirable summer climate like that of the Canadian Northwest.1450

The two cold regions barely deserve to be called cultural zones, as their inability to support more than a tiny population has made them almost irrelevant in history. [Compare maps pages 8, 9, and 612.] The Northmen's discoveries and settlements in Greenland were just a barren historical footnote, despite the vikings' ships reaching a new hemisphere. Iceland is the only land in this sub-arctic area that has played a role in history, and its role was mostly passive. The little attention it gained was due to its island nature and its location in a swirl of the Gulf Stream, which helps mitigate the harsh climate effects of its northern location and brings it just into the upper limit of the temperate zone. The vast sub-arctic lowlands of Russia and Siberia, which extend the cold zone well below the sixtieth parallel from the Ural Mountains to the lower Amur River, have at times over the last three centuries, especially in the past decade, influenced eastern Asiatic history significantly. This happened because the hot summer typical of continental climates pushes the July isotherm of 20°C northward over Asia's vast heated surface, nearly up to the sixtieth parallel, well within Siberia's borders. This creates a short but warm growing season with extended hours of sunlight, which is very beneficial for cereals, giving Omsk, Tomsk, Vitimsk, and all the Russian settlements in Siberia a great summer climate that resembles that of the Canadian Northwest.1450

The cradle of civilization.

The North Temperate Zone is preëminently the culture zone of the earth. It is the seat of the most important, most steadily progressive civilizations, and the source of all the cultural stimuli which have given an upward start to civilization in other zones during the past three centuries. It contains the Mediterranean basin, which was the pulsing heart of ancient history, and all the modern historically important regions of Europe, Asia, Africa, and America. The temperate belt of the southern hemisphere also is following its lead, since European civilization has been transplanted to other parts of the world. This is the zone which least suffers from the drawbacks of climatic monotony or extremes, and best combines, especially in the northern hemisphere, the wide range of annual and seasonal variety so favorable to economic and cultural development, with the incalculable advantage of large land area.

The North Temperate Zone is clearly the main cultural zone of the planet. It's home to the most significant and consistently advancing civilizations, and it has been the source of all the cultural influences that have propelled civilization in other zones over the past three centuries. This zone includes the Mediterranean basin, which was the vibrant center of ancient history, as well as all the modern historically significant areas in Europe, Asia, Africa, and America. The temperate regions of the southern hemisphere are also following suit, as European civilization has been spread to other parts of the world. This zone experiences the least issues from climatic monotony or extremes and offers, especially in the northern hemisphere, a wide variety of annual and seasonal changes that are beneficial for economic and cultural growth, along with the immense advantage of a large land area.

Man grew in the temperate zone, was born in the Tropics. There, in his primitive, pre-civilized state, he lived in a moist, warm, uniform climate which supplied abundantly his simple wants, put no strain upon his feeble intellect and will. That first crude human product of Nature's Pliocene workshop turned out in the steaming lowland of Java, and now known to us as the Pithecanthropus erectus, found about him the climatic conditions generally conceded to have been necessary for man in his helpless, futile infancy. Where man has remained in the Tropics, with few exceptions he has suffered arrested development. His nursery has kept him a child. Though his initial progress depended upon the gifts which Nature put into his hands, his later evolution depended far more upon the powers which she developed within him. These have no limit, so far as our experience shows; but their growth is painful, reluctant. Therefore they develop only where Nature subjects man to compulsion, forces him to earn his daily bread, and thereby something more than bread. This compulsion is found in less luxurious but more salutary geographic conditions than the Tropics afford, in an environment that exacts a tribute of labor and invention in return for the boon of life, but offers a reward certain and generous enough to insure the accumulation of wealth which marks the beginning of civilization.1451

Humans originated in the temperate zone but were born in the Tropics. In that early, pre-civilized state, they lived in a warm, moist climate that easily met their basic needs without challenging their limited intelligence and willpower. The first rough human form produced by Nature's Pliocene workshop emerged in the humid lowlands of Java, now known as Pithecanthropus erectus. This environment provided the conditions widely believed to be necessary for humans in their vulnerable, early stages. Where humans have remained in the Tropics, they have largely experienced stunted development, as their surroundings kept them in a childlike state. Although their initial progress relied on the natural resources available to them, their ongoing evolution depended much more on the inner strengths that Nature cultivated within them. These inner strengths appear to have no boundaries based on our experiences; however, their growth is often slow and challenging. As a result, they develop primarily where Nature pushes humans to work hard for their survival and, in turn, something greater than just meeting their basic needs. This push is found in less comfortable but healthier geographic conditions than those of the Tropics, in an environment that demands effort and creativity in exchange for the gift of life, while also providing a reliable and ample reward that fosters the accumulation of wealth, marking the beginning of civilization.1451

Most of the ancient civilizations originated just within the mild but drier margin of the Temperate Zone, where the cooler air of a short winter acted like a tonic upon the energies relaxed by the lethargic atmosphere of the hot and humid Tropics; where congenial warmth encouraged vegetation, but where the irrigation necessary to secure abundant and regular crops called forth inventiveness, coöperation, and social organization, and gave to the people their first baptism of redemption from savagery to barbarism. Native civilizations of limited development have arisen in the Tropics, but only where, as in Yemen, Mexico and Peru, a high, cool, semi-arid plateau, a restricted area of fertile soil, and a protected location alternately coddled and spurred the nascent people.

