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MACHIAVELLI

WITH AN INTRODUCTION BY

HENRY CUST. M.P.

VOLUME I


THE ART OF WAR

TRANSLATED BY

PETER WHITEHORNE

1560


THE PRINCE

TRANSLATED BY

EDWARD DACRES

1640


LONDON

Published by DAVID NUTT

at the Sign of the Phoenix LONG ACRE

1905

Edinburgh: T. and A. CONSTABLE, Printers to His Majesty

TO MY FRIEND CHARLES WHIBLEY

H.C.

INTRODUCTION

The Life of a Day.

A Day in the Life.

'I am at my farm; and, since my last misfortunes, have not been in Florence twenty days. I spent September in snaring thrushes; but at the end of the month, even this rather tiresome sport failed me. I rise with the sun, and go into a wood of mine that is being cut, where I remain two hours inspecting the work of the previous day and conversing with the woodcutters, who have always some trouble on hand amongst themselves or with their neighbours. When I leave the wood, I go to a spring, and thence to the place which I use for snaring birds, with a book under my arm—Dante or Petrarch, or one of the minor poets, like Tibullus or Ovid. I read the story of their passions, and let their loves remind me of my own, which is a pleasant pastime for a while. Next I take the road, enter the inn door, talk with the passers-by, inquire the news of the neighbourhood, listen to a variety of matters, and make note of the different tastes and humours of men.

'I I'm at my farm, and since my last troubles, I haven't been in Florence for twenty days. I spent September catching thrushes, but by the end of the month, even this somewhat tiring activity let me down. I wake up with the sun and head into one of my woods that's being cut down, where I spend two hours checking on the previous day's work and chatting with the woodcutters, who always have some issue going on among themselves or with their neighbors. After leaving the woods, I go to a spring and then to my usual spot for catching birds, with a book under my arm—Dante or Petrarch, or one of the lesser poets, like Tibullus or Ovid. I read about their passions and let their loves remind me of my own, which is a nice distraction for a little while. Then I take the road, enter the inn, chat with passers-by, ask about the news in the area, listen to various topics, and observe the different tastes and moods of people.'

'This brings me to dinner-time, when I join my family and eat the poor produce of my farm. After dinner I go back to the inn, where I generally find the host and a butcher, a miller, and a pair of bakers. With these companions I play the fool all day at cards or backgammon: a thousand squabbles, a thousand insults and abusive dialogues take place, while we haggle over a farthing, and shout loud enough to be heard from San Casciano.

This takes me to dinner time, when I join my family and eat the meager produce from my farm. After dinner, I head back to the inn, where I usually find the host along with a butcher, a miller, and a couple of bakers. With these friends, I waste the day playing cards or backgammon: we have a thousand arguments, a thousand insults, and a lot of rude exchanges while we haggle over a penny, shouting loud enough to be heard from San Casciano.

'But when evening falls I go home and enter my writing-room. On the threshold I put off my country habits, filthy with mud and mire, and array myself in royal courtly garments. Thus worthily attired, I make my entrance into the ancient courts of the men of old, where they receive me with love, and where I feed upon that food which only is my own and for which I was born. I feel no shame in conversing with them and asking them the reason of their actions.

But when evening comes, I go home and enter my writing room. At the threshold, I take off my country clothes, dirty with mud and grime, and dress myself in elegant, royal garments. Dressed like this, I step into the ancient courts of the wise men of the past, where they welcome me warmly, and I indulge in the knowledge that is uniquely mine and for which I was meant to pursue. I feel no shame in talking with them and asking why they did what they did.

'They, moved by their humanity, make answer. For four hours' space I feel no annoyance, forget all care; poverty cannot frighten, nor death appal me. I am carried away to their society. And since Dante says "that there is no science unless we retain what we have learned" I have set down what I have gained from their discourse, and composed a treatise, De Principalibus, in which I enter as deeply as I can into the science of the subject, with reasonings on the nature of principality, its several species, and how they are acquired, how maintained, how lost. If you ever liked any of my scribblings, this ought to suit your taste. To a prince, and especially to a new prince, it ought to prove acceptable. Therefore I am dedicating it to the Magnificence of Giuliano.'

'They, touched by their humanity, respond. For four hours, I feel no annoyance and forget all my worries; poverty doesn’t scare me, nor does death frighten me. I’m swept away into their company. And since Dante says "that there is no knowledge unless we remember what we have learned," I have written down what I’ve gained from their conversation and created a treatise, De Principalibus, where I explore as deeply as I can into the science of the subject, discussing the nature of principalities, their various types, how they are acquired, maintained, and lost. If you’ve ever enjoyed any of my writings, this should appeal to you. It should especially resonate with a prince, and particularly a new prince. So, I am dedicating it to the Magnificence of Giuliano.'

Niccolò Machiavelli.

Niccolò Machiavelli.

Such is the account that Niccolò Machiavelli renders of himself when after imprisonment, torture, and disgrace, at the age of forty-four, he first turned to serious writing. For the first twenty-six or indeed twenty-nine of those years we have not one line from his pen or one word of vaguest information about him. Throughout all his works written for publication, there is little news about himself. Montaigne could properly write, 'Ainsi, lecteur, je suis moy-mesme la matière de mon livre.' But the matter of Machiavelli was far other: 'Io ho espresso quanto io so, e quanto io ho imparato per una lunga pratica e continua lezione delle cose del mondo.'

This is how Niccolò Machiavelli introduces himself after experiencing imprisonment, torture, and disgrace. At the age of forty-four, he began to write seriously. For the first twenty-six, or even twenty-nine years of his life, there isn't a single line from him or any vague details about his life. In all his published works, there’s not much information about himself. Montaigne could rightly say, 'So, reader, I am myself the subject of my book.' But for Machiavelli, it was different: 'I have expressed what I know, and what I have learned through long practice and constant observation of the world.'

The Man.

The Guy.

Machiavelli was born on the 3rd of May 1469. The period of his life almost exactly coincides with that of Cardinal Wolsey. He came of the old and noble Tuscan stock of Montespertoli, who were men of their hands in the eleventh century. He carried their coat, but the property had been wasted and divided. His forefathers had held office of high distinction, but had fallen away as the new wealth of the bankers and traders increased in Florence. He himself inherited a small property in San Casciano and its neighbourhood, which assured him a sufficient, if somewhat lean, independence. Of his education we know little enough. He was well acquainted with Latin, and knew, perhaps, Greek enough to serve his turn. 'Rather not without letters than lettered,' Varchi describes him. That he was not loaded down with learned reading proved probably a great advantage. The coming of the French, and the expulsion of the Medici, the proclamation of the Republic (1494), and later the burning of Savonarola convulsed Florence and threw open many public offices. It has been suggested, but without much foundation, that some clerical work was found for Machiavelli in 1494 or even earlier. It is certain that on July 14, 1498, he was appointed Chancellor and Secretary to the Dieci di Libertà e Pace, an office which he held till the close of his political life at fall of the Republic in 1512.

Machiavelli was born on May 3, 1469. His lifespan nearly coincided with that of Cardinal Wolsey. He came from the old and noble Tuscan family of Montespertoli, whose members were craftsmen in the eleventh century. He inherited their coat of arms, but their wealth had been squandered and fragmented. His ancestors had held high-ranking positions, but as the new wealth of bankers and traders grew in Florence, they lost their status. Machiavelli inherited a modest property in San Casciano and the surrounding area, which provided him with a basic, albeit meager, independence. We know little about his education. He was well-versed in Latin and probably knew just enough Greek to get by. "Better somewhat educated than fully lettered," Varchi describes him. His lack of heavy scholarly reading likely turned out to be a great advantage. The arrival of the French, the expulsion of the Medici, the declaration of the Republic in 1494, and later the execution of Savonarola caused turmoil in Florence and opened up many government positions. It has been suggested, though without much evidence, that Machiavelli might have done some clerical work in 1494 or even earlier. However, it's clear that on July 14, 1498, he was appointed Chancellor and Secretary to the Dieci di Libertà e Pace, a position he held until the end of his political career with the fall of the Republic in 1512.

Official Life.

Official Life.

The functions of his Council were extremely varied, and in the hands of their Secretary became yet more diversified. They represented in some sense the Ministry for Home, Military, and especially for Foreign Affairs. It is impossible to give any full account of Machiavelli's official duties. He wrote many thousands of despatches and official letters, which are still preserved. He was on constant errands of State through the Florentine dominions. But his diplomatic missions and what he learned by them make the main interest of his office. His first adventure of importance was to the Court of Caterina Sforza, the Lady of Forlì, in which matter that astute Countess entirely bested the teacher of all diplomatists to be. In 1500 he smelt powder at the siege at Pisa, and was sent to France to allay the irritations of Louis XII. Many similar and lesser missions follow. The results are in no case of great importance, but the opportunities to the Secretary of learning men and things, intrigue and policy, the Court and the gutter were invaluable. At the camp of Cæsar Borgia, in 1502, he found in his host that fantastic hero whom he incarnated in The Prince, and he was practically an eye-witness of the amazing masterpiece, the Massacre of Sinigaglia. The next year he is sent to Rome with a watching brief at the election of Julius II., and in 1506 is again sent to negotiate with the Pope. An embassy to the Emperor Maximilian, a second mission to the French King at Blois, in which he persuades Louis XII. to postpone the threatened General Council of the Church (1511), and constant expeditions to report upon and set in order unrestful towns and provinces did not fulfil his activity. His pen was never idle. Reports, despatches, elaborate monographs on France, Germany, or wherever he might be, and personal letters innumerable, and even yet unpublished, ceased not night nor day. Detail, wit, character-drawing, satire, sorrow, bitterness, all take their turn. But this was only a fraction of his work. By duty and by expediency he was bound to follow closely the internal politics of Florence where his enemies and rivals abounded. And in all these years he was pushing forward and carrying through with unceasing and unspeakable vigour the great military dream of his life, the foundation of a National Militia and the extinction of Mercenary Companies. But the fabric he had fancied and thought to have built proved unsubstantial. The spoilt half-mutinous levies whom he had spent years in odious and unwilling training failed him at the crowning moment in strength and spirit: and the fall of the Republic implied the fall of Machiavelli and the close of his official life. He struggled hard to save himself, but the wealthy classes were against him, perhaps afraid of him, and on them the Medici relied. For a year he was forbidden to leave Florentine territory, and for a while was excluded from the Palazzo. Later his name was found in a list of Anti-Medicean conspirators. He was arrested and decorously tortured with six turns of the rack, and then liberated for want of evidence.

The functions of his Council were quite diverse, and under the direction of their Secretary, they became even more varied. They essentially represented the Ministry for Domestic, Military, and especially Foreign Affairs. It's hard to provide a complete account of Machiavelli's official responsibilities. He wrote thousands of dispatches and official letters that are still preserved today. He was constantly on state missions throughout the Florentine territories. However, his diplomatic missions and what he learned from them are the most interesting aspects of his role. His first significant assignment was to the court of Caterina Sforza, the Lady of Forlì, where that clever Countess outsmarted the future master diplomat entirely. In 1500, he experienced battle during the siege of Pisa and was sent to France to ease tensions with Louis XII. Many similar and minor missions followed. The outcomes were not particularly significant, but the chances for the Secretary to learn about people and events, intrigue and policy, the court and the streets were invaluable. At the camp of Cæsar Borgia in 1502, he encountered the extraordinary figure he later portrayed in The Prince, and he was practically an eye-witness to the incredible event known as the Massacre of Sinigaglia. The following year he was sent to Rome to observe the election of Julius II, and in 1506 he was again dispatched to negotiate with the Pope. An embassy to Emperor Maximilian, a second mission to the French King at Blois, where he convinced Louis XII to delay the proposed General Council of the Church (1511), along with continuous trips to report on and manage unrest in towns and provinces, were just a part of his activities. He was always writing. His reports, dispatches, detailed essays on France, Germany, or wherever he found himself, countless personal letters, many still unpublished, never ceased day or night. He included detail, wit, character sketches, satire, sorrow, and bitterness in turn. Yet, this was only a fraction of his work. By obligation and necessity, he had to closely monitor the internal politics of Florence, where he had many enemies and rivals. During all these years, he was tirelessly pursuing his lifelong military ambition to establish a National Militia and eliminate Mercenary Companies. However, the structure he envisioned and thought he had built turned out to be insubstantial. The poorly trained, semi-mutinous troops he had spent years reluctantly training let him down at the critical moment in both strength and spirit: the fall of the Republic signified the fall of Machiavelli and the end of his official career. He fought hard to save himself, but the wealthy classes were against him, possibly fearing him, and they were relied upon by the Medici. For a year, he was prohibited from leaving Florentine territory and was temporarily excluded from the Palazzo. Later, his name appeared on a list of anti-Medici conspirators. He was arrested and appropriately tortured with six turns of the rack before being released due to lack of evidence.

After his Fall.

After his downfall.

For perhaps a year after his release the Secretary engaged in a series of tortuous intrigues to gain the favour of the Medici. Many of the stories may be exaggerated, but none make pleasant reading, and nothing proved successful. His position was miserable. Temporarily crippled by torture, out of favour with the Government, shunned by his friends, in deep poverty, burdened with debt and with a wife and four children, his material circumstances were ill enough. But, worse still, he was idle. He had deserved well of the Republic, and had never despaired of it, and this was his reward. He seemed to himself a broken man. He had no great natural dignity, no great moral strength. He profoundly loved and admired Dante, but he could not for one moment imitate him. He sought satisfaction in sensuality of life and writing, but found no comfort. Great things were stirring in the world and he had neither part nor lot in them. By great good fortune he began a correspondence with his friend Francesco Vettori, the Medicean Ambassador at Rome, to whom he appeals for his good offices: 'And if nothing can be done, I must live as I came into the world, for I was born poor and learnt to want before learning to enjoy.' Before long these two diplomats had co-opted themselves into a kind of Secret Cabinet of Europe. It is a strange but profoundly interesting correspondence, both politically and personally. Nothing is too great or too small, too glorious or too mean for their pens. Amid foolish anecdotes and rather sordid love affairs the politics of Europe, and especially of Italy, are dissected and discussed. Leo X. had now plunged into political intrigue. Ferdinand of Spain was in difficulty. France had allied herself with Venice. The Swiss are the Ancient Romans, and may conquer Italy. Then back again, or rather constant throughout, the love intrigues and the 'likely wench hard-by who may help to pass our time.' But through it all there is an ache at Machiavelli's heart, and on a sudden he will break down, crying,

For about a year after he was released, the Secretary got involved in a series of complicated schemes to win the favor of the Medici. Some of the stories might be exaggerated, but none are pleasant to read, and nothing he tried was successful. His situation was dire. He was physically weakened by torture, out of favor with the government, avoided by his friends, living in deep poverty, burdened by debt, and had a wife and four children to support. His material conditions were bad enough. But even worse, he was idle. He had served the Republic well, had never lost hope in it, and this was his reward. He felt like a broken man. He didn’t have much natural dignity or moral strength. He deeply loved and admired Dante, but he couldn’t mimic him even for a moment. He sought satisfaction in the pleasures of life and writing, but found no solace. Big events were happening in the world, and he had no part in any of them. Luckily, he started a correspondence with his friend Francesco Vettori, the Medici Ambassador in Rome, to whom he appealed for help: 'And if nothing can be done, I must live as I came into the world, for I was born poor and learned to want before learning to enjoy.' Before long, these two diplomats formed a sort of Secret Cabinet of Europe. It was a strange but deeply interesting correspondence, both politically and personally. Nothing was too big or too small, too glorious or too trivial for their letters. Among silly anecdotes and somewhat sordid love affairs, they dissected and discussed the politics of Europe, especially those of Italy. Leo X. was now deeply involved in political intrigue. Ferdinand of Spain was facing difficulties. France had allied with Venice. The Swiss were like the Ancient Romans and might conquer Italy. Then back to the love intrigues and the ‘likely wench nearby who could help pass the time.’ But throughout all of this, Machiavelli felt a deep ache in his heart, and suddenly, he would break down, crying,

Però se aleuna volta io rido e canto

Però se qualche volta io rido e canto

Facciol, perchè non ho se non quest' una

Facciol, why do I have only this one?

Via da sfogare il mio angoscioso pianto.

Via da sfogare il mio angoscioso pianto.

Vettori promised much, but nothing came of it. By 1515 the correspondence died away, and the Ex-Secretary found for himself at last the true pathway through his vale of years.

Vettori promised a lot, but nothing came of it. By 1515, the communication faded, and the former Secretary finally discovered the real path through his years.

The true Life.

The real life.

The remainder of Machiavelli's life is bounded by his books. He settled at his villa at San Casciano, where he spent his day as he describes in the letter quoted at the beginning of this essay. In 1518 he began to attend the meetings of the Literary Club in the Orti Oricellarii, and made new and remarkable friends. 'Era amato grandamente da loro ... e della sua conversazione si dilettavano maravigliosamente, tenendo in prezzo grandissimo tutte l'opere sue,' which shows the personal authority he exercised. Occasionally he was employed by Florentine merchants to negotiate for them at Venice, Genoa, Lucca, and other places. In 1519 Cardinal Medici deigned to consult him as to the Government, and commissioned him to write the History of Florence. But in the main he wrote his books and lived the daily life we know. In 1525 he went to Rome to present his History to Clement VII., and was sent on to Guicciardini. In 1526 he was busy once more with military matters and the fortification of Florence. On the 22nd of June 1527 he died at Florence immediately after the establishment of the second Republic. He had lived as a practising Christian, and so died, surrounded by his wife and family. Wild legends grew about his death, but have no foundation. A peasant clod in San Casciano could not have made a simpler end. He was buried in the family Chapel in Santa Croce, and a monument was there at last erected with the epitaph by Doctor Ferroni—'Tanto nomini nullum par elogium.' The first edition of his complete works was published in 1782, and was dedicated to Lord Cowper.

The rest of Machiavelli's life is defined by his writings. He settled at his villa in San Casciano, where he spent his days as he describes in the letter at the beginning of this essay. In 1518, he began attending the gatherings of the Literary Club in the Orti Oricellarii, where he made new and remarkable friends. 'He was greatly loved by them... and they greatly enjoyed his conversation, holding all his works in very high regard,' which reflects the personal influence he had. Occasionally, Florentine merchants would hire him to negotiate on their behalf in Venice, Genoa, Lucca, and other locations. In 1519, Cardinal Medici took the time to consult him about the government and commissioned him to write the History of Florence. But mainly, he wrote his books and lived the daily life we know. In 1525, he went to Rome to present his History to Clement VII and was sent on to Guicciardini. In 1526, he was again involved with military matters and the fortification of Florence. On June 22, 1527, he passed away in Florence just after the establishment of the second Republic. He had lived as a practicing Christian and died surrounded by his wife and family. Wild legends emerged about his death, but they have no basis in fact. A simple peasant in San Casciano could not have had a more straightforward end. He was buried in the family chapel in Santa Croce, and a monument was eventually erected there with the epitaph by Doctor Ferroni—'Such a name deserves no less a tribute.' The first edition of his complete works was published in 1782 and was dedicated to Lord Cowper.

His Character.

His Persona.

What manner of man was Machiavelli at home and in the market-place? It is hard to say. There are doubtful busts, the best, perhaps, that engraved in the 'Testina' edition of 1550, so-called on account of the portrait. 'Of middle height, slender figure, with sparkling eyes, dark hair, rather a small head, a slightly aquiline nose, a tightly closed mouth: all about him bore the impress of a very acute observer and thinker, but not that of one able to wield much influence over others.' Such is a reconstruction of him by one best able to make one. 'In his conversation,' says Varchi, 'Machiavelli was pleasant, serviceable to his friends, a friend of virtuous men, and, in a word, worthy to have received from Nature either less genius or a better mind.' If not much above the moral standard of the day he was certainly not below it. His habits were loose and his language lucid and licentious. But there is no bad or even unkind act charged against him. To his honesty and good faith he very fairly claims that his poverty bears witness. He was a kind, if uncertain, husband and a devoted father. His letters to his children are charming. Here is one written soon before his death to his little son Guido.—'Guido, my darling son, I received a letter of thine and was delighted with it, particularly because you tell me of your full recovery, the best news I could have. If God grants life to us both I expect to make a good man of you, only you must do your fair share yourself.' Guido is to stick to his books and music, and if the family mule is too fractious, 'Unbridle him, take off the halter and turn him loose at Montepulciano. The farm is large, the mule is small, so no harm can come of it. Tell your mother, with my love, not to be nervous. I shall surely be home before any trouble comes. Give a kiss to Baccina, Piero, and Totto: I wish I knew his eyes were getting well. Be happy and spend as little as you may. Christ have you in his keeping.'—There is nothing exquisite or divinely delicate in this letter, but there are many such, and they were not written by a bad man, any more than the answers they evoke were addressed to one. There is little more save of a like character that is known of Machiavelli the man. But to judge him and his work we must have some knowledge of the world in which he was to move and have his being.

What kind of man was Machiavelli at home and in the market? It's hard to say. There are questionable busts, the best, perhaps, being the one in the 'Testina' edition of 1550, named after the portrait. 'Of average height, slender build, with bright eyes, dark hair, a rather small head, a slightly hooked nose, and a tightly closed mouth: everything about him suggested a very keen observer and thinker, but not one able to influence others much.' This is a reconstruction by someone who could accurately do so. 'In conversation,' says Varchi, 'Machiavelli was pleasant, helpful to his friends, a supporter of virtuous people, and, in short, someone who deserved either less genius or a better mind from Nature.' While he wasn't far above the moral standards of his time, he certainly wasn't below them either. He had loose habits, and his language was clear and somewhat inappropriate. But there are no accusations of bad or even unkind acts against him. He justifiably claims that his poverty is evidence of his honesty and good faith. He was a caring, if unreliable, husband and a devoted father. His letters to his children are delightful. Here’s one written shortly before his death to his little son, Guido: 'Guido, my darling son, I received your letter and was thrilled with it, especially because you told me about your full recovery, which is the best news I could have. If God keeps us both alive, I hope to raise you to be a good man, but you have to do your part too.' Guido is advised to focus on his studies and music, and if the family mule is too difficult, 'Unbridle him, take off the halter, and let him roam free at Montepulciano. The farm is big, and the mule is small, so nothing will go wrong. Tell your mother, with my love, not to worry. I’ll definitely be home before any trouble arises. Give a kiss to Baccina, Piero, and Totto: I hope to hear that his eyes are getting better. Be happy and spend as little as possible. May Christ watch over you.'—There’s nothing exquisite or extraordinarily delicate in this letter, but there are many like it, and they were not written by a bad man, just as the replies they provoke were not addressed to one. There’s not much more known about Machiavelli as a person that isn’t of a similar nature. But to evaluate him and his work, we must have some understanding of the world he lived in and operated within.


State of Italy.

Italy's status.

At the beginning of the sixteenth century Italy was rotten to the core. In the close competition of great wickedness the Vicar of Christ easily carried off the palm, and the Court of Alexander VI. was probably the wickedest meeting-place of men that has ever existed upon earth. No virtue, Christian or Pagan, was there to be found; little art that was not sensuous or sensual. It seemed as if Bacchus and Venus and Priapus had come to their own again, and yet Rome had not ceased to call herself Christian.

At the start of the sixteenth century, Italy was deeply corrupt. In the fierce rivalry of extreme immorality, the Pope stood out as the worst, and the Court of Alexander VI was likely the most depraved gathering of people in history. There was no virtue, whether Christian or Pagan, to be found; and little art that wasn’t about sensuality or hedonism. It felt as if Bacchus, Venus, and Priapus had reclaimed their influence, yet Rome still identified as Christian.

Superstition.

Superstition.

'Owing to the evil ensample of the Papal Court,' writes Machiavelli, 'Italy has lost all piety and all religion: whence follow infinite troubles and disorders; for as religion implies all good, so its absence implies the contrary. To the Church and priests of Rome we owe another even greater disaster which is the cause of her ruin. I mean that the Church has maintained, and still maintains Italy divided.' The Papacy is too weak to unite and rule, but strong enough to prevent others doing so, and is always ready to call in the foreigner to crush all Italians to the foreigner's profit, and Guicciardini, a high Papal officer, commenting on this, adds, 'It would be impossible to speak so ill of the Roman Court, but that more abuse should not be merited, seeing it is an infamy, and example of all the shames and scandals of the world.' The lesser clergy, the monks, the nuns followed, with anxious fidelity, the footsteps of their shepherds. There was hardly a tonsure in Italy which covered more than thoughts and hopes of lust and avarice. Religion and morals which God had joined together, were set by man a thousand leagues asunder. Yet religion still sat upon the alabaster throne of Peter, and in the filthy straw of the meanest Calabrian confessional. And still deeper remained a blind devoted superstition. Vitellozzo Vitelli, as Machiavelli tells us, while being strangled by Cæesar Borgia's assassin, implored his murderer to procure for him the absolution of that murderer's father. Gianpaolo Baglioni, who reigned by parricide and lived in incest, was severely blamed by the Florentines for not killing Pope Julius II. when the latter was his guest at Perugia. And when Gabrino Fondato, the tyrant of Cremona, was on the scaffold, his only regret was that when he had taken his guests, the Pope and Emperor, to the top of the Cremona tower, four hundred feet high, his nerve failed him and he did not push them both over. Upon this anarchy of religion, morals, and conduct breathed suddenly the inspiring breath of Pagan antiquity which seemed to the Italian mind to find its finest climax in tyrannicide. There is no better instance than in the plot of the Pazzi at Florence. Francesco Pazzi and Bernardo Bandini decided to kill Lorenzo and Giuliano de' Medici in the cathedral at the moment of the elevation of the Host. They naturally took the priest into their confidence. They escorted Giuliano to the Duomo, laughing and talking, and playfully embraced him—to discover if he wore armour under his clothes. Then they killed him at the moment appointed.

"Owing to the corrupt example set by the Papal Court," writes Machiavelli, "Italy has lost all sense of piety and religion, leading to endless troubles and chaos; for as religion represents all that is good, its absence signifies the opposite. We owe the Church and the priests of Rome another even greater disaster that is causing their ruin. I mean that the Church has kept, and continues to keep, Italy divided." The Papacy is too weak to unite and govern, but strong enough to stop anyone else from doing so, always ready to invite outsiders to crush Italians for the benefit of those outsiders. Guicciardini, a high-ranking Papal official, comments on this, saying, "It would be impossible to speak poorly of the Roman Court without it deserving even more criticism, as it is a disgrace and a prime example of every shame and scandal in the world." The lesser clergy, the monks, and the nuns followed closely, with anxious loyalty, in the footsteps of their leaders. There was hardly a tonsure in Italy that concealed anything more than thoughts and hopes of lust and greed. Religion and morals, which God had linked together, were set a thousand miles apart by man. Yet religion still occupied the alabaster throne of Peter and the filthy straw of the humblest Calabrian confessional. And still deeper lay a blind, devoted superstition. Vitellozzo Vitelli, as Machiavelli tells us, while being strangled by Cesare Borgia's assassin, begged his killer to ask for forgiveness from that murderer’s father. Gianpaolo Baglioni, who came to power through murder and lived in incest, was heavily criticized by the Florentines for not killing Pope Julius II when the latter was his guest in Perugia. And when Gabrino Fondato, the tyrant of Cremona, was on the scaffold, his only regret was that when he had taken his guests, the Pope and the Emperor, to the top of the Cremona tower, four hundred feet high, he lost his nerve and did not push them over. Amid this anarchy of religion, morals, and behavior, the inspiring essence of Pagan antiquity suddenly breathed life into the Italian imagination, which seemed to reach its peak in the idea of killing tyrants. A prime example of this is the Pazzi conspiracy in Florence. Francesco Pazzi and Bernardo Bandini planned to kill Lorenzo and Giuliano de' Medici in the cathedral at the moment of the elevation of the Host. Naturally, they brought the priest into their confidence. They accompanied Giuliano to the Duomo, laughing and chatting, playfully embracing him to check if he wore armor under his clothes. Then they killed him at the appointed moment.

Pagan influence.

Paganism's impact.

Nor were there any hills from which salvation might be looked for. Philosophy, poetry, science, expressed themselves in terms of materialism. Faith and hope are ever the last survivors in the life of a man or of a nation. But in Italy these brave comforters were at their latest breath. It is perhaps unfair to accept in full the judgment of Northern travellers. The conditions, training, needs of England and Germany were different. In these countries courage was a necessity, and good faith a paying policy. Subtlety could do little against a two-handed sword in the hands of an angry or partially intoxicated giant. Climate played its part as well as culture, and the crude pleasures and vices of the North seemed fully as loathsome to the refined Italian as did the tortuous policy and the elaborate infamies of the South to their rough invaders. Alone, perhaps, among the nations of Europe the Italians had never understood or practised chivalry, save in such select and exotic schools as the Casa Gioiosa under Vittorino da Feltre at Mantua. The oath of Arthur's knights would have seemed to them mere superfluity of silliness. Onore connoted credit, reputation, and prowess. Virtù, which may be roughly translated as mental ability combined with personal daring, set the standard and ruled opinion. 'Honour in the North was subjective: Onore in Italy objective.' Individual liberty, indeed, was granted in full to all, at the individual's risk. The love of beauty curbed grossness and added distinction. Fraud became an art and force a science. There is liberty for all, but for the great ones there is licence. And when the day of trial comes, it is the Churchmen and the Princes who can save neither themselves nor man, nor thing that is theirs. To such a world was Machiavelli born. To whom should he turn? To the People? To the Church? To the Princes and Despots? But hear him:—

There were no hills from which salvation could be expected. Philosophy, poetry, and science expressed themselves in materialistic terms. Faith and hope are always the last things to fade in a person's or a nation's life. But in Italy, these brave comforts were at their last gasp. It's probably unfair to fully accept the opinions of Northern travelers. The conditions, training, and needs of England and Germany were different. In those places, courage was essential, and honesty had its rewards. Subtlety was of little use against a two-handed sword wielded by an angry or partially drunk giant. Climate influenced matters just as much as culture, and the crude pleasures and vices of the North were just as repulsive to the refined Italian as the twisted politics and elaborate deceptions of the South were to their rough invaders. Perhaps uniquely among European nations, Italians had never grasped or practiced chivalry, except in a few select and foreign institutions like the Casa Gioiosa under Vittorino da Feltre in Mantua. The oath of Arthur's knights would have seemed to them a silly excess. Onore meant credit, reputation, and skill. Virtù, which could be roughly translated as a mix of intelligence and personal bravery, set the standard and shaped public opinion. 'Honor in the North was subjective: Onore in Italy was objective.' Individual freedom was given fully to everyone, but at the individual's own risk. A love of beauty controlled vulgarity and added refinement. Deception became an art, and force became a science. There is freedom for all, but for the powerful, there is license. And when the time of trial arrives, it's the Churchmen and the Princes who can save neither themselves nor anyone or anything they possess. Into such a world, Machiavelli was born. Who should he turn to? The People? The Church? The Princes and Despots? But listen to him:—

'There shall never be found any good mason, which will beleeve to be able to make a faire image of a peece of marble ill hewed, but verye well of a rude peece. Our Italian Princes beleeved, before they tasted the blowes of the outlandish warre, that it should suffice a Prince to know by writinges, how to make a subtell aunswere, to write a goodly letter, to shewe in sayinges, and in woordes, witte and promptenesse, to know how to canvas a fraude, to decke themselves with precious stones and gold, to sleepe and to eate with greater glory then other: To kepe many lascivious persons about them, to governe themselves with their subjects, covetously and proudely: To roote in idlenes, to give the degrees of the exercise of warre for good will, to dispise if any should have shewed them any laudable waie, minding that their wordes should bee aunswers of oracles: nor the sely wretches were not aware that they prepared themselves to be a pray to whome so ever should assaulte them. Hereby grew then in the thousand fowre hundred and nintie and fowre yere, the great feares, the sodaine flightes and the marveilous losses: and so three most mighty states which were in Italie, have bene dievers times sacked and destroyed. But that which is worse, is where those that remaine, continue in the very same errour, and liev in the verie same disorder and consider not, that those who in olde time would keepe their states, caused to be done these thinges, which of me hath beene reasoned, and that their studies were, to prepare the body to diseases, and the minde not to feare perills. Whereby grewe that Cæsar, Alexander, and all those men and excellent Princes in olde time, were the formost amongst the fighters, going armed on foote: and if they lost their state, they would loose their life, so that they lievd and died vertuously.'

A skilled mason knows he can create a beautiful statue from a rough piece of marble, but not from a poorly shaped one. Our Italian princes once believed, before confronting the harsh realities of foreign wars, that knowing how to give clever responses in writing, compose elegant letters, express wit and quick thinking in conversation, scheme effectively, adorn themselves with precious stones and gold, and enjoy life more gloriously than others was enough. They surrounded themselves with immoral people, ruled their subjects greedily and arrogantly, remained idle, awarded military titles out of generosity, and dismissed anyone who tried to offer sensible advice, thinking those voices should be seen as prophetic. These naive individuals didn’t realize they were making themselves vulnerable to attackers. As a result, in 1494, there were great fears, sudden retreats, and overwhelming losses, leading to the repeated sacking and destruction of three of the most powerful states in Italy. Worse still, those who remain continue to make the same mistakes, living in chaos and failing to understand that those who wanted to preserve their states back then had taken the very measures I mentioned, preparing their bodies for illness and their minds to face dangers. This is how Caesar, Alexander, and other great leaders of ancient times were among the best fighters, going into battle on foot; and if they lost their state, they would lose their lives, meaning they lived and died with honor.

Such was the clay that waited the moulding of the potter's hand. 'Posterity, that high court of appeal, which is never tired of eulogising its own justice and discernment,' has recorded harsh sentence on the Florentine. It is better to-day to let him speak for himself.

Such was the clay that awaited the shaping of the potter's hand. 'Future generations, that esteemed judge, which is never tired of praising its own fairness and insight,' has delivered a harsh verdict on the Florentine. It's better today to let him speak for himself.

The Prince.

The Prince.

The slender volume of The Prince has probably produced wider discussion, more bitter controversy, more varied interpretations and a deeper influence than any book save Holy Writ. Kings and statesmen, philosophers and theologians, monarchists and republicans have all and always used or abused it for their purposes. Written in 1513, the first year of Machiavelli's disgrace, concurrently with part of the Discorsi, which contain the germs of it, the book represents the fulness of its author's thought and experience. It was not till after Machiavelli's death, that it was published in 1532, by order of Clement VII. Meanwhile, however, in manuscript it had been widely read and favourably received.

The slim book The Prince has sparked more discussion, intense debate, diverse interpretations, and a greater impact than almost any book except the Bible. Kings and politicians, philosophers and theologians, monarchists and republicans have all used or misused it for their agendas. Written in 1513, the same year Machiavelli fell from grace, alongside parts of the Discorsi, which contain its foundational ideas, the book showcases the fullness of its author's thoughts and experiences. It wasn't published until after Machiavelli died in 1532, at the request of Clement VII. In the meantime, though, it had been widely read and well-received in manuscript form.

Its purpose.

Its purpose.

The mere motive of its creation and dedication has been the theme of many volumes. Machiavelli was poor, was idle, was out of favour, and therefore, though a Republican, wrote a devilish hand-book of tyranny to strengthen the Medici and recover his position. Machiavelli, a loyal Republican, wrote a primer of such fiendish principles as might lure the Medici to their ruin. Machiavelli's one idea was to ruin the rich: Machiavelli's one idea was to oppress the poor: he was a Protestant, a Jesuit, an Atheist: a Royalist and a Republican. And the book published by one Pope's express authority was utterly condemned and forbidden, with all its author's works, by the express command of another (1559). But before facing the whirlwind of savage controversy which raged and rages still about The Prince, it may be well to consider shortly the book itself—consider it as a new book and without prejudice. The purpose of its composition is almost certainly to be found in the plain fact that Machiavelli, a politician and a man of letters, wished to write a book upon the subject which had been his special study and lay nearest to his business and bosom. To ensure prominence for such a book, to engage attention and incidentally perhaps to obtain political employment for himself, he dedicated it to Lorenzo de' Medici, the existing and accepted Chief of the State. But far and above such lighter motives stood the fact that he saw in Lorenzo the only man who might conceivably bring to being the vast dream of patriotism which the writer had imagined. The subject he proposed to himself was largely, though not wholly, conditioned by the time and place in which he lived. He wrote for his countrymen and he wrote for his own generation. He had heard with his ears and seen with his eyes the alternate rending anarchy and moaning paralysis of Italy. He had seen what Agricola had long before been spared the sight of. And what he saw, he saw not through a glass darkly or distorted, but in the whitest, driest light, without flinching and face to face. 'We are much beholden,' writes Bacon, 'to Machiavelli and others that wrote what men do, and not what they ought to do.' He did not despair of Italy, he did not despair even of Italian unity. But he despaired of what he saw around him, and he was willing at almost any price to end it. He recognised, despite the nominal example of Venice, that a Republican system was impossible, and that the small Principalities and Free Cities were corrupt beyond hope of healing. A strong central unifying government was imperative, and at that day such government could only be vested in a single man. For it must ever be closely remembered, as will be pointed out again, that throughout the book the Prince is what would now be called the Government. And then he saw with faithful prophecy, in the splendid peroration of his hope, a hope deferred for near four hundred years, he saw beyond the painful paths of blood and tyranny, a vision of deliverance and union. For at least it is plain that in all things Machiavelli was a passionate patriot, and Amo la patria mia più dell' anima is found in one of the last of many thousand letters that his untiring pen had written.

The simple reason for its creation and dedication has been the topic of many books. Machiavelli was poor, idle, and out of favor. So, despite being a Republican, he wrote a chilling manual of tyranny to empower the Medici and regain his position. Machiavelli, a true Republican, wrote a guide filled with wicked principles that could lead the Medici to their downfall. Machiavelli's main idea was to ruin the wealthy; his other idea was to oppress the poor. He was viewed as a Protestant, a Jesuit, an Atheist, a Royalist, and a Republican. The book, published under the express authority of one Pope, was completely condemned and banned, along with all of the author's works, by the direct order of another (1559). But before confronting the storm of fierce debate that surrounded and still surrounds The Prince, it might be useful to briefly examine the book itself—consider it as a new work and without bias. The reason for its writing is almost certainly found in the fact that Machiavelli, a politician and writer, wanted to create a book about a subject he had closely studied and that was central to his life and work. To give such a book visibility, to draw attention, and perhaps to secure political employment for himself, he dedicated it to Lorenzo de' Medici, the current and recognized leader of the State. However, much more important than those lighter motives was his belief that Lorenzo was the only person capable of realizing the grand vision of patriotism that Machiavelli had imagined. The subject he chose was largely shaped, though not entirely, by the time and place he lived in. He wrote for his fellow countrymen and for his generation. He had heard and seen the ongoing chaos and debilitating paralysis that plagued Italy. He witnessed what Agricola had previously been spared from seeing. And what he saw was clear and unfiltered, not through a distorted lens but in the starkest light, without flinching and face to face. “We owe much,” writes Bacon, “to Machiavelli and others who wrote about what people do, not what they should do.” He did not lose hope for Italy and even for Italian unity. But he was disheartened by what he observed around him and was willing to pay almost any price to change it. He recognized, despite the nominal example of Venice, that a Republican system was unattainable and that the small principalities and free cities were hopelessly corrupt. A strong, central, unifying government was essential, which at that time could only be led by a single individual. It’s important to remember, as will be pointed out again, that throughout the book, the Prince is what we would now refer to as the Government. He then foresaw, with unwavering vision, in the triumphant conclusion of his hopes—a hope delayed for nearly four hundred years—a glimpse of freedom and unity beyond the brutal roads of bloodshed and tyranny. For it is clear that in all things, Machiavelli was a devoted patriot, and Amo la patria mia più dell' anima is found in one of the last of the many thousands of letters his tireless hand had written.

The purpose, then, of The Prince is to lay down rules, within the possibilities of the time, for the making of a man who shall create, increase, and maintain a strong and stable government. This is done in the main by a plain presentation of facts, a presentation condensed and critical but based on men and things as they actually were. The ethical side is wholly omitted: the social and economical almost entirely. The aspect is purely political, with the underlying thought, it may be supposed, that under the postulated government, all else will prosper.

The aim of The Prince is to establish rules, given the realities of the time, for creating, expanding, and sustaining a strong and stable government. This is largely achieved through a straightforward presentation of facts that is concise and critical, grounded in the true nature of people and events. Ethical considerations are completely left out, while social and economic factors are mostly ignored. The focus is strictly political, with the underlying assumption that everything else will thrive under the proposed government.

The Book; New States.

The Book; New States.

Machiavelli opens by discussing the various forms of governments, which he divides into Republics and Principalities. Of the latter some may be hereditary and some acquired. Of hereditary states he says little and quotes but one, the Duchy of Ferrara. He then turns to his true subject, the acquisition and preservation of States wholly new or new in part, States such as he saw himself on every side around him. Having gained possession of a new State, he says, you must first extirpate the family of your predecessor. You should then either reside or plant colonies, but not trust to garrisons. 'Colonies are not costly to the Prince, are more faithful and cause less offence to the subject States: those whom they may injure being poor and scattered, are prevented from doing mischief. For it should be observed that men ought either to be caressed or trampled out, seeing that small injuries may be avenged, whereas great ones destroy the possibility of retaliation: and so the damage that has to be inflicted ought to be such that it need involve no fear of reprisals.' There is perhaps in all Machiavelli no better example of his lucid scientific method than this passage. There is neither excuse nor hypocrisy. It is merely a matter of business calculation. Mankind is the raw material, the State is the finished work. Further you are to conciliate your neighbours who are weak and abase the strong, and you must not let the stranger within your gates. Above all look before as well as after and think not to leave it to time, godere li benefici del tempo, but, as did the Romans, strike and strike at once. For illustration he criticises, in a final and damning analysis, the career of Louis XII. in Italy. There was no canon of statecraft so absolute that the King did not ignore it, and in inevitable Nemesis, there was no ultimate disaster so crowning as not to be achieved.

Machiavelli starts by talking about the different types of governments, which he splits into Republics and Principalities. Some of the Principalities are hereditary while others are acquired. He doesn’t say much about hereditary states, only mentioning the Duchy of Ferrara. Then he shifts to his main topic, which is how to acquire and keep States that are completely new or partially new—States he saw all around him. Once you have taken over a new State, he says, you should first get rid of your predecessor's family. After that, you should either live there or establish colonies, but don't rely on garrisons. "Colonies don't cost much for the ruler, they're more loyal, and they offend the subject States less: those they might harm are usually poor and scattered, which stops them from causing problems. It's important to note that people should either be treated well or crushed, because small harms can be avenged, while large ones eliminate any chance of retaliation. Therefore, the harm that needs to be done should be such that it doesn’t evoke fear of revenge." This passage illustrates Machiavelli's clear scientific approach better than anything else in his work. There’s no excuse or pretense—it's just a business decision. People are the raw material, and the State is the finished product. Additionally, you should win over your weaker neighbors and put down the strong ones, and you must avoid letting outsiders into your territory. Above all, look ahead as well as back, and don't just rely on time, godere li benefici del tempo, like the Romans did—act quickly and decisively. As an example, he harshly critiques the actions of Louis XII in Italy. There was no rule of statecraft that the King didn’t overlook, and in an inevitable twist of fate, there was no disaster so great that it couldn’t befall him.

Conquests.

Victories.

After observing that a feudal monarchy is much less easy of conquest than a despotism, since in the one case you must vanquish many lesser lordships while in the other you merely replace slaves by slaves, Machiavelli considers the best method of subjugating Free Cities. Here again is eminent the terrible composure and the exact truth of his politics. A conquered Free City you may of course rule in person, or you may construct an oligarchy to govern for you, but the only safe way is to destroy it utterly, since 'that name of Liberty, those ancient usages of Freedom,' are things 'which no length of years and no benefits can extinguish in the nation's mind, things which no pains or forethought can uproot unless the citizens be utterly destroyed.'

After noticing that a feudal monarchy is much harder to conquer than a despotism—since in the first case you have to defeat many smaller lords, while in the latter you just replace one set of slaves with another—Machiavelli explores the best way to take control of Free Cities. Here, his unsettling calmness and the precise honesty of his political views stand out. Once you conquer a Free City, you can rule it directly or set up an oligarchy to manage it for you, but the only truly secure method is to completely destroy it. The concept of Liberty and those long-held traditions of Freedom are things that 'no amount of time and no benefits can erase from the nation's consciousness,' and they are things that 'no amount of pain or careful planning can eliminate unless the citizens are completely wiped out.'

Hitherto the discussion has ranged round the material politics of the matter, the acquisition of material power. Machiavelli now turns to the heart of his matter, the proper character and conduct of a new Prince in a new Principality and the ways by which he shall deal most fortunately with friend and foe. For fortune it is, as well as ability, which go to the making of the man and the maintenance of his power.

Until now, the discussion has focused on the material politics of the situation, the gaining of material power. Machiavelli now shifts to the core of his subject—the right character and behavior of a new prince in a new principality, and the ways in which he should effectively interact with both friends and enemies. It is fortune, along with skill, that contributes to the making of a man and the preservation of his power.

Cæsar Borgia.

Caesar Borgia.

In the manner of the day Moses, Cyrus, Romulus, and Theseus are led across the stage in illustration. The common attribute of all such fortunate masters of men was force of arms, while the mission of an unarmed prophet such as Savonarola was foredoomed to failure. In such politics Machiavelli is positive and ruthless: force is and must be the remedy and the last appeal, a principle which indeed no later generation has in practice set at naught. But in the hard dry eyes of the Florentine Secretary stood, above all others, one shining figure, a figure to all other eyes, from then till now, wrapped in mysterious and miasmatic cloud. In the pages of common history he was a tyrant, he was vicious beyond compare, he was cruel beyond the Inquisition, he was false beyond the Father of Lies, he was the Antichrist of Rome and he was a failure: but he was the hero of Niccolò Machiavelli, who, indeed, found in Cæsar Borgia the fine flower of Italian politics in the Age of the Despots. Son of the Pope, a Prince of the Church, a Duke of France, a master of events, a born soldier, diplomatist, and more than half a statesman, Cæsar seemed indeed the darling of gods and men whom original fortune had crowned with inborn ability. Machiavelli knew him as well as it was possible to know a soul so tortuous and secret, and he had been present at the most critical and terrible moments of Cæsar's life. That in despite of a life which the world calls infamous, in despite of the howling execrations of all Christendom, in despite of ultimate and entire failures, Machiavelli could still write years after, 'I know not what lessons I could teach a new Prince more useful than the example of his actions,' exhibits the ineffaceable impressions that Cæsar Borgia had made upon the most subtle and observant mind of modern history.

In the way of the day, Moses, Cyrus, Romulus, and Theseus are shown on stage as examples. The common trait of all these successful leaders was their military might, while the mission of an unarmed prophet like Savonarola was destined to fail. In terms of politics, Machiavelli is clear and uncompromising: force is and must be the solution and the final recourse, a principle that no later generation has disregarded in reality. But in the cold, hard gaze of the Florentine Secretary, one figure stood out above all others, a figure that has been shrouded in a mysterious cloud from then until now. In the pages of conventional history, he was labeled a tyrant, described as exceptionally vicious, crueler than the Inquisition, more deceitful than the Father of Lies, the Antichrist of Rome, and ultimately a failure: yet he was the hero of Niccolò Machiavelli, who found in César Borgia the pinnacle of Italian politics during the Age of the Despots. The son of the Pope, a Prince of the Church, a Duke of France, a master of circumstances, a natural soldier, diplomat, and more than half a statesman, César truly seemed to be favored by both gods and men, equipped with innate talent that fortune had bestowed upon him. Machiavelli understood him as thoroughly as one could understand such a twisted and secretive soul, having witnessed the most critical and terrifying moments of César's life. That despite living an infamous life, facing the furious condemnation of all Christendom, and experiencing complete and utter failures, Machiavelli could still write years later, 'I know not what lessons I could teach a new Prince more useful than the example of his actions,' demonstrates the lasting impact that César Borgia had on the most perceptive and observant mind of modern history.

Cæsar's Career.

Caesar's Career.

Cæsar was the acknowledged son of Pope Alexander by his acknowledged mistress Vannozza dei Cattani. Born in 1472, he was an Archbishop and a Cardinal at sixteen, and the murderer of his elder brother at an age when modern youths are at college. He played his part to the full in the unspeakable scandals of the Vatican, but already 'he spoke little and people feared him.' Ere long the splendours of the Papacy seemed too remote and uncertain for his fierce ambition, and, indeed, through his father, he already wielded both the temporal and the spiritual arms of Peter. To the subtlety of the Italian his Spanish blood had lent a certain stern resolution, and as with Julius and Sulla the lust for sloth and sensuality were quickened by the lust for sway. He unfrocked himself with pleasure. He commenced politician, soldier, and despot. And for the five years preceding Alexander's death he may almost be looked upon as a power in Europe. Invested Duke of Romagna, that hot-bed of petty tyranny and tumult, he repressed disorder through his governor Messer Ramiro with a relentless hand. When order reigned, Machiavelli tells us he walked out one morning into the market-place at Cesena and saw the body of Ramiro, who had borne the odium of reform, lying in two pieces with his head on a lance, and a bloody axe by his side. Cæsar reaped the harvest of Ramiro's severity, and the people recognising his benevolence and justice were 'astounded and satisfied.'

Cæsar was the recognized son of Pope Alexander and his known mistress Vannozza dei Cattani. Born in 1472, he became an Archbishop and a Cardinal at sixteen, and he killed his older brother at an age when modern young men are in college. He fully participated in the shocking scandals of the Vatican, but even then, "he spoke little and people feared him." Soon, the grandeur of the Papacy felt too distant and unsure for his fierce ambition, and indeed, through his father, he already wielded both the political and spiritual powers of Peter. His Spanish blood gave him a certain strong determination on top of the cunning of the Italians, and just like Julius and Sulla, his craving for luxury and indulgence was fueled by his desire for power. He happily cast aside his clerical robes. He became a politician, soldier, and dictator. In the five years leading up to Alexander's death, he can almost be seen as a major force in Europe. As Duke of Romagna, a hotbed of petty tyranny and chaos, he suppressed disorder with an iron fist through his governor Messer Ramiro. When there was order, Machiavelli tells us he walked one morning into the marketplace at Cesena and saw Ramiro’s body, who had been blamed for reforms, lying in two pieces with his head on a lance and a bloody axe beside him. Cæsar reaped the benefits of Ramiro's harshness, and the people, recognizing his kindness and fairness, were "astonished and satisfied."

But the gaze of the Borgia was not bounded by the strait limits of a mere Italian Duchy. Whether indeed there mingled with personal ambition an ideal of a united Italy, swept clean of the barbarians, it is hard to say, though Machiavelli would have us believe it. What is certain is that he desired the supreme dominion in Italy for himself, and to win it spared neither force nor fraud nor the help of the very barbarians themselves. With a decree of divorce and a Cardinal's hat he gained the support of France, the French Duchy of Valentinois, and the sister of the King of Navarre to wife. By largesse of bribery and hollow promises he brought to his side the great families of Rome, his natural enemies, and the great Condottieri with their men-at-arms. When by their aid he had established and extended his government he mistrusted their good faith. With an infinity of fascination and cunning, without haste and without rest, he lured these leaders, almost more cunning than himself, to visit him as friends in his fortress of Sinigaglia. 'I doubt if they will be alive to-morrow morning,' wrote Machiavelli, who was on the spot. He was right. Cæsar caused them to be strangled the same night, while his father dealt equal measure to their colleagues and adherents in Rome. Thenceforth, distrusting mercenaries, he found and disciplined out of a mere rabble, a devoted army of his own, and having unobtrusively but completely extirpated the whole families of those whose thrones he had usurped, not only the present but the future seemed assured to him.

But the ambition of the Borgia extended beyond the narrow confines of a single Italian Duchy. Whether there was a blending of personal ambition with a vision of a united Italy, free from outside influences, is hard to determine, although Machiavelli would want us to believe that. What is clear is that he sought ultimate power in Italy for himself, and to achieve it, he used both force and deceit, even aligning himself with the very outsiders he aimed to control. With a divorce decree and a Cardinal's hat, he secured France's support, the French Duchy of Valentinois, and married the sister of the King of Navarre. Through generous bribes and empty promises, he won over the powerful families of Rome, traditionally his enemies, as well as the great Condottieri and their troops. After establishing and extending his rule with their help, he grew suspicious of their loyalty. With relentless charm and cleverness, he invited these leaders, who were nearly as cunning as he was, to visit him as friends at his fortress in Sinigaglia. "I doubt if they will be alive tomorrow morning," Machiavelli wrote, being present at the scene. He was correct. Cæsar ordered their execution that very night, while his father dealt with their allies in Rome in the same ruthless manner. From then on, distrusting mercenaries, he fashioned and trained a loyal army from a mere mob, and having subtly eliminated the entire families of those whose positions he had taken, both his present and future seemed secure.

He had fulfilled the first of Machiavelli's four conditions. He rapidly achieved the remaining three. He bought the Roman nobles so as to be able to put a bridle in the new 'Pope's mouth.' He bought or poisoned or packed or terrorised the existing College of Cardinals and selected new Princes of the Church who should accept a Pontiff of his choosing. He was effectively strong enough to resist the first onset upon him at his father's death. Five years had been enough for so great an undertaking. One thing alone he had not and indeed could not have foreseen. 'He told me himself on the day on which (Pope) Julius was created, that he had foreseen and provided for everything else that could happen on his father's death, but had never anticipated that, when his father died, he too should have been at death's door.' Even so the fame and splendour of his name for a while maintained his authority against his unnumbered enemies. But soon the great betrayer was betrayed. 'It is well to cheat those who have been masters of treachery,' he had said himself in his hours of brief authority. His wheel had turned full cycle. Within three years his fate, like that of Charles XII., was destined to a foreign strand, a petty fortress, and a dubious hand. Given over to Spain he passed three years obscurely. 'He was struck down in a fight at Viana in Navarre (1507) after a furious resistance: he was stripped of his fine armour by men who did not know his name or quality and his body was left naked on the bare ground, bloody and riddled with wounds. He was only thirty-one.' And so the star of Machiavelli's hopes and dreams was quenched for a season in the clouds from which it came.

He had met the first of Machiavelli's four conditions. He quickly achieved the other three. He bought off the Roman nobles to gain control over the new 'Pope.' He bribed, poisoned, intimidated, or manipulated the existing College of Cardinals and selected new Princes of the Church who would accept a Pontiff of his choice. He was strong enough to withstand the initial challenge after his father's death. Five years had been sufficient for such a significant undertaking. There was only one thing he hadn’t foreseen and truly couldn’t have expected. 'He told me himself on the day Pope Julius was made, that he had anticipated and prepared for everything else that could happen after his father's death, but he never expected that when his father died, he would also be on the brink of death.' Even so, the fame and prestige of his name temporarily held his authority against countless enemies. But soon, the great deceiver was deceived. 'It’s wise to outsmart those who are masters of deceit,' he had said during his brief time in power. His fortune had turned full circle. Within three years, his fate, like that of Charles XII, was destined for a foreign shore, a small fortress, and an uncertain fate. Handed over to Spain, he spent three years in obscurity. 'He was killed in a battle at Viana in Navarre (1507) after a fierce struggle: he was stripped of his beautiful armor by men who did not know his identity or status, and his body was left bare on the ground, bloody and covered in wounds. He was only thirty-one.' Thus, the star of Machiavelli's hopes and dreams was dimmed for a time in the clouds from which it had emerged.

The Lesson.

The Lesson.

It seems worth while to sketch the strange tempestuous career of Cæsar Borgia because in the remaining chapters of The Prince and elsewhere in his writings, it is the thought and memory of Valentinois, transmuted doubtless and idealised by the lapse of years, that largely inform and inspire the perfect Prince of Machiavelli. But it must not be supposed that in life or in mind they were intimate or even sympathetic. Machiavelli criticises his hero liberally and even harshly. But for the work he wanted done he had found no better craftsman and no better example to follow for those that might come after. Morals and religion did not touch the purpose of his arguments except as affecting policy. In policy virtues may be admitted as useful agents and in the chapter following that on Cæsar, entitled, curiously enough, 'Of those who by their crimes come to be Princes,' he lays down that 'to slaughter fellow citizens, to betray friends, to be devoid of honour, pity and religion cannot be counted as merits, for these are means which may lead to power but which confer no glory.' Cruelty he would employ without hesitation but with the greatest care both in degree and in kind. It should be immediate and complete and leave no possibility of counter-revenge. For it is never forgotten by the living, and 'he deceives himself who believes that, with the great, recent benefits cause old wrongs to be forgotten.' On the other hand 'Benefits should be conferred little by little so that they may be more fully relished.' The cruelty proper to a Prince (Government, for as ever they are identical) aims only at authority. Now authority must spring from love or fear. It were best to combine both motives to obedience but you cannot. The Prince must remember that men are fickle, and love at their own pleasure, and that men are fearful and fear at the pleasure of the Prince. Let him therefore depend on what is of himself, not on that which is of others. 'Yet if he win not love he may escape hate, and so it will be if he does not meddle with the property or women-folk of his subjects.' When he must punish let him kill. 'For men will sooner forget the death of their father than the loss of their estate.' And moreover you cannot always go on killing, but a Prince who has once set himself to plundering will never stop. This is the more needful because the only secure foundation of his rule lies in his trust of the people and in their support. And indeed again and again you shall find no more thorough democrat than this teacher of tyrants. 'The people own better broader qualities, fidelities and passions than any Prince and have better cause to show for them.' 'As for prudence and stability, I say that a people is more stable, more prudent, and of better judgment than a Prince.' If the people go wrong it is almost certainly the crime or negligence of the Prince which drives or leads them astray. 'Better far than any number of fortresses is not to be hated by your people.' The support of the people and a national militia make the essential strength of the Prince and of the State.

It seems worthwhile to outline the strange and turbulent life of Cæsar Borgia because in the remaining chapters of The Prince and elsewhere in his writings, it’s his thoughts and memories, transformed and idealized over time, that largely inform and inspire Machiavelli's perfect Prince. However, it shouldn't be assumed that they were close or even sympathetic in life or thought. Machiavelli critiques his hero generously and even harshly. But for the tasks he needed accomplished, he found no better craftsman or example to follow for those who would come after. Morality and religion didn’t influence the purpose of his arguments except as they relate to policy. In policy, virtues can be seen as useful tools, and in the chapter following the one on Cæsar, amusingly titled 'Of those who by their crimes come to be Princes,' he states that 'to kill fellow citizens, to betray friends, and to lack honor, compassion, and religion cannot be considered virtues, as these are means that may lead to power but do not bring glory.' He would use cruelty without hesitation but with great care regarding both its degree and type. It should be swift and complete, leaving no room for retaliation. This is never forgotten by the living, and 'he deceives himself who believes that, with great, recent benefits, old wrongs will be forgotten.' On the flip side, 'Benefits should be given gradually so they can be truly appreciated.' The cruelty essential to a Prince (Government, as they are always the same) aims solely at authority. Authority should arise from either love or fear. It's best to combine both to encourage obedience, but that’s often impossible. The Prince must remember that people are fickle and love at their own convenience, while people are fearful and fear at the Prince's leisure. Therefore, he should rely on what he controls, not what others control. 'Yet if he cannot win love, he may avoid hate, especially if he doesn’t interfere with his subjects' property or women.' When he must punish, he should kill. 'For people will forget a father’s death more quickly than they will forget the loss of their property.' Furthermore, you can’t keep killing indefinitely, but a Prince who begins to loot will never stop. This is crucial because the only solid foundation of his rule is his trust in the people and their support. In fact, again and again, you’ll discover no more thorough democrat than this teacher of tyrants. 'The people possess broader qualities, loyalties, and passions than any Prince and have a better cause to display them.' 'Regarding wisdom and stability, I assert that a people is more stable, wiser, and has better judgment than a Prince.' If the people go astray, it's almost definitely the Prince's crime or negligence that leads them off course. 'Far better than any number of fortresses is to not be hated by your people.' The support of the people and a national militia are the essential strengths of the Prince and the State.

National Defence.

National Defense.

The chapters on military organisation may be more conveniently considered in conjunction with The Art of War. It is enough at present to point out two or three observations of Machiavelli which touch politics from the military side. To his generation they were entirely novel, though mere commonplace to-day. National strength means national stability and national greatness; and this can be achieved, and can only be achieved, by a national army. The Condottiere system, born of sloth and luxury, has proved its rottenness. Your hired general is either a tyrant or a traitor, a bully or a coward. 'In a word the armour of others is too wide or too strait for us: it falls off us, or it weighs us down.' And in a fine illustration he compares auxiliary troops to the armour of Saul which David refused, preferring to fight Goliath with his sling and stone.

The chapters on military organization are best considered alongside The Art of War. For now, it's enough to highlight a couple of points from Machiavelli that relate to politics from a military perspective. At the time, these ideas were completely new, although they seem like common sense today. National strength translates to national stability and greatness, which can only be achieved through a national army. The Condottiere system, born out of laziness and luxury, has shown its flaws. A hired general is either a tyrant or a traitor, a bully or a coward. 'In short, the armor of others is either too loose or too tight for us: it either falls off or weighs us down.' He illustrates this by comparing auxiliary troops to the armor of Saul that David rejected, choosing instead to face Goliath with his sling and stone.

Conduct of the Prince.

Prince's conduct.

Having assured the external security of the State, Machiavelli turns once more to the qualities and conduct of the Prince. So closely packed are these concluding chapters that it is almost impossible to compress them further. The author at the outset states his purpose: 'Since it is my object to write what shall be useful to whosoever understands it, it seems to me better to follow the practical truth of things rather than an imaginary view of them. For many Republics and Princedoms have been imagined that were never seen or known to exist in reality. And the manner in which we live and in which we ought to live, are things so wide asunder that he who suits the one to betake himself to the other is more likely to destroy than to save himself.' Nothing that Machiavelli wrote is more sincere, analytic, positive and ruthless. He operates unflinchingly on an assured diagnosis. The hand never an instant falters, the knife is never blunt. He deals with what is, and not with what ought to be. Should the Prince be all-virtuous, all-liberal, all-humane? Should his word be his bond for ever? Should true religion be the master-passion of his life? Machiavelli considers. The first duty of the Prince (or Government) is to maintain the existence, stability, and prosperity of the State. Now if all the world were perfect so should the Prince be perfect too. But such are not the conditions of human life. An idealising Prince must fall before a practising world. A Prince must learn in self-defence how to be bad, but like Cæsar Borgia, he must be a great judge of occasion. And what evil he does must be deliberate, appropriate, and calculated, and done, not selfishly, but for the good of the State of which he is trustee. There is the power of Law and the power of Force. The first is proper to men, the second to beasts. And that is why Achilles was brought up by Cheiron the Centaur that he might learn to use both natures. A ruler must be half lion and half fox, a fox to discern the toils, a lion to drive off the wolves. Merciful, faithful, humane, religious, just, these he may be and above all should seem to be, nor should any word escape his lips to give the lie to his professions: and in fact he should not leave these qualities but when he must. He should, if possible, practise goodness, but under necessity should know how to pursue evil. He should keep faith until occasion alter, or reason of state compel him to break his pledge. Above all he should profess and observe religion, 'because men in general judge rather by the eye than by the hand, and every one can see but few can touch.' But none the less, must he learn (as did William the Silent, Elizabeth of England, and Henry of Navarre) how to subordinate creed to policy when urgent need is upon him. In a word, he must realise and face his own position, and the facts of mankind and of the world. If not veracious to his conscience, he must be veracious to facts. He must not be bad for badness' sake, but seeing things as they are, must deal as he can to protect and preserve the trust committed to his care. Fortune is still a fickle jade, but at least the half our will is free, and if we are bold we may master her yet. For Fortune is a woman who, to be kept under, must be beaten and roughly handled, and we see that she is more ready to be mastered by those who treat her so, than by those who are shy in their wooing. And always, like a woman, she gives her favours to the young, because they are less scrupulous and fiercer and more audaciously command her to their will.

Having secured the external safety of the state, Machiavelli shifts his focus back to the qualities and behavior of the Prince. These concluding chapters are so densely packed that it’s nearly impossible to summarize them further. The author makes his purpose clear from the beginning: "Since my goal is to write something useful to anyone who understands it, I believe it's better to follow the practical truth of things rather than an imaginary view of them. Many republics and principalities have been imagined that have never existed in reality. The way we live and how we should live are so far apart that someone who tries to match one to the other is more likely to ruin themselves than to save themselves." Nothing that Machiavelli wrote is more sincere, analytical, straightforward, and ruthless. He operates confidently with a clear understanding. His hand never wavers, and his knife is always sharp. He engages with what is real, not what should be. Should the Prince be entirely virtuous, generous, and humane? Should his word be his bond for life? Should true religion be the driving passion of his existence? Machiavelli reflects on these questions. The Prince’s first duty (or government’s) is to ensure the existence, stability, and prosperity of the state. If the world were perfect, the Prince would also be perfect. But that is not how human life works. An idealistic Prince will fail in a practical world. A Prince must learn to be bad if necessary, but like Caesar Borgia, he must be skilled at recognizing the right moment. Any evil he commits must be intentional, fitting, and calculated, done not out of selfishness but for the good of the state he oversees. There is the power of Law and the power of Force. The first belongs to humans, the second to beasts. That's why Achilles was raised by Chiron the Centaur, so he could learn to use both natures. A ruler must be part lion and part fox, using the fox's cunning to avoid traps and the lion's strength to fend off threats. He may be merciful, loyal, humane, religious, and just, and should especially seem that way; he shouldn't let any words slip that contradict his claims. In fact, he should only abandon these qualities when absolutely necessary. He should, if possible, practice goodness, but when required, he must know how to pursue evil. He should keep his promises until circumstances change or the needs of the state compel him to break his word. Above all, he should profess and uphold religion, "because people generally judge more by what they see than by what they do, and anyone can see but few can take action." However, he must also learn (just like William the Silent, Elizabeth of England, and Henry of Navarre) how to place policy above creed when the situation calls for it. In short, he must understand and confront his own reality, and the truths about humanity and the world. If he can't be truthful to his conscience, he must be truthful to the facts. He shouldn’t act badly for its own sake, but by seeing things as they are, he must do what he can to protect and preserve the trust placed in him. Fortune is still a fickle mistress, but at least half of our will is free, and if we are bold, we may still conquer her. Fortune is like a woman who must be tamed by force; we see that she is more likely to yield to those who are assertive than to those who are hesitant. And always, like a woman, she favors the young because they are less cautious, bolder, and more confidently demand her attention.

The Appeal.

The Appeal.

And so at the last the sometime Secretary of the Florentine Republic turns to the new Master of the Florentines in splendid exhortation. He points to no easy path. He proposes no mean ambition. He has said already that 'double will that Prince's glory be, who has founded a new realm and fortified it and adorned it with good laws, good arms, good friends, and good examples.' But there is more and better to be done. The great misery of men has ever made the great leaders of men. But was Israel in Egypt, were the Persians, the Athenians ever more enslaved, down-trodden, disunited, beaten, despoiled, mangled, overrun and desolate than is our Italy to-day? The barbarians must be hounded out, and Italy be free and one. Now is the accepted time. All Italy is waiting and only seeks the man. To you the darling of Fortune and the Church this splendid task is given, to and to the army of Italy and of Italians only. Arm Italy and lead her. To you, the deliverer, what gates would be closed, what obedience refused! What jealousies opposed, what homage denied. Love, courage, and fixed fidelity await you, and under your standards shall the voice of Petrarch be fulfilled:

And so at last, the former Secretary of the Florentine Republic turns to the new Leader of the Florentines with a grand call to action. He doesn't point out an easy route or suggest a small ambition. He has already stated that 'the Prince's glory will be doubled, who has established a new realm and strengthened it with good laws, strong arms, loyal friends, and positive examples.' But there's more and better to achieve. The immense suffering of people has always produced great leaders. But were the Israelites in Egypt, the Persians, or the Athenians ever more enslaved, oppressed, divided, defeated, looted, mutilated, invaded, and desolate than Italy is today? The barbarians must be driven out, and Italy must be united and free. Now is the right moment. All of Italy is waiting and simply seeks the right person. To you, darling of Fortune and the Church, this extraordinary task is entrusted, only to the army of Italy and Italians. Equip Italy and lead her. To you, the savior, what gates would be closed, what obedience denied! What rivalries challenged, what respect withheld. Love, bravery, and unwavering loyalty await you, and under your banners, the voice of Petrarch will be fulfilled:

Virtu contro al furore

Virtue against fury

Prenderà l'arme e fia il combatter corto:

Prenderà le armi e combatterà presto:

Chè l'antico valore

The ancient value

Negl' Italici cor non è ancor morto.

Negli Italiani, il cuore non è ancora morto.

Such is The Prince of Machiavelli. The vision of its breathless exhortation seemed then as but a landscape to a blind man's eye. But the passing of three hundred and fifty years of the misery he wept for brought at the last, almost in perfect exactness, the fulfilment of that impossible prophecy.

Such is The Prince by Machiavelli. The urgency of its call seemed then like a landscape to someone who couldn't see. But after three hundred and fifty years of the suffering he lamented, we finally saw, almost exactly, the realization of that seemingly impossible prediction.

The Attack.

The Attack.

There is no great book in the world of smaller compass than The Prince of Machiavelli. There is no book more lucidly, directly, and plainly written. There is no book that has aroused more vehement, venomous, and even truculent controversy from the moment of its publication until to-day. And it is asserted with great probability that The Prince has had a more direct action upon real life than any other book in the world, and a larger share in breaking the chains and lighting the dark places of the Middle Ages. It is a truism to say that Machiavellism existed before Machiavelli. The politics of Gian Galeazzo Visconti, of Louis XI. of France, of Ferdinand of Spain, of the Papacy, of Venice, might have been dictated by the author of The Prince. But Machiavelli was the first to observe, to compare, to diagnose, to analyse, and to formulate their principles of government. The first to establish, not a divorce, but rather a judicial separation between the morals of a man and the morals of a government. It is around the purpose and possible results of such a separation in politics, ethics, and religion that the storm has raged most fiercely. To follow the path of that storm through near four centuries many volumes would be needed, and it will be more convenient to deal with the more general questions in summing up the influence of Machiavelli as a whole. But the main lines and varying fortunes of the long campaign may be indicated. During the period of its manuscript circulation and for a few years after its publication The Prince was treated with favour or at worst with indifference, and the first mutterings were merely personal to the author. He was a scurvy knave and turncoat with neither bowels nor conscience, almost negligible. But still men read him, and a change in conditions brought a change in front. He had in The Prince, above all in the Discorsi, accused the Church of having ruined Italy and debauched the world. In view of the writer's growing popularity, of the Reformation and the Pagan Renaissance, such charges could no longer be lightly set aside. The Churchmen opened the main attack. Amongst the leaders was Cardinal Pole, to whom the practical precepts of The Prince had been recommended in lieu of the dreams of Plato, by Thomas Cromwell, the malleus monachorum of Henry VIII. The Catholic attack was purely theological, but before long the Jesuits joined in the cry. Machiavelli was burnt in effigy at Ingoldstadt. He was subdolus diabolicarum cogitationum faber, and irrisor et atheos to boot. The Pope himself gave commissions to unite against him, and his books were placed on the Index, together, it must be admitted, with those of Boccaccio, Erasmus, and Savonarola so the company was goodly. But meanwhile, and perhaps in consequence, editions and translations of The Prince multiplied apace. The great figures of the world were absorbed by it. Charles V., his son, and his courtiers studied the book. Catherine de Medici brought it to France. A copy of The Prince was found on the murdered bodies of Henry III. and Henry IV. Richelieu praised it. Sextus V. analysed it in his own handwriting. It was read at the English Court; Bacon was steeped in it, and quotes or alludes to it constantly. Hobbes and Harrington studied it.

There isn’t a more compact great book in the world than The Prince by Machiavelli. No book is written more clearly, directly, or simply. No other book has sparked more intense, bitter, and even combative debate since its publication up to today. It’s highly likely that The Prince has had a more direct impact on real life than any other book in existence, playing a major role in breaking the chains and illuminating the dark corners of the Middle Ages. It's a given that Machiavellism existed before Machiavelli. The political strategies of Gian Galeazzo Visconti, Louis XI of France, Ferdinand of Spain, the Papacy, and Venice could have easily been dictated by the author of The Prince. But Machiavelli was the first to observe, compare, diagnose, analyze, and articulate their principles of governance. He was also the first to create not a complete separation, but a sort of judicial separation between personal morals and governmental morals. The fiercest debates have revolved around the implications and potential consequences of such a separation in politics, ethics, and religion. To trace the path of that debate over nearly four centuries would require many volumes, so it makes sense to focus on the more general questions when summing up Machiavelli’s overall influence. However, we can point out the key points and shifting tides of this lengthy discussion. During the time it was shared as a manuscript and for a few years following its publication, The Prince was either welcomed or, at worst, ignored, with the first criticisms mainly targeting the author personally. He was seen as a lowly turncoat with no morals or conscience, nearly insignificant. But people still read him, and changing circumstances led to a change in perception. In The Prince, especially in the Discorsi, he accused the Church of ruining Italy and corrupting the world. Given the author’s rising popularity, along with the Reformation and the Pagan Renaissance, such accusations could no longer be dismissed. Church leaders launched the main assault, with Cardinal Pole among them, who had been recommended the practical lessons of The Prince instead of Plato’s ideals by Thomas Cromwell, the malleus monachorum of Henry VIII. The Catholic response was purely theological, but soon the Jesuits joined in. Machiavelli was burned in effigy at Ingolstadt. He was labeled subdolus diabolicarum cogitationum faber, and irrisor et atheos as well. The Pope himself issued orders for unity against him, and his books were placed on the Index, along with those of Boccaccio, Erasmus, and Savonarola, so he had some prominent company. Yet, possibly as a consequence, editions and translations of The Prince increased rapidly. Influential figures around the world became engrossed in it. Charles V, his son, and their courtiers studied the book. Catherine de Medici brought it to France. A copy of The Prince was found on the bodies of the murdered Henry III and Henry IV. Richelieu praised it. Sextus V analyzed it in his own handwriting. It was read at the English Court; Bacon was deeply influenced by it and frequently quotes or references it. Hobbes and Harrington studied it.

But now another change. So then, cried Innocent Gentillet, the Huguenot, the book is a primer of despotism and Rome, and a grammar for bigots and tyrants. It doubtless is answerable for the Massacre of St. Bartholomew. The man is a chien impur. And in answer to this new huntsman the whole Protestant pack crashed in pursuit. Within fifty years of his death The Prince and Machiavelli himself had become a legend and a myth, a haunting, discomforting ghost that would not be laid. Machiavellism had grown to be a case of conscience both to Catholic and Protestant, to Theologian, Moralist, and Philosopher. In Spain the author, damned in France for his despotism and popery, was as freshly and freely damned for his civil and religious toleration. In England to the Cavaliers he was an Atheist, to the Roundheads a Jesuit. Christina of Sweden annotated him with enthusiasm. Frederick the Great published his Anti-Machiavel brimming with indignation, though it is impossible not to wonder what would have become of Prussia had not the Prussian king so closely followed in practice the precepts of the Florentine, above all perhaps, as Voltaire observed, in the publication of the Anti-Machiavel itself. No doubt in the eighteenth century, when monarchy was so firmly established as not to need Machiavelli, kings and statesmen sought to clear kingship of the supposed stain he had besmirched them with. But their reading was as little as their misunderstanding was great, and the Florentine Secretary remained the mysterious necromancer. It was left for Rousseau to describe the book of this 'honnête homme et bon citoyen' as 'le livre des Républicains,' and for Napoleon, the greatest of the author's followers if not disciples, to draw inspiration and suggestion from his Florentine forerunner and to justify the murder of the Due d'Enghien by a quotation from The Prince. 'Mais après tout,' he said, 'un homme d'Etat est-il fait pour être sensible? N'est-ce pas un personnage—complètement excentrique, toujours seul d'un côté, avec le monde de l'autre?' and again 'Jugez done s'il doit s'amuser à ménager certaines convenances de sentiments si importantes pour le commun des hommes? Peut-il considérer les liens du sang, les affections, les puérils ménagements de la société? Et dans la situation où il se trouve, que d'actions séparées de l'ensemble et qu'on blâme, quoiqu'elles doivent contribuer au grand oeuvre que tout le monde n'aperçoit pas? ... Malheureux que vous êtes! vous retiendrez vos éloges parce que vous craindrez que le mouvement de cette grande machine ne fasse sur vous l'effet de Gulliver, qui, lorsqu'il déplaçait sa jambe, écrasait les Lilliputiens. Exhortez-vous, devancez le temps, agrandissez votre imagination, regardez de loin, et vous verrez que ces grands personnages que vous croyez violents, cruels, que sais-je? ne sont que des politiques. Ils se connaissent, se jugent mieux que vous, et, quand ils sont réellement habiles, ils savent se rendre maîtres de leurs passions car ils vont jusqu'à en calculer les effets.' Even in his carriage at Waterloo was found a French translation of The Prince profusely annotated.

But now there's another shift. So then, exclaimed Innocent Gentillet, the Huguenot, the book is a manual of tyranny and Rome, and a rulebook for bigots and tyrants. It must be responsible for the Massacre of St. Bartholomew. The man is a chien impur. And in response to this new hunter, the entire Protestant pack broke into a chase. Within fifty years of his death, The Prince and Machiavelli himself had turned into a legend and a myth, a haunting, unsettling ghost that wouldn’t be put to rest. Machiavellianism became a matter of conscience for both Catholics and Protestants, for Theologians, Moralists, and Philosophers. In Spain, the author, condemned in France for his tyranny and Catholicism, was just as fervently condemned for his civil and religious tolerance. In England, to the Cavaliers, he was an Atheist, while to the Roundheads, he was a Jesuit. Christina of Sweden praised him enthusiastically. Frederick the Great published his Anti-Machiavel brimming with indignation, though it’s hard not to wonder what would have happened to Prussia had not the Prussian king so closely followed the teachings of the Florentine in practice, especially, as Voltaire noted, in the very publication of the Anti-Machiavel itself. No doubt in the eighteenth century, when monarchy was so securely established that it didn’t need Machiavelli, kings and statesmen tried to cleanse kingship of the supposed stain he had left on them. But their reading was as shallow as their misunderstanding was vast, and the Florentine Secretary remained the enigmatic sorcerer. It was left to Rousseau to describe the book of this 'honnête homme et bon citoyen' as 'the book of Republicans,' and for Napoleon, the most significant of the author's followers if not disciples, to draw inspiration and guidance from his Florentine predecessor and to justify the murder of the Duke d'Enghien with a quote from The Prince. 'But after all,' he said, 'is a statesman supposed to be sensitive? Isn’t he a character—completely eccentric, always alone on one side, with the world on the other?' and again, 'So judge whether he should bother with some delicate sentiments that are so important to common people? Can he consider the bonds of blood, the affections, the petty compromises of society? And in the position he finds himself in, what actions are separate from the whole and get criticized, even though they must contribute to the grand project that not everyone sees? ... Poor you! you will hold back your praises because you will fear that the movement of this great machine might impact you like Gulliver, who, when he moved his leg, crushed the Lilliputians. Encourage yourselves, stay ahead of time, broaden your imagination, look from afar, and you will see that those great figures you think are violent, cruel, or whatever, are merely politicians. They know themselves, judge themselves better than you, and when they are truly skilled, they know how to master their passions because they even calculate their effects.' Even in his carriage at Waterloo, a French translation of The Prince was found, filled with extensive notes.

The Defence.

The Defense.

But from the first the defence was neither idle nor weak. The assault was on the morals of the man: the fortress held for the ideas of the thinker. He does not treat of morals, therefore he is immoral, cried the plaintiff. Has he spoken truth or falsehood? Is his word the truth and will his truth prevail? was the rejoinder. In Germany and Italy especially and in France and England in less degree, philosophers and critics have argued and written without stint and without cease. As history has grown wider and more scientific so has the preponderance of opinion leaned to the Florentine's favour.

But from the beginning, the defense was neither inactive nor weak. The attack was on the man's morals: the stronghold stood firm for the thinker's ideas. "He doesn't discuss morals, so he's immoral," shouted the plaintiff. "Has he spoken the truth or a lie? Is his word the truth and will his truth prevail?" was the response. In Germany and Italy especially, and to a lesser extent in France and England, philosophers and critics have argued and written tirelessly. As history has become broader and more scientific, the balance of opinion has increasingly favored the Florentine's position.

It would be impossible to recapitulate the arguments or even to indicate the varying points of view. And indeed the main hindrance in forming a just idea of The Prince is the constant treatment of a single side of the book and the preconceived intent of the critic. Bacon has already been mentioned. Among later names are Hobbes, Spinoza, Leibnitz. Herder gives qualified approval, while Fichte frankly throws down the glove as The Prince's champion. 'Da man weiss dass politische Machtfragen nie, am wenigsten in einem verderbten Volke, mit den Mitteln der Moral zu lösen sind, so ist es unverständig das Buch von Fürsten zu verschreien. Macchiavelli hatte einen Herrscher zu schildern, keinen Klosterbruder.' The last sentence may at least be accepted as a last word by practical politicians. Ranke and Macaulay, and a host of competent Germans and Italians have lent their thought and pens to solve the riddle in the Florentine's favour. And lastly, the course of political events in Europe have seemed to many the final justification of the teaching of The Prince. The leaders of the Risorgimento thought that they found in letters, 'writ with a stiletto,' not only the inspirations of patriotism and the aspirations to unity, but a sure and trusted guide to the achievement. Germany recognised in the author a schoolmaster to lead them to unification, and a military instructor to teach them of an Armed People. Half Europe snatched at the principle of Nationality. For in The Prince, Machiavelli not only begat ideas but fertilised the ideas of others, and whatever the future estimation of the book may be, it stands, read or unread, as a most potent, if not as the dominant, factor in European politics for four hundred years.

It would be impossible to summarize the arguments or even to point out the different perspectives. The biggest challenge in forming a fair understanding of The Prince is how it's often viewed from just one angle, shaped by the critic's biases. Bacon has already been mentioned. Among later thinkers are Hobbes, Spinoza, and Leibnitz. Herder gives it some cautious praise, while Fichte boldly takes a stand as The Prince's defender. 'Since one knows that political power issues are never, especially in a corrupt society, solvable by moral means, it's unwise to condemn the book about princes. Machiavelli was describing a ruler, not a monk.' That last sentence could at least be accepted as a final word by practical politicians. Ranke and Macaulay, along with many capable Germans and Italians, have contributed their thoughts to support the Florentine's perspective. Finally, the course of political events in Europe has seemed to many as the ultimate validation of the lessons in The Prince. The leaders of the Risorgimento believed they found in its words, 'written with a stiletto,' not only inspirations of patriotism and aspirations for unity but also a reliable guide to achieving those goals. Germany viewed the author as a teacher who could lead them to unification and a military mentor to educate them about an Armed People. Half of Europe embraced the idea of Nationality. For in The Prince, Machiavelli not only sparked ideas but also nurtured the ideas of others, and regardless of how the book may be judged in the future, it remains, whether read or unread, a significant, if not the primary, influence in European politics for four hundred years.

The Discorsi.

The Discourses.

The Discorsi, printed in Rome by Blado, 1537, are not included in the present edition, as the first English translation did not appear until 1680, when almost the entire works of Machiavelli were published by an anonymous translator in London. But some account and consideration of their contents is imperative to any review of the Florentine's political thoughts. Such Discorsi and Relazioni were not uncommon at the time. The stronger and younger minds of the Renaissance wearied of discussing in the lovely gardens of the Rucellai the ideas of Plato or the allegories of Plotinus. The politics of Aristotle had just been intelligibly translated by Leonardo Bruni (1492). And to-day the young ears and eyes of Florence were alert for an impulse to action. They saw glimpses, in reopened fields of history, of quarries long grown over where the ore of positive politics lay hid. The men who came to-day to the Orti Oricellarii were men versed in public affairs, men of letters, historians, poets, living greatly in a great age, with Raphael, Michael Angelo, Ariosto, Leonardo going up and down amongst them. Machiavelli was now in fair favour with the Medici, and is described by Strozzi as una persona per sorgere (a rising man). He was welcomed into the group with enthusiasm, and there read and discussed the Discorsi. Nominally mere considerations upon the First Decade of Livy, they rapidly encircled all that was known and thought of policy and state-craft, old and living.

The Discorsi, printed in Rome by Blado in 1537, are not included in this edition, as the first English translation didn't appear until 1680, when nearly all of Machiavelli's works were published by an anonymous translator in London. However, a discussion and consideration of their content is essential for any review of the Florentine's political ideas. During that time, such Discorsi and Relazioni were quite common. The stronger and younger minds of the Renaissance grew tired of discussing the ideas of Plato or the allegories of Plotinus in the beautiful gardens of the Rucellai. Aristotle's politics had just been clearly translated by Leonardo Bruni in 1492. And at this moment, the young people in Florence were eager for a call to action. They caught glimpses, in reopened historical fields, of long-overgrown quarries where the raw materials for effective politics were hidden. The people who came to the Orti Oricellarii were well-versed in public affairs—literary figures, historians, and poets—living in a remarkable era, with Raphael, Michelangelo, Ariosto, and Leonardo among them. Machiavelli was now quite favored by the Medici and was described by Strozzi as una persona per sorgere (a rising man). He was welcomed into the group with enthusiasm and there read and discussed the Discorsi. Although they were nominally just considerations on the First Decade of Livy, they quickly encompassed everything known and thought about policy and statecraft, both old and contemporary.

Their Plan.

Their Strategy.

Written concurrently with The Prince, though completed later, the Discorsi contain almost the whole of the thoughts and intents of the more famous book, but with a slightly different application. 'The Prince traces the progress of an ambitious man, the Discorsi the progress of an ambitious people,' is an apt if inadequate criticism. Machiavelli was not the first Italian who thought and wrote upon the problems of his time. But he was the first who discussed grave questions in modern language. He was the first modern political writer who wrote of men and not of man, for the Prince himself is a collective individuality.

Written at the same time as The Prince, but finished later, the Discorsi include almost all the ideas and intentions of the more well-known book, albeit with a slightly different focus. “The Prince follows the journey of an ambitious individual, while the Discorsi follows the journey of an ambitious society,” is a fitting but limited critique. Machiavelli wasn't the first Italian to think about and write on the issues of his time. However, he was the first to address serious questions in modern language. He was the first modern political writer to write about groups of people rather than just one person, as the Prince himself represents a collective identity.

'This must be regarded as a general rule,' is ever in Machiavelli's mouth, while Guicciardini finds no value in a general rule, but only in 'long experience and worthy discretion.' The one treated of policy, the other of politics. Guicciardini considered specifically by what methods to control and arrange an existing Government. Machiavelli sought to create a science, which should show how to establish, maintain, and hinder the decline of states generally conceived. Even Cavour counted the former as a more practical guide in affairs. But Machiavelli was the theorist of humanity in politics, not the observer only. He distinguished the two orders of research. And, during the Italian Renaissance such distinction was supremely necessary. With a crumbled theology, a pagan Pope, amid the wreck of laws and the confusion of social order, il sue particolare and virtù, individuality and ability (energy, political genius, prowess, vital force: virtù is impossible to translate, and only does not mean virtue), were the dominating and unrelenting factors of life. Niccolò Machiavelli, unlike Montesquieu, agreed with Martin Luther that man was bad. It was for both the Wittenberger and the Florentine, in their very separate ways, to found the school and wield the scourge. In the naked and unashamed candour of the time Guicciardini could say that he loathed the Papacy and all its works. 'For all that, he adds, 'the preferments I have enjoyed, have forced me for my private ends to set my heart upon papal greatness. Were it not for this consideration, I should love Martin Luther as my second self.' In the Discorsi, Machiavelli bitterly arraigns the Church as having 'deprived Italians of religion and liberty.' He utterly condemns Savonarolà, yet he could love and learn from Dante, and might almost have said with Pym, 'The greatest liberty of the Kingdom is Religion. Thereby we are freed from spiritual evils, and no impositions are so grievous as those that are laid upon the soul.'

"This should be seen as a general rule," is always on Machiavelli's lips, while Guicciardini finds no value in a general rule, but only in "long experience and sound judgment." One focused on policy, the other on politics. Guicciardini looked specifically at how to control and manage an existing government. Machiavelli aimed to create a science that would explain how to establish, maintain, and prevent the decline of states in general. Even Cavour regarded the former as a more practical guide in matters. But Machiavelli was the theorist of humanity in politics, not just an observer. He recognized the two different kinds of research. And during the Italian Renaissance, this distinction was crucial. With a shattered theology, a pagan Pope, amidst the ruins of laws and the chaos of social order, il sue particolare and virtù, individuality and ability (energy, political genius, skill, vital force: virtù is impossible to translate and does not simply mean virtue), were the dominant and relentless forces of life. Niccolò Machiavelli, unlike Montesquieu, agreed with Martin Luther that humanity is flawed. It was for both the Wittenberger and the Florentine, in their very different ways, to establish the school and wield the whip. In the stark and unapologetic honesty of the time, Guicciardini could say that he detested the Papacy and all its works. "Still," he adds, "the positions I've held have forced me for my own interests to focus on papal greatness. If it weren't for this consideration, I would love Martin Luther as my own self." In the Discorsi, Machiavelli harshly criticizes the Church for having "taken away religion and freedom from Italians." He completely condemns Savonarola, yet he could admire and learn from Dante, and might almost have said with Pym, "The greatest freedom of the Kingdom is Religion. This frees us from spiritual evils, and no burdens are as heavy as those placed upon the soul."

Religion.

Faith.

The Florentine postulates religion as an essential element in a strong and stable State. Perhaps, with Gibbon, he deemed it useful to the Magistrate. But his science is impersonal. He will not tolerate a Church that poaches on his political preserves. Good dogma makes bad politics. It must not tamper with liberty or security. And most certainly, with Dante, in the Paradiso, he would either have transformed or omitted the third Beatitude, that the Meek shall inherit the earth. With such a temperament, Machiavelli must ever keep touch with sanity. It was not for him as for Aristotle to imagine what an ideal State should be, but rather to inquire what States actually were and what they might actually become. He seeks first and foremost 'the use that may be derived from history in politics'; not from its incidents but from its general principles. His darling model of a State is to be found where Dante found it, in the Roman Republic. The memory and even the substance of Dante occur again and again. But Dante's inspiration was spiritual: Machiavelli's frankly pagan, and with the latter Fortune takes the place of God. Dante did not love the Papacy, but Machiavelli, pointing out how even in ancient Rome religion was politic or utilitarian, leads up to his famous attack upon the Roman Church, to which he attributes all the shame and losses, political, social, moral, national, that Italy has suffered at her hands. And now for the first time the necessity for Italian Unity is laid plainly down, and the Church and its temporal power denounced as the central obstacles. In religion itself the Secretary saw much merit. 'But when it is an absolute question of the welfare of our country, then justice or injustice, mercy or cruelty, praise or ignominy, must be set aside, and we must seek alone whatever course may preserve the existence and liberty of the state.' Throughout the Discorsi, Machiavelli in a looser and more expansive form, suggests, discusses, or re-affirms the ideas of The Prince. There is the same absence of judgment on the moral value of individual conduct; the same keen decision of its practical effect as a political act. But here more than in The Prince, he deals with the action and conduct of the people. With his passion for personal and contemporary incarnation he finds in the Swiss of his day the Romans of Republican Rome, and reiterates the comparison in detail. Feudalism, mercenaries, political associations embodied in Arts and Guilds, the Temporal power of the Church, all these are put away, and in their stead he announces the new and daring gospel that for organic unity subjects must be treated as equals and not as inferiors. 'Trust the people' is a maxim he repeats and enforces again and again. And he does not shrink from, but rather urges the corollary, 'Arm the people.' Indeed it were no audacious paradox to state the ideal of Machiavelli, though he nominally preferred a Republic, as a Limited Monarchy, ruling over a Nation in Arms. No doubt he sought, as was natural enough in his day, to construct the State from without rather than to guide and encourage its evolution from within. It seemed to him that, in such an ocean of corruption, Force was a remedy and Fraud no sluttish handmaid. 'Vice n'est-ce pas,' writes Montaigne, of such violent acts of Government, 'car il a quitté sa raison à une plus universelle et puissante raison.' Even so the Prince and the people could only be justified by results. But the public life is of larger value than the private, and sometimes one man must be crucified for a thousand. Despite all prejudice and make-belief, such a rule and practice has obtained from the Assemblies of Athens to the Parliaments of the twentieth century. But Machiavelli first candidly imparted it to the unwilling consciences and brains of men, and it is he who has been the chosen scape-goat to carry the sins of the people. His earnestness makes him belie his own precept to keep the name and take away the thing. In this, as in a thousand instances, he was not too darkly hidden; he was too plain. 'Machiavelli,' says one who studied the Florentine as hardly another had done, 'Machiavelli hat gesündigt, aber noch mehr ist gegen ihn gesündigt worden.' Liberty is good, but Unity is its only sure foundation. It is the way to the Unity of Government and People that the thoughts both of The Prince and the Discorsi lead, though the incidents be so nakedly presented as to shock the timorous and vex the prurient, the puritan, and the evil thinker. The people must obey the State and fight and die for its salvation, and for the Prince the hatred of the subjects is never good, but their love, and the best way to gain it is by 'not interrupting the subject in the quiet enjoyment of his estate.' Even so bland and gentle a spirit as the poet Gray cannot but comment, 'I rejoice when I see Machiavelli defended or illustrated, who to me appears one of the wisest men that any nation in any age hath produced.'

The Florentine sees religion as a key part of a strong and stable state. Like Gibbon, he considered it beneficial for the rulers. However, his approach is detached. He won’t accept a Church that encroaches on political matters. Good beliefs lead to bad governance. They shouldn’t interfere with freedom or security. And definitely, like Dante in the Paradiso, he would have changed or skipped the third Beatitude, which says that the meek will inherit the earth. With his mindset, Machiavelli must always stay grounded. Unlike Aristotle, who envisioned an ideal state, he focuses on what states actually are and what they might become. He aims first and foremost to extract 'the lessons politics can learn from history'; not from its events but from its overarching principles. His favorite model for a state is found where Dante discovered it, in the Roman Republic. Dante’s influence recurs throughout his work. But while Dante was spiritually inspired, Machiavelli's approach is openly secular, placing Fortune in the position of God. Dante wasn’t fond of the Papacy, but Machiavelli observed how even in ancient Rome, religion served political purposes, leading to his famous critique of the Roman Church, which he blames for all the political, social, moral, and national damages Italy has suffered at its hands. For the first time, he clearly expresses the need for Italian Unity, condemning the Church and its temporal power as the main obstacles. He recognizes the merits of religion. 'However, when it’s a matter of our nation's welfare, then concepts of justice or injustice, mercy or cruelty, praise or shame must be set aside, and we should solely pursue whatever path may safeguard the existence and freedom of the state.' Throughout the Discorsi, Machiavelli discusses, elaborates, or reinforces the ideas presented in The Prince in a more detailed manner. He maintains the same lack of judgment on the moral quality of individual behavior; the same sharp analysis of its practical influence as a political act. But here, more than in The Prince, he engages with the actions and behavior of the people. With the enthusiasm for contemporary relevance, he sees the Swiss of his time as the Romans of the Republican era and repeats the analogy in detail. He dismisses feudalism, mercenaries, political groups embodied in Arts and Guilds, and the Church's temporal power, presenting a bold new doctrine that for true unity, subjects must be regarded as equals rather than subordinates. 'Trust the people' is a principle he emphasizes over and over. He does not shy away from, but rather advocates for, the corollary, 'Arm the people.' It wouldn’t be far-fetched to declare Machiavelli’s ideal, even though he nominally supported a Republic, as a Limited Monarchy ruling a Nation in Arms. Naturally, he aimed, as was typical in his time, to shape the state from the outside rather than nurture its growth from within. In a sea of corruption, he saw Force as a remedy and Deception not as an ignoble assistant. 'It’s not a vice,' Montaigne writes of such drastic governmental actions, 'because it has given reason to a more universal and powerful reason.' Even so, both the ruler and the populace can only be justified by their outcomes. Public life carries more weight than private life, and sometimes one individual must be sacrificed for the sake of many. Regardless of prejudice and pretense, this principle has endured from the Assemblies of Athens to twentieth-century Parliaments. Yet Machiavelli was the first to honestly lay this truth before the unwilling minds and hearts of people, making him the scapegoat for the collective failings of society. His earnestness contradicts his own advice to retain the facade while removing the substance. In this, as in countless instances, he wasn’t overly obscure; he was just too straightforward. 'Machiavelli,' says a scholar who studied him closely, 'Machiavelli has sinned, but even more has been sinned against.' Liberty is valuable, but Unity is its only solid foundation. The thoughts in both The Prince and Discorsi lead towards the Unity of Government and People, even if the events depicted may shock the nervous and annoy the prudish and morally corrupt. The people must obey the state and be willing to fight and die for its survival, and for the Prince, the subjects’ hatred is never favorable, but their love is essential, and the best way to achieve it is by 'allowing the subject to enjoy their peace without interference.' Even a gentle spirit like the poet Gray noted, 'I rejoice when I see Machiavelli defended or illustrated, who to me seems to be one of the wisest men that any nation in any age has produced.'

The Art of War.

The Art of War.

Throughout both The Prince and the Discorsi are constant allusions to, and often long discussions on, military affairs. The Army profoundly interested Machiavelli both as a primary condition of national existence and stability, and also, as he pondered upon the contrast between ancient Rome and the Florence that he lived in, as a subject fascinating in itself. His Art of War was probably published in 1520. Before that date the Florentine Secretary had had some personal touch both with the theory and practice of war. As a responsible official in the camp before Pisa he had seen both siege work and fighting. Having lost faith in mercenary forces he made immense attempts to form a National Militia, and was appointed Chancellor of the Nove della Milizia. In Switzerland and the Tyrol he had studied army questions. He planned with Pietro Navarro the defence of Florence and Prato against Charles V. At Verona and Mantua in 1509, he closely studied the famous siege of Padua. From birth to death war and battles raged all about him, and he had personal knowledge of the great captains of the Age. Moreover, he saw in Italy troops of every country, of every quality, in every stage of discipline, in every manner of formation. His love of ancient Rome led him naturally to the study of Livy and Vegetius, and from them with regard to formations, to the relative values of infantry and cavalry and other points of tactics, he drew or deduced many conclusions which hold good to-day. Indeed a German staff officer has written that in reading the Florentine you think you are listening to a modern theorist of war. But for the theorist of those days a lion stood in the path. The art of war was not excepted from the quick and thorough transformation that all earthly and spiritual things were undergoing. Gunpowder, long invented, was being applied. Armour, that, since the beginning, had saved both man and horse, had now lost the half of its virtue. The walls of fortresses, impregnable for a thousand years, became as matchwood ramparts. The mounted man-at-arms was found with wonder to be no match for the lightly-armoured but nimble foot-man. The Swiss were seen to hold their own with ease against the knighthood of Austria and Burgundy. The Free Companies lost in value and prestige what they added to their corruption and treachery. All these things grew clear to Machiavelli. But his almost fatal misfortune was that he observed and wrote in the mid-moment of the transition. He had no faith in fire-arms, and as regards the portable fire-arms of those days he was right. After the artillery work at Ravenna, Novara, and Marignano it is argued that he should have known better. But he was present at no great battles, and pike, spear, and sword had been the stable weapons of four thousand years. These were indeed too simple to be largely modified, and the future of mechanisms and explosives no prophet uninspired could foresee. And indeed the armament and formation of men were not the main intent of Machiavelli's thought. His care in detail, especially in fortifications, of which he made a special study, in encampments, in plans, in calculations, is immense. Nothing is so trivial as to be left inexact.

Throughout both The Prince and Discorsi, there are constant references and often lengthy discussions about military matters. The Army deeply interested Machiavelli both as a key factor for national existence and stability, and as he reflected on the differences between ancient Rome and the Florence of his time, it became a subject of fascination in its own right. His Art of War was likely published in 1520. Before that, the Florentine Secretary had personal experience with both the theory and practice of war. As a responsible official in the camp before Pisa, he witnessed both siege work and actual combat. After losing faith in mercenary forces, he made considerable efforts to create a National Militia and was appointed Chancellor of the Nove della Milizia. He studied military issues in Switzerland and the Tyrol. He collaborated with Pietro Navarro on the defense of Florence and Prato against Charles V. In Verona and Mantua in 1509, he closely observed the famous siege of Padua. From birth to death, war and battles surrounded him, and he had firsthand knowledge of the great military leaders of his time. Additionally, he observed troops from every nation in Italy, of varying quality, in different stages of discipline, and in various formations. His admiration for ancient Rome naturally led him to study Livy and Vegetius, from whom he derived many conclusions about formations, the relative strengths of infantry and cavalry, and other tactical points that are still valid today. In fact, a German staff officer has noted that reading the Florentine feels like listening to a modern war theorist. However, for those theorists of his era, a significant challenge lay ahead. The art of war was not immune to the rapid and profound changes happening in both tangible and spiritual realms. Gunpowder, long invented, was being put into use. Armor, which had historically protected both men and horses, had lost much of its effectiveness. The once-impenetrable fortress walls, which had stood strong for a thousand years, became as fragile as wooden palisades. The heavily armored knights were surprisingly outmatched by the light-footed but agile infantry. The Swiss managed to hold their ground against the knights of Austria and Burgundy with ease. The Free Companies diminished in value and prestige, losing credibility due to their corruption and treachery. Machiavelli clearly recognized all these changes. However, his almost tragic misfortune was that he observed and wrote in the midst of this transition. He had little faith in firearms, and concerning the portable weapons of his time, he was justified. After the artillery battles at Ravenna, Novara, and Marignano, some argue he should have understood better. Yet, he did not witness any significant battles, and pikes, spears, and swords had been the main weapons for four thousand years. These weapons were too fundamental to undergo significant modifications, and the future of mechanisms and explosives could not have been predicted by any uninspired prophet. In fact, the weaponry and formations of troops were not the central focus of Machiavelli's thoughts. His meticulous attention to detail, especially in fortifications—which he studied extensively—as well as in encampments, plans, and calculations, was immense. Nothing was too trivial to be left imprecise.

The New Model.

The Latest Model.

But he centred his observation and imagination on the origin, character, and discipline of an army in being. He pictures the horror, waste, and failure of a mercenary system, and lays down the fatal error in Italy of separating civil from military life, converting the latter into a trade. In such a way the soldier grows to a beast, and the citizen to a coward. All this must be changed. The basic idea of this astounding Secretary is to form a National Army, furnished by conscription and informed by the spirit of the New Model of Cromwell. All able-bodied men between the ages of seventeen and forty should be drilled on stated days and be kept in constant readiness. Once or twice a year each battalion must be mobilised and manoeuvred as in time of war. The discipline must be constant and severe. The men must be not only robust and well-trained, but, above all, virtuous, modest, and disposed to any sacrifice for the public good. So imbued should they be with duty and lofty devotion to their country that though they may rightly deceive the enemy, reward the enemy's deserters and employ spies, yet 'an apple tree laden with fruit might stand untouched in the midst of their encampment.' The infantry should far exceed the cavalry, 'since it is by infantry that battles are won.' Secrecy, mobility, and familiarity with the country are to be objects of special care, and positions should be chosen from which advance is safer than retreat. In war this army must be led by one single leader, and, when peace shines again, they must go back contented to their grateful fellow-countrymen and their wonted ways of living. The conception and foundation of such a scheme, at such a time, by such a man is indeed astounding. He broke with the past and with all contemporary organisations. He forecast the future of military Europe, though his own Italy was the last to win her redemption through his plans. 'Taken all in all,' says a German military writer, 'we may recognise Machiavelli in his inspired knowledge of the principles of universal military discipline as a true prophet and as one of the weightiest thinkers in the field of military construction and constitution. He penetrated the essence of military technique with a precision wholly alien to his period, and it is, so to say, a new psychological proof of the relationship between the art of war and the art of statecraft, that the founder of Modern Politics is also the first of modern Military Classics.'

But he focused his thoughts and imagination on the origin, nature, and training of a standing army. He imagines the horror, waste, and failures of a mercenary system, and points out the critical mistake in Italy of separating civilian from military life, turning the latter into just a job. This leads to soldiers becoming brutal and civilians becoming cowardly. All of this needs to change. The main idea of this remarkable Secretary is to create a National Army, formed through conscription and inspired by the principles of Cromwell's New Model Army. Every able-bodied man between the ages of seventeen and forty should be trained on designated days and kept ready at all times. Once or twice a year, each battalion should be mobilized and trained like it’s wartime. Discipline must be strict and consistent. The soldiers should not only be strong and well-prepared but, most importantly, virtuous, humble, and willing to make sacrifices for the greater good. They should be so dedicated to their duty and deep love for their country that even though they may justifiably deceive the enemy, reward turncoats, and use spies, “an apple tree loaded with fruit could remain untouched in the middle of their camp.” The infantry should significantly outnumber the cavalry, "since battles are won by infantry." Special attention must be paid to secrecy, mobility, and knowledge of the terrain, with positions chosen that allow for safer advances than retreats. In wartime, this army should be led by a single commander, and once peace returns, they should gladly return to their grateful fellow citizens and their usual lives. The idea and establishment of such a plan at such a time by such a person is truly remarkable. He broke away from the past and all current organizations. He envisioned the future of military Europe, even though his own Italy was the last to achieve redemption through his strategies. “Overall,” says a German military writer, “we can recognize Machiavelli in his inspired understanding of the principles of universal military discipline as a true prophet and one of the most significant thinkers in military organization and structure. He grasped the essence of military technique with a precision that was entirely foreign to his time, and it serves as a new psychological validation of the connection between the art of war and the art of governance that the founder of Modern Politics is also the first of modern Military Classics.”

But woe to the Florentine Secretary with his thoughts born centuries before their time. As in The Prince, so in the Art of War, he closes with a passionate appeal of great sorrow and the smallest ray of hope. Where shall I hope to find the things that I have told of? What is Italy to-day? What are the Italians? Enervated, impotent, vile. Wherefore, 'I lament mee of nature, the which either ought not to have made mee a knower of this, or it ought to have given mee power, to have bene able to have executed it: For now beeing olde, I cannot hope to have any occasion, to be able so to doo: In consideration whereof, I have bene liberall with you who beeing grave young men, may (when the thinges said of me shall please you) at due times, in favoure of your Princes, helpe them and counsider them. Wherin I would have you not to be afraied, or mistrustfull, because this Province seemes to bee altogether given to raise up againe the things deade, as is seene by the perfection that Poesie, painting, and writing, is now brought unto: Albeit, as much as is looked for of mee, beeing strooken in yeeres, I do mistrust. Where surely, if Fortune had heretofore graunted mee so much state, as suffiseth for a like enterprise, I would not have doubted, but in most short time, to have shewed to the world, how much the auncient orders availe: and without peradventure, either I would have increased it with glory, or lost it without shame.'

But woe to the Florentine Secretary with his thoughts that seem to belong to another era. Just like in The Prince, in the Art of War, he ends with a heartfelt plea full of deep sorrow and a tiny glimmer of hope. Where can I possibly find the things I’ve talked about? What is Italy like today? What are the Italians? Weak, powerless, disgraceful. Therefore, 'I lament my nature, which either shouldn’t have made me aware of this, or should have given me the strength to act on it: For now, being old, I can't hope to have any chance to do so: Considering this, I’ve been generous with you, young men of stature, who may (when my words resonate with you) at the right times, in favor of your Princes, help and support them. In this regard, I urge you not to be fearful or doubtful, because this Province seems completely dedicated to reviving what is dead, as shown by the excellence that poetry, painting, and writing have now reached: Although, given my age, I have my doubts. For surely, if Fortune had granted me the status before that’s needed for such an endeavor, I wouldn't have hesitated, but in a very short time, I would have shown the world how much the ancient methods are worth: and without a doubt, I would have either brought it to greater glory or lost it without shame.'

The History of Florence.

Florence's History.

In 1520 Machiavelli was an ageing and disappointed man. He was not popular with any party, but the Medici were willing to use him in minor matters if only to secure his adherence. He was commissioned by Giulio de Medici to write a history of Florence with an annual allowance of 100 florins. In 1525 he completed his task and dedicated the book to its begetter, Pope Clement VII.

In 1520, Machiavelli was an older and disillusioned man. He wasn't favored by any group, but the Medici were willing to employ him for minor tasks just to ensure his loyalty. Giulio de Medici commissioned him to write a history of Florence, offering an annual stipend of 100 florins. By 1525, he finished his work and dedicated the book to its originator, Pope Clement VII.

In the History, as in much of his other work, Machiavelli enriches the science of humanity with a new department. 'He was the first to contemplate the life of a nation in its continuity, to trace the operation of political forces through successive generations, to contrast the action of individuals with the evolution of causes over which they had but little control, and to bring the salient features of the national biography into relief by the suppression of comparatively unimportant details.' He found no examples to follow, for Villani with all his merits was of a different order. Diarists and chroniclers there were in plenty, and works of the learned men led by Aretino, written in Latin and mainly rhetorical. The great work of Guicciardini was not published till years after the Secretary's death. Machiavelli broke away from the Chronicle or any other existing form. He deliberately applied philosophy to the sequence of facts. He organised civil and political history. He originally intended to begin his work at the year 1234, the year of the return of Cosimo il Vecchio from exile and of the consolidation of Medicean power on the ground that the earlier periods had been covered by Aretino and Bracciolini. But he speedily recognised that they told of nothing but external wars and business while the heart of the history of Florence was left unbared. The work was to do again in very different manner, and in that manner he did it. Throughout he maintains and insistently insinuates his unfailing explanation of the miseries of Italy; the necessity of unity and the evils of the Papacy which prevents it. In this book dedicated to a Pope he scants nothing of his hatred of the Holy See. For ever he is still seeking the one strong man in a blatant land with almost absolute power to punish, pull down, and reconstruct on an abiding foundation, for to his clear eyes it is ever the events that are born of the man, and not the man of the events. He was the first to observe that the Ghibellines were not only the Imperial party but the party of the aristocrats and influential men, whereas the Guelphs were the party not only of the Church but of the people, and he traces the slow but increasing struggle to the triumph of democracy in the Ordinamenti di Giustizia (1293). But the triumph was not final. The Florentines were 'unable to preserve liberty and could not tolerate slavery.' So the fighting, banishments, bloodshed, cruelty, injustice, began once more. The nobles were in origin Germanic, he points out, the people Latin; so that a racial bitterness gave accent to their hate. But yet, he adds impartially, when the crushed nobility were forced to change their names and no longer dared be heard 'Florence was not only stripped of arms but likewise of all generosity.' It would be impossible to follow the History in detail. The second, seventh and eighth books are perhaps the most powerful and dramatic. Outside affairs and lesser events are lightly touched. But no stories in the world have been told with more intensity than those of the conspiracies in the seventh and eighth books, and none have given a more intimate and accurate perception of the modes of thought and feeling at the time. The History ends with the death of Lorenzo de Medici in 1492. Enough has been said of its breadth of scope and originality of method. The spirit of clear flaming patriotism, of undying hope that will not in the darkest day despair, the plangent appeal to Italy for its own great sake to rouse and live, all these are found pre-eminently in the History as they are found wherever Machiavelli speaks from the heart of his heart. Of the style a foreigner may not speak. But those who are proper judges maintain that in simplicity and lucidity, vigour, and power, softness, elevation, and eloquence, the style of Machiavelli is 'divine,' and remains, as that of Dante among the poets, unchallenged and insuperable among all writers of Italian prose.

In the History, as in much of his other work, Machiavelli enriches the understanding of humanity with a new area of study. He was the first to look at the life of a nation as a continuous journey, to trace the effects of political forces across generations, to compare individual actions with the development of larger causes that they could hardly influence, and to highlight the key aspects of a nation's story by minimizing less important details. He had no examples to follow; Villani, despite his merits, was of a different kind. There were plenty of diarists and chroniclers, as well as works by learned men like Aretino, which were written in Latin and mostly rhetorical. Guicciardini's major work wasn’t published until years after Machiavelli's death. Machiavelli broke away from traditional Chronicles and other existing formats. He intentionally applied philosophy to a sequence of events. He organized civil and political history. He originally planned to start his work in 1234, the year Cosimo il Vecchio returned from exile and Medicean power was solidified, claiming that earlier periods were already covered by Aretino and Bracciolini. But he quickly realized they focused solely on outside wars and affairs while neglecting the true core of Florence’s history. He set out to accomplish this in a very different way, and he succeeded. Throughout, he emphasizes and subtly underscores his ongoing explanation for Italy's suffering: the need for unity and the problems posed by the Papacy that obstructs it. In this book dedicated to a Pope, he holds nothing back regarding his disdain for the Holy See. He is always searching for one strong leader in a chaotic land with nearly absolute power to punish, dismantle, and build on a solid foundation because, to him, events arise from individuals, not the other way around. He was the first to note that the Ghibellines were not only the Imperial party but also the party of aristocrats and influential men, while the Guelphs represented both the Church and the people, and he traces the slow but growing struggle leading to the victory of democracy in the Ordinamenti di Giustizia (1293). However, that triumph was not conclusive. The Florentines were 'unable to protect their liberty and could not bear slavery.' Thus, fighting, banishments, bloodshed, cruelty, and injustice erupted once again. He notes that the nobles were originally Germanic, while the people were Latin, which added a layer of racial animosity to their hatred. Yet, he objectively adds that when the defeated nobility were forced to change their names and no longer dared to speak up, 'Florence was not only stripped of arms but also of all kindness.' It would be impossible to detail the History comprehensively. The second, seventh, and eighth books are perhaps the most powerful and dramatic. External affairs and lesser events are briefly mentioned. But no stories in the world have been told with more intensity than the conspiracies in the seventh and eighth books, nor have they provided a more intimate and accurate understanding of the thought and feelings of the time. The History concludes with the death of Lorenzo de Medici in 1492. Enough has been said about its broad scope and innovative methods. The spirit of clear, passionate patriotism, of unwavering hope that refuses to despair in the darkest times, and the heartfelt call to Italy to awaken and thrive are all prominently found in the History, just as they are wherever Machiavelli speaks from deep within his heart. A foreigner may not evaluate the style. However, those who are qualified judges maintain that in simplicity and clarity, vigor and strength, tenderness, elevation, and eloquence, Machiavelli's style is 'divine,' and remains, like Dante's among poets, unmatched and unparalleled among all writers of Italian prose.

Other Works.

Other Projects.

Though Machiavelli must always stand as a political thinker, an historian, and a military theorist it would leave an insufficient idea of his mental activities were there no short notice of his other literary works. With his passion for incarnating his theories in a single personality, he wrote the Life of Castruccio Castracani, a politico-military romance. His hero was a soldier of fortune born Lucca in 1281, and, playing with a free hand, Machiavelli weaves a life of adventure and romance in which his constant ideas of war and politics run through and across an almost imaginary tapestry. He seems to have intended to illustrate and to popularise his ideals and to attain by a story the many whom his discourses could not reach. In verse Machiavelli was fluent, pungent, and prosaic. The unfinished Golden Ass is merely made of paragraphs of the Discorsi twined into rhymes. And the others are little better. Countless pamphlets, essays, and descriptions may be searched without total waste by the very curious and the very leisurely. The many despatches and multitudinous private letters tell the story both of his life and his mind. But the short but famous Novella di Belfagor Arcidiavolo is excellent in wit, satire, and invention. As a playwright he wrote, among many lesser efforts, one supreme comedy, Mandragola, which Macaulay declares to be better than the best of Goldoni's plays, and only less excellent than the very best of Molière's. Italian critics call it the finest play in Italian. The plot is not for nursery reading, but there are tears and laughter and pity and anger to furnish forth a copious author, and it has been not ill observed that Mandragola is the comedy of a society of which The Prince is the tragedy.

Although Machiavelli will always be recognized as a political thinker, historian, and military theorist, simply labeling him as such doesn't capture the full extent of his intellectual endeavors without mentioning his other literary works. Driven by his desire to embody his theories in a single character, he wrote the Life of Castruccio Castracani, a political-military romance. His protagonist is a soldier of fortune born in Lucca in 1281, and with creative freedom, Machiavelli crafts a tale filled with adventure and romance where his recurring themes of war and politics interweave through an almost fictional tapestry. He seems to have aimed to showcase and popularize his ideals, reaching those who his discourses could not. In verse, Machiavelli was skilled, sharp, and straightforward. The unfinished Golden Ass is primarily composed of paragraphs from the Discorsi turned into rhymes. The others are not much better. There are countless pamphlets, essays, and descriptions that curious and leisurely readers can explore without much loss. His numerous dispatches and private letters reveal both his life story and his thoughts. However, the brief yet famous Novella di Belfagor Arcidiavolo shines with wit, satire, and creativity. As a playwright, he produced many lesser works but also one major comedy, Mandragola, which Macaulay claims is superior to Goldoni's best plays and only slightly less impressive than Molière's finest works. Italian critics regard it as the best play in Italian literature. The plot isn’t suitable for children, but it contains tears, laughter, compassion, and anger that make for a rich narrative, and it has been aptly noted that Mandragola is the comedy of a society that The Prince depicts as its tragedy.

The End.

The End.

It has been said of the Italians of the Renaissance that with so much of unfairness in their policy, there was an extraordinary degree of fairness in their intellects. They were as direct in thought as they were tortuous in action and could see no wickedness in deceiving a man whom they intended to destroy. To such a charge—if charge it be—Machiavelli would have willingly owned himself answerable. He observed, in order to know, and he wished to use his knowledge for the advancement of good. To him the means were indifferent, provided only that they were always apt and moderate in accordance with necessity, A surgeon has no room for sentiment: in such an operator pity were a crime. It is his to examine, to probe, to diagnose, flinching at no ulcer, sparing neither to himself or to his patient. And if he may not act, he is to lay down very clearly the reasons which led to his conclusions and to state the mode by which life itself may be saved, cost what amputation and agony it may. This was Machiavelli's business, and he applied his eye, his brains, and his knife with a relentless persistence, which, only because it was so faithful, was not called heroic. And we know that he suffered in the doing of it and that his heart was sore for his patient. But there was no other way. His record is clear and shining. He has been accused of no treachery, of no evil action. His patriotism for Italy as a fatherland, a dream undreamt by any other, never glowed more brightly than when Italy lay low in shame, and ruin, and despair. His faith never faltered, his spirit never shrank. And the Italy that he saw, through dark bursts of storm, broken and sinking, we see to-day riding in the sunny haven where he would have her to be.

It has been said of the Italians of the Renaissance that while their politics were often unfair, their intellects displayed a remarkable fairness. They were straightforward in thought but complicated in action and felt no guilt in deceiving someone they planned to destroy. To such an accusation—if it can be called that—Machiavelli would have readily accepted responsibility. He observed to gain knowledge, and he aimed to use this knowledge for the greater good. To him, the means were irrelevant, as long as they were appropriate and moderate according to what was necessary. A surgeon has no place for sentiment: for such an operator, pity is a crime. It is his job to examine, to probe, to diagnose, not flinching at any wound, sparing neither himself nor his patient. And if he cannot act, he must clearly explain the reasons for his conclusions and outline how life itself may be saved, no matter the cost of amputation and pain. This was Machiavelli's role, and he applied his intellect, skill, and resolve with an unwavering determination that, because of its loyalty, was not considered heroic. We know he felt anguish while doing this and that his heart ached for his patient. But there was no other way. His record is clear and commendable. He has faced no accusations of treachery or wrongdoing. His love for Italy as a homeland, a vision not dreamed by anyone else, never shone brighter than when Italy was in a state of shame, ruin, and despair. His faith never wavered, and his spirit never weakened. And the Italy he envisioned, through dark storms, broken and sinking, we see today thriving in the sunny haven where he would have wanted her to be.

HENRY CUST.

HENRY CUST.


CONTENTS


THE ARTE OF WARRE

WRITTEN FIRST IN ITALIAN BY

NICHOLAS MACHIAVELL

AND SET FORTHE IN ENGLISHE BY

PETER WHITEHORNE

STUDIENT AT GRAIES INNE

WITH AN ADDICION OF OTHER LIKE MARCIALLE FEATES AND EXPERIMENTES

AS IN A TABLE

IN THE ENDE OF THE BOOKE

MAIE APPERE

1560

Menfss. Iulij.

{3}

TO THE MOSTE

TO THE MOST

HIGHE, AND EXCELLENT PRINCES,

High and excellent princes,

ELIZABETH, by the Grace of God, Quene

ELIZABETH, by the Grace of God, Queen

of Englande, Fraunce, and Irelande,

of England, France, and Ireland,

defender of the faithe, and of the Churche

defender of the faith, and of the Church

of Englande, and Irelande, on yearth

of England and Ireland, on earth

next under God, the supreme

next under God, the supreme

Governour.

Governor.

A lthough commonlie every man, moste worthie and renoumed Soveraine, seketh specially to commend and extolle the thing, whereunto he feleth hymself naturally bent and inclined, yet al soche parciallitie and private affection laid aside, it is to bee thought (that for the defence, maintenaunce, and advauncemente of a Kyngdome, or Common weale, or for the good and due observacion of peace, and administracion of Justice in the same) no one thinge to be more profitable, necessarie, or more honourable, then the knowledge of service in warre, and dedes of armes; bicause consideryng the ambicion of the {4} worlde, it is impossible for any realme or dominion, long to continue free in quietnesse and savegarde, where the defence of the sweard is not alwaies in a readinesse. For like as the Grekes, beyng occupied aboute triflyng matters, takyng pleasure in resityng of Comedies, and soche other vain thinges, altogether neclecting Marciall feates, gave occasion to Philip kyng of Macedonia, father to Alexander the Great, to oppresse and to bring theim in servitude, under his subjeccion, even so undoubtedly, libertie will not be kepte, but men shall be troden under foote, and brought to moste horrible miserie and calamitie, if thei givyng theim selves to pastymes and pleasure, forssake the juste regarde of their owne defence, and savegarde of their countrie, whiche in temporall regimente, chiefly consisteth in warlike skilfulnesse. And therefore the aunciente Capitaines and mightie Conquerours, so longe as thei florished, did devise with moste greate diligence, all maner of waies, to bryng their men to the perfect knowledge of what so ever thing appertained to the warre: as manifestly appereth by the warlike games, whiche in old time the Princes of Grecia ordained, upon the mount Olimpus, and also by thorders and exercises, that the aunciente {5} Romaines used in sundrie places, and specially in Campo Martio, and in their wonderful sumptuous Theaters, whiche chiefly thei builded to that purpose. Whereby thei not onely made their Souldiours so experte, that thei obtained with a fewe, in faightyng againste a greate houge multitude of enemies, soche marveilous victories, as in many credible Histories are mencioned, but also by the same meanes, their unarmed and rascalle people that followed their Campes, gotte soche understandyng in the feates of warre, that thei in the daie of battaile, beeyng lefte destitute of succour, were able without any other help, to set themselves in good order, for their defence againste the enemie, that would seke to hurte theim, and in soche daungerous times, have doen their countrie so good service, that verie often by their helpe, the adversaries have been put to flight, and fieldes moste happely wone. So that thantiquitie estemed nothing more happie in a common weale, then to have in the same many men skilfull in warlike affaires: by meanes whereof, their Empire continually inlarged, and moste wonderfully and triumphantly prospered. For so longe as men for their valiauntnesse, were then rewarded and had in estimacion, glad was he that {6} could finde occasion to venter, yea, and spende his life, to benefite his countrie: as by the manly actes that Marcus Curcius, Oracius Cocles, and Gaius Mucius did for the savegarde of Rome and also by other innumerable like examples dooeth plainly appeare. But when through long and continuall peace, thei began to bee altogether given to pleasure and delicatenesse, little regardyng Marciall feates, nor soche as were expert in the practise thereof: Their dominions and estates, did not so moche before increase and prospere, as then by soche meanes and oversight, thei sodainly fell into decaie and utter ruine. For soche truly is the nature and condicion, bothe of peace and warre, that where in governemente, there is not had equalle consideration of them bothe, the one in fine, doeth woorke and induce, the others oblivion and utter abholicion. Wherfore, sith the necessitie of the science of warres is so greate, and also the necessarie use thereof so manifeste, that even Ladie Peace her self, doeth in maner from thens crave her chief defence and preservacion, and the worthinesse moreover, and honour of the same so greate, that as by prose we see, the perfecte glorie therof, cannot easely finde roote, but in the hartes of moste noble couragious {7} and manlike personages, I thought most excellente Princes, I could not either to the specialle gratefiyng of your highnesse, the universall delight of all studious gentlemen, or the common utilitie of the publike wealth, imploie my labours more profitablie in accomplishyng of my duetie and good will, then in settyng foorthe some thing, that might induce to the augmentyng and increase of the knowledge thereof: inespecially thexample of your highnes most politike governemente over us, givyng plaine testimonie of the wonderfull prudente desire that is in you, to have your people instructed in this kinde of service, as well for the better defence of your highnesse, theim selves, and their countrie, as also to discourage thereby, and to be able to resist the malingnitie of the enemie, who otherwise would seeke peradventure, to invade this noble realme or kyngdome.

A Although it’s common for most individuals, especially esteemed and renowned leaders, to seek out and praise things they naturally favor, when all bias and personal affection are set aside, it is important to recognize that for the defense, support, and advancement of a kingdom or commonwealth, or for the proper maintenance of peace and administration of justice, nothing is more beneficial, necessary, or honorable than understanding military service and acts of arms. Considering the ambition of the world, a realm or dominion cannot remain free, peaceful, and secure for long without readiness for defense. Just as the Greeks, consumed with trivial matters and distracted by the enjoyment of comedies and other frivolous things, entirely neglected martial skills, leading to their oppression and subjugation by Philip of Macedonia, the father of Alexander the Great, so will liberty not be preserved; people will be trampled underfoot and subjected to the most horrible misery and calamity if they indulge in entertainment and pleasures while ignoring the essential duty of their own defense and the protection of their country, which in temporal governance relies primarily on military skills. Therefore, throughout history, ancient captains and mighty conquerors diligently devised various ways to train their troops in all things related to war, as is clearly shown by the martial games organized by the princes of Greece on Mount Olympus, and by the orders and exercises used by the ancient Romans in various places, especially in the Campus Martius and their magnificent theaters, specifically built for that purpose. Through these efforts, they not only trained their soldiers to such expertise that a small number could achieve remarkable victories against vast multitudes of enemies, as recounted in many credible histories, but also their unarmed followers in the camp gained enough understanding in military tactics that, when left without support on the day of battle, they were capable of organizing themselves effectively for defense against any threatening enemy, rendering significant service to their country during dangerous times. Very often, their assistance led to adversaries being routed and fields being triumphantly won. Antiquity regarded it as one of the most fortunate circumstances for a commonwealth to have many skilled warriors, which allowed their empire to continually expand and prosper remarkably and triumphantly. As long as individuals were rewarded and respected for their bravery, those who found opportunities to risk and even sacrifice their lives for the benefit of their country felt proud, as clearly demonstrated by the courageous acts of Marcus Curtius, Horatius Cocles, and Gaius Mucius for the safety of Rome, along with numerous other similar examples. However, when prolonged and continuous peace led to indulgence in pleasure and luxury, disregarding martial skills and those versed in them, their territories did not continue to grow and thrive; instead, because of such negligence, they swiftly fell into decay and ruin. Such is the nature and condition of both peace and war that if governance does not give equal consideration to both, one will ultimately lead to the others' oblivion and complete eradication. Thus, since the necessity of military knowledge is so great, and its imperative use is so clear that even Lady Peace herself essentially demands her main defense and preservation from this knowledge, and given the significant worth and honor of it being evident, as prose shows us, the perfect glory of it can hardly take root except in the hearts of noble and courageous individuals, I thought it fitting, most excellent princes, that I could not more suitably serve your highness, delight all diligent gentlemen, or benefit the common wealth than by promoting something that might encourage the growth and enhancement of this knowledge. Especially given your highness's exemplary governance over us, which clearly demonstrates your wise desire to have your people trained in this kind of service, both for your own defense, theirs, and that of your country, as well as to discourage and be able to resist the malice of any enemy who might otherwise seek to invade this noble realm or kingdom.

When therfore about x. yeres paste, in the Emperours warres against the Mores and certain Turkes beyng in Barberie, at the siege and winnyng of Calibbia, Monesterio and Africa, I had as well for my further instruction in those affaires, as also the better to acquainte me with the Italian tongue, reduced into Englishe, the {8} booke called The arte of Warre, of the famous and excellente Nicholas Machiavell, whiche in times paste he beyng a counsailour, and Secretarie of the noble Citee of Florence, not without his greate laude and praise did write: and havyng lately againe, somwhat perused the same, the whiche in soche continuall broiles and unquietnesse, was by me translated, I determined with my self, by publishyng thereof, to bestowe as greate a gift (sins greater I was not able) emongeste my countrie men, not experte in the Italian tongue, as in like woorkes I had seen before me, the Frenchemen, Duchemen, Spaniardes, and other forreine nacions, moste lovyngly to have bestowed emongeste theirs: The rather undoubtedly, that as by private readyng of the same booke, I then felt my self in that knowledge marveilously holpen and increased, so by communicatyng the same to many, our Englishemen findyng out the orderyng and disposyng of exploictes of warre therein contained, the aide and direction of these plaine and briefe preceptes, might no lesse in knowledge of warres become incomperable, then in prowes also and exercise of the same, altogether invincible: which my translacion moste gracious Soveraine, together {9} with soche other thynges, as by me hath been gathered, and thought good to adde thereunto, I have presumed to dedicate unto youre highnes: not onely bicause the whole charge and furniture of warlike counsailes and preparacions, being determined by the arbitremente of Governours and Princes, the treatise also of like effecte should in like maner as of right, depende upon the protection of a moste worthie and noble Patronesse, but also that the discourse it self, and the woorke of a forrein aucthour, under the passeport and safeconduite of your highnes moste noble name, might by speciall aucthoritie of the same, winne emongest your Majesties subjectes, moche better credite and estimacion. And if mooste mightie Queen, in this kind of Philosophie (if I maie so terme it) grave and sage counsailes, learned and wittie preceptes, or politike and prudente admonicions, ought not to be accompted the least and basest tewels of weale publike. Then dare I boldely affirme, that of many straungers, whiche from forrein countries, have here tofore in this your Majesties realme arrived, there is none in comparison to bee preferred, before this worthie Florentine and Italian, who havyng frely without any gaine of exchaunge (as after some {10} acquaintaunce and familiaritie will better appeare) brought with hym moste riche, rare and plentiful Treasure, shall deserve I trust of all good Englishe lishe hartes, most lovingly and frendly to be intertained, embraced and cherished. Whose newe Englishe apparell, how so ever it shall seme by me, after a grosse fasion, more fitlie appoincted to the Campe, then in nice termes attired to the Carpet, and in course clothyng rather putte foorthe to battaile, then in any brave shewe prepared to the bankette, neverthelesse my good will I truste, shall of your grace be taken in good parte, havyng fashioned the phraise of my rude stile, even accordyng to the purpose of my travaile, whiche was rather to profite the desirous manne of warre, then to delight the eares of the fine Rethorician, or daintie curious scholemanne: Moste humblie besechyng your highnes, so to accept my labour herein, as the first fruictes of a poore souldiours studie, who to the uttermoste of his smalle power, in the service of your moste gracious majestie, and of his countrie, will at al tymes, accordyng to his bounden duetie and allegeaunce, promptlie yeld hym self to any labour, travaile, or daunger, what so ever shal happen. Praiyng {11} in the mean season the almightie God, to give your highnes in longe prosperous raigne, perfect health, desired tranquilitie, and against all your enemies, luckie and joifull victorie.

About ten years ago, during the Emperor's wars against the Moors and some Turks in Barbary, at the siege and capture of Calibbia, Monesterio, and Africa, I translated into English a book called The Art of War by the renowned Nicholas Machiavelli. He wrote this when he was a counselor and secretary of the noble city of Florence, earning significant praise for his work. Recently, after reviewing it again, I decided to share it with my fellow countrymen who aren’t familiar with Italian. I wanted to offer them a gift, as I had seen many foreigners, like the French, Dutch, and Spaniards, generously share similar works with their own people. I was motivated by the fact that, through reading the book privately, I greatly enhanced my own understanding of these matters. By sharing it, I hoped that English speakers would also learn the strategies and tactics of warfare contained in it, becoming not only knowledgeable but also formidable in practice. My gracious Sovereign, I have chosen to dedicate my translation, along with other things I’ve gathered and thought would be good to include, to your highness. Not only because the planning and equipment for warfare should be shaped by the insight of leaders and princes, but also because this work, by a foreign author, under your noble name, might gain much greater respect and value among your subjects. If I may call it that, in this kind of philosophy—grave and wise counsel, learned and witty advice, or prudent suggestions—should not be treated as trivial. I can confidently say that of all the foreigners who have arrived in your realm, none compare to this worthy Florentine and Italian. He has come freely, without asking for anything in return (as will become clear after some familiarity) and has brought with him a wealth of rare treasures, deserving to be warmly welcomed and embraced by all good English hearts. I hope my new English version, however rough it may seem, is more suited for the battlefield than for fine gatherings, and though it may appear more functional than polished, I trust that my good intentions will be well received. I aimed for the phrasing of my humble style to align with my purpose, which was to benefit those eager to learn about warfare, rather than to impress eloquent rhetoricians or scholarly perfectionists. I humbly ask your highness to accept my effort as the first fruits of a poor soldier's study, who, to the best of his small abilities, will always dedicate himself to the service of your gracious majesty and his country, ready to face any labor, travel, or danger that may arise. Meanwhile, I pray that Almighty God grants your highness a long and prosperous reign, perfect health, peaceful joy, and victorious outcomes against all your enemies.

