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THE ECONOMIC
CONSEQUENCES OF
THE PEACE
by
JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, C.B.
Fellow of King's College, Cambridge
New York
Harcourt, Brace and Howe
1920
PREFACE
The writer of this book was temporarily attached to the British Treasury during the war and was their official representative at the Paris Peace Conference up to June 7, 1919; he also sat as deputy for the Chancellor of the Exchequer on the Supreme Economic Council. He resigned from these positions when it became evident that hope could no longer be entertained of substantial modification in the draft Terms of Peace. The grounds of his objection to the Treaty, or rather to the whole policy of the Conference towards the economic problems of Europe, will appear in the following chapters. They are entirely of a public character, and are based on facts known to the whole world.
The author of this book was briefly attached to the British Treasury during the war and served as their official representative at the Paris Peace Conference until June 7, 1919. He also acted as deputy for the Chancellor of the Exchequer on the Supreme Economic Council. He stepped down from these roles when it became clear that there was no realistic hope for significant changes in the draft Terms of Peace. The reasons for his objections to the Treaty, or rather to the entire approach of the Conference regarding Europe's economic issues, will be outlined in the following chapters. These reasons are entirely public and are based on facts widely known around the world.
J.M. Keynes.
J.M. Keynes.
King's College, Cambridge,
November, 1919.
King's College, Cambridge,
November 1919.
CONTENTS
Chapter 1. | Intro |
Chapter 2. | Europe pre-War |
Chapter 3. | The Conference |
Chapter 4. | The Agreement |
Chapter 5. | Restitution |
Chapter 6. | Europe post-Treaty |
Chapter 7. | Solutions |
THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF THE PEACE
Chapter 1
Introduction
The power to become habituated to his surroundings is a marked characteristic of mankind. Very few of us realize with conviction the intensely unusual, unstable, complicated, unreliable, temporary nature of the economic organization by which Western Europe has lived for the last half century. We assume some of the most peculiar and temporary of our late advantages as natural, permanent, and to be depended on, and we lay our plans accordingly. On this sandy and false foundation we scheme for social improvement and dress our political platforms, pursue our animosities and particular ambitions, and feel ourselves with enough margin in hand to foster, not assuage, civil conflict in the European family. Moved by insane delusion and reckless self-regard, the German people overturned the foundations on which we all lived and built. But the spokesmen of the French and British peoples have run the risk of completing the ruin, which Germany began, by a Peace which, if it is carried into effect, must impair yet further, when it might have restored, the delicate, complicated organization, already shaken and broken by war, through which alone the European peoples can employ themselves and live.
The ability to get used to our environment is a notable trait of humanity. Very few of us truly understand how strangely unusual, unstable, complex, unreliable, and temporary the economic system that Western Europe has relied on for the past fifty years really is. We take some of our most bizarre and fleeting advantages from recent times for granted, thinking of them as natural, permanent, and something we can rely on, and we plan accordingly. On this shaky and false foundation, we strategize for social improvement and shape our political agendas, pursue our grudges and personal ambitions, and feel we have enough leeway to nurture, rather than alleviate, civil conflict within the European community. Driven by insane delusion and reckless self-interest, the German people dismantled the very foundations that support us all. But the representatives of the French and British people risk completing the devastation that Germany began with a Peace that, if implemented, will further damage the already delicate and complex system, which was already shaken and broken by war, through which the European peoples can work and live.
In England the outward aspect of life does not yet teach us to feel or realize in the least that an age is over. We are busy picking up the threads of our life where we dropped them, with this difference only, that many of us seem a good deal richer than we were before. Where we spent millions before the war, we have now learnt that we can spend hundreds of millions and apparently not suffer for it. Evidently we did not exploit to the utmost the possibilities of our economic life. We look, therefore, not only to a return to the comforts of 1914, but to an immense broadening and intensification of them. All classes alike thus build their plans, the rich to spend more and save less, the poor to spend more and work less.
In England, the way life looks doesn’t yet give us a sense that a certain era has ended. We’re busy picking up the pieces of our lives where we left off, with one key difference: many of us seem quite a bit wealthier than we were before. Where we used to spend millions before the war, we’ve now learned that we can spend hundreds of millions and seemingly not feel the impact. Clearly, we didn’t fully tap into the potential of our economic life. So, we’re looking not just for a return to the comforts of 1914, but for a significant expansion and enhancement of them. All classes are planning accordingly: the rich aim to spend more and save less, while the poor hope to spend more and work less.
But perhaps it is only in England (and America) that it is possible to be so unconscious. In continental Europe the earth heaves and no one but is aware of the rumblings. There it is not just a matter of extravagance or "labor troubles"; but of life and death, of starvation and existence, and of the fearful convulsions of a dying civilization.
But maybe it's only in England (and America) where people can be so unaware. In continental Europe, the ground shakes and everyone feels the tremors. It's not just about extravagance or "labor issues"; it's about life and death, hunger and survival, and the terrifying upheavals of a civilization on the verge of collapse.
For one who spent in Paris the greater part of the six months which succeeded the Armistice an occasional visit to London was a strange experience. England still stands outside Europe. Europe's voiceless tremors do not reach her. Europe is apart and England is not of her flesh and body. But Europe is solid with herself. France, Germany, Italy, Austria and Holland, Russia and Roumania and Poland, throb together, and their structure and civilization are essentially one. They flourished together, they have rocked together in a war, which we, in spite of our enormous contributions and sacrifices (like though in a less degree than America), economically stood outside, and they may fall together. In this lies the destructive significance of the Peace of Paris. If the European Civil War is to end with France and Italy abusing their momentary victorious power to destroy Germany and Austria-Hungary now prostrate, they invite their own destruction also, being so deeply and inextricably intertwined with their victims by hidden psychic and economic bonds. At any rate an Englishman who took part in the Conference of Paris and was during those months a member of the Supreme Economic Council of the Allied Powers, was bound to become, for him a new experience, a European in his cares and outlook. There, at the nerve center of the European system, his British preoccupations must largely fall away and he must be haunted by other and more dreadful specters. Paris was a nightmare, and every one there was morbid. A sense of impending catastrophe overhung the frivolous scene; the futility and smallness of man before the great events confronting him; the mingled significance and unreality of the decisions; levity, blindness, insolence, confused cries from without,—all the elements of ancient tragedy were there. Seated indeed amid the theatrical trappings of the French Saloons of State, one could wonder if the extraordinary visages of Wilson and of Clemenceau, with their fixed hue and unchanging characterization, were really faces at all and not the tragi-comic masks of some strange drama or puppet-show.
For someone who spent most of the six months after the Armistice in Paris, a visit to London felt surreal. England remains distant from Europe. The silent tremors of Europe don't reach her. Europe is separate, and England isn't part of it. But Europe is solidly connected within itself. France, Germany, Italy, Austria, Holland, Russia, Romania, and Poland pulse together, and their structure and civilization are essentially one. They thrived together, they endured a war together, which we, despite our massive contributions and sacrifices (though to a lesser extent than America), were economically removed from, and they may collapse together as well. This is the troubling essence of the Peace of Paris. If the European Civil War is to end with France and Italy using their temporary power to dismantle the now-defeated Germany and Austria-Hungary, they are inviting their own destruction too, as they are deeply intertwined with their victims through hidden psychic and economic ties. At any rate, an Englishman who took part in the Conference of Paris and was a member of the Supreme Economic Council of the Allied Powers during those months was bound to have a new experience, becoming a European in his concerns and perspective. There, at the nerve center of the European system, his British worries would largely fade away, and he would be haunted by other, more terrifying issues. Paris felt like a nightmare, and everyone there seemed morbid. A sense of imminent disaster overshadowed the frivolous atmosphere; man’s futility and smallness in the face of significant events loomed large; the mixed significance and unreality of the decisions made; lightness, blindness, arrogance, and the muffled cries from outside—all the elements of ancient tragedy were present. Seated indeed among the theatrical decorations of the French State Salons, one could wonder if the extraordinary faces of Wilson and Clemenceau, with their fixed expressions and unchanging character, were truly human faces or rather the tragicomic masks of some bizarre drama or puppet show.
The proceedings of Paris all had this air of extraordinary importance and unimportance at the same time. The decisions seemed charged with consequences to the future of human society; yet the air whispered that the word was not flesh, that it was futile, insignificant, of no effect, dissociated from events; and one felt most strongly the impression, described by Tolstoy in War and Peace or by Hardy in The Dynasts, of events marching on to their fated conclusion uninfluenced and unaffected by the cerebrations of Statesmen in Council:
The events in Paris felt both incredibly important and trivial at the same time. The decisions seemed to carry heavy implications for the future of society, yet there was a sense that they were empty words, pointless and without real impact, disconnected from what was happening. It strongly evoked the feeling, described by Tolstoy in War and Peace or by Hardy in The Dynasts, that events were moving toward their inevitable outcome, untouched and uninfluenced by the thoughts of politicians in meetings.
Spirit of the Years |
Observe that all wide sight and self-command Deserts these throngs now driven to demonry By the Immanent Unrecking. Nought remains But vindictiveness here amid the strong, And there amid the weak an impotent rage. |
Spirit of the Pities |
Why prompts the Will so senseless-shaped a doing? |
Spirit of the Years |
I have told thee that It works unwittingly, As one possessed not judging. |
In Paris, where those connected with the Supreme Economic Council, received almost hourly the reports of the misery, disorder, and decaying organization of all Central and Eastern Europe, allied and enemy alike, and learnt from the lips of the financial representatives of Germany and Austria unanswerable evidence, of the terrible exhaustion of their countries, an occasional visit to the hot, dry room in the President's house, where the Four fulfilled their destinies in empty and arid intrigue, only added to the sense of nightmare. Yet there in Paris the problems of Europe were terrible and clamant, and an occasional return to the vast unconcern of London a little disconcerting. For in London these questions were very far away, and our own lesser problems alone troubling. London believed that Paris was making a great confusion of its business, but remained uninterested. In this spirit the British people received the Treaty without reading it. But it is under the influence of Paris, not London, that this book has been written by one who, though an Englishman, feels himself a European also, and, because of too vivid recent experience, cannot disinterest himself from the further unfolding of the great historic drama of these days which will destroy great institutions, but may also create a new world.
In Paris, where those involved with the Supreme Economic Council received almost hourly updates on the suffering, chaos, and declining organization across Central and Eastern Europe, both allied and enemy nations, they heard from the financial representatives of Germany and Austria undeniable proof of the severe exhaustion affecting their countries. A rare visit to the hot, dry room in the President's house, where the Four engaged in empty and dry intrigue, only added to the feeling of nightmare. Yet, in Paris, the challenges facing Europe were urgent and alarming, making the occasional return to London's vast indifference somewhat unsettling. In London, these issues felt distant, and only our own smaller problems seemed to matter. London thought that Paris was creating confusion in its affairs but chose to remain uninterested. With this mindset, the British people accepted the Treaty without bothering to read it. However, it is under the influence of Paris, not London, that this book has been written by someone who, although an Englishman, considers himself a European too and, due to recent intense experiences, cannot detach himself from the ongoing unfolding of the significant historical drama of these times, which may destroy great institutions but could also help create a new world.
Chapter 2
Europe Pre-War
Before 1870 different parts of the small continent of Europe had specialized in their own products; but, taken as a whole, it was substantially self-subsistent. And its population was adjusted to this state of affairs.
Before 1870, various regions of the small continent of Europe specialized in their own products; however, as a whole, it was largely self-sufficient. Its population was adapted to this situation.
After 1870 there was developed on a large scale an unprecedented situation, and the economic condition of Europe became during the next fifty years unstable and peculiar. The pressure of population on food, which had already been balanced by the accessibility of supplies from America, became for the first time in recorded history definitely reversed. As numbers increased, food was actually easier to secure. Larger proportional returns from an increasing scale of production became true of agriculture as well as industry. With the growth of the European population there were more emigrants on the one hand to till the soil of the new countries, and, on the other, more workmen were available in Europe to prepare the industrial products and capital goods which were to maintain the emigrant populations in their new homes, and to build the railways and ships which were to make accessible to Europe food and raw products from distant sources. Up to about 1900 a unit of labor applied to industry yielded year by year a purchasing power over an increasing quantity of food. It is possible that about the year 1900 this process began to be reversed, and a diminishing yield of Nature to man's effort was beginning to reassert itself. But the tendency of cereals to rise in real cost was balanced by other improvements; and—one of many novelties—the resources of tropical Africa then for the first time came into large employ, and a great traffic in oil-seeds began to bring to the table of Europe in a new and cheaper form one of the essential foodstuffs of mankind. In this economic Eldorado, in this economic Utopia, as the earlier economists would have deemed it, most of us were brought up.
After 1870, a completely new situation emerged on a large scale, and Europe's economic condition became unstable and unusual over the next fifty years. The pressure of population on food, which had previously been balanced by the availability of supplies from America, was for the first time in recorded history clearly reversed. As the population grew, food actually became easier to obtain. Larger proportional returns from increased production were seen in both agriculture and industry. With the growth of the European population, there were more emigrants to farm the land in new countries, and at the same time, more workers available in Europe to produce industrial goods and capital items that would support emigrant populations in their new homes, as well as to build the railways and ships that would bring food and raw materials from far-off places to Europe. Up until around 1900, a unit of labor in industry provided a purchasing power for an increasing amount of food every year. It’s possible that around 1900, this trend started to reverse, and the diminishing returns from nature on human effort began to make a comeback. However, the rise in real costs of cereals was offset by other advancements; and, as one of many new developments, the resources of tropical Africa began to be utilized extensively for the first time, leading to a significant trade in oilseeds that brought a new and cheaper form of essential food to European tables. In this economic paradise, in this economic utopia, as earlier economists might have described it, most of us were raised.
That happy age lost sight of a view of the world which filled with deep-seated melancholy the founders of our Political Economy. Before the eighteenth century mankind entertained no false hopes. To lay the illusions which grew popular at that age's latter end, Malthus disclosed a Devil. For half a century all serious economical writings held that Devil in clear prospect. For the next half century he was chained up and out of sight. Now perhaps we have loosed him again.
That optimistic era lost touch with a worldview that deeply saddened the founders of our Political Economy. Before the eighteenth century, people had no unrealistic expectations. To expose the illusions that became widespread towards the end of that era, Malthus revealed a dark truth. For fifty years, all serious economic writings clearly acknowledged that truth. For the next fifty years, it was hidden away and ignored. Now it seems we may have unleashed it once more.
What an extraordinary episode in the economic progress of man that age was which came to an end in August, 1914! The greater part of the population, it is true, worked hard and lived at a low standard of comfort, yet were, to all appearances, reasonably contented with this lot. But escape was possible, for any man of capacity or character at all exceeding the average, into the middle and upper classes, for whom life offered, at a low cost and with the least trouble, conveniences, comforts, and amenities beyond the compass of the richest and most powerful monarchs of other ages. The inhabitant of London could order by telephone, sipping his morning tea in bed, the various products of the whole earth, in such quantity as he might see fit, and reasonably expect their early delivery upon his doorstep; he could at the same moment and by the same means adventure his wealth in the natural resources and new enterprises of any quarter of the world, and share, without exertion or even trouble, in their prospective fruits and advantages; or he could decide to couple the security of his fortunes with the good faith of the townspeople of any substantial municipality in any continent that fancy or information might recommend. He could secure forthwith, if he wished it, cheap and comfortable means of transit to any country or climate without passport or other formality, could despatch his servant to the neighboring office of a bank for such supply of the precious metals as might seem convenient, and could then proceed abroad to foreign quarters, without knowledge of their religion, language, or customs, bearing coined wealth upon his person, and would consider himself greatly aggrieved and much surprised at the least interference. But, most important of all, he regarded this state of affairs as normal, certain, and permanent, except in the direction of further improvement, and any deviation from it as aberrant, scandalous, and avoidable. The projects and politics of militarism and imperialism, of racial and cultural rivalries, of monopolies, restrictions, and exclusion, which were to play the serpent to this paradise, were little more than the amusements of his daily newspaper, and appeared to exercise almost no influence at all on the ordinary course of social and economic life, the internationalization of which was nearly complete in practice.
What an extraordinary time in human economic progress that era was, which ended in August 1914! Most people worked hard and lived with a low standard of comfort, yet they seemed reasonably content with their situation. However, for anyone with a bit of talent or drive, there was a path to escape into the middle and upper classes, who enjoyed conveniences, comforts, and amenities at a low cost and with minimal effort—luxuries that even the richest kings of previous times could hardly imagine. A resident of London could order a variety of goods from around the globe by phone, all while enjoying morning tea in bed, and expect them to be delivered quickly to his doorstep; he could simultaneously invest in natural resources and new ventures anywhere in the world, effortlessly sharing in their future benefits; or he could choose to secure his wealth by trusting the residents of any noteworthy city across continents, based on whim or knowledge. If he wanted, he could easily find cheap and comfortable travel to any country or climate without needing a passport or dealing with formalities, send his servant to a nearby bank for any amount of cash he needed, and then head abroad to unfamiliar places, without knowing their religion, language, or customs, carrying cash with him, and feel deeply wronged if anyone bothered him. Most importantly, he saw this situation as normal, certain, and permanent, only expecting it to get better, viewing any change as odd, unacceptable, and avoidable. The concerns of militarism and imperialism, along with racial and cultural rivalries, monopolies, restrictions, and exclusions—issues that would soon disrupt this paradise—were nothing more than trivial stories in his daily newspaper and seemed to have little effect on the everyday social and economic life, which was practically complete in its internationalization.
It will assist us to appreciate the character and consequences of the Peace which we have imposed on our enemies, if I elucidate a little further some of the chief unstable elements already present when war broke out, in the economic life of Europe.
It will help us understand the nature and effects of the peace we've imposed on our enemies if I explain a bit more about some of the main unstable factors that were already present in Europe's economic life when the war started.
I. Population
In 1870 Germany had a population of about 40,000,000. By 1892 this figure had risen to 50,000,000, and by June 30, 1914, to about 68,000,000. In the years immediately preceding the war the annual increase was about 850,000, of whom an insignificant proportion emigrated.[1] This great increase was only rendered possible by a far-reaching transformation of the economic structure of the country. From being agricultural and mainly self-supporting, Germany transformed herself into a vast and complicated industrial machine, dependent for its working on the equipoise of many factors outside Germany as well as within. Only by operating this machine, continuously and at full blast, could she find occupation at home for her increasing population and the means of purchasing their subsistence from abroad. The German machine was like a top which to maintain its equilibrium must spin ever faster and faster.
In 1870, Germany had a population of about 40 million. By 1892, that number had risen to 50 million, and by June 30, 1914, it was roughly 68 million. In the years right before the war, the annual increase was around 850,000, with a small percentage of that number emigrating.[1] This significant growth was only made possible by a major transformation of the country's economic structure. Germany shifted from being primarily agricultural and self-sufficient to becoming a vast and complex industrial machine, relying on a balance of various factors both inside and outside the country. Only by running this machine continuously and at full capacity could Germany provide jobs for its growing population and afford to buy the necessary goods from abroad. The German industrial system was like a top that needed to spin faster and faster to maintain its balance.
In the Austro-Hungarian Empire, which grew from about 40,000,000 in 1890 to at least 50,000,000 at the outbreak of war, the same tendency was present in a less degree, the annual excess of births over deaths being about half a million, out of which, however, there was an annual emigration of some quarter of a million persons.
In the Austro-Hungarian Empire, which increased from about 40 million in 1890 to at least 50 million at the start of the war, a similar trend was noticeable, though to a lesser extent, with an annual surplus of births over deaths of about half a million. However, there was also an annual emigration of around a quarter of a million people.
To understand the present situation, we must apprehend with vividness what an extraordinary center of population the development of the Germanic system had enabled Central Europe to become. Before the war the population of Germany and Austria-Hungary together not only substantially exceeded that of the United States, but was about equal to that of the whole of North America. In these numbers, situated within a compact territory, lay the military strength of the Central Powers. But these same numbers—for even the war has not appreciably diminished them[2]—if deprived of the means of life, remain a hardly less danger to European order.
To understand the current situation, we need to clearly grasp how remarkable a center of population Central Europe became through the development of the Germanic system. Before the war, the combined population of Germany and Austria-Hungary not only significantly surpassed that of the United States but was also roughly equal to that of all of North America. Within this densely populated area lay the military strength of the Central Powers. However, these same numbers—since the war has not really reduced them[2]—if cut off from means of livelihood, pose a considerable threat to European stability.
European Russia increased her population in a degree even greater than Germany—from less than 100,000,000 in 1890 to about 150,000,000 at the outbreak of war;[3] and in the year immediately preceding 1914 the excess of births over deaths in Russia as a whole was at the prodigious rate of two millions per annum. This inordinate growth in the population of Russia, which has not been widely noticed in England, has been nevertheless one of the most significant facts of recent years.
European Russia boosted its population even more than Germany—growing from less than 100 million in 1890 to about 150 million at the start of the war;[3] and in the year right before 1914, the number of births exceeded deaths in Russia by an impressive two million per year. This remarkable population growth in Russia, which hasn't received much attention in England, has nonetheless been one of the most important developments in recent years.
The great events of history are often due to secular changes in the growth of population and other fundamental economic causes, which, escaping by their gradual character the notice of contemporary observers, are attributed to the follies of statesmen or the fanaticism of atheists. Thus the extraordinary occurrences of the past two years in Russia, that vast upheaval of Society, which has overturned what seemed most stable—religion, the basis of property, the ownership of land, as well as forms of government and the hierarchy of classes—may owe more to the deep influences of expanding numbers than to Lenin or to Nicholas; and the disruptive powers of excessive national fecundity may have played a greater part in bursting the bonds of convention than either the power of ideas or the errors of autocracy.
The major events in history are often the result of steady changes in population growth and other key economic factors, which, because they happen gradually, go unnoticed by people at the time, leading them to blame the mistakes of leaders or the zeal of non-believers. For example, the remarkable events in Russia over the past two years—a massive societal upheaval that has disrupted what once seemed most stable, such as religion, property ownership, land ownership, government structures, and class hierarchy—may be more influenced by the deep effects of a growing population than by figures like Lenin or Nicholas. The overwhelming force of rapid population growth might have played a larger role in challenging established norms than the impact of ideas or the faults of tyranny.
II. Organization
The delicate organization by which these peoples lived depended partly on factors internal to the system.
The fragile way of life these communities had relied partly on factors within the system.
The interference of frontiers and of tariffs was reduced to a minimum, and not far short of three hundred millions of people lived within the three Empires of Russia, Germany, and Austria-Hungary. The various currencies, which were all maintained on a stable basis in relation to gold and to one another, facilitated the easy flow of capital and of trade to an extent the full value of which we only realize now, when we are deprived of its advantages. Over this great area there was an almost absolute security of property and of person.
The barriers of borders and tariffs were kept to a minimum, and nearly three hundred million people lived within the three Empires of Russia, Germany, and Austria-Hungary. The different currencies, all of which were kept stable in relation to gold and to each other, made it easy for capital and trade to move freely, something we truly appreciate now, as we miss those benefits. Throughout this vast region, there was almost complete security for both property and personal safety.
These factors of order, security, and uniformity, which Europe had never before enjoyed over so wide and populous a territory or for so long a period, prepared the way for the organization of that vast mechanism of transport, coal distribution, and foreign trade which made possible an industrial order of life in the dense urban centers of new population. This is too well known to require detailed substantiation with figures. But it may be illustrated by the figures for coal, which has been the key to the industrial growth of Central Europe hardly less than of England; the output of German coal grew from 30,000,000 tons in 1871 to 70,000,000 tons in 1890, 110,000,000 tons in 1900, and 190,000,000 tons in 1913.