Most ancient civilizations developed in the mild but drier edges of the Temperate Zone, where the cooler air of a brief winter energized people who were lethargic from the hot and humid Tropics. This pleasant warmth boosted plant growth, but the irrigation needed for plentiful and consistent crops prompted creativity, cooperation, and social organization, marking the people's first step away from savagery toward civilization. While some native civilizations with limited growth have emerged in the Tropics, this only occurred in places like Yemen, Mexico, and Peru, where high, cool, semi-arid plateaus, small areas of fertile land, and sheltered locations nurtured and motivated the early inhabitants.

As the Tropics have been the cradle of humanity, the Temperate Zone has been the cradle and school of civilization. Here Nature has given much by withholding much. Here man found his birthright, the privilege of the struggle.

As the Tropics have been the birthplace of humanity, the Temperate Zone has been the birthplace and teacher of civilization. Here, Nature has provided plenty while also holding back a lot. Here, humanity found its birthright, the right to struggle.


NOTES TO CHAPTER XVII

Notes on Chapter 17

1409.

G.G. Chisholm, Commercial Geography, p. 15. London, 1904.

G.G. Chisholm, Commercial Geography, p. 15. London, 1904.

1410.

Montesquieu, The Spirit of Laws, Vol. I, Book XIV. London, 1906.

Montesquieu, The Spirit of Laws, Vol. I, Book XIV. London, 1906.

1411.

W.Z. Ripley, Races of Europe, pp. 574-578. New York, 1899.

W.Z. Ripley, Races of Europe, pp. 574-578. New York, 1899.

1412.

Julius Hann, Handbook of Climatology, Part I, pp. 223-224. New York, 1903.

Julius Hann, Handbook of Climatology, Part I, pp. 223-224. New York, 1903.

1413.

Isaiah Bowman, Distribution of Population in Bolivia, Bulletin of Geographical Society of Philadelphia, Vol. VII, pp. 40, 41.

Isaiah Bowman, Distribution of Population in Bolivia, Bulletin of Geographical Society of Philadelphia, Vol. VII, pp. 40, 41.

1414.

Ratzel, Aus Mexico, p. 415, Note 14. Breslau, 1878.

Ratzel, Aus Mexico, p. 415, Note 14. Breslau, 1878.

1415.

Julius Hann, Handbook of Climatology, Part I, pp. 224-227. New York, 1903.

Julius Hann, Handbook of Climatology, Part I, pp. 224-227. New York, 1903.

1416.

G.G. Chisholm, Commercial Geography, p. 23. London, 1904.

G.G. Chisholm, Commercial Geography, p. 23. London, 1904.

1417.

Julius Hann, Handbook of Climatology, Part I, pp. 171-173. New York, 1903.

Julius Hann, Handbook of Climatology, Part I, pp. 171-173. New York, 1903.

1418.

Ibid., pp. 188-189.

Ibid., pp. 188-189.

1419.

Ibid., pp. 57-58.

Ibid., pp. 57-58.

1420.

Risley and Gait, Census of India for 1901, Vol. I, Part 1, pp. 14-21, map p. 4. Calcutta, 1903.

Risley and Gait, Census of India for 1901, Vol. I, Part 1, pp. 14-21, map p. 4. Calcutta, 1903.

1421.

H.J. Mackinder, Britain and the British Seas, pp. 173-174. London, 1904.

H.J. Mackinder, Britain and the British Seas, pp. 173-174. London, 1904.

1422.

G.G. Chisholm, Commercial Geography, pp. 65-66. London, 1904.

G.G. Chisholm, Commercial Geography, pp. 65-66. London, 1904.

1423.

Ibid., 126-128. Holdich, India, p. 259. London, 1905.

Ibid., 126-128. Holdich, India, p. 259. London, 1905.

1424.

G.G. Chisholm, Commercial Geography, pp. 114, 382. London, 1904.

G.G. Chisholm, Commercial Geography, pp. 114, 382. London, 1904.

1425.

J. Russell Smith, The Economic Importance of the Tropical Plateaus in America, House Doc. 460, 58-3--53, pp. 829-835. Washington, 1904.