Your humble subject and dailie oratour,

Your humble servant and daily speaker,

PETER WHITEHORNE. {13}

PETER WHITEHORNE. {13}

THE PROHEME

THE PROHEME

OF NICHOLAS MACHIAVELL,

OF NICHOLAS MACHIAVELL,

Citezein and Secretarie of Florence,

Citezein and Secretary of Florence,

upon his booke of the Arte of Warre, unto

upon his book of the Art of War, to

Laurence Philippe Strozze, one of the

Laurence Philippe Strozze, one of the

nobilitie of Florence.

nobility of Florence.

There have Laurence, many helde, and do holde this opinion, that there is no maner of thing, whiche lesse agreeth the one with the other, nor that is so much unlike, as the civil life to the Souldiours. Wherby it is often seen, that if any determin in thexercise of that kinde of service to prevaile, that incontinent he doeth not only chaunge in apparel, but also in custome and maner, in voice, and from the facion of all civil use, he doeth alter: For that he thinketh not meete to clothe with civell apparell him, who wil be redie, and promt to all kinde of violence, nor the civell customes, and usages maie that man have, the whiche judgeth bothe those customes to be effeminate, and those usages not to be agreable to his profession: Nor it semes not convenient for him to use the civill gesture and ordinarie wordes, who with fasing and blasphemies, will make afraied other menne: the whiche causeth in this time, suche opinion to be moste true. But if thei should consider thauncient orders, there should nothing be founde more united, more confirmable, and that of necessitie ought to love so much the one the other, as these: for as muche as {14} all the artes that are ordeined in a common weale, in regarde or respecte of common profite of menne, all the orders made in the same, to live with feare of the Lawe, and of God should be vaine, if by force of armes their defence wer not prepared, which, well ordeined, doe maintain those also whiche be not well ordeined. And likewise to the contrarie the good orders, without the souldiours help, no lesse or otherwise doe disorder, then the habitacion of a sumptuous and roiall palais, although it wer decte with gold and precious stones, when without being covered, should not have wherewith to defende it from the raine. And if in what so ever other orders of Cities and Kyngdomes, there hath been used al diligence for to maintain men faithfull, peaceable, and full of the feare of God, in the service of warre, it was doubled: if for in what man ought the countrie to seke greater faith, then in him, who must promise to die for the same? In whom ought there to bee more love of peace, then in him, whiche onely by the warre maie be hurte? In whome ought there to bee more feare of GOD, then in him, which every daie committyng himself to infinite perilles, hath moste neede of his helpe? This necessitie considered wel, bothe of them that gave the lawes to Empires, and of those that to the exercise of service wer apoincted, made that the life of Souldiours, of other menne was praised, and with all studie folowed and imitated. But the orders of service of war, beyng altogether corrupted, and a greate waie from the auncient maners altered, there hath growen these sinisterous opinions, which maketh men to hate the warlike service, and to flie the conversacion of those that dooe exercise it. Albeit I judgeing by the same, that I have seen and redde, that it is not a thyng impossible, to bryng it again to the auncient maners, and to give it some facion of the vertue passed, I have determined to the entente not to passe this my idell time, without doyng some thyng, to write that whiche I doe understande, to the satisfaction of those, who of aunciente actes, are lovers of the science of warre. And although it be a bold thing to intreate of the same matter, wher of {15} otherwise I have made no profession, notwithstanding I beleve it is no errour, to occupie with wordes a degree, the whiche many with greater presumpcion with their deedes have occupied: for as muche as the errours that I maie happen to make by writing, may be without harme to any man corrected: but those the whiche of them be made in doyng cannot be knowen without the ruine of Empires. Therefore Laurence you ought to consider the qualitie of this my laboure, and with your judgement to give it that blame, or that praise, as shall seeme unto you it hath deserved. The whiche I sende unto you, as well to shewe my selfe gratefull, although my habilitie reche not to the benefites, which I have received of you, as also for that beyng the custome to honour with like workes them who for nobilitie, riches, wisedome, and liberalitie doe shine: I knowe you for riches, and nobilitie, not to have many peeres, for wisedome fewe, and for liberalitie none. {17}

TMany, Laurence, believe and hold the view that there is nothing less compatible with one another, nor so unlike, as civil life is to soldiers. Therefore, it is often observed that if someone is determined to succeed in that kind of service, they immediately change not only their clothing but also their customs and manners, their speech, and even the way they conduct themselves in all civil interactions. They do not find it fitting to dress in civilian clothes when they need to be ready for all kinds of violence, nor can a person who views civil customs as weak and incompatible with their profession maintain those customs. It also doesn't seem appropriate for someone who uses threats and blasphemies to frighten others to adopt civil gestures and ordinary words. This leads to the firm belief that such views are true in this time. However, if they were to consider the ancient orders, nothing would seem more united, more confirmable, and in need of mutual affection than these two: because just as all the arts established in a commonwealth are for the common good of people, all the rules made for living under the fear of the Law and of God would be pointless if not protected by military strength, which, when well-ordered, supports those not well-ordered. Likewise, in contrast, good order without the soldiers' help leads to chaos, just like a sumptuously decorated palace, even one adorned with gold and precious stones, would be helpless against the rain if left uncovered. If in any other orders of cities and kingdoms there has been effort to maintain loyal, peaceful, and God-fearing people in military service, that effort has been doubled, for who should the nation trust more than one who must promise to die for it? Who should have a greater love for peace than one who could be harmed only through war? Who should hold a greater fear of God than one who, confronting countless dangers daily, has the greatest need for divine assistance? Recognizing this necessity, both those who created laws for empires and those assigned to military service led to the admiration and imitation of soldiers' lives. But with military service thoroughly corrupted and greatly altered from ancient ways, these negative opinions have arisen, leading people to disdain military service and avoid socializing with those who practice it. Nevertheless, judging by what I have seen and read, I believe it is not impossible to restore it to its ancient ways and infuse it with some semblance of past virtue. Thus, I've decided not to let this idle time pass without doing something, to write what I understand for the satisfaction of those who appreciate ancient acts and love the science of warfare. Although it is bold to address this topic, one I have not formally professed, I believe it is not wrong to engage in discussing a subject that many have addressed with greater presumption through their actions: for any errors I might make in writing can be corrected without harming anyone, while the mistakes made in action often go unnoticed until the ruin of empires occurs. Therefore, Laurence, you should assess the quality of my work and judge it with the scrutiny it deserves, whether that means criticizing or praising it. I send this to you not only to show my gratitude, although my abilities do not match the benefits I’ve received from you, but also because it is customary to honor those who shine for nobility, wealth, wisdom, and generosity with similar works. I consider you to have few peers for your wealth and nobility, for wisdom, very few, and for generosity, none. {17}

THE ARTE OF WARRE

THE TABLE OF CERTAIN PRINCIPALL THINGES, CONTAINED IN THIS WOORKE OF MACHIAVEL

Why a good man ought not to exersise warfare as his arte

Why a good man shouldn't make war his profession

Deedes of armes ought to be used privatly in time of peace for exersise, and in time of warre for necessetie and renoume

Deeds of arms should be practiced privately during peacetime for training, and in wartime for necessity and honor.

The strength of an armie is the footemen

The strength of an army is the infantry.

The Romaines renued their Legions and had men in the flower of their age

The Romans renewed their legions and had men in the prime of their lives.

Whether men of armes ought to be kept

Whether armed men should be maintained

What is requisete for the preparyng of an armie

What is required for preparing an army

Out of what contrie souldiers ought to be chosen

Out of which country soldiers should be chosen

Souldiers ought to bee chosen, by thaucthoritie of the Prince, of suche men as be his oune subjectes

Soldiers should be chosen, by the authority of the Prince, from those men who are his own subjects.

The difference of ages, that is to be taken in the chosinge of souldiours for the restoring of an olde power and for the making of a newe

The difference in ages should be considered when choosing soldiers for restoring an old power and for creating a new one.

{18}

The weapons or power that is prepared, of the naturall subjectes, of a common weale bringeth profit and not hurte

The weapons or power that is prepared by the natural subjects of a commonwealth bring benefit and not harm.

What cause letted the Venetians, that they made not a Monarchi of the worlde

What caused the Venetians not to create a monarchy of the world?

How an armie maye bee prepared in the countrie, where were no exersise of warre

How an army may be prepared in the countryside, where there was no exercise of war.

The custome that the Romaines used, in the chosyng of their souldiours

The custom that the Romans followed in choosing their soldiers.

The greater number of men is best

The majority of people is best.

Whether the multitude of armed men ar occation of confusion and of dissorder

Whether the numerous armed men are a cause of confusion and disorder.

How to prohibite, that the Capitaines make no discension

How to prevent the captains from creating divisions

What armour the antiquetie used

What armor did the ancients use?

The occation of the boldenes of the duchemen

The occasion of the boldness of the Dutchmen

Whiche maner of armyng menne is better either the Duche or Romaine fasion

Which way of arming men is better, the Dutch or the Roman style?

Diverse examples of late dayes

Diverse examples of late days

An example of Tigran

An example of Tigran

Whether the footemen or the horsemen ought to bee estemed moste

Whether the foot soldiers or the cavalry should be considered more valuable

The cause whie the Romaines were overcome of the parthians

The reason the Romans were defeated by the Parthians

What order, or what vertue maketh, that footemen overcum horsemen

What strategy or virtue allows foot soldiers to overcome horseback riders?

{19}

Howe the antiquitie exersised their men to learne them to handle their weapons

How the ancients trained their men to handle their weapons.

What the antiquitie estemed moste happie in a common weale

What the ancients considered most fortunate in a commonwealth

The maner, of maintainyng the order

The way of maintaining the order

What a legion is, of Grekes called a Falange, and of Frenchemen Catterva

What a legion is, called a Phalanx by the Greeks, and a Catterva by the French.

The devision of a legion, and the divers names of orders

The division of a legion, and the different names of orders

The order of batellraye, and the manner of appoincting the battels

The order of battle, and the way of appointing the battles

How to order, CCCC.L. men to doo some severall feate

How to order, CCCC.L. men to do some various tasks.

The fation of a battaile that the Suisers make like a crosse

The formation of a battle that the Swiss create looks like a cross.

What carriages the Capitaines ought to have, and the number of carriages requisite to every band of men

What carriages the Captains should have, and the number of carriages needed for each group of men

Diverse effectes caused of diverse soundes

Diverse effects caused by different sounds

Whereof cometh the utilitie, and the dissorder of the armies that are now a daies

Where does the usefulness and the disorder of the armies that exist these days come from?

The manner of arminge men

How to equip men

The number of carriages that men of armes and lighte horsemen ought to have

The number of carriages that men-at-arms and light cavalry should have

The greatest dissorder that is used now a dayes in the orderinge of an armie

The biggest mess that's happening these days in the organization of an army

How the Romaines devided their armie in Hastati, Principi and Triarii

How the Romans divided their army into Hastati, Principi, and Triarii.

{20}

The manner that the Romaines used to order them selves agayne in the overthrow

The way the Romans managed to regroup after the defeat

The custom of the Greekes

The custom of the Greeks

A maine battaile of Suissers

A main battle of Swiss

How manie legions of Romaine Citesens was in an ordinarie armie

How many legions of Roman citizens were in an ordinary army?

The manner how to pitche a fielde to faighte a battaile

The way to set up a field to fight a battle

Of what number of faighting men an armie oughte to be

Of how many fighting men an army should have

The description of a battaile that is a faighting

The description of a battle that is a fight

An exsample of Ventidio faighting against the Parthians

An example of Ventidio fighting against the Parthians.

An example of Epaminondas

An example of Epaminondas

How the Artillerie is unprofitable

Why the Artillery is not profitable

How that a maine battaile of Suissers cannot ocupie more then fower pikes

How a main battle of Swiss soldiers can only occupy four pikes.

How the battailes when thei cum to be eight or ten, maye be receyved in the verie same space, that received the fyve

How the battles, when they reach eight or ten, can be received in the same space that received the five.

The armes that the Standarde of all tharmie ought to have

The arms that the standard of the whole army should have

Divers examples of the antiquetie

Diverse examples of antiquity

Whether the fronte of the armie ought to bee made large

Whether the front of the army should be made large

To how many thinges respecte ought to be had, in the ordringe of an armie

To how many things should respect be given in organizing an army

An example of Scipio

An example of Scipio

{21}

In what place a Capitain maie order his armie with savegarde not to be clene overthrowen

In what way can a captain organize his army safely to avoid being completely defeated?

Aniball and Scipio praised for the orderynge of their armies

Aniball and Scipio were praised for their organization of the armies.

Cartes used of the Asiaticans

Cards used by the Asians

Diverse examples of the antiquitie

Diverse examples from antiquity

The prudence which the Capitaine ought to use, in the accidence that chaunse in faightinge

The caution that the Captain should exercise in the events that occur during fighting.

What a Capitaine ought to doo, that is the conqueror, or that is conquered

What a Captain should do, whether they are the conqueror or the conquered

A Capitaine ought not to faighte the battaile, but with advauntage, excepte he be constrained

A captain shouldn’t fight the battle unless he has the advantage, unless he's forced to.

How to avoide the faightinge of the fielde

How to avoid fighting in the field

Advertismentes that the Capitaine ought to have

Advertisments that the Captain should have

Speakyng to souldiers helpeth muche to make them to be curagious and bolde

Speaking to soldiers greatly helps to make them courageous and bold.

Whether all the armie ought to bee spoken unto, or onely to the heddes thereof

Whether all the armies should be addressed, or just their leaders.

The manner how to leade an armie gowinge thorough suspected places, or to incounter the enemie

The way to lead an army through potentially dangerous areas or to face the enemy

An example of Aniball

Aniball example

Wether any thing oughte to bee commaunded with the voise or with the trompet

Whether anything ought to be commanded with the voice or with the trumpet

The occations why the warres made now a dayes, doo impoverish the conquerors as well as the conquered

The reasons why wars are fought nowadays impoverish both the conquerors and the conquered.

{22}

Credite ought not to be given to thinges which stand nothinge with reason

Credit should not be given to things that have no basis in reason.

The armie ought not to knowe what the Capitaine purposeth to doo

The army shouldn't know what the Captain plans to do.

Diverse examples

Varied examples

The maner how to incampe an armie

The way to set up a camp for an army

How brode the spaces and the wayes ought to be within the campe

How broad the spaces and the ways should be within the camp.

What waye ought to be used when it is requiset to incampe nere the enemie

What method should be used when it is necessary to camp near the enemy?

How the watche and warde ought to be apoincted in the campe, and what punishmente they ought to have that doo not their dutie

How the watch and ward should be arranged in the camp, and what punishment should be given to those who do not fulfill their duties.

How the Romanies prohibited women to be in their armies and idell games to be used

How the Romani people prohibited women from being in their armies and banned idle games from being played.

How to incampe accordinge to the nomber of men, and what nomber of menne maie suffise againste, what so ever enemie that wer

How to camp based on the number of men, and what number of men may be sufficient against any enemy that comes.

How to doo to be assured, of the fideletie of those that are had in suspition

How to be sure about the loyalty of those who are under suspicion

What a Capitaine ought to doo beinge beseged of his enemies

What a captain should do when besieged by his enemies

Example of Coriliano and others

Example of Coriliano and others

It is requiset chiefly for a Capitain to kepe his souldiers punished and payed

It is essential for a captain to keep his soldiers disciplined and paid.

{23}

Of aguries

Of omens

Moste excellent advertismentes and pollicies

Most excellent advertisements and policies

The occation of the overthrowe of the Frenchmen at Garigliano

The occasion of the overthrow of the French at Garigliano

Cities are strong, either by nature or by industrie

Cities are powerful, either by nature or by industry.

The maner of fortificacion

The method of fortification

Bulwarkes ought not to be made oute of a towne distante from the same

Bulwarks shouldn't be built outside of a town that is far away from it.

Example of Genoa

Example of Genoa

Of the Countes Catherin

Of Countess Catherine

The fation of percullesies used in Almaine

The fashion of peculiarities used in Germany

Howe the battelmentes of walles were made at the first, and how thei are made now adaies

How the battlements of walls were built in the past and how they are constructed today.

The provisions that is mete to bee made, for the defence of a towne

The arrangements that need to be made for the defense of a town

Divers pollicies, for the beseginge and defendinge of a toune or fortres

Divers policies for the besieging and defending of a town or fortress

Secrete conveing of letters

Secret letter delivery

The defence againste a breache

The defense against a breach

Generall rules of warre

General rules of war

{25}

THE FIRST BOOKE

{27}

Forasmuch as I beleve that after death, al men maie be praised without charge, al occasion and suspecte of flatterie beyng taken awaie, I shal not doubte to praise our Cosimo Ruchellay, whose name was never remembred of me without teares, havyng knowen in him those condicions, the whiche in a good frende or in a citezien, might of his freendes, or of his countrie, be desired: for that I doe not knowe what thyng was so muche his, not excepting any thing (saving his soule) which for his frendes willingly of him should not have been spent: I knowe not what enterprise should have made him afraide, where the same should have ben knowen to have been for the benefite of his countrie. And I doe painly confesse, not to have mette emongest so many men, as I have knowen, and practised withal, a man, whose minde was more inflamed then his, unto great and magnificent thynges. Nor he lamented not with his frendes of any thyng at his death, but because he was borne to die a yong manne within his owne house, before he had gotten honour, and accordynge to his desire, holpen any manne: for that he knewe, that of him coulde not be spoken other, savyng that there should be dead a good freende. Yet it resteth not for this, that we, and what so ever other that as we did know him, are not able to testifie (seeyng his woorkes doe not appere) of his lawdable qualities. True it is, that fortune was not for al this, so muche his enemie, that it left not some brief {28} record of the readinesse of his witte, as doeth declare certaine of his writinges, and settyng foorthe of amorous verses, wherin (although he were not in love) yet for that he would not consume time in vain, til unto profounder studies fortune should have brought him, in his youthfull age he exercised himselfe. Whereby moste plainly maie be comprehended, with how moche felicitie he did describe his conceiptes, and how moche for Poetrie he should have ben estemed, if the same for the ende therof, had of him ben exercised. Fortune having therfore deprived us from the use of so great a frende, me thinketh there can bee founde no other remedie, then as muche as is possible, to seke to enjoye the memorie of the same, and to repeate suche thynges as hath been of him either wittely saied, or wisely disputed. And for as much as there is nothyng of him more freshe, then the reasonyng, the whiche in his last daies Signior Fabricio Collonna, in his orchard had with him, where largely of the same gentilman were disputed matters of warre, bothe wittely and prudently, for the moste parte of Cosimo demaunded, I thought good, for that I was present there with certain other of our frendes, to bring it to memorie, so that reading the same, the frendes of Cosimo, whiche thether came, might renewe in their mindes, the remembraunce of his vertue: and the other part beyng sorie for their absence, might partly learne hereby many thynges profitable, not onely to the life of Souldiours, but also to civil mennes lives, which gravely of a moste wise man was disputed. Therfore I saie, that Fabricio Collonna retournyng out of Lombardie, where longe time greatly to his glorie, he had served in the warres the catholike kyng, he determined, passyng by Florence, to rest himself certain daies in the same citee, to visite the Dukes excellencie, and to see certaine gentilmen, whiche in times paste he had been acquainted withal. For whiche cause, unto Cosimo it was thought beste to bid him into his orchard, not so muche to use his liberalitee, as to have occasion to talke with him at leasure, and of him to understande and to learne divers thinges, accordyng as of suche a man maie bee hoped for, {29} semyng to have accasion to spende a daie in reasonyng of suche matters, which to his minde should best satisfie him. Then Fabricio came, accordyng to his desire, and was received of Cosimo together, with certain of his trustie frendes, emongest whome wer Zanoby Buondelmonti, Baptiste Palla, and Luigi Allamanni, all young men loved of him and of the very same studies moste ardente, whose good qualities, for as muche as every daie, and at every houre thei dooe praise themselves, we will omit. Fabricio was then accordyng to the time and place honoured, of all those honours, that thei could possible devise: But the bankettyng pleasures beyng passed, and the tabel taken up, and al preparacion of feastinges consumed, the which are sone at an ende in sight of greate men, who to honorable studies have their mindes set, the daie beyng longe, and the heate muche, Cosimo judged for to content better his desire, that it wer well doen, takyng occasion to avoide the heate, to bring him into the moste secret, and shadowest place of his garden. Where thei beyng come, and caused to sit, some upon herbes, some in the coldest places, other upon litle seates which there was ordeined, under the shadow of moste high trees, Fabricio praiseth the place, to be delectable, and particularly consideryng the trees, and not knowyng some of them, he did stande musinge in his minde, whereof Cosimo beeyng a ware saied, you have not peradventure ben acquainted with some of these sortes of trees: But doe not marvell at it, for as muche as there bee some, that were more estemed of the antiquitie, then thei are commonly now a daies: and he tolde him the names of them, and how Barnardo his graundfather did travaile in suche kinde of plantyng: Fabricio replied, I thought it shuld be the same you saie, and this place, and this studie, made me to remember certaine Princes of the Kyngdome of Naples, whiche of these anncient tillage and shadow doe delight. And staiyng upon this talke, and somewhat standyng in a studdie, saied moreover, if I thought I should not offende, I woud tell my opinion, but I beleeve I shall not, commonyng with friendes, and to dispute of thynges, and not to {30} condemne them. How much better thei should have doen (be it spoken without displeasure to any man) to have sought to been like the antiquitie in thinges strong, and sharpe, not in the delicate and softe: and in those that thei did in the Sunne, not in the shadowe: and to take the true and perfecte maners of the antiquitie: not those that are false and corrupted: for that when these studies pleased my Romaines, my countrie fell into ruin. Unto which Cosimo answered. But to avoide the tediousnesse to repeate so many times he saied, and the other answered, there shall be onely noted the names of those that speakes, without rehersing other.

Since I believe that after death, everyone can be praised without risk of flattery, I have no hesitation in praising our Cosimo Ruchellay, whose name I remember with tears, having known in him those qualities that one might wish for in a good friend or citizen. I do not know of a single thing that was truly his, except his soul, that he wouldn't have willingly spent for his friends. I can't imagine what undertaking would have frightened him if it was known to be for the benefit of his country. I must admit, I haven't met many men, among those I have known and worked with, whose ambition for greatness surpassed his. He did not lament at his death for any reason other than that he was forced to die young in his own home before he had gained honor or helped anyone as he desired, knowing that people would only speak of him as having lost a good friend. Nevertheless, it doesn't mean that we, along with anyone else who knew him, cannot testify to his admirable qualities (even if his works are not visible). The truth is that fortune was not his enemy to the extent that it didn’t leave some brief {28} record of his sharp wit, as shown in some of his writings, including love verses. Even though he was not in love, he didn’t want to waste time until he could engage in deeper studies, so he practiced in his youth. This clearly shows how brilliantly he expressed his thoughts and how much he could have been valued for his poetry if he had pursued it fully. Since fortune deprived us of such a great friend, I think the best remedy is to seek to enjoy his memory as much as possible and to recall what clever things he said or wise discussions he had. Since there's nothing fresher about him than the reasoning he had in his last days with Signior Fabricio Collonna in his orchard, where they discussed matters of war, both cleverly and wisely, mainly solicited by Cosimo, I thought it worthwhile, as I was present along with some of our friends, to remember it. This way, when his friends who came there read it, they could rekindle the memory of his virtue, while those who were sorry for their absence could learn many things beneficial not only for soldiers' lives but also for the lives of civilians, which a very wise man discussed seriously. Therefore, I will say that Fabricio Collonna, returning from Lombardy where he had served the Catholic king for a long time to his glory, decided to stop in Florence for a few days to visit the Duke and see certain gentlemen he had known in the past. For this reason, it seemed best to invite him to Cosimo’s orchard, not merely to share his hospitality but to have the opportunity to talk to him at ease and to understand and learn various things, as one might expect from such a man, {29} seemingly having the chance to spend a day discussing matters that would satisfy him most. Then Fabricio came, as he desired, and was welcomed by Cosimo along with some of his trusted friends, including Zanoby Buondelmonti, Baptiste Palla, and Luigi Allamanni, all young men whom he loved and who were equally passionate about the same studies. We will skip praising their qualities, as they do so themselves daily and hourly. Fabricio was honored in accordance with the time and place with all the honors that were possible to devise. But after the banquet’s pleasures were done, and the table cleared, and all the preparations for feasting consumed (which quickly happens in the presence of great men who are focused on honorable pursuits), the day was long, and the heat was intense. Cosimo thought it would better satisfy his desires to bring him into the most private and shaded part of his garden to escape the heat. Once they arrived there and were seated—some on the grass, some in the coolest spots, and others on small seats prepared under the shade of the tallest trees—Fabricio praised the place, finding it delightful, especially regarding the trees. Not knowing some of them, he stood pondering, to which Cosimo, noticing, said, “You are perhaps not familiar with some of these kinds of trees. But don’t be surprised, as some are more esteemed for their antiquity than they are generally today.” He then told him their names and how Barnardo, his grandfather, had taken the time to plant them. Fabricio replied, “I thought this might be the case, and this place and this study reminded me of certain Princes of the Kingdom of Naples, who find joy in these ancient groves and shade.” And continuing this conversation, pausing for thought, he further stated, “If I thought I wouldn’t offend, I would share my opinion, but I believe I shall not, discussing with friends and not condemning them. How much better they would have done (saying this without offending anyone) to have aimed to emulate the ancient ways in things strong and sharp, not in the delicate and soft; and in those things done in the sun, not in the shadow; and to adopt the true and perfect customs of antiquity, not those that are false and corrupted. For when these pursuits satisfied my Romans, my country fell into ruin.” To this, Cosimo replied. But to avoid the tedium of repeating so many times he spoke, the others suggested noting only the names of those who spoke without recounting others.

Then COSIMO saied, you have opened the waie of a reasoning, which I have desired, and I praie you that you will speake withoute respecte, for that that I without respecte will aske you, and if I demaundyng, or repliyng shall excuse, or accuse any, it shal not be to excuse, or accuse, but to understande of you the truth.

Then Cosimo said, you have opened up a line of reasoning that I have been wanting, and I ask you to speak without holding back, because I will ask you without hesitation. If my questions or responses seem to excuse or blame anyone, it won't be to defend or condemn, but to seek the truth from you.

FABRICIO. And I shall be very well contented to tell you that, whiche I understand of al the same that you shall aske me, the whiche if it shall be true, or no, I wil report me to your judgemente: and I will be glad that you aske me, for that I am to learne, as well of you in askyng me, as you of me in aunswerynge you: for as muche as many times a wise demaunder, maketh one to consider many thynges, and to knowe many other, whiche without havyng been demaunded, he should never have knowen.

FABRICIO. I'm more than happy to share what I know about everything you’re going to ask me. Whether it's true or not, I’ll leave that up to your judgment. I’m glad you’re asking me because I can learn from you as much as you can learn from me by my answers. A thoughtful question often makes one reflect on many things and discover lots of other insights that they wouldn’t have known without being asked.

COSIMO. I will retourne to thesame, that you said first, that my graundfather and those your Princes, should have doen more wisely, to have resembled the antiquitie in hard thinges, then in the delicate, and I will excuse my parte, for that, the other I shall leave to excuse for you. I doe not beleve that in his tyme was any manne, that so moche detested the livyng in ease, as he did, and that so moche was a lover of the same hardenesse of life, whiche you praise: notwithstandyng he knewe not how to bee able in persone, nor in those of his sonnes to use it, beeyng borne in so corrupte a worlde, where one that would digresse from the common use, should {31} bee infamed and disdained of every man: consideryng that if one in the hottest day of Summer being naked, should wallowe hymself upon the Sande, or in Winter in the moste coldest monethes upon the snowe, as Diogenes did, he should be taken as a foole. If one, (as the Spartans were wonte to doe) should nourishe his children in a village, makyng them to slepe in the open aire, to go with hedde and feete naked, to washe them selves in the colde water for to harden them, to be able to abide moche paine, and for to make theim to love lesse life, and to feare lesse death, he should be scorned, and soner taken as a wilde beast, then as a manne. If there wer seen also one, to nourishe himself with peason and beanes, and to despise gold, as Fabricio doeth, he should bee praised of fewe, and followed of none: so that he being afraied of this present maner of livyng, he left thauncient facions, and thesame, that he could with lest admiracion imitate in the antiquitie, he did.

COSIMO. I'll return to what you first said, that my grandfather and those princes you mentioned should have been wiser to emulate ancient practices in tough situations rather than in delicate ones. I will excuse my part in this, while you can excuse yourself. I don’t believe there was anyone in his time who detested living in comfort as much as he did, nor who loved the toughness of life that you praise; yet he didn’t know how to live it out himself, or teach his sons to, given they were born into such a corrupt world. Anyone who strayed from common practices would be ridiculed and scorned by everyone. If someone, on the hottest summer day, decided to roll around naked in the sand or, in the coldest winter months, to do the same in the snow like Diogenes, they would be seen as a fool. If someone did what the Spartans used to do—raising their children in a village, having them sleep outdoors, going barefoot and naked, washing them in cold water to toughen them, enduring pain, and making them love life less and fear death less—they would be mocked and seen more as a wild animal than a human. If someone were also seen living off peas and beans, undervaluing gold like Fabricio does, they would be praised by few and followed by none. Afraid of this current way of living, he abandoned ancient practices, adopting instead what he could imitate with the least amount of admiration from the past.

FABRICIO. You have excused it in this parte mooste strongly: and surely you saie the truthe: but I did not speake so moche of this harde maner of livyng, as of other maners more humaine, and whiche have with the life now a daies greater conformitie. The whiche I doe not beleve, that it hath been difficulte to bryng to passe unto one, who is nombred emongest Princes of a citee: for the provyng whereof, I will never seke other, then thexample of the Romaines. Whose lives, if thei wer well considred, and thorders of thesame common weale, there should therin be seen many thinges, not impossible to induce into a cominaltie, so that it had in her any good thing.

FABRICIO. You’ve defended it in this part very convincingly, and you’re definitely telling the truth. But I wasn’t just talking about this harsh way of living, but about other, more humane ways that align better with today’s life. I don’t believe it would be difficult to implement these changes for someone who is counted among the princes of a city. To prove my point, I’ll only refer to the example of the Romans. If we truly consider their lives and the structure of their republic, we would see many things that could easily be introduced into a community, as long as it possessed any good qualities.

COSIMO. What thynges are those, that you would induce like unto the antiquitie.

COSIMO. What are those things that you want to bring back like in ancient times?

FABRICIO. To honour, and to reward vertue, not to despise povertie, to esteme the maners and orders of warfare, to constrain the citezeins to love one an other, to live without sectes, to esteme lesse the private, than the publike, and other like thinges, that easily might bee with this time accompanied: the which maners ar not difficult to bring to passe, when a man should wel consider them, and entre {32} therin by due meanes: for asmoche as in thesame, the truth so moche appereth, that every common wit, maie easely perceive it: which thing, who that ordeineth, doth plant trees, under the shadowe wherof, thei abide more happie, and more pleasantly, then under these shadowes of this goodly gardeine.

FABRICIO. To honor and reward virtue, not to look down on poverty, to value the customs and principles of warfare, to encourage citizens to care for one another, to live without divisions, to prioritize the public good over private interests, and other similar ideals that could be easily achieved today: these behaviors are not difficult to adopt if one considers them well and approaches them appropriately. In this, the truth is so clear that any common sense can easily grasp it. Those who establish these values create a foundation under which people will live happier and more fulfilling lives than they would under the shadows of any lavish garden.

COSIMO. I will not speake any thyng againste thesame that you have saied, but I will leave it to bee judged of these, whom easely can judge, and I will tourne my communicacion to you, that is an accusar of theim, the whiche in grave, and greate doynges, are not followers of the antiquitie, thinkyng by this waie more easely to be in my entent satisfied. Therfore, I would knowe of you whereof it groweth, that of the one side you condempne those, that in their doynges resemble not the antiquitie? Of the other, in the warre, whiche is your art, wherin you are judged excellent, it is not seen, that you have indevoured your self, to bryng the same to any soche ende, or any thyng at all resembled therein the auncient maners.

COSIMO. I won't argue against what you've said, but I'll let those who can judge easily take a look at it, and I’ll turn my conversation to you, who accuse them. Those who engage in serious and significant actions do not follow the old ways, thinking that by this means, they can more easily satisfy my intentions. So, I’d like to know from you why on one hand you condemn those who don’t do things like the ancients? On the other hand, in the art of war, where you're regarded as excellent, it's not evident that you've made any effort to bring it to a point or resemble the ancient methods in any way.

FABRICIO. You are happened upon the poincte, where I loked: for that my talke deserved no other question: nor I desired other: and albeit that I could save my self with an easie excuse, not withstandyng for my more contentacion, and yours, seyng that the season beareth it, I will enter in moche longer reasoning. Those men, whiche will enterprise any thyng, ought firste with all diligence to prepare theim selves, to be ready and apte when occasion serveth, to accomplish that, which thei have determined to worke: and for that when the preparacions are made craftely, thei are not knowen, there cannot be accused any man of any negligence, if firste it be not disclosed by thoccasion: in the which working not, is after seen, either that there is not prepared so moche as suffiseth, or that there hath not been of any part therof thought upon. And for as moche as to me there is not come any occasion to be able, to shewe the preparacions made of me, to reduce the servise of warre into his auncient orders, if I have not reduced it, I cannot be of you, nor of other blamed: I {33} beleve this excuse shuld suffise for answere to your accusement.

FABRICIO. You’ve hit the nail on the head, where I was looking: my talk deserved no other question, nor did I want another. Even though I could easily excuse myself, for my own satisfaction and yours, considering the time allows it, I will engage in much longer reasoning. Those who want to undertake anything should first prepare themselves diligently, so they are ready and capable when the opportunity arises to accomplish what they have set out to do. Because when preparations are made skillfully, they go unnoticed, no one can be blamed for negligence unless the opportunity reveals it: at which point, it becomes clear whether the preparation was sufficient or if there was no thought given to any part of it. Since I haven't had the opportunity to show the preparations I've made to restore military service to its former structure, if I haven't done so, I cannot be blamed by you or anyone else. I believe this excuse should suffice as an answer to your accusation. {33}

COSIMO. It should suffice, when I wer certain, that thoccasion were not come.

COSIMO. It should be enough, when I was certain, that the occasion had not come.

FABRICIO. But for that I know, that you maie doubt whether this occasion hath been cum, or no, I will largely (when you with pacience will heare me) discourse what preparacions are necessary first to make, what occasion muste growe, what difficultie doeth let, that the preparacions help not, and why thoccasion cannot come, and how these things at ones, which some contrary endes, is most difficill, and most easie to do.

FABRICIO. But since you might wonder if this opportunity has actually come about, I will gladly explain everything you need to know—what preparations are necessary to make first, what events must take place, what difficulties might prevent those preparations from being useful, why the opportunity can't arise, and how all these factors, which seem to be at odds, can actually be the most difficult yet the easiest to address.

COSIMO. You cannot do bothe to me, and unto these other, a thing more thankfull then this. And if to you it shall not be tedious to speake, unto us it shal never be grevous to heare: but for asmoch as this reasonyng ought to be long, I will with your license take helpe of these my frendes: and thei, and I praie you of one thyng, that is, that you will not bee greved, if some tyme with some question of importaunce, we interrupte you.

COSIMO. You can't do both to me and to these others something more appreciated than this. And if it's not too much trouble for you to speak, it will never be burdensome for us to listen. However, since this discussion is going to be lengthy, with your permission, I will rely on my friends here: they and I kindly ask one thing, which is that you won't be upset if we occasionally interrupt you with some important questions.

Why a good man ought never to use the exercise of armes, as his art.

Why a good man should never use weapons as his craft.

FABRICIO. I am moste well contented, that you Cosimo with these other younge men here, doe aske me: for that I beleve, that youthfulnes, will make you lovers of warlike thinges, and more easie to beleve thesame, that of me shalbe saied. These other, by reason of havyng nowe their hedde white, and for havyng upon their backes their bloude congeled, parte of theim are wonte to bee enemies of warre, parte uncorrectable, as those, whom beleve, that tymes, and not the naughtie maners, constraine men to live thus: so that safely aske you all of me, and without respecte: the whiche I desire, as well, for that it maie be unto me a little ease, as also for that I shall have pleasure, not to leave in your mynde any doubt. I will begin at your woordes, where you saied unto me, that in the warre, that is my arte, I had not indevoured to bryng it to any aunciente ende: whereupon I saie, as this beyng an arte, whereby men of no maner of age can live honestly, it cannot bee used for an arte, but of a common weale: or of a kyngdome: and the one and the other of these, when thei bee well ordeined, will never {34} consente to any their Citezeins, or Subjectes, to use it for any arte, nor never any good manne doeth exercise it for his particulare arte: for as moche as good he shall never bee judged, whom maketh an excersise thereof, where purposing alwaies to gaine thereby, it is requisite for hym to be ravenyng, deceiptfull, violente, and to have many qualities, the whiche of necessitie maketh hym not good: nor those menne cannot, whiche use it for an arte, as well the greate as the leaste, bee made otherwise: for that this arte doeth not nourishe them in peace. Wherfore thei ar constrained either to thinke that there is no peace, or so moche to prevaile in the tyme of warre, that in peace thei maie bee able to kepe them selves: and neither of these two thoughtes happeneth in a good man: for that in mindyng to bee able to finde himself at all tymes, dooe growe robberies, violence, slaughters, whiche soche souldiours make as well to the frendes, as to the enemies: and in mindyng not to have peace, there groweth deceiptes, whiche the capitaines use to those, whiche hire them, to the entent the warre maie continue, and yet though the peace come often, it happeneth that the capitaines beyng deprived of their stipendes, and of their licencious livyng, thei erecte an ansigne of adventures, and without any pitie thei put to sacke a province. Have not you in memorie of your affaires, how that beyng many Souldiours in Italie without wages, bicause the warre was ended, thei assembled together many companies, and went taxyng the tounes, and sackyng the countrie, without beyng able to make any remedie? Have you not red, that the Carthagenes souldiours, the first warre beyng ended which thei had with the Romaines, under Matho, and Spendio, twoo capitaines, rebelliously constituted of theim, made more perillous warre to the Carthaginens, then thesame whiche thei had ended with the Romaines? In the time of our fathers, Frances Sforza, to the entente to bee able to live honourably in the time of peace, not only beguiled the Millenars, whose souldiour he was, but he toke from them their libertie and became their Prince. Like unto him hath been all the other souldiours {35} of Italie whiche have used warfare, for their particulare arte, and albeeit thei have not through their malignitie becomen Dukes of Milein, so moche the more thei deserve to bee blamed: for that although thei have not gotten so moch as he, thei have all (if their lives wer seen) sought to bring the like thynges to passe. Sforza father of Fraunces, constrained Quene Jone, to caste her self into the armes of the king of Aragon, havyng in a sodain forsaken her, and in the middest of her enemies, lefte her disarmed, onely to satisfie his ambicion, either in taxyng her, or in takyng from her the Kyngdome. Braccio with the verie same industrie, sought to possesse the kyngdome of Naples, and if he had not been overthrowen and slaine at Aquila, he had brought it to passe. Like disorders growe not of other, then of soche men as hath been, that use the exercise of warfare, for their proper arte. Have not you a Proverbe, whiche fortefieth my reasons, whiche saieth, that warre maketh Theves, and peace hangeth theim up? For as moche as those, whiche knowe not how to live of other exercise, and in the same finding not enie man to sustayne theym, and havyng not so moche power, to knowe how to reduce theim selves together, to make an open rebellion, they are constrayned of necessetie to Robbe in the highe waies, and Justice is enforced to extinguishe theim.

FABRICIO. I’m really pleased that you Cosimo and the other young men here are asking me this, because I believe that your youth will make you eager for a discussion of martial matters, and more open to what I have to say. The older ones, because they have grey hair and their blood has cooled, are often hostile to war; some of them are unchangeable, thinking that circumstances, and not bad behavior, force people to live this way. So feel free to ask me anything without hesitation; I welcome it both as a little relief for myself and because I want to ensure you have no doubts in your minds. I will start with your words, where you said to me that in the field of war, which is my skill, I haven’t strived to lead it to any ancient conclusion. In response, I say that since this is a discipline through which men of any age can live honorably, it should not be used as a craft for a commonwealth or a kingdom. And when these are well-organized, neither will ever allow their citizens or subjects to use it as a trade, nor will any good man exercise it for personal gain. A good man will never be perceived as such if he practices it solely for profit, which inevitably requires him to be greedy, deceitful, violent, and possess many traits that make him not good. Those who engage in it as a trade—whether great or small—cannot become otherwise, as this craft does not nurture them in peace. Therefore, they are compelled to either think that there is no peace, or to excel in wartime to ensure their survival in peace. Neither of these thoughts exist in a virtuous person, for in striving to always ensure his own wellbeing, he brings about robberies, violence, and slaughter, which such soldiers inflict on both friends and foes. In aiming to avoid peace, deceit arises, which captains use against those who hire them to prolong the war. And even when peace does often occur, it happens that those captains, stripped of their pay and reckless living, rally for adventure and without pity lay waste to a province. Do you not recall in your dealings how many soldiers in Italy, when the war ended and they received no wages, banded together in groups, taxing towns and pillaging the countryside, unable to find any remedy? Have you not read that the Carthaginian soldiers, after their first war with the Romans, under Matho and Spendio, two captains rebelling against them, caused more peril to the Carthaginians than that which they had finished with the Romans? In our fathers' time, Francesco Sforza, in order to live honorably in peace, not only deceived the mercenaries he commanded, but also took their freedom and became their Prince. All other soldiers of Italy who have conducted warfare for personal benefit have acted similarly, and even though they haven’t become Dukes of Milan through evil means like he did, they deserve even more blame; for even if they didn’t achieve as much as he did, they all, if their lives were examined, sought to accomplish the same outcomes. Sforza’s father coerced Queen Joanna into the arms of the King of Aragon, having suddenly abandoned her, and left her defenseless in the midst of her enemies, solely to satisfy his ambition through either taxing her or taking her kingdom. Braccio sought to claim the kingdom of Naples with the same determination, and had he not been overthrown and killed at Aquila, he would have succeeded. Such disorders arise only from men like these, who practice the art of warfare for their own gain. Have you not heard the proverb that supports my argument, stating that war creates thieves, and peace hangs them? Because those who do not know how to live through other means, finding no one to support them, and lacking enough power to unite themselves, are compelled by necessity to rob on the highways, and justice is forced to extinguish them.

COSIMO. You have made me to esteme this arte of warfare almoste as nothyng, and I have supposed it the moste excellentes, and moste honourableste that hath been used: so that if you declare me it not better, I cannot remaine satisfied: For that when it is thesame, that you saie, I knowe not, whereof groweth the glorie of Cesar, of Pompei, of Scipio, of Marcello, and of so many Romaine Capitaines, whiche by fame are celebrated as Goddes.

COSIMO. You've made me think that this art of warfare is almost nothing, while I’ve considered it the most excellent and honorable that has ever existed. If you can’t explain it better, I won't be satisfied. When it's the same as what you say, I don’t see where the glory of Caesar, Pompey, Scipio, Marcellus, and so many Roman leaders, who are celebrated as gods, comes from.

FABRICIO. I have not yet made an ende of disputyng al thesame, that I purposed to propounde: whiche were twoo thynges, the one, that a good manne could not use this exercise for his arte: the other, that a common weale or a kingdome well governed, did never permitte, that their Subjectes or Citezeins should use it for an arte. Aboute the {36} firste, I have spoken as moche as hath comen into my mynde: there remaineth in me to speake of the seconde where I woll come to aunswere to this your laste question, and I saie that Pompey and Cesar, and almoste all those Capitaines, whiche were at Rome, after the laste Carthagenens warre, gotte fame as valiaunt men, not as good, and those whiche lived before them, gotte glorie as valiaunte and good menne: the whiche grewe, for that these tooke not the exercise of warre for their arte: and those whiche I named firste, as their arte did use it. And so longe as the common weale lived unspotted, never any noble Citezein would presume, by the meane of soche exercise, to availe thereby in peace, breakyng the lawes, spoilyng the Provinces, usurpyng, and plaiyng the Tyraunte in the countrie, and in every maner prevailyng: nor any of how lowe degree so ever thei were, would goe aboute to violate the Religion, confederatyng theim selves with private men, not to feare the Senate, or to followe any tirannicall insolence, for to bee able to live with the arte of warre in all tymes. But those whiche were Capitaines, contented with triumphe, with desire did tourne to their private life, and those whiche were membres, would be more willyng to laie awaie their weapons, then to take them, and every manne tourned to his science, whereby thei gotte their livyng: Nor there was never any, that would hope with praie, and with this arte, to be able to finde theim selves. Of this there maie be made concernyng Citezeins, moste evidente conjecture, by the ensample of Regolo Attillio, who beyng Capitain of the Romaine armies in Affrica, and havyng as it wer overcome the Carthegenens, he required of the Senate, licence to retourne home, to kepe his possessions, and told them, that thei were marde of his housbandmen. Whereby it is more clere then the Sunne, that if thesame manne had used the warre as his arte, and by meanes thereof, had purposed to have made it profitable unto him, havyng in praie so many Provinces, he would not have asked license, to returne to kepe his feldes: for as moche as every daie he might otherwise, have gotten moche more, then the value of al those possessions: but bicause {37} these good men and soche as use not the warre for their arte, will not take of thesame any thing then labour, perilles, and gloris, when thei are sufficiently glorious, thei desire to returne home, and to live of their owne science. Concernyng menne of lowe degree, and common souldiours, to prove that thei kepte the verie same order, it doeth appeare that every one willingly absented theim selves from soche exercise, and when thei served not in the warre, thei would have desired to serve, and when thei did serve, thei would have desired leave not to have served: whiche is wel knowen through many insamples, and inespecially seeyng how emonge the firste privileges, whiche the Romaine people gave to their Citezeins was, that thei should not be constrained against their willes, to serve in the warres. Therefore Rome so long as it was well governed, whiche was untill the commyng of Graccus, it had not any Souldiour that would take this exercise for an arte, and therefore it had fewe naughtie, and those few wer severely punished. Then a citee well governed, ought to desire, that this studie of warre, be used in tyme of peace for exercise, and in the time of warre, for necessitie and for glorie: and to suffer onely the common weale to use it for an arte, as Rome did, and what so ever Citezein, that hath in soche exercise other ende, is not good, and what so ever citee is governed otherwise, is not well ordeined.

FABRICIO. I haven't finished discussing everything I intended to bring up, which includes two main points: first, that a good person shouldn’t practice this exercise as their profession; and second, that a well-governed republic or kingdom never allows its subjects or citizens to use it as a profession. Regarding the first point, I’ve said as much as I can; now I need to address the second, where I will respond to your last question. I say that Pompey and Caesar, along with almost all the commanders in Rome after the last Carthaginian war, gained fame as brave men, not as good ones, while those who lived before them gained glory as both brave and good. This difference arose because the latter didn’t take up warfare as their profession, while those I mentioned first did. As long as the republic remained untainted, no noble citizen would dare to exploit such exercise for personal gain in peace, violating laws, plundering provinces, usurping power, and behaving like a tyrant in the country, prevailing over everyone. Nor would any citizen, no matter how low their status, attempt to violate the law, colluding with private individuals, disregarding the Senate, or following any tyrannical actions to survive as a warrior at all times. But the commanders, satisfied with their triumphs, willingly turned back to their private lives, and those who were members preferred to lay down their weapons rather than to take them up, and everyone returned to their own professions, from which they earned a living. No one ever hoped to survive through plunder and warfare. Regarding citizens, one clear example can be seen in Regolo Attillio, who, as commander of the Roman armies in Africa and after defeating the Carthaginians, asked the Senate for permission to return home to tend to his property, explaining that it was at risk from his farmers. From this, it’s clearer than day that if this man had treated war as his profession and sought to profit from it, having so many provinces to plunder, he wouldn’t have asked for leave to return to his fields. He could have gained far more every day than the worth of all his possessions. But because these good men, who do not view war as their profession, only take from it labor, dangers, and glory, once they feel sufficiently glorious, they prefer to return home and live off their own skills. As for common soldiers, to show that they maintain the same attitude, it appears that each one willingly distanced themselves from such exercises, wishing to serve when they were not in war, and desiring leave from service when they were. This is well known through many examples, especially considering that among the very first privileges given by the Roman people to their citizens was that they should not be forced against their will to serve in wars. Therefore, as long as Rome was well governed, which was until the coming of Gracchus, it had no soldier who would take this exercise as a profession, and consequently, it had few wrongdoers, and those few were severely punished. Thus, a well-governed city should seek that the study of warfare is practiced in peacetime for exercise and in wartime out of necessity and for glory, and to allow only the commonwealth to employ it as a profession, as Rome did. Any citizen who has other intentions regarding such exercise is not good, and any city governed otherwise is not well arranged.

COSIMO. I remain contented enough and satisfied of thesame, whiche hetherto you have told, and this conclusion pleaseth me verie wel whiche you have made, and as muche as is loked for touching a common welth, I beleve that it is true, but concerning Kinges, I can not tell nowe, for that I woulde beleve that a Kinge would have about him, whome particularly should take suche exercise for his arte.

COSIMO. I'm pretty happy and satisfied with what you've said so far, and I really like the conclusion you've drawn. As for what we expect regarding a commonwealth, I believe that's true. But when it comes to kings, I'm not so sure right now, because I would think a king would have someone specific around him who focuses on that kind of work.

FABRICIO. A kingdome well ordred ought moste of all to avoide the like kinde of men, for only thei, are the destruction of their king, and all together ministers of tiranny, and alledge me not to the contrarie anie presente kingdome, for that I woll denie you all those to be kingdomes well ordered, bicause the kingdomes whiche have {38} good orders, give not their absolute Empire unto their king, saving in the armies, for as much as in this place only, a quicke deliberation is necessarie, and for this cause a principall power ought to be made. In the other affaires, he ought not to doe any thing without councell, and those are to be feared, which councell him, leaste he have some aboute him which in time of peace desireth to have warre bicause they are not able without the same to live, but in this, I wilbe a little more large: neither to seke a kingdome altogether good, but like unto those whiche be nowe a daies where also of a king those ought to be feared, whiche take the warre for theire art, for that the strength of armies without any doubte are the foote menne: so that if a king take not order in suche wise, that his men in time of peace may be content to returne home, and to live of their owne trades, it will follow of necessitie, that he ruinate: for that there is not found more perilous men, then those, whiche make the warre as their arte: bicause in such case, a king is inforsed either alwaies to make warre, or to paie them alwaies, or else to bee in perill, that they take not from him his kingdome. To make warre alwaies, it is not possible: to paie them alwaies it can not be: see that of necessitie, he runneth in peril to lese the state. The Romaines (as I have saide) so long as they were wise and good, would never permitte, that their Citizeins should take this exercise for their arte, although they were able to nurrishe them therin alwaies, for that that alwaies they made warre: but to avoide thesame hurte, whiche this continuall exercise might doe them, seyng the time did not varie, they changed the men, and from time to time toke such order with their legions, that in xv. yeres alwaies, they renewed them: and so thei had their men in the floure of their age, that is from xviij. to xxxiij. yeres, in which time the legges, the handes, and the yes answere the one the other, nor thei tarried not till there strengthe should decaie, and there naghtines increase, as it did after in the corrupted times. For as muche as Octavian first, and after Tiberius, minding more their own proper power, then the publicke profite, began to {39} unarme the Romaine people, to be able easely to commaunde them, and to kepe continually those same armies on the frontries of the Empire: and bicause also they judged those, not sufficient to kepe brideled the people and Romaine Senate, they ordeined an armie called Pretoriano, which laie harde by the walles of Rome, and was as a rocke on the backe of the same Citie. And for as much as then thei began frely to permitte, that suche men as were apoincted in suche exercises, should use the service of warre for their arte, streight waie the insolence of theim grewe, that they became fearful unto the Senate, and hurtefull to the Emperour, whereby ensued suche harme, that manie were slaine thorough there insolensie: for that they gave, and toke awaie the Empire, to whome they thought good. And some while it hapned, that in one self time there were manie Emperours, created of divers armies, of whiche thinges proceded first the devision of the Empire, and at laste the ruine of the same. Therefore kinges ought, if thei wil live safely, to have there souldiours made of men, who when it is time to make warre, willingly for his love will go to the same, and when the peace cometh after, more willingly will returne home. Whiche alwaies wilbe, when thei shalbe men that know how to live of other arte then this: and so they ought to desire, peace beyng come, that there Prince doo tourne to governe their people, the gentilmen to the tending of there possessions, and the common souldiours to their particular arte, and everie one of these, to make warre to have peace, and not to seke to trouble the peace, to have warre.

FABRICIO. A well-organized kingdom should primarily avoid certain types of people, as they are the ones who destroy their king and serve as tools of tyranny. Don’t argue otherwise with examples from current kingdoms, because I will dispute the notion that those can be considered well-ordered kingdoms. The kingdoms that have {38} good order do not grant their king absolute power, except in military matters, as quick decisions are essential in that context, and thus a central authority is necessary. In other affairs, he should not act without counsel, and those who advise him should be watched carefully, lest he surround himself with individuals who seek war during peacetime because they cannot sustain themselves otherwise. Allow me to elaborate: instead of seeking a completely good kingdom, consider those that exist today where kings must also be wary of those who take war as their profession, for the backbone of armies is undoubtedly the foot soldiers. If a king does not ensure that his men are content to return home and support themselves during peacetime, it will inevitably lead to his ruin. There are no more dangerous individuals than those who pursue war as their craft. In such situations, a king is forced to either make war continuously, pay them constantly, or risk losing his kingdom to them. It’s impossible to wage war all the time, and paying them indefinitely is not feasible either; thus, he risks losing his state. The Romans, as I mentioned, never allowed their citizens to take war as a profession while they remained wise and good, even though they could always support them through war. To avoid the harms of this constant engagement, they adjusted their forces over time, renewing them every fifteen years so their soldiers were always in the prime of their youth, between eighteen and thirty-three years old, a time when their limbs are strong and coordinated. They did not wait until their strength waned and their effectiveness decreased, as occurred in later corrupt times. However, Octavian and later Tiberius, prioritizing their own power over public good, began to disarm the Roman people to exert more control and maintain armies along the Empire’s frontiers. They deemed these armies insufficient for keeping the populace and Roman Senate in check, so they created a close-proximity army known as the Praetorian Guard, which acted as a bulwark for Rome. Because of this, they then allowed such appointed men to engage in warfare as their profession, leading to their arrogance, making them a threat to the Senate and harmful to the Emperor. This resulted in significant damage, with many casualties due to their overreaching behavior, as they claimed and took away power at will. It eventually led to a situation where multiple emperors arose from different armies, causing the division and ultimately the ruin of the Empire. Therefore, kings must, if they wish to live securely, have soldiers made up of men who, when it’s time for war, will willingly go for the sake of their king, and when peace returns, will more willingly return home. This will always be the case when they are individuals capable of living by means other than warfare. Consequently, they should wish that upon the arrival of peace, their prince governs his people, the nobles manage their estates, and the common soldiers return to their trades, with each of them preparing for war to ensure peace, rather than seeking to disrupt peace for war.

COSIMO. Truely this reasonyng of yours, I thinke to bee well considered, notwithstanding beyng almost contrarie to that, whiche till nowe I have thought, my minde as yet doeth not reste purged of all doubte, for as muche as I see manie Lordes and gentelmen, to finde them selves in time of peace, thorough the studies of warre, as your matches bee, who have provision of there princes, and of the cominaltie. I see also, almost al the gentelmen of armes, remaine with neir provision, I see manie souldiours lie in garison of Cities {40} and fortresses, so that my thinkes, that there is place in time of peace, for everie one.

COSIMO. I truly think your reasoning is well thought out, even though it goes against what I've believed until now. My mind still isn’t free of doubt, especially since I see many lords and gentlemen who find themselves occupied with the studies of war during peacetime, just like your matches. They have the support of their princes and the community. I also see that almost all the gentlemen-at-arms are without sufficient resources. Many soldiers are stationed in the garrisons of cities and fortresses, so it seems to me that there’s space for everyone during peacetime.

FABRICIO. I doe not beleve that you beleve this, that in time of peace everie man may have place, bicause, put case that there coulde not be brought other reason, the small number, that all they make, whiche remaine in the places alledged of you, would answer you. What proporcion have the souldiours, whiche are requiset to bee in the warre with those, whiche in the peace are occupied? For as much as the fortreses, and the cities that be warded in time of peace, in the warre are warded muche more, unto whome are joyned the souldiours, whiche kepe in the fielde, whiche are a great number, all whiche in the peace be putte awaie. And concerning the garde of states, whiche are a small number, Pope July, and you have shewed to everie man, how muche are to be feared those, who will not learne to exercise any other art, then the warre, and you have for there insolence, deprived them from your garde, and have placed therin Swisers, as men borne and brought up under lawes, and chosen of the cominaltie, according to the true election: so that saie no more, that in peace is place for everie man. Concerning men at armes, thei al remaining in peace with their wages, maketh this resolution to seme more difficulte: notwithstandyng who considereth well all, shall finde the answere easie, bicause this manner of keping men of armes, is a corrupted manner and not good, the occasion is, for that they be men, who make thereof an arte, and of them their should grow every daie a thousande inconveniencies in the states, where thei should be, if thei were accompanied of sufficient company: but beyng fewe, and not able by them selves to make an armie, they cannot often doe suche grevous hurtes, neverthelesse they have done oftentimes: as I have said of Frances, and of Sforza his father, and of Braccio of Perugia: so that this use of keping men of armes, I doe not alowe, for it is a corrupte maner, and it may make great inconveniencies.

FABRICIO. I don’t believe you really think this— that in times of peace everyone can find a place. Even if there were no other reason, just look at the small number of people who remain in the areas you mentioned, and they would answer you. What proportion do the soldiers required for war have compared to those who are busy during peacetime? The fortresses and cities that are guarded in peacetime require even more protection during war, where soldiers must join together in the field, which is a large number, all of whom are sent away during peace. As for the guard of states, which consists of a small number of men, Pope Julius and you have shown everyone how much those should be feared who refuse to learn anything besides war. Because of their arrogance, you’ve removed them from your guard and replaced them with Swiss, who are raised under laws and chosen by the community, according to proper election. So, don’t say anymore that there’s a place for everyone in peace. Regarding men-at-arms, their ongoing salaries during peacetime make this situation seem more difficult. However, anyone who thinks it through will find the answer easy because this way of keeping men-at-arms is a corrupt practice and not good. The issue is that they turn it into an art form, leading to daily inconveniences in the states where they are located, especially if they are part of a sufficient company. But being few and unable to form an army, they can’t often do serious damage; however, they have done so repeatedly, as I mentioned regarding France, and Sforza’s father, and Braccio of Perugia. Therefore, I do not approve of this practice of keeping men-at-arms as it is corrupt and can lead to major problems.

COSIMO. Woulde you live without them? or keping them, how would you kepe them?

COSIMO. Would you live without them? Or if you kept them, how would you keep them?

{41}

A kinge that hath about him any that are to much lovers of warre, or to much lovers of peace shal cause him to erre.

A king who has around him anyone who loves war too much, or loves peace too much, will lead him astray.

FABRICIO. By waie of ordinaunce, not like to those of the king of Fraunce: for as muche as they be perilous, and insolent like unto ours, but I would kepe them like unto those of the auncient Romaines, whom created their chivalry of their own subjectes, and in peace time, thei sente them home unto their houses, to live of their owne trades, as more largely before this reasoning ende, I shal dispute. So that if now this part of an armie, can live in such exercise, as wel when it is peace, it groweth of the corrupt order. Concerning the provisions, which are reserved to me, and to other capitaines, I saie unto you, that this likewise is an order moste corrupted: for as much as a wise common weale, ought not to give such stipendes to any, but rather thei ought to use for Capitaines in the warre, their Citezeins, and in time of peace to will, that thei returne to their occupations. Likewise also, a wise king either ought not to give to suche, or giving any, the occasion ought to be either for rewarde of some worthy dede, or else for the desire to kepe suche a kinde of man, as well in peace as in warre. And bicause you alledged me, I will make ensample upon my self, and saie that I never used the warre as an arte, for as muche as my arte, is to governe my subjectes, and to defende them, and to be able to defende them, to love peace, and to know how to make warre, and my kinge not so muche to rewarde and esteeme me, for my knowledge in the warre, as for the knowledge that I have to councel him in peace. Then a king ought not to desire to have about him, any that is not of this condicion if he be wise, and prudently minde to governe: for that, that if he shal have about him either to muche lovers of peace, or to much lovers of warre, they shall make him to erre. I cannot in this my firste reasoning, and according to my purpose saie more, and when this suffiseth you not, it is mete, you seke of them that may satisfie you better. You maie now verie well understand, how difficulte it is to bringe in use the auncient maners in the presente warres, and what preparations are mete for a wise man to make, and what occasions ought to be loked for, to be able to execute it. But by and by, you shall {42} know these things better, if this reasoning make you not werie, conferring what so ever partes of the auncient orders hath ben, to the maners nowe presente.

FABRICIO. In terms of organization, it's not like the armies of the King of France, because they are risky and arrogant like ours. I would keep them more like the ancient Romans, who created their knighthood from their own citizens. In peacetime, they sent them back home to pursue their trades. I will discuss this in more detail as we continue. If this part of an army can sustain itself during peacetime, it points to a corrupt system. Regarding the resources reserved for me and other captains, I must say this is also a corrupt order, because a wise state shouldn’t give such salaries to anyone; instead, they should use their citizens as captains during wartime and direct them to return to their jobs in peacetime. Similarly, a wise king shouldn’t give rewards to such people, or if he does, it should either be for acknowledging a worthy deed or to keep a certain type of man available for both peace and war. Since you referenced me, I'll use myself as an example and say that I've never treated war as a craft; my skill is in governing my subjects, protecting them, loving peace, and knowing how to make war. My king values me not so much for my knowledge of warfare but for my ability to advise him in times of peace. A wise king should not want anyone around him who does not share this mindset. Those who are too fixated on peace or too eager for war will lead him astray. I cannot say more in this initial argument, and if this is not sufficient for you, it might be best for you to seek insights from others who can satisfy you better. You can now see how difficult it is to reintroduce ancient practices in today’s conflicts and what preparations a wise person should make, and what situations to watch for, in order to implement it. However, you will soon understand these matters more clearly, as long as this discussion does not tire you, by comparing whatever aspects of ancient practices apply to modern ways.

COSIMO. If we desired at the first to here your reason of these thinges, truly thesame whiche hetherto you have spoken, hath doubled our desire: wherefore we thanke you for that we have hard, and the rest, we crave of you to here.

COSIMO. If we wanted to hear your reasoning about these things from the beginning, honestly what you've said so far has only intensified our curiosity. So, we thank you for what we've heard, and we ask you to continue sharing the rest.

FABRICIO. Seyng that it is so your pleasure, I will begin to intreate of this matter from the beginning, to the intent it maye be better understode, being able by thesame meane, more largely to declare it. The ende of him that wil make warre, is to be able to fight with every enemy in the fielde and to be able to overcum an armie. To purpose to doe this, it is convenient to ordeine an hoost. To ordein an hoost, their must be found menne, armed, ordered, and as well in the small, as in the great orders exercised, to knowe howe to kepe araie, and to incampe, so that after bringing them unto the enemie, either standing or marching, they maie know how to behave themselves valiantly. In this thing consisteth all the industrie of the warre on the lande, whiche is the most necessarie, and the most honorablest, for he that can wel order a fielde against the enemie, the other faultes that he should make in the affaires of warre, wilbe borne with: but he that lacketh this knowledge, although that in other particulars he be verie good, he shal never bring a warre to honor: for as muche as a fielde that thou winnest, lesing? img 94 doeth cancell all other thy evill actes: so like wise lesing it, all thinges well done of thee before, remaine vaine. Therfore, beyng necessarie first to finde the menne, it is requiset to come to the choise of them. They whiche unto the warre have given rule, will that the menne be chosen out of temperate countries, to the intente they may have hardines, and prudence, for as muche as the hote countrey, bredes prudente men and not hardy, the colde, hardy, and not prudente. This rule is good to be geven, to one that were prince of all the world, bicause it is lawfull for him to choose men out of those places, whiche he shall thinke beste. But minding to give a rule, that every one may use, it is mete to {43} declare, that everie common weale, and every kingdome, ought to choose their souldiours out of their owne countrie, whether it be hote, colde, or temperate: for that it is scene by olde ensamples, how that in every countrie with exercise, their is made good souldiours: bicause where nature lacketh, the industry supplieth, the which in this case is worthe more, then nature, and taking them in other places, you shal not have of the choise, for choise is as much to saie, as the best of a province, and to have power to chuse those that will not, as well as those that wil serve. Wherfore, you muste take your choise in those places, that are subjecte unto you, for that you cannot take whome you liste, in the countries that are not yours, but you muste take suche as will goe with you.

FABRICIO. Since it’s your decision, I will start discussing this matter from the beginning so it can be better understood; I can then explain it more thoroughly. The aim of anyone who wants to wage war is to effectively fight every enemy in the field and overcome an army. To achieve this, it’s essential to organize a force. To organize a force, you need to recruit men who are armed and trained, both in the small and large formations, to know how to maintain order and camp so that when faced with the enemy, whether standing still or marching, they can act bravely. This is where the entire effort of land warfare lies, which is the most necessary and the most honorable. For someone who can effectively organize a battlefield against the enemy, any other mistakes in military matters will be overlooked; however, one who lacks this knowledge, even if they excel in other aspects, will never bring honor to a war. Just as winning a field can erase all your past misdeeds, losing it makes everything else you’ve done pointless. Therefore, since it’s necessary first to find the men, it’s crucial to select them wisely. Those who have governed warfare suggest that recruits be chosen from temperate regions to ensure they possess both bravery and wisdom, as hot countries tend to produce cunning men but not daring ones, while cold areas produce the brave but not the wise. This guideline is valid for someone who is a ruler over all the world because it allows them to choose men from the areas they see fit. But if we’re establishing a rule that everyone can follow, it’s appropriate to declare that every republic and kingdom should select their soldiers from their own territory, whether it’s hot, cold, or temperate. Historical examples show that, with training, good soldiers can be made anywhere, for where nature is lacking, industry compensates, which in this case is worth more than nature. And if you recruit from elsewhere, you won’t have a good selection, as “choosing” essentially means finding the best from a province. You need to have the ability to select those who will serve as well as those who won’t. Therefore, you should choose from those areas that are under your control, since you can’t just take anyone you want from lands that aren’t yours; you must select those willing to go with you.

COSIMO. Yet there maie bee of those, that will come, taken and lefte, and therefore, thei maie be called chosen.

COSIMO. Yet there may be some who will come, taken and left, and therefore, they may be called chosen.

Oute of what Countrie is best to chuse Souldiours to make a good election.

Oute of what Country is best to choose Soldiers to make a good selection.

FABUICIO. You saie the truthe in a certaine maner, but consider the faultes, whiche soche a chosen manne hath in himselfe, for that also many times it hapneth, that he is not a chosen manne. For those that are not thy subjectes, and whiche willyngly doe serve, are not of the beste, but rather of the worste of a Province, for as moche as if any be sclanderous, idell, unruly, without Religion, fugetive from the rule of their fathers, blasphemours, Dise plaiers, in every condicion evill brought up, bee those, whiche will serve, whose customes cannot be more contrarie, to a true and good servise: Albeit, when there bee offered unto you, so many of soche men, as come to above the nomber, that you have appoincted, you maie chuse them: but the matter beyng naught, the choise is not possible to be good: also, many times it chaunceth, that thei be not so many, as will make up the nomber, whereof you have nede, so that beyng constrained to take them al, it commeth to passe, that thei cannot then bee called chosen men, but hired Souldiours. With this disorder the armies of Italie, are made now a daies, and in other places, except in Almaine, bicause there thei doe not hire any by commaundemente of the Prince, but accordyng to the will of them, that are disposed to serve. {44} Then consider now, what maners of those aunciente armies, maie bee brought into an armie of men, put together by like waies.

FABUICIO. You speak the truth in a certain way, but think about the faults that a chosen man has within himself, for many times it happens that he is not truly a chosen man. Those who are not your subjects and who willingly serve are often not the best, but rather the worst of a province, since if any are slanderous, idle, unruly, lacking in religion, rebellious against their father's authority, blasphemers, and generally poorly raised, these are the ones who will serve, whose behavior is completely contrary to true and good service. Although, when so many of these men are offered to you, surpassing the number you've set, you may choose from them: but if the matter is poor, then the choice cannot be good. Also, many times it happens that they are not enough to make up the number you need, so that being forced to take all of them, they can’t then be called chosen men, but hired soldiers. This disorder is how the armies of Italy are formed nowadays, and in other places as well, except in Germany, because there they don’t hire anyone by command of the prince, but according to the willingness of those who want to serve. {44} Then consider now, what kind of manners from those ancient armies might be brought into an army of men put together in similar ways.

COSIMO. What waie ought to bee used then?

COSIMO. What way should we use then?

FABRICIO. The same waie that I saied, to chuse them of their owne subjectes, and with the auethoritie of the Prince.

FABRICIO. Just like I said, they should choose from their own subjects, and with the authority of the Prince.

COSMO. In the chosen, shall there bee likewise brought in any auncient facion?

COSMO. In the chosen ones, should there also be any ancient style brought in?

FABRICIO. You know well enough that ye: when he that should commaunde theim, were their Prince, or ordinarie lorde, whether he were made chief, or as a Citezein, and for the same tyme Capitaine, beyng a common weale, otherwise it is harde to make any thyng good.

FABRICIO. You know very well that when someone is supposed to lead them, whether he is a Prince or a regular lord, whether he is appointed as a chief or just a citizen, and at the same time acts as a captain, being part of a commonwealth, it’s difficult to get anything to work well otherwise.

COSIMO. Why?

COSIMO. Why?

FABRICIO. I will tell you a nane: For this time I will that this suffise you, that it cannot be wrought well by other waie.

FABRICIO. I'll give you a name: For now, I want you to know that this is enough for you, as it can't be done well in any other way.

Whether it be better to take menne oute of townes or out of the countrie to serve.

Whether it’s better to take men from towns or from the countryside to serve.

COSIMO. Having then to make this choyse of men in their owne countries, whether judge you that it be better to take them oute of the citie, or out of the countrie?

COSIMO. So, when it comes to choosing these men in their own countries, do you think it's better to take them from the city or from the countryside?

FABRICIO. Those that have written of such matters, doe all agree, that it is best to chuse them out of the countrie, being men accustomed to no ease, nurished in labours, used to stonde in the sunne, to flie the shadow, knowing how to occupy the spade, to make a diche, to carrie a burden, and to bee without any deceite, and without malisiousnes. But in this parte my opinion should be, that beyng two sortes of souldiours, on foote, and on horsebacke, that those on foote, should be chosen out of the countrie, and those on horseback, oute of the Cities.

FABRICIO. Those who have written about these matters all agree that it's best to choose them from the countryside, where men are used to hard work, accustomed to being outdoors, avoiding the shade, skilled with a shovel, able to dig a ditch, carry a load, and are honest and unmalicious. However, in my opinion, since there are two types of soldiers—infantry and cavalry—I believe that the infantry should be chosen from the countryside, while the cavalry should come from the cities.

Of what age Souldiours ought to bee chosen.

Of what age soldiers should be chosen.

COSIMO. Of what age would you choose them?

COSIMO. How old would you want them to be?

FABRICIO. I would take them, when I had to make a newe armie, from xvii. to xl. yeres: when it were made alredy, and I had to restore them, of xvii. alwaies.

FABRICIO. I would select them, when I had to create a new army, from 17 to 40 years old: once it was formed and I had to replace them, always from 17.

COSIMO. I doe not understonde well this distinction.

COSIMO. I don't quite understand this distinction.

FABRICIO. I shall tell you: when I should ordaine an hooste to make warre, where were no hooste alredy, it {45} should be necessarie to chuse all those men, which were most fitte and apte for the warre, so that they were of servisable age, that I might bee able to instructe theim, as by me shalbe declared: but when I would make my choise of menne in places, where a powre were alredy prepared, for suppliyng of thesame, I would take them of xvii. yeres: for as much as the other of more age be alredy chosen and apoincted.

FABRICIO. Let me explain: when I need to organize an army to go to war, where there’s no army currently, it {45} is essential to choose the men who are most fit and capable for battle, ensuring they are of the right age so that I can train them, as I will explain later. However, when I need to select men in places where a force has already been prepared to reinforce it, I would take men starting from the age of 17, since the older ones have already been chosen and assigned.

COSIMO. Then woulde you prepare a power like to those whiche is in our countrie?

COSIMO. So, will you prepare a force similar to what we have in our country?

FABRICIO. Ye truly, it is so that I would arme them, Captaine them, exercise and order them in a maner, whiche I cannot tell, if you have ordred them so.

FABRICIO. Yes, it’s true that I would train them, Captain, organize them, and get them ready in a way that I can’t say if you’ve arranged them that way.

COSIMO. Then do you praise the keping of order?

COSIMO. So you think keeping things in order is good?

FABRICIO. Wherefore would you that I should dispraise it?

FABRICIO. Why would you want me to criticize it?

COSIMO. Bicause many wise menne have alwaies blamed it.

COSIMO. Because many wise men have always criticized it.

FABRICIO. You speake against all reason, to saie that a wise man blameth order, he maie bee well thought wise, and be nothyng so.

FABRICIO. You speak against all reason, to say that a wise man blames order; he may be thought of as wise, but he is not at all.

COSIMO. The naughtie profe, which it hath alwaies, maketh us to have soche opinion thereof.

COSIMO. The naughty proposal, like it always does, makes us have such an opinion about it.

FABRICIO. Take hede it be not your fault, and not the kepyng of order, the whiche you shall knowe, before this reasonyng be ended.

FABRICIO. Just make sure it’s not your fault, and that you keep things in order, which you'll understand by the end of this discussion.

COSIMO. You shall doe a thyng moste thankfull, yet I will saie concernyng thesame, that thei accuse it, to the entente you maie the better justifie it. Thei saie thus, either it is unprofitable, and we trustyng on the same, shall make us to lese our state, or it shall be verteous, and by thesame meane, he that governeth may easely deprive us thereof. Thei alledge the Romaines, who by meane of their owne powers, loste their libertie. Thei alledge the Venicians, and the Frenche king, whiche Venicians, bicause thei will not be constrained, to obeie one of their owne Citezeins, use the power of straungers: and the Frenche kyng hath disarmed his people, to be able more easely to commaunde them, but thei whiche like not the ordinaunces, feare moche more the unprofitablenesse, that thei suppose maie insue {46} thereby, then any thyng els: the one cause whiche thei allege is, bicause thei are unexperte: The other, for that thei have to serve par force: for asmoche as thei saie, that the aged bee not so dissiplinable, nor apte to learne the feate of armes, and that by force, is doen never any thyng good.

COSIMO. You will do something very commendable, but I want to say regarding this that they criticize it so that you may better justify it. They say this: either it's useless, and if we rely on it, we will end up losing our situation, or it will be virtuous, and in that case, those in power can easily take it away from us. They refer to the Romans, who lost their freedom through their own powers. They mention the Venetians and the French king; the Venetians, because they refuse to obey one of their own citizens, use the power of outsiders. And the French king has disarmed his people to be able to command them more easily, but those who don't like the rules fear much more the uselessness they believe may result from this than anything else. One reason they give is that they are inexperienced; the other is that they have to serve by force, since they say that the old aren’t as trainable or able to learn the art of war, and that nothing good ever comes from being forced.

By what meanes souldiours bee made bolde and experte.

By what means should soldiers be made bold and experienced?

FABRICIO. All these reasons that you have rehearsed, be of men, whiche knoweth the thyng full little, as I shall plainly declare. And firste, concernyng the unprofitablenesse, I tell you, that there is no service used in any countrie more profitable, then the service by the Subjectes of thesame nor thesame service cannot bee prepared, but in this maner: and for that this nedeth not to be disputed of, I will not lese moche tyme: bicause al thensamples of auncient histores, make for my purpose, and for that thei alledge the lacke of experience, and to use constraint: I saie how it is true, that the lacke of experience, causeth lacke of courage, and constrainte, maketh evill contentacion: but courage, and experience thei are made to gette, with the maner of armyng theim, exercisyng, and orderyng theim, as in proceadyng of this reasonyng, you shall heare. But concernyng constrainte, you ought to understande, that the menne, whiche are conducted to warfare, by commaundement of their Prince, thei ought to come, neither altogether forced, nor altogether willyngly, for as moche as to moche willyngnesse, would make thinconveniencies, where I told afore, that he should not be a chosen manne, and those would be fewe that would go: and so to moche constraint, will bring forth naughtie effectes. Therefore, a meane ought to be taken, where is not all constrainte, nor all willingnesse: but beyng drawen of a respecte, that thei have towardes their Prince, where thei feare more the displeasure of thesame, then the presente paine: and alwaies it shall happen to be a constrainte, in maner mingled with willingnesse, that there cannot growe soche evil contentacion, that it make evill effectes. Yet I saie not for all this, that it cannot bee overcome, for that full many tymes, were overcome the Romaine armies, and the armie of Aniball was overcome, so that it is seen, that an armie cannot be ordained so sure, that it cannot be overthrowen. {47} Therefore, these your wise men, ought not to measure this unprofitablenesse, for havyng loste ones, but to beleve, that like as thei lese, so thei maie winne, and remeadie the occasion of the losse: and when thei shall seke this thei shall finde, that it hath not been through faulte of the waie, but of the order, whiche had not his perfeccion and as I have saied, thei ought to provide, not with blamyng the order, but with redressing it, the whiche how it ought to be doen, you shall understande, from poinct to poinct. Concernyng the doubte, leste soche ordinaunces, take not from thee thy state, by meane of one, whiche is made hedde therof, I answere, that the armure on the backes of citezeins, or subjectes, given by the disposicion of order and lawe, did never harme, but rather alwaies it doeth good, and mainteineth the citee, moche lenger in suretie, through helpe of this armure, then without. Rome continued free CCCC. yeres, and was armed. Sparta viii.C. Many other citees have been disarmed, and have remained free, lesse then xl. For as moche as citees have nede of defence, and when thei have no defence of their owne, thei hire straungers, and the straunges defence, shall hurte moche soner the common weale, then their owne: bicause thei be moche easier to be corrupted, and a citezein that becommeth mightie, maie moche soner usurpe, and more easely bryng his purpose to passe, where the people bee disarmed, that he seketh to oppresse: besides this, a citee ought to feare a greate deale more, twoo enemies then one. Thesame citee that useth straungers power, feareth at one instant the straunger, whiche it hireth, and the Citezein: and whether this feare ought to be, remember thesame, whiche I rehearsed a little a fore of Frances Sforza. That citee, whiche useth her own proper power, feareth no man, other then onely her owne Citezein. But for all the reasons that maie bee saied, this shall serve me, that never any ordeined any common weale, or Kyngdome, that would not thinke, that thei theim selves, that inhabite thesame, should with their sweardes defende it.

FABRICIO. All the reasons you've laid out, my friend, come from people who know very little about the subject, as I'll explain clearly. First, regarding the lack of profitability, I tell you that there's no service performed in any country that's more beneficial than that of its subjects, and this service can only be structured this way. Since this doesn't require much debate, I won't waste too much time on it. Ancient history consistently supports my point, and they all mention a lack of experience and the use of coercion: I say that it's true that a lack of experience leads to a lack of courage, and coercion creates bad morale. However, courage and experience can be developed through proper training and organization, as you'll hear in the course of this discussion. Concerning coercion, you should understand that soldiers who are commanded to war by their prince should not arrive entirely forced or entirely willing. Too much eagerness might lead to issues where I mentioned before that one wouldn’t be a chosen man, which would mean few would actually go. Excessive coercion will also bring negative consequences. Therefore, a balance should be sought between not forcing too much and not being entirely willing, but rather motivated by the respect they have for their prince, fearing his displeasure more than any personal pain. This will always create a situation where coercion is mixed with willingness, preventing any serious discontent from causing bad outcomes. Yet, I’m not saying all this cannot be overcome, as many times Roman armies were defeated, and Hannibal’s army was vanquished too, proving that no army is so well-prepared that it cannot be toppled. {47} Therefore, these wise men should not judge the lack of profitability based on their losses, but rather believe that just as they lose, they can also win and mitigate the reasons for their losses. When they seek this, they'll find that it hasn’t been due to the method, but rather the order, which lacked perfection. As I said, they should address the issue, not by blaming the order, but by correcting it, and you'll understand how this should be done step by step. As for concerns about whether such arrangements might undermine your position because of someone placed at the head, I respond that armor on the backs of citizens or subjects, provided by the arrangement of order and law, has never harmed anyone; rather, it always does good and keeps the city safer for much longer with that protection than without it. Rome remained free for 400 years while armed, and Sparta for 800. Many other cities have been disarmed and remained free for less than 40 years. Cities need defense, and when they lack their own, they hire outsiders, whose protection will harm the common good much sooner than their own, because they are much easier to corrupt. A citizen who becomes powerful can more easily usurp control and achieve his goals where the people are disarmed and weak. Additionally, a city should fear two enemies more than one. The same city that relies on foreign power fears both the outsider it hires and its own citizen. Remember my earlier mention of Francesco Sforza; that city which employs its own strength fears no one but its own citizens. Despite all the arguments that might be made, I maintain that no one ever established a republic or kingdom who didn’t think that those living within it should defend it with their own swords.

And if the Venicians had been so wise in this, as in all {48} their other orders, thei should have made a new Monarchie in the world, whom so moche the more deserve blame, havyng been armed of their first giver of lawes: for havyng no dominion on the lande, thei wer armed on the sea, where thei made their warre vertuously, and with weapons in their handes, increased their countrie. But when thei were driven to make warre on the lande, to defende Vicenza, where thei ought to have sent one of their citezens, to have fought on the lande, thei hired for their capitain, the Marques of Mantua: this was thesame foolishe acte, whiche cut of their legges, from climyng into heaven, and from enlargyng their dominion: and if thei did it, bicause thei beleved that as thei knewe, how to make warre on the Sea, so thei mistrusted theim selves, to make it on the lande, it was a mistruste not wise: for as moche as more easely, a capitain of the sea, whiche is used to fight with the windes, with the water, and with men, shall become a Capitaine of the lande, where he shall fight with men onely, then a capitaine of the lande, to become a capitain of the sea. The Romanies knowyng how to fight on the lande, and on the sea, commyng to warre, with the Carthaginens, whiche were mightie on the sea, hired not Grekes, or Spaniardes, accustomed to the sea, but thei committed thesame care, to their Citezeins, whiche thei sent on the land, and thei overcame. If thei did it, for that one of their citezeins should not become a tiraunt, it was a feare smally considered: for that besides thesame reasons, whiche to this purpose, a little afore I have rehearsed, if a Citezein with the powers on the sea, was never made a tiraunt in a citee standyng in the sea, so moche the lesse he should have been able to accomplishe this with the powers of the lande: whereby thei ought to se that the weapons in the handes of their Citezeins, could not make tirantes: but the naughtie orders of the governement, whiche maketh tirannie in a citee, and thei havyng good governement, thei nede not to feare their owne weapons: thei toke therefore an unwise waie, the whiche hath been occasion, to take from them moche glorie, and moche felicitie. Concernyng the erroure, whiche the kyng of Fraunce committeth {49} not kepyng instructed his people in the warre, the whiche those your wise men alledge for ensample, there is no man, (his particulare passions laied a side) that doeth not judge this fault, to be in thesame kyngdome, and this negligence onely to make hym weake. But I have made to greate a digression, and peradventure am come out of my purpose, albeit I have doen it to aunswere you, and to shewe you, that in no countrie, there can bee made sure foundacion, for defence in other powers but of their owne subjectes: and their own power, cannot be prepared otherwise, then by waie of an ordinaunce, nor by other waie, to induce the facion of an armie in any place, nor by other meane to ordein an instruction of warfare. If you have red the orders, whiche those first kynges made in Rome, and inespecially Servio Tullo, you shall finde that the orders of the Classi is no other, then an ordinaunce, to bee able at a sodaine, to bryng together an armie, for defence of thesame citee. But let us retourne to our choise, I saie againe, that havyng to renewe an olde order, I would take them of xvii. havyng to make a newe armie, I would take them of all ages, betwene xvii. and xl. to be able to warre straight waie.

And if the Venetians had been as wise in this as in all their other decisions, they should have created a new monarchy in the world, which would have deserved a lot of blame since they had been given their laws by their first lawgiver. Because they had no control over the land, they were strong at sea, where they fought bravely and expanded their territory. But when they were forced to wage war on land to defend Vicenza, instead of sending one of their citizens to fight, they hired the Marquis of Mantua as their captain. This was the same foolish act that hindered their rise to greatness and expansion. If they did this out of a belief that, while they knew how to fight at sea, they didn’t trust themselves to fight on land, it was an unwise doubt. A sea captain, who is used to battling against the winds, water, and people, can more easily become a land captain, where he only has to fight people, than the other way around. The Romans, who knew how to fight on land and at sea, when going to war against the Carthaginians, who were powerful at sea, didn’t hire Greeks or Spaniards who were season veterans at sea; instead, they entrusted the task to their own citizens, who fought on land and won. If they did this because they feared that one of their citizens would become a tyrant, it was a fear not well considered. Aside from the reasons I mentioned earlier, if a citizen with sea power had never become a tyrant in a coastal city, then even less could he have done so with land power. They should have seen that their citizens’ weapons could not create tyrants; it was the poor governance that leads to tyranny in a city, and with good governance, they shouldn’t fear their own weapons. Thus, they took an unwise path that caused them to lose a lot of glory and happiness. Regarding the error that the king of France makes by not properly training his people in war, as your wise men point out as an example, there is no one (setting aside personal biases) who doesn’t think this fault weakens the kingdom. But I’ve digressed too much and may have strayed from my point, though I’ve done it to respond to you and demonstrate that in no country can a sure foundation for defense be made by any power other than their own subjects. Their own power can only be prepared through regulation, and it cannot be otherwise induced to create an army in any place, nor can it be organized to provide military instruction another way. If you read the rules established by the first kings in Rome, especially Servius Tullius, you will find that the rules of the Classis are nothing else but a regulation to quickly assemble an army for the defense of the city. But let us return to our choice; I say again that when renewing an old order, I would select them from those aged seventeen; when creating a new army, I would choose individuals of all ages between seventeen and forty to be ready for war immediately.

Of what science soldiours ought to bee chosen.

Of what science soldiers should be chosen.

COSIMO. Would you make any difference, of what science you would chuse them?

COSIMO. Would it matter what kind of science you choose?

FABRICIO. The aucthours, which have written of the arte of warre, make difference, for that thei will not, that there bee taken Foulers, Fishers, Cookes, baudes, nor none that use any science of voluptuousnesse. But thei will, that there bee taken Plowmen, Ferrars, Smithes, Carpenters, Buchars, Hunters, and soche like: but I would make little difference, through conjecture of the science, concernyng the goodnesse of the man, notwithstandyng, in as moche as to be able with more profite to use theim, I would make difference, and for this cause, the countrie men, which are used to till the grounde, are more profitable then any other. Next to whom be Smithes, Carpentars, Ferrars, Masons, wherof it is profitable to have enough: for that their occupacions, serve well in many thynges: beyng a thyng verie good to have a souldiour, of whom maie be had double servise.

FABRICIO. The authors who have written about the art of war make a distinction because they don't want people like fowlers, fishermen, cooks, prostitutes, or anyone involved in pleasure-seeking activities. Instead, they prefer to include farmers, blacksmiths, carpenters, butchers, hunters, and similar trades. However, I wouldn't make much distinction based on the skill of the person; still, to make better use of them, I would differentiate. This is because country folks who work the land are more useful than others. After them, we have blacksmiths, carpenters, and masons, of whom it's beneficial to have plenty, as their trades are useful in many ways. It's quite advantageous to have a soldier who can provide double service.

{50}

Howe to chose a souldiour.

How to choose a soldier.

COSIMO. Wherby doe thei knowe those, that be, or are not sufficient to serve.

COSIMO. How do they know who is capable of serving and who is not?

FABRICIO. I will speake of the maner of chusing a new ordinaunce, to make an armie after, for that parte of this matter, doeth come also to be reasoned of, in the election, which should be made for the replenishing, or restoring of an old ordinaunce. I saie therfore, that the goodnesse of one, whiche thou muste chuse for a Souldiour, is knowen either by experience, thorough meane of some of his worthy doynges, or by conjecture. The proofe of vertue, cannot be founde in men whiche are chosen of newe, and whiche never afore have ben chosen, and of these are founde either fewe or none, in the ordinaunce that of newe is ordeined. It is necessarie therefore, lackyng this experience, to runne to the conjecture, whiche is taken by the yeres, by the occupacion, and by the personage: of those two first, hath been reasoned, there remaineth to speake of the thirde. And therefore, I saie how some have willed, that the souldiour bee greate, emongest whom was Pirrus. Some other have chosen theim onely, by the lustinesse of the body, as Cesar did: whiche lustinesse of bodie and mynde, is conjectured by the composicion of the members, and of the grace of the countenaunce: and therefore, these that write saie, that thei would have the iyes lively and cherefull, the necke full of sinowes, the breaste large, the armes full of musculles, the fingers long, little beallie, the flankes rounde, the legges and feete drie: whiche partes are wont alwayes to make a manne nimble and strong, whiche are twoo thynges, that in a souldiour are sought above al other. Regarde ought to bee had above all thynges, to his customes, and that in hym bee honestie, and shame: otherwise, there shall bee chosen an instrumente of mischief, and a beginnyng of corrupcion: for that lette no manne beleve that in the dishoneste educacion, and filthy minde, there maie take any vertue, whiche is in any parte laudable. And I thinke it not superfluous, but rather I beleve it to bee necessarie, to the entente you maie the better understande, the importaunce of this chosen, to tell {51} you the maner that the Romaine Consuls, in the beginnyng of their rule, observed in the chosing of their Romain legions: in the whiche choise of men, bicause thesame legions were mingled with old souldiours and newe, consideryng the continuall warre thei kepte, thei might in their choise procede, with the experince of the old, and with the conjecture of the newe: and this ought to be noted, that these men be chosen, either to serve incontinently, or to exercise theim incontinently, and after to serve when nede should require. But my intencion is to shew you, how an armie maie be prepared in the countrie, where there is no warlike discipline: in which countrie, chosen men cannot be had, to use them straight waie, but there, where the custome is to levie armies, and by meane of the Prince, thei maie then well bee had, as the Romaines observed, and as is observed at this daie emong the Suisers: bicause in these chosen, though there be many newe menne, there be also so many of the other olde Souldiours, accustomed to serve in the warlike orders, where the newe mingled together with the olde, make a bodie united and good, notwithstanding, that themperours after, beginning the staciones of ordinarie Souldiours, had appoincted over the newe souldiours, whiche were called tironi, a maister to exercise theim, as appeareth in the life of Massimo the Emperour. The whiche thyng, while Rome was free, not onely in the armies, but in the citee was ordeined: and the exercises of warre, beyng accustomed in thesame, where the yong men did exercise, there grewe, that beyng chosen after to goe into warre, thei were so used in the fained exercise of warfare, that thei could easely worke in the true: but those Emperours havyng after put doune these exercises, thei wer constrained to use the waies, that I have shewed you. Therefore, comyng to the maner of the chosen Romain, I saie that after the Romain Consulles (to whom was appoincted the charge of the warre) had taken the rule, myndyng to ordeine their armies, for that it was the custome, that either of them should have twoo Legions of Romaine menne, whiche was the strength of their armies, thei created xxiiii. {52} Tribunes of warre, and thei appoincted sixe for every Legion, whom did thesame office, whiche those doe now a daies, that we call Conestables: thei made after to come together, all the Romain men apte to beare weapons and thei put the Tribunes of every Legion, seperate the one from the other. Afterwarde, by lot thei drewe the Tribes, of whiche thei had firste to make the chosen, and of thesame Tribe thei chose fower of the best, of whiche was chosen one of the Tribunes, of the first Legion, and of the other three was chosen, one of the Tribunes of the second Legion, of the other two there was chosen one of the Tribunes of the third, and the same last fell to the fowerth Legion. After these iiij, thei chose other fower, of which, first one was chosen of the Tribunes of the seconde Legion, the seconde of those of the thirde, the thirde of those of the fowerth, the fowerth remained to the first. After, thei chose other fower, the first chose the thirde, the second the fowerth, the thirde the fiveth, the fowerth remained to the seconde: and thus thei varied successively, this maner of chosyng, so that the election came to be equall, and the Legions wer gathered together: and as afore we saied, this choise might bee made to use straighte waie, for that thei made them of men, of whom a good parte were experiensed in the verie warfare in deede, and all in the fained exercised, and thei might make this choise by conjecture, and by experience. But where a power must be ordeined of newe, and for this to chuse them out of hande, this chosen cannot be made, saving by conjecture, whiche is taken by consideryng their ages and their likelinesse.

FABRICIO. I will talk about how to choose a new order to create an army afterward. This part of the subject must also be addressed when deciding how to replace or restore an old order. I say that the qualities of a soldier you need to choose are known either through experience, based on some of their prior noteworthy actions, or through conjecture. The proof of virtue cannot be found in individuals who are newly chosen and have never been selected before, and of such individuals, there are either few or none in the new order established. Therefore, lacking this experience, it is necessary to rely on conjecture, which is based on age, occupation, and character. We’ve already discussed the first two, so now I’ll address the third. Some have believed that soldiers should be strong, one of whom was Pyrrhus. Others have chosen them solely based on physical fitness, like Caesar did. This physical and mental fitness is inferred from the body’s structure and facial appearance. Hence, those who write about this indicate that they prefer the eyes to be lively and bright, the neck muscular, the chest broad, the arms muscular, the fingers long, a small waist, rounded hips, and dry legs and feet. These features typically make a man agile and strong, which are two essential qualities sought in a soldier. Above all, attention should be paid to his habits and that he possesses honor and shame; otherwise, you risk choosing an instrument of harm and the start of corruption. Let no one believe that through dishonorable upbringing and a filthy mind, any virtue, which is commendable in any part, can emerge. I don’t think it’s unnecessary but rather necessary to better understand the importance of this choice to tell you how the Roman Consuls, at the beginning of their rule, approached selecting their Roman legions. In that choice of men, since those legions were mixed with old and new soldiers, considering the constant warfare they maintained, they could select with the experience of the old and the conjecture of the new. It should be noted that these men are chosen either to serve immediately or to be trained before serving when necessary. However, my intention is to show you how an army can be prepared in a country without military discipline, where chosen men can’t be utilized right away. They can only be obtained where there is a custom of raising armies, and through the ruler, they can then be gathered well, as the Romans did and as is still practiced today among the Swiss. Because among these chosen, even though there may be many new soldiers, there are also plenty of seasoned soldiers accustomed to military service, where the new mix with the old creates a united and effective body. Nevertheless, the emperors later established the stations for regular soldiers, appointing a master to train the new soldiers, as is evident in the life of Emperor Maximus. This practice was established not only in the armies but also in the city while Rome was free: and the military exercises were maintained there, where young men trained, ensuring that when selected for war, they were so accustomed to the mock exercises of warfare that they could easily perform in real situations. However, those emperors, having later abolished these exercises, were forced to adopt the methods I previously mentioned. So, returning to the process of selecting Romans, I say that after the Roman Consuls, who were in charge of warfare, took over, intending to structure their armies, it was customary for each of them to have two legions of Roman men, which was the strength of their forces. They created twenty-four war tribunes, appointing six for each legion, serving the same role as those we now call Constables. Then they gathered all the Roman men fit to bear arms, and they separated the tribunes of each legion from one another. Afterward, they drew lots for the tribes from which they first selected each group, and of that tribe, they chose the four best. From these, one tribune was selected from the first legion, and one tribune from the other three was chosen from the second legion, and one from the other two was chosen from the third legion, with the last one going to the fourth legion. After these four, they chose another set of four: the first from the second legion, the second from the third, the third from the fourth, and the fourth going back to the first. Then they chose another four: the first from the third, the second from the fourth, the third from the fifth, and the fourth returning to the second. They varied this selection process so that the election was fair, and the legions were assembled. As we mentioned earlier, this choice could be made for immediate use, as they made their selections from men of whom a good portion had real experience in combat and all had been trained in mock exercises. They could make this selection based on conjecture and experience. But where a new force must be organized, and for this, to choose them out of hand, this selection can only be done through conjecture, which is based on observing their ages and appearances.

COSIMO. I beleve all to be true, as moche as of you hath been spoken: but before that you procede to other reasonyng, I woll aske of you one thing, which you have made me to remember: saiyng that the chosen, that is to be made where men were not used to warre, ought to be made by conjecture: for asmoche as I have heard some men, in many places dispraise our ordinaunce, and in especially concernyng the nomber, for that many saie, that there ought to bee taken lesse nomber, whereof is gotten this profite, that thei shall {53} be better and better chosen, and men shal not be so moche diseased, so that there maie bee given them some rewarde, whereby thei maie bee more contented, and better bee commaunded, whereof I would understande in this parte your opinion, and whether you love better the greate nomber, than the little, and what waie you would take to chuse theim in the one, and in the other nomber.

COSIMO. I believe everything that's been said about you is true, but before we move on to other discussions, I want to ask you something that you made me think of: you mentioned that those chosen to lead should be selected based on speculation, especially where warfare isn't common. I've heard some people criticize our system, particularly regarding the numbers involved. Many say fewer people should be selected, arguing that this would result in a better and more suitable choice. They suggest that having a smaller group would lead to less discontent among the men, allowing them to receive rewards that would keep them more satisfied and easier to command. I’d like to hear your thoughts on this: do you prefer a larger group or a smaller one, and how would you go about choosing them in either case?

FABRICIO. Without doubte it is better, and more necessary, the great nomber, then the little: but to speake more plainly, where there cannot be ordeined a great nomber of men, there cannot be ordeined a perfect ordinaunce: and I will easely confute all the reasons of them propounded. I saie therefore firste, that the lesse nomber where is many people, as is for ensample Tuscane, maketh not that you have better, nor that the chosen be more excellent, for that myndyng in chosing the menne, to judge them by experience, there shall be founde in thesame countrie moste fewe, whom experience should make provable, bothe for that fewe hath been in warre, as also for that of those, mooste fewe have made triall, whereby thei might deserve to bee chosen before the other: so that he whiche ought in like places to chuse, it is mete he leave a parte the experience, and take them by conjecture. Then being brought likewise into soche necessitie, I would understande, if there come before me twentie young men of good stature, with what rule I ought to take, or to leave any: where without doubte, I beleve that every man will confesse, how it is lesse errour to take them al, to arme theim and exercise theim, beyng not able to knowe, whiche of theim is beste, and to reserve to make after more certaine chosen, when in practisyng theim with exercise, there shall be knowen those of moste spirite, and of moste life: which considered, the chusing in this case a fewe, to have them better, is altogether naught.

FABRICIO. Without a doubt, having a larger group is better and more necessary than a smaller one. To put it simply, if you can't organize a large number of people, you can't create a perfect order. I can easily dispute all the reasons given otherwise. First, having a smaller group in a place with many people, like Tuscany, doesn't mean you have better or more excellent choices. When selecting individuals, judging based on experience will reveal that in such a country, very few people have enough experience to be proven worthy, both because few have been in combat and even fewer have had the opportunity to demonstrate their worth. Therefore, someone who needs to make these selections should ignore experience and rely on intuition. If I find myself in a situation where I have twenty young men of good stature in front of me, I would wonder how I should decide who to choose or reject. I believe everyone would agree that it is less of a mistake to choose them all, to train and equip them, rather than risk leaving anyone out when I can't be sure which one is the best. After practicing with them, I'll be able to identify those with the most spirit and energy. Considering this, choosing a few in hopes of having better candidates is completely misguided.

Concernyng diseasing lesse the countrie, and men, I saie that the ordinaunce, either evill or little that it bee, causeth not any disease, for that this order doeth not take menne from any of their businesse, it bindeth them not, that thei cannot go to doe any of their affaires: for that it bindeth {54} them onely in the idell daies, to assemble together, to exercise them, the whiche thyng doeth not hurt, neither to the countrie, nor to the men, but rather to yong men it shall bryng delite: For that where vilie on the holy daies thei stande idell in tipplyng houses, thei will go for pleasure to those exercises, for that the handlyng of weapons, as it is a goodly spectacle, so unto yong men it is pleasaunt. Concernyng to bee able to paie the lesse nomber, and for this to kepe theim more obediente, and more contented, I answere, how there cannot be made an ordinaunce of so fewe, whiche maie be in maner continually paied, where thesame paiment of theirs maie satisfie them. As for ensample, if there were ordeined a power of v. thousande men, for to paie them after soche sorte, that it might be thought sufficient, to content them, it shal bee convenient to give theim at least, ten thousaunde crounes the moneth: first, this nomber of men are not able to make an armie, this paie is intolerable to a state, and of the other side, it is not sufficiente to kepe men contented, and bounde to be able to serve at al times: so that in doyng this, there shall be spent moche, and a small power kept, whiche shall not be sufficient to defend thee, or to doe any enterprise of thine. If thou shouldest give theim more, or shouldest take more, so moche more impossibilitie it should be, for thee to paie theim: if thou shouldest give them lesse, or should take lesse, so moche the lesse contentacion should be in them, or so moche the lesse profite thei shal bring thee. Therfore, those that reason of makyng an ordinaunce, and whilest thei tary at home to paie them, thei reason of a thing either impossible, or unprofitable, but it is necessarie to paie them, when thei are taken up to be led to the warre: albeit, though soche order should somewhat disease those, in time of peace, that are appoincted in thesame, which I se not how, there is for recompence all those benefites, whiche a power brynges, that is ordeined in a countrie: for that without thesame, there is nothyng sure. I conclude, that he that will have the little nomber, to be able to paie them, or for any of the other causes alledged of you, doeth not {55} understande, for that also it maketh for my opinion, that every nomber shall deminishe in thy handes, through infinite impedimentes, whiche men have: so that the little nomber shall tourne to nothing: again havyng thordinaunce greate, thou maiest at thy pleasure use fewe of many, besides this, it must serve thee in deede, and in reputacion and alwaies the great nomber shall give thee moste reputacion. More over, makyng the ordinaunce to kepe menne exercised, if thou appoincte a fewe nomber of men in many countries, the handes of men bee so farre a sonder, the one from the other, that thou canst not without their moste grevous losse, gather them together to exercise them, and without this exercise, the ordinaunce is unprofitable, as hereafter shall be declared.

Concerning reducing the country's forces and people, I say that the regulations, whether they're bad or minimal, don't cause any harm because they don't take people away from their work; they don't restrict them from handling their own affairs. Instead, they only require them to come together on idle days to practice, which doesn't hurt the country or its people but rather brings enjoyment to the young. Instead of wasting time in taverns on holy days, they can find pleasure in these activities, since handling weapons is not only a great spectacle, but also enjoyable for young men. Regarding being able to pay fewer people and thereby keeping them more obedient and content, I respond that it’s not possible to create a regulation that accommodates so few people and still pays them adequately. For example, if a force of five thousand is organized and it's believed that paying them this way would be enough to satisfy them, it would be necessary to pay at least ten thousand crowns a month. First, this number of men cannot form an army; this pay is excessive for any state, and on the other hand, it won't be enough to keep the men content and available for service at all times. So, if you go through with this, you’ll end up spending a lot and only maintain a small force, which won't be sufficient for your defense or any initiatives. If you try to pay them more or hire more, it will become that much harder for you to pay them. If you pay them less or hire fewer, then there'll be less satisfaction among them, and they’ll yield less benefit. Therefore, those who suggest making a regulation while they stay home to pay them are discussing something either impossible or unhelpful. It is necessary to pay them when they are called up for war. Even though such regulations might inconvenience those appointed during peacetime—though I don't see how—there are all the benefits that a trained force brings to a country, because without one, there's nothing secure. I conclude that anyone wanting to keep the number small, to make it manageable, or for any of the other reasons you mentioned, doesn't understand, as it supports my view that every number will diminish in your hands, due to endless challenges people face, resulting in a small force fading away. However, having a larger force allows you to use a few of many as needed, plus it has to be beneficial both in fact and in perception, as a larger number will always give you more reputation. Moreover, when creating regulations to keep people trained, if you appoint a small number across many areas, the distance between them makes it hard to gather them for practice without significant losses. Without this training, the regulations are pointless, as I will explain later.

COSIMO. It suffiseth upon this my demaunde, that whiche you have saied: but I desire now, that you declare me an other doubt. Thei saie, that soche a multitude of armed men, will make confusion, discension and disorder in the countrie where thei are.

COSIMO. What you’ve said is enough for my question, but now I’d like you to explain another concern. They say that such a large number of armed men will create confusion, division, and disorder in the country where they are.

How to provid againste soche inconveniences as souldiours maie cause.

How to prevent inconveniences that soldiers may cause.

FABRICIO. This is an other vaine opinion, the cause wherof, I shall tell you: soche as are ordeined to serve in the warres, maie cause disorder in twoo maners, either betwene them selves, or against other, whiche thinges moste easely maie be withstode, where the order of it self, should not withstande it: for that concernyng the discorde emong theim selves, this order taketh it waie, and doeth not nourishe it, for that in orderyng them, you give them armour and capitaines. If the countrie where you ordein them, bee so unapte for the warre, that there are not armours emong the men of thesame, and that thei bee so united, that thei have no heddes, this order maketh theim moche fearser against the straunger, but it maketh them not any thyng the more disunited, for that men well ordered, feare the lawe beyng armed, as well as unarmed, nor thei can never alter, if the capitaines, which you give them, cause not the alteracion, and the waie to make this, shall be tolde now: but if the countrie where you ordein them, be warlike and disunited, this order onely shal be occasion to unite them: bicause this order giveth them {56} armours profitable for the warre, and heddes, extinguishers of discencion: where their owne armours bee unprofitable for the warres, and their heddes nourishers of discorde. For that so sone as any in thesame countrie is offended, he resorteth by and by to his capitain to make complaint, who for to maintain his reputacion, comforteth hym to revengement not to peace. To the contrary doeth the publike hed, so that by this meanes, thoccasion of discorde is taken awaie, and the occasion of union is prepared, and the provinces united and effeminated, gette utilitie, and maintain union: the disunited and discencious, doe agree, and thesame their fearsnesse, which is wont disordinately to worke, is tourned into publike utilitie. To minde to have them, to doe no hurt against other, it ought to bee considered, that thei cannot dooe this, except by meane of the heddes, whiche governe them. To will that the heddes make no disorder, it is necessarie to have care, that thei get not over them to much auctoritie. And you must consider that this auctoritie, is gotten either by nature, or by accidente: and as to nature, it behoveth to provide, that he which is boren in one place, be not apoincted to the men billed in the same, but be made hedde of those places, where he hath not any naturall aquaintance: and as to the accident, the thing ought to be ordeined in suche maner, that every yere the heddes maie be changed from governement to goverment: for as muche as the continuall auctoritie over one sorte of menne, breedeth among them so muche union, that it maie turne easely to the prejudice of the Prince: whiche permutations howe profitable they be to those who have used theim, and hurtefull to them that have not observed theim, it is well knowen by the kingdome of the Assirians, and by the Empire of the Romaines: where is seene, that the same kingdome indured a M. yeres without tumulte, and without any Civill warre: whiche preceded not of other, then of the permutations, whiche from place to place everie yere thesame Capitaines made, unto whome were apoincted the charge of the Armies. Nor for any other occasion in the Romaine Empire, after the bloud of Cesar was extinguished, there grewe so many civill warres, {57} betwene the Capitaines of the hostes, and so many conspiracies of the forsaied capitaines against the Emperours, not onely kepyng continually still those capitaines alwayes in one governement. And if in some of those firste Emperoures, of those after, whom helde the Empire with reputacion, as Adriane, Marcus, Severus, and soche like, there had been so moche foresight, that thei had brought this custome of chaungyng the capitaines in thesame Empire, without doubte it should have made theim more quiete, and more durable: For that the Capitaines should have had lesse occasion to make tumultes, the Emperours lesse cause to feare, and the senate in the lackes of the successions, should have had in the election of the Emperour, more aucthoritie, and by consequence should have been better: but the naughtie custome, either for ignoraunce, or through the little diligence of menne, neither for the wicked, nor good ensamples, can be taken awaie.

FABRICIO. This is another misguided opinion, and I'll explain why: those chosen to serve in the wars can create disorder in two ways, either among themselves or against outsiders. These issues can be easily managed if the proper order is established, which should not hinder it. Regarding the discord among themselves, this order addresses it and doesn’t encourage it; when you organize them, you provide them with weapons and leaders. If the area where you organize them is so unfit for war that the people have no weapons and are so united that they lack leaders, this order makes them much braver against outsiders but doesn’t make them any more divided. Well-organized people fear the law while armed as much as when unarmed, and they won’t change unless the leaders you assign them cause that change. I’ll explain how to achieve this now: but if the area where you organize them is warlike and divided, this order will only serve to unite them because it provides them with effective weapons for war and leaders who quell dissent, as opposed to unhelpful weapons and leaders who foster discord. As soon as someone in that area is offended, they immediately go to their leader to complain, who, wanting to maintain his reputation, encourages revenge rather than peace. In contrast, the public leader does the opposite, which helps remove the cause of discord and prepares the way for unity. The united provinces benefit and maintain that unity, while the disunited and discordant come to an agreement, and their usual disarray turns into public benefit. If you want them to do no harm to others, you need to remember that they can’t accomplish this without the leadership that governs them. To ensure that leaders don’t create disorder, it’s important to be careful that they don’t gain too much power over them. You should note that this power can come either by nature or by circumstance. As for natural power, precautions must be taken to ensure that someone born in one place isn’t assigned to govern those from the same area but is made leader of regions where he has no natural connections. Regarding circumstances, there must be arrangements so that every year leaders can be rotated between different commands. The consistent authority over one group tends to create enough unity among them that it can easily become a disadvantage to the ruler. The benefits of these changes are well known from the kingdom of Assyria and the Roman Empire. It is clear that the kingdom enjoyed many years without unrest or civil war due to the yearly rotation of captains assigned to lead the armies. Also, in the Roman Empire after Caesar's bloodline was extinguished, there were numerous civil wars and conspiracies among the aforementioned captains against the emperors, mainly because those captains were kept continually in the same command. If some of those early emperors, like Hadrian, Marcus, Severus, and others who held the empire with distinction, had foresight to implement the custom of changing the captains within the empire, it surely would have brought them more peace and longevity. The captains would have had less reason to create turmoil, the emperors would have less cause to fear, and the Senate would have had more authority in selecting the emperor during succession flaws, resulting in better outcomes. However, the bad custom, whether due to ignorance or a lack of diligence, is not easily eliminated, regardless of whether it is for wicked or good examples.

COSIMO. I cannot tell, if with my questionyng, I have as it were led you out of your order, bicause from the chusyng of men, we be entred into an other matter, and if I had not been a little before excused, I should thinke to deserve some reprehension.

COSIMO. I can’t say if my questioning has thrown you off track, since we started with the selection of people and ended up on a different topic. If I hadn't just been excused, I would expect to be criticized.

The nomber of horsemen, that the Romanies chose for a Legion, and for a Consailes armie.

The number of horsemen that the Romani chose for a Legion and for a Consailes army.

FABRICIO. Let not this disquiete you, for that all this reasonyng was necessary, myndyng to reason of the ordinaunce, the which beyng blamed of many, it was requsite to excuse it, willyng to have this first parte of chusyng men to be alowed. But now before I discend to the other partes, I will reason of the choise of men on horsebacke. Of the antiquitie, these were made of the moste richeste, havyng regard bothe to the yeres, and to the qualitie of the man, and thei chose CCC. for a Legion, so that the Romain horse, in every Consulles armie, passed not the nomber of vi. C.

FABRICIO. Don’t let this bother you, because all this reasoning was necessary, keeping in mind the rules. Since many criticize it, it was important to explain it, hoping to have this first part of choosing men approved. But now before I move on to the other parts, I will discuss the selection of mounted men. In ancient times, these were taken from the wealthiest, considering both their age and the quality of the individual, and they chose 300 for a legion, so that the Roman cavalry in any consul’s army did not exceed the number of 600.

COSIMO. Would you make an ordinaunce of hors, to exercise them at home, and to use their service when nede requires?

COSIMO. Would you set up a rule for horses, so we can train them at home and use them when necessary?

The choosing and ordering of horsemen, that is to be observed at this present.

The selection and arrangement of horsemen, which is to be noted at this time.

FABRICIO. It is most necessary, and it cannot be doen otherwise, minding to have the power, that it be the owne {58} proper, and not to purpose to take of those, which make thereof an art.

FABRICIO. It's essential, and it can't be done any other way, keeping in mind that it should be one's own, and not intended to take from those who turn it into an art. {58}

COSIMO. How would you choose them?

COSIMO. How would you pick them?

FABRICIO. I would imitate the Romans, I would take of the richest, I would give them heads or chief Captains, in the same manner, as nowadays to other is given, and I would arm them and exercise them.

FABRICIO. I would follow the example of the Romans; I would take from the wealthiest, appoint them leaders or chief captains, just like it's done today, and I would equip and train them.

COSIMO. To these should it be well to give some provision?

COSIMO. Should we provide some support for them?

FABRICIO. Yea marie, but so much only as is necessary to keep the horse, for as much as bringing to thy subjects expenses, they might justly complain of thee, therefore it should be necessary, to pay them their charges of their horse.

FABRICIO. Yeah Marie, but only what’s necessary to take care of the horse, because if you burden your subjects with expenses, they would rightfully complain about you. So, it’s important to cover their costs for the horse.

COSIMO. What number would you make? and how would you arme them?

COSIMO. What number would you choose? And how would you arm them?

FABRICIO. You pass into another matter. I will tell you in convenient place, which shall be when I have told you, how footmen ought to be armed, and how a power of men is prepared, for a day of battle.

FABRICIO. You're shifting to a different topic. I'll let you know at a more appropriate time, which will be after I explain to you how foot soldiers should be equipped and how a group of men is organized for a day of battle.

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THE SECOND BOOKE

{61}

Howe the Romaines armed their souldiers and what weapons thei used.

How the Romans equipped their soldiers and what weapons they used.

I beleeve that it is necessarye, men being founde, to arme them, and minding to doo this, I suppose that it is a needefull thing to examine, what armoure the antiquitie used, and of the same to chose the best. The Romanes devided their foote men in heavie and lighte armed: Those that were light armed, they called by the name of Veliti: Under this name were understoode all those that threwe with Slinges, shot with Crossebowes, cast Dartes, and they used the most parte of them for their defence, to weare on their heade a Murion, with a Targaet on their arme: they fought out of the orders, and farre of from the heavie armed, which did weare a head peece, that came downe to their shoulders, a Corselet, which with the tases came downe to the knees, and they had the legges and armes, covered with greaves, and vambraces, with a targaet on the left arme, a yarde and a halfe long, and three quarters of a yarde brode, whiche had a hoope of Iron upon it, to bee able to sustaine a blowe, and an other under, to the intente, that it being driven to the earth, it should not breake: for to offende, they had girte on their left flanke a swoorde, the length of a yearde and a naile, on their righte side, a Dagger: they had a darte in every one of their handes, the which they called Pilo, and in the beginning of the fight, they threwe those at the enemie. This was the ordering, and importaunce of the armours of the Romanes, by the which {62} they possessed all the world. And although some of these ancient writers gave them, besides the foresayde weapons, a staffe in their hande like unto a Partasen, I cannot tell howe a heavy staff, may of him that holdeth a Targaet be occupied: for that to handle it with both hands, the Targaet should bee an impediment, and to occupye the same with one hande, there can be done no good therewith, by reason of the weightynesse thereof: besides this, to faight in the strong, and in the orders with such long kinde of weapon, it is unprofitable, except in the first front, where they have space enough, to thrust out all the staffe, which in the orders within, cannot be done, for that the nature of the battaile (as in the order of the same, I shall tell you) is continually to throng together, which although it be an inconvenience, yet in so doing they fear lesse, then to stande wide, where the perill is most evident, so that all the weapons, which passe in length a yarde and a halfe, in the throng, be unprofitable: for that, if a man have the Partasen, and will occupye it with both handes, put case that the Targaet let him not, he can not hurte with the same an enemy, whom is upon him, if he take it with one hande, to the intent to occupy also the Targaet, being not able to take it, but in the middest, there remayneth so much of the staff behind, that those which are behinde him, shall let him to welde it. And whether it were true, either that the Romans had not this Partasen, or that having it, did little good withal, read all the battailes, in the historye thereof, celebrated of Titus Livius, and you shall see in the same, most seldom times made mencion of Partasens, but rather alwaies he saieth, that the Dartes being thrown, they laid their hands on their sweardes. Therefore I will leave this staffe, and observe, concerning the Romanes, the swoorde for to hurte, and for defense the Targaet, with the other armours aforesaide.

I I believe that it’s essential to equip men for battle, so I think it’s necessary to look into the armor used in ancient times and pick the best options. The Romans divided their infantry into heavy and light armed soldiers: those who were lightly armed were called Velites. This term referred to all who used slings, shot crossbows, and threw darts; most of them wore a helmet and carried a small shield on their arm for protection. They generally fought at a distance from the heavily armed soldiers, who wore a helmet that extended down to their shoulders, a breastplate that came down to their knees, and had their legs and arms protected with greaves and vambraces. They also carried a shield on their left arm that was a yard and a half long and three-quarters of a yard wide, reinforced with an iron hoop to withstand blows, with another hoop underneath to prevent it from breaking if driven to the ground. For offense, they wore a sword on their left side that was a yard and a nail long, and a dagger on their right side. Each soldier had a spear, called a pilum, in each hand, which they threw at the enemy at the start of the fight. This was the organization and significance of Roman armor, which enabled them to conquer the world. Although some ancient writers mention that they also carried a staff similar to a partisan, I’m unsure how an overloaded staff could be managed by someone holding a shield: to wield it with both hands would be hindered by the shield, and using it with one hand wouldn’t be effective due to its weight. Moreover, fighting in close formation with such long weapons is impractical, except at the front, where there’s enough space to extend the staff, which can’t be done within the ranks due to the nature of battle (I’ll explain that in detail later). While this may seem like a drawback, it causes fighters to fear less than standing apart, where danger is more obvious, meaning that all weapons exceeding a length of a yard and a half are ineffective in close quarters. If a soldier had the partisan and attempted to wield it with both hands, even if the shield didn’t obstruct him, he wouldn't be able to harm an enemy up close. If he tried to use it one-handed while holding the shield, the excess staff would still be behind him, preventing him from effectively using it. Whether or not the Romans actually had this partisan or if they didn’t use it effectively, read the battles documented in the history of Titus Livius, and you’ll find that it’s rarely mentioned; instead, he often states that after throwing their darts, they drew their swords. Therefore, I will set aside the staff and focus on the sword for offense and the shield, along with the other armaments previously mentioned, for defense.

A brave and a terrible thing to the enemies.

A courageous and fearsome thing to the enemies.

The Greekes did not arme them selves so heavyly, for their defense, as the Romans dyd: but for to offend the enemies, they grounded more on their staves, then on their swoordes, and in especiallye the Fallangye of Macedonia, {63} which used staves, that they called Sarisse, seven yardes and a halfe long, with the which they opened the rankes of their enemies, and they keept the orders in their Fallangy. And although some writers saie, that they had also the Targaet, I can not tell (by the reasons aforesayde) howe the Sarisse and they coulde stande together. Besides this, in the battaile that Paulus Emilius made, with Persa king of Macedonia, I do not remember, that there is made any mention of Targaettes, but only of the Sarisse, and of the difficultie that the Romane armie had, to overcome them: so that I conjecture, that a Macedonicall Fallange, was no other wise, then is now a dayes a battaile of Suizzers, the whiche in their Pikes have all their force, and all their power. The Romanes did garnish (besides the armours) the footemen with feathers; the whiche thinges makes the fight of an armie to the friendes goodly, to the enemies terrible. The armour of the horsemen, in the same first Romane antiquitie, was a rounde Targaet, and they had their head armed, and the rest unarmed: They had a swoorde and a staffe, with an Iron head onely before, long and small: whereby it happened, that they were not able to staye the Targaet, and the staffe in the incountring broke, and they through being unarmed, were subjecte to hurtes: after, in processe of time, they armed them as the footemen, albeit they used the Targaette muche shorter, square, and the staffe more stiffe, and with twoo heades, to the entente, that breaking one of the heades, they mighte prevaile with the other. With these armours as well on foote, as on horsebacke, the Romanes conquered all the worlde, and it is to be beleeved, by the fruiet thereof, whiche is seene, that they were the beste appointed armies, that ever were: and Titus Livius in his history, doeth testifie verye often, where comming to comparison with the enemies armies, he saieth: But the Romanes, by vertue, by the kinde of their armours, and piactise in the service of warre, were superiours: and therfore I have more particularly reasoned of the armours of conquerours, then of the conquered. But nowe mee thikes good, to reason onelye of the manner of arming {64} men at this presente. Footemen have for their defence, a breast plate, and for to offende, a launce, sixe yardes and three quarters long, which is called a pike, with a swoorde on their side, rather rounde at the poinct, then sharpe. This is the ordinarie arming of footemen nowe a dayes, for that fewe there be, which have their legges armed, and their armes, the heade none, and those fewe, beare insteede of a Pike, a Halberde, the staffe whereof as you know, is twoo yardes and a quarter long, and it hath the Iron made like an axe. Betweene them, they have Harkebutters, the which with the violence of the fire, do the same office, which in olde time the slingers did, and the Crosseboweshoters. This maner of arming, was found out by the Dutchemen, inespeciallye of Suizzers, whom being poore, and desirous to live free, they were, and be constrayned to fight, with the ambition of the Princes of Almaine, who being riche, were able to keepe horse, the which the same people could not do for povertye. Wherby it grewe, that being on foote, minding to defende them selves from the enemies, that were on horsebacke, it behooveth them to seeke of the aunciente orders, and to finde weapons, whiche from the furie of horses, should defende them: This necessitie hath made either to be maintayned, or to bee founde of them the aunciente orders, without whiche, as everye prudente man affirmeth, the footemen is altogether unprofitable. Therefore, they tooke for their weapon the Pike, a moste profitable weapon, not only to withstande horses, but to overcome them: and the Dutchemen have by vertue of these weapons, and of these orders, taken such boldnesse, that XV. or XX. thousande of them, will assault the greatest nomber of horse that maye be: and of this, there hath beene experience enough within this XXV. yeres. And the insamples of their vertue hath bene so mightie, grounded upon these weapons, and these orders, that sence King Charles passed into Italie, everye nation hath imitated them: so that the Spanish armies, are become into most great reputation.

The Greeks didn’t arm themselves as heavily for defense as the Romans did; instead, to attack their enemies, they relied more on their spears than on their swords. Particularly, the Macedonian Phalanx used long spears called Sarissas, which were seven and a half yards long, allowing them to break through enemy lines while maintaining formation. Although some writers say they also had shields, I’m not sure how the Sarissa and shields could be used together based on the reasons mentioned earlier. Additionally, in the battle fought by Paulus Emilius against Perseus, the king of Macedonia, I don’t recall any mention of shields, only of the Sarissa and the difficulties faced by the Roman army in overcoming them. I suspect that a Macedonian Phalanx was similar to a modern battle of Swiss troops, who derive all their strength from their pikes. The Romans also adorned their foot soldiers with feathers to make their army look impressive to allies and fearsome to enemies. In the early Roman era, cavalrymen used round shields and had their heads armed while the rest of their bodies remained unprotected. They carried a sword and a long, thin spear with an iron tip at the end, which often broke upon impact, leaving them vulnerable due to their lack of armor. Over time, they eventually armed themselves like the infantry, though the shields were much shorter and square, and their spears became stiffer and had two points so that if one broke, they still had the other to use. With this armor, both foot soldiers and cavalry, the Romans conquered the entire world, and it’s believed, based on the results we see, that they had the best-equipped armies ever. Titus Livius often notes in his history that when comparing the Roman army to their enemies, he says: "But the Romans, due to their virtue, type of armor, and military practice, were superior." Therefore, I’ve discussed the armor of the conquerors in more detail than that of the conquered. Now, however, I think it’s better to focus solely on how men are equipped today. Modern infantry are equipped with breastplates for defense and a lance approximately six and three-quarters yards long, known as a pike, along with a sword that is more rounded at the tip rather than sharp. This is the standard armor for foot soldiers nowadays, as few have armed legs or arms and none have armed heads, and those few carry a halberd instead of a pike, the staff of which is about two yards and a quarter long, with the iron head shaped like an axe. In addition, they have hand cannons that, with the force of gunpowder, perform a similar role to what slingers and crossbowmen did in ancient times. This style of armor was developed by the Dutch, especially the Swiss, who, being poor and eager to live freely, had to fight against wealthy German princes who could afford mounted soldiers. This led them to defend themselves as infantry, seeking ancient tactics and finding weapons that could protect them from cavalry charges. This necessity has compelled them to maintain or to rediscover ancient tactics, without which, as any wise man asserts, infantry would be entirely ineffective. Consequently, they chose the pike as their weapon—a highly effective weapon, not only to stand against horses but to defeat them. The Dutch have gained such confidence from these weapons and formations that 15,000 or 20,000 of them will charge against any number of cavalry. There has been ample evidence of this in the past 25 years. The examples of their bravery, rooted in these weapons and formations, have been so powerful that since King Charles’s campaign in Italy, every nation has imitated them, leading to Spanish armies gaining great notoriety.

COSIMO. Which maner of arming, do you praise moste, either these Dutchemens, or the auncient Romanes?

COSIMO. Which style of armor do you prefer, the Dutch or the ancient Romans?

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Whether the Romanes maner in arming of men, be better then the arming of men, that is used nowe a daies.

Whether the Roman way of equipping soldiers is better than the way soldiers are outfitted today.

FABRICIO. The Romane without doubte, and I will tell the commoditie, and the discommoditie of the one, and the other. The Dutche footemen, are able to withstande, and overcome the horses: they bee moste speedie to marche, and to be set in araye, being not laden with armours: of the other part, they be subjecte to all blowes, both farre of, and at hande: because they be unarmed, they bee unprofitable unto the battaile on the lande, and to everye fighte, where is strong resistaunce. But the Romanes withstoode, and overcame the horses, as well as the Dutchemen, they were safe from blowes at hande, and farre of, being covered with armours: they were also better able to charge, and better able to sustaine charges, having Targaettes: they might more aptly in the preace fight with the swoorde, then these with the Pike, and though the Dutchemen have likewise swoordes, yet being without Targaets, they become in suche case unprofitable: The Romanes might safelye assault townes, having their bodies cleane covered with armour, and being better able to cover themselves with their Targaettes. So that they had no other incommoditie, then the waightynesse of their armours, and the pain to cary them: the whiche thinges thei overcame, with accustomyng the body to diseases, and with hardenyng it, to bee able to indure labour. And you knowe, how that in thinges accustomed, men suffer no grief. And you have to understand this, that the footemen maie be constrained, to faight with footemen, and with horse, and alwaies those be unprofitable, whiche cannot either sustain the horses, or beyng able to sustain them, have notwithstandyng neede to feare the footemen, whiche be better armed, and better ordeined then thei. Now if you consider the Duchemen, and the Romaines, you shall finde in the Duchemen activitie (as we have said) to overcome the horses, but greate dissavauntage, when thei faighte with menne, ordeined as thei them selves are, and armed as the Romaines were: so that there shall be this advauntage more of the one, then of thother, that the Romaines could overcome the men, and the horses, the Duchemen onely the horses.

FABRICIO. The Romans without a doubt, and I will explain the advantages and disadvantages of both. The Dutch foot soldiers can resist and defeat the horses: they are very quick to march and form ranks since they aren't burdened with armor. On the other hand, they are vulnerable to blows from a distance and up close: being unarmed, they are ineffective in a land battle, especially against strong resistance. However, the Romans can withstand and defeat the horses just like the Dutch, as they are protected from blows at close range and from afar, thanks to their armor. They are also better equipped to charge and absorb charges, having shields. They can fight more effectively in peace with swords than the Dutch can with pikes, and although the Dutch also have swords, without shields, they become less effective in such situations. The Romans could safely attack towns, completely covered in armor and better able to protect themselves with their shields. Their only drawback was the weight of their armor and the discomfort of carrying it, which they managed by training their bodies to endure hardship. And you know that in habitual situations, men feel no pain. You must also understand that foot soldiers may be forced to fight against both other foot soldiers and cavalry, and those who cannot withstand cavalry or who, while able to resist, still fear foot soldiers better armed and organized than themselves are always at a disadvantage. Now, if you consider the Dutch and the Romans, you will find that while the Dutch have the agility to overcome horses, they face significant disadvantages when fighting against men who are organized and armed as the Romans were. Therefore, the Romans have the advantage of being able to defeat both men and horses, while the Dutch can only defeat the horses.

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COSIMO. I would desire, that you would come to some more particulare insample, whereby wee maie better understande.

COSIMO. I would like you to provide a more specific example so that we can better understand.

An ensample whiche proveth that horsemen with staves, cannot prevaile against footemen with Pikes, and what great advauntage the armed have, againste the unarmed. The victory of Carminvola against the Duchemen.

An example that shows how horsemen with staffs cannot succeed against foot soldiers with pikes, and the significant advantage that armed individuals have over the unarmed. The victory of Carminvola against the Dutch.

FABRICIO. I saie thus, that you shall finde in many places of our histories, the Romain footemen to have overcome innumerable horses, and you shall never finde, that thei have been overcome of men on foote, for default that thei have had in their armour, or thorowe the vantage that the enemie hath had in the armours: For that if the maner of their armyng, should have had defaulte, it had been necessarie, that there should folowe, the one of these twoo thynges, either that findyng soche, as should arme theim better then thei, thei should not have gone still forwardes, with their conquestes, or that thei should have taken the straungers maners, and should have left their owne, and for that it folowed not in the one thing, nor in the other, there groweth that ther maie be easely conjectured, that the maner of their armyng, was better then thesame of any other. It is not yet thus happened to the Duchemen, for that naughtie profe, hath ben seen made them, when soever thei have chaunsed to faight with men on foote prepared, and as obstinate as thei, the whiche is growen of the vauntage, whiche thesame have incountred in thenemies armours. Philip Vicecounte of Milaine, being assaulted of xviii. thousande Suizzers, sent against theim the Counte Carminvola, whiche then was his capitaine. He with sixe thousande horse, and a fewe footemen, went to mete with them, and incounteryng theim, he was repulsed with his moste greate losse: wherby Carminvola as a prudente man, knewe straight waie the puisaunce of the enemies weapons, and how moche against the horses thei prevailed, and the debilitie of the horses, againste those on foote so appoincted: and gatheryng his men together again, he went to finde the Suizzers, and so sone as he was nere them, he made his men of armes, to a light from their horse, and in thesame mane, faightyng with them he slue theim all, excepte three thousande: the whiche seyng them selves to consume, without havyng reamedy, castyng their weapons to the grounde, yelded.

FABRICIO. I say this: you will find in many parts of our history that the Roman foot soldiers defeated countless cavalry, and you will never find a case where they were beaten by foot soldiers due to flaws in their armor or because the enemy had an advantage in weapons. If there had been a problem with their armor, one of two things would have happened: either they would have encountered someone who armed them better and would not have continued their conquests, or they would have adopted the foreign styles and abandoned their own. Since neither of these situations occurred, it can be easily inferred that their method of equipping themselves was superior to any other. This has not been the case for the Dutch, as proven by their failures whenever they faced well-prepared foot soldiers as stubborn as themselves, which results from the advantages the latter gained from their armaments. Philip, the Vice Count of Milan, when attacked by 18,000 Swiss, sent the Count Carminvola, who was then his captain, to face them. He, with 6,000 horsemen and a few foot soldiers, went to meet them, but encountered defeat with significant losses. Seeing this, Carminvola, being wise, immediately recognized the strength of the enemy's weapons and how they outmatched the cavalry against those well-equipped foot soldiers. Gathering his men again, he sought out the Swiss, and as soon as he approached them, he had his armored men dismount from their horses. In that same manner, fighting them, he killed all but three thousand, who, seeing themselves being overwhelmed with no remedy, threw down their weapons and surrendered.

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COSIMO. Whereof cometh so moche disavauntage?