These factors of order, security, and uniformity, which Europe had never before experienced across such a large and populous area or for such an extended period, paved the way for the organization of a vast system for transportation, coal distribution, and foreign trade that enabled an industrial way of life in the densely populated urban centers of new residents. This is widely recognized and doesn’t need detailed backup with numbers. However, it can be illustrated by coal statistics, which have been essential for the industrial growth of Central Europe just as much as for England; the output of German coal increased from 30 million tons in 1871 to 70 million tons in 1890, 110 million tons in 1900, and 190 million tons in 1913.
Round Germany as a central support the rest of the European economic system grouped itself, and on the prosperity and enterprise of Germany the prosperity of the rest of the Continent mainly depended. The increasing pace of Germany gave her neighbors an outlet for their products, in exchange for which the enterprise of the German merchant supplied them with their chief requirements at a low price.
Germany served as the central support for the rest of the European economic system, and the prosperity of the rest of the continent largely depended on Germany's success and innovation. Germany's growing economy provided its neighbors with a market for their products, which in turn allowed the resourcefulness of German merchants to supply them with essential goods at competitive prices.
The statistics of the economic interdependence of Germany and her neighbors are overwhelming. Germany was the best customer of Russia, Norway, Holland, Belgium, Switzerland, Italy, and Austria-Hungary; she was the second best customer of Great Britain, Sweden, and Denmark; and the third best customer of France. She was the largest source of supply to Russia, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Holland, Switzerland, Italy, Austria-Hungary, Roumania, and Bulgaria; and the second largest source of supply to Great Britain, Belgium, and France.
The stats on the economic interdependence of Germany and her neighbors are striking. Germany was the top customer for Russia, Norway, the Netherlands, Belgium, Switzerland, Italy, and Austria-Hungary; she was the second biggest customer for Great Britain, Sweden, and Denmark; and the third biggest customer for France. She was the largest supplier to Russia, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Italy, Austria-Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria; and the second largest supplier to Great Britain, Belgium, and France.
In our own case we sent more exports to Germany than to any other country in the world except India, and we bought more from her than from any other country in the world except the United States.
In our situation, we exported more to Germany than to any other country in the world except India, and we bought more from Germany than from any other country in the world except the United States.
There was no European country except those west of Germany which did not do more than a quarter of their total trade with her; and in the case of Russia, Austria-Hungary, and Holland the proportion was far greater.
There was no European country, except for those west of Germany, that did less than a quarter of their total trade with her; and for Russia, Austria-Hungary, and Holland, the proportion was much higher.
Germany not only furnished these countries with trade, but, in the case of some of them, supplied a great part of the capital needed for their own development. Of Germany's pre-war foreign investments, amounting in all to about $6,250,000,000, not far short of $2,500,000,000 was invested in Russia, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, Roumania, and Turkey.[4] And by the system of "peaceful penetration" she gave these countries not only capital, but, what they needed hardly less, organization. The whole of Europe east of the Rhine thus fell into the German industrial orbit, and its economic life was adjusted accordingly.
Germany not only provided these countries with trade, but in some cases, supplied a significant portion of the capital needed for their development. Of Germany's pre-war foreign investments, totaling about $6,250,000,000, nearly $2,500,000,000 was invested in Russia, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania, and Turkey.[4] And through the system of "peaceful penetration," she offered these countries not just capital, but also the organization they desperately needed. As a result, all of Europe east of the Rhine fell into the German industrial sphere, and its economic life was adjusted accordingly.
But these internal factors would not have been sufficient to enable the population to support itself without the co-operation of external factors also and of certain general dispositions common to the whole of Europe. Many of the circumstances already treated were true of Europe as a whole, and were not peculiar to the Central Empires. But all of what follows was common to the whole European system.
But these internal factors alone wouldn’t have been enough for the population to sustain itself without the cooperation of external factors as well as certain general attitudes that were common across Europe. Many of the circumstances discussed earlier applied to Europe as a whole and weren’t unique to the Central Empires. However, everything that follows was common to the entire European system.
III. The Psychology of Society
Europe was so organized socially and economically as to secure the maximum accumulation of capital. While there was some continuous improvement in the daily conditions of life of the mass of the population, Society was so framed as to throw a great part of the increased income into the control of the class least likely to consume it. The new rich of the nineteenth century were not brought up to large expenditures, and preferred the power which investment gave them to the pleasures of immediate consumption. In fact, it was precisely the inequality of the distribution of wealth which made possible those vast accumulations of fixed wealth and of capital improvements which distinguished that age from all others. Herein lay, in fact, the main justification of the Capitalist System. If the rich had spent their new wealth on their own enjoyments, the world would long ago have found such a régime intolerable. But like bees they saved and accumulated, not less to the advantage of the whole community because they themselves held narrower ends in prospect.
Europe was organized socially and economically to maximize the accumulation of capital. While there was some ongoing improvement in the daily life of the majority of the population, society was structured in a way that allowed a significant portion of the increased income to be controlled by the class least likely to spend it. The newly wealthy of the nineteenth century were not accustomed to large spending and preferred the power that investment provided over the pleasures of immediate consumption. In fact, it was the inequality in the distribution of wealth that enabled those massive accumulations of fixed wealth and capital improvements that set that era apart from all others. This aspect was, in fact, the main justification for the Capitalist System. If the rich had spent their newfound wealth on personal enjoyment, the world would have found such a system unbearable long ago. But like bees, they saved and accumulated, benefiting the entire community even though their own goals were narrower.
The immense accumulations of fixed capital which, to the great benefit of mankind, were built up during the half century before the war, could never have come about in a Society where wealth was divided equitably. The railways of the world, which that age built as a monument to posterity, were, not less than the Pyramids of Egypt, the work of labor which was not free to consume in immediate enjoyment the full equivalent of its efforts.
The massive buildup of fixed capital that, to the great advantage of humanity, took shape in the fifty years leading up to the war, could never have happened in a society where wealth was evenly distributed. The railways that were constructed during that time as a legacy for future generations were, just like the Pyramids of Egypt, the result of labor that was not able to fully enjoy the immediate rewards of its work.
Thus this remarkable system depended for its growth on a double bluff or deception. On the one hand the laboring classes accepted from ignorance or powerlessness, or were compelled, persuaded, or cajoled by custom, convention, authority, and the well-established order of Society into accepting, a situation in which they could call their own very little of the cake that they and Nature and the capitalists were co-operating to produce. And on the other hand the capitalist classes were allowed to call the best part of the cake theirs and were theoretically free to consume it, on the tacit underlying condition that they consumed very little of it in practice. The duty of "saving" became nine-tenths of virtue and the growth of the cake the object of true religion. There grew round the non-consumption of the cake all those instincts of puritanism which in other ages has withdrawn itself from the world and has neglected the arts of production as well as those of enjoyment. And so the cake increased; but to what end was not clearly contemplated. Individuals would be exhorted not so much to abstain as to defer, and to cultivate the pleasures of security and anticipation. Saving was for old age or for your children; but this was only in theory,—the virtue of the cake was that it was never to be consumed, neither by you nor by your children after you.
Thus, this remarkable system relied on a double deception for its growth. On one hand, the working class accepted their situation due to ignorance or powerlessness, or they were compelled, persuaded, or coaxed by custom, convention, authority, and the established order of society into accepting a reality where they got very little of the benefits from the hard work they, nature, and the capitalists were producing together. On the other hand, the capitalist class was allowed to claim the best parts of the benefits as theirs and were theoretically free to consume them, under the unspoken condition that they actually consumed very little of it in practice. The duty of "saving" became nine-tenths of virtue, and the expansion of resources became the goal of true belief. Around the avoidance of consumption grew the instincts of puritanism, which in past times withdrew from the world and neglected both the arts of production and enjoyment. So, the resources increased; but the purpose wasn’t clearly defined. People were encouraged not just to abstain but to postpone, to nurture the pleasures of security and anticipation. Saving was for old age or for your children; but this was only theoretical—the true virtue of the resources was that they were never meant to be consumed, neither by you nor by your children after you.
In writing thus I do not necessarily disparage the practices of that generation. In the unconscious recesses of its being Society knew what it was about. The cake was really very small in proportion to the appetites of consumption, and no one, if it were shared all round, would be much the better off by the cutting of it. Society was working not for the small pleasures of to-day but for the future security and improvement of the race,—in fact for "progress." If only the cake were not cut but was allowed to grow in the geometrical proportion predicted by Malthus of population, but not less true of compound interest, perhaps a day might come when there would at last be enough to go round, and when posterity could enter into the enjoyment of our labors. In that day overwork, overcrowding, and underfeeding would have come to an end, and men, secure of the comforts and necessities of the body, could proceed to the nobler exercises of their faculties. One geometrical ratio might cancel another, and the nineteenth century was able to forget the fertility of the species in a contemplation of the dizzy virtues of compound interest.
In writing this, I don't mean to criticize the practices of that generation. Deep down, society understood its purpose. The resources were quite limited compared to people's desires, and if we shared everything equally, no one would really benefit from it. Society wasn't focused on the small pleasures of today but on securing a better future and improving humanity—essentially, working for "progress." If only the resources could be allowed to grow at the rate Malthus predicted for population growth, and just as true for compound interest, maybe there would come a time when there was finally enough for everyone, and future generations could enjoy the results of our efforts. In that time, overwork, overcrowding, and undernourishment would be things of the past, and people, assured of their basic comforts and needs, could move on to more elevated pursuits. One growth rate might offset another, and the nineteenth century managed to overlook the natural fertility of the species while fixating on the enticing benefits of compound interest.
There were two pitfalls in this prospect: lest, population still outstripping accumulation, our self-denials promote not happiness but numbers; and lest the cake be after all consumed, prematurely, in war, the consumer of all such hopes.
There were two risks in this situation: first, if the population continues to grow faster than we can accumulate resources, our sacrifices might lead to more people, but not to happiness; and second, if everything is consumed too soon in war, which destroys all such hopes.
But these thoughts lead too far from my present purpose. I seek only to point out that the principle of accumulation based on inequality was a vital part of the pre-war order of Society and of progress as we then understood it, and to emphasize that this principle depended on unstable psychological conditions, which it may be impossible to recreate. It was not natural for a population, of whom so few enjoyed the comforts of life, to accumulate so hugely. The war has disclosed the possibility of consumption to all and the vanity of abstinence to many. Thus the bluff is discovered; the laboring classes may be no longer willing to forego so largely, and the capitalist classes, no longer confident of the future, may seek to enjoy more fully their liberties of consumption so long as they last, and thus precipitate the hour of their confiscation.
But these thoughts take me too far away from what I’m trying to say. I just want to point out that the principle of accumulation based on inequality was a crucial part of the pre-war social order and the notion of progress as we understood it back then. I also want to stress that this principle relied on unpredictable psychological conditions, which might be impossible to recreate. It wasn’t natural for a population, where so few enjoyed the comforts of life, to accumulate so much wealth. The war has revealed the potential for consumption to everyone and shown the foolishness of restraint to many. So now the illusion is exposed; the working class may no longer be willing to sacrifice so much, and the wealthy, no longer feeling secure about the future, might decide to fully enjoy their consumption freedoms while they still can, possibly hastening the moment of their own loss.
IV. The Relation of the Old World to the New
The accumulative habits of Europe before the war were the necessary condition of the greatest of the external factors which maintained the European equipoise.
The habits that built up in Europe before the war were a key factor in maintaining balance among external influences in Europe.
Of the surplus capital goods accumulated by Europe a substantial part was exported abroad, where its investment made possible the development of the new resources of food, materials, and transport, and at the same time enabled the Old World to stake out a claim in the natural wealth and virgin potentialities of the New. This last factor came to be of the vastest importance. The Old World employed with an immense prudence the annual tribute it was thus entitled to draw. The benefit of cheap and abundant supplies resulting from the new developments which its surplus capital had made possible, was, it is true, enjoyed and not postponed. But the greater part of the money interest accruing on these foreign investments was reinvested and allowed to accumulate, as a reserve (it was then hoped) against the less happy day when the industrial labor of Europe could no longer purchase on such easy terms the produce of other continents, and when the due balance would be threatened between its historical civilizations and the multiplying races of other climates and environments. Thus the whole of the European races tended to benefit alike from the development of new resources whether they pursued their culture at home or adventured it abroad.
A large portion of the surplus capital goods built up by Europe was exported overseas, where this investment enabled the development of new food sources, materials, and transportation, while also allowing the Old World to claim a share in the natural wealth and untapped potential of the New. This last point became extremely important. The Old World carefully managed the annual benefits it was entitled to receive. It is true that the advantages of cheap and abundant supplies resulting from these new developments were enjoyed in the present, not postponed. However, most of the profits from these foreign investments were reinvested to build a reserve (which was hoped to be used) against a future time when Europe's industrial labor could no longer acquire goods from other continents on such favorable terms, and when the balance between its historical civilizations and the growing populations of other climates would be at risk. In this way, all European races tended to benefit from the development of new resources, whether they focused on their culture at home or sought it abroad.
Even before the war, however, the equilibrium thus established between old civilizations and new resources was being threatened. The prosperity of Europe was based on the facts that, owing to the large exportable surplus of foodstuffs in America, she was able to purchase food at a cheap rate measured in terms of the labor required to produce her own exports, and that, as a result of her previous investments of capital, she was entitled to a substantial amount annually without any payment in return at all. The second of these factors then seemed out of danger, but, as a result of the growth of population overseas, chiefly in the United States, the first was not so secure.
Even before the war, the balance between old civilizations and new resources was already at risk. Europe’s prosperity relied on the fact that, due to the significant surplus of food available for export from America, she could buy food at a low cost relative to the labor needed to produce her own exports. Additionally, thanks to previous investments of capital, she received a considerable annual return without any payment required in exchange. The second factor seemed safe at the time, but due to population growth overseas, mainly in the United States, the first was less secure.
When first the virgin soils of America came into bearing, the proportions of the population of those continents themselves, and consequently of their own local requirements, to those of Europe were very small. As lately as 1890 Europe had a population three times that of North and South America added together. But by 1914 the domestic requirements of the United States for wheat were approaching their production, and the date was evidently near when there would be an exportable surplus only in years of exceptionally favorable harvest. Indeed, the present domestic requirements of the United States are estimated at more than ninety per cent of the average yield of the five years 1909-1913.[5] At that time, however, the tendency towards stringency was showing itself, not so much in a lack of abundance as in a steady increase of real cost. That is to say, taking the world as a whole, there was no deficiency of wheat, but in order to call forth an adequate supply it was necessary to offer a higher real price. The most favorable factor in the situation was to be found in the extent to which Central and Western Europe was being fed from the exportable surplus of Russia and Roumania.
When the virgin soils of America began to produce, the population proportions of those continents and their local needs were very small compared to Europe. As recently as 1890, Europe had a population three times larger than that of North and South America combined. But by 1914, the domestic demand for wheat in the United States was nearly matching its production, and it was clear that soon there would only be an exportable surplus during exceptionally good harvest years. In fact, the current domestic demand in the United States is estimated to be over ninety percent of the average yield from 1909 to 1913.[5] At that time, however, the trend towards tighter supply was not due to a lack of abundance but rather a steady increase in real costs. This means that while there was no overall shortage of wheat, a higher real price was needed to draw out an adequate supply. The most encouraging aspect of the situation was the extent to which Central and Western Europe was being supported by the exportable surplus from Russia and Romania.
In short, Europe's claim on the resources of the New World was becoming precarious; the law of diminishing returns was at last reasserting itself and was making it necessary year by year for Europe to offer a greater quantity of other commodities to obtain the same amount of bread; and Europe, therefore, could by no means afford the disorganization of any of her principal sources of supply.
In short, Europe's hold on the resources of the New World was becoming shaky; the law of diminishing returns was finally coming into play, requiring Europe to provide more of other goods each year to get the same amount of bread. Therefore, Europe could not afford any disruptions to its main sources of supply.
Much else might be said in an attempt to portray the economic peculiarities of the Europe of 1914. I have selected for emphasis the three or four greatest factors of instability,—the instability of an excessive population dependent for its livelihood on a complicated and artificial organization, the psychological instability of the laboring and capitalist classes, and the instability of Europe's claim, coupled with the completeness of her dependence, on the food supplies of the New World.
Much more could be said to describe the economic oddities of Europe in 1914. I've chosen to focus on three or four key factors of instability: the precariousness of an overpopulated society relying on a complex and artificial system for survival, the psychological instability among both workers and capitalists, and Europe's tenuous claim and total dependence on food supplies from the New World.
The war had so shaken this system as to endanger the life of Europe altogether. A great part of the Continent was sick and dying; its population was greatly in excess of the numbers for which a livelihood was available; its organization was destroyed, its transport system ruptured, and its food supplies terribly impaired.
The war had so disrupted this system that it put Europe's entire existence at risk. Much of the continent was suffering and on the brink of collapse; its population far exceeded the resources available for survival; its infrastructure was in ruins, its transportation network was broken, and its food supplies were severely damaged.
It was the task of the Peace Conference to honor engagements and to satisfy justice; but not less to re-establish life and to heal wounds. These tasks were dictated as much by prudence as by the magnanimity which the wisdom of antiquity approved in victors. We will examine in the following chapters the actual character of the Peace.
It was the job of the Peace Conference to keep promises and ensure justice; but just as importantly, to bring life back to normal and heal wounds. These responsibilities were driven by both practicality and the generosity that ancient wisdom admired in those who triumphed. We will explore the true nature of the Peace in the chapters that follow.
FOOTNOTES:
[2] The net decrease of the German population at the end of 1918 by decline of births and excess of deaths as compared with the beginning of 1914, is estimated at about 2,700,000.
[2] By the end of 1918, the German population had decreased by approximately 2,700,000 due to a drop in births and a higher number of deaths compared to the beginning of 1914.
[5] Even since 1914 the population of the United States has increased by seven or eight millions. As their annual consumption of wheat per head is not less than 6 bushels, the pre-war scale of production in the United States would only show a substantial surplus over present domestic requirements in about one year out of five. We have been saved for the moment by the great harvests of 1918 and 1919, which have been called forth by Mr. Hoover's guaranteed price. But the United States can hardly be expected to continue indefinitely to raise by a substantial figure the cost of living in its own country, in order to provide wheat for a Europe which cannot pay for it.
[5]Since 1914, the population of the United States has grown by seven or eight million people. Given that their annual wheat consumption per person is at least 6 bushels, the pre-war production levels in the U.S. would only show a significant surplus over current domestic needs about one year out of five. We've been fortunate for now due to the large harvests of 1918 and 1919, which were encouraged by Mr. Hoover's guaranteed pricing. However, it's unlikely that the United States can keep raising the cost of living substantially just to supply wheat to a Europe that can't afford to pay for it.
Chapter 3
The Conference
In Chapters IV. and V. I shall study in some detail the economic and financial provisions of the Treaty of Peace with Germany. But it will be easier to appreciate the true origin of many of these terms if we examine here some of the personal factors which influenced their preparation. In attempting this task, I touch, inevitably, questions of motive, on which spectators are liable to error and are not entitled to take on themselves the responsibilities of final judgment. Yet, if I seem in this chapter to assume sometimes the liberties which are habitual to historians, but which, in spite of the greater knowledge with which we speak, we generally hesitate to assume towards contemporaries, let the reader excuse me when he remembers how greatly, if it is to understand its destiny, the world needs light, even if it is partial and uncertain, on the complex struggle of human will and purpose, not yet finished, which, concentrated in the persons of four individuals in a manner never paralleled, made them, in the first months of 1919, the microcosm of mankind.
In Chapters IV and V, I will take a closer look at the economic and financial provisions of the Treaty of Peace with Germany. However, it will be easier to understand the true origins of many of these terms if we consider some of the personal factors that influenced their development. In taking on this task, I will inevitably touch on questions of motive, which can lead to misunderstandings, and it's important to note that spectators shouldn't assume the final judgment on these matters. Still, if it seems that I sometimes take liberties that historians commonly do, despite the greater insight we might have, I hope the reader will forgive me when considering how much the world needs some level of understanding, even if it’s partial and uncertain, about the ongoing complex struggle of human will and purpose. This struggle, uniquely concentrated in four individuals in early 1919, made them a microcosm of humanity.
In those parts of the Treaty with which I am here concerned, the lead was taken by the French, in the sense that it was generally they who made in the first instance the most definite and the most extreme proposals. This was partly a matter of tactics. When the final result is expected to be a compromise, it is often prudent to start from an extreme position; and the French anticipated at the outset—like most other persons—a double process of compromise, first of all to suit the ideas of their allies and associates, and secondly in the course of the Peace Conference proper with the Germans themselves. These tactics were justified by the event. Clemenceau gained a reputation for moderation with his colleagues in Council by sometimes throwing over with an air of intellectual impartiality the more extreme proposals of his ministers; and much went through where the American and British critics were naturally a little ignorant of the true point at issue, or where too persistent criticism by France's allies put them in a position which they felt as invidious, of always appearing to take the enemy's part and to argue his case. Where, therefore, British and American interests were not seriously involved their criticism grew slack, and some provisions were thus passed which the French themselves did not take very seriously, and for which the eleventh-hour decision to allow no discussion with the Germans removed the opportunity of remedy.
In the parts of the Treaty I’m focusing on, the French took the lead, as they were usually the ones who made the most clear and extreme proposals first. This was partly a tactical move. When the final outcome is expected to be a compromise, it’s often smart to start with an extreme position; the French knew from the beginning—like most others—that there would be a two-step compromise process, first to align with the ideas of their allies and partners, and second during the actual Peace Conference with the Germans themselves. These tactics proved to be effective in the end. Clemenceau built a reputation for moderation with his colleagues by occasionally dismissing the more extreme proposals from his ministers with a look of intellectual fairness; many decisions passed where American and British critics were often a bit unaware of the real issue, or where France's allies put themselves in a tricky position by appearing to take the enemy's side and argue their case. Therefore, where British and American interests weren’t significantly at stake, their criticism lessened, and some provisions were passed that the French didn’t take very seriously, and the last-minute decision to prevent any discussion with the Germans removed any chance for adjustments.
But, apart from tactics, the French had a policy. Although Clemenceau might curtly abandon the claims of a Klotz or a Loucheur, or close his eyes with an air of fatigue when French interests were no longer involved in the discussion, he knew which points were vital, and these he abated little. In so far as the main economic lines of the Treaty represent an intellectual idea, it is the idea of France and of Clemenceau.
But, aside from tactics, the French had a plan. Even though Clemenceau might dismiss the claims of a Klotz or a Loucheur without much thought, or pretend not to notice when French interests weren't part of the conversation, he was aware of which points were crucial, and he conceded very little on those. To the extent that the main economic principles of the Treaty reflect an intellectual perspective, it is the perspective of France and Clemenceau.
Clemenceau was by far the most eminent member of the Council of Four, and he had taken the measure of his colleagues. He alone both had an idea and had considered it in all its consequences. His age, his character, his wit, and his appearance joined to give him objectivity and a, defined outline in an environment of confusion. One could not despise Clemenceau or dislike him, but only take a different view as to the nature of civilized man, or indulge, at least, a different hope.
Clemenceau was clearly the most notable member of the Council of Four, and he understood his colleagues well. He alone had a vision and had thought through all its implications. His age, personality, sense of humor, and appearance combined to give him clarity and a clear presence in a chaotic environment. It was impossible to despise or dislike Clemenceau; instead, one could only hold a different perspective on what it means to be civilized or, at the very least, entertain a different hope.