J. Russell Smith, The Economic Importance of the Tropical Plateaus in America, House Doc. 460, 58-3--53, pp. 829-835. Washington, 1904.

1426.

G.G. Chisholm, Commercial Geography, p. 160. London, 1904.

G.G. Chisholm, Commercial Geography, p. 160. London, 1904.

1427.

E.C. Semple, American History and Its Geographic Conditions, Chap. XV. Boston, 1903.

E.C. Semple, American History and Its Geographic Conditions, Chap. XV. Boston, 1903.

1428.

W.Z. Ripley, Races of Europe, pp. 215-238. New York, 1899.

W.Z. Ripley, Races of Europe, pp. 215-238. New York, 1899.

1429.

Ibid., p. 276, Map p. 274.

Ibid., p. 276, Map p. 274.

1430.

E.C. Semple, American History and Its Geographic Conditions, p. 280-283. Boston, 1903.

E.C. Semple, American History and Its Geographic Conditions, pp. 280-283. Boston, 1903.

1431.

G.G Chisholm, Commercial Geography, pp. 434, 436. London, 1904.

G.G. Chisholm, Commercial Geography, pp. 434, 436. London, 1904.

1432.

H.R. Mill, International Geography, p. 1009. New York, 1902.

H.R. Mill, International Geography, p. 1009. New York, 1902.

1433.

Ratzel, History of Mankind, Vol. II, pp. 218-225. London, 1896-1898.

Ratzel, History of Mankind, Vol. II, pp. 218-225. London, 1896-1898.

1434.

Ibid., Vol. II, p. 217.

Ibid., Vol. 2, p. 217.

1435.

W.Z. Ripley, Races of Europe, Chap. XXI. New York, 1899.

W.Z. Ripley, Races of Europe, Chap. XXI. New York, 1899.

1436.

Dr. C. Keller, Madagascar, Mauritius, and Other East African Islands, pp. 172-175. London, 1901.

Dr. C. Keller, Madagascar, Mauritius, and Other East African Islands, pp. 172-175. London, 1901.

1437.

Matthias Romero, Mexico and the United States, Vol. I, p. 79. New York, 1898.

Matthias Romero, Mexico and the United States, Vol. I, p. 79. New York, 1898.

1438.

From a personal interview with the supervising agent for South America.

From a personal interview with the supervising agent for South America.

1439.

Heinrich von Treitschke, Politik, Vol. I, p. 212 et seq. Leipzig, 1897.

Heinrich von Treitschke, Politik, Vol. I, p. 212 and following. Leipzig, 1897.

1440.

Henry Buckle, History of Civilization in England, Vol. I, p. 32. New York, 1884.

Henry Buckle, History of Civilization in England, Vol. I, p. 32. New York, 1884.

1441.

G.G. Chisholm, Commercial Geography, pp. 320-324. London, 1904.

G.G. Chisholm, Commercial Geography, pp. 320-324. London, 1904.

1442.

Anatole Leroy-Beaulieu, Empire of the Tsars, Vol. I, pp. 6, 139-144. New York, 1893.

Anatole Leroy-Beaulieu, Empire of the Tsars, Vol. I, pp. 6, 139-144. New York, 1893.

1443.

Norway, Official Publication, p. 308. Christiania, 1900.

Norway, Official Publication, p. 308. Oslo, 1900.

1444.

A. Leroy-Beaulieu, Empire of the Tsars, Vol. I, pp. 19, 142, 327. New York, 1893.

A. Leroy-Beaulieu, Empire of the Tsars, Vol. I, pp. 19, 142, 327. New York, 1893.

1445.

G.G. Chisholm, Commercial Geography, pp. 214, 315. London, 1904.

G.G. Chisholm, Commercial Geography, pp. 214, 315. London, 1904.

1446.

A. Leroy-Beaulieu, Empire of the Tsars, Vol. I, pp. 412-413. New York, 1893.

A. Leroy-Beaulieu, Empire of the Tsars, Vol. I, pp. 412-413. New York, 1893.

1447.

Holdich, India, pp. 255-257. London, 1905.

Holdich, India, pp. 255-257. London, 1905.

1448.

G.G. Chisholm, Commercial Geography, p. 329. London, 1904.

G.G. Chisholm, Commercial Geography, p. 329. London, 1904.

1449.

From an interview with the supervising agent for South America.

From an interview with the supervising agent for South America.

1450.

G.G. Chisholm, Commercial Geography, p. 356. London, 1904.

G.G. Chisholm, Commercial Geography, p. 356. London, 1904.

1451.

Henry Buckle, History of Civilization in England, Vol. I, pp. 31-33. New York, 1884.

Henry Buckle, History of Civilization in England, Vol. I, pp. 31-33. New York, 1884.




        
        
    
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