COSIMO. Where does all this disadvantage come from?

The battailes when thei are a faightyng, doe throng together.

The battles, when they are fighting, crowd together.

FABRICIO. I have a little afore tolde you, but seyng that you have not understoode it, I will rehearse it againe. The Duchemen (as a little before I saied unto you) as it were unarmed, to defende themselves, have to offende, the Pike and the swearde: thei come with these weapons, and with their orders to finde the enemies, whom if thei bee well armed, to defende theim selves, as were the menne of armes of Carminvola, whiche made theim a lighte on foote, thei come with the sweard, and in their orders to find them, and have no other difficultie, then to come nere to the Suizzers, so that thei maie reche them with the sweard, for that so sone as thei have gotten unto them, thei faight safely: for asmoche as the Duch man cannot strike thenemie with the Pike, whom is upon him, for the length of the staffe, wherefore it is conveniente for hym, to put the hande to the sweard, the whiche to hym is unprofitable, he beyng unarmed, and havyng against hym an enemie, that is all armed. Whereby he that considereth the vantage, and the disavantage of the one, and of the other, shall see, how the unarmed, shall have no maner of remeady, and the overcommyng of the firste faight, and to passe the firste poinctes of the Pikes, is not moche difficulte, he that faighteth beyng well armed: for that the battailes go (as you shall better understande, when I have shewed you, how thei are set together) and incounteryng the one the other, of necessitie thei thrust together, after soche sorte, that thei take the one thother by the bosome, and though by the Pikes some bee slaine, or overthrowen, those that remain on their feete, be so many, that thei suffice to obtaine the victorie. Hereof it grewe, that Carminvola overcame them, with so greate slaughter of the Suizzers, and with little losse of his.

FABRICIO. I’ve told you a bit before, but since you haven’t understood it, I’ll go over it again. The Dutch, as I mentioned earlier, are sort of unarmed for defense, so they rely on offense with the pike and the sword. They come with these weapons and their formations to find the enemies, who, if well-armed, they will defend themselves against, just like the men-at-arms from Carminvola, which made them light on their feet. They approach with the sword, and their strategy is to get close to the Swiss so they can strike with the sword. Once they’re close enough, they can fight safely because the Dutchman can’t hit the enemy with the pike when it’s up against him due to the length of the staff. So, it’s better for him to switch to the sword, which is not helpful for him when he’s unarmed and facing an armed enemy. Anyone who considers the advantages and disadvantages of both sides will see that the unarmed have no remedy. Overcoming the initial fight and getting past the first thrusts of the pikes isn’t very difficult for someone who is well-armed. During battles (as you’ll understand better when I show you how they align), once they encounter each other, they inevitably push against one another, grabbing each other by the torso. Even if some are slain or knocked down by the pikes, those who remain standing are sufficient to secure the victory. This explains how Carminvola defeated them, causing a great slaughter of the Swiss with little loss on his side.

COSIMO. Consider that those of Carminvola, were men of armes, whom although thei wer on foote, thei were covered all with stele, and therefore thei wer able to make the profe thei did: so that me thinkes, that a power ought to be armed as thei, mindyng to make the verie same profe.

COSIMO. Keep in mind that the people of Carminvola were soldiers, and even though they were on foot, they were fully armored. Because of this, they were able to demonstrate their strength. It seems to me that a force should be equipped like them if they intend to showcase the same strength.

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FABRICIO. If you should remember, how I tolde you the Romaines were armed, you would not thynke so: for as moche as a manne, that hath the hedde covered with Iron, the breaste defended of a Corselet, and of a Targaet, the armes and the legges armed, is moche more apt to defende hymself from the Pike, and to enter emong them, then a man of armes on foote. I wil give you a little of a late ensample. There wer come out of Cicelie, into the kyngdome of Naples, a power of Spaniardes, for to go to finde Consalvo, who was besieged in Barlet, of the Frenchemen: there made against theim Mounsier de Vhigni, with his menne of armes, and with aboute fower thousande Duchemen on foote: The Duchemen incountered with their Pikes lowe, and thei opened the power of the Spaniardes: but those beyng holp, by meane of their bucklers and of the agiletie of their bodies, mingled togethers with the Duchemen, so that thei might reche them with the swearde, whereby happened the death, almoste of all theim, and the victorie to the Spaniardes. Every man knoweth, how many Duchemen were slaine in the battaile of Ravenna, the whiche happened by the verie same occasion: for that the Spanishe souldiours, got them within a swerdes length of the Duche souldiours, and thei had destroied them all, if of the Frenche horsemen, the Duchemen on foote, had not been succored: notwithstandyng, the Spaniardes close together, brought themselves into a safe place. I conclude therefore, that a good power ought not onely to be able, to withstande the horses, but also not to have fear of menne on foote, the which (as I have many tymes saied) procedeth of the armours, and of the order.

FABRICIO. If you remember how I told you the Romans were armed, you wouldn’t think that way: because a man with his head covered in iron, his chest defended by a breastplate, and his arms and legs equipped is much better able to defend himself from a spear and get among them than an armored man on foot. Let me give you a recent example. A group of Spaniards came out of Sicily into the kingdom of Naples to find Consalvo, who was besieged in Barlet by the French. Monsieur de Vhigni opposed them with his armored men and about four thousand Dutch soldiers on foot. The Dutch charged with their pikes low and broke through the Spanish ranks. However, with the help of their shields and the agility of their bodies, the Spaniards mingled with the Dutch so they could reach them with their swords, resulting in the deaths of almost all the Dutch and the victory for the Spaniards. Everyone knows how many Dutch soldiers were killed in the battle of Ravenna, which happened for the same reason: the Spanish soldiers got within sword's reach of the Dutch soldiers, and they would have wiped them all out if the Dutch on foot hadn’t been supported by the French horsemen. Nevertheless, the Spaniards gathered closely together and moved into a safe position. Therefore, I conclude that a strong force should not only be able to withstand horses but also not fear men on foot, which, as I have said many times, comes from the armor and the formation.

How to arme men, and what weapons to appoincte theim, after the Romaine maner, and Duche facion.

How to arm men, and what weapons to assign them, in the Roman style and the Dutch fashion.

COSIMO. Tell therefore, how you would arme them?

COSIMO. So, tell me, how would you equip them?

FABRICIO. I would take of the Romaine armours, and of the Duchemennes weapons, and I would that the one haulfe, should bee appoincted like the Romaines, and the other haulfe like the Duchemen: for that if in sixe thousande footemen (as I shall tell you a little hereafter) I should have thre thousande men with Targaettes, after the Romain maner, and two thousande Pikes, and a thousand {69} Harkebutters, after the Duche facion, thei should sufice me: for that I would place the Pikes, either in the fronte of the battaile, or where I should feare moste the horses, and those with the Targaetes and sweardes, shall serve me to make a backe to the Pikes, and to winne the battaile, as I shall shewe you: so that I beleeve, that a power thus ordayned, should overcome at this daye, any other power.

FABRICIO. I would take the Roman armor and the Dutch weapons, and I would have one half designed like the Romans and the other half like the Dutch. Because if I have six thousand foot soldiers (as I will explain shortly), I would need three thousand men with shields, in the Roman style, and two thousand pikemen, along with a thousand Harkebutters, in the Dutch fashion; that would be enough for me. I would position the pikemen either at the front of the battle or where I fear the horses the most, and those with the shields and swords would serve as support for the pikemen and help win the battle, as I will demonstrate. I believe that a force organized this way could defeat any other force today.

COSIMO. This which hath beene saide, sufficeth concerning footemen, but concerning horsemen, wee desire to understand which you thinke more stronger armed, either ours, or the antiquitie.

COSIMO. What has been said is enough about foot soldiers, but regarding cavalry, we want to know which you think is better armed, ours or those from ancient times.

The victorie of Lucullo, against Tiarane king of Armenia; For what pupose horsemen be most requisite.

The victory of Lucullus against Tigranes, king of Armenia; For what purpose horsemen are most necessary.

FABRICIO. I beleeve that in these daies, having respect to the Saddelles bolstered, and to the stiroppes not used of the antiquitie, they stande more stronglye on horsebacke, then in the olde time: I thinke also they arme them more sure: so that at this daye, a bande of men of armes, paysing very muche, commeth to be with more difficultie withstoode, then were the horsemen of old time: notwithstanding for all this, I judge, that there ought not to be made more accompt of horses, then in olde time was made, for that (as afore is sayde) manye times in our dayes, they have with the footemen receyved shame and shall receyve alwayes, where they incounter, with a power of footemen armed, and ordered, as above hath bene declared. Tigrane king of Armenia, had againste the armie of the Romanes, wherof was Capitayne Lucullo, CL. thousande horsemen, amongest the whiche, were many armed, like unto our men of armes, which they called Catafratti, and of the other parte, the Romanes were about sixe thousande, with xxv. thousand footemen: so that Tigrane seeing the armie of the enemies, saide: these be horses enough for an imbassage: notwithstanding, incountering together, he was overthrowen: and he that writeth of the same fighte, disprayseth those Catafratti, declaring them to be unprofitable; for that hee sayeth, because they had their faces covered, they had muche a doe to see, and to offende the enemie, and they falling, being laden with armour coulde not rise up again, nor welde themselves in {70} any maner to prevaile. I say therefore, that those people or kingdomes, whiche shall esteeme more the power of horses, then the power of footemen be alwaies weake, and subjecte to all ruine, as by Italie hath been seene in our time, the whiche hath beene taken, ruinated, and over run with straungers, through not other fault, then for having taken litle care, of the service on foote, and being brought the souldiours therof, all on horsebacke. Yet there ought to bee had horses, but for seconde, and not for firste foundaion of an armie: for that to make a discovery, to over run and to destroy the enemies countrie, and to keepe troubled and disquieted, the armie of the same, and in their armours alwayes, to let them of their victuals, they are necessary, and most profitable: but concerning for the daye of battaile, and for the fighte in the fielde, whiche is the importaunce of the warre, and the ende, for which the armies are ordeined, they are more meeter to follow the enemie being discomfited then to do any other thing which in the same is to be done, and they bee in comparison, to the footemen much inferiour.

FABRICIO. I believe that these days, considering the reinforced saddles and the stirrups that haven't been used since ancient times, riders are more stable on horseback than in the past. I also think they are equipped more securely. So nowadays, a group of armored cavalry faces more difficulty being resisted than the horsemen from ancient times. However, despite all this, I think we shouldn't place more value on horses than was done in the past. As mentioned before, many times in our days, they have been shamed by foot soldiers and will continue to be whenever they encounter a force of well-armed and organized infantry, as has been explained above. Tigranes, king of Armenia, had against the Roman army led by Lucullus, 150,000 horsemen, among whom were many armed like our knights, known as Cataphracts. On the other side, the Romans had about six thousand cavalry and twenty-five thousand infantry. Seeing the enemy's army, Tigranes said: these are enough horses for an embassy; nonetheless, when they faced off, he was defeated. The writer recording that battle disapproves of those Cataphracts, claiming they were useless because, with their faces covered, they had a hard time seeing and attacking the enemy. If they fell, weighed down by their armor, they couldn't get back up or move effectively. Therefore, I say that those people or kingdoms that value the power of horses more than the power of foot soldiers are always weak and subject to ruin, as has been seen in Italy in our time, which has been taken, destroyed, and overrun by foreigners due to nothing other than neglecting the service of infantry and sending soldiers there entirely on horseback. Yet there should still be horses, but as a secondary option, not as the primary foundation of an army. They are essential and most beneficial for scouting, raiding, destroying the enemy's territory, and keeping their army troubled and unsettled in their armors, causing them to run low on supplies. However, regarding the day of battle and fighting in the field, which is the essence of war and the purpose for which armies are organized, they are better suited to chase down and finish off the defeated enemy than to perform any other tasks, and they are, in comparison to infantry, much inferior.

COSIMO. There is happened unto mee twoo doubtes, the one, where I knowe, that the Parthians dyd not use in the warre, other then horses, and yet they devided the worlde with the Romanes: the other is, that I woulde that you should shewe, howe the horsemen can be withstoode of footemen, and wherof groweth the strength of these, and the debilitie of those?

COSIMO. I've come across two doubts. First, I know that the Parthians only used horses in battle, yet they managed to divide the world with the Romans. Second, I wish you would explain how cavalry can be resisted by infantry, and what gives strength to one and weakness to the other.

The reason why footmen are able to overcome horsemen; How footmen maie save them selves from horsemen; The exercise of Souldiours, ought to be devided into thre partes; What exercises the auncient common weales used to exercise their youth in, and what commoditie insued thereby; How the antiquitie, learned their yong soldiours, to handell their weapons; What thantiquitie estemed moste happie in a common weale; Mouster Maisters; for thexercisyng of yong men unexperte.

The reason why foot soldiers can overcome cavalry; How foot soldiers can protect themselves from horsemen; The training of soldiers should be divided into three parts; What exercises ancient republics used to train their youth and what benefits came from that; How the ancients taught their young soldiers to handle their weapons; What the ancients considered most fortunate in a republic; Master instructors for training inexperienced young men.

FABRICIO. Either I have tolde you, or I minded to tell you, howe that my reasoning of the affaires of warre, ought not to passe the boundes of Europe: when thus it is, I am not bounde unto you, to make accompte of the same, which is used in Asia, yet I muste saye unto you thus, that the warring of the Parthians, was altogether contrarye, to the same of the Romanes: for as muche as the Parthians, warred all on horsebacke, and in the fight, they proceeded confusedlye, and scattered, and it was a maner of fighte unstable, and full of uncertaintie. The Romanes were (it maye be sayde) almoste al on foote, and thei fought close {71} together and sure, and thei overcame diversly, the one the other, according to the largenesse, or straightnesse of the situation: for that in this the Romaines were superiours, in thesame the Parthians, whom might make greate proofe, with thesame maner of warryng, consideryng the region, which thei had to defende, the which was moste large: for as moche as it hath the sea coaste, distant a thousande miles, the rivers thone from thother, twoo or three daies journey, the tounes in like maner and the inhabitauntes few: so that a Romaine armie heavie and slowe, by meanes of their armoures, and their orders, could not over run it, without their grevous hurt (those that defended it, being on horsebacke mooste expedite) so that thei were to daie in one place, and to morowe distaunt fiftie miles. Hereof it grewe, that the Parthians might prevaile with their chivalrie onely, bothe to the ruine of the armie of Crassus, and to the perill of thesame, of Marcus Antonius: but I (as I have told you) doe not intende in this my reasonyng, to speake of the warfare out of Europe, therfore I will stand upon thesame, whiche in times past, the Romaines ordained, and the Grekes, and as the Duchemen doe now adaies. But let us se to the other question of yours, where you desire to understande, what order, or what naturall vertue makes, that the footemen overcome the horsmen. And I saie unto you first that the horses cannot go, as the footmen in every place: Thei are slower then the footemen to obeie, when it is requisite to alter the order: for as moche, as if it be nedefull, either goyng forward, to turne backwarde, or tournyng backwarde, to go forwarde, or to move themselves standing stil, or goyng to stand still, without doubt, the horsemen cannot dooe it so redilie as the footemen: the horsemen cannot, being of some violence, disordained, returne in their orders, but with difficultie, although thesame violence cease, the whiche the footemen dooe moste easely and quickly. Besides this, it happeneth many tymes, that a hardie manne shall be upon a vile horse, and a coward upon a good, whereby it foloweth, that this evill matchyng of stomackes, makes disorder. Nor no man doeth marvell, that {72} a bande of footemenne, susteineth all violence of horse for that a horse is a beaste, that hath sence, and knoweth the perilles, and with an ill will, will enter in them: and if you consider, what force maketh theim go forwarde, and what holdeth them backwarde, you shall se without doubt thesame to be greater, whiche kepeth them backe, then that whiche maketh them go forwardes: For that the spurre maketh theim go forwarde, and of the other side, either the swearde, or the Pike, kepeth theim backe: so that it hath been seen by the olde, and by the late experience, a bande of footemen to bee moste safe, ye, invinsible for horses. And if you should argue to this, that the heate, with whiche thei come, maketh theim more furious to incounter who that would withstande them, and lesse to regard the Pike, then the spurre: I saie, that if the horse so disposed, begin to see, that he must run upon the poincte of the Pike, either of himself, he wil refrain the course so that so sone as he shall feele himself pricked, he will stande still atones, or beeyng come to theim, he will tourne on the right, or on the lefte hande. Whereof if you wil make experience, prove to run a horse against a walle: you shall finde fewe, with what so ever furie he come withall, will strike against it. Cesar havyng in Fraunce, to faighte with the Suizzers, a lighted, and made every manne a light on foote, and to avoide from the araies, the horses, as a thyng more meete to flie, then to faight. But notwithstandyng these naturall impedimentes, whiche horses have, thesame Capitaine, whiche leadeth the footemen, ought to chuse waies, whiche have for horse, the moste impedimentes that maie bee, and seldome tymes it happeneth, but that a manne maie save hymself, by the qualitie of the countrie: for that if thou marche on the hilles, the situacion doeth save thee from thesame furie, whereof you doubt, that thei go withail in the plain, fewe plaines be, whiche through the tillage or by meanes of the woddes, doe not assure thee: for that every hillocke, every bancke, although it be but small, taketh awaie thesame heate, and every culture where bee Vines, and other trees, lettes the horses: and if thou come {73} to battaile, the very same lettes happeneth, that chaunceth in marchyng: for as moche as every little impedemente, that the horse hath, abateth his furie. One thyng notwithstandyng, I will not forgette to tell you, how the Romaines estemed so moche their orders, and trusted so moche to their weapons, that if thei shuld have had, to chuse either so rough a place to save theim selves from horses, where thei should not have been able, to raunge their orders, or a place where thei should have nede, to feare more of horses, but ben able to deffende their battaile, alwaies thei toke this, and left that: but bicause it is tyme, to passe to the armie, having armed these souldiours, accordyng to the aunciente and newe use, let us see what exercises the Romaines caused theim make, before the menne were brought to the battaile. Although thei be well chosen, and better armed, thei ought with moste greate studie be exercised, for that without this exercise, there was never any souldiour good: these exercises ought to be devided into three partes, the one, for to harden the bodie, and to make it apte to take paines, and to bee more swifter and more readier, the other, to teach them, how to handell their weapons, the third, for to learne them to kepe the orders in the armie, as well in marchyng, as in faightyng, and in the incampyng: The whiche be three principall actes, that an armie doeth: for asmoche, as if an armie marche, incampe, and faight with order, and expertly, the Capitaine leseth not his honoure, although the battaile should have no good ende. Therfore, all thauncient common weales, provided these exercises in maner, by custome, and by lawe, that there should not be left behinde any part thereof. Thei exercised then their youth, for to make them swift, in runnyng, to make theim readie, in leapyng, for to make them strong, in throwyng the barre, or in wrestlyng: and these three qualities, be as it were necessarie in souldiours. For that swiftnesse, maketh theim apte to possesse places, before the enemie, and to come to them unloked for, and at unwares to pursue them, when thei are discomfaicted: the readinesse, maketh theim apte to avoide a blowe, to leape over a diche, to winne a {74} banke: strength, maketh them the better able to beare their armours, to incounter the enemie, to withstande a violence. And above all, to make the bodie the more apte to take paines, thei used to beare greate burthens, the whiche custome is necessarie: for that in difficulte expedicions it is requisite many tymes, that the souldiour beside his armours, beare vitualles for many daies, and if he were not accustomed to this labour, he could not dooe it: and without this, there can neither bee avoided a perill, nor a victorie gotten with fame. Concernyng to learne how to handell the weapons, thei exercised theim, in this maner: thei would have the yong menne, to put on armour, whiche should waie twise as moche, as their field armour, and in stede of a swearde, thei gave them a cudgell leaded, whiche in comparison of a verie swearde in deede, was moste heavie; thei made for every one of them, a poste to be set up in the ground, which should be in height twoo yardes and a quarter, and in soche maner, and so strong, that the blowes should not slur nor hurle it doune, against the whiche poste, the yong man with a targaet, and with the cudgell, as against an enemie did exercise, and some whiles he stroke, as though he would hurte the hedde, or the face, somewhile he retired backe, an other while he made forewarde: and thei had in this exercise, this advertisment, to make theim apt to cover theim selves, and to hurte the enemie: and havyng the counterfaight armours moste heavy, their ordinarie armours semed after unto them more lighter. The Romanies, would that their souldiours should hurte with the pricke, and not with the cutte, as well bicause the pricke is more mortalle, and hath lesse defence, as also to thentent that he that should hurt, might lye the lesse open, and be more apt to redouble it, then with cuttes. Dooe not marvaile that these auncient men, should thinke on these small thynges, for that where the incounteryng of men is reasoned of, you shall perceive, that every little vauntage, is of greate importaunce: and I remember you the same, whiche the writers of this declare, rather then I to teache you. The antiquitie estemed nothing move {75} happie, in a common weale, then to be in thesame, many men exercised in armes: bicause not the shining of precious stones and of golde, maketh that the enemies submit themselves unto thee, but onely the fear of the weapons: afterwarde the errours whiche are made in other thynges, maie sometymes be corrected, but those whiche are dooen in the warre, the paine straight waie commyng on, cannot be amended. Besides that, the knowlege to faight, maketh men more bold, bicause no man feareth to doe that thing, which he thinketh to have learned to dooe. The antiquitie would therefore, that their Citezeins should exercise themselves, in all marcial feates, and thei made them to throwe against thesame poste, dartes moche hevier then the ordinarie: the whiche exercise, besides the makyng men expert in throwyng, maketh also the arme more nimble, and moche stronger. Thei taught them also to shote in the long bowe, to whorle with the sling: and to all these thynges, thei appoincted maisters, in soche maner, that after when thei were chosen for to go to the warre, thei were now with mynde and disposicion, souldiours. Nor there remained them to learn other, then to go in the orders, and to maintain them selves in those, either marchyng, or faightyng: The whiche moste easely thei learned, mingeling themselves with those, whiche had long tyme served, whereby thei knewe how to stande in the orders.

FABRICIO. Either I've told you or I've meant to tell you how my thoughts on warfare should not extend beyond the boundaries of Europe. So, I’m not obligated to discuss what’s done in Asia with you. Still, I must mention that the way the Parthians fought was entirely different from the Romans. The Parthians fought mainly on horseback, and their tactics were chaotic and scattered, making it a kind of fight that was unstable and uncertain. The Romans, on the other hand, mostly fought on foot, standing close together and securely. They overcame each other based on the terrain's size or narrowness: because in that regard, the Romans were superior, while the Parthians, who conducted their warfare well given the vast territory they had to defend, had the challenge of covering a coastline that stretched a thousand miles. The rivers were two or three days apart, and the towns were similar in distance, with few inhabitants. Thus, a Roman army, heavy and slow due to their armor and formations, couldn't easily maneuver without suffering significant losses since those defending the area were more mobile on horseback. They could be in one place today and fifty miles away tomorrow. This is how the Parthians managed to defeat Crassus's army and bring danger to Marcus Antonius. However, as I've told you, I don't intend to discuss warfare outside Europe, so I'll focus on what the Romans and Greeks practiced in the past, as well as what the Dutch do these days. Now, let’s address your other question about the order or natural abilities that allow foot soldiers to overcome cavalry. First, foot soldiers can maneuver in ways horses cannot. Horses are slower to react when it’s necessary to change direction. They find it difficult to regain their formation when disordered, even if the chaos subsides, while foot soldiers can do so quickly and easily. Besides, it's common for a brave man to be on a bad horse while a coward rides a good one, so mismatched pairing leads to disorder. No one is surprised that a group of foot soldiers can withstand the full force of cavalry because a horse is an animal that senses danger and is hesitant to charge into peril. If you consider what motivates horses to move forward versus what holds them back, you’ll see that the forces keeping them back are stronger than those driving them forward. The spur propels them, while the sword or pike keeps them at bay. Experience has shown, both old and new, that a group of foot soldiers can be very safe, even invincible against horses. If you argue that the heat of their charge makes them more ferocious against anyone who stands in their way and less aware of the pike than of the spur, I say that if a horse realizes it has to run into the point of a pike, it will hesitate. As soon as it feels the prick, it will stop. When it gets close, it will turn to the right or left. If you want to prove this, try to run a horse against a wall. You’ll find that few, no matter how furious they might be, will charge into it. While in France, Caesar, preparing to fight the Swiss, dismounted everyone and had them fight on foot, considering horses were better suited for flight than battle. Despite these natural limitations of horses, the commander leading foot soldiers should choose paths that create the most obstacles for the cavalry. Rarely does it happen that a man can’t find a way to save himself based on the land's qualities. If you march on hills, the terrain protects you from the dangers you fear in open plains; few plains exist that don't have crops or woods for cover. Every slight rise or bank, even small ones, reduces the cavalry's momentum, and every cultivated area with vines or trees hinders horses. And when it comes to battle, the same impediments affect horses as they do when marching; even the smallest obstacle can lessen their fury. One thing I won’t forget to tell you is how much the Romans valued their formations and trusted their weapons, so much so that if they had to choose between a difficult terrain that would protect them from horses but wouldn’t allow them to arrange their formations or a place where they would need to fear cavalry yet could defend their battle, they always chose the latter. However, it’s time to move on to the army. After arming the soldiers according to ancient and modern practices, let’s see what exercises the Romans had them do before going to battle. Even if they were well-chosen and better armed, they needed rigorous training because no soldier can be good without it. These exercises should be divided into three parts: one to toughen the body and make it more able to endure hardship and be quicker and more agile, the second to teach them how to handle their weapons, and the third to teach them to maintain their formations in the army, both during marching and fighting and while encamping. These are the three main actions an army performs, as if an army marches, camps, and fights in an orderly and skilled manner, the commander does not lose honor, even if the battle does not turn out well. Thus, all ancient republics mandated these exercises as a custom and a law to ensure no part was neglected. They trained their youth to be fast runners, to leap well, and to be strong in throwing the javelin or wrestling. These three qualities are essential for soldiers because swiftness allows them to seize places before the enemy, catch them off guard, and pursue them when they are defeated; readiness enables them to dodge blows, leap over ditches, and take hills; strength helps them bear their armor, confront the enemy, and withstand assaults. Above all, to make the body more able to endure hardship, they practiced carrying heavy burdens, which was important because in difficult missions, soldiers often needed to carry supplies for several days in addition to their armor. Without being accustomed to this labor, they wouldn't be able to do it. Without this preparation, neither can peril be avoided nor victory be achieved with honor. As for learning to handle weapons, they practiced like this: young men would put on armor that weighed twice as much as their field armor and were given a heavy cudgel instead of a sword. They made a post two and a quarter yards high, sturdy enough that blows wouldn’t knock it down. Each young man practiced against this post with a shield and cudgel as if facing an enemy, sometimes striking as if aiming for the head or face, sometimes retreating or advancing. They aimed to make themselves able to defend and hurt the enemy, and with heavier training armor, their regular armor felt lighter. The Romans preferred their soldiers to stab rather than slash because stabbing is more lethal and has less defense, as well as allowing the attacker to remain less exposed and more able to follow up. Don’t wonder why these ancients focused on these details; when it comes to combat, every little advantage is significant, and as the writers note, I’m more here to remind you than to educate you. The ancients valued nothing more in a republic than having many men trained in arms because it isn’t the glitter of precious stones or gold that makes enemies submit to you, but rather the fear of weapons. Mistakes in other matters can sometimes be corrected, but errors in warfare bring immediate consequences that cannot be fixed. Furthermore, knowing how to fight makes men bolder because no one fears doing things they believe they have learned to do. Therefore, the ancients wanted their citizens to be skilled in all martial feats, making them throw heavier javelins against the same post. This practice not only made men proficient in throwing but also strengthened and quickened their arms. They taught them to shoot a longbow and to use a sling, appointing instructors for all these activities so that when they were eventually chosen to go to war, they would be mentally and physically ready to be soldiers. All that remained was to learn to march in formation and maintain their positions, whether marching or fighting, which they easily learned by integrating with those who had served for a long time, enabling them to understand how to hold their formations.

COSIMO. What exercises would you cause theim to make at this present?

COSIMO. What exercises would you have them do right now?

The exercises that souldiers ought to make in these daies; The exercise of swimmyng; Tiber, is a river runnyng through Rome the water wher of will never corrupte; Thexercise of vautyng, and the commoditie thereof; An order that is taken in certain countries, concerning exercises of warre; What knowledge a Souldiour ought to have; A Cohorte is a bande of men; Of what nomer and of what kind of armours and weapons, a maine battaile ought to bee, and the distributing and appoinetyng of thesame; veliti are light armed men; Thecapitaines that ar appointed to every band of men; Twoo orders observed in an armie; How a captain muste instructe muste instructe his souldiours how thei ought to governe themselves in the battaile.

The exercises that soldiers should do these days; The exercise of swimming; Tiber is a river running through Rome, and its water will never corrupt; The exercise of vaulting, and its benefits; An order established in certain countries regarding military training; What a soldier should know; A cohort is a band of men; What size and type of armor and weapons a main battle should have, and the distribution and arrangement of the same; Velites are light-armed men; The captains assigned to each band of men; Two orders observed in an army; How a captain must instruct his soldiers on how they should conduct themselves in battle.

FABRICIO. A good many of those, whiche have been declared, as runnyng, and wrestlyng, makyng theim to leape, makyng theim to labour in armours, moche heavier then the ordinarie, making them shoote with Crosse bowes, and longe bowes, whereunto I would joyne the harkabus, a newe instrument (as you know) verie necessarie, and to these exercises I would use, al the youth of my state, but with greater industrie, and more sollicitatenesse thesame parte, whiche I should have alreadie appoincted to serve, and alwaies in the idell daies, thei should bee exercised. I would also that thei should learne to swimme, the whiche {76} is a thyng verie profitable: for that there be not alwaies bridges over rivers, boates be not alwaies readie: so that thy army not knowyng howe to swime, remaineth deprived of many commodities: and many occasions to woorke well, is taken awaie. The Romaines for none other cause had ordained, that the yong men should exercise them selves in Campus Martius, then onely, for that havyng Tiber at hande, thei might, beyng weried with the exercise on lande, refreshe theim selves in the water, and partly in swimmyng, to exercise them selves. I would make also, as the antiquitie, those whiche should serve on horsebacke to exercise, the whiche is moste necessarie, for that besides to know how to ride, thei muste knowe how on horsebacke thei maie prevaile of them selves. And for this thei had ordeined horses of wood, upon the which thei practised, to leape by armed, and unarmed, without any helpe, and on every hande: the whiche made, that atones, and at a beck of a capitain, the horsmen were on foote, and likewise at a token, thei mounted on horsebacke. And soche exercises, bothe on foote and on horsebacke, as thei were then easie to bee doen, so now thei should not be difficult to thesame common weale, or to thesame prince, whiche would cause them to be put in practise of their yong men. As by experience is seen, in certaine citees of the Weste countrie, where is kepte a live like maners with this order. Thei devide all their inhabiters into divers partes: and every parte thei name of the kinde of those weapons, that thei use in the warre. And for that thei use Pikes, Halbardes, Bowes, and Harkebuses, thei call them Pike menne, Halberders, Harkebutters, and Archars: Therefore, it is mete for all the inhabiters to declare, in what orders thei will be appoincted in. And for that all men, either for age, or for other impedimentes, be not fitte for the warre, every order maketh a choise of men, and thei call them the sworen, whom in idell daies, be bounde to exercise themselves in those weapons, wherof thei be named: and every manne hath his place appoincted hym of the cominaltie, where soche exercise ought to be made: and those whiche be of thesame {77} order, but not of the sworen, are contributaries with their money, to thesame expenses, whiche in soche exercises be necessarie: therfore thesame that thei doe, we maie doe. But our smal prudence dooeth not suffre us, to take any good waie. Of these exercises there grewe, that the antiquitie had good souldiours, and that now those of the Weste, bee better men then ours: for as moche as the antiquitie exercised them, either at home (as those common weales doe) or in the armies, as those Emperours did, for thoccasions aforesaied: but we, at home will not exercise theim, in Campe we cannot, bicause thei are not our subjectes, and for that we are not able to binde them to other exercises then thei them selves liste to doe: the whiche occacion hath made, that firste the armies bee neclected, and after, the orders, and that the kyngdomes, and the common weales, in especially Italians, live in soche debilitie. But let us tourne to our order, and folowyng this matter of exercises, I saie, how it suffiseth not to make good armies, for havyng hardened the men, made them strong, swift, and handsome, it is nedefull also, that thei learne to stande in the orders, to obeie to signes, to soundes, and to the voice of the capitain: to knowe, standyng, to retire them selves, goyng forwardes, bothe faightyng, and marchyng to maintain those: bicause without this knowlege, withal serious diligence observed, and practised, there was never armie good: and without doubt, the fierce and disordered menne, bee moche more weaker, then the fearfull that are ordered, for that thorder driveth awaie from men feare, the disorder abateth fiercenesse. And to the entente you maie the better perceive that, whiche here folowyng shalbe declared, you have to understande, how every nation, in the orderyng of their men to the warre, have made in their hoste, or in their armie, a principall member, the whiche though thei have varied with the name, thei have little varied with the nomber of the menne: for that thei all have made it, betwene sixe and viii. M. men. This nomber of men was called of the Romaines, a Legion, of Grekes a Fallange, of Frenchemen Caterva: this verie same in our tyme of the {78} Suizzers, whom onely of the auncient warfare, kepe some shadowe, is called in their tongue that, whiche in ours signifieththe maine battaile. True it is, that every one of them, hath after devided it, accordyng to their purposes. Therefore me thinkes beste, that wee grounde our talke, upon this name moste knowen, and after, according to the aunciente, and to the orders now adaies, the beste that is possible to ordaine it; and bicause the Romaines devided their Legion, whiche was made betwene five and sixe thousande men, in ten Cohortes, I will that wee devide our main battaile, into ten battailes, and that we make it of sixe thousande menne on foote, and we will give to every battaile, CCCCL. men, of whiche shall be, CCCC. armed with heavie armour, and L. with light armour: the heavie armed, shall be CCC. Targettes with sweardes, and shalbe called Target men: and C. with Pikes, whiche shalbe called ordinarie Pikes: the light armed shalbe, L. men armed with Harkabuses, Crosse bowes, and Partisans, and smal Targaettes, and these by an aunciente name, were called ordinarie Veliti: all of the ten battailes therefore, comes to have three thousande Targaet men, a thousande ordinarie Pikes, CCCC. ordinarie Veliti, all whiche make the nomber of fower thousande and five hundred men. And we saied, that we would make the maine battaile of six thousande; therefore there must be added an other thousande, five hundred men, of whiche I will appoinet a thousande with Pikes, whom I will call extraordinarie Veliti, and thus my menne should come (as a little before I have saied) to bee made halfe of Targaetes, and halfe of Pikes and other weapons. I would appoinete to everie battaile, or bande of men, a Conestable, fower Centurions and fouretic peticapitaines, and moreover a hedde to the ordinarie Veliti. with five peticapitaines; I would give to the thousande extraordinarie Pikes, three Conestabelles, ten Centurions, and a hundred peticapitaines; to the extraodrinarie Veliti, two Conestabelles, v. Centurions, and l. peticapitaines: I would then apoinet a generall hed, over all the main {79} battaile: I would that every Conestable should have an Ansigne, and a Drum. Thus there should be made a manne battaile of ten battailes, of three thousande Targaet men, of a thousande ordinarie Pikes, of a thousande extraordinarie of five hundred ordinarie Veliti, of five hundred extraordinarie, so there should come to bee sixe thousande men, emongeste the whiche there should bee M.D. peticapitaines, and moreover, xv. Conestables, with xv. Drummes, and xv. Ansignes, lv. Centurions, x. heddes of the ordinarie Veliti, and a Capitaine over all the maine battaile with his Asigne and Drume, and I have of purpose repeated this order the oftener, to the intent, that after when I shall shewe you, the maners of orderyng the battailes, and tharmies, you should not be confounded: I saie therefore, how that, that king, or that common weale, whiche intendeth to ordeine their subjectes to armes, ought to appoincte theim with these armoures and weapons, and with these partes, and to make in their countrie so many maine battailes, as it were able: and when thei should have ordained them, according to the forsaid distribucion, minding to exercise them in the orders, it should suffice to exercise every battaile by it self: and although the nomber of the men, of every one of them, cannot by it self, make the facion of a juste armie, notwithstandyng, every man maie learne to dooe thesame, whiche particularly appertaineth unto hym: for that in the armies, twoo orders is observed, the one, thesame that the men ought to doe in every battaile, and the other that, whiche the battaile ought to doe after, when it is with the other in an armie. And those men, whiche doe wel the first, mooste easely maie observe the seconde: But without knowyng thesame, thei can never come to the knowlege of the seconde. Then (as I have saied) every one of these battailes, maie by them selves, learne to kepe the orders of the araies, in every qualitie of movyng, and of place, and after learne to put them selves togethers, to understande the soundes, by meanes wherof in the faight thei are commaunded, to learne to know by that, as the Gallics by the whissell, what ought to be doen, either to {80} stande still, or to tourne forward, or to tourne backwarde or whiche waie to tourne the weapons, and the face: so that knowyng how to kepe well the araie, after soche sorte, that neither place nor movyng maie disorder them, understandyng well the commaundementes of their heddes, by meanes of the sounde, and knowyng quickly, how to retourne into their place, these battailes maie after easly (as I have said) beyng brought many together, learne to do that, whiche all the body together, with the other battailes in a juste armie, is bounde to dooe. And bicause soche universall practise, is also not to bee estemed a little, ones or twise a yere, when there is peace, all the main battaile maie be brought together, to give it the facion of an whole armie, some daies exercisyng theim, as though thei should faight a fielde, settyng the fronte, and the sides with their succours in their places. And bicause a capitaine ordeineth his hoste to the fielde, either for coumpte of the enemie he seeth, or for that, of whiche without seyng he doubteth, he ought to exercise his armie in the one maner, and in the other, and to instructe theim in soche sorte, that thei maie knowe how to marche, and to faight, when nede should require, the wyng to his souldiours, how thei should governe theim selves, when thei should happen to be assaulted of this, or of that side: and where he ought to instructe theim how to faight againste the enemie, whom thei should see: he must shewe them also, how the faight is begun, and where thei ought to retire: being overthrowen, who hath to succeade in their places, to what signes, to what soundes, to what voices, thei ought to obeie, and to practise them in soche wise in the battaile, and with fained assaultes, that thei may desire the verie thyng in deede. For that an armie is not made coragious, bicause in thesame be hardie menne, but by reason the orders thereof bee well appoineted: For as moche as if I be one of the first faighters, and do knowe, beyng overcome, where I maie retire, and who hath to succeade in my place, I shall alwaies faight with boldnes, seing my succour at hand. If I shall be one of the seconde faighters, the first being driven backe, {81} and overthrowen, I shall not bee afraied, for that I shall have presuposed that I maie bee, and I shall have desire to be thesame, whiche maie give the victory to my maister, and not to bee any of the other. These exercises bee moste necessarie, where an armie is made of newe, and where the old armie is, thei bee also necessarie: for that it is also seen, how the Romaines knew from their infancie, thorder of their armies, notwithstandyng, those capitaines before thei should come to thenemie, continually did exercise them in those. And Josephus in his historie saieth, that the continuall exercises of the Romaine armies, made that all thesame multitude, whiche folowe the campe for gain, was in the daie of battaile profitable: bicause thei all knewe, how to stande in the orders, and to faight kepyng the same: but in the armies of newe men, whether thou have putte theim together, to faight straight waie, or that thou make a power to faight, when neede requires, without these exercises, as well of the battailes severally by themselves, as of all the armie, is made nothing: wherefore the orders beying necessarie, it is conveniente with double industrie and laboure, to shewe them unto soche as knoweth them not, and for to teache it, many excellent capitaines have travailed, without any respecte.

FABRICIO. Many of the activities I've mentioned involve running, wrestling, jumping, and working hard in heavier armor than usual. I would also add the use of crossbows and longbows, along with the harquebus, a new instrument that is very necessary. I would have all the youth of my state participate in these activities, focusing on the same group I would have already designated for service. They should be exercised especially on idle days. I would also ensure they learn to swim, which is very useful: since there aren’t always bridges over rivers and boats aren’t always available, an army that doesn’t know how to swim loses many advantages and opportunities for success. The Romans had set young men to practice in the Campus Martius precisely for this reason, so they could refresh themselves in the Tiber after tiring exercises on land, partly by swimming. I would also have them, like in ancient times, train those who serve on horseback, which is essential because, in addition to knowing how to ride, they must also understand how to manage themselves while mounted. They used wooden horses for practice, jumping on and off while armed and unarmed, without assistance, from all sides. This meant that at a signal from their captain, horsemen could quickly dismount, and likewise, they could mount at a signal. Such exercises, whether on foot or on horseback, that were once easy to do should now not be difficult for the same commonwealth or the same prince who aims to make them practical for their young men. As experience shows in certain cities in the West that maintain similar practices, they divide all their inhabitants into different groups, each named after the kinds of weapons they use for war. Since they utilize pikes, halberds, bows, and harquebuses, they call them pike men, halberdiers, harquebusiers, and archers. Therefore, it is fitting for all inhabitants to declare which divisions they prefer to belong to. Since not everyone, due to age or other limitations, is suited for war, each division chooses its members and calls them the sworn, who are expected to practice with the weapons for which they are named during idle days. Each person has a designated place by the community for these exercises, and those of the same division who are not sworn are contributors with their money to the necessary expenses for such training: hence, what they do, we can do too. But our limited wisdom prevents us from taking effective action. From these exercises, it is clear that the ancients had good soldiers and that now those in the West are better than ours because the ancients trained them, either at home (as these commonwealths do) or in armies, as those emperors did for the mentioned reasons. However, we do not practice them at home, and we can't do so in camp since they are not our subjects, and we are unable to compel them to exercises other than those they themselves wish to do. This situation has led to the initial neglect of armies and later of the divisions, resulting in kingdoms and commonwealths, especially in Italy, living in such weakness. But let’s return to our structure, and following this discussion about exercises, I say it is not enough to have good armies: while toughening the men, making them strong, swift, and well-trained is necessary, it is also crucial for them to learn how to maintain formation, obey signals, sounds, and the commands of the captain: to know how to stand firm, retreat, and advance, both in fighting and marching, to sustain their duties. Because without this knowledge, despite all serious diligence practiced, there has never been a good army; and undoubtedly, fierce and disordered men are much weaker than those who are fearful yet organized, for the order drives fear away from men while disorder diminishes fierceness. To help you better understand what follows, you should know that every nation, in organizing its forces for war, has established a principal unit, which, despite variations in name, has not significantly differed in number, maintaining a size of between six and eight thousand men. This number was called a Legion by the Romans, a Phalanx by the Greeks, and a Caterva by the French. This same unit in our time among the Swiss, who keep some resemblance to ancient warfare, is called in their language what signifies the main battle in ours. Indeed, each of them has tailored it according to their needs. Therefore, I believe it is best to base our discussion on this most recognized name, and subsequently, to structure it as best as possible according to ancient practices and current orders. Because the Romans divided their Legion, which consisted of between five and six thousand men, into ten Cohorts, I will divide our main battle into ten battalions of six thousand men on foot, giving each battalion four hundred men, of which four hundred will be heavily armed and one hundred lightly armed. Those heavily armed will be three hundred with shields and swords, referred to as shield men; and one hundred with pikes, called ordinary pikemen. The lightly armed will consist of one hundred men with harquebuses, crossbows, partisans, and small shields, historically known as ordinary Veliti. Thus, all ten battalions will consist of three thousand shield men, one thousand ordinary pikemen, and four hundred ordinary Veliti, totalling four thousand five hundred men. Given we want the main battalion to consist of six thousand men, we must add another one thousand five hundred men, of which I will designate one thousand as extraordinary Veliti, making my forces—as mentioned previously—half shield men, and half pikemen and other weapons. I would assign each battalion or group of men a Constable, four Centurions, and forty petty captains, along with a leader for the ordinary Veliti, who will have five petty captains. I would give the thousand extraordinary pikemen three Constables, ten Centurions, and one hundred petty captains; for the extraordinary Veliti, two Constables, five Centurions, and fifty petty captains. I would then appoint a general leader over the entire main battalion: I would have every Constable carry a standard and a drum. Therefore, there would be created a battalion of ten units, including three thousand shield men, one thousand ordinary pikemen, one thousand extraordinary Veliti, and five hundred ordinary Veliti, bringing the total to six thousand men, among whom there would be five hundred petty captains, fifteen Constables, fifteen Drums, and fifteen Standards, fifty-five Centurions, ten leaders of the ordinary Veliti, and a Captain over the entire main battalion with his Standard and Drum. I have repeated this order frequently so that when I later show you how to arrange the battalions and armies, you won’t get confused. I say, therefore, that the king or commonwealth that intends to organize its subjects for arms should equip them with these armors and weapons, and with these units, and establish as many main battalions as possible in their country. And once they have organized them according to the mentioned distribution, intending to train them in formation, it would suffice to train each battalion separately. Even though the number of men in each can’t, on its own, create the shape of a proper army, every individual can learn the tasks specific to him: for in armies, two formations are observed; one is what the men must do in every battalion, and the other is what the battalion should do when it is part of a larger army. Those who excel in the first can more easily grasp the second: but without understanding the first, they can never come to know the second. Then (as I’ve said) every battalion may by itself learn to maintain formation in every type of movement and location, and then learn to bring themselves together, comprehend the sounds by which they are commanded to act in battle, to recognize from that along with the Gauls, by the whistle, what actions to take—whether to stand still, advance, retreat, or turn their weapons and face in the right direction—so that by mastering this formation, knowing well the commands of their leaders through sound, and quickly returning to their positions, these battalions can then, as I’ve said, easily learn to do what the collective body, with the other battalions in a proper army, is obliged to do. And because such universal practice should not be undervalued, once or twice a year, during peacetime, the main battalion can be united to give the appearance of a complete army, practicing for some days as if they were about to engage in battle, positioning the front and the flanks with their supports in place. And because a captain prepares his forces for the field, either based on the enemy he sees or the threat he doubts without seeing, he should train his army in both ways, instructing them so they know how to march and fight when needed, guiding his soldiers on how they should behave when threatened from one side or another. When instructing them on how to fight against the enemy they see, he must also show them how the battle starts, when they should retreat, who should take their positions when they are overthrown, and to what signals, sounds, and commands they should obey, and practice with them in such a way during battle and with simulated attacks that they might genuinely desire the real thing. For an army becomes courageous not merely because it contains brave men but because its formations are well organized: because if I am one of the foremost fighters and I know where to retreat if I am defeated and who is supposed to succeed me, I will always fight boldly, seeing my support close. If I am among the second line, and the first is pushed back and defeated, I won’t be afraid since I will have considered that I might be that support; I will want to be the one who can deliver victory to my master, rather than being anyone else. These exercises are essential, whether an army is newly formed or comprises veterans; for it is evident how the Romans mastered their military order from youth, yet those commanders before engaging the enemy continuously practiced them. And Josephus in his history says that the continuous training of the Roman armies made the entire crowd following the camp for profit beneficial during a battle, as they all knew how to stand in formation and fight while maintaining that order. However, in newly formed armies, regardless of whether they are prepared to fight directly or to rally when needed, without these exercises—both of the battalions individually and the entire army—nothing is achieved: hence, since proper ordering is necessary, it is essential to double the effort and work to teach those who are unfamiliar with it.

COSIMO. My thinkes that this reasoning, hath sumwhat transported you: for asmoche, as havyng not yet declared the waies, with the whiche the battailes bee exercised, you have reasoned of the whole armie, and of the daie of battaile.

COSIMO. I think that this reasoning has somewhat overwhelmed you; because, having not yet explained the ways in which battles are conducted, you have discussed the entire army and the day of battle.

The chief importance in the exercisyng of bandes of men; Three principall for thorderyng of menne into battaile raie; The manner how to bryng a bande of men into battaile raie after a square facion; The better waie for the ordring of a band of men in battaile raie, after the first facion; How to exercise men, and to take soche order, whereby a band of men that were by whatsoever chance disordred maye straighte wai be brought into order againe; What advertisement ought to bee used in tourning about a whole bande of menne, after soche sorte, as though it were but one bodie; How to order a band of menne after soche sort that thei maie make their front againste thenemie of whiche flanke thei list; How a band of man oughte to be ordered, when in marchyng thei should bee constrained to faighton their backes.

The main focus in training groups of men: Three key principles for organizing them into battle formation; The way to arrange a group of men into battle in a square formation; The best method for arranging a group of men in battle formation, following the initial style; How to train men and establish procedures so that a group that becomes disordered can quickly be brought back into order; What guidance should be followed when turning an entire group of men around, as if they were a single body; How to organize a group of men so they can face the enemy from whichever flank they choose; How a group of men should be arranged when, while marching, they are forced to fight facing away.

FABRICIO. You saie truth, but surely thoccasion hath been the affection, whiche I beare to these orders, and the grief that I feele, seyng thei be not put in use: notwithstanding, doubt not but that I will tourne to the purpose: as I have saied, the chief importaunce that is in thexercise of the battailes, is to knowe how to kepe well the armies: and bicause I tolde you that one of these battailes, ought to bee made of fower hundred men heavie armed, I wil staie my self upon this nomber. Thei ought then to be brought into lxxx. rankes, and five to a ranke: afterward goyng {82} fast, or softly, to knit them together, and to lose them: the whiche how it is dooen, maie bee shewed better with deedes, then with wordes. Which nedeth not gretly to be taught, for that every manne, whom is practised in servise of warre, knoweth how this order procedeth, whiche is good for no other, then to use the souldiours to keepe the raie: but let us come to putte together one of these battailes, I saie, that there is given them three facions principally, the firste, and the moste profitablest is, to make al massive, and to give it the facion of two squares, the second is, to make it square with the front horned, the thirde is, to make it with a voide space in the middest: the maner to put men together in the first facion, maie be of twoo sortes, tho together in the first facion, maie be of twoo sortes, thone is to double the rankes, that is, to make the seconde ranke enter into the first, the iiii. into the third, the sixt into the fift, and so foorth, so that where there was lxxx. rankes, five to a ranke, thei maie become xl. rankes, x. to a ranke. Afterward cause theim to double ones more in thesame maner, settyng the one ranke into an other, and so there shall remain twentie rankes, twentie men to a ranke: this maketh twoo squares aboute, for as moche as albeit that there bee as many men the one waie, as in the other, notwithstandyng to wardes the hedde, thei joine together, that the one side toucheth the other: but by the other waie, thei be distant the one from the other, at least a yarde and a haulfe, after soche sorte, that the square is moche longer, from the backe to the fronte, then from the one side to thother: and bicause we have at this presente, to speake often of the partes afore, of behinde, and of the sides of these battailes, and of all the armie together, knowe you, that when I saie either hedde or fronte, I meane the parte afore, when I shall saie backe, the part behind, when I shall saie flankes, the partes on the sides. The fiftie ordinarie veliti of the battaile, muste not mingle with the other rankes, but so sone as the battaile is facioned, thei shalbe set a long by the flankes therof. The other waie to set together the battaile is this, and bicause it is better then the firste, I will set it before your ives juste, how it {83} ought to bee ordeined. I beleve that you remember of what nomber of menne, of what heddes it is made, and of what armours thei are armed, then the facion, that this battaile ought to have, is (as I have saied) of twentie rankes, twentie men to a ranke, five rankes of Pikes in the front, and fiftene rankes of Targaettes on the backe, twoo Centurions standying in the fronte, twoo behinde on the backe, who shall execute the office of those, whiche the antiquitie called Tergiductori. The Conestable with the Ansigne, and with the Drumme, shall stande in thesame space, that is betwene the five rankes of the Pikes, and the fiftene of the Targeaettes. Of the Peticapitaines, there shall stande one upon every side of the ranckes, so that every one, maie have on his side his men, those peticapitaines, whiche shalbe on the left hande, to have their men on the right hand, those Peticapitaines, whiche shall be on the right hand, to have their menne on the left hande: The fiftie Veliti, muste stande a long the flankes, and on the backe of the battaile. To mynde now, that this battaile maie be set together in this facion, the men goyng ordinarily, it is convenient to order them thus. Make the men to be brought into lxxx. rankes, five to a ranke, as a little afore we have said, leavyng the Veliti either at the hedde, or at the taile, so that thei stande out of this order: and it ought to be ordeined, that every Centurion have behinde his back twentie rankes, and to bee nexte behinde every Centurion, five rankes of Pikes, and the reste Targaettes. The Conestable shall stande with the Drum, and the Ansigne, in thesame space, whiche is betwene the Pikes, and the Targaettes of the seconde Centurion, and to occupie the places of three Targaette men. Of the Peticapitaines, twentie shall stand on the sides of the rankes, of the first Centurion, on the lefte hande, and twentie shall stande on the sides of the rankes, of the last Centurion on the right hande. And you muste understande, that the Peticapitaine, whiche hath to leade the Pikes, ought to have a Pike, and those that leade the Targaettes, ought to have like weapons. Then the rankes beyng brought into this order, and mindyng in marchyng, {84} to bryng them into battaile, for to make the hedde, the first Centurion must be caused to stande still, with the firste twentie rankes, and the seconde to proceade marchyng, and tournyng on the right hand, he must go a long the sides of the twentie rankes that stande still, till he come to bee even with the other Centurion, where he must also stande still, and the thirde Centurion to procede marchyng, likewise tournyng on the right hand, and a long the sides of the rankes that stande still, must go so farre, that he be even with the other twoo Centurions, and he also standyng still, the other Centurion must folowe with his rankes, likewise tournyng on the right hande, a longe the sides of the rankes that stande still, so farre that he come to the hed of the other, and then to stand still, and straight waie twoo Centurions onely, shall depart from the front, and go to the backe of the battaile, the whiche cometh to bee made in thesame maner, and with thesame order juste, as a little afore I have shewed you. The Veliti muste stande a long, by the flankes of thesame, accordyng as is disposed in the first waie, whiche waie is called redoublyng by right line, this is called redoublyng by flanke: the first waie is more easie, this is with better order, and commeth better to passe, and you maie better correcte it, after your owne maner, for that in redoublyng by righte line, you muste bee ruled by the nomber, bicause five maketh ten, ten twentie, twentie fourtie, so that with redoublyng by right line, you cannot make a hedde of fiftene, nor of five and twentie, nor of thirtie, nor of five and thirtie, but you must go where thesame nomber will leade you. And yet it happeneth every daie in particulare affaires, that it is convenient to make the forwarde with sixe hundred, or eight hundred men, so that to redouble by right line, should disorder you: therefore this liketh me better: that difficultie that is, ought moste with practise, and with exercise to bee made easie. Therefore I saie unto you, how it importeth more then any thyng, to have the souldiours to know how to set themselves in araie quickly, and it is necessarie to keepe theim in this battaile, to exercise theim therin, and {85} to make them to go apace, either forward or backward, to passe through difficulte places, without troublyng thorder: for asmoche as the souldiours, whiche can doe this well, be expert souldiours, and although thei have never seen enemies in the face, thei maie be called old souldiours, and contrariwise, those whiche cannot keepe these orders, though thei have been in a thousande warres, thei ought alwaies to be reputed new souldiours. This is, concernyng setting them together, when thei are marching in small rankes: but beyng set, and after beyng broken by some accident or chaunce, whiche groweth either of the situacion, or of the enemie, to make that in a sodaine, thei maie come into order againe, this is the importaunce and the difficultie, and where is nedefull moche exercise, and moche practise, and wherin the antiquitie bestowed moche studie. Therefore it is necessarie to doe twoo thynges, firste to have this battaile full of countersignes, the other, to keepe alwaies this order, that those same men maie stand alwaies in the ranke, which thei were firste placed in: as for insample, if one have begon to stande in the seconde, that he stande after alwaie in that, and not onely in that self same rancke, but in that self same place: for the observyng whereof (as I have saied) bee necessarie many countersignes. In especially it is requisite, that the Ansigne bee after soche sorte countersigned, that companyng with the other battailes, it maie be knowen from theim, accordyng as the Conestable, and the Centurions have plumes of fethers in their heddes differente, and easie to be knowen, and that whiche importeth moste, is to ordaine that the peticapitaines bee knowen. Whereunto the antiquitie had so moche care, that thei would have nothing els written in their hedde peces, but the nomber that thei were named by, callyng them firste, seconde, thirde, and fourthe xc. And yet thei were not contented with this, but made every souldiour to have written in his Targaet, the nomber of the ranke, and the nomber of the place, in whiche ranke he was appoineted. Then the menne being countersigned thus, and used to stande betwene these limites, it is an easie thyng, thei {86} beyng disordered, to sett theim all againe quickly into order: considering, that the Ansigne standyng still, the Centurions, and the Peticapitaines maie gesse their places by the iye, and beyng brought the left of the left, the right of the right, with their accustomed distance, the souldiours led by their rule, and by the differences of the cognisances, maie be quickly in their proper places, no otherwise, then as if the boordes of a tunne should bee taken a sunder, whiche beyng first marked, moste easely maie bee set together again, where thesame beyng not countersigned, were impossible to bryng into order any more. These thynges, with diligence and with exercise, are quickely taught, and quickly learned, and beyng learned, with difficultie are forgotten: for that the newe menne, be led of the olde, and with tyme, a Province with these exercises, may become throughly practised in the war. It is also necessarie to teache theim, to tourne theim selves all at ones, and when neede requires, to make of the flankes, and of the backe, the fronte, and of the front, flankes, or backe, whiche is moste easie: bicause it suffiseth that every manne doe tourne his bodie, towardes thesame parte that he is commaunded, and where thei tourne their faces, there the fronte commeth to bee. True it is, that when thei tourne to any of the flanckes, the orders tourne out of their proporcion: for that from the breast to the backe, there is little difference, and from the one flancke to the other, there is verie moche distance, the whiche is al contrarie to the ordinarie order of the battaile: therefore it is convenient, that practise, and discrecion, doe place them as thei ought to be: but this is small disorder, for that moste easely by themselves, thei maie remedie it. But that whiche importeth more, and where is requisite more practise, is when a battaile would tourne all at ones, as though it were a whole bodie, here is meete to have greate practise, and greate discrecion: bicause mindyng to tourne, as for insample on the left hande, the left corner must stande still, and those that be next to hym that standeth still, muste marche so softly, that thei that bee in the right corner, nede not to runne: otherwise {87} all thing should be confounded. But bicause it happeneth alwaies, when an armie marcheth from place to place, that the battailes, whiche are not placed in the front, shall be driven to faight not by hedde, but either by flancke, or by backe, so that a battaile muste in a sodaine make of flancke, or of backe, hedde: and mindyng that like battailes in soche cace, maie have their proporcion, as above is declared, it is necessarie, that thei have the Pikes on thesame flancke, that ought to be hedde, and the Peticapitaines, Centurions, and Conestables, to resorte accordyngly to their places. Therefore to mynde to dooe this, in plasyng them together, you must ordeine the fower skore rankes, of five in a ranke, thus: Set all the Pikes in the first twentie rankes, and place the Peticapitaines thereof, five in the first places, and five in the last: the other three score rankes, whiche come after, bee all of Targaettes, whiche come to bee three Centuries. Therefore, the first and the laste ranke of every Centurion, would be Peticapitaines, the Conestable with the Ansigne, and with the Drumme, muste stande in the middest of the first Centurie of Targaettes, and the Centurions in the hed of every Centurie. The bande thus ordained, when you would have the Pikes to come on the left flancke, you must redouble Centurie by Centurie, on the right flancke: if you would have them to come on the right flancke, you must redouble theim on the lefte. And so this battaile tourneth with the Pikes upon a flancke, and the Conestable in the middeste: the whiche facion it hath marchyng: but the enemie commyng, and the tyme that it would make of flancke hedde, it nedeth not but to make every man to tourne his face, towardes thesame flancke, where the Pikes be, and then the battaile tourneth with the rankes, and with the heddes in thesame maner, as is aforesaied: for that every man is in his place, excepte the Centurions, and the Centurions straight waie, and without difficultie, place themselves: But when thei in marchyng, should bee driven to faight on the backe, it is convenient to ordein the rankes after soch sorte, that settyng theim in battaile, the Pikes maie come behinde, and to doe this, there is to bee kepte {88} no other order, then where in orderyng the battaile, by the ordinarie, every Centurie hath five rankes of Pikes before, to cause that thei maie have them behind, and in all the other partes to observe thorder, whiche I declared firste.

FABRICIO. You're right, but the reason for my feelings is the passion I have for these formations and the frustration I feel seeing they aren’t put to use. Nevertheless, don't doubt that I'll get to the point: as I've said, the key to battle exercises is knowing how to properly maintain the armies. Since I mentioned that one of these battles should consist of four hundred heavily armed men, I’ll stick to that number. They should be arranged in eighty ranks, with five in each rank. After that, whether they move quickly or slowly, they should be kept together or allowed to spread out, which can be better shown through actions than words. This doesn’t require much teaching, as every soldier trained in warfare knows how this formation works, which is mainly useful for getting the soldiers to maintain their ranks. But let’s proceed to discuss how to put one of these battles together. I say they can be organized in three main ways: the first, and most effective, is to create a solid block shaped like two squares; the second is to make it square with a pointed front; the third is to create an open space in the middle. The way to arrange men in the first formation can happen in two ways. One method is to double the ranks, meaning the second rank enters the first, the fourth enters the third, the sixth enters the fifth, and so forth, so that where there were eighty ranks of five in each, they may become forty ranks of ten in each. Afterward, they should double once more in the same manner, fitting one rank into another, resulting in twenty ranks of twenty men each. This creates two squares all around because although there are as many men one way as the other, they connect at the front, touching each side. However, they remain about a yard and a half apart otherwise, which makes the square much longer from back to front than from side to side. Since we often reference the front, back, and sides of these battles and the whole army, let it be known that when I say head or front, I mean the front part; when I say back, I refer to the rear; and when I mention flanks, I’m talking about the sides. The fifty ordinary velites in the battle must not mix with the other ranks, but as soon as the battle is formed, they should line up along the flanks. The other way to set up the battle is this, and since it’s better than the first, I’ll lay it out for you as it should be arranged. I believe you remember the number of men, the way they’re organized, and what armor they're equipped with, so this formation should consist of twenty ranks, with twenty men in each: five ranks of pikes in the front and fifteen ranks of targe in the back, with two centurions at the front and two behind them, executing the duties of those whom antiquity called Tergiductores. The constable with the standard and drum should stand in the space between the five ranks of pikes and the fifteen ranks of targe. One peticapitaine should stand on each side of the ranks so that everyone has their men on their respective sides. The peticapitaines on the left side should have their men to the right, and those on the right should have their men on the left. The fifty velites must stand along the flanks and behind the battle. Now, to organize this battle in this way, the men should be lined up in eighty ranks, five to a rank, as said before, leaving the velites either at the front or at the back, so they are outside this order. It should be arranged that each centurion has twenty ranks behind them, with five ranks of pikes right behind each centurion, followed by the rest of the targe. The constable should stand with the drum and standard in the space between the pikes and the targe of the second centurion, taking up the places of three targe men. Twenty peticapitaines should stand beside the ranks of the first centurion on the left side, and another twenty beside the ranks of the last centurion on the right. You must understand that the peticapitaine leading the pikes should have a pike, and those leading the targe should have similar weapons. Then, with the ranks arranged this way, when marching to bring them into battle and form the head, you need to have the first centurion stop with the first twenty ranks while the second marches forward turning right, going along the sides of the twenty ranks that are still, until he aligns with the other centurion, where he also must stop. The third centurion will then proceed to march, turning right and keeping along the sides of the still ranks until he aligns with the other two centurions and then must also stop. The other centurion must follow with his ranks, once again turning right along the sides of the still ranks until he reaches the front of the others and then stops. Immediately, just two centurions will leave the front and head to the back of the created formation, which will follow the same process and order, just as I showed you before. The velites should remain along the sides of the formation as laid out in the first way, which is called doubling in a straight line, while this other method is referred to as doubling by flank: the first is easier, but the second is better arranged and simpler to manage according to your methods. Because in doubling in a straight line, you must follow the numbers, since five makes ten, ten makes twenty, twenty makes forty, so you can't create a head of fifteen, twenty-five, thirty, or thirty-five with straight doubling—you have to go where the same number leads you. Yet, it frequently occurs in practical situations that it’s necessary to move forward with six hundred or eight hundred men, so doubling in a straight line would lead to disorder. Thus, I prefer this method: the difficulties should be made easier through practice and exercise. Therefore, I say to you, it's more important than anything to have soldiers know how to quickly arrange themselves, and it’s necessary to keep them in this battle, to train them for it, and to ensure they can move quickly, whether forward or backward, to navigate difficult situations without disrupting the formation. Because soldiers who can do this well are experienced soldiers, and even if they’ve never faced the enemy directly, they can be called seasoned. Conversely, those who can't maintain these formations, no matter how many wars they’ve fought, should always be regarded as inexperienced. This pertains to arranging them when they're marching in small ranks; but once established and later disrupted by accident or chance due to circumstances or enemy actions, they should be able to quickly return to order. This is of great importance and difficulty, and it requires a lot of practice, which is where ancient traditions placed much emphasis. Therefore, it is essential to do two things: first, ensure this battle is full of signals, and second, ensure that the same soldiers always remain in the ranks they were initially placed in. For example, if someone starts in the second rank, they must always remain there, not just in that same rank but in the exact same place. Observing this requires many signals as I’ve mentioned. Especially, it’s crucial to have the standard organized so that when combined with the other battles, it can be identified by the same standards, similar to how the constables and centurions have different, easily recognizable plumes in their helmets. Most importantly, it’s necessary to ensure the peticapitaines are identifiable. Antiquity took such great care that they would have nothing else written on their headpieces but the number they were called by, designating them as first, second, third, and fourth, etc. They were not satisfied with this; they also made every soldier write on their targe the rank number and the position in that rank where they were assigned. Thus, soldiers being clearly signed and accustomed to standing between these limits can easily be reformed into order after being disrupted, considering that with the standard standing still, the centurions and peticapitaines can identify their positions at a glance. The soldiers arranged left to left and right to right, with their usual distances, can quickly find their places as if pulling the staves of a barrel apart; with them marked beforehand, they can be easily put back together. However, if the same weren’t signed, it would be impossible to restore order. These things are quickly taught and learned, and once learned, they’re hard to forget because the inexperienced are guided by the experienced, and over time, a province, through these exercises, can become thoroughly trained for war. It’s also necessary to teach them how to turn all at once and, when needed, to turn the flanks and back into the front, and the front into flanks or back, which is most straightforward. It suffices that each person turns their body towards the direction they are commanded, and where they turn their faces, there the front will be. It is true, however, that when they turn to any flanks, the formations tend to go out of proportion, as from the chest to the back there’s little difference, yet from one flank to the other there's significant distance, which is against the usual formation of the battle. Therefore, practice and discretion should guide their arrangement as needed. But this is a minor disorder, as they can easily remedy it. What is more critical, and requires more practice, is when a battle must turn all at once, as if it were one body. Here, it’s crucial to have great practice and great discretion because, for instance, if intending to turn to the left, the left corner must remain still, and those next to the stationary soldier must march softly enough that the ones on the right corner don’t have to run; otherwise, everything may come apart. But since it always happens that when an army marches from one place to another, the battles not positioned at the front will either be forced to fight not at the front but from the flank or back, a battle must suddenly transition from flank or back to front. Keeping in mind that these battles in such cases might maintain their formation as previously stated, it's essential to have the pikes on the same flank that should be the front, and the peticapitaines, centurions, and constables need to move accordingly to their places. So, to ensure this in arranging them, you must organize the eighty ranks of five in a rank like this: place all the pikes in the first twenty ranks and position the peticapitaines, five in the first positions and five in the last. The remaining three score ranks that follow will consist entirely of targe, forming three centuries. Therefore, the first and last rank of every centurion would be peticapitaines, while the constable with the standard and drum should stand in the midst of the first century of targe, and the centurions at the head of each century. With the formation thus arranged, when you want the pikes to come to the left flank, you must double them century by century on the right flank; if you want them to come to the right flank, you must double them on the left. Thus, the battle turns with the pikes on a flank, with the constable in the middle. When the enemy arrives and it's time to create a frontal attack from the flank, all you need to do is have everyone turn their faces towards the flank with the pikes, and then the battle will turn with the ranks and heads in the same manner as mentioned before: since everyone is in their place except the centurions, the centurions will quickly and easily position themselves. But when they find themselves in a march and are forced to fight from the rear, it is important to arrange the ranks in such a way that when establishing the battle, the pikes may be in the back, and to achieve this, it is essential to maintain no other order than that whereby when forming the battle traditionally, each century has five ranks of pikes in front, enabling them to be behind while observing the other arrangements as I initially outlined.

COSIMO. You have tolde (if I dooe well remember me) that this maner of exercise, is to bee able to bryng these battailes together into an armie, and that this practise, serveth to be able to order theim selves in the same: But if it should happen, that these CCCCL. men, should have to doe an acte seperate, how would you order them?

COSIMO. You told me (if I remember correctly) that this kind of exercise is meant to prepare us to bring these battles together into an army, and that this practice helps us organize ourselves in that way. But if it turns out that these 400 men need to act separately, how would you arrange them?

How a battaile is made with twoo hornes; The orderyng of a battaile with a voide space in the middeste.

How a battle is formed with two horns; The arrangement of a battle with an empty space in the middle.

FABRICIO. He that leadeth them, ought then to judge, where he will place the Pikes, and there to put them, the whiche doeth not repugne in any part to the order above written: for that also, though thesame bee the maner, that is observed to faighte a fielde, together with thother battailes, notwithstandyng it is a rule, whiche serveth to all those waies, wherein a band of menne should happen to have to doe: but in shewyng you the other twoo waies of me propounded, of ordering the battailes, I shal also satisfie you more to your question: for that either thei are never used, or thei are used when a battaile is a lone, and not in companie of other, and to come to the waie of ordering them, with twoo hornes, I saie, that thou oughteste to order the lxxx. rankes, five to a ranke, in this maner. Place in the middest, one Centurion, and after hym xxv. rankes, whiche muste bee with twoo Pikes on the lefte hande, and with three Targaettes on the right, and after the first five, there must be put in the twentie folowyng, twentie Peticapitaines, all betwene the pikes, and the Targaettes, excepte those whiche beare the Pike, whom maie stand with the Pikes: after these xxv. rankes thus ordered, there is to be placed an other Centurion, and behinde hym fiftene rankes of Targaettes: after these, the Conestable betwene the Drum and the Ansigne, who also must have after him, other fiftene rankes of Targaettes: after this, the thirde Centurion must be placed, and behinde hym, xxv. rankes, {89} in every one of whiche, ought to bee three Targaettes on the lefte flancke, and twoo Pikes on the right, and after the five first rankes, there must be xx. Peticapitaines placed betwene the Pikes, and the Targaettes: after these rankes, the fowerth Centurion must folowe. Intendying therefore, of these rankes thus ordered, to make a battaile with twoo hornes, the first Centurion must stand still, with the xxv. rankes, whiche be behinde him, after the second Centurion muste move, with the fiftene rankes of Targaettes, that bee behinde hym, and to tourne on the right hande, and up by the right flancke of the xxv. rankes, to go so farre, that he arrive to the xv. ranke, and there to stande still: after, the Conestable muste move, with the fiftene rankes of Targaettes, whiche be behinde hym, and tournyng likewise on the right hande, up by the right flancke of the fiftene rankes, that wer firste moved, muste marche so farre, that he come to their heddes, and there to stand stil: after, the thirde Centurion muste move with the xxv. rankes, and with the fowerth Centurion, whiche was behinde, and turnyng up straight, must go a long by the right flanck of the fiftene last rankes of the Targaettes, and not to stande still when he is at the heddes of them, but to followe marchyng so farre, that the laste ranke of the xxv. maie come to be even with the rankes behinde. And this dooen, the Centurion, whiche was hedde of the firste fiftene rankes of Targaettes, must go awaie from thens where he stoode, and go to the backe in the lefte corner: and thus a battaile shall be made of xxv. rankes, after twentie men to a rank, with two hornes, upon every side of the front, one horn, and every one, shall have ten rankes, five to a ranke, and there shall remain a space betwene the twoo hornes, as moche as containeth ten men, whiche tourne their sides, the one to thother. Betwene the two hornes, the capitain shall stande, and on every poinct of a horne, a Centurion: There shall bee also behinde, on every corner, a Centurion: there shal be twoo rankes of Pikes, and xx. Peticapitaines on every flancke. These twoo hornes, serve to kepe betwene theim the artillerie, when this battaile should have any {90} withit, and the cariages: The Veliti muste stande a long the flankes, under the Pikes. But mindyng to bring this horned battaile, with a voide space in the middeste, there ought no other to bee doen, then of fiftene rankes, of twentie to a ranke, to take eight rankes, and to place them on the poinctes of the twoo hornes, whiche then of hornes, become backe of the voide space, in this place, the cariages are kept, the capitain standeth, and the Ansigne, but never the Artillerie, the whiche is placed either in the front, or a long the flankes. These be the waies, that a battaile maie use when it is constrained to passe alone through suspected places: notwithstandyng, the massive battaile without hornes, and without any soche voide place is better, yet purposyng to assure the disarmed, the same horned battaile is necessarie. The Suizzers make also many facions of battailes, emong which, thei make one like unto a crosse: bicause in the spaces that is betwen the armes therof, thei kepe safe their Harkebuters from the daunger of the enemies: but bicause soche battailes be good to faight by theim selves, and my intente is to shew, how many battailes united, do faight with thenemie, I wil not labour further in describing them.

FABRICIO. The person leading them should judge where to place the pikes, ensuring they don’t conflict with the previously outlined order. This method, while typically used to fight a battle, also serves as a general rule for any group of men who may find themselves in a similar situation. However, while I’ll explain the other two methods of organizing battalions, I want to clarify that they are rarely used, or they are employed only when a battalion is on its own, not alongside others. When organizing them into two wings, I propose that you arrange the 80 ranks, five men in each rank, in this way: place one centurion in the middle, followed by 25 ranks, with two pikes on the left and three shields on the right. After the first five ranks, add 20 leaders (peticapitaines) among the pikes and shields, except for those carrying pikes, who can stand among the pikes. After these 25 ranks are organized, place another centurion, and behind him arrange 15 ranks of shields. Next, the constable should be positioned between the drum and the standard, followed by another 15 ranks of shields behind him. After this, the third centurion should be placed, and behind him, 25 ranks, where each should have three shields on the left flank and two pikes on the right. After the first five ranks, place 20 leaders in between the pikes and the shields. Following these ranks, the fourth centurion will follow. Thus, if you intend to create a battalion with two wings, the first centurion should remain still with the 25 ranks behind him. The second centurion must then move with the 15 ranks of shields behind him, turning to the right and moving along the right flank of the 25 ranks until reaching the 15th rank, where he should stop. After this, the constable must move with the 15 ranks of shields behind him, also turning right and marching along the right flank of the previously moved ranks, until he reaches their heads, where he should halt. Following this, the third centurion must move with the 25 ranks, and along with the fourth centurion who was behind, he should turn straight and move along the right flank of the last 15 ranks of shields, continuing to march until the last rank of the 25 is in line with the ranks behind. Once this is done, the centurion in charge of the first 15 ranks of shields must leave his position and move to the back left corner. In this way, a battalion of 25 ranks, with 20 men per rank and two wings, will be formed. Each wing will consist of 10 ranks, five men in a rank, creating a gap between the two wings that accommodates 10 men, who will face each other. The captain will stand between the two wings, and at each tip of a wing, there will be a centurion. Additionally, there will be a centurion at every corner in the back. There will be two ranks of pikes and 20 leaders on each flank. These two wings are meant to protect the artillery when this battalion encounters any situation, along with the supplies. The light infantry (veliti) should be positioned along the flanks, under the pikes. To create this winged battalion with an empty space in the middle, no other steps need to be taken than to take 15 ranks, with 20 men in each rank, select 8 ranks, and place them at the tips of the two wings. These wings will then serve as the back of the empty space, where the supplies will be stored and where the captain and the standard will be positioned. However, no artillery will be placed here, as it will be arranged either at the front or along the flanks. These are the methods that a battalion can employ when it must pass alone through risky areas. Nevertheless, while a massive battalion without wings and without such an empty space is generally better, having this winged battalion is necessary for ensuring the protection of the vulnerable. The Swiss also create various formations, one of which resembles a cross; this is because they keep their harquebusiers safe from enemy danger in the spaces between its arms. However, since such formations are effective for fighting independently, and my goal is to show how combined battalions engage the enemy, I will not elaborate further on them.

COSIMO. My thinkes I have verie well comprehended the waie, that ought to be kept to exercise the men in these battailes: But (if I remember me well) you have saied, how that besides the tenne battailes, you joyne to the maine battaile, a thousande extraordinarie Pikes, and five hundred extraordinarie Veliti: will you not appoincte these to be exercised?

COSIMO. I think I understand very well the way we should train the men for these battles. But if I remember correctly, you mentioned that in addition to the ten battles, you include a thousand extra pikes and five hundred extra skirmishers in the main battle. Aren't you going to arrange for their training?

To what purpose the Pikes and Velite extraordinarie must serve.

To what purpose the Pikes and extraordinary Velites must serve.

FABRICIO. I would have theim to bee exercised, and that with moste great diligence: and the Pikes I would exercise, at leaste Ansigne after Ansigne, in the orders of the battailes, as the other: For as moche as these should doe me more servise, then the ordinarie battailes, in all particulare affaires: as to make guides, to get booties, and to doe like thynges: but the Veliti, I would exercise at home, without bringing them together, for that their office being to faight a sonder, it is not mete, that thei should companie with {91} other, in the common exercises: for that it shall suffice, to exercise them well in the particular exercises. Thei ought then (as I firste tolde you, nor now me thynkes no labour to rehearse it againe) to cause their men to exercise them selves in these battailes, whereby thei maie knowe how to kepe the raie, to knowe their places, to tourne quickly, when either enemie, or situacion troubleth them: for that, when thei knowe how to do this, the place is after easely learned, which a battaile hath to kepe, and what is the office thereof in the armie: and when a Prince, or a common weale, will take the paine, and will use their diligence in these orders, and in these exercisyng, it shall alwaies happen, that in their countrie, there shall bee good souldiours, and thei to be superiours to their neighbours, and shalbe those, whiche shall give, and not receive the lawes of other men: but (as I have saied) the disorder wherein thei live, maketh that thei neclecte, and doe not esteme these thynges, and therefore our armies be not good: and yet though there were either hed, or member naturally vertuous, thei cannot shewe it.

FABRICIO. I want them to be trained with great diligence. I would train the Pikemen, at least one squad after another, in the formation of battles, just like the others. Since they will serve me better than the regular infantry in various situations—like leading, seizing loot, and similar tasks. However, I would train the Velites at home, without gathering them together, because their role is to fight separately, and it’s not right for them to train alongside others in the common drills. It's enough to train them well in specific exercises. They should then, as I mentioned before (and I don't mind repeating it), have their men practice these formations so they can learn to maintain order, know their positions, and turn quickly when either an enemy or the situation complicates things. Once they understand how to do this, learning the position that a battle must hold and its role in the army will come easily. When a prince or a republic takes the effort and uses their diligence in these formations and drills, good soldiers will always emerge in their country, making them superior to their neighbors. They will be the ones who set the laws, rather than follow the whims of others. But (as I have said) the disarray in which they live causes them to neglect and undervalue these things, which is why our armies are not effective. Even if there were a head or a member that is naturally virtuous, they wouldn't be able to demonstrate it.

COSIMO. What carriages would you, that every one of these battailes should have?

COSIMO. What carriages do you want for each of these battles?

Neither Centurion nor Peticapitaine, ought not to ride; What carriages the Capitaines ought to have, and the nomber of carrages requisite to every bande of menne.

Neither the Centurion nor the Peticapitaine should ride; the types of carriages the Capitaines should have, and the number of carriages needed for each band of men.

FABRICIO. Firste, I would that neither Centurion, nor Peticapitain, should be suffered to ride: and if the Conestable would nedes ride, I would that he should have a Mule, and not a horse: I would allowe hym twoo carriages, and one to every Centurion, and twoo to every three Peticapitaines, for that so many wee lodge in a lodgyng, as in the place therof we shall tell you: So that every battaile will come to have xxxvi. carriages, the whiche I would should carrie of necessitie the tentes, the vesselles to seeth meate, axes, barres of Iron, sufficient to make the lodgynges, and then if thei can carry any other thyng, thei maie dooe it at their pleasure.

FABRICIO. First, I don’t want either Centurions or Petty Captains to be allowed to ride. If the Constable insists on riding, I think he should have a mule instead of a horse. I would allocate him two carriages, and one for each Centurion, with two for every three Petty Captains, because that's how many we can accommodate in a lodging, which we’ll explain later. This way, every battle will have 36 carriages, which I believe should carry the tents, cooking utensils, axes, iron bars necessary for setting up the lodgings, and if they can carry anything else, they can do so at their discretion.

COSIMO. I beleve that the heddes of you, ordeined in every one of these battailes, be necessarie: albeit, I would doubt, lest that so many commaunders, should confounde all.

COSIMO. I believe that the leaders you've assigned for each of these battles are necessary; however, I worry that having so many commanders might create confusion.

Without many capitaines, an armie cannot be governed; To what purpose Ansignes ought to serve; For what purpose Drummes oughte to bee used; The propertie that soundes of instrumentes have in mens myndes.

Without many leaders, an army can't be managed; The purpose of banners; For what purpose drums should be used; The effect that sounds of instruments have on people's minds.

FABRICIO. That should bee, when it were not referred to {92} one man, but referryng it, thei cause order, ye and without theim, it is impossible to governe an armie: for that a wall, whiche on every parte enclineth, requireth rather to have many proppes, and thicke, although not so strong, then fewe, though thei were strong: bicause the vertue of one a lone, doeth not remedie the ruine a farre of. And therefore in tharmies, and emong every ten men, it is convenient that there bee one, of more life, of more harte, or at leaste wise of more aucthoritie, who with stomacke, with wordes, and with example, maie kepe them constante, and disposed to faight, and these thynges of me declared, bee necessarie in an armie, as the Heddes, the Ansignes, and the Drummes, is seen that wee have theim all in our armies, but none doeth his office. First to mynde that the Peticapitaines doe thesame, for whiche thei are ordeined, it is necessarie (as I have said) that there bee a difference, betwene every one of them and their men, and that thei lodge together, doyng their duties, standyng in thorder with them: for that thei placed in their places, bee a rule and a temperaunce, to maintaine the raies straight and steddie, and it is impossible that thei disorder, or disorderyng, dooe not reduce themselves quickly into their places. But we now adaies, doe not use them to other purpose, then to give theim more wages, then to other menne, and to cause that thei dooe some particulare feate: The very same happeneth of the Ansigne bearers, for that thei are kept rather to make a faire muster, then for any other warlike use: but the antiquitie used theim for guides, and to bryng theim selves againe into order: for that every man, so sone as the Ansigne stoode still, knewe the place, that he kept nere to his Ansigne, wherunto he retourned alwaies: thei knewe also, how that the same movyng, or standyng, thei should staie, or move: therfore it is necessarie in an armie, that there be many bodies, and every bande of menne to have his Ansigne, and his guide: wherfore havyng this, it is mete that thei have stomackes inough, and by consequence life enough. Then the menne ought to marche, accordyng to the Ansigne: and the Ansigne to move, accordyng to the {93} Drumme, the whiche Drumme well ordered, commaundeth to the armie, the whiche goyng with paces, that answereth the tyme of thesame, will come to kepe easilie thorders: for whiche cause the antiquitie had Shalmes, Flutes, and soundes perfectly tymed: For as moche as like as he that daunseth, proceadeth with the tyme of the Musick, and goyng with thesame doeth not erre, even so an armie obeiyng, in movyng it self to thesame sounde, doeth not disorder: and therefore, thei varied the sounde, accordyng as thei would varie the mocion, and accordyng as thei would inflame, or quiete, or staie the mindes of men: and like as the soundes were divers, so diversly thei named them: the sounde Dorico, ingendered constancie, the sounde Frigio, furie: whereby thei saie, that Alexander beyng at the Table, and one soundyng the sounde Frigio, it kendled so moche his minde, that he laied hande on his weapons. All these maners should be necessarie to finde again: and when this should bee difficulte, at least there would not be left behind those that teache the Souldiour to obeie, the whiche every man maie varie, and ordeine after his owne facion, so that with practise, he accustome the eares of his souldiours to knowe it: But now adaies of this sounde, there is no other fruicte taken for the moste part, then to make a rumour.

FABRICIO. It should be, if it were not focused on one person, but referring to it as a group, they create order, and without them, it is impossible to manage an army. A wall, which leans on every side, needs many supports, thick ones, even if they're not incredibly strong, rather than just a few, no matter how strong they might be. The strength of one alone does not fix the collapse from afar. Therefore, in armies, and among every ten men, it's important that there is one person who is more lively, more courageous, or at least holds more authority, who with determination, words, and example can keep them motivated and ready to fight. These things I mentioned are essential in an army, just like the Heads, the Standards, and the Drums; we see we have them all in our armies, but none are fulfilling their roles. First, to remember that the captains do the same for which they are appointed, it’s necessary (as I have said) to have a distinction between each of them and their men, and for them to stay together, doing their duties, standing in order with them. Those placed in their roles bring organization and stability to maintain the ranks straight and steady, and it is impossible for them to get out of order, or disordering, without quickly returning to their places. But nowadays, we don’t use them for anything other than giving them higher wages than other men, and to get them to perform some specific feat. The same goes for the Standard bearers; they are kept mainly to make a nice display, rather than for any actual military purpose. In ancient times, they were used as guides to bring themselves back into order, because as soon as the Standard stood still, everyone knew the position they kept near their Standard, which they would always return to. They also knew whether, moving or standing, they should pause or advance. Therefore, it is necessary in an army to have many units, and each group of men should have its own Standard and guide. Having this, it is important for them to have enough determination and consequently enough spirit. Then the men should march according to the Standard, and the Standard should move according to the {93} Drum, which when well ordered, commands the army. If the army marches in time with it, it will easily maintain its order. This is why the ancients had Horns, Flutes, and perfectly timed sounds; just as a dancer proceeds with the rhythm of the music and doesn’t err while moving to it, an army obeying, in moving itself to the same sound, does not get out of order. Therefore, they varied the sounds depending on how they wanted to change the motion, and according to how they aimed to motivate or calm the minds of men. Just as the sounds were diverse, so they named them differently: the Dorian sound inspired constancy, the Phrygian sound incited fury; to the point that they say, when Alexander was at the table, and someone played the Phrygian sound, it stirred his mind so much that he grabbed his weapons. All these methods should be rediscovered; when this becomes difficult, at the very least there should remain those who teach the Soldier to obey, which everyone can vary and arrange in their own way, so that with practice, he can train the ears of his soldiers to recognize it. But nowadays, from this sound, there is little gained, primarily just creating noise.

COSIMO. I would desire to understande of you, if ever with your self you have discourced, whereof groweth so moche vilenesse, and so moche disorder, and so moche necligence in these daies of this exercise?

COSIMO. I would like to understand from you if you have ever discussed with yourself what causes so much wickedness, so much disorder, and so much neglect in these days of this practice?

A notable discourse of the aucthour, declaryng whereof groweth so moche vilenes disorder and necligence in these daies, concernyng the exercises of warre.

A significant discussion by the author, explaining the source of so much vile disorder and negligence in these days, regarding the practice of warfare.

FABRICIO. With a good will I will tell you thesame, that I thinke. You knowe how that of the excellente men of warre, there hath been named many in Europe, fewe in Affric, and lesse in Asia: this grewe, for that these twoo laste partes of the worlde, have had not paste one kyngdome, or twoo, and fewe common weales, but Europe onely, hath had many kyngdomes, and infinite common weales, where menne became excellent, and did shewe their vertue, accordyng as thei were sette a woorke, and brought before their Prince, or common weale, or king that he be: it {94} followeth therefore, that where be many dominions, there rise many valiaunt menne, and where be fewe, fewe. In Asia is founde Ninus, Cirus, Artasercses, Mithridates: and verie fewe other, that to these maie be compared. In Africk, is named (lettyng stande thesame auncient Egipt) Massinissa, Jugurta, and those Capitaines, whiche of the Carthaginens common weale were nourished, whom also in respecte to those of Europe, are moste fewe: bicause in Europe, be excellente men without nomber, and so many more should be, if together with those should bee named the other, that be through the malignitie of time extincte: for that the worlde hath been moste vertuous, where hath been moste states, whiche have favoured vertue of necessitie, or for other humaine passion. There rose therfore in Asia, fewe excellente menne: bicause thesame Province, was all under one kyngdome, in the whiche for the greatnesse thereof, thesame standing for the moste parte of tyme idell, there could not growe men in doynges excellent. To Africke there happened the verie same, yet there were nourished more then in Asia, by reason of the Carthaginens common weale: for that in common weales, there growe more excellent men, then in kingdomes, bicause in common weales for the most part, vertue is honoured, in Kyngdomes it is helde backe: wherby groweth, that in thone, vertuous men are nourished, in the other thei are extincte. Therefore he that shall consider the partes of Europe, shall finde it to have been full of common weales, and of princedomes, the whiche for feare, that the one had of the other, thei wer constrained to kepe lively the warlike orders, and to honor them, whiche in those moste prevailed: for that in Grece, besides the kyngdome of the Macedonians, there were many common weales, and in every one of theim, were bred moste excellente men. In Italie, were the Romaines, the Sannites, the Toscanes, the Gallie Cisalpini. Fraunce, and Almainie, wer ful of common weales and princedomes. Spaine likewise: and although in comparison of the Romaines, there are named fewe other, it groweth through the malignitie of the writers, whom folowe fortune, {95} and to theim for the moste parte it suffised, to honour the conquerours: but it standeth not with reason, that betwene the Sannites, and the Toscanes, whom fought CL. yeres with the Romaine people, before thei wer overcome, there should not growe exceadyng many excellente menne. And so likewise in Fraunce, and in Spaine: but that vertue, whiche the writers did not celebrate in particuler menne, thei celebrated generally in the people, where thei exalte to the starres, the obstinatenesse that was in them, to defende their libertie. Beyng then true, that where bee moste dominions, there riseth moste valiaunt menne, it foloweth of necessitie, that extinguishyng those, vertue is extincte straighte waie, the occasion decaiyng, whiche maketh menne vertuous. Therefore, the Romaine Empire beyng after increased, and havyng extinguished all the common weales, and Princedomes of Europe, and of Afrike, and for the moste part those of Asia, it lefte not any waie to vertue, excepte Rome: whereby grewe, that vertuous menne began to be as fewe in Europe, as in Asia: the whiche vertue, came after to the laste caste: For as moche, as all the vertue beyng reduced to Roome, so sone as thesame was corrupted, almoste all the worlde came to bee corrupted: and the Scithian people, were able to come to spoile thesame Empire, the whiche had extinguished the vertue of other, and knewe not howe to maintaine their owne: and after, although through the inundacion of those barberous nacions, thesame Empire was devided into many partes, this vertue is not renued:

FABRICIO. I’ll gladly share my thoughts with you. You know that many excellent warriors have been named in Europe, fewer in Africa, and even less in Asia: this is because the latter two regions have had only one or two kingdoms, and few republics, while Europe has had numerous kingdoms and countless republics where people have excelled and shown their virtue, as they were engaged and brought before their prince or republic or king. It follows, then, that where there are many dominions, many valiant individuals arise, and where there are few, there are few. In Asia, we have Ninus, Cyrus, Artaxerxes, Mithridates, and very few others who can be compared to them. In Africa, aside from ancient Egypt, there’s Massinissa, Jugurtha, and those captains nurtured by the Carthaginian republic, who are also relatively few compared to those in Europe, where there are countless excellent men, and many more would exist if we also counted those who, due to the malignity of time, have become extinct. The world has been most virtuous where there have been the most states that supported virtue, either out of necessity or other human passions. Thus, in Asia, few excellent men arose because that province was mostly under one kingdom, which, due to its vastness, remained idle for most of the time, so few exceptional individuals could emerge. Africa faced the same issue, though it produced more than Asia because of the Carthaginian republic: in republics, more excellent men emerge than in kingdoms, as, in republics, virtue is generally honored, whereas in kingdoms, it is stifled. Therefore, in one, virtuous individuals thrive, while in the other, they perish. Consequently, anyone who considers the regions of Europe will find it filled with republics and principalities, which, due to the fear one had of the other, were compelled to uphold military orders and honor those who prevailed in them. In Greece, besides the kingdom of the Macedonians, there were many republics, and in each of them, many excellent men were bred. In Italy, we had the Romans, the Samnites, the Tuscans, the Cisalpine Gauls. France and Germany were full of republics and principalities. Spain was the same; and although, when compared to the Romans, a few others are mentioned, this arises from the bias of the writers, who tend to follow fortune, mostly honoring the conquerors. However, it doesn’t make sense that between the Samnites and the Tuscans, who fought for 150 years against the Roman people before they were defeated, there would not emerge many excellent men. The same applies to France and Spain: the virtue that writers didn't celebrate in individual men, they celebrated in the people as a whole, where they exalted the steadfastness of their struggle to defend their freedom. Since it’s true that where there are most dominions, the most valiant individuals arise, it necessarily follows that the extinction of those limits leads to an immediate extinction of virtue since the conditions that make men virtuous are decaying. Therefore, after the Roman Empire expanded and extinguished all the republics and principalities in Europe and Africa, and most in Asia, it left no room for virtue except for Rome itself. This resulted in a situation where virtuous men became as few in Europe as in Asia. This virtue eventually came to a final decline: as all virtue was reduced to Rome, as soon as it became corrupt, almost the entire world became corrupted: the Scythian people were able to invade this Empire, which had extinguished the virtue of others and didn’t know how to maintain its own. Following this, although the inundation of those barbarous nations divided the Empire into many parts, this virtue was not renewed.

The causes why the aunciente orders are neclected.

The reasons why the ancient orders are neglected.

The one cause is, for that it greveth theim moche, to take againe the orders when thei are marde, the other, bicause the maner of livyng now adaies, having respect to the Christian religion, commaundeth not thesame necessitie to menne, to defende themselves, whiche in olde tyme was: for that then, the menne overcome in warre, either were killed, or remained perpetuall slaves, where thei led their lives moste miserably: The tounes overcome, either were rased, or the inhabiters thereof driven out, their goodes taken awaie, sent dispersed through the worlde: so that the vanquished in warre, suffered all extreme miserie: {96} of this feare, men beyng made afraied, thei wer driven to kepe lively the warlike exercises, and thei honoured soche as were excellente in theim: But nowe adaies, this feare for the moste part is not regarded: of those that are overcom, fewe bee killed, none is kepte longe in prison: for that with facelitie, thei are sette at libertie: the citees also, whiche a thousande tymes have rebelled, are not destroied, the men wherof, are let a lone with their goodes, so that the greateste hurte that is feared, is but a taske: in so moche, that men will not submit them selves to the orders of warre, and to abide alwaies under those, to avoide the perilles whereof thei are little afraied: again these Provinces of Europe, be under a verie fewe heddes, in respecte as it hath been in times past: for that al Fraunce, obeieth one kyng, al Spain, an other: Italie is in fewe partes, so that the weake citees, are defended with leanyng to hym that overcometh, and the strong states, for the causes aforesaied, feare no soche extreme ruine.

The main reason is that it greatly troubles them to reclaim their positions once they are defeated. Additionally, the way of living nowadays, considering the Christian faith, no longer imposes the same necessity on people to defend themselves as it did in ancient times. Back then, men who were defeated in battle were either killed or became permanent slaves, living their lives in extreme misery. The cities that were conquered were either destroyed or the inhabitants were expelled, their belongings taken away and scattered across the world. Thus, the vanquished in war suffered immense hardship. Out of this fear, people were compelled to maintain military training and honored those who excelled in it. But nowadays, this fear is largely disregarded; few of those who are defeated are killed, and none remain imprisoned for long because they are quickly released. The cities, which have rebelling countless times, are not destroyed, and their people are left alone with their possessions. The greatest harm that is feared is merely a task, to the point that people will not submit themselves to military discipline or remain under it to avoid dangers they are little afraid of. Furthermore, these provinces of Europe are under very few leaders compared to the past; all of France obeys one king, all of Spain another, and Italy is divided into few parts. The weaker cities depend on leaning toward those who conquer, while the stronger states, for the reasons mentioned, do not fear such extreme ruin.

COSIMO. Yet ther hath ben seen many tounes that have ben sacked within this xxv. yeres, and lost their dominions, whose insample, ought to teache other how to live, and to take again some of those old orders.

COSIMO. Yet there have been many towns that have been raided in the last twenty-five years, losing their power, and their examples should teach others how to live and to restore some of those old ways.

FABRICIO. You saie true: but if you note what tounes have gone to sacke, you shall not finde that thei have been the heddes of states, but of the members; as was seen sacked Tortona, and not Milaine: Capua, and not Napelles, Brescia, and not Venice, Ravenna, and not Roome: the whiche insamples maketh those that governe, not to chaunge their purposes, but rather maketh them to stande more in their opinion, to be able to redeme again all thynges with taskes, and for this, thei will not submit theim selves to the troubles of thexercises of warre, semyng unto them partly not necessarie, partly, an intrinsicate matter, whiche thei understande not: Those other, whiche bee subjectes to them, whom soche insamples ought to make afraied, have no power to remedie it: and those Princes, that have ones loste their estates, are no more able, and those which as yet kept them, know not, nor wil not. Bicause thei will {97} without any disease rain by fortune, and not by their vertue: for that in the worlde beyng but little vertue, thei see fortune governeth all thynges. And thei will have it to rule theim, not thei to rule it. And to prove this that I have discoursed to bee true, consider Almaine, in the whiche, bicause there is many Princedomes, and common weales, there is moche vertue, and all thesame, whiche in the present service of warre is good, dependeth of the insamples of those people: who beyng all gellious of their states, fearing servitude, the which in other places is not feared, thei all maintaine theim selves Lordes, and honourable: this that I have saied, shall suffice to shewe the occacions of the presente utilitie, accordyng to my opinion: I cannot tell, whether it seeme thesame unto you, or whether there be growen in you any doubtyng.

FABRICIO. You're right: but if you look at which towns have been sacked, you’ll notice that it’s not the capitals, but rather the smaller cities; just like Tortona was sacked, not Milan; Capua, not Naples; Brescia, not Venice; Ravenna, not Rome. These examples make those in power less likely to change their strategies; instead, they become more convinced that they can recover everything through taxation. Because of this, they won’t submit to the hardships of war, thinking that it’s partly unnecessary and partly a complicated matter that they don’t understand. The subjects under them, who should be afraid of such examples, have no power to change the situation. Those princes who have lost their states are no longer able to regain them, and those who still hold on to their states either don’t know how or don’t want to. They want to let fortune control everything rather than take charge themselves, believing that in a world where there is little virtue, fortune governs all. They prefer to let it lead, rather than being the ones who lead it. To demonstrate that what I’m saying is true, look at Germany, where there are many principalities and republics. There is much virtue there, and what is beneficial in their current military service comes from the examples of those people. Being all jealous of their states, and fearing servitude—something that isn’t feared in other places—they all maintain their positions as lords and honorable figures. This is enough to illustrate the current utility, in my opinion. I can't say if you see it the same way or if you have any doubts about it.

COSIMO. None, but rather I understande all verie well: onely I desire, tournyng to our principall matter, to understande of you, how you would ordein the horses with these battailes, and how many, and how thei should be governed, and how armed.

COSIMO. No, I understand everything very well. I just want to turn to our main topic and ask you how you would arrange the horses for these battles, how many there should be, how they should be managed, and how they should be equipped.

The armyng of horsemen; The weapons that light horsmenne should have; The nombre of horsmen requisite for a maine bataille of six thousand men; The nombre of carrages that men of armes and light horsmen ought to have.

The arrangement of cavalry; The weapons that light cavalry should carry; The number of cavalry needed for a main battle of six thousand men; The number of wagons that armed men and light cavalry should have.

FABRICIO. You thinke peraventure, that I have left it behinde: whereat doe not marvell, for that I purpose for twoo causes, to speake therof little, the one is, for that the strengthe, and the importaunce of an armie, is the footemen, the other is, bicause this part of service of warre, is lesse corrupted, then thesame of footemen. For that though it be not stronger then the old, yet it maie compare with thesame, nevertheles ther hath been spoken a little afore, of the maner of exercisyng them. And concernyng tharmyng them, I would arme them as thei doe at this present, as wel the light horsemen, as the menne of armes: but the light horsemen, I would that thei should be all Crossebowe shuters, with some Harkebutters emong them: the whiche though in the other affaires of warre, thei bee little profitable, thei be for this most profitable, to make afraied the countrie menne, and to drive them from a passage, that were kept of them: bicause a Harkebutter, shall feare them more, then twentie other armed. But commyng to the {98} nomber, I saie, that having taken in hand, to imitate the service of warre of the Romaines, I would not ordein more then three hundred horse, profitable for every maine battaile, of whiche I would that there were CL. men of armes, and CL. light horsmen, and I would give to every one of these partes, a hedde, making after emong them fiftene peticapitaines for a bande, givyng to every one of them a Trompet, and a standarde: I would that every ten menne of armes, should have five carriages, and every ten light horsemen twoo, the whiche as those of the footemen, should carrie the tentes, the vesselles, and the axes, and the stakes, and the rest of their other harneis. Nor beleve not but that it is disorder, where the menne of armes have to their service fower horse, bicause soche a thyng is a corrupt use: for that the men of armes in Almaine, are seen to bee with their horse alone, every twentie of theim, havyng onely a carte, that carrieth after them their necessary thynges. The Romaine horsemen, were likewise a lone: true it is, that the Triary lodged nere them, whiche wer bound to minister helpe unto theim, in the kepyng of their horses the whiche maie easely be imitated of us, as in the distributyng of the lodgynges, I shall shewe you. Thesame then that the Romaines did, and that whiche the Duchmen doe now a daies, we maie doe also, ye, not doyng it, we erre. These horses ordained and appoincted together with a main battaile, maie sometymes be put together, when the battailes bee assembled, and to cause that betwene theim bee made some sight of assault, the whiche should be more to make them acquainted together, then for any other necessitie. But now of this part, there hath been spoke sufficiently, wherefore let us facion the armie, to be able to come into the field against the enemie, and hope to winne it: whiche thyng is the ende, for whiche the exercise of warre is ordeined, and so moche studie therein bestowed.

FABRICIO. You might think that I've overlooked it, and that's understandable because I plan to talk about it very briefly for two reasons. The first is that the strength and importance of an army lies in the infantry. The second is that this area of military service is less corrupted than that of the infantry. Even though it may not be stronger than the old, it can certainly compare, and I mentioned earlier how to train them. As for equipping them, I would arm both the light cavalry and the men-at-arms as they are today. However, I would make sure that all the light cavalry are crossbowmen, with a few harquebusiers among them. Although they may not be very useful in other military matters, they are extremely effective for intimidating local peasants and driving them away from a guarded passage because a harquebusier can scare them more than twenty other armed troops. As for numbers, I suggest that if we are to emulate the Roman military, we should not have more than three hundred horses for each main battle, consisting of one hundred men-at-arms and one hundred light cavalry. I would assign a leader to each of these groups, creating fifteen captains for each band, giving each of them a trumpet and a standard. I would also ensure that every ten men-at-arms have five supply wagons, and every ten light cavalry have two, which, like those of the infantry, would carry tents, supplies, tools, stakes, and their other gear. Don’t think it’s acceptable for men-at-arms to have four horses each because that's an indication of corrupt practice: in Germany, men-at-arms are typically seen with their horses alone, with every twenty of them having just one cart for necessary items. The Roman cavalry operated similarly alone; it’s true that the Triarii camped nearby to help them with their horses, which we can easily imitate, as I will show you in the distribution of accommodations. So, just as the Romans did and the Dutch do today, we can do the same; failing to do so would be a mistake. These horses designated for the main battle can sometimes be assembled when the battles are organized, to provide a show of force, which would serve more to familiarize them with each other than for any immediate necessity. But now that we've covered this part sufficiently, let’s focus on structuring the army to effectively engage the enemy and aim for victory, which is the ultimate goal for which military training is organized and so much effort is devoted.

{101}

THE THIRDE BOOKE

COSIMO. S eeing that we chaunge reasonyng, I will that the demaunder be chaunged: bicause I would not be thought presumptuous, the which I have alwaies blamed in other: therfore, I resigne the Dictatorship, and give this aucthoritie to hym that will have it, of these my other frendes.

COSIMO. S Since we’re switching topics, I want to change the question: because I don’t want to seem presumptuous, which I’ve always criticized in others; therefore, I resign the Dictatorship and give this authority to whoever among my other friends will take it.

ZANOBI. We would be moste glad, that you should procede, but seyng that you will not, yet tell at leaste, whiche of us shall succede in your place.

ZANOBI. We would be very happy for you to go ahead, but since you won't, at least tell us which of us will take your place.

COSIMO. I will give this charge to signor Fabricio.

COSIMO. I’ll give this task to Mr. Fabricio.

FABRICIO. I am content to take it, and I will that we folowe the Venecian custome, that is, that the youngeste speake firste: bicause this beyng an exercise for yong men, I perswade my self, that yong menne, bee moste apt to reason thereof, as thei be moste readie to execute it.

FABRICIO. I'm happy to take it, and I suggest we follow the Venetian custom, which is for the youngest to speak first: because this is an exercise for young men, I believe that young men are most suited to discuss it, as they are the most ready to carry it out.

COSIMO. Then it falleth to you Luigi: and as I have pleasure of soche a successour, so you shal satisfie your self of soche a demaunder: therefore I praie you, let us tourne to the matter, and let us lese no more tyme.

COSIMO. Then it’s up to you, Luigi: just as I’m pleased with such a successor, you should be satisfied with such a request. So I ask you, let’s get back to the matter at hand and not waste any more time.

The greateste disorder that is used now a daies in pitching of a fielde; The order how a Romain Legion was appoincted to faight; The maner that the Grekes used in their Falangi, when thei fought against their enemies; The order that the Suizzers use in their main battailes when thei faight; Howe to appoincte a main battaile with armour and weapons, and to order thesame after the Greke and Romain maner.

The greatest chaos seen nowadays in organizing a battlefield; the way a Roman legion was arranged to fight; the method the Greeks used in their phalanx when they battled their enemies; the formation the Swiss follow in their main battles when they fight; how to set up a major battle with armor and weapons, and to organize it according to Greek and Roman styles.

FABRICIO. I am certain, that to mynde to shewe wel, how an armie is prepared, to faight a fielde, it should be necessarie to declare, how the Grekes, and the Romaines ordeined the bandes of their armies: Notwithstandyng, you your selves, beeyng able to rede, and to consider these tnynges, by meanes of the auncient writers. I will passe {102} over many particulars: and I will onely bryng in those thynges, whiche I thinke necessarie to imitate, mindyng at this tyme, to give to our exercise of warre, some parte of perfection: The whiche shall make, that in one instant, I shall shewe you, how an armie is prepared to the field, and how it doeth incounter in the verie faight, and how it maie be exercised in the fained. The greatest disorder, that thei make, whiche ordeine an armie to the fielde, is in giving them onely one fronte, and to binde them to one brunt, and to one fortune: the whiche groweth, of havyng loste the waie, that the antiquitie used to receive one bande within an other: bicause without this waie, thei can neither succour the formoste, nor defende them, nor succede in the faight in their steede: the whiche of the Romaines, was moste excellently well observed. Therefore, purposyng to shewe this waie, I saie, how that the Romaines devided into iii. partes every Legion, in Hastati, Prencipi, and Triarii, of which, the Hastati wer placed in the first front, or forward of the armie, with thorders thicke and sure, behinde whom wer the Prencipi, but placed with their orders more thinne: after these, thei set the Triarii, and with so moche thinnes of orders, that thei might, if nede wer, receive betwene them the Prencipi, and the Hastati. Thei had besides these, the Slingers, and Crosbowshoters, and the other lighte armed, the whiche stoode not in these orders, but thei placed them in the bed of tharmie, betwene the horses and the other bandes of footemen: therefore these light armed, began the faight, if thei overcame (whiche happened seldom times) thei folowed the victorie: if thei were repulced, thei retired by the flanckes of the armie, or by the spaces ordained for soche purposes, and thei brought them selves emong the unarmed: after the departure of whom, the Hastati incountered with the enemie, the whiche if thei saw themselves to be overcome, thei retired by a little and little, by the rarenesse of thorders betwene the Prencipi, and together with those, thei renued the faight if these also wer repulced, thei retired al in the rarenesse of the orders of the Triarii, and al together on a heape, {103} began againe the faight: and then, if thei were overcome, there was no more remeady, bicause there remained no more waies to renue them again. The horses stoode on the corners of the armie, to the likenes of twoo winges to a bodie, and somewhiles thei fought with the enemies horses, an other while, thei rescued the fotmen, according as nede required. This waie of renuyng theim selves three tymes, is almoste impossible to overcome: for that, fortune muste three tymes forsake thee, and the enemie to have so moche strengthe, that three tymes he maie overcome thee. The Grekes, had not in their Falangi, this maner of renuyng them selves, and although in those wer many heddes, and many orders, notwithstandyng, thei made one bodie, or els one hedde: the maner that thei kepte in rescuyng the one the other was, not to retire the one order within the other, as the Romaines, but to enter the one manne into the place of the other: the which thei did in this maner. Their Falange brought into rankes, and admit, that thei put in a ranke fiftie menne, commyng after with their hedde againste the enemie, of all the rankes the foremoste sixe, mighte faight: Bicause their Launces, the whiche thei called Sarisse, were so long, that the sixt ranke, passed with the hedde of their Launces, out of the first ranke: then in faightyng, if any of the first, either through death, or through woundes fell, straight waie there entered into his place, thesame man, that was behinde in the second ranke, and in the place that remained voide of the seconde, thesame man entred, whiche was behind hym in the thirde, and thus successively, in a sodaine the rankes behinde, restored the faultes of those afore, so that the rankes alwaies remained whole, and no place of the faighters was voide, except the laste rankes, the whiche came to consume, havyng not menne behinde their backes, whom might restore theim: So that the hurte that the first rankes suffered, consumed the laste, and the firste remained alwaies whole: and thus these Falangi by their order, might soner be consumed, then broken, for that the grosse bodie, made it more immovable. The Romaines used at the beginnyng the Falangi, and did set {104} in order their Legions like unto them: after, this order pleased them not, and thei devided the Legions into many bodies, that is, in bandes and companies: Bicause thei judged (as a little afore I saied) that thesame bodie, should have neede of many capitaines, and that it should be made of sunderie partes, so that every one by it self, might be governed. The maine battailes of the Suizzers, use at this present, all the maners of the Falangi, as well in ordryng it grosse, and whole, as in rescuyng the one the other: and in pitchyng the field, thei set the main battailes, thone to the sides of the other: and though thei set them the one behinde the other, thei have no waie, that the firste retiryng it self, maie bee received of the seconde, but thei use this order, to the entent to bee able to succour the one thother, where thei put a maine battaile before, and an other behinde thesame on the right hande: so that if the first have nede of helpe, that then the other maie make forewarde, and succour it: the third main battaile, thei put behind these, but distant from them, a Harkebus shot: this thei doe, for that thesaid two main battailes being repulced, this maie make forwarde, and have space for theim selves, and for the repulced, and thesame that marcheth forward, to avoide the justling of the one the other: for asmoche as a grosse multitude, cannot bee received as a little bodie: and therefore, the little bodies beyng destincte, whiche were in a Romaine Legion, might be placed in soche wise, that thei might receive betwene theim, and rescue the one the other. And to prove this order of the Suizzers not to be so good, as the auncient Romaines, many insamples of the Romain Legions doe declare, when thei fought with the Grekes Falangi, where alwaies thei were consumed of theim: for that the kinde of their weapons (as I have said afore) and this waie of renuyng themselves, could do more, then the massivenesse of the Falangi. Havyng therefore, with these insamples to ordaine an armie, I have thought good, partly to retaine the maner of armyng and the orders of the Grekes Falangi, and partely of the Romain Legions: and therfore I have saied, that I would have in a main battaile, twoo {105} thousande pikes, whiche be the weapons of the Macedonicall Falangi, and three thousande Targaettes with sweardes, whiche be the Romain weapons: I have devided the main battaile, into x. battailes, as the Romaines their Legion into ten Cohortes: I have ordeined the Veliti, that is the light armed, to begin the faight, as the Romaines used: and like as the weapons beyng mingled, doe participate of thone and of the other nacion, so the orders also doe participate: I have ordained, that every battaile shall have v. rankes of Pikes in the fronte, and the rest of Targaettes, to bee able with the front, to withstande the horses, and to enter easely into the battaile of the enemies on foot, having in the firste fronte, or vawarde, Pikes, as well as the enemie, the whiche shall suffice me to withstande them, the Targaettes after to overcome theim. And if you note the vertue of this order, you shal se al these weapons, to doe fully their office, for that the Pikes, bee profitable against the horses, and when thei come against the footemenne, thei dooe their office well, before the faight throng together, bicause so sone as thei presse together, thei become unprofitable: wherefore, the Suizzers to avoide this inconvenience, put after everye three rankes of Pikes, a ranke of Halberdes, the whiche they do to make roome to the Pikes, which is not yet so much as suffiseth. Then putting our Pikes afore, and the Targaettes behinde, they come to withstande the horses, and in the beginning of the fight, they open the rayes, and molest the footemen: But when the fight is thrust together, and that they become unprofitable, the Targaettes and swoords succeede, which may in every narowe place be handled.

FABRICIO. I’m convinced that to show clearly how an army is prepared to fight in a battlefield, it’s essential to explain how the Greeks and the Romans organized their military units. However, since you can read and consider these matters through the works of ancient writers, I will skip over many details and only include those aspects that I think are necessary to emulate, with the intention of adding some level of perfection to our military exercises. This will allow me to show you, in one go, how an army prepares for battle, how it engages in combat, and how it can be maneuvered in various situations. The biggest mistake made by those who organize an army for the field is giving it only one front, binding them to a single charge and a single fate. This happens because they have strayed from the ancient way of having one unit within another. Without this method, they cannot support the front lines, defend them, or succeed in battle in their place, which the Romans observed excellently. Therefore, intending to demonstrate this method, I will explain how the Romans divided each Legion into three parts: Hastati, Principes, and Triarii. The Hastati were positioned at the front of the army in thick and sturdy formations, while the Principes were behind them but arranged more loosely. Behind these were the Triarii, in such a thin formation that they could, if needed, receive the Principes and the Hastati between them. They also had Slingers and Crossbowmen, among other light infantry, who did not stand in these formations but were placed within the ranks of the army, between the cavalry and the other infantry units. These light troops began the engagement; if they won (which rarely happened), they would pursue the victory. If they were pushed back, they would retire to the flanks of the army or through designated spaces and merge with the unarmed. After their withdrawal, the Hastati would engage the enemy, and if they found themselves overwhelmed, they would gradually retreat through the gaps between the Principes. Together, they would renew the engagement, and if those were also pushed back, they would all retire through the ranks of the Triarii and regroup. If they were overpowered at that point, there would be no remedy because there would be no way to renew the fight again. The cavalry stood at the ends of the army like wings on a body, sometimes fighting against the enemy's cavalry and at other times rescuing the infantry as needed. This ability to renew themselves three times is almost impossible to overcome, as it requires fortune to abandon you three times, and the enemy must have enough strength to defeat you on three occasions. The Greeks did not have this way of renewing themselves in their Phalanx. Although there were many leaders and formations, they effectively formed one body or one head. Their method of supporting one another was not to pull one unit back in order for another to advance, as the Romans did, but to have one man step into the place of another. They organized their Phalanx, allowing fifty men to form a rank facing the enemy, with the front six ranks able to fight. Their long spears, called Sarissas, were so lengthy that the sixth rank’s spearhead extended beyond the first rank. Thus, when any soldiers in front fell, either from death or injury, the man directly behind in the second rank would immediately fill the gap, and the same would happen successively through the ranks, keeping the formation intact with no gaps, except in the last ranks, which were meant to wear down and had no soldiers behind them to fill in. Consequently, the damage taken by the front ranks would wear down the last ranks, while the first remained intact. Therefore, these Phalanxes could be diminished more slowly than they could be broken, due to their solid mass making them more stable. Initially, the Romans used the Phalanx and arranged their Legions similarly. Later, that formation did not suit them, and they divided the Legions into various units, including bands and companies, reasoning (as I mentioned before) that such a body would require numerous commanders and should be made up of various parts, so each could operate independently. The main battles of the Swiss, even today, utilize all the methods of the Phalanx, both in forming a solid unit and in supporting one another. When setting the battlefield, they place their main battles side by side; even when they are positioned behind one another, they have a means for the first to retreat and be replaced by the second, but they structure it to enable mutual assistance, placing one main battle in front and another behind on the right side, so if the first needs help, the second can advance and support it. The third main battle is positioned behind these at a distance, ready to fire with Harquebus shots. They do this so that, if the first two main battles are pushed back, this one can advance and have space for itself and for those who retreated, preventing a collision between them as a large force cannot maneuver as easily as a small one. Hence, the smaller groups that were part of a Roman Legion could operate in a way that allowed them to support one another effectively. To demonstrate that the Swiss order is not superior to that of the ancient Romans, many examples from Roman Legions illustrate this when fighting the Greek Phalanx, where they were always defeated. The nature of their weapons (as I stated earlier) and their way of renewing themselves proved to be more effective than the mass of the Phalanx. Having taken these examples to organize an army, I believe it's wise to retain aspects of the Greek Phalanx while incorporating elements from the Roman Legions. Thus, I propose that in a main battle, we have two thousand pikes, which are Macedonian Phalanx weapons, and three thousand Targaettes with swords, which are Roman weapons. I will divide the main battle into ten units, as the Romans divided their legions into ten Cohorts. I have arranged the Velites, or light infantry, to start the engagement, as the Romans did. Just as the mixed weapons share characteristics of both nations, so too do the orders. I have arranged that each unit will have five ranks of pikes at the front, and the rest will be Targaettes, enabling them to withstand cavalry at the front and to easily engage the enemy's main battle on foot, having in the forefront or vanguard, pikes as well as the enemy, which will be enough for me to withstand them, with the Targaettes there to overpower them afterward. If you note the effectiveness of this order, you will see that all these weapons perform their roles adequately, as the pikes are effective against horses, and when they come up against infantry, they do their job well before the combat gets crowded, as once they press together, they become less useful. Therefore, the Swiss avoid this issue by placing a rank of Halberds after every three ranks of pikes, making space for the pikes to operate even if this isn’t completely sufficient. By placing our pikes in front and Targaettes behind, they can withstand the cavalry and, at the start of the fight, disrupt the infantry. When the fight gets intense and they become less effective, the Targaettes and swords can take over since they can be handled in narrow spaces.

LUIGI. Wee looke nowe with desire to understande, howe you would ordeyne the armie to fighte the fielde, with these weapons, and with these order.

LUIGI. We now look forward with eagerness to understand how you would organize the army to fight in the field, with these weapons and in this formation.

The nomber of men that was in a Counsulles armie; How the Romaines placed their Legions in the field; How to order an armie in the fielde to fighte a battaile, according to the minde of the authour; How the extraordinary pikes bee placed in the set battaile; The place where thextraordinarie archars and harkebutters, and the men of armes and lighte horsmen ought to stande when the field is pitched, and goeth to faighte the battaile; The ordinarie archars and harkebutters are placed aboute their owne battailes; The place where the generall hedde of a maine battaile muste stande, when thesame power of men is appoincted to faight; What menne a general capitain of a maine battaile oughte to have aboute hym; The place wher a general capitain of all thearmie must stand when the battaile is ready to be fought and what nomber of chosen men oughte to be aboute hym; How many canons is requisite for an armie, and of what sise they ought to bee; Where the artillerie ought to be placed when thearmie is reedie to fight; An armie that were ordered as above is declared, maie in fighting, use the Grekes maner, and the Roman fashion; To what purpose the spaces that be betwene every bande of men do serve.

The number of men in a council's army; How the Romans arranged their legions on the battlefield; How to organize an army in the field to fight a battle, according to the author's perspective; How the special pikes are positioned in the set battle; The position where the extraordinary archers and gunmen, along with men-at-arms and light cavalry, should stand when the field is established and preparing for battle; The regular archers and gunmen are placed around their own battalions; The location where the general commander of a main battle must stand when the same number of men is appointed to fight; What personnel a general captain of a main battle should have around him; The position where a general captain of the entire army must stand when the battle is ready to be fought and how many chosen men should be around him; How many cannons are necessary for an army and what size they should be; Where the artillery should be positioned when the army is ready to engage; An army organized as described above may, in combat, use the Greek method and the Roman style; The purpose of the spaces between each band of soldiers.

FABRICIO. And I will not nowe shewe you other, then this: you have to understande, how that in an ordinarye Romane armie, which they call a Consull armie, there were no more, then twoo Legions of Romane Citezens which were sixe hundred horse, and about aleven thousande footemen: they had besides as many more footemen and horsemen, {106} whiche were sente them from their friends and confiderates, whome they divided into twoo partes, and called the one, the right horne and the other the left horne: nor they never permitted, that these aiding footemen, should passe the nomber of the footemen of their Legions, they were well contented, that the nomber of those horse shoulde be more then theirs: with this armie, which was of xxii. thousand footemen, and about twoo thousande good horse, a Consul executed all affaires, and went to all enterprises: yet when it was needefull to set against a greater force, twoo Consulles joyned together with twoo armies. You ought also to note in especially, that in all the three principall actes, which an armie doth that is, to march, to incampe, and to fight, the Romanes used to put their Legions in the middeste, for that they woulde, that the same power, wherein they most trusted, shoulde bee moste united, as in the reasoning of these three actes, shall be shewed you: those aiding footemen, through the practise they had with the Legion Souldiours, were as profitable as they, because they were instructed, according as the souldiours of the Legions were, and therefore, in like maner in pitching the field, they pitched. Then he that knoweth how the Romaines disposed a Legion in their armie, to fight a field, knoweth how they disposed all: therefor, having tolde you how they devided a Legion into three bandes, and how the one bande received the other, I have then told you, how al tharmie in a fielde, was ordained. Wherefore, I minding to ordain a field like unto the Romaines, as they had twoo Legions, I will take ii. main batailes, and these being disposed, the disposicion of all an armie shalbe understode therby: bycause in joyning more men, there is no other to be doen, then to ingrosse the orders: I thinke I neede not to rehearse how many men a maine battaile hath, and howe it hath ten battailes, and what heades bee in a battaile and what weapons they have, and which be the ordinarie Pikes and Veliti, and which the extraordinarie for that a litle a fore I told you it destinctly, and I willed you to kepe it in memorie as a necessarie thing to purpose, to understande {107} all the other orders: and therfore I will come to the demonstracion of the order without repeating it any more: Me thinkes good, that the ten battailes of one main battaile be set on the left flanke, and the tenne other, of the other main battaile, on the right: these that are placed on the left flanke, be ordeined in this maner, there is put five battailes the one to the side of the other in the fronte, after suche sorte, that betweene the one and the other, there remaine a space of three yardes, whiche come to occupie for largenesse Cvi. yardes, of ground, and for length thirtie: behinde these five battailes, I would put three other distante by right line from the firste thirtie yardes: twoo of the whiche, should come behinde by right line, to the uttermoste of the five, and the other should kepe the space in the middeste, and so these three, shall come to occupie for bredth and length, as moche space, as the five doeth. But where the five have betwene the one, and the other, a distaunce of three yardes, these shall have a distance of xxv. yardes. After these, I would place the twoo last battailes, in like maner behinde the three by right line, and distaunte from those three, thirtie yardes, and I would place eche of theim, behinde the uttermoste part of the three, so that the space, whiche should remain betwen the one and the other, should be lxviii. yardes: then al these battailes thus ordered, will take in bredth Cvi. yardes, and in length CL. Thextraordinarie Pikes, I would deffende a long the flanckes of these battailes, on the left side, distante from them fiftene yardes, makyng Cxliij. rankes, seven to a ranke, after soche sorte, that thei maie impale with their length, all the left sixe of the tenne battailes in thesame wise, declared of me to be ordained: and there shall remain fourtie rankes to keepe the carriages, and the unarmed, whiche ought to remaine in the taile of the armie, distributyng the Peticapitaines, and the Centurions, in their places: and of the three Conestables, I would place one in the hedde, the other in the middeste, the third in the laste ranke, the whiche should execute the office of a Tergiductore, whom the {108} antiquitie so called hym, that was appoincted to the backe of the armie. But retournyng to the hedde of the armie, I saie how that I would place nere to the extraordinarie pikes, the Veliti extraordinarie, whiche you knowe to be five hundred, and I would give them a space of xxx. yardes: on the side of these likewise on the left hande, I would place the menne of armes, and I would thei should have a space of a Cxii. yardes: after these, the light horsemen, to whom I would appoinct as moche ground to stande in, as the menne of armes have: the ordinarie veliti, I would leave about their owne battailes, who should stand in those spaces, whiche I appoincte betwene thone battaile and thother: whom should be as their ministers, if sometyme I thought not good to place them under the extraordinarie Pikes: in dooyng or not doyng whereof, I would proceade, accordyng as should tourne best to my purpose. The generall hedde of all the maine battaile, I would place in thesame space, that were betwene the first and the seconde order of the battailes, or els in the hedde, and in thesame space, that is betwene the laste battaile of the firste five, and the extraordinarie Pikes, accordyng as beste should serve my purpose, with thirtie or fourtie chosen men about hym, that knewe by prudence, how to execute a commission, and by force, to withstande a violence, and thei to be also betwen the Drumme and the Ansigne: this is thorder, with the whiche I would dispose a maine battaile, whiche should bee the disposyng of halfe the armie, and it should take in breadth three hundred fourscore and twoo yardes, and in length as moche as above is saied, not accomptyng the space, that thesame parte of the extraordinarie Pikes will take, whiche muste make a defence for the unarmed, whiche will bee aboute lxxv. yardes: the other maine battaile, I would dispose on the righte side, after the same maner juste, as I have disposed that on the lefte, leavyng betwene the one main battaile, and thother, a space of xxii. yardes: in the hedde of whiche space, I would set some little carriages of artillerie, behynde the whiche, should stande the generall capitaine of all the armie, and should have {109} about hym with the Trumpet, and with the Capitaine standerde, twoo hundred menne at least, chosen to be on foote the moste parte, emongest whiche there should be tenne or more, mete to execute all commaundementes, and should bee in soche wise a horsebacke, and armed, that thei mighte bee on horsebacke, and on foote, accordyng as neede should require. The artillerie of the armie, suffiseth ten Cannons, for the winning of Townes, whose shotte shoulde not passe fiftie pounde: the whiche in the fielde should serve mee more for defence of the campe, then for to fight the battaile: The other artillerie, should bee rather of ten, then of fifteene pounde the shotte: this I would place afore on the front of all the armie, if sometime the countrie should not stande in such wise, that I mighte place it by the flancke in a sure place, where it mighte not of the enemie be in daunger: this fashion of an armie thus ordered, may in fighting, use the order of the Falangi, and the order of the Romane Legions: for that in the fronte, bee Pikes, all the men bee set in the rankes, after such sorte, that incountering with the enemie, and withstanding him, maye after the use of the Falangi, restore the firste ranckes, with those behinde: on the other parte, if they be charged so sore, that they be constrayned to breake the orders, and to retire themselves, they maye enter into the voide places of the seconde battailes, which they have behinde them, and unite their selves with them, and making a new force, withstande the enemie, and overcome him: and when this sufficeth not, they may in the verie same maner, retire them selves the seconde time, and the third fight: so that in this order, concerning to fight, there is to renue them selves, both according to the Greeke maner, and according to the Romane: concerning the strength of the armie, there cannot be ordayned a more stronger: for as much, as the one and the other borne therof, is exceedingly well replenished, both with heades, and weapons, nor there remayneth weake, other then the part behinde of the unarmed, and the same also, hath the flanckes impaled with the extraordinarie Pikes: nor the enemie can not of anye parte {110} assaulte it, where he shall not finde it well appointed, and the hinder parte can not be assaulted: Because there can not bee an enemie, that hath so much puissaunce, whome equallye maye assault thee on everye side: for that hee having so great a power, thou oughtest not then to matche thy selfe in the fielde with him: but when he were three times more then thou, and as well appointed as thou, hee doth weaken him selfe in assaulting thee in divers places, one part that thou breakest, will cause all the reste go to naughte: concerning horses, although he chaunce to have more then thine, thou needest not feare: for that the orders of the Pikes, which impale thee, defende thee from all violence of them, although thy horses were repulced. The heades besides this, be disposed in such place, that they may easyly commaunde, and obeye: the spaces that bee between the one battaile, and the other, and betweene the one order, and the other, not onely serve to be able to receyve the one the other, but also to give place to the messengers, whiche should go and come by order of the Capitayne. And as I tolde you firste, howe the Romanes had for an armie, aboute foure and twentie thousande men, even so this oughte to bee: and as the other souldiours tooke ensample of the Legions, for the maner of fighting, and the fashion of the armie, so those souldiours, whiche you shoulde joyne to oure twoo mayne battailes, oughte to take the forme and order of them: whereof having put you an ensample, it is an easye matter to imitate it, for that increasing, either twoo other mayne battailes unto the armie, or as many other souldiours, as they bee, there is no other to bee done, then to double the orders, and where was put tenne battailes on the lefte parte, to put twentie, either ingrossing, or distending the orders, according as the place, or the enemie shoulde compell thee.

FABRICIO. And I won’t show you anything else besides this: you need to understand that in a typical Roman army, which they call a Consular army, there were only two Legions of Roman citizens consisting of six hundred cavalry and about eleven thousand foot soldiers. Additionally, they had the same number of foot soldiers and cavalry sent to them by their allies and confederates, which they divided into two parts, calling one the right wing and the other the left wing. They never allowed these supplementary foot soldiers to outnumber those in their Legions; they were content for the number of cavalry to exceed theirs. With this army, totaling twenty-two thousand foot soldiers and around two thousand good cavalry, a Consul managed all affairs and launched all campaigns. However, when it was necessary to face a greater force, two Consuls would join together with two armies. You should also especially note that in all three main activities an army does—marching, camping, and fighting—the Romans would position their Legions in the center because they wanted their strongest force to be the most united, as will be explained in detailing these three activities. The supporting foot soldiers, due to their experience with the Legion soldiers, were as effective as they were because they were trained just like the soldiers in the Legions and thus set up their encampments similarly. Therefore, anyone who knows how the Romans stationed a Legion in their army to wage a battle knows how they arranged everything. Hence, having explained to you how they divided a Legion into three divisions, and how one division supports the other, I've also described how the whole army in a field was organized. Thus, intending to arrange a field similar to the Romans, with two Legions, I will take two main battalions, and by arranging these, the organization of the entire army will be understood thereby; because in joining more men, there is no other way to do it than by consolidating the orders. I believe I don't need to restate how many men a main battalion has, how it comprises ten battalions, what units are in a battalion, what weapons they have, which are the regular Pikes and Velites, and which are the extraordinary ones, since I previously explained that clearly, and I wanted you to remember it as a necessary thing to understand all the other orders. Therefore, I will move to demonstrate the order without repeating it anymore. I think it’s good for the ten battalions of one main battalion to be positioned on the left flank, and the ten others of the other main battalion on the right: those positioned on the left flank are arranged as follows: five battalions are placed side by side at the front, with a distance of three yards between each, occupying a total width of 186 yards and a length of thirty. Behind these five battalions, I would place three more, spaced out thirty yards away from the first five: two of which would align directly behind the last of the five, and one would keep the gap in the center, together occupying the same width and length as the five. Where the five had a distance of three yards between each other, these will have a distance of twenty-five yards. After these, I would place the last two battalions in the same manner directly behind the three, spaced thirty yards from them, and each positioned behind the farthest part of the three, so that there remains a space of sixty-eight yards between them. All these battalions ordered this way will have a total width of 186 yards and a length of 150. I would line the extraordinary Pikes along the flanks of these battalions on the left side, spaced fifteen yards from them, creating 143 ranks, with seven to a rank, so they can stretch out with their length to cover all six of the ten battalions indicated. There will also be forty ranks to manage the supplies and the unarmed personnel, who must remain at the rear of the army, distributing the Petty Captains and the Centurions in their places. Of the three Constables, I would position one at the front, the other in the middle, and the third in the last rank, who would perform the role of Tergiductor, as it was called in antiquity, a title given to the one assigned to the rear of the army. But returning to the front of the army, I say that I would place the extraordinary Velites, which you know to be five hundred, adjacent to the extraordinary pikes, giving them a space of thirty yards. Next to these, also on the left, I would place the men-at-arms, who should have a space of 112 yards. Following them would be the light cavalry, for whom I would assign as much ground to stand on as the men-at-arms have. The ordinary Velites would stay close to their own battalions, where they would occupy the spaces I appoint between one battalion and another, acting as their support unless I decide it’s better not to have them positioned under the extraordinary Pikes. In either case, I would proceed in whichever way best suits my purpose. I would position the overall commander of the main battalion in the same space that lies between the first and second order of the battalions, or at the front, in the area between the last battalion of the first five and the extraordinary Pikes, depending on what serves my purpose best, accompanied by thirty or forty selected men who know how to carry out a mission with skill and defend against violence, placed between the Drum and the Standard. This is the order by which I would arrange a main battalion, equivalent to half the army, which would stretch 382 yards wide and as long as stated above, excluding the space taken by the extraordinary Pikes to defend the unarmed personnel, which would be around seventy-five yards. I would arrange the other main battalion on the right side in the same way as I did on the left, leaving a space of twenty-two yards between the two main battalions. In the front of that space, I would position some small artillery carriages, behind which would stand the overall captain of the entire army, having about 200 men with him, mostly chosen to be on foot, among whom there should be ten or more able to execute all commands and be equipped in such a way that they could be mounted or dismounted depending on the need. The army’s artillery should consist of ten Cannons to capture Towns, with a shot not exceeding fifty pounds; these will most serve to defend the camp rather than fight the battle. The other artillery should be lighter, around ten to fifteen pounds per shot, and I would place it in front of the entire army unless the terrain allows for positioning it securely on the flank where it wouldn’t be endangered by the enemy. This structure of an army, thus arranged, can use both the formation of the Phalanx and the order of the Roman Legions in battle; because in front, there are Pikes, and all the men are arranged in ranks in such a way that when encountering the enemy and resisting, they can, in the manner of the Phalanx, restore the front line with those behind. Conversely, if they are pressured so heavily that they are forced to break formation and retreat, they can enter the gaps of the second battalion behind them, regroup, and confront the enemy again, and when that is not sufficient, they can retreat a second or third time. Thus, regarding fighting, this arrangement allows for continuous renewal, both in the Greek manner and in the Roman way. Concerning the strength of the army, a stronger order cannot be devised; for both sides are exceedingly well-resourced with commanders and weapons, leaving nothing weak except for the rear part of the unarmed, which, however, is also fortified by the extraordinary Pikes along the flanks. The enemy cannot attack from any side without finding it well-prepared, and the rear cannot be assaulted either; for no enemy possesses sufficient power to engage you from all sides equally. Thus, if they are three times your number and as well-prepared as you, they weaken themselves by attacking in various places. Any breach you make will leave the rest vulnerable. Regarding horses, even if they happen to have more than yours, you need not fear; as the arrangements of the Pikes protecting you shield you from all their assaults, even if your horses are pushed back. The commanders are situated in such a way that they can easily command and follow orders; the spaces between the battalions and orders serve not only to allow them to receive one another but also to give room for messengers moving according to the Captain's orders. And as I told you at the beginning, how the Romans had about twenty-four thousand men for an army, so that should be the case here: and just as the other soldiers drew lessons from the Legions about fighting and army structure, those soldiers who you should integrate into our two main battalions ought to adopt the form and order of them. With this example provided, it’s easy to imitate; for adding either two more main battalions to the army or as many soldiers as needed will require nothing more than doubling the orders, where there were ten battalions on the left, putting twenty, either consolidating or extending the orders as required by the terrain or the might of the enemy.