The figure and bearing of Clemenceau are universally familiar. At the Council of Four he wore a square-tailed coat of very good, thick black broadcloth, and on his hands, which were never uncovered, gray suede gloves; his boots were of thick black leather, very good, but of a country style, and sometimes fastened in front, curiously, by a buckle instead of laces. His seat in the room in the President's house, where the regular meetings of the Council of Four were held (as distinguished from their private and unattended conferences in a smaller chamber below), was on a square brocaded chair in the middle of the semicircle facing the fireplace, with Signor Orlando on his left, the President next by the fireplace, and the Prime Minister opposite on the other side of the fireplace on his right. He carried no papers and no portfolio, and was unattended by any personal secretary, though several French ministers and officials appropriate to the particular matter in hand would be present round him. His walk, his hand, and his voice were not lacking in vigor, but he bore nevertheless, especially after the attempt upon him, the aspect of a very old man conserving his strength for important occasions. He spoke seldom, leaving the initial statement of the French case to his ministers or officials; he closed his eyes often and sat back in his chair with an impassive face of parchment, his gray gloved hands clasped in front of him. A short sentence, decisive or cynical, was generally sufficient, a question, an unqualified abandonment of his ministers, whose face would not be saved, or a display of obstinacy reinforced by a few words in a piquantly delivered English.[6] But speech and passion were not lacking when they were wanted, and the sudden outburst of words, often followed by a fit of deep coughing from the chest, produced their impression rather by force and surprise than by persuasion.
The figure and demeanor of Clemenceau are well-known. At the Council of Four, he wore a long black coat made of thick broadcloth and gray suede gloves that he never took off. His boots were sturdy black leather, stylish but country-like, sometimes fastened with a buckle instead of laces. In the President's house, where the regular meetings of the Council of Four took place (unlike their private meetings in a smaller chamber below), he sat in a brocaded chair in the center of a semicircle facing the fireplace, with Signor Orlando on his left, the President next to the fireplace, and the Prime Minister seated opposite him on the other side of the fireplace. He carried no papers or briefcase and didn't have a personal secretary, although several French ministers and officials relevant to the matter would be present around him. His walk, gestures, and voice were strong, but he also had the appearance of an elderly man conserving his energy for important moments, especially after the attack on him. He spoke infrequently, typically leaving the initial presentation of the French position to his ministers or officials. He often closed his eyes and leaned back in his chair with an expressionless face, his gray gloved hands clasped in front of him. A brief, decisive, or cynical remark was usually enough—a question or a complete dismissal of his ministers, whose reputation would not be saved, or a show of stubbornness backed by a few words delivered in an accentuated English. But when needed, he could speak passionately, and sudden bursts of speech, often followed by a bout of coughing, left a stronger impression through their intensity and surprise rather than persuasion.
Not infrequently Mr. Lloyd George, after delivering a speech in English, would, during the period of its interpretation into French, cross the hearthrug to the President to reinforce his case by some ad hominem argument in private conversation, or to sound the ground for a compromise,—and this would sometimes be the signal for a general upheaval and disorder. The President's advisers would press round him, a moment later the British experts would dribble across to learn the result or see that all was well, and next the French would be there, a little suspicious lest the others were arranging something behind them, until all the room were on their feet and conversation was general in both languages. My last and most vivid impression is of such a scene—the President and the Prime Minister as the center of a surging mob and a babel of sound, a welter of eager, impromptu compromises and counter-compromises, all sound and fury signifying nothing, on what was an unreal question anyhow, the great issues of the morning's meeting forgotten and neglected; and Clemenceau silent and aloof on the outskirts—for nothing which touched the security of France was forward—throned, in his gray gloves, on the brocade chair, dry in soul and empty of hope, very old and tired, but surveying the scene with a cynical and almost impish air; and when at last silence was restored and the company had returned to their places, it was to discover that he had disappeared.
Not infrequently, after delivering a speech in English, Mr. Lloyd George would, while it was being interpreted into French, cross the hearthrug to the President to bolster his case with some private conversation or to gauge the possibility of a compromise—and this would sometimes trigger a general upheaval and chaos. The President's advisers would crowd around him, moments later the British experts would trickle over to find out the outcome or make sure everything was fine, and soon the French would join, a bit suspicious that the others were making arrangements without them, until the entire room was on their feet and conversations flowed in both languages. My last and most vivid memory is of such a scene—the President and the Prime Minister at the center of a bustling crowd and a mixture of voices, a jumble of eager, spontaneous compromises and counter-compromises, all sound and fury meaning nothing, about what was ultimately an irrelevant question, the significant issues of the morning meeting forgotten and ignored; and Clemenceau, silent and detached on the sidelines—because nothing relating to France's security was being discussed—seated, in his gray gloves, on the brocade chair, dry in spirit and devoid of hope, very old and weary, but observing the chaos with a cynical and almost mischievous expression; and when silence finally returned and everyone settled back into their seats, it was to find that he had vanished.
He felt about France what Pericles felt of Athens—unique value in her, nothing else mattering; but his theory of politics was Bismarck's. He had one illusion—France; and one disillusion—mankind, including Frenchmen, and his colleagues not least. His principles for the peace can be expressed simply. In the first place, he was a foremost believer in the view of German psychology that the German understands and can understand nothing but intimidation, that he is without generosity or remorse in negotiation, that there is no advantage he will not take of you, and no extent to which he will not demean himself for profit, that he is without honor, pride, or mercy. Therefore you must never negotiate with a German or conciliate him; you must dictate to him. On no other terms will he respect you, or will you prevent him from cheating you. But it is doubtful how far he thought these characteristics peculiar to Germany, or whether his candid view of some other nations was fundamentally different. His philosophy had, therefore, no place for "sentimentality" in international relations. Nations are real things, of whom you love one and feel for the rest indifference—or hatred. The glory of the nation you love is a desirable end,—but generally to be obtained at your neighbor's expense. The politics of power are inevitable, and there is nothing very new to learn about this war or the end it was fought for; England had destroyed, as in each preceding century, a trade rival; a mighty chapter had been closed in the secular struggle between the glories of Germany and of France. Prudence required some measure of lip service to the "ideals" of foolish Americans and hypocritical Englishmen; but it would be stupid to believe that there is much room in the world, as it really is, for such affairs as the League of Nations, or any sense in the principle of self-determination except as an ingenious formula for rearranging the balance of power in one's own interests.
He felt about France the way Pericles felt about Athens—she had unique value, and nothing else mattered; but his political views were those of Bismarck. He held one illusion—France; and one disillusion—mankind, including the French and, especially, his colleagues. His principles for peace can be summed up simply. First, he was a strong believer in the German perspective that Germans understand and respond only to intimidation, that they lack generosity or remorse in negotiations, that they will take any advantage they can get from you, and that they will degrade themselves for profit, being without honor, pride, or mercy. Therefore, you must never negotiate with a German or try to appease him; you must dictate terms to him. Otherwise, he won’t respect you or prevent himself from deceiving you. However, it’s unclear how much he thought these traits were unique to Germany, or if his honest view of other nations was fundamentally different. His philosophy offered no room for "sentimentality" in international relations. Nations are real entities, and you may love one while feeling indifference—or hatred—toward the others. The glory of the nation you love is a worthwhile goal, but it's usually achieved at the expense of your neighbors. The politics of power are unavoidable, and there’s nothing new to understand about this war or the reasons it was fought; England, as it has every century before, eliminated a trade rival; a significant chapter closed in the ongoing struggle between the glories of Germany and France. Caution required some minimal acknowledgment of the "ideals" of foolish Americans and hypocritical Englishmen; but it would be naïve to think that there’s much space in the world, as it truly is, for something like the League of Nations, or that self-determination makes sense beyond being a clever strategy for rearranging the balance of power to one's own advantage.
These, however, are generalities. In tracing the practical details of the Peace which he thought necessary for the power and the security of France, we must go back to the historical causes which had operated during his lifetime. Before the Franco-German war the populations of France and Germany were approximately equal; but the coal and iron and shipping of Germany were in their infancy, and the wealth of France was greatly superior. Even after the loss of Alsace-Lorraine there was no great discrepancy between the real resources of the two countries. But in the intervening period the relative position had changed completely. By 1914 the population of Germany was nearly seventy per cent in excess of that of France; she had become one of the first manufacturing and trading nations of the world; her technical skill and her means for the production of future wealth were unequaled. France on the other hand had a stationary or declining population, and, relatively to others, had fallen seriously behind in wealth and in the power to produce it.
These, however, are generalizations. To understand the practical details of the Peace he believed were necessary for France's power and security, we need to look back at the historical factors that influenced his lifetime. Before the Franco-German War, the populations of France and Germany were roughly equal; however, Germany's coal, iron, and shipping industries were just starting to develop, while France was significantly wealthier. Even after losing Alsace-Lorraine, the actual resources of both countries were still fairly comparable. But over the years, their relative positions changed dramatically. By 1914, Germany's population was almost seventy percent larger than France's; it had become one of the leading manufacturing and trading nations in the world, with unmatched technical skills and resources for generating future wealth. In contrast, France had a stagnant or declining population and, compared to others, had fallen far behind in wealth and production capacity.
In spite, therefore, of France's victorious issue from the present struggle (with the aid, this time, of England and America), her future position remained precarious in the eyes of one who took the view that European civil war is to be regarded as a normal, or at least a recurrent, state of affairs for the future, and that the sort of conflicts between organized great powers which have occupied the past hundred years will also engage the next. According to this vision of the future, European history is to be a perpetual prize-fight, of which France has won this round, but of which this round is certainly not the last. From the belief that essentially the old order does not change, being based on human nature which is always the same, and from a consequent skepticism of all that class of doctrine which the League of Nations stands for, the policy of France and of Clemenceau followed logically. For a Peace of magnanimity or of fair and equal treatment, based on such "ideology" as the Fourteen Points of the President, could only have the effect of shortening the interval of Germany's recovery and hastening the day when she will once again hurl at France her greater numbers and her superior resources and technical skill. Hence the necessity of "guarantees"; and each guarantee that was taken, by increasing irritation and thus the probability of a subsequent Revanche by Germany, made necessary yet further provisions to crush. Thus, as soon as this view of the world is adopted and the other discarded, a demand for a Carthaginian Peace is inevitable, to the full extent of the momentary power to impose it. For Clemenceau made no pretense of considering himself bound by the Fourteen Points and left chiefly to others such concoctions as were necessary from time to time to save the scruples or the face of the President.
Despite France's victory in the current struggle (with help this time from England and America), her future position still seemed unstable to anyone who believed that European civil war would be a normal, or at least a common, situation going forward, and that the conflicts between major powers that have defined the last hundred years will continue into the next. In this vision of the future, European history looks like a never-ending battle, where France has won this round, but this victory is certainly not the last. From the belief that fundamentally the old order remains unchanged, being rooted in human nature that stays constant, and from a resulting skepticism toward the ideals represented by the League of Nations, France's and Clemenceau’s policies followed a clear logic. A Peace based on generosity or fair and equal treatment, driven by ideologies like the President’s Fourteen Points, could only serve to shorten the time it takes for Germany to recover and hasten the day when it would once again attack France with its larger numbers and superior resources and expertise. Therefore, "guarantees" became essential; each guarantee created further irritation and increased the chances of a future German retaliation, making further measures to subdue Germany necessary. So, once this worldview is accepted and the alternative is rejected, the demand for a Carthaginian Peace becomes unavoidable, to the fullest extent of the current power to enforce it. Clemenceau did not pretend to be bound by the Fourteen Points and primarily left it to others to create the necessary arrangements from time to time to appease the President’s scruples or public image.
So far as possible, therefore, it was the policy of France to set the clock back and to undo what, since 1870, the progress of Germany had accomplished. By loss of territory and other measures her population was to be curtailed; but chiefly the economic system, upon which she depended for her new strength, the vast fabric built upon iron, coal, and transport must be destroyed. If France could seize, even in part, what Germany was compelled to drop, the inequality of strength between the two rivals for European hegemony might be remedied for many generations.
As much as possible, France aimed to turn back the clock and reverse what Germany had achieved since 1870. By losing territory and implementing other measures, France intended to reduce Germany’s population; however, the main goal was to dismantle the economic system that had become the foundation of Germany’s new power—the extensive network built on iron, coal, and transportation. If France could capture even a portion of what Germany was forced to let go, it could balance the power between the two competitors vying for dominance in Europe for many generations.
Hence sprang those cumulative provisions for the destruction of highly organized economic life which we shall examine in the next chapter.
Hence arose those collective measures for the destruction of highly organized economic life that we will explore in the next chapter.
This is the policy of an old man, whose most vivid impressions and most lively imagination are of the past and not of the future. He sees the issue in terms, of France and Germany not of humanity and of European civilization struggling forwards to a new order. The war has bitten into his consciousness somewhat differently from ours, and he neither expects nor hopes that we are at the threshold of a new age.
This is the mindset of an old man whose strongest memories and most vivid imagination are focused on the past rather than the future. He views the situation in terms of France and Germany, not humanity and European civilization moving toward a new order. The war has affected his awareness in a way that's different from ours, and he neither expects nor hopes that we are on the brink of a new age.
It happens, however, that it is not only an ideal question that is at issue. My purpose in this book is to show that the Carthaginian Peace is not practically right or possible. Although the school of thought from which it springs is aware of the economic factor, it overlooks, nevertheless, the deeper economic tendencies which are to govern the future. The clock cannot be set back. You cannot restore Central Europe to 1870 without setting up such strains in the European structure and letting loose such human and spiritual forces as, pushing beyond frontiers and races, will overwhelm not only you and your "guarantees," but your institutions, and the existing order of your Society.
It turns out that this isn't just an ideal question at stake. The goal of this book is to demonstrate that the Carthaginian Peace is neither practically correct nor achievable. While the school of thought it comes from acknowledges the economic factor, it still misses the deeper economic trends that will shape the future. The clock can't be turned back. You can't revert Central Europe to 1870 without causing significant strains in the European structure and unleashing such human and spiritual forces that, transcending borders and nationalities, will not only overwhelm you and your "guarantees," but also your institutions and the current order of your society.
By what legerdemain was this policy substituted for the Fourteen Points, and how did the President come to accept it? The answer to these questions is difficult and depends on elements of character and psychology and on the subtle influence of surroundings, which are hard to detect and harder still to describe. But, if ever the action of a single individual matters, the collapse of The President has been one of the decisive moral events of history; and I must make an attempt to explain it. What a place the President held in the hearts and hopes of the world when he sailed to us in the George Washington! What a great man came to Europe in those early days of our victory!
By what trickery was this policy put in place of the Fourteen Points, and how did the President come to accept it? The answer to these questions is complicated and hinges on aspects of character and psychology along with subtle influences from the environment that are hard to pinpoint and even harder to articulate. But if there was ever a moment when an individual’s actions really mattered, the downfall of the President stands out as one of the significant moral turning points in history; and I have to try to explain it. What a position the President held in the hearts and hopes of the world when he arrived on the George Washington! What a remarkable man came to Europe in those early days of our victory!
In November, 1918, the armies of Foch and the words of Wilson had brought us sudden escape from what was swallowing up all we cared for. The conditions seemed favorable beyond any expectation. The victory was so complete that fear need play no part in the settlement. The enemy had laid down his arms in reliance on a solemn compact as to the general character of the Peace, the terms of which seemed to assure a settlement of justice and magnanimity and a fair hope for a restoration of the broken current of life. To make assurance certain the President was coming himself to set the seal on his work.
In November 1918, the forces of Foch and Wilson's words offered us a sudden escape from everything that was consuming what we valued. The situation seemed better than we could have anticipated. The victory was so thorough that fear didn't need to factor into the settlement. The enemy had surrendered, trusting in a serious agreement regarding the overall nature of the Peace, which appeared to guarantee justice, generosity, and a realistic chance to restore the disrupted flow of life. To ensure everything was finalized, the President was coming in person to put his stamp on the outcome.
When President Wilson left Washington he enjoyed a prestige and a moral influence throughout the world unequaled in history. His bold and measured words carried to the peoples of Europe above and beyond the voices of their own politicians. The enemy peoples trusted him to carry out the compact he had made with them; and the Allied peoples acknowledged him not as a victor only but almost as a prophet. In addition to this moral influence the realities of power were in his hands. The American armies were at the height of their numbers, discipline, and equipment. Europe was in complete dependence on the food supplies of the United States; and financially she was even more absolutely at their mercy. Europe not only already owed the United States more than she could pay; but only a large measure of further assistance could save her from starvation and bankruptcy. Never had a philosopher held such weapons wherewith to bind the princes of this world. How the crowds of the European capitals pressed about the carriage of the President! With what curiosity, anxiety, and hope we sought a glimpse of the features and bearing of the man of destiny who, coming from the West, was to bring healing to the wounds of the ancient parent of his civilization and lay for us the foundations of the future.
When President Wilson left Washington, he held a level of prestige and moral influence around the world that was unmatched in history. His bold and measured words resonated with the people of Europe, drowning out their own politicians. The enemy nations trusted him to honor the agreements he had made with them, and the Allied nations viewed him not just as a victor but almost as a prophet. Along with this moral authority, he also wielded significant power. The American military was at its peak in terms of numbers, discipline, and equipment. Europe was completely reliant on food supplies from the United States, and financially, it was even more dependent. Europe not only owed the U.S. more than it could repay, but it also needed substantial additional assistance to avoid starvation and bankruptcy. Never before had a philosopher possessed such powerful tools to influence the rulers of this world. Crowds in European capitals surrounded the President’s carriage! With what curiosity, anxiety, and hope we sought to catch a glimpse of the features and demeanor of the man of destiny who, coming from the West, was to heal the wounds of the ancient origin of his civilization and lay the groundwork for our future.
The disillusion was so complete, that some of those who had trusted most hardly dared speak of it. Could it be true? they asked of those who returned from Paris. Was the Treaty really as bad as it seemed? What had happened to the President? What weakness or what misfortune had led to so extraordinary, so unlooked-for a betrayal?
The disappointment was so intense that some of those who had trusted the most hardly felt they could talk about it. Could it really be true? they asked those who came back from Paris. Was the Treaty really as terrible as it looked? What happened to the President? What weakness or misfortune led to such an extraordinary, unexpected betrayal?
Yet the causes were very ordinary and human. The President was not a hero or a prophet; he was not even a philosopher; but a generously intentioned man, with many of the weaknesses of other human beings, and lacking that dominating intellectual equipment which would have been necessary to cope with the subtle and dangerous spellbinders whom a tremendous clash of forces and personalities had brought to the top as triumphant masters in the swift game of give and take, face to face in Council,—a game of which he had no experience at all.
Yet the reasons were quite ordinary and human. The President wasn't a hero or a prophet; he wasn't even a philosopher; he was just a well-meaning man, with many of the flaws that others have, and missing the strong intellectual tools that would have been needed to deal with the clever and dangerous manipulators that a massive clash of forces and personalities had elevated to the top as successful players in the fast-paced game of negotiation, face to face in Council—a game he had no experience with at all.
We had indeed quite a wrong idea of the President. We knew him to be solitary and aloof, and believed him very strong-willed and obstinate. We did not figure him as a man of detail, but the clearness with which he had taken hold of certain main ideas would, we thought, in combination with his tenacity, enable him to sweep through cobwebs. Besides these qualities he would have the objectivity, the cultivation, and the wide knowledge of the student. The great distinction of language which had marked his famous Notes seemed to indicate a man of lofty and powerful imagination. His portraits indicated a fine presence and a commanding delivery. With all this he had attained and held with increasing authority the first position in a country where the arts of the politician are not neglected. All of which, without expecting the impossible, seemed a fine combination of qualities for the matter in hand.
We really had a completely wrong impression of the President. We saw him as solitary and distant, and thought he was very strong-willed and stubborn. We didn’t see him as a detail-oriented person, but we believed that his clarity on certain key issues, combined with his determination, would help him navigate any obstacles. In addition to these traits, he would have the objectivity, refinement, and broad knowledge of a scholar. The remarkable quality of language in his famous Notes suggested a man with a rich and powerful imagination. His portraits showed a commanding presence and strong delivery. With all of this, he had achieved and maintained an increasing level of authority in a country where political skills are not overlooked. Without expecting the impossible, this combination of qualities seemed well-suited for the task at hand.
The first impression of Mr. Wilson at close quarters was to impair some but not all of these illusions. His head and features were finely cut and exactly like his photographs, and the muscles of his neck and the carriage of his head were distinguished. But, like Odysseus, the President looked wiser when he was seated; and his hands, though capable and fairly strong, were wanting in sensitiveness and finesse. The first glance at the President suggested not only that, whatever else he might be, his temperament was not primarily that of the student or the scholar, but that he had not much even of that culture of the world which marks M. Clemenceau and Mr. Balfour as exquisitely cultivated gentlemen of their class and generation. But more serious than this, he was not only insensitive to his surroundings in the external sense, he was not sensitive to his environment at all. What chance could such a man have against Mr. Lloyd George's unerring, almost medium-like, sensibility to every one immediately round him? To see the British Prime Minister watching the company, with six or seven senses not available to ordinary men, judging character, motive, and subconscious impulse, perceiving what each was thinking and even what each was going to say next, and compounding with telepathic instinct the argument or appeal best suited to the vanity, weakness, or self-interest of his immediate auditor, was to realize that the poor President would be playing blind man's buff in that party. Never could a man have stepped into the parlor a more perfect and predestined victim to the finished accomplishments of the Prime Minister. The Old World was tough in wickedness anyhow; the Old World's heart of stone might blunt the sharpest blade of the bravest knight-errant. But this blind and deaf Don Quixote was entering a cavern where the swift and glittering blade was in the hands of the adversary.
The first impression of Mr. Wilson up close was to challenge some but not all of these ideas. His head and features were well-defined and exactly like his photos, and the muscles in his neck and the way he held his head were notable. However, like Odysseus, the President appeared wiser when seated; his hands, while capable and fairly strong, lacked sensitivity and finesse. At first glance, it was clear that, whatever else he might be, his temperament was not primarily that of a student or scholar, and he didn’t possess much of the worldly sophistication that defined M. Clemenceau and Mr. Balfour as remarkably cultured gentlemen of their time. More concerning was that he wasn’t just unaware of his surroundings in a typical way; he was completely oblivious to his environment. What chance did a man like that have against Mr. Lloyd George's sharp, almost psychic awareness of everyone around him? Watching the British Prime Minister observe the crowd, with six or seven senses that ordinary people lacked, assessing character, motives, and subconscious impulses, perceiving what each person was thinking and even what they were about to say, and deftly tailoring his arguments or appeals to the vanity, weakness, or self-interest of his immediate audience, made it clear that the poor President would be playing a losing game at that gathering. Never had a man entered a room more perfectly suited to be a victim of the Prime Minister's polished skills. The Old World was tough in its wickedness; its heart of stone could blunt the sharpest sword of the bravest knight-errant. But this blind and deaf Don Quixote was stepping into a space where the swift and gleaming sword was wielded by his opponent.
But if the President was not the philosopher-king, what was he? After all he was a man who had spent much of his life at a University. He was by no means a business man or an ordinary party politician, but a man of force, personality, and importance. What, then, was his temperament?
But if the President wasn't the philosopher-king, what was he? After all, he was someone who had spent a lot of his life at a university. He wasn't a businessman or just your average party politician, but a person of strength, character, and significance. So, then, what was his temperament?
The clue once found was illuminating. The President was like a Nonconformist minister, perhaps a Presbyterian. His thought and his temperament wore essentially theological not intellectual, with all the strength and the weakness of that manner of thought, feeling, and expression. It is a type of which there are not now in England and Scotland such magnificent specimens as formerly; but this description, nevertheless, will give the ordinary Englishman the distinctest impression of the President.
The clue, once discovered, was enlightening. The President resembled a Nonconformist minister, maybe a Presbyterian. His mindset and temperament were primarily theological rather than intellectual, embodying both the strengths and weaknesses of that way of thinking, feeling, and expressing himself. This type no longer exists in England and Scotland with the same grandeur as before; however, this description will still provide the typical English person with a clear impression of the President.