LUIGI. Surelye sir I imagine in suche wise of this armie, that mee thinkes I nowe see it, and I burne with a desire to see it incounter, and I woulde for nothing in the worlde, that you shoulde become Fabius Maximus intendyng to kepe the enemie at a baie, and to deferre the daie of battaile: {111} bicause I would saie worse of you, then the Romain people saied of hym.

LUIGI. Surely, sir, I imagine this army in such a way that I believe I see it now, and I'm burning with a desire to see it in battle. I wouldn't want anything in the world for you to become Fabius Maximus, intending to hold the enemy at bay and delay the day of battle, {111} because I would have worse to say about you than the Roman people did about him.

The descripcion of a battaile that is a faightyng.

The description of a battle that is a fight.

FABRICIO. Doubt not: Doe you not heare the artillerie? Ours have alredie shotte, but little hurte the enemie: and thextraordinarie Veliti, issuyng out of their places together with the light horsemen, moste speadely, and with moste merveilous furie, and greateste crie that maie be, thei assaulte the enemie: whose artillerie hath discharged ones, and hath passed over the heddes of our footemen, without doyng them any hurt, and bicause it cannot shoote the seconde tyme, the Veliti, and our horsemen, have nowe gotten it, and the enemies for to defende it, are come fore warde, so that neither our ordinaunce, nor thenemies, can any more doe their office. Se with how moche vertue, strengthe and agilitie our men faighteth, and with how moche knowledge through the exercise, whiche hath made them to abide, and by the confidence, that thei have in the armie, the whiche, see, how with the pace therof, and with the men of armes on the sides, it marcheth in good order, to give the charge on the adversarie: See our artillerie, whiche to give theim place, and to leave them the space free, is retired by thesame space, from whens the Veliti issued: See how the capitaine incourageth them, sheweth them the victorie certain: See how the Veliti and light horsemen bee inlarged, and retourned on the flanckes of tharmie, to seke and view, if thei maie by the flanck, doe any injurie to the adversaries: behold how the armies be affronted. Se with how moche valiauntnesse thei have withstode the violence of thenemies, and with how moche silence, and how the capitain commaundeth the menne of armes, that thei sustain, and not charge, and that thei breake not from the order of the footemen: see how our light horsemen be gone, to give the charge on a band of the enemies Harkebutters, whiche would have hurt our men by flancke, and how the enemies horse have succoured them, so that tourned betwene the one and the other horse, thei cannot shoote, but are faine to retire behinde their owne battaile: see with what furie our Pikes doe also affront, and {112} how the footemen be now so nere together the one to the other, that the Pikes can no more be occupied: so that according to the knowlege learned of us, our pikes do retire a little and a little betwen the targaettes. Se how in this while a great bande of men of armes of the enemies, have charged our men of armes on the lefte side, and how ours, accordyng to knowlege, bee retired under the extraordinarie Pikes, and with the help of those, giving again a freshe charge, have repulced the adversaries, and slain a good part of them: in so moche, that thordinarie pikes of the first battailes, be hidden betwene the raies of the Targaettes, thei havyng lefte the faight to the Targaet men: whom you maie see, with how moche vertue, securitie, and leasure, thei kill the enemie: see you not how moche by faightyng, the orders be thrust together? That thei can scarse welde their sweardes? Behold with how moche furie the enemies move: bicause beyng armed with the pike, and with the swerd unprofitable (the one for beyng to long, the other for findyng thenemie to well armed) in part thei fall hurt or dedde, in parte thei flie. See, thei flie on the righte corner, thei flie also on the lefte: behold, the victorie is ours. Have not we wonne a field moste happely? But with more happinesse it should bee wonne, if it were graunted me to put it in acte. And see, how there neded not the helpe of the seconde, nor of the third order, for our first fronte hath sufficed to overcome theim: in this part, I have no other to saie unto you, then to resolve if any doubt be growen you.

FABRICIO. Don’t doubt: Can’t you hear the artillery? Ours have already fired, but did little damage to the enemy; and the extraordinary Veliti, charging out with the light cavalry, quickly and with incredible fury, and the loudest shout possible, attack the enemy: whose artillery has fired once, passing over our foot soldiers’ heads without hurting them. Since it can’t shoot again, the Veliti and our cavalry have now taken it, and the enemy’s defenders have moved forward, so that neither our artillery nor the enemy’s can do their jobs anymore. Look at how much valor, strength, and agility our men fight with, and how much knowledge from their training has made them stand firm, coupled with the confidence they have in the army, which, see how it moves steadily, with the armored men on the sides, advancing in good order to charge the adversary: Observe our artillery, which has withdrawn to give them space, retreating from the point where the Veliti emerged: Notice how the captain encourages them, showing them that victory is certain: See how the Veliti and light cavalry have spread out and moved around the flanks of the army, looking to see if they can hurt the enemy from the side: behold how the armies confront each other. See how valiantly they have withstood the enemy’s violence, and with how much silence, and how the captain commands the armored men to hold back and not charge, and that they do not break from the formation of the foot soldiers: notice how our light cavalry has moved to charge a group of the enemy’s handgunners who would have hurt our men from the side, and how the enemy’s cavalry has come to their aid, so that caught between the two forces, they cannot shoot, but are forced to retreat behind their own lines: see how fiercely our Pikes are also engaging, and how the foot soldiers are now so close together that the Pikes cannot be used anymore: so according to the knowledge we have gained, our pikes withdraw little by little between the shields. Look how meanwhile a large group of enemy cavalry has charged our armored men on the left side, and how ours, expertly, have taken cover behind the extraordinary Pikes, and with their help, charging again, have pushed back the adversaries and killed many of them: to such an extent that the regular pikes from the initial battles are hidden between the ranks of the Shields, having left the fight to the Shield-bearers: whom you can see, with how much valor, confidence, and ease, they are killing the enemy: do you not see how by fighting, the formations are pressed together? That they can hardly wield their swords? Behold how fiercely the enemies move: because armed with the pike, and with the sword being ineffective (one being too long, the other failing to penetrate the enemy’s better armor) some fall wounded or dead, while others flee. Look, they are running away on the right flank, and they are also fleeing on the left: behold, victory is ours. Haven’t we happily won the battlefield? But it would have been won with even more happiness if I had been allowed to act on it. And see, there is no need for the support of the second or third lines, for our first front has sufficed to overcome them: in this regard, I have nothing more to say to you than to resolve any doubts you may have.

Questions concerning the shotyng of ordinaunce.

Questions concerning the shooting of ordnance.

LUIGI. You have with so moche furie wonne this fielde that I so moche mervaile and am so astonied, that I beleve that I am not able to expresse, if any doubt remain in my mynde: yet trustyng in your prudence, I will be so bolde to tell thesame that I understande. Tell me firste, why made you not your ordinaunce to shoote more then ones? And why straighte waie you made them to retire into tharmie, nor after made no mension of them? Me thought also, that you leveled the artillerie of the enemie high, and appoincted it after your own devise: the whiche might very {113} well bee, yet when it should happen, as I beleve it chaunseth often, that thei strike the rankes, what reamedie have you? And seyng that I have begun of the artillerie, I will finishe all this question, to the intente I nede not to reason therof any more. I have heard many dispraise the armours, and the orders of the aunciente armies, arguyng, how now a daies, thei can doe little, but rather should bee altogether unprofitable, havyng respecte to the furie of the artillerie: bicause, this breaketh the orders, and passeth the armours in soche wise, that it semeth unto them a foolishenesse to make an order, whiche cannot bee kepte, and to take pain to beare a harneis, that cannot defende a man.

LUIGI. You have fought with such fury to win this battle that I’m amazed and stunned; I believe I can't express what’s in my mind, if there’s any doubt left. Still, trusting in your wisdom, I'll be bold enough to share what I understand. First, why didn't you organize your troops to shoot more than once? And why did you make them retreat straight into the army without mentioning it again? I also thought you aimed the enemy’s artillery high and set it up according to your own plan, which might very well be the case. However, when it inevitably happens, as I believe it often does, that they strike the ranks, what will you do? And since I started with the artillery, I’ll finish this topic so I don’t have to discuss it again. I've heard many criticize the armor and tactics of ancient armies, arguing that nowadays they are mostly ineffective, especially considering the fury of artillery. This breaks formations and penetrates armor in such a way that it seems foolish to create a strategy that can't be maintained, and to bother with armor that can't protect a person.

An aunswere to the questions that were demaunded, concernyng the shoting of ordinaunce; The best remedie to avoide the hurte that the enemie in the fielde maie doe with his ordinaunce; A policie against bowes and dartes; Nothyng causeth greater confusion in an armie, than to hinder mennes fightes; Nothing more blindeth the sight of men in an armie, then the smoke of ordinaunce; A policie to trouble the enemies sight; The shotte of greate ordinaunce in the fielde, is not moche to bee feared of fotemenne; Bicause menne of armes stand closer together then light horsmen, thei ought to remaine behinde the armie till the enemies ordinaunce have done shootyng; The artillerie is no let, why the auncient orders of warfar ought not to be used in these daies.

An answer to the questions that were asked regarding the use of artillery; the best way to avoid the damage that the enemy can inflict in the field with their artillery; a strategy against bows and arrows; nothing causes greater confusion in an army than to disrupt soldiers’ fighting; nothing blinds the sight of soldiers in an army more than the smoke from artillery; a strategy to disrupt the enemy's sight; the fire from large artillery in the field is not much to be feared by foot soldiers; because men-at-arms stand closer together than light cavalry, they should stay behind the army until the enemy's artillery has finished shooting; artillery is no reason why the ancient orders of warfare should not be used today.

FABRICIO. This question of yours (bicause it hath many heddes) hath neede of a long aunswere. It is true, that I made not thartillery to shoote more than ones, and also of thesame ones, I stoode in doubte: the occasion was, for asmoche as it importeth more, for one to take hede not to be striken, then it importeth to strike the enemie. You have to understande, that to purpose that a pece of ordinaunce hurte you not, it is necessarie either to stande where it cannot reche you, or to get behinde a wall, or behinde a banke: other thing there is not that can witholde it: and it is nedefull also, that the one and the other be moste strong. Those capitaines whiche come to faight a field, cannot stand behind a wal, or behind bankes, nor where thei maie not be reached: therfore it is mete for them, seyng thei cannot finde a waie to defende them, to finde some mean, by the whiche thei maie be least hurte: nor thei cannot finde any other waie, then to prevente it quickly: the waie to prevent it, is to go to finde it out of hande, and hastely, not at leasure and in a heape: for that through spede, the blowe is not suffered to bee redoubled, and by the thinnesse, lesse nomber of menne maie be hurt. This, a bande of menne ordered, cannot dooe; bicause if thesame marche hastely, it goweth out of order: if it go scattered, the enemie shall have no paine to breake it, for that it breaketh by it self: and therfore, I ordered the armie after soche sorte, that it might dooe the one thyng {114} and the other: for as moche as havyng set in the corners thereof, a thousande Veliti, I appoincted that after that our ordinaunce had shotte, thei should issue out together with the light horsemen, to get the enemies artillerie: and therfore, I made not my ordinance to shoote again, to the intente, to give no tyme to the enemie to shoote: Bicause space could not be given to me, and taken from other men, and for thesame occasion, where I made my ordinaunce not to shoote the seconde tyme, was for that I would not have suffered the enemie to have shot at al, if I had could: seyng that to mynde that the enemies artillerie be unprofitable, there is no other remedie, but to assaulte it spedely: for as moche as if the enemies forsake it, thou takeste it, if thei will defende it, it is requisite that thei leave it behind, so that being possessed of enemies, and of frendes, it cannot shoote. I would beleve, that with out insamples these reasons should suffice you, yet beyng able to shewe olde ensamples, to prove my saiynges true, I will. Ventidio commyng to faight a field with the Parthians, whose strength for the moste part, consisted in bowes and arrowes, he suffered theim almoste to come harde to his campe, before he drewe out his armie, the whiche onely he did, to be able quickly to prevent them: and not to give them space to shoote. Cesar when he was in Fraunce, maketh mencion, that in faighting a battaile with the enemies, he was with so moche furie assaulted of them, that his menne had no time to whorle their Dartes, accordyng to the custome of the Romaines: wherfore it is seen, that to intende, that a thyng that shooteth farre of, beyng in the field, doe not hurte thee, there is no other remedy, then with as moche celeritie as maie bee, to prevente it. An other cause moved me to procede, without shotyng the ordinaunce, whereat peradventure you will laugh: yet I judge not that it is to be dispraised. Ther is nothyng that causeth greater confusion in an armie, then to hinder mennes fightes: whereby many moste puisaunte armies have been broken, by meanes their fighte hath been letted, either with duste, or with the Sunne: yet there is nothyng, that more letteth the sight {115} then the smoke that the artillerie maketh in shotyng: therfore, I would thinke that it wer more wisedome, to suffer the enemie to blinde hymself, then to purpose (thou being blind) to go to finde hym: for this cause, either I would not shote, or (for that this should not be proved, considering the reputacion that the artillerie hath) I would place it on the corners of the armie, so that shootyng, it should not with the smoke thereof, blinde the front of thesame, whiche is the importaunce of my men. And to prove that it is a profitable thyng, to let the sight of the enemie, there maie be brought for insample Epaminondas, whom to blind the enemies armie, whiche came to faight with hym, he caused his light horsemen, to run before the fronte of the enemies, to raise up the duste, and to lette their sight, whereby he gotte the victorie. And where it semeth unto you, that I have guided the shot of the artillerie, after my owne devise, making it to passe over the heddes of my men, I answer you, that most often tymes, and without comparison, the greate ordinaunce misse the footemen, moche soner than hitte theim: for that the footemen are so lowe, and those so difficult to shoote; that every little that thou raisest theim, thei passe over the heddes of men: and if thei be leveled never so little to lowe, thei strike in the yearth, and the blowe cometh not to theim: also the unevenesse of the grounde saveth them, for that every little hillocke, or high place that is, betwene the men and thordinance, letteth the shot therof. And concernyng horsmen, and in especially men of armes, bicause thei ought to stand more close together, then the light horsemen, and for that thei are moche higher, maie the better be stroken, thei maie, untill the artillerie have shotte, be kepte in the taile of the armie. True it is, that the Harkebutters doe moche more hurt, and the field peces, then the greate ordinance, for the whiche, the greatest remedy is, to come to hande strokes quickly: and if in the firste assaulte, there be slaine some, alwaies there shall bee slaine: but a good capitaine, and a good armie, ought not to make a coumpte of a hurte, that is particulare, but of a {116} generall, and to imitate the Suizzers, whom never eschue to faight, beyng made afraied of the artillerie: but rather punishe with death those, whiche for feare thereof, either should go out of the ranke, or should make with his body any signe of feare. I made them (so sone as thei had shotte) to bee retired into the armie, that thei might leave the waie free for the battaile: I made no more mencion of theim, as of a thyng unprofitable, the faight beyng begun. You have also saied, that consideryng the violence of this instrument, many judge the armours, and the auncient orders to be to no purpose, and it semeth by this your talke, that men now a daies, have founde orders and armours, whiche are able to defend them against the artillerie: if you knowe this, I would bee glad that you would teache it me: for that hetherto, I never sawe any, nor I beleve that there can any be founde: so that I would understande of soche men, for what cause the souldiours on foote in these daies, weare the breastplate, or the corselet of steele, and thei on horsebacke go all armed: bicause seyng that thei blame the aunciente armyng of men as unprofitable, considryng the artillery, thei ought to despise also this? I would understande moreover, for what occasion the Suizzers, like unto the auncient orders, make a battaile close together of sixe, or eight thousande menne, and for what occasion all other have imitated theim, this order bearyng the verie same perill, concernyng the artillerie, that those other should beare, whiche should imitate the antiquitie. I beleve thei should not knowe what to answere: but if you should aske soche Souldiours, as had some judgement, thei would aunswere first, that thei go armed, for that though thesame armoure defende theim not from the artillerie: it defendeth them from crossebowes, from Pikes, from sweardes, from stones, and from all other hurt, that commeth from the enemies, thei would answere also, that thei went close together, like the Suizzers, to be able more easely to overthrow the footemen, to be able to withstand better the horse and to give more difficultie to the enemie to breake them: so that it is seen, that the souldiours have to fear, {117} many other thynges besides the ordinance: from which thynges, with the armours, and with the orders, thei are defended: whereof foloweth, that the better that an armie is armed, and the closer that it hath the orders, and stronger, so moche the surer it is: so that he that is of thesame opinion, that you saie, it behoveth either that he bee of smalle wisedome, or that in this thyng, he hath studied verie little: for as moche as if we see, that so little a parte of the aunciente maner of armyng, whiche is used now a daies, that is the pike, and so little a parte of those orders, as are the maine battailes of the Suizzers, dooe us so moche good, and cause our armies to bee so strong, why ought not we to beleve, that the other armours, and thother orders whiche are lefte, be profitable? Seyng that if we have no regard to the artillerie, in puttyng our selves close together, as the Suizzers, what other orders maie make us more to feare thesame? For as moche as no order can cause us so moche to feare thesame, as those, whiche bryng men together. Besides this, if the artillerie of the enemies should not make me afraied, in besiegyng a Toune, where it hurteth me with more safegarde, beyng defended of a wall, I beyng not able to prevente it, but onely with tyme, with my artillerie to lette it, after soche sorte that it maie double the blowe as it liste, why should I feare thesame in the field, where I maie quickly prevent it? So that I conclude thus, that the artillerie, according to my opinion, doeth not let, that the aunciente maners cannot be used, and to shewe the auncient vertue: and if I had not talked alreadie with you of this instrument, I would of thesame, declare unto you more at length: but I will remit my self to that, whiche then I saied.

FABRICIO. This question of yours (because it has many aspects) needs a lengthy answer. It's true that I didn't make the artillery to shoot more than once, and I was in doubt about those same shots: the reason being that it's more important for one to take care not to be hit than it is to strike the enemy. You have to understand that to ensure a piece of artillery doesn't harm you, it's necessary either to be positioned where it can't reach you, or to take cover behind a wall or a bank: there's no other way to avoid it; and it's also essential that both the position and the cover are very strong. The commanders who come to fight in the field can't stand behind a wall, or behind banks, or in places where they can’t be reached: therefore, it is fitting for them, seeing they can't find a way to defend themselves, to find some means by which they may be least hurt; and they cannot find any other way than to quickly anticipate it: the way to do that is to approach it immediately and hastily, not leisurely and in a heap: because by acting fast, the blow is not allowed to be doubled, and the smaller number of men may be harmed less. This, a group of men ordered, cannot do; because if they march hastily, they go out of order: if they scatter, the enemy will have no trouble breaking them, as they break themselves; and therefore, I organized the army in such a way that it could do both things: for as I set in the corners a thousand Velites, I arranged that after our artillery had shot, they should come out together with the light horsemen to capture the enemy's artillery: and thus, I did not have my artillery shoot again, intending to give no time to the enemy to shoot: Because time could not be given to me and taken from others, and for the same reason, the occasion I made my artillery not shoot the second time was because I would not allow the enemy to shoot at all, if I could: seeing that remembering the enemy's artillery is useless, there's no other remedy but to assault it quickly: because if the enemy abandons it, you seize it, if they will defend it, it’s necessary that they leave it behind, so that being possessed by enemies and friends, it cannot shoot. I would believe that without examples these reasons should suffice you, yet being able to show old examples to prove my words true, I will. Ventidius, coming to fight a battle with the Parthians, whose strength mostly relied on bows and arrows, let them come almost close to his camp before he drew out his army, which he did only to be able to quickly prevent them: and not to give them space to shoot. Caesar, when he was in France, mentions that in fighting a battle with the enemy, he was assaulted with such fury that his men had no time to hurl their darts, as was the custom of the Romans: wherefore it is seen that to intend for something that shoots from afar while being in the field, to not be hurt by it, there is no other remedy, than to prevent it as quickly as possible. Another reason moved me to proceed without shooting the artillery, at which you might laugh: yet I don’t think it deserves to be despised. There’s nothing that causes greater confusion in an army than to hinder men’s fighting: whereby many most powerful armies have been broken due to their fight being obstructed, either by dust or by the sun: yet there’s nothing that hinders sight more than the smoke that artillery makes when shooting: therefore, I would think that it would be wiser to let the enemy blind themselves than to intend (you being blind) to find them: for this reason, either I would not shoot, or (for this should not be proven, considering the reputation that artillery has) I would place it on the corners of the army, so that shooting, it should not, with its smoke, blind the front of the same, which is important for my men. And to prove that it’s beneficial to obscure the enemy’s sight, an example can be brought of Epaminondas, who to blind the enemy's army, which came to fight with him, caused his light horsemen to run before the front of the enemies to raise dust and obstruct their sight, which led him to victory. And where it seems to you that I directed the shot of the artillery, according to my own design, making it pass over the heads of my men, I answer you that most often, and without comparison, the great artillery misses the foot soldiers much sooner than it hits them: because the foot soldiers are so low, and those so difficult to shoot; that any little elevation, they pass over the heads of men: and if leveled just a bit low, they strike the earth, and the blow doesn’t reach them: also, the unevenness of the ground saves them, as every little hillock or high place that is between the men and the artillery hinders its shot. And concerning horsemen, especially men-at-arms, because they ought to stand closer together than light horsemen, and because they are much taller, they can be struck more easily, they can, until the artillery has shot, be kept in the back of the army. It’s true that the harquebusiers do much more harm, and the field pieces, than the great artillery, for which, the best remedy is to quickly come to hand strokes: and if in the first assault some are slain, there will always be some slain: but a good captain, and a good army, should not count on a hurt that is particular, but of a general, and to imitate the Swiss, who never avoid fighting, being afraid of artillery: but rather punish with death those who, for fear of it, either leave the ranks or show any sign of fear with their bodies. I made them (as soon as they had shot) retreat into the army, so that they might leave the way clear for the battle: I made no more mention of them, as of something unprofitable, the fight being begun. You also said that considering the power of this instrument, many judge armor and ancient orders to be useless, and it seems from your words that people nowadays have found orders and armors that can defend them against artillery: if you know this, I would be glad if you would teach it to me: for until now, I have never seen any, nor do I believe any can be found: so that I would like to understand from such people why the foot soldiers these days wear a breastplate, or a steel corslet, while those on horseback go fully armed: because if they criticize the ancient armoring of men as useless, considering the artillery, they ought to despise this as well? I would like to know moreover, for what reason the Swiss, like the ancient orders, make a battle close together of six or eight thousand men, and why all others have imitated them, this order bearing the very same danger, concerning the artillery, that those others would bear who imitate antiquity. I believe they wouldn’t know what to answer: but if you were to ask such soldiers who had some judgment, they would answer first that they go armed because although this armor doesn’t defend them from artillery: it protects them from crossbows, from pikes, from swords, from stones, and from all other harm that comes from enemies, they would also answer that they go close together, like the Swiss, to be able to more easily overthrow the foot soldiers, withstand horsemen better, and give more difficulty to the enemy to break them: so that it is seen that the soldiers have to fear many other things besides artillery: from which things, with armors and orders, they are defended: hence it follows that the better an army is armed and the closer its orders are, and the stronger it is, the safer it is: so that whoever is of the same opinion as you say, either must be of little wisdom, or that he has studied very little in this matter: for as we see, that such a small part of the ancient way of arming, which is used nowadays, that is the pike, and such a small portion of those orders, such as the main battles of the Swiss, do us so much good and make our armies so strong, why shouldn’t we believe that the other armors and the other orders that are left are beneficial? Seeing that if we have no regard for artillery in grouping ourselves together, like the Swiss, what other orders could make us more afraid of them? Because no order can make us fear them more than those that bring men together. Besides this, if the enemy's artillery doesn’t frighten me, in besieging a town, where it hurts me with more safety, being protected by a wall, I being unable to prevent it, but only in time, with my artillery to hinder it, in such a way that it can double the blow as it pleases, why should I fear it in the field, where I can quickly prevent it? So I conclude thus, that artillery, according to my opinion, does not prevent ancient methods from being used, and to show ancient virtue: and if I had not already talked with you about this instrument, I would explain more fully: but I will refer back to what I said then.

LUIGI. Wee maie now understande verie well, how moche you have aboute the artillerie discoursed: and in conclusion, my thinkes you have shewed, that the preventyng it quickly, is the greatest remedie, that maie be had for thesame, beyng in the fielde, and havyng an armie againste you. Upon the whiche there groweth in me a doubte: bicause me thinkes, that the enemie might place his {118} ordinaunce in soche wise, in his armie, that it should hurt you, and should be after soche sort garded of the footemen, that it could not be prevented. You have (if you remember your self well) in the orderyng of your armie to faight, made distaunces of three yardes, betwene the one battaile and the other, makyng those distaunces fiftene, whiche is from the battailes, to thextraordinarie pikes: if thenemie, shuld order his armie like unto yours, and should putte the artillerie a good waie within those spaces, I beleve that from thens, it should hurte you with their moste greate safegard: bicause menne can not enter into the force of their enemies to prevent it.

LUIGI. We can now understand very well how much you’ve talked about artillery: and in conclusion, I think you’ve shown that quickly preventing it is the best remedy available in the field when an enemy army is against you. This raises a doubt in my mind: because I think that the enemy could position their artillery in such a way within their army that it would harm you, and have it sufficiently guarded by foot soldiers so that it couldn’t be prevented. You have (if you remember correctly) arranged your army to fight with distances of three yards between each battle line, making those distances fifteen, which is from the battle lines to the extraordinary pikes. If the enemy were to arrange their army like yours, and place their artillery well within those spaces, I believe it would hurt you with great protection: because men cannot enter into the strength of their enemies to prevent it.

A generall rule againste soche thynges as cannot bee withstoode.

A general rule against things that cannot be resisted.

FABRICIO. You doubt moste prudently, and I will devise with my self, either to resolve you the doubte, or shewe you the remedie: I have tolde you, that continually these battailes, either through goyng, or thorowe faightyng, are movyng, and alwaies naturally, thei come to drawe harde together, so that if you make the distaunces of a small breadth, where you set the artillerie, in a little tyme thei be shootte up, after soche sort, that the artillerie cannot any more shoote: if you make theim large, to avoide this perill, you incurre into a greater, where you through those distances, not onely give commoditie to the enemie, to take from you the artillerie, but to breake you: but you have to understande, that it is impossible to keepe the artillerie betwene the bandes, and in especially those whiche go on carriages: For that the artillerie goeth one waie, and shooteth an other waie: So that havyng to go and to shoote, it is necessary, before thei shote, that thei tourne, and for to tourne theim, thei will have so moche space, that fiftie cartes of artillerie, would disorder any armie: therfore, it is mete to kepe them out of the bandes, where thei may be overcome in the maner, as a little afore we have shewed: but admit thei might be kept, and that there might be found a waie betwen bothe, and of soche condicion, that the presyng together of men should not hinder the artillerie, and were not so open that it should give waie to the enemie, I saie, that it is remedied moste easely, with makyng distances {119} in thy armie against it, whiche maie give free passage to the shot of those, and so the violence thereof shall come to be vain, the which maie be doen moste easely: for asmoche, as the enemie mindyng to have his artillerie stand safe, it behoveth that he put them behinde, in the furthest part of the distances, so that the shot of the same, he purposyng that thei hurt not his owne men, ought to passe by right line, and by that very same alwaies: and therefore with givyng theim place, easely thei maie bee avoided: for that this is a generall rule, that to those thynges, whiche cannot be withstoode, there must bee given waie, as the antiquitie made to the Eliphantes, and to the carres full of hookes. I beleve, ye, I am more then certaine, that it semeth unto you, that I have ordered and wonne a battaile after my own maner: notwithstanding, I answeer unto you this, when so moche as I have saied hetherto, should not suffice, that it should be impossible, that an armie thus ordered, and armed, should not overcome at the first incounter, any other armie that should bee ordained, as thei order the armies now adaies, whom most often tymes, make not but one front, havyng no targaettes, and are in soche wise unarmed, that thei cannot defende themselves from the enemie at hand, and thei order theim after soche sorte, that if thei set their battailes by flanck, the one to the other, thei make the armie thinne: if thei put the one behind the other, havyng no waie to receive the one the other, thei doe it confusedly, and apt to be easly troubled: and although thei give three names to their armies, and devide them into thre companies, vaward, battaile, and rereward, notwithstandyng it serveth to no other purpose, then to marche, and to distinguis the lodgynges: but in the daie of battaile, thei binde them all to the first brunte, and to the first fortune.

FABRICIO. You doubt wisely, and I’ll figure out whether to resolve your doubt or show you a solution: I've mentioned that these battles are always happening, whether through movement or fighting, and they naturally come together closely. If you create a small distance between where you position the artillery, it won’t be long before it’s shot up in such a way that it can’t shoot anymore. If you widen the gap to avoid this risk, you fall into a greater one, as you then allow the enemy to take your artillery and break your formation. You need to understand that it's impossible to keep the artillery within the ranks, especially those on carriages. This is because the artillery moves in one direction and shoots in another. So, they need to turn before shooting, and turning requires enough space that fifty artillery carts could disrupt any army. Therefore, it’s best to keep them out of the ranks, where they can be engaged as we showed earlier. But let’s assume they could be kept and a way could be found that the pressing of troops wouldn’t obstruct the artillery and wasn’t so open that it would allow the enemy to exploit it. I say this can easily be addressed by creating distances in your army against it, which will allow free passage for their shots, making their impact ineffective. This can be easily managed. Since the enemy, aiming to keep his artillery safe, must place it behind, at the farthest part of the distances, the shots should pass in a straight line, ensuring they don't harm their own men. By giving them space, they can easily be avoided. This is a general rule: for things that cannot be resisted, one must yield, just as antiquity did with elephants and carts full of spikes. I believe, yes, I’m quite certain, that it seems to you that I have planned and won a battle my own way. However, I respond to you this: even if what I've said so far might seem insufficient, it should be impossible for an army organized and equipped like this not to overcome at the first encounter, any other army arranged as they do today. They often create only a single front, lacking shields, and are organized in such a way that they cannot defend themselves against the enemy up close. They position themselves so that if one wing supports the other, they thin out the army, and if they place one behind the other without a way to support one another, they do so haphazardly, making them easy targets. Although they give their armies three names and divide them into three parts—vanguard, battle, and rearguard—this serves no other purpose than to march and distinguish their camps. But on the day of battle, they bind them all to the first charge and the first fortune.

LUIGI. I have noted also in the faightyng of your fielde, how your horsemen were repulced of the enemies horsemen: for whiche cause thei retired to the extraordinaire Pikes: whereby grewe, that with the aide of theim, thei withstode, and drave the enemies backe? I beleve that the Pikes maie {120} withstande the horses, as you saie, but in a grosse and thicke maine battaile, as the Suizzers make: but you in your army, have for the hedde five rankes of Pikes, and for the flancke seven, so that I cannot tell how thei maie bee able to withstande them.

LUIGI. I’ve also noticed in your battle that your cavalry was pushed back by the enemy's cavalry. Because of this, they fell back to the extra pikes, which allowed them to hold their ground and drive the enemy back. I believe that the pikes can, as you say, withstand horses, especially in a dense and tightly packed battle like the Swiss do. However, in your army, you have five ranks of pikes at the front and seven on the flanks, so I'm not sure how they’ll be able to withstand them.

A Battaile how greate so ever it bee, cannot atones occupy above v. rankes of Pikes.

A battle, no matter how great it is, cannot occupy more than five ranks of pikes.

FABRICIO. Yet I have told you, how sixe rankes of pikes wer occupied at ones, in the Macedonicall Falangi, albeit you ought to understande, that a maine battaile of Suizzers, if it were made of a thousande rankes, it cannot occupie more then fower, or at the most five: bicause the Pikes be sixe yardes and three quarters longe, one yarde and halfe a quarter, is occupied of the handes, wherefore to the firste ranke, there remaineth free five yardes and a half, and a halfe quarter of Pike: the seconde ranke besides that whiche is occupied with the hande, consumeth a yarde and half a quarter in the space, whiche remaineth betwene the one ranke and thother: so that there is not left of pike profitable, more then fower yardes and a halfe: to the thirde ranke, by this verie same reason, there remaineth three yardes and a quarter and a halfe: to the fowerth, twoo yardes and a quarter: to the fift one yard and halfe a quarter: the other rankes, for to hurte, be unprofitable, but thei serve to restore these firste rankes, as we have declared, and to bee a fortificacion to those v. Then if five of their rankes can withstande the horse, why cannot five of ours withstande theim? to the whiche also there lacketh not rankes behinde, that doeth sustain and make them the very same staie, although thei have no pikes as the other. And when the rankes of thextraordinarie pikes, which are placed on the flanckes, should seme unto you thinne, thei maie bee brought into a quadrante, and put on the flancke nere the twoo battailes, whiche I set in the laste companie of the armie: From the whiche place, thei maie easely altogether succour the fronte, and the backe of the armie, and minister helpe to the horses, accordyng as nede shall require.

FABRICIO. I've already explained how six ranks of pikemen were used at once in the Macedonian phalanx. However, you should know that a main battle of Swiss soldiers, even if made up of a thousand ranks, can only occupy four or, at most, five ranks. This is because the pikemen's poles are six and three-quarters yards long, with a yard and a half being held in hand, which leaves about five and a half yards and a half-quarter of the pike free for the first rank. The second rank, in addition to what is held in hand, takes up a yard and a half in the space between each rank, so only about four and a half yards of pike are usable. By the same reasoning, the third rank has about three and a quarter yards and a half left, the fourth has two and a quarter yards left, and the fifth has one and a half quarters. The other ranks don’t contribute much offensively but serve to support the first ranks, as I’ve explained, and provide reinforcement to those five. So, if five of their ranks can withstand cavalry, why can’t five of ours do the same? There are also ranks behind that back them up and maintain the same formation, even if they don’t have pikes like the others. And if the extra ranks of pikemen placed on the flanks seem thin, they can be arranged in a quarter and positioned near the two battle formations that I set in the last part of the army. From that position, they can easily support both the front and the back of the army and assist the cavalry as needed.

LUIGI. Would you alwaies use this forme of order, when you would pitche a fielde.

LUIGI. Would you always use this way of organizing things when you want to set up a battlefield?

{121}

An advertiement concernyng the pitchying of a field.

An advertisement regarding the leasing of a field.

FABRICIO. No in no wise: for that you ought to varie the facion of the armie, according to the qualitie of the situacion, and the condicion and quantitie of the enemie, as before this reasonyng dooe ende, shall bee shewed certaine insamples: but this forme is given unto you, not so moche as moste strongeste of all, where in deede it is verie strong, as to the intente that thereby you maie take a rule, and an order to learne to knowe the waies to ordeine the other: for as moche, as every science hath his generalitie, upon the whiche a good part of it is grounded. One thing onely I advise you, that you never order an armie, after soche sorte, that those that faight afore, cannot bee sucoured of theim, whiche be set behind: bicause he that committeth this errour, maketh the greateste parte of his armie to bee unprofitable, and if it incounter any strength, it cannot overcome.

FABRICIO. Not at all: for that, you should change the formation of the army based on the nature of the situation and the condition and size of the enemy. As this discussion wraps up, I'll show you some examples. This setup is given to you not just because it’s the strongest, although it is indeed very strong, but so you can learn a method and a way to understand how to arrange others. Just like every field of knowledge has its principles, which a significant part of it is built upon. One thing I advise is that you never arrange an army in a way that those fighting at the front can’t be supported by those behind them. Because whoever makes that mistake renders a large part of their army useless, and if they encounter any strong opposition, they won’t be able to prevail.

LUIGI. There is growen in me, upon this parte a doubte. I have seen that in the placyng of the battailes, you make the fronte of five on a side, the middeste of three, and the last partes of twoo, and I beleve, that it were better to ordain them contrariwise: for that I thinke, that an armie should with more difficultie bee broken, when he that should charge upon it, the more that he should entre into the-same, so moche the stronger he should finde it: and the order devised of you, me thinkes maketh, that the more it is entered into, so moche the weaker it is founde.

LUIGI. I have a doubt about this matter. I’ve noticed that in the arrangement of the battles, you place five on the front line, three in the middle, and two in the back. I believe it would be better to organize them the other way around. I think an army is harder to break when the enemy charges at it; the further they go in, the stronger they should find it. Your setup, in my opinion, makes it weaker the more they push forward.

How the front of the armie ought to bee made; How the middell part of the armie ought to be ordered.

How the front of the army should be organized; How the middle part of the army should be arranged.

FABRICIO. If you should remember how to the Triarii, whom were the thirde order of the Romain Legions, there were not assigned more then sixe hundred men, you would doubt lesse, havyng understode how thei were placed in the laste companie: For that you should see, how I moved of this insample, have placed in the last companie twoo battailes, whiche are nine hundred men, so that I come rather (folowyng the insample of the Romaine people) to erre, for havyng taken to many, then to fewe: and although this insample should suffice, I will tell you the reason, the which is this. The first fronte of the armie, is made perfectly whole and thicke, bicause it must withstande the brunt of {122} the enemies, and it hath not to receive in it any of their felowes: and for this, it is fitte that it bee full of menne: bicause a fewe menne, should make it weake, either thinnesse, or for lacke of sufficiente nomber: but the seconde companie, for as moche as it must first receive their frendes, to sustain the enemie, it is mete that it have greate spaces, and for this it behoveth, that it be of lesse nomber then the first: for that if it wer of greater nomber, or equall, it should bee conveniente, either not to leave the distaunces, the whiche should be disorder, or leavyng theim, to passe the boundes of thoseafore, the whiche should make the facion of the armie unperfecte: and it is not true that you saie, that the enemie, the more that he entereth into the maine battaile, so moche the weaker he findeth it: for that the enemie, can never faight with the seconde order, except the first be joined with thesame: so that he cometh to finde the middest of the maine battaile more stronger, and not more weaker, havyng to faight with the first, and with the seconde order altogether: the verie same happeneth, when the enemie should come to the thirde companie: for that there, not with twoo battailes, whiche is founde freshe, but with all the maine battaile he must faight: and for that this last part hath to receive moste men, the spaces therof is requisite to be greatest, and that whiche receiveth them, to be the leste nomber.

FABRICIO. If you remember the Triarii, who were the third order of the Roman legions, they were assigned no more than six hundred men. You would doubt less, having understood how they were positioned in the last company. From this example, I've placed two battalions, totaling nine hundred men, in the last company. Therefore, following the example of the Roman people, I’d rather err by having too many than too few. Although this example should be sufficient, I will explain the reasoning behind it. The front line of the army is solid and dense because it must withstand the attack from the enemies and should not include any of its own men. For this reason, it needs to be full of soldiers; having too few would weaken it, either through sparse coverage or insufficient numbers. The second company, however, must first accommodate its allies to support against the enemy, so it should have significant gaps, thus requiring it to be smaller than the first company. If it were of equal or greater size, it would lead to disarray, either by not leaving enough space, which would cause disorder, or surpassing the boundaries, which would distort the army's formation. It's not true that you say the enemy finds it weaker the more they penetrate the main battle; the enemy can never engage with the second line unless the first is involved. Therefore, they encounter the center of the main battle as stronger, not weaker, as they must fight the first and second lines together. The same applies when the enemy approaches the third company; they must confront not just two battalions that are fresh, but the whole main battle. Thus, since this last section needs to accommodate the most men, its spaces must be the largest, and the one that receives them should have the least number.

The orderyng of the hinder part of tharmy.

The arrangement of the back part of the army.

LUIGI. It pleaseth me thesame that you have told: but answere me also this: if the five first battailes doe retire betwene the three seconde battailes, and after the eight betwene the twoo thirde, it semeth not possible, that the eight beyng brought together, and then the tenne together, maie bee received when thei bee eight, or when thei be tenne in the verie same space, whiche received the five.

LUIGI. I’m glad to hear what you’ve said: but also answer me this: if the first five battles retreat between the three second battles, and then the eight retreat between the two third battles, it doesn’t seem possible that the eight, when gathered together, and then the ten when gathered together, can be received when they are eight or when they are ten in the very same space that received the five.

The retire of the Pikes, to place the Targaet men.

The retirement of the Pikes, to replace the Targaet men.

FABRICIO. The first thyng that I aunswere is, that it is not the verie same space: For that the five have fower spaces in the middeste, whiche retiryng betwene the thre, or betwene the twoo, thei occupie: then there remaineth thesame space, that is betwene the one maine battaile and {123} other and thesame that is, betwene the battailes, and the extraordinarie Pikes, al the whiche spaces makes largenesse: besides this, it is to bee considered, that the battailes kepe other maner of spaces, when thei bee in the orders without beyng altered, then when thei be altered: for that in the alteracion: either thei throng together, or thei inlarge the orders: thei inlarge theim, when thei feare so moche, that thei fall to fliyng, thei thrust them together, when thei feare in soche wise, that thei seke to save them selves, not with runnyng a waie, but with defence: So that in this case, thei should come to be destingueshed, and not to be inlarged. Moreover, the five rankes of the Pikes, that are before, so sone as thei have begun the faighte, thei ought betwene their battailes to retire, into the taile of the armie, for to give place to the Targaet men, that thei maie faighte: and thei goyng into the taile of the armie, maie dooe soche service as the capitain should judge, were good to occupie theim aboute, where in the forward, the faight beyng mingled, thei should otherwise bee altogether unprofitable. And for this the spaces ordained, come to bee for the remnaunte of the menne, wide inough to receive them: yet when these spaces should not suffice, the flankes on the sides be men, and not walles, whom givyng place, and inlargyng them selves, maie make the space to containe so moche, that it maie bee sufficient to receive theim.

FABRICIO. The first thing I’ll say is that it’s not exactly the same space: The five have four spaces in the middle, which they occupy by moving between the three, or between the two. Then there’s the same space that exists between the one main battle and {123} the other, and that is, between the battles and the extra Pikes. All these spaces create plenty of room. Also, it’s important to note that the battles maintain different kinds of spaces when they are in formation without being changed, compared to when they are altered. In the alteration, they either crowd together or they expand the formations: they expand when they’re so scared that they start to run, and they crowd together when they’re scared enough that they try to save themselves, not by running away, but by defending themselves. So in this case, they should be distinguished rather than expanded. Moreover, the five ranks of the Pikes at the front, as soon as they start the fight, should retreat between their battles to the back of the army to make space for the Target men to fight. By going to the back of the army, they can do whatever the captain thinks is good to keep them occupied; otherwise, in the middle of the mixed fight, they would be totally useless. And for this reason, the designated spaces should be wide enough to accommodate the remaining men. However, if these spaces aren’t enough, the flanks on the sides are men, not walls, who by creating space and expanding themselves can make the area large enough to fit them.

How the pikes that are placed on the flankes of the armie ought to governe them selves when the rest of the armie is driven to retire.

How the pikes positioned on the flanks of the army should manage themselves when the rest of the army is forced to retreat.

LUIGI. The rankes of the extraordinarie Pikes, whiche you place on the flanckes of the armie, when the first battailes retire into the second, will you have them to stande still, and remain with twoo homes to the armie? Or will you that thei also retire together, with the battailes? The whiche when thei should do, I see not how thei can, havyng no battailes behinde with distaunces that maie receive them.

LUIGI. The lines of the extra pikemen that you have positioned on the flanks of the army, when the first battles pull back into the second, should they stand still and keep two flanks for the army? Or do you want them to also fall back along with the battles? If they do that, I don’t see how they can, since there are no battles behind them at a distance to support them.

Thexercise of the army in generall; The nomber that is mete to be written in the Ansigne of every band of men; The degrees of honours in an armie, whiche soche a man ought to rise by, as should bee made a generall capitain.

The exercise of the army in general; The number that should be recorded in the assignment of each group of men; The ranks of honors in an army, which such a person should advance through to become a general captain.

FABRICIO. If the enemie overcome theim not, when he inforceth the battailes to retire, thei maie stande still in their order, and hurte the enemie on the flanck, after that the firste battailes retired: but if he should also overcome {124} theim, as semeth reason, beyng so puisaunte, that he is able to repulce the other, thei also ought to retire: whiche thei maie dooe excellently well, although thei have not behinde, any to receive them: bicause from the middest thei maie redouble by right line, entring the one ranke into the other, in the maner whereof wee reasoned, when it was spoken of the order of redoublyng: True it is, that to mynde redoublyng to retire backe, it behoveth to take an other waie, then thesame that I shewed you: for that I told you, that the second ranke, ought to enter into the first, the fowerth into the thirde, and so foorth: in this case, thei ought not to begin before, but behinde, so that redoublyng the rankes, thei maie come to retire backewarde not to tourne forward: but to aunswere to all thesame, that upon this foughten field by me shewed, might of you bee replied. I saie unto you again, that I have ordained you this armie, and shewed this foughten field for two causes, thone, for to declare unto you how it is ordered, the other to shewe you how it is exercised: thorder, I beleve you understande moste well: and concernyng the exersice, I saie unto you, that thei ought to be put together in this forme, as often times as maie be: for as moche as the heddes learne therby, to kepe their battailes in these orders: for that to particulare souldiours, it appertaineth to keepe well the orders of every battaile, to the heddes of the battailes, it appertaineth to keepe theim well in every order of the armie, and that thei knowe how to obeie, at the commaundement of the generall capitain: therefore, it is conveniente that thei knowe, how to joyne the one battaile with thother, that thei maie knowe how to take their place atones: and for this cause it is mete that thansigne of every battaile, have written in some evident part, the nomber therof: as well for to be able to commaunde them, as also for that the capitain, and the souldiours by thesame nomber, maie more easely knowe theim againe: also the maine battailes, ought to be nombred, and to have the nomber in their principal Ansigne: Therefore it is requisite, to knowe of what nomber the maine battaile shall be, that is placed on the left, or on {125} the right horne of what nombers the battailes bee, that are set in the fronte, and in the middeste, and so foorthe of the other. The antiquitie would also, that these nombers should bee steppes to degrees, of honors of the armies: as for insample, the first degree, is the Peticapitain, the seconde, the hedde of fiftie ordinarie Veliti, the thirde, the Centurion, the fowerth, the hedde of the first battaile, the fifte, of the second, the sixt, of the thirde, and so forthe, even to the tenth battaile, the whiche must be honoured in the seconde place, nexte the generall capitaine of a maine battaile: nor any ought to come to thesame hedde, if first, he have not risen up by all these degrees. And bicause besides these heddes, there be the three Conestables of the extraordinarie Pikes, and twoo of the extraordinarie Veliti, I would that thei should be in the same degree of the Conestable of the first battaile: nor I would not care, that there were sixe men of like degree, to thintent, that every one of them might strive, who should doe beste, for to be promised to be hedde of the seconde battaile. Then every one of these heddes, knowyng in what place his battaile ought to be sette in, of necessitie it must folowe, that at a sounde of the Trompette, so sone as the hedde standarde shall bee erected, all the armie shall be in their places: and this is the first exercise, whereunto an armie ought to bee accustomed, that is to set theim quickly together: and to doe this, it is requisite every daie, and divers times in one daie, to set them in order, and to disorder them.

FABRICIO. If the enemy does not defeat them, when he forces the battles to retreat, they can remain in formation and strike the enemy from the side after the first battles have retreated. But if he should also defeat them, as it seems reasonable since he is so powerful that he can push back the others, they should also retreat. They can do this quite effectively, even without having anyone behind them, because from the middle, they can double up in a straight line, with one rank entering into the other, in the manner we discussed when we talked about the order of doubling. It's true that to double while retreating, they need to take a different approach than the one I showed you: I told you that the second rank should enter the first, the fourth into the third, and so on; in this case, they should not begin in front, but from behind, so that by doubling the ranks, they can retreat backwards without turning forward. But to respond to all this, regarding the battlefield I showed you, you might have something to say. I say to you again, that I have arranged this army and showed you this battlefield for two reasons: one, to explain how it is organized, the other to demonstrate how it is practiced. I believe you understand the order very well; and regarding the exercise, I tell you that they should come together in this form as often as possible, as much as the leaders learn to maintain their battles in these formations. For individual soldiers, it is important to keep the orders of each battle, while it is up to the leaders of the battles to maintain them well in every formation of the army, and for them to know how to obey the command of the general captain. Therefore, it is essential that they know how to join one battle with another, so they can take their places at once. For this reason, it is appropriate that the standard of each battle have its number written in some obvious part, both to command them and so that the captain and the soldiers can more easily recognize them again by that same number. Also, the main battles should be numbered and have that number on their primary standard. Therefore, it is necessary to know what number the main battle on the left or the right flank will be, what numbers the battles are that are placed at the front, in the middle, and so on with the others. Antiquity also suggested that these numbers should be steps to ranks of honor in the armies: for example, the first rank is the Peticapitain, the second, the head of fifty ordinary Veliti, the third, the Centurion, the fourth, the head of the first battle, the fifth of the second, the sixth of the third, and so forth, up to the tenth battle, which must be honored in second place, next to the general captain of a main battle. No one should reach that rank unless they have first risen through all these ranks. And because alongside these heads, there are the three Constables of the extraordinary Pikes, and two of the extraordinary Veliti, I would want them to be at the same rank as the Constable of the first battle. I wouldn't mind having six men of the same rank, so each of them could strive to be the best and be promised to be the head of the second battle. Then, each of these heads, knowing where their battle should be positioned, must necessarily follow that at the sound of the trumpet, as soon as the head standard is raised, the whole army will be in their places. This is the first exercise to which an army should be accustomed, which is to assemble them quickly. To do this, it is necessary to practice every day, and several times in one day, to organize them and then disband them.

LUIGI. What armes would you that thansignes of all the armie, shoul'd have beside the nomber?

LUIGI. What weapons would you have that signs of the entire army should have besides the number?

The armes that oughte to bee in the standarde, and in the ansignes of an armie; The second and thirde exercise of an armie; The fowerth exercise of an armie; The soundes of the instrumentes of musicke, that the antiquitie used in their armies; What is signified by the sounde of the Trompet.

The weapons that should be in the standard and in the banners of an army; The second and third drills of an army; The fourth drill of an army; The sounds of the musical instruments that ancient times used in their armies; What is meant by the sound of the trumpet.

FABRICIO. The standarde of the generall Capitaine oughte to have the armes of the Prince of the armie, all the other, maie have the verie same armes, and to varie with the fieldes, or to varie with the armes, as should seme beste to the Lorde of the armie: Bicause this importeth little, so that the effect growe, that thei be knowen the one from the other. But let us passe to the other exercise: the which is to make them to move, and with a convenient pace to {126} marche, and to se, that marehyng thei kepe the orders. The third exercise is, that thei learne to handle themselves in thesame maner, whiche thei ought after to handle theimselves in the daie of battaile, to cause the artillerie to shoote, and to bee drawen out of the waie, to make the extraordinarie Veliti to issue out, after a likenes of an assault, to retire theim: To make that the firste battailes, as though thei wer sore charged, retire into the spaces of the second: and after, all into the thirde, and from thens every one to retourne to his place: and in soche wise to use theim in this exercise, that to every manne, all thyng maie be knowen, and familiar: the which with practise, and with familiaritie, is brought to passe moste quickly. The fowerth exercise is, that thei learne to knowe by meane of the sounde, and of the Ansigne, the commaundemente of their capitaine: for as moche as that, whiche shall be to them pronounced by voice, thei without other commaundemente, maie understande: and bicause the importaunce of this commaundement, ought to growe of the sounde, I shall tell you what soundes the antiquitie used. Of the Lacedemonians, accordyng as Tucidido affirmeth, in their armies were used Flutes: for that thei judged, that this armonie, was moste mete to make their armie to procede with gravetie, and with furie: the Carthaginens beyng moved by this verie same reason, in the first assaulte, used the violone. Aliatte kyng of the Lidians, used in the warre the violone, and the Flutes: but Alexander Magnus, and the Romaines, used hornes, and Trumpettes, as thei, that thought by vertue of soche instrumentes, to bee able to incourage more the myndes of Souldiours, and make theim to faight the more lustely: but as we have in armyng the armie, taken of the Greke maner, and of the Romaine, so in distrihutyng the soundes, we will keepe the customes of the one, and of the other nacion: therefore, nere the generall capitain, I would make the Trompettes to stand, as a sounde not onely apt to inflame the armie, but apte to bee heard in all the whole tumoult more, then any other sounde: all the other soundes, whiche should bee aboute the Conestables, and {127} the heddes of maine battailes I would, that thei should bee smalle Drummes, and Flutes, sounded not as thei sounde theim now but as thei use to sounde theim at feastes. The capitaine then with the Trompet, should shewe when thei must stande still, and go forward, or tourne backward, when the artillerie must shoote, when the extraordinarie Veliti must move, and with the varietie or distinccion of soche soundes, to shewe unto the armie all those mocions, whiche generally maie bee shewed, the whiche Trompettes, should bee after followed of the Drummes, and in this exercise, bicause it importeth moche, it behoveth moche to exercise the armie. Concernyng the horsemen, there would be used likewise Trompettes, but of a lesse sounde, and of a divers voice from those of the Capitaine. This is as moche as is come into my remembraunce, aboute the order of the armie, and of the exercise of thesame.

FABRICIO. The standard of the general captain should display the emblem of the prince of the army; all others may have the same emblem, varying with the backgrounds or with the emblems as seems best to the lord of the army. This is of little importance, as long as the outcome allows them to be recognized from one another. But let’s move to the next exercise: which is to get them moving and to march at a suitable pace to {126} see that while marching, they maintain their formations. The third exercise involves teaching them to handle themselves in the same way they should act on the day of battle, to cause the artillery to fire, and to be cleared from the way, to allow the extraordinary Veliti to come out, simulating an assault, and then retreat them: To make the first battalions, as if they were heavily engaged, retreat into the spaces of the second: and after that, all into the third, and then each one to return to their place: and in such a way to use them in this exercise that everything becomes known and familiar to each man: which is achieved most quickly through practice and familiarity. The fourth exercise is for them to learn to recognize the captain’s commands by the sounds and the signals: so that what is spoken to them can be understood without any other direction, and since the significance of this command should arise from the sound, I will tell you what sounds ancient times used. The Spartans, as Thucydides asserts, used flutes in their armies because they believed that this harmony was most suitable to make their army proceed with seriousness and fury: the Carthaginians, moved by the same reasoning, used the viola in their first assault. Aliattes, king of the Lydians, used the viola and flutes in war: but Alexander the Great and the Romans used horns and trumpets, thinking that such instruments could better inspire the soldiers and encourage them to fight more eagerly: but just as we have adopted the Greek and Roman manner of organizing the army, in distributing the sounds, we will uphold the customs of both nations: therefore, near the general captain, I would set the trumpets, as a sound not only suitable to energize the army, but capable of being heard above all the tumult better than any other sound: all the other sounds around the constables and {127} the heads of the main battalions I would have be small drums and flutes, played not as they are played now but as they are played at feasts. The captain, then, with the trumpet, should signal when they must stand still, move forward, or turn back, when the artillery must fire, when the extraordinary Veliti must move, and using different distinct sounds to communicate to the army all those movements that can generally be communicated, which trumpets should then be followed by the drums, and in this exercise, as it is very important, it is necessary to practice the army a lot. Concerning the horsemen, trumpets should also be used, but with a softer sound and a different tone from those of the captain. This is all I can recall regarding the order of the army and the conduct of the same.

LUIGI. I praie you let it not be grevous unto you to declare unto me an other thyng, that is, for what cause you made the light horsmen, and the extraordinarie Veliti, to goe with cries, rumours, and furie, when thei gave the charge? And after in the incountering of the rest of tharmie, you shewed, that the thing folowed with a moste greate scilence? And for that I understande not the occasion of this varietie, I would desire that you would declare it unto me.

LUIGI. Please don’t take it the wrong way, but I’d like to ask you something else: why did you have the light cavalry and the extraordinary Velites charge with loud cries, shouts, and fury, while afterward, during the clash with the rest of the army, things were carried out in complete silence? Since I don’t understand the reason for this difference, I would appreciate it if you could explain it to me.

The cries, and rumours, wher with the firste charge is given unto the enemies, and the silence that ought to bee used after, when the faight is ones begunne.

The shouts and rumors that accompany the first attack on the enemies, and the silence that should follow once the fight has begun.

FABRICIO. The opinion of auncient capitaines, hath been divers about the commyng to handes, whether thei ought with rumour to go a pace, or with scilence to go faire and softely: this laste waie, serveth to kepe the order more sure, and to understande better the commaundementes of the Capitaine: the firste, serveth to incourage more the mindes of men: and for that I beleve, that respecte ought to bee had to the one, and to the other of these twoo thynges, I made the one goe with rumour, and thother with scilence: nor me thinkes not in any wise, that the continuall rumours bee to purpose: bicause thei lette the commaundementes, the whiche is a thyng moste pernicious: nor it standeth not with reason, that the Romaines used, except at the firste assaulte {128} to make rumour: for that in their histories, is seen many tymes to have happened, that through the wordes, and comfortinges of the capitain the souldiours that ranne awaie, were made to stande to it, and in sundrie wise by his commaundemente, to have varied the orders, the whiche should not have followed, if the rumoures had been louder then his voyce.

FABRICIO. The views of ancient captains have varied about how to approach battle—whether to advance with noise or move quietly and carefully. The latter approach helps maintain order and better understand the captain's commands. The former is meant to rally the troops. I believe it's important to consider both strategies, which is why I decided to use noise for one and silence for the other. I don’t think constant noise is effective because it confuses the commands, which is very harmful. It doesn’t make sense, as the Romans did, to create noise except at the initial assault. Their histories show many times that through the words and encouragement of the captain, soldiers who fled were inspired to hold their ground. Additionally, in various situations, his orders changed the tactics that wouldn't have happened if the noise had overwhelmed his voice. {128}

{131}

THE FOWERTH BOOKE

LUIGI.S eng that under my governement, a field hath been wonne so honourably, I suppose that it is good, that I tempt not fortune any more, knowyng how variable, and unstable she is: and therefore, I desire to give up my governement, and that Zanobi do execute now this office of demaundyng, mindyng to followe the order, whiche concerneth the youngeste: and I knowe he will not refuse this honoure, or as we would saie, this labour, as well for to doe me pleasure, as also for beyng naturally of more stomach than I: nor it shall not make hym afraied, to have to enter into these travailes, where he maie bee as well overcome, as able to conquere.

LUIGI.S eng that under my leadership, a field has been won so honorably, I think it’s wise not to tempt fate any longer, knowing how changeable and unstable she is. Therefore, I want to resign from my leadership and have Zanobi take over this task, planning to follow the procedure that concerns the youngest. I know he won’t refuse this honor, or as we would say, this duty, both to please me and because he naturally has more ambition than I do. It won’t scare him to take on these challenges, where he could either be defeated or come out victorious.

ZANOBI. I am readie to do what soever shall please you to appoinete me, although that I desire more willingly to heare: for as moche as hetherto, your questions have satisfied me more, then those should have pleased me, whiche in harkenyng to your reasonyng, hath chaunced to come into my remembraunce. But sir, I beleve that it is good, that you lese no tyme, and that you have pacience, if with these our Ceremonies we trouble you.

ZANOBI. I'm ready to do whatever you want me to, but I’d rather listen. Your questions have satisfied me more than the topics I remembered while hearing your reasoning. But, sir, I believe it’s best that you don't waste any time and be patient if our ceremonies are bothering you.

FABRICIO. You doe me rather pleasure, for that this variacion of demaunders, maketh me to knowe the sundrie wittes and sunderie appetites of yours: But remaineth there any thyng, whiche seemeth unto you good, to bee joyned to the matter, that alreadie hath been reasoned of?

FABRICIO. You really please me because this variety of questions helps me understand your different thoughts and desires. But is there anything else that seems good to you to add to the topic we've already discussed?

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ZANOBI. Twoo thinges I desire, before you passe to an other parte: the one is, to have you to shewe, if in orderyng armies, there needeth to bee used any other facion: the other, what respectes a capitaine ought to have, before he conducte his men to the faight, and in thesame an accidente risyng or growyng, what reamedie maie be had.

ZANOBI. Two things I want from you before you move on to another topic: first, I need you to explain if there’s any other approach to organizing armies; second, what considerations a captain should have before leading his men into battle, and if an unexpected event occurs, what solutions can be applied.

To deffende moche the fronte of an armie, is most perillous; What is beste for a capitaine to dooe, where his power is, moche lesse then thenemies power; A general rule; The higher grounde ought to be chosen; An advertisement not to place an armie wher the enemie maie se what the same doeth; Respectes for the Sonne and Winde; The variyng of order and place maie cause the conquered to become victorius; A policie in the ordering of men and pitchyng of a fielde; How to compasse about the enemies power; How a capitaine maie faight and bee as it were sure, not to be overcome; How to trouble the orders of the enemie; What a capitaine oughte to dooe when he hath not so many horsmen as the enemie; A greate aide for horsemen; The policies used betwene Aniball and Scipio.

To defend the front of an army is very risky; what is best for a captain to do when his forces are much weaker than the enemy's? A general rule: choose the higher ground. A warning not to position an army where the enemy can see what it’s doing; factors like the sun and wind. Changing the order and position can help the outnumbered become victorious. Strategies for arranging troops and setting up a battlefield; how to surround the enemy’s forces; how a captain can fight and still be fairly certain not to be defeated; how to disrupt the enemy's formations; what a captain should do when he has fewer cavalry than the enemy; a significant advantage for cavalry; the strategies used between Hannibal and Scipio.

FABRICIO. I will inforce my self to satisfie you, I will not answere now distinctly to your questions: for that whileste I shall aunswere to one, many tymes it will come to passe, that I muste aunswere to an other. I have tolde you, how I have shewed you a facion of an armie, to the intent, that accordyng to thesame, there maie bee given all those facions, that the enemie, and the situacion requireth: For as moche as in this case, bothe accordyng to the power thereof, and accordyng to the enemie, it proceadeth: but note this, that there is not a more perillous facion, then to deffende moche the front of tharmie, if then thou have not a most puisant, and moste great hoste: otherwise, thou oughtest to make it rather grosse, and of small largenesse, then of moche largenes and thin: for when thou hast fewe men in comparison to thenemie, thou oughtest to seke other remedies, as is to ordain thine army in soche a place, wher thou maiest be fortefied, either through rivers, or by meanes of fennes, after soch sort, that thou canst not bee compassed aboute, or to inclose thy self on the flanckes with diches, as Cesar did in Fraunce. You have to take in this cace, this generall rule, to inlarge your self, or to draw in your self with the front, according to your nomber, and thesame of the enemie. For thenemies being of lesse nomber, thou oughtest to seke large places, havyng in especially thy men well instructed: to the intent thou maiest, not onely compasse aboute the enemie, but to deffende thy orders: for that in places rough and difficulte, beyng not able to prevaile of thy orders, thou commeste not to have any advauntage, hereby grewe, that the Romaines almoste alwaies, sought the open fieldes, and advoided the straightes. To the contrarie, as I have said, thou oughtest to doe, if thou hast fewe menne, or ill instructed: for that then thou {133} oughteste to seeke places, either where the little nomber maye be saved, and where the small experience dooe not hurte thee: Thou oughtest also to chuse the higher grounde, to be able more easily to infest them: notwithstandyng, this advertisment ought to be had, not to ordaine thy armie, where the enemie maie spie what thou doest and in place nere to the rootes of the same, where the enemies armie maie come: For that in this case, havyng respecte unto the artillerie, the higher place shall gette thee disadvauntage: Bicause that alwaies and commodiously, thou mightest of the enemies artillerie bee hurte, without beyng able to make any remedy, and thou couldest not commodiously hurte thesame, beyng hindered by thine owne men. Also, he that prepareth an armie to faight a battaile, ought to have respecte, bothe to the Sunne, and to the Winde, that the one and the other, doe not hurte the fronte, for that the one and the other, will let thee the sight, the one with the beames, and the other with the duste: and moreover, the Winde hindereth the weapons, whiche are stroken at the enemie, and maketh their blowes more feable: and concerning the Sunne, it sufficeth not to have care, that at the firste it shine not in the face, but it is requisite to consider, that increasyng the daie, it hurte thee not: and for this, it should bee requsite in orderyng the men, to have it all on the backe, to the entente it should have to passe moche tyme, to come to lye on the fronte. This waie was observed of Aniball at Canne, and of Mario against the Cimbrians. If thou happen to be moche inferiour of horses, ordaine thine armie emongeste Vines, and trees, and like impedimentes, as in our time the Spaniardes did, when thei overthrewe the Frenchmenne at Cirignuola. And it hath been seen many times, with all one Souldiours, variyng onely the order, and the place, that thei have become of losers victorers: as it happened to the Carthageners, whom havyng been overcome of Marcus Regolus divers tymes, were after by the counsaill of Santippo a Lacedemonian, victorious: whom made them to go doune into the plaine, where by vertue of the horses, and of {134} Eliphantes, thei were able to overcome the Romaines. It semes unto me, accordyng to the auncient insamples that almoste all the excellente Capitaines, when thei have knowen, that the enemie hath made strong one side of his battaile, thei have not set against it, the moste strongest parte, but the moste weakest, and thother moste strongest thei have set against the most weakest: after in the beginning the faighte, thei have commaunded to their strongest parte, that onely thei sustaine the enemie, and not to preace upon hym, and to the weaker, that thei suffer them selves to be overcome, and to retire into the hindermoste bandes of the armie. This breadeth twoo greate disorders to the enemie: the firste, that he findeth his strongest parte compassed about, the second is, that semyng unto him to have the victorie, seldome tymes it happeneth, that thei disorder not theim selves, whereof groweth his sodain losse. Cornelius Scipio beyng in Spain, againste Asdruball of Carthage, and understanding how to Asdruball it was knowen, that he in the orderyng the armie, placed his Legions in the middest, the whiche was the strongest parte of his armie, and for this how Asdruball with like order ought to procede: after when he came to faighte the battaile, he chaunged order, and put his Legions on the hornes of the armie, and in the middest, placed all his weakeste men: then commyng to the handes, in a sodain those men placed in the middeste, he made to marche softly, and the hornes of the armie, with celeritie to make forwarde, so that onely the hornes of bothe the armies fought, and the bandes in the middest, through beyng distaunt the one from the other, joyned not together, and thus the strongest parte of Scipio, came to faight with the weakest of Asdruball, and overcame hym. The whiche waie was then profitable, but now havyng respect to the artillerie, it cannot be used: bicause the same space, whiche should remain in the middest, betwene the one armie and the other, should give tyme to thesame to shoote: The whiche is moste pernicious, as above is saied: Therefore it is requisite to laie this waie aside, and to use, as a little afore we saied, makyng all the {135} armie to incounter, and the weakest parte to give place. When a capitaine perceiveth, that he hath a greater armie then his enemie, mindyng to compasse hym aboute, before he be aware let hym ordaine his fronte equall, to thesame of his adversaries, after, so sone as the faight is begun, let hym make the fronte by a little and little to retire, and the flanckes to deffende, and alwaies it shall happen, that the enemie shal find hymself, before he be aware compassed about. When a capitain will faight, as it wer sure not to be broken, let hym ordaine his armie in place, where he hath refuge nere, and safe, either betwene Fennes, or betwene hilles, or by some strong citee: for that in this case, he cannot bee followed of the enemie, where the enemie maie be pursued of him: this poincte was used of Aniball, when fortune began to become his adversarie, and that he doubted of the valiauntnesse of Marcus Marcello. Some to trouble the orders of the enemie, have commaunded those that were light armed, to begin the faight, and that beyng begunne, to retire betwene the orders: and when the armies were after buckled together, and that the fronte of either of them were occupied in faightyng, thei have made theim to issue out by the flanckes of the battaile, and thesame have troubled and broken. If any perceive hymself to bee inferiour of horse, he maie besides the waies that are alredie shewed, place behinde his horsemen a battaile of Pikes, and in faightyng take order, that thei give waie to the Pikes, and he shall remain alwaies superiour. Many have accustomed to use certain fotemenne lighte armed, to faighte emong horsemen, the whiche hath been to the chivalrie moste greate helpe. Of all those, which have prepared armies to the field, be moste praised Aniball and Scipio, when thei fought in Africk: and for that Aniball had his armie made of Carthaginers, and of straungers of divers nacions, he placed in the first fronte thereof lxxx. Elephantes, after he placed the straungers, behinde whom he sette his Carthaginers, in the hindermoste place, he putte the Italians, in whom he trusted little: the whiche thing he ordained so, for that the straungers havyng before {136} theim the enemie, and behinde beyng inclosed of his men, could not flie: so that being constrained to faight thei should overcome, or wearie the Romaines, supposyng after with his freshe and valiaunte men, to be then able easely to overcome the Romaines, beeyng wearied. Against this order, Scipio set the Astati, the Prencipi, and the Triarii, in the accustomed maner, to bee able to receive the one the other, and to rescue the one the other: he made the fronte of the armie, full of voide spaces, and bicause it should not be perceived but rather should seme united, he filled them ful of veliti, to whom he commaunded, that so sone as the Eliphantes came, thei should avoide, and by the ordinarie spaces, should enter betwene the Legins, and leave open the waie to the Eliphauntes, and so it came to passe, that it made vaine the violence of theim, so that commyng to handes, he was superiour.

FABRICIO. I will do my best to satisfy you. I won't answer your questions clearly right now; because as I respond to one, I'll often end up needing to answer another. I've mentioned how I've shown you a layout of an army, so that based on this, we can discuss all the formations that the enemy and the situation require. This is due to the fact that both the power of my army and the enemy's tactics play into this. But remember, there is no more dangerous strategy than heavily defending the front of the army unless you have a very strong and large force. Otherwise, you should make it thicker and shorter rather than wide and thin. When you have fewer men compared to the enemy, you should look for other solutions, like placing your army in a location where you can be fortified, either by rivers or marshes, to ensure you can't be surrounded, or to defend your flanks with ditches, like Caesar did in France. In this case, you should follow this general rule: expand or contract your front based on your numbers and those of the enemy. If the enemy is outnumbered, you should seek expansive locations, especially if your men are well-trained, so that you can not only surround the enemy but also protect your formations. In rough and difficult terrains, you won't gain an advantage if you can't leverage your formations. This is why the Romans almost always sought open fields and avoided narrow places. Conversely, as I mentioned, if you have fewer or poorly trained men, you should choose locations where a small number can be saved, and where a lack of experience won't hurt you. You should also choose higher ground to more easily attack them. However, be cautious not to position your army where the enemy can see what you're doing or in places close to their roots, where the enemy's army may approach. In this situation, considering artillery, being on higher ground may put you at a disadvantage. Because you'll always be easily hit by enemy artillery without being able to retaliate effectively, as you'll be obstructed by your own soldiers. Also, anyone preparing an army for battle should pay attention to both the Sun and the Wind to ensure they don't harm their front lines. Both can obstruct your vision—one with its rays, the other with dust. Moreover, Wind can diminish the effectiveness of weapons aimed at the enemy and weaken their impact. Regarding the Sun, it's not enough just to avoid getting shined in the face initially, but you should also consider that as the day progresses, it doesn't disadvantage you. For this reason, it’s necessary to arrange your troops so that they all face away from it, preventing them from facing the Sun for too long. This tactic was observed by Hannibal at Cannae and by Marius against the Cimbrians. If you find yourself at a disadvantage in cavalry, place your army among vines, trees, or similar obstacles, as the Spaniards did in our time when they defeated the French at Cerignola. It has been seen many times that with the same soldiers, varying only their formation and location, they could turn from losers into victors: as happened with the Carthaginians, who were frequently defeated by Marcus Regulus until they became victorious by the strategy of Santippo, a Spartan, who made them move down into the plains where the strength of their horses and elephants could overcome the Romans. It seems to me that according to ancient examples, almost all outstanding commanders, when they realize the enemy has strengthened one side of their battalion, do not confront it with their strongest forces but instead pit their strongest against the enemy's weakest. In the initial stages of the battle, they command their strongest unit to just hold the enemy back without engaging aggressively, while instructing the weaker units to allow themselves to fall back and retreat into the rear ranks of the army. This creates two major disarray situations for the enemy: first, they find their strongest units surrounded; second, feeling victorious, they rarely keep their formation, leading to sudden losses. Cornelius Scipio, while in Spain against Hannibal of Carthage, learned that Hannibal typically placed his legions in the center, the strongest part of his army. Knowing how Hannibal might set up his lines, Scipio changed his formation, placing his legions on the wings of the army and putting his weakest troops in the center. Then, as they engaged, he had the men in the center march back slowly while the wings advanced rapidly, ensuring that only the wings of both armies fought, with the central divisions remaining distant and not engaging with one another. This way, Scipio's strongest units fought Hannibal's weakest, ensuring victory. While this strategy worked then, in modern warfare considering artillery, it cannot be applied as the gap left between the two armies would provide enough time for enemy artillery to fire—something very dangerous, as mentioned earlier. Therefore, it’s necessary to set this approach aside and instead, as previously discussed, make all the {135} army engage, allowing the weaker side to give ground. When a commander realizes that he has a larger army than the enemy and wishes to encircle them without their notice, he should align his front with that of his adversary. Once the battle begins, he should gradually withdraw his front and defend his flanks, which will eventually lead the enemy to find themselves encircled before they realize it. If a commander aims to fight in a way that ensures they aren’t easily defeated, they should position their army in a location where they have safe refuge nearby, be it among marshes, hills, or near some strong city. In this scenario, the enemy may not be able to pursue them while they can chase down the enemy. Hannibal used this tactic when fortune began to turn against him, and he was unsure of Marcus Marcellus’s valiance. To disrupt the enemy formations, some commanders have ordered light-armed troops to begin the fight, and once it begins, to retreat behind the lines. When the two armies engage, and both fronts are occupied in fighting, they then manage to come out from the flanks of the battle, causing confusion and breaking the enemy apart. If anyone perceives that they are inferior in cavalry, in addition to the strategies already mentioned, they can arrange a formation of pikes behind their cavalry and during the fight ensure that they allow the pikes to advance, maintaining a position of superiority. Many have found success using certain light infantry to fight among cavalry, which has proven to be a significant advantage for the knights. Of all those who prepared armies for the battlefield, Hannibal and Scipio are most praised for their battles in Africa. Hannibal, having assembled his army of Carthaginians and various foreign troops, placed eighty elephants at the front. Behind them, he positioned the foreigners, followed by the Carthaginians, and in the rear, he placed the Italians, whom he trusted the least. He organized it this way, so that the foreigners, facing the enemy and being encircled by his own men, couldn't flee; thus, compelled to fight, they would either win or tire out the Romans, allowing his fresh and valiant men to easily overcome the fatigued Romans afterward. In response to this formation, Scipio arranged the hastati, principes, and triarii in the usual way, ensuring that each could support the others. He filled the front of his army with gaps, and to disguise these, made it appear unified by filling the spaces with velites. He ordered them to step aside when the elephants approached, allowing a clear path for the elephants, which proved to nullify their aggressive approach, so that when the battle commenced, he was in a superior position.

ZANOBI. You have made me to remember, in alledging me this battaile, how Scipio in faighting, made not the Astati to retire into thorders of the Prencipi, but he devided theim, and made theim to retire in the hornes of the armie, to thintent thei might give place to the Prencipi, when he would force forwarde: therfore I would you should tell me, what occasion moved hym, not to observe the accustomed order.

ZANOBI. You've reminded me, by bringing up this battle, how Scipio, during the fight, didn’t have the Astati fall back into the ranks of the Principes; instead, he divided them and had them retreat to the flanks of the army so they could give way to the Principes when he wanted to push forward. So, I’d like you to tell me what made him choose not to follow the usual order.

Cartes full of hookes made to destroie the enemies; The remedy that was used against Cartes full of hookes; The straunge maner that Silla used in orderyng his army against Archelaus; How to trouble in the faighte the armie of the enemies; A policie of Caius Sulpitius, to make his enemies afraied; A policie of Marius againste the Duchmenne; A policie of greate importaunce, while a battaile is a faightyng; How horsemen maie bee disordered; How the turke gave the Sophie an overthrowe; How the Spaniardes overcame the armie of Amilcare; How to traine the enemie, to his destruccion; A policie of Tullo Hostilio and Lucius Silla in dessemlyng of a mischaunce; Sertorius slue a man for telling him of the death of one of his capitaines; Howe certaine captaines have staied their men that hath been running awaie; Attillius constrained his men that ran awaie to tourne again and to faight; How Philip king of Macedonia made his men afraied to run awaie; Victorie ought with all celeritie to bee folowed; What a capitaine ought to dooe, when he should chaunce to receive an overthrowe; How Martius overcame the armie of the Carthaginers; A policie of Titus Dimius to hide a losse, whiche he had received in a faight; A general rule; Aniball; Scipio; Asdruball; A Capitaine ought not to faight without advantage, excepte he be constrained; How advauntage maie bee taken of the enemies; Furie withstode, converteth into vilenesse; What maner of men a capitaine ought to have about him continually, to consult withall; The condicions of the capitain of the enemies, and of those that are about hym is moste requisite to bee knowen; A timerous army is not to be conducted to faight; How to avoide the faightyng of a fielde.

Cartes filled with hooks meant to destroy the enemies; The remedy that was used against Cartes filled with hooks; The strange method that Silla employed to arrange his army against Archelaus; How to disrupt the enemy's army during battle; A tactic of Caius Sulpitius to scare his enemies; A strategy of Marius against the Dutch; A crucial strategy while a battle is being fought; How cavalry can be disordered; How the Turk defeated the Sophie; How the Spaniards overcame the army of Amilcare; How to lead the enemy to their destruction; A tactic of Tullo Hostilio and Lucius Silla in masking an unfortunate incident; Sertorius killed a man for informing him about the death of one of his captains; How certain captains have stopped their men from fleeing; Attillius compelled his fleeing men to turn back and fight; How Philip, king of Macedonia, frightened his men into running away; Victory should be pursued with all speed; What a captain should do if he happens to suffer a defeat; How Martius defeated the army of the Carthaginians; A tactic of Titus Dimius to conceal a loss he experienced in battle; A general rule; Hannibal; Scipio; Asdrubal; A captain should not fight without an advantage unless forced to; How advantage can be taken from the enemies; Anger, if resisted, turns into disgrace; What kind of people a captain should have around him at all times to consult with; The conditions of the enemy's captain and those around him are essential to know; A fearful army should not be led into battle; How to avoid fighting in an open field.

FABRICIO. I will tell you. Aniball had putte all the strengthe of his armie, in the seconde bande: wherefore Scipio for to set againste thesame like strengthe, gathered the Prencipi and the Triarii together: So that the distaunces of the Prencipi, beyng occupied of the Triarii, there was no place to bee able to receive the Astati: and therefore he made the Astati to devide, and to go in the hornes of the armie, and he drewe them not betwene the Prencipi. But note, that this waie of openyng the first bande, for to give place to the seconde, cannot bee used, but when a man is superiour to his enemie: for that then there is commoditie to bee able to dooe it, as Scipio was able: but beyng under, and repulced, it cannot be doen, but with thy manifest ruine: and therefore it is convenient {137} to have behinde, orders that maie receive thee, but let us tourne to our reasonyng. The auncient Asiaticans, emongest other thynges devised of them to hurt the enemies, used carres. The whiche had on the sides certaine hookes, so that not onely thei served to open with their violence the bandes, but also to kill with the hookes the adversaries: against the violence of those, in thre maners thei provided, either thei sustained theim with the thickenesse of the raies, or thei received theim betwene the bandes, as the Eliphantes were received, or els thei made with arte some strong resistence: As Silla a Romaine made againste Archelaus, whom had many of these cartes, whiche thei called hooked, who for to sustaine theim, drave many stakes into the grounde, behinde his first bandes of men, whereby the cartes beyng stopped, lost their violence. And the newe maner that Silla used against hym in orderyng the armie, is to bee noted: for that he put the Veliti, and the horse, behinde, and all the heavie armed afore, leavyng many distaunces to be able to sende before those behinde, when necessite required: whereby the fight beyng begun, with the helpe of the horsemen, to the whiche he gave the waie, he got the victorie. To intende to trouble in the faight the enemies armie, it is conveniente to make some thyng to growe, that maie make theim afraied, either with showyng of newe helpe that commeth, or with showyng thynges, whiche maie represente a terrour unto theim: after soche sorte, that the enemies begiled of that sight, maie be afraied, and being made afraied, thei maie easely bee overcome: the whiche waies Minutio Rufo used, and Accilio Glabrione Consulls of Rome. Caius Sulpitius also set a greate many of sackes upon Mules, and other beastes unprofitable for the warre, but in soche wise ordained, that thei semed men of armes, and he commaunded, that thei should appere upon a hill, while he were a faightyng with the Frenchemen, whereby grewe his victorie. The verie same did Marius, when he foughte against the Duchemen. Then the fained assaultes availyng moche, whilest the faight continueth, it is conveniente, that the very assaultes in deede, dooe helpe {138} moche: inespecially if at unwares in the middest of the faight, the enemie might bee assaulted behinde, or on the side: the whiche hardely maie be doen, if the countrie helpe thee not: for that when it is open, parte of thy men cannot bee hid, as is mete to bee doen in like enterprises: but in woddie or hille places, and for this apt for ambusshes parte of thy men maie be well hidden, to be able in a sodain, and contrary to thenemies opinion to assaut him, whiche thyng alwaies shall be occasion to give thee the victorie. It hath been sometyme of greate importaunce, whilest the faighte continueth, to sowe voices, whiche doe pronounce the capitaine of thenemies to be dedde, or to have overcome on the other side of the armie: the whiche many times to them that have used it, hath given the victorie. The chivalrie of the enemies maie bee easely troubled, either with sightes, or with rumours, not used: as Creso did, whom put Camelles againste the horses of the adversaries, and Pirrus sette againste the Romaine horsemen Eliphantes, the sighte of whiche troubled and disordered them. In our time, the Turke discomfited the Sophi in Persia, and the Soldane in Surria with no other, then with the noise of Harkabuses, the whiche in soche wise, with their straunge rumours, disturbed the horses of those, that the Turke mighte easely overcome them: The Spaniardes to overcome the armie of Amilcare, put in the firste fronte Cartes full of towe drawen of oxen, and comming to handes, thei kindeled fire to thesame, wherfore the oxen to flie from the fire, thrust into the armie of Amilcar, and opened it. Thei are wonte (as we have saied) to begile the enemie in the faight, drawyng him into their ambusshes, where the Countrie is commodious for the same purpose, but where it were open and large, many have used to make diches, and after have covered them lightly with bowes and yearth, and lefte certain spaces whole, to be able betnene those to retire: after, so sone as the faight hath been begunne, retiryng by those, and the enemie folowing them, hath fallen in the pittes. If in the faight there happen thee, any accident that maie feare thy souldiours, it is a moste {139} prudente thyng, to knowe how to desemble it, and to pervert it to good, as Tullo Hostilio did, and Lucius Silla: whom seyng while thei fought, how a parte of his men wer gone to the enemies side, and how thesame thing had verie moche made afraied his men, he made straighte waie throughout all the armie to be understoode, how all thing proceded, accordyng to his order: the whiche not onely did not trouble the armie, but it increased in them so moche stomack, that he remained victorious. It happened also to Silla, that havyng sente certaine souldiours to doe some businesse, and thei beyng slain he saied, to the intent his armie should not be made afraied thereby, that he had with crafte sent theim into the handes of the enemies, for that he had found them nothyng faithfull. Sertorius faightyng a battaile in Spaine, slue one, whom signified unto hym the death of one of his capitaines, for feare that tellyng the very same to other, he should make theim afraied. It is a moste difficult thyng, an armie beyng now moved to flie, to staie it, and make it to faight. And you have to make this distinccion: either that it is all moved, and then to be impossible to tourne it, or there is moved a parte thereof, and then there is some remedie. Many Romain capitaines, with making afore those whiche fled, have caused them to staie, making them ashamed of running awaie, as Lucius Silla did, where alredy parte of his Legions beyng tourned to flight, driven awaie by the men of Mithridates, he made afore them with a swearde in his hande criyng: if any aske you, where you left your capitaine, saie, we have left hym in Boecia, where he faighteth. Attillius a consull set againste that ran awaie, them that ranne not awaie, and made them to understande, that if thei would not tourne, thei should be slaine of their frendes, and of their enemies. Philip of Macedonia understanding how his men feared the Scithian Souldiours, placed behinde his armie, certaine of his moste trustie horsemen, and gave commission to theim, that thei should kill whom so ever fledde: wherfore, his men mindyng rather to die faightyng, then fliyng, overcame. Many Romaines, not so moche to staie a flight, as for to {140} give occasion to their men, to make greater force, have whileste thei have foughte, taken an Ansigne out of their owne mennes handes, and throwen it emongeste the enemies, and appoincted rewardes to hym that could get it again. I doe not beleve that it is out of purpose, to joyne to this reasonyng those thynges, whiche chaunce after the faight, in especially beyng brief thinges, and not to be left behinde, and to this reasonyng conformable inough. Therefore I saie, how the fielde is loste, or els wonne: when it is wonne, the victorie ought with all celeritie to be folowed, and in this case to imitate Cesar, and not Aniball, whom staiyng after that he had discomfited the Romaines at Canne, loste the Empire of Rome: The other never rested after the victorie, but folowed the enemie beyng broken, with greater violence and furie, then when he assalted hym whole: but when a capitaine dooeth loese, he ought to see, if of the losse there maie growe any utilite unto hym, inespecially if there remain any residue of tharmie. The commoditie maie growe of the small advertisment of the enemie, whom moste often times after the victorie, becometh negligent, and giveth thee occasion to oppresse hym, as Marcius a Romaine oppressed the armie of the Carthaginers, whom having slain the twoo Scipions, and broken their armie, not estemyng thesame remnaunt of menne, whiche with Marcius remained a live, were of hym assaulted and overthrowen: for that it is seen, that there is no thing so moche to bee brought to passe, as thesame, whiche the enemie thinketh, that thou canst not attempte: bicause for the moste parte, men bee hurte moste, where thei doubt leaste: therefore a capitain ought when he cannot doe this, to devise at least with diligence, that the losse bee lesse hurtfull, to dooe this, it is necessarie for thee to use meanes, that the enemie maie not easely folowe thee, or to give him occasion to make delaie: in the first case, some after thei have been sure to lese, have taken order with their heddes, that in divers partes, and by divers waies thei should flie, havyng appoincted wher thei should after assemble together: the which made, that thenemie (fearing to devide the armie) {141} was faine to let go safe either all, or the greatest part of them. In the seconde case, many have cast before the enemie, their dearest thinges, to the entent that he tariyng about the spoile, might give them more laisure to flie. Titus Dimius used no small policie to hide the losse, whiche he had received in the faight, for asmoche as havyng fought untill night, with great losse of his menne, he made in the night to be buried, the greatest part of them, wherefore in the mornyng, the enemies seyng so many slaine of theirs, and so fewe of the Romaines, belevyng that thei had the disavauntage, ran awaie. I trust I have thus confusedly, as I saied, satisfied in good part your demaunde: in dede about the facions of the armies, there resteth me to tell you, how some tyme, by some Capitaines, it hath been used to make theim with the fronte, like unto a wedge, judgyng to bee able by soche meane, more easely to open the enemies armie. Against this facion, thei have used to make a facion like unto a paire of sheres, to be able betwene thesame voide place, to receive that wedge, and to compasse it about, and to faight with it on every side: whereupon I will that you take this generall rule, that the greatest remedie that is used againste a devise of the enemie, is to dooe willingly thesame, whiche he hath devised that thou shalt dooe perforce: bicause that doyng it willingly, thou doest it with order, and with thy advauntage, and his disadvauntage, if thou shouldest doe it beyng inforced, it should be thy undoyng: For the provyng whereof, I care not to reherse unto you, certain thynges alredy tolde. The adversary maketh the wedge to open thy bandes: if thou gowest with them open, thou disorderest hym, and he disordereth not thee. Aniball set the Elephantes in the fronte of his armie, to open with theim the armie of Scipio. Scipio went with it open, and it was the occasion of his victorie, and of the ruine of hym. Asdruball placed his strongest men in the middest of the fronte of his armie, to overthrowe Scipios menne: Scipio commaunded, that by them selves thei should retire and he broke theim: So that like devises when thei are foreseen, bee the causes of the {142} victorie of him, against whom thei be prepared. There remaineth me also, if I remember my self well, to tell you what respectes a Capitaine ought to have, before he leade his men to faight: upon whiche I have to tell you firste, how a capitaine ought never to faight a battaile, except he have advauntage, or be constrained. The vantage groweth of the situacion, of the order, of havyng more, or better menne: the necessitie groweth when thou seest how that not faightyng, thou muste in any wise lose, as should bee for lackyng of money, and for this, thy armie to bee ready all maner of waies to resolve, where famishemente is ready to assaulte thee, where the enemie looketh to bee ingrosed with newe men: in these cases, thou oughtest alwaies to faight, although with thy disadvauntage: for that it is moche better to attempte fortune, where she maie favour thee, then not attemptyng, to see thy certaine ruine: and it is as grevous a faulte in this case, in a capitain not to faight, as to have had occasion to overcome, and not to have either knowen it through ignoraunce, or lefte it through vilenesse. The advauntages some tymes the enemie giveth thee, and some tymes thy prudence: Many in passyng Rivers have been broken of their enemie, that hath been aware thereof, whom hath taried, till the one halfe hath been of the one side, and the other halfe on the other, and then hath assaulted them: as Cesar did to the Suizzers, where he destroied the fowerth parte of theim, through beyng halfe over a river. Some tyme thy enemie is founde wearie, for havyng folowed thee to undescritely, so that findyng thy self freshe and lustie, thou oughtest not to let passe soche an occasion: besides this, if the enemie offer unto thee in the mornyng betymes to faight, thou maiest a good while deferre to issue out of thy lodgyng, and when he hath stoode long in armour, and that he hath loste that same firste heate, with the whiche he came, thou maiest then faight with him. This waie Scipio and Metellus used in Spaine: the one against Asdruball, the other against Sertorius. If the enemie be deminished of power, either for havyng devided the armie, as the Scipions in Spain, or {143} for some other occasion, thou oughteste to prove chaunce. The greateste parte of prudent capitaines, rather receive the violence of the enemies, then go with violence to assalte them: for that the furie is easely withstoode of sure and steddie menne, and the furie beyng sustained, converteth lightly into vilenesse: Thus Fabius did againste the Sannites, and against the Galles, and was victorious and his felowe Decius remained slain. Some fearing the power of their enemies, have begun the faight a little before night, to the intent that their men chaunsyng to bee overcome, might then by the helpe of the darkenesse thereof, save theim selves. Some havyng knowen, how the enemies armie beyng taken of certaine supersticion, not to faight in soche a tyme, have chosen thesame tyme to faighte, and overcome: The whiche Cesar observed in Fraunce, againste Arionistus, and Vespasian in Surrie, againste the Jewes. The greatest and moste importaunte advertismente, that a capitaine ought to have, is to have aboute hym faithfull menne, that are wise and moste expert in the warre, with whom he must continually consulte and reason of his men, and of those of the enemies, whiche is the greater nomber, whiche is beste armed, or beste on horsebacke, or best exercised, whiche be moste apte to suffer necessitie, in whom he trusteth moste, either in the footemen, or in the horsemen: after thei ought to consider the place where thei be, and whether it be more to the purpose for thenemie, then for him: which of theim hath victualles moste commodious: whether it be good to deferre the battaile, or to faight it: what good might bee given hym, or taken awaie by tyme: for that many tymes, souldiours seyng the warre to be delaied, are greved, and beyng wearie, in the pain and in the tediousnesse therof, wil forsake thee. It importeth above all thyng, to knowe the capitain of the enemies, and whom he hath aboute hym, whether he be rashe, or politike, whether he be fearfull, or hardie: to see how thou maiest truste upon the aidyng souldiours. And above all thyng thou oughtest to take hede, not to conducte the armie to faight when it feareth, or when in any wise it mistrusteth {144} of the victorie: for that the greatest signe to lose, is thei beleve not to be able to winne: and therfore in this case, thou oughtest to avoide the faightyng of the fielde, either with doyng as Fabius Maximus, whom incampyng in strong places, gave no courage to Aniball, to goe to finde hym, or when thou shouldest thinke, that the enemie also in strong places, would come to finde thee, to departe out of the fielde, and to devide the menne into thy tounes to thentent that tediousnesse of winnyng them, maie wearie hym.

FABRICIO. I'll explain. Aniball had concentrated all the strength of his army in the second line: therefore, Scipio to match that strength, assembled the Principes and the Triarii together. As a result, the distances filled by the Principes, occupied by the Triarii, left no space to accommodate the Astati. So, he made the Astati split and move to the flanks of the army instead of placing them between the Principes. But note, this tactic of opening the front line to make way for the second line can only be used when one is superior to the enemy; only then is there an advantage to doing so, as Scipio was able to. However, if one is inferior and pushed back, it cannot be done without clear ruin. Therefore, it is essential to have reserves behind that can support you, but let’s get back to our reasoning. The ancient Asians, among other strategies to harm the enemy, utilized chariots. These had hooks on the sides designed not only to violently break through lines but also to kill adversaries with the hooks. To counter that violence, they made three preparations: either by bracing themselves with the thickness of the ranks, or by absorbing the impact between the lines, as was done with elephants, or they constructed some robust defenses. For instance, Silla, a Roman, fought against Archelaus, who had many of these hooked chariots, and to sustain against them, drove stakes into the ground behind his front lines, thus stopping the chariots and diminishing their impact. The new method Silla employed in organizing his army is noteworthy: he placed the Velites and cavalry behind and all the heavily armed men in front, leaving ample space to send reinforcements for when the need arose. Thus, once the battle began, with the help of the cavalry, to whom he gave the opening, he secured victory. To disrupt the enemy’s army during combat, it is wise to create something that might frighten them, whether that be by showing new assistance arriving or by displaying things that evoke terror: in such a way that the enemy, deceived by that sight, might be frightened and thus easily overcome. Minutio Rufo and Accilio Glabrione, both Consuls of Rome, employed such tactics. Caius Sulpitius also put a great many sacks on mules and other useless animals for war, arranged so they looked like armed soldiers, and commanded them to appear on a hill while he fought with the French, which contributed to his victory. Marius did the very same when he fought against the Germans. Then, the fake assaults being quite effective while the struggle continues, it is also crucial that real assaults provide significant assistance, especially if suddenly, amid the battle, the enemy can be attacked from behind or the sides. That is hard to achieve if the terrain does not support it, as in open areas, part of your men cannot be hidden, which is necessary in such endeavors. But in wooded or hilly regions, designated for ambushes, part of your men can be well concealed, ready to unexpectedly assault the enemy, a move that will always give you a chance for victory. Sometimes, during the fight, it is of great importance to spread rumors that pronounce the enemy captain dead, or that they have been defeated on the opposite side of the army; many who have used such tactics have gained victory. The enemy's cavalry can easily be disturbed, either by sights or by unexpected rumors: as Cresus did, by putting camels against the enemy's horses, and Pyrrhus, by sending elephants to confront the Roman cavalry, which confused and disordered them. In our time, the Turk defeated the Safavid in Persia and the Sultan in Syria with nothing but the noise of harquebuses, which, with their strange sounds, unsettled the enemy’s horses, allowing the Turk to easily overcome them. The Spaniards, to defeat the army of Hamilcar, placed chariots loaded with tow drawn by oxen at the front; when the clash occurred, they set fire to them, causing the oxen to flee from the flames and crash into Hamilcar's army, breaking it up. They often do this, as we've said, to deceive the enemy in battle, drawing them into their ambushes where the terrain suits the purpose. In open fields, many have made ditches, lightly covering them with branches and dirt, leaving certain spaces open for the men to retreat through. After the fight begins, as the enemy follows those retreating, they fall into the pits. If during the fight any incident arises that may frighten your soldiers, it is prudent to know how to conceal it and turn it to your advantage, as Tullo Hostilio and Lucius Silla did. Seeing, while fighting, that part of his men had defected to the enemy, which greatly frightened his troops, he quickly made it understood throughout the army that everything was proceeding according to his plan, which not only did not trouble them but rallied them so much that he remained victorious. It also happened to Silla that, after sending certain soldiers to complete a task, and they being slain, he claimed, to prevent his army from becoming frightened, that he had cleverly sent them into enemy hands, asserting that he found them untrustworthy. Sertorius, fighting a battle in Spain, killed one soldier who informed him of the death of one of his captains, fearing that telling this truth to others would scare them. It is very difficult to stop an army that is on the verge of fleeing and make it fight. You must differentiate between two scenarios: either the entire army is moving to retreat, and it is then impossible to turn them around, or part of them is fleeing, and in that case, there can be some remedy. Many Roman captains, by placing themselves in front of those who fled, have caused them to stop out of shame for running away, as Lucius Silla did when part of his legions had already turned to flight, driven off by the forces of Mithridates. He stepped in front of them with a sword in hand, exclaiming: if anyone asks you where you left your captain, say, we left him in Boeotia, where he is fighting. Attillius, a consul, placed those who would not flee against those who did, making it clear that if they did not rally back, they would be slain by both their friends and the enemy. Philip of Macedonia, understanding how his men feared the Scythian soldiers, placed several of his most trusted cavalry behind his army and ordered them to kill anyone who fled; as a result, his men preferred to fight rather than escape. Many Romans, not necessarily to stop a flight, but to encourage their men to exert greater effort, have taken a standard from their own men and thrown it among the enemy, promising rewards to whoever could retrieve it. I do not believe it is irrelevant to connect this discussion to events that happen post-battle, especially brief ones that cannot be overlooked, and that are quite relevant to this discussion. Therefore, I say, when the field is lost or won: when it is won, the victory should be pursued with all speed, and in this, one should imitate Caesar, not Aniball, who, staying after he had defeated the Romans at Cannae, lost control over Rome. The former never rested after victory, but pursued the broken enemy with greater violence and fury than when he attacked him in full strength. However, when a captain does lose, he should look for any advantage that may come from the defeat, especially if there are any remnants of the army. The advantage may arise from the enemy's minor notice, who, quite often, after a victory, becomes negligent and gives you the chance to overpower him, as Marcius, a Roman, overpowered the Carthaginians. Having slain the two Scipios and broken their army, he underestimated the remaining men alive with Marcius, and they were assaulted and defeated by him. There is nothing more achievable than what the enemy believes you cannot attempt: because most often, men are hurt where they least suspect. Therefore, when a captain cannot achieve this, he should at least strive to minimize the damage done by the loss. To do this, it is necessary to employ strategies so the enemy cannot easily follow you or find ways to delay them: in the first case, some, once sure of their loss, arranged their heads so that in different parts and by different routes, they would flee, planning where they would regroup later. This caused the enemy, fearing to divide their forces, to allow either all or most of them to escape safely. In the second case, many have thrown their most treasured possessions before the enemy to buy time; by the time the enemy loots, they get more leisure to escape. Titus Dimius employed considerable cunning to conceal the loss he suffered in battle, for after fighting until night, with significant losses among his men, he arranged for the majority of them to be buried overnight, which in the morning caused the enemy, seeing so many of theirs slain and so few Romans dead, to believe they had the disadvantage and flee. I believe I have sufficiently addressed your inquiry, as I said. Regarding the formations of armies, I must mention how some captains have sometimes deployed them in a wedge formation, believing that would enable them to easily break through the enemy's ranks. To counter this formation, they would shape their line like a pair of shears, to accommodate that wedge and surround it, fighting back from all sides. Hence, I want you to adopt this general rule: the greatest remedy used against an enemy's tactic is to willingly execute what he has devised you should do by force; because by doing it willingly, you do it in an organized manner and to your advantage while his is to his disadvantage. Conversely, if you do it out of compulsion, it will lead to your undoing. To prove this, I need not remind you of certain things already related. The enemy creates the wedge to break your lines: if you go forward with them open, you disrupt him, and he does not disrupt you. Aniball placed elephants at the forefront of his army to break Scipio's lines. Scipio advanced with his lines open, which was the cause of his victory and Aniball's ruin. Asdrubal placed his strongest troops in the middle of his army's front to overthrow Scipio's troops. Scipio ordered them to withdraw by themselves, and he broke them up. Such strategies, when anticipated, become the causes of {142} victory for the one prepared against them. Additionally, I think it reminds me to tell you what considerations a captain should have before leading his men into battle: about which I must first say that a captain should never engage in battle unless he has the advantage or is compelled. The advantage comes from the situation, the formation, having more or better men: necessity arises when you see that not fighting would cost you your defeat, as would be due to lacking resources, and where famine threatens to assault you, or when the enemy looks primed with fresh fighters: in these situations, always fight, even if it puts you at a disadvantage; for it is much better to tempt fortune while she might be favorable to you than to see your inevitable ruin by not attempting. In this case, it is as grave a fault for a captain to refrain from fighting as it is to have had the opportunity to succeed and not have recognized it out of ignorance or to have neglected it out of cowardice. The advantages sometimes come from the enemy, and sometimes by your own prudence. Many have been caught crossing rivers by their enemy, who would wait until half of them were on one side and half on the other, and then attacked them, as Caesar did against the Suissers, where he destroyed a fourth of them while they were half across a river. Sometimes, your enemy finds themselves weary after having pursued you too hastily, so when you find yourself fresh and ready, you should take hold of such opportunities. Additionally, if the enemy offers to fight you early in the morning, you can delay coming out of your quarters long enough to lose that initial momentum they brought with them, allowing you to engage with them later. This method was used by Scipio and Metellus in Spain: one against Asdruball, the other against Sertorius. If the enemy's power is diminished either by having split their forces, as the Scipios did in Spain, or due to other circumstances, then you should seize the chance. Most prudent captains prefer to withstand the enemy's violence rather than to aggressively attack them: for fury is easily resisted by steady and solid men, and once that fury is contained, it can quickly turn to cowardice. This was how Fabius acted against the Samnites and Gauls; he was victorious, while his fellow Decius was slain. Some, fearing their enemy's power, have begun the fight just before nightfall with the intention that they could regroup under the cover of darkness should they be on the losing side. Others, knowing their enemy holds certain superstitions against fighting at certain times, have chosen that very moment to engage, and emerged victorious. Caesar observed this in France against Arionistus, and Vespasian in Syria against the Jews. The most important advice a captain should heed is to surround himself with loyal men, who are wise and experienced in warfare, with whom he must constantly consult about his men and those of the enemy—who has the greater number, who is better armed or mounted, who is best equipped to handle hardship, whom he trusts most, among foot soldiers or cavalry. They should also consider the terrain where they are, and if it favors the enemy more than themselves; which of them has provisions more favorable; whether it is wise to delay the battle or engage immediately; what could be gained or lost by timing; for often soldiers, seeing that the war is delayed, become distressed, and, weary from the effort and its monotony, will leave you. It matters above all else, to know the enemy's captain and those around him, whether he is rash or calculated, whether he is fearful or bold; to understand how you might rely on your supporting soldiers. And above all, you should take care not to lead your army into battle when it is afraid or when it has any doubts about victory: for the greatest indicator of defeat is their belief that they cannot win. Therefore, in this case, you should avoid battle in the field, either by doing as Fabius Maximus did, who camped in strong positions, giving Aniball no courage to seek him out, or by departing from the field when you believe the enemy, also concealed in strongholds, would come to attack you, and dividing your forces among your towns to ensure that the effort of capturing them would wear him down.

ZANOBI. Cannot the faightyng of the battaile be otherwise avoided, then in devidyng the armie in sunderie partes and placyng the men in tounes?

ZANOBI. Can't the fighting of the battle be avoided in any other way than by splitting the army into separate parts and placing the men in towns?

Fabius Maximus.

Fabius Maximus.

FABRICIO. I beleve that ones alreadie, with some of you I have reasoned, how that he, that is in the field, cannot avoide to faight the battaile, when he hath an enemie, which will faight with hym in any wise, and he hath not, but one remedie, and that is, to place him self with his armie distant fiftie miles at leaste, from his adversarie, to be able betymes to avoide him, when he should go to finde hym. For Fabius Maximus never avoided to faight the battaile with Aniball, but he would have it with his advauntage: and Aniball did not presume to bee able to overcome hym, goyng to finde hym in the places where he incamped: where if he had presupposed, to have been able to have overcome, it had been conveniente for Fabius, to have fought the battaile with hym, or to have avoided.

FABRICIO. I believe I’ve already discussed this with some of you: when someone is on the battlefield, they can’t avoid fighting when they have an enemy who is determined to engage with them. The only remedy is to position himself and his army at least fifty miles away from the opponent, allowing them to escape quickly if needed. Fabius Maximus never avoided battling Hannibal, but he always sought to do it on his own terms. Hannibal didn’t dare to think he could defeat him by going to where he was camped. If he had believed he could win, it would have been wise for Fabius to either fight him or avoid the confrontation altogether.

Philip king of Macedonia, overcome by the Romaines; How Cingentorige avoided the faightyng of the fielde with Cesar; The ignorance of the Venecians; What is to be doen wher soldiours desire to faight, contrary to their capitaines minde; How to incourage souldiers; An advertisment to make the soldiour most obstinately to faight.

Philip, king of Macedonia, defeated by the Romans; How Cingentorige managed to avoid fighting in the field against Caesar; The ignorance of the Venetians; What to do when soldiers want to fight against their captain's wishes; How to motivate soldiers; A recommendation to make the soldier fight most fiercely.

Philip Kyng of Macedonia, thesame that was father to Perse, commyng to warre with the Romaines, pitched his campe upon a verie high hill, to the entent not to faight with theim: but the Romaines wente to find hym on thesame hill, and discomfaited hym. Cingentorige capitain of the Frenche menne, for that he would not faight the field with Cesar, whom contrarie to his opinion, had passed a river, got awaie many miles with his men. The Venecians in our tyme, if thei would not have come to have fought with the Frenche kyng, thei ought not to have taried till the Frenche armie, had passed the River Addus, but to have {145} gotten from them as Cingentorige, where thei havyng taried knewe not how to take in the passyng of the men, the occasion to faight the battaile, nor to avoide it: For that the Frenche men beyng nere unto them, as the Venecians went out of their Campe, assaulted theim, and discomfited theim: so it is, that the battaile cannot bee avoided, when the enemie in any wise will faight, nor let no man alledge Fabius, for that so moche in thesame case, he did flie the daie of battaile, as Aniball. It happeneth many tymes, that thy souldiours be willyng to faight, and thou knoweste by the nomber, and by the situacion, or for some other occasion to have disadvauntage, and desirest to make them chaunge from this desire: it happeneth also, that necessitie, or occasion, constraineth thee to faight, and that thy souldiours are evill to be trusted, and smally disposed to faight: where it is necessarie in thone case, to make theim afraied, and in the other to incourage theim: In the firste case, when perswacions suffiseth not, there is no better waie, then to give in praie, a part of them unto thenemie, to thintent those that have, and those that have not fought, maie beleve thee: and it may very wel be doen with art, thesame which to Fabius Maximus hapned by chaunce. Tharmie of Fabius (as you knowe) desired to faight with Aniballs armie: the very same desire had the master of his horses: to Fabius it semed not good, to attempte the faight: so that through soche contrary opinions, he was fain to devide the armie: Fabius kept his men in the campe, the other fought, and commyng into great perill, had been overthrowen, if Fabius had not rescued him: by the whiche insample the maister of the horse, together with all the armie, knewe how it was a wise waie to obeie Fabius. Concernyng to incourage theim to faight, it should be well doen, to make them to disdain the enemies, shewyng how thei speake slaunderous woordes of them, to declare to have intelligence with them, and to have corrupted part of them, to incampe in place, where thei maie see the enemies, and make some light skirmishe with them, for that the thyng that is dailie seen, with more facilitie is despised: to shewe {146} theim to bee unworthie, and with an oracion for the purpose, to reprehende them of their cowardnesse, and for to make them ashamed, to tell theim that you will faight alone, when thei will not beare you companie. And you ought above all thyng to have this advertismente, mindyng to make the Souldiour obstinate to faight, not to permitte, that thei maie send home any of their substaunce, or to leave it in any place, till the warre bee ended, that thei maie understande, that although fliyng save their life, yet it saveth not theim their goodes, the love whereof, is wonte no lesse then thesame, to make men obstinate in defence.

Philip Kyng of Macedonia, the same father of Perse, went to war with the Romans and set up his camp on a very high hill, intending not to fight them. However, the Romans came to find him on that hill and defeated him. Cingetorige, the leader of the French, did not want to fight Caesar, who, contrary to his wishes, had crossed a river and retreated several miles with his men. The Venetians in our time, if they didn't want to fight the French king, should not have waited until the French army crossed the River Addus. They should have retreated, like Cingetorige, where they stayed too long without knowing how to either engage in battle or avoid it. Since the French were close, as the Venetians left their camp, they were attacked and defeated. Thus, it shows that you can't avoid a battle when the enemy is determined to fight. No one should bring up Fabius; in this situation, he retreated on the day of battle just like Hannibal did. It often happens that your soldiers want to fight, but you know from the numbers, the situation, or other reasons that you are at a disadvantage and want to change their minds. It can also happen that necessity or circumstances force you to fight, and your soldiers are undisciplined and reluctant to engage. In the first case, when persuasion fails, a good way to handle it is to give part of them to the enemy as a sacrifice, so that those who have fought and those who haven’t will believe you. This can be done cleverly, as happened by chance to Fabius Maximus. His army, as you know, wanted to fight Hannibal's forces, and the same desire was held by his horse master. Fabius thought it unwise to attempt battle, so due to their opposing views, he had to divide the army: Fabius kept his men in camp while the other side fought and got into serious danger, nearly being defeated if Fabius hadn’t come to their aid. By this example, the horse master and the rest of the army realized it was wise to obey Fabius. To encourage them to fight, it would be good to make them scorn the enemy, showing how they speak ill of them, declare they’ve made secret deals, and have corrupted some of their ranks, camp them in a place where they can see the enemy, and engage in minor skirmishes. This way, what they see daily can be more easily dismissed. Show them the enemy is unworthy, and through a speech aimed at reproaching them for cowardice and shaming them, tell them you will fight alone if they won’t accompany you. Above all, you should remember, if aiming to make soldiers eager to fight, not to allow them to send home any of their belongings or leave them anywhere until the war is over, so they understand that although fleeing may save their lives, it does not save their possessions, which can inspire men as much as life itself in making them steadfast in defense.

ZANOBI. YOU have tolde, how the souldiours maie be tourned to faight, with speakyng to theim: doe you meane by this, that all the armie must bee spoken unto, or to the heddes thereof?

ZANOBI. You’ve said how soldiers can be rallied to fight by talking to them: do you mean that the entire army should be addressed, or just the leaders?

It is requisite for excellent Capitaines to bee good orators; Alexander Magnus used openly to perswade his armie; The effecteousnes of speking; Souldiours ought to be accustomed to heare their Capitaine speake; How in olde time souldiers were threatened for their faltes; Enterprises maie the easelier be brought to passe by meanes of religion; Sertorius; A policie of Silla; A policie of Charles the seventh king of Fraunce against the Englishmen; How souldiers maiebee made to esteme little their enemies; The surest wai to make souldiours moste obstinat to faight; By what meanes obstinatenesse to faighte is increased.

It’s essential for great leaders to be good speakers; Alexander the Great used to openly persuade his army. The effectiveness of communication is crucial; soldiers should be used to hearing their leader speak. In the past, soldiers were punished for their mistakes. Religious beliefs can help make missions easier to accomplish. Sertorius. A strategy of Silla. A strategy of Charles VII of France against the English. How soldiers can be made to underestimate their enemies. The best way to make soldiers more determined to fight. The ways in which determination to fight can be strengthened.

FABRICIO. TO perswade, or to diswade a thyng unto fewe, is verie easie, for that if woordes suffise not, you maie then use aucthoritie and force: but the difficultie is, to remove from a multitude an evill opinion, and that whiche is contrary either to the common profite, or to thy opinion, where cannot be used but woordes, the whiche is meete that thei be heard of every man, mindyng to perswade them all. Wherfore, it was requisite that the excellente Capitaines were oratours: for that without knowyng how to speake to al the army, with difficultie maie be wrought any good thing: the whiche altogether in this our tyme is laied aside. Rede the life of Alexander Magnus, and you shall see how many tymes it was necessarie for hym to perswade, and to speake publikly to his armie: otherwise he should never have brought theim, beyng become riche, and full of spoile, through the desertes of Arabia, and into India with so moche his disease, and trouble: for that infinite tymes there growe thynges, wherby an armie ruinateth, when the capitain either knoweth not, or useth not to speake unto thesame, for that this speakyng taketh awaie feare, in courageth the mindes, increaseth the obstinatenes to faight, discovereth the deceiptes, promiseth rewardes, sheweth the perilles, and the waie to avoide theim, reprehendeth, praieth, {147} threatened, filleth full of hope, praise, shame, and doeth a11 those thynges, by the whiche the humaine passions are extincte or kendled: wherefore, that prince, or common weale, whiche should appoincte to make a newe power, and cause reputacion to their armie, ought to accustome the Souldiours thereof, to heare the capitain to speake, and the capitain to know how to speake unto them. In kepyng desposed the souldiours in old tyme, to faight for their countrie, the religion availed moche, and the othes whiche thei gave them, when thei led theim to warfare: for as moche as in al their faultes, thei threatned them not onely with those punishementes, whiche might be feared of men but with those whiche of God might be looked for: the whiche thyng mingled with the other Religious maners, made many tymes easie to the auncient capitaines all enterprises, and will doe alwaies, where religion shall be feared, and observed. Sertorius prevailed, by declaryng that he spake with a Stagge, the whiche in Goddes parte, promised hym the victorie. Silla saied, he spoke with an Image, whiche he had taken out of the Temple of Apollo. Many have tolde how God hath appered unto them in their slepe, whom hath admonished them to faight. In our fathers time, Charles the seventh kyng of Fraunce, in the warre whiche he made againste the Englishemen, saied, he counsailed with a maide, sent from God, who was called every where the Damosell of Fraunce, the which was occacion of his victorie. There maie be also used meanes, that maie make thy men to esteme little the enemie, as Agesilao a Spartaine used, whom shewed to his souldiours, certain Persians naked, to the intent that seyng their delicate members, thei should not have cause to feare them. Some have constrained their men to faight through necessitie, takyng awaie from them all hope of savyng theim selves, savyng in overcommyng. The whiche is the strongest, and the beste provision that is made, to purpose to make the souldiour obstinate to faight: whiche obstinatenesse is increased by the confidence, and love of the Capitaine, or of the countrie. Confidence is caused through the armour, {148} the order the late victorie, and the opinion of the Capitaine. The love of the countrie, is caused of nature: that of the Capitain, through vertue, more then by any other benefite: the necessities maie be many, but that is strongest, whiche constraineth thee; either to overcome, or to dye.

FABRICIO. Convincing or discouraging a few people is really easy because if words don’t work, you can resort to authority and force. The challenge lies in changing unfavorable opinions from a crowd, especially when it goes against either the common good or your own beliefs, where only words can be used, and those words should be heard by everyone, aiming to persuade them all. Therefore, it was essential for great leaders to be orators, as without the ability to speak to the whole army, it would be hard to achieve anything worthwhile. Nowadays, this has largely been ignored. Read the life of Alexander the Great, and you'll see how many times he needed to persuade and speak publicly to his army; otherwise, he would never have led them—after becoming rich and laden with spoils—through the deserts of Arabia and into India amidst so much difficulty and strife. Countless situations can lead an army to destruction when the commander either doesn't know how to communicate with them or doesn't do it, because this communication alleviates fear, boosts morale, increases resolve to fight, exposes deceit, promises rewards, outlines dangers, and shows ways to avoid them, reproves, encourages, threatens, fills with hope, honors, shames, and does all those things that either extinguish or ignite human passions. Thus, a prince or republic that intends to build a new power and establish reputation for their army must train their soldiers to listen to the commander and ensure the commander knows how to speak to them. In earlier times, soldiers were motivated to fight for their country by religion and the oaths taken when led into battle; they were threatened not just with punishments to be feared from men but also with divine repercussions. This, along with other religious practices, often made it easier for ancient commanders to undertake missions and will always work where religion is respected and feared. Sertorius succeeded by claiming he spoke with a stag, which, on God's behalf, promised him victory. Sulla claimed to have spoken with a statue taken from the Temple of Apollo. Many have recounted how God appeared to them in dreams, urging them to fight. In our parents’ generation, Charles VII, King of France, in the war against the English, said he consulted a maiden sent by God, known everywhere as the Maid of France, who was the catalyst for his victory. There are also methods to make your men underestimate the enemy, as Agesilaus of Sparta did by showing his soldiers naked Persians to instill a lack of fear in them. Some leaders compelled their men to fight out of necessity, removing all hope of saving themselves except by overcoming the enemy. This is the most effective and strongest strategy to compel a soldier to fight obstinately, which is encouraged by confidence in and love for the commander or the country. Confidence is generated by the armor, the formation, recent victories, and the captain's reputation. The love of country is instinctive; the captain’s love stems from virtue rather than any other benefit. The pressures can be numerous, but the strongest is that which forces you to either conquer or die.

{151}

THE FIVETH BOOKE

How the Romaines marched with their armies; How the Romaines ordered their armie when it happened to be assaulted on the waie; How the main battailes ought to marche; The orderyng of an armie after soche sorte, that it maie marche safelie through the enemies countrie and be alwaies in a redines to faight; The place in the armie wher the bowmen and Harkabutters are appoincted; The place in the armie wher thextraordinarie Pikes are appoincted. The place in the armie wherthe generall capitain must be; Where the artillerie must be placed. The light horsmenne must be sente before to discover the countrie and the menne of armes to come behind tharmy; A generall rule concernyng horse; Wher the carriages and the unarmed are placed; The waie must be made plaine wher the armie shall marche in order; How many miles a day an armie maie marche in battaile raie, to bee able to incampe before sunne set; The orderyng of the armie, when it is assaulted on the vawarde; The orderyng of tharmie when thenemie commes to assaulte it behinde; How the armie is ordered when it is assaulted of any of the sides; doen when the army is assaulted on twoo sides.

How the Romans marched with their armies; How the Romans arranged their army when it was attacked on the way; How the main battles should march; The organization of an army so that it can march safely through enemy territory and always be ready to fight; The position in the army where the bowmen and firearms are assigned; The position in the army where the extraordinary pikes are assigned. The place in the army where the general commander must be; Where the artillery must be placed. The light cavalry must be sent ahead to scout the territory, and the armored troops will follow behind the army; A general rule regarding cavalry; Where the supply wagons and the unarmed soldiers are positioned; The path must be cleared where the army will march in order; How many miles a day an army can march in battle formation to be able to camp before sunset; The arrangement of the army when it is attacked at the front; The arrangement of the army when the enemy comes to attack it from behind; How the army is arranged when it is attacked from any side; and what to do when the army is attacked on two sides.

FABRICIO. I have shewed you, how an armi, is ordained to faight a fielde with an other armie, which is seen pitched against it, and have declared unto you, howe the same is overcome, and after many circumstaunces, I have likewise shewed you, what divers chaunces, maie happen about thesame, so that me thinkes tyme to shewe you now, how an armie is ordered, againste thesame enemie, whiche otherwise is not seen, but continually feared, that he assaulte thee: this happeneth when an armie marcheth through the enemies countrie, or through suspected places. Firste, you must understande, how a Romaine armie, sent alwaies ordinarely afore, certaine bandes of horsemen, as spies of the waie: after followed the right horne, after this, came all the carriages, whiche to thesame apperteined, after this, came a Legion, after it, the carriages therof, after that, an other legion, and next to it, their carriages, after whiche, came the left horne, with the carriages thereof at their backe, and in the laste part, folowed the remnaunte of the chivalrie: this was in effecte the maner, with whiche ordinarily thei marched: and if it happened that the armie were assaulted in the waie on the fronte, or on the backe, thei made straight waie all the carriages to bee drawen, either on the right, or on the lefte side, accordyng as chaunsed, or as thei could beste, havyng {152} respecte to the situacion: and all the men together free from their impedimentes, made hedde on that parte, where the enemie came. If thei were assaulted on the flancke, thei drue the carriages towardes thesame parte that was safe, and of the other, thei made hedde. This waie beyng well and prudently governed, I have thought meete to imitate, sending afore the light horsemen, as exploratours of the Countrie: Then havyng fower maine battailes I would make them to marche in araie, and every one with their carriages folowyng theim. And for that there be twoo sortes of carriages, that is partainyng to particulare souldiours, and partainyng to the publike use of all the Campe, I would devide the publike Carriages into fower partes, and to every maine battaile, I would appoinct his parte, deviding also the artillerie into fower partes, and all the unarmed, so that every nomber of armed menne, should equally have their impedimentes. But bicause it happeneth some times, that thei marche through the countrie, not onely suspected, but so daungerous, that thou fearest every hower to be assaulted, thou art constrained for to go more sure, to chaunge the forme of marchyng, and to goe in soche wise prepared, that neither the countrie menne, nor any armie, maie hurte thee, findyng thee in any parte unprovided. In soche case, the aunciente capitaines were wont, to marche with the armie quadrante, whiche so thei called this forme, not for that it was altogether quadrante, but for that it was apte to faight of fower partes, and thei saied, that thei wente prepared, bothe for the waie, and for the faight: from whiche waie, I will not digresse, and I will ordaine my twoo maine battailes, whiche I have taken for to make an armie of, to this effect. Mindyng therefore, to marche safely through the enemies Countrie, and to bee able to aunswere hym on every side, when at unwares the armie might chaunce to be assaulted, and intendyng therefore, accordyng to the antiquitie, to bryng thesame into a square, I would devise to make a quadrant, that the rome therof should be of space on every part Clix. yardes, in this maner. First I would put the flanckes, distant the one {153} flanck from the other, Clix. yardes, and I would place five battailes for a flancke, in a raie in length, and distant the one from the other, twoo yardes and a quarter: the whiche shall occupie with their spaces, every battaile occupiyng thirtie yardes, Clix. yardes. Then betwen the hedde and the taile of these two flanckes, I would place the other tenne battailes, in every parte five, orderyng them after soche sorte, that fower should joyne to the hedde of the right flanck, and fower to the taile of the lefte flancke, leaving betwene every one of them, a distance of thre yardes: one should after joyne to the hedde of the lefte flancke, and one to the taile of the right flancke: and for that the space that is betwene the one flancke and the other, is Clix. yardes, and these battailes whiche are set the one to the side of the other by breadth, and not by length, will come to occupie with the distaunces one hundred yardes and a halfe yarde, there shall come betwene theim fower battailes, placed in the fronte on the right flancke, and the one placed in thesame on the lefte, to remaine a space of fiftie and eighte yardes and a halfe, and the verie same space will come to remaine in the battailes, placed in the hinder parte: nor there shall bee no difference, saving that the one space shall come on the parte behind towardes the right horne, and thother shall come on the parte afore, towardes the lefte home. In the space of the lviii. yardes and a halfe before, I would place all the ordinarie Veliti, in thesame behinde, the extraordinarie, which wil come to be a thousande for a space, and mindyng to have the space that ought to be within the armie, to be every waie Clix. yardes, it is mete that the five battailes, whiche are placed in the hedde, and those whiche are placed in the taile, occupie not any parte of the space, whiche the flanckes keepe: and therefore it shall be convenient, that the five battailes behinde, doe touche with the fronte, the taile of their flanckes, and those afore, with the taile to touche he hedde, after soche sorte, that upon every corner of the ame armie, there maie remaine a space, to receive an other battaile: and for that there bee fower spaces, I would take {154} fower bandes of the extraordinarie Pikes, and in every corner I would place one, and the twoo Ansignes of the foresaied Pikes, whiche shall remain overplus, I would sette in the middest of the rome of this armie, in a square battaile, on the hedde whereof, should stande the generall capitaine, with his menne about him. And for that these battailes ordeined thus, marche all one waie, but faight not all one waie, in puttyng them together, those sides ought to be ordained to faight, whiche are not defended of thother battailes. And therfore it ought to be considered, that the five battailes that be in the front, have all their other partes defended, excepte the fronte: and therfore these ought to bee put together in good order, and with the Pikes afore. The five battailes whiche are behinde, have all their sides defended, except the parte behinde, and therefore those ought to bee put together in soche wise, that the Pikes come behind, as in the place therof we shall shewe. The five battailes that bee in the right flancke, have all their sides defended, except the right flancke. The five that be on the left flanck, have all their partes defended, excepte the lefte flancke: and therefore in orderyng the battailes, thei ought to bee made, that the Pikes maie tourne on the same flanck, that lieth open: and the Peticapitaines to stand on the hedde, and on the taile, so that nedyng to faight, all the armour and weapons maie be in their due places, the waie to doe this, is declared where we reasoned of the maner of orderyng the battailes. The artillerie I would devide, and one parte I would place without, on the lefte flancke, and the other on the right. The light horsemen, I would sende afore to discover the countrie. Of the menne of armes, I would place part behinde, on the right home, and parte on the lefte, distante about thirtie yardes from the battailes: and concerning horse, you have to take this for a general rule in every condicion, where you ordaine an armie, that alwaies thei ought to be put, either behinde, or on the flanckes of thesame: he that putteth them afore, over against the armie, it behoveth hym to doe one of these twoo thinges, either that he put {155} them so moche afore, that beyng repulced, thei maie have so moche space, that maie give them tyme, to be able to go a side from thy footemen, and not to runne upon them, or to order them in soche wise, with so many spaces, that the horses by those maie enter betwene them, without disorderyng them. Nor let no man esteme little this remembraunce, for as moche as many capitaines, whom havyng taken no hede thereof, have been ruinated, and by themselves have been disordered, and broken. The carriages and the unarmed menne are placed, in the rome that remaineth within the armie, and in soche sorte equally devided, that thei maie give the waie easely, to whom so ever would go, either from the one corner to the other, or from the one hedde, to the other of the armie. These battailes without the artillerie and the horse, occupie every waie from the utter side, twoo hundred and eleven yardes and a halfe of space: and bicause this quadrante is made of twoo main battailes, it is convenient to distinguishe, what part thone maine battaile maketh, and what the other: and for that the main battailes are called by the nomber, and every of theim hath (as you knowe) tenne battailes, and a generall hed, I would cause that the first main battaile, should set the first v. battailes therof in the front, the other five, in the left flanck, and the capitain of the same should stande in the left corner of the front. The seconde maine battaile, should then put the firste five battailes therof, in the right flanck, and the other five in the taile, and the hedde capitain of thesame, should stande in the right corner, whom should come to dooe the office of the Tergiductor. The armie ordained in this maner, ought to be made to move, and in the marchyng, to observe all this order, and without doubte, it is sure from all the tumultes of the countrie men. Nor the capitain ought not to make other provision, to the tumultuarie assaultes, then to give sometyme Commission to some horse, or Ansigne of Veliti, that thei set themselves in order: nor it shall never happen that these tumultuous people, will come to finde thee at the drawyng of the swerd, or pikes poincte: for that men out of order, have {156} feare of those that be in araie: and alwaies it shall bee seen, that with cries and rumours, thei will make a greate assaulte, without otherwise commyng nere unto thee, like unto barking curres aboute a Mastie. Aniball when he came to the hurte of the Romaines into Italie, he passed through all Fraunce, and alwaies of the Frenche tumultes, he took small regarde. Mindyng to marche, it is conveniente to have plainers and labourers afore, whom maie make thee the waie plaine, whiche shall bee garded of those horsemen, that are sent afore to viewe the countrie: an armie in this order maie marche tenne mile the daie, and shall have tyme inough to incampe, and suppe before Sunne goyng doune, for that ordinarely, an armie maie marche twentie mile: if it happen that thou be assaulted, of an armie set in order, this assaulte cannot growe sodainly: for that an armie in order, commeth with his pace, so that thou maiest have tyme inough, to set thy self in order to faight the field, and reduce thy menne quickly into thesame facion, or like to thesame facion of an armie, which afore is shewed thee. For that if thou be assaulted, on the parte afore, thou needeste not but to cause, that the artillerie that be on the flanckes, and the horse that be behinde, to come before, and place theimselves in those places, and with those distaunces, as afore is declared. The thousande Veliti that bee before, must go out of their place, and be devided into CCCCC. for a parte, and go into their place, betwene the horse and the hornes of tharmy: then in the voide place that thei shal leave, the twoo Ansignes of the extraordinarie Pikes muste entre, whiche I did set in the middest of the quadrante of the armie. The thousande Veliti, whiche I placed behinde, must departe from thesame place, and devide them selves in the flanckes of the battailes, to the fortificacion of those: and by the open place that thei shal leave, all the carriages and unarmed menne must go out, and place themselves on the backe of the battaile. Then the rome in the middeste beyng voided, and every man gone to his place: the five battailes, whiche I placed behinde on the armie, must make forward in the voide place, that is {157} betwene the one and the other flanck, and marche towardes the battailes, that stand in the hedde, and three of theim, muste stande within thirtie yardes of those, with equall distances, betwene the one and the other, and the other twoo shal remain behinde, distaunte other thirtie yardes: the whiche facion maie bee ordained in a sodaine, and commeth almoste to bee like, unto the firste disposicion, whiche of tharmy afore we shewed. And though it come straighter in the fronte, it commeth grosser in the flanckes, whiche giveth it no lesse strength: but bicause the five battailes, that be in the taile, have the Pikes on the hinder parte, for the occasion that before we have declared, it is necessarie to make theim to come on the parte afore, mindyng to have theim to make a backe to the front of tharmie: and therfore it behoveth either to make them to tourne battaile after battaile, as a whole body, or to make them quickly to enter betwen thorders of targettes, and conduct them afore, the whiche waie is more spedy, and of lesse disorder, then to make them to turn al together: and so thou oughtest to doe of all those, whiche remain behind in every condicion of assault, as I shal shewe you. If it appere that thenemie come on the part behinde, the first thyng that ought to bee dooen, is to cause that every man tourne his face where his backe stode, and straight waie tharmie cometh to have made of taile, hed, and of hed taile: then al those waies ought to be kept, in orderyng thesame fronte, as I tolde afore. If the enemie come to incounter the right flancke, the face of thy armie ought to bee made to tourne towardes thesame side: after, make all those thynges in fortificacion of thesame hedde, whiche above is saied, so that the horsemen, the Veliti, and the artillerie, maie be in places conformable to the hed thereof: onely you have this difference, that in variyng the hed of those, which are transposed, some have to go more, and some lesse. In deede makyng hedde of the right flancke, the Veliti ought to enter in the spaces, that bee betwene the horne of the armie, and those horse, whiche were nerest to the lefte flancke, in whose place ought to enter, the twoo Ansignes of the {158} extraordinarie Pikes, placed in the middest: But firste the carriages and the unarmed, shall goe out by the open place, avoidyng the rome in the middest, and retiryng themselves behinde the lefte flancke, whiche shall come to bee then the taile of the armie: the other Veliti that were placed in the taile, accordyng to the principall orderyng of the armie, in this case, shall not move: Bicause the same place should not remaine open, whiche of taile shall come to be flancke: all other thyng ought to bee dooen, as in orderyng of the firste hedde is saied: this that is told about the makyng hed of the right flanck, must be understode to be told, havyng nede to make it of the left flanck: for that the very same order ought to bee observed. If the enemie should come grose, and in order to assaulte thee on twoo sides, those twoo sides, whiche he commeth to assaulte thee on, ought to bee made stronge with the other twoo sides, that are not assaulted, doublyng the orders in eche of theim, and devidyng for bothe partes the artillerie, the Veliti, and the horse. If he come on three or on fower sides, it is necessarie that either thou or he lacke prudence: for that if thou shalt bee wise, thou wilte never putte thy self in place, that the enemie on three or fower sides, with a greate nomber of men, and in order, maie assault thee: for that mindyng, safely to hurte thee, it is requisit, that he be so great, that on every side, he maie assault thee, with as many men, as thou haste almoste in al thy army: and if thou be so unwise, that thou put thy self in the daunger and force of an enemie, whom hath three tymes more menne ordained then thou, if thou catche hurte, thou canste blame no man but thy self: if it happen not through thy faulte, but throughe some mischaunce, the hurt shall be without the shame, and it shal chaunce unto thee, as unto the Scipions in Spaine, and to Asdruball in Italie but if the enemie have not many more men then thou, and intende for to disorder thee, to assaulte thee on divers sides, it shal be his foolishnesse, and thy good fortune: for as moche as to doe so, it is convenient, that he become so thinne in soche wise, that then easely thou maiste overthrow {159} one bande, and withstande an other, and in short time ruinate him: this maner of ordering an armie against an enemie, whiche is not seen, but whiche is feared, is a necessarie and a profitable thing, to accustome thy souldiours, to put themselves together, and to march with soche order, and in marchyng, to order theimselves to faight, accordyng to the first hedde, and after to retourne in the forme, that thei marched in, then to make hedde of the taile, after, of the flanckes, from these, to retourne into the first facion: the whiche exercises and uses bee necessarie, mindyng to have an armie, throughly instructed and practised: in whiche thyng the Princes and the capitaines, ought to take paine. Nor the discipline of warre is no other, then to knowe how to commaunde, and to execute these thynges. Nor an instructed armie is no other, then an armie that is wel practised in these orders: nor it cannot be possible, that who so ever in this time, should use like disciplin shall ever bee broken. And if this quadrante forme whiche I have shewed you, is somewhat difficulte, soche difficultnesse is necessarie, takyng it for an exercise: for as moche as knowyng well, how to set theim selves in order, and to maintaine theim selves in the same, thei shall knowe after more easely, how to stand in those, whiche should not have so moche difficultie.

FABRICIO. I I have shown you how an army is arranged to fight against another army that is positioned against it, and I've explained how it can be defeated. After many circumstances, I've also discussed the various chances that may arise in this situation. Now, I think it’s time to show you how an army is organized against the same enemy, which may not be seen but is continually feared to attack you: this occurs when an army is marching through enemy territory or suspicious areas. First, you must understand that a Roman army always sends out certain units of cavalry ahead of time as scouts on the way. Following them comes the right flank, then all the supply wagons pertaining to it. After that comes a Legion, followed by its wagons, then another legion, with its wagons next in line, and finally the left flank with its supply wagons behind it, followed by the remainder of the cavalry. This is typically how they march. If the army is attacked from the front or back while on the move, they quickly pull all the wagons to either the right or left side, depending on what happens or what seems best, keeping in mind the situation. All the men then gather free from their baggage on the side where the enemy is coming. If they are attacked from the flank, they pull the wagons toward the safe side while the other prepares to face the threat. Understanding this approach well and executing it wisely, I think it wise to imitate them by sending out light cavalry as scouts for the terrain. Then, having four main battalions, I would make them march in formation with all their supply wagons following. Since there are two types of baggage, one pertaining to individual soldiers and the other for the general camp's use, I would divide the public supplies into four parts and assign each main battalion its share, also dividing the artillery in four parts so that each group of armed soldiers would equally manage their supplies. However, sometimes they march through areas that are not only suspect but so dangerous that you fear being attacked at any moment; you must adapt your marching style to move more securely and be prepared so that neither the local population nor any army can harm you by catching you off guard. In such cases, ancient commanders typically marched with the army in a square formation, which they called this not because it was perfectly square but because it was suitable for attacks from four sides. They said this way was prepared for both the march and the fight. I won’t digress from that, and I will arrange my two main battalions I have chosen to create an army accordingly. Therefore, planning to march safely through enemy territory, ready to respond should the army be suddenly attacked, I intend, as per ancient tradition, to organize it into a square. I would plan for the square to have a size of 160 yards on each side. First, I would place the flanks 160 yards apart from each other, arranging five battalions along each flank in a line, spaced two and a quarter yards apart, with each battalion taking up thirty yards. Then, between the front and back of these two flanks, I would place ten more battalions, five on each side, arranging them so that four join the front of the right flank and four the back of the left flank, leaving a distance of three yards between each. One would attach to the front of the left flank, and one to the back of the right flank. Since the distance between the flanks is 160 yards and these battalions are positioned side by side rather than end to end, they would occupy a total width of one hundred yards and a half yard with four more battalions in the front on the right flank and one more in the left, leaving a space of fifty-eight and a half yards, which would be similar behind the battalions placed in the rear. In the 58.5 yards in front, I would place all the regular Velites, behind them the extra ones, amounting to a thousand, ensuring that the internal space of the army remains 160 yards on all sides. It’s fitting that the five battalions in the front and those in the rear do not occupy any of the space held by the flanks; therefore, it would be appropriate that the five battalions at the back touch the front of their flanks, and those at the front do the same at the back, leaving room at each corner of the army for an additional battalion. For this purpose, I would take four squads of the extra Pikes to station one at each corner, and the two ensigns of the aforementioned Pikes, which would remain as a surplus, I would place in the center of the army formation, in a square battalion, at the head of which would stand the general with his men around him. Since these battalions are arranged to march in unison but fight in different directions, the sides that are not defended by other battalions should be readied for attack. Therefore, it should be noted that the five battalions in the front have all their sides secured, except for their front. They must be organized well and with the Pikes at the front. The five battalions behind have all their sides secured, except for the back, so they should be arranged such that the Pikes are positioned at the back, in the manner I will describe. The five battalions on the right flank have all their sides secured, except for the right flank. The five on the left flank have all their parts secured, except for the left flank. Thus, in organizing the battalions, they must be configured so that the Pikes can face the open flank, and the Captains positioned at the front and back, ensuring readiness for battle, with armor and weapons properly placed. The method to do this has been explained in our discussion about the organization of the battalions. I would divide the artillery, placing part outside on the left flank and the other on the right. The light cavalry would be sent ahead to scout the territory. From the armored men, I would place some behind on the right flank and some on the left, about thirty yards from the battalions. In regard to cavalry, you should remember this general rule in any situation when organizing an army: they should always be positioned either behind or on the flanks. Anyone who places them directly in front of the army faces one of these two dilemmas: either they advance them so far that, when repelled, they have enough space to sidestep from your infantry without running into them, or they arrange them in such a way, with gaps that allow the horses to weave through without causing disorder. Don’t underestimate this reminder, as many commanders who overlooked this have been ruined and faced disarray at their own hands. The supply wagons and unarmed men should be placed within the remaining space in the army so that they can easily give way to anyone who wants to pass either from corner to corner or from one end to the other of the army. These battalions, minus the artillery and cavalry, will occupy a total of two hundred eleven and a half yards of space on the outside. Since this quadrant is made of two main battalions, it's important to distinguish what part each main battalion constitutes. Each main battalion, as you know, is comprised of ten battalions and a general command; I would have the first main battalion place its first five battalions in the front and the other five on the left flank, while the captain of this battalion stands in the left corner of the front. The second main battalion would then position its first five battalions on the right flank and the other five in the rear while the captain of this battalion stands in the right corner, fulfilling the role of the Tergiductor. An army organized in this way should be able to move while adhering to this order in its march, certainly keeping it safe from any disruption from the local populace. The captain should only make additional provisions for any sudden attacks by appointing some cavalry or Veliti ensigns to organize themselves. Rest assured, these tumultuous groups will never confront you when your weapons are drawn or your pikes pointed; for disorganized men fear those in formation and will only create a great uproar without getting close to you, much like barking curs around a Mastiff. When Hannibal came to wreak havoc upon the Romans in Italy, he passed through all of France, paying little mind to the French disturbances. While preparing to march, it’s advisable to have workers and laborers up front to make the way smoother, which should be guarded by those horsemen sent ahead to scout the territory. An army formatted this way can march ten miles a day and have enough time to camp and dine before sunset, as an army typically can march twenty miles. If you find yourself confronted by a well-ordered army, such an assault cannot arise suddenly; a structured army arrives at a measured pace, allowing you the time required to arrange yourself for battle and quickly reorganize your men into the previously established formation. For if you are attacked from the front, all you need do is ensure that the artillery on the flanks and the cavalry behind move to the front and position themselves accordingly, as previously explained. The thousand Velites in front must leave their positions, divide into groups of 500, and spread between the cavalry and the flanks of the army. Then, in the vacant spaces they vacate, the two ensigns of the extraordinary Pikes should enter, which I have set in the center of the army square. The thousand Velites placed behind must also depart from their location and position themselves on the flanks of the battalions to strengthen them. In the openings they create, all the supply wagons and unarmed men should exit and set themselves behind the battalion. Once the middle space is cleared and everyone is in their designated locations, the five battalions positioned at the back of the army must move forward into the gap between the flanks and advance towards the front line, with three of them standing within thirty yards of the frontline, maintaining equal distances between each, while the other two remain behind, thirty yards back. This formation can be quickly arranged and resembles the initial structure I previously showed you. Though it may manifest tighter at the front, it gains breadth at the flanks, which provides it with significant strength. However, since the five battalions at the rear have the Pikes positioned at the back, as previously indicated, it is essential to get them to step forward to fortify the front of the army. Therefore, it is necessary to either rotate them turn by turn as a cohesive body or to move them promptly through the ranks of shields, steering them forward, which is a faster and less disorderly method than turning them all at once. This approach should also apply to all those remaining behind in any situation of assault, as I will demonstrate. If the enemy attacks from behind, the first thing to do is have everyone turn around to face where their backs were, and immediately the army should be rearranged into front to back and back to front. All paths should be prepared as previously instructed to maintain this front. If the enemy strikes the right flank, your army’s front should pivot in that direction; thereafter, fortifications should be put in place as described above so that the cavalry, Veliti, and artillery are suited to the head of that formation, but there’s one exception: when repositioning the head of those redeployed, some must move farther than others. Indeed, while making the front of the right flank, the Veliti should fill the gaps between the horn of the army and those horses nearest to the left flank, where the two ensigns of the extraordinary Pikes previously in the middle should enter. But first, the supply wagons and unarmed men must exit through the cleared space, retreating behind the left flank, which will then become the tail of the army. The other Veliti stationed at the rear per the army's original organization should not shift positions in this case. We want to avoid leaving the position open developing into a flank. Everything else should follow the initial setup instructions. This information about creating a head for the right flank should also be understood in the context of potentially needing to make the left flank, as the same order must be adhered to. If the enemy comes in force, intending to assault you from two sides, those two sides under attack must be strengthened with the non-attacked sides, doubling the orders on each and appropriately distributing the artillery, Veliti, and cavalry for both. If the enemy approaches from three or four sides, either you or they are lacking in prudence; for if you have wisdom, you will never place yourself in a position where the enemy can assault you with a large number of troops arranged in an organized manner from three or four sides. Because, for them to safely harm you, it’s vital they are so large that they can simultaneously attack you from all sides with as many men as you have in your whole army. If you are so foolish as to dangerously expose yourself to an enemy with three times as many men organized than you, if you suffer defeat, you can blame no one but yourself. If the failure arises from circumstances beyond your control, the injury will come without the accompanying shame, and you will find yourself in the same situation as the Scipios in Spain and Hasdrubal in Italy. However, if the enemy is only slightly larger than you and intends to disrupt your formation by attacking from different angles, their folly will prove your fortune; because to do so, they would have to stretch themselves thin enough for you to easily overrun one group while withstanding another, and in a short time, you could ruin them. This approach to organizing an army against an unseen, feared enemy is essential and beneficial, training your soldiers to come together, march orderly, and, while marching, arrange themselves for battle according to the initial head, then revert to the formation in which they previously marched, subsequently forming a tail and flanks, returning to the original arrangement. Such exercises and practices are crucial for having a thoroughly trained and practiced army, in which princes and commanders should invest effort. Warfare discipline is nothing but knowing how to command and execute these actions. An organized army is merely one that is well-practiced in these orders, and it is unlikely anyone maintaining such discipline can ever be defeated. If the quadrant formation I demonstrated is somewhat challenging, keep in mind that such challenges are necessary as practice; for by mastering how to order themselves and sustain that order, they will more easily know how to stand in formations that are less difficult.

ZANOBI. I beleve as you saie, that these orders bee verie necessarie, and I for my parte, knowe not what to adde or take from it: true it is, that I desire to know of you twoo thynges, the one, if when you will make of the taile, or of the flancke hedde, and would make them to tourne, whether this be commaunded by the voice, or with the sounde: thother, whether those that you sende afore, to make plain the waie, for the armie to marche, ought to be of the verie same souldiours of your battailes, or other vile menne appoincted, to like exercise.

ZANOBI. I believe what you say is true, that these orders are very necessary, and I, for my part, don’t know what to add or take away from it. It’s true that I want to know two things from you: first, if when you make the tail or the flank head and want them to turn, is this commanded by voice or by sound? Second, should those you send ahead to clear the way for the army to march be the same soldiers from your battles, or can they be other low-ranking people assigned to that task?

Commaundementes of Capitaines being not wel understoode, maie be the destruction of an armie; Respect that is to be had in commaundementes made with the sounde of the Trompet; In commaundmentes made with the voice, what respect is to be had; Of Pianars.

Commendations from captains that aren't well understood can lead to the destruction of an army; consider the respect given to commands made with the sound of the trumpet; in commands made with the voice, what respect is to be given; of pianists.

FABRICIO. Your firste question importeth moche: for that many tymes the commaundementes of Capitaines, beyng not well understoode, or evill interpreted, have disordered their armie: therfore the voices, with the whiche thei commaunde {160} in perilles, ought to bee cleare, and nete. And if thou commaunde with the sounde, it is convenient to make, that betwene the one waie and the other, there be so moche difference, that the one cannot be chaunged for the other: and if thou commaundest with the voice, thou oughteste to take heede, that thou flie the general voices, and to use the particulares, and of the particulars, to flie those, whiche maie be interpreted sinisterly. Many tymes the saiyng backe, backe, hath made to ruinate an armie; therfore this voice ought not to be used, but in steede therof to use, retire you. If you will make theim to tourne, for to chaunge the hedde, either to flanck, or to backe, use never to saie tourne you, but saie to the lefte, to the right, to the backe, to the front: thus all the other voices ought to be simple, and nete, as thrust on, march, stande stronge, forwarde, retourne you: and all those thynges, whiche maie bee dooen with the voice, thei doe, the other is dooen with the sounde. Concernyng those menne, that must make the waies plaine for the armie to marche, whiche is your seconde question, I would cause my owne souldiours to dooe this office, as well bicause in the aunciente warfare thei did so, as also for that there should be in the armie, lesser nomber of unarmed men, and lesse impedimentes: and I would choose out of every battaile, thesame nomber that should nede, and I would make theim to take the instrumentes, meete to plaine the grounde withall, and their weapons to leave with those rankes, that should bee nereste them, who should carrie them, and the enemie commyng, thei shall have no other to doe, then to take them again, and to retourne into their araie.

FABRICIO. Your first question is very important because many times the commands of leaders, when not understood correctly or misinterpreted, have thrown their army into chaos. Therefore, the commands given in dangerous situations should be clear and straightforward. If you’re giving commands with your voice, it’s important to ensure that there’s a huge difference between each command so that one cannot be confused with another. If you're using your voice, you should avoid general commands and stick to specific ones, avoiding those that could be misinterpreted negatively. Many times, saying "back, back" has caused armies to fall apart; therefore, this phrase should not be used—instead, say "retreat." If you want them to turn or change direction, never say "turn," but specify "to the left," "to the right," "to the back," or "to the front." All other commands should be simple and clear, like "push forward," "march," "stand firm," "go forward," "turn back." Anything that can be done with a voice should be done that way, while other actions should be signaled with sounds. Regarding those who need to clear the way for the army to march—which is your second question—I would have my own soldiers handle this task, partly because they used to do this in ancient warfare, and also because it would mean fewer unarmed men in the army, reducing obstacles. I would select the necessary number from each battalion and have them take the tools needed to clear the ground while leaving their weapons with the nearest ranks, who would carry them. When the enemy approaches, they would just need to retrieve their weapons and return to their formation.

ZANOBI. Who shall carrie thinstrumentes to make the waie plaine withall?

ZANOBI. Who will carry the tools to smooth the path?

FABRICIO. The Cartes that are appoincted to carrie the like instrumentes.

FABRICIO. The cards that are chosen to carry the same instruments.

ZANOBI. I doubte whether you should ever brynge these our souldiours, to labour with Shovell or Mattocke, after soche sorte.

ZANOBI. I doubt whether you should ever make these soldiers work with a shovel or pickaxe in that way.

The victualles that thantiquitie made provision of, for their armies.

The supplies that ancient times prepared for their armies.

FABRICIO. All these thynges shall bee reasoned in the {161} place thereof, but now I will let alone this parte, and reason of the maner of the victualing of the armie: for that me thinketh, havyng so moche traivailed theim, it is tyme to refreshe them, and to comfort them with meate. You have to understande, that a Prince ought to ordaine his armie, as expedite as is possible, and take from thesame all those thynges, whiche maie cause any trouble or burthen unto it, and make unto hym any enterprise difficulte. Emongest those thynges that causeth moste difficultie, is to be constrained to keepe the armie provided of wine, and baked bread. The antiquitie cared not for Wine, for that lackyng it, thei dranke water, mingeled with a little vinegre, to give it a taste: For whiche cause, emong the municions of victualles for the hoste, vineger was one, and not wine. Thei baked not the breade in Ovens, as thei use for Citees, but thei provided the Meale, and of thesame, every Souldiour after his owne maner, satisfied hym self, havyng for condimente Larde and Baken, the whiche made the breade saverie, that thei made, and maintained theim strong, so that the provision of victualles for the armie, was Meale, Vineger, Larde, and Bacon, and for the horses Barley. Thei had ordinarely heardes of greate beastes and small, whiche folowed the armie, the whiche havyng no nede to bee carried, caused not moche impedimente. Of this order there grewe, that an armie in old time, marched somtymes many daies through solitarie places, and difficulte, without sufferyng disease of victualles: for that thei lived of thyngs, whiche easely thei might convey after them. To the contrarie it happeneth in the armies, that are now a daies, whiche mindyng not to lacke wine, and to eate baked breade in thesame maner, as when thei are at home, whereof beyng not able to make provision long, thei remaine often tymes famished, or though thei be provided, it is dooen with disease, and with moste greate coste: therfore I would reduce my armie to this maner of living: and I would not that thei should eate other bread, then that, which by themselves thei should bake. Concernyng wine, I would not prohibite the drinkyng thereof, nor yet the commyng of it {162} into the armie, but I would not use indevour, nor any labour for to have it, and in the other provisions, I would governe my self altogether, like unto the antiquitie: the whiche thing, if you consider well, you shall see how moche difficultie is taken awaie, and how moche trouble and disease, an armie and a capitaine is avoided of, and how moche commoditie shall bee given, to what so ever enterprise is to bee dooen.

FABRICIO. We’ll discuss all these matters in the {161} relevant section, but for now, I’ll set that aside and talk about how to supply the army with food. I think after so much hard work, it’s time to refresh them and comfort them with food. You need to understand that a prince should organize his army as efficiently as possible and remove anything that could cause trouble or burden it, which would make any undertaking difficult. One of the biggest challenges is being forced to keep the army supplied with wine and baked bread. In the past, they didn’t care much for wine; lacking it, they would drink water mixed with a bit of vinegar to add flavor. For this reason, vinegar was included among the provisions for the troops, but not wine. They didn’t bake bread in ovens like cities do; instead, they provided flour, and each soldier prepared it as they saw fit, using lard and bacon as seasoning, which made the bread flavorful and kept them strong. So, the food supply for the army consisted of flour, vinegar, lard, and bacon, and for the horses, barley. They typically had herds of large and small animals following the army, which didn't need to be carried, thus causing little hindrance. Because of this, armies in ancient times could march for many days through remote, difficult areas without suffering from food shortages, as they lived off things that were easy to carry with them. In contrast, today’s armies, unwilling to go without wine and to eat baked bread just like at home, often find themselves starving or, even if they are supplied, it comes at great cost and hassle. Therefore, I would prefer to have my army live like this, and I wouldn’t want them to eat any bread other than what they bake themselves. As for wine, I wouldn’t prohibit drinking it or its arrival {162} in the army, but I wouldn’t make any effort or work to obtain it. For the other supplies, I would manage myself entirely like the people of old. If you think about it, you’ll see how much difficulty is eliminated, how much trouble and hassle the army and its leader avoid, and how much better it makes things for any undertaking that needs to be done.

ZANOBI. We have overcome thenemie in the field, marched afterward upon his countrie, reason would, that spoiles be made, tounes sacked, prisoners taken, therefore I would knowe how the antiquitie in these thynges, governed them selves.

ZANOBI. We have defeated the enemy in battle, marched afterward into their territory, and it seems reasonable that we take spoils, sack towns, and capture prisoners. So, I want to know how ancient peoples handled these matters.

The occasions why the warres made nowe adaies, doe impoverishe the conquerors as well as the conquered; The order that the Romaines toke, concerning the spoile and the booties that their souldiours gotte; An order that the antiquitie tooke, concernyng their soldiours wages.

The reasons why wars nowadays aren't fought anymore actually hurt both the conquerors and the conquered. The rules that the Romans established about the spoils and loot that their soldiers gained; a system that ancient times implemented regarding their soldiers' pay.

FABRICIO. Beholde, I will satisfie you. I beleve you have considered, for that once alredie with some of you I have reasoned, howe these present warres, impoverishe as well those lordes that overcome, as those that leese: for that if the one leese his estate, the other leeseth his money, and his movables: the whiche in olde time was not, for that the conquerour of the warre, waxed ritche. This groweth of keepyng no compte in these daies of the spoiles, as in olde tyme thei did, but thei leave it to the discreacion of the souldiours. This manner maketh twoo moste great disorders: the one, that whiche I have tolde: the other that the souldiour becometh more covetous to spoyle, and lesse observeth the orders: and manie times it hath been seen, howe the covetousnesse of the praye, hath made those to leese, whome were victorious. Therefore the Romaines whiche were princes of armies, provided to the one and to the other of these inconvenienses, ordainyng that all the spoyle should apertaine to the publicke, and that the publicke after should bestowe it, as shoulde be thought good: and therfore thei had in tharmie the questours, whom were as we would say, the chamberlaines, to whose charge all the spoyle and booties were committed: whereof the consull was served to geve the ordinarie pay to the souldiours, to succour the wounded, and the sicke, and for the other businesse of the armie. The consull might well, and he used it often, to graunte a spoyle to soldiours: but {163} this grauntyng, made no disorder: for that the armie beyng broken all the pray was put in the middest, and distributed by hedde, accordyng to the qualitee of everie man: the which maner thei constituted, to thintente, that the soldiours should attend to overcome, and not to robbe: and the Romaine Legions overcame the enemies, and folowed them not, for that thei never departed from their orders: onely there folowed them, the horsemenne with those that were light armed, and if there were any other souldiours then those of the legions, they likewyse pursued the chase. Where if the spoyle shoulde have ben his that gotte it, it had not ben possible nor reasonable, to have kepte the legions steddie, and to withstonde manie perils; hereby grewe therefore, that the common weale inritched, and every Consull carried with his triumphe into the treasurie, muche treasure, whiche all was of booties and spoiles. An other thing the antiquetie did upon good consideration, that of the wages, whiche they gave to every souldiour, the thirde parte they woulde shoulde be laied up nexte to him, whome carried the ansigne of their bande, whiche never gave it them againe, before the warre was ended: this thei did, beyng moved of twoo reasons, the first was to thintente, that the souldiour should thrive by his wages, because the greatest parte of them beyng yonge men, and carelesse, the more thei have, so muche the more without neede thei spende, the other cause was, for that knowyng, that their movabelles were nexte to the ansigne, thei should be constrained to have more care thereof, and with more obstinatenesse to defende it: and this made them stronge and to holde together: all which thynges is necessarie to observe, purposinge to reduce the exercise of armes unto the intier perfection therof.

FABRICIO. Look, I’ll satisfy you. I believe you have considered, since I’ve discussed this with some of you before, how the current wars impoverish both the lords who win and those who lose: for when one loses his estate, the other loses his money and possessions. In the past, this wasn’t the case, because the conqueror of the war grew rich. This happens because nowadays they don’t keep track of the spoils like they used to, leaving it to the soldiers’ discretion. This creates two major problems: the first is what I mentioned; the second is that soldiers become more greedy to plunder and pay less attention to orders. Many times, it has been seen how the desire for loot has caused even the victorious to lose. Therefore, the Romans, who were leaders of armies, addressed both of these issues by ordaining that all spoils should go to the public, which would later distribute it as deemed fit. This is why they had quaestors in the army, who were like what we would call chamberlains, responsible for all the spoils and loot. The consul was there to provide the regular pay for the soldiers, to help the wounded and sick, and for other matters of the army. The consul could, and often did, grant a spoil to soldiers; however, this granting did not cause disorder, because when the army was broken, all the loot was placed in the middle and distributed by headcount, according to each person’s rank. They established this method so that soldiers would focus on winning battles instead of robbing. The Roman legions defeated the enemies and did not chase after them because they never strayed from their orders; only the cavalry and light infantry followed. If the spoils had gone to whoever captured them, it wouldn't have been possible or reasonable to keep the legions steady and withstand many dangers; thus, the commonwealth grew rich, and every consul brought back substantial treasure, all from loot and spoils. Another thing the ancients did thoughtfully was to require that one-third of the pay given to each soldier be set aside next to the one carrying their standard, which was never returned to them until the war was over. They did this for two reasons: first, to ensure that the soldiers would benefit from their wages, because most of them were young and careless; the more they had, the more they spent recklessly; the second reason was that knowing their belongings were close to the standard would compel them to take better care of it and defend it more fiercely. This made them strong and united; all these things are essential to observe if one aims to refine the art of warfare to its complete perfection.

ZANOBI. I beleeve that it is not possible, that to an armie that marcheth from place to place, there fal not perrilous accidentes, where the industerie of the capitaine is needefull, and the worthinesse of the souldiours, mindyng to avoyde them. Therefore I woulde be glad, that you remembring any, would shew them.

ZANOBI. I believe it’s not possible for an army that’s moving from place to place to avoid dangerous accidents entirely, where the skill of the captain and the bravery of the soldiers are essential for avoiding them. So I’d appreciate it if you could share any examples you remember.

{164}

Captaines mai incurre the daunger of ambusshes twoo maner of wayes; How to avoide the perill of ambusshes; Howe ambusshes have ben perceived; Howe the Capitaine of the enemies ought to be esteemed; Where men be in greatest perill; The description of the countrey where an army muste marche, is most requiset for a Capitaine to have; A most profitable thyng it is for a capitayne to be secrete in all his affaires; An advertisment concernyng the marchyng of an armie; The marching of an armie ought to be ruled by the stroke of the Drumme; The condicion of the enemie ought to be considered.

Captains can face the danger of ambushes in two ways: How to avoid the risk of ambushes; How ambushes have been recognized; How the enemy captain should be regarded; Where people are in the greatest danger; It's essential for a captain to understand the terrain where an army must march; It's very beneficial for a captain to keep all his operations confidential; Advice regarding the movement of an army; The movement of an army should be guided by the sound of the drum; The condition of the enemy should be taken into account.

FABRICIO. I shall contente you with a good will, beyng inespetially necessarie, intendyng to make of this exercise a perfecte science. The Capitaines ought above all other thynges, whileste thei marche with an armie, to take heede of ambusshes, wherein they incurre daunger twoo waies, either marchynge thou entrest into them, or thoroughe crafte of the enemie thou arte trained in before thou arte aware. In the first case, mindyng to avoide suche perill, it is necessarie to sende afore double warde, whome may discover the countrey, and so muche the more dilligence ought to be used, the more that the countrey is apte for ambusshes, as be the woddie or hilly countries, for that alwaies thei be layd either in a wodde, or behind a hille: and as the ambusshe not forseene, doeth ruin thee, so forseyng the same, it cannot hurte thee. Manie tymes birdes or muche duste have discovered the enemie: for that alwayes where the enemie cometh to finde thee, he shall make great duste, whiche shall signifie unto thee his comyng: so often tymes a Capitaine seyng in the places where he ought to passe, Doves to rise, or other of those birdes that flie in flockes, and to tourne aboute and not to light, hath knowen by the same the ambusshe of the enemies to be there, and sendynge before his men, and sertainely understandyng it, hath saved him selfe and hurte his enemie. Concernyng the seconde case, to be trained in, (which these our men cal to be drawen to the shot) thou ought to take heede, not straight way to beleve those thinges, which are nothyng reasonable, that thei be as they seeme: as shoulde be, if the enemie should set afore thee a praie, thou oughtest to beleeve that in the same is the hooke, and that therin is hid the deceipte. If many enemies be driven away by a fewe of thine, if a fewe enemies assaulte manie of thine, if the enemies make a sodeine flight, and not standynge with reason, alwaies thou oughtest in suche cases to feare deceipte, and oughtest never to beleeve that the enemie knoweth not how to doe his businesse, but rather intendyng that he may begile thee the lesse, and mindyng to stand in lesse peril, the weaker that he is, and the lesse craftier that {165} the enemie is, so muche the more thou oughtest to esteeme him: and thou muste in this case use twoo sundrie poinctes, for that thou oughtest to feare him in thy minde and with the order, but with wordes, and with other outewarde demonstracion, to seeme to dispyse him: because this laste way, maketh that the souldiours hope the more to have the victorie: the other maketh thee more warie, and lesse apte to be begyled. And thou hast to understand, that when men marche thoroughe the enemies countrey, they ar in muche more, and greater perils, then in fayghtyng the fielde: and therefore the Capitaine in marchyng, ought to use double diligence: and the first thyng that he ought to doo, is to get described, and payncted oute all the countrie, thorough the which he must marche, so that he maye know the places, the number, the distances, the waies, the hilles, the rivers, the fennes, and all the quallites of them: and to cause this to bee knowen, it is convenient to have with him diversly, and in sundrie maners such men, as know the places, and to aske them with diligence, and to se whether their talke agree, and accordyng to the agreyng therof, to note: he oughte also to sende afore the horsemen, and with them prudente heddes, not so muche to discover the enemie, as to viewe the countrey, to se whether it agree with the description, and with the knowledge that they have of the same. Also the guydes that are sente, ought to be kepte with hope of rewarde, and feare of paine. And above all thynges it ought to be provided, that the armie knowe not to what businesse he leadeth them: for that there is nothyng in the warre more profitable, then to keepe secret the thynges that is to be dooen: and to thintente a suddeine assaulte dooe not trouble thy soldiours, thou oughteste to see them to stande reddie with their weapons, because the thynges that ar provided for, offend lesse. Manie for to avoyde the confusion of marchyng, have placed under the standerde, the carriages, and the unarmed, and have commaunded them to folow the same, to the intente that in marchyng needyng to staye, or to retire, they might dooe it more easely, which thyng as profitable, I alowe very {166} muche. Also in marchyng, advertismente ought to be had, that the one parte of the armie goe not a sunder from the other, or that thoroughe some goyng fast, and some softe, the armie become not slender: the whiche thynges, be occation of dissorder: therfore the heddes muste be placed in suche wise, that they may maintaine the pace even, causing to goe softe those that goe to fast, and to haste forward the other that goe to sloe, the whiche pace can not bee better ruled, then by the stroke of the drumme. The waies ought to be caused to be inlarged, so that alwaies at least a bande of iiii. hundred men may marche in order of battaile. The custome and the qualitie of the enemie ought to be considered, and whether that he wil assaulte thee either in the mornyng, or at none or in the evenynge, and whether he be more puisante with fotemen or horsemen, and accordyng as thou understandest, to ordeine and to provide for thy self. But let us come to some particular accidente. It hapneth sometime, that thou gettyng from the enemie, because thou judgest thy selfe inferiour, and therfore mindynge not to faight with him, and he comyng at thy backe, thou arivest at the banke of a river, passyng over the which, asketh time, so that the enemie is redie to overtake thee and to fayght with thee. Some, which chaunsing to bee in suche perill, have inclosed their armie on the hinder parte with a diche, and fillyng the same full of towe, and firyng it, have then passed with the armie without beyng able to be letted of the enemie, he beyng by the same fire that was betwene them held backe.

FABRICIO. I will gladly provide you with useful insights, as this is especially necessary, aiming to turn this exercise into a complete science. Captains should, above all else, pay attention to ambushes while marching with an army, since they risk danger in two ways: either by walking into one or being caught off guard by the enemy's clever tactics. In the first case, to avoid such danger, it's essential to send out scouts who can survey the area, and as the terrain is more suited for ambushes—like wooded or hilly areas—greater diligence should be exercised, as ambushes are often laid in woods or behind hills. Just as an unforeseen ambush can ruin you, being aware of it can keep you safe. Many times, birds or stirred-up dust have revealed the enemy's approach: whenever the enemy seeks to find you, they'll create dust that signals their arrival. Often, a captain noticing doves or other flocking birds take off and circle without landing can deduce the presence of an enemy ambush and, by sending his men ahead and confirming it, has saved himself and harmed his foe. Regarding the second case, being caught off guard (which our men refer to as being lured into shooting range), you should be cautious not to automatically believe things that seem unreasonable; if the enemy sets a trap before you, be suspicious that it's a setup. If many of your men are driven away by just a few of the enemy, or if a few enemies attack many of yours, or if the enemies suddenly flee without reason, you should always suspect deception. Never assume the enemy doesn't know what they're doing; instead, recognize that they might be trying to deceive you with these tactics while trying to make their weakened position seem safer. The less crafty the enemy is, the more you should regard them with caution. In this case, you must employ two strategies: fear them in your mind and with your orders, while outwardly showing disdain through words and other displays. This latter strategy boosts your soldiers' hopes for victory, while the former makes you more cautious and less likely to be deceived. Understand that when men march through enemy territory, they are in much greater danger than in open battlefield fights. Therefore, a captain should exercise double diligence while marching. The first thing he should do is have the entire region through which he will march mapped out so that he can know the locations, numbers, distances, paths, hills, rivers, marshes, and all their qualities. To accomplish this, it's wise to have various knowledgeable individuals with him and to question them diligently to see if their accounts match, noting any discrepancies. He should also send cavalry ahead with wise leaders, not just to scout the enemy, but to assess the terrain to see if it aligns with their descriptions. Additionally, the guides sent should be kept motivated by promises of reward and the fear of punishment. Above all else, it should be ensured that the army remains unaware of the mission's specifics, as nothing in warfare is more advantageous than keeping plans secret. To prevent a sudden attack from unsettling your soldiers, you should ensure they are ready with their weapons, as being prepared lessens the potential for surprise. Many have organized their march by placing the supplies and unarmed individuals under the standard and commanded them to follow closely, allowing for easier stopping or retreat when necessary. While marching, care must also be taken to prevent one side of the army from drifting apart from the other; if some move too quickly and others too slowly, the army may stretch thin, leading to disarray. Therefore, the leaders should arrange the pace so those moving too quickly slow down while encouraging those moving too slowly to catch up, a pace that can best be regulated by the beat of a drum. The paths should be widened, allowing at least a company of four hundred men to march in battle formation. The enemy's habits and qualities should be considered, including whether they will attack in the morning, noon, or evening, and whether they are stronger in infantry or cavalry, planning accordingly. However, let’s address a particular scenario: sometimes, while trying to evade the enemy because you feel outmatched and are not planning to fight, they may pursue you closely, leading you to a riverbank, where crossing takes time and the enemy is ready to engage you. Some, finding themselves in such peril, have fortified their rear with a ditch filled with tow and set it on fire, then crossed with their army unimpeded, as the flames held the enemy back.

Annone of Carthage.

None of Carthage.

ZANOBI. I am harde of beliefe, that this fyre coulde stay theim, in especially because I remember that I have harde, howe Annone of Carthage, beyng besieged of enemies, inclosed him selfe on the same parte, with wodde, which he did set on fire where he purposed to make eruption. Wherfore the enemies beyng not intentive on the same parte to looke to him, he made his armie to passe over the same flame, causing every man to holde his Target before his face for to defend them from the fire, and smoke.

ZANOBI. I find it hard to believe that this fire could stop them, especially since I remember hearing how Hannibal of Carthage, when besieged by enemies, surrounded himself on the same side with wood, which he set on fire to prepare for an attack. Because the enemies weren't paying attention to that side, he got his army to cross over the flames, telling everyone to hold their shields up in front of their faces to protect themselves from the fire and smoke.

Nabide a spartayne; Quintus Luttatius pollecie to passe over a river; How to passe a ryver without a bridge; A polecie of Cesar to passe a river, where his enemie beyng on the other side therof sought to lette hym.

Nabide a spartayne; Quintus Luttatius found a way to cross a river; How to cross a river without a bridge; A strategy of Caesar to cross a river, where his enemy on the other side tried to stop him.

FABRICIO. You saye well: but consider you howe I have {167} saied, and howe Annone did: for as muche as I saied that they made a diche, and filled it with towe, so that he, that woulde passe over the same, should be constrained to contende with the diche and with fire: Annone made the fire, without the diche, and because he intended to passe over it, he made it not great, for that otherwise without the diche, it shoulde have letted him. Dooe you not knowe, that Nabide a Spartan beyng besieged in Sparta of the Romaines, set fire on parte of his towne to let the way to the Romaines, who alredie wer entred in? And by meane of the same flame not onely hindered their way, but drave them oute: but let us turne to our matter. Quintus Luttatius a Romaine, havyng at his backe the Cimbri, and commyng to a river, to thentente the enemie should give him time to passe over, semed to geve time to them to faight with him: and therfore he fained that he would lodge there, and caused trenches to be made, and certaine pavilions to be erected, and sent certayne horsemen into the countrie for forredge: so that the Cimbrise beleevyng, that he incamped, they also incamped, and devided them selves into sundrie partes, to provide for victuals, wherof Luttatius being aware, passed the river they beyng not able to let him. Some for to passe a river havynge no bridge, have devided it, and one parte they have turned behynde their backes, and the other then becomynge shalower, with ease they have passed it: when the rivers be swift, purposyng to have their footemen to passe safely, they place their strongest horses on the higher side, that thei may sustain the water, and an other parte be lowe that may succour the men, if any of the river in passyng should be overcome with the water: They passe also rivers, that be verie deepe, with bridges, with botes, and with barrelles: and therfore it is good to have in a redinesse in an armie wherewith to be able to make all these thynges. It fortuneth sometime that in passyng a river, the enemie standynge agaynst thee on the other banke, doeth let thee: to minde to overcome this difficultie, I know not a better insample to folow, then the same of Cesar, whome havynge his armie on the banke of a river in Fraunce, and {168} his passage beynge letted of Vergintorige a Frenche man, the whiche on the other side of the river had his men, marched many daies a longe the river, and the like did the enemie: wherfore Cesar incamping in a woddie place, apte to hide men, he tooke out of every legion three cohortes, and made them to tarie in the same place, commaundynge theim that so soone as he was departed, they shoulde caste over a bridge, and should fortefie it, and he with his other menne folowed on the waye: wherfore Vergintorige seyng the number of the legions, thinkyng that there was not left anie parte of theim behinde, folowed also his way: but Cesar when he supposed that the bridge was made, tourned backewarde, and findynge all thinges in order, passed the river without difficultee.

FABRICIO. You make a good point, but consider what I said and what Annone did: I mentioned that they dug a ditch and filled it with tow, so that anyone trying to cross would have to deal with the ditch and fire. Annone created the fire without the ditch, and because he intended to cross it, he didn’t make it too large, otherwise it would have stopped him without the ditch. Don’t you know that Nabide, a Spartan besieged by the Romans in Sparta, set fire to part of his town to block the Romans, who had already entered? The flames not only hindered their progress but also drove them out. Now, let’s get back to our topic. Quintus Luttatius, a Roman, had the Cimbri behind him, and when he reached a river, he seemed to give the enemy time to cross by pretending he would camp there. He had trenches dug and tents set up, and he sent horsemen out to gather supplies. Believing he was encamped, the Cimbri also set up camp and divided into different groups to gather food. Luttatius, realizing this, crossed the river while they were unable to stop him. Some people, when faced with a river without a bridge, have divided the river, turning one section behind them while the other became shallower, making it easier to cross. When rivers are swift, to ensure their infantry crosses safely, they position their strongest horses on the higher side to handle the water, while the lower side assists the men in case anyone is overwhelmed by the current. They also cross deep rivers using bridges, boats, and barrels. That’s why it’s good for an army to be ready with the means to do all these things. Sometimes, when crossing a river, the enemy stands against you on the other bank, blocking your way. To overcome this challenge, I can think of no better example than that of Caesar, who, with his army on the bank of a river in France, found his passage blocked by Vergintorige, a Frenchman who had his troops on the other side. Caesar marched for many days alongside the river, as did the enemy. Therefore, Caesar camped in a wooded area suitable for hiding men, took three cohorts from each legion, and had them stay behind, instructing them to throw a bridge across as soon as he departed and to secure it while he continued on with the rest of his men. Seeing the number of legions, Vergintorige thought no troops were left behind, so he also continued on his way. But when Caesar believed the bridge had been built, he turned back and, finding everything in order, crossed the river without difficulty.

ZANOBI. Have ye any rule to know the foordes?

ZANOBI. Do you have any rule for knowing the paces?

How to know the Foordes of a river.

How to determine the fords of a river.

FABRICIO. Yea, we have: alwaies the river, in that parte, whiche is betwene the water, that is stilleste, and the water that runneth fastest, there is least depth and it is a place more meete to be looked on, then any other where. For that alwaies in thesame place, the river is moste shallowest. The whiche thyng, bicause it hath been proved many tymes, is moste true.

FABRICIO. Yes, we have: always the river, in that part where the water is calmer and the water flows fastest, it's shallower, and it's a better spot to look at than anywhere else. Because in that same place, the river is the shallowest. This, having been proven many times, is definitely true.

ZANOBI. If it chaunce that the River hath marde the Foorde, so that the horses sincke, what reamedy have you?

ZANOBI. If it happens that the river has ruined the crossing, so that the horses sink, what solution do you have?

Howe to escape oute of a straight where the same is besette with enemies; Howe Lutius Minutius escaped out of a strayght wherin he was inclosed of his enemies; Howe some Capitaynes have suffered them selves to be compassed aboute of their enemies; A polecie of Marcus Antonius; A defence for the shotte of arrowes.

How to escape from a tight spot surrounded by enemies; How Lutius Minutius got out of a situation where he was trapped by his foes; How some captains have allowed themselves to be encircled by their enemies; A strategy from Marcus Antonius; A defense against arrows.

FABRICIO. The remedie is to make hardels of roddes whiche must be placed in the bottome of the river, and so to passe upon those: but let us folowe our reasonyng. If it happen that a capitain be led with his armie, betwen two hilles, and that he have not but twoo waies to save hymself, either that before, or that behinde, and those beyng beset of thenemies, he hath for remidie to doe the same, which some have doen heretofore: that which have made on their hinder parte a greate trenche, difficult to passe over, and semed to the enemie, to mynde to kepe him of, for to be able with al his power, without neding to feare behinde, to make force that waie, whiche before remaineth open. The whiche the enemies belevyng, have made theim selves stronge, towardes the open parte, and have forsaken the {169} inclosed and he then castyng a bridge of woode over the Trenche, for soche an effect prepared, bothe on thesame parte, with out any impedimente hath passed, and also delivered hymself out of the handes of the enemie. Lucius Minutus a Consul of Rome, was in Liguria with an armie, and was of the enemies inclosed, betwene certaine hilles, whereby he could not go out: therefore he sente certaine souldiours of Numidia on horsebacke, whiche he had in his armie (whom were evill armed, and upon little leane horses) towardes the places that were kepte of the enemies, whom at the first sight made the enemies, to order theim selves together, to defende the passage: but after that thei sawe those men ill apoincted, and accordyng to their facion evill horsed, regardyng theim little, enlarged the orders of their warde, wherof so sone as the Numidians wer a ware, givyng the spurres to their horses, and runnyng violently upon theim, passed before thei could provide any remedy, whom beyng passed, destroied and spoiled the countrie after soche sorte, that thei constrained the enemies, to leave the passage free to the armie of Lucius. Some capitaine, whiche hath perceived hymself to be assaulted of a greate multitude of enemies, hath drawen together his men, and hath given to the enemie commoditie, to compasse hym all about, and then on thesame part, whiche he hath perceived to be moste weake, hath made force, and by thesame waie, hath caused to make waie, and saved hymself.

FABRICIO. The solution is to create barriers of rods that should be placed at the bottom of the river, and then to walk on those. But let’s continue our reasoning. If a captain finds himself and his army trapped between two hills, with only two ways to escape—either in front or behind—and both are surrounded by enemies, he has to take the same actions that others have done before: they have dug a large trench behind them that is difficult to cross, which appears to the enemy as a means to keep them away, enabling the captain to concentrate all his strength on the open way in front. The enemies, believing this, strengthen their defenses toward the open passage, neglecting the rear. Then, the captain builds a wooden bridge over the trench, and with this preparation, he crosses unimpeded and escapes the enemies’ grasp. Lucius Minutus, a consul of Rome, was in Liguria with an army and became encircled by enemies between certain hills, preventing him from leaving. So, he sent some Numidian soldiers on horseback, who were poorly armed and riding thin horses, toward the enemy-held positions. Initially, the sight of these poorly equipped men prompted the enemies to organize their defenses for the passage. But once they saw the Numidians' weak appearance and terrible horses, they dismissed them and spread their lines thinner. As soon as the Numidians noticed this, they urged their horses forward and charged violently at the enemies, managing to pass before they could react, and afterwards devastated the countryside, forcing the enemy to leave the passage open for Lucius's army. Some captains, realizing they are being attacked by a large number of enemies, have gathered their forces and given the enemy the opportunity to surround them, and then on the side they saw as the weakest, they have made their stand, creating a path to save themselves.

Marcus Antonius retiryng before the armie of the Parthians, perceived how the enemies every daie before Sunne risyng, when he removed, assaulted him, and all the waie troubled hym: in so moch, that he determined not to departe the nexte daie, before None: so that the Parthians beleving, that he would not remove that daie, retourned to their tentes. Whereby Marcus Antonius might then all the reste of the daie, marche without any disquietnesse. This self same man for to avoide the arrowes of the Parthians, commaunded his men, that when the Parthians came towardes them, thei should knele, and that the second ranke of the battailes, should cover with their Targaettes, {170} the heddes of the firste, the thirde, the seconde, the fowerth the third, and so successively, that all the armie came, to be as it were under a pentehouse, and defended from the shotte of the enemies. This is as moche as is come into my remembraunce, to tell you, which maie happen unto an armie marchyng: therefore, if you remember not any thyng els, I will passe to an other parte.

Marcus Antonius, retreating before the Parthian army, noticed how the enemy attacked him every day before sunrise while he was on the move, constantly harassing him. So much so, that he decided not to leave the next day before noon, leading the Parthians to believe he wouldn’t move that day and return to their tents. As a result, Marcus Antonius could march the rest of the day without any trouble. To avoid the Parthian arrows, he ordered his men to kneel when the Parthians approached, and the second rank of soldiers would cover the heads of the first with their shields, and so on for the third and fourth ranks, so that the entire army was protected under a sort of makeshift roof, shielded from enemy fire. This is about all I can recall to share with you regarding what can happen to an army on the march; therefore, if you don’t remember anything else, I’ll move on to another part.

{173}

THE SIXTHE BOOKE

ZANOBI. I beleve that it is good, seyng the reasonyng must be chaunged, that Baptiste take his office, and I to resigne myne, and wee shall come in this case, to imitate the good Capitaines (accordyng as I have nowe here understoode of the gentilman) who place the beste souldiours, before and behinde the armie, semyng unto theim necessarie to have before, soche as maie lustely beginne the faight, and soche as behinde maie lustely sustaine it. Now seyng Cosimus began this reasonyng prudently, Baptiste prudently shall ende it. As for Luigi and I, have in this middeste intertained it, and as every one of us hath taken his part willingly, so I beleve not, that Baptiste wil refuse it.

ZANOBI. I I believe it’s good, saying that the reasoning needs to change, that Baptiste should take my position, and I should resign mine. In this case, we should follow the example of good leaders (according to what I’ve learned from the gentleman) who place the best soldiers at the front and back of the army, recognizing the need to have those who can boldly start the fight in front and those who can strongly support it from behind. Now, since Cosimus started this reasoning wisely, Baptiste will wisely conclude it. As for Luigi and me, we have discussed it in the middle, and since each of us has willingly taken our part, I believe Baptiste won’t refuse it.

BAPTISTE. I have let my self been governed hetherto, so I minde to doe still. Therfore be contente sir, to folowe your reasonyng, and if we interrupte you with this practise of ours, have us excused.

BAPTISTE. I have allowed myself to be controlled so far, and I plan to keep doing that. So please, sir, be okay with following your reasoning, and if we interrupt you with our actions, please excuse us.

How the Grekes incamped; Howe the Romaines incamped; The maner of the incamping of an armie; The lodging for the generall capitaine.

How the Greeks camped; How the Romans camped; The way an army sets up camp; The accommodation for the general captain.

FABRICIO. You dooe me, as all readie I have saied, a moste greate pleasure; for this your interrupting me, taketh not awaie my fantasie, but rather refresheth me. But mindyng to followe our matter I saie, how that it is now tyme, that we lodge this our armie, for that you knowe every thyng desireth reste and saftie, bicause to reste, and not to reste safely, is no perfecte reste: I doubte moche, whether it hath not been desired of you, that I should firste {174} have lodged them, after made theim to marche, and laste of all to faight, and we have doen the contrary: whereunto necessitie hath brought us, for that intendyng to shewe, how an armie in going, is reduced from the forme of marching, to thesame maner of faightyng, it was necessarie to have firste shewed, how thei ordered it to faight. But tournyng to our matter, I saie, that minding to have the Campe sure, it is requisite that it be strong, and in good order: the industrie of the Capitaine, maketh it in order, the situacion, or the arte, maketh it stronge. The Grekes sought strong situacions, nor thei would never place theim selves, where had not been either cave, or bancke of a river, or multitude of trees, or other naturall fortificacion, that might defende theim: but the Romaines not so moche incamped safe through the situacion, as through arte, nor thei would never incampe in place, where thei should not have been able to have raunged all their bandes of menne, accordyng to their discipline. Hereby grewe, that the Romaines might kepe alwaies one forme of incamping, for that thei would, that the situacion should bee ruled by them, not thei by the situacion: the which the Grekes could not observe, for that beyng ruled by the situacion, and variyng the situacion and forme, it was conveniente, that also thei should varie the maner of incampyng, and the facion of their lodgynges. Therefore the Romaines, where the situacion lacked strength thei supplied thesame with arte, and with industrie. And for that I in this my declaracion, have willed to imitate the Romaines, I will not departe from the maner of their incamping, yet not observyng altogether their order, but takyng thesame parte, whiche semeth unto me, to be mete for this present tyme. I have told you many tymes, how the Romaines had in their consull armies, twoo Legions of Romaine men, whiche were aboute a leven thousande footemen, and sixe hundred horsemen, and moreover thei had an other leven thousande footemen, sente from their frendes in their aide: nor in their armie thei had never more souldiers that were straungers, then Romaines, excepte horsemenne, whom thei cared not, {175} though thei were more in nomber then theirs: and in all their doynges, thei did place their Legions in the middeste, and the aiders, on the sides: the whiche maner, thei observed also in incampyng, as by your self you maie rede, in those aucthoures, that write of their actes: and therefore I purpose not to shewe you distinctly how thei incamped, but to tell you onely with what order, I at this presente would incampe my armie, whereby you shall then knowe, what parte I have taken out of the Romaine maners. You knowe, that in stede of twoo Romaine Legions, I have taken twoo maine battailes of footemen, of sixe thousande footemen, and three hundred horsemen, profitable for a maine battaile, and into what battailes, into what weapons, into what names I have devided theim: you knowe howe in orderyng tharmie to marche, and to faight, I have not made mencion of other men, but onely have shewed, how that doublyng the men, thei neded not but to double the orders: but mindyng at this presente, to shew you the maner of incampyng, me thinketh good not to stande onely with twoo maine battailes, but to bryng together a juste armie, made like unto the Romaines, of twoo maine battailes, and of as many more aidyng men: the whiche I make, to the intent that the forme of the incampyng, maie be the more perfect, by lodgyng a perfecte armie: whiche thyng in the other demonstracions, hath not semed unto me so necessarie. Purposing then, to incampe a juste armie, of xxiiii. thousande footemen, and of twoo thousande good horsemenne, beeyng devided into fower maine battailes, twoo of our owne menne, and twoo of straungers, I would take this waie. The situacion beyng founde, where I would incampe, I would erecte the hed standarde, and aboute it, I would marke out a quadrant, whiche should have every side distante from it xxxvii. yardes and a half, of whiche every one of them should lye, towardes one of the fower regions of heaven, as Easte, Weste, Southe, and Northe: betwene the whiche space, I would that the capitaines lodgyng should be appoincted. And bicause I beleve that it is wisedom, to devide the armed from the unarmed, seyng that so, for the moste parte the {176} Romaines did, I would therefore seperate the menne, that were cumbered with any thing, from the uncombered. I would lodge all, or the greatest parte of the armed, on the side towardes the Easte, and the unarmed, and the cumbred, on the Weste side, makyng Easte the hedde, and Weste the backe of the Campe, and Southe, and Northe should be the flanckes: and for to distinguishe the lodgynges of the armed, I would take this waie. I would drawe a line from the hedde standarde, and lead it towardes the Easte, the space of CCCCC.x. yardes and a half: I would after, make two other lines, that should place in the middeste the same, and should bee as longe as that, but distante eche of theim from it a leven yardes and a quarter: in the ende whereof, I would have the Easte gate, and the space that is betwene the twoo uttermoste lines, should make a waie, that should go from the gate, to the capitaines lodging, whiche shall come to be xxii. yardes and a halfe broad, and CCCClxxii. yardes and a halfe longe, for the xxxvii. yardes and a halfe, the lodgyng of the Capitaine will take up: and this shall bee called the Capitaine waie. Then there shall be made an other waie, from the Southe gate, to the Northe gate, and shall passe by the hedde of the capitaine waie, and leave the Capitaines lodgyng towardes theaste, whiche waie shalbe ix.C.xxxvii. yardes and a halfe long (for the length therof wilbe as moche as the breadth of all the lodgynges) and shall likewise be xxii. yardes and a half broad, and shalbe called the crosse waie. Then so sone as the Capitaines lodgyng, were appoincted out, and these twoo waies, there shall bee begun to be appoincted out, the lodginges of our own two main battailes, one of the whiche, I would lodge on the right hand of the capitaines waie, and the other, on the lefte: and therefore passing over the space, that the breadth of the crosse waie taketh, I would place xxxii. lodgynges, on the lefte side of the capitain waie, and xxxii. on the right side, leavyng betwene the xvi. and the xvii. lodgyng, a space of xxii. yardes and a halfe, the whiche should serve for a waie overthwart, whiche should runne overthwarte, throughout all the lodgynges of the {177} maine battailes as in the distributyng of them shall bee seen.

FABRICIO. You give me, as I've already said, great pleasure; for your interruption doesn’t take away my thoughts, but rather refreshes me. To get back to our topic, I say that it’s now time to settle our army, because you know everything needs rest and safety; resting without safety isn’t perfect rest. I’m concerned that it might have been expected of you that I should first have settled them, made them march, and finally fight, while we’ve done the opposite. Necessity has led us to this, as I intended to show how an army in movement is transformed from marching to fighting; it was necessary to first show how they arranged themselves to fight. But turning back to our matter, I say that in order to secure the camp, it is essential that it be strong and well-organized: the skill of the captain puts it in order, while the location and strategy make it strong. The Greeks sought strong positions; they never camped where there weren’t either caves, riverbanks, countless trees, or other natural fortifications for defense. However, the Romans didn’t secure themselves so much by location as by strategy, and they would never camp in a place where they couldn’t arrange all their units according to their discipline. This enabled the Romans to maintain a consistent form of encampment, as they wished for the position to be controlled by them, rather than them being dictated by the location, which the Greeks couldn’t maintain. Being governed by the location and varying both the location and formation, it was necessary for them to also change their manner of encamping and the layout of their quarters. Therefore, where the location lacked strength, the Romans compensated with strategy and skill. Since in this explanation I wish to imitate the Romans, I won’t stray from their method of encamping, although I won’t adhere strictly to their system, but will take that part which seems to me suitable for this present time. I have told you many times how the Romans, in their consular armies, had two Legions of Roman men, which numbered about eleven thousand foot soldiers and six hundred horsemen, and in addition, they had another eleven thousand foot soldiers sent as assistance from their allies. Moreover, in their army they never had more foreign soldiers than Romans, except for horsemen, whom they didn’t mind being more numerous than their own. In all their actions, they placed their Legions in the center and the reinforcements on the sides, which they also observed in encamping, as you can read in the accounts of those who write about their deeds. Therefore, I don’t intend to explain in detail how they camped, but simply to inform you of the order in which I currently would encamp my army, thus revealing what aspects I have taken from the Roman methods. You know that instead of two Roman Legions, I have taken two main battalions of foot soldiers, totaling six thousand foot soldiers and three hundred horsemen, useful for a main battle, and into what battalions, weapons, and names I have divided them. You know how, in arranging the army to march and to fight, I didn’t mention other soldiers but only showed that by doubling the men, they needed only to double the orders. But now, intending to demonstrate the manner of encamping, I think it’s fitting not to rely solely on two main battalions, but to assemble a proper army, structured like the Romans, with two main battalions and as many supporting troops. I do this so the encampment’s formation may be more complete by lodging a perfect army, which has not seemed so necessary in the other discussions. Therefore, intending to camp a proper army of twenty-four thousand foot soldiers and two thousand good horsemen, divided into four main battalions, two of our own men and two of foreigners, this is how I would proceed. Once the location is found for the camp, I would set up the main standard, and around it, I would mark out a square, with each side being thirty-seven and a half yards long, each facing one of the four directions: East, West, South, and North. Between this space, I would designate the captains' quarters. And because I believe it’s wise to separate the armed from the unarmed, since that’s how the Romans did for the most part, I would then separate the men burdened with anything from the unburdened. I would lodge all, or the majority of the armed, on the side facing East, and the unarmed and encumbered on the West side, making East the front and West the back of the camp, with South and North serving as flanks. To distinguish the quarters of the armed, I would proceed as follows. I would draw a line from the main standard towards the East, extending a distance of five hundred and ten yards. Then I would make two other lines that would place in the middle the same length while being eleven yards and a quarter apart. At the end of these lines, I would have the East gate, and the space between the two outermost lines would create a path from the gate to the captains' quarters, which would measure twenty-two and a half yards wide and three hundred seventy-two and a half yards long, as the thirty-seven and a half yards will be occupied by the Captain's quarters. This would be called the Captain’s way. Then there would be another way running from the South gate to the North gate, passing by the end of the Captain's way, keeping the Captain's quarters toward the East; this path would be nine hundred thirty-seven and a half yards long (because the length will be equal to the width of all the quarters) and would also be twenty-two and a half yards wide, and would be called the crossway. Once the Captain's quarters have been designated, along with these two paths, we would begin to outline the quarters for our own two main battalions, one of which I would place on the right side of the Captain’s way, and the other on the left. Thus, skipping over the space that the width of the crossway occupies, I would place thirty-two quarters on the left side of the Captain's way and thirty-two on the right side, leaving a space of twenty-two and a half yards between the sixteenth and seventeenth quarters, which would serve as a transverse path that would run through all the quarters of the main battalions as will be seen in their allocation.

The lodgings for the men of armes, and their Capitaine; Note, which is breadth and whiche length in the square campe; The lodgings for the lighte horsemen, and their capitain; The lodgings for the footemen of twoo ordinary main battailes; The lodgings for the conestables; The nomber of footemen appoincted to every lodging; The lodynges for the chiefe Capitaines of the maine battayles and for the treasurers, marshals and straungers; Lodginges for the horsemen, of the extraordinarie mayne battailes; The lodgynges for the extraordinarie Pykes and Veliti; How the Artillerie must be placed in the Campe; Lodgynges for the unarmed men, and the places that are apoineted for the impedimentes of the campe.

The accommodations for the men-at-arms and their captain; note the width and length of the square camp; the accommodations for the light cavalry and their captain; the accommodations for the infantry of two regular main battalions; the accommodations for the constables; the number of infantry assigned to each accommodation; the accommodations for the chief captains of the main battalions, as well as for the treasurers, marshals, and guests; accommodations for the cavalry of the extraordinary main battalions; the accommodations for the extraordinary pikemen and skirmishers; how the artillery should be arranged in the camp; accommodations for unarmed men, and the areas designated for the camp's impediments.

Of these twoo orders of lodgynges in the beginnyng of the head, whiche shall come to joygne to the crosse waye, I would lodge the Capitaine of the men of armes, in the xv. lodgynges, which on everie side foloweth next, their men of armes, where eche main battaile, havyng a CL. men of armes, it will come to ten men of armes for a lodgyng. The spaces of the Capitaines lodgynges, should be in bredth xxx. and in length vii. yardes and a halfe. And note that when so ever I sai bredeth, it signifieth the space of the middest from Southe to Northe, and saiyng length, that whiche is from weste to Easte. Those of the men of armes, shoulde be xi. yardes and a quarter in length, and xxii. yardes and a halfe in bredeth. In the other xv. lodgynges, that on everie syde should folowe, the whiche should have their beginnyng on the other side of the overthwarte way, and whiche shall have the very same space, that those of the men of armes had, I woulde lodge the light horsemen: wherof beynge a hundred and fiftie, it will come to x. horsemen for a lodgyng, and in the xvi. that remaineth, I woulde lodge their Capitaine, gevynge him the verie same space, that is geven to the Capitain of the men of armes: and thus the lodginges of the horsemen of two maine battailes, will come to place in the middest the Capitaine way, and geve rule to the lodginges of the footemen, as I shall declare. You have noted how I have lodged the CCC. horsemen of everie main battaile with their Capitaines, in xxxii. lodgynges placed on the Captaine waie, havynge begun from the crosse waie, and how from the xvi. to the xvii. there remaineth a space of xxii. yardes and a halfe, to make awaie overthwarte. Mindyng therefore to lodge the xx. battailes, which the twoo ordinarie maine battailes have, I woulde place the lodgyng of everie twoo battailes, behinde the lodgynges of the horsemen, everie one of whiche, should have in length xi. yardes and a quarter, and in bredeth xxii. yardes and a half as those of the horsemens, and shoulde bee joigned on the hinder parte, that thei shoulde touche the one the other. {178} And in every first lodgyng on everie side which cometh to lie on the crosse waie, I woulde lodge the Counstable of a battaile, whiche should come to stand even with the lodgyng of the Capitayne of the men of armes, and this lodgyng shall have onely of space for bredeth xv. yardes, and for length vii. yardes and a halfe. In the other xv. lodgynges, that on everie side followeth after these, even unto the overthwarte way, I would lodge on everie part a battaile of foote men, whiche beyng iiii. hundred and fiftie, there will come to a lodgyng xxx. The other xv. lodgynges, I woulde place continually on every side on those of the light horse men, with the verie same spaces, where I woulde lodge on everie part, an other battaile of fote men, and in the laste lodgyng, I would place on every parte the Conestable of the battaile, whiche will come to joigne with the same of the Capitaine of the lighte horsemen, with the space of vii. yardes and a halfe for length, and xv. for bredeth: and so these two firste orders of lodgynges, shal be halfe of horsemen, and halfe of footemen. And for that I woulde (as in the place therof I have tolde you) these horse menne shoulde be all profitable, and for this havynge no servauntes whiche in kepyng the horses, or in other necessarie thynges might helpe them, I woulde that these footemen, who lodge behynde the horse, should bee bounde to helpe to provide, and to keepe theim for their maisters: and for this to bee exempted from the other doynges of the Campe. The whiche maner, was observed of the Romanies. Then leavyng after these lodgynges on everie parte, a space of xxii. yardes and a halfe, whiche shoulde make awaye, that shoulde be called the one, the firste waye on the righte hande, and the other the firste waie on the lefte hand, I woulde pitche on everie side an other order of xxxii. double lodgynges, whiche should tourne their hinder partes the one againste the other with the verie same spaces, as those that I have tolde you of, and devided after the sixtenth in the verie same maner for to make the overthwarte waie, where I would lodge on every side iiii. battailes of footemen, with their constables in bothe endes. Then leavyng on every side an other space of xxii. yardes {179} and a halfe, that shoulde make a waie, whiche shoulde be called of the one side, the seconde waie on the right hande, and on the other syde, the seconde way on the lefte hande, I would place an other order on everie side of xxxii. double lodgynges, with the verie same distance and devisions, where I would lodge on everie side, other iiii. battailes with their Constables: and thus the horesemenne and the bandes of the twoo ordinarie maine battailes, should come to be lodged in three orders of lodgynges, on the one side of the capitaine waie, and in three other orders of lodgynges on the other side of the Capitaine waie. The twoo aidyng maine battels (for that I cause them to be made of the verie same nation) I woulde lodge them on everie parte of these twoo ordinarie maine battailes, with the very same orders of double lodgynges, pitchyng first one order of lodgynges, where should lodge halfe the horsemen, and half the foote men, distance xxii. yardes and a halfe from the other, for to make a way whiche should be called the one, the thirde waie on the right hande, and the other the thirde waie on the lefte hande. And after, I woulde make on everie side, twoo other orders of lodgynges, in the verie same maner destinguesshed and ordeined, as those were of the ordinarie maine battelles, which shall make twoo other wayes, and they all should be called of the numbre, and of the hande, where thei should be placed: in suche wyse, that all this side of the armie, shoulde come to be lodged in xii. orders of double lodgynges, and in xiii. waies, reckenynge captaine waie, and crosse waie: I would there should remayne a space from the lodgynges to the Trenche of lxxv. yardes rounde aboute: and if you recken al these spaces, you shall see that from the middest of the Capitaines lodgyng to the easte gate, there is Dx. yardes. Now there remaineth twoo spaces, whereof one is from the Capitaines lodgyng to the Southe gate, the other is from thense to the Northe gate: whiche come to be (either of them measurynge them from the poincte in the middest) CCCC.lxxvi. yardes. Then takyng out of everie one of these spaces xxxvii. yardes and a halfe, whiche the Capitaynes lodgynge occupieth, and xxxiiii. yardes everie {180} waie for a market place, and xxii. yardes and a halfe for way that devides everie one of the saied spaces in the middest, and lxxv. yardes, that is lefte on everie part betweene the lodgynges and the Trenche, there remaineth on every side a space for lodginges of CCC. yardes broade, and lxxv. yardes longe, measurynge the length with the space that the Captaines lodgynge taketh up. Devidynge then in the middest the saied lengthe, there woulde be made on every hande of the Capitaine xl. lodgynges xxxvii. yardes and a halfe longe, and xv. broade, whiche will come to be in all lxxx. lodgynges, wherin shall be lodged the heddes of the maine battailes, the Treasurers, the Marshalles of the fielde, and all those that shoulde have office in the armie, leavyng some voide for straungers that shoulde happen to come, and for those that shall serve for good will of the Capitaine. On the parte behinde the Capitaines lodgynge, I would have a way from Southe to Northe xxiii. yardes large, and shoulde be called the bed way, whiche shall come to be placed a longe by the lxxx. lodgynges aforesayd: for that this waie, and the crosseway, shall come to place in the middest betweene them bothe the Capitaines lodgynge, and the lxxx. lodgynges that be on the sides therof. From this bed waie, and from over agaynst the captaines lodgyng, I would make an other waie, which shoulde goe from thens to the weste gate, lykewyse broade xxii. yardes and a halfe, and should aunswer in situation and in length to the Captaine way, and should be called the market waie. These twoo waies beynge made, I woulde ordeine the market place, where the market shall bee kepte, whiche I woulde place on the head of the market way over against the capitaines lodgynge, and joigned to the head way, and I woulde have it to be quadrante, and woulde assigne lxxxx. yardes and three quarters to a square: and on the right hande and lefte hande, of the saied market place, I would make two orders of lodginges, where everie order shal have eight double lodginges, which shall take up in length, ix. yardes, and in bredeth xxii. yardes and a halfe, so that there shall come to be on every hande of the market place, xvi. lodgynges {181} that shall place the same in the middest which shall be in al xxxii. wherin I woulde lodge those horsemen, which shoulde remaine to the aidyng mayne battailes: and when these should not suffise, I woulde assigne theim some of those lodginges that placeth between them the Capitaines lodgynge, and in especially those, that lie towardes the Trenche. There resteth now to lodge the Pikes, and extraordinarie Veliti, that everie main battaile hath, which you know accordynge to our order, how everie one hath besides the x. battailes M. extraordinarie Pikes, and five hundreth Veliti: so that the twoo cheefe maine battailes, have two thousande extraordinarie Pikes, and a thousande extraordinarie Veliti, and the ayders as many as those, so that yet there remaineth to be lodged, vi. M. menne, whome I woulde lodge all on the weste side, and a longe the Trenche. Then from the ende of the hed waye, towardes Northe, leavyng the space of lxxv. yardes from them to the trenche, I woulde place an order of v. double lodgynges, whiche in all shoulde take up lvi. yardes in lengthe, and xxx. in bredeth: so that the bredeth devided, there will come to everie lodgyng xi. yardes and a quarter for lengthe, and for bredeth twoo and twentie yardes and a half. And because there shall be x. lodgynges, I will lodge three hundred men, apoinctyng to every lodging xxx. men: leavyng then a space of three and twentie yardes and a quarter, I woulde place in like wise, and with like spaces an other order of five double lodgynges, and againe an other, till there were five orders of five double lodgynges: which wil come to be fiftie lodgynges placed by right line on the Northe side, every one of them distante from the Trenche lxxv. yardes, which will lodge fifteene hundred men. Tournyng after on the lefte hande towardes the weste gate, I woulde pitche in all the same tracte, whiche were from them to the saied gate, five other orders of double lodgynges, with the verie same spaces, and with the verie same maner: true it is, that from the one order to the other, there shall not be more then a xi. yardes and a quarter of space: wherin shall be lodged also fifteene hundred men: and thus from the {182} Northe gate to the weste, as the Trenche turneth, in a hundred lodginges devided in x. rewes of five double lodgynges in a rowe, there will be lodged all the Pikes and extraordinarie Veliti of the cheefe maine battayles. And so from the west gate to the Southe, as the Trenche tourneth even in the verie same maner, in other ten rewes of ten lodgynges in a rewe, there shall be lodged the pikes, and extraordinarie Veliti of the aidyng mayne battailes. Their headdes or their counstables may take those lodgynges, that shal seeme unto them moste commodious, on the parte towardes the trenche. The Artillerie, I woulde dispose throughoute all the Campe, a longe the banke of the Trenche: and in all the other space that shoulde remaine towardes weste, I woulde lodge all the unarmed, and place all the impedimentes of the Campe. And it is to be understoode, that under this name of impedimentes (as you know) the antiquitee mente all the same trayne, and all those thynges, which are necessarie for an armie, besides the souldiours: as are Carpenters, Smithes, Masons, Ingeners, Bombardiers, althoughe that those might be counted in the numbre of the armed, herdemen with their herdes of motons and beeves whiche for victuallyng of the armie, are requiset: and moreover maisters of all sciences, together with publicke carriages of the publicke munition, whiche pertaine as well to victuallyng, as to armynge. Nor I would not distinguishe these lodginges perticularly, only I would marke out the waies which should not be occupied of them: then the other spaces, that betweene the waies shall remaine, whiche shall be fower, I woulde appoincte theim generally for all the saied impedimentes, that is one for the herdemen, the other for artificers and craftes men, the thirde for publicke carriages of victuals, the fowerth for the municion of armour and weapons. The waies whiche I woulde shoulde be lefte without ocupiyng them, shal be the market waie, the head waye, and more over a waie that shoulde be called the midde waye, whiche should goe from Northe to Southe, and should passe thoroughe the middest of the market waie, whiche from the weste parte, shoulde serve for the same purpose {183} that the overthwarte way doeth on the east parte. And besides this, a waye whiche shall goe aboute on the hinder parte, alonge the lodgynges of the Pikes and extraordinarie Veliti, and all these wayes shall be twoo and tweentie vardes and a halfe broade. And the Artilerie, I woulde place a longe the Trenche of the Campe, rounde aboute the same.

Of these two types of accommodations at the start of the main road, which will connect to the crossroad, I would set up the Captain of the cavalry in the 15 accommodations that follow immediately on either side, with each main battle consisting of 100 cavalrymen, resulting in ten cavalrymen per accommodation. The Captain's accommodations should be 30 feet wide and 7.5 yards long. Note that whenever I say 'width', I mean the distance from south to north, and when I say 'length', I'm referring to the distance from west to east. The accommodations for the cavalrymen should be 11.25 yards long and 22.5 yards wide. In the other 15 accommodations on either side, starting on the other side of the crossroad, which will have the exact space as those for the cavalry, I would lodge the light cavalry: with 150 men, this would allow for 10 horsemen per accommodation. In the remaining 16 accommodations, I would lodge their Captain, providing him the same space as the Captain of the cavalry. This way, the accommodations for the cavalry from the two main battles will be centered along the Captain's path and provide structure for the foot soldiers' accommodations, as I will explain. You see how I have placed 300 horsemen from each main battle with their Captains in 32 accommodations situated along the Captain's path, starting from the crossroad, and how there’s a gap of 22.5 yards from 16 to 17 to create the transverse path. Intending to accommodate the 20 battles, which the two main battles have, I would arrange each two battles behind the horsemen's accommodations, each having the same dimensions of 11.25 yards in length and 22.5 yards in width, and they should be joined at the back so they touch each other. {178} In every first accommodation on each side that meets the crossroad, I would lodge the Constable of a battle, who should be aligned with the Captain of the cavalry, and this accommodation should only be 15 yards wide and 7.5 yards long. In the other 15 accommodations that follow these, all the way to the transverse pathway, I would place a battle of foot soldiers on either side, totaling 450, this will result in 30 per accommodation. The other 15 accommodations, I would continuously place on either side of the light cavalry, with the same dimensions, where I would lodge yet another battle of foot soldiers on each side, and in the last accommodation, I would place on each side the Constable of the battle, which will connect with the one for the Captain of the light cavalry, allowing 7.5 yards in length and 15 yards in width. Thus, these first two types of accommodations will consist of half cavalry and half foot soldiers. Since I’ve stated previously, these cavalrymen should be completely self-sufficient, not relying on servants for their horses or other necessities, I would require that the foot soldiers lodging behind the cavalry assist in providing for and keeping watch over them, exempting them from other camp duties. This practice was noted among the Romans. Then leaving a space of 22.5 yards on each side, which will create passageways, I would set up on either side another arrangement of 32 double accommodations, which would face each other with the same spacing as those previously mentioned, divided after the sixteenth in the same manner to create the transverse path, where I would lodge on each side 4 battles of foot soldiers, with their constables at both ends. Next, leaving another space of 22.5 yards {179} for another passageway, which will be called the second passageway on the right side and the second passageway on the left side, I would place another set of 32 double accommodations on each side, maintaining the same distances and divisions, where I would lodge another 4 battles with their constables. Thus, the cavalry and troops of the two main battles will be arranged in three orders of accommodations on one side of the Captain's path, and in three other orders of accommodations on the other side. The two supporting main battles (as I have chosen them from the same group) I would place on either side of these two ordinary main battles, with the same arrangements of double accommodations, first positioning one set where half the cavalry and half the foot soldiers will lodge, 22.5 yards apart from another set, creating a passageway that will be named the third passageway on the right and the third passageway on the left. Then, I would create two more orders of accommodations on each side, arranged in the same manner as those of the ordinary main battles, which will create two more pathways, all named by their respective numbers and positions, so that this side of the army would be situated in 12 orders of double accommodations, and in 13 pathways, including the Captain's path and the transverse path. I would leave a space of 75 yards all around from the accommodations to the trench, and if you tally all these spaces, you will see that from the center of the Captain's lodging to the east gate, there is 50 yards. Now, there remain two spaces: one from the Captain's lodging to the south gate, and the other from there to the north gate; each measures (when calculated from the center point) 476 yards. Then, taking out 37.5 yards for the space occupied by the Captain's accommodations, and 34 yards for each {180} passage for a marketplace, 22.5 yards for the passage that divides each of the aforementioned spaces, and 75 yards remaining on either side between the accommodations and the trench, there would be left a space for accommodations of 300 yards wide and 75 yards long, measuring the length including the area the Captain's accommodations take up. Dividing that length down the middle, I would create on each side of the Captain 40 accommodations that are 37.5 yards long and 15 yards wide, totaling 80 accommodations, where the leaders of the main battles, the Treasurers, the Field Marshals, and all those with roles in the army will be lodged, leaving some space for visitors who might come and for those serving out of goodwill for the Captain. Behind the Captain's accommodations, I would set up a path from south to north 23 yards wide, called the bed path, which will run alongside the aforementioned 80 accommodations. This path and the crossroad will be centered between the Captain’s accommodations and the 80 accommodations beside them. From this bed path, and opposite the Captain's accommodations, I would create another path leading from there to the west gate, also 22.5 yards wide, which will mirror the structure and length of the Captain's path, called the market path. With these two paths established, I would organize a marketplace where trade will take place

BAPTISTE. I confesse that I understand not, nor I beleeve that also to saye so, is any shame unto me, this beyng not my exercise: notwithstandyng, this order pleaseth me muche: onely I woulde that you shoulde declare me these doubtes: The one, whie you make the waie, and the spaces aboute so large. The other, that troubleth me more, is these spaces, whiche you apoincte oute for the lodgynges, howe they ought to be used.

BAPTISTE. I admit that I don't understand, and I don’t believe it’s shameful for me to say so, since this isn’t my area of expertise. However, I do really like this arrangement. I just wish you would clarify a couple of things for me: first, why you make the pathways and the spaces around them so wide. The second thing that troubles me even more is how these areas you designate for lodging should be used.

The Campe ought to be all waies of one facion.

The camp should be all the same in every way.

FABRICIO. You must note, that I make all the waies, xxii. yardes and a halfe broade, to the intente that thorowe them, maie go a battaile of men in araie, where if you remember wel, I tolde you how every bande of menne, taketh in breadth betwene xviii. and xxii. yardes of space to marche or stande in. Nowe where the space that is betwene the trenche, and the lodgynges, is lxxv. yardes broade, thesame is moste necessarie, to the intent thei maie there order the battailes, and the artillerie, bothe to conducte by thesame the praies, and to have space to retire theim selves with newe trenches, and newe fortificacion if neede were: The lodginges also, stande better so farre from the diches, beyng the more out of daunger of fires, and other thynges, whiche the enemie, might throwe to hurte them. Concernyng the seconde demaunde, my intent is not that every space, of me marked out, bee covered with a pavilion onely, but to be used, as tourneth commodious to soch as lodge there, either with more or with lesse Tentes, so that thei go not out of the boundes of thesame. And for to marke out these lodginges, there ought to bee moste cunnyng menne, and moste excellente Architectours, whom, so sone as the Capitaine hath chosen the place, maie knowe how to give it the facion, and to distribute it, distinguishyng the waies, {184} devidyng the lodgynges with Coardes and staves, in soche practised wise, that straight waie, thei maie bee ordained, and devided: and to minde that there growe no confusion, it is conveniente to tourne the Campe, alwaies one waie, to the intente that every manne maie knowe in what waie, in what space he hath to finde his lodgyng: and this ought to be observed in every tyme, in every place, and after soche maner, that it seme a movyng Citee, the whiche where so ever it goweth, carrieth with it the verie same waies, the verie same habitacions, and the verie same aspectes, that it had at the firste: The whiche thing thei cannot observe, whom sekyng strong situacions, must chaunge forme, accordyng to the variacion of the grounde: but the Romaines in the plaine, made stronge the place where thei incamped with trenches, and with Rampires, bicause thei made a space about the campe, and before thesame a ditche, ordinary broad fower yardes and a halfe, and depe aboute twoo yardes and a quarter, the which spaces, thei increased, according as thei intended to tarie in a place, and accordyng as thei feared the enemie. I for my parte at this presente, would not make the listes, if I intende not to Winter in a place: yet I would make the Trenche and the bancke no lesse, then the foresaied, but greater, accordyng to necessitie. Also, consideryng the artellerie, I would intrench upon every corner of the Campe, a halfe circle of ground, from whens the artillerie might flancke, whom so ever should seke to come over the Trenche. In this practise in knowyng how to ordain a campe, the souldiours ought also to be exercised, and to make with them the officers expert, that are appoincted to marke it out, and the Souldiours readie to knowe their places: nor nothyng therein is difficulte, as in the place thereof shall bee declared: wherefore, I will goe forewarde at this tyme to the warde of the campe, bicause without distribucion of the watche, all the other pain that hath been taken, should be vain.

FABRICIO. You should note that I make all the paths twenty-two and a half yards wide so that a line of soldiers can march in formation through them. If you recall, I mentioned that each group of soldiers takes up between eighteen and twenty-two yards of space to march or stand in. Now, the area between the trench and the lodgings is seventy-five yards wide, which is essential for organizing the battles and the artillery. This space allows for the collection of spoils and ensures there’s room to retreat with new trenches and fortifications if needed. The lodgings are also better positioned further from the ditches, making them less vulnerable to fires and other damage from things the enemy might throw at them. Regarding the second question, my intention is not for every marked space to be covered only by a tent, but to be used as it suits those camped there, whether with larger or smaller tents, as long as they stay within those boundaries. For marking out these lodgings, we need skilled and excellent architects who, once the captain has chosen the location, can shape and organize it, designating the paths, {184} dividing the lodgings with ropes and stakes, in such a way that they can be orderly arranged. To avoid confusion, it's advisable to orient the camp in a consistent direction, so everyone knows which way and in what place to find their lodging. This should be maintained at all times and in every location, creating an air of a moving city that retains the same paths, dwellings, and appearance it had initially. This is something that those seeking strong positions cannot achieve, as they must adapt according to the terrain. However, the Romans fortified their camps in the plains with trenches and ramparts, creating a space around the camp and in front of it a ditch usually four and a half yards wide and about two yards deep, which they expanded as they planned to stay longer or as they feared the enemy. Personally, I wouldn’t establish the lists if I didn’t plan to winter in a location; even so, I would create the trench and the bank no less than stated before, but larger if necessary. Also, considering artillery, I would establish half circles of ground at every corner of the camp from where the artillery could flank anyone trying to cross the trench. In this practice of organizing a camp, soldiers should also be trained, along with expert officers assigned to mark it out, and soldiers ready to know their positions. There’s nothing difficult in this, as will be explained in its place; therefore, I will proceed now to the watch of the camp because without the distribution of the guard, all the efforts that have been made would be in vain.

BAPTISTE. Before you passe to the watche, I desire that you would declare unto me, when one would pitche his campe nere the enemie, what waie is used: for that I knowe {185} not, how a man maie have tyme, to be able to ordaine it without perill.

BAPTISTE. Before you head to the watch, I’d like you to explain to me how one sets up camp near the enemy, because I really don’t know how someone can manage that without danger.

FABRICIO. You shall understande this, that no Capitaine will lye nere the enemie, except he, that is desposed to faight the fielde, when so ever his adversarie will: and when a capitaine is so disposed, there is no perill, but ordinarie: for that the twoo partes of the armie, stande alwaies in a redinesse, to faight the battaile, and thother maketh the lodginges. The Romaines in this case, gave this order of fortifiyng the Campe, unto the Triarii: and the Prencipi, and the Astati, stoode in armes. This thei did, for as moche as the Triarii, beyng the last to faight, might have time inough, if the enemie came, to leave the woorke, and to take their weapons, and to get them into their places. Therfore, accordyng unto the Romaines maner, you ought to cause the Campe to be made of those battailes, whiche you will set in the hinder parte of the armie, in the place of the Triarii. But let us tourne to reason of the watche.

FABRICIO. You need to understand this: no captain will lie close to the enemy unless he is prepared to fight when his opponent chooses. When a captain is ready for battle, the risk is just normal; both parts of the army are always ready to engage while the other sets up camp. The Romans, in this case, instructed the Triarii to fortify the camp, while the Principes and the Hastati stood ready for arms. They did this so that the Triarii, who were the last to fight, would have enough time to leave their tasks, grab their weapons, and take their positions if the enemy attacked. Therefore, according to Roman practice, you should set up the camp using those battle lines that you plan to place at the back of the army, in the position of the Triarii. But let's move on to discuss the watch.

Theantiquitie used no Scoutes; The watche and warde of the Campe.

The ancient times used no Scouts; The watch and guard of the Camp.

I thinke I have not founde, emongest the antiquitie, that for to warde the campe in the night, thei have kepte watche without the Trenche, distaunte as thei use now a daies, whom thei call Scoutes: the whiche I beleve thei did, thinkyng that the armie might easely bee deceived, through the difficultie, that is in seeyng them againe, for that thei might bee either corrupted, or oppressed of the enemie: So that to truste either in parte, or altogether on them, thei judged it perillous. And therefore, all the strength of the watche, was with in the trenche, whiche thei did withall diligence kepe, and with moste greate order, punished with death, whom so ever observed not thesame order: the whiche how it was of them ordained, I will tell you no other wise, leaste I should bee tedious unto you, beyng able by your self to see it, if as yet you have not seen it: I shall onely briefly tell that, whiche shall make for my purpose, I wold cause to stand ordinarely every night, the thirde parte of the armie armed, and of thesame, the fowerth parte alwaies on foote, whom I would make to bee destributed, {186} throughout all the banckes, and throughout all the places of the armie, with double warde, placed in every quadrante of thesame: Of whiche, parte should stande still, parte continually should go from the one corner of the Campe, to the other: and this order, I would observe also in the daie, when I should have the enemie nere.

I don't think I've found in ancient history that they kept watch outside the trench at night like they do now, calling them scouts. I believe they did this because they thought the army could easily be misled due to the difficulty in seeing them again, as they could be either bribed or overpowered by the enemy. So, they considered it dangerous to rely fully or even partly on them. Therefore, all the strength of the watch was inside the trench, which they diligently maintained in an orderly manner, punishing with death anyone who failed to follow that order. As for how they set this up, I won't explain further to avoid boring you, especially since you can see it yourself if you haven't already done so. I'll just briefly share what supports my point: I would arrange for a third of the army to be armed every night, and from that, a fourth would always be on foot, distributed throughout the camp and all key locations with double watch in every quadrant. Some would remain still, while others would continually move from one corner of the camp to the other. I would also follow this arrangement during the day when the enemy was nearby.

Dilligence ought to be used, to knowe who lieth oute of the Campe, and who they be that cometh of newe; Claudius Nero; The justice that ought to be in a campe. The fauts that the antiquitie punisshed with Death; Where greate punishementes be, there oughte likewise to bee great rewardes; It was no marvel that the Romaines became mightie Princes; A meane to punishe and execute Justice, without raising tumultes; Manlius Capitolinus; Souldiours sworen to kepe the discipline of warre.

Diligence should be used to know who is outside the camp and who is coming in new; Claudius Nero; The justice that should exist in a camp. The faults that were punished with death in ancient times; Where there are great punishments, there should also be great rewards; It was no surprise that the Romans became mighty princes; A means to punish and execute justice without causing disturbances; Manlius Capitolinus; Soldiers sworn to uphold the discipline of war.

Concernyng the givyng of the watche worde, and renuyng thesame every evening, and to doe the other thynges, whiche in like watches is used, bicause thei are thynges well inough knowen, I will speake no further of them: onely I shall remember one thyng, for that it is of greate importaunce, and whiche causeth great saulfgarde observyng it, and not observyng it, moche harme: The whiche is, that there be observed greate diligence, to knowe at night, who lodgeth not in the Campe, and who commeth a newe: and this is an easie thing to see who lodgeth, with thesame order that wee have appoincted: for as moche as every lodgyng havyng the determined nomber of menne, it is an easie matter to see, if thei lacke, or if there be more menne: and when thei come to be absente without lisence, to punishe them as Fugetives, and if there bee more, to understande what thei be, what they make there, and of their other condicions. This diligence maketh that the enemie cannot but with difficultie, practise with thy capitaines, and have knowlege of thy counsailes: which thing if of the Romaines, had not been diligently observed, Claudius Nero could not, havyng Aniball nere hym, depart from his Campe, whiche he had in Lucania, and to go and to retourne from Marca, without Aniball should have firste heard thereof some thyng. But it suffiseth not to make these orders good, excepte thei bee caused to bee observed, with a greate severtie: for that there is nothyng that would have more observacion, then is requisite in an armie: therefore the lawes for the maintenaunce of thesame, ought to be sharpe and harde, and the executour therof moste harde. The Romaines punished with death him that lacked in the watch, he that forsoke the place that was given hym to faight in, he that caried any thynge, hidde out of the {187} Campe, if any manne should saie, that he had doen some worthy thing in the faight, and had not doen it, if any had fought without the commaundemente of the Capitaine, if any had for feare, caste awaie his weapons: and when it happened, that a Cohorte, or a whole Legion, had committed like fault, bicause thei would not put to death all, thei yet tooke al their names, and did put them in a bagge, and then by lotte, thei drue oute the tenthe parte, and so those were put to death: the whiche punishemente, was in soche wise made, that though every man did not feele it every man notwithstandyng feared it: and bicause where be greate punishementes, there ought to be also rewardes, mindyng to have menne at one instant, to feare and to hope, thei had appoincted rewardes to every worthie acte: as he that faighting, saved the life of one of his Citezeins, to hym that firste leapte upon the walle of the enemies Toune, to hym that entered firste into the Campe of the enemies, to hym that had in faightyng hurte, or slaine the enemie, he that had stroken him from his horse: and so every vertuous act, was of the Consulles knowen and rewarded, and openly of every manne praised: and soche as obtained giftes, for any of these thynges, besides the glorie and fame, whiche thei got emongest the souldiours, after when thei returned into their countrie, with solemne pompe, and with greate demonstracion emong their frendes and kinsfolkes, thei shewed them. Therefore it was no marveile, though thesame people gotte so moche dominion, having so moche observacion in punishemente, and rewarde towardes theim, whom either for their well doyng, or for their ill doyng, should deserve either praise or blame: Of whiche thynges it were convenient, to observe the greater parte. Nor I thinke not good to kepe secrete, one maner of punishmente of theim observed, whiche was, that so sone as the offendour, was before the Tribune, or Consulle convicted, he was of the same lightely stroken with a rodde: after the whiche strikyng, it was lawfull for the offendour to flie, and to all the Souldiours to kill hym: so that straight waie, every man threwe at hym either stones, or dartes, or with {188} other weapons, stroke hym in soche wise, that he went but little waie a live, and moste fewe escaped, and to those that so escaped, it was not lawfull for them to retourne home, but with so many incommodities, and soche greate shame and ignomie, that it should have ben moche better for him to have died. This maner is seen to be almoste observed of the Suizzers, who make the condempned to be put to death openly, of thother souldiours, the whiche is well considered, and excellently dooen: for that intendyng, that one be not a defendour of an evill doer, the greateste reamedie that is founde, is to make hym punisher of thesame: bicause otherwise, with other respecte he favoureth hym: where when he hymself is made execucioner, with other desire, he desireth his punishemente, then when the execucion commeth to an other. Therefore mindyng, not to have one favored in his faulte of the people, a greate remedie it is, to make that the people, maie have hym to judge. For the greater proofe of this, thinsample of Manlius Capitolinus might be brought, who being accused of the Scenate, was defended of the people, so longe as thei were not Judge, but becommyng arbitratours in his cause, thei condempned hym to death. This is then a waie to punishe, without raisyng tumultes, and to make justise to be kepte: and for as moche as to bridell armed menne, neither the feare of the Lawes, nor of menne suffise not, the antiquitie joined thereunto the aucthoritie of God: and therefore with moste greate Ceremonies, thei made their souldiours to sweare, to kepe the discipline of warre, so that doyng contrariewise, thei should not onely have to feare the Lawes, and menne, but God: and thei used all diligence, to fill them with Religion.

Regarding the giving of the watchword, and renewing it every evening, as well as carrying out the other tasks typically done during watches, because these are well known, I won’t elaborate further. However, I want to highlight one important point, as it greatly affects safety: It’s crucial to ensure that at night, we know who is not lodging in the camp and who is newly arrived. This is easy to monitor under the established protocol, since every lodging has a specific number of men assigned. It’s simple to check if anyone is missing or if there are extra men. If someone is absent without permission, they should be punished as deserters, and if there are more men, we need to find out who they are, what they’re doing there, and their backgrounds. This vigilance ensures that the enemy has a hard time dealing with your commanders and finding out your strategies. If the Romans hadn’t observed this rigorously, Claudius Nero wouldn’t have been able to leave his camp in Lucania and journey to and from Marca without Hannibal getting wind of it. But it’s not enough to create these rules; they must be enforced strictly. In an army, nothing deserves more attention than these regulations. Therefore, the laws to uphold them should be harsh, and those enforcing them must be resolute. The Romans imposed the death penalty on anyone who failed to keep watch, abandoned their assigned place in battle, removed anything from the camp without permission, falsely claimed to have done something heroic in battle, fought against orders, or discarded their weapons in fear. If a cohort or an entire legion committed a similar offense, rather than executing all, they would compile their names, put them in a bag, and by chance, draw out one-tenth of the names for execution. This punishment was crafted so that while not everyone felt its effects, all still feared it. Because where there are severe punishments, there should also be rewards; they aimed to have soldiers simultaneously fear and hope. Rewards were assigned for every worthy act: to the man who saved a fellow citizen in battle, to the first one to leap over the enemy’s wall, to the first one to enter the enemy camp, to those who injured or killed the enemy, and those who unseated foes from their horses. Every virtuous act was acknowledged and rewarded by the consuls, and publicly praised by all. Those who received gifts for such deeds, in addition to the glory and fame earned among soldiers, showcased their honors to friends and family upon returning home in grand fashion. Thus, it’s no surprise that such a people gained immense dominion, maintaining rigorous observance in both punishment and reward towards those deserving praise or blame for their actions. It would be wise to observe most of these practices. I also think it’s important to reveal one type of punishment they followed, which was that as soon as the offender was convicted before the Tribune or Consul, they were immediately struck with a rod. After this striking, it was lawful for the offender to run away, and all soldiers could kill him, leading to immediate attacks with stones, darts, or other weapons, so he didn’t live long. Very few escaped, and those who did couldn’t return home without suffering such great shame and disgrace that it would have been better for them to have died. This method is seen almost identically among the Swiss, who have the condemned executed publicly by other soldiers. This approach is well-considered and excellently executed, as the best way to prevent someone from defending an offender is to make them the punisher. Otherwise, they might show favoritism. If he himself is made the executioner, he seeks the punishment with a different motivation than if the execution is carried out by someone else. Therefore, to ensure no one pardons another’s faults, a strong solution is to let the people judge. A prime example of this is Manlius Capitolinus, who, when accused before the Senate, was defended by the people until they became judges in his case and condemned him to death. This method allows for punishment without causing uproar, maintaining justice. Additionally, since controlling armed men requires more than just the fear of laws or men, the ancients added the authority of God. Thus, with great ceremony, they made their soldiers swear to uphold military discipline, on the premise that acting otherwise would not only incite fear of laws and men but also of God. They took great care to instill them with a sense of religion.

Women and idell games, were not suffered by the antiquitie, to bee in their armies.

Women and ideal games were not allowed by ancient times to be in their armies.

BAPTISTE. Did the Romaines permitte, that women might bee in their armies, or that there might be used these idell plaies, whiche thei use now a daies.

BAPTISTE. Did the Romans allow women to be in their armies, or to play these idle games that they play nowadays?

FABRICIO. Thei prohibited the one and thother, and this prohibicion was not moche difficulte: For that there were so many exercises, in the whiche thei kept every daie the souldiours, some whiles particularely, somewhiles generally {189} occupied that thei had no time to thinke, either on Venus, or on plaies, nor on any other thyng, whiche sedicious and unproffitable souldiours doe.

FABRICIO. They banned both of them, and this ban wasn't too difficult: There were so many activities, where they kept the soldiers busy every day, sometimes individually and sometimes as a group, {189} that they had no time to think about Venus, games, or anything else that unruly and unproductive soldiers do.

BAPTISTE. I am herein satisfied, but tell me, when the armie had to remove, what order kepte thei?

BAPTISTE. I'm satisfied with this, but tell me, when the army had to move, what order did they follow?

Ordre in the removing the armie by the soundes of a Trumpet.

Order in moving the army by the sound of a trumpet.

FABRICIO. The chief Trumpet sounded three tymes, at the firste sound, thei toke up the Tentes, and made the packes, at the seconde, thei laded the carriage, at the thirde, thei removed in thesame maner aforsaied, with the impedimentes after every parte of armed men, placyng the Legions in the middeste: and therefore you ought to cause after thesame sorte, an extraordinarie maine battaile to remove: and after that, the particulare impedimentes therof, and with those, the fowerth part of the publike impedimentes, which should bee all those, that were lodged in one of those partes, whiche a little afore we declared: and therfore it is conveniente, to have every one of them, appointed to a maine battaile, to the entente that the armie removyng, every one might knowe his place in marchyng: and thus every maine battaile ought to goe awaie, with their owne impedimentes, and with the fowerth parte of the publike impedimentes, followyng after in soche maner, as wee shewed that the Romaines marched.

FABRICIO. The chief Trumpet sounded three times. At the first sound, they took down the tents and packed everything up. At the second, they loaded the wagons. At the third, they moved out in the same order as before, with the supplies following each unit of armed men, placing the Legions in the center. Therefore, you should arrange a main battle to move out in the same way, and then the specific supplies for it, along with a fourth of the public supplies, which should include everything lodged in one of those sections we mentioned earlier. It’s important to have each of them ready for a main battle, so that as the army moves, everyone knows their place in the march. Thus, each main battle should depart with their own supplies and with a fourth of the public supplies following in the same manner as we showed how the Romans marched.

BAPTISTE. In pitchyng the Campe, had thei other respectes, then those you have tolde?

BAPTISTE. When setting up the camp, did they have other considerations besides the ones you mentioned?

Respectes to be had for incampyng; How to choose a place to incampe; How to avoide diseases from the armie; The wonderfull commoditie of exercise; The provision of victualles that ought alwaies to bee in a readinesse in an armie.

Respect must be given for camping; How to choose a place to camp; How to avoid diseases from the army; The wonderful benefits of exercise; The supply of food that should always be ready in an army.

FABRICIO. I tell you again, that the Romaines when thei encamped, would be able to kepe the accustomed fashion of their maner, the whiche to observe, thei had no other respecte: but concernyng for other consideracions, thei had twoo principall, the one, to incampe theim selves in a wholesome place, the other, to place themselves, where thenemie could not besiege theim, nor take from them the waie to the water, or victualles. Then for to avoide infirmitie, thei did flie from places Fennie, or subjecte to hurtfull windes: whiche thei knewe not so well, by the qualitie of the situacion, as by the face of the inhabitours: for when thei sawe theim evill coloured, or swollen, or full of other infeccion, thei would not lodge there: concernyng thother respecte {190} to provide not to be besieged, it is requisite to consider the nature of the place, where the friendes lye, and thenemies, and of this to make a conjecture, if thou maiest be besieged or no: and therefore it is meete, that the Capitaine be moste experte, in the knowlege of situacions of countries, and have aboute him divers men, that have the verie same expertenes. Thei avoide also diseases, and famishment, with causyng the armie to kepe no misrule, for that to purpose to maintain it in health, it is nedefull to provide, that the souldiours maie slepe under tentes, that thei maie lodge where bee Trees, that make shadowe, where woodde is for to dresse their meate, that thei go not in the heate, and therefore thei muste bee drawen out of the campe, before daie in Summer, and in Winter, to take hede that thei marche not in the Snowe, and in the Froste, without havyng comoditie to make fire, and not to lack necessarie aparel, nor to drink naughtie water: those that fall sicke by chaunce, make them to bee cured of Phisicions: bicause a capitain hath no reamedie, when he hath to faight with sicknesse, and with an enemie: but nothing is so profitable, to maintaine the armie in health, as is the exercise: and therfore the antiquitie every daie, made them to exercise: wherby is seen how muche exercise availeth: for that in the Campe, it kepeth thee in health, and in the faight victorious. Concernyng famishemente, it is necessarie to see, that the enemie hinder thee not of thy victualles, but to provide where thou maieste have it, and to see that thesame whiche thou haste, bee not loste: and therefore it is requisite, that thou have alwaies in provision with the armie, sufficiente victuall for a monethe, and then removyng into some strong place, thou muste take order with thy nexte frendes, that daily thei maie provide for thee, and above al thinges bestowe the victual with diligence, givyng every daie to every manne, a reasonable measure, and observe after soche sorte this poincte, that it disorder thee not: bicause all other thyng in the warre, maie with tyme be overcome, this onely with tyme overcometh thee: nor there shall never any enemie of thyne, who maie overcome thee {191} with famishemente, that will seeke to overcome thee with iron. For that though the victory be not so honourable, yet it is more sure and more certaine: Then, thesame armie cannot avoide famishemente, that is not an observer of justice, whiche licenciously consumeth what it liste: bicause the one disorder, maketh that the victualls commeth not unto you, the other, that soche victuall as commeth, is unprofitably consumed: therefore thantiquitie ordained, that thei should spende thesame, whiche thei gave, and in thesame tyme when thei appoincted: for that no souldiour did eate, but when the Capitaine did eate: The whiche how moche it is observed of the armies nowe adaies, every manne knoweth, and worthely thei can not bee called menne of good order and sober, as the antiquitie, but lasivious and drunkardes.

FABRICIO. I’ll say it again: the Romans, when they camped, were able to maintain their usual practices. They had no other reason for this except for their customs. However, regarding other considerations, they had two main priorities: one was to camp in a healthy location, and the other was to position themselves so that the enemy could not besiege them or cut off their access to water or food. To avoid illness, they steered clear of marshy places or areas exposed to harmful winds. They relied on the physical appearance of the local inhabitants rather than just the quality of the land. When they saw people who looked unwell, swollen, or infected, they would not stay there. Regarding the requirement to not be besieged, it's important to consider the nature of the terrain where allies and enemies are located and make an estimation about the possibility of being besieged. Therefore, it's essential for the captain to be well-versed in the geography of the area and surround himself with various knowledgeable individuals. They also avoid diseases and starvation by ensuring the army maintains discipline. To keep the troops healthy, it is crucial to provide tents for sleeping and camping near trees for shade, along with wood for cooking. They shouldn’t walk in the heat; thus, they should leave camp before sunrise in summer and avoid trekking in snow or frost during winter without the means to make a fire, ensuring they have adequate clothing and access to clean water. Those who fall sick should be treated by physicians, as a captain has no remedy when faced with both illness and an enemy. However, nothing is as beneficial for maintaining the army's health as exercise, which is why ancient times required daily drills. It’s clear how valuable exercise is because it keeps you healthy in camp and victorious in battle. Regarding starvation, it's essential to ensure that the enemy doesn’t cut you off from your supplies, and to manage your resources so that none are wasted. Therefore, it’s necessary to always have enough supplies for a month and, when moving to a secure location, coordinate with your allies to guarantee daily provisions. Above all, food must be distributed carefully, giving each man a reasonable amount each day without causing disorder. Unlike other challenges in war that can be managed over time, starvation only worsens with time. There will never be an enemy that can overcome you with starvation who wouldn't also try to defeat you with weapons. Although a victory through starvation may not be honorable, it is more reliable and certain. An army that doesn’t respect its provisions cannot avoid starvation, as it recklessly consumes whatever it wants. Such disorder leads to either a lack of food reaching you or the advantageous utilization of food that comes. Therefore, the ancients established that they should only consume what was given and at the same time that it was designated. A soldier only ate when the captain did. It’s evident how much this is followed by modern armies, and they cannot rightfully be called disciplined or sober as those in antiquity but rather indulgent and drunkards.

BAPTISTE. You saied in the beginnyng of orderynge the Campe, that you woulde not stande onely uppon twoo maine battailes, but woulde take fower, for to shewe how a juste armie incamped: therfore I would you shoulde tell me twoo thynges, the one, when I shoulde have more or lesse men, howe I ought to incampe them, the other, what numbre of souldiours should suffice you to faight against what so ever enemie that were.

BAPTISTE. You said at the beginning of organizing the camp that you wouldn’t just focus on two main battles, but would include four to demonstrate how a proper army should be camped. So, I would like you to tell me two things: first, when I should have more or fewer men, how I should arrange them in the camp; second, what number of soldiers would be enough for you to fight against any enemy.

Howe to lodge in the Campe more or lesse menne, then the ordinarie; The nombre of men that an army ought to be made of, to bee able to faighte with the puisantest enemie that is; Howe to cause men to do soche a thing as shold bee profitable for thee, and hurtfull to them selves; Howe to overcome menne at unwares; How to tourne to commoditie the doynges of soche, as use to advertise thy enemie of thy proceadynges; How to order the campe, that the enemie shal not perceive whether the same bee deminished, or increased; A saiyng of Metellus; Marcus Crassus; How to understand the secretes of thy enemie; A policie of Marius, to understande howe he might truste the Frenchmen; What some Capitaines have doen when their countrie have been invaded of enemies; To make the enemie necligente in his doynges; Silla Asdruball; The policie of Aniball, where by he escaped out of the danger of Fabius Maximus; A Capitayne muste devise how to devide the force of his enemies; How to cause the enemie to have in suspect his most trusty men; Aniball Coriolanus; Metellus against Jugurte; A practis of the Romayne oratours, to bryng Aniball out of Credit with Antiochus; Howe to cause the enemie to devide his power; Howe Titus Didius staied his enemies that wer going to incounter a legion of men that were commyng in his ayde; Howe some have caused the enemie to devide his force; A policie to winne the enemies countrie before he be aware; Howe to reforme sedicion and discorde; The benefitte that the reputacion of the Capitaine causeth, which is only gotten by vertue; The chiefe thyng that a capitayne ought to doe; When paie wanteth, punishment is not to be executed; The inconvenience of not punisshynge; Cesar chaunsynge to fall, made the same to be supposed to signifi good lucke; Religion taketh away fantasticall opinions; In what cases a Capitaine ought not to faight with his enemie if he may otherwyse choose; A policie of Fulvius wherby he got and spoyled his enemies Campe; A policie to disorder the enemie; A policie to overcome the enemie; A policie; How to beguile the enemie; Howe Mennonus trained his enemies oute of stronge places to bee the better able to overcom them.

How to camp with more or fewer men than usual; The number of soldiers an army should have to take on the most powerful enemy; How to persuade men to do things that will benefit you while harming themselves; How to catch men off guard; How to manage the camp so the enemy won’t notice if it’s getting smaller or larger; A saying from Metellus; Marcus Crassus; How to understand your enemy's secrets; A tactic from Marius on how he could trust the French; What some commanders have done when their country was invaded by enemies; To make the enemy careless in their actions; Silla Asdrubal; The strategy of Hannibal that allowed him to escape the dangers posed by Fabius Maximus; A commander must devise ways to split the enemy's forces; How to make the enemy suspicious of their most loyal men; Hannibal, Coriolanus; Metellus against Jugurtha; A tactic from Roman orators to discredit Hannibal with Antiochus; How to get the enemy to divide their power; How Titus Didius halted his enemies who were about to confront a legion coming to help him; How some have forced the enemy to split their forces; A strategy to conquer the enemy's territory before they realize it; How to address sedition and discord; The advantage that the commander’s reputation brings, which is earned solely through virtue; The main things a commander should do; When payment is lacking, punishment shouldn’t be carried out; The downside of not punishing; Caesar’s fall was seen as a sign of good luck; Religion removes fanciful beliefs; In which situations a commander should avoid fighting the enemy if possible; A tactic from Fulvius that allowed him to capture and pillage the enemy’s camp; A tactic to disrupt the enemy; A tactic to defeat the enemy; A strategy; How to deceive the enemy; How Mennon lured his enemies out of strong positions to better overcome them.

FABRICIO. To the first question I answer you, that if the armie be more or lesse, then fower or sixe thousande souldiours, the orders of lodgynges, may bee taken awaie or joined, so many as suffiseth: and with this way a man may goe in more, and in lesse, into infinite: Notwithstandynge the Romaines, when thei joigned together twoo consull armies, thei made twoo campes, and thei tourned the partes of the unarmed, thone against thother. Concernyng the second question, I say unto you, that the Romaines ordinary armie, was about xxiiii. M. souldiours: but when thei were driven to faight against the greatest power that might be, the moste that thei put together, wer L. M. With this number, thei did set against two hundred thousand Frenchemen, whome assaulted them after the first warre, that thei had with the Carthageners. With this verie same numbre, thei fought againste Anniball. And you muste note, that {192} the Romaines, and the Grekes, have made warre with fewe, fortefiyng themselves thorough order, and thorough arte: the west, and the easte, have made it with multitude: But the one of these nacions, doeth serve with naturall furie: as doe the men of the west partes, the other through the great obedience whiche those men have to their kyng. But in Grece, and in Italy, beyng no naturall furie, nor the naturall reverence towardes their king, it hath been necessary for them to learne the discipline of warre, the whiche is of so muche force, that it hath made that a fewe, hath been able to overcome the furie, and the naturall obstinatenesse of manie. Therefore I saie, that mindyng to imitate the Romaines, and the Grekes, the number of L. M. souldiers ought not to bee passed, but rather to take lesse: because manie make confucion, nor suffer not the discipline to be observed, and the orders learned, and Pirrus used to saie, that with xv. thousande men he woulde assaile the worlde: but let us pas to an other parte. We have made this our armie to winne a field and shewed the travailes, that in the same fight may happen: we have made it to marche, and declared of what impedimentes in marchyng it may be disturbed: and finally we have lodged it: where not only it ought to take a littell reste of the labours passed, but also to thinke howe the warre ought to be ended: for that in the lodgynges, is handeled many thynges, inespecially thy enemies as yet remainyng in the fielde, and in suspected townes, of whome it is good to be assured, and those that be enemies to overcome them: therfore it is necessarie to come to this demonstracion, and to passe this difficultie with the same glorie, as hitherto we have warred. Therfore comynge to particular matters, I saie that if it shoulde happen, that thou wouldest have manie men, or many people to dooe a thyng, whiche were to thee profittable, and to theim greate hurte, as should be to breake downe the wall of their citie, or to sende into exile many of them, it is necessarie for thee, either to beguile them in such wise that everie one beleeve not that it toucheth him: so that succouryng not the one the other, thei may finde them selves al to {193} be oppressed without remedie, or els unto all to commaunde the same, whiche they ought to dooe in one selfe daie, to the intente that every man belevyng to be alone, to whome the commaundement is made, maie thinke to obey and not to remedie it: and so withoute tumulte thy commaundement to be of everie man executed. If thou shouldest suspecte the fidelitie of anie people, and woulde assure thee, and overcome them at unawares, for to colour thy intente more easelie, thou canst not doe better, then to counsel with them of some purpose of thine, desiryng their aide, and to seeme to intende to make an other enterprise, and to have thy minde farre from thinkyng on them: the whiche will make, that thei shall not think on their owne defence, beleevyng not that thou purposest to hurte them, and thei shal geve thee commoditie, to be able easely to satisfie thy desire. When thou shouldest perceive, that there were in thine armie some, that used to advertise thy enemie of thy devises, thou canst not doe better, myndynge to take commoditie by their traiterous mindes, then to commen with them of those thynges, that thou wilte not doe, and those that thou wilt doe, to kepe secret, and to say to doubte of thynges, that thou doubtest not, and those of whiche thou doubtest, to hide: the which shall make thenemie to take some enterprise in hand, beleving to know thy devises, where by easly thou maiest beguile and opresse hym. If thou shouldest intende (as Claudius Nero did) to deminishe thy armie, sendynge helpe to some freende, and that the enemie shoulde not bee aware therof, it is necessarie not to deminishe the lodgynges, but to maintayne the signes, and the orders whole, makyng the verie same fires, and the verye same wardes throughout all the campe, as wer wont to be afore. Lykewise if with thy armie there should joigne new men, and wouldest that the enemie shoulde not know that thou werte ingrosed, it is necessarie not to increase the lodgynges: Because keepyng secrete doynges and devises, hath alwaies been moste profitable. Wherfore Metellus beyng with an armie in Hispayne, to one, who asked him what he would doe the nexte daie, answered, that if his sherte knew therof, he {194} would bourne it. Marcus Craussus, unto one, whome asked him, when the armie shoulde remove, saied beleevest thou to be alone not to here the trumpet? If thou shouldest desire to understande the secretes of thy enemie, and to know his orders, some have used to sende embassadours, and with theim in servauntes aparel, moste expertest men in warre: whom havynge taken occasion to se the enemies armie, and to consider his strengthe and weakenesse, it hath geven them oportunitie to overcome him. Some have sente into exile one of their familiars, and by meanes of the same, hath knowen the devises of his adversarie. Also like secrettes are understoode of the enemies when for this effecte there were taken any prisoners. Marius whiche in the warre that he made with the Cimbrie, for to know the faieth of those Frenchmen, who then inhabited Lombardie, and were in leage with the Romaine people, sent them letters open, and sealed: and in the open he wrote, that they shoulde not open the sealed, but at a certaine time, and before the same time demaundyng them againe, and finding them opened, knew thereby that their faithe was not to be trusted. Some Capitaines, being invaded, have not desired to goe to meete the enemie, but have gone to assaulte his countrey, and constrained him to retorne to defende his owne home: The whiche manie times hath come wel to passe, for that those soldiours beginnyng to fil them selves with booties, and confidence to overcome, shall sone make the enemies souldiours to wexe afraide, when they supposynge theim selves conquerours, shal understand to become losers: So that to him that hath made this diversion, manie times it hath proved well. But onely it may be doen by him, whiche hath his countrey stronger then that of the enemies, because when it were otherwise, he should goe to leese. It hath been often a profitable thyng to a capitaine, that hath been besieged in his lodgynges by the enemie, to move an intreatie of agreemente, and to make truse with him for certaine daies: the which is wonte to make the enemies more necligente in all doynges: so that avaylynge thee of their necligence, thou maiest easely have occacion to get thee oute of {195} handes. By this way Silla delivered him selfe twise from the enemies: and with this verie same deceipte, Asdruball in Hispayne got oute of the force of Claudious Nero, whome had besieged him. It helpeth also to deliver a man out of the daunger of the enemie, to do some thyng beside the forsaied, that may keepe him at a baye: this is dooen in two maners, either to assaulte him with parte of thy power, so that he beyng attentive to the same faight, may geve commoditie to the reste of thy men to bee able to save theim selves, or to cause to rise some newe accidente, which for the strayngenesse of the thynge, maie make him to marvell, and for this occasion to stande doubtefull, and still: as you knowe howe Anniball dyd, who beynge inclosed of Fabius Maximus, tied in the nighte small Bavens kindeled beetweene the hornes of manie Oxen, so that Fabius astonied at the strangenesse of the same sight, thought not to lette him at all the passage. A Capitayne oughte amonge all other of his affaires, with al subtiltie to devise to devide the force of the enemie, either with makyng him to suspecte his owne menne, in whome he trusteth, or to give him occasion, that he maye seperate his menne, and therby to be come more weake. The fyrste way is dooen with keepyng saulfe the thynges of some of those whiche he hath aboute him, as to save in the warre their menne and their possessions, renderynge theim their children, or other their necessaries withoute raunsome. You know that Anniball havynge burned all the fieldes aboute Rome, he made onely to bee reserved saulfe those of Fabius Maximus. You know how Coriolanus comyng with an armie to Rome, preserved the possessions of the nobilitie, and those of the comminaltie he bourned, and sacked. Metellus havinge an armie againste Jugurte, all the oratours, whiche of Jugurte were sente him, were required of him, that they woulde geve him Jugurte prisoner, and after to the verie same men writyng letters of the verie same matter, wrought in suche wise, that in shorte tyme Jugurte havyng in suspecte all his counsellours, in diverse maners put them to death. Anniball beynge fled to Antiochus, the Romaine oratours practised {196} with him so familiarly, that Antiochus beyng in suspecte of him, trusted not anie more after to his counselles. Concernyng to devide the enemies men, there is no more certainer waie, then to cause their countrie to be assaulted to the intente that being constrained to goe to defende the same, they maie forsake the warre. This way Fabius used havynge agaynst his armie the power of the Frenchemen, of the Tuscans, Umbries and Sannites. Titus Didius havyng a few men in respecte to those of the enemies, and lookynge for a legion from Rome, and the enemies purposinge to goe to incounter it, to the intente that they should not goe caused to bee noised through all his armie, that he intended the nexte daie to faighte the field with the enemies: after he used means, that certaine of the prisoners, that he had taken afore, had occasion to runne awaie. Who declaryng the order that the Consull had taken to faighte the nexte daie, by reason wherof the enemies beyng afraide to deminishe their owne strength, went not to incounter the same legion, and by this way thei wer conducted safe. The which means serveth not to devide the force of the enemies, but to augmente a mans owne. Some have used to devide the enemies force, by lettyng him to enter into their countrie, and in profe have let him take manie townes, to the intente that puttynge in the same garrisons, he might thereby deminishe his power, and by this waie havynge made him weake, have assaulted and overcomen him. Some other mindyng to goe into one province, have made as though they woulde have invaded an other, and used so much diligence, that sodenly entryng into the same, where it was not doubted that they woulde enter, they have first wonne it, before the ennemie coulde have time to succour it: for that thy enemie beynge not sure, whether thou purposest to tourne backe, to the place fyrste of thee threatned, is constrained not to forsake the one place, to succour the other, and so many times he defendeth neither the one nor the other. It importeth besides the sayde thynges to a Capitaine, if there growe sedicion or discorde amonge the souldiours, to knowe with arte howe to extynguishe it: The {197} beste waie is to chastise the headdes of the faultes, but it muste be doen in such wise, that thou maiest first have oppressed them, before they be able to be aware: The way is if they be distante from thee, not onely to call the offenders, but together with theim all the other, to the entente that not beleevynge, that it is for any cause to punishe them, they become not contumelius, but geve commoditie to the execution of the punishemente: when thei be present, thou oughtest to make thy selfe stronge with those that be not in faulte, and by meane of their helpe to punishe the other. When there hapneth discorde amonge them, the beste waye is, to bryng them to the perill, the feare whereof is wonte alwaies to make them agree. But that, which above all other thynge kepeth the armie in unitee, is the reputacion of the Capitaine, the whiche onely groweth of his vertue: because neither bloud, nor authoritie gave it ever without vertue. And the chiefe thyng, whiche of a Capitain is looked for to be doen, is, to keepe his souldiours punisshed, and paied: for that when so ever the paie lacketh, it is conveniente that the punisshement lacke: because thou canst not correcte a souldiour, that robbeth, if thou doest not paie him, nor the same mindynge to live, cannot abstaine from robbynge: but if thou paiest him and punisshest him not, he beecometh in everie condicion insolente: For that thou becomest of small estimacion, where thou chaunsest not to bee able to maintaine the dignitie of thy degree, and not mainetainyng it, there foloweth of necessitee tumulte, and discorde, whiche is the ruine of an armie. Olde Capitaines had a troubell, of the which the presente be almoste free, whiche was to interprete to their purpose the sinister auguries: because if there fell a thunderbolte in an armie, if the sunne were darkened or the Moone, if there came an erthequake, if the Capitaine either in gettyng up, or in lightynge of his horse fell, it was of the souldiours interpreted sinisterously: And it ingendred in them so moche feare, that comynge to faight the fielde, easely they should have lost it: and therefore the aunciente Capitaines so sone as a lyke accidente grewe, either they {198} shewed the cause of the same, and redused it to a naturall cause, or they interpreted it to their purpose. Cesar fallyng in Africa, in comyng of the sea saied, Africa I have taken thee. Moreover manie have declared the cause of the obscuryng of the Moone, and of earthquakes: which thing in our time cannot happen, as well because our men be not so supersticious, as also for that our religion taketh away altogether such opinions: al be it when they should chaunse, the orders of the antiquitie ought to be imitated. When either famishement, or other naturall necessitie, or humaine passion, hath broughte thy enemie to an utter desperation, and he driven of the same, cometh to faight with thee, thou oughtest to stande within thy campe, and as muche as lieth in thy power, to flie the faight. So the Lacedemonians did against the Masonians, so Cesar did against Afranio, and Petreio. Fulvius beyng Consul, against the Cimbrians, made his horsemen manie daies continually to assaulte the enemies, and considered how thei issued out of their campe for to folow them: wherfore he sette an ambusshe behinde the Campe of the Cimbrians, and made them to be assaulted of his horsmen, and the Cimbrians issuyng oute of their campe for to follow them. Fulvio gotte it, and sacked it. It hath ben of great utilitie to a Capitaine, havyng his armie nere to the enemies armie, to sende his menne with the enemies ansignes to robbe, and to burne his owne countrey, whereby the enemies beleevynge those to bee menne, whiche are come in their aide, have also runne to helpe to make them the pray: and for this disorderyng them selves, hathe therby given oportunitie to the adversary to overcome them. This waie Alexander of Epirus used againste the Illirans and Leptenus of Siracusa against the Carthaginers and bothe to the one and to the other, the devise came to passe most happely. Manie have overcome the enemie, gevyng him occasion to eate and to drinke oute of measure, fayning to have feared, and leaving their Campes full of wyne and herdes of cattell, wherof the enemie beyng filled above all naturall use, have then assaulted him, and with his destruction overthrowen him. So Tamirus did against {199} Cirus, and Tiberius Graccus agaynst the Spaniardes. Some have poysoned the wine, and other thynges to feede on, for to be able more easely to overcome them. I saied a littel afore how I founde not, that the antiquetie kepte in the night Scoutes abroade, and supposed that they did it for to avoide the hurte, whiche might growe therby: because it is founde, that through no other meane then throughe the watche man, whiche was set in the daie to watche the enemie, hath been cause of the ruin of him, that set him there: for that manie times it hath hapned, that he beyng taken, hath been made perforce to tell theim the token, whereby they might call his felowes, who commyng to the token, have been slaine or taken. It helpeth to beguile the enemie sometime to varie a custome of thine, whereupon he having grounded him self, remaineth ruinated: as a Capitaine did once, whome usinge to cause to be made signes to his men for comynge of the enemies in the night with fire, and in the daie with smoke, commaunded that withoute anie intermission, they shoulde make smoke and fire, and after commynge upon them the enemie, they should reste, whome beleevyng to come without beynge seen, perceivyng no signe to be made of beyng discovered, caused (through goeyng disordered) more easie the victorie to his adversarie. Mennonus a Rodian mindynge to drawe from stronge places the enemies armie, sente one under colour of a fugitive, the whiche affirmed, howe his armie was in discorde, and that the greater parte of them wente awaie: and for to make the thynge to be credited, he caused to make in sporte, certaine tumultes amonge the lodgynges: whereby the enemie thvnkyng thereby to be able to discomfaighte them, assaultynge theim, were overthrowen.

FABRICIO. To the first question, I answer that if the army is more or less than four or six thousand soldiers, the arrangements for lodging may be adjusted as needed: this way, one can significantly increase or decrease the size of the army. However, the Romans, when they combined the armies of two consuls, created two camps and repositioned the unarmed parts to face each other. Regarding the second question, I tell you that the ordinary Roman army consisted of about 24,000 soldiers; but when they faced the greatest might possible, they mustered up to 50,000. With this number, they went against two hundred thousand Frenchmen who attacked them after their first war with the Carthaginians. With this very same number, they fought against Hannibal. You must note that the Romans and the Greeks have fought wars with relatively few troops, using order and strategy, while both the West and East have relied on larger numbers. Yet, one of these nations operates with natural fury, as do the men of the West, while the other serves through great loyalty to their king. In Greece and Italy, lacking that natural fury or reverence for their king, it was necessary for them to learn the discipline of war, which is so powerful that it enables a few to overcome the fury and natural stubbornness of many. Therefore, I assert that if one intends to emulate the Romans and the Greeks, the number of 50,000 soldiers should not be exceeded; rather, it is better to have fewer. For too many create confusion, disrupting the discipline and learned orders. Pyrrhus used to say that with 15,000 men, he could challenge the world. But let’s move on to another topic. We’ve organized this army to win a battle and have outlined the potential challenges that may arise during the fight. We've arranged it for marching and discussed what obstacles might disrupt the march: finally, we have established camp, where not only should it take a little rest from past labors, but also think about how the war should be concluded. Much can be handled in the camps, especially concerning enemies still in the field and in suspected towns, about which it is good to gather intelligence, and those who are enemies need to be dealt with. Therefore, it's necessary to arrive at this demonstration and overcome this challenge with the same glory we've had in battle thus far. Therefore, when it comes to specific matters, I say that if you find yourself needing many people for a task that would benefit you and greatly harm them—like tearing down the walls of their city or exiling many—it is necessary for you either to deceive them so that no one believes it concerns them, so that not helping each other, they may find themselves completely overwhelmed without remedy, or to command all of them to act in a single day, so that believing they are alone in their orders, they may think to obey without remedying it: this way, your command will be executed without any tumult by everyone. If you suspect the loyalty of any group and want to secure them and take them by surprise, to disguise your intentions more easily, it’s best to discuss some of your plans with them, asking for their support and appearing to intend to pursue another venture, thus keeping your mind far from thinking about them. This causes them not to consider their defense, as they won't believe you intend to harm them, and they will give you an opportunity to satisfy your desires easily. When you notice that there are people in your army who tend to inform your enemy about your plans, the best strategy, aiming to take advantage of their treacherous minds, is to talk to them about things you don’t intend to do and keep secret the plans you do intend to execute. Express doubts about matters you’re confident in, and hide those about which you have concerns. This will lead the enemy to undertake certain actions believing they understand your strategy, which will allow you to deceive and defeat them easily. If you intend to diminish your army, as Claudius Nero did, by sending help to a friend without the enemy being aware, it is necessary not to reduce the encampments, but to maintain the signs and orders intact, making the same fires and keeping the same guards throughout the camp as were there before. Likewise, if new recruits join your army and you want the enemy to remain unaware of this increase, it is necessary not to expand the lodgings because keeping secrets in actions and plans has always been most beneficial. Thus, Metellus, while having an army in Hispania, when asked what he would do the next day, replied that if his shirt knew, it would burn. Marcus Crassus, when asked when the army would move, said, do you believe to be alone and not hear the trumpet? If you wish to understand the secrets of your enemy and know their arrangements, some have sent ambassadors disguised as servants, experts in warfare, who then took the opportunity to observe the enemy’s army and assess its strengths and weaknesses, giving them the chance to overcome him. Others have exiled trusted associates to learn about their opponent’s plans. Similarly, such secrets can be understood from the enemy when any prisoners have been taken for this purpose. Marius, during his war with the Cimbrians, to ascertain the loyalty of those Frenchmen residing in Lombardy, who were allied with the Romans, sent them letters that were both open and sealed: in the open letter, he stated that they should not open the sealed one until a certain time, and upon demanding it back before that time, if he found it opened, he knew their loyalty could not be trusted. Some commanders, when under siege, did not seek to confront the enemy directly but chose to raid their territory, forcing them to return home for defense. This has often been successful because soldiers, beginning to fill themselves with spoils and confidence, will cause the enemy’s soldiers to become fearful when they realize that perceived victors may soon become losers. For the one who initiates such diversions has often been well rewarded. But this can only be done by one whose country is stronger than that of the enemy, as the opposite could lead to a loss. It has frequently been advantageous for a captain besieged in his camp by the enemy to propose a truce and make a temporary agreement, which usually leads the enemy to be more negligent. This negligence gives you the opportunity to escape their grasp. Sulla managed to escape from the enemy twice this way, and using the same trick, Asdrubal escaped the force of Claudius Nero, who had besieged him. It is also helpful for a man to escape from the enemy's danger by creating a diversion that keeps them at bay. This can be accomplished in two ways: either by attacking with part of your force so that the enemy is focused on that fight, allowing the rest of your men to save themselves, or by causing some unexpected incident that creates confusion and hesitation in the enemy, like how Hannibal, when surrounded by Fabius Maximus, set light to small beacons between the horns of many oxen, causing Fabius to be astonished by this strange sight, thinking he should not let him escape at all. A captain, among all his affairs, ought to devise ways to divide the enemy's forces, either by making them suspect their own trusted men or by providing occasions for them to separate their troops, thereby becoming weaker. The first way can be accomplished by safeguarding the possessions of some of those around him—such as protecting their men and their properties, returning their children or other necessities without ransom. You know that Hannibal, after burning all the fields around Rome, spared only those of Fabius Maximus. You know how Coriolanus, upon arriving with an army at Rome, preserved the property of the nobility while burning and plundering that of the common people. Metellus, while campaigning against Jugurtha, was approached by orators sent by Jugurtha who asked if he would hand Jugurtha over as a prisoner; he later wrote letters to those very same men on this same matter, manipulating them so that in a short time Jugurtha, suspecting all his advisors, put them to death in various ways. After Hannibal fled to Antiochus, the Roman orators engaged with him so personally that Antiochus, suspecting him, no longer trusted his counsel. Regarding dividing the enemy’s troops, there is no better method than to have their homeland invaded, compelling them to return to defend it, which makes them abandon the current war. Fabius used this strategy against the combined forces of the French, Tuscans, Umbrians, and Samnites. Titus Didius, having fewer men than the enemy, while awaiting a legion from Rome, planned for the enemy to counter it; to ensure they did not, he spread the word throughout his army that he intended to engage the next day. Afterward, he arranged for some of the prisoners he had taken to escape. Their proclamation of the consul’s plans to fight the next day caused the enemy, fearing a reduction in their strength, not to pursue the legion, allowing them to exit safely. Such strategies serve not only to divide the enemy's forces but also to strengthen one’s own. Some have managed to divide the enemy’s strength by allowing them into their territory, and in practice, have let them take many towns, so that by placing garrisons there, they might weaken their power, and thereby attack and defeat them. Others, intending to invade one province, have pretended to threaten another, putting in so much effort that they suddenly entered the latter, where it was least expected, capturing it before the enemy had time to send reinforcements; as the enemy, not knowing whether you would return to the initially threatened place, is forced not to abandon one location to assist the other, often leading to a situation where they fail to defend either. Additionally, it is essential for a captain, if discord or sedition arises among the soldiers, to know how to extinguish it artfully. The best way is to punish the ringleaders of such faults, but this must be done in such a manner that they are suppressed before they are aware of the action. The method is, if they are distant from you, not only to call the offenders forward but to gather all others as well, so that they don’t believe it is a punishment directed at them, preventing them from becoming bold, and giving you the opportunity to execute the punishment. When they are present, you should strengthen yourself with those who are not at fault and, with their help, punish the others. When discord arises among them, the best approach is to bring them to peril, as fear usually leads to agreement. However, what maintains an army in unity more than anything else is the reputation of the captain, which arises solely from his virtue; because neither lineage nor authority ever bestows it without virtue. The primary expectation of a captain is to ensure that his soldiers are disciplined and paid; for whenever pay is lacking, it becomes appropriate for punishment to also be absent, since you cannot correct a soldier who robs if you do not pay him, nor can one who wishes to live refrain from theft. But if you pay him and do not punish him, he becomes insolent in every situation. Then, you lose esteem, as you cannot uphold the dignity of your rank, and when you fail to maintain that dignity, tumult and discord inevitably follow, leading to the ruin of an army. Old captains faced troubles from which we are nearly free today, which involved misinterpreting unfavorable omens: for if lightning struck an army, if the sun or moon were eclipsed, or if there was an earthquake, if the captain fell either getting up or while mounting his horse, the soldiers would interpret it ominously. This bred so much fear in them that as they approached battle, they would easily lose it; thus, the ancient captains, when a similar event occurred, either explained the cause and reduced it to a natural occurrence or interpreted it favorably for themselves. Caesar, falling from a ship in Africa, declared, "Africa, I have taken you." Moreover, many have suggested reasons for the darkening of the moon and for earthquakes: this cannot happen in our time, both because our people are not so superstitious and because our religion completely dispels such beliefs; however, should they occur, the practices of antiquity should be emulated. When either famine, other natural necessity, or human passion drives your enemy to desperation, and he comes to fight you out of that desperation, you should remain within your camp and do everything possible to avoid the battle. This is how the Lacedemonians acted against the Messenians, how Caesar acted against Afranius and Petreius. Fulvius, being consul, continually had his cavalry engage the enemies for many days, observing how they would emerge from their camp to pursue them; thus, he set an ambush behind the Cimbrian camp and had them attacked by his horsemen, leading the Cimbrians, in their eagerness to follow, to suffer defeat. It has been greatly beneficial for a captain, having his army close to the enemy, to send out his men under the enemy's insignia to rob and burn his own land, causing the enemy to believe they are comrades arriving to assist them, thus rushing to aid in the pillaging; this disorder contributes to giving the adversary an opportunity to overcome them. This method was employed by Alexander of Epirus against the Illyrians and by Leptinus of Syracuse against the Carthaginians. Both strategies proved highly successful for each. Many have defeated the enemy by providing them ample opportunity to overindulge, pretending to be fearful, and leaving their camps full of wine and herds of cattle—so that the enemy, filled beyond natural limits, would be attacked and overwhelmed. Tamirus did this against Cyrus, and Tiberius Gracchus against the Spaniards. Some have poisoned supplies, including wine and other foods, to easily conquer them. I noted earlier that I found no evidence that the ancients maintained night watches, assuming they did so to avoid harm that could arise from neglect. History shows that no other means than the sentinel set during the day has caused the downfall of the one who placed him there; for it has frequently happened that when captured, he was forced to reveal the signal that would summon his fellows, who, upon arriving in response, have been slain or taken. Sometimes, it helps to deceive the enemy by varying your known customs, leading them to ruin. A captain once caused the signals for his men regarding the enemy’s night approach to be made with fire, and during the day with smoke, but commanded that fire and smoke be continuously produced without interruption. Then, when the enemy approached, believing they were discreet, they found no sign of being discovered, leading to chaos, which made victory easier for his opponent. Mennonus of Rhodes sought to lure the enemy army away from strongholds, sending one under the guise of a defector who claimed his army was in discord and that most were fleeing; to lend credence to this, he staged minor disturbances among the encampments. The enemy, believing they could succeed in defeating them, attacked, only to be overwhelmed.