With this picture of him in mind, we can return to the actual course of events. The President's program for the World, as set forth in his speeches and his Notes, had displayed a spirit and a purpose so admirable that the last desire of his sympathizers was to criticize details,—the details, they felt, were quite rightly not filled in at present, but would be in due course. It was commonly believed at the commencement of the Paris Conference that the President had thought out, with the aid of a large body of advisers, a comprehensive scheme not only for the League of Nations, but for the embodiment of the Fourteen Points in an actual Treaty of Peace. But in fact the President had thought out nothing; when it came to practice his ideas were nebulous and incomplete. He had no plan, no scheme, no constructive ideas whatever for clothing with the flesh of life the commandments which he had thundered from the White House. He could have preached a sermon on any of them or have addressed a stately prayer to the Almighty for their fulfilment; but he could not frame their concrete application to the actual state of Europe.
With this image of him in mind, we can return to what actually happened. The President's vision for the world, as presented in his speeches and notes, showed an admirable spirit and purpose, so his supporters were less inclined to criticize the details—those details, they believed, were understandably not fleshed out yet but would be in time. At the start of the Paris Conference, it was widely thought that the President, with the help of many advisors, had developed a comprehensive plan not only for the League of Nations but also for incorporating the Fourteen Points into a real Treaty of Peace. However, in reality, the President hadn't worked out anything; when it came to action, his ideas were vague and incomplete. He had no plan, no scheme, no constructive ideas at all for bringing to life the principles he had proclaimed from the White House. He could have delivered a sermon on any of them or offered a formal prayer to the Almighty for their realization; but he couldn't outline how they would be practically applied to Europe's current situation.
He not only had no proposals in detail, but he was in many respects, perhaps inevitably, ill-informed as to European conditions. And not only was he ill-informed—that was true of Mr. Lloyd George also—but his mind was slow and unadaptable. The President's slowness amongst the Europeans was noteworthy. He could not, all in a minute, take in what the rest were saying, size up the situation with a glance, frame a reply, and meet the case by a slight change of ground; and he was liable, therefore, to defeat by the mere swiftness, apprehension, and agility of a Lloyd George. There can seldom have been a statesman of the first rank more incompetent than the President in the agilities of the council chamber. A moment often arrives when substantial victory is yours if by some slight appearance of a concession you can save the face of the opposition or conciliate them by a restatement of your proposal helpful to them and not injurious to anything essential to yourself. The President was not equipped with this simple and usual artfulness. His mind was too slow and unresourceful to be ready with any alternatives. The President was capable of digging his toes in and refusing to budge, as he did over Fiume. But he had no other mode of defense, and it needed as a rule but little manoeuvering by his opponents to prevent matters from coming to such a head until it was too late. By pleasantness and an appearance of conciliation, the President would be manoeuvered off his ground, would miss the moment for digging his toes in, and, before he knew where he had been got to, it was too late. Besides, it is impossible month after month in intimate and ostensibly friendly converse between close associates, to be digging the toes in all the time. Victory would only have been possible to one who had always a sufficiently lively apprehension of the position as a whole to reserve his fire and know for certain the rare exact moments for decisive action. And for that the President was far too slow-minded and bewildered.
He not only lacked detailed proposals, but he was, in many ways—perhaps inevitably—poorly informed about European situations. And it wasn’t just him; Mr. Lloyd George was also not well-informed. However, the President’s thinking was slow and inflexible. His slowness in dealing with Europeans stood out. He couldn’t quickly grasp what everyone else was saying, assess the situation at a glance, come up with a response, and adapt slightly to meet the challenges. This left him vulnerable to being outmatched by someone as quick and aware as Lloyd George. It’s rare to find a top statesman as inept as the President when it came to the quick maneuvers of the council chamber. There often comes a moment when you can achieve significant victory simply by making a small concession to save the opposing side's face or by reframing your proposal in a way that helps them without compromising anything essential for you. The President simply didn’t have this basic skill. His mind was too slow and uninspired to come up with any alternatives. He was capable of stubbornly digging in his heels and refusing to move, as he did with Fiume, but that was his only defense. Typically, it took just a bit of maneuvering by his opponents to delay matters until it was too late. Through charm and a show of conciliation, the President would be pushed away from his position, missing his chance to stand firm, and before he realized what had happened, it was too late. Additionally, it's tough to be stubborn all the time during close and seemingly friendly discussions. Victory would only have been achievable for someone who had a sharp awareness of the overall situation, allowing them to hold back their responses and know precisely when to act decisively. The President was far too slow and confused for that.
He did not remedy these defects by seeking aid from the collective wisdom of his lieutenants. He had gathered round him for the economic chapters of the Treaty a very able group of business men; but they were inexperienced in public affairs, and knew (with one or two exceptions) as little of Europe as he did, and they were only called in irregularly as he might need them for a particular purpose. Thus the aloofness which had been found effective in Washington was maintained, and the abnormal reserve of his nature did not allow near him any one who aspired to moral equality or the continuous exercise of influence. His fellow-plenipotentiaries were dummies; and even the trusted Colonel House, with vastly more knowledge of men and of Europe than the President, from whose sensitiveness the President's dullness had gained so much, fell into the background as time went on. All this was encouraged by his colleagues on the Council of Four, who, by the break-up of the Council of Ten, completed the isolation which the President's own temperament had initiated. Thus day after day and week after week, he allowed himself to be closeted, unsupported, unadvised, and alone, with men much sharper than himself, in situations of supreme difficulty, where he needed for success every description of resource, fertility, and knowledge. He allowed himself to be drugged by their atmosphere, to discuss on the basis of their plans and of their data, and to be led along their paths.
He didn't fix these issues by getting help from the collective wisdom of his advisors. He had gathered a highly skilled group of business people for the economic sections of the Treaty, but they were inexperienced in public matters and, except for a couple of them, knew as little about Europe as he did. They were only brought in occasionally when he needed them for something specific. So, the distance that had worked well in Washington was kept up, and his natural reserve didn’t let anyone get close to him who wanted equal footing or a chance to influence him regularly. His fellow negotiators were like puppets; even the trusted Colonel House, who had much more knowledge of people and Europe than the President, who benefited from the President's own dullness, faded into the background over time. All of this was encouraged by his colleagues on the Council of Four, who, by breaking up the Council of Ten, added to the isolation that the President's personality had started. So, day after day and week after week, he let himself be locked away, unsupported, without advice, and alone, with men far sharper than he was, in extremely challenging situations where he needed every type of resource, creativity, and knowledge to succeed. He let himself be influenced by their environment, discussing things based on their plans and data, and following their lead.
These and other various causes combined to produce the following situation. The reader must remember that the processes which are here compressed into a few pages took place slowly, gradually, insidiously, over a period of about five months.
These and other different factors came together to create the following situation. The reader should keep in mind that the events covered in just a few pages unfolded slowly, gradually, and subtly, over a period of about five months.
As the President had thought nothing out, the Council was generally working on the basis of a French or British draft. He had to take up, therefore, a persistent attitude of obstruction, criticism, and negation, if the draft was to become at all in line with his own ideas and purpose. If he was met on some points with apparent generosity (for there was always a safe margin of quite preposterous suggestions which no one took seriously), it was difficult for him not to yield on others. Compromise was inevitable, and never to compromise on the essential, very difficult. Besides, he was soon made to appear to be taking the German part and laid himself open to the suggestion (to which he was foolishly and unfortunately sensitive) of being "pro-German."
As the President hadn’t figured anything out, the Council was mainly working off a French or British draft. He had to take a consistent stance of blocking, criticizing, and rejecting things if the draft was ever going to align with his own ideas and goals. When he encountered some apparently generous offers (since there were always plenty of ridiculous suggestions that no one took seriously), it was hard for him not to give in on other issues. Compromise was unavoidable, and it was very challenging to avoid compromising on the essentials. Plus, he soon found himself being seen as siding with the Germans and became vulnerable to the accusation (which he was foolishly and unfortunately sensitive to) of being "pro-German."
After a display of much principle and dignity in the early days of the Council of Ten, he discovered that there were certain very important points in the program of his French, British, or Italian colleague, as the case might be, of which he was incapable of securing the surrender by the methods of secret diplomacy. What then was he to do in the last resort? He could let the Conference drag on an endless length by the exercise of sheer obstinacy. He could break it up and return to America in a rage with nothing settled. Or he could attempt an appeal to the world over the heads of the Conference. These were wretched alternatives, against each of which a great deal could be said. They were also very risky,—especially for a politician. The President's mistaken policy over the Congressional election had weakened his personal position in his own country, and it was by no means certain that the American public would support him in a position of intransigeancy. It would mean a campaign in which the issues would be clouded by every sort of personal and party consideration, and who could say if right would triumph in a struggle which would certainly not be decided on its merits? Besides, any open rupture with his colleagues would certainly bring upon his head the blind passions of "anti-German" resentment with which the public of all allied countries were still inspired. They would not listen to his arguments. They would not be cool enough to treat the issue as one of international morality or of the right governance of Europe. The cry would simply be that, for various sinister and selfish reasons, the President wished "to let the Hun off." The almost unanimous voice of the French and British Press could be anticipated. Thus, if he threw down the gage publicly he might be defeated. And if he were defeated, would not the final Peace be far worse than if he were to retain his prestige and endeavor to make it as good as the limiting conditions of European politics would allow, him? But above all, if he were defeated, would he not lose the League of Nations? And was not this, after all, by far the most important issue for the future happiness of the world? The Treaty would be altered and softened by time. Much in it which now seemed so vital would become trifling, and much which was impracticable would for that very reason never happen. But the League, even in an imperfect form, was permanent; it was the first commencement of a new principle in the government of the world; Truth and Justice in international relations could not be established in a few months,—they must be born in due course by the slow gestation of the League. Clemenceau had been clever enough to let it be seen that he would swallow the League at a price.
After showing a lot of principle and dignity in the early days of the Council of Ten, he realized there were some really important aspects of his French, British, or Italian colleague's agenda that he couldn't get them to agree to through secret diplomacy. So what were his options? He could let the Conference drag on forever out of sheer stubbornness. He could break it off and head back to America in anger with nothing resolved. Or he could try to reach out to the world, bypassing the Conference entirely. None of these options were ideal, and there were solid arguments against each one. They were risky, especially for a politician. The President's poor choices during the Congressional election had weakened his standing in his own country, and it wasn't guaranteed that the American public would back him if he took a hardline stance. It would turn into a campaign where the issues would get lost in personal and party politics, and who could say if what was right would actually win in a situation that wouldn’t be judged fairly? Plus, any public fallout with his colleagues would definitely unleash the blind anger of “anti-German” feelings that the public in all allied nations still had. They wouldn’t be open to his arguments. They wouldn’t be calm enough to view the issue as one of international morality or good governance in Europe. The reaction would simply be that, for various shady and self-serving reasons, the President wanted "to let the Hun off." He could expect almost unanimous backlash from the French and British Press. So, if he publicly challenged them, he could end up losing. And if he lost, wouldn’t the final Peace be much worse than if he kept his reputation intact and tried to negotiate within the limits of European politics? But most importantly, if he lost, would he not also lose the League of Nations? And wasn’t that, after all, the most crucial issue for the future happiness of the world? The Treaty would change and soften over time. Many things that seemed vital now would turn insignificant, and many impractical things would never happen for that reason. But the League, even in an imperfect form, was here to stay; it was the beginning of a new principle in world governance; Truth and Justice in international relations couldn’t be established overnight—they needed to be nurtured over time through the League. Clemenceau had been smart enough to make it clear that he would support the League if the price was right.
At the crisis of his fortunes the President was a lonely man. Caught up in the toils of the Old World, he stood in great need of sympathy, of moral support, of the enthusiasm of masses. But buried in the Conference, stifled in the hot and poisoned atmosphere of Paris, no echo reached him from the outer world, and no throb of passion, sympathy, or encouragement from his silent constituents in all countries. He felt that the blaze of popularity which had greeted his arrival in Europe was already dimmed; the Paris Press jeered at him openly; his political opponents at home were taking advantage of his absence to create an atmosphere against him; England was cold, critical, and unresponsive. He had so formed his entourage that he did not receive through private channels the current of faith and enthusiasm of which the public sources seemed dammed up. He needed, but lacked, the added strength of collective faith. The German terror still overhung us, and even the sympathetic public was very cautious; the enemy must not be encouraged, our friends must be supported, this was not the time for discord or agitations, the President must be trusted to do his best. And in this drought the flower of the President's faith withered and dried up.
At the height of his troubles, the President was a lonely man. Trapped in the struggles of the Old World, he desperately needed sympathy, moral support, and the enthusiasm of the masses. But stuck in the Conference, suffocated by the hot and toxic atmosphere of Paris, he got no feedback from the outside world, and felt no pulse of passion, sympathy, or encouragement from his silent supporters everywhere. He sensed that the wave of popularity that had welcomed him to Europe was starting to fade; the Paris Press openly mocked him; his political opponents back home were using his absence to stir up negativity against him; England was distant, critical, and unresponsive. He had structured his entourage in such a way that he wasn’t receiving the faith and enthusiasm from private channels that public sources seemed to be withholding. He needed, but was missing, the extra strength of collective belief. The German threat still loomed over us, and even the sympathetic public was very cautious; the enemy should not be encouraged, our friends had to be supported, and this wasn’t the right time for discord or agitation—people had to trust the President to do his best. And in this drought, the flower of the President's faith withered and dried up.
Thus it came to pass that the President countermanded the George Washington, which, in a moment of well-founded rage, he had ordered to be in readiness to carry him from the treacherous halls of Paris back to the seat of his authority, where he could have felt himself again. But as soon, alas, as he had taken the road of compromise, the defects, already indicated, of his temperament and of his equipment, were fatally apparent. He could take the high line; he could practise obstinacy; he could write Notes from Sinai or Olympus; he could remain unapproachable in the White House or even in the Council of Ten and be safe. But if he once stepped down to the intimate equality of the Four, the game was evidently up.
So it happened that the President canceled the George Washington, which, in a moment of justified anger, he had ordered to be ready to take him from the deceitful halls of Paris back to the center of his power, where he could feel like himself again. But, sadly, as soon as he chose the path of compromise, the flaws in his character and approach, already noted, became painfully clear. He could take the high road; he could be stubborn; he could write grand notes from Sinai or Olympus; he could remain aloof in the White House or even in the Council of Ten and be fine. But if he ever lowered himself to the same level as the Four, it was clear that he was done for.
Now it was that what I have called his theological or Presbyterian temperament became dangerous. Having decided that some concessions were unavoidable, he might have sought by firmness and address and the use of the financial power of the United States to secure as much as he could of the substance, even at some sacrifice of the letter. But the President was not capable of so clear an understanding with himself as this implied. He was too conscientious. Although compromises were now necessary, he remained a man of principle and the Fourteen Points a contract absolutely binding upon him. He would do nothing that was not honorable; he would do nothing that was not just and right; he would do nothing that was contrary to his great profession of faith. Thus, without any abatement of the verbal inspiration of the Fourteen Points, they became a document for gloss and interpretation and for all the intellectual apparatus of self-deception, by which, I daresay, the President's forefathers had persuaded themselves that the course they thought it necessary to take was consistent with every syllable of the Pentateuch.
Now, it was at this point that what I’ve referred to as his theological or Presbyterian temperament became problematic. Having determined that some compromises were unavoidable, he could have aimed to secure as much as possible of the essence, even if it meant sacrificing some details, through firmness, skill, and the financial power of the United States. But the President wasn't capable of such clear self-understanding. He was too principled. Although compromises were now necessary, he remained a man of principle, and the Fourteen Points felt like a binding contract to him. He wouldn’t do anything that wasn’t honorable; he wouldn’t do anything that wasn’t fair and right; he wouldn’t do anything that contradicted his strong beliefs. As a result, without diminishing the verbal commitment to the Fourteen Points, they turned into a document for interpretation and rationalization, and for all the mental tricks of self-deception, which, I dare say, the President's forefathers had used to convince themselves that their chosen course aligned with every word of the Pentateuch.
The President's attitude to his colleagues had now become: I want to meet you so far as I can; I see your difficulties and I should like to be able to agree to what you propose; but I can do nothing that is not just and right, and you must first of all show me that what you want does really fall within the words of the pronouncements which are binding on me. Then began the weaving of that web of sophistry and Jesuitical exegesis that was finally to clothe with insincerity the language and substance of the whole Treaty. The word was issued to the witches of all Paris:
The President's attitude toward his colleagues had shifted to: I want to meet you as much as I can; I understand your challenges and I'd like to agree with your proposals, but I can’t do anything that's not fair and right, and you need to first show me that what you’re asking for actually fits within the terms that I must follow. Then started the complex reasoning and manipulative interpretations that ultimately clouded the sincerity of both the language and essence of the entire Treaty. The message was sent out to the schemers of all Paris:
Fair is foul, and foul is fair, Hover through the fog and filthy air. |
The subtlest sophisters and most hypocritical draftsmen were set to work, and produced many ingenious exercises which might have deceived for more than an hour a cleverer man than the President.
The most skilled tricksters and the most deceitful writers were put to work, creating many clever pieces that could have fooled someone even smarter than the President for over an hour.
Thus instead of saying that German-Austria is prohibited from uniting with Germany except by leave of France (which would be inconsistent with the principle of self-determination), the Treaty, with delicate draftsmanship, states that "Germany acknowledges and will respect strictly the independence of Austria, within the frontiers which may be fixed in a Treaty between that State and the Principal Allied and Associated Powers; she agrees that this independence shall be inalienable, except with the consent of the Council of the League of Nations," which sounds, but is not, quite different. And who knows but that the President forgot that another part of the Treaty provides that for this purpose the Council of the League must be unanimous.
Thus, instead of saying that German-Austria can't unite with Germany without France's approval (which goes against the principle of self-determination), the Treaty, with careful wording, states that "Germany acknowledges and will strictly respect the independence of Austria, within the borders that may be set in a Treaty between that State and the Principal Allied and Associated Powers; she agrees that this independence shall be inalienable, except with the consent of the Council of the League of Nations," which sounds different but really isn't. And who knows, maybe the President forgot that another part of the Treaty requires the Council of the League to be unanimous for this purpose.
Instead of giving Danzig to Poland, the Treaty establishes Danzig as a "Free" City, but includes this "Free" City within the Polish Customs frontier, entrusts to Poland the control of the river and railway system, and provides that "the Polish Government shall undertake the conduct of the foreign relations of the Free City of Danzig as well as the diplomatic protection of citizens of that city when abroad."
Instead of handing Danzig over to Poland, the Treaty designates Danzig as a "Free" City, but includes this "Free" City within the Polish Customs border, gives Poland control over the river and railway system, and states that "the Polish Government shall manage the foreign relations of the Free City of Danzig as well as provide diplomatic protection for its citizens when they are abroad."
In placing the river system of Germany under foreign control, the Treaty speaks of declaring international those "river systems which naturally provide more than one State with access to the sea, with or without transhipment from one vessel to another."
In putting the river system of Germany under foreign control, the Treaty states that it will declare international those "river systems that naturally give more than one State access to the sea, whether or not this involves transferring goods from one vessel to another."
Such instances could be multiplied. The honest and intelligible purpose of French policy, to limit the population of Germany and weaken her economic system, is clothed, for the President's sake, in the august language of freedom and international equality.
Such examples could be expanded. The straightforward and clear goal of French policy, to reduce Germany's population and undermine its economy, is dressed up, for the sake of the President, in the grand language of freedom and international equality.
But perhaps the most decisive moment, in the disintegration of the President's moral position and the clouding of his mind, was when at last, to the dismay of his advisers, he allowed himself to be persuaded that the expenditure of the Allied Governments on pensions and separation allowances could be fairly regarded as "damage done to the civilian population of the Allied and Associated Powers by German aggression by land, by sea, and from the air," in a sense in which the other expenses of the war could not be so regarded. It was a long theological struggle in which, after the rejection of many different arguments, the President finally capitulated before a masterpiece of the sophist's art.
But maybe the most crucial moment in the breakdown of the President's moral stance and the confusion in his thinking was when, much to his advisers' disappointment, he was convinced that the expenditures of the Allied Governments on pensions and separation allowances could be seen as "damage done to the civilian population of the Allied and Associated Powers by German aggression by land, by sea, and from the air," in a way that other war expenses couldn't. It was a lengthy philosophical battle where, after dismissing many different arguments, the President ultimately gave in to a masterful piece of manipulation.
At last the work was finished; and the President's conscience was still intact. In spite of everything, I believe that his temperament allowed him to leave Paris a really sincere man; and it is probable that to this day he is genuinely convinced that the Treaty contains practically nothing inconsistent with his former professions.
At last, the work was done, and the President's conscience was still clear. Despite everything, I think his personality helped him leave Paris as a truly sincere man; and it’s likely that to this day, he genuinely believes that the Treaty doesn’t contradict his earlier statements.
But the work was too complete, and to this was due the last tragic episode of the drama. The reply of Brockdorff-Rantzau inevitably took the line that Germany had laid down her arms on the basis of certain assurances, and that the Treaty in many particulars was not consistent with these assurances. But this was exactly what the President could not admit; in the sweat of solitary contemplation and with prayers to God he had done nothing that was not just and right; for the President to admit that the German reply had force in it was to destroy his self-respect and to disrupt the inner equipoise of his soul; and every instinct of his stubborn nature rose in self-protection. In the language of medical psychology, to suggest to the President that the Treaty was an abandonment of his professions was to touch on the raw a Freudian complex. It was a subject intolerable to discuss, and every subconscious instinct plotted to defeat its further exploration.
But the work was too complete, and this led to the final tragic episode of the drama. Brockdorff-Rantzau's response inevitably took the stance that Germany had surrendered based on certain assurances, and that the Treaty contradicted those assurances in many ways. But this was exactly what the President could not accept; in his solitary contemplation and with prayers to God, he had done nothing that was unjust or wrong; for the President to accept that the German response had validity would be to undermine his self-respect and disrupt the inner balance of his soul; and every instinct of his stubborn nature surged in self-protection. In terms of medical psychology, suggesting to the President that the Treaty represented a betrayal of his principles was to hit a nerve in a Freudian complex. It was a topic too unbearable to discuss, and every subconscious instinct worked to prevent any further exploration.
Thus it was that Clemenceau brought to success, what had seemed to be, a few months before, the extraordinary and impossible proposal that the Germans should not be heard. If only the President had not been so conscientious, if only he had not concealed from himself what he had been doing, even at the last moment he was in, a position to have recovered lost ground and to have achieved some very considerable successes. But the President was set. His arms and legs had been spliced by the surgeons to a certain posture, and they must be broken again before they could be altered. To his horror, Mr. Lloyd George, desiring at the last moment all the moderation he dared, discovered that he could not in five days persuade the President of error in what it had taken five months to prove to him to be just and right. After all, it was harder to de-bamboozle this old Presbyterian than it had been to bamboozle him; for the former involved his belief in and respect for himself.
Thus it was that Clemenceau succeeded in what had seemed, just a few months earlier, to be the extraordinary and impossible idea that the Germans should not be listened to. If only the President hadn’t been so meticulous, if only he hadn’t been so aware of what he was doing, even at the last moment he could have regained lost ground and achieved some significant successes. But the President was determined. His arms and legs had been set by the surgeons in a certain position, and they would have to be broken again before they could be changed. To his dismay, Mr. Lloyd George, wanting to be as moderate as he could at the last moment, found that he could not convince the President of his mistake in just five days when it had taken five months to prove to him what was just and right. After all, it was harder to un-bamboozle this old Presbyterian than it had been to bamboozle him; for the former involved his belief in and respect for himself.
Thus in the last act the President stood for stubbornness and a refusal of conciliations.
Thus in the last act, the President stood for stubbornness and a refusal to compromise.
FOOTNOTES:
[6] He alone amongst the Four could speak and understand both languages, Orlando knowing only French and the Prime Minister and President only English; and it is of historical importance that Orlando and the President had no direct means of communication.
[6] He was the only one out of the Four who could speak and understand both languages, with Orlando knowing only French and the Prime Minister and President only English; it's historically significant that Orlando and the President had no direct way to communicate.