The enemie ought not to be brought into extreme desperacion; How Lucullus constrained certaine men that ran awaie from him to his enemies, to fayght whether they wold or not.

The enemy shouldn’t be pushed into extreme desperation; just look at how Lucullus forced certain men who fled from him to fight against their will.

Besides thesaied thynges, regarde ought to be had not to brynge the enemie into extreme desperacion: whereunto Cesar had regarde, faightyng with the Duchemen, who opened them the waie, seyng, howe thei beyng not able to flie, necessitie made them strong, and would rather take paine to followe theim, when thei fled, then the perill to overcome them, when thei defended them selves. {200} Lucullus seyng, how certaine Macedonian horsemenne, whiche were with hym, went to the enemies parte, straight waie made to sounde to battaile, and commaunded, that the other men should folowe hym: whereby the enemies beleving, that Lucullus would begin the faight, went to incounter the same Macedonians, with soche violence, that thei were constrained to defende themselves: and so thei became against their willes, of fugetives, faighters. It importeth also to knowe, how to be assured of a toune, when thou doubteste of the fidelitie thereof, so sone as thou haste wonne the fielde, or before, the whiche certain old insamples maie teache thee.

Besides the things mentioned, care should be taken not to push the enemy into complete despair. Caesar was mindful of this when fighting the Germans, who opened a path for him, seeing that because they could not flee, necessity made them strong and they would rather put in the effort to chase him when he fled than face the danger of being defeated while defending themselves. {200} Lucullus, noticing that certain Macedonian horsemen with him were going over to the enemy’s side, immediately signaled for battle and commanded the others to follow him. This made the enemy believe that Lucullus was about to start the fight, prompting them to confront the Macedonians with such violence that they were forced to defend themselves, turning them against their will from fugitives into fighters. It is also important to know how to secure a town when you doubt its loyalty, as soon as you have won the field or even beforehand, which certain old examples can teach you.

A policie wher by Pompey got a towne; How Publius Valerius assured him self of a towne; A policie that Alexander Magnus used to be assured of all Tracia, which Philip kynge of Spaine did practise to be asured of England when he wente to sainct Quintens; Examples for Capitaines to winne the hartes of the people.

A strategy through which Pompey took control of a town; How Publius Valerius secured a town for himself; A strategy that Alexander the Great used to gain control of all of Thrace, which King Philip of Spain tried to apply in his attempt to take England when he went to St. Quintin; Examples for leaders to win the hearts of the people.

Pompei doubtyng of the Catinensians, praied them that thei would bee contente, to receive certaine sicke menne, that he had in his armie, and sendyng under the habite of sicke persones, most lustie menne, gotte the toune. Publius Valerius, fearyng the fidelitie of the Epidannians, caused to come, as who saieth, a Pardon to a churche without the toune, and when al the people wer gone for Pardon, he shutte the gates, receivyng after none in, but those whom he trusted. Alexander Magnus, mindyng to goe into Asia, and to assure himself of Thracia, toke with him all the principall of thesame Province, givyng theim provision, and he set over the common people of Thracia, men of lowe degree, and so he made the Princes contented with paiyng theim, and the people quiete, havyng no heddes that should disquiete them: But emong all the thynges, with the whiche the Capitaines, winne the hartes of the people, be the insamples of chastitie and justice, as was thesame of Scipio in Spaine, when he rendered that yong woman, moste faire of personage to her father, and to her housebande: the whiche made him more, then with force of armes to winne Spain.

Pompey, doubting the Catinensians, asked them to be willing to accept some sick men he had in his army, and by sending in well-built men disguised as the sick, he captured the town. Publius Valerius, fearing the loyalty of the Epidannians, arranged for a pardon to be offered at a church outside the town, and when everyone had gone for the pardon, he shut the gates, only allowing in those he trusted. Alexander the Great, planning to go into Asia and secure Thrace, took with him all the leaders of that province, providing for them, and he appointed men of low status to oversee the common people of Thrace. This way, he kept the princes satisfied by paying them, and the populace calm, as they had no leaders to create unrest. Among all the things that captains use to win the hearts of the people are examples of chastity and justice, as shown by Scipio in Spain when he returned a young woman, who was very beautiful, to her father and husband, a deed that won him Spain more than the force of arms ever could.

Cesar having caused that woodde to bee paied for, whiche he had occupied for to make the Listes, about his armie in Fraunce, got so moche a name of justice, that he made easier the conquest of thesame province. I cannot tell what remaineth me, to speake more upon these accidentes, for that concerning this matter, there is not lefte any parte, {201} that hath not been of us disputed. Onely there lacketh to tell, of the maner of winnyng, and defendyng a toune: the whiche I am readie to doe willingly, if you be not now wearie.

Cesar had the timber paid for that he had used to create the Lists for his army in France, which earned him a reputation for fairness that made it easier to conquer that province. I can’t think of anything else to say about these events, as we have already debated every aspect of this matter. The only thing left to discuss is how to win and defend a town, which I am happy to do if you’re not too tired now.

BAPTISTE. Your humanitie is so moche, that it maketh us to followe our desires, without beyng afraied to be reputed presumptuous, seyng that you liberally offer thesame, whiche we should have been ashamed, to have asked you: Therefore, we saie unto you onely this, that to us you cannot dooe a greater, nor a more gratefuller benefite, then to finishe this reasonyng. But before that you passe to that other matter, declare us a doubte, whether it bee better to continewe the warre, as well in the Winter, as thei use now adaies, or to make it onely in the Sommer, and to goe home in the Winter, as the antiquitie did.

BAPTISTE. Your kindness is so immense that it encourages us to pursue our desires without worrying about being seen as presumptuous, since you generously offer what we would have been embarrassed to ask for. So, we only say this: there’s no greater or more appreciated favor you could do for us than to finish this discussion. But before you move on to the next topic, could you clarify a question for us? Is it better to continue the war in the winter, as they do nowadays, or to fight only in the summer and return home in the winter, like they did in ancient times?

Warre ought not to be made in winter; Rough situacions, colde and watrie times, are enemies to the oder of warre; An overthrowe caused by winter.

War shouldn't be waged in winter; rough conditions, cold and wet times, are enemies to the order of war; a defeat caused by winter.

FABRICIO. See, that if the prudence of the demaunder were not, there had remained behinde a speciall part, that deserveth consideracion. I answere you againe, that the antiquitie did all thynges better, and with more prudence then wee: and if wee in other things commit some erroure, in the affaires of warre, wee commit all errour. There is nothing more undiscrete, or more perrillous to a Capitayne, then to make warre in the Winter, and muche more perrill beareth he, that maketh it, then he that abideth it: the reason is this. All the industrie that is used in the discipline of warre, is used for to bee prepared to fighte a fielde with thy enemie, because this is the ende, whereunto a Capitayne oughte to goo or endevour him selfe: For that the foughten field, geveth thee the warre wonne or loste: then he that knoweth best how to order it, and he that hath his army beste instructed, hath moste advauntage in this, and maye beste hope to overcome. On the other side, there is nothing more enemie to the orders, and then the rough situacions, or the colde watery time: for that the rough situacions, suffereth thee not to deffende thy bandes, according to thee discipline: the coulde and watery times, suffereth thee not to keepe thy men together, nor thou canst not bring them in good order to the enemy: but it is convenient for thee to lodge them a sunder of necessitie, and {202} without order, being constrayned to obeye to Castells, to Boroughes, and to the Villages, that maye receyve thee, in maner that all thy laboure of thee, used to instructe the army is vaine. Nor marvayle you not though now a daies, they warre in the Winter, because the armies being without discipline, know not the hurt that it dooth them, in lodging not together, for that it is no griefe to them not to be able to keepe those orders, and to observe that discipline, which they have not: yet they oughte to see howe much harme, the Camping in the Winter hath caused, and to remember, how the Frenchmen in the yeare of oure Lorde God, a thousande five hundred and three, were broken at Gariliano of the Winter, and not of the Spaniardes: For as much as I have saide, he that assaulteth, hath more disadvauntage then he that defendeth: because the fowle weather hurteth him not a littell, being in the dominion of others and minding to make warre. For that he is constrayned, either to stande together with his men, and to sustaine the incommoditie of water and colde, or to avoide it to devide his power: But he that defendeth, may chuse the place as he listeth, and tary him with his freshe men: and he in a sodayne may set his men in araye, and goo to find a band of the enemies men, who cannot resiste the violence of them. So the Frenchemen were discomfited, and so they shall alwayes be discomfited, which will assaulte in the Winter an enemye, whoo hath in him prudence. Then he that will that force, that orders, that discipline and vertue, in anye condition availe him not, let him make warre in the fielde in the winter: and because that the Romaines woulde that all these thinges, in which they bestowed so much diligence, should availe them, fleedde no otherwise the Winter, then the highe Alpes, and difficulte places, and whatsoever other thing shoulde let them, for being able to shewe their arte and their vertue. So this suffiseth to your demaund, wherefore we wil come to intreate of the defending and besieging of tounes, and of their situacions and edifications.

FABRICIO. Look, if there weren't some wisdom in the question asked, there would be an important point left behind that deserves consideration. I tell you again that ancient times did everything better and more wisely than we do now. While we may make mistakes in various matters, in warfare, we make all the mistakes. There’s nothing more reckless, or more dangerous for a captain, than to wage war in the winter, and he who initiates it bears much more risk than he who endures it. The reason is simple. All the effort put into military training is meant to prepare for battle with the enemy because that is the ultimate goal a captain should strive for. The outcome of the battle determines whether the war is won or lost. Therefore, he who knows best how to manage it, and who has properly trained his army, has the greatest advantage and the best hope of victory. On the flip side, nothing disrupts order more than harsh conditions and cold, rainy weather. The tough terrain doesn’t allow for proper defense according to discipline; the cold and wet conditions prevent you from keeping your troops together, and you can’t organize them effectively against the enemy. Instead, you end up having to separate them out of necessity, staying in castles, towns, and villages that can shelter you, making all your efforts to train the army pointless. Don’t be surprised that nowadays battles happen in the winter; the armies, lacking discipline, don’t realize the harm done by not being together, as it doesn’t bother them not to maintain those formations and that discipline which they lack. Still, they should consider how much damage winter camping has caused and remember how the French were defeated at Gariliano in the year of our Lord 1503—not by the Spaniards. As I have said, he who attacks has more disadvantages than he who defends, because bad weather significantly hurts him, being in enemy territory and intending to make war. He is forced either to stay close with his men and endure the discomfort of rain and cold, or to avoid it by splitting his forces. But the defender can choose the location as he wishes and can wait with his fresh troops. When suddenly made to engage, they can confront a segment of the enemy’s forces, who will struggle against their onslaught. Thus, the French were defeated, and they will always be defeated when they attack an enemy in the winter who possesses wisdom. So, if someone desires that strength, that order, that discipline and virtue, to work under any circumstances, they should not fight in the field in winter. The Romans understood this well; they avoided winter conditions, taking refuge in the high Alps and difficult terrains, or anything else that might impede them, in order to showcase their skills and virtues. This suffices to respond to your inquiry, so we will now turn to discussing the defense and siege of towns, and their locations and fortifications.

{205}

THE SEVENTH BOOKE

Tounes and Fortresses maie be strong twoo waies; The place that now a daies is moste sought to fortifie in; How a Toune walle ought to bee made; The walle of a toune ought to bee high, and the diche within, and not without; The thickenes that a Toune walle ought to bee of, and the distaunces betwene everie flancker, and of what breadth and deapth the dich ought to bee; How the ordinaunce is planted, for the defence of a toune; The nature of the batterie.

Towns and fortresses can be strong in two ways; The places that are most sought after to fortify these days; How a town wall should be built; The wall of a town should be high, and the ditch should be inside, not outside; The thickness that a town wall should have, and the distances between each flank, and how wide and deep the ditch should be; How the artillery is positioned for the defense of a town; The nature of the bombardment.

Y ou oughte to knowe, how that tounes and fortresses, maie bee strong either by nature, or by industrie; by nature, those bee strong, whiche bee compassed aboute with rivers, or with Fennes, as Mantua is and Ferrara, or whiche bee builded upon a Rocke, or upon a stepe hille, as Monaco, and Sanleo: For that those that stande upon hilles, that be not moche difficulct to goe up, be now a daies, consideryng the artillerie and the Caves, moste weake. And therfore moste often times in building, thei seke now a daies a plain, for to make it stronge with industrie. The firste industrie is, to make the walles crooked, and full of tournynges, and of receiptes: the whiche thyng maketh, that thenemie cannot come nere to it, bicause he maie be hurte, not onely on the front, but by flancke. If the walles be made high, thei bee to moche subjecte to the blowes of the artillerie: if thei be made lowe, thei bee moste easie to scale. If thou makeste the diches on the out side thereof, for to give difficultie to the Ladders, if it happen that the enemie fill them up (whiche a great armie maie easely dooe) the wall remaineth taken of thenemie. Therefore purposyng to provide to the one and thother foresaid inconveniences, I beleve (savyng alwaies better judgement) that the walle ought to be made highe, and the Diche within, and not without. This is the moste strongeste waie of {206} edificacion, that is made, for that it defendeth thee from the artillerie, and from Ladders, and it giveth not facilitie to the enemie, to fill up the diche: Then the walle ought to be high, of that heighth as shall bee thought beste, and no lesse thick, then two yardes and a quarter, for to make it more difficult to ruinate. Moreover it ought to have the toures placed, with distances of CL. yardes betwen thone and thother: the diche within, ought to be at leaste twoo and twentie yardes and a halfe broad, and nine depe, and al the yearth that is digged out, for to make the diche, muste be throwen towardes the Citee, and kepte up of a walle, that muste be raised from the bottome of the diche, and goe so high over the toune, that a man maie bee covered behinde thesame, the whiche thing shal make the depth of the diche the greater. In the bottome of the diche, within every hundred and l. yardes, there would be a slaughter house, which with the ordinaunce, maie hurte whom so ever should goe doune into thesame: the greate artillerie that defende the citee, are planted behinde the walle, that shutteth the diche, bicause for to defende the utter walle, being high, there cannot bee occupied commodiously, other then smalle or meane peeses. If the enemie come to scale, the heigth of the firste walle moste easely defendeth thee: if he come with ordinaunce, it is convenient for hym to batter the utter walle: but it beyng battered, for that the nature of the batterie is, to make the walle to fall, towardes the parte battered, the ruine of the walle commeth, finding no diche that receiveth and hideth it, to redouble the profunditie of thesame diche: after soche sorte, that to passe any further, it is not possible, findyng a ruine that with holdeth thee, a diche that letteth thee, and the enemies ordinaunce, that from the walle of the diche, moste safely killeth thee. Onely there is this remedie, to fill the diche: the whiche is moste difficulte to dooe, as well bicause the capacitie thereof is greate, as also for the difficultie, that is in commyng nere it, the walle beeyng strong and concaved, betwene the whiche, by the reasons aforesaied, with difficultie maie be entered, havyng after to goe up a breache through a {207} ruin, whiche giveth thee moste greate difficultie, so that I suppose a citee thus builded, to be altogether invinsible.

Y You should know that towns and fortresses can be strong either by nature or by design. Naturally strong towns are those surrounded by rivers or marshes, like Mantua and Ferrara, or built on a rock or a steep hill, like Monaco and San Leo. Today, however, hills that aren’t too difficult to climb are considered weak because of artillery and tunnels. Therefore, in modern construction, builders often seek flat land to strengthen it through design. The first step in design is to create walls that are winding and full of angles and recesses. This makes it harder for the enemy to approach because they can be attacked not just from the front but also from the sides. If the walls are too high, they are very vulnerable to artillery fire; if they are too low, they are easy to scale. If you dig ditches outside to complicate the use of ladders but the enemy fills them in (which a large army can do easily), the wall will be taken. To address these issues, I believe (with due respect to better judgment) that the wall should be made high, and the ditch should be inside rather than outside. This is the strongest method of fortification because it protects you from artillery and ladders and prevents the enemy from easily filling the ditch. The wall should be high, at a height deemed best, and at least two and a quarter yards thick to make it harder to breach. Additionally, towers should be spaced 150 yards apart, and the ditch should be at least 22 and a half yards wide and nine deep. All the earth dug out to create the ditch should be thrown toward the city and kept up by a wall that rises from the bottom of the ditch and reaches high above the town, allowing a person to take cover behind it, which will increase the depth of the ditch. At the bottom of the ditch, there should be a slaughterhouse every 100 to 150 yards that can harm anyone who enters it. The main artillery defending the city is placed behind the wall that encloses the ditch, as it’s only practical to use small or medium-sized artillery to defend the outer wall, which is high. If the enemy tries to scale it, the height of the first wall makes it easier to defend. If they come with artillery, they would aim for the outer wall, but once it’s breached, the nature of artillery is to make the wall collapse towards the damaged side. The destruction of the wall occurs without a ditch to catch and conceal it, effectively increasing the depth of that ditch. This creates a situation where further progress is impossible, surrounded by ruins that hinder you, a ditch that blocks your path, and the enemy’s artillery, which can kill from the wall of the ditch. The only remedy is to fill the ditch, which is very difficult because of its large capacity and the challenge of approaching it due to the strong, concave wall. Entering through the reasons mentioned above is challenging, leading to having to climb over a breach through a {207} ruin, which creates a great deal of difficulty, making me believe a city built this way is virtually invincible.

BAPTISTE. When there should bee made besides the diche within, a diche also without, should it not bee stronger?

BAPTISTE. If there’s going to be a ditch made on the inside, shouldn’t there also be one on the outside, and shouldn’t it be stronger?

FABRICIO. It should be without doubt, but mindyng to make one diche onely, myne opinion is, that it standeth better within then without.

FABRICIO. It should be without a doubt, but considering that I can only make one statement, I believe it is better to keep it inside than outside.

BAPTISTE. Would you, that water should bee in the diches, or would you have them drie?

BAPTISTE. Do you want the water to be in the ditches, or would you prefer them dry?

A drie diche is moste sureste.

A dry ditch is the safest bet.

FABRICIO. The opinion of men herein bee divers, bicause the diches full of water, saveth thee from mines under grounde, the Diches without water, maketh more difficulte the fillyng of them: but I havyng considered all, would make them without water, for that thei bee more sure: For diches with water, have been seen in the Winter to bee frosen, and to make easie the winnyng of a citee, as it happened to Mirandola, when Pope Julie besieged it: and for to save me from mines, I would make it so deepe, that he that would digge lower, should finde water.

FABRICIO. Men's opinions on this matter are varied because ditches filled with water protect you from underground mines, while ditches without water make filling them more difficult. However, after considering everything, I would prefer to construct them without water, as they are more secure. Ditches with water have been known to freeze in winter, making it easier to capture a city, as happened in Mirandola when Pope Julius besieged it. To protect against mines, I would make the ditch so deep that anyone trying to dig lower would find water.

An advertisemente for the buildyng and defending of a Toune or Fortresse; Small fortresses cannot bee defended; A toune of war or Fortresse, ought not to have in them any retiring places; Cesar Borgia; The causes of the losse of the Fortresse of Furlie, that was thought invincible; Howe the houses that are in a toune of war or Fortresse ought to be builded.

An advertisement for building and defending a town or fortress; Small fortresses can't be defended; A war town or fortress shouldn't have any hiding places; Caesar Borgia; The reasons for the loss of the fortress of Furlie, which was considered invincible; How the houses in a war town or fortress should be built.

The Fortresses also, I would builde concernyng the diches and the walles in like maner, to the intent thei should have the like difficultie to be wonne. One thyng I will earnestly advise hym, that defendeth a Citee: and that is, that he make no Bulwarkes without distaunte from the walle of thesame: and an other to hym that buildeth the Fortresse, and this is, that he make not any refuge place in them, in whiche he that is within, the firste walle beyng loste, maie retire: That whiche maketh me to give the firste counsaile is, that no manne ought to make any thyng, by meane wherof, he maie be driven without remedie to lese his firste reputacion, the whiche losyng, causeth to be estemed lesse his other doinges, and maketh afraied them, whom have taken upon theim his defence, and alwaies it shall chaunce him this, whiche I saie, when there are made Bulwarkes out of the Toune, that is to bee defended, bicause alwaies he shall leese theim, little thynges now a daies, beyng not able to bee defended, when thei be subject to the furie of ordinance, in soche wise that lesyng them, {208} thei be beginning and cause of his ruine. When Genua rebelled againste king Leus of Fraunce, it made certaine Bulwarkes alofte on those hilles, whiche bee about it, the whiche so sone as thei were loste, whiche was sodainly, made also the citee to be loste. Concernyng the second counsaile, I affirme nothyng to be to a Fortresse more perilous, then to be in thesame refuge places, to be able to retire: Bicause the hope that menne have thereby, maketh that thei leese the utter warde, when it is assaulted: and that loste, maketh to bee loste after, all the Fortresse. For insample there is freshe in remembraunce, the losse of the Fortresse of Furly, when Catherin the Countesse defended it againste Cesar Borgia, sonne to Pope Alexander the vi. who had conducted thether the armie of the king of Fraunce: thesame Fortresse, was al full of places, to retire out of one into an other: for that there was firste the kepe, from the same to the Fortresse, was a diche after soche sorte, that thei passed over it by a draw bridge: the fortresse was devided into three partes, and every parte was devided from the other with diches, and with water, and by Bridges, thei passed from the one place to the other: wherefore the Duke battered with his artillerie, one of the partes of the fortresse, and opened part of the walle: For whiche cause Maister Jhon Casale, whiche was appoincted to that Warde, thought not good to defende that breache, but abandoned it for to retire hymself into the other places: so that the Dukes men having entered into that parte without incounter, in a sodaine thei gotte it all: For that the Dukes menne became lordes of the bridges, whiche went from one place to an other. Thei loste then this Fortresse, whiche was thought invinsible, through two defaultes, the one for havyng so many retiryng places, the other, bicause every retiryng place, was not Lorde of the bridge thereof. Therefore, the naughtie builded Fortresse, and the little wisedome of them that defended it, caused shame to the noble enterprise of the countesse, whoe had thought to have abidden an armie, whiche neither the kyng of Naples, nor the Duke of Milaine would have abidden: and although {209} his inforcementes had no good ende, yet notwithstandyng he gotte that honoure, whiche his valiauntnesse had deserved: The whiche was testified of many Epigrammes, made in those daies in his praise. Therefore, if I should have to builde a Fortresse, I would make the walles strong, and the diches in the maner as we have reasoned, nor I would not make therein other, then houses to inhabite, and those I would make weake and lowe, after soche sorte that thei should not let him that should stande in the middest of the Market place, the sight of all the walle, to the intente that the Capitain might see with the iye, where he maie succour: and that every manne should understande, that the walle and the diche beyng lost, the fortresse were lost. And yet when I should make any retiryng places, I would make the bridges devided in soche wise, that every parte should be Lorde of the bridges of his side, ordainyng, that thei should fall upon postes, in the middest of the diche.

The fortresses should be built with ditches and walls designed to be equally hard to conquer. I strongly advise anyone defending a city not to create any bastions that are too close to the city walls. Additionally, builders of the fortress should avoid making any safe retreat areas, where someone inside can fall back if the first wall is breached. The reason for my first piece of advice is that no one should create something that might force them to lose their reputation, as this loss diminishes the value of their other accomplishments and frightens those who took on their defense. This situation often happens when bastions are built outside the city needing protection, because they can easily be lost nowadays, being defenseless against artillery. Losing them can lead to the beginning of one’s ruin. For example, when Genoa revolted against King Louis of France, it built certain bastions on the surrounding hills, and as soon as those were lost, which was swift, the city also fell. Regarding the second piece of advice, I assert that nothing is more dangerous for a fortress than having such retreat spaces. The hope that people place in these locations makes them neglect overall defense when it’s under attack, leading to the entire fortress being lost once that outer defense is breached. A clear reminder is the fall of the fortress of Furly when Countess Catherine defended it against Cesare Borgia, the son of Pope Alexander VI, who had brought the army of the King of France there. This fortress had many areas to retreat from one to another. The path from the keep to the fortress was designed with a ditch crossed by a drawbridge. The fortress was divided into three sections, each separated by ditches and water, allowing passage between them via bridges. Consequently, the Duke used his artillery to breach one part of the fortress and opened a section of the wall. Because of this, Master John Casale, who was in charge of that defense, deemed it imprudent to defend that breach and instead retreated to the other areas. As a result, the Duke's men entered that part without opposition, quickly taking control. The Duke’s forces became the masters of the bridges connecting the sections. Thus, they lost what was thought to be an invincible fortress due to two mistakes: having so many retreat locations and not having each retreat area under control of its own bridge. Therefore, the poorly constructed fortress and the lack of wisdom from those defending it brought shame on Countess Catherine’s honorable endeavor, who had hoped to withstand an army that neither the King of Naples nor the Duke of Milan would have endured. Even though her forces did not succeed, he earned the honor that his bravery deserved, which was evidenced by many epigrams written in those days praising him. If I were to build a fortress, I would make the walls strong and the ditches as previously discussed. I wouldn’t include anything but living quarters, which I would make weak and low so that someone in the middle of the marketplace could see the entire wall. This way, the captain could observe where to assist, and everyone would understand that if the wall and ditch were lost, the fortress would be lost as well. And if I created any retreat areas, I would design the bridges so that each section would control the bridges on its side, ensuring they would fall onto posts in the middle of the ditch.

BAPTISTE. You have saied that littel thynges now a daies can not bee defended, and it seemed unto me to have understoode the contrarie, that the lesser that a thyng wer, the better it might be defended.

BAPTISTE. You said that little things can't be defended nowadays, and it seemed to me that I understood the opposite—that the smaller something is, the easier it can be defended.

The fortifiyng of the entrance of a Toune.

The strengthening of the entrance of a town.

FABRICIO. You have not understoode well, because that place cannot be now a daies called stronge, wher he that defendeth it, hath not space to retire with new diches, and with new fortificacions, for that the force of the ordinance is so much, that he that trusteth uppon the warde of one wall and of one fortification only, is deceived: and because the Bulwarkes (mindyng that they passe not their ordinarie measure, for that then they shoulde be townes and Castels) be not made, in suche wise that men maie have space within them to retire, thei are loste straight waie. Therefore it is wisdom to let alone those Bulwarkes without, and to fortifie thenterance of the toune, and to kever the gates of the same with turnyngs after suche sort, that men cannot goe in nor oute of the gate by right line: and from the tournynges to the gate, to make a diche with a bridge. Also they fortifie the gate, with a Percullis, for to bee abell {210} to put therin their menne, when they be issued out to faight, and hapnyng that the enemies pursue them, to avoide, that in the mingelynge together, they enter not in with them: and therfore these be used, the which the antiquitie called Cattarratte, the whiche beyng let fall, exclude thenemies, and save the freendes, for that in suche a case, men can do no good neither by bridges nor by a gate, the one and the other beynge ocupied with prease of menne.

FABRICIO. You haven't understood well, because that place can't be called strong nowadays, where the defender doesn't have the room to retreat with new trenches and fortifications. The power of the artillery is so great that anyone who relies only on one wall and one fortification is mistaken. Since the bulwarks (not made to exceed their usual size, otherwise they'd be towns and castles) aren't designed to allow space for retreat within them, they become immediately lost. Therefore, it's wise to leave those outer bulwarks alone and to reinforce the entrance of the town, making sure to design the gates in such a way that people can't enter or exit in a straight line. From the turns leading to the gate, a trench with a bridge should be made. They also fortify the gate with a portcullis to be able to place their men there when they go out to fight, and if the enemies pursue them, to prevent them from mixing together and entering with them. This is why they use what antiquity called a catarract, which, when dropped, keeps the enemies out and protects the friends, as in such a situation, people can't do any good with either bridges or gates, since both would be crowded with people.

BAPTISTE. I have seene these Perculleses that you speake of, made in Almayne of littell quarters of woodde after the facion of a grate of Iron, and these percullises of ouers, be made of plankes all massive: I woulde desire to understande whereof groweth this difference, and which be the strongest.

BAPTISTE. I have seen these defenses you mentioned, made in Germany with small wooden sections designed like an iron grate, and these defenses of ours are made from solid planks. I'd like to understand why there is this difference and which one is stronger.

Battelments ought to be large and thicke and the flanckers large within.

Battlements should be wide and thick, and the flanks should be spacious inside.

FABRICIO. I tell you agayne, that the manners and orders of the warre, throughe oute all the worlde, in respecte to those of the antiquitie, be extinguesshed, and in Italye they bee altogether loste, for if there bee a thing somewhat stronger then the ordinarye, it groweth of the insample of other countries. You mighte have understoode and these other may remember, with howe muche debilitie before, that king Charles of Fraunce in the yere of our salvation a thousande CCCC. xciiii. had passed into Italie, they made the batelmentes not halfe a yarde thicke, the loopes, and the flanckers were made with a litle opening without, and muche within, and with manye other faultes whiche not to be tedious I will let passe: for that easely from thinne battelments the defence is taken awaye, the flanckers builded in the same maner, moste easylye are opened: Nowe of the Frenchemen is learned to make the battelment large and thicke, and the flanckers to bee large on the parte within, and to drawe together in the middeste of the wall, and then agayn to waxe wider unto the uttermost parte without: this maketh that the ordinaunce hardlye can take away the defence. Therfore the Frenchmen have, manye other devises like these, the whiche because they have not beene seene of our men, they have not beene considered. Among whiche, is this kinde of {211} perculles made like unto a grate, the which is a greate deale better then oures: for that if you have for defence of a gate a massive parculles as oures, letting it fall, you shutte in your menne, and you can not though the same hurte the enemie, so that hee with axes, and with fire, maye breake it downe safely: but if it bee made like a grate, you maye, it being let downe, through those holes and through those open places, defende it with Pikes, with crosbowes, and with all other kinde of weapons.

FABRICIO. I'm telling you again that the strategies and practices of war around the world, compared to those of ancient times, have faded away, and in Italy, they've completely vanished. If there's anything a bit more effective than usual, it’s based on examples from other countries. You might remember, and others may recall, how weak it was before when King Charles of France came into Italy in the year 1494. They built the battlements less than half a yard thick; the loops and flanks were poorly designed with small openings on the outside and much larger ones inside, along with many other faults that I won’t go into to avoid being tedious. The thin battlements easily lose their defensive capability, and flanks built in the same way can be easily breached. Now, the French have learned to build battlements that are wide and thick, with larger flanks on the inside that taper in the middle of the wall and then widen towards the outer edge. This makes it difficult for artillery to undermine the defense. Therefore, the French have many other strategies like these that haven’t been seen or considered by our people. Among those is this kind of {211} grate-like barriers, which are much better than ours. If you have a solid barrier for the defense of a gate like ours, lowering it traps your men inside, and you can’t harm the enemy with it, allowing them to safely break it down with axes and fire. But if it’s made like a grate, when you lower it, you can defend it through those holes and openings with pikes, crossbows, and all other kinds of weapons.

BAPTISTE. I have seene in Italye an other use after the outelandishe fashion, and this is, to make the carriage of the artillery with the spokes of the wheele crooked towardes the Axeltree. I woulde knowe why they make them so: seeming unto mee that they bee stronger when they are made straighte as those of oure wheeles.

BAPTISTE. I've seen a different practice in Italy, following a foreign style, where they design the artillery wheels with the spokes angled towards the axle. I'd like to know why they make them this way, since it seems to me that they would be stronger if made straight, like our wheels.

Neither the ditche, wall tillage, nor any kinde of edificacion, ought to be within a mile of a toune of warre.

Neither the ditch, wall tillage, nor any kind of building should be within a mile of a war town.

FABRICIO. Never beleeve that the thinges that differ from the ordinarie wayes, be made by chaunce: and if you shoulde beleeve that they make them so, to shewe fayrer, you are deceaved: because where strength is necessarie, there is made no counte of fayrenesse: but all groweth, for that they be muche surer and muche stronger then ours. The reason is this: the carte when it is laden, either goeth even, or leaning upon the righte, or upon the lefte side: when it goeth even, the wheeles equally sustayne the wayght, the which being equallye devided betweene them, doth not burden much, but leaning, it commeth to have all the paise of the cariage on the backe of that wheele upon the which it leaneth. If the spokes of the same be straight they wil soone breake: for that the wheele leaning, the spokes come also to leane, and not to sustaine the paise by the straightnesse of them, and so when the carte goeth even, and when they are least burdened, they come to bee strongest: when the Carte goeth awrye, and that they come to have moste paise, they bee weakest. Even the contrarie happeneth to the crooked spokes of the Frenche Cartes, for that when the carte leaning upon one side poincteth uppon them, because they bee ordinary crooked, they come then to bee straight, and to be able to sustayne {212} strongly al the payse, where when the carte goeth even, and that they bee crooked, they sustayne it halfe: but let us tourne to our citie and Fortresse. The Frenchemen use also for more safegarde of the gates of their townes, and for to bee able in sieges more easylye to convey and set oute men of them, besides the sayde thinges, an other devise, of which I have not seene yet in Italye anye insample: and this is, where they rayse on the oute side from the ende of the drawe bridge twoo postes, and upon either of them they joigne a beame, in suche wise that the one halfe of them comes over the bridge, the other halfe with oute: then all the same parte that commeth withoute, they joygne together with small quarters of woodde, the whiche they set thicke from one beame to an other like unto a grate, and on the parte within, they fasten to the ende of either of the beames a chaine: then when they will shutte the bridge on the oute side, they slacke the chaines, and let downe all the same parte like unto a grate, the whiche comming downe, shuttethe the bridge, and when they will open it, they drawe the chaines, and the same commeth to rise up, and they maye raise it up so much that a man may passe under it, and not a horse, and so much that there maye passe horse and man, and shutte it againe at ones, for that it falleth and riseth as a window of a battelment. This devise is more sure than the Parculles, because hardely it maye be of the enemye lette in such wise, that it fall not downe, falling not by a righte line as the Parculles, which easely may be underpropped. Therfore they which will make a citie oughte to cause to be ordained all the saide things: and moreover aboute the walle, there woulde not bee suffered any grounde to be tilled, within a myle thereof, nor any wall made, but shoulde be all champaine, where should be neither ditch nor banck, neither tree nor house, which might let the fighte, and make defence for the enemie that incampeth.

FABRICIO. Never believe that things which are different from the usual ways happen by chance; and if you think they do this to appear more attractive, you are mistaken: because when strength is necessary, beauty doesn't matter. Everything grows strong because they're much more reliable and tougher than ours. The reason is this: when a cart is loaded, it either goes straight, or tilts to one side. When it goes straight, the wheels bear the weight equally, which means the load is not too heavy. But when tilted, all the weight rests on the wheel that's bearing the burden. If the spokes of that wheel are straight, they will soon break; because as the wheel tilts, the spokes also lean and can't support the weight by their straightness. So, when the cart moves evenly and is least burdened, the spokes are strongest. When the cart is off balance and has the most weight, they are weakest. The opposite happens with the crooked spokes of French carts; when the cart tilts to one side, the crooked spokes effectively straighten themselves and can handle the load well. However, when the cart is straight, the crooked spokes only partially support the load. Now, let’s turn to our city and fortress. The French also use another design for added security at the gates of their towns, which allows them to more easily send out soldiers during sieges—something I've yet to see replicated in Italy. This design involves raising two posts outside from the end of the drawbridge, and connecting a beam to each one so that one half extends over the bridge and the other half extends outwards. They then connect the outward-facing part with small wooden slats arranged thickly like a grate. On the inside, they attach a chain to the end of each beam. When they want to close the bridge on the outside, they loosen the chains, allowing the outward section to drop down like a grate. This closing mechanism seals the bridge, and when they want to open it, they pull the chains, causing the grate to rise. They can lift it just high enough for a person to pass under but not a horse, or high enough for both horse and rider to go through, then shut it quickly, as it falls and rises like a window in a battlement. This mechanism is better than a palisade because it's difficult for the enemy to bring it down since it doesn’t fall in a straight line like a palisade, which can easily be propped up. Therefore, anyone who wants to build a city should ensure all these elements are arranged; furthermore, there should not be any land cultivated within a mile of the walls, nor any structures built, ensuring the area is completely open, free from ditches, banks, trees, or houses that could provide cover for the enemy encamped nearby.

Noote; The provision that is meete to be made for the defence of a toune.

Note: The arrangement that should be made for the defense of a town.

And noote, that a Towne, whiche hathe the ditches withoute, with the banckes higher then the grounde, is moste weake: for as muche as they make defence to the enemye {213} which assaulteth thee, and letteth him not hurte thee, because easely they may be opened, and geve place to his artillerye: but let us passe into the Towne. I will not loose so muche time in shewing you howe that besides the foresayde thinges, it is requisite to have provision of victualles, and wherewith to fight, for that they be thinges that everye man underdeth, and without them, all other provision is vaine: and generally twoo thinges oughte to be done, to provide and to take the commoditie from the enemie that he availe not by the things of thy countrey: therfore the straw, the beastes, the graine, whiche thou canste not receive into house, ought to be destroied. Also he that defendeth a Towne, oughte to provide that nothing bee done tumultuouslye and disordinatelye, and to take suche order, that in all accidentes everye man maye knowe what he hath to doo.

And note that a town with ditches outside and banks higher than the ground is the weakest. This is because they provide defense against the enemy attacking you and prevent them from causing harm, but they can easily be breached and allow access to their artillery. Now, let’s move into the town. I won’t waste time explaining that, aside from the aforementioned things, it's essential to stock up on provisions and supplies for fighting, as these are understood by everyone, and without them, all other preparations are pointless. Generally, two things should be done: provide for yourself and deny the enemy access to the resources of your land. Therefore, any straw, animals, or grain that you cannot store should be destroyed. Additionally, anyone defending a town should ensure that nothing is done chaotically or disorganized and should make arrangements so that in any situation, everyone knows what they need to do.

What incoragethe the enemy most that besiegeth a toune; What he that besiegeth and he that defendeth oughte to doo; Advertisementes for a besieged towne; Howe the Romaines vitaled Casalino besieged of Aniball; A policie for the besieged.

What encourages the enemy the most that is besieging a town; what the besieger and the defender should do; advice for a besieged town; how the Romans supplied Casalino when besieged by Hannibal; a strategy for the besieged.

The order that oughte to be taken is thus, that the women, the olde folkes, the children, and the impotent, be made to keepe within doores, that the Towne maye be left free, to yong and lustie men, whom being armed, must be destributed for the defence of the same, appointing part of them to the wall, parte to the gates, parte to the principall places of the Citie, for to remedie those inconveniences, that might growe within: an other parte must not be bound to any place, but be ready to succour all, neede requiring: and the thing beeing ordained thus, with difficultie tumulte can growe, whiche maye disorder thee. Also I will that you note this, in the besieging and defending of a Citie, that nothing geveth so muche hoope to the adversarye to be able to winne a towne, as when he knoweth that the same is not accustomed to see the enemie: for that many times for feare onely without other experience of force, cities have bene loste: Therefore a man oughte, when he assaulteth a like Citie, to make all his ostentacions terrible. On the other parte he that is assaulted, oughte to appoincte to the same parte, whiche the enemie fighteth againste, strong men and suche as opinion makethe not afraide, but weapons onely: for that if the first proofe turne vaine, it {214} increaseth boldenesse to the besieged, and then the enemie is constrained to overcome them within, with vertue and reputacion. The instrumentes wherwith the antiquitie defended townes, where manie: as balistes, onagris, scorpions, Arcubalistes, Fustibals, Slinges: and also those were manie with which thei gave assaultes. As Arrieti, Towers, Musculi Plutei, Viney, Falci, testudeni, in steede of which thynges be now a daies the ordinance, the whiche serve him that bessegeth, and him that defendeth: and therfore I will speake no forther of theim: But let us retourne to our reasonyng and let us come to particular offences. They ought to have care not to be taken by famine, and not to be overcome through assaultes: concernyng famin, it hath ben tolde, that it is requiset before the siege come, to be well provided of vitualles. But when a towne throughe longe siege, lacketh victuals, some times hath ben seen used certaine extraordinarie waies to be provided of their friendes, whome woulde save them: inespeciall if through the middest of the besieged Citie there runne a river, as the Romaines vittelled their castell called Casalino besieged of Anibal, whom being not able by the river to sende them other victual then Nuttes, wherof castyng in the same great quantitie, the which carried of the river, without beyng abel to be letted, fedde longe time the Casalinians. Some besieged, for to shew unto the enemie, that they have graine more then inough and for to make him to dispaire, that he cannot, by famin overcome theim, have caste breade oute of the gates, or geven a Bullocke graine to eate, and after have suffered the same to be taken, to the intent that kilde and founde full of graine, might shewe that aboundance, whiche they had not. On the other parte excellent Capitaines have used sundrie waies to werie the enemie.

The order that should be followed is this: the women, the elderly, the children, and the disabled should stay indoors, so that the town can be left clear for young, strong men who, when armed, must be distributed for its defense. Some should be assigned to the walls, some to the gates, and some to the key areas of the city to manage any issues that may arise inside. Another group shouldn't be tied to any specific place but should be ready to assist anyone in need. By organizing things this way, it’s hard for turmoil to break out, which could put you in disorder. Also, note this regarding the siege and defense of a city: nothing gives hope to the enemy of being able to conquer a town as much as knowing that the town isn't used to seeing the enemy. Many cities have fallen out of fear alone, without any real confrontation. Therefore, when attacking such a city, one should make all displays intimidating. On the other hand, those being attacked should assign strong men to the area the enemy is attacking, particularly those who aren’t easily frightened by reputation but only by weapons. If the first attempt proves unsuccessful, it boosts the courage of the defenders, forcing the enemy to defeat them through strength and reputation. The tools from ancient times used to defend towns were many, such as ballistae, onagers, scorpions, crossbows, and slings, as well as various instruments used for assaults, like towers and siege engines. Nowadays, the artillery serves both the besieger and the defender; thus, I won’t go into detail about them. But let’s return to our reasoning and discuss specific offenses. They should be careful not to be taken by famine or overcome by assaults. Regarding famine, it's been said that it’s essential to be well-stocked with food before a siege begins. However, when a town runs low on supplies due to a prolonged siege, extraordinary measures have sometimes been used to obtain aid from friends who would save them. Particularly if there's a river running through the besieged city, like how the Romans supplied their fortress called Casalino, besieged by Hannibal, who could only send nuts down the river. These nuts were thrown into the river in large quantities, which carried them along, feeding the Casalinians for a long time. Some defenders, to show the enemy that they have plenty of grain and to make them despair of overcoming them by famine, have thrown bread out of the gates or given a bull grain to eat, only to allow it to be taken so that when it was killed, it would appear full of grain, suggesting an abundance that they didn’t actually have. On the other hand, excellent commanders have used various tactics to wear down the enemy.

A policie of Fabius in besieging of a toune; A policie of Dionisius in besiegynge of a toune.

A strategy of Fabius in besieging a town; A strategy of Dionysius in besieging a town.

Fabius suffered them whome he besieged, to sowe their fieldes, to the entente that thei should lacke the same corne, whiche they sowed.

Fabius let those he was besieging plant their fields, so that they would eventually lack the very grain they sowed.

Dionisius beynge in Campe at Regio, fained to minde to make an agreement with them, and duryng the practise {215} therof he caused him selfe to be provided of their victuales, and then when he had by this mean got from them their graine, he kepte them straight and famished them.

Dionisius, being in camp at Regio, pretended to want to reach an agreement with them, and during the negotiations {215} he arranged to get supplies from them. Then, once he had obtained their grain, he cut them off and left them starving.

Howe Alexander wanne Leucadia.

Howe Alexander wants Leucadia.

Alexander Magnus mindyng to winne Leucadia overcame all the Castels aboute it, and by that means drivyng into the same citie a great multitude of their owne countrie men, famished them.

Alexander the Great, wanting to conquer Leucadia, took control of all the surrounding castles, and by doing so, he forced a large number of their own countrymen into the city, starving them.

The besieged ought to take heed of the first brunte; The remedie that townes men have, when the enemies ar entred into the towne; How to make the townes men yeelde.

The people under siege should pay attention to the first attack; The solution that townspeople have when the enemies have entered the town; How to make the townspeople surrender.

Concernynge the assaultes, there hath been tolde that chiefely thei ought to beware of the firste bronte, with whiche the Romaines gotte often times manie townes, assaultyng them sodainly, and on every side: and thei called it Aggredi urbem corona. As Scipio did, when he wanne newe Carthage in Hispayne: the which brunte if of a towne it be withstoode, with difficultie after will bee overcome: and yet thoughe it should happen that the enemie were entred into the citie, by overcomynge the wall, yet the townes men have some remedie, so thei forsake it not: for as much as manie armies through entring into a toune, have ben repulced or slaine: the remedie is, that the townes men doe keepe them selves in highe places, and from the houses, and from the towers to faight with them: the whiche thynge, they that have entered into the citie, have devised to overcome in twoo manners: the one with openyng the gates of the citie, and to make the waie for the townes men, that thei might safely flie: the other with sendynge foorthe a proclamacion, that signifieth, that none shall be hurte but the armed, and to them that caste their weapons on the grounde, pardon shall be graunted: the whiche thynge hath made easie the victorie of manie cities.

Regarding the assaults, it has been said that primarily they should watch out for the initial attack, with which the Romans often captured many towns, assaulting them suddenly from all sides: they called it Aggredi urbem corona. Like Scipio did when he conquered New Carthage in Hispania. If the town withstands that assault, it will be difficult to overcome later: and even if the enemy manages to enter the city by breaching the wall, the townspeople still have some recourse, as long as they don’t abandon it. Many armies have been repulsed or killed after entering a town. The solution is for the townspeople to hold their ground in high places, fighting from their homes and towers. Those who have entered the city have devised two ways to overcome that: one by opening the city gates to allow townspeople an escape route, and the other by issuing a proclamation stating that no one will be harmed except the armed, and those who throw down their weapons will be granted mercy. This tactic has often made the victory over many cities easier.

How townes or cities are easelie wonne; How duke Valentine got the citie of Urbine; The besieged ought to take heede of the deciptes and policies of the enemie; How Domitio Calvino wan a towne.

How towns or cities are easily taken; How Duke Valentine captured the city of Urbino; The besieged should be wary of the deceptions and strategies of the enemy; How Domizio Calvino conquered a town.

Besides this, the Citees are easie to bee wonne, if thou come upon them unawares: whiche is dooen beyng with thy armie farre of, after soche sort, that it be not beleved, either that thou wilte assaulte theim, or that thou canst dooe it, without commyng openly, bicause of the distance of the place: wherefore, if thou secretely and spedely assaulte theim, almoste alwaies it shall followe, that thou shalte gette the victorie. I reason unwillingly of the thynges succeded in our tyme, for that to me and to mine, it {216} should be a burthen, and to reason of other, I cannot tel what to saie: notwithstanding, I cannot to this purpose but declare, the insample of Cesar Borgia, called duke Valentine, who beyng at Nocera with his menne, under colour of goyng to besiege Camerino, tourned towardes the state of Urbin, and gotte a state in a daie, and without any paine, the whiche an other with moche time and cost, should scante have gotten. It is conveniente also to those, that be besieged, to take heede of the deceiptes, and of the policies of the enemie, and therefore the besieged ought not to truste to any thyng, whiche thei see the enemie dooe continually, but let theim beleve alwaies, that it is under deceipte, and that he can to their hurte varie it. Domitio Calvino besiegyng a toune, used for a custome to compasse aboute every daie, with a good parte of his menne, the wall of the same: whereby the Tounes menne, belevyng that he did it for exercise, slacked the Ward: whereof Domicius beyng aware, assaulted and overcame them.

Besides this, the townspeople are easy to catch off guard if you approach them unexpectedly: this can be done by having your army far away in such a way that they do not believe you intend to attack or that you can do it without coming openly due to the distance. Therefore, if you secretly and quickly attack them, you will almost always achieve victory. I reluctantly mention events from our time, as it feels burdensome to me and mine, and when it comes to discussing others, I'm not sure what to say. Nonetheless, I must point out the example of Cesare Borgia, known as Duke Valentino, who, while at Nocera with his troops under the pretense of besieging Camerino, instead turned towards the state of Urbino, capturing a territory in just a day and without much effort, which another would have barely gained with significant time and expense. It is also advisable for those who are besieged to be wary of the enemy's tricks and strategies; therefore, the besieged should never trust anything they see the enemy doing continuously but should always believe it is a deception and that the enemy can change tactics to their detriment. Domitius Calvinus, while besieging a town, had a custom of circling around the walls every day with a good part of his men. The townsmen, believing he was doing it for practice, became lax in their guard, which Domitius noticed and seized the opportunity to attack and defeat them.

A policie to get a towne.

A plan to acquire a town.

Certaine Capitaines understandyng, that there should come aide to the besieged, have apareled their Souldiours, under the Ansigne of those, that should come, and beyng let in, have gotte the Toune.

Certain captains, realizing that help was on the way for those under siege, equipped their soldiers under the banner of those who were coming, and once let in, they took the town.

How Simon of Athens wan a towne; A policie to get a towne; How Scipio gotte certaine castels in Afrike.

How Simon of Athens was a town; A plan to get a town; How Scipio captured certain castles in Africa.

Simon of Athens set fire in a night on a Temple, whiche was out of the toune, wherefore, the tounes menne goyng to succour it, lefte the toune in praie to the enemie. Some have slaine those, whiche from the besieged Castle, have gone a foragyng, and have appareled their souldiours, with the apparell of the forragers, whom after have gotte the toune. The aunciente Capitaines, have also used divers waies, to destroie the Garison of the Toune, whiche thei have sought to take. Scipio beyng in Africa, and desiring to gette certaine Castles, in whiche were putte the Garrisons of Carthage, he made many tymes, as though he would assaulte theim, albeit, he fained after, not onely to abstaine, but to goe awaie from them for feare: the whiche Aniball belevyng to bee true, for to pursue hym with greater force, and for to bee able more easely to oppresse him, drewe out {217} all the garrisons of theim: The whiche Scipio knowyng, sente Massinissa his Capitaine to overcome them.

Simon of Athens set fire one night to a temple outside the town, which caused the townspeople to leave the town vulnerable to the enemy as they rushed to help. Some have killed those who went out foraging from the besieged castle and then dressed their soldiers in the foragers' clothes, which allowed them to take the town. The ancient commanders also used various tactics to destroy the garrison of the town they were trying to capture. While in Africa, Scipio wanted to seize certain castles that held Carthaginian garrisons. He often pretended he planned to assault them but then acted as if he was retreating out of fear. Hannibal, believing this to be true, pursued him with greater force to be able to overwhelm him more easily and pulled all their garrisons out. Scipio, aware of this, sent his captain Massinissa to defeat them.

Howe Pirrus wan the chiefe Citie of Sclavonie; A policie to get a towne; How the beseiged are made to yelde; Howe to get a towne by treason; A policie of Aniball for the betraiyng of a Castell; How the besieged maie be begiled; How Formion overcame the Calcidensians; What the besieged muste take heede of; Liberalitie maketh enemies frendes; The diligence that the besieged ought to use in their watche and ward.

Howe Pirrus was the main city of Sclavonia; A strategy for taking a town; How the besieged are forced to surrender; How to capture a town through betrayal; A strategy of Hannibal for the betrayal of a castle; How the besieged can be deceived; How Formion defeated the Calcidensians; What the besieged should be careful of; Generosity turns enemies into friends; The vigilance that the besieged should maintain in their watch and guard.

Pirrus makyng warre in Sclavonie, to the chiefe citee of the same countrie, where were brought many menne in Garrison, fained to dispaire to bee able to winne it, and tourning to other places, made that the same for to succour them, emptied it self of the warde, and became easie to bee wonne. Many have corrupted the water, and have tourned the rivers an other waie to take Tounes. Also the besieged, are easely made to yelde them selves, makyng theim afraied, with signifiyng unto them a victorie gotten, or with new aides, whiche come in their disfavour. The old Capitaines have sought to gette Tounes by treason, corruptyng some within, but thei have used divers meanes. Sum have sente a manne of theirs, whiche under the name of a fugetive, might take aucthoritie and truste with the enemies, who after have used it to their profite. Some by this meanes, have understode the maner of the watche, and by meanes of the same knowledge, have taken the Toune. Some with a Carte, or with Beames under some colour, have letted the gate, that it could not bee shutte, and with this waie, made the entrie easie to the enemie. Aniball perswaded one, to give him a castle of the Romaines, and that he should fain to go a huntyng in the night, makyng as though he could not goe by daie, for feare of the enemies, and tournyng after with the Venison, should put in with hym certaine of his menne, and so killyng the watchmen, should give hym the gate. Also the besieged are beguiled, with drawyng them out of the Toune, and goyng awaie from them, faining to flie when thei assault thee. And many (emong whom was Anibal) have for no other intente, let their Campe to be taken, but to have occasion to get betwene theim and home, and to take their Toune. Also, thei are beguiled with fainyng to departe from them, as Formion of Athens did, who havyng spoiled the countrie of the Calcidensians, received after their ambassadours, fillyng their Citee with faire promises, and hope of safetie, under the which as simple menne, thei were a little after of Formione {218} oppressed. The besieged ought to beware of the men, whiche thei have in suspecte emong them: but some times thei are wont, as well to assure them selves with deserte, as with punishemente. Marcellus knoweyng how Lucius Bancius a Nolane, was tourned to favour Aniball so moche humanitie and liberalitie, he used towardes him, that of an enemie, he made him moste frendely. The besieged ought to use more diligence in the warde, when the enemie is gone from theim, then when he is at hande. And thei ought to warde those places, whiche thei thinke, that maie bee hurt least: for that many tounes have been loste, when thenemie assaulteth it on thesame part, where thei beleve not possible to be assaulted. And this deceipt groweth of twoo causes, either for the place being strong, and to beleve, that it is invinsible, or through craft beyng used of the enemie, in assaltyng theim on one side with fained alaroms, and on the other without noise, and with verie assaltes in deede: and therefore the besieged, ought to have greate advertisment, and above all thynges at all times, and in especially in the night to make good watche to bee kepte on the walles, and not onely to appoincte menne, but Dogges, and soche fiearse Mastives, and lively, the whiche by their sente maie descrie the enemie, and with barkyng discover him: and not Dogges onely, but Geese have ben seen to have saved a citee, as it happened to Roome, when the Frenchemen besieged the Capitoll.

Pirrus was waging war in Slavonia, targeting the main city of that region, where many troops were stationed. He pretended to despair about capturing it, and by shifting his focus elsewhere, he caused the garrison there to empty out and made it easier to conquer. Many have poisoned the water and redirected the rivers to capture towns. The besieged can easily be convinced to surrender by instilling fear through news of a victory or new reinforcements arriving to help the attackers. Experienced commanders have tried to take towns through betrayal by corrupting some inside, using various tactics. Some sent a man disguised as a defector to gain the trust of the enemy, which they later exploited for their advantage. This allowed them to learn about the guard's routines and, using that knowledge, seize the town. Others, under a pretense, blocked the gates with carts or beams so they couldn't be closed, facilitating the enemy's entry. Anibal convinced someone to give him a Roman fortress by claiming he needed to hunt at night to avoid enemy detection, and while returning with the game, he let in some of his men to kill the guards and take control of the gate. The besieged are also deceived into going outside the town, feigning flight during an assault. Many, including Anibal, have pretended to abandon their camp just to create opportunities to attack their enemies and capture towns. They're tricked by feigning retreat, like Formion of Athens, who, after raiding the territory of the Calcidensians, welcomed their ambassadors with empty promises of safety, only to later oppress them. The besieged should be cautious of those they suspect among their ranks, yet sometimes they try to secure their loyalty through rewards as well as punishments. Knowing how Lucius Bancius, a man from Nola, turned to Anibal’s side, he used such kindness and generosity that he transformed him from an enemy to a close friend. The besieged should be especially vigilant with their defenses when the enemy is absent rather than when they are close. They should safeguard the areas they believe are least likely to be attacked because many towns have fallen when the enemy struck where the defenders thought they were safe. This deception arises from two reasons: either because the location seems strong and thus believed to be invincible, or because the enemy uses deception, attacking one side with fake alarms while launching a real assault from another. Therefore, those under siege should be very alert, especially at night, making sure to keep watch on the walls, not only by assigning men but also by having dogs—fierce mastiffs that can scent the enemy and bark to alert the defenders. Not just dogs, but even geese have been known to save a city, as it happened in Rome when the French besieged the Capitol.

An order of Alcibiades for the dew keping of watch and warde.

An order from Alcibiades for the management of watch and ward.

Alcibiades for to see, whether the warde watched, Athense beeyng besieged of the Spartaines, ordained that when in the night, he should lifte up a light, all the ward should lift up likewise, constitutyng punishmente to hym that observed it not.

Alcibiades wanted to check whether the guard was alert while Athens was under siege by the Spartans. He arranged that when he raised a light at night, the entire guard should do the same, establishing a punishment for anyone who failed to follow this order.

The secrete conveighyng of Letters; The defence against a breach; How the antiquitie got tounes by muining under grounde.

The secret conveying of letters; the defense against a breach; how the ancients captured towns by mining underground.

Isicrates of Athens killed a watchman, which slept, saiyng that he lefte him as he found him. Those that have been besieged, have used divers meanes, to sende advise to their frendes: and mindyng not to send their message by mouth, thei have written letters in Cifers, and hidden them in sundrie wise: the Cifers be according, as pleaseth him that ordaineth them, the maner of hidyng them is divers. Some {219} have written within the scaberde of a sweard: Other have put the Letters in an unbaked lofe, and after have baked the same, and given it for meate to hym that caried theim. Certaine have hidden them, in the secreteste place of their bodies: other have hidden them in the collor of a Dogge, that is familiare with hym, whiche carrieth theim: Some have written in a letter ordinarie thinges, and after betwene thone line and thother, have also written with water, that wetyng it or warming it after, the letters should appere. This waie hath been moste politikely observed in our time: where some myndyng to signifie to their freendes inhabityng within a towne, thinges to be kept secret, and mindynge not to truste any person, have sente common matters written, accordyng to the common use and enterlined it, as I have saied above, and the same have made to be hanged on the gates of the Temples, the whiche by countersignes beyng knowen of those, unto whome they have been sente, were taken of and redde: the whiche way is moste politique, bicause he that carrieth them maie bee beguiled, and there shall happen hym no perill. There be moste infinite other waies, whiche every manne maie by himself rede and finde: but with more facilitie, the besieged maie bee written unto, then the besieged to their frendes without, for that soche letters cannot be sent, but by one, under colour of a fugetive, that commeth out of a toune: the whiche is a daungerous and perilous thing, when thenemie is any whit craftie: But those that sende in, he that is sente, maie under many colours, goe into the Campe that besiegeth, and from thens takyng conveniente occasion, maie leape into the toune: but lette us come to speake of the present winnyng of tounes. I saie that if it happen, that thou bee besieged in thy citee, whiche is not ordained with diches within, as a little before we shewed, to mynde that thenemie shall not enter through the breach of the walle, whiche the artillerie maketh: bicause there is no remedie to lette thesame from makyng of a breache, it is therefore necessarie for thee, whileste the ordinance battereth, to caste a diche within the wall which is battered, and that it be in bredth at leaste {220} twoo and twentie yardes and a halfe, and to throwe all thesame that is digged towardes the toun, whiche maie make banke, and the diche more deper: and it is convenient for thee, to sollicitate this worke in soche wise, that when the walle falleth, the Diche maie be digged at least, fower or five yardes in depth: the whiche diche is necessarie, while it is a digging, to shutte it on every side with a slaughter house: and when the wall is so strong, that it giveth thee time to make the diche, and the slaughter houses, that battered parte, commeth to be moche stronger, then the rest of the citee: for that soche fortificacion, cometh to have the forme, of the diches which we devised within: but when the walle is weake, and that it giveth thee not tyme, to make like fortificacions, then strengthe and valiauntnesse muste bee shewed, settyng againste the enemies armed menne, with all thy force. This maner of fortificacion was observed of the Pisans, when you besieged theim, and thei might doe it, bicause thei had strong walles, whiche gave them time, the yearth beyng softe and moste meete to raise up banckes, and to make fortificacions: where if thei had lacked this commoditie, thei should have loste the toune. Therefore it shall bee alwaies prudently doen, to provide afore hand, makyng diches within the citee, and through out all the circuite thereof, as a little before wee devised: for that in this case, the enemie maie safely be taried for at laisure, the fortificacions beyng redy made. The antiquitie many tymes gotte tounes, with muinyng under ground in twoo maners, either thei made a waie under grounde secretely, whiche risse in the toune, and by thesame entered, in whiche maner the Romaines toke the citee of Veienti, or with the muinyng, thei overthrewe a walle, and made it ruinate: this laste waie is now a daies moste stronge, and maketh, that the citees placed high, be most weake, bicause thei maie better bee under muined: and puttyng after in a Cave of this Gunne pouder, whiche in a momente kindelyng, not onely ruinateth a wall, but it openeth the hilles, and utterly dissolveth the strength of them.

Isocrates of Athens killed a sleeping watchman, saying that he left him as he found him. Those who have been besieged have used various methods to send messages to their friends: not wanting to communicate verbally, they have written letters in codes and hidden them in different ways. The codes depend on the preferences of the person designing them, and the methods of hiding are diverse. Some have written inside the scabbard of a sword; others have placed the letters in an unbaked loaf and then baked it, giving the loaf to the person carrying the message. Some have hidden them in the most secret parts of their bodies; others have concealed them in the collar of a dog that is familiar to the messenger. Some have used ordinary letters, and in between the lines, they have written with water, so that by wetting or warming the paper afterward, the letters would appear. This method has been observed most cleverly in our time, where some, aiming to inform their friends living in a town about things to be kept secret and not trusting anyone else, have sent commonplace matters written according to regular practice and interlined as previously mentioned, which were then hung on the gates of the temples. By using countersigns known to the intended recipients, the letters were taken down and read. This method is very strategic because the person carrying the message can be deceived and will not face any danger. There are countless other ways one can discover on their own, but it is generally easier for the besieged to be written to than for them to send messages outside because such letters can only be sent by one person, disguised as a fugitive coming out of a town, which is a risky and dangerous move if the enemy is crafty. However, those sending messages in can approach the besieging camp under various disguises and, at the right moment, could slip back into the town. Now, let’s discuss the current methods of capturing towns. If you find yourself besieged in your city, which is not fortified with ditches inside, as I mentioned before, you should ensure that the enemy cannot enter through the breach of the wall created by artillery. Since there’s no way to prevent a breach from being made, it’s necessary for you, while the artillery is damaging the walls, to dig a ditch within the battered wall, at least twenty-two and a half yards wide, and to push all the excavated earth toward the town to create a bank and make the ditch deeper. It's important to arrange this work so that when the wall falls, the ditch is at least four or five yards deep. While digging, this ditch must be enclosed on all sides with a barricade, and when the wall is strong enough to give you time to create that ditch and the barricades, the battered part becomes much stronger than the rest of the city. This kind of fortification takes the shape of the ditches we developed inside. But if the wall is weak and you don’t have time to create similar fortifications, then strength and valor must be displayed in defending against the enemy's armed men with all your might. This method of fortification was used by the Pisans when you besieged them, and they were able to do it because they had strong walls that allowed them time, as the earth was soft and most suitable for raising banks and building fortifications; without that advantage, they would have lost the town. Therefore, it is always wise to plan ahead by creating ditches within the city and throughout its perimeter, as I mentioned earlier, so that in this case, the enemy can safely be waited out since the fortifications are already in place. In ancient times, towns were often captured by digging underground in two ways: either they secretly created a pathway underground that emerged inside the town and used that to enter, as the Romans did when they took the city of Veii, or they undermined a wall, causing it to collapse. The latter method is now the strongest and makes high-placed cities the most vulnerable since they can be undermined more easily. Additionally, placing gunpowder in a cave, which ignites in an instant, not only destroys a wall but also opens up hills and utterly dissolves their strength.

The reamedie against Caves or undermuinynges; What care the besieged ought to have; What maketh a citee or campe difficulte to bee defended; By what meanes thei that besiege ar made afraied; Honour got by constancie.

The remedy against caves or undermining; what the besieged should be concerned about; what makes a city or camp difficult to defend; how those who lay siege can be scared off; honor gained through perseverance.

The remedie for this, is to builde in the plain, and to {221} make the diche that compasseth thy citee, so deepe, that the enemie maie not digge lower then thesame, where he shall not finde water, whiche onely is enemie to the caves: for if thou be in a toune, which thou defendest on a high ground, thou canst not remedie it otherwise, then to make within thy walles many deepe Welles, the whiche be as drouners to thesame Caves, that the enemie is able to ordain against thee. An other remedie there is, to make a cave againste it, when thou shouldeste bee aware where he muineth, the whiche waie easely hindereth hym, but difficultly it is foreseen, beyng besieged of a craftie enemie. He that is besieged, ought above al thinges to have care, not to bee oppressed in the tyme of reste: as is after a battaile fought, after the watche made, whiche is in the Mornyng at breake of daie, and in the Evenyng betwen daie and night, and above al, at meale times: in whiche tyme many tounes have been wonne, and armies have been of them within ruinated: therefore it is requisite with diligence on all partes, to stande alwaies garded, and in a good part armed. I will not lacke to tell you, how that, whiche maketh a citee or a campe difficult to be defended, is to be driven to kepe sundred all the force, that thou haste in theim, for that the enemie beyng able to assaulte thee at his pleasure altogether, it is conveniente for thee on every side, to garde every place, and so he assaulteth thee with all his force, and thou with parte of thine defendest thee. Also, the besieged maie bee overcome altogether, he without cannot bee, but repulced: wherefore many, whom have been besieged, either in a Campe, or in a Toune, although thei have been inferiour of power, have issued out with their men at a sodaine, and have overcome the enemie. This Marcellus of Nola did: this did Cesar in Fraunce, where his Campe beeyng assaulted of a moste great nomber of Frenchmen, and seeyng hymself not able to defende it, beyng constrained to devide his force into many partes, and not to bee able standyng within the Listes, with violence to repulce thenemie: he opened the campe on thone side, and turning towardes thesame parte with all his {222} power, made so moche violence against them, and with moche valiantnes, that he vanquisshed and overcame them. The constancie also of the besieged, causeth many tymes displeasure, and maketh afraied them that doe besiege. Pompei beyng against Cesar, and Cesars armie beeyng in greate distresse through famine, there was brought of his bredde to Pompei, whom seyng it made of grasse, commaunded, that it should not bee shewed unto his armie, least it shoulde make them afraide, seyng what enemies they had against theim. Nothyng caused so muche honour to the Romaines in the warre of Aniball, as their constancie: for as muche as in what so ever envious, and adverse fortune thei were troubled, they never demaunded peace, thei never made anie signe of feare, but rather when Aniball was aboute Rome, thei solde those fieldes, where he had pitched his campe, dearer then ordinarie in other times shoulde have been solde: and they stoode in so much obstinacie in their enterprises, that for to defende Rome, thei would not raise their campe from Capua, the whiche in the verie same time that Roome was besieged, the Romaines did besiege.

The solution for this is to build in the plain and to {221} make the ditch that surrounds your city so deep that the enemy cannot dig lower than that point, where they won't find water, which is the only thing that threatens the caves. If you are in a town located on high ground that you need to defend, the only way to remedy it is to create many deep wells within your walls, which act as obstacles to the caves that the enemy can set up against you. Another option is to create a cave in response to their movements, but this is hard to foresee, especially when besieged by a crafty enemy. Those who are under siege must be particularly cautious not to be caught off guard during periods of rest, such as after a battle, during watch times (which occur at dawn and at dusk), and especially during mealtimes. Many towns have been taken, and armies have been ruined during these times. Therefore, it's essential to remain vigilant and well-armed at all times. I must point out that what makes a city or camp difficult to defend is the necessity to split all your forces among the various locations. If the enemy can attack you all at once, you must guard every area; when he attacks with all his might, you can only defend with a part of your forces. Additionally, the besieged can be completely overcome, while the besieging forces cannot. This is why many who have been besieged, whether in a camp or a town, despite being outmatched in strength, have charged out suddenly and defeated the enemy. Marcellus of Nola did this; so did Caesar in France, where his camp was attacked by a massive number of Frenchmen. Finding himself unable to defend it, forced to divide his forces into many parts, and unable to withstand the enemy's assault, he opened his camp on one side and charged at them with all his {222} power, fighting fiercely and valiantly enough to overcome them. The determination of those under siege often causes frustration and fear for those who are besieging. When Pompey faced Caesar and Caesar's army was in great distress due to famine, a type of bread made from grass was brought to Pompey. Upon seeing this, he ordered that it not be shown to his army, fearing it would frighten them, highlighting the enemies they faced. Nothing brought more honor to the Romans during the war with Hannibal than their resilience. No matter what envy or adversity they faced, they never sought peace nor showed any signs of fear. Instead, when Hannibal was near Rome, they sold the fields where he had pitched his camp for more than they would have under normal circumstances. They were so determined in their efforts to defend Rome that they refused to withdraw their camp from Capua, which, at the very same time Rome was besieged, they were also laying siege to.

I knowe that I have tolde you of manie thynges, the whiche by your selfe you might have understoode, and considered, notwithstandyng I have doen it (as to daie also I have tolde you) for to be abell to shewe you better by meane therof, the qualitie of this armie, and also for to satisfie those, if there be anie, whome have not had the same commoditie to understand them as you. Nor me thinkes that there resteth other to tell you, then certaine generall rules, the whiche you shal have moste familiar, which be these.

I know that I have told you many things that you could have understood and considered on your own. Still, I’ve shared them with you (as I did today) so I can better show you the nature of this army and to satisfy those who may not have had the same opportunity to understand as you have. I also think there’s nothing left to share with you except for some general rules, which you will find most familiar, and they are these.

Generall rules of warre.

General rules of war.

The same that helpeth the enemie, hurteth thee: and the same that helpeth thee, hurteth the enemie.

What helps the enemy also hurts you, and what helps you also hurts the enemy.

He that shall be in the warre moste vigilant to observe the devises of the enemie, and shall take moste payne to exercise his armie, shall incurre least perilles and maie hope moste of the victorie.

Whoever is most vigilant in the war to observe the enemy's plans and puts the most effort into training their army will face the fewest dangers and can expect the greatest chance of victory.

Never conducte thy men to faight the field, if first them hast not confirmed their mindes and knowest them to be {223} without feare, and to be in good order: for thou oughteste never to enterprise any dangerous thyng with thy souldiours, but when thou seest, that they hope to overcome.

Never lead your men into battle unless you've first made sure they're confident and ready {223} without fear, and in good shape: you should never take any risky action with your soldiers unless you see that they're hopeful of victory.

It is better to conquere the enemie with faminne, then with yron: in the victorie of which, fortune maie doe much more then valiantnesse.

It is better to defeat the enemy with famine than with iron; in that victory, fortune can do much more than bravery.

No purpose is better then that, whiche is hidde from the enemie untill thou have executed it.

No purpose is better than one that is hidden from the enemy until you have carried it out.

To know in the warre how to understande occasion, and to take it, helpeth more then anie other thynge.

To understand the situation in war and to seize the moment helps more than anything else.

Nature breedeth few stronge menne, the industrie and the exercise maketh manie.

Nature breeds few strong men; industry and effort create many.

Discipline maie doe more in warre, then furie.

Discipline does more in war than rage.

When anie departe from the enemies side for to come to serve thee, when thei be faithfull, thei shalbe unto thee alwaies great gaines: for that the power of thadversaries are more deminisshed with the losse of them, that runne awaie, then of those that be slaine, although that the name of a fugetive be to new frendes suspected, to olde odius.

When anyone leaves the enemy's side to come and serve you, if they are loyal, they will always bring you great benefits. This is because the power of the adversaries is diminished more by the loss of those who run away than by those who are killed, even though the name of a fugitive may be viewed with suspicion by new friends and hated by old ones.

Better it is in pitchyng the fielde, to reserve behynde the first front aide inoughe, then to make the fronte bigger to disperse the souldiours.

It's better to hold back enough support behind the front line in battle than to extend the front and risk scattering the soldiers.

He is difficultely overcome, whiche can know his owne power and the same of the enemie.

He is hard to defeat, who knows his own strength and that of the enemy.

The valiantenesse of the souldiours availeth more then the multitude.

The bravery of soldiers is worth more than their numbers.

Some times the situacion helpeth more then the valiantenesse.

Sometimes the situation helps more than bravery.

New and sudden thynges, make armies afrayde.

New and unexpected things make armies afraid.

Slowe and accustomed thinges, be littell regarded of them. Therfore make thy armie to practise and to know with small faightes a new enemie, before thou come to faight the fielde with him.

Slow and familiar things are often not taken seriously by them. Therefore, have your army train and become familiar with a new enemy through minor skirmishes before you engage in battle with him.

He that with disorder foloweth the enemie after that he is broken, will doe no other, then to become of a conquerour a loser.

He who chaotically pursues the enemy after being defeated will only turn from a conqueror into a loser.

He that prepareth not necessarie victualles to live upon, is overcome without yron.

He who doesn't prepare the necessary food to live on is defeated without weapons.

{224}

He that trusteth more in horsemen then in footemen, more in footemen then in horsemen, must accommodate him selfe with the situacion.

He who trusts more in cavalry than in infantry, or more in infantry than in cavalry, must adapt to the situation.

When thou wilte see if in the daie there be comen anie spie into the Campe, cause everie man to goe to his lodgynge.

When you want to see if any spies have entered the camp during the day, make sure everyone goes back to their quarters.

Chaunge purpose, when thou perceivest that the enemie hath forseene it.

Change your plans when you notice that the enemy has anticipated them.

How to consulte.

How to consult.

Consulte with many of those thinges, which thou oughtest to dooe: the same that thou wilt after dooe, conferre with fewe.

Consult with many of the things you need to do: the same things you will do later, discuss with a few.

Souldiours when thei abide at home, are mainteined with feare and punishemente, after when thei ar led to the warre with hope and with rewarde.

Solders, when they stay at home, are kept in line with fear and punishment, but when they are sent to war, it’s with hope and rewards.

Good Capitaines come never to faight the fielde, excepte necessitie constraine theim, and occasion call them.

Good captains never go into battle unless necessity forces them and the situation demands it.

Cause that thenemies know not, how thou wilte order thy armie to faight, and in what so ever maner that thou ordainest it, make that the firste bande may be received of the seconde and of the thirde.

Cause that the enemies do not know how you will organize your army to fight, and however you arrange it, ensure that the first group can be supported by the second and the third.

In the faight never occupie a battell to any other thyng, then to the same, for whiche thou haste apoineted it, if thou wilt make no disorder.

In a fight, don’t engage in a battle for anything other than what you’ve planned it for, if you want to avoid chaos.

The sodene accidentes, with difficultie are reamedied: those that are thought upon, with facilitie.

The sudden accidents are hard to fix; those that are planned for are easier to handle.

What thynges are the strength of the warre.

What things are the strength of the war?

Men, yron, money, and bread, be the strengthe of the warre, but of these fower, the first twoo be moste necessarie: because men and yron, finde money and breade: but breade and money fynde not men and yron.

Men, iron, money, and bread are the strength of war, but among these four, the first two are the most essential: because men and iron find money and bread, but bread and money do not find men and iron.

The unarmed riche man, is a bootie to the poore souldiour.

The unarmed rich man is a target for the poor soldier.

Accustome thy souldiours to dispise delicate livyng and lacivius aparell.

Accustom your soldiers to disdain luxury living and extravagant attire.

This is as muche as hapneth me generally to remember you, and I know that there might have ben saied manie other thynges in all this my reasonynge: as should be, howe and in howe manie kinde of waies the antiquitie ordered their bandes, how thei appareled them, and how in manie other thynges they exercised them, and to have joygned {225} hereunto manie other particulars, the whiche I have not judged necessarie to shew, as wel for that you your self may se them, as also for that my intente hath not been to shew juste how the olde servis of warre was apoincted, but howe in these daies a servis of warre might be ordained, whiche should have more vertue then the same that is used. Wherfore I have not thought good of the auncient thynges to reason other, then that, which I have judged to suche introduction necessarie. I know also that I might have delated more upon the service on horsebacke, and after have reasoned of the warre on the Sea: for as muche as he that destinguissheth the servis of warre, saieth, how there is an armie on the sea, and of the lande, on foote, and on horsebacke. Of that on the sea, I will not presume to speake, for that I have no knowledge therof: but I will let the Genoues, and the Venecians speake therof, whome with like studies have heretofore doen great thinges.

This is about as much as happens to come to mind for me to remind you, and I know that many other things could have been said in all this reasoning: for example, how and in how many different ways the ancients organized their armies, how they dressed, and how they trained in many other aspects, and to have included {225} many other details which I haven't deemed necessary to show, both because you can see them for yourself, and also because my intent hasn't been to demonstrate exactly how the old military service was established, but rather how a military service today could be arranged that would be more effective than the current one. Therefore, I didn't think it wise to discuss ancient matters further than what I deemed necessary for this introduction. I also recognize that I could have elaborated more on cavalry and then discussed naval warfare: since those who distinguish military service say that there are armies at sea, on land, on foot, and on horseback. I won't presume to speak of naval matters since I have no knowledge of it: instead, I'll let the Genoese and Venetians talk about that, as they have achieved great things in similar pursuits.

Also of horses, I wil speake no other, then as afore I have saied, this parte beynge (as I have declared) least corrupted. Besides this, the footemen being wel ordained, which is the puissance of the armie, good horses of necessitie will come to be made.

Also regarding horses, I will only speak as I have said before, this part being (as I mentioned) the least corrupted. Furthermore, since the infantry is well organized, which is the strength of the army, good horses will necessarily be produced.

Provisions that maie bee made to fill a Realme full of good horse; The knowledge that a capitaine oughte to have.

Provisions that can be made to fill a kingdom with good horses; The knowledge that a captain should have.

Onely I counsel him that would ordayne the exercise of armes in his owne countrey, and desireth to fill the same with good horses, that he make two provisions: the one is, that he destribute Mares of a good race throughe his dominion, and accustome his menne to make choise of coltes, as you in this countrie make of Calves and Mules: the other is, that to thentente the excepted might finde a byer, I woulde prohibet that no man should kepe a Mule excepte he woulde keepe a horse: so that he that woulde kepe but one beaste to ride on, shoulde be constrained to keepe a horse: and moreover that no man should weare fine cloathe except he which doeth keepe a horse: this order I under stande hath beene devised of certaine princes in our time, whome in short space have therby, brought into their countrey an excellente numbre of good horses. Aboute the other thynges, as much as might be looked for concernynge {226} horse, I remit to as much as I have saied to daie, and to that whiche they use. Peradventure also you woulde desire to understand what condicions a Capitaine ought to have: wherof I shal satisfie you moste breeflie: for that I cannot tell how to chose anie other man then the same, who shoulde know howe to doe all those thynges whiche this daie hath ben reasoned of by us: the which also should not suffise, when he should not knowe howe to devise of him selfe: for that no man without invencion, was ever excellent in anie science: and if invencion causeth honour in other thynges, in this above all, it maketh a man honorable: for everie invention is seen, although it were but simple, to be of writers celebrated: as it is seen, where Alexander Magnus is praised, who for to remove his Campe moste secretely, gave not warnyng with the Trumpette, but with a hatte upon a Launce. And was praised also for havyng taken order that his souldiours in buckelynge with the enemies, shoulde kneele with the lefte legge, to bee able more strongly to withstande their violence: the whiche havyng geven him the victorie, it got him also so muche praise, that all the Images, whiche were erected in his honour, stoode after the same facion. But because it is tyme to finishe this reasonyng, I wil turne againe to my first purpose, and partly I shall avoide the same reproche, wherin they use to condempne in this towne, such as knoweth not when to make an ende.

I just advise someone who wants to promote the use of weapons in their own country and wants to fill it with good horses to make two arrangements: first, they should distribute quality mares throughout their territory and train their people to choose colts, just like you choose calves and mules in this country. The second is that to ensure those excluded can find a buyer, I suggest prohibiting anyone from keeping a mule unless they also have a horse. This way, anyone who only wants one animal to ride will have to keep a horse. Moreover, no one should wear fine clothes unless they own a horse. I understand this approach was devised by certain princes in our time, and in a short while, they brought an excellent number of good horses into their country. Regarding other aspects related to horses, I refer to what I’ve said so far and to what they practice. Perhaps you also want to know what qualities a captain should have: I will answer you briefly. I cannot choose anyone other than the one who knows how to do all the things we’ve discussed today; this person must also know how to come up with strategies on their own because no one has ever excelled in any field without creativity. If creativity brings honor in various matters, it is especially what makes a person honorable in this. Every invention, no matter how simple, is recognized by writers, as seen with Alexander the Great, who, to move his camp quietly, signaled with a hat on a lance instead of a trumpet. He was also praised for instructing his soldiers to kneel with their left leg while confronting enemies to withstand their blows better, which brought him victory and immense praise, such that all the statues erected in his honor were positioned in that same way. But since it’s time to conclude this discussion, I will return to my initial point and partly avoid the reproach that often condemns those in this town who do not know when to stop.

The auctor retorneth to his first purpose and maketh a littel discorse to make an ende of his reasonyng.

The author returns to his main point and makes a brief statement to conclude his reasoning.

If you remembre Cosimus you tolde me, that I beyng of one side an exalter of the antiquitie, and a dispraiser of those, which in waightie matters imitated them not, and of the other side, I havynge not in the affaires of war, wherin I have taken paine, imitated them, you coulde not perceive the occasion: wherunto I answered, how that men which wil doo any thing, muste firste prepare to knowe how to doe it, for to be able, after to use it, when occasion permitteth: whether I doe know how to bryng the servis of warre to the auncient manners or no, I will be judged by you, whiche have hearde me upon this matter longe dispute wherby you may know, how much time I have consumed {227} in these studies: and also I beleeve that you maie imagen, how much desire is in me to brynge it to effecte: the whiche whether I have been able to have doen, or that ever occasion hath been geven me, most easely you maie conjecture: yet for to make you more certaine and for my better justificacion, I will also aledge the occasions: and as much as I have promised, I will partely performe, to shew you the difficultie and the facelitie, whiche bee at this presente in suche imitacions.

If you remember, Cosimo, you mentioned that I, being someone who praises the past and criticizes those who in important matters don’t follow it, and on the other hand, not having imitated it in the military affairs I’ve engaged in, seemed vague to you. I responded by saying that anyone who wants to achieve something must first prepare by learning how to do it, so they can use that knowledge when the opportunity arises. Whether I know how to adapt military service to ancient methods is for you to judge, as you have listened to my long arguments on this topic, and you can see how much time I have spent {227} on these studies. I also believe you can imagine how much I want to bring this to fruition. Whether I’ve been able to do it or if I’ve ever had the chance, you can easily guess. Yet, to make you more certain and for my own justification, I will also present the circumstances, and as much as I promised, I will partially deliver, to show you the difficulties and ease that currently exist in such imitations.

A prince may easelie brynge to intiere perfection the servis of warre; Two sortes of Capitaines worthie to bee praysed.

A prince can easily achieve complete excellence in military service; there are two types of captains worthy of praise.

Therfore I saie, how that no deede that is doen now a daies emong men, is more easie to be reduced unto the aunciente maners, then the service of Warre: but by them onely that be Princes of so moche state, who can at least gather together of their owne subjectes, xv. or twentie thousande yong menne: otherwise, no thyng is more difficulte, then this, to them whiche have not soche commoditie: and for that you maie the better understande this parte, you have to knowe, howe that there bee of twoo condicions, Capitaines to bee praised: The one are those, that with an armie ordained through the naturalle discipline thereof, have dooen greate thynges: as were the greater parte of the Romaine Citezeins, and suche as have ledde armies, the which have had no other paine, then to maintaine them good, and to se them guided safely: the other are they, whiche not onely have had to overcome the enemie, but before they come to the same, have been constrained to make good and well ordered their armie: who without doubte deserve muche more praise, then those have deserved, which with olde armies, and good, have valiantely wrought. Of these, such wer Pelopida, and Epaminonda, Tullus Hostillius, Phillip of Macedony father of Alexander, Cirus kyng of the Percians, Graccus a Romaine: they all were driven first to make their armies good, and after to faighte with them: they all coulde doe it, as well throughe their prudence, as also for havynge subjectes whome thei might in like exercises instruct: nor it shuld never have ben otherwise possible, that anie of theim, though they had ben never so good and ful of al excellencie, should have {228} been able in a straunge countrey, full of men corrupted, not used to anie honest obedience, to have brought to passe anie laudable worke. It suffiseth not then in Italie, to know how to governe an army made, but first it is necessarie to know how to make it and after to know how to commaunde it: and to do these things it is requisit they bee those princes, whome havyng much dominion, and subjectes inoughe, maie have commoditie to doe it: of whiche I can not bee, who never commaunded, nor cannot commaunde, but to armies of straungers, and to men bounde to other, and not to me: in whiche if it be possible, or no, to introduce anie of those thynges that this daie of me hath ben reasoned, I will leave it to your judgement.

Therefore I say, that no action taken these days among people is easier to be linked to ancient customs than military service. However, this is only true for those who are rulers of significant power, capable of gathering at least 15,000 or 20,000 young men from their own subjects. Otherwise, nothing is more difficult for those who lack such resources. To help you understand this part better, you should know that there are two kinds of captains who deserve praise. The first are those who, with a well-organized army through natural discipline, have accomplished great things, like most of the Roman citizens and those who have led armies with no other challenge than to keep them strong and safely guided. The second are those who not only have to defeat the enemy but, before engaging in battle, must first organize and prepare their army well. These leaders undoubtedly deserve much more praise than those who have acted bravely with established and capable armies. Examples of the latter include Pelopidas, Epaminondas, Tullus Hostilius, Philip of Macedon, father of Alexander, and Cyrus, king of the Persians, as well as Gracchus, a Roman. They were all compelled first to strengthen their armies and then to fight with them. They were able to do this both due to their wisdom and because they had subjects whom they could train in similar activities. It would have been impossible for any of them, no matter how skilled or exceptional they were, to achieve anything commendable in a foreign land filled with people who were corrupt and not accustomed to any honest obedience. Thus, it’s not enough in Italy to know how to command a ready-made army; first, it’s necessary to know how to create one and then how to lead it. To accomplish these tasks, it’s essential that they are rulers with enough power and subjects to enable them to do so. I cannot be one of those rulers, as I have never commanded, nor can I command, armies of strangers and men loyal to others, not to me. Whether it is possible to introduce any of the concepts discussed today into that context, I leave to your judgment.

Albeit when coulde I make one of these souldiours which now a daies practise, to weare more armur then the ordinarie, and besides the armur, to beare their owne meate for two or three daies, with a mattocke: When coulde I make theim to digge, or keepe theim every daie manie howers armed, in fained exercises, for to bee able after in the verie thyng in deede to prevaile? When woulde thei abstaine from plaie, from laciviousnesse, from swearynge, from the insolence, whiche everie daie they committe? when would they be reduced into so muche dissepline, into so much obedience and reverence, that a tree full of appels in the middest of their Campe, shoulde be founde there and lefte untouched? As is redde, that in the auncient armies manie times hapned. What thynge maye I promis them, by meane wherof thei may have me in reverence to love, or to feare, when the warre beyng ended, they have not anie more to doe with me? wher of maie I make them ashamed, whiche be borne and brought up without shame? whie shoulde thei be ruled by me who knowe me not? By what God or by what sainctes may I make them to sweare? By those that thei worship, or by those that they blaspheme? Who they worship I knowe not anie: but I knowe well they blaspheme all. How shoulde I beleeve that thei will keepe their promise to them, whome everie hower they dispise? How can they, that dispise God, reverence men? Then {229} what good fashion shoulde that be, whiche might be impressed in this matter? And if you should aledge unto me that Suyzzers and Spaniardes bee good souldiours, I woulde confesse unto you, how they be farre better then the Italians: but if you note my reasonynge, and the maner of procedyng of bothe, you shall see, howe they lacke many thynges to joygne to the perfection of the antiquetie. And how the Suyzzers be made good of one of their naturall uses caused of that, whiche to daie I tolde you: those other are made good by mean of a necessitie: for that servyng in a straunge countrie, and seemyng unto them to be constrained either to die, or to overcome, thei perceivynge to have no place to flie, doe become good: but it is a goodnesse in manie partes fawtie: for that in the same there is no other good, but that they bee accustomed to tarie the enemie at the Pike and sweardes poincte: nor that, which thei lacke, no man should be meete to teache them, and so much the lesse, he that coulde not speake their language.

But when could I make one of these soldiers, who nowadays practice, wear more armor than usual, and in addition to the armor, carry their own food for two or three days, with a pickaxe? When could I make them dig, or keep them armed for many hours each day in fake exercises, so they can actually succeed later on in real situations? When would they refrain from playing, from lewdness, from swearing, from the arrogance they commit every day? When would they be brought to such discipline, obedience, and respect that a tree full of apples in the middle of their camp would be left untouched? As is often read, happened many times in ancient armies. What could I promise them that would earn their respect and love, or fear, when the war ends and they have nothing more to do with me? What could shame them, when they are raised without shame? Why should they be ruled by me, someone they don’t know? By what God or saints could I make them swear? By those they worship, or by those they blaspheme? I don’t know who they worship, but I know they blaspheme all. How can I believe they will keep their promises to those they despise every hour? How can those who despise God revere men? Then {229} what good way could be instilled in this matter? And if you were to argue that Swiss and Spaniards are good soldiers, I would agree they are much better than the Italians. But if you consider my reasoning and the way both groups operate, you will see how they lack many things needed to achieve the perfection of antiquity. The Swiss are made good by one of their natural characteristics, as I told you today; those others are forced into goodness out of necessity, since serving in a foreign land, with the belief they are constrained to either die or overcome, they see there’s nowhere to flee, they become good. But this goodness has many flaws; because in that, the only thing is that they are used to holding the enemy at spear and sword point. Moreover, no one is suitable to teach them what they lack, especially not someone who can’t speak their language.

The Auctor excuseth the people of Italie to the great reproche of their prynces for their ignorance in the affaires of warre.

The author excuses the people of Italy for the great shame of their princes due to their lack of knowledge in military affairs.

But let us turne to the Italians, who for havynge not had wise Princes, have not taken anie good order: and for havyng not had the same necessitie, whiche the Spaniardes have hadde, they have not taken it of theim selves, so that they remaine the shame of the worlde: and the people be not to blame, but onely their princes, who have ben chastised, and for their ignorance have ben justely punisshed, leesinge moste shamefully their states, without shewing anie vertuous ensample. And if you will see whether this that I say be trew: consider how manie warres have ben in Italie since the departure of kyng Charles to this day, where the war beyng wonte to make men warlyke and of reputacion, these the greater and fierser that they have been, so muche the more they have made the reputacion of the members and of the headdes therof to bee loste. This proveth that it groweth, that the accustomed orders were not nor bee not good, and of the newe orders, there is not anie whiche have knowen how to take them. Nor never beleeve that reputacion will be gotten, by the Italians weapons, but by the same waie that {230} I have shewed, and by means of theim, that have great states in Italie: for that this forme maie be impressed in simple rude men, of their owne, and not in malicious, ill brought up, and straungers. Nor there shall never bee founde anie good mason, whiche will beleeve to be able to make a faire image of a peece of Marbell ill hewed, but verye well of a rude peece.

But let’s focus on the Italians, who, due to not having wise leaders, have failed to establish any good order. Unlike the Spaniards, they haven’t faced the same necessity to improve themselves, leaving them as the shame of the world. The blame lies solely with their leaders, who have been punished and justly so for their ignorance, losing their states in a very disgraceful manner, without setting any virtuous example. If you want to see if what I say is true, consider how many wars Italy has experienced since King Charles left until now. Wars that usually make men more warrior-like and reputable, have instead, the greater and fiercer they’ve been, only caused the reputations of the leaders and their followers to be lost. This shows that the established orders were never good, and the new orders haven’t found anyone capable of implementing them. Never believe that reputation can be gained through Italian weapons, but rather in the way I’ve shown, and through those who have significant states in Italy. This idea can indeed be impressed upon simple, unrefined people from their own, but not on malicious, poorly raised outsiders. There will never be a good craftsman who believes he can create a beautiful statue from a poorly chiseled piece of marble, but he can certainly do so with a rough block.

A discription of the folishenesse of the Italian princes; Cesar and Alexander, were the formoste in battell; The Venecians and the duke of Ferare began to have reduced the warfare to the Aunciente maners; He that despiseth the servis of warre, despiseth his own welthe.

A description of the foolishness of the Italian princes; Caesar and Alexander were the foremost in battle; the Venetians and the Duke of Ferrara started to revert warfare back to ancient ways; whoever dismisses the service of war dismisses their own wealth.

Our Italian Princes beleved, before thei tasted the blowes of the outlandishe warre, that it should suffice a Prince to knowe by writynges, how to make a subtell answere, to write a goodly letter, to shewe in saiynges, and in woordes, witte and promptenesse, to knowe how to canvas a fraude, to decke theim selves with precious stones and gold, to slepe and to eate with greater glorie then other: To keepe many lascivious persones aboute them, to governe theim selves with their subjectes, covetuously and proudely: To rotte in idlenesse, to give the degrees of the exercise of warre, for good will, to despise if any should have shewed them any laudable waie, minding that their wordes should bee aunswers of oracles: nor the sely wretches were not aware, that thei prepared theim selves to bee a praie, to whom so ever should assaulte theim. Hereby grewe then in the thousande fower hundred nintie and fower yere, the greate feares, the sodain flightes, and the marveilous losses: and so three most mightie states which were in Italie, have been divers times sacked and destroied. But that which is worse, is where those that remaine, continue in the verie same erroure, and live in the verie same disorder, and consider not, that those, who in old time would kepe their states, caused to be dooen these thynges, which of me hath been reasoned, and that their studies wer, to prepare the body to diseases, and the minde not to feare perilles. Whereby grewe that Cesar, Alexander, and all those menne and excellente Princes in old tyme, were the formoste emongest the faighters, goyng armed on foote: and if thei loste their state, thei would loose their life, so that thei lived and died vertuously. And if in theim, or in parte of theim, there might bee condempned to muche ambicion to reason of: yet there shall {231} never bee founde, that in theim is condempned any tendernesse or any thynge that maketh menne delicate and feable: the whiche thyng, if of these Princes were redde and beleved, it should be impossible, that thei should not change their forme of living, and their provinces not to chaunge fortune. And for that you in the beginnyng of this our reasonyng, lamented your ordinaunces, I saie unto you, that if you had ordained it, as I afore have reasoned, and it had given of it self no good experience, you might with reason have been greved therewith: but if it bee not so ordained, and exercised, as I have saied, it maie be greeved with you, who have made a counterfaite thereof, and no perfecte figure. The Venecians also, and the Duke of Ferare, beganne it, and followed it not, the whiche hath been through their faulte, not through their menne. And therfore I assure you, that who so ever of those, whiche at this daie have states in Italie, shall enter firste into this waie, shall be firste, before any other, Lorde of this Province, and it shall happen to his state, as to the kyngdome of the Macedonians, the which commyng under Philip, who had learned the maner of settyng armies in order of Epaminondas a Thebane, became with this order, and with these exercises (whileste the reste of Grece stoode in idlenesse, and attended to risite comedes) so puisant, that he was able in few yeres to possesse it all, and to leave soche foundacion to his sonne, that he was able to make hymself, prince of all the world. He then that despiseth these studies, if he be a Prince, despiseth his Princedome: if he bee a Citezein, his Citee. Wherefore, I lamente me of nature, the whiche either ought not to have made me a knower of this, or it ought to have given me power, to have been able to have executed it: For now beyng olde, I cannot hope to have any occasion, to bee able so to dooe: In consideracion whereof, I have been liberall with you, who beeyng grave yong menne, maie (when the thynges saied of me shall please you) at due tymes in favour of your Princes, helpe theim and counsaile them, wherein I would have you not to bee afraied, or mistrustfull, bicause this Province seemes to bee altogether given, {232} to raise up againe the thynges dedde, as is seen by the perfeccion that poesie, paintyng, and writing, is now brought unto: Albeit, as moche as is looked for of me, beyng strooken in yeres, I do mistruste. Where surely, if Fortune had heretofore graunted me so moche state, as suffiseth for a like enterprise, I would not have doubted, but in moste shorte tyme, to have shewed to the worlde, how moche the aunciente orders availe: and without peradventure, either I would have increased it with glory, or loste it without shame.

Our Italian princes believed, before they experienced the blows of foreign war, that it was enough for a prince to know how to craft a clever response through writing, to compose a great letter, to display wit and quickness in speech and words, to know how to scheme for a deception, to adorn themselves with precious stones and gold, to sleep and eat with more glory than others. They kept many lascivious people around them and ruled with their subjects covetously and proudly, rotting in idleness, giving out military honors for good will, and dismissing anyone who tried to show them a worthy path, thinking their words should be like oracles. The poor wretches were unaware they were preparing to be prey for anyone who would attack them. Thus in the year 1494, the great fears, sudden flights, and incredible losses emerged: three of the most powerful states in Italy were sacked and destroyed multiple times. What’s worse is that those who remain continue in the same error, living in the same chaos and not realizing that those who once managed to hold onto their states took actions that I have discussed. Their focus was on preparing their bodies for diseases and their minds to face dangers. Hence, Caesar, Alexander, and all those great princes of old were among the foremost fighters, going into battle armed on foot. If they lost their states, they would lose their lives, so they lived and died with virtue. If they could be condemned for too much ambition, there will never be found any condemnation of tenderness or anything that makes men weak and delicate. If these princes read and believed this, it would be impossible for them not to change their way of life and for their fortunes not to change. And since you lamented your arrangements at the beginning of our discussion, I say to you that if you had organized things as I previously reasoned and it produced no good results, you might have justifiably been upset. But if it hasn’t been organized and exercised as I suggested, it is you who should be worried, as you have created a counterfeit and not a perfect example. The Venetians and the Duke of Ferrara started on this path but did not follow through, which has been due to their fault, not their men. Therefore, I assure you, whoever among those who currently have states in Italy takes the first step into this way will be the first, before anyone else, to be Lord of this Province, and his state will have the same fortune as the kingdom of the Macedonians, which, under Philip, who learned how to set armies in order from Epaminondas, became so powerful with this order and these exercises (while the rest of Greece stood idle and watched comedies) that he was able in a few years to possess it all and leave such a foundation for his son that he could make himself the prince of the entire world. He who despises these studies, if he is a prince, despises his princedom; if he is a citizen, he despises his city. Therefore, I lament my nature, which either should not have made me aware of this, or it should have given me the power to execute it. Now being old, I can no longer hope for the opportunity to act. Considering this, I have been generous with you, who being serious young men, may (when the things I’ve said please you) at the right time support and advise your princes. I encourage you not to be afraid or distrustful, because this Province seems entirely poised to revive what is dead, as seen by the perfection that poetry, painting, and writing have now achieved: although, as much as is expected from me, being struck by age, I do have my doubts. If fortune had granted me previously the status sufficient for such an enterprise, I would not have doubted to show the world how much the ancient orders are worth, and without a doubt, either I would have enhanced it with glory, or lost it without disgrace.


The ende of the seventh and laste booke of the arte of warre, of Nicholas Machiavell, Citezein and Secretarie of Florence, translated out of Italian into Englishe: By Peter Whitehorne, felow of Graise Inne.

The end of the seventh and last book of the art of war, by Nicholas Machiavelli, Citizen and Secretary of Florence, translated from Italian into English by Peter Whitehorne, Fellow of Gray's Inn.

{234}

TO THE READERS

T o thentente that such as rede this booke maie without difficultie understande the order of the battailes, or bandes of men, and of the armies, and lodgynges in the Campe, accordynge as they in the discription of theim are apoincted, I thinke it necessarie to shewe you the figure of everie one of them: wherefore it is requiset firste, to declare unto you, by what poinctes and letters, the footemen, the horsemen, and everie other particuler membre are set foorthe.

T To help those who read this book easily understand the arrangement of the battles, the groups of soldiers, and the camp layouts as described, I believe it’s necessary to show you the diagram for each one of them. Therefore, it’s important first to explain how the infantry, cavalry, and each specific unit are represented by points and letters.

KNOW THERFORE THAT

KNOW THEREFORE THAT

.} Signifies {Targetmen.

'} {Pikemen.

c} {a Captain of ten men.

v} {Ordinary skirmishers. (Those who shoot with arquebuses or bows)

r} {Extraordinary skirmishers.

C} {a Centurion or captain of a hundred men.

k} {a Constable or captain of a band of four hundred and fifty men.

H} {The head captain of a main battle.

G} {The general captain of the whole army.

t} {The Trumpet.

d} {The Drum.

b} {The Ensign.

s} {The Standard.

m} {Men-at-arms.

l} {Light cavalry.

A} {Artillery or ordnance.
{235}

In the first figure nexte folowyng, is discribed the forme of an ordinarie battaile or bande of fower hundred and fiftie men, and in what maner it is redoubled by flanke. And also how with the verie same order of lxxx. rankes, by chaungyng onely to the hinder parte the five rankes of Pikes which were the formost of everie Centurie, thei maye likewise in bringyng them in battaile raie, come to bee placed behinde: whiche may be doen, when in marchyng, the enemies should come to assaulte them at their backes: accordynge as the orderyng therof is before declared. Fol. 87.

In the first figure following, the formation of a typical battle line or band of five hundred and fifty men is described, along with how it can be strengthened by its flanks. It also explains how, using the same arrangement of eighty ranks, by simply moving the five front ranks of Pikes from the front of each Century to the back, they can also be placed in battle formation. This can be done in case the enemies try to attack them from behind while they are marching, as previously explained. Fol. 87.

In the seconde figure, is shewed how a battaile or bande of men is ordered, whiche in marchyng should be driven to faight on the flanke: accordyng as in the booke is declared. Fol. 87.

In the second figure, it shows how a battle or group of men is arranged, which when marching should be pushed to fight on the flank: as explained in the book. Fol. 87.

In the thirde figure, is shewed how a battaile or bande of men, is ordered with two hornes, fol. 88, and after is shewed how the same maie be made with a voide place in the middest: accordynge as the orderyng therof, in the booke moste plainely is declared, fol. 89.

In the third figure, it shows how a battle or group of men is arranged with two flanks, fol. 88, and then it demonstrates how the same can be set up with an empty space in the middle: as the organization of it is clearly explained in the book, fol. 89.

In the fowerth figure, is shewed the forme or facion of an armie apoincted to faight the battaile with the enemies: and for the better understandynge thereof, the verie same is plainlier set foorthe in the figure next unto it, wherby the other two figures next folowyng maie the easier be understoode: accordynge as in the booke is expressed. Fol. 105.

In the fourth figure, the shape or layout of an army ready to fight the battle against the enemies is shown. To make this clearer, the same is illustrated more clearly in the next figure, which helps in understanding the following two figures more easily, as explained in the book. Fol. 105.

In the fifte figure, is shewed the forme of a fower square armie: as in the booke is discribed. Fol. 152.

In the fifth figure, the shape of a four-square army is shown, as described in the book. Fol. 152.

In the sixte figure, is shewed howe an Armie is brought from a fower square facion, to the ordinarie forme, to faight a fielde: accordyng as afore is declared. Fol. 156.

In the sixth figure, it shows how an army is brought from a square formation to the standard shape for battling in the field, as previously stated. Fol. 156.

In the seventh figure, is discribed the maner of incamping: according as the same in the booke is declared. Fol. 174.

In the seventh figure, the way of camping is described as it is explained in the book. Fol. 174.

{236}

THE FIRSTE FIGURE

THE FIRST FIGURE

This is the maner of ordering of CCCC. men, into lxxx. rankes, five to a ranke, to bring them into a iiii square battaile with the Pikes on the front, as after foloweth.

This is the way to organize 400 men into 80 ranks, five in each rank, to set them up in a square battle formation with the pikes at the front, as follows.

C  
c''''  
c''''  
c''''  
c''''  
c''''  
c....  
c....  
c....  
c....  
c....  
c....  
c....  
c....  
c....  
c....  
c....  
c....  
c....  
c....  
c....  
c....  
C  
'''''  
'''''  
'''''  
'''''  
'''''  
.....  
.....  
.....  
.....  
.....  
.....  
.....  
.....  
.....  
.....  
.....  
.....  
.....  
.....  
C  
'''''  
'''''  
'''''  
'''''  
'''''  
.....  
.....  
.....  
.....  
.....  
.....  
.....  
.....  
.....  
.....  
.....  
.....  
.....  
.....  
C  
''''c  
''''c  
''''c  
''''c  
''''c  
....c  
....c  
....c  
....c  
....c  
....c  
....c  
....c  
....c  
....c  
....c  
....c  
....c  
....c  
....c  
....c  
{237}

This is the foresaied lxxx. rankes of iiii. C. men brought into a fower square battaile with the Pikes on the fronte. And the fiftie Veliti on the sides and on the backe.

This is the foretold 80 ranks of 400 men arranged in a four-square battle formation with the pikes at the front and the 50 Velites on the sides and at the back.

C                    C  
vc''''''''''''''''''cv  
vc''''''''''''''''''cv  
vc''''''''''''''''''cv  
vc''''''''''''''''''cv  
vc''''''''''''''''''cv  
vc........dkb.......cv  
vc..................cv  
vc..................cv  
vc..................cv  
vc..................cv  
vc..................cv  
vc..................cv  
vc..................cv  
vc..................cv  
vc..................cv  
vc..................cv  
vc..................cv  
vc..................cv  
C v v v v v v v v v v C  
{238}

THE SECONDE FIGURE

THE SECOND FIGURE

This is the maner of ordering of CCCC. men, into lxxx. rankes, five to a ranke, to bring them into a iiii square battaile with the Pikes on the side, as after foloweth.

This is the way to organize 400 men into 80 ranks, five in each rank, to arrange them into a square battle formation with the pikes on the sides, as follows.

C  
ccccc  
''''''  
''''''  
''''''  
''''''  
''''''  
''''''  
''''''  
''''''  
''''''  
''''''  
''''''  
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{239}

This is the foresaied lxxx. rankes of iiii. C. men brought into a fower square battaile with the Pikes on the side.

This is the mentioned 80 ranks of 400 men arranged in a square battle formation with the pikes on the sides.

CvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvC  
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{240}

THE THYRDE FIGURE

THE THIRD FIGURE

These are the nombers of rankes appoincted to make the horned battaile of, and the square battaile with the voide space in the middest, as after foloweth.

These are the numbers of ranks designated for the horned battle and the square battle with an empty space in the middle, as follows.

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{241}
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{242}

THE FOURTH FIGURE

THE 4TH FIGURE

A           A     A     A     A     A
llm mCrCCC    Cu,,uCCu,,uCCu,,uCCu,,uCCu,,uCA
llm mrrr,,,   vu,,uvvu,,uvvu,,uvvu,,uvvu,,uvA
llm mrrrdkb   vdk bvvdk bvvdk bvvdk bvvdk bv
lltksdkb,,,   vc..uvvu..uvvu..uvvu..uvvu..uv   t G
llm mrrr,,,   vc..uvvu..uvvu..uvvu..uvvu..uv   lll
ktm mrrr,,,   vc..uvvu..uvvu..uvvu..uvvu..uv  ....
lsm mCr(,,,   Cu..uCCu..uCCu..uCCu..uCCu..uC
llm m   ,,,
llm m   ,,,               .....
llm m   ,,,                dHb
llm m   ,,,               .....
,,,
,,,
,,,
,,,   Cu..uC      Cu..uC      Cu..uC
,,,   vu,,uv      vu,,uv      vu,,uv
,,,   vdk bv      vdk bv      vdk bv
CdkbC  vu..uv      vu..uv      vu..uv
,,   vu..uv      vu..uv      vu..uv
,,,   vu..uv      vu..uv      vu..uv
,,,   Cu..uC      Cu..uC      Cu..uC
,,,
,,,
,,,
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,,,
,,,
,,,
,,,   Cu,,uC                  Cu,,uC
,,,   vu,,uv                  vu,,uv
,,,   vdk bv                  vdk bv
,,,   vu..uv                  vu..uv
dkb   vu..uv                  vu..uv
,,,   vu..uv                  vu..uv
C C   Cu..uC                  Cu..uC

The cariages and the unarmed.

The carriages and the unarmed.

{243}
A     A     A     A     A     A  
A Cu,,uCCu,,uCCu,,uCCu,,uCCu,,uC   C CCrCm mll  
A vu,,uvvu,,uvvu,,uvvu,,uvvu,,uv   ,,,rrrm mll  
m vdk bvvdk bvvdk bvvdk bvvdk bv   dkbrrrm mll  
s vu..uvvu..uvvu..uvvu..uvvu..uv   ,,,dkbm mll  
llvu..uvvu..uvvu..uvvu..uvvu..uv   ,,,rrrtksll  
..vu.. vvu..uvvu..uvvu..uvvu..uv   ,,,rrrm mtk  
Cu..uCCu..uC  ..uCCu..uCCu..uC   ,,,rrrm msl  
,,,   m mll  
,,,   m mll  
dHb           ,,,   m mll  
....          ,,,   m mll  
,,,  
,,,  
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Cu,,uC      Cu,,uC      Cu,,uC   ,,,  
vu,,uv      uv,,uv      uv,,uv   ,,,  
vdk bv      vdk bv      vdk bv   ,,,  
vu..uv      vu..uv      vu..uv  CdkbC  
vu..uv      vu..uv      vu..uv   ,,,  
vu..uv      vu..uv      vu..uv   ,,,  
Cu..uC      Cu..uC      Cu..uC   ,,,  
,,,  
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Cu,,uC                  Cu,,uC   ,,,  
vu,,uv                  uv,,uv   ,,,  
vdk bv                  vdk bv   ,,,  
vu..uv                  vu..uv   ,,,  
vu..uv                  vu..uv   dkb  
vu..uv                  vu..uv   ,,,  
Cu..uC                  Cu..uC   C C  
{244}

THE FIFT FIGURE

THE FIFTH FIGURE

A ) ,,,, C) ,,,, C) ,,,, C),,,,C),,,,))v) vCvC),,,,C) ,,,, C A  
  u ,,,, uu ,,,, uu ,,,, uu,,,,uu,,,,uvvvvvvvvu,,,,uu ,,,, u  
  u ,,,, uu  dkb uu  dkb uu dkbuu dkbuvvvvvvvvu dkbuu ,,,, u  
  u  dkb uu .... uu .... uu....uu....u)vv vvvCu....uu  dkb u  A  
A u ,,,, uu .... uu .... uu....uu....uvvvvvvvvu....uu ,,,, u  
  u ,,,, uu .... uu .... uu....uu....uvvvvvvvvu....uu ,,,, u A  
  ) ,,,, C) .... C) .... C)....C)....C)v) vCvC)....)) ,,,, C  
A ) uuuC                                            )  uuu C  
  ,,,,....                                          ....,,,, A  
  ,,,,....    ....                                  ....,,,,  
  ,,dkb...    dHb                                    ..dkb,,  
A ,,,,....    ....                                  ....,,,,  
  ,,,,....                                          ....,,,, A  
  ) n n nC                                          ) n n nC  
A ) u u uC                                          ) u u uC  
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  ,,,,....                  ...III..                ....,,,, A  
  ,, dkb..                  .. mm ..                .. dkb,,  
A ,,,,....                  .. tGs..                ....,,,,  
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  ) n n nC                                          ) n n nC A  
  ) u u uC               ),,,,C),,,,C               ) u u uC  
A ,,,,....               u,,,,uu,,,,u               ....,,,,  
  ,,,,....               u,,,,uu,,,,u               ....,,,, A  
  ,, dkb..               u dkbuu dkbu               .. dkb,,  
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  ,,,,....               u,,,,uu,,,,u               ....,,,,  
A ) n n nC               ),,,,C),,,,C               ) n n nC  
{245}
A ) u u uC                                          ) u u uC A  
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  ,, dkb..                                          .. dkb,,  
A ,,,,....                                          ....,,,, A  
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  ) n n nC                                          ) n n nC  
  ) u u uC                                          ) u u uC  
A ,,,,....                                          ....,,,, A  
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A ,,,,....                                          ....,,,, A  
  ) n n nC                                          ) n n nC  
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  u ,,,, uu....urrrrrrrrrrrru....uu....uu....uu....uu ,,,, C  
A u ,,,, uu....urr dkb dkb ru....uu....uu....uu....uu ,,,, u A  
  u  dkb uu dkbu rrrrrrrrrrru dkbnu dkbuu dkbuu dkbuu  dkb u  
  u ,,,, uu,,,,urr dkb dkb ru,,,,uu,,,,uu,,,,uu,,,,uu ,,,, u  
  u ,,,, uu,,,,u rrrrrrrrrrru,,,,uu,,,,uu,,,,uu,,,,uu ,,,, u  
A ) ,,,, C),,,,C ) r) rC rC ),,,,u),,,,C),,,,C),,,,C) ,,,, C A  

  mmmm mmmm                                        mmmm mmmm  
  mmmm mmmm                                        mmmm mmmm  
  mmmm mmmm                                        mmmm mmmm  
  mmmtksmmm                                        mmmtksmmm  
  mmmm mmmm                                        mmmm mmmm  
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  mmmm mmmm                                        mmmm mmmm  
{246}
A      A      A       A     A  
mmmmmmmm CvC)u, ,uC)u, ,uC)u, ,uC)u,,uC)u,  
mmmmmmmm vvvru, ,urru, ,urru, ,urru,,urru,,  
mmmmmmmm vvvrudkburrudkburrd k brrdk brrudk  
mmmtksmmmvvvru. .urru. .urru. .urru..urru..  
mmmmmmmm vvvru. .ruur. .urru. .urru..urru..  
mmmmmmmm vvv)u. .uC)u. .uC)u. .uC)u..uCCu .  
mmmmmmmm vvv),,,,,C  
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         vvvr,dkb..r       dHb         . .m  
         vvvr,,,...r       ....        ...t  
         vvvr,,,...r                   ....  
         vvv),,,...C  
         vvv),,,...C  
         vvvr,,,...r      )u, ,uC      )u,,  
         )vCr,dkb .r      ru. ,ur      ru,,  
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            r,,,...r      ru. .ur      ru..  
            r,,,...r      ru. .ur      ru..  
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            r,,,...r      ru. .ur  
            ),,, ..C      ru. .ur  
            ),,,...C      )u. .uC  
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            ),,, ..C  
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            r, dkb,r  
            r,,,,,,r  
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            ),,,,,,C  
{247}
   A     A       A     A      A
,uC)u, ,uC)u, ,uC)u, ,uC)u, ,uC)v) mmmmmmmm
,urru, ,urru, ,urru, ,urru, ,urvvv mmmmmmmm
b,rr,dkb,rr,dkb,rr,dkb,rr dkb rvvv mmmmmmmm
.urru. .urru. .urru. .urru. .urvvvmmmtkfmmm
.urru. .urru. .urru. .urru. .urvvv mmmmmmmm
.uC)u. .uC)u. .uC)u. .uCCu. .u)vvv mmmmmmmm
                        )...,,Cvvv mmmmmmmm
.ll..       ....        r...,,,rdkb
.m.         dHb         r.dkb, rvvv
Gs..        ....        r...,,,rvvv
....                    r...,,,rvvv
                        )... ,,Cvvv
,uC       )u. .uC       )... ,,Cvvv
,ur       ru, ,ur       r...,,,rvvv
kb,r      r,dkb,r       r.dkb, rC )
,ur       ru. .ur       r...,,,r
,ur       ru. .ur       r...,,,r
,uC       )u. .u)       )... ,,C
                        )... ,,C
                        r...,,,r
                        r.dkb, r
                        r...,,,r
                        r...,,,r
                        )...,,,C
                        )...,,,C
          )u, ,uC       r...,, r
          ru, ,ur       r.dkb, r
          r,dkb,r       r...,,,r
          ru. .ur       r...,,,r
          ru. .ur       )... ,,C
          )u. .uC       )... ,,C
                        r...,,,r
                        r.dkb, r
                        r...,,,r
                        r...,,,r
                        )... ,,C
                        ),,, ,,C
                        r,,,,,,r
                        r,dkb, r
                        r,,,,,,r
                        r,,,,,,r
                        ),,, ,,C

{252}

NICHOLAS MACHIAVEL'S

PRINCE

TRANSLATED OUT OF ITALIAN INTO ENGLISH BY

E.D.

WITH SOME ANIMADVERSIONS NOTING AND TAXING HIS ERRORS

1640

{253}

TO THE MOST NOBLE AND ILLUSTRIOUS, JAMES Duke of Lenox, Earle of March, Baron of Setrington, Darnly, Terbanten, and Methuen, Lord Great Chamberlain and Admiral of Scotland, Knight of the most Noble Order of the Garter, and one of his Majesties most honourable Privy Counsel in both kingdomes.

TO THE MOST NOBLE AND ILLUSTRIOUS, JAMES Duke of Lenox, Earl of March, Baron of Setrington, Darnly, Terbanten, and Methuen, Lord Great Chamberlain and Admiral of Scotland, Knight of the most Noble Order of the Garter, and one of His Majesty's most honorable Privy Council in both kingdoms.

P oysons are not all of that malignant and noxious quality, that as destructives of Nature, they are utterly to be abhord; but we find many, nay most of them have their medicinal uses. This book carries its poyson and malice in it; yet mee thinks the judicious peruser may honestly make use of it in the actions of his life, with advantage. The Lamprey, they say, hath a venemous string runs all along the back of it; take that out, and it is serv'd in for a choyce dish to dainty palates; Epictetus the Philosopher, sayes, Every thing hath {254} two handles, as the fire brand, it may be taken up at one end in the bare hand without hurt: the other being laid hold on, will cleave to the very flesh, and the smart of it will pierce even to the heart. Sin hath the condition of the fiery end; the touch of it is wounding with griefe unto the soule: nay it is worse; one sin goes not alone but hath many consequences. Your Grace may find the truth of this in your perusal of this Author: your judgement shall easily direct you in finding out the good uses of him: I have pointed at his chiefest errors with my best endeavors, and have devoted them to your Graces service: which if you shall accept and protect, I shall remain

P Poisons aren’t all that harmful and destructive to nature that we should completely reject them; in fact, many, if not most, have their medicinal uses. This book contains some poison and malice, yet I believe that a thoughtful reader could use it to their advantage in their life’s actions. They say the lamprey has a venomous string along its back; remove that, and it becomes a delicacy for sophisticated palates. Epictetus the Philosopher said, "Everything has two handles," like a firebrand: one end can be picked up by hand without harm, while the other end will stick to your flesh and cause intense pain. Sin is like the fiery end; its touch wounds the soul with grief. And it’s even worse; one sin doesn’t come alone but brings many consequences. Your Grace can see the truth of this in your reading of this author: your judgment will easily help you find the good uses for him. I have pointed out his major errors to the best of my ability and dedicated them to your Grace’s service. If you accept and support these, I will remain

Your Graces humble and devoted servant,

Your Grace's humble and devoted servant,

EDWARD DACRES.

EDWARD DACRES.

{255}

THE EPISTLE TO THE READER.

Q uestionless some men will blame me for making this Author speak in our vulgar tongue. For his Maximes and Tenents are condemnd of all, as pernicious to all Christian States, and hurtfull to all humane Societies. Herein I shall answer for my self with the Comœdian, Placere studeo bonis quam plurimis, et minimé multos lædere: I endeavor to give content to the most I can of those that are well disposed, and no scandal to any. I grant, I find him blamed and condemned: I do no less my self. Reader, either do thou read him without a prejudicate opinion, and out of thy own judgement taxe his errors; or at least, if thou canst stoop so low, make use of my pains to help thee; I will promise thee this reward for thy labor: if thou consider well the actions of the world, thou shalt find him much practised by those that condemn him; who willingly would walk as theeves do with close lanternes in the night, that they being undescried, and yet seeing all, might surprise the unwary in the dark. Surely this book will infect no man: out of the wicked treasure of a mans own wicked heart, he drawes his malice and mischief. From the same flower the Bee sucks honey, from whence the Spider hath his poyson. And he that means well, shall be here warnd, where the deceitfull man learnes to set his snares. A judge who hath often used to examine theeves, becomes the more expert to sift out their tricks. If mischief come hereupon, blame not me, nor blame my Author: lay the saddle on the right horse: but Hony soit qui mal y pense: let shame light on him that hatcht the mischief.

Q Some people will criticize me for having this Author speak in our everyday language. His principles and beliefs are condemned by everyone as harmful to all Christian nations and damaging to human societies. In response, I’ll quote a comedian, Placere studeo bonis quam plurimis, et minimé multos lædere: I try to please as many good people as I can without offending anyone. I acknowledge that he is criticized and condemned; I feel the same way. Reader, either approach him without any bias and judge his errors with your own mind, or, if you’re willing, use my efforts to assist you; I promise this reward for your effort: if you examine the actions of the world closely, you’ll find that those who condemn him often engage in his practices, willingly sneaking around like thieves with their lanterns in the dark, so they can go unnoticed while catching the unsuspecting. This book will not corrupt anyone: a person draws their malice and wickedness from their own wicked heart. From the same flower, the Bee gathers honey, while the Spider extracts poison. Those who have good intentions will be warned here about where the deceitful person learns to set their traps. A judge who frequently examines thieves becomes more skilled at uncovering their tricks. If any harm arises from this, don’t blame me or my Author; point the finger at the right person: Hony soit qui mal y pense: let shame fall on the one who created the trouble.

{256}

THE PRINCE

NICHOLAS MACHIAVELLI,

to the Magnificent LAURENCE sonne to PETER OF MEDICIS health.

T hey that desire to ingratiate themselves with a Prince, commonly use to offer themselves to his view, with things of that nature as such persons take most pleasure and delight in: whereupon we see they are many times presented with Horses and Armes, cloth of gold, pretious stones, and such like ornaments, worthy of their greatness. Having then a mind to offer up my self to your Magnificence, with some testimony of my service to you, I found nothing in my whole inventory, that I think better of, or more esteeme, than the knowlege of great mens actions, which I have learned by a long experience of modern affairs, and a continual reading of those of the ancients. Which, now that I have with great diligence long workt it out, and throughly sifted, I commend to your Magnificence. And, however I may well think this work unworthy of your view; yet such is your humanity, that I doubt not but it shall find acceptance, considering, that for my part I am not able to tender a greater gift, than to present you with the means, whereby in a very short time you may be able to understand all that, which I, in the space of many years, and with many sufferances and dangers, have made proof and gaind the knowledge of. And this work I have not set forth either with elegancy of discourse or stile, nor with any other ornament whereby to captivate the reader, as others use, because I would not have it gain its esteem from elsewhere than from the truth of the matter, and the gravity of the subject. Nor can this {257} be thought presumption, if a man of humble and low condition venture to dilate and discourse upon the governments of Princes; for even as they that with their pensils designe out countreys, get themselves into the plains below to consider the nature of the mountains, and other high places above; and again to consider the plains below, they get up to the tops of the mountains; in like manner to understand the nature of the people, it is fit to be a Prince; and to know well the dispositions of Princes, sutes best with the understanding of a subject. Your Magnificence then may be pleased, to receive this small present, with the same mind that I send it; which if you shall throughly peruse and consider, you shall perceive therein that I exceedingly wish, that you may attain to that greatness, which your own fortune, and your excellent endowments promise you: and if your Magnificence from the very point of your Highness shall sometime cast your eyes upon these inferior places, you shall see how undeservedly I undergoe an extream and continual despight of Fortune.

T People who want to win the favor of a Prince often present themselves along with things that he finds most enjoyable and appealing. As a result, they frequently show up with horses, weapons, cloth of gold, precious stones, and other such ornaments that reflect their status. With the intention of offering myself to your Magnificence, along with a sign of my service to you, I realized there was nothing in my possession that I value more than the knowledge of great individuals' actions. I've gained this wisdom through years of experience in contemporary matters and constant reading of the ancients. Now that I've diligently worked through it and thoroughly examined it, I present it to your Magnificence. Although I might think this work is unworthy of your attention, your kindness gives me confidence that it will be appreciated. For my part, I can't offer you anything greater than the means to understand everything I've learned over many years filled with suffering and danger. This work isn't polished with fancy language or style, nor does it have any other embellishments to win over readers, as others do. I want it to be valued solely for the truth of its content and the seriousness of the subject. Nor should it be considered arrogant for someone of humble background to discuss the governance of Princes; just as artists who map out countries first go down to the plains to understand the nature of the mountains, and then climb the peaks to analyze the plains below, it’s necessary for a Prince to understand the people's nature, and for a subject to grasp the qualities of Princes. Therefore, I hope your Magnificence will accept this modest gift with the same spirit in which I send it. If you read and reflect on it thoroughly, you will see my deep wish for you to achieve the greatness that your fortune and excellent qualities promise. And if, from your high position, you ever glance down at these lesser places, you will realize how unjustly I endure extreme and constant disdain from Fortune.

{259}

THE TABLE OF THE CHAPTERS

CHAP. 1. How many sorts of Principalities there are, and how many wayes they are attained to

CHAP. 1. How many types of Principalities exist, and how are they acquired?

CHAP. 2. Of hereditary Principalities

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Of hereditary kingdoms

CHAP. 3. Of mixt Principalities

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Of mixed Principalities

CHAP. 4. Wherefore Darius his Kingdome, taken by Alexander, rebelled not against his successors after Alexanders death

CHAP. 4. After Darius's kingdom was taken by Alexander, it did not rebel against his successors following Alexander's death.

CHAP. 5. In what manner Cities and Principalities are to be governed, which before they were conquered, lived under their own laws

CHAP. 5. How Cities and Principalities should be governed, which before they were conquered, lived under their own laws

CHAP. 6. Of new Principalities that are conquered by ones own armes and valor

CHAP. 6. Of new Principalities that are conquered by one’s own arms and courage

{260}

CHAP. 7. Of new Principalities gotten by fortune and other mens forces

CHAP. 7. About new Principalities acquired through luck and the strength of others

CHAP. 8. Concerning those who by wicked means have attaind to a Principality

CHAP. 8. About those who have obtained a Principality through dishonest methods.

CHAP. 9. Of the Civil Principality

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Of the Civil Territory

CHAP. 10. In what manner the forces of all Principalities ought to be measured

CHAP. 10. How the forces of all Principalities should be measured

CHAP. 11. Concerning Ecclesiastical Principalities

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__. About Church Authorities

CHAP. 12. How many sorts of Military discipline there be; and touching mercenary soldiers

CHAP. 12. How many types of military discipline are there, and regarding mercenary soldiers.

CHAP. 13. Of Auxiliary Soldiers, mixt and natives

CHAP. 13. Of Auxiliary Soldiers, mixed and locals

CHAP. 14. What belongs to the Prince touching military discipline

CHAP. 14. What the Prince owns regarding military discipline

CHAP. 15. Of those things in respect whereof men, and especially Princes are prais'd or disprais'd

CHAP. 15. Of those things regarding which people, and especially leaders, are praised or criticized

{261}

CHAP. 16. Of Liberality and Miserableness

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Of Generosity and Stinginess

CHAP. 17. Of Cruelty and Clemency, and whether it is better to be belov'd or feared

CHAP. 17. Of Cruelty and Clemency, and whether it is better to be loved or feared

CHAP. 18. In what manner Princes ought to keep their word

CHAP. 18. How Princes should keep their promises

CHAP. 19. That Princes should take a care not to incur contempt or hatred

CHAP. 19. Princes should be careful not to bring on contempt or hatred.

CHAP. 20. Whether the Citadels and many other things, which Princes make use of, are profitable or dammageable

CHAP. 20. Whether the Citadels and many other things that princes use are beneficial or harmful

CHAP. 21. How a Prince ought to behave himself to gain reputation

CHAP. 21. How a Prince should act to build his reputation

CHAP. 22. Touching Princes Secretaries

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Contacting Princes Secretaries

CHAP. 23. That Flatterers are to be avoyded

Avoid flatterers.

CHAP. 24. Wherefore the Princes of Italy have lost their States

CHAP. 24. Why the princes of Italy have lost their territories.

{262}

CHAP. 25. How great power Fortune hath in humane affairs, and what means there is to resist it

CHAP. 25. How much influence Fortune has in human affairs, and what ways there are to resist it.

CHAP. 26. An exhortation to free Italy from the Barbarions

CHAP. 26. A call to liberate Italy from the Barbarians

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THE PRINCE

Written by

NICHOLAS MACHIAVELLI, Secretary and Citizen of Florence.

CHAP. I

How many sorts of Principalities there are, and how many wayes they are attained to.

A ll States, all Dominions that have had, or now have rule over men, have been and are, either Republiques or Principalities. Principalities are either hereditary, whereof they of the blood of the Lord thereof have long time been Princes; or else they are new; and those that are new, are either all new, as was the Dutchy of Millan to Francis Sforce; or are as members adjoyned to the hereditary State of the Prince that gains it; as the Kingdom of Naples is to the King of Spain. These Dominions so gotten, are accustomed either to live under a Prince, or to enjoy their liberty; and are made conquest of, either with others forces, or ones own, either by fortune, or by valor.

A All states and territories that have controlled or currently control people have been and are either republics or principalities. Principalities can be hereditary, where the ruling family has long been in power, or they can be new. New principalities can be completely new, like the Duchy of Milan under Francesco Sforza, or they can be added to a ruler's hereditary state, like the Kingdom of Naples is to the King of Spain. These territories, once acquired, typically live under a prince or enjoy their freedom, and they are conquered either with external forces, personal strength, luck, or bravery.

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CHAP. II

Of Hereditary Principalities.

I will not here discourse of Republiques, because I have other where treated of them at large: I will apply my self only to a Principality, and proceed, while I weave this web, by arguing thereupon, how these Principallities can be governed and maintained. I say then that in States of inheritance, and accustomed to the blood of their Princes, there are far fewer difficulties to keep them, than in the new: for it suffices only not to transgress the course his Ancestors took, and so afterward to temporise with those accidents that can happen; that if such a Prince be but of ordinary industry, he shall allwaies be able to maintain himself in his State, unless by some extraordinary or excessive power he be deprived thereof; and when he had lost it, upon the least sinister chance that befalls the usurper, he recovers it again. We have in Italy the Duke of Ferrara for example hereof, who was of ability to resist the Venetians, in the year 84, and to withstand Pope Julius in the tenth for no other reason, than because he had of old continued in that rule; for the natural Prince hath fewer occasions, and less heed to give offence, whereupon of necessity he must be more beloved; and unless it be that some extravagant vices of his bring him into hatred, it is agreeable to reason, that naturally he should be well beloved by his own subjects: and in the antiquity and continuation of the Dominion, the remembrances and occasions of innovations are quite extinguished: for evermore one change leaves a kind of breach or dent, to fasten the building of another.

I will not talk about republics here since I've covered them in detail elsewhere. Instead, I’ll focus on a principality and discuss how these principalities can be governed and maintained. I say that in hereditary states, where the people are accustomed to their rulers, it’s much easier to keep control compared to new ones. It’s enough not to stray from the path set by their ancestors and to manage the unforeseen challenges that arise. If such a prince has at least average skill, he will always be able to maintain his position unless he’s forced out by an extraordinary or overwhelming power; and once he loses it, a minor misstep by the usurper is often enough for him to regain it. We can look at the Duke of Ferrara in Italy as an example; he managed to stand up to the Venetians in 1484 and resist Pope Julius II later on, simply because he had maintained his rule for a long time. A natural prince has fewer reasons to cause offense, making him more likely to be loved by his subjects. Unless he has some serious flaws that cause hatred, it makes sense that he would generally be well-loved. As for the history and continuity of his rule, past memories and reasons for change are mostly erased; one change always leaves a mark that makes another change more likely.

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CHAP. III

Of mixt Principalities.

B ut the difficulties consist in the new Principality; and first, if it be not all new, but as a member, so that it may be termed altogether as mixt; and the variations thereof proceed in the first place from a natural difficulty, which we commonly finde in all new Principalities; for men do willingly change their Lord, beleeving to better their condition; and this beliefe causes them to take armes against him that rules over them, whereby they deceive themselves, because they find after by experience, they have made it worse: which depends upon another natural and ordinary necessity, forcing him alwaies to offend those, whose Prince he newly becomes, as well by his soldiers he is put to entertain upon them as by many other injuries, which a new conquest draws along with it; in such manner as thou findest all those thine enemies, whom thou hast endammaged in the seizing of that Principality, and afterwards canst not keep them thy friends that have seated thee in it, for not being able to satisfie them according to their expectations, nor put in practice strong remedies against them, being obliged to them. For however one be very well provided with strong armies, yet hath he alwaies need of the favor of the inhabitants in the Countrey, to enter thereinto. For these reasons, Lewis the twelfth, King of France, suddenly took Milan, and as soon lost it; and the first time Lodwick his own forces served well enough to wrest it out of his hands; for those people that had opened him the gates, finding themselves deceived of their opinion, and of that future good which they had promised themselves, could not endure the distastes the new Prince gave them. True it is, that Countreys that have rebelled again the second time, being recovered, are harder lost; for their Lord, taking occasion from their rebellion, is less respective of {266} persons, but cares only to secure himself, by punishing the delinquents, to clear all suspicions, and to provide for himself where he thinks he is weakest: so that if to make France lose Milan the first time, it was enough for Duke Lodwick to make some small stir only upon the confines; yet afterwards, before they could make him lose it the second time, they had need of the whole world together against him, and that all his armies should be wasted and driven out of Italy; which proceeded from the forenamed causes: however though both the first and second time it was taken from him. The generall causes of the first we have treated of; it remains now that we see those of the second; and set down the remedies that he had, or any one else can have that should chance to be in those termes he was, whereby he might be able to maintain himself better in his conquest than the King of France did. I say therefore, that these States which by Conquest are annexed to the ancient states of their conqueror, are either of the same province and the same language, or otherwise; and when they are, it is very easy to hold them, especially when they are not used to live free; and to enjoy them securely, it is enough to have extinguished the Princes line who ruled over them: For in other matters, allowing them their ancient conditions, and there being not much difference of manners betwixt them, men ordinarily live quiet enough; as we have seen that Burgundy did, Britany, Gascony, and Normandy, which so long time continued with France: for however there be some difference of language between them, yet can they easily comport one with another; and whosoever makes the conquest of them, meaning to hold them, must have two regards; the first, that the race of their former Prince be quite extinguished; the other, that he change nothing, neither in their lawes nor taxes, so that in a very short time they become one entire body with their ancient Principality. But when any States are gaind in a Province disagreeing in language, manners, and orders, here are the difficulties, and here is there need of good fortune, and great industry to maintain them; and it would be one of the best {267} and livelyest remedies, for the Conqueror to goe in person and dwell there; this would make the possession hereof more secure and durable; as the Turk hath done in Greece, who among all the other courses taken by him for to hold that State, had he not gone thither himself in person to dwell, it had never been possible for him to have kept it: for abiding there, he sees the disorders growing in their beginnings, and forthwith can remedy them; whereas being not there present, they are heard of when they are grown to some height, and then is there no help for them. Moreover, the Province is not pillaged by the officers thou sendest thither: the subjects are much satisfied of having recourse to the Prince near at hand, whereupon have they more reason to love him, if they mean to be good; and intending to do otherwise, to fear him: and forrein Princes will be well aware how they invade that State; insomuch, that making his abode there, he can very hardly lose it. Another remedy, which is also a better, is to send Colonies into one or two places, which may be as it were the keys of that State; for it is necessary either to do this, or to maintain there many horse and foot. In these colonies the Prince makes no great expence, and either without his charge, or at a very small rate, he may both send and maintain them; and gives offence only to them from whom he takes their fields and houses, to bestow them on those new inhabitants who are but a very small part of that State; and those that he offends, remaining dispersed and poore, can never hurt him: and all the rest on one part, have no offence given them, and therefore a small matter keeps them in quiet: on the other side, they are wary not to erre, for fear it befalls not them, as it did those that were dispoild. I conclude then, that those colonies that are not chargeable, are the more trusty, give the less offence; and they that are offended, being but poor and scattered, can do but little harme, as I have said; for it is to be noted, that men must either be dallyed and flattered withall, or else be quite crusht; for they revenge themselves of small dammages; but of great ones they are not able; so that when wrong is done {268} to any man, it ought so to be done, that it need fear no return of revenge again. But in lieu of Colonies, by maintaining soldiers there, the expence is great; for the whole revenues of that State are to be spent in the keeping of it; so the conquest proves but a loss to him that hath got it, and endammages him rather; for it hurts that whole State to remove the army from place to place, of which annoyance every one hath a feeling, and so becomes enemie to thee; as they are enemies, I wis, who are outraged by thee in their own houses, whensoever they are able to do thee mischief. Every way then is this guard unprofitable. Besides, he that is in a different Province, (as it is said) should make himself Head and defender of his less powerfull neighbors, and devise alwaies to weaken those that are more mighty therein, and take care that upon no chance there enter not any foreiner as mighty as himself; for it will alwaies come to pass, that they shall be brought in by those that are discontented, either upon ambition, or fear; as the Etolians brought the Romans into Greece; and they were brought into every countrey they came, by the Natives; and the course of the matter is, that so soon as a powerfull Stranger enters a countrey, all those that are the less powerfull there, cleave to him, provoked by an envy they beare him that is more mighty than they; so that for these of the weaker sort, he may easily gain them without any pains: for presently all of them together very willingly make one lump with that he hath gotten: He hath only to beware that these increase not their strengths, nor their authorities, and so he shall easily be able by his own forces, and their assistances, to take down those that are mighty, and remain himself absolute arbitre of that Countrey. And he that playes not well this part, shall quickly lose what he hath gotten; and while he holds it, shall find therein a great many troubles and vexations. The Romans in the Provinces they seiz'd on, observed well these points, sent colonies thither, entertained the weaker sort, without augmenting any thing their power, abated the forces of those that were mighty, and permitted not any powerfull forreiner to gain too much {269} reputation there. And I will content my self only with the countrey of Greece for example hereof. The Achayans and Etolians were entertained by them, the Macedons kingdome was brought low, Antiochus was driven thence, nor ever did the Achayans or Etolians deserts prevail so far for them, that they would ever promise to enlarge their State, nor the perswasions of Philip induce them ever to be his friends, without bringing him lower; nor yet could Antiochus his power make them ever consent that he should hold any State in that countrey: for the Romans did in these cases that which all judicious Princes ought to do, who are not only to have regard unto all present mischiefs, but also to the future, and to provide for those with all industry; for by taking order for those when they are afarre off, it is easie to prevent them; but by delaying till they come near hand to thee, the remedy comes too late; for this malignity is grown incurable: and it befalls this, as the physicians say of the hectick feaver, that in the beginning it is easily cur'd, but hardly known; but in the course of time, not having been known in the beginning, nor cured, it becomes easie to know, but hard to cure. Even so falls it out in matters of State; for by knowing it aloof off (which is given only to a wise man to do) the mischiefs that then spring up, are quickly helped; but when, for not having been perceived, they are suffered to increase, so that every one sees them, there is then no cure for them: therefore the Romans, seeing these inconvenients afar off, alwaies prevented them, and never sufferd them to follow; for to escape a war, because they knew that a war is not undertaken, but deferred for anothers advantage; therefore would they rather make a war with Philip and Antiochus in Greece, to the end it should not afterwards be made with them in Italy, though for that time they were able to avoid both the one and the other, which they thought not good to do: nor did they approve of that saying that is ordinarily in the mouthes of the Sages of our dayes, to enjoy the benefits of the present time; but that rather, to take the benefit of their valor and wisdome; for time drives forward everything, and may bring {270} with it as well good as evil, and evil as good. But let us return to France, and examine if any of the things prescribed have been done by them: and we will speak of Lewis, and not of Charles, as of whom by reason of the long possession he held in Italy we better knew the wayes he went: and you shall see he did the clean contrary to what should have been done by him that would maintain a State of different Language and conditions. King Lewis was brought into Italy by the Venetians ambition, who would have gotten for their shares half the State of Lombardy: I will not blame his comming, or the course he took, because he had a mind to begin to set a foot in Italy; but having not any friends in the country, all gates being barred against him, by reason of King Charles his carriage there, he was constrained to joyn friendship with those he could; and this consideration well taken, would have proved lucky to him, when in the rest of his courses he had not committed any error. The King then having conquered Lombardy, recovered presently all that reputation that Charles had lost him; Genua yeelded to him, the Florentines became friends with him; the Marquess of Mantua, the Duke of Ferrara, the Bentivolti, the Lady of Furli, the Lord of Faenza, Pesaro Rimino, Camerino, and Piombino, the Lucheses, Pisans and Sienses, every one came and offered him friendship: then might the Venetians consider the rashness of the course they had taken, who, only to get into their hands two Townes in Lombardy, made the King Lord of two thirds in Italy. Let any man now consider with how small difficulty could the King have maintained his reputation in Italy, if he had followed these aforenamed rules, and secured and defended those his friends, who because their number was great, and they weak and fearful, some of the Church, and others of the Venetians were alwaies forced to hold with him, and by their means he might easily have been able to secure himself against those that were mightiest: but he was no sooner got into Milan, than he took a quite wrong course, by giving ayd to Pope Alexander, to seize upon Romania, and perceiv'd not that by this resolution he weakned himself, ruining his own {271} friends, and those had cast themselves into his bosom, making the Church puissant, by adding to their Spiritual power, they gaind their authority, and so much temporal estate. And having once got out of the way, he was constrained to go on forward; insomuch as to stop Alexanders ambition, and that he should not become Lord of all Tuscany, of force he was to come into Italy: and this sufficed him not, to have made the Church mighty, and taken away his own friends; but for the desire he had to get the Kingdome of Naples, he divided it with the King of Spain: and where before he was the sole arbitre of Italy, he brought in a competitor, to the end that all the ambitious persons of that country, and all that were ill affected to him, might have otherwhere to make their recourse: and whereas he might have left in that Kingdome some Vice-King of his own, he took him from thence, to place another there, that might afterward chace him thence. It is a thing indeed very natural and ordinary, to desire to be of the getting hand: and alwaies when men undertake it, if they can effect it, they shall be prais'd for it, or at least not blam'd: but when they are not able, and yet will undertake it, here lies the blame, here is the error committed. If France then was able with her own power to assail the Kingdome of Naples, she might well have done it; but not being able, she should not have divided it: and if the division she made of Lombardy with the Venetians, deserv'd some excuse, thereby to set one foot in Italy; yet this merits blame, for not being excused by that necessity. Lewis then committed these five faults; extinguisht the feebler ones, augmented the State of another that was already powerful in Italy, brought thereinto a very puissant forreiner, came not thither himself to dwell there, nor planted any colonies there: which faults while he liv'd, he could not but be the worse for; yet all could not have gone so ill, had he not committed the sixt, to take from the Venetians their State; for if he had not enlarg'd the Churches territories nor brought the Spaniard into Italy, it had bin necessary to take them lower; but having first taken those other courses, he should never have {272} given way to their destruction; for while they had been strong, they would alwaies have kept the others off from venturing on the conquest of Lombardy. For the Venetians would never have given their consents thereto, unless they should have been made Lords of it themselves; and the others would never have taken it from France, to give it them: and then they would never have dar'd to go and set upon them both together. And if any one should say, that King Lewis yeelded Romania to Alexander, and the Kingdome of Naples to Spain, to avoid a war; I answer with the reasons above alledged, that one should never suffer any disorder to follow, for avoiding of a war; for that war is not sav'd, but put off to thy disadvantage. And if any others argue, that the King had given his word to the Pope, to do that exploit for him, for dissolving of his marriage, and for giving the Cardinals Cap to him of Roan; I answer with that which hereafter I shall say touching Princes words, how they ought to be kept. King Lewis then lost Lombardy, for not having observ'd some of those termes which others us'd, who have possessed themselves of countries, and desir'd to keep them. Nor is this any strange thing, but very ordinary and reasonable: and to this purpose I spake at Nantes with that French Cardinal, when Valentine (for so ordinarily was Cæsar Borgia Pope Alexanders son call'd) made himself master of Romania; for when the Cardinal said to me, that the Italians understood not the feats of war; I answered, the Frenchmen understood not matters of State: for had they been well vers'd therein, they would never have suffer'd the Church to have grown to that greatness. And by experience we have seen it, that the power hereof in Italy, and that of Spain also, was caused by France, and their own ruine proceeded from themselves. From whence a general rule may be taken, which never, or very seldom fails, That he that gives the means to another to become powerful, ruines himself; for that power is caus'd by him either with his industry, or with his force; and as well the one as the other of these two is suspected by him that is grown puissant.

B But the challenges come with the new Principality; first, if it isn’t entirely new but belongs as a part, it can be referred to as mixed. The variations arise from a natural difficulty, which we generally see in all new Principalities; because people are eager to switch their Lord, believing it will improve their situation. This belief leads them to take up arms against their ruler, deceiving themselves, as they realize through experience that they have made things worse. This depends on another natural and common necessity, which compels him to upset those whose Prince he has just become, both through the soldiers he must maintain and through various other grievances that come with a new conquest. Thus, you find all those enemies harmed during the takeover of that Principality, and later, you can’t keep those who supported you as friends, because you are unable to meet their expectations or to take strong actions against them since you are indebted to them. No matter how well-equipped one is with strong armies, there is always a need for the goodwill of the local inhabitants to gain entry. For these reasons, Louis the Twelfth, King of France, quickly took Milan and soon lost it; and the first time Ludovico's own forces were adequate enough to pry it from his control, as those who opened their gates to him found themselves disappointed in their expectations of future gains and couldn’t tolerate the injustices brought by the new Prince. Indeed, once a territory has revolted for a second time and is reclaimed, it is harder to lose it; for their Lord, taking advantage of the rebellion, is less considerate of individuals, focusing instead on securing himself by punishing wrongdoers to eliminate all suspicion and fortify himself where he feels weakest. So that if during the first loss of Milan for France it was enough for Duke Ludovico to make a minor stir on the borders, afterwards, before they could cause him to lose it again, they would need the whole world united against him, and all his armies would have to be worn down and driven out of Italy; which stemmed from the aforementioned reasons. Although it was taken away from him both the first and second times. The general reasons for the first loss have been addressed; now we must look at those for the second and outline the solutions he had, or any others could have, in the conditions he faced to maintain his conquest better than the King of France did. Therefore, I assert that those States annexed through conquest to the ancient states of their conqueror are either from the same region and share the same language, or not. When they do share this, it’s very easy to maintain control, especially if they have not been accustomed to living freely. To enjoy these territories safely, it is sufficient to have eliminated the ruling Prince’s lineage: Regarding other matters, if their ancient customs are allowed to persist and not much difference in behavior exists among them, people generally live quite peacefully; as we have seen with Burgundy, Brittany, Gascony, and Normandy, which remained part of France for a long time: for although there is some difference of language among them, they can easily get along; and whoever conquers them, intending to hold them, must pay attention to two things: first, that the lineage of their former Prince is completely extinguished; and second, that nothing is changed, neither in their laws nor in their taxes, so that in a short amount of time they become one cohesive entity with the ancient Principality. However, when any States are gained in a Province differing in language, customs, and systems, that’s where the challenges arise, and that’s where good fortune and considerable effort are necessary to keep control; and one of the best and most effective solutions for the Conqueror is to go in person and settle there; this would make possession of it more secure and lasting; just as the Turk has done in Greece, who, among all his other strategies to hold that State, if he had not gone there himself to reside, it would never have been possible for him to maintain it: for by staying there, he sees the disorders from their inception and can immediately address them; whereas when he’s not present, they’re only reported when they have escalated, and then it becomes too late to fix them. Moreover, the Province is not pillaged by the officials he sends there: the subjects are much more satisfied knowing they have access to their Prince nearby, which gives them more reason to love him if they wish to be loyal; and if they aim to be otherwise, to fear him. Foreign Princes will also be cautious about invading that State, to such an extent that by establishing his presence there, he can hardly lose it. Another remedy, which is even better, is to send Colonies to one or two strategic locations that can be seen as the keys to that State; for it’s necessary to do this, or to maintain a troop of cavalry and infantry there. In these colonies, the Prince incurs little expense, and either at no cost, or at very low cost, he can send and sustain them; and he only offends those from whom he takes fields and homes to give to the new inhabitants, who represent a very small segment of that State; and those he offends, being scattered and impoverished, can never harm him: and all the rest, who are not offended, require only minimal effort to keep them content. On the other hand, they are cautious not to err, fearing they may end up like those who were dispossessed. I conclude, then, that those colonies which are not costly are the most reliable, offend the least, and those who are offended, being poor and dispersed, can do very little harm, as I mentioned; for it should be noted that people must either be courted and flattered or completely crushed; for they take revenge for small grievances; but for large ones, they are unable to retaliate; so that when a wrong is done {268} to someone, it should be carried out in such a way that there is no fear of reprisal. But instead of Colonies, maintaining soldiers there incurs great expense; for all the revenues from that State would be consumed in keeping them there; so the conquest proves to be a loss for the one who has acquired it, and harms him instead; for it disrupts the entire State to move the army around, and everyone feels that annoyance, thus turning against you; just as those become enemies who are aggrieved by you in their own homes whenever they can do you harm. Thus, this form of protection is unproductive. Furthermore, he who is in a different Province, (as it is often said) should position himself as the leader and protector of his weaker neighbors, and always work to undermine those who are more powerful and ensure that no foreigner of equal strength enters, for it will always happen that they will be brought in by the discontented, whether through ambition or fear; as the Aetolians brought the Romans into Greece; and they were welcomed by every country they entered, by the Natives; and the dynamic is that as soon as a powerful outsider enters a country, all those who are less powerful there tend to align with him, motivated by envy they feel towards the more powerful than themselves; thus, those in the weaker group can easily align with him without any effort: for immediately, all of them together readily merge with whatever he has captured. He only has to ensure that these don’t increase in strength or authority, and he will easily be able to use his own forces combined with theirs to bring down the mighty, remaining the absolute ruler of that Country. And he who does not manage this well shall quickly lose what he has gained; and while he holds it, he will find it filled with troubles and troubles. The Romans, in the Provinces they seized, understood these points well, sent colonies there, won over the weaker elements, without bolstering their power, diminished the strength of the powerful, and did not allow any strong foreigner to gain too great a {269} reputation. I will content myself with the example of Greece here. The Achaeans and Aetolians were welcomed by them, the Macedonian kingdom was brought down, Antiochus was driven out, nor did the Achaeans or Aetolians ever manage to leverage their merits so far that they would promise to expand their State, nor did the persuasion of Philip ever lead them to become his allies, without bringing him down; nor could Antiochus's power ever convince them to accept his holding of any State in that country: for the Romans did in these situations what all wise Princes ought to do, who must not only consider all current dangers, but also think ahead and provide for future threats with all diligence; for if you prepare for them while they are still distant, it’s easy to avert them; but delaying until they’re right in your midst brings remedy too late, as this ailment becomes incurable: it parallels what physicians say of the hectic fever, which can be readily cured in its early stages, but is often difficult to detect; but over time, if it has gone unrecognized in the beginning and remains untreated, it becomes easy to identify but difficult to treat. Matters of State unfold similarly; for if you identify issues from afar (which is allowed only to a wise person), the emergent problems can be swiftly resolved; however, when, due to lack of awareness, they are allowed to escalate, and everyone sees them, then there is no remedy for them: therefore the Romans, noticing these inconveniences from a distance, always intervened and never allowed them to follow through; for they avoided war, knowing that wars won't disappear but are postponed for someone else's benefit; therefore they preferred to engage in war with Philip and Antiochus in Greece, to prevent a potential conflict on their own land later, even though at the time they were capable of preventing both situations, which they deemed unwise to do: nor did they endorse the common saying among the sages of our time, to enjoy the benefits of the present moment; but rather, to leverage the advantages of their valor and wisdom; for time propels all things forward, and may bring {270} both good things and bad, as well as evil and good. But let’s return to France and examine whether any of the mentioned strategies were applied by them: and we’ll talk about Louis, not Charles, since due to Charles’ lengthy hold in Italy, we are better familiar with the ways he operated: and you’ll see he took the exact opposite course of action regarding what should have been done by someone wishing to maintain control in a State with different Language and customs. King Louis was lured into Italy by the Venetians' ambitions, who wanted a share of half of Lombardy: I will not critique his entry or the path he chose, because he aimed to establish a foothold in Italy; but having no allies in the region, all gates barring him due to King Charles’ policies there, he was forced to form alliances with whoever he could; and considering this carefully, it could have worked in his favor, had he not made errors in other aspects of his course. Once King conquered Lombardy, he swiftly regained all the prestige that Charles had lost; Genoa surrendered to him, the Florentines aligned with him; the Marquess of Mantua, the Duke of Ferrara, the Bentivoglio, the Lady of Forli, the Lord of Faenza, Pesaro, Rimino, Camerino, and Piombino, the Lucchese, Pisan, and Sienese, all came forward to offer their friendship: then the Venetians might reconsider the recklessness of their actions, who, merely to gain two towns in Lombardy, made the King master of two-thirds of Italy. Let anyone reflect on how easily the King could have maintained his reputation in Italy, had he adhered to the aforementioned guidelines, securing and defending those allies, who by their sheer number and their own fear, along with some from the Church, were continuously compelled to side with him, and through their assistance, he could have easily secured himself from the mightiest threats: but no sooner did he arrive in Milan than he took a completely misguided path, by supporting Pope Alexander in seizing Romania, failing to realize that this decision weakened him, damaging his own {271} allies, and empowering the Church by increasing their Spiritual authority and thus their temporal power. Once he strayed off course, he had to continue along that path; so much so that to curb Alexander’s ambition and prevent him from becoming the Lord of all Tuscany, he was compelled to return to Italy: and it was insufficient for him that he had made the Church powerful and swallowed his own allies; but fueled by his desire to acquire the Kingdom of Naples, he divided it with the King of Spain: and where previously he had been the sole decision-maker in Italy, he introduced a rival, allowing all the ambitious individuals in that country, and all who held negative feelings towards him, to find other avenues for their ambitions: and although he could have left a Viceroy of his own in that Kingdom, he removed him to place another there who might later drive him out. It is indeed very natural and common to want to be the one profiting: and whenever people pursue this, if they succeed, they will be praised for it, or at least not criticized: but when they fail and still attempt it, therein lies the blame, therein lies the mistake. If France was then able to challenge the Kingdom of Naples on her own, it could certainly have done so; but unable to, she should not have pursued a division: and if the division she made over Lombardy with the Venetians deserves some justification, to establish a foothold in Italy, yet this is blameworthy, as the necessity cannot excuse it. Therefore, Louis made these five mistakes: he exterminated the weaker factions, bolstered the power of another that was already strong in Italy, invited a very powerful foreigner into the mix, failed to establish himself there in person, nor did he establish any colonies there: which errors while he lived, he could not but suffer for; nevertheless, things might not have gone so badly had he not committed the sixth mistake, to take the Venetians’ State; for if he had not expanded the Church’s territories nor brought the Spaniard into Italy, it would have been necessary to bring them down a notch; but having taken those other paths first, he should never have permitted their destruction; for had they remained strong, they would have consistently kept the others from attempting to conquer Lombardy. The Venetians would have never consented to this, unless they had been made Lords themselves; and the others would never have dared to take it from France to give it to them: and then they would never have dared to approach and attack both together. Should someone now argue that King Louis yielded Romania to Alexander and the Kingdom of Naples to Spain to avoid a war; I counter with the reasons outlined above, that one should never allow any disorder to arise in order to prevent a war; for that war does not vanish, but is postponed to your detriment. And if anyone else argues that the King had given his word to the Pope, to carry out that endeavor for him, for the dissolution of his marriage, and for granting the Roan Cardinal his cap; I respond with what I shall later discuss regarding how Princes’ promises ought to be honored. King Louis then lost Lombardy for neglecting to observe some of the principles others have used, who have gained control of territories and wished to hold onto them. Nor is this surprising but rather very ordinary and rational: and for this reason, I spoke in Nantes with that French Cardinal, when Valentino (as Caesar Borgia, Pope Alexander's son, was commonly called) took control of Romania; for when the Cardinal remarked to me that the Italians were ignorant of the art of war, I replied that the Frenchmen were clueless about matters of State: for had they been well-versed therein, they would never have allowed the Church to grow to such power. Experience has shown us that the authority of the Church in Italy and that of Spain as well were consequences of France, and their own downfall resulted from themselves. From this, a general rule can be deduced, which rarely, if ever, fails: He who provides the means for another to become powerful, ruins himself; for that power is facilitated by either his industriousness or through force; and both forms are regarded with suspicion by the one who has become strong.

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CHAP. IV

Wherefore Darius his Kingdome taken by Alexander, rebelled not against Alexanders Successors after his death.

T he difficulties being consider'd, which a man hath in the maintaining of a State new gotten, some might marvaile how it came to pass, that Alexander the great subdued all Asia in a few years; and having hardly possessed himself of it, died; whereupon it seemed probable that all that State should have rebelled; nevertheless his Successors kept the possession of it, nor found they other difficulty in holding it, than what arose among themselves through their own ambition. I answer, that all the Principalities whereof we have memory left us, have been governed in two several manners; either by a Prince, and all the rest Vassals, who as ministers by his favor and allowance, do help to govern that Kingdom; or by a Prince and by Barons, who not by their Princes favor, but by the antiquity of blood hold that degree. And these kinds of Barons have both states of their own, and Vassals who acknowledge them for their Lords; and bare them a true natural affection. Those States that are govern'd by a Prince and by Vassals, have their Prince ruling over them with more authority; for in all his countrey, there is none acknowledged for superior, but himself: and if they yeeld obedience to any one else, it is but as to his minister and officer, nor beare they him any particular good will. The examples of these two different Governments now in our dayes, are, the Turk, and the King of France. The Turks whole Monarchy is govern'd by one Lord, and the rest are all his Vassals; and dividing his whole Kingdom into divers Sangiacques or Governments, he sends several thither, and those he chops and changes, as he pleases. But the King {274} of France is seated in the midst of a multitude of Lords, who of old have been acknowledg'd for such by their subjects, and being belov'd by them, enjoy their preheminencies; nor can the King take their States from them without danger. He then that considers the one and the other of these two States, shall find difficulty in the conquest of the Turks State; but when once it is subdu'd, great facility to hold it. The reasons of these difficulties in taking of the Turks Kingdom from him, are, because the Invader cannot be called in by the Princes of that Kingdom, nor hope by the rebellion of those which he hath about him, to be able to facilitate his enterprize: which proceeds from the reasons aforesaid; for they being all his slaves, and oblig'd to him, can more hardly be corrupted; and put case they were corrupted, little profit could he get by it, they not being able to draw after them any people, for the reasons we have shewed: whereupon he that assails the Turk, must think to find him united; and must rather relie upon his own forces, than in the others disorders: but when once he is overcome and broken in the field, so that he cannot repair his armies, there is nothing else to be doubted than the Royal blood, which being once quite out, there is none else left to be feard, none of the others having any credit with the people. And as the conqueror before the victory could not hope in them; so after it, ought he not to fear them. The contrary falls out in Kingdoms governed as is that of France: for it is easie to be enterd by the gaining of any Baron in the Kingdom; for there are alwaies some malecontents to be found, and those that are glad of innovation. Those for the reasons alledg'd are able to open thee a way into that State, and to further thy victory, which afterwards to make good to thee, draws with it exceeding many difficulties, as well with those that have ayded thee, as those thou hast supprest. Nor is it enough for thee to root out the Princes race: for there remaine still those Lords who quickly will be the ring-leaders of new changes; and in case thou art not able to content these, nor extinguish them, thou losest that State, whensoever the occasion is offerd. Now if thou {275} shalt consider what sort of government that of Darius was, thou shalt find it like to the Turks dominion, and therefore Alexander was necessitated first to defeat him utterly, and drive him out of the field; after which victory Darius being dead, that State was left secure to Alexander, for the reasons we treated of before: and his successors, had they continued in amity, might have enjoy'd it at ease: nor ever arose there in that Kingdome other tumults, than those they themselves stir'd up. But of the States that are order'd and grounded as that of France, it is impossible to become master at such ease: and from hence grew the frequent rebellions of Spain, France, and Greece against the Romans, by reason of the many Principalities those States had: whereof while the memory lasted, the Romans were alwayes doubtfull of the possession of them; but the memory of them being quite wip't out, by the power and continuance of the Empire, at length they enjoy'd it securely; and they also were able afterwards fighting one with another, each of one them to draw after them the greater part of those provinces, according as their authority had gain'd them credit therein: and that because the blood of their ancient Lords was quite spent, they acknowledg'd no other but the Romans. By the consideration then of these things, no man will marvaile that Alexander had so little trouble to keep together the State of Asia; and that others have had such great difficulties to maintain their conquest, as Pyrrhus, and many others; which proceeds not from the small or great valour of the conquerour, but from the difference of the subject.

T The challenges a person faces in maintaining a newly acquired state are considerable. Some might wonder how Alexander the Great managed to conquer all of Asia in just a few years, only to die soon after gaining control, leading many to believe that the entire region would revolt. However, his successors maintained their hold on it, facing no greater difficulties than those stemming from their own ambitions. I explain that all known principalities have been ruled in two main ways: either by a prince with vassals who govern the kingdom with his permission or by a prince alongside barons who hold their status due to noble lineage rather than the prince's favor. These barons possess their own states and have vassals who recognize them as their lords and feel genuine loyalty toward them. In states governed by a prince and vassals, the prince wields more power since no one else is acknowledged as superior. Any obedience given to others is merely acknowledgment of their role as agents of the prince, not out of personal affection. The modern examples of these two governance types are the Turks and the King of France. The entire Turkish empire is ruled by one lord, with everyone else as his vassals. He divides his kingdom into several sangiacques, appointing and changing governors as he sees fit. In contrast, the King of France is surrounded by many lords who have historically been recognized as such by their subjects and are loved by them, enjoying their privileges; the king cannot easily take their lands without risking unrest. Considering both types of governance, one finds it challenging to conquer the Turkish state, but, once subjugated, it is relatively easy to hold. The difficulties in invading the Turkish kingdom arise from the fact that the invader cannot rely on the princes of that kingdom for support, nor can they count on any rebellions among those close to him to aid their efforts. Since these individuals are all his subordinates and tied to him, they can't easily be bribed; even if they were, they lack the power to rally the populace for support, as we've noted. Thus, anyone attacking the Turk should expect him to be united and must depend on their own strengths rather than relying on any chaos among his ranks. However, once the Turk is defeated in battle and unable to replenish his armies, there’s nothing left to fear but the royal lineage; once they are entirely removed, no one else poses a significant threat to the conqueror. In contrast, in kingdoms like France, it's easy to invade by winning over a baron, as there are always discontented individuals looking for change. Such individuals can provide a pathway into the kingdom and assist in securing victory, but maintaining that victory is fraught with challenges, both from those who helped and those who have been subdued. It’s not enough to eliminate the prince’s bloodline; the remaining lords can quickly become catalysts for new revolts. If you cannot satisfy them or root out their influence, you risk losing the state whenever the opportunity arises. If you examine the governance of Darius, you'll find it similar to that of the Turks. Hence, Alexander had to completely defeat him and chase him from the battlefield. After Darius's death, that state was left secure for Alexander, for the reasons we discussed earlier. His successors, had they remained allies, could have enjoyed it peacefully, with no further disturbances arising except those they instigated themselves. In contrast, states structured like France cannot be easily conquered; this is why Spain, France, and Greece frequently rebelled against the Romans due to the numerous principalities in those regions. As long as the memory of those principalities remained, the Romans were always uncertain about their possession. However, once this memory faded due to the power and longevity of the Empire, they eventually secured their hold. They were also able to conquer and retain the loyalty of many provinces, as former rulers’ bloodlines had been exhausted, leaving the population recognizing only Roman authority. Given these considerations, it is no wonder that Alexander had relatively few problems keeping the Asian state intact, while others like Pyrrhus struggled significantly to maintain their conquests. This discrepancy arises not from the conqueror’s bravery but from the nature of the subjects themselves.

{276}

CHAP. V

In what manner Cities and Principalities are to be govern'd, which, before they were conquer'd, liv'd under their own Laws.

W hen those States that are conquered, as it is said, have been accustomed to live under their own Laws, and in liberty, there are three wayes for a man to hold them. The first is to demolish all their strong places; the other, personally to goe and dwell there; the third, to suffer them to live under their own Laws, drawing from them some tribute, and creating therein an Oligarchy, that may continue it in thy service: for that State being created by that Prince, knowes it cannot consist without his aid and force, who is like to doe all he can to maintain it; and with more facility is a City kept by meanes of her own Citizens, which hath been us'd before to live free, than by any other way of keeping. We have for example the Spartans and the Romans; the Spartans held Athens and Thebes, creating there an Oligarchy: yet they lost it. The Romans to be sure of Capua, Carthage, and Numantia, dismantell'd them quite, and so lost them not: they would have kept Greece as the Spartans had held them, leaving them free, and letting them enjoy their own Laws; and it prospered not with them: so that they were forc'd to deface many Cities of that province to hold it. For in truth there is not a surer way to keep them under, than by demolishments; and whoever becomes master of a City us'd to live free, and dismantells it not, let him look himselfe to bee ruin'd by it; for it alwayes in time of rebellion takes the name of liberty for refuge, and the ancient orders it had; which neither by length of time, nor for any favours afforded them, are ever forgotten; and for any thing that can be done, or order'd, unlesse the inhabitants be disunited {277} and dispers'd, that name is never forgotten, nor those customes: but presently in every chance recourse is thither made: as Pisa did after so many yeeres that she had been subdu'd by the Florentines. But when the Cities or the Provinces are accustomed to live under a Prince, and that whole race is quite extirpated: on one part being us'd to obey; on the other, not having their old Prince; they agree not to make one from among themselves: they know not how to live in liberty, in such manner that they are much slower to take armes; and with more facility may a Prince gaine them, and secure himselfe of them. But in Republiques there is more life in them, more violent hatred, more earnest desire of revenge; nor does the remembrance of the ancient liberty ever leave them, or suffer them to rest; so that the safest way, is, either to ruine them, or dwell among them.

W When those states that have been conquered, as they say, are used to living under their own laws and in freedom, there are three ways for a person to maintain control over them. The first is to tear down all their fortifications; the second is to personally go and live there; the third is to allow them to maintain their own laws, while extracting some tribute and establishing an oligarchy that serves your interests. This way, since the state is created by that leader, it understands it can't survive without his support and power, who is likely to do everything possible to uphold it; and it’s easier to keep a city controlled by its own citizens, who are accustomed to living freely, than by any other means of governance. Take the Spartans and the Romans as examples; the Spartans dominated Athens and Thebes by creating an oligarchy there, but ultimately they lost control. The Romans, determined to hold onto Capua, Carthage, and Numantia, completely dismantled them, and as a result, did not lose them. They desired to keep Greece in the same way the Spartans had, allowing them freedom and letting them keep their own laws, but that strategy didn’t work out for them, forcing them to destroy many cities in that region to maintain control. In reality, there’s no more reliable way to keep them subdued than through destruction; and anyone who masters a city used to independence and doesn’t dismantle it should expect to face ruin because it always claims the right of liberty during times of rebellion, along with the ancient customs retained, which are never forgotten, regardless of how much time passes or any favors given. No matter what is done or ordered, unless the inhabitants are divided and scattered, that claim to liberty and those customs are never erased; people will always turn back to that idea, like Pisa did after many years of being subdued by the Florentines. However, when cities or provinces are used to being ruled by a prince, and that entire lineage is completely wiped out—on one side having become accustomed to obedience, while on the other lacking their old prince—they rarely choose to elect a new leader among themselves; they don’t know how to live freely, which makes them slower to take up arms, and allows a prince to gain their loyalty more easily and secure himself. In republics, however, there’s a lot more energy, deep hatred, and strong desires for revenge; the memory of past freedoms never leaves them or allows them to be at peace, so the safest approach is either to destroy them or live among them.

CHAP. VI

Of new Principalities, that are conquer'd by ones own armes and valour.

L et no man marvaile, if in the discourse I shall make of new Principalities, both touching a Prince, and touching a State, I shall alledge very famous examples: for seeing men almost alwayes walk in the pathes beaten by others, and proceed in their actions by imitation; and being that others wayes cannot bee exactly follow'd, nor their vertues, whose patterne thou set'st before thee, attain'd unto; a wise man ought alwayes to tread the footsteps of the worthiest persons, and imitate those that have been the most excellent: to the end that if his vertue arrive not thereto, at least it may yeeld some favour thereof, and doe as good Archers use, who thinking the place they intend to hit, too farre distant, and knowing how farr the strength of their bow will carry, they lay their ayme a great {278} deale higher than the mark; not for to hit so high with their arrow, but to bee able with the help of so high an aime to reach the place they shoot at. I say, that in Principalities wholly new, where there is a new Prince, there is more and lesse difficulty in maintaining them, as the vertue of their Conquerour is greater or lesser. And because this successe, to become a Prince of a private man, presupposes either vertue, or fortune; mee thinks the one and other of these two things in part should mitigate many difficulties; however he that hath lesse stood upon fortune, hath maintain'd himselfe the better. Moreover it somewhat facilitates the matter in that the Prince is constrain'd, because he hath not other dominions, in person to come and dwell there. But to come to these who by their own vertues, and not by fortune, attain'd to be Princes; the excellentest of these are Moses, Cyrus, Romulus, Theseus, and such like; and though of Moses we are not to reason, he onely executing the things that were commanded him by God; yet merits he well to be admir'd, were it only for that grace that made him worthy to converse with God. But considering Cyrus, and the others, who either got or founded Kingdomes, we shall find them all admirable; and if there particular actions and Lawes be throughly weigh'd, they will not appeare much differing from those of Moyses, which he receiv'd from so Sovraigne an instructer. And examining their lives and actions, it will not appeare, that they had other help of fortune, than the occasion, which presented them with the matter wherein they might introduce what forme they then pleas'd; and without that occasion, the vertue of their mind had been extinguish'd; and without that vertue, the occasion had been offer'd in vaine. It was then necessary for Moses to find the people of Israel slaves in Ægypt, and oppress'd by the Ægyptians, to the end that they to get out of their thraldome, should bee willing to follow him. It was fit that Romulus should not be kept in Albia, but expos'd presently after his birth, that he might become King of Rome, and founder of that City. There was need that Cyrus should find the Persians discontented with the {279} Medes government, and the Medes delicate and effeminate through their long peace. Theseus could not make proof his vertue, had not he found the Athenians dispers'd. These occasions therefore made these men happy, and their excellent vertue made the occasion be taken notice of, whereby their countrey became enobled, and exceeding fortunate. They, who by vertuous waies, like unto these, become Princes, attain the Principality with difficulty, but hold it with much ease; and the difficulties they find in gaining the Principality, arise partly from the new orders and courses they are forc'd to bring in, to lay the foundation of their State, and work their own security. And it is to be consider'd, how there is not any thing harder to take in hand, nor doubtfuller to succeed, nor more dangerous to mannage, than to be the chief in bringing in new orders; for this Chief finds all those his enemies, that thrive upon the old orders; and hath but luke warme defenders of all those that would do well upon the new orders, which luke-warme temper proceeds partly from fear of the opposers who have the laws to their advantage; partly from the incredulity of the men who truly beleeve not a new thing, unless there be some certain proof given them thereof. Whereupon it arises, that whensoever they that are adversaries, take the occasion to assayle, they do it factiously; and these others defend but cooly, so that their whole party altogether runs a hazzard. Therefore it is necessary, being we intend throughly to discourse this part, to examine if these innovators stand of themselves, or if they depend upon others; that is, if to bring their work to effect, it be necessary they should intreat, or be able to constrain; in the first case they allwayes succeed ill, and bring nothing to pass; but when they depend of themselves, and are able to force, then seldom it is that they hazzard. Hence came it that all the prophets that were arm'd, prevail'd; but those that were unarm'd, were too weak: for besides what we have alledg'd, the nature of the people is changeable, and easie to be perswaded to a matter; but it is hard also to settle them in that perswasion. And therefore it behoves {280} a man to be so provided, that when they beleeve no longer, he may be able to compel them thereto by force. Moses, Cyrus, Theseus, and Romulus would never have been able to cause their Laws to be obey'd, had they been disarm'd; as in our times it befel Fryer Jerome Savanarola, who perished in his new constitutions, when the multitude began not to beleeve him; neither had he the means to keep them firme, that had beleev'd; not to force beleefe in them that had not beleev'd him. Wherefore such men as these, in their proceedings find great difficulty, and all their dangers are in the way, and these they must surmount by their vertue; but having once master'd them, and beginning to be honored by all, when they have rooted those out that envi'd their dignities, they remain powerful, secure, honorable, and happy. To these choice examples, I will add one of less remark; but it shall hold some proportion with them, and this shall suffice me for all others of this kind, which is Hiero the Siracusan. He of a private man, became Prince of Siracusa, nor knew he any other ayd of fortune than the occasion: for the Siracusans being oppress'd, made choyce of him for their Captain, whereupon he deserv'd to be made their Prince: and he was of such vertue even in his private fortune, that he who writes of him, sayes, he wanted nothing of reigning, but a Kingdom; this man extinguish'd all the old soldiery, ordaind the new; left the old allyances, entertained new; and as he had friendship, and soldiers that were his own, upon that ground he was able to build any edifice; so that he indured much trouble in gaining, and suffered but little in maintaining.

L And it’s no wonder that in my discussion about new Principalities, both regarding a Prince and a State, I will reference well-known examples. People usually follow paths that others have walked and imitate their actions; since it’s impossible to perfectly replicate others’ ways or virtues, a wise person should always follow in the footsteps of the greatest individuals and model themselves after the most outstanding. This way, even if they can’t reach the same level, they can at least gain some benefits from it, similar to skilled archers who, thinking their target is too far away, aim much higher than the mark—not to hit that high, but to ensure that their shot can reach the target by aiming high. I want to point out that in completely new Principalities, where there’s a new Prince, the difficulty in maintaining them varies based on the greatness of the conqueror’s virtue. Since the success of becoming a Prince from being an ordinary person assumes either virtue or fortune, I believe that both can lessen many challenges; however, those who rely less on fortune tend to maintain their position better. Furthermore, it somewhat eases the situation since the Prince, lacking other dominions, is compelled to personally reside there. Now, considering those who became Princes through their own virtues, rather than through fortune, the most notable examples include Moses, Cyrus, Romulus, Theseus, and others. Although we shouldn’t debate Moses, who merely executed what was commanded by God, he certainly deserves admiration, if only for the grace that allowed him to speak with God. However, if we look at Cyrus and the others who either took or founded Kingdoms, we will find all of them commendable, and if we weigh their specific actions and laws, they won’t appear very different from those of Moses, which he received from such a supreme instructor. When examining their lives and deeds, it will be clear that their only fortune was the opportunity that allowed them to implement their own desired form; without that chance, their virtues would have gone unnoticed, and without those virtues, the opportunity would have been meaningless. It was necessary for Moses to find the people of Israel as slaves in Egypt, oppressed by the Egyptians, so that they would willingly follow him out of bondage. Romulus needed to be abandoned shortly after birth, so he could become the King of Rome and the founder of that city. Cyrus needed to find the Persians unhappy with the Medes’ rule, while the Medes had become soft and effeminate due to their long peace. Theseus could not demonstrate his virtue unless he found the Athenians scattered. Thus, these circumstances were fortunate for these men, and their outstanding virtues drew attention to those chances, through which their countries became distinguished and extremely fortunate. Those who become Princes through virtuous means like these may find it difficult to gain their Principality, but they hold onto it much more easily. The difficulties they encounter in gaining the Principality stem partly from the new systems they must introduce to secure their State. It must also be noted that there’s nothing harder to undertake, more uncertain to succeed, or riskier to manage than leading the introduction of new laws; because the Chief who does so finds everyone else opposing him who benefits from the old orders, and has only lukewarm supporters from those who could benefit from the new orders, a lukewarmness that arises partly from fear of the opposers who have laws in their favor, and partly from the disbelief of people who won’t accept anything new without concrete proof. When opponents have the opportunity to attack, they do so aggressively; while those backing the new order only defend half-heartedly, putting the entire group at risk. Therefore, it’s necessary, as we thoroughly discuss this matter, to analyze whether these innovators are self-sufficient or rely on others; in other words, if they need to persuade others to bring their plans to fruition or can impose them. In the first case, they will always fail and accomplish nothing. But when they are self-reliant and able to enforce their will, they rarely put themselves in jeopardy. Hence, all armed prophets succeeded, while unarmed ones were too weak. Moreover, as we’ve noted, the nature of people is changeable, easily persuaded to a cause, but hard to keep settled in that belief. Therefore, a person must be prepared so that when people no longer believe, they can compel them through force. Moses, Cyrus, Theseus, and Romulus would never have been able to enforce their laws without being armed, much like Friar Jerome Savonarola in our times, who fell due to his new reforms when the crowd began to doubt him; nor did he have the means to reinforce the beliefs of those who did believe, or to force faith upon those who did not. Consequently, such individuals face incredible difficulties in their endeavors, and all their dangers are on the path ahead, which they must overcome through their virtue; but once they conquer these challenges and start gaining respect, having eliminated those who envied their status, they remain powerful, secure, honorable, and fortunate. To these exemplary figures, I will add one lesser-known but still relevant figure: Hiero of Syracuse. He rose from being an ordinary man to becoming the Prince of Syracuse, relying on nothing but opportunity. The Syracusans, being oppressed, chose him as their Captain, ultimately deserving his elevation to Prince. He was so virtuous in his ordinary life that the writer about him claimed he lacked nothing needed to reign except a Kingdom. This man eliminated all old soldiers, organized new ones, severed old alliances, and formed new ones. With his own friendships and troops, he was able to build any structure he desired; thus, he endured much trouble in gaining power, but suffered little in keeping it.

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CHAP. VII

Of new Principalities, gotten by fortune, and other mens forces.

T hey who by fortune only become Princes of private men, with small pains attain to it, but have much ado to maintain themselves in it; and find no difficulty at all in the way, because they are carried thither with wings: but all the difficulties arise there, after they are plac'd in them. And of such sort are those who have an estate given them for money, by the favor of some one that grants it them: as it befell many in Greece, in the cities of Jonia, and Hellespont; where divers Princes were made by Darius, as well for his own safety as his glory; as also them that were made Emperors; who from private men by corrupting the soldiers, attaind to the Empire. These subsist meerly upon the will, and fortune of those that have advanced them; which are two voluble and unsteady things; and they neither know how, nor are able to continue in that dignity: they know not how, because unless it be a man of great understanding and vertue, it is not probable that he who hath always liv'd a private life, can know how to command: neither are they able, because they have not any forces that can be friendly or faithful to them. Moreover those States that suddenly fall into a mans hands, as all other things in nature that spring and grow quickly, cannot well have taken root, nor have made their correspondencies so firm, but that the first storm that takes them, ruines them; in case these, who (as it is said) are thus on a sudden clambred up to be Princes, are not of that worth and vertue as to know how to prepare themselves to maintain that which chance hath cast into their bosoms, and can afterwards lay those foundations, which others have cast before they were Princes. For the one and {282} the other of these wayes about the attaining to be a Prince, by Vertue, or by Fortune, I will alledge you two examples which have been in the dayes of our memory. These were Francis Sforza, and Cæsar Borgia; Francis by just means and with a great deal of vertue, of a private man got to be Duke of Millan; and that which with much pains he had gaind, he kept with small ado. On the other side Cæesar Borgia (commonly termed Duke Valentine) got his state by his Fathers fortune, and with the same lost it; however that for his own part no pains was spar'd, nor any thing omitted, which by a discreet and valorus man ought to have been done, to fasten his roots in those Estates, which others armes or fortune had bestowed on him; for (as it was formerly said) he that lays not the foundations first, yet might be able by means of his extraordinary vertues to lay them afterwards, however it be with the great trouble of the architect, and danger of the edifice. If therefore we consider all the Dukes progresses, we may perceive how great foundations he had cast for his future power, which I judge a matter not superfluous to run over; because I should not well know, what better rules I might give to a new Prince, than the pattern of his actions; and however the courses he took, availd him not, yet was it not his fault, but it proceeded from an extraordinary and extream malignity of fortune. Pope Alexander the sixt, desiring to make the Duke his son a great man, had a great many difficulties, present and future: first he saw no way there was whereby he might be able to make him Lord of any State, that was not the Churches; and if he turnd to take that from the Church, he knew that the Duke of Milan, and the Venetians would never agree to it; for Faenza and Riminum were under the Venetians protection. Moreover, he saw that the armes of Italy, and those whereof in particular he might have been able to make some use, were in their hands, who ought to fear the Popes greatness; and therefore could not any wayes rely upon them: being all in the Orsins and Colonies hands, and those of their faction. It was necessary then, that those matters thus appointed by them should be disturbed, and {283} the States of Italy disordered, to be able safely to master part of them, which he then found easie to do, seeing the Venetians upon three considerations had us'd the means to bring the French men back again into Italy: which he not only did not withstand, but furthered, with a resolution of King Lewis his ancient marriage. The King then past into Italy with the Venetians ayd, and Alexanders consent; nor was he sooner arrived in Milan, than the Pope had soldiers from him for the service of Romania, which was quickly yeelded up to him upon the reputation of the Kings forces. The Duke then having made himself master of Romania, and beaten the Colonies, desiring to hold it, and proceed forward, two things hindered him: the one, his own soldiers, which he thought were not true to him; the other, the French mens good wills; that is to say, he feared that the Princes soldiers, whereof he had served himself, would fail him, and not only hinder his conquest, but take from him what he had gotten; and that the King also would serve him the same turn. He had experience of the Orsini upon an occasion, when after the taking of Faenza he assaulted Bolonia, to which assault he saw them go very cold. And touching the King, he discovered his mind, when having taken the Dutchy of Urbin, he invaded Tuscany; from which action the King made him retire; whereupon the Duke resolved to depend no more upon fortune, and other mens armes. And the first thing he did, was, to weaken the Orsini, and Colonnies factions in Rome: for he gain'd all their adherents that were gentlemen, giving them large allowances, and honoring them according to their qualities with charges and governments; so that in a few months the good will they bare to the parties was quite extinguisht, and wholly bent to the Duke. After this, he waited an occasion to root out the Orsini, having before dispersed those of the family of Colonnia, which fell out well to his hand; and he us'd it better. For the Orsini being too late aware, that the Dukes and the Churches greatness was their destruction, held a Council together in a dwelling house of theirs in the {284} country adjoyning to Perusia. From thence grew the rebellion of Urbin, and the troubles of Romania, and many other dangers befell the Duke, which he overcame all with the help of the French: and having regained his reputation, trusting neither France, nor any forrein forces, to the end he might not be put to make trial of them again, he betook himself to his sleghts; and he knew so well to disguise his intention, that the Orsins, by the mediation of Paul Orsine, were reconciled to him, to whom the Duke was no way wanting in all manner of courtesies whereby to bring them into security, giving them rich garments, money, and horses, til their own simplicities led them all to Sinigallia, into his hands. These heads being then pluck'd off, and their partisans made his friends; the Duke had laid very good foundations, to build his own greatness on, having in his power all Romania with the Dutchy of Urbin, and gained the hearts of those people, by beginning to give them some relish of their well being. And because this part is worthy to be taken notice of, and to be imitated by others, I will not let it escape. The Duke, when he had taken Romania, finding it had been under the hands of poor Lords who had rather pillag'd their subjects, than chastis'd or amended them, giving them more cause of discord, than of peace and union, so that the whole countrey was fraught with robberies, quarrels, and other sorts of insolencies; thought the best way to reduce them to termes of pacification, and obedience to a Princely power, was, to give them some good government: and therefore he set over them one Remiro D'Orco, a cruel hasty man, to whom he gave an absolute power. This man in a very short time setled peace and union amongst them with very great reputation. Afterwards the Duke thought such excessive authority serv'd not so well to his purpose, and doubting it would grow odious, he erected a civil Judicature in the midst of the countrey, where one excellent Judge did Preside, and thither every City sent their Advocate: and because he knew the rigors past had bred some hatred against him, to purge the minds of those people, and to gain them wholly to himself, he purpos'd to {285} shew, that if there was any cruelty used, it proceeded not from any order of his, but from the harsh disposition of his Officers. Whereupon laying hold on him, at this occasion, he caus'd his head to be struck off one morning early in the market place at Cesena, where he was left upon a gibbet, with a bloody sword by his side; the cruelty of which spectacle for a while satisfied and amaz'd those people. But to return from whence we have digressd: I say, that the Duke finding himself very strong, and in part out of doubt of the present dangers, because he was arm'd after his own manner, and had in some good measure suppress'd those forces, which, because of their vicinity, were able to annoy him, he wanted nothing else to go on with his Conquest, but the consideration of France: for he knew, that the King, who now, though late, was advis'd of his error, would never suffer him: and hereupon he began to seek after new allyances, and to waver with France, when the French came towards Naples against the Spaniards, who then besieged Gagetta; and his design was only to be out of their danger, which had been effected for him, had Pope Alexander lived. And thus were his businesses carried touching his present estate. As for the future, he had reason to doubt lest the new successor to the Papacy would not be his friend, and would endeavor to take that from him that Alexander had bestowed on him; and he thought to provide for this foure waies: First by rooting out the races of all those Lords he had dispoyled, whereby to take those occasions from the Pope. Secondly, by gaining all the gentlemen of Rome, whereby he might be able with those to keep the Pope in some awe. Thirdly, to make the Colledge of Cardinals as much at his devotion as possibly might be. Fourthly, by making of so large Conquests, before the Popes death, as that he might be able of himself to withstand the first fury of his enemies. Three of these fowre at Pope Alexanders death he had effected, and the fourth he had neare brought to a point. For of those Lords he had stript, he put to death as many as he could come at, and very few escap'd him: he gaind him the Roman Gentlemen: and in the Colledge he had made a {286} great faction. And touching his new Conquest, he had a designe to become Lord of Tuscany. And he had possessed himself already of Perusia, and Pombin, and taken protection of Pisa: and so soon as he should have cast off his respect to France (which now he meant to hold no longer) being the French were now driven out of the Kingdome of Naples by the Spaniards, so that each of them was forc'd to buy his friendship at any termes; he was then to leap into Pisa. After this Lucca and Siena were presently to fall to him, partly for envy to the Florentines, and partly for fear. The Florentines had no way to escape him: all which, had it succeeded with him, as without question it had, the very same year that Alexander dy'd, he had made himself master of so great forces, and such reputation, that he would have been able to have stood upon his own bottom, without any dependance of fortune, or resting upon others helps, but only upon his own strength and valor. But Alexander dy'd five years after that he had begun to draw forth his sword: and left him setled only in the State of Romania, with all his other designes in the ayre, sick unto death, between two very strong armies of his enemies; and yet was there in this Duke such a spirit and courage; and he understood so well, how men are to be gaind, and how to be lost, and so firm were the grounds he had laid in a short time, that, had he not had those armies upon his back, or had been in health, he would have carried through his purpose in spight of all opposition; and that the foundations he grounded upon were good, it appeard in that Romania held for him above a moneth, and he remained secure in Rome, though even at deaths doore: and however the Baglioni, Vitelli, and Orsini came into Rome; yet found they none would take their parts against him. And this he was able to have effected, that if he could not have made him Pope whom be would, he could have hindred him that he would not should be Pope. But had he been in health when Alexander dy'd, every thing had gone easily with him; and he told me on that day that Julius the second was created Pope, that he had fore-thought on all that which could happen, in case his {287} father chanc'd to dye, and for every thing provided its remedy, this onely excepted, that he foresaw not that he should at the same time be brought unto deaths dore also. Having then collected all the Dukes actions, me thinks I could not well blame him, but rather (as I have here done) set him as a pattern to be followed by all those who by fortune and others armes have been exalted to an Empire. For he being of great courage, and having lofty designes, could not carry himself otherwise; and the only obstacle of his purposes was the brevity of Alexanders life, and his own sickness. Whoever therefore deemes it necessary in his entrance into a new Principality, to secure himself of his enemies, and gain him friends, to overcome either by force or by cunning, to make himself beloved, or feared of his people, be followed and reverenced by his soldiers, to root out those that can, or owe thee any hurt, to change the ancient orders with new wayes, to be severe, and yet acceptable, magnanimous, and liberall; to extinguish the unfaithfull soldiery, and create new; to maintain to himself the armities of Kings and Princes, so that they shall either with favor benefit thee, or be wary how to offend thee; cannot find more fresh and lively examples than the actions of this man. He deserves to be found fault withall for the creation of Julius the second, wherein an evil choice was made for him: for, as it is said, not being able to make a Pope to his mind, he could have withheld any one from being Pope; and should never have consented that any one of those Cardinals should have got the Papacy, whom he had ever done harme to; or who having attaind the Pontificate were likely to be afraid of him: because men ordinarily do hurt either for fear, or hatred. Those whom he had offended, were among others, he who had the title of St. Peter ad Vincula, Colonna, St. George, and Ascanius; all the others that were in possibility of the Popedome, were such as might have feard him rather, except the Cardinal of Roan, and the Spaniards; these by reason of their allyance and obligation with him, the other because of the power they had, having the Kingdome of France on their party; wherefore the Duke above {288} all things should have created a Spanyard Pope, and in case he could not have done that, he should have agreed that Roan should have been, and not St. Peter ad Vincula. And whoever beleeves, that with great personages new benefits blot on the remembrance of old injuries, is much deceiv'd. The Duke therefore in this election, was the cause of his own ruine at last.

T Those who unexpectedly become princes from common people find it easy to attain such status, but they struggle to hold onto it; they face no difficulty in reaching that place because they are brought there effortlessly. The real challenges arise after they get there. This is true for those who are granted an estate for money through someone else's favor, as happened to many in Greece, especially in the cities of Ionia and the Hellespont, where several princes were created by Darius for his own safety and glory, as well as those turned into emperors, who became powerful through corrupting the soldiers. Their power relies solely on the will and fortune of those who have elevated them, both of which are fickle and unreliable; they neither know how to maintain that dignity nor have anyone loyal or trustworthy to support them. Additionally, states that suddenly come to a man, like all other rapidly emerging things in nature, lack a solid foundation and robust connections, making them vulnerable to destruction with the first storm that hits them. If those who suddenly become princes aren't worthy or capable of preparing to uphold what fortune has placed in their hands, they can't later establish the foundations others laid before they were princes. To illustrate both paths to becoming a prince—through virtue or fortune—I will provide two examples from recent history: Francis Sforza and Cesare Borgia. Francis, through just means and considerable virtue, rose from a private man to the Duke of Milan; and what he gained with effort, he maintained with relative ease. In contrast, Cesare Borgia (commonly known as Duke Valentino) gained his position through his father’s fortune and ultimately lost it for that same reason. However, he made every effort, employing all that a wise and valiant man should to root himself in the territories bestowed upon him by the arms of others, knowing that, as previously mentioned, one who does not lay foundations from the start may still be able to establish them later, albeit with significant trouble and risk. If we examine the progress made by the Duke, we can see the strong foundations he laid for his future power, and I believe it’s worthwhile to review this because I can’t think of better principles to advise a new prince than his actions. Although the paths he took did not ultimately benefit him, it was not his fault; it was due to the extraordinary and extreme malice of fortune. Pope Alexander VI, wanting to make his son the Duke a powerful man, faced many current and future challenges: firstly, he saw no way to make him the lord of any state other than the Church. If he tried to seize that from the Church, he knew that the Duke of Milan and the Venetians would never agree since Faenza and Rimini were under Venetian protection. Moreover, he recognized that the military forces of Italy, which he could potentially count on, were in the hands of those who should be wary of the Pope’s power, and thus he could not rely on them. Being entirely under the control of the Orsini and Colonna factions, it was necessary for these arrangements to be disrupted, and for the states of Italy to be disordered, in order to take possession of any part of them safely, which he found easy to do when the Venetians, for three reasons, sought to reintroduce the French into Italy. Not only did he not oppose this, but he supported it with the hope of King Louis’s ancient marriage. The King then entered Italy with the Venetians' help and the Pope's consent; and as soon as he arrived in Milan, the Pope received soldiers from him for the conquest of Romagna, which quickly fell to him due to the reputation of the King’s forces. Afterward, the Duke found himself in control of Romagna and had defeated the Colonna. Wanting to hold onto it and continue moving forward, he faced two obstacles: one being his own soldiers, whom he feared were disloyal to him, and the second being the goodwill of the French. In essence, he feared that the princes’ soldiers, whom he had previously employed, would betray him, not only hindering his conquest but also taking away what he had gained; and he worried the King would do the same. He experienced the betrayal of the Orsini during his attack on Bologna after capturing Faenza, where he noticed their lack of enthusiasm. He understood the King's intent when the King annexed Urbino and invaded Tuscany, forcing the Duke to withdraw. This led the Duke to resolve to rely no longer on fortune or the arms of others. The first step he took was to weaken the Orsini and Colonna factions in Rome. He won over all their followers among the gentry, providing them generous rewards and honoring them with positions and commands, which completely extinguished their loyalty to their former factions and turned it towards the Duke. Afterwards, he waited for an opportunity to eliminate the Orsini, having previously dispersed the Colonna family, which allowed him to gain ground. The Orsini, realizing too late that the Duke and the Church’s power threatened them, convened in one of their houses near Perugia. From there arose the rebellion in Urbino and the turmoil in Romagna. The Duke faced many other dangers, all of which he overcame with the help of the French. After regaining his reputation, he decided not to rely on France or foreign forces anymore, so he wouldn’t have to test them again, and he then resorted to his own strategies. He knew how to disguise his intentions so well that the Orsini, through the mediation of Paul Orsini, reconciled with him, and the Duke was generous in offering them courtesies to build trust, including nice clothes, money, and horses, until their own naivety led them all into his hands at Sinigallia. After eliminating their leaders and securing their followers as his friends, the Duke laid strong foundations for his own greatness, controlling all of Romagna along with the Duchy of Urbino and winning the people’s hearts by giving them a taste of better governance. This part is notable and worth emulating, so I won’t skip it. Upon taking Romagna, the Duke found it had been under the rule of impoverished lords who plundered their subjects rather than correcting or improving them, which had led to discord rather than peace. Therefore, to establish order and obedience to princely power, he decided to implement good governance. He appointed Remiro d’Orco, a harsh and swift man, giving him absolute authority. In a very short time, he restored peace and unity among the people, earning significant admiration. Later, concerned that such extreme authority would become undesirable, he established a civil judiciary in the heart of the region, where an excellent judge presided, with every city sending its advocate. Knowing that the past harsh rule had caused some resentment against him, and to cleanse the people's attitudes and win them completely over, he decided to demonstrate that if any cruelty occurred, it was not according to his orders but stemmed from his officials’ harsh nature. Thus, seizing the opportunity, he had the judge executed early one morning in the Cesena market, leaving his head on a gibbet next to a bloody sword. The brutality of that scene shocked and silenced the people for a time. Returning from our digression, I note that the Duke, feeling very strong and somewhat certain about immediate dangers due to his own resources and having largely quelled the forces nearby that could threaten him, only needed to consider France to continue his conquest. He knew that the King, who had finally become aware of his mistake, would never allow him to proceed. Consequently, he began searching for new alliances and wavering with France when the French came into Naples against the Spaniards, who were then besieging Gaeta, merely seeking to escape danger, which would have worked out for him if Pope Alexander had lived. So, that is how his affairs stood regarding his present situation. For the future, he had reason to worry that the new pope might not support him and might seek to take away what Alexander had granted him. He thought to prepare for this in four ways: First, by eliminating the families of all the lords he had dispossessed, thereby removing any opportunity for the pope to act against him. Second, by winning over all the Roman nobility to keep the pope in check. Third, to secure the College of Cardinals to be as much under his influence as possible. Fourth, by making such significant conquests before the pope died that he could stand against the initial wave of enemies on his own. At the death of Pope Alexander, he accomplished three of these four goals, and the fourth was nearly completed. He executed as many of the lords he had stripped as he could find, with very few escaping him; he won over the Roman gentry and established a significant faction in the College of Cardinals. Regarding his new conquests, he aimed to become lord of Tuscany. He had already captured Perugia and Pom pin, as well as claimed Pisa as a protectorate. As soon as he discarded his respect for France—which he no longer intended to maintain—given that the French were now ousted from the Kingdom of Naples by the Spaniards, and each side was forced to buy his friendship at any cost, he was ready to take Pisa. After that, Lucca and Siena were next in line to fall into his hands, partly due to envy towards the Florentines and partly out of fear. The Florentines had no way to resist him. If all had gone as it likely would have, in the same year Alexander died, he would have been in control of such substantial forces and garnered such a reputation that he could have stood on his own, without reliance on fortune or aid from others, but only on his strength and bravery. However, Alexander died five years after he began to take action, leaving him only established in Romagna, with all his other plans hanging in the balance, severely ill and caught between two very strong armies of his enemies. Yet, this duke had such spirit and courage; he understood so well how to attract influence and how to lose it, and the foundations he laid were so solid in a short time that, had he not been facing those armies or had he been in good health, he would have successfully achieved his goals despite all opposition. The strength of his foundations was evident in that Romagna held for him for over a month and he remained secure in Rome, even at death's door. Even when the Baglioni, Vitelli, and Orsini entered Rome, they found no one willing to side with them against him. He was capable of doing that, which was if he couldn’t make the pope he desired, he could prevent the election of the one he did not want. However, had he been well when Alexander died, everything would have gone smoothly for him. He told me on the day Julius II was elected pope that he had considered everything that might happen in case of his father's death and had prepared solutions to everything but this one risk—he did not foresee he would also be pushed to death's door at the same time. After reviewing all the actions of the Duke, I believe it would be unjust to blame him; rather, as I have illustrated here, he should serve as a model for all those who, through fortune and others' arms, have climbed to greatness. He possessed great courage and had high ambitions, and he couldn’t have acted otherwise. The only barriers to his ambitions were Pope Alexander's short life and his own illness. Therefore, anyone who thinks it necessary, when entering a new principality, to secure themselves against enemies and gain friends, to conquer either through force or cunning, to be loved or feared by their people, to command respect from their soldiers, to root out potential threats, to alter old orders with new approaches, to be severe yet acceptable, generous, and bold; to eliminate untrustworthy mercenaries and create new forces; and to maintain alliances with kings and princes, so they either favor you or think twice before offending you, cannot find fresher or more vibrant examples than the actions of this man. He should be criticized for the election of Julius II, in which he made an unfortunate choice: for, it has been said, if he could not create a pope to his liking, he should have prevented anyone from becoming pope whom he had harmed, or who might become fearful of him upon attaining the papacy. Those he had offended included the likes of St. Peter ad Vincula, Colonna, St. George, and Ascanius; all other potential popes might have feared him, except the Cardinal of Roan and the Spaniards. The latter, because of their alliances and obligations to him, and the former because of their power, having the Kingdom of France on their side. Therefore, above all, the Duke should have ensured a Spanish pope was elected; and if that wasn’t possible, he should have allowed Roan to succeed, not St. Peter ad Vincula. Anyone who believes that great personages can erase old grievances with new benefits is gravely mistaken. Thus, in this election, the Duke ultimately caused his own downfall.

Till wee come to this seaventh Chapter, I find not any thing much blame-worthy, unlesse it be on ground he layes in the second Chapter; whereupon hee builds most of this Fabrick, viz. That Subjects must either be dallyed or flatterd withall, or quite crusht. Whereby our Author advises his Prince to support his authority with two Cardinall Vertues, Dissimulation, and Cruelty. He considers not herein that the head is but a member of the body, though the principall; and the end of the parts is the good of the whole. And here he goes against himselfe in the twenty sixt Chapter of his Rep. 1. 1. where hee blames Philip of Macedon for such courses, terming them very cruell, and against all Christian manner of living; and that every man should refuse to be a King, and desire rather to live a private life, than to reigne so much to the ruine of mankind. The life of Cæsar Borgia, which is here given as a paterne to new Princes, we shall find to have been nothing else but a cunning carriage of things so, that he might thereby first deceive and inveigle, and then suppresse all those that could oppose or hinder his ambition. For if you runne over his life, you shall see the Father Pope Alexander the sixt and him, both imbarqued for his advancement, wherein they engag'd the Papall authority, and reputation of Religion; for faith and conscience these men never knew, though they exacted it of others: there was never promise made, but it was only so farre kept as servd for advantage; Liberality was made use of: Clemency and Cruelty, all alike, as they might serve to worke with their purposes. All was sacrific'd to ambition; no friendship could tye these men, nor any religion: and no marvell: for ambition made them forget both God and man. But see the end of all this cunning: though this Cæsar Borgia contrived all his businesse so warily, that our Author much commends him, and hee had attaind neere the pitch of his hopes, and had provided for each misadventure could befall him its remedy; Policy shewd it selefe short-sighted; for hee foresaw not at the time of his Fathers death, he himself should bee brought unto deaths doore also. And me thinks this Example might have given occasion to our Author to confesse, that surely there is a God that ruleth the earth. And many {289} times God cutts off those cunning and mighty men in the hight of their purposes, when they think they have neare surmounted all dangers and difficulties. 'To the intent that the living may know, that the most high ruleth in the Kingdome of men, and giveth it to whomsoever he will, and setteth up over it the basest of men.' Daniel. 4. 17.

Up until this seventh chapter, I haven't found anything particularly blameworthy, except for what he claims in the second chapter, which forms the basis of most of this work: that people need to be entertained, flattered, or completely crushed. Here, the author advises his prince to maintain his authority with two main qualities: deception and cruelty. He overlooks the fact that the head is just one part of the body, though the most important, and that the goal of all parts is the well-being of the whole. He contradicts himself in the twenty-sixth chapter of his Rep. 1. 1., where he criticizes Philip of Macedon for those actions, calling them very cruel and against Christian principles; insisting that any man should refuse kingship and choose a private life over ruling at the expense of humanity. The life of Caesar Borgia, presented here as a model for new princes, turns out to be nothing more than a clever manipulation of events to first deceive and trap, and then eliminate anyone who could threaten or hinder his ambitions. If you look back over his life, you will see that he and his father, Pope Alexander VI, worked together for his advancement, compromising papal authority and the reputation of religion; these men had no real faith or conscience, despite demanding it from others. Promises were only kept as long as they served their interests; generosity, mercy, and cruelty were all employed interchangeably to achieve their goals. Everything was sacrificed for ambition; no friendship could connect these men, nor could any religion. It’s no wonder, because ambition made them forget both God and humanity. But consider the result of all this cunning: even though Caesar Borgia managed his affairs meticulously enough for our author to praise him, and he nearly achieved his hopes while preparing for every possible misfortune, politics proved to be shortsighted. He didn’t anticipate that, upon his father's death, he too would be pushed to the brink of death. I think this example should have led our author to recognize that there is indeed a God who governs the earth. Many times, God removes those cunning and powerful individuals at the peak of their ambitions when they think they have overcome all threats and challenges. 'So that the living may know that the Most High rules in the kingdom of men, gives it to whomever He wills, and sets the lowest of men over it.' Daniel 4:17.

CHAP. VIII

Concerning those who by wicked meanes have attaind to a Principality.

B ut because a man becomes a Prince of a private man two wayes, which cannot wholly be attributed either to Fortune or Vertue, I think not fit to let them passe me: howbeit the one of them may be more largely discoursed upon, where the Republicks are treated of. These are, when by some wicked and unlawfull meanes a man rises to the Principality; or when a private person by the favour of his fellow Citizens becomes Prince of his countrey. And speaking of the first manner, it shall be made evident by two Examples, the one ancient, the other moderne, without entring otherwise into the justice or merit of this part; for I take it that these are sufficient for any body that is forc'd to follow them. Agathocles the Sicilian, not of a private man onely, but from a base and abject fortune, got to be King of Siracusa. This man borne but of a Potter, continued alwayes a wicked life throughout all the degrees of this fortune: neverthelesse he accompanied his lewdnesse with such a courage and resolution, that applying himselfe to military affaires, by the degrees thereof he attained to bee Prætour of Siracusa, and being setled in that degree, and having determined that he would become Prince, and hold that by violence and without obligation to any other, which by consent had been granted him: and to this purpose haveing had some private intelligence touching his designe with {290} Amilcar the Carthaginian, who was imployd with his army in Sicily, one morining gatherd the people together and the Senate of Syracusa, as if he had some what to advise with them of matters belonging to the Commonwealth, and upon a signe given, caus'd his souldiers to kill his Senatours, and the richest of the people; who being slaine, he usurp'd the Principality of that City without any civill strife: and however he was twice broken by the Carthaginians, and at last besieged, was able not onely to defend his own City, but leaving part of his own army at the defence thereof, with the other invaded Affrique, and in a short time freed Siracusa from the siege, and brought the Carthaginians into extreme necessity, who were constraind to accord with him, be contented with the possession of Affrique, and quitt Sicily to Agathocles. He then that should consider the actions and valour of this man, would not see any, or very few things to be attributed unto Fortune; seeing that as is formerly sayd, not by any ones favour, but by the degrees of service in warre with many sufferings and dangers, to which he had risen, he came to the Principality; and that hee maintained afterwards with so many resolute and hazardous undertakings. Yet cannot this be term'd vertue or valour to slay his own Citizens, betray his friends, to be without faith, without pitty, without religion, which wayes are of force to gaine dominion, but not glory: for if Agathocles his valour bee well weighd, in his enturing upon, and comming off from dangers, and the greatnesse of his courage, in supporting and mastering of adversities, no man can see why he should be thought any way inferiour even to the ablest Captaines. Notwithstanding his beastly cruelty and inhumanity with innumerable wickednesses, allow not that he should be celebrated among the most excellent men. That cannot then be attributed to Fortune or Vertue, which without the one or the other was attaind to by him. In our dayes, while Alexander the sixth held the sea, Oliverotte of Fermo, who some few yeeres before had been left young by his parents, was brought up under the care of an uncle of his on the {291} mothers side, called John Foliani, and in the beginning of his youth given, by him to serve in the warres under Paulo Vitelli: to the end that being well instructed in that discipline, he might rise to some worthy degree in the warrs. Afterwards when Paulo was dead, he served under Vitellozzo his brother, and in very short time, being ingenious, of a good personage, and brave courage, he became one of the prime men among the troops he served in: but thinking it but servile to depend upon another, he plotted by the ayd of some Citizens of Fermo (who lik'd rather the thraldome of their City than the liberty of it) and by the favour of the Vitelli, to make himselfe master of Fermo; and writ to John Foliani, that having been many yeeres from home, he had a mind to come and see him and the City, and in some part take notice of his own patrimony; and because he had not imployd himselfe but to purchase honour, to the end his Citizens might perceive, that he had not vainely spent his time, he had a desire to come in good equipage and accompanied with a hundred horse of his friends and servants; and he intreated him that he would be pleasd so to take order, that he might be honourably received by the inhabitants of Fermo, which turnd as well to his honor that was his uncle, as his that was the nephew. In this, John faild not in any office of courtesie due to his nephew: and caused him to be well receivd by them of Fermo, and lodged him in his own house: where having passed some dayes, and stayd to put in order somewhat that was necessary for his intended villany, he made a very solemne feast, whether he invited John Foliani, and all the prime men of Fermo: and when all their chear was ended, and all their other entertainments, as in such feasts it is customary, Oliverotto of purpose mov'd some grave discourses; speaking of the greatnesse of Pope Alexander, and Cæsar his son, and their undertakings; where unto John and the others making answer, he of a sudden stood up, saying, that those were things to be spoken of in a more secret place, and so retir'd into a chamber, whether John and all the other Citizens followd him; nor were they sooner {292} set downe there, than from some secret place therein camp forth diverse souldiers, who slew John and all the others: after which homicide Oliverotto got a horsebacke and ravaged the whole towne, and besieged the supreme Magistrate in the palace, so that for feare they were all constraind to obey him, and to settle a government, whereof hee made himselfe Prince; and they being all dead who, had they been discontented with him, could have hurt him; he strengthned himselfe with new civill and military orders, so that in the space of a yeer that he held the Principality, he was not only secure in the City of Fermo, but became fearefull to all his neighbours; and the conquest of him would have prov'd difficult, as that of Agathocles, had he not let himselfe been deceivd by Cæsar Borgia, when at Sinigallia, as before was said, he took the Orsini and Vitelli: where he also being taken a yeere after he had committed the parricide, was strangled together with Vitellozzo (whome he had had for master both of his vertues and vices.) Some man might doubt from whence it should proceed, that Agathocles, and such like, after many treacheries and crueltyes, could possibly live long secure in his own countrey, and defend himselfe from his forrein enemies, and that never any of his own Citizens conspir'd against him, seeing that by means of cruelty, many others have never been able even in peaceable times to maintaine their States, much lesse in the doubtfull times of warre. I beleeve that this proceeds from the well, or ill using of those cruelties: they may bee termd well us'd (if it bee lawfull to say well of evill) that are put in practice only once of necessity for securities sake, not insisting therein afterwards; but there is use made of them for the subjects profit, as much as may be. But those that are ill us'd, are such as though they bee but few in the beginning, yet they multiply rather in time, than diminish. They that take that first way, may with the help of God, and mens care, find some remedy for their State, as Agathocles did: for the others, it is impossible they should continue. Whereupon it is to be noted, that in the laying {293} hold of a State, the usurper thereof ought to runne over and execute all his cruelties at once, that he be not forced often to returne to them, and that he may be able, by not renewing of them, to give men some security, and gaine their affections by doing them some courtesies. Hee that carries it otherwise, either for fearefullnesse, or upon evill advice, is alwayes constraind to hold his sword drawne in his hand; nor ever can hee rely upon his subjects, there being no possibility for them, because of his daily and continuall injuries, to live in any safety: for his injuries should bee done altogether, that being seldomer tasted, they might lesse offend; his favours should bee bestowd by little, and little to the end they might keep their taste the better; and above all things a Prince must live with his subjects in such sort, that no accident either of good or evill can make him vary: for necessity comming upon him by reason of adversities, thou hast not time given thee to make advantage of thy cruelties; and the favours which then thou bestowest, will little help thee, being taken as if they came from thee perforce, and so yeeld no returne of thanks.

B But because a man can become a Prince in two ways, neither of which can be completely attributed to Fortune or Virtue, I think it's important to discuss them: however, one of these can be elaborated on more, especially when talking about Republics. These ways are when a man rises to power through some wicked and unlawful means, or when a private individual, with the support of his fellow citizens, becomes the Prince of his country. To illustrate the first method, I will present two examples, one ancient and the other modern, without delving deeply into the justice or merits of this part, since I believe these examples are enough for anyone forced to follow them. Agathocles of Sicily, not only from being a private man but also from a lowly and miserable background, rose to become King of Syracuse. Born to a potter, he lived a wicked life throughout the various stages of his rise: nevertheless, he accompanied his depravity with such courage and determination that, through military affairs, he eventually became Praetor of Syracuse. Once established in that role, he decided he would become Prince by force and without obligation to anyone else, which had been granted to him by consent. To achieve this, he had private intelligence about his plan with {290} Amilcar the Carthaginian, who was engaged with his army in Sicily. One morning, he gathered the people and the Senate of Syracuse, as if he had something important to discuss regarding the Commonwealth, and upon a signal, he ordered his soldiers to kill the Senators and the wealthiest citizens. Once they were slain, he usurped the Principality of that city without any civil strife. Even though he was defeated twice by the Carthaginians and eventually besieged, he was able not only to defend his own city but also left part of his army to protect it while he invaded Africa. In a short time, he freed Syracuse from the siege and brought the Carthaginians into dire straits, forcing them to reach an agreement, accepting the possession of Africa and surrendering Sicily to Agathocles. If one were to consider the actions and valor of this man, there would be very little attributed to Fortune; as noted earlier, he rose to power not by anyone's favor, but through his military service, enduring many hardships and dangers, and he maintained his rule with numerous determined and risky ventures. Yet, this cannot be called virtue or valor when it involves killing his own citizens, betraying his friends, or being without faith, mercy, or religion. Those are the means to gain dominion but not glory. If Agathocles' bravery is weighed considering his daring and overcoming dangers, as well as the greatness of his courage in enduring and mastering adversities, no one can see why he should be regarded as inferior to even the most capable captains. Regardless, his monstrous cruelty and inhumanity, along with countless wicked acts, prevent him from being celebrated among the most excellent men. What he achieved cannot be attributed to Fortune or Virtue, as he attained it without either. In our days, while Alexander the Sixth held the sea, Oliverotto of Fermo, who a few years earlier had been left an orphan, was raised by his uncle on his mother’s side, named John Foliani. In his early youth, he was put to serve in the wars under Paulo Vitelli, with the intention that once well-educated in that discipline, he might rise to a worthy rank in the military. After Paulo's death, he served under his brother Vitellozzo, and in a very short period, being clever, well-built, and brave, he became one of the top men among the troops. However, thinking it servile to depend on another, he plotted with the help of some citizens of Fermo (who preferred the subjugation of their city to its freedom) and with the favor of the Vitelli, to make himself the master of Fermo. He wrote to John Foliani, saying that having been away from home for many years, he wished to visit him and the city, and in part check on his family estate. Since he had only been engaged in seeking honor, he wanted to arrive in good style, accompanied by a hundred horsemen who were his friends and servants, and he asked his uncle to ensure that he was honorably received by the citizens of Fermo, which would bring honor both to his uncle and himself. In this, John did not fail to show any courtesy due to his nephew and made sure he was well received by the people of Fermo, lodging him in his own house. After spending some days there, arranging what was necessary for his planned treachery, Oliverotto held a very formal feast, to which he invited John Foliani and all the leading men of Fermo. When the meal and other entertainment customary for such feasts were over, Oliverotto intentionally started some serious discussions about the greatness of Pope Alexander and his son Caesar, and their enterprises; to which John and others responded. He suddenly stood up, saying these matters should be discussed in a more private place and retired to a chamber, where John and all the other citizens followed him. Once they were seated, soldiers suddenly emerged from a hidden spot, who killed John and all the others. After this murder, Oliverotto mounted a horse and plundered the entire town, besieging the highest magistrate in the palace, so that from fear, everyone was forced to obey him and establish a government, of which he made himself Prince. With all those who might have been discontented and could have harmed him now dead, he reinforced himself with new civil and military orders, so that in the year he held the Principality, he was not only secure in the city of Fermo but also instilled fear in all his neighbors; the task of conquering him would have proven difficult, like that of Agathocles, had he not been deceived by Caesar Borgia when at Sinigallia, as mentioned earlier, he captured the Orsini and Vitelli. He was subsequently captured a year after committing that parricide and was strangled alongside Vitellozzo (whom he had regarded as both his mentor and his vice). Some might wonder how Agathocles and similar figures, after many acts of treachery and cruelty, could possibly live secure in their own countries and defend themselves against foreign enemies without any of their own citizens conspiring against them, especially since many others have failed to maintain their states, even in peaceful times, much less in the uncertain times of war due to cruelty. I believe this stems from the proper or improper use of those cruelties: they may be considered well used (if it is acceptable to say anything good about evil) when carried out only once out of necessity for security, without continuing afterwards; but when they are used for the benefit of the subjects, as much as possible, they fare better. Conversely, those that are poorly used tend to multiply over time rather than decrease, even if initially there are only a few. Those who take that first route may, with God's help and men's care, find some remedy for their state, like Agathocles did; for the others, it is impossible for them to continue. Hence, it is important to note that when seizing a state, the usurper should carry out all his cruelties at once, so he won't be forced to return to them often, and can give people some assurance and gain their goodwill by providing them with some kindness. Those who act otherwise, either out of fear or poor advice, must always keep their sword drawn; they can never rely on their subjects, as it's impossible for them to live in safety due to the ongoing and continual injuries. Their injuries should be administered all at once, so that, being less frequently experienced, they will annoy people less; favors should be granted gradually in order to leave a better impression. Above all, a Prince must interact with his subjects in such a way that no event, whether good or bad, prompts any change in his behavior; for when necessity arises from adversity, there won’t be time to take advantage of cruelty, and the favors given at that moment will be perceived as forced, offering little gratitude in return.

CHAP. IX

Of the Civill Principality.

B ut comming to the other part, when a principall Citizen, not by villany, or any other insufferable violence, but by the favour of his fellow-citizens becomes Prince of his native countrey: which we may terme a Civill Principality; nor to attaine hereunto is Vertue wholly or Fortune wholly necessary, but rather a fortunate cunning: I say, this Principality is climb'd up to, either by the peoples help, or the great mens. For, in every City we finde these two humours differ; and they {294} spring from this, that the people desire not to be commanded nor oppressed by the great ones, and the great ones are desirous to command and oppresse the people: and from these two several appetites, arise in the City one of these three effects, either a Principality, or Liberty, or Tumultuary licentiousnesse. The Principality is caused either by the people, or the great ones, according as the one or other of these factions have the occasion offerd; for the great ones seeing themselves not able to resist the people, begin to turne the whole reputation to one among them, and make him Prince, whereby they may under his shadow vent their spleenes. The people also, not being able to support the great mens insolencies, converting the whole reputation to one man, create him their Prince, to be protected by his authority. He that comes to the Principality by the assistance of the great ones, subsists with more difficulty, than he that attaines to it by the peoples favour; for he being made Prince, hath many about him, who account themselves his equalls, and therefore cannot dispose nor command them at his pleasure. But he that gaines the Principality by the peoples favor, finds himselfe alone in his throne, and hath none or very few neare him that are not very supple to bend: besides this, the great ones cannot upon easie termes be satisfied, or without doing of wrong to others, where as a small matter contents the people: for the end which the people propound to themselves, is more honest than that of the great men, these desiring to oppresse, they only not to be oppressed. To this may be added also, that the Prince which is the peoples enemy, can never well secure himselfe of them, because of their multitude; well may hee bee sure of the Nobles, they being but a few. The worst that a Prince can look for of the people become his enemy, is to be abandoned by them: but when the great ones once grow his enemies, he is not only to feare their abandoning of him, but their making of a party against him also: for there being in them more forecast and craft, they alwayes take time by the forelocks whereby to save themselves, and seeke credit with him who they hope shall get the mastery. The Prince {295} likewise is necessitated alwayes to live with the same people, but can doe well enough without the same great men; he being able to create new ones, and destroy them again every day, and to take from them, and give them credit as he pleases: and to cleare this part, I say, that great men ought to be considerd two wayes principally, that is, if they take thy proceedings so much to heart, as to engage their fortunes wholly in thine, in case they lye not alwayes catching at spoyle, they ought to be well honourd and esteem'd: those that bind themselves not to thy fortune, are to be considerd also two wayes; either they doe it for lack of courage, and naturall want of spirit, and then shouldst thou serve thy selfe of them, and of them especially that are men of good advice; for if thy affaires prosper, thou dost thy selfe honour thereby; if crost, thou needst not feare them: but when they oblige not themselves to thee of purpose, and upon occasion of ambition, it is a signe they think more of themselves than of thee: and of these the Prince ought to beware, and account of them as his discoverd enemyes: for alwayes in thy adversity they will give a hand too to ruine thee. Therefore ought hee that comes to be Prince by the peoples favour, keepe them his friends: which he may easily doe, they desiring only to live free from oppression: but he that becomes Prince by the great mens favour, against the will of the people, ought above all things to gaine the people to him, which he may easily effect, when he takes upon him their protection: And because men when they find good, where they look for evill, are thereby more endered to their benefactour, therefore growes the people so pliant in their subjection to him, as if by their favours he had attaind his dignity. And the Prince is able to gaine them to his side by many wayes, which because they vary according to the subject, no certaine rule can be given thereupon; wherefore we shall let them passe I will only conclude, that it is necessary for a Prince to have the people his friend; otherwise in his adversities he hath no helpe. Nabis Prince of the Spartans supported the siege of all Greece, and an exceeding victorious army of the Romans, {296} and against those defended his native countrey and State, and this suffic'd him alone, that as the danger came upon him, he secur'd himself of a fewer; whereas if the people had been his enemy, this had nothing availd him. And let no man think to overthrow this my opinion with that common proverb, that He who relyes upon the people, layes his foundation in the dirt; for that is true where a private Citizen grounds upon them, making his account that the people shall free him, when either his enemyes or the Magistrates oppresse him: In this case he should find himself often deceiv'd, as it befell the Gracchyes in Rome, and in Florence George Scali: but he being a Prince that grounds thereupon, who can command, and is a man of courage, who hath his wits about him in his adversityes, and wants not other preparations, and holds together the whole multitude animated with his valour and orders, shall not prove deceiv'd by them, and shall find he hath layd good foundations. These Principalityes are wont to be upon the point of falling when they goe about to skip from the civil order to the absolute: for these Princes either command of themselves, or by the Magistrate; in this last case their State is more weak and dangerous, because they stand wholly at the will and pleasure of these Citizens, who then are set over the Magistrates, who especially in adverse times are able with facility to take their State from them either by rising up against them, or by not obeying them; and then the Prince is not at hand in those dangers to take the absolute authority upon him: for the Citizens and subjects that are accustomed to receive the commands from the Magistrates, are not like in those fractions to obey his: and in doubtfull times he shall alwayes have greatest penury of whom he may trust; for such a Prince cannot ground upon that which he sees in peaceable times, when the Citizens have need of the State; for then every one runs, and every one promises, and every one will venture his life for him, where there is no danger neare; but in times of hazzard, when the State hath need of Citizens, there are but few of them then, and so much the more is this experience dangerous, in that {297} it can be but once made. Therefore a prudent Prince ought to devise a way whereby his Citizens alwayes and in any case and quality of time may have need of his government, and they shall alwaies after prove faithfull to him.

B But coming to the other side, when a prominent citizen becomes the leader of his homeland not by wickedness or extreme violence, but through the support of his fellow citizens, we can call this a Civil Principality. To achieve this does not require complete virtue or fortune, but rather a clever blend of both. This kind of principality is reached either through the help of the people or the powerful. In every city, we observe these two different attitudes: the people do not want to be ruled or oppressed by the powerful, and the powerful want to command and oppress the people. From these conflicting desires arise one of three outcomes in the city: either a Principality, Liberty, or chaotic lawlessness. The Principality is formed by either the people or the powerful, depending on which side has the upper hand at that moment. When the powerful realize they cannot resist the people's will, they will often consolidate their influence around one of their own and make him the Prince to operate under his protection. Similarly, when the people can no longer tolerate the arrogance of the powerful, they give their favor to one man and proclaim him their Prince to safeguard them. A Prince who rises with the support of the powerful faces more challenges than one who gains it through the people's approval. Once made a Prince, the former has many around him who see themselves as his equals and thus cannot be easily commanded. In contrast, the Prince who earns the people's favor finds himself alone on his throne, surrounded by few who are not entirely submissive. Additionally, the powerful are harder to please without wronging others, while the people can be content with little; the people's aim is more honorable than that of the powerful, who seek to oppress, while the people merely wish to avoid oppression. It's also worth noting that a Prince who is seen as the enemy by the people can never feel secure because of their sheer numbers; while he can trust the nobility, they are fewer in number. The worst fate a Prince can expect from the people if they become his enemies is abandonment, whereas when the powerful become his enemies, he must fear not only being abandoned but also their potential to rally against him. The powerful, being more crafty and strategic, always look for ways to secure their safety and curry favor with whoever they anticipate will hold power. Likewise, the Prince always lives among the same people but can do without the same powerful allies; he can create new ones and dispose of them daily, granting or taking away their status as he sees fit. To clarify this point, I assert that great men should be viewed in two main ways: first, if they take your actions seriously and invest their fortunes in yours, and if they aren’t always looking for personal gain, they should be honored and respected. Those who do not tie their fortunes to yours should also be assessed in two ways: either they do so out of cowardice and a lack of spirit, in which case you should use them, especially those with good advice—if your initiatives succeed, you will gain honor; if they fail, you need not fear them. However, if they refuse to commit to you out of ambition, it indicates they care more for their interests than yours; these are the individuals the Prince must be wary of, as they can become revealed enemies who will assist in his downfall during difficult times. Thus, a Prince who comes to power through the people's favor must keep them on his side, which is easily done as they only wish to live free from oppression. Conversely, a Prince who gains power through the support of the powerful, against the people's will, must—above all else—win over the people, which he can accomplish simply by offering them protection. Because people tend to become more attached to those who do good for them when they expect ill, the populace will become so agreeable to him that it seems as if he attained his title through their support. A Prince can gain their loyalty through various means, which differ based on the situation, and thus no specific method can be laid out. I will conclude by stating that it is essential for a Prince to have the people's support; otherwise, he will have no help in times of trouble. Nabis, the Prince of the Spartans, withstood the siege of all Greece and a powerful Roman army, and this alone sufficed because when danger approached, he secured himself with fewer allies. If the people were against him, this advantage would have meant nothing. And let no one attempt to counter this perspective with the common saying, "He who relies on the people builds on shaky ground," for this is true only for a private citizen who depends on them, thinking they will save him when either his enemies or the officials oppress him. In this case, he often finds himself deceived, as was the fate of the Gracchus brothers in Rome and George Scali in Florence. However, a Prince who bases his power on the people's support and who commands respect—being courageous and having the foresight during tough times, without lacking any preparations, and uniting the masses with his valor and orders—will not be let down by them and will find he has laid strong foundations. These principalities often teeter on the brink of collapse when they attempt to transition from civil governance to absolute rule. For these Princes either lead independently or through the officials; in the latter case, their rule is weaker and more perilous since they entirely depend on the goodwill of these citizens, who can easily usurp their authority by either rebelling against them or refusing to obey. During these crises, when the Prince is not available to seize absolute power, the citizens accustomed to obeying officials will not readily submit to him; and during troubling times, he will always find himself lacking in trustworthy allies. For such a Prince cannot rely on what appears stable in peaceful periods when citizens need the state; that is when everyone rallies and promises support, willing to risk their lives for him because there is no immediate danger. But in times of threat, when the state needs citizens, very few will stand by him, which makes this lack of loyalty particularly serious, as the opportunity for betrayal comes only once. Therefore, a wise Prince should find a way to ensure that his citizens will always need his leadership, and they will remain loyal to him through all circumstances.

CHAP. X

In what manner the Forces of all Principalities ought to be measured.

It is requisite in examining the quality of those Principalities, to have another consideration of them, that is, if a Prince have such dominions, that he is able in case of necessity to subsist of himself, or else whether he hath alwaies need of another to defend him. And to cleer this point the better, I judge them able to stand of themselves, who are of power either for their multitudes of men, or quantity of money, to bring into the field a compleat armie, and joyn battel with whoever comes to assail them: and so I think those alwaies to stand in need of others help, who are not able to appear in the field against the enemy, but are forc'd to retire within their walls and guard them. Touching the first case, we have treated already, and shall adde somwhat thereto as occasion shall require. In the second case, we cannot say other, save only to encourage such Princes to fortifie and guard their own Capital city, and of the countrey about, not to hold much account; and whoever shall have well fortified that town, and touching other matters of governments shall have behaved himself towards his subjects, as hath been formerly said, and hereafter shall be, shall never be assaild but with great regard; for men willingly undertake not enterprises, where they see difficulty to work them through; nor can much facility be there found, where one assails him, who hath his town strong and wel guarded, and is not {298} hated of his people. The cities of Germany are very free; they have but very little of the countrey about them belonging to them; and they obey the Emperor, when they please, and they stand not in fear, neither of him nor any other Potentate about them: for they are in such a manner fortified, that every one thinks the siege of any of them would prove hard and tedious: for all of them have ditches, and rampires, and good store of Artillery, and alwaies have their publick cellars well provided with meat and drink and firing for a yeer: besides this, whereby to feed the common people, and without any loss to the publick, they have alwaies in common whereby they are able for a year to imploy them in the labor of those trades that are the sinews and the life of that city, and of that industry whereby the commons ordinarily supported themselves: they hold up also the military exercises in repute, and hereupon have they many orders to maintain them. A Prince then that is master of a good strong city, and causeth not himself to be hated, cannot be assaulted; and in case he were, he that should assail him, would be fain to quit him with shame: for the affairs of the world are so various, that it is almost impossible that an army can lie incampt before a town for the space of a whole yeer: and if any should reply, that the people having their possessions abroad, in case they should see them a fire, would not have patience, and the tedious siege and their love to themselves would make them forget their Prince: I answer that a Prince puissant and couragious, will easily master those difficulties, now giving his subjects hope, that the mischief will not be of durance; sometimes affright them with the cruelty of their enemies, and other whiles cunningly securing himself of those whom he thinks too forward to run to the enemy. Besides this by ordinary reason the enemy should burne and waste their countrey, upon his arrival, and at those times while mens minds are yet warme, and resolute in their defence: and therefore so much the less ought a Prince doubt: for after some few dayes, that their courages grow coole, the dammages are all done, and mischiefs received, and there is no help for {299} it, and then have they more occasion to cleave faster to their Prince, thinking he is now more bound to them, their houses having for his defence been fired, and their possessions wasted; and mens nature is as well to hold themselves oblig'd for the kindnesses they do, as for those they receive; whereupon if all be well weigh'd, a wise Prince shall not find much difficulty to keep sure and true to him his Citizens hearts at the beginning and latter end of the siege, when he hath no want of provision for food and ammunition.

IIt is necessary to consider the quality of those Principalities, particularly whether a Prince has dominions that allow him to be self-sufficient in times of need, or if he always requires the support of others for defense. To clarify this point, I believe that those who can stand on their own are powerful either through large numbers of men or substantial wealth, allowing them to deploy a complete army and engage in battle against anyone who attacks them. Conversely, those who cannot face the enemy in battle and must retreat behind their walls always rely on outside help. Regarding the first case, we have already discussed it and will add more as needed. In the second case, we can only encourage such Princes to strengthen and defend their own capital cities, rather than underestimate the surrounding territory. Anyone who successfully fortifies their town and governs their subjects well, as previously discussed, will never face an assault lightly; people tend to avoid ventures that appear difficult to succeed in, and there is little ease in attacking someone who has a strong and well-guarded town and is not hated by their people. The cities of Germany are quite independent; they have very little land around them and obey the Emperor only when they choose. They do not fear him or any other powerful leader because they are fortified in such a way that it would be hard and time-consuming to lay siege to them. Each of these cities has ditches, ramparts, ample artillery, and always maintains public supplies of food, drink, and fuel for a year. Additionally, to support the common people without harming the public interest, they have ways to keep locals engaged in the trades that sustain the city and community. They also value military training and have numerous orders to uphold it. Therefore, a Prince who possesses a strong city and isn't despised cannot be attacked; if he were, the attacker would likely leave in shame. The affairs of the world are so varied that it's almost impossible for an army to camp outside a town for a whole year. If anyone argues that the people, having their possessions outside, would lose patience if they saw them burning, leading them to forget their Prince, I reply that a powerful and courageous Prince can easily overcome those challenges by instilling hope in his subjects that the situation won't last long. He can occasionally frighten them with the cruelty of their enemies and cleverly secure those who seem too willing to confront the enemy. Besides, typically the enemy would devastate the countryside upon arrival, especially while people are still determined to defend their homes. Thus, a Prince should worry less because, after a few days, when their resolve cools, the damage has been done, and they have suffered losses with no remedy. They then have even more reason to cling to their Prince, believing he is more indebted to them, as their homes have been burned and possessions destroyed. Human nature dictates that people feel obligated for both the kindnesses they perform and those they receive. Therefore, if all of this is carefully considered, a wise Prince will not find much difficulty in keeping his citizens loyal to him at both the beginning and end of a siege, provided he has enough food and ammunition.

CHAP. XI

Concerning Ecclesiastical Principalities.

T here remains now only that we treat of the Ecclesiastical Principalities, about which all the difficulties are before they are gotten: for they are attained to either by vertue, or Fortune; and without the one or the other they are held: for they are maintaind by orders inveterated in the religion, all which are so powerfull and of such nature, that they maintain their Princes in their dominions in what manner soever they proceed and live. These only have an Estate and defend it not; have subjects and govern them not; and yet their States because undefended, are not taken from them; nor their subjects, though not govern'd, care not, think not, neither are able to aliene themselves from them. These Principalities then are only happy and secure: but they being sustained by superior causes, whereunto humane understanding reaches not, I will not meddle with them: for being set up and maintained by God, it would be the part of a presumptuous and rash man to enter into discourse of them. Yet if any man should ask me whence it proceeds, that the Church in temporal power hath attaind to such greatness, seeing that till the time of Alexander the sixt, the Italian Potentates, {300} and not only they who are entituled the potentates, but every Baron and Lord though of the meanest condition in regard of the temporality, made but small account of it; and now a King of France trembles at the power thereof; and it hath been able to drive him out of Italy, and ruine the Venetians; and however this be well known, me thinks it is not superstitious in some part to recall it to memory. Before that Charles King of France past into Italy, this countrey was under the rule of the Pope, Venetians, the King of Naples, the Duke of Milan, and the Florentines. These Potentates took two things principally to their care; the one, that no forreiner should invade Italy; the other that no one of them should inlarge their State. They, against whom this care was most taken, were the Pope and the Venetians; and to restrain the Venetians, there needed the union of all the rest, as it was in the defence of Ferrara; and to keep the Pope low, they served themselves of the Barons of Rome, who being divided into two factions, the Orsini and Colonnesi, there was alwaies occasion of offence between them, who standing ready with their armes in hand in the view of the Pope, held the Popedome weak and feeble: and however sometimes there arose a couragious Pope, as was Sextus; yet either his fortune, or his wisdome was not able to free him of these incommodities, and the brevity of their lives was the cause thereof; for in ten years, which time, one with another, Popes ordinarily liv'd, with much ado could they bring low one of the factions. And if, as we may say, one had near put out the Colonnesi, there arose another enemy to the Orsini, who made them grow again, so that there was never time quite to root them out. This then was the cause, why the Popes temporal power was of small esteem in Italy; there arose afterwards Pope Alexander the sixt, who of all the Popes that ever were, shewed what a Pope was able to do with money and forces: and he effected, by means of his instrument, Duke Valentine, and by the ocasion of the French mens passage, all those things which I have formerly discoursed upon in the Dukes actions: and however his purpose was nothing at all to {301} inlarge the Church dominions, but to make the Duke great; yet what he did, turnd to the Churches advantage, which after his death when the Duke was taken away, was the heir of all his pains. Afterwards succeeded Pope Julius, and found the Church great, having all Romania, and all the Barons of Rome being quite rooted out, and by Alexanders persecutions, all their factions worne down; he found also the way open for the heaping up of moneys, never practised before Alexanders time; which things Julius not only follow'd, but augmented; and thought to make himself master of Bolonia, and extinguish the Venetians, and chase the French men out of Italy: and these designes of his prov'd all lucky to him, and so much the more to his praise in that he did all for the good of the Church, and in no private regard: he kept also the factions of the Orsins and Colonnesi, in the same State he found them: and though there were among them some head whereby to cause an alteration; yet two things have held them quiet; the one the power of the Church, which somewhat affrights them; the other because they have no Cardinals of their factions, who are the primary causes of all the troubles amongst them: nor shall these parties ever be at rest, while they have Cardinals; because they nourish the factions both in Rome, and abroad; and the Barons then are forced to undertake the defence of them: and thus from the Prelates ambitions arise the discords and tumults among the Barons. And now hath Pope Leo his Holiness found the Popedome exceeding puissant, of whom it is hoped, that if they amplified it by armes, he by his goodness, and infinite other vertues, will much more advantage and dignifie it.

T Now we need to discuss the Ecclesiastical Principalities, which present all the difficulties before they are attained. These are achieved either through virtue or luck; without one or the other, they cannot be maintained. They are upheld by longstanding traditions in religion, all of which are so powerful and significant that they keep their rulers secure in their domains, no matter how they act or live. These Principalities have a territory but do not defend it; they have subjects but do not govern them; yet their territories, even when unprotected, are not taken from them; nor do their subjects, though not governed, care, think, or are able to detach themselves from them. Therefore, these Principalities are both fortunate and secure. However, because they are supported by higher causes that human understanding cannot fully grasp, I won’t delve into them. Since they are established and maintained by God, it would be presumptuous and reckless to discuss them. Yet, if someone were to ask me how the Church gained such immense temporal power, considering that until the time of Alexander VI, the Italian rulers— {300} —and not only those who were called rulers, but every Baron and Lord, even those of the lowest rank concerning temporal power, regarded it with little importance. Now, a King of France trembles at its might; it has been able to drive him out of Italy and ruin the Venetians. While this is well known, it doesn't seem superstitious to recall it in some part. Before Charles, King of France, entered Italy, the country was under the control of the Pope, the Venetians, the King of Naples, the Duke of Milan, and the Florentines. These rulers focused on two main concerns: ensuring that no foreigner would invade Italy and that none of them would expand their territory. The Pope and the Venetians were primarily the targets of this concern, and to curb the Venetians, a united front from the others was needed, as seen in the defense of Ferrara. To keep the Pope in check, they utilized the Barons of Rome, who were divided into two factions, the Orsini and Colonnesi, which always created opportunities for conflict between them. With their weapons at the ready in the Pope's view, these factions kept the papacy weak and feeble. Although some courageous Popes, like Sextus, arose, they were unable to free themselves from these issues due to either their fate or wisdom; their short reigns contributed to this problem. Within the ten years that Popes typically lived, they struggled to diminish one faction. And even if one faction, like the Colonnesi, seemed close to being wiped out, another enemy of the Orsini would rise, causing them to regrow, thus never allowing for a complete eradication. This, then, explains why the Pope's temporal power was not highly esteemed in Italy. Later, Pope Alexander VI emerged, who demonstrated what a Pope could achieve with wealth and forces more than any other Pope before him. Through his agent, Duke Valentino, and aided by the French passing through, he accomplished all those things I previously discussed about the Duke's actions. Although his aim was not to enlarge the Church's dominions but to elevate the Duke, what he did ultimately benefited the Church, which inherited all his efforts after the Duke's demise. Afterwards, Pope Julius succeeded him and found the Church in a strong position, having all of Romagna and having removed all the Barons of Rome; due to Alexander's persecution, their factions were worn down. He discovered a method for amassing wealth, something that had not been seen before Alexander's time; Julius not only pursued this but expanded upon it, intending to make himself master of Bologna, eliminate the Venetians, and drive the French out of Italy. All his plans turned out to be successful, and this added to his praise because he did it all for the Church's benefit, with no personal agenda. He also kept the Orsini and Colonnesi factions in the same state he found them; and although there were some leaders among them that could instigate change, two factors kept them in check: the Church's power, which somewhat intimidated them, and the absence of their own Cardinals, who typically are the main sources of trouble among them. These factions will never find peace as long as they have Cardinals, since they fuel conflicts both in Rome and abroad, forcing the Barons to defend them. Thus, the ambitions of the Prelates give rise to discord and turmoil among the Barons. Now, Pope Leo, his Holiness, has discovered the papacy to be incredibly powerful, and it is hoped that by expanding it through military means, he will enhance it even more through his goodness and other virtues.

{302}

CHAP. XII

How many sorts of Military discipline there are and touching Mercenary soldiers.

H aving treated particularly of the qualities of those Principalities, which in the beginning I propounded to discourse upon, and considered in some part the reasons of their well and ill being, and shewd the waies whereby many have sought to gain, and hold them, it remains now that I speak in general of the offences and defences, that may chance in each of the forenamed. We have formerly said that it is necessary for a Prince to have good foundations laid; otherwise it must needs be that he go to wrack. The Principal foundations that all States have, as well new, as old, or mixt, are good laws, and good armes; and because there cannot be good laws, where there are not good armes; and where there are good armes, there must needs be good laws, I will omit to discourse of the laws, and speak of armes. I say then that the armes, wherewithall a Prince defends his State, either are his own, or mercenary, or auxiliary, or mixt. Those that are mercenary and auxiliar, are unprofitable, and dangerous, and if any one holds his State founded upon mercenary armes, he shall never be quiet, nor secure, because they are never well united, ambitious, and without discipline, treacherous, among their friends stour, among their enemies cowardly; they have no fear of God, nor keep any faith with men; and so long only defer they the doing of mischief, till the enemy comes to assul thee; and in time of peace thou art despoyled by them, in war by thy enemies: the reason hereof is, because they have no other love, nor other cause to keep them in the field, but only a small stipend, which is not of force to make them willing to hazard their lives for thee: they are willing indeed to be thy soldiers, till thou goest to fight; but then they fly, or {303} run away; which thing would cost me but small pains to perswade; for the ruine of Italy hath not had any other cause now a dayes, than for that it hath these many years rely'd upon mercenary armes; which a good while since perhaps may have done some man some service, and among themselves they may have been thought valiant: but so soon as any forrein enemy appeared, they quickly shewed what they were. Whereupon Charles the King of France, without opposition, made himself master of all Italy: and he that said, that the causes thereof were our faults, said true; but these were not those they beleeved, but what I have told; and because they were the Princes faults, they also have suffered the punishment. I will fuller shew the infelicity of these armes. The mercenary Captains are either very able men, or not: if they be, thou canst not repose any trust in them: for they will alwaies aspire unto their own proper advancements, either by suppressing of thee that art their Lord, or by suppressing of some one else quite out of thy purpose: but if the Captain be not valorous, he ordinarily ruines thee: and in case it be answered, that whoever shall have his armes in his hands, whether mercenary or not, will do so: I would reply, that armes are to be imployed either by a Prince, or Common-wealth. The Prince ought to go in person, and performe the office of a commander: the Republick is to send forth her Citizens: and when she sends forth one that proves not of abilities, she ought to change him then; and when he does prove valorous, to bridle him so by the laws, that he exceed not his commission. And by experience we see, that Princes and Republiques of themselves alone, make very great conquests; but that mercenary armes never do other than harme; and more hardly falls a Republick armed with her own armes under the obedience of one of her own Citizens, than one that is armed by forrein armes. Rome and Sparta subsisted many ages armed and free. The Swissers are exceedingly well armed, and yet very free. Touching mercenary armes that were of old, we have an example of the Carthagians, who near upon were oppress'd by their own mercenary soldiers, when the first war {304} with the Romans was finished; however the Carthagians had their own Citizens for their Captains. Philip of Macedon was made by the Thebans after Epaminondas his death, General of their Armies; and after the victory, he took from them liberty. The Milaneses when Duke Philip was dead, entertaind Francis Sforza into their pay against the Venetians, who having vanquisht their enemie at Caravaggio, afterwards joyned with them, where by to usurp upon the Milaneses his Masters. Sforza his father, being in Joan the Queen of Naples pay, left her on a sudden disarmed; whereupon she, to save her Kingdom, was constraind to cast her self into the King of Arrragon's bosome. And in case the Venetians and the Florentines have formerly augmented their State with these kind of armes, and their own Captains, and yet none of them have ever made themselves their Princes, but rather defended them: I answer, that the Florentines in this case have had fortune much their friend: for of valorous Captains, which they might any way fear, some have not been victors, some have had opposition, and others have laid the aim of their ambitions another way. He who overcame not, was John Aouto, of whose faith there could no proof be made, being he vanquisht not; but every one will acknowledge, that, had he vanquisht, the Florentines were at his discretion. Sforza had alwaies the Bracceschi for his adversaries, so that they were as a guard one upon another. Francis converted all his ambition against Lombardy. Braccio against the Church, and the Kingdome of Naples. But let us come to that which followed a while agoe. The Florentines made Paul Vitelli their General, a throughly advis'd man, and who from a private fortune had rose to very great reputation: had he taken Pisa, no man will deny but that the Florentines must have held fast with him; for had he been entertained in their enemies pay, they had no remedy; and they themselves holding of him, of force were to obey him. The Venetians, if we consider their proceedings, we shall see wrought both warily and gloriously, while themselves made war, which was before their undertakings by land, where the gentlemen {305} with their own Commons in armes behav'd themselves bravely: but when they began to fight by land, they lost their valor, and follow'd the customes of Italy; and in the beginning of their enlargement by land, because they had not much territory, and yet were of great reputation, they had not much cause to fear their Captains; but as they began to extend their bounds, which was under their Commander Carminiola, they had a taste of this error: for perceiving he was exceeding valorous, having under his conduct beaten the Duke of Milan; and knowing on the other side, how he was cold in the war, they judg'd that they could not make any great conquest with him; and because they neither would, nor could cashier him, that they might not lose what they had gotten, they were forced for their own safeties to put him to death. Since they have had for their General Bartholomew of Berganio, Robert of St. Severin, the Count of Petilian, and such like: whereby they were to fear their losses, as well as to hope for gain: as it fell out afterwards at Vayla, where in one day they lost that, which with so much pains they had gotten in eight hundred years: for from these kind of armes grow slack and slow and weak gains; but sudden and wonderfull losses: And because I am now come with these examples into Italy, which now these many years, have been governd by mercenary armes, I will search deeper into them, to the end that their course and progress being better discoverd, they may be the better amended. You have to understand, that so soon as in these later times the yoak of the Italian Empire began to be shaken off, and the Pope had gotten reputation in the temporality, Italy was divided into several States: for many of the great cities took armes against their Nobility; who under the Emperors protection had held them in oppression; and the Pope favored these, whereby he might get himself reputation, in the temporality; of many others, their Citizens became Princes, so that hereupon Italy being come into the Churches hands as it were, and some few Republicks, those Priests and Citizens not accustomed to the use of armes, began to take strangers to their pay. The first that gave {306} reputation to these soldiers was Alberick of Como in Romania. From his discipline among others descended Brachio and Sforza, who in their time were the arbitres of Italy; after these followed all others, who even till our dayes have commanded the armes of Italy; and the success of their valor hath been, that it was overrun by Charles, pillaged by Lewis, forc'd by Ferdinand, and disgrac'd by the Swissers. The order which they have held, hath been, first whereby to give reputation to their own armes to take away the credit of the Infantry. This they did, because they having no State of their own, but living upon their industry, their few foot gave them no reputation, and many they were not able to maintain; whereupon they reduc'd themselves to cavalery, and so with a supportable number they were entertained and honored: and matters were brought to such termes, that in an army of twenty thousand soldiers you should not find two thousand foot. They had moreover us'd all industry to free themselves and their soldiers of all pains and fear, in their skirmishes, not killing, but taking one another prisoners, and without ransome for their freedom; they repaired not all to their tents by night, nor made palizado or trench thereabout, nor lay in the field in the summer: and all these things were thus contrived and agreed of among them in their military orders, whereby (as is said) to avoid pains and dangers, insomuch as they have brought Italy into slavery and disgrace.

H Having discussed the qualities of those Principalities, which I initially intended to talk about, and considered some reasons for their successes and failures, as well as the strategies many have used to acquire and maintain them, it's now time to speak generally about the offenses and defenses that may occur within each of the aforementioned. We have previously stated that a Prince must have strong foundations; otherwise, he is bound to fail. The main foundations that all States, whether new, old, or mixed, have are good laws and strong arms. Since there cannot be good laws without strong arms, and when there are strong arms, good laws must also exist, I will skip discussing laws and focus on arms. I say that the arms a Prince uses to defend his State can be his own, mercenary, auxiliary, or mixed. Mercenary and auxiliary forces are unbeneficial and risky, and if anyone relies on mercenary arms to maintain their State, they will never find peace or security because they are often poorly united, ambitious, and undisciplined. They can be treacherous among friends and cowardly against enemies; they show no fear of God and keep no faith with people. They only delay doing harm until the enemy approaches, while in peace, you are robbed by them, and in war, by your foes. The reason for this is that they have no loyalty or cause to fight for you beyond a small paycheck, which isn’t enough motivation to risk their lives. They might act as your soldiers until it's time to fight, and then they will flee or run away, which wouldn’t take much convincing since Italy's ruin has stemmed largely from relying on mercenary arms. Those may have done some service in the past, and among themselves, they might have appeared brave, but as soon as a foreign enemy appeared, their true nature was revealed. Consequently, Charles, the King of France, without resistance, took control of all Italy. It is true that the causes for this were our faults, but those were not what people believed; what I've stated is the truth. Because these were the Princes' mistakes, they too have faced the consequences. I will further illustrate the misfortunes of these arms. The mercenary leaders can either be very capable or not. If they are capable, you cannot trust them because they will always aim for their own advancement, either by undermining you, their Lord, or by eliminating someone else outside of your view. On the other hand, if the Captain lacks bravery, he usually leads you to ruin. If it’s contended that whoever has arms in their hands, whether mercenary or not, will act in such a way, I would counter that arms should be used by either a Prince or a Republic. A Prince should lead personally and fulfill the duties of a commander; the Republic should deploy her citizens. When she sends out someone who proves incapable, she should replace him, and when he shows valor, she ought to restrain him by laws to ensure he does not exceed his commission. History shows us that Princes and Republics alone achieve great conquests, while mercenary forces bring only harm. A Republic with its own arms is less likely to fall under the control of one of its citizens than one that relies on foreign forces. Rome and Sparta thrived for many ages armed and free. The Swiss are extremely well-armed and yet very free. Regarding the mercenary forces of the past, we have the example of the Carthaginians, who were nearly overthrown by their own mercenary soldiers after the first war with the Romans. However, the Carthaginians had their own citizens as their leaders. Philip of Macedon was appointed General of the Theban army after the death of Epaminondas, and following his victory, he took away their freedom. The Milanese, after Duke Philip's death, hired Francesco Sforza against the Venetians, who, after defeating their enemy at Caravaggio, later allied with them to seize control over the Milanese, his former employers. Sforza's father, when employed by Joan, the Queen of Naples, abandoned her suddenly, leaving her disarmed, which forced her to seek refuge with the King of Aragon to save her Kingdom. And if the Venetians and the Florentines have previously expanded their states with such arms and their own leaders, still none of them have ever made themselves Princes but rather defended them. I respond that the Florentines have been particularly fortunate in this regard: for of the valiant leaders they might have feared, some were not victorious, some faced opposition, and others redirected their ambitions. The man who didn’t conquer was Giovanni Acuto, whose loyalty could not be proven since he was not defeated; but everyone acknowledges that if he had won, the Florentines would have been at his mercy. Sforza always faced the Bracceschi as his adversaries, mutually guarding one another. Francesco aimed all his ambitions at Lombardy, while Braccio targeted the Church and the Kingdom of Naples. But let’s come to what happened recently. The Florentines made Paolo Vitelli their General, a thoroughly wise man who rose from humble beginnings to great reputation: had he taken Pisa, no one would deny that the Florentines would have held on to him tightly; for if he had been taken into the pay of their enemies, they would have had no recourse; and by being under him, they would have surely been compelled to obey him. The Venetians, if we analyze their actions, fought both cautiously and gloriously while pursuing war, particularly before their land campaigns, where the nobles alongside their commoners behaved bravely; but when they began fighting on land, they lost their valor and conformed to Italian customs. At the start of their expansion on land, having not much territory and yet high reputation, they had little reason to fear their leaders; but as they began to extend their territory under their Commander Carmignola, they encountered this flaw: realizing he was exceedingly courageous, having under his command defeated the Duke of Milan, and knowing he was ineffective in war, they concluded they could not achieve great conquests with him. And unwilling to dismiss him for fear of losing their gains, they were forced, for their own safety, to have him executed. They later had as their General Bartholomew of Bergamo, Robert of St. Severin, the Count of Petilia, and others like them, which caused them to fear losses as well as hold hopes for gain, as occurred later at Vailà, where in a single day they lost what took them eight hundred years to acquire. For from these types of arms come slow and weak gains but sudden and disastrous losses. And since I've now brought these examples into Italy, which has been governed by mercenary arms for many years, I’ll delve deeper into them so their course and outcomes might be better understood and improved. You should know that as soon as the yoke of the Italian Empire began to loosen in recent times, and the Pope gained influence in matters of the State, Italy became divided into several territories. Many of the major cities took up arms against their Nobility, who, under the Emperor's protection, had oppressed them; and the Pope supported these efforts to gain prestige in the temporal realm. In many other cases, their citizens became Princes, leading to Italy, as it were, falling into the hands of the Church and a few Republics. Those priests and citizens not accustomed to warfare began hiring foreigners for their armies. The first to give recognition to these soldiers was Alberico of Como in Romania. From his discipline, among others, sprang Braccio and Sforza, who in their time were arbiters of Italy. Following them were all the others who have commanded the arms of Italy up to our days, and the results of their valor were that it was overrun by Charles, plundered by Louis, forced by Ferdinand, and humiliated by the Swiss. The approach they took was first to enhance the reputation of their own arms while undermining the credibility of infantry. They did this because, having no State of their own and living off their skills, their small infantry did not provide them any reputation, and they could not maintain many soldiers. Consequently, they reduced themselves to cavalry, where they could be supported and honored with a manageable number. Matters reached a point where in an army of twenty thousand soldiers, there would be barely two thousand infantry. Furthermore, they took all measures to free themselves and their soldiers from all trouble and fear during skirmishes, opting to capture rather than kill each other, and without charging ransoms for their freedom. They didn’t all return to their tents at night or build barricades or trenches around their camps, nor did they sleep in the fields during summer: all these arrangements were designed and agreed upon in their military regulations to avoid hard work and danger, to the extent that they have brought Italy into misery and disgrace.

{307}

CHAP. XIII

Of Auxiliary Soldiers, mixt, and native.

T he Auxiliary forces, being the other kind of unprofitable armes, are, when any puissant one is called in, who with his forces comes to assist and defend thee; such as in these later times did Pope Julius use, who having seen the evil proof of his mercenary soldiers in the enterprize of Ferrara, applied himself to the Auxiliaries, and agreed with Ferdinand King of Spain, that with his Forces he should aid him. These armes may be profitable and advantagious for themselves; but for him that calls them in, hurtfull; because in losing, thou art left defeated; and conquering, thou becomest their prisoner. And however that of these examples the ancient stories are full fraught; yet will I not part from this of Pope Julius the second, which is as yet fresh: whose course could not have been more inconsiderate, for the desire he had to get Ferrara, putting himself wholly into strangers hands: but his good fortune caused another cause to arise, that hindred him from receiving the fruit of his evil choice; for his Auxiliaries being broken at Ravenna, and the Swissers thereupon arriving, who put the Conquerors to flight beyond all opinion, even their own and others, he chanced not to remain his enemies prisoner, they being put to flight, nor prisoner to his Auxiliaries, having vanquished by other forces than theirs. The Florentines being wholly disarmed, brought ten thousand French to Pisa for to take it: by which course they ran more hazzard, than in any time of their troubles. The Emperor of Constantinople, to oppress his neighbors, brought into Greece ten thousand Turks, who when the war was ended, could not be got out thence, which was the beginning of Greeces servitude under the Infidels. He then that will in no case be able to overcome, let him serve himself of these armes; for they are much {308} more dangerous than the mercenaries; for by those thy ruine is more suddenly executed; for they are all united, and all bent to the obedience of another. But for the mercenaries to hurt thee, when they have vanquished, there is no more need of time, and greater occasion, they not being all united in a body, and being found out and paid by thee, wherein a third that thou mak'st their head, cannot suddenly gaine so great authority, that he can endammage thee. In summe, in the mercenaries their sloth and lazinesse to fight is more dangerous: in the auxiliaries their valour. Wherefore a wise Prince hath alwayes avoyded these kind of armes, and betaken himselfe to his owne, and desired rather to loss with his owne, than conquer with anothers, accounting that not a true victorie which was gotten with others armes. I will not doubt to alleadge Cæsar Borgia, and his actions. This Duke entred into Romania with auxiliarie armes, bringing with him all French souldiers: but afterwards not accounting those armes secure, bent himselfe to mercenaries, judging lesse danger to be in those, and tooke in pay the Orsini and the Vitelli, which afterwards in the proof of them, finding wavering, unfaithful, and dangerous, he extinguishd, and betook himselfe to his owne; and it may easily be perceiv'd what difference there is between the one and the other of these armes, considering the difference that was between the Dukes reputation, when he had the French men alone, and when he had the Orsini and Vitelli; but when he remaind with his own, and stood of himselfe, we shall find it was much augmented: nor ever was it of grate esteeme, but when every one saw, that he wholly possessed his owne armes. I thought not to have parted from the Italian examples of late memory; but that I must not let passe that of Hiero the Siracusan, being one of those I formerly nam'd. This man (as I said before) being made general of the Siracusans forces, knew presently that mercenary souldiery was nothing for their profit in that they were hirelings, as our Italians are; and finding no way either to hold, or cashier them made them all bee cut to peeces, and afterwards waged warre with his owne men, and {309} none others. I will also call to memory a figure of the old Testament serving just to this purpose. When David presented himselfe before Saul to goe to fight with Goliah the Philistins Champion, Saul to encourage him, clad him with his owne armes, which David when he had them upon back, refused, saying, he was not able to make any proofe of himself therein, and therefore would goe meet the enemy with his own sling and sword. In summe, others armes either fall from thy shoulders, or cumber or streighten thee. Charls the seventh, Father of Lewis the eleventh, having by his good fortune and valour set France at liberty from the English, knew well this necessity of being arm'd with his owne armes, and settled in his Kingdome the ordinances of men at armes, and infantry. Afterwards King Lewis his sonne abolisht those of the infantry, and began to take the Swissers to pay; which errour follow'd by the others, is (as now indeed it appeares) the cause of that Kingdomes dangers. For having given reputation to the Swissers, they have renderd all their own armes contemptible; for this hath wholly ruind their foot, and oblig'd their men at armes to forrein armes: for being accustomed to serve with the Swissers, they think they are not able to overcome without them. From whence it comes that the French are not of force against the Swissers, and without them also against others they use not to adventure. Therefore are the French armies mixt, part mercenaries, and part natives, which armes are farre better than the simple mercenaries or simple auxiliaries, and much inferiour to the natives; and let the said example suffice for that: for the Kingdome of France would have been unconquerable, if Charles his order had been augmented and maintaind: but men in their small wisdome begin a thing, which then because it hath some favour of good, discovers not the poyson that lurkes thereunder, as I before said of the hectick feavers. Wherefore that Prince which perceives not mischiefes, but as they grow up, is not truely wise; and this is given but to few: and if we consider the first ruine of the Romane Empire, we shall find it was from taking the Goths first {310} into their pay; for from that beginning the forces of the Romane Empire began to grow weak, and all the valour that was taken hence was given to them. I conclude then that without having armes of their owne, no Principality can be secure, or rather is wholly oblig'd to fortune, not having valour to shelter it in adversity. And it was alwayes the opinion and saying of wise men, that nothing is so weak and unsetled, as is the reputation of power not founded upon ones owne proper forces: which are those that are composed of thy subjects, or Citizens, or servants; all the rest are mercenary or auxiliary; and the manner how to order those well, is easie to find out, if those orders above nam'd by me, shall be but run over, and if it shall be but consider'd, how Philip Alexander the Great his Father, and in what manner many Republicks and Princes have armd and appointed themselves, to which appointments I referre my selfe wholly.

T The Auxiliary forces, which are another type of unprofitable troops, can be dangerous when a powerful leader arrives with his forces to assist and defend you; like Pope Julius did in recent times, after he recognized the failures of his mercenary soldiers in the campaign for Ferrara, and turned to the Auxiliaries, negotiating with Ferdinand, King of Spain, to receive support from his Forces. While these troops can be beneficial and advantageous for themselves, they can be harmful for whoever calls them in; because if you lose, you are left defeated, and if you win, you become their prisoner. Although there are many ancient examples to illustrate this, I will focus on Pope Julius II, whose actions were particularly reckless; his desire to conquer Ferrara led him to rely entirely on foreign forces. Yet, fortune intervened, sparing him from the consequences of his poor choice—when his Auxiliaries were defeated at Ravenna, the Swiss arrived and routed the conquerors beyond their wildest expectations, allowing him to avoid being made a prisoner by either his enemies or his Auxiliaries, having triumphed with forces that were not his own. The Florentines were completely disarmed and brought ten thousand French soldiers to Pisa to capture it, taking greater risks than at any other time during their troubles. The Emperor of Constantinople, seeking to overpower his neighbors, brought ten thousand Turks into Greece, who after the war ended, could not be removed, marking the start of Greece's subjugation under the Infidels. Thus, anyone who cannot overcome in any circumstance may resort to these forces; for they are far more dangerous than mercenaries; their ruin is executed swiftly because they are all united, compliant to another's authority. Conversely, with mercenaries, to harm you after a victory requires no time or greater opportunity, as they are not all united, and if you find and pay them, a third party you make their leader cannot quickly gain such overwhelming power that he could endanger you. In summary, mercenaries' laziness in battle proves more dangerous, while Auxiliaries exhibit valor. Therefore, a wise Prince has always avoided these kinds of troops, preferring to rely on his own, even if it means losing with his own men rather than conquering with others, believing that a victory achieved with foreign arms is not a true victory. I will not hesitate to mention Caesar Borgia and his actions. This Duke entered Romagna with auxiliary forces, bringing along all French soldiers; however, later finding those troops insecure, he turned to mercenaries, considering them a lesser threat, hiring the Orsini and the Vitelli. After discovering their unreliability, he eliminated them and returned to his own forces; the difference in his reputation can easily be seen when he relied solely on the French versus when he depended on the Orsini and Vitelli. But when he stood with his own, we see that his status was greatly enhanced: he was only truly esteemed when it was evident he completely relied on his own arms. I did not intend to stray from recent Italian examples, but I cannot overlook Hiero of Syracuse, one of those I previously mentioned. This man, once appointed general of the Syracusan forces, quickly recognized that mercenary soldiers were useless since they were hired hands, much like our Italians, and finding no way to maintain them or dismiss them, had them all killed and waged war solely with his own men. I will also recall an example from the Old Testament that is relevant to this discussion. When David presented himself to Saul to fight Goliath, Saul, wanting to encourage him, dressed him in his own armor. However, once David had it on, he rejected it, stating he was not capable of proving himself in it, and instead chose to confront the enemy with his own sling and sword. In short, others' armor either falls off your shoulders or restricts you. Charles VII, father of Louis XI, having liberated France from English control through his fortune and valor, understood the necessity of being armed with his own forces and established the ordinances of men-at-arms and infantry in his kingdom. Later, King Louis, his son, abolished the infantry and began hiring the Swiss, a mistake that has, as we can now see, led to the dangers facing that kingdom. By giving prestige to the Swiss, they have rendered all their own forces contemptible, entirely undermining their infantry and compelling their men-at-arms to rely on foreign troops; accustomed to serving with the Swiss, they believe they cannot triumph without them. Consequently, French armies have become mixed, part mercenaries and part natives, which is much better than having only mercenaries or only auxiliaries, but far inferior to having purely natives. That said example should suffices; the Kingdom of France would have been unconquerable if Charles's organization had been expanded and maintained. Yet, men, in their limited wisdom, start something that, because it shows some initial promise, fails to recognize the hidden poison it harbors, similar to what I mentioned earlier about the fever. Therefore, a Prince who does not recognize dangers until they arise is not truly wise; such insight is given to very few. If we consider the initial downfall of the Roman Empire, we find it began with hiring the Goths; from that point, the Roman forces began to weaken, and all the valor gained was turned over to them. I conclude that without their own troops, no principality can be secure; rather, it is completely at the mercy of fortune, lacking the valor to protect it in tough times. It has always been the belief and saying of wise men that nothing is so weak and unstable as the reputation of power not based on one's own forces, which should consist of your subjects, citizens, or servants; all others are mercenary or auxiliary. The way to properly organize these forces is easily discovered by reviewing the orders I have mentioned, along with considering how Philip, Alexander the Great's father, and many Republics and Princes have armed and organized themselves; to which preparations, I wholly refer my example.

CHAP. XIV

What belongs to the Prince touching military Discipline.