Chapter 4
The Agreement
The thoughts which I have expressed in the second chapter were not present to the mind of Paris. The future life of Europe was not their concern; its means of livelihood was not their anxiety. Their preoccupations, good and bad alike, related to frontiers and nationalities, to the balance of power, to imperial aggrandizements, to the future enfeeblement of a strong and dangerous enemy, to revenge, and to the shifting by the victors of their unbearable financial burdens on to the shoulders of the defeated.
The ideas I shared in the second chapter weren't on Paris's mind. They weren't worried about Europe's future or how to make a living. Their concerns, both good and bad, focused on borders and national identities, maintaining the balance of power, expanding empires, weakening a strong and dangerous enemy, seeking revenge, and shifting their overwhelming financial burdens onto the defeated.
Two rival schemes for the future polity of the world took the field,—the Fourteen Points of the President, and the Carthaginian Peace of M. Clemenceau. Yet only one of these was entitled to take the field; for the enemy had not surrendered unconditionally, but on agreed terms as to the general character of the Peace.
Two competing plans for the future governance of the world emerged—the President's Fourteen Points and M. Clemenceau's Carthaginian Peace. However, only one of these was really supposed to come forward; the enemy hadn't surrendered unconditionally, but rather under agreed terms regarding the overall nature of the Peace.
This aspect of what happened cannot, unfortunately, be passed over with a word, for in the minds of many Englishmen at least it has been a subject of very great misapprehension. Many persons believe that the Armistice Terms constituted the first Contract concluded between the Allied and Associated Powers and the German Government, and that we entered the Conference with our hands, free, except so far as these Armistice Terms might bind us. This was not the case. To make the position plain, it is necessary briefly to review the history, of the negotiations which began with the German Note of October 5, 1918, and concluded with President Wilson's Note of November 5, 1918.
This part of what happened can't just be brushed aside, because in the minds of many English people, it has been widely misunderstood. A lot of folks think that the Armistice Terms were the first agreement made between the Allied and Associated Powers and the German Government, and that we came into the Conference with completely free hands, except for how the Armistice Terms might restrict us. That wasn't true. To clarify the situation, it's important to briefly go over the history of the negotiations that started with the German Note on October 5, 1918, and ended with President Wilson's Note on November 5, 1918.
On October 5, 1918, the German Government addressed a brief Note to the President accepting the Fourteen Points and asking for Peace negotiations. The President's reply of October 8 asked if he was to understand definitely that the German Government accepted "the terms laid down" in Fourteen Points and in his subsequent Addresses and "that its object in entering into discussion would be only to agree upon the practical details of their application." He added that the evacuation of invaded territory must be a prior condition of an Armistice. On October 12 the German Government returned an unconditional affirmative to these questions;-"its object in entering into discussions would be only to agree upon practical details of the application of these terms." On October 14, having received this affirmative answer, the President made a further communication to make clear the points: (1) that the details of the Armistice would have to be left to the military advisers of the United States and the Allies, and must provide absolutely against the possibility of Germany's resuming hostilities; (2) that submarine warfare must cease if these conversations were to continue; and (3) that he required further guarantees of the representative character of the Government with which he was dealing. On October 20 Germany accepted points (1) and (2), and pointed out, as regards (3), that she now had a Constitution and a Government dependent for its authority on the Reichstag. On October 23 the President announced that, "having received the solemn and explicit assurance of the German Government that it unreservedly accepts the terms of peace laid down in his Address to the Congress of the United States on January 8, 1918 (the Fourteen Points), and the principles of settlement enunciated in his subsequent Addresses, particularly the Address of September 27, and that it is ready to discuss the details of their application," he has communicated the above correspondence to the Governments of the Allied Powers "with the suggestion that, if these Governments are disposed to effect peace upon the terms and principles indicated," they will ask their military advisers to draw up Armistice Terms of such a character as to "ensure to the Associated Governments the unrestricted power to safeguard and enforce the details of the peace to which the German Government has agreed." At the end of this Note the President hinted more openly than in that of October 14 at the abdication of the Kaiser. This completes the preliminary negotiations to which the President alone was a party, adding without the Governments of the Allied Powers.
On October 5, 1918, the German Government sent a brief note to the President accepting the Fourteen Points and requesting peace negotiations. The President's response on October 8 asked for confirmation that the German Government accepted "the terms laid down" in the Fourteen Points and in his subsequent addresses and that its purpose in entering discussions would be solely to agree on the practical details of their implementation. He added that the evacuation of occupied territory must be a prerequisite for an armistice. On October 12, the German Government replied with an unconditional yes to these questions, stating that its aim in entering discussions would be only to agree on the practical details of applying these terms. On October 14, having received this affirmative response, the President issued a further communication to clarify the following points: (1) that the details of the armistice would need to be determined by the military advisers of the United States and the Allies and must ensure against the possibility of Germany resuming hostilities; (2) that submarine warfare must stop if these discussions were to continue; and (3) that he required additional guarantees regarding the representative nature of the Government he was dealing with. On October 20, Germany accepted points (1) and (2) and noted that, regarding point (3), it now had a Constitution and a Government whose authority depended on the Reichstag. On October 23, the President announced that, "having received the solemn and explicit assurance of the German Government that it unreservedly accepts the terms of peace laid down in his Address to the Congress of the United States on January 8, 1918 (the Fourteen Points), and the principles of settlement stated in his subsequent addresses, particularly the Address of September 27, and that it is prepared to discuss the details of their implementation," he communicated the above correspondence to the Governments of the Allied Powers "with the suggestion that, if these Governments are inclined to achieve peace based on the outlined terms and principles," they should ask their military advisers to draft Armistice Terms that would "ensure the Associated Governments the unrestricted power to safeguard and enforce the details of the peace the German Government has agreed to." At the end of this note, the President hinted more directly than in his October 14 note at the abdication of the Kaiser. This completes the preliminary negotiations to which the President was the only party, without the involvement of the Governments of the Allied Powers.
On November 5, 1918, the President transmitted to Germany the reply he had received from the Governments associated with him, and added that Marshal Foch had been authorized to communicate the terms of an armistice to properly accredited representatives. In this reply the Allied Governments, "subject to the qualifications which follow, declare their willingness to make peace with the Government of Germany on the terms of peace laid down in the President's Address to Congress of January 8, 1918, and the principles of settlement enunciated in his subsequent Addresses." The qualifications in question were two in number. The first related to the Freedom of the Seas, as to which they "reserved to themselves complete freedom." The second related to Reparation and ran as follows:—"Further, in the conditions of peace laid down in his Address to Congress on the 8th January, 1918 the President declared that invaded territories must be restored as well as evacuated and made free. The Allied Governments feel that no doubt ought to be allowed to exist as to what this provision implies. By it they understand that compensation will be made by Germany for all damage done to the civilian population of the Allies and to their property by the aggression of Germany by land, by sea, and from the air."[7]
On November 5, 1918, the President sent Germany the response he received from the governments aligned with him, adding that Marshal Foch had been authorized to share the terms of an armistice with properly accredited representatives. In this response, the Allied Governments stated, "subject to the qualifications that follow, we declare our willingness to make peace with the Government of Germany based on the terms outlined in the President's Address to Congress on January 8, 1918, and the principles of settlement stated in his later Addresses." There were two qualifications. The first concerned the Freedom of the Seas, regarding which they "reserved complete freedom." The second concerned Reparation and was stated as follows: "Furthermore, in the conditions of peace outlined in his Address to Congress on January 8, 1918, the President declared that invaded territories must be restored as well as evacuated and made free. The Allied Governments believe that there should be no doubt about what this provision means. By it, they expect that Germany will compensate for all damage done to the civilian population of the Allies and their property as a result of Germany's aggression by land, by sea, and from the air." [7]
The nature of the Contract between Germany and the Allies resulting from this exchange of documents is plain and unequivocal. The terms of the peace are to be in accordance with the Addresses of the President, and the purpose of the Peace Conference is "to discuss the details of their application." The circumstances of the Contract were of an unusually solemn and binding character; for one of the conditions of it was that Germany should agree to Armistice Terms which were to be such as would leave her helpless. Germany having rendered herself helpless in reliance on the Contract, the honor of the Allies was peculiarly involved in fulfilling their part and, if there were ambiguities, in not using their position to take advantage of them.
The nature of the agreement between Germany and the Allies resulting from this exchange of documents is straightforward and clear. The terms of peace will follow the President's Addresses, and the aim of the Peace Conference is "to discuss the details of their application." The circumstances surrounding the agreement were particularly serious and binding; one of the conditions was that Germany had to accept Armistice Terms that would leave it defenseless. Having made itself defenseless based on this agreement, the Allies had a special responsibility to honor their commitments and, if there were any ambiguities, to avoid exploiting them.
What, then, was the substance of this Contract to which the Allies had bound themselves? An examination of the documents shows that, although a large part of the Addresses is concerned with spirit, purpose, and intention, and not with concrete solutions, and that many questions requiring a settlement in the Peace Treaty are not touched on, nevertheless, there are certain questions which they settle definitely. It is true that within somewhat wide limits the Allies still had a free hand. Further, it is difficult to apply on a contractual basis those passages which deal with spirit, purpose, and intention;—every man must judge for himself whether, in view of them, deception or hypocrisy has been practised. But there remain, as will be seen below, certain important issues on which the Contract is unequivocal.
What, then, was the essence of this Contract to which the Allies committed themselves? A look at the documents reveals that, although much of the Addresses focuses on spirit, purpose, and intention rather than specific solutions, and many issues that need addressing in the Peace Treaty are not mentioned, there are still certain matters they definitively resolve. It's true that within somewhat broad limits the Allies still had flexibility. Moreover, it's challenging to apply a contractual interpretation to those sections that discuss spirit, purpose, and intention—each person has to decide for themselves whether, considering those sections, any deception or hypocrisy has occurred. However, as will be shown below, there are key issues on which the Contract is clear.
In addition to the Fourteen Points of January 18, 1918, the Addresses of the President which form part of the material of the Contract are four in number,—before the Congress on February 11; at Baltimore on April 6; at Mount Vernon on July 4; and at New York on September 27, the last of these being specially referred to in the Contract. I venture to select from these Addresses those engagements of substance, avoiding repetitions, which are most relevant to the German Treaty. The parts I omit add to, rather than detract from, those I quote; but they chiefly relate to intention, and are perhaps too vague and general to be interpreted contractually.[8]
In addition to the Fourteen Points from January 18, 1918, there are four Presidential Addresses included in the Contract material: one before Congress on February 11; one in Baltimore on April 6; one at Mount Vernon on July 4; and one in New York on September 27, with the last one specifically mentioned in the Contract. I’ll highlight the key commitments from these Addresses that are most relevant to the German Treaty, making sure to avoid any repetitions. The sections I leave out add context rather than take away from the parts I quote, but they mainly concern intentions and are probably too vague and general to be interpreted as binding contracts.[8]
The Fourteen Points.—(3). "The removal, so far as possible, of all economic barriers and the establishment of an equality of trade conditions among all the nations consenting to the Peace and associating themselves for its maintenance." (4). "Adequate guarantees given and taken that national armaments will be reduced to the lowest point consistent with domestic safety." (5). "A free, open-minded, and absolutely impartial adjustment of all colonial claims," regard being had to the interests of the populations concerned. (6), (7), (8), and (11). The evacuation and "restoration" of all invaded territory, especially of Belgium. To this must be added the rider of the Allies, claiming compensation for all damage done to civilians and their property by land, by sea, and from the air (quoted in full above). (8). The righting of "the wrong done to France by Prussia in 1871 in the matter of Alsace-Lorraine." (13). An independent Poland, including "the territories inhabited by indisputably Polish populations" and "assured a free and secure access to the sea." (14). The League of Nations.
The Fourteen Points.—(3). "The removal, as much as possible, of all economic barriers and the establishment of equal trade conditions among all the nations agreeing to the Peace and joining together to maintain it." (4). "Adequate guarantees given and taken that national military forces will be reduced to the minimum level necessary for domestic safety." (5). "A free, open-minded, and completely impartial resolution of all colonial claims," taking into account the interests of the populations involved. (6), (7), (8), and (11). The withdrawal and "restoration" of all occupied territory, especially Belgium. Additionally, the Allies assert the need for compensation for all damage inflicted on civilians and their property by land, sea, and air (quoted in full above). (8). Correcting "the wrong done to France by Prussia in 1871 regarding Alsace-Lorraine." (13). An independent Poland, including "the territories inhabited by unmistakably Polish populations" and "guaranteeing a free and secure access to the sea." (14). The League of Nations.
Before the Congress, February 11.—"There shall be no annexations, no contributions, no punitive damages.... Self-determination is not a mere phrase. It is an imperative principle of action which statesmen will henceforth ignore at their peril.... Every territorial settlement involved in this war must be made in the interest and for the benefit of the populations concerned, and not as a part of any mere adjustment or compromise of claims amongst rival States."
Before the Congress, February 11.—"There will be no annexations, no contributions, no punitive damages.... Self-determination isn't just a saying. It’s a crucial principle of action that political leaders will ignore at their own risk.... Any territorial arrangement related to this war must be in the interest and for the benefit of the people involved, not simply as a way to adjust or compromise claims among competing States."
New York, September 27.—(1) "The impartial justice meted out must involve no discrimination between those to whom we wish to be just and those to whom we do not wish to be just." (2) "No special or separate interest of any single nation or any group of nations can be made the basis of any part of the settlement which is not consistent with the common interest of all." (3) "There can be no leagues or alliances or special covenants and understandings within the general and common family of the League of Nations." (4) "There can be no special selfish economic combinations within the League and no employment of any form of economic boycott or exclusion, except as the power of economic penalty by exclusion from the markets of the world may be vested in the League of Nations itself as a means of discipline and control." (5) "All international agreements and treaties of every kind must be made known in their entirety to the rest of the world."
New York, September 27.—(1) "The fair justice we provide must not discriminate between those we want to be fair to and those we do not." (2) "No particular interest of any single nation or group of nations can form the basis for any part of the settlement that does not align with the common interest of all." (3) "There can’t be any leagues, alliances, or special agreements within the overall family of the League of Nations." (4) "There can be no self-serving economic groups within the League and no use of economic boycotts or exclusions, except for the economic penalties that may be assigned to the League of Nations itself as a means of discipline and control." (5) "All international agreements and treaties of every kind must be fully disclosed to the rest of the world."
This wise and magnanimous program for the world had passed on November 5, 1918 beyond the region of idealism and aspiration, and had become part of a solemn contract to which all the Great Powers of the world had put their signature. But it was lost, nevertheless, in the morass of Paris;—the spirit of it altogether, the letter in parts ignored and in other parts distorted.
This wise and generous plan for the world was established on November 5, 1918, moving beyond mere idealism and hope, becoming a serious agreement that all the major world powers signed. However, it was ultimately lost in the chaos of Paris; the essence was entirely disregarded, while some parts of the agreement were ignored or misrepresented.
The German observations on the draft Treaty of Peace were largely a comparison between the terms of this understanding, on the basis of which the German nation had agreed to lay down its arms, and the actual provisions of the document offered them for signature thereafter. The German commentators had little difficulty in showing that the draft Treaty constituted a breach of engagements and of international morality comparable with their own offense in the invasion of Belgium. Nevertheless, the German reply was not in all its parts a document fully worthy of the occasion, because in spite of the justice and importance of much of its contents, a truly broad treatment and high dignity of outlook were a little wanting, and the general effect lacks the simple treatment, with the dispassionate objectivity of despair which the deep passions of the occasion might have evoked. The Allied governments gave it, in any case, no serious consideration, and I doubt if anything which the German delegation could have said at that stage of the proceedings would have much influenced the result.
The German response to the draft Treaty of Peace mainly compared the terms of this agreement, which the German nation had accepted to end hostilities, with the actual conditions in the document they were later presented to sign. The German commentators easily illustrated that the draft Treaty represented a violation of commitments and international ethics comparable to their own wrongdoing in invading Belgium. However, the German reply was not entirely appropriate for the occasion, as, despite the validity and significance of much of its content, it lacked a truly broad approach and high dignity, and the overall impact missed the straightforward treatment and unemotional objectivity of despair that the intense feelings of the moment could have inspired. The Allied governments, in any case, gave it little serious thought, and I am doubtful that anything the German delegation could have said at that point would have significantly affected the outcome.
The commonest virtues of the individual are often lacking in the spokesmen of nations; a statesman representing not himself but his country may prove, without incurring excessive blame—as history often records—vindictive, perfidious, and egotistic. These qualities are familiar in treaties imposed by victors. But the German delegation did not succeed in exposing in burning and prophetic words the quality which chiefly distinguishes this transaction from all its historical predecessors—its insincerity.
The most common virtues of individuals are often missing in national leaders; a politician who represents not just themselves but their country can sometimes appear, without much criticism—as history often shows—spiteful, deceitful, and selfish. These traits are commonly seen in treaties forced upon the defeated. But the German delegation failed to highlight in strong and foretelling language the key characteristic that sets this deal apart from all previous ones—its lack of sincerity.
This theme, however, must be for another pen than mine. I am mainly concerned in what follows, not with the justice of the Treaty,—neither with the demand for penal justice against the enemy, nor with the obligation of contractual justice on the victor,—but with its wisdom and with its consequences.
This theme, however, is better suited for someone other than me. What I’m primarily focused on in the following discussion is not the fairness of the Treaty—neither the call for punishing the enemy nor the responsibility of fair dealing from the victor—but its wisdom and its outcomes.
I propose, therefore, in this chapter to set forth baldly the principal economic provisions of the Treaty, reserving, however, for the next my comments on the Reparation Chapter and on Germany's capacity to meet the payments there demanded from her.
I propose, therefore, in this chapter to clearly outline the main economic provisions of the Treaty, saving my comments on the Reparation Chapter and Germany's ability to make the required payments for the next chapter.
The German economic system as it existed before the war depended on three main factors: I. Overseas commerce as represented by her mercantile marine, her colonies, her foreign investments, her exports, and the overseas connections of her merchants; II. The exploitation of her coal and iron and the industries built upon them; III. Her transport and tariff system. Of these the first, while not the least important, was certainly the most vulnerable. The Treaty aims at the systematic destruction of all three, but principally of the first two.
The German economy before the war relied on three main factors: I. International trade, represented by its merchant fleet, colonies, foreign investments, exports, and the overseas ties of its merchants; II. The use of its coal and iron resources and the industries built around them; III. Its transportation and tariff system. Among these, the first was the most exposed, though not the least important. The Treaty seeks to systematically dismantle all three, but primarily focuses on the first two.
I
(1) Germany has ceded to the Allies all the vessels of her mercantile marine exceeding 1600 tons gross, half the vessels between 1000 tons and 1600 tons, and one quarter of her trawlers and other fishing boats.[9] The cession is comprehensive, including not only vessels flying the German flag, but also all vessels owned by Germans but flying other flags, and all vessels under construction as well as those afloat.[10] Further, Germany undertakes, if required, to build for the Allies such types of ships as they may specify up to 200,000 tons[11] annually for five years, the value of these ships being credited to Germany against what is due from her for Reparation.[12]
(1) Germany has given the Allies all the vessels of her merchant fleet that are over 1600 gross tons, half of the vessels between 1000 and 1600 tons, and a quarter of her trawlers and other fishing boats.[9] The transfer is extensive, including not just ships flying the German flag, but also all ships owned by Germans that fly other flags, as well as all ships that are under construction alongside those currently in use.[10] In addition, Germany agrees, if needed, to build for the Allies any types of ships they specify, up to 200,000 tons[11] each year for five years, with the value of these ships being applied to Germany's debt for Reparation.[12]
Thus the German mercantile marine is swept from the seas and cannot be restored for many years to come on a scale adequate to meet the requirements of her own commerce. For the present, no lines will run from Hamburg, except such as foreign nations may find it worth while to establish out of their surplus tonnage. Germany will have to pay to foreigners for the carriage of her trade such charges as they may be able to exact, and will receive only such conveniences as it may suit them to give her. The prosperity of German ports and commerce can only revive, it would seem, in proportion as she succeeds in bringing under her effective influence the merchant marines of Scandinavia and of Holland.
Thus, the German merchant navy has been driven from the seas and won't be able to rebuild for many years to come on a scale that meets the needs of its own trade. For now, no shipping lines will operate from Hamburg, except those that foreign nations might find worthwhile to set up using their surplus capacity. Germany will have to pay foreigners for transporting its goods whatever rates they choose to impose, and will only get the level of service they decide to provide. The health of German ports and trade will likely recover only to the extent that Germany can bring the merchant fleets of Scandinavia and Holland under its influence.
(2) Germany has ceded to the Allies "all her rights and titles over her oversea possessions."[13] This cession not only applies to sovereignty but extends on unfavorable terms to Government property, all of which, including railways, must be surrendered without payment, while, on the other hand, the German Government remains liable for any debt which may have been incurred for the purchase or construction of this property, or for the development of the colonies generally.[14]
(2) Germany has given up to the Allies "all her rights and titles over her overseas possessions."[13] This transfer not only covers sovereignty but also includes unfavorable terms for government property, all of which, including railways, must be handed over without any compensation. Meanwhile, the German Government is still responsible for any debts that may have been taken on for the purchase or construction of this property, or for the overall development of the colonies.[14]
In distinction from the practice ruling in the case of most similar cessions in recent history, the property and persons of private German nationals, as distinct from their Government, are also injuriously affected. The Allied Government exercising authority in any former German colony "may make such provisions as it thinks fit with reference to the repatriation from them of German nationals and to the conditions upon which German subjects of European origin shall, or shall not, be allowed to reside, hold property, trade or exercise a profession in them."[15] All contracts and agreements in favor of German nationals for the construction or exploitation of public works lapse to the Allied Governments as part of the payment due for Reparation.
In contrast to the typical decisions made in similar cases in recent history, the property and individuals of private German citizens, separate from their government, are also negatively impacted. The Allied Government in charge of any former German colony "can set any rules it deems appropriate regarding the repatriation of German nationals from these areas and the terms under which German subjects of European descent may or may not be permitted to live, own property, do business, or work in these locations."[15] All contracts and agreements benefiting German nationals for the construction or operation of public works will be transferred to the Allied Governments as part of the reparations owed.
But these terms are unimportant compared with the more comprehensive provision by which "the Allied and Associated Powers reserve the right to retain and liquidate all property, rights, and interests belonging at the date of the coming into force of the present Treaty to German nationals, or companies controlled by them," within the former German colonies.[16] This wholesale expropriation of private property is to take place without the Allies affording any compensation to the individuals expropriated, and the proceeds will be employed, first, to meet private debts due to Allied nationals from any German nationals, and second, to meet claims due from Austrian, Hungarian, Bulgarian, or Turkish nationals. Any balance may either be returned by the liquidating Power direct to Germany, or retained by them. If retained, the proceeds must be transferred to the Reparation Commission for Germany's credit in the Reparation account.[17]
But these terms are minor compared to the broader provision that "the Allied and Associated Powers reserve the right to keep and liquidate all property, rights, and interests belonging on the date the current Treaty comes into effect to German nationals or companies controlled by them," within the former German colonies.[16] This complete takeover of private property will happen without the Allies providing any compensation to the individuals affected, and the proceeds will be used first to pay private debts owed to Allied nationals by any German nationals, and second, to settle claims from Austrian, Hungarian, Bulgarian, or Turkish nationals. Any remaining balance may either be returned directly to Germany by the liquidating Power or kept by them. If kept, the proceeds must be sent to the Reparation Commission for Germany's credit in the Reparation account.[17]
In short, not only are German sovereignty and German influence extirpated from the whole of her former oversea possessions, but the persons and property of her nationals resident or owning property in those parts are deprived of legal status and legal security.
In short, not only is German sovereignty and influence completely removed from all of its former overseas possessions, but the people and property of its nationals living in or owning property there are stripped of legal status and protection.