A prince then ought to have no other ayme, nor other thought, nor take any thing else for his proper art, but warr, and the orders and discipline thereof: for that is the sole arte which belongs to him that commands, and is of so great excellency, that not only those that are borne Princes, it maintains so; but many times raises men from a private fortune to that dignity. And it is seene by the contrary, that when Princes have given themselves more to their delights, than to the warres, they have lost their States; and the first cause that makes thee lose it, is the neglect of that arte; and the cause that makes thee gaine it, is that thou art experienc'd and approvd in that arte. Francis Sforza by being a man at armes, of a {311} private man became Duke of Milan; and his sons by excusing themselves of the troubles and paines belonging to those imployments of Princes, became private men. For among other mischiefes thy neglect of armes brings upon thee, it causes thee to be contemnd, which is one of those disgraces, from which a Prince ought to keepe himselfe, as hereafter shall be sayd: for from one that is disarmd to one that is armd there is no proportion; and reason will not, that he who is in armes, should willingly yeeld obedience to him that is unfurnishd of them, and that he that is disarmd should be in security among his armed vassalls; for there being disdaine in the one, and suspicion in the other, it is impossible these should ever well cooperate. And therefore a Prince who is quite unexperienced in matter of warre, besides the other infelicities belonging to him, as is said, cannot be had in any esteeme among his souldiers, nor yet trust in them. Wherefore he ought never to neglect the practice of the arte of warre, and in time of peace should he exercise it more than in the warre; which he may be able to doe two wayes; the one practically, and in his labours and recreations of his body, the other theoretically. And touching the practick part, he ought besides the keeping of his own subjects well traind up in the discipline and exercise of armes, give himselfe much to the chase, whereby to accustome his body to paines, and partly to understand the manner of situations, and to know how the mountaines arise, which way the vallyes open themselves, and how the plaines are distended flat abroad, and to conceive well the nature of the rivers, and marrish ground, and herein to bestow very much care, which knowledge is profitable in two kinds: first he learnes thereby to know his own countrey, and is the better enabled to understand the defence thereof, and afterwards by meanes of this knowledge and experience in these situations, easily comprehends any other situation, which a new he hath need to view, for the little hillocks, vallies, plaines, rivers, and marrish places. For example, they in Tuscany are like unto those of other countries: so that from the knowledge of {312} the site of one country, it is easie to attain to know that of others. And that Prince that wants this skill, failes of the principall part a Commander should be furnisht with; for this shows the way how to discover the enemy, to pitch the camp, to lead their armies, to order their battells, and also to besiege a town at thy best advantage, Philopomenes Prince of the Achayans, among other praises Writers give him, they say, that in time of peace, he thought not upon any thing so much as the practise of warre; and whensoever he was abroad in the field to disport himselfe with his friends, would often stand still, and discourse with them, in case the enemies were upon the top of that hill, and we here with our army, whether of us two should have the advantage, and how might we safely goe to find them, keeping still our orders; and if we would retire our selves, what course should we take if they retir'd, how should we follow them? and thus on the way, propounded them all such accidents could befall in any army; would heare their opinions, and tell his owne, and confirme it by argument; so that by his continuall thought hereupon, when ever he led any army no chance could happen, for which he had not a remedy. But touching the exercise of the mind, a Prince ought to read Histories, and in them consider the actions of the worthiest men, marke how they have behav'd themselves in the warrs, examine the occasions of their victories, and their losses; wherby they may be able to avoyd these, and obtaine those; and above all, doe as formerly some excellent man hath done, who hath taken upon him to imitate, if any one that hath gone before him hath left his memory glorious; the course he took, and kept alwaies near unto him the remembrances of his actions and worthy deeds: as it is said, that Alexander the great imitated Achilles; Cæsar Alexander, and Scipio Cyrus. And whoever reads the life of Cyrus, written by Xenophon, may easily perceive afterwards in Scipio's life how much glory his imitation gaind him, and how much Scipio did conforme himselfe in his chastity, affability, humanity, and liberality with those things, that are written by Xenophon of Cyrus. {313} Such like wayes ought a wise Prince to take, nor ever be idle in quiet times, but by his paines then, as it were provide himself of store, whereof he may make some use in his adversity, the end that when the times change, he may be able to resist the stormes of his hard fortune.

A A prince should have no other aim or thought, nor pursue anything else as his main skill, but war and its orders and discipline. This is the only art that truly belongs to someone in command, and it's so valuable that it not only preserves the status of those born as princes, but often elevates individuals from a private life to that rank. Conversely, when princes indulge in pleasures rather than focusing on warfare, they risk losing their states; the primary reason for this loss is neglect of that art, while the way to gain it is through experience and mastery in that art. Francis Sforza, through his skills as a soldier, rose from a commoner to become the Duke of Milan; his sons, however, distanced themselves from the hardships and responsibilities of princely duties and returned to private life. Among the many problems caused by neglecting arms, one is being looked down upon, a disgrace a prince should avoid, as will be explained later. There is no comparison between the unarmed and the armed; it’s unreasonable to expect someone armed to willingly obey someone unarmed, and it's unrealistic for an unarmed person to feel secure among armed vassals. With disdain on one side and suspicion on the other, effective collaboration becomes impossible. Therefore, a prince who is inexperienced in warfare, aside from other misfortunes, will not be respected or trusted by his soldiers. Thus, he should never neglect to practice the art of war, and during peacetime, he should train even more than in wartime. This can be done in two ways: practically, through physical training and exercises, and theoretically. For the practical side, besides ensuring his subjects are well-trained in the discipline and exercise of arms, he should engage in hunting to toughen his body and understand the layout of the land—how mountains rise, valleys open, plains spread out, and the nature of rivers and marshy ground. He should invest significant effort in this knowledge, which is beneficial in two ways: first, he learns about his own country and improves his ability to defend it, and second, this knowledge and experience in familiar terrains helps him understand new terrains he may need to examine, including hills, valleys, plains, rivers, and marshes. For instance, the landscapes in Tuscany resemble those in other regions, making it easier to apply knowledge of one location to another. A prince lacking this skill misses the essential qualities a commander should possess; as it allows him to scout the enemy, set up camp, lead armies, organize battles, and besiege towns effectively. Philopomenes, Prince of the Achayans, is celebrated in writings

CHAP. XV

Of those things, in respect whereof, men, and especially Princes, are praised, or dispraised.

I t now remaines that we consider what the conditions of a Prince ought to be, and his termes of government over his subjects, and towards his friends. And because I know that many have written hereupon; I doubt, lest I venturing also to treat thereof, may be branded with presumption, especially seeing I am like enough to deliver an opinion different from others. But my intent being to write for the advantage of him that understands me, I thought it fitter to follow the effectuall truth of the matter, than the imagination thereof; And many Principalities and Republiques, have been in imagination, which neither have been seen nor knowne to be indeed: for there is such a distance between how men doe live, and how men ought to live; that he who leaves that which is done, for that which ought to be done, learnes sooner his ruine than his preservation; for that man who will professe honesty in all his actions, must needs goe to ruine among so many that are dishonest. Whereupon it is necessary for a Prince, desiring to preserve himselfe, to be able to make use of that honestie, and to lay it aside againe, as need shall require. Passing by then things that are only in imagination belonging to a Prince, to discourse upon those that are really true; I say that all men, whensoever mention is made of them, and especially Princes, because they are placed {314} aloft in the view of all, are taken notice of for some of these qualities, which procure them either commendations or blame: and this is that some one is held liberal, some miserable, (miserable I say, nor covetous; for the covetous desire to have, though it were by rapine; but a miserable man is he, that too much for bears to make use of his owne) some free givers, others extortioners; some cruell, others pitious; the one a Leaguebreaker, another faithfull; the one effeminate and of small courage, the other fierce and couragious; the one courteous, the other proud; the one lascivious, the other chaste; the one of faire dealing, the other wily and crafty; the one hard, the other easie; the one grave, the other light; the one religious, the other incredulous, and such like. I know that every one will confesse, it were exceedingly praise worthy for a Prince to be adorned with all these above nam'd qualities that are good: but because this is not possible, nor doe humane conditions admit such perfection in vertues, it is necessary for him to be so discret, that he know how to avoid the infamie of those vices which would thrust him out of his State; and if it be possible, beware of those also which are not able to remove him thence; but where it cannot be, let them passe with lesse regard. And yet, let him not stand much upon it, though he incurre the infamie of those vices, without which he can very hardly save his State: for if all be throughly considerd, some thing we shall find which will have the colour and very face of Vertue, and following them, they will lead the to thy destruction; whereas some others that shall as much seeme vice, if we take the course they lead us, shall discover unto us the way to our safety and well-being.

I Now, we need to consider what a prince's conditions should be like, and how he should govern his subjects and interact with his friends. I know many have written about this, and I worry that by trying to address it myself, I might be seen as presumptuous, especially since my views may differ from others. However, since my goal is to provide insight for those who hear me, I believe it’s better to focus on the effective truth of the matter rather than just imagined ideals. Many principalities and republics exist only in imagination, which have neither been seen nor truly known; there is such a gap between how people actually live and how they should live that someone who focuses only on what ought to be done will learn their downfall faster than their survival. A person who claims to be honest in all actions will inevitably fail among so many who are dishonest. Therefore, it’s essential for a prince, wishing to preserve himself, to know when to act honestly and when to set that aside as circumstances demand. By focusing on the realities that belong to a prince rather than mere imaginings, I say that whenever people refer to them, especially princes, who are in the public eye, they are noted for certain qualities that earn them praise or blame. Some are called generous, while others are seen as miserly (though I mean miserable—not merely greedy, as the greedy desire to accumulate, even through wrongful means, while a miserable person is one who fails to use their resources). Some are openhanded, others extortionists; some are cruel, others compassionate; one may be deceitful while another is trustworthy; some are weak and cowardly, while others are fierce and brave; one may be polite, while another is arrogant; some are indulgent, others chaste; one may be straightforward, while another is sly; some are harsh, others lenient; some are serious, others frivolous; some are devout, while others are skeptical; and so on. I believe everyone agrees that it would be highly admirable for a prince to possess all these good qualities. However, since that’s impossible and human nature doesn’t allow for such perfection in virtues, a prince must be so discerning that he knows how to avoid the disgrace of the vices that could cost him his position. If possible, he should steer clear of those vices that wouldn’t displace him, but if he cannot avoid them, he should regard them with less concern. Yet, he shouldn't be too troubled if he incurs the reputation of some vices without which he might find it very difficult to maintain his state. In the end, if we look closely, we will find some actions that appear virtuous, which, if followed, can lead to destruction, while others that might seem like vices could, in fact, guide us toward safety and well-being.

The second blemish in this our Authours book, I find in his fifteenth Chapter: where he instructs his Prince to use such an ambidexterity as that he may serve himselfe either of vertue, or vice, according to his advantage, which in true pollicy is neither good in attaining the Principality nor in securing it when it is attaind. For Politicks, presuppose Ethiques, which will never allow this rule: as that a man might make this small {315} difference between vertue, and vice, that he may indifferently lay aside, or take up the one or the other, and put it in practise as best conduceth to the end he propounds himselfe. I doubt our Authour would have blamd Davids regard to Saul when 1 Sam. 24. in the cave he cut off the lap of Sauls garment, and spared his head; and afterwards in the 26. when he forbad Abishai to strike him as he lay sleeping. Worthy of a Princes consideration is that saying of Abigal to David 1 Sam. 25. 30.

The second issue I see in this author's book is in his fifteenth chapter, where he advises his prince to switch between virtue and vice as it benefits him. This approach isn’t useful for gaining or keeping power. Politics depend on ethics, which don’t support the idea that someone can easily choose between virtue and vice, using whichever serves their goals best. I suspect our author would criticize David’s respect for Saul when, in 1 Samuel 24, he cut off a corner of Saul's robe but spared his life, and later in 26, when he stopped Abishai from killing Saul while he slept. Abigail’s comment to David in 1 Samuel 25:30 is something a prince should take seriously.

'It shall come to passe when the Lord shall have done to my Lord according to all that he hath spoken concerning thee, and shall have appointed thee Ruler over Israel, that this shall be no grief to thee, nor offence of heart unto my Lord, that thou hast forborne to shed blood, etc.'

'It will happen when the Lord has done for my Lord everything He has promised you, and has made you the Ruler over Israel, that this will not be a source of sorrow for you, nor a burden to my Lord, that you have chosen not to spill blood, etc.'

For surely the conscience of this evill ground whereupon they have either built, or underpropped their tyranny, causes men, as well metus as spes in longum projicere, which sets them a work on further mischiefe.

For certainly the conscience of this evil ground on which they have either built or supported their tyranny makes people, both in fear and in hope, look far ahead, which leads them to create further trouble.

CHAP. XVI

Of Liberality, and Miserablenesse.

B eginning then at the first of the above mentioned qualities, I say that it would be very well to be accounted liberall: neverthelesse, liberality used in such a manner, as to make thee be accounted so, wrongs thee: for in case it be used vertuously, and as it ought to be, it shall never come to be taken notice of, so as to free thee from the infamie of its contrary. And therefore for one to hold the name of liberal among men, it were needfull not to omit any sumptuous quality, insomuch that a Prince alwayes so dispos'd, shall waste all his revenues, and at the end shall be forc'd, if he will still maintaine that reputation of liberality, heavily to burthen his subjects, and become a great exactour; and put in practise all those things that can be done to get mony: Which begins to make him hatefull to his subjects, and fall into every ones contempt, growing necessitous: so that having with this liberality wrong'd many, and imparted of his bounty but to a few; he feels every first mischance, and runs a hazard {316} of every first danger: Which he knowing, and desiring to withdraw himself from, incurs presently the disgrace of being termed miserable. A Prince therefore not being able to use this vertue of liberality, without his own damage, in such a sort, that it may be taken notice of, ought, if he be wise, not to regard the name of Miserable; for in time he shall alwaies be esteemed the more liberal, seeing that by his parsimony his own revenues are sufficient for him; as also he can defend himself against whoever makes war against him, and can do some exploits without grieving his subjects: so that he comes to use his liberality to all those, from whom he takes nothing, who are infinite in number; and his miserableness towards those to whom he gives nothing, who are but a few. In our dayes we have not seen any, but those who have been held miserable, do any great matters; but the others all quite ruin'd. Pope Julius the second, however he serv'd himself of the name of Liberal, to get the Papacy, yet never intended he to continue it, to the end he might be able to make war against the King of France: and he made so many wars without imposing any extraordinary tax, because his long thrift supplyed his large expences. This present King of Spain could never have undertaken, nor gone through with so many exploits, had he been accounted liberal. Wherefore a Prince ought little to regard (that he may not be driven to pillage his subjects, that he may be able to defend himself, that he may not fall into poverty and contempt, that he be not forced to become an extortioner) though he incurre the name of miserable; for this is one of those vices, which does not pluck him from his throne. And if any one should say, Cæsar by his liberality obtained the Empire, and many others (because they both were, and were esteemd liberal) attaind to exceeding great dignities. I answer, either thou art already come to be a Prince, or thou art in the way to it; in the first case, this liberality is hurtful; in the second, it is necessary to be accounted so; and Cæsar was one of those that aspired to the Principality of Rome. But if after he had gotten it, he had survived, and not forborne {317} those expences, he would quite have ruined that Empire. And if any one should reply; many have been Princes, and with their armies have done great exploits, who have been held very liberal. I answer, either the Prince spends of his own and his subjects, or that which belongs to others: in the first, he ought to be sparing; in the second, he should not omit any part of liberality. And that Prince that goes abroad with his army, and feeds upon prey, and spoyle, and tributes, and hath the disposing of that which belongs to others, necessarily should use this liberality; otherwise would his soldiers never follow him; and of that which is neither thine, nor thy subjects, thou mayest well be a free giver, as were Cyrus, Cæsar and Alexander; for the spending of that which is anothers, takes not away thy reputation, but rather adds to it, only the wasting of that which is thine own hurts thee; nor is there any thing consumes itself so much as liberality, which whilest thou usest, thou losest the means to make use of it, and becomest poore and abject; or to avoid this poverty, an extortioner and hatefull person. And among all those things which a Prince ought to beware of is, to be dispised, and odious; to one and the other of which, liberality brings thee. Wherefore there is more discretion to hold the stile of Miserable, which begets an infamy without hatred, than to desire that of Liberal, whereby to incurre the necessity of being thought an extortioner, which procures an infamy with hatred.

B Beginning then with the first of the qualities mentioned above, I say it would be quite good to be considered generous. However, if generosity is displayed in a way that seeks approval, it actually harms you. When used virtuous and correctly, it won't draw attention to itself, thus freeing you from the shame of its opposite. To be seen as generous among people, one must never neglect any lavish attribute; a Prince who behaves this way will waste all his resources and eventually be forced, to maintain this reputation for generosity, to heavily tax his subjects and become a great oppressor, resorting to every method possible to get money. This starts to make him disliked by his subjects and leads to his contempt, creating a situation where he becomes desperate. So, after damaging many with this generosity and only being generous towards a few, he feels every little misfortune and risks every small danger. Knowing this and wanting to avoid it, he soon faces the disgrace of being called miserly. A Prince, therefore, unable to exercise this virtue of generosity without harming himself in a way that can be noticed, should, if wise, not worry about being labeled miserly; over time, he will be better regarded as generous, since his frugality will allow him to sustain his own income, defend himself against any attackers, and engage in actions without burdening his subjects: allowing him to be generous to all those from whom he takes nothing, who are countless, while being seen as miserly to few who receive nothing. In our times, we have not witnessed any significant achievements from those who have been regarded as miserly; rather, it has been the others who have faced complete ruin. Pope Julius II, while he used the label of generous to gain the papacy, never intended to sustain it so he could wage war against the King of France; he engaged in many wars without imposing extraordinary taxes, as his long-term thrift covered his vast expenses. This current King of Spain could have never undertaken, nor achieved so much if he was viewed as generous. Therefore, a Prince should not overly concern himself with (to avoid resorting to pillaging his subjects, being able to defend himself, not falling into poverty and disgrace, and not being forced to become an extortionist) the title of miserly; for this is one of those faults which does not remove him from his throne. If someone were to argue that Caesar obtained the Empire through his generosity, and that many others (because they were seen as generous) attained great honors, I would respond that either you are already a Prince or you are on your way to becoming one; in the first case, that generosity is harmful; in the second, it is necessary to be seen as such. Caesar aspired to be the Prince of Rome. But if after acquiring it, he continued to spend excessively, he would have ultimately destroyed that Empire. If one were to argue that many have been Princes and accomplished great feats with their armies while being seen as very generous, I would respond that either the Prince spends his own resources and those of his subjects, or uses what belongs to others: in the first case, he should be frugal; in the second, he should not omit any form of generosity. A Prince who goes out with his army and benefits from plunder, pillage, and tributes, and handles resources that belong to others, should necessarily exercise this generosity; otherwise, his soldiers would never follow him. From what is neither yours nor your subjects’ you can afford to be generous, just like Cyrus, Caesar, and Alexander; spending what belongs to others does not harm your reputation but enhances it. However, wasting your own resources harms you; nothing depletes itself as much as generosity, because while you are generous, you lose the means to continue being so and become poor and desperate, or to escape this poverty, an extortionist and a loathed person. Among all things a Prince must be wary of, it is being despised and hated, both of which can come from generosity. Hence, it is more prudent to hold the title of miserly, which creates a low reputation without hatred, than to strive for being labeled generous, which leads to the risk of being thought of as an extortionist, creating a reputation filled with both infamy and hatred.

{318}

CHAP. XVII

Of Cruelty, and Clemency, and whether it is better to be belov'd, or feard.

D escending afterwards unto the other fore-alledged qualities, I say, that every Prince should desire to be held pitiful, and not cruel. Nevertheless ought he beware that he ill uses not this pitty. Cæsar Borgia was accounted cruel, yet had his cruelty redrest the disorders in Romania, setled it in union, and restored it to peace, and fidelity: which, if it be well weighed, we shall see was an act of more pitty, than that of the people of Florence, who to avoyd the terme of cruelty, suffered Pistoya to fall to destruction. Wherefore a Prince ought not to regard the infamy of cruelty, for to hold his subjects united and faithfull: for by giving a very few proofes of himself the other way, he shall be held more pittiful than they, who through their too much pitty, suffer disorders to follow, from whence arise murthers and rapines: for these are wont to hurt an intire universality, whereas the executions practised by a Prince, hurt only some particular. And among all sorts of Princes, it is impossible for a new Prince to avoyd the name of cruel, because all new States are full of dangers: whereupon Virgil by the mouth of Dido excuses the inhumanity of her Kingdom, saying,

D Descending to the other mentioned qualities, I say that every prince should aim to be seen as compassionate, not cruel. However, he must be careful not to misuse this compassion. Caesar Borgia was considered cruel, yet his cruelty corrected the chaos in Romagna, united it, and restored peace and loyalty—something that, if examined closely, can be seen as a more compassionate act than that of the people of Florence, who, to avoid being labeled cruel, allowed Pistoia to fall into ruin. Therefore, a prince should not be concerned about the shame of cruelty if it means keeping his subjects united and loyal; with just a few actions demonstrating otherwise, he will be viewed as more compassionate than those who, due to excessive compassion, allow chaos to ensue, leading to murder and theft. Such issues tend to harm the whole community, whereas the actions of a prince only affect certain individuals. Among all types of princes, it’s impossible for a new prince to avoid being called cruel, because all new states are fraught with dangers. Thus, Virgil, through Dido, justifies the harshness of her kingdom, saying,

Res dura et Regni novitas me talia cogunt

Hard circumstances and the newness of the kingdom compel me to such things

Moliri et latè fines custode tenere.

To build and hold the boundaries under guard.

My hard plight and new State force me to guard

My difficult situation and new circumstances force me to be cautious.

My confines all about with watch and ward.

My surroundings are all under close watch.

Nevertheless ought he to be judicious in his giving belief to any thing, or moving himself thereat, nor make his people extreamly afraid of him; but proceed in a moderate way {319} with wisdome, and humanity, that his too much confidence make him not unwary, and his too much distrust intolerable; from hence arises a dispute, whether it is better to be belov'd or feard: I answer, a man would wish he might be the one and the other: but because hardly can they subsist both together, it is much safer to be feard, than be loved; being that one of the two must needs fail; for touching men, we may say this in general, they are unthankful, unconstant, dissemblers, they avoyd dangers, and are covetous of gain; and whilest thou doest them good, they are wholly thine; their blood, their fortunes, lives and children are at thy service, as is said before, when the danger is remote; but when it approaches, they revolt. And that Prince who wholly relies upon their words, unfurnished of all other preparations, goes to wrack: for the friendships that are gotten with rewards, and not by the magnificence and worth of the mind, are dearly bought indeed; but they will neither keep long, nor serve well in time of need: and men do less regard to offend one that is supported by love, than by fear. For love is held by a certainty of obligation, which because men are mischievous, is broken upon any occasion of their own profit. But fear restrains with a dread of punishment which never forsakes a man. Yet ought a Prince cause himself to be belov'd in such a manner, that if he gains not love, he may avoid hatred: for it may well stand together, that a man may be feard and not hated; which shall never fail, if he abstain from his subjects goods, and their wives; and whensoever he should be forc'd to proceed against any of their lives, do it when it is to be done upon a just cause, and apparent conviction; but above all things forbeare to lay his hands on other mens goods; for men forget sooner the death of their father, than the loss of their patrimony. Moreover the occasions of taking from men their goods, do never fail: and alwaies he that begins to live by rapine, finds occasion to lay hold upon other mens goods: but against mens lives, they are seldome found, and sooner fail. But where a Prince is abroad in the field with his army, and {320} hath a multitude of soldiers under his government, then is it necessary that he stands not much upon it, though he be termed cruel: for unless he be so, he shall never have his soldiers live in accord one with another, nor ever well disposed to any brave piece of service. Among Hannibals actions of mervail, this is reckoned for one, that having a very huge army, gathered out of several nations, and all led to serve in a strange countrey, there was never any dissention neither amongst themselves, nor against their General, as well in their bad fortune as their good. Which could not proceed from any thing else than from that barbarous cruelty of his, which together with his exceeding many vertues, rendred him to his soldiers both venerable and terrible; without which, to that effect his other vertues had served him to little purpose: and some writers though not of the best advised, on one side admire these his worthy actions, and on the otherside, condemn the principal causes thereof. And that it is true, that his other vertues would not have suffic'd him, we may consider in Scipio, the rarest man not only in the dayes he liv'd, but even in the memory of man; from whom his army rebel'd in Spain: which grew only upon his too much clemency, which had given way to his soldiers to become more licentious, than was well tollerable by military discipline: for which he was reprov'd by Fabius Maximus in the Senate, who termed him the corrupter of the Roman soldiery. The Locrensians having been destroyed by a Lieutenant of Scipio's, were never reveng'd by him, nor the insolence of that Lieutenant punisht; all this arising from his easie nature: so that one desiring to excuse him in the Senate, said, that there were many men knew better how to keep themselves from faults, than to correct the faults of other men: which disposition of his in time would have wrong'd Scipio's reputation and glory, had he therewith continu'd in his commands: but living under the government of the Senate, this quality of his that would have disgrac'd him not only was conceal'd, but prov'd to the advancement of his glory. I conclude then, returning to the purpose of being feard, and {321} belov'd; insomuch as men love at their own pleasure, and to serve their own turne, and their fear depends upon the Princes pleasure, every wise Prince ought to ground upon that which is of himself, and not upon that which is of another: only this, he ought to use his best wits to avoid hatred, as was said.

Nevertheless, he should be careful about what he believes and how he reacts, and not make his people overly afraid of him. He should act moderately, with wisdom and humanity, so that his excessive confidence doesn’t make him careless, and his excessive distrust doesn’t become unbearable. This raises the debate about whether it’s better to be loved or feared. I say a man would wish to be both, but since they can’t easily coexist, it’s much safer to be feared than loved, as one of the two must inevitably fail. Regarding people in general, we can say they are ungrateful, inconsistent, deceitful, avoid dangers, and are greedy for gain. While you do good for them, they are entirely yours; their resources, fortunes, lives, and children are at your service, as mentioned earlier, when danger is far away. But when it approaches, they turn against you. A prince who completely relies on their promises, without other preparations, is doomed; friendships gained through rewards rather than through the greatness and worth of character are costly, and they won’t last long or serve well in times of need. People are less concerned about offending someone who is loved than someone who is feared. Love is maintained by a sense of obligation, which is easily broken when it benefits them. Fear, on the other hand, is a constant threat of punishment that never leaves a person. However, a prince should make himself loved in such a way that if he can't win their love, he can at least avoid their hatred. It’s possible for a man to be feared without being hated, which can happen if he does not take from his subjects’ property or their wives. Whenever he must act against someone’s life, he should do it only when there is a just cause and clear evidence. Above all, he should avoid seizing other people’s possessions, as men forget their father’s death faster than the loss of their inheritance. Moreover, there are always opportunities to take goods from people, and those who start living by theft will find reasons to take others’ belongings; but opportunities to threaten lives are rarely found and tend to be less frequent. When a prince is out in the field with his army and has many soldiers under his command, it’s necessary not to worry too much about being called cruel; because if he isn’t, he won’t have soldiers that work well together or are inclined to perform brave acts. Among Hannibal's remarkable actions, this is noted: despite having a massive army made up of various nations, all serving in a foreign land, there was never any discord among them or against their general, in both good and bad times. This must have come from his brutal cruelty, which, along with his many virtues, made him both respected and feared by his soldiers; without this, his other virtues would have amounted to little. Some writers, though not the most perceptive, admire these accomplishments while also condemning the main reasons behind them. The truth is, his other virtues wouldn’t have been enough, as seen with Scipio, who was not only the most exceptional man of his time but in all of history; from him, his army rebelled in Spain. This was solely due to his excessive leniency, which allowed his soldiers to become more unruly than military discipline could tolerate. For this, he was criticized by Fabius Maximus in the Senate, who called him the corrupter of the Roman soldiers. The Locrensians, having been destroyed by one of Scipio's lieutenants, were never avenged by him, nor was the lieutenant punished for his arrogance, all stemming from his easygoing nature. One person, trying to defend him in the Senate, said that many know how to avoid faults but not how to correct others' faults; this trait would eventually have harmed Scipio's reputation and glory had he remained in command. However, under Senate governance, this aspect of his character, which could have disgraced him, was hidden and turned into an enhancement of his glory. I conclude, returning to the subject of being feared and loved; since people love at their own convenience and for their own benefit, and their fear is based on the prince’s whims, every wise prince should focus on what is within himself and not rely on what is external. He should use his best judgment to avoid hatred, as mentioned.

CHAP. XVIII

In what manner Princes ought to keep their words.

H ow commendable in a Prince it is to keep his word, and live with integrity, not making use of cunning and subtlety, every one knows well: yet we see by experience in these our dayes, that those Princes have effected great matters, who have made small reckoning of keeping their words, and have known by their craft to turne and wind men about, and in the end, have overcome those who have grounded upon the truth. You must then know, there are two kinds of combating or fighting; the one by right of the laws, the other meerly by force. That first way is proper to men, the other is also common to beasts: but because the first many times suffices not, there is a necessity to make recourse to the second; wherefore it behooves a Prince to know how to make good use of that part which belongs to a beast, as well as that which is proper to a man. This part hath been covertly shew'd to Princes by ancient writers; who say that Achilles and many others of those ancient Princes were intrusted to Chiron the Senator, to be brought up under his discipline: the moral of this, having for their teacher one that was half a beast and half a man, was nothing else, but that it was needful for a Prince to understand how to make his advantage of the one and the other nature, because neither could subsist without the other. A Prince then being necessitated to know how to make use of that part belonging to a beast, {322} ought to serve himself of the conditions of the Fox and the Lion; for the Lion cannot keep himself from snares, nor the Fox defend himself against the Wolves. He had need then be a Fox, that he may beware of the snares, and a Lion that he may scare the wolves. Those that stand wholly upon the Lion, understand not well themselves. And therefore a wise Prince cannot, nor ought not keep his faith given when the observance thereof turnes to disadvantage, and the occasions that made him promise, are past. For if men were all good, this rule would not be allowable; but being they are full of mischief, and would not make it good to thee, neither art thou tyed to keep it with them: nor shall a Prince ever want lawfull occasions to give colour to this breach. Very many modern examples hereof might be alledg'd, wherein might be shewed how many peaces concluded, and how many promises made, have been violated and broken by the infidelity of Princes; and ordinarily things have best succeeded with him that hath been nearest the Fox in condition. But it is necessary to understand how to set a good colour upon this disposition, and to be able to fain and dissemble throughly; and men are so simple, and yeeld so much to the present necessities, that he who hath a mind to deceive, shall alwaies find another that will be deceivd. I will not conceal any one of the examples that have been of late. Alexander the sixth, never did any thing else than deceive men, and never meant otherwise, and alwaies found whom to work upon; yet never was there man would protest more effectually, nor aver any thing with more solemn oaths, and observe them less than he; nevertheless, his cousenages all thriv'd well with him; for he knew how to play this part cunningly. Therefore is there no necessity for a Prince to be endued with all above written qualities, but it behooveth well that he seem to be so; or rather I will boldly say this, that having these qualities, and alwaies regulating himself by them, they are hurtfull; but seeming to have them, they are advantageous; as to seem pittiful, faithful, mild, religious, and of integrity, and indeed to be so; provided withall thou beest of such a {323} composition, that if need require to use the contrary, thou canst, and knowest how to apply thy self thereto. And it suffices to conceive this, that a Prince, and especially a new Prince, cannot observe all those things, for which men are held good; he being often forc'd, for the maintenance of his State, to do contrary to his faith, charity, humanity, and religion: and therefore it behooves him to have a mind so disposd, as to turne and take the advantage of all winds and fortunes; and as formerly I said, not forsake the good, while he can; but to know how to make use of the evil upon necessity. A Prince then ought to have a special care, that he never let fall any words, but what are all season'd with the five above written qualities, and let him seem to him that sees and hears him, all pitty, all faith, all integrity, all humanity, all religion; nor is there any thing more necessary for him to seem to have, than this last quality: for all men in general judge thereof, rather by the sight, than by the touch; for every man may come to the sight of him, few come to the touch and feeling of him; yvery man may come to see what thou seemest, few come to perceive and understand what thou art; and those few dare not oppose the opinion of many, who have the majesty of State to protect them: And in all mens actions, especially those of Princes wherein there is no judgement to appeale unto men, forbeare to give their censures, till the events and ends of things. Let a Prince therefore take the surest courses he can to maintain his life and State: the means shall alwaies be thought honorable, and commended by every one; for the vulgar is over-taken with the appearance and event of a thing: and for the most part of people, they are but the vulgar: the others that are but few, take place where the vulgar have no subsisteance. A Prince there is in these dayes, whom I shall not do well to name, that preaches nothing else but peace and faith; but had he kept the one and the other, several times had they taken from him his state and reputation.

H How commendable it is for a prince to keep his promises and act with integrity, avoiding cunning and deceit, we all know well. Yet, we see in today's world that those princes who achieve great things often disregard keeping their word, skillfully manipulating others, and ultimately overcoming those who rely on truth. You should understand that there are two types of fighting; one through the law, and the other purely by force. The first is suited to humans, while the second is common among beasts. However, since the first method often isn’t enough, it becomes necessary to resort to the second. Therefore, a prince must know how to skillfully utilize both aspects—beastly and human. Ancient writers have subtly shown this to princes; for instance, they mention that Achilles and many other princes were entrusted to Chiron the centaur for their education. The moral here is clear: a prince needs to understand how to benefit from both natures because neither can exist without the other. A prince, then, must be able to utilize the qualities of both the fox and the lion; the lion cannot avoid traps, nor can the fox defend against wolves. Therefore, he must be like a fox to avoid snares and a lion to scare away wolves. Those who rely solely on the lion are not very self-aware. Hence, a wise prince should not and cannot keep promises if doing so harms him, particularly if the reasons for his original promise have passed. If all men were good, this rule wouldn’t apply; however, since they are often deceitful and untrustworthy, he is not obligated to keep his word with them. A prince will always find legitimate reasons to justify breaking his promises. Numerous modern examples illustrate how many treaties and promises have been violated by the treachery of princes, and generally, things have gone best for those who behave more like foxes. It is necessary to understand how to disguise this tendency and to be able to feign and deceive completely; people are so simple and easily swayed by current needs that anyone who wants to deceive will always find someone willing to be deceived. I won't hide any recent examples. Alexander VI spent his life deceiving people and always found someone to manipulate; yet no one swore more earnestly or made promises with greater solemnity than he, while keeping them the least. Nevertheless, his deceits thrived because he knew how to play this role cleverly. Therefore, it isn't necessary for a prince to actually possess all these qualities mentioned. Instead, he needs to appear to have them; or rather, I would confidently say that truly embodying them while adhering to them can be harmful, but merely seeming to have them is beneficial. He should appear compassionate, faithful, gentle, pious, and honest, and actually strive to be so; provided, however, that he is composed in such a way that he can apply the opposite when necessary. It suffices to understand that a prince, especially a new one, cannot adhere to all the traits that are typically associated with goodness, as he is often forced to act against his word, charity, humanity, and religion for the sake of maintaining his state. Hence, he must be adaptable, able to seize every opportunity and wind of fortune; as I mentioned earlier, he shouldn’t abandon goodness while he can, but must also know how to make use of evil when necessary. A prince should be particularly careful not to let slip any words that aren’t flavored with the five qualities mentioned above, and he should seem to all who see and hear him to embody all mercy, faith, integrity, humanity, and piety. Furthermore, there is nothing more important for him to seem to possess than that last quality; since people tend to judge based on appearances rather than substance, most will merely see what he appears to be and not truly perceive what he is; and those few who do perceive him often don’t dare to oppose the beliefs of the many, who have the authority of state to protect them. In all actions, especially those of princes, where there is no judgment available for people to rely on, they refrain from passing judgment until they see the outcomes. Therefore, a prince should take the safest approaches to preserve his life and state: the means will always be regarded as honorable and praised by everyone, for the masses are swayed by appearance and result; and most people are simply part of the masses. The few that hold significance exist where the masses have no presence. There is currently a prince whom I shouldn’t name, who preaches nothing but peace and faith, yet had he truly upheld both, he would have lost his state and reputation multiple times.

In the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth Chap, our Author descends to particulars, perswading his Prince in his sixteenth to {324} such a suppleness of disposition, as that upon occasion he can make use either of liberality or miserableness, as need shall require. But that of liberality is to last no longer than while he is in the way to some designe: which if he well weigh, is not really a reward of vertue, how ere it seems; but a bait and lure to bring birds to the net. In the seventeenth Chap, he treats of clemency and cruelty, neither of which are to be exercis'd by him as acts of mercy or justice; but as they may serve to advantage his further purposes. And lest the Prince should incline too much to clemency, our Author allows rather the restraint by fear, than by love. The contrary to which all stories shew us. I will say this only, cruelty may cut of the power of some, but causes the hatred of all, and gives a will to most to take the first occasion offerd for revenge. In the eighteenth Chap, our Author discourses how Princes ought to govern themselves in keeping their promises made: whereof he sayes they ought to make such small reckoning, as that rather they should know by their craft how to turne and wind men about, whereby to take advantage of all winds and fortunes. To this I would oppose that in the fifteenth Psal. v. 5. He that sweareth to his neighbor, and disappointeth him not, though it were to his own hindrance. It was a King that writ it, and me thinks the rule he gave, should well befit both King and Subject: and surely this perswades against all taking of advantages. A man may reduce all the causes of faith-breaking to three heads. One may be, because he that promised, had no intention to keep his word; and this is a wicked and malitious way of dealing. A second may bee, because hee that promisd, repents of his promise made; and that is grounded on unconstancy, and lightness in that he would not be well resolved before he entred into covenant. The third may be, when it so falls out, that it lyes not in his power that made the promise to performe it. In which case a man ought to imitate the good debter, who having not wherewithall to pay, hides not himself, but presents his person to his creditor, willingly suffering imprisonment. The first and second are very vitious and unworthy of a Prince: in the third, men might well be directed by the examples of those two famous Romans, Regulus and Posthumius. I shall close this with the answer of Charles the fifth, when he was pressed to break his word with Luther for his safe return from Wormes; Fides rerum promissarum etsi toto mundo exulet, tamen apud imperatorem cam consistere oportet. Though truth be banisht out of the whole world, yet should it alwaies find harbour in an Emperors breast.

In the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth chapters, the author provides detailed advice to his prince. In the sixteenth chapter, he advises being adaptable, so the prince can act either generously or stingily based on the situation. However, any generosity should only last as long as it serves a purpose; upon closer inspection, it’s less about rewarding virtue and more about trapping others in. In the seventeenth chapter, he talks about mercy and cruelty, suggesting that both should not be seen as acts of kindness or justice but rather as tools to advance personal goals. To keep the prince from favoring mercy too much, the author recommends using fear for control instead of love. History tells a different story. Cruelty may remove the power of a few but it creates hatred in everyone and motivates many to seek revenge when they can. In the eighteenth chapter, the author advises princes on how to handle their promises: they shouldn’t take them too seriously but should instead be adept at manipulating situations to their advantage. In contrast, I would refer to Psalm 15:5, which says that someone who swears loyalty to their neighbor and keeps that promise, even at a personal cost, is an ideal model. A king wrote this, and it seems like a principle that should apply to both kings and their subjects, clearly discouraging exploitation. The reasons for breaking trust can be grouped into three main ones. First, the person who made the promise never intended to keep it, which is a dishonest and malicious act. Second, the individual regrets their commitment due to inconsistency and impulsiveness before making the promise. The third case occurs when it’s simply impossible for the person to keep their word. In this situation, one should behave like a responsible debtor who, unable to pay, doesn’t hide but instead presents himself to his creditor, willingly accepting the consequences. The first two reasons are deeply flawed and unbecoming of a prince; in the third, people can look to the examples of the two famous Romans, Regulus and Posthumius, for guidance. I’ll conclude with the response of Charles the Fifth when he was advised to break his promise to Luther for safe passage from Worms: Fides rerum promissarum etsi toto mundo exulet, tamen apud imperatorem cam consistere oportet. Even if truth is banished from the entire world, it should always have a place in an emperor’s heart.

Gulielmus Xenocarus in vit. Car. Quinti.

William Xenocarus in the life of Car. Quintus.

{325}

CHAP. XIX

That Princes should take a care, not to incurre contempt or hatred.

B ut because among the qualities, whereof formerly mention is made, I have spoken of those of most importance, I will treat of the others more briefly under these qualityes that a Prince is to beware, as in part is above-said, and that he fly those things which cause him to be odious or vile: and when ever he shall avoid this, he shall fully have plaid his part, and in the other disgraces he shall find no danger at all. There is nothing makes him so odious, as I said, as his extortion of his subjects goods, and abuse of their women, from which he ought to forbear; and so long as he wrongs not his whole people, neither in their goods, nor honors, they live content, and he hath only to strive with the Ambition of some few: which many waies and easily too, is restrain'd. To be held various, light, effeminate, faint-hearted, unresolv'd, these make him be contemnd and thought base, which a Prince should shun like rocks, and take a care that in all his actions there appear magnanimity, courage, gravity, and valor; and that in all the private affairs of his subjects, he orders it so, that his word stand irrevocable: and maintain himself in such repute, that no man may think either to deceive or wind and turn him about: that Prince that gives such an opinion of himself, is much esteemed, and against him who is so well esteemed, hardly are any conspiracies made by his subjects, or by forreiners any invasion, when once notice is taken of his worth, and how much he is reverenced by his subjects: For a Prince ought to have two fears, the one from within, in regard of his subjects; the other from abroad, in regard of his mighty neighbors; from these he defends himself by good armes and good friends; and alwayes he shall have {326} good friends, if he have good armes; and all things shall alwaies stand sure at home, when those abroad are firme, in case some conspiracy have not disturbed them; and however the forrein matters stand but ticklishly; yet if he have taken such courses at home, and liv'd as we have prescribed, he shall never be able (in case he forsake not himself) to resist all possibility, force and violence, as I said Nabis the Spartan did: but touching his subjects, even when his affairs abroad are setled, it is to be fear'd they may conspire privily; from which a Prince sufficiently secure himself by shunning to be hated or contemned, and keeping himself in his peoples good opinion, which it is necessary for him to compass, as formerly we treated at large. And one of the powerfullest remedies a Prince can have against conspiracies, is, not to be hated nor dispised by the universality; for alwaies he that conspires, beleeves the Princes death is acceptable to the subject: but when he thinks it displeases them, he hath not the heart to venture on such a matter; for the difficulties that are on the conspirators side, are infinite. By experience it is plain, that many times plots have been laid, but few of them have succeeded luckily; for he that conspires, cannot be alone, nor can he take the company of any, but of those, who he beleeves are malecontents; and so soon as thou hast discover'd thy self to a malecontent, thou givest him means to work his own content: for by revealing thy treason, he may well hope for all manner of favour: so that seeing his gain certain of one side; and on the other, finding only doubt and danger, either he had need be a rare friend, or that he be an exceeding obstinate enemy to the Prince, if he keeps his word with thee. And to reduce this matter into short termes: I say, there is nothing but jealousie, fear, and suspect of punishment on the conspirators part to affright him; but on the Princes part, there is the majesty of the principality, the laws, the defences of his friends and the State, which do so guard him, that to all these things the peoples good wills being added, it is unpossible any one should be so head-strong as to conspire; for ordinarily where a traytor is to feare before the execution of his mischiefe, {327} in this case he is also to feare afterwards, having the people for his enemy when the fact is commited, and therefore for this cause, not being able to hope for any refuge. Touching this matter, many examples might be brought; but I will content my selfe to name one which fell out in the memory of our Fathers. Annibal Bentivolii, grand Father of this Annibal who now lives, that was Prince in Bolonia, being slaine by the Canneschi that conspir'd against him, none of his race being left, but this John, who was then in swadling clouts; presently the people rose upon this murder, and slew all the Canneschi which proceeded from the popular affection, which the family of the Bentivolii held then in Bolonia: which was so great, that being there remain'd not any, now Anniball was dead, that was able to manage the State; and having notice that in Florence there was one borne of the Bentivolii, who till then was taken for a Smiths sonne: the citizens of Bolonia went to Florence for him, and gave the government of their City to him, which was rul'd by him, untill John was of fit yeares to governe. I conclude then, that a Prince ought to make small account of treasons, whiles he hath the people to friend: but if they be his enemies and hate him, he may well feare every thing, and every one. And well ordered States, and discreet Princes have taken care withall diligence, not to cause their great men to fall into desperation, and to content the people, and so to maintaine them: for this is one of the most important businesses belonging to a Prince. Among the Kingdomes that are well orderd and governd in our dayes, is that of France, and therein are found exceeding many good orders, whereupon the Kings liberty and security depends: of which the chiefe is the Parliament, and the authority thereof: for he that founded that Kingdome, knowing the great mens ambition and insolence; and judgeing it necessary there should be a bridle to curbe them; and on the other side knowing the hatred of the Commonalty against the great ones, grounded upon feare, intending to secure them, would not lay this care wholly upon the King, but take this trouble from him, which he {328} might have with the great men, in case he favourd the Commonalty; or with the Commonalty, in case he favourd the great men; and thereupon set up a third judge, which was that, to the end it should keep under the great ones, and favour the meaner sort, without any imputation to the King. It was not possible to take a better, nor wiser course then this; nor a surer way to secure the King, and the Kingdome. From whence we may draw another conclusion worthie of note, that Princes ought to cause others to take upon them the matters of blame and imputation; and upon themselves to take only those of grace and favour. Here againe I conclude, that a Prince ought to make good esteeme of his Nobility; but not thereby to incur the Commons hatred: It would seeme perhaps to many, considering the life and death of many Romane Emperours, that they were examples contrary to my opinion, finding that some have liv'd worthily, and shewd many rare vertues of the minde, and yet have lost the Empire, and been put to death by their owne subjects, conspiring against them. Intending then to answer these objections, I shall discourse upon the qualities of some Emperours, declaring the occasions of their ruine, not disagreeing from that which I have alledgd; and part thereof I will bestow on the consideration of these things, which are worthy to be noted by him that reads the actions of those times: and it shall suffice me to take all those Emperours that succeeded in the Empire from Marcus the Philosopher to Maximinus, who were Mercus and Commodus his sonne, Pertinax, Julian, Severus, Antonius, Caracalla his sonne, Macrinus, Heliogabalus, Alexander, and Maximin. And first it is to be noted, that where in the other Principalities, they are to contend only with the ambition of the Nobles, and the insolence of the people; the Romane Emperours had a third difficulty, having to support the cruelty and covetousnesse of the souldiers, which was so hard a thing, that it caused the ruine of many, being hard to satisfy the souldiers, and the people; for the people love their quiet, and therefore affect modest Princes; and the souldiers love a Prince of a warlike courage, that is insolent, {329} cruell, and plucking from every one: which things they would have them exercise upon the people, whereby they might be able to double their stipends, and satisfie their avarice and cruelty: whence it proceeds, that those Emperours who either by Nature or by Art, had not such a reputation, as therewith they could curbe the one and the other, were alwayes ruind: and the most of them, specially those who as new men came to the principality, finding the difficulty of those two different humours, applyed themselves to content the souldiers, making small account of wronging the people, which was a course then necessary; for the Princes not being able to escape the hatred of every one, ought first endeavour that they incurre not the hatred of any whole universality; and when they cannot attaine thereunto, they are to provide with all industry, to avoyd the hatred of those universalities that are the most mighty. And therefore those Emperors, who because they were but newly call'd to the Empire, had need of extraordinary favours, more willingly stuck to the soldiers, than to the people; which neverthelesse turnd to their advantage, or otherwise, according as that Prince knew how to maintaine his repute with them. From these causes aforesayd proceeded it, that Marcus Pertinax, and Alexander, though all living modestly, being lovers of justice, and enemies of cruelty, courteous and bountifull, had all from Marcus on ward, miserable ends; Marcus only liv'd and dy'd exceedingly honoured: for he came to the Empire by inheritance, and was not to acknowledge it either from the soldiers, nor from the people: afterwards being accompanyed with many vertues, which made him venerable, he held alwayes whilst he liv'd the one and the other order within their limits, and was never either hated, or contemnd. But Pertinax was created Emperour against the soldiers wills, who being accustomed to live licentiously under Commodus, could not endure that honest course that Pertinax sought to reduce them to: Whereupon having gotten himself hatred, and to this hatred added contempt, in that he was old, was ruind in the very beginning of his government. Whence it ought to be {330} observed, that hatred is gaind as well by good deeds as bad; and therefore as I formerly said, when a Prince would maintaine the State, he is often forced not to be good: for when that generality, whether it be the people, or soldiers, or Nobility, whereof thou thinkst thou standst in need to maintain thee, is corrupted, it behoves thee to follow their humour, and content them, and then all good deeds are thy adversaries. But let us come to Alexander who was of that goodnesse, that among the prayses given him, had this for one, that in fourteen yeers wherein he held the Empire, he never put any man to death, but by course of justice; neverthelesse being held effeminate, and a man that suffered himselfe to be ruled by his mother, and thereupon fallen into contempt, the army conspird against him. Now on the contrary discoursing upon the qualities of Commodus, Severus, Antonius, Caracalla, and Maximinus, you shall find them exceeding cruell, and ravinous, who to satisfie their soldiers, forbeare no kinde of injury that could be done upon the people; and all of them, except Severus, came to evill ends: for in Severus, there was such extraordinary valour, that while he held the soldiers his freinds, however the people were much burthend by him, he might alwayes reigne happily: for his valour rendred him so admirable in the souldiers and peoples sights; that these in a manner stood amazd and astonishd, and those others reverencing and honoring him. And because the actions of this man were exceeding great, being in a new Prince, I will briefly shew how well he knew to act the Foxes and the Lions parts; the conditions of which two, I say, as before, are very necessary for a Prince to imitate. Severus having had experience of Julian the Emperours sloth, perswaded his army (whereof he was commander in Sclavonia) that they should doe well to goe to Rome to revenge Pertinax his death, who was put to death by the Imperiall guard; and under this pretence, not making any shew that he aspird unto the Empire, set his army in march directly towards Rome, and was sooner come into Italy, than it was knowne he had mov'd from his station. Being ariv'd at Rome, he {331} was by the Senate chosen Emperour for feare, and Julian slaine. After this beginning, two difficulties yet remaind to Severus, before he could make himselfe Lord of the whole State; the one in Asia, where Niger the Generall of those armies had gotten the title of Emperour, the other in the West with Albinus, who also aspird to the Empire: and because he thought there might be some danger to discover himselfe enemy to them both, he purposed to set upon Niger, and cozen Albinus, to whom he writ, that being elected Emperour by the Senate, he would willingly communicate it with him; and thereupon sent him the title of Cæsar, and by resolution of the Senate, tooke him to him for his Colleague; which things were taken by Albinus in true meaning. But afterwards when Severus had overcome and slaine Niger, and pacified the affaires and in the East, being returned to Rome, he complaind in the Senate of Albinus, how little weighing the benefits received from him, he had sought to slay him by treason, and therefore was he forc'd to goe punish his ingratitude: afterwards he went into France, where he bereft him both of his State and life, whoever then shall in particular examine his actions, shall finde he was a very cruell Lion, and as crafty a Fox: and shall see that he was alwayes feard and reverenc'd by every one, and by the armies not hated; and shall nothing marvell that he being a new man, was able to hold together such a great Empire: for his extraordinary reputation defended him alwayes from that hatred, which the people for his extortions might have conceiv'd against him. But Antonius his sonne, was also an exceeding brave man, and endued with most excellent qualities, which causd him to be admird by the people, and acceptable to the souldiers, because he was a warlike man, enduring all kind of travell and paines, despising all delicate food, and all kinde of effeminacy, which gaind him the love of all the armies: neverthelesse his fiercenesse and cruelty were such, and so hideous, having upon many particular occasions put to death a great part of the people of Rome, and all those of Alexandria, that he grew odious to the world, and began to be feard by those {332} also that were neare about him; so that he was slaine by a Centurion in the very midst of his army. Where it is to be noted, that these kinde of deaths, which follow upon the deliberation of a resolv'd and obstinate minde, cannot by a Prince be avoyded: for every one that feares not to dye, is able to doe it; but a Prince ought to be lesse afraid of it because it very seldome falls out. Only should he beware not to doe any extreame injury to any of those of whom he serves himself, or that he hath near about him in any imployment of his Principality, as Antonius did: who had reproachfully slaine a brother of that Centurion; also threatned him every day, and neverthelesse entertaind him still as one of the guards of his body, which was a rash course taken, and the way to destruction, as befell him. But let us come to Commodus for whom it was very easie to hold the Empire, by reason it descended upon him by inheritance, being Marcus his sonne, and it had been enough for him to follow his fathers footsteps, and then had he contented both the people and the soldiers: but being of a cruell and savage disposition, whereby to exercise his actions upon the people, he gave himselfe to entertaine armies, and those in all licentiousnesse. On the other part not maintaining his dignity, but often descending upon the stages to combate with fencers, and doing such other like base things, little worthy of the Imperiall majesty, he became contemptible in the soldiers sight; and being hated of one part, and despisd of the other, he was conspird against, and slaine. It remaines now, that we declare Maximinus his conditions, who was a very warlike man; and the armies loathing Alexanders effeminacy, whereof I spake before, when they had slain him, chose this man Emperour, who not long continued so, because two things there were that brought him into hatred and contempt; the one because he was very base, having kept cattell in Thrace, which was well knowne to every one, and made them to scorne him; the other, because in the beginning of his Principality having delayd to goe to Rome, and enter into possession of the Imperiall throne, he had gaind the infamy of being thought {333} exceeding cruell, having by his Prefects in Rome, and in every place of the Empire, exercisd many cruelties, insomuch that the whole world being provok'd against him to contempt for the basenesse of his blood; on the other side upon the hatred conceiv'd against him for feare of his crulty; first Affrica, afterwards the Senate, with all the people of Rome and all Italy, conspired against him, with whom his own army took part; which incamping before Aquileya, and finding some difficulty to take the town, being weary of his cruelties, and because they saw he had so many enemies, fearing him the lesse, slew him. I purpose not to say any thing either of Heliogabalus, Macrinus, or Julian, who because they were throughly base, were sudenly extinguished: but I will come to the conclusion of this discourse; and I say, that the Princes of our times have lesse of this difficulty to satisfie the Soldiers extraordinarily in their government; for notwithstanding that there be some considerations to be had of them, yet presently are those armies dissolved, because none of these Princes do use to maintaine any armies together, which are annex'd and inveterated with the governments of the provinces, as were the armies of the Romane Empire. And therefore if then it was necessary rather to content the soldiers than the people, it was because the soldiers were more powerfull than the people: now is it more necessary for all Princes, (except the Turk and the Souldan) to satisfie their people than their soldiers, because the people are more mighty than they; wherein I except the Turk, he alwayes maintaining about his person 12000 foot, and 15000 horse, upon which depends the safety and strength of his Kingdome; and it is necessary that laying aside all other regard of his people, he maintaine these his friends. The Souldans Kingdome is like hereunto, which being wholy in the souldiers power, he must also without respect of his people keep them his friends. And you are to consider, that this State of the Souldans differs much from all the other Principalities: For it is very like the Papacy, which cannot be termd an hereditary Principality: nor a new Principality: for the sons of the deceasd Prince are {334} not heires and Lords thereof, but he that is chosen receives that dignity from those who have the authority in them. And this order being of antiquity, cannot be termd a new Principality, because therein are none of those difficulties that are in new ones: for though the Prince be new, yet are the orders of that state ancient, and ordaind to receive him, as if he were their hereditary Prince. But let us returne to our matter; whosoever shall consider our discourse before, shall perceive that either hatred, or contempt have caus'd the ruine of the afore-named Emperors; and shall know also, from it came that part of them proceeding one way, and part a contrary; yet in any of them the one had a happy success, and the others unhappy: for it was of no availe, but rather hurtful for Pertinax and Alexander, because they were new Princes, to desire to imitate Marcus, who by inheritance came to the Principality: and in like manner it was a wrong to Caracalla, Commodus, and Maximus, to imitate Severus, because none of them were endued with so great valor as to follow his steps therein. Wherefore a new Prince in his Principality cannot well imitate Marcus his actions; nor yet is it necessary to follow those of Severus: but he ought make choyce of those parts in Severus which are necessary for the founding of a State; and to take from Marcus those that are fit and glorious to preserve a State which is already established and setled.

B But since I have already discussed the most important qualities that a prince should have, I'll briefly cover the others that a prince should be cautious of, as mentioned before. He should avoid anything that makes him disliked or contemptible. If he can steer clear of this, he will have fulfilled his role, and he won't face significant threats from other disgraces. There's nothing that makes him more hated than the exploitation of his subjects’ property and the abuse of their women, which he should refrain from. As long as he doesn’t wrong the majority of his people, in terms of their possessions or honor, they will remain content, and he will only face challenges from the ambitions of a few individuals, which can be managed in many ways. Being seen as fickle, frivolous, cowardly, or indecisive leads to being scorned and viewed as lowly, qualities a prince should avoid at all costs. Instead, he should ensure that in all his actions, he displays nobility, courage, seriousness, and bravery. He must handle his subjects’ private matters in such a way that his word is unchallengeable, maintaining such a reputation that no one thinks they can deceive or maneuver him. A prince who earns this kind of respect is highly valued, and conspiracies against such a well-regarded figure are rare, whether from his subjects or foreign invaders, once his worth is recognized and how much he is revered by his people. A prince should be mindful of two fears: one from within regarding his subjects, and the other from outside concerning powerful neighbors. He safeguards himself from these through good armies and loyal friends. A prince will always have good friends if he has a strong military; as long as external circumstances remain stable—unless disrupted by conspiracy—domestic affairs will also remain secure. Even if foreign matters are precarious, if he has managed his domestic affairs well and lives by the principles I’ve laid out, he should resist all forms of potential force and violence, as I mentioned Nabis the Spartan did. However, regarding his subjects, even when external matters are settled, it's important to fear potential secret conspiracies; a prince can secure himself by avoiding being hated or disdained and keeping himself in good standing with his people, which is necessary to achieve, as discussed previously. One of the most powerful remedies a prince can have against conspiracies is not to be hated or despised by the populace; conspirators always believe that a prince's death would be welcomed by the subjects, but when they think it would displease them, they lack the courage to act on such a plan, facing infinite difficulties on their side. History shows that many plots have been devised, but few have succeeded; for a conspirator cannot act alone and can only associate with individuals he believes are discontented. The moment you've revealed yourself to a malcontent, you provide them with an opportunity to fulfill their own desires: by exposing your treachery, they can hope for various rewards. Given the certainty of their gain and the danger on the opposite side, they would have to be a rare ally or a persistently obstinate enemy of the prince to keep their word to you. In short, fear, jealousy, and suspicion of punishment frighten conspirators; meanwhile, the prince has the majesty of his position, the laws, and the protection of his allies and state, which safeguard him so well that with the people's goodwill, it’s nearly impossible for anyone to be so bold as to conspire. Generally, a traitor fears for his life before committing an act of treachery, and once the deed is done, he must fear the people as his enemies, leaving him with no hope for refuge. Many examples could be provided regarding this matter, but I’ll settle on one from the memory of our ancestors. Annibal Bentivolii, the grandfather of the current Annibal, who ruled in Bologna, was killed by the Canneschi who conspired against him, leaving none of his lineage but this John, who was then an infant. Immediately, the people rose up against this murder, executing all the Canneschi out of popular affection for the Bentivolii family, which was so strong that with Annibal's death, there was no one left capable of managing the state. Upon learning that there was a Bentivolii born in Florence, previously believed to be a blacksmith’s son, the citizens of Bologna went to Florence, brought him back, and entrusted their city’s governance to him until John came of age. Thus, a prince should think little of treason while having the support of the people; if they become his enemies and hate him, he has reason to fear everything and everyone. Well-run states and wise princes diligently ensure their nobles do not fall into despair, keeping the people satisfied and thus maintaining such support. This is one of the most critical tasks for a prince. Among the well-ordered and governed kingdoms of today is France, which has many good laws essential for the king's liberty and security, the foremost of which is the Parliament and its authority. The founder of that kingdom knew well the ambition and insolence of the nobility and deemed it essential to rein them in. At the same time, understanding the common folk's hatred towards the elite due to fear, he wanted to alleviate the king of the burden of these matters, which could arise if he favored either. Therefore, he established a third party, meant to keep the nobles in check and support the commoners, without implicating the king. There was no better or wiser course of action than this; nor a surefire method to secure the king and the kingdom. From this, we can derive another important conclusion: that princes should delegate blame and fault to others while taking on only grace and favor themselves. I conclude that a prince must hold his nobility in good esteem but not incur the hatred of the commons. It may seem to many, considering the lives and deaths of several Roman Emperors, that they serve as contrary examples to my argument since some lived honorably, demonstrating many rare virtues, yet lost their empire and were murdered by their own subjects in conspiracy against them. To address these objections, I will discuss the qualities of some emperors, detailing the reasons for their ruin, which align with my claims. I'll particularly focus on notable emperors from Marcus the Philosopher to Maximinus, including his son Commodus, Pertinax, Julian, Severus, Antonius, Caracalla, Macrinus, Heliogabalus, Alexander, and Maximin. First, it's crucial to note that while in other principalities, rulers only contend with the ambitions of nobles and the insolence of the populace, Roman Emperors faced a third challenge: the cruelty and greed of soldiers, a difficulty so great that it led to the ruin of many, as it is hard to satisfy both soldiers and the people. The people prefer tranquility and therefore favor modest princes, while soldiers seek a bold prince, one who is arrogant, cruel, and prone to exploiting the populace, which allows them to bolster their salaries and fulfill their greed. Because of this, those emperors who lacked the necessary reputation to curb both the soldiers and the people through either natural ability or artifice were always ruined. Most emperors, particularly those who rose from obscurity, focused on pleasing the soldiers and disregarded the wrongs done to the populace, which was the necessary path at the time. Princes, unable to escape widespread hatred, should first endeavor not to incur the ire of any significant group; when that’s impossible, they must work diligently to avoid the hatred of those powerful groups. Therefore, those emperors, newly called to the throne, leaned towards the soldiers rather than the people, which turned out to be advantageous or disadvantageous, based on how well each prince maintained their stature with them. Consequently, both Marcus Pertinax and Alexander, despite living modestly, being lovers of justice and loathing cruelty, and being kind and generous, all met miserable ends after Marcus; the only one who lived and died exceptionally honored was Marcus since he inherited the empire and didn’t owe his position to soldiers or the people. He possessed many virtues that rendered him venerable, and throughout his life, he kept both the nobility and the populace within their bounds without being hated or scorned. Pertinax, however, was made emperor against the will of the soldiers who, having become accustomed to living in excess under Commodus, could not tolerate the disciplined rule Pertinax sought to impose. Consequently, having earned their hatred, along with contempt due to his old age, he was quickly ruined. This suggests that hatred can be gained through good deeds as well as bad; thus, when a prince aims to establish his state, he is often compelled to act against goodness. When a general populace—be it commoners, soldiers, or nobility—whom he believes necessary for his stability, becomes corrupted, he must align with their whims and satisfy them, rendering all good deeds adversarial. Let’s now turn to Alexander, who was recognized for having not executed anyone in fourteen years of rule except by legal process; nevertheless, he was seen as effeminate and ruled by his mother, leading to his downfall due to contempt. The army conspired against him. Conversely, by examining the qualities of Commodus, Severus, Antonius, Caracalla, and Maximinus, we see these emperors were exceedingly cruel and greedy; to satisfy their soldiers, they committed all sorts of offenses against the people. Most of these except Severus ended badly; in Severus's case, his extraordinary valor ensured that while he retained the soldiers’ favor, he could rule happily, even with the people burdened by his actions, due to his outstanding reputation in the eyes of both soldiers and common folk, leaving them in awe of him. Because of his great achievements as a new ruler, I will briefly show how adept he was at balancing the roles of both fox and lion, both of which are essential traits for a prince to emulate. Severus, seeing the laziness of Emperor Julian, persuaded his army, of which he was commanding in Sclavonia, to march on Rome to avenge Pertinax's death, murdered by the imperial guard. Under this pretense, without revealing his ambitions for the throne, he advanced his army toward Rome, arriving in Italy before his movements became known. Once in Rome, he was fearfully acclaimed emperor by the Senate, leading to Julian's assassination. However, two challenges remained for Severus before he could seize control of the entire state: one in Asia, where Niger, the general of those armies, claimed the title of emperor; the other in the West with Albinus, who also aspired to rule. To avoid revealing animosity toward them, he planned to confront Niger and deceive Albinus, writing to him that, having been elected emperor by the Senate, he would gladly share the title with him, sending him the title of Caesar, and by resolution of the Senate, taking him on as a colleague; Albinus accepted these overtures genuinely. Eventually, after defeating and killing Niger and settling affairs in the East, Severus returned to Rome, where he condemned Albinus in the Senate for not valuing the benefits he had granted, alleging Albinus plotted against him, necessitating a response to his treachery: subsequently, he went to France and stripped him of both title and life. Anyone who examines Severus's actions will find him to have been a cruel lion and a cunning fox, consistently respected and feared by all, and not despised by the armies. It’s no wonder that as a new man, he could hold such a vast empire together; his remarkable standing evaded the resentment the populace might have held due to his extortion. Meanwhile, Antonius, his son, also showcased extraordinary valor and remarkable qualities that made him admired by the people and favored by the soldiers, as he was a martial figure enduring all sorts of hardship, rejecting luxuries and weakness, earning the love of all armies. Despite this, his brutality and cruelty were so extreme, having executed numerous Romans and every citizen of Alexandria, that he became reviled around the world, feared even by those close to him, leading to his murder at the hands of a centurion right in the midst of his army. It's notable that such deaths resulting from a deliberate and resolute mindset are unavoidable for a prince; anyone unafraid of death can act, yet a prince should fear it less because it rarely occurs. He must simply guard against inflicting severe injuries to those close to him, which Antonius failed to do, having shamefully killed a brother of that centurion, threatening him daily while still keeping him in his bodyguard, a reckless choice leading to his demise. Now let’s consider Commodus, for whom maintaining the empire was relatively easy due to inheritance as Marcus's son. He merely needed to follow his father’s lead to please both the populace and the soldiers. However, being cruel and savage, he chose to exercise his rule over the people liberally. Additionally, neglecting his dignity, he often descended onto stages to box with gladiators and engaged in disgraceful acts unworthy of imperial majesty, rendering him contemptible in the soldiers’ eyes. As a result, he was despised and eventually conspired against and killed. Finally, we should discuss Maximinus, a very martial figure, who the armies favored after disgust over Alexander's effeminacy, leading to Alexander’s murder and their choosing Maximinus as emperor. He did not last long in that role because two factors led to his disdain and contempt: first, he was of low birth, being known to have kept cattle in Thrace, which caused ridicule; secondly, delaying his arrival in Rome to take possession of the imperial throne led him to infamy for extreme cruelty. Through his prefects, he inflicted numerous cruelties across the empire, provoking widespread contempt due to his lowly origins and the fear his cruelty incited. Eventually, Africa, then the Senate, all of Rome's populace, and all of Italy conspired against him, with his own army joining in. While encamped before Aquileia, facing challenges in taking the city and weary of his cruelties, they ultimately ended his life. My intention is not to discuss Heliogabalus, Macrinus, or Julian, all of whom were so contemptible they were swiftly extinguished. I conclude this discourse, stating that contemporary princes face less difficulty satisfying soldiers excessively in their governance. Although considerations of soldier satisfaction remain, armies today tend to dissolve quickly, as modern princes do not maintain longstanding forces intertwined with provincial governance as the armies of the Roman Empire did. Thus, what was once necessary to prioritize military satisfaction over that of the people was due to soldiers having more power than civilians. Today, however, it is more essential for all princes (except the Turk and the Sultan) to fulfill the needs of their people more than their military, as the people are now more powerful; the exception being the Turk who maintains 12,000 infantry and 15,000 cavalry for the safety and strength of his kingdom, needing to keep these allies loyal over all other considerations. The Sultan's domain is similar, wielding total power through his soldiers, compelling him to prioritize their favor over the populace. One must note that the Sultan's regime significantly differs from other principalities: it resembles the papacy which shouldn't be classified strictly as hereditary or new; the sons of a deceased prince are not heirs in the same sense, as the chosen one receives the office through the authority of others. This order, which has ancient roots, doesn't qualify as a new principality, as it lacks the challenges found in newly established ones; although the ruler may be new, the institution's customs are old and structured to welcome him as if he were their hereditary leader. Returning to the main topic, anyone reflecting on my previous arguments will see that either hatred or contempt caused the downfall of the aforementioned emperors; it also reveals that factions among them had varying outcomes: some faced fortunate ends while others suffered misfortune. For Pertinax and Alexander, their attempts to emulate Marcus were futile and ultimately detrimental, as they were new princes while Marcus ascended by inheritance. Similarly, it was ill-advised for Caracalla, Commodus, and Maximus to imitate Severus, as none possessed his remarkable bravery to follow in his footsteps. Thus, a new prince cannot easily mirror Marcus's actions in governance nor is it necessary to adhere to Severus's model; instead, he should select the aspects that are crucial for establishing a state from Severus’s example while adopting from Marcus those qualities suited for preserving a state already set in place.

{335}

CHAP. XX

Whether the Citadels and many other things which Princes often make use of, are profitable or dammageable.

S ome Princes, whereby they might safely keep their State, have disarmed their subjects; some others have held the towns under their dominion, divided into factions; others have maintain'd enmities against themselves; others have appli'd themselves to gain them, where they have suspected at their entrance into the government; others have built Fortresses; and others again have ruined and demolished them: and however that upon all these things, a man cannot well pass a determinate sentence, unless one comes to the particulars of these States, where some such like determinations were to be taken; yet I shall speak of them in so large a manner, as the matter of it self will bear. It was never then that a new Prince would disarme his own subjects; but rather when he hath found them disarmed, he hath alwaies arm'd them. For being belov'd, those armes become thine; those become faithful, which thou hadst in suspicion; and those which were faithful, are maintaind so; and thy subjects are made thy partisans; and because all thy subjects cannot be put in armes, when thou bestowest favors on those thou armest, with the others thou canst deal more for thy safety; and that difference of proceeding which they know among them, obliges them to thee; those others excuse thee, judgeing it necessary that they have deservd more, who have undergone more danger, and so have greater obligation: but when thou disarmst them, thou beginst to offend them, that thou distrustest them, either for cowardise, or small faith; and the one or the other of those two opinions provokes their hatred against thee; and because thou canst not stand disarmed, {336} thou must then turn thy self to mercenary Soldiery, whereof we have formerly spoken what it is, and when it is good; it can never be so much as to defend thee from powerful enemies, and suspected subjects; therefore as I have said, a new Prince in a new Principality hath alwaies ordaind them armes. Of examples to this purpose, Histories are full. But when a Prince gains a new State, which as a member he adds to his ancient dominions, then it is necessary to disarme that State, unless it be those whom thou hast discoverd to have assisted thee in the conquest thereof; and these also in time and upon occasions, it is necessary to render delicate and effeminate, and so order them, that all the arms of thy State be in the hands of thy own Soldiers, who live in thy ancient State near unto thee. Our ancestors and they that were accounted Sages, were wont to say that it was necessary to hold Pistoya in factions, and Pisa with Fortresses; and for this cause maintaind some towns subject to them in differences, whereby to hold it more easily. This, at what time Italy was ballanc'd in a certain manner, might be well done; but mee thinks it cannot now a dayes be well given for a precept; for I do not beleeve, that divisions made can do any good; rather it must needs be, that when the enemy approaches them, Cities divided are presently lost; for alwaies the weaker part will cleave to the forrein power, and the other not be able to subsist. The Venetians (as I think) mov'd by the aforesaid reasons, maintaind the factions of the Guelfes and Gibellins, in their townes; and however they never suffered them to spill one anothers blood, yet they nourish'd these differences among them, to the end that the citizens imployd in these quarrels, should not plot any thing against them: which as it proved, never serv'd them to any great purpose: for being defeated at Vayla, presently one of those two factions took courage and seizd upon their whole State. Therefore such like waies argue the Princes weakness; for in a strong principality they never will suffer such divisions; for they shew them some kind of profit in time of peace, being they are able by means thereof more easily to mannage their subjects: but war comming, such like orders discover {337} their fallacy. Without doubt, Princes become great, when they overcome the difficulties and oppositions that are made against them; and therefore Fortune especially when she hath to make any new Prince great, who hath more need to gain reputation than an hereditary Prince, causes enemies to rise against him, and him to undertake against them: to the end he may have occasion to master them, and know that ladder, which his enemies have set him upon, whereby to rise yet higher. And therefore many think, that a wise Prince when he hath the occasion, ought cunningly to nourish some enmity, that by the suppressing thereof, his greatness may grow thereupon. Princes, especially those that are new, have found more faith and profit in those men, who in the beginning of their State, have been held suspected, than in those who at their entrance have been their confidents. Pandulphus Petrucci, Prince of Siena, governd his State, more with them that had been suspected by him, than with the others. But of this matter we cannot speak at large, because it varies according to the subject; I will only say this, that those men, who in the beginning of a Principality were once enemies, if they be of quality so that to maintain themselves they have need of support, the Prince might alwaies with the greatest facility gain for his; and they are the rather forced to serve him faithfully, insomuch as they know it is more necessary for them by their deeds to cancel that sinister opinion, which was once held of them; and so the Prince ever draws from these more advantage, than from those, who serving him too supinely, neglect his affairs. And seing the matter requires it, I will not omit to put a Prince in mind, who hath anew made himself master of a State, by means of the inward helps he had from thence that he consider well the cause that mov'd them that favor'd him to favor him, if it be not a natural affection towards him; for if it be only because they were not content with their former government, with much pains and difficulties shall he be able to keep them long his friends, because it will be impossible for him to content them. By these examples then which are drawn out of ancient and modern {338} affaires, searching into the cause hereof, we shall find it much more easie to gain those men for friends, who formerly were contented with the State, and therefore were his enemies: than those, who because they were not contented therewith, became his fiends, and favor'd him in getting the mastery of it. It hath been the custome of Princes, whereby to hold their States more securely, to build Citadels, which might be bridles and curbs to those that should purpose any thing against them, and so to have a secure retreat from the first violences. I commend this course, because it hath been used of old; notwithstanding Nicholas Vitelli in our dayes hath been known to demolish two Citadels in the town of Castello, the better to keep the State; Guidubaldo Duke of Urbin being to return into his State, out of which he was driven by Cæsar Borgia, raz'd all the Fortresses of that Countrey, and thought he should hardlyer lose that State again without them. The Bentivolii returning into Bolonia, used the like courses. Citadels then are profitable, or not, according to the times; and if they advantage thee in one part, they do thee harme in another; and this part may be argued thus. That Prince who stands more in fear of his own people than of strangers, ought to build Fortresses: but he that is more afraid of strangers than of his people, should let them alone. Against the house of Sforza, the Castle of Milan, which Francis Sforza built, hath and will make more war, than any other disorder in that State: and therefore the best Citadel that may be, is not to incurre the peoples hatred; for however thou holdest a Fortress, and the people hate thee, thou canst hardly scape them; for people, when once they have taken armes, never want the help of strangers at their need to take ther parts. In our dayes we never saw that they ever profited any Prince, unless it were the Countess of Furli, when Count Hieronymo of Furli her husband was slain; for by means thereof she escap'd the peoples rage, and attended aid from Milan, and so recover'd her State: and then such were the times that the stranger could not assist the people: but afterwards they serv'd her to little purpose, when Cæsar Borgia assaild her, and that {339} the people which was her enemy, sided with the stranger. Therefore both then, and at first, it would have been more for her safety, not to have been odious to the people, than to have held the Fortresses. These things being well weigh'd then, I will commend those that shall build up Fortresses, and him also that shall not; and I will blame him, howsoever he be, that relying upon those, shall make small account of being hated by his people.

S Some princes have disarmed their subjects to secure their rule, while others have maintained divided factions among their towns. Some have kept enemies close, others have sought to win over those they suspected when they took power, some have built fortresses, and still others have destroyed them. It's difficult to make a definitive judgment about these strategies without looking at the specifics of each state; however, I will discuss them broadly as the subject allows. Historically, new princes have not disarmed their own subjects; instead, they have armed those who are disarmed. When you are liked, you gain loyal arms; those you once suspected become trustworthy, and the loyal are kept that way. Your subjects become your supporters; since not all subjects can be armed, granting favors to those you arm allows you to manage the others for your safety. The perceived difference in treatment obligates them to you; others excuse you, believing that those who have faced more danger deserve more recognition. But if you disarm them, you begin to offend, as it signals distrust, either of cowardice or lack of faith; either perception breeds hatred towards you. And since you cannot remain defenseless, {336} you must rely on mercenary soldiers, which we have previously discussed regarding their pros and cons; they can never effectively protect you from powerful enemies or suspicious subjects. Thus, as I mentioned, a new prince in a new principality generally arms his subjects. History is replete with examples of this. However, when a prince acquires a new state, which he adds to his existing dominions, he must disarm that state unless he has identified allies from the conquest. Over time, those allies must also be softened and trained so that all arms in the state rest with his own soldiers, who live nearby in his original territory. Our ancestors and the wise have maintained that it was essential to keep Pistoya divided and Pisa fortified; they maintained certain towns in conflict to secure control over them. When Italy was balanced in a certain way, this worked well, but I don't believe it is a valid strategy today, as divisions only weaken. When hostile forces approach, divided cities easily fall; the weaker faction will align with the foreign power and the other will not survive. The Venetians, for instance, maintained the rival factions of the Guelfs and Ghibellines in their towns, ensuring they never shed each other's blood but nurturing divisions to prevent citizens from plotting against them. This strategy ultimately failed; after their defeat at Vayla, one faction quickly grew bold and seized the entire state. Such tactics reveal a prince's weakness; in a strong principality, divisions are not tolerated, as they offer some apparent benefit during peace by simplifying management of subjects. However, during war, such strategies expose their flaws. Indeed, princes achieve greatness by overcoming challenges and opposition; fortune, particularly when making a new prince prominent, creates enemies to spur him into action against them. This presents opportunities for him to conquer adversaries and reveals the means by which he can ascend further. Many believe a wise prince should cleverly cultivate enmity so that overcoming it contributes to his stature. New princes especially have found more loyalty and gain from those once considered suspect than from those initially trusted allies. Pandulphus Petrucci, the Prince of Siena, governed more effectively with those he had initially viewed with suspicion than with his former allies. However, the specifics here vary based on circumstances; I will only emphasize that former enemies, if they are of a quality that requires support to maintain their position, can easily be turned to serve the prince. They are compelled to demonstrate loyalty to counter the negative perceptions previously held against them, so the prince often benefits more from them than from those who serve without engagement. And since the situation calls for it, I must remind a prince who has recently taken control of a state to consider the reasons behind the support he received from those who favored him. If their preference is not grounded in genuine loyalty but simply a dissatisfaction with previous leadership, he will struggle to maintain their friendship, as he cannot realistically satisfy them. From these examples, drawn from both ancient and modern {338} affairs, we find it's often easier to win over those who were initially content with the state and thus became adversaries than to retain those who favored him only due to their prior discontent with governance. Historically, princes have built citadels to ensure more secure control over their states and as a means to deter potential threats. I support this approach, as it has been employed for ages. However, in our time, Nicholas Vitelli famously demolished two citadels in Castello to strengthen his state. Guidubaldo, Duke of Urbino, destroyed all fortifications in returning to his territory after being driven out by Caesar Borgia, believing he could fortify his return without them. The Bentivolii employed similar tactics upon their return to Bologna. Therefore, the value of citadels is context-dependent; if they support you in one way, they could also harm you in another. This can be summarized: a prince who fears his own people more than outside threats should build fortresses, while one who fears foreigners more than his own people should refrain from doing so. The Castle of Milan, built by Francesco Sforza, has done more to destabilize the Sforza family than any other disorder in that state. Thus, the best fortress is to avoid inciting the people's hatred; if you hold a fortress but are hated, it's hard to escape their wrath. When the people are armed and hostile, they easily find foreign allies to support their cause. In our time, no fortress has benefited a prince, except for the Countess of Forli, whose husband, Count Hieronymo, was killed. Thanks to her fortresses, she escaped the public's anger, sought aid from Milan, and recovered her state; yet, at that time, foreign assistance was limited. But later, when Caesar Borgia attacked her, the people turned against her and allied with the invaders. Therefore, both during that time and at the outset, it would have been safer for her not to alienate the populace than to rely on fortifications. Given all these considerations, I will commend those who build fortresses and those who choose not to, but I will criticize any prince who rests on fortresses while ignoring the risks of being hated by his subjects.

CHAP. XXI

How a Prince ought to behave himself to gain reputation.

T here is nothing gains a Prince such repute as great exploits, and rare tryals of himself in Heroick actions. We have now in our dayes Ferdinand King of Arragon the present King of Spain: he in a manner may be termed a new Prince; for from a very weak King, he is now become for fame and glory, the first King of Christendome, and if you shall wel consider his actions, you shall find them all illustrious, and every one of them extraordinary. He in the beginning of his reign assaild Granada, and that exploit was the ground of his State. At first he made that war in security, and without suspicion he should be any waies hindred, and therein held the Barons of Castiglias minds busied, who thinking upon that war, never minded any innovation; in this while he gaind credit and authority with them, they not being aware of it; was able to maintain with the Church and the peoples money all his soldiers, and to lay a foundation for his military ordinances with that long war, which afterwards gaind him exceeding much honor. Besides this, to the end he might be able hereamong to undertake greater matters, serving himself alwaies of the colour of religion, he gave himself to a kind of {340} religious cruelty, chasing and dispoyling those Jewes out of the Kingdome; nor can this example be more admirable and rare: under the same cloke he invaded Affrick and went through with his exploit in Italy: and last of all hath he assaild France, and so alwaies proceeded on forwards contriving of great matters, which alwaies have held his subjects minds in peace and admiration, and busied in attending the event, what it should be: and these his actions have thus grown, one upon another, that they have never given leisure to men so to rest, as they might ever plot any thing against them. Moreover it much avails a Prince to give extraordinary proofes of himself touching the government within, such as those we have heard of Bernard of Milan, whensoever occasion is given by any one, that may effectuate some great thing either of good or evil, in the civil government; and to find out some way either to reward or punish it, whereof in the world much notice may be taken. And above all things a Prince ought to endeavor in all his actions to spread abroad a fame of his magnificence and worthiness. A Prince also is well esteemed, when he is a true friend, or a true enemy; when without any regard he discovers himself in favor of one against another; which course shall be alwaies more profit, than to stand neuter: for if two mighty ones that are thy neighbors, come to fall out, or are of such quality, that one of them vanquishing, thou art like to be in fear of the vanquisher, or not; in either of these two cases, it will ever prove more for thy profit, to discover thy self, and make a good war of it: for in the first case, if thou discoverest not thy selfe, thou shalt alwaies be a prey to him that overcomes, to the contentment and satisfaction of the vanquisht; neither shalt thou have reason on thy side, nor any thing else to defend or receive thee. For he that overcomes, will not have any suspected friends that give him no assistance in his necessity: and he that loses, receives thee not, because thou wouldest not with thy armes in hand run the hazzard of his fortune. Antiochus passed into Greece, thereunto induc'd by the Etolians, to chace the Romans thence: and sent his Ambassadors to the {341} Achayans, who were the Romans friends, to perswade them to stand neuters; on the other side the Romans moved them to joyne armes with theirs: this matter came to be deliberated on in the council of the Achayans, where Antiochus his Ambassador encouraged them to stand neuters, whereunto the Romans Ambassador answerd; Touching the course, that is commended to you, as best and profitablest for your State, to wit, not to intermeddle in the war between us, nothing can be more against you: because, not taking either part, you shall remain without thanks, and without reputation a prey to the conqueror. And it will alwaies come to pass that he who is not thy friend, will requite thy neutrality; and he that is thy friend, will urge thee to discover thy self by taking arms for him: and evil advised Princes; to avoyd the present dangers, folow often times that way of neutrality, and most commonly go to ruine: but when a Prince discovers himself strongly in favor of a party; if he to whom thou cleavest, overcomes; however that he be puissant, and thou remainest at his disposing, he is oblig'd to thee, and there is a contract of friendship made; and men are never so openly dishonest, as with such a notorious example of dishonesty to oppress thee. Besides victories are never so prosperous, that the conqueror is like neglect all respects, and especially of justice. But if he to whom thou stickst, loses, thou art received by him; and, while he is able, he aydes thee, and so thou becomest partner of a fortune that may arise again; the second case, when they that enter into the lists together, are of such quality, that thou needest not fear him that vanquisheth, so much the more is it discretion in thee to stick to him; for thou goest to ruine one with his assistance, who ought to do the best he could to save him, if he were well advised; and he overcomming, is left at thy discretion; and it is unpossible but with thy ayd he must overcome. And here it is to be noted, that a Prince should be well aware never to joyn with any one more powerfull than himself, to offend another, unless upon necessity, as formerly is said. For when he overcomes, thou art left at his discretion, and Princes ought avoid as {342} much as they are able, to stand at anothers discretion. The Venetians took part with France against the Duke of Milan, and yet could have avoided that partaking, from which proceeded their ruine. But when it cannot be avoyded, as it befel the Florentines when the Pope and the King of Spain went both with their armies to Lombardy, there the Prince ought to side with them for the reasons aforesaid. Nor let any State think they are able to make such sure parties, but rather that they are all doubtfull; for in the order of things we find it alwaies, that whensoever a man seeks to avoid one inconvenient, he incurs another. But the principal point of judgement, is in discerning between the qualities of inconvenients, and not taking the bad for the good. Moreover a Prince ought to shew himself a lover of vertue, and that he honors those that excel in every Art. Afterwards ought he encourage his Citizens, whereby they may be enabled quickly to exercise their faculties as well in merchandise, and husbandry, as in any other kind of traffick, to the end that no man forbear to adorne and cultivate his possessions for fear that he be despoyled of them; or any other to open the commerce upon the danger of heavy impositions: but rather to provide rewards for those that shall set these matters afoot, or for any one else that shall any way amplifie his City or State. Besides he ought in the fit times of the year entertain the people with Feasts and Maskes; and because every City is devided into Companies, and arts, and Tribes, he ought to take special notice of those bodies, and some times afford them a meeting, and give them some proof of his humanity, and magnificence; yet withall holding firme the majestie of his State; for this must never fail in any case.

T Nothing earns a Prince as much respect as great achievements and significant challenges in heroic actions. In our time, we have Ferdinand, King of Aragon, the current King of Spain: he can almost be called a new Prince; having gone from a weak king to now being the most renowned and celebrated King of Christendom. If you look closely at his actions, you'll find that they are all remarkable and each one extraordinary. At the start of his reign, he attacked Granada, and that campaign was the foundation of his power. Initially, he waged that war without fear or suspicion of being hindered, which kept the Barons of Castile preoccupied, as they focused on the war instead of any potential internal changes. Meanwhile, he gained trust and authority with them without their notice; he was able to finance all his soldiers with the Church and people's money, laying a foundation for his military structures through that long war, which later brought him immense honor. Additionally, in order to undertake greater matters while always presenting it under the guise of religion, he engaged in a form of religious cruelty, driving the Jews out of the kingdom. This instance is both admirable and rare: under the same pretext, he invaded Africa and carried out his exploits in Italy; lastly, he attacked France, continuously moving forward with significant plans that always kept his subjects calm and in awe, occupied with anticipating the outcomes. His actions grew upon one another, leaving little time for people to rest and plot against him. Moreover, it greatly benefits a Prince to demonstrate extraordinary capabilities in domestic governance, as we have heard about Bernard of Milan, whenever an opportunity arises that could lead to significant changes, for better or worse, in civil governance; and to find ways to reward or punish such occurrences, which would attract considerable attention worldwide. Above all, a Prince should strive in all his actions to cultivate a reputation for magnificence and worthiness. A Prince is well-regarded when he is a true friend or a true enemy; when he openly shows support for one side against another; such a stance will always be more advantageous than remaining neutral. For if two powerful neighbors fall into conflict, or if one is of a nature that winning would mean fear for you, it will invariably be more beneficial for you to take a stance and support one side in the conflict: for in the case you don’t choose, you will always be at the mercy of the victor, satisfying the vanquished. You won’t have any justification on your side, nor anything else for protection or acceptance. The victor will not want suspected allies who provide no support in his time of need; and the loser will not accept you, as you wouldn’t risk his fortune with your own arms. Antiochus crossed into Greece, urged by the Aetolians to drive the Romans out. He sent his ambassadors to the Achaeans, who were friends of the Romans, persuading them to stay neutral; while on the other side, the Romans urged them to ally with them. This matter was discussed in the Achaean council, where Antiochus's ambassador encouraged them to remain neutral. To this, the Roman ambassador replied; concerning the path suggested to you as best and most beneficial for your state, namely not to interfere in our war, nothing could be worse for you: because by taking no side, you will remain thankless and reputation-less, a victim to the conqueror. And it will always happen that he who is not your friend will repay your neutrality; and he who is your friend will press you to reveal your support by taking up arms for him: and ill-advised Princes, attempting to avoid current dangers, often choose that path of neutrality, which most commonly leads to ruin: but when a Prince shows strong support for a side; if the one you back wins, he may be powerful, but you remain under his influence and there is a bond of friendship formed; and people are rarely outright dishonest enough to use such an open example of betrayal against you. Furthermore, victories are never so convenient that the conqueror can overlook all considerations, especially those of justice. But if the side you support loses, you will be accepted by them; and, while they are able, they will help you, enabling you to share in a fortune that may rise again; in the second case, when those entering the fray together are such that you do not need to fear the victor, it is even more prudent for you to side with him; for you risk losing someone you ought to assist if he is to be saved, and with his victory, you remain at his mercy; and it is impossible that without your aid, he doesn’t triumph. It should be noted that a Prince should always be wary of allying with someone more powerful than himself to offend another, except in cases of necessity, as previously mentioned. For when he wins, you are left at his mercy, and Princes should avoid, as much as possible, being placed at another's discretion. The Venetians allied with France against the Duke of Milan and could have avoided that alliance, leading to their downfall. But when avoidance is impossible, as it happened to the Florentines when both the Pope and the King of Spain marched into Lombardy with their armies, the Prince should side with them for the reasons stated earlier. Also, no state should think they can form such secure alliances, but rather that they are all uncertain; for in the course of events, we see that whenever someone seeks to avoid one problem, they end up facing another. But the key to judgment is in distinguishing between the types of issues and not mistaking the bad for the good. Furthermore, a Prince should show himself as a lover of virtue, honoring those who excel in every art. Afterwards, he should encourage his citizens, enabling them to quickly utilize their skills both in commerce and agriculture, as well as in any other trade, so that no one hesitates to improve and nurture their possessions for fear of being robbed of them, nor for anyone to pursue business at the risk of heavy taxes; but rather to provide incentives for those who initiate such ventures or for anyone who contributes to enhancing his city or state. Besides, he ought to entertain the people at appropriate times of the year with feasts and masquerades; and since every city is divided into guilds and trades, he should pay special attention to these groups, occasionally hosting gatherings for them, and offering evidence of his humanity and generosity; yet, while doing so, he must firmly uphold the majesty of his state, which must never waver in any case.

{343}

CHAP. XXII

Touching Princes Secretaries.

I t is no small importance to a Prince, the choyce he makes, of servants being ordinarily good or bad, as his wisdome is. And the first conjecture one gives of a great man, and of his understanding, is, upon the sight of his followers and servants he hath about him, when they prove able and faithful, and then may he alwaies be reputed wise because he hath known how to discern those that are able, and to keep them true to him. But when they are otherwise, there can be no good conjecture made of him; for the first error he commits, is in this choyce. There was no man that had any knowledge of Antonio of Vanafro, the servant of Pandulfus Petrucci Prince of Sicily, who did not esteem Pandulfus for a very discreet man, having him for his servant. And because there are three kinds of understandings; the one that is advised by it self; the other that understands when it is informed by another; the third that neither is advised by it self nor by the demonstration of another; the first is best, the second is good, and the last quite unprofitable. Therefore it was of necessity, that if Pandulfus attaind not the first degree, yet he got to the second; for whenever any one hath the judgement to discerne between the good and the evil, that he does and sayes, however that he hath not his distinction from himself, yet still comes he to take notice of the good or evil actions of that servant; and those he cherishes, and these he suppresses; insomuch that the servant finding no means to deceive his master, keeps himself upright and honest. But how a Prince may throughly understand his servant, here is the way that never fails. When thou seest the servant study more for his own advantage than thine, and that in all his actions, he searches most {344} after his own profit; this man thus qualified, shall never prove good servant, nor canst thou ever relie upon him: for he that holds the Sterne of the State in hand, ought never call home his cares to his own particular, but give himself wholly over to his Princes service, nor ever put him in minde of any thing not appertaining to him. And on the other side the Prince to keep him good to him, ought to take a care for his servant, honoring him, enriching, and obliging him to him, giving him part both of dignities and offices, to the end that the many honors and much wealth bestowed on him, may restrain his desires from other honors, and other wealth, and that those many charges cause him to fear changes that may fall, knowing he is not able to stand without his master. And when both the Princes and the servants are thus disposed, they may rely the one upon the other: when otherwise, the end will ever prove hurtfull for the one as well as for the other.

I It's incredibly important for a Prince to choose his servants wisely, as that reflects his own judgment. The first impression we get of a great leader and their intelligence comes from observing the quality of their followers and servants. When a prince's attendants are capable and loyal, he earns a reputation for wisdom because it shows he can recognize and retain talent. However, if his choices are poor, it casts doubt on his judgment, as that initial decision is critical. Anyone familiar with Antonio of Vlaanderen, the servant of Pandulfus Petrucci, the Prince of Sicily, considered Pandulfus a wise man for having him as a servant. There are three types of understanding: the first relies on one's own judgment, the second depends on input from others, and the third lacks both self-awareness and understanding from others. The first type is the best, the second is good, and the last is completely worthless. Therefore, if Pandulfus didn't reach the first level, he was at least at the second; as long as someone can judge between good and bad actions, even if they don't arrive at conclusions independently, they still recognize the good and bad actions of their servants—rewarding the former and punishing the latter. This way, a servant has no opportunity to deceive his master and remains honest. To truly understand a servant, here's an infallible method: when you notice that a servant is more concerned with their own benefit than yours, seeking personal gain in everything they do, you can be sure they will never be a good servant and cannot be trusted. A person who controls the state should never focus solely on their own interests but should fully commit to serving their prince, without distracting him with irrelevant matters. On the other hand, the prince should look out for his servant by honoring and enriching him, ensuring he is obliged to the prince by sharing in titles and responsibilities. This way, the many honors and wealth bestowed on him will keep him from seeking other titles and riches, and the responsibilities he carries will make him fear changes that could threaten his position, knowing he cannot succeed without his master. When both the prince and the servant are aligned in this manner, they can trust one another; otherwise, the outcome will end up harming both.

CHAP. XXIII

That Flatterers are to be avoyded.

I will not omit one principle of great inportance, being an errour from which Princes with much difficulty defend themselves, unlesse they be very discreet, and make a very good choice; and this is concerning flatterers; whereof all writings are full: and that because men please themselves so much in their own things, and therein cozen themselves, that very hardly can they escape this pestilence; and desiring to escape it, there is danger of falling into contempt; for there is no other way to be secure from flattery, but to let men know, that they displease thee not in telling thee truth: but when every one hath this leave, thou losest thy reverence. Therefore ought {345} a wise Prince take a third course, making choyce of some understanding men in his State, and give only to them a free liberty of speaking to him the truth; and touching those things only which he inquires of, and nothing else; but he ought to be inquisitive of every thing, and hear their opinions, and then afterwards advise himself after his own manner; and in these deliberations, and with every one of them so carrie himself, that they all know, that the more freely they shall speak, the better they shall be liked of: and besides those, not give eare to any one; and thus pursue the thing resolved on, and thence continue obstinate in the resolution taken. He who does otherwise, either falls upon flatterers, or often changes upon the varying of opinions, from whence proceeds it that men conceive but slightly of him. To this purpose I will alledge you a moderne example. Peter Lucas a servant of Maximilians the present Emperor, speaking of his Majesty, said that he never advised with any body, nor never did any thing after his own way: which was because he took a contrary course to what we have now said: for the Emperor is a close man, who communicates his secrets to none, nor takes counsel of any one; but as they come to be put in practise, they begin to be discovered and known, and so contradicted by those that are near about him; and he as being an easy man, is quickly wrought from them. Whence it comes that what he does to day, he undoes on the morrow; and that he never understands himself what he would, nor what he purposes, and that there is no grounding upon any of his resolutions. A Prince therefore ought alwayes to take counsell, but at his owne pleasure, and not at other mens; or rather should take away any mans courage to advise him of any thing, but what he askes: but he ought well to aske at large, and then touching the things inquird of, be a patient hearer of the truth; and perceiving that for some respect the truth were conceald from him, be displeased thereat. And because some men have thought that a Prince that gaines the opinion to bee wise, may bee held so, not by his owne naturall indowments, but by the good counsells he hath about him; without {346} question they are deceivd; for this is a generall rule and never failes, that a Prince who of himselfe is not wise, can never be well advised, unlesse he should light upon one alone, wholly to direct and govern him, who himself were a very wise man. In this case it is possible he may be well governd: but this would last but little: for that governor in a short time would deprive him of his State; but a Prince not having any parts of nature, being advised of more then one, shall never be able to unite these counsels: of himself shall he never know how to unite them; and each one of the Counsellers, probably will follow that which is most properly his owne; and he shall never find the meanes to amend or discerne these things; nor can they fall out otherwise, because men alwayes prove mischievous, unlesse upon some necessity they be forc'd to become good: we conclude therefore, that counsells from whencesoever they proceed, must needs take their beginning from the Princes wisdome, and not the wisdome of the Prince from good counsells.

I will not leave out one important principle, which is an error that rulers find hard to avoid unless they are very careful and make wise choices; and this is about flatterers. All writings discuss this because people often take pleasure in their own affairs and deceive themselves in the process, making it hard to escape this trap. In trying to avoid it, there’s a risk of becoming subject to ridicule; the only way to protect oneself from flattery is to let people know they won’t upset you by telling the truth. However, once everyone feels free to speak openly, you lose your respect. Therefore, a wise ruler should take a different approach, choosing some knowledgeable individuals in his realm and allowing only them the liberty to speak the truth to him, but only about the matters he asks about, and nothing more. He should be curious about everything and listen to their opinions before deciding in his own way. He should handle these discussions so that they all understand that the more freely they speak, the more he will appreciate them. Aside from these trusted individuals, he shouldn't listen to anyone else, and should stick to the decisions he makes. Those who act differently either get surrounded by flatterers or frequently change their minds based on varying opinions, leading people to think lightly of them. To illustrate this, I will mention a modern example. Peter Lucas, a servant of the current Emperor Maximilian, remarked that his Majesty never consulted anyone nor acted according to his own views; this was because he followed the opposite course from what has been advised here. The Emperor is a reserved man who shares his secrets with no one and doesn’t seek counsel from anyone; as his plans roll out, they become revealed and opposed by those around him, and because he is rather accommodating, he is quickly swayed by them. This results in him reversing what he decides today by tomorrow and leads him to not truly understand what he wants or intends, leaving no stability in his decisions. A Prince should always seek counsel, but on his terms, not according to others'; or better yet, he should discourage anyone from advising him on anything he hasn’t asked about. However, he should ask broadly and then be a patient listener to the truth regarding his inquiries; if he realizes that the truth is being withheld from him out of some consideration, he should be displeased by it. Some people believe that a Prince who earns a reputation for wisdom might do so not from his own innate qualities but from the good advisors surrounding him; they are certainly mistaken. It is a universal truth that a Prince lacking wisdom in himself will never receive sound advice, unless he happens upon one individual who entirely directs and governs him, and that person happens to be exceptionally wise. In such a case, he could be well governed, but this would be temporary because that governor would quickly usurp his power. A Prince without natural intelligence, when advised by more than one person, will never be able to reconcile their advice; he will never learn to unite their counsel, and each advisor will likely pursue what benefits them most. He will not find ways to correct or assess these situations, as things can't turn out any other way, because people tend to be troublesome unless they are forced by necessity to become good. Thus, we conclude that counsel, whatever its source, must stem from the Prince's wisdom, and not that the Prince's wisdom derives from good counsel.

In this Chapter our Authour prescribes some rules how to avoyd flattery, and not to fall into contempt. The extent of these two extreames is so large on both sides, that there is left but a very narrow path for the right temper to walke between them both: and happy were that Prince, who could light on so good a Pilote as to bring him to Port between those rocks and those quicksands. Where Majesty becomes familiar, unlesse endued with a super-eminent vertue, it loses all awfull regards: as the light of the Sunne, because so ordinary, because so common, we should little value, were it not that all Creatures feele themselves quickned by the rayes thereof. On the other side, Omnis insipiens arrogantiâ et plausibus capitur, Every foole is taken with his owne pride and others flatteryes: and this foole keeps company so much with all great wise men, that hardly with a candle and lantern can they be discernd betwixt. The greatest men are more subject to grosse and palpable flatteries; and especially the greatest of men, who are Kings and Princes: for many seek the Rulers favour. Prov. 28. 26. For there are divers meanes whereby private men are instructed; Princes have not that good hap: but they whose instruction is of most importance, so soone as they have taken the government upon them, no longer suffer any {347} reproovers: for but few have accesse unto them, and they who familiary converse with them, doe and say all for favour. Isocrat, to Nicocles, All are afraid to give him occasion of displeasure, though by telling him truth. To this purpose therefore sayes one; a Prince excells in learning to ride the great horse, rather than in any other exercise, because his horse being no flatterer, will shew him he makes no difference between him and another man, and unlesse he keepe his seate well, will lay him on the ground. This is plaine dealing. Men are more subtile, more double-hearted, they have a heart and a heart neither is their tongue their hearts true interpreter. Counsell in the heart of man is like deepe waters; but a man of understanding will draw it out. Prov. 20. 5. This understanding is most requisite in a Prince, inasmuch as the whole Globe is in his hand, and the inferiour Orbes are swayed by the motion of the highest. And therefore surely it is the honour of a King to search out such a secret: Prov. 25. 2. His counsellours are his eyes and eares; as they ought to be dear to him, so they ought to be true to him, and make him the true report of things without disguise. If they prove false eyes, let him pluck them out; he may as they use glasse eyes, take them forth without paine, and see never a whit the worse for it. The wisdome of a Princes Counsellours is a great argument of the Princes wisdome. And being the choyce of them imports the Princes credit and safety, our Authour will make him amends for his other errours by his good advice in his 22 Chap. whether I referre him.

In this chapter, the author shares some tips on how to avoid flattery and maintain respect. The gap between these two extremes is so vast that there’s only a narrow path for the right mindset to navigate. A prince would be lucky to find a skilled guide to safely lead him through such perils. When royalty becomes too common, unless paired with exceptional virtue, it loses its awe-inspiring nature, much like sunlight, which we would undervalue if not for the life it brings to living things. Conversely, as the saying goes, "Every fool is deceived by his own pride and the flattery of others": this fool interacts so much with wise and great people that they become hard to tell apart, even with a candle or lantern. Great individuals are often more vulnerable to obvious flattery, particularly kings and princes, who attract many seeking their approval. Unlike ordinary people, princes don’t have the same opportunities to learn. However, those whose education is most important, once they assume leadership roles, often keep reprovers away: few can approach them, and those close to them usually do and say anything to win favor. Isocrates remarked to Nicocles that everyone fears giving him a reason to be displeased, even when speaking the truth. For this reason, one saying goes that a prince excels in learning how to ride a horse above all other skills, since a horse, being unflattering, shows him that it treats him the same as anyone else, and if he doesn’t maintain his position well, he will be thrown off. This is clear-cut. People are more subtle and duplicitous; they have one heart and another heart, and their words often don't match their true feelings. Counsel in someone’s heart is like deep waters, but a wise person will find a way to draw it out. This understanding is especially critical for a prince, as he holds the world in his hands, and the lower realms are shaped by the actions of those at the top. It is indeed a king's honor to uncover such truths. His advisors are his eyes and ears; while they should be dear to him, they also need to be honest, giving him accurate reports without disguise. If they prove to be false guides, he should dismiss them; much like using glass eyes, he can remove them without harm and won’t see any worse for it. The wisdom of a prince’s advisors reflects the prince's wisdom. Since selecting them impacts his reputation and safety, the author will assist him in correcting his other errors with solid advice in his 22nd chapter, which I recommend he refer to.

CHAP. XXIV

Wherefore the Princes of Italy have lost their States.

W hen these things above said are well observ'd, they make a new Prince seeme as if he had been of old, and presently render him more secure and firme in the State, than if he had already grown ancient therein: for a new Prince is much more observd in his action, than a Prince by inheritance; and when they are known to bee vertuous, men are much more gaind and oblig'd to them thereby, than by the antiquity of their blood: for men {348} are much more taken by things present, than by things past, and when in the present they find good, they content themselves therein, and seeke no further; or rather they undertake the defence of him to their utmost, when the Prince is not wanting in other matters to himself; and so shall he gaine double glory to have given a beginning to a new Principality, adornd, and strengthnd it with good lawes, good arms, good friends, and good examples; as he shall have double shame, that is born a Prince, and by reason of his small discretion hath lost it. And if we shall consider those Lords, that in Italy have lost their States in our dayes, as the King of Naples, the Duke of Milan, and others; first we shall find in them a common defect, touching their armes, for the reasons which have been above discoursd at length. Afterwards we shall see some of them, that either shall have had the people for their enemies; or be it they had the people to friend, could never know how to assure themselves of the great ones: for without such defects as these, States are not lost, which have so many nerves, that they are able to maintaine an army in the feld. Philip of Macedon, not the father of Alexander the Great, but he that was vanquished by Titus Quintius, had not much State in regard of the greatnesse of the Romanes and of Greece that assail'd him; neverthelesse in that he was a warlike man and knew how to entertaine the people, and assure himself of the Nobles, for many yeares he made the warre good against them: and though at last some town perhaps were taken from him, yet the Kingdome remaind in his hands still. Wherefore these our Princes who for many yeares had continued in their Principalities, for having afterwards lost them, let them not blame Fortune, but their own sloth; because they never having thought during the time of quiet, that they could suffer a change (which is the common fault of men, while faire weather lasts, not to provide for the tempest) when afterwards mischiefes came upon them, thought rather upon flying from them, than upon their defence, and hop'd that the people, weary of the vanquishers insolence, would recall them: which course when the others faile, is good: {349} but very ill is it to leave the other remedies for that: for a man wou'd never go to fall, beleeving another would come to take him up: which may either not come to passe, or if it does, it is not for thy security, because that defence of his is vile, and depends not upon thee; but those defences only are good, certaine, and durable, which depend upon thy owne selfe, and thy owne vertues.

W When the things mentioned above are carefully observed, they make a new Prince seem as if he has always been in power, and they quickly make him more secure and stable in his position than if he had been there for a long time. A new Prince is watched more closely in his actions than an inherited Prince; and when it is known that they are virtuous, people are more drawn to and obligated to them because of that than because of their noble lineage. People are much more influenced by present circumstances than by the past, and when they see something good in the present, they are satisfied with it and don’t seek more; or rather, they will go to great lengths to defend him when he manages his other responsibilities well. He will earn double glory for founding a new principality, strengthening it with good laws, strong military forces, loyal allies, and positive examples; while he will face double shame if he was born a Prince and, due to his lack of wisdom, loses it. If we consider those Lords in Italy who have lost their states in our time, like the King of Naples, the Duke of Milan, and others, we’ll first notice a common flaw regarding their military, as discussed in length earlier. Then, we will see some of them had the people as their enemies, or even if they had the people's support, they could never secure the loyalty of the nobles. Without such defects, states do not fall, especially those with enough resources to maintain an army in the field. Philip of Macedon, not the father of Alexander the Great, but the one defeated by Titus Quintius, had little power given the might of the Romans and the Greeks confronting him. Nevertheless, because he was a warrior and knew how to engage the people and secure the nobles' loyalty, he managed to hold off against them for many years. Although in the end, perhaps some towns were captured from him, the kingdom remained in his hands. Therefore, those Princes who have held onto their principalities for many years should not blame Fortune for losing them but rather their own negligence, as they never considered during peaceful times that they could face a change (which is a common human fault; people often fail to prepare for a storm when the weather is fair). When troubles finally struck them, they thought more about escaping than defending themselves and hoped that the people, tired of the conquerors’ arrogance, would call them back. This strategy can succeed when the other options fail, but it’s very unwise to rely solely on that. A person shouldn’t fall, believing someone else will catch them; that might not happen, and even if it does, it’s not a secure solution because that support is unreliable and doesn’t depend on you. The only defenses that are good, certain, and lasting are those that rely on yourself and your own virtues.

CHAP. XXV

How great power Fortune hath in humane affaires, and what meanes there is to resist it.

I t is not unknown unto me, how that many have held opinion, and still hold it, that the affaires of the world are so governd by fortune, and by God, that men by their wisdome cannot amend or alter them; or rather that there is no remedy for them: and hereupon they would think that it were of no availe to take much paines in any thing, but leave all to be governd by chance. This opinion hath gain'd the more credit in our dayes, by reason of the great alteration of things, which we have of late seen, and do every day see, beyond all humane conjecture: upon which, I sometimes thinking, am in some parte inclind to their opinion: neverthelesse not to extinguish quite our owne free will, I think it may be true, that Fortune is the mistrisse of one halfe of our actions; but yet that she lets us have rule of the other half, or little lesse. And I liken her to a precipitous torrent, which when it rages, over-flows the plaines, overthrowes the trees, and buildings, removes the earth from one side, and laies it on another, every one flyes before it, every one yeelds to the fury thereof, as unable to {350} withstand it; and yet however it be thus, when the times are calmer, men are able to make provision against these excesses, with banks and fences so, that afterwards when it swels again, it shall all passe smoothly along, within its channell, or else the violence thereof shall not prove so licentious and hurtfull. In like manner befals it us with fortune, which there shewes her power where vertue is not ordeind to resist her, and thither turnes she all her forces, where she perceives that no provisions nor resistances are made to uphold her. And if you shall consider Italy, which is the seat of these changes, and that which hath given them their motions, you shall see it to be a plaine field, without any trench or bank; which had it been fenc'd with convenient vertue as was Germany, Spain or France; this inundation would never have causd these great alterations it hath, or else would it not have reach'd to us: and this shall suffice to have said, touching the opposing of fortune in generall. But restraining my selfe more to particulars, I say that to day we see a Prince prosper and flourish and to morrow utterly go to ruine; not seeing that he hath alterd any condition or quality; which I beleeve arises first from the causes which we have long since run over, that is because that Prince that relies wholly upon fortune, runnes as her wheele turnes. I beleeve also, that he proves the fortunate man, whose manner of proceeding meets with the quality of the time; and so likewise he unfortunate from whose course of proceeding the times differ: for we see that men, in the things that induce them to the end, (which every one propounds to himselfe, as glory and riches) proceed therein diversly; some with respects, others more bold, and rashly; one with violence, and th'other with cunning; the one with patience, th'other with its contrary; and every one of severall wayes may attaine thereto; we see also two very respective and wary men, the one come to his purpose, and th'other not; and in like maner two equally prosper, taking divers course; the one being wary the other head-strong; which proceeds from nothing else, but from the quality of the times, which agree, or not, with their proceedings. {351} From hence arises that which I said, that two working diversly, produce the same effect: and two equaly working, the one attains his end, the other not. Hereupon depends the alteration of the good; for if to one that behaves himself with warinesse and patience, times and affaires turne so favourably, that the carriage of his businesse prove well, he prospers; but if the times and affaires chance, he is ruind, because he changes not his manner of proceeding: nor is there any man so wise, that can frame himselfe hereunto; as well because he cannot go out of the way, from that whereunto Nature inclines him: as also, for that one having alwayes prosperd, walking such a way, cannot be perswaded to leave it; and therefore the respective and wary man, when it is fit time for him to use violence and force, knows not how to put it in practice, whereupon he is ruind: but if he could change his disposition with the times and the affaires, he should not change his fortune. Pope Julius the second proceeded in all his actions with very great violence, and found the times and things so conformable to that his manner of proceeding that in all of them he had happy successe. Consider the first exploit he did at Bolonia, even while John Bentivolio lived: the Venetians were not well contented therewith; the King of Spaine likewise with the French, had treated of that enterprise; and notwithstanding al this, he stirrd up by his own rage and fiercenesse, personally undertook that expedition: which action of his put in suspence and stopt Spaine and the Venetians; those for feare, and the others for desire to recover the Kingdome of Naples; and on the other part drew after him the King of France; for that King seeing him already in motion, and desiring to hold him his friend, whereby to humble the Venetians, thought he could no way deny him his souldiers, without doing him an open injury. Julius then effected that with his violent and heady motion, which no other Pope with all humane wisdome could ever have done; for if he had expected to part from Rome with his conclusions settled, and all his affaires ordered before hand, as any other Pope would have done, he had never brought it to passe: {352} For the King of France would have devised a thousand excuses, and others would have put him in as many feares. I will let passe his other actions, for all of them were alike, and all of them prov'd lucky to him; and the brevity of his life never sufferd him to feele the contrary: for had he litt upon such times afterwards, that it had been necessary for him to proceed with respects, there had been his utter ruine; for he would never have left those wayes, to which he had been naturally inclind. I conclude then, fortune varying, and men continuing still obstinate to their own wayes, prove happy, while these accord together: and as they disagree, prove unhappy: and I think it true, that it is better to be heady than wary; because Fortune is a mistresse; and it is necessary, to keep her in obedience to ruffle and force her: and we see, that she suffers her self rather to be masterd by those, than by others that proceed coldly. And therefore, as a mistresse, shee is a friend to young men, because they are lesse respective, more rough, and command her with more boldnesse.

I It’s not unknown to me that many people believe, and still believe, that the affairs of the world are governed by luck and by God, to the extent that humans cannot change or alter them through wisdom; or rather that there is no remedy for them. Because of this, they think it’s pointless to work hard on anything and that it’s better to let everything be governed by chance. This view has gained more support in our times due to the significant changes we've recently witnessed, which go beyond all human expectation. Sometimes, when I think about it, I find myself somewhat inclined to this opinion. Nonetheless, I don't want to completely dismiss our own free will. I believe it may be true that Fortune controls half of our actions, but she allows us the freedom to govern the other half, or perhaps a little less. I compare her to a raging torrent, which, when it floods, overtakes the plains, uproots trees and buildings, moves earth from one side to another, and everyone flees from it, yielding to its fury, unable to withstand it. Yet, whenever things are calmer, people can prepare against these excesses with barriers and levees, so that when it swells again, it will flow smoothly within its channel, or at least its force will not be so reckless and harmful. In the same way, we deal with Fortune, who shows her power where virtue is not organized to resist her, and she directs all her forces to places where she sees no defenses or resistance to uphold her. If you look at Italy, the center of these changes, which has caused these upheavals, you will find it to be a flat field without any trench or bank; had it been fortified with proper virtue like Germany, Spain, or France, this flood would never have caused the great changes it has, or it wouldn't have reached us at all. This is sufficient commentary on resisting Fortune in general. But if I focus more on specifics, I say that today we see a prince thrive and prosper, and tomorrow he falls into ruin, without any change in his conditions or qualities; I believe this arises first from what we've long discussed, that a prince who relies entirely on Fortune operates according to her whims. I also believe that the fortunate man is the one whose actions align with the qualities of the times; likewise, he who is unfortunate because his approach is out of step with the times. We observe that people, in their pursuits towards their goals, which everyone seeks, such as glory and wealth, take various paths; some are cautious, while others are bold and reckless; some act violently, while others use cleverness; one is patient, while the other is not; and anyone can achieve these goals in their different ways. We also see two very cautious individuals, where one achieves his goal and the other does not; similarly, two people may prosper equally while taking different approaches, one being cautious and the other headstrong, which comes from nothing other than the quality of the times that align, or fail to align, with their methods. {351} From this arises what I mentioned, that two acting differently can produce the same result; and two acting similarly, where one reaches his goal and the other does not. Here lies the change in fortunes; for if someone behaves with caution and patience, and times and circumstances tilt favorably so that his business goes well, he thrives; but if times and circumstances shift unfavorably, he faces ruin, because he does not change his approach. No one is so wise as to adapt completely; he cannot stray from the path that nature leads him to; and additionally, someone who has always prospered following a certain way cannot be persuaded to abandon it. Thus, when it is the right time for the cautious person to be forceful, he doesn’t know how to execute it, leading to his ruin. However, if he could change his approach with the times and circumstances, his fortune would not change. Pope Julius II acted with great force in all of his actions and found times and circumstances so suitable for his method that he enjoyed success in all of them. Consider his first move at Bologna, during the lifetime of John Bentivoglio; the Venetians were not pleased with it; the King of Spain and France had discussed this undertaking; yet, despite all this, he motivated by his own fiery nature, undertook that expedition personally. His actions put Spain and the Venetians on hold: the former out of fear, and the latter out of a desire to regain the Kingdom of Naples. On the other side, he drew in the King of France; seeing him already taking action, desiring to keep him as an ally to weaken the Venetians, the king thought he could not refuse him soldiers without causing an open offense. Julius achieved through his violent and impulsive actions what no other pope with all human wisdom could ever have done; for if he had waited to leave Rome with everything settled and all his affairs arranged beforehand, like any other pope would have, he would have never succeeded. {352} The King of France would have concocted a thousand excuses, and others would have instilled as many fears. I will skip over his other actions, as they were all alike, and all brought him fortune; the brevity of his life did not allow him to experience failure. For if he had encountered times later that required him to act cautiously, that would have meant his complete ruin, for he would never have abandoned those ways to which he was naturally inclined. I conclude that as Fortune varies and men remain obstinate in their own ways, they find success when their paths coincide, and adversity when they diverge. I believe it is better to be impulsive than cautious; because Fortune is a mistress, and it’s necessary to dominate her with force and vigor. We see she submits more readily to those who act boldly than to those who proceed coldly. Therefore, as a mistress, she tends to favor young men, because they are less cautious, more aggressive, and command her with greater confidence.

I have considered the 25 Chapter, as representing me a full view of humane policy and cunning: yet me thinks it cannot satisfie a Christian in the causes of the good and bad successe of things. The life of man is like a game at Tables; skill availes much I grant, but that's not all: play thy game well, but that will not winne: the chance thou throwest must accord with thy play. Examine this; play never so surely, play never so probably, unlesse the chance thou castest, lead thee forward to advantage, all hazards are losses, and thy sure play leaves thee in the lurch. The sum of this is set down in Ecclesiastes chap. 9. v. 11. The race is not to the swift, nor the battell to the strong: neither yet bread to the wise, nor yet riches to men of understanding, nor yet favour to men of skill; but time and chance hapeneth to them all. Our cunning Author for all his exact rules he delivere in his books, could not fence against the despight of Fortune, as he complaines in his Epistle to this booke. Nor that great example of policy, Duke Valentine, whome our Author commends to Princes for his crafts-master, could so ruffle or force his mistresse Fortune, that he could keep her in obedience. Man can contribute no more to his actions than vertue and wisdome: but the successe depends upon a power above. Surely there is the {353} finger of god; or as Prov. 16. v. 33. 'The lot is cast into the lap, but the whole disposing thereof is of the Lord.' It was not Josephs wisdome made all things thrive under his hand; but because the Lord was with him; and that which he did, the Lord made it to prosper, Gen. 39. Surely this is a blessing proceeding from the divine providence, which beyond humane capacity so cooperateth with the causes, as that their effects prove answerable, and sometimes (that we may know there is something above the ordinary causes) the success returns with such a supereminency of worth, that it far exceeds the vertue of the ordinary causes.

I've examined Chapter 25 and see it as a comprehensive look at human strategy and cunning; however, I believe it doesn’t fully satisfy a Christian's need to understand why things succeed or fail. Human life resembles a board game; I agree that skill matters, but it’s not everything. You can play well, but that alone won’t secure a win. The results of your moves need to match your strategy. Think about it: no matter how confident or likely your play is, unless the roll you make gives you an advantage, all risks will lead to loss, and your solid strategy will leave you with nothing. This is captured in Ecclesiastes 9:11: “The race isn’t always to the swift, or the battle to the strong; nor is bread to the wise, wealth to those with understanding, or favor to those with skills; but time and chance happen to them all.” Our clever author, despite all the precise rules he outlines in his writings, couldn’t shield himself from the whims of Fortune, as he laments in his Epistle. And the great example of strategy, Duke Valentine, whom our author praises to princes for his skillful actions, couldn’t tame or control his fickle Fortune to keep her in check. A person can only influence their actions through virtue and wisdom, but the outcome depends on a higher power. Surely, there’s the {353} touch of God; or as Proverbs 16:33 says, “The lot is cast into the lap, but the Lord determines the outcome.” It wasn’t just Joseph’s wisdom that led to everything succeeding under his supervision, but because the Lord was with him, ensuring that whatever he did thrived (Genesis 39). This truly is a blessing from divine providence, which operates beyond human capability so that the outcomes align with their causes, and sometimes (to remind us that there’s something greater than ordinary causes) the success is so extraordinarily above and beyond that it far exceeds what would be expected from usual means.

CHAP. XXVI

An Exhortation to free Italy from the Barbarians.

H aving then weighed all things above discours'd, and devising with my self, whether at this present in Italy the time might serve to honor a new Prince, and whether there were matter that might minister occasion to a wise and valorous Prince, to introduce such a forme, that might do honor to him, and good to the whole generality of the people in the countrey: me thinks so many things concurre in favor of a new Prince, that I know not whether there were ever any time more proper for this purpose. And if as I said, it was necessary, desiring to see Moses his vertue, that the children of Israel should be inthrald in Ægypt; and to have experience of the magnanimity of Cyrus his mind, that the Persians should be oppress'd by the Medes; and to set forth the excellency of Theseus, that the Athenians should be dispersed; so at this present now we are desirous to know the valor of an Italian spirit, it were necessary Italy should be reduc'd to the same termes it is now in, and were in more slavery than the Hebrews were; more subject than the Persians, more {354} scatterd than the Athenians; without head, without order, battered, pillaged, rent asunder, overrun, and had undergone all kind of destruction. And however even in these later dayes, we have had some kind of shew of hope in some one, whereby we might have conjectur'd, that he had been ordained for the deliverance hereof, yet it prov'd afterwards, that in the very height of all his actions he was curb'd by fortune, insomuch that this poore countrey remaining as it were without life, attends still for him that shall heal her wounds, give an end to all those pillagings and sackings of Lombardy, to those robberies and taxations of the Kingdome, and of Tuscany, and heal them of their soars, now this long time gangren'd. We see how she makes her prayers to God, that he send some one to redeem her from these Barbarous cruelties and insolencies. We see her also wholly ready and disposed to follow any colours, provided there be any one take them up. Nor do we see at this present, that she can look for other, than your Illustrious Family, to become Cheiftain of this deliverance, which hath now by its own vertue and Fortune been so much exalted, and favored by God and the Church, whereof it now holds the Principality: and this shall not be very hard for you to do, if you shall call to mind the former actions, and lives of those that are above named. And though those men were very rare and admirable, yet were they men, and every one of them began upon less occasion than this; for neither was their enterprize more just than this, nor more easie; nor was God more their friend, than yours. Here is very great justice: for that war is just, that is necessary; and those armes are religious, when there is no hope left otherwhere, but in them. Here is an exceeding good disposition thereto: nor can there be, where there is a good disposition, a giant difficulty, provided that use be made of those orders, which I propounded for aim and direction to you. Besides this, here we see extraordinary things without example effected by God; the sea was opened, a cloud guided the way, devotion poured forth the waters, and it rain'd down Manna; all these things have concurred in your greatness, {355} the rest is left for you to do. God will not do every thing himself, that he may not take from us our free will, and of that glory that belongs to us. Neither is it a marvel, if any of the aforenamed Italians have not been able to compass that, which we may hope your illustrious family shall: though in so many revolutions of Italy, and so many feats of war, it may seem that the whole military vertue therein be quite extinguisht; for this arises from that the ancient orders thereof were not good; and there hath since been none that hath known how to invent new ones. Nothing can so much honor a man rising anew, as new laws and new ordinances devised by him: these things when they have a good foundation given them, and contain in them their due greatness, gain him reverence and admiration; and in Italy their wants not the matter wherein to introduce any forme. Here is great vertue in the members, were it not wanting in the heads. Consider in the single fights that have been, and duels, how much the Italians have excel'd in their strength, activity and address; but when they come to armies, they appear not, and all proceeds from the weakness of the Chieftaines; for they that understand the managing of these matters, are not obeyed; and every one presumes to understand; hitherto there having not been any one so highly raised either by fortune or vertue, as that others would submit unto him. From hence proceeds it, that in so long time, and in so many battels fought for these last past 20 years, when there hath been an army wholly Italian, it alwaies hath had evil success; whereof the river Tarus first was witness, afterwards Alexandria, Capua, Genua, Vayla, Bolonia, Mestri. Your Illustrious family then being desirous to tread the footsteps of these Worthyes who redeem'd their countreys, must above all things as the very foundation of the whole fabrick, be furnished with soldiers of your own natives: because you cannot have more faithful, true, nor better soldiers; and though every one of them be good, all together they will become better when they shall find themselves entertained, commanded, and honored by their own Prince. Wherefore it is necessary to provide for {356} those armes, whereby to be able with the Italian valor to make a defence against forreiners. And however the Swisse infantry and Spanish be accounted terrible; yet is there defect in both of them, by which a third order might not only oppose them, but may be confident to vanquish them: for the Spaniards are not able to indure the Horse, and the Swisse are to feare the foot, when they incounter with them, as resolute in the fight as they; whereupon it hath been seen, and upon experience shall be certain, that the Spaniards are not able to beare up against the French Cavalery, and the Swisses have been routed by the Spanish Foot. And though touching this last, there hath not been any entire experience had, yet was there some proof thereof given in the battel of Ravenna, when the Spanish Foot affronted the Dutch battalions, which keep the same rank the Swisses do, where the Spaniards with their nimbleness of body, and the help of their targets entred in under their Pikes, and there stood safe to offend them, the Dutch men having no remedy: and had it not been for the Cavalery that rusht in upon them, they had quite defeated them. There may then (the defect of the one and other of these two infantries being discoverd) another kind of them be anew ordained, which may be able to make resistance against the Horse, and not fear the Foot, which shall not be a new sort of armes, but change of orders. And these are some of those things which ordained a new, gain reputation and greatness to a new Prince. Therefore this occasion should not be let pass, to the end that Italy after so long a time may see some one redeemer of hers appear. Nor can I express with what dearness of affection he would be received in all those countreys which have suffered by those forrein scums, with what thirst of revenge, with what resolution of fidelity, with what piety, with what tears. Would any gates be shut again him? Any people deny him obedience? Any envy oppose him? Would not every Italian fully consent with him? This government of the Barbarians stinks in every ones nostrils. Let your Illustrious Family then undertake this worthy exployt with that courage and {357} those hopes wherewith such just actions are to be attempted; to the end that under your colours, this countrey may be enabled, and under the protection of your fortune that saying of Petrarch be verifyed.

H Having weighed everything discussed above and considering with myself whether this is the right time in Italy to honor a new Prince, and whether there is a situation that might provide an opportunity for a wise and courageous Prince to introduce such a form that would honor him and benefit all the people in the country, I believe that so many factors are coming together in favor of a new Prince that I cannot think of a more appropriate time for this purpose. Just as it was necessary for the Israelites to be enslaved in Egypt to witness Moses's virtue and for the Persians to be oppressed by the Medes to know Cyrus's greatness, and for the Athenians to be scattered to highlight the excellence of Theseus, today we desire to see the valor of an Italian spirit; thus, it is necessary for Italy to remain in the same state it is now, enduring more slavery than the Hebrews, being more oppressed than the Persians, and more scattered than the Athenians. It is without leadership, without order, battered, looted, torn apart, overrun, and has suffered every kind of devastation. Even in recent days, we have seen some signs of hope from individuals that might suggest they were destined to deliver us, yet it turned out that at the peak of their efforts, fortune constrained them. Thus, this poor country remains lifeless, still waiting for someone to heal its wounds, put an end to the looting and pillaging of Lombardy, to the robberies and taxes in the Kingdom and Tuscany, and to heal from its long-festering sores. We see how it prays to God for someone to rescue it from these barbaric cruelties and insolences. We also see it fully ready and willing to follow any flag, provided someone picks them up. At this moment, we do not see who else it can look to but your illustrious family to lead this liberation, which has now been so elevated by its own virtue and fortune, and favored by God and the Church, of which it now holds the Principality. This will not be difficult for you to accomplish if you consider the actions and lives of those who came before you. Although those individuals were rare and admirable, they were still just men, and each began with less cause than this; their undertakings were neither more just nor easier, nor was God more their ally than He is yours. The justice here is immense: for that war is just which is necessary, and arms are sanctified when there is no hope left except in them. There is a very favorable disposition for this; where there is a good disposition, there can be no great difficulty, provided the orders I suggested for your aim and direction are utilized. Furthermore, we see extraordinary events accomplished by God without precedent: the sea was parted, a cloud guided the way, devotion brought forth water, and manna rained down; all these things have contributed to your greatness, {355} while the rest is left for you to achieve. God will not do everything Himself, so He does not take away our free will and the glory that belongs to us. It is not surprising if some of the aforementioned Italians have not been able to accomplish what we hope your illustrious family can: despite all the revolutions in Italy and many military feats, it might seem that the entire military virtue has been extinguished, but this arises from the fact that the ancient orders were not good, and since then, no one has known how to create new ones. Nothing brings greater honor to a man who rises anew than new laws and new ordinances devised by him. When these have a solid foundation and contain the necessary greatness, they earn him respect and admiration; and in Italy, there is no lack of material to introduce any form. There is great virtue among the people, if only it were present in the leadership. Consider the single battles and duels that have taken place; how much the Italians have excelled in strength, agility, and skill; but when they come to armies, they do not shine, and all stems from the weakness of the leaders. Those who understand how to manage these matters are not obeyed, and everyone thinks they understand; up to now, no one has been so elevated by fortune or virtue that others would submit to him. This explains why, for so long, and over so many battles fought in the last 20 years, whenever there has been an entirely Italian army, it has always faced defeat; witnesses to this are the river Tarus, followed by Alexandria, Capua, Genoa, Vayla, Bologna, and Mestri. Your illustrious family, therefore, desiring to follow in the footsteps of those great figures who redeemed their countries, must above all ensure that they are supplied with soldiers from your own native people: because you cannot find more faithful, loyal, or better soldiers. Even though each one may be good, together they will be better when they see themselves valued, commanded, and honored by their own Prince. Thus, it is essential to equip {356} these arms so that you can defend against foreigners with Italian valor. And while the Swiss and Spanish infantry are considered formidable, both have weaknesses through which a third order could not only oppose them but also be confident in defeating them: the Spaniards cannot endure cavalry, and the Swiss fear foot soldiers when confronted by equally resolute fighters. Experience has shown, and will undoubtedly verify, that the Spaniards cannot withstand the French cavalry, and the Swiss have been routed by the Spanish infantry. Although a complete assessment of this last point has not been fully made, some proof was provided in the battle of Ravenna, when the Spanish infantry faced the Dutch battalions, which hold the same position as the Swiss, where the Spaniards, with their nimbleness and the help of their shields, slipped under the pikes and engaged them effectively, the Dutch having no remedy; had it not been for the cavalry that charged in, they would have completely defeated them. Given the discovered weaknesses of both infantry types, it is possible to create a new kind that can resist cavalry and not fear infantry; this would not be a new kind of arms but a change in tactics. These are some of the things that, if newly established, will bring reputation and greatness to a new Prince. Therefore, this opportunity should not be missed so that Italy may finally see a redeemer emerge after so long. I cannot express how warmly he would be welcomed in all those regions suffering from foreign scum, with what thirst for revenge, what loyalty, what piety, and what tears. Would any gates be closed to him? Would any people refuse to obey him? Would any envy oppose him? Would not every Italian gladly support him? This barbaric rule disgusts everyone. Let your illustrious family undertake this noble endeavor with the courage and hope necessary for such just actions to succeed, so that under your banner, this country may be empowered, and under your fortunate protection, the saying of Petrarch may be fulfilled.

Virtù contr' al fuore

Virtue against temptation

Prendera l'arme, e fia il combatter corto:

He'll take up arms, and the fight will be brief:

Che l'antico valore

The ancient value

Ne gli Italici cor non è morto.

Nor is the heart of the Italians dead.

Vertue against fury shall advance the fight,

Virtue against rage will push the battle forward,

And it i' th' combate soon shall put to flight:

And in the fight, it will soon be chased away:

For th' old Roman valor is not dead,

For the old Roman courage is not dead,

Nor in th' Italians brests extinguished.

Nor in the hearts of the Italians extinguished.

FINIS

FINISHED

 



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