(3) The provisions just outlined in regard to the private property of Germans in the ex-German colonies apply equally to private German property in Alsace-Lorraine, except in so far as the French Government may choose to grant exceptions.[18] This is of much greater practical importance than the similar expropriation overseas because of the far higher value of the property involved and the closer interconnection, resulting from the great development of the mineral wealth of these provinces since 1871, of German economic interests there with those in Germany itself. Alsace-Lorraine has been part of the German Empire for nearly fifty years—a considerable majority of its population is German speaking—and it has been the scene of some of Germany's most important economic enterprises. Nevertheless, the property of those Germans who reside there, or who have invested in its industries, is now entirely at the disposal of the French Government without compensation, except in so far as the German Government itself may choose to afford it. The French Government is entitled to expropriate without compensation the personal property of private German citizens and German companies resident or situated within Alsace-Lorraine, the proceeds being credited in part satisfaction of various French claims. The severity of this provision is only mitigated to the extent that the French Government may expressly permit German nationals to continue to reside, in which case the above provision is not applicable. Government, State, and Municipal property, on the other hand, is to be ceded to France without any credit being given for it. This includes the railway system of the two provinces, together with its rolling-stock.[19] But while the property is taken over, liabilities contracted in respect of it in the form of public debts of any kind remain the liability of Germany.[20] The provinces also return to French sovereignty free and quit of their share of German war or pre-war dead-weight debt; nor does Germany receive a credit on this account in respect of Reparation.
(3) The rules just mentioned regarding the private property of Germans in the former German colonies also apply to private German property in Alsace-Lorraine, unless the French Government decides to make exceptions.[18] This is much more significant in practical terms than the similar expropriation overseas, due to the much higher value of the property involved and the closer connection that has developed from the significant growth of mineral wealth in these provinces since 1871, linking German economic interests there with those in Germany itself. Alsace-Lorraine has been part of the German Empire for nearly fifty years—a large majority of its population speaks German—and it has been home to some of Germany's most important economic activities. However, the property of Germans living there or investing in its industries is now completely under the control of the French Government without any compensation, unless the German Government decides to provide it. The French Government is allowed to expropriate without compensation the personal property of private German citizens and German companies located in Alsace-Lorraine, with the proceeds being used to partially satisfy various French claims. The harshness of this rule is somewhat softened by the possibility that the French Government may explicitly allow German nationals to continue living there, in which case the above rule does not apply. On the other hand, government, state, and municipal property will be handed over to France without any compensation. This includes the railway system of the two provinces, along with its rolling stock.[19] However, while the property is taken over, any debts related to it in the form of public debts remain Germany’s responsibility.[20] The provinces also return to French sovereignty free and clear of their share of German war or pre-war debt; Germany does not receive any credit for this regarding Reparations.
(4) The expropriation of German private property is not limited, however, to the ex-German colonies and Alsace-Lorraine. The treatment of such property forms, indeed, a very significant and material section of the Treaty, which has not received as much attention as it merits, although it was the subject of exceptionally violent objection on the part of the German delegates at Versailles. So far as I know, there is no precedent in any peace treaty of recent history for the treatment of private property set forth below, and the German representatives urged that the precedent now established strikes a dangerous and immoral blow at the security of private property everywhere. This is an exaggeration, and the sharp distinction, approved by custom and convention during the past two centuries, between the property and rights of a State and the property and rights of its nationals is an artificial one, which is being rapidly put out of date by many other influences than the Peace Treaty, and is inappropriate to modern socialistic conceptions of the relations between the State and its citizens. It is true, however, that the Treaty strikes a destructive blow at a conception which lies at the root of much of so-called international law, as this has been expounded hitherto.
(4) The confiscation of German private property isn’t just limited to the former German colonies and Alsace-Lorraine. The handling of this property actually makes up a very important part of the Treaty, which hasn’t received as much attention as it should, even though it faced intense objections from the German delegates at Versailles. As far as I know, there’s no precedent in any recent peace treaty for how private property is addressed below, and the German representatives argued that this new precedent poses a risky and unethical threat to the security of private property everywhere. This is an exaggeration, and the clear distinction, accepted by tradition and convention over the last two centuries, between the property and rights of a State and the property and rights of its citizens is an artificial one, which is quickly becoming outdated due to many influences beyond the Peace Treaty, and it doesn’t fit modern socialist views on the relationship between the State and its citizens. It is true, however, that the Treaty delivers a damaging blow to a concept that is fundamental to much of what has been called international law up to now.
The principal provisions relating to the expropriation of German private property situated outside the frontiers of Germany, as these are now determined, are overlapping in their incidence, and the more drastic would seem in some cases to render the others unnecessary. Generally speaking, however, the more drastic and extensive provisions are not so precisely framed as those of more particular and limited application. They are as follows:—
The main rules regarding the expropriation of German private property located outside Germany's borders, as they are currently defined, tend to overlap, and in some cases, the more severe measures might make the others unnecessary. Overall, though, the more severe and broad rules are not as clearly defined as those with more specific and limited application. They are as follows:—
(a) The Allies "reserve the right to retain and liquidate all property, rights and interests belonging at the date of the coming into force of the present Treaty to German nationals, or companies controlled by them, within their territories, colonies, possessions and protectorates, including territories ceded to them by the present Treaty."[21]
(a) The Allies "reserve the right to keep and sell all property, rights, and interests that belong to German nationals or companies they control, as of the date the current Treaty goes into effect, within their territories, colonies, possessions, and protectorates, including territories ceded to them by this Treaty."[21]
This is the extended version of the provision which has been discussed already in the case of the colonies and of Alsace-Lorraine. The value of the property so expropriated will be applied, in the first instance, to the satisfaction of private debts due from Germany to the nationals of the Allied Government within whose jurisdiction the liquidation takes place, and, second, to the satisfaction of claims arising out of the acts of Germany's former allies. Any balance, if the liquidating Government elects to retain it, must be credited in the Reparation account.[22] It is, however, a point of considerable importance that the liquidating Government is not compelled to transfer the balance to the Reparation Commission, but can, if it so decides, return the proceeds direct to Germany. For this will enable the United States, if they so wish, to utilize the very large balances, in the hands of their enemy-property custodian, to pay for the provisioning of Germany, without regard to the views of the Reparation Commission.
This is the extended version of the provision that has already been discussed in relation to the colonies and Alsace-Lorraine. The value of the property that has been taken will first go towards settling private debts owed by Germany to the nationals of the Allied Government in whose jurisdiction the liquidation occurs, and second, to cover claims from Germany's former allies. Any remaining balance, if the liquidating Government chooses to keep it, must be credited to the Reparation account.[22] However, it is important to note that the liquidating Government is not required to transfer the balance to the Reparation Commission, but can instead choose to return the proceeds directly to Germany. This would allow the United States, if they wish, to use the substantial balances held by their enemy-property custodian to pay for provisions in Germany, without needing to consider the opinions of the Reparation Commission.
These provisions had their origin in the scheme for the mutual settlement of enemy debts by means of a Clearing House. Under this proposal it was hoped to avoid much trouble and litigation by making each of the Governments lately at war responsible for the collection of private debts due from its nationals to the nationals of any of the other Governments (the normal process of collection having been suspended by reason of the war), and for the distribution of the funds so collected to those of its nationals who had claims against the nationals of the other Governments, any final balance either way being settled in cash. Such a scheme could have been completely bilateral and reciprocal. And so in part it is, the scheme being mainly reciprocal as regards the collection of commercial debts. But the completeness of their victory permitted the Allied Governments to introduce in their own favor many divergencies from reciprocity, of which the following are the chief: Whereas the property of Allied nationals within German jurisdiction reverts under the Treaty to Allied ownership on the conclusion of Peace, the property of Germans within Allied jurisdiction is to be retained and liquidated as described above, with the result that the whole of German property over a large part of the world can be expropriated, and the large properties now within the custody of Public Trustees and similar officials in the Allied countries may be retained permanently. In the second place, such German assets are chargeable, not only with the liabilities of Germans, but also, if they run to it, with "payment of the amounts due in respect of claims by the nationals of such Allied or Associated Power with regard to their property, rights, and interests in the territory of other Enemy Powers," as, for example, Turkey, Bulgaria, and Austria.[23] This is a remarkable provision, which is naturally non-reciprocal. In the third place, any final balance due to Germany on private account need not be paid over, but can be held against the various liabilities of the German Government.[24] The effective operation of these Articles is guaranteed by the delivery of deeds, titles, and information.[25] In the fourth place, pre-war contracts between Allied and German nationals may be canceled or revived at the option of the former, so that all such contracts which are in Germany's favor will be canceled, while, on the other hand, she will be compelled to fulfil those which are to her disadvantage.
These rules originated from the plan for settling enemy debts through a Clearing House. The idea was to prevent a lot of hassle and lawsuits by making each government involved in the recent war responsible for collecting private debts owed by its citizens to the citizens of other governments (since the usual collection process was put on hold because of the war). They would then distribute the collected funds to their nationals who had claims against the nationals of the other governments, with any final balance being settled in cash. This plan could have been fully bilateral and reciprocal. And in some ways, it is, especially regarding the collection of commercial debts. However, the complete victory of the Allied Governments allowed them to impose several deviations from reciprocity in their favor, with the main ones being as follows: When the Treaty concludes peace, the property of Allied nationals under German jurisdiction automatically reverts to Allied ownership, while German property within Allied jurisdictions is to be retained and liquidated as described earlier. This means that all German property across many parts of the world can be expropriated, and significant assets currently held by Public Trustees and similar officials in Allied countries can be kept permanently. Secondly, these German assets not only cover the liabilities of Germans but also, if they apply, the "payment of amounts due concerning claims by the nationals of such Allied or Associated Power regarding their property, rights, and interests in the territory of other Enemy Powers," like Turkey, Bulgaria, and Austria.[23] This is an impressive provision that is obviously non-reciprocal. Thirdly, any final balance owed to Germany regarding private matters doesn’t have to be paid but can instead be offset against the various liabilities of the German Government.[24] The effective enforcement of these Articles is ensured by the transfer of deeds, titles, and information.[25] Lastly, pre-war contracts between Allied and German nationals can be canceled or reinstated at the discretion of the former. This means that any contracts favorable to Germany will be nullified, while Germany will have to fulfill contracts that are to its detriment.
(b) So far we have been concerned with German property within Allied jurisdiction. The next provision is aimed at the elimination of German interests in the territory of her neighbors and former allies, and of certain other countries. Under Article 260 of the Financial Clauses it is provided that the Reparation Commission may, within one year of the coming into force of the Treaty, demand that the German Government expropriate its nationals and deliver to the Reparation Commission "any rights and interests of German nationals in any public utility undertaking or in any concession[26] operating in Russia, China, Turkey, Austria, Hungary, and Bulgaria, or in the possessions or dependencies of these States, or in any territory formerly belonging to Germany or her allies, to be ceded by Germany or her allies to any Power or to be administered by a Mandatory under the present Treaty." This is a comprehensive description, overlapping in part the provisions dealt with under (a) above, but including, it should be noted, the new States and territories carved out of the former Russian, Austro-Hungarian, and Turkish Empires. Thus Germany's influence is eliminated and her capital confiscated in all those neighboring countries to which she might naturally look for her future livelihood, and for an outlet for her energy, enterprise, and technical skill.
(b) Until now, we've focused on German property within Allied jurisdiction. The next provision aims to eliminate German interests in the territories of its neighbors and former allies, as well as certain other countries. According to Article 260 of the Financial Clauses, the Reparation Commission can, within a year of the Treaty taking effect, require the German Government to expropriate its nationals and hand over to the Reparation Commission "any rights and interests of German nationals in any public utility operation or in any concession[26] working in Russia, China, Turkey, Austria, Hungary, and Bulgaria, or in the possessions or dependencies of these states, or in any territory that formerly belonged to Germany or its allies, to be ceded by Germany or its allies to any power or to be managed by a Mandatory under this Treaty." This is a thorough description, partially overlapping with the provisions discussed in (a) above, but also including the new states and territories formed from the former Russian, Austro-Hungarian, and Turkish Empires. Thus, Germany's influence is eliminated, and its capital is confiscated in all those neighboring countries where it might naturally seek future livelihood, along with an outlet for its energy, enterprise, and technical expertise.
The execution of this program in detail will throw on the Reparation Commission a peculiar task, as it will become possessor of a great number of rights and interests over a vast territory owing dubious obedience, disordered by war, disruption, and Bolshevism. The division of the spoils between the victors will also provide employment for a powerful office, whose doorsteps the greedy adventurers and jealous concession-hunters of twenty or thirty nations will crowd and defile.
The implementation of this program in detail will present a unique challenge for the Reparation Commission, as it will come into possession of numerous rights and interests over a large territory that is uncertain in its loyalty, troubled by war, chaos, and Bolshevism. The distribution of the benefits among the victors will also create a demand for a significant office, where greedy opportunists and envious deal-seekers from twenty or thirty nations will gather and disrupt.
Lest the Reparation Commission fail by ignorance to exercise its rights to the full, it is further provided that the German Government shall communicate to it within six months of the Treaty's coming into force a list of all the rights and interests in question, "whether already granted, contingent or not yet exercised," and any which are not so communicated within this period will automatically lapse in favor of the Allied Governments.[27] How far an edict of this character can be made binding on a German national, whose person and property lie outside the jurisdiction of his own Government, is an unsettled question; but all the countries specified in the above list are open to pressure by the Allied authorities, whether by the imposition of an appropriate Treaty clause or otherwise.
To ensure the Reparation Commission fully exercises its rights and doesn’t miss out due to lack of knowledge, it's specified that the German Government must send a list of all relevant rights and interests—"whether already granted, contingent, or not yet exercised"—within six months of the Treaty taking effect. Any rights not communicated during this time will automatically expire in favor of the Allied Governments.[27] How binding this kind of decree can be on a German national, whose person and property are outside the control of his own Government, remains an unresolved issue; however, all countries mentioned in the above list can be influenced by the Allied authorities, either through an appropriate Treaty clause or other means.
(c) There remains a third provision more sweeping than either of the above, neither of which affects German interests in neutral countries. The Reparation Commission is empowered up to May 1, 1921, to demand payment up to $5,000,000,000 in such manner as they may fix, "whether in gold, commodities, ships, securities or otherwise."[28] This provision has the effect of intrusting to the Reparation Commission for the period in question dictatorial powers over all German property of every description whatever. They can, under this Article, point to any specific business, enterprise, or property, whether within or outside Germany, and demand its surrender; and their authority would appear to extend not only to property existing at the date of the Peace, but also to any which may be created or acquired at any time in the course of the next eighteen months. For example, they could pick out—as presumably they will as soon as they are established—the fine and powerful German enterprise in South America known as the Deutsche Ueberseeische Elektrizitätsgesellschaft (the D.U.E.G.), and dispose of it to Allied interests. The clause is unequivocal and all-embracing. It is worth while to note in passing that it introduces a quite novel principle in the collection of indemnities. Hitherto, a sum has been fixed, and the nation mulcted has been left free to devise and select for itself the means of payment. But in this case the payees can (for a certain period) not only demand a certain sum but specify the particular kind of property in which payment is to be effected. Thus the powers of the Reparation Commission, with which I deal more particularly in the next chapter, can be employed to destroy Germany's commercial and economic organization as well as to exact payment.
(c) There’s a third provision that is broader than the previous ones, neither of which impacts German interests in neutral countries. The Reparation Commission can demand payment of up to $5,000,000,000 by May 1, 1921, in such manner as they may fix, "whether in gold, commodities, ships, securities, or otherwise."[28] This provision effectively gives the Reparation Commission dictatorial powers over all German property of every kind during this period. They can, under this Article, identify any specific business, enterprise, or property, whether inside or outside Germany, and demand its surrender; their authority seems to cover not just property existing at the time of the Peace but also any that may be created or acquired during the next eighteen months. For instance, they could target—theoretically they probably will soon after their establishment—the notable and influential German enterprise in South America known as the Deutsche Ueberseeische Elektrizitätsgesellschaft (the D.U.E.G.) and transfer it to Allied interests. The clause is clear and comprehensive. It's worth noting that this introduces a completely new principle in the collection of indemnities. Until now, a fixed sum was established, and the affected nation was free to come up with and choose its own payment method. But in this case, the payees can (for a certain time) not only demand a specific amount but also specify the exact type of property for payment. Thus, the powers of the Reparation Commission, which I will discuss in more detail in the next chapter, can be used to undermine Germany's commercial and economic structure as well as to enforce payment.
The cumulative effect of (a), (b), and (c) (as well as of certain other minor provisions on which I have not thought it necessary to enlarge) is to deprive Germany (or rather to empower the Allies so to deprive her at their will—it is not yet accomplished) of everything she possesses outside her own frontiers as laid down in the Treaty. Not only are her oversea investments taken and her connections destroyed, but the same process of extirpation is applied in the territories of her former allies and of her immediate neighbors by land.
The combined result of (a), (b), and (c) (along with a few other minor details that I haven't felt the need to elaborate on) is to strip Germany (or more accurately, to give the Allies the power to strip her at their discretion—it’s not done yet) of everything she owns outside her own borders as outlined in the Treaty. Not only are her overseas investments taken and her connections severed, but the same strategy of removal is applied in the lands of her former allies and her neighboring countries by land.
(5) Lest by some oversight the above provisions should overlook any possible contingencies, certain other Articles appear in the Treaty, which probably do not add very much in practical effect to those already described, but which deserve brief mention as showing the spirit of completeness in which the victorious Powers entered upon the economic subjection of their defeated enemy.
(5) Just in case the above provisions miss any possible situations, a few other Articles are included in the Treaty. These probably don’t really change anything practically from what’s already mentioned, but they deserve a quick mention to show the thoroughness with which the victorious Powers approached the economic domination of their defeated enemy.
First of all there is a general clause of barrer and renunciation: "In territory outside her European frontiers as fixed by the present Treaty, Germany renounces all rights, titles and privileges whatever in or over territory which belonged to her or to her allies, and all rights, titles and privileges whatever their origin which she held as against the Allied and Associated Powers...."[29]
First, there's a general clause about barring and renouncing: "In territory outside her European borders as defined by this Treaty, Germany gives up all rights, titles, and privileges in or over territory that belonged to her or her allies, as well as all rights, titles, and privileges of any origin that she held against the Allied and Associated Powers...."[29]
There follow certain more particular provisions. Germany renounces all rights and privileges she may have acquired in China.[30] There are similar provisions for Siam,[31] for Liberia,[32] for Morocco,[33] and for Egypt.[34] In the case of Egypt not only are special privileges renounced, but by Article 150 ordinary liberties are withdrawn, the Egyptian Government being accorded "complete liberty of action in regulating the status of German nationals and the conditions under which they may establish themselves in Egypt."
Here are some more specific rules. Germany gives up all rights and privileges it may have had in China.[30] There are similar rules for Siam,[31] Liberia,[32] Morocco,[33] and Egypt.[34] In the case of Egypt, not only are special privileges given up, but by Article 150, regular freedoms are also revoked, allowing the Egyptian Government "complete freedom to manage the status of German nationals and the conditions under which they can settle in Egypt."
By Article 258 Germany renounces her right to any participation in any financial or economic organizations of an international character "operating in any of the Allied or Associated States, or in Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria or Turkey, or in the dependencies of these States, or in the former Russian Empire."
By Article 258, Germany gives up its right to be involved in any financial or economic organizations of an international nature "operating in any of the Allied or Associated States, or in Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria, or Turkey, or in the dependencies of these States, or in the former Russian Empire."
Generally speaking, only those pre-war treaties and conventions are revived which it suits the Allied Governments to revive, and those in Germany's favor may be allowed to lapse.[35]
Generally speaking, only the pre-war treaties and agreements that the Allied Governments want to revive are reinstated, while those that benefit Germany may be allowed to expire.[35]
It is evident, however, that none of these provisions are of any real importance, as compared with those described previously. They represent the logical completion of Germany's outlawry and economic subjection to the convenience of the Allies; but they do not add substantially to her effective disabilities.
It’s clear, though, that none of these provisions really matter compared to the ones mentioned earlier. They mark the logical end of Germany's outlaw status and economic subjugation for the Allies' convenience; however, they don’t significantly increase her actual limitations.
II
The provisions relating to coal and iron are more important in respect of their ultimate consequences on Germany's internal industrial economy than for the money value immediately involved. The German Empire has been built more truly on coal and iron than on blood and iron. The skilled exploitation of the great coalfields of the Ruhr, Upper Silesia, and the Saar, alone made possible the development of the steel, chemical, and electrical industries which established her as the first industrial nation of continental Europe. One-third of Germany's population lives in towns of more than 20,000 inhabitants, an industrial concentration which is only possible on a foundation of coal and iron. In striking, therefore, at her coal supply, the French politicians were not mistaking their target. It is only the extreme immoderation, and indeed technical impossibility, of the Treaty's demands which may save the situation in the long-run.
The rules about coal and iron are more significant for their long-term effects on Germany's internal industrial economy than for the immediate financial implications. The German Empire has been built more on coal and iron than on blood and iron. The effective use of the vast coalfields of the Ruhr, Upper Silesia, and the Saar made the growth of the steel, chemical, and electrical industries possible, establishing Germany as the leading industrial nation in continental Europe. One-third of Germany's population resides in towns with more than 20,000 people, an industrial concentration that only exists on a base of coal and iron. Therefore, by targeting Germany's coal supply, the French politicians were aiming at the right problem. It may be the extreme demands of the Treaty and their technical impracticality that ultimately save the situation in the long run.
(1) The Treaty strikes at Germany's coal supply in four ways:—
(1) The Treaty targets Germany's coal supply in four ways:—
(i.) "As compensation for the destruction of the coal-mines in the north of France, and as part payment towards the total reparation due from Germany for the damage resulting from the war, Germany cedes to France in full and absolute possession, with exclusive rights of exploitation, unencumbered, and free from all debts and charges of any kind, the coal-mines situated in the Saar Basin."[36] While the administration of this district is vested for fifteen years in the League of Nations, it is to be observed that the mines are ceded to France absolutely. Fifteen years hence the population of the district will be called upon to indicate by plebiscite their desires as to the future sovereignty of the territory; and, in the event of their electing for union with Germany, Germany is to be entitled to repurchase the mines at a price payable in gold.[37]
(i.) "As compensation for the destruction of the coal mines in northern France, and as part of the payment towards the total reparations owed by Germany for the war damages, Germany hands over to France full and absolute ownership, with exclusive rights to operate, untied and free from any debts or charges, the coal mines located in the Saar Basin."[36] While the management of this area will be under the League of Nations for fifteen years, it's important to note that the mines are completely ceded to France. After fifteen years, the local population will vote in a plebiscite to express their preferences regarding the future governance of the territory; if they choose to unite with Germany, then Germany has the right to repurchase the mines at a price paid in gold.[37]
The judgment of the world has already recognized the transaction of the Saar as an act of spoliation and insincerity. So far as compensation for the destruction of French coal-mines is concerned, this is provided for, as we shall see in a moment, elsewhere in the Treaty. "There is no industrial region in Germany," the German representatives have said without contradiction, "the population of which is so permanent, so homogeneous, and so little complex as that of the Saar district. Among more than 650,000 inhabitants, there were in 1918 less than 100 French. The Saar district has been German for more than 1,000 years. Temporary occupation as a result of warlike operations on the part of the French always terminated in a short time in the restoration of the country upon the conclusion of peace. During a period of 1048 years France has possessed the country for not quite 68 years in all. When, on the occasion of the first Treaty of Paris in 1814, a small portion of the territory now coveted was retained for France, the population raised the most energetic opposition and demanded 'reunion with their German fatherland,' to which they were 'related by language, customs, and religion.' After an occupation of one year and a quarter, this desire was taken into account in the second Treaty of Paris in 1815. Since then the country has remained uninterruptedly attached to Germany, and owes its economic development to that connection."
The world has already judged the Saar transaction as an act of theft and dishonesty. Regarding compensation for the destruction of French coal mines, this is addressed elsewhere in the Treaty, as we'll see shortly. "There is no industrial area in Germany," the German representatives stated without contradiction, "whose population is as stable, as homogeneous, and as uncomplicated as that of the Saar district. Among more than 650,000 residents, there were fewer than 100 French people in 1918. The Saar district has been German for over 1,000 years. Temporary occupations due to French military actions have always ended quickly with the restoration of the territory following peace agreements. Over a span of 1,048 years, France has controlled the area for just under 68 years in total. When, during the first Treaty of Paris in 1814, a small part of the now-desired territory was kept for France, the population strongly opposed it and demanded 'reunion with their German homeland,' to which they were 'connected by language, customs, and religion.' After an occupation lasting a little over a year, this wish was acknowledged in the second Treaty of Paris in 1815. Since then, the region has been continuously linked to Germany and has thrived economically because of that connection."
The French wanted the coal for the purpose of working the ironfields of Lorraine, and in the spirit of Bismarck they have taken it. Not precedent, but the verbal professions of the Allies, have rendered it indefensible.[38]
The French wanted the coal to work the iron fields of Lorraine, and in the spirit of Bismarck, they took it. Not based on precedent, but on the statements made by the Allies, it has become indefensible.[38]
(ii.) Upper Silesia, a district without large towns, in which, however, lies one of the major coalfields of Germany with a production of about 23 per cent of the total German output of hard coal, is, subject to a plebiscite,[39] to be ceded to Poland. Upper Silesia was never part of historic Poland; but its population is mixed Polish, German, and Czecho-Slovakian, the precise proportions of which are disputed.[40] Economically it is intensely German; the industries of Eastern Germany depend upon it for their coal; and its loss would be a destructive blow at the economic structure of the German State.[41]
(ii.) Upper Silesia is a region without large cities, but it does contain one of Germany's major coalfields, producing about 23 percent of the country's total hard coal output. It is set to be transferred to Poland, pending a plebiscite,[39]. Upper Silesia was never part of historic Poland; however, its population consists of Polish, German, and Czecho-Slovakian people, though the exact ratios are disputed.[40] Economically, it is heavily German; the industries in Eastern Germany rely on it for coal, and losing it would be a severe blow to the economic framework of the German state.[41]
With the loss of the fields of Upper Silesia and the Saar, the coal supplies of Germany are diminished by not far short of one-third.
With the loss of the fields of Upper Silesia and the Saar, Germany's coal supplies are reduced by nearly a third.
(iii.) Out of the coal that remains to her, Germany is obliged to make good year by year the estimated loss which France has incurred by the destruction and damage of war in the coalfields of her northern Provinces. In para. 2 of Annex V. to the Reparation Chapter, "Germany undertakes to deliver to France annually, for a period not exceeding ten years, an amount of coal equal to the difference between the annual production before the war of the coal-mines of the Nord and Pas de Calais, destroyed as a result of the war, and the production of the mines of the same area during the year in question: such delivery not to exceed 20,000,000 tons in any one year of the first five years, and 8,000,000 tons in any one year of the succeeding five years."
(iii.) From the remaining coal, Germany is required to compensate each year for the estimated loss that France has suffered due to the destruction and damage caused by the war in the coalfields of its northern provinces. In paragraph 2 of Annex V. to the Reparation Chapter, "Germany agrees to deliver to France annually, for a period not exceeding ten years, an amount of coal equal to the difference between the annual production before the war of the coal mines in Nord and Pas de Calais, which were destroyed as a result of the war, and the production of the mines in the same area during the year in question: such deliveries must not exceed 20,000,000 tons in any one year of the first five years, and 8,000,000 tons in any one year of the following five years."
This is a reasonable provision if it stood by itself, and one which Germany should be able to fulfil if she were left her other resources to do it with.
This is a fair condition on its own, and Germany should be able to meet it if she had access to her other resources.
(iv.) The final provision relating to coal is part of the general scheme of the Reparation Chapter by which the sums due for Reparation are to be partly paid in kind instead of in cash. As a part of the payment due for Reparation, Germany is to make the following deliveries of coal or equivalent in coke (the deliveries to France being wholly additional to the amounts available by the cession of the Saar or in compensation for destruction in Northern France):—
(iv.) The last provision about coal is part of the overall plan of the Reparation Chapter, which states that some of the payments for Reparation will be made in goods instead of cash. As part of the payment owed for Reparation, Germany is required to deliver the following amounts of coal or its equivalent in coke (with the deliveries to France being completely separate from the quantities obtained through the cession of the Saar or in compensation for the damage in Northern France):—
(i.) To France 7,000,000 tons annually for ten years;[42]
(i.) To France 7,000,000 tons every year for ten years;[42]
(ii.) To Belgium 8,000,000 tons annually for ten years;
(ii.) To Belgium 8,000,000 tons each year for ten years;
(iii.) To Italy an annual quantity, rising by annual increments from 4,500,000 tons in 1919-1920 to 8,500,000 tons in each of the six years, 1923-1924 to 1928-1929;
(iii.) To Italy, an annual amount, increasing each year from 4,500,000 tons in 1919-1920 to 8,500,000 tons in each of the six years from 1923-1924 to 1928-1929;
(iv.) To Luxemburg, if required, a quantity of coal equal to the pre-war annual consumption of German coal in Luxemburg.
(iv.) To Luxembourg, if needed, an amount of coal equal to the pre-war annual consumption of German coal in Luxembourg.
This amounts in all to an annual average of about 25,000,000 tons.
This totals to an annual average of around 25,000,000 tons.
These figures have to be examined in relation to Germany's probable output. The maximum pre-war figure was reached in 1913 with a total of 191,500,000 tons. Of this, 19,000,000 tons were consumed at the mines, and on balance (i.e. exports less imports) 33,500,000 tons were exported, leaving 139,000,000 tons for domestic consumption. It is estimated that this total was employed as follows:—
These numbers need to be looked at in relation to Germany's expected output. The highest figure before the war was hit in 1913, totaling 191,500,000 tons. Of that, 19,000,000 tons were used at the mines, and after accounting for exports (i.e., exports minus imports), 33,500,000 tons were exported, leaving 139,000,000 tons for domestic use. It's estimated that this total was used as follows:—
Railways | 18,000,000 | tons. | |||
Gas, water, and electricity | 12,500,000 | " | |||
Bunkers | 6,500,000 | " | |||
House-fuel, small industry and agriculture | 24,000,000 | " | |||
Industry | 78,000,000 | " | |||
139,000,000 | " | ||||
The diminution of production due to loss of territory is:— | |||||
Alsace-Lorraine | 3,800,000 | tons. | |||
Saar Basin | 13,200,000 | " | |||
Upper Silesia | 43,800,000 | " | |||
60,800,000 | " |
There would remain, therefore, on the basis of the 1913 output, 130,700,000 tons, or, deducting consumption at the mines themselves, (say) 118,000,000 tons. For some years there must be sent out of this supply upwards of 20,000,000 tons to France as compensation for damage done to French mines, and 25,000,000 tons to France, Belgium, Italy, and Luxemburg;[43] as the former figure is a maximum, and the latter figure is to be slightly less in the earliest years, we may take the total export to Allied countries which Germany has undertaken to provide as 40,000,000 tons, leaving, on the above basis, 78,000,000 tons for her own use as against a pre-war consumption of 139,000,000 tons.
There would still be, based on the 1913 output, 130,700,000 tons, or, after accounting for consumption at the mines themselves, about 118,000,000 tons. For several years, over 20,000,000 tons needs to be sent to France as compensation for damage to French mines, and 25,000,000 tons to France, Belgium, Italy, and Luxembourg; [43] since the first figure is a maximum and the latter figure will be slightly less in the initial years, we can estimate the total export to Allied countries that Germany has committed to provide as 40,000,000 tons, leaving 78,000,000 tons for its own use compared to a pre-war consumption of 139,000,000 tons.
This comparison, however, requires substantial modification to make it accurate. On the one hand, it is certain that the figures of pre-war output cannot be relied on as a basis of present output. During 1918 the production was 161,500,000 tons as compared with 191,500,000 tons in 1913; and during the first half of 1919 it was less than 50,000,000 tons, exclusive of Alsace-Lorraine and the Saar but including Upper Silesia, corresponding to an annual production of about 100,000,000 tons.[44] The causes of so low an output were in part temporary and exceptional but the German authorities agree, and have not been confuted, that some of them are bound to persist for some time to come. In part they are the same as elsewhere; the daily shift has been shortened from 8-1/2 to 7 hours, and it is improbable that the powers of the Central Government will be adequate to restore them to their former figure. But in addition, the mining plant is in bad condition (due to the lack of certain essential materials during the blockade), the physical efficiency of the men is greatly impaired by malnutrition (which cannot be cured if a tithe of the reparation demands are to be satisfied,—the standard of life will have rather to be lowered), and the casualties of the war have diminished the numbers of efficient miners. The analogy of English conditions is sufficient by itself to tell us that a pre-war level of output cannot be expected in Germany. German authorities put the loss of output at somewhat above 30 per cent, divided about equally between the shortening of the shift and the other economic influences. This figure appears on general grounds to be plausible, but I have not the knowledge to endorse or to criticize it.
This comparison, however, requires significant adjustments to be accurate. On one hand, it’s clear that the production figures from before the war can’t serve as a reliable basis for current output. In 1918, production was 161,500,000 tons compared to 191,500,000 tons in 1913; during the first half of 1919, it dropped to less than 50,000,000 tons, not including Alsace-Lorraine and the Saar but including Upper Silesia, which amounts to an estimated annual production of about 100,000,000 tons.[44] The reasons for such low output are partly temporary and unusual, but German authorities agree, and have not been proven wrong, that some of these issues will likely continue for a while. Some are similar to those faced elsewhere; the daily work shift has been reduced from 8.5 hours to 7 hours, and it’s unlikely that the Central Government has enough power to return it to its previous length. Additionally, the mining facilities are in poor condition (due to the lack of essential materials during the blockade), workers’ physical efficiency has been severely affected by malnutrition (which can’t be improved if a fraction of the reparation demands are to be met—the standard of living will likely need to be lowered), and the war casualties have reduced the number of skilled miners. The comparison with conditions in England alone is enough to indicate that a pre-war level of output can’t be expected in Germany. German authorities estimate the loss in output to be slightly above 30 percent, with the reasons split about equally between the shortened shifts and other economic factors. This estimate seems reasonable overall, but I don’t have the expertise to fully support or critique it.
The pre-war figure of 118,000,000 tons net (i.e. after allowing for loss of territory and consumption at the mines) is likely to fall, therefore, at least as low as to 100,000,000[45] tons, having regard to the above factors. If 40,000,000 tons of this are to be exported to the Allies, there remain 60,000,000 tons for Germany herself to meet her own domestic consumption. Demand as well as supply will be diminished by loss of territory, but at the most extravagant estimate this could not be put above 29,000,000 tons.[46] Our hypothetical calculations, therefore, leave us with post-war German domestic requirements, on the basis of a pre-war efficiency of railways and industry, of 110,000,000 tons against an output not exceeding 100,000,000 tons, of which 40,000,000 tons are mortgaged to the Allies.
The pre-war figure of 118,000,000 tons net (i.e. after accounting for loss of territory and consumption at the mines) is likely to drop to at least 100,000,000[45] tons, considering the factors mentioned above. If 40,000,000 tons of this are to be exported to the Allies, that leaves 60,000,000 tons for Germany to meet its own domestic needs. Both demand and supply will decrease due to the loss of territory, but even at the most optimistic estimate, this reduction couldn’t exceed 29,000,000 tons.[46] Our hypothetical calculations, therefore, suggest that post-war German domestic requirements, based on pre-war efficiency of railways and industry, would be around 110,000,000 tons, while the output will not exceed 100,000,000 tons, with 40,000,000 tons already committed to the Allies.
The importance of the subject has led me into a somewhat lengthy statistical analysis. It is evident that too much significance must not be attached to the precise figures arrived at, which are hypothetical and dubious.[47] But the general character of the facts presents itself irresistibly. Allowing for the loss of territory and the loss of efficiency, Germany cannot export coal in the near future (and will even be dependent on her Treaty rights to purchase in Upper Silesia), if she is to continue as an industrial nation. Every million tons she is forced to export must be at the expense of closing down an industry. With results to be considered later this within certain limits is possible. But it is evident that Germany cannot and will not furnish the Allies with a contribution of 40,000,000 tons annually. Those Allied Ministers, who have told their peoples that she can, have certainly deceived them for the sake of allaying for the moment the misgivings of the European peoples as to the path along which they are being led.
The importance of this topic has led me to conduct a somewhat lengthy statistical analysis. It's clear that we shouldn't put too much emphasis on the exact figures we've gathered, which are hypothetical and questionable.[47] However, the overall nature of the facts is compelling. Considering the loss of territory and efficiency, Germany won't be able to export coal in the near future (and will even rely on her Treaty rights to buy in Upper Silesia) if she wants to remain an industrial nation. For every million tons she has to export, an industry will have to shut down. While this is feasible within certain limits, it’s obvious that Germany cannot and will not provide the Allies with 40 million tons yearly. Those Allied Ministers who have told their citizens that she can, have certainly misled them to temporarily ease the concerns of the European public about the direction they are being taken.
The presence of these illusory provisions (amongst others) in the clauses of the Treaty of Peace is especially charged with danger for the future. The more extravagant expectations as to Reparation receipts, by which Finance Ministers have deceived their publics, will be heard of no more when they have served their immediate purpose of postponing the hour of taxation and retrenchment. But the coal clauses will not be lost sight of so easily,—for the reason that it will be absolutely vital in the interests of France and Italy that these countries should do everything in their power to exact their bond. As a result of the diminished output due to German destruction in France, of the diminished output of mines in the United Kingdom and elsewhere, and of many secondary causes, such as the breakdown of transport and of organization and the inefficiency of new governments, the coal position of all Europe is nearly desperate;[48] and France and Italy, entering the scramble with certain Treaty rights, will not lightly surrender them.
The presence of these misleading provisions (among others) in the clauses of the Treaty of Peace poses a significant risk for the future. The unrealistic expectations surrounding reparations, which finance ministers have used to mislead their citizens, will fade away once they have served their immediate purpose of delaying tax increases and budget cuts. However, the coal clauses won't be forgotten so easily—because it's crucial for France and Italy to do everything they can to enforce their rights. Due to reduced production caused by destruction in France, decreased output from mines in the UK and elsewhere, and various secondary issues like transportation breakdowns, disorganization, and the inefficiency of new governments, Europe's coal situation is nearly hopeless; and with the Treaty rights at stake, France and Italy won't easily give them up.
As is generally the case in real dilemmas, the French and Italian case will possess great force, indeed unanswerable force from a certain point of view. The position will be truly represented as a question between German industry on the one hand and French and Italian industry on the other. It may be admitted that the surrender of the coal will destroy German industry, but it may be equally true that its non-surrender will jeopardize French and Italian industry. In such a case must not the victors with their Treaty rights prevail, especially when much of the damage has been ultimately due to the wicked acts of those who are now defeated? Yet if these feelings and these rights are allowed to prevail beyond what wisdom would recommend, the reactions on the social and economic life of Central Europe will be far too strong to be confined within their original limits.
In real dilemmas, the situations in France and Italy carry a lot of weight, even being difficult to dispute from a certain perspective. The issue is essentially framed as a conflict between German industry on one side and French and Italian industry on the other. It's true that giving up coal would ruin German industry, but equally, not giving it up could threaten French and Italian industry. In this scenario, shouldn't the victors uphold their treaty rights, especially when much of the damage resulted from the harmful actions of those who are now defeated? However, if these feelings and rights are allowed to dominate beyond what is wise, the effects on the social and economic landscape of Central Europe could be too intense to remain contained.
But this is not yet the whole problem. If France and Italy are to make good their own deficiencies in coal from the output of Germany, then Northern Europe, Switzerland, and Austria, which previously drew their coal in large part from Germany's exportable surplus, must be starved of their supplies. Before the war 13,600,000 tons of Germany's coal exports went to Austria-Hungary. Inasmuch as nearly all the coalfields of the former Empire lie outside what is now German-Austria, the industrial ruin of this latter state, if she cannot obtain coal from Germany, will be complete. The case of Germany's neutral neighbors, who were formerly supplied in part from Great Britain but in large part from Germany, will be hardly less serious. They will go to great lengths in the direction of making their own supplies to Germany of materials which are essential to her, conditional on these being paid for in coal. Indeed they are already doing so.[49] With the breakdown of money economy the practice of international barter is becoming prevalent. Nowadays money in Central and South-Eastern Europe is seldom a true measure of value in exchange, and will not necessarily buy anything, with the consequence that one country, possessing a commodity essential to the needs of another, sells it not for cash but only against a reciprocal engagement on the part of the latter country to furnish in return some article not less necessary to the former. This is an extraordinary complication as compared with the former almost perfect simplicity of international trade. But in the no less extraordinary conditions of to-day's industry it is not without advantages as a means of stimulating production. The butter-shifts of the Ruhr[50] show how far modern Europe has retrograded in the direction of barter, and afford a picturesque illustration of the low economic organization to which the breakdown of currency and free exchange between individuals and nations is quickly leading us. But they may produce the coal where other devices would fail.[51]
But this isn't the whole problem yet. If France and Italy are going to cover their coal shortages with Germany's output, then Northern Europe, Switzerland, and Austria, which used to rely heavily on Germany's coal exports, will end up short. Before the war, Germany exported 13,600,000 tons of coal to Austria-Hungary. Since almost all of the former Empire's coalfields are now outside of what is considered German-Austria, the industrial collapse of this region will be complete if it can't get coal from Germany. The same goes for Germany's neutral neighbors, who used to receive some supplies from Great Britain but mainly from Germany; their situation will be equally serious. They will go to great lengths to ensure that the materials they provide to Germany are paid for with coal. In fact, they are already doing this.[49] With the collapse of the monetary economy, international barter is becoming more common. Nowadays, money in Central and South-Eastern Europe is seldom a true indicator of value in trade and might not buy anything at all. This means that one country, having essential goods for another, sells them not for cash but on the condition that the latter country provides something equally necessary in return. This makes things quite complicated compared to the previously straightforward international trade. However, under today’s unusual industrial conditions, it does have its benefits in boosting production. The butter-shifts of the Ruhr[50] demonstrate how far modern Europe has regressed towards barter and provide a vivid example of the poor economic structure caused by the collapse of currency and free trade between individuals and nations. But they might be able to produce coal where other methods would fail.[51]
Yet if Germany can find coal for the neighboring neutrals, France and Italy may loudly claim that in this case she can and must keep her treaty obligations. In this there will be a great show of justice, and it will be difficult to weigh against such claims the possible facts that, while German miners will work for butter, there is no available means of compelling them to get coal, the sale of which will bring in nothing, and that if Germany has no coal to send to her neighbors she may fail to secure imports essential to her economic existence.
Yet if Germany can find coal for the neighboring neutral countries, France and Italy might loudly argue that in this situation, she can and must uphold her treaty obligations. This will create a strong appearance of justice, and it will be hard to counter such claims with the potential reality that, while German miners will work for better pay, there’s no way to force them to mine coal, which won’t generate any profit, and that if Germany lacks coal to send to her neighbors, she could fail to secure vital imports necessary for her economic survival.
If the distribution of the European coal supplies is to be a scramble in which France is satisfied first, Italy next, and every one else takes their chance, the industrial future of Europe is black and the prospects of revolution very good. It is a case where particular interests and particular claims, however well founded in sentiment or in justice, must yield to sovereign expediency. If there is any approximate truth in Mr. Hoover's calculation that the coal output of Europe has fallen by one-third, a situation confronts us where distribution must be effected with even-handed impartiality in accordance with need, and no incentive can be neglected towards increased production and economical methods of transport. The establishment by the Supreme Council of the Allies in August, 1919, of a European Coal Commission, consisting of delegates from Great Britain, France, Italy, Belgium, Poland, and Czecho-Slovakia was a wise measure which, properly employed and extended, may prove of great assistance. But I reserve constructive proposals for Chapter VII. Here I am only concerned with tracing the consequences, per impossibile, of carrying out the Treaty au pied de lettre.[52]
If the distribution of European coal supplies turns into a race where France goes first, Italy follows, and everyone else takes what they can get, the industrial future of Europe looks grim and the chances of revolution are high. This is a situation where individual interests and claims, no matter how justified in feelings or fairness, must give way to national necessity. If Mr. Hoover's estimate that coal production in Europe has dropped by a third is even close to the truth, we face a situation where distribution must be handled fairly according to need, and we can't overlook any incentives for boosting production and improving transport efficiency. The establishment of a European Coal Commission by the Supreme Council of the Allies in August 1919, with representatives from Great Britain, France, Italy, Belgium, Poland, and Czecho-Slovakia, was a smart move that, if used effectively and expanded, could be very helpful. But I'll save my constructive suggestions for Chapter VII. Right now, I'm focused on outlining the consequences, per impossibile, of implementing the Treaty au pied de lettre.[52]
(2) The provisions relating to iron-ore require less detailed attention, though their effects are destructive. They require less attention, because they are in large measure inevitable. Almost exactly 75 per cent of the iron-ore raised in Germany in 1913 came from Alsace-Lorraine.[53] In this the chief importance of the stolen provinces lay.
(2) The rules about iron ore don’t need as much focus, even though their effects are harmful. They need less attention because they are mostly unavoidable. Around 75 percent of the iron ore produced in Germany in 1913 came from Alsace-Lorraine.[53] In this, the main significance of the annexed regions was highlighted.
There is no question but that Germany must lose these ore-fields. The only question is how far she is to be allowed facilities for purchasing their produce. The German Delegation made strong efforts to secure the inclusion of a provision by which coal and coke to be furnished by them to France should be given in exchange for minette from Lorraine. But they secured no such stipulation, and the matter remains at France's option.
There’s no doubt that Germany has to lose these ore fields. The only question is how much access they will have to buy their products. The German Delegation worked hard to get a deal that would allow them to exchange the coal and coke they supplied to France for minette from Lorraine. However, they didn't get that agreement, and it’s now up to France to decide.
The motives which will govern France's eventual policy are not entirely concordant. While Lorraine comprised 75 per cent of Germany's iron-ore, only 25 per cent of the blast furnaces lay within Lorraine and the Saar basin together, a large proportion of the ore being carried into Germany proper. Approximately the same proportion of Germany's iron and steel foundries, namely 25 per cent, were situated in Alsace-Lorraine. For the moment, therefore, the most economical and profitable course would certainly be to export to Germany, as hitherto, a considerable part of the output of the mines.
The motives that will shape France's future policy are not completely aligned. While Lorraine had 75 percent of Germany's iron ore, only 25 percent of the blast furnaces were located in Lorraine and the Saar basin combined, with a significant amount of the ore being transported into Germany proper. About the same percentage of Germany's iron and steel foundries, specifically 25 percent, were based in Alsace-Lorraine. For now, the most economical and profitable option would definitely be to continue exporting a significant part of the mines' output to Germany, as has been done before.
On the other hand, France, having recovered the deposits of Lorraine, may be expected to aim at replacing as far as possible the industries, which Germany had based on them, by industries situated within her own frontiers. Much time must elapse before the plant and the skilled labor could be developed within France, and even so she could hardly deal with the ore unless she could rely on receiving the coal from Germany. The uncertainty, too, as to the ultimate fate of the Saar will be disturbing to the calculations of capitalists who contemplate the establishment of new industries in France.
On the other hand, France, having recovered the resources of Lorraine, is likely to try to replace as much as possible the industries that Germany had based on them with industries located within its own borders. A lot of time will pass before the facilities and skilled labor can be developed in France, and even then, it would struggle to process the ore without a steady supply of coal from Germany. The uncertainty regarding the eventual fate of the Saar will also disrupt the plans of investors looking to establish new industries in France.
In fact, here, as elsewhere, political considerations cut disastrously across economic. In a régime of Free Trade and free economic intercourse it would be of little consequence that iron lay on one side of a political frontier, and labor, coal, and blast furnaces on the other. But as it is, men have devised ways to impoverish themselves and one another; and prefer collective animosities to individual happiness. It seems certain, calculating on the present passions and impulses of European capitalistic society, that the effective iron output of Europe will be diminished by a new political frontier (which sentiment and historic justice require), because nationalism and private interest are thus allowed to impose a new economic frontier along the same lines. These latter considerations are allowed, in the present governance of Europe, to prevail over the intense need of the Continent for the most sustained and efficient production to repair the destructions of war, and to satisfy the insistence of labor for a larger reward.[54]
In fact, here, as everywhere else, political issues severely impact economics. In a system of Free Trade and open economic exchange, it wouldn't matter if iron was on one side of a political boundary while labor, coal, and blast furnaces were on the other. But the reality is that people have found ways to make themselves and each other worse off; they choose group conflicts over personal happiness. Given the current passions and motivations within European capitalist society, it seems likely that Europe's effective iron output will decrease due to a new political boundary (which feelings and historical justice demand), since nationalism and personal interests are allowed to create a new economic division along the same lines. These factors are currently prioritized in Europe's governance over the pressing need for the continent to achieve the most sustained and efficient production to recover from the devastation of war and meet the labor demands for better compensation.[54]
The same influences are likely to be seen, though on a lesser scale, in the event of the transference of Upper Silesia to Poland. While Upper Silesia contains but little iron, the presence of coal has led to the establishment of numerous blast furnaces. What is to be the fate of these? If Germany is cut off from her supplies of ore on the west, will she export beyond her frontiers on the east any part of the little which remains to her? The efficiency and output of the industry seem certain to diminish.
The same influences are probably going to be noticeable, though to a lesser extent, if Upper Silesia is transferred to Poland. While Upper Silesia has very little iron, the presence of coal has resulted in many blast furnaces being set up. What will happen to these? If Germany is cut off from its ore supplies to the west, will it export any of the little that remains to the east? The efficiency and production of the industry seem likely to decline.
Thus the Treaty strikes at organization, and by the destruction of organization impairs yet further the reduced wealth of the whole community. The economic frontiers which are to be established between the coal and the iron, upon which modern industrialism is founded, will not only diminish the production of useful commodities, but may possibly occupy an immense quantity of human labor in dragging iron or coal, as the case may be, over many useless miles to satisfy the dictates of a political treaty or because obstructions have been established to the proper localization of industry.
Thus, the Treaty undermines organization, and by dismantling it, further diminishes the already reduced wealth of the entire community. The economic borders that will be created between coal and iron, which modern industrialism relies on, will not only reduce the production of useful goods but could also require a massive amount of human labor to transport iron or coal, as necessary, over many unnecessary miles just to comply with a political treaty or because obstacles have been put in place that prevent proper industrial localization.
III
There remain those Treaty provisions which relate to the transport and the tariff systems of Germany. These parts of the Treaty have not nearly the importance and the significance of those discussed hitherto. They are pin-pricks, interferences and vexations, not so much objectionable for their solid consequences, as dishonorable to the Allies in the light of their professions. Let the reader consider what follows in the light of the assurances already quoted, in reliance on which Germany laid down her arms.
There are still some Treaty provisions related to Germany's transport and tariff systems. These sections of the Treaty are not nearly as important or significant as the ones discussed earlier. They are minor annoyances and interferences, not so much because of their real impact, but because they seem dishonorable to the Allies given their stated intentions. The reader should keep in mind the assurances previously mentioned, which Germany relied on when it laid down its arms.
(i.) The miscellaneous Economic Clauses commence with a number of provisions which would be in accordance with the spirit of the third of the Fourteen Points,—if they were reciprocal. Both for imports and exports, and as regards tariffs, regulations, and prohibitions, Germany binds herself for five years to accord most-favored-nation treatment to the Allied and Associated States.[55] But she is not entitled herself to receive such treatment.
(i.) The miscellaneous Economic Clauses start with several provisions that align with the spirit of the third of the Fourteen Points—if they were mutual. For both imports and exports, as well as tariffs, regulations, and prohibitions, Germany commits to offering most-favored-nation treatment to the Allied and Associated States for five years.[55] However, she is not allowed to receive such treatment herself.
For five years Alsace-Lorraine shall be free to export into Germany, without payment of customs duty, up to the average amount sent annually into Germany from 1911 to 1913.[56] But there is no similar provision for German exports into Alsace-Lorraine.
For five years, Alsace-Lorraine will be allowed to export to Germany without paying customs duties, up to the average amount sent annually from 1911 to 1913.[56] However, there is no similar arrangement for German exports to Alsace-Lorraine.
For three years Polish exports to Germany, and for five years Luxemburg's exports to Germany, are to have a similar privilege,[57]— but not German exports to Poland or to Luxemburg. Luxemburg also, which for many years has enjoyed the benefits of inclusion within the German Customs Union, is permanently excluded from it henceforward.[58]
For three years, Polish exports to Germany, and for five years, Luxembourg's exports to Germany will have the same privilege,[57]—but not German exports to Poland or Luxembourg. Luxembourg, which has benefited from being part of the German Customs Union for many years, will now be permanently excluded from it.[58]
For six months after the Treaty has come into force Germany may not impose duties on imports from the Allied and Associated States higher than the most favorable duties prevalent before the war and for a further two years and a half (making three years in all) this prohibition continues to apply to certain commodities, notably to some of those as to which special agreements existed before the war, and also to wine, to vegetable oils, to artificial silk, and to washed or scoured wool.[59] This is a ridiculous and injurious provision, by which Germany is prevented from taking those steps necessary to conserve her limited resources for the purchase of necessaries and the discharge of Reparation. As a result of the existing distribution of wealth in Germany, and of financial wantonness amongst individuals, the offspring of uncertainty, Germany is threatened with a deluge of luxuries and semi-luxuries from abroad, of which she has been starved for years, which would exhaust or diminish her small supplies of foreign exchange. These provisions strike at the authority of the German Government to ensure economy in such consumption, or to raise taxation during a critical period. What an example of senseless greed overreaching itself, to introduce, after taking from Germany what liquid wealth she has and demanding impossible payments for the future, a special and particularized injunction that she must allow as readily as in the days of her prosperity the import of champagne and of silk!
For six months after the Treaty takes effect, Germany cannot impose import duties on goods from Allied and Associated States that are higher than the most favorable rates in place before the war. For an additional two and a half years (making three years total), this ban continues for certain products, particularly those with special agreements that existed before the war, along with wine, vegetable oils, artificial silk, and washed or scoured wool.[59] This is a ridiculous and damaging rule, preventing Germany from taking necessary steps to conserve its limited resources for buying essentials and fulfilling Reparations. Due to the current distribution of wealth in Germany and reckless financial behavior among individuals, a result of uncertainty, Germany is at risk of being flooded with luxuries and semi-luxuries from abroad, which it has been deprived of for years, likely exhausting or reducing its small reserves of foreign exchange. These rules undermine the authority of the German Government to manage consumption wisely or to increase taxes during a critical time. What a prime example of senseless greed gone too far, to demand that after stripping Germany of its liquid assets and requiring unreasonable payments in the future, a specific and detailed mandate be enforced that allows the import of champagne and silk just as freely as in the days of its prosperity!
One other Article affects the Customs Régime of Germany which, if it was applied, would be serious and extensive in its consequences. The Allies have reserved the right to apply a special customs régime to the occupied area on the bank of the Rhine, "in the event of such a measure being necessary in their opinion in order to safeguard the economic interests of the population of these territories."[60] This provision was probably introduced as a possibly useful adjunct to the French policy of somehow detaching the left bank provinces from Germany during the years of their occupation. The project of establishing an independent Republic under French clerical auspices, which would act as a buffer state and realize the French ambition of driving Germany proper beyond the Rhine, has not yet been abandoned. Some believe that much may be accomplished by a régime of threats, bribes, and cajolery extended over a period of fifteen years or longer.[61] If this Article is acted upon, and the economic system of the left bank of the Rhine is effectively severed from the rest of Germany, the effect would be far-reaching. But the dreams of designing diplomats do not always prosper, and we must trust the future.
One other article impacts the customs regime of Germany, which, if implemented, would have serious and widespread consequences. The Allies have reserved the right to apply a special customs regime to the occupied area along the Rhine River, "if such a measure is deemed necessary in their opinion to protect the economic interests of the local population."[60] This provision was likely introduced as a potentially useful addition to the French strategy of detaching the left bank territories from Germany during their years of occupation. The plan to establish an independent Republic under French clerical support, which would serve as a buffer state and fulfill the French goal of pushing Germany beyond the Rhine, has not been entirely abandoned. Some think that a regime of threats, bribes, and persuasion could achieve a lot over a span of fifteen years or more.[61] If this article is enacted, and the economic system of the left bank of the Rhine is effectively cut off from the rest of Germany, the impact would be significant. But the ambitions of crafty diplomats don't always succeed, and we must trust in what the future holds.
(ii.) The clauses relating to Railways, as originally presented to Germany, were substantially modified in the final Treaty, and are now limited to a provision by which goods, coming from Allied territory to Germany, or in transit through Germany, shall receive the most favored treatment as regards rail freight rates, etc., applied to goods of the same kind carried on any German lines "under similar conditions of transport, for example, as regards length of route."[62] As a non-reciprocal provision this is an act of interference in internal arrangements which it is difficult to justify, but the practical effect of this,[63] and of an analogous provision relating to passenger traffic,[64] will much depend on the interpretation of the phrase, "similar conditions of transport."[65]
(ii.) The clauses regarding Railways, as originally proposed to Germany, were significantly changed in the final Treaty and now include a provision stating that goods coming from Allied territory to Germany, or passing through Germany, will receive the most favored treatment in terms of rail freight rates, etc., compared to goods of the same type transported on any German lines "under similar transport conditions, such as route length."[62] As a non-reciprocal provision, this is an interference in internal arrangements that is hard to justify, but the practical impact of this,[63] and of a similar provision related to passenger traffic,[64] will largely depend on how the phrase "similar conditions of transport" is interpreted.[65]
For the time being Germany's transport system will be much more seriously disordered by the provisions relating to the cession of rolling-stock. Under paragraph 7 of the Armistice conditions Germany was called on to surrender 5000 locomotives and 150,000 wagons, "in good working order, with all necessary spare parts and fittings." Under the Treaty Germany is required to confirm this surrender and to recognize the title of the Allies to the material.[66] She is further required, in the case of railway systems in ceded territory, to hand over these systems complete with their full complement of rolling-stock "in a normal state of upkeep" as shown in the last inventory before November 11, 1918.[67] That is to say, ceded railway systems are not to bear any share in the general depletion and deterioration of the German rolling-stock as a whole.
For now, Germany's transportation system will be significantly disrupted by the rules about giving up rolling stock. According to paragraph 7 of the Armistice conditions, Germany was instructed to surrender 5,000 locomotives and 150,000 wagons, "in good working order, with all necessary spare parts and fittings." Under the Treaty, Germany must confirm this surrender and acknowledge the Allies' ownership of the equipment.[66] Additionally, for railway systems in the territories being ceded, Germany is required to hand over these systems complete with their full set of rolling stock "in a normal state of upkeep" as indicated in the most recent inventory before November 11, 1918.[67] This means that ceded railway systems should not be affected by the overall decline and deterioration of German rolling stock.
This is a loss which in course of time can doubtless be made good. But lack of lubricating oils and the prodigious wear and tear of the war, not compensated by normal repairs, had already reduced the German railway system to a low state of efficiency. The further heavy losses under the Treaty will confirm this state of affairs for some time to come, and are a substantial aggravation of the difficulties of the coal problem and of export industry generally.
This is a loss that can definitely be recovered over time. However, the shortage of lubricating oils and the extreme strain from the war, which normal repairs couldn't address, had already brought the German railway system down to a low level of efficiency. The additional significant losses imposed by the Treaty will prolong this situation for a while and will greatly worsen the challenges of the coal issue and the export industry in general.
(iii.) There remain the clauses relating to the river system of Germany. These are largely unnecessary and are so little related to the supposed aims of the Allies that their purport is generally unknown. Yet they constitute an unprecedented interference with a country's domestic arrangements and are capable of being so operated as to take from Germany all effective control over her own transport system. In their present form they are incapable of justification; but some simple changes might transform them into a reasonable instrument.
(iii.) There are still the clauses about Germany's river system. These are mostly unnecessary and have little to do with what the Allies supposedly aimed for, so their meaning is generally unclear. However, they represent an unprecedented interference in a country's domestic affairs and could effectively strip Germany of control over its own transport system. As they stand now, they can't be justified; but a few simple changes could turn them into a reasonable tool.
Most of the principal rivers of Germany have their source or their outlet in non-German territory. The Rhine, rising in Switzerland, is now a frontier river for a part of its course, and finds the sea in Holland; the Danube rises in Germany but flows over its greater length elsewhere; the Elbe rises in the mountains of Bohemia, now called Czecho-Slovakia; the Oder traverses Lower Silesia; and the Niemen now bounds the frontier of East Prussia and has its source in Russia. Of these, the Rhine and the Niemen are frontier rivers, the Elbe is primarily German but in its upper reaches has much importance for Bohemia, the Danube in its German parts appears to have little concern for any country but Germany, and the Oder is an almost purely German river unless the result of the plebiscite is to detach all Upper Silesia.
Most of the major rivers in Germany either start or end outside of German territory. The Rhine, which begins in Switzerland, serves as a border river for part of its journey and flows into the sea in Holland. The Danube starts in Germany but mainly flows through other countries. The Elbe has its source in the mountains of Bohemia, now known as Czecho-Slovakia. The Oder runs through Lower Silesia, and the Niemen now marks the border of East Prussia, with its source in Russia. Among these, the Rhine and the Niemen are border rivers, the Elbe is mainly German but is significant for Bohemia in its upper reaches, the Danube in its German sections seems mainly relevant to Germany, and the Oder is almost entirely a German river unless a plebiscite ultimately separates all of Upper Silesia.
Rivers which, in the words of the Treaty, "naturally provide more than one State with access to the sea," properly require some measure of international regulation and adequate guarantees against discrimination. This principle has long been recognized in the International Commissions which regulate the Rhine and the Danube. But on such Commissions the States concerned should be represented more or less in proportion to their interests. The Treaty, however, has made the international character of these rivers a pretext for taking the river system of Germany out of German control.
Rivers that, as stated in the Treaty, "naturally provide more than one State with access to the sea," clearly need some level of international regulation and solid protections against discrimination. This principle has been acknowledged for a long time in the International Commissions that oversee the Rhine and the Danube. However, in these Commissions, the States involved should be represented roughly in proportion to their interests. The Treaty, on the other hand, has used the international status of these rivers as an excuse to remove the river system of Germany from German control.
After certain Articles which provide suitably against discrimination and interference with freedom of transit,[68] the Treaty proceeds to hand over the administration of the Elbe, the Oder, the Danube, and the Rhine to International Commissions.[69] The ultimate powers of these Commissions are to be determined by "a General Convention drawn up by the Allied and Associated Powers, and approved by the League of Nations."[70] In the meantime the Commissions are to draw up their own constitutions and are apparently to enjoy powers of the most extensive description, "particularly in regard to the execution of works of maintenance, control, and improvement on the river system, the financial régime, the fixing and collection of charges, and regulations for navigation."[71]
After certain Articles that appropriately protect against discrimination and interference with the freedom of transit,[68] the Treaty goes on to assign the management of the Elbe, the Oder, the Danube, and the Rhine to International Commissions.[69] The ultimate authority of these Commissions will be defined by "a General Convention created by the Allied and Associated Powers, and approved by the League of Nations."[70] In the meantime, the Commissions will establish their own constitutions and will apparently have extensive powers, "especially concerning the execution of maintenance, control, and improvement projects on the river system, the financial structure, the setting and collection of fees, and regulations for navigation."[71]
So far there is much to be said for the Treaty. Freedom of through transit is a not unimportant part of good international practice and should be established everywhere. The objectionable feature of the Commissions lies in their membership. In each case the voting is so weighted as to place Germany in a clear minority. On the Elbe Commission Germany has four votes out of ten; on the Oder Commission three out of nine; on the Rhine Commission four out of nineteen; on the Danube Commission, which is not yet definitely constituted, she will be apparently in a small minority. On the government of all these rivers France and Great Britain are represented; and on the Elbe for some undiscoverable reason there are also representatives of Italy and Belgium.
So far, there’s a lot to be said for the Treaty. Freedom of transit is an important part of good international practice and should be established everywhere. The problematic aspect of the Commissions is their membership. In each case, the voting is set up so that Germany is clearly in the minority. On the Elbe Commission, Germany has four votes out of ten; on the Oder Commission, three out of nine; on the Rhine Commission, four out of nineteen; and on the Danube Commission, which isn’t officially formed yet, it seems Germany will also be in a small minority. France and Great Britain are represented in the governance of all these rivers, and for some unknown reason, there are also representatives from Italy and Belgium on the Elbe.
Thus the great waterways of Germany are handed over to foreign bodies with the widest powers; and much of the local and domestic business of Hamburg, Magdeburg, Dresden, Stettin, Frankfurt, Breslan, and Ulm will be subject to a foreign jurisdiction. It is almost as though the Powers of Continental Europe were to be placed in a majority on the Thames Conservancy or the Port of London.
Thus, the major waterways of Germany are given over to foreign entities with extensive authority; much of the local and domestic business in Hamburg, Magdeburg, Dresden, Stettin, Frankfurt, Breslau, and Ulm will be under foreign jurisdiction. It’s almost like if the powers of Continental Europe were to have a majority on the Thames Conservancy or the Port of London.
Certain minor provisions follow lines which in our survey of the Treaty are now familiar. Under Annex III. of the Reparation Chapter Germany is to cede up to 20 per cent of her inland navigation tonnage. Over and above this she must cede such proportion of her river craft upon the Elbe, the Oder, the Niemen, and the Danube as an American arbitrator may determine, "due regard being had to the legitimate needs of the parties concerned, and particularly to the shipping traffic during the five years preceding the war," the craft so ceded to be selected from those most recently built.[72] The same course is to be followed with German vessels and tugs on the Rhine and with German property in the port of Rotterdam.[73] Where the Rhine flows between France and Germany, France is to have all the rights of utilizing the water for irrigation or for power and Germany is to have none;[74] and all the bridges are to be French property as to their whole length.[75] Finally the administration of the purely German Rhine port of Kehl lying on the eastern bank of the river is to be united to that of Strassburg for seven years and managed by a Frenchman to be nominated by the new Rhine Commission.
Certain minor provisions follow lines that are now familiar from our review of the Treaty. Under Annex III of the Reparation Chapter, Germany must give up up to 20 percent of its inland navigation tonnage. In addition to this, it must cede a proportion of its river craft on the Elbe, the Oder, the Niemen, and the Danube as determined by an American arbitrator, "taking into account the legitimate needs of the parties involved, especially the shipping traffic during the five years before the war," with the ceded craft being selected from those most recently built.[72] The same procedure will apply to German vessels and tugs on the Rhine as well as German property in the port of Rotterdam.[73] Where the Rhine runs between France and Germany, France will have all the rights to use the water for irrigation or power, and Germany will have none;[74] and all the bridges will be fully owned by the French.[75] Finally, the administration of the purely German Rhine port of Kehl, located on the eastern bank of the river, will be combined with that of Strassburg for seven years and managed by a Frenchman appointed by the new Rhine Commission.
Thus the Economic Clauses of the Treaty are comprehensive, and little has been overlooked which might impoverish Germany now or obstruct her development in future. So situated, Germany is to make payments of money, on a scale and in a manner to be examined in the next chapter.
Thus, the Economic Clauses of the Treaty are thorough, and hardly anything has been missed that could impoverish Germany now or hinder her growth in the future. In this context, Germany is required to make payments of money, at a level and in a way that will be discussed in the next chapter.
FOOTNOTES:
[8] I also omit those which have no special relevance to the German Settlement. The second of the Fourteen Points, which relates to the Freedom of the Seas, is omitted because the Allies did not accept it. Any italics are mine.
[8] I also leave out those that are not specifically relevant to the German Settlement. The second of the Fourteen Points, which pertains to Freedom of the Seas, is excluded because the Allies did not accept it. Any italics are my own.
[9] Part VIII. Annex III. (1).
__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Part 8. Annex 3. (1).
[10] Part VIII. Annex III. (3).
Part VIII. Annex III. (3).
[12] Part VIII. Annex III. (5).
[13] Art. 119.
[14] Arts. 120 and 257.
__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Arts. 120 and 257.
[15] Art. 122.
[16] Arts. 121 and 297(b). The exercise or non-exercise of this option of expropriation appears to lie, not with the Reparation Commission, but with the particular Power in whose territory the property has become situated by cession or mandation.
[16] Arts. 121 and 297(b). Whether or not this option for expropriation is taken seems to depend, not on the Reparation Commission, but on the specific country where the property is located due to cession or mandate.
[18] Arts. 53 and 74.
[19] In 1871 Germany granted France credit for the railways of Alsace-Lorraine but not for State property. At that time, however, the railways were private property. As they afterwards became the property of the German Government, the French Government have held, in spite of the large additional capital which Germany has sunk in them, that their treatment must follow the precedent of State property generally.
[19] In 1871, Germany gave France credit for the railways in Alsace-Lorraine, but not for state-owned property. At that time, the railways were privately owned. However, since they later became the property of the German Government, the French Government has maintained, despite the significant additional investment Germany has made in them, that their treatment should be consistent with the principles applied to state property in general.
[21] Art. 297 (b).
__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Art. 297 (b).
[23] The interpretation of the words between inverted commas is a little dubious. The phrase is so wide as to seem to include private debts. But in the final draft of the Treaty private debts are not explicitly referred to.
[23] The meaning of the words in quotation marks is somewhat unclear. The phrase is so broad that it appears to encompass private debts. However, in the final version of the Treaty, private debts are not specifically mentioned.
[24] This provision is mitigated in the case of German property in Poland and the other new States, the proceeds of liquidation in these areas being payable direct to the owner (Art. 92.)
[24] This rule is relaxed when it comes to German property in Poland and the other new States, as the money from liquidation in these areas goes directly to the owner (Art. 92.)
[25] Part X. Section IV. Annex, para. 10: "Germany will, within six months from the coming into force of the present Treaty, deliver to each Allied or Associated Power all securities, certificates, deeds, or other documents of title held by its nationals and relating to property, rights, or interests situated in the territory of that Allied or Associated Power.... Germany will at any time on demand of any Allied or Associated Power furnish such information as may be required with regard to the territory, rights, and interests of German nationals within the territory of such Allied or Associated Power, or with regard to any transactions concerning such property, rights, or interests effected since July 1, 1914."
[25] Part X. Section IV. Annex, para. 10: "Germany will, within six months of the start date of this Treaty, provide each Allied or Associated Power with all securities, certificates, deeds, or other ownership documents held by its citizens that pertain to property, rights, or interests located in the territory of that Allied or Associated Power... Germany will, upon request from any Allied or Associated Power, supply any needed information regarding the territory, rights, and interests of German nationals within the territory of that Allied or Associated Power, or concerning any transactions related to such property, rights, or interests that have occurred since July 1, 1914."
[27] Art. 260.
[28] Art. 235.
[29] Art. 118.
__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Art. 118.
[30] Arts. 129 and 132.
__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Arts. 129 and 132.
[31] Arts. 135-137.
__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Arts. 135-137.
[32] Arts. 135-140.
[33] Art. 141: "Germany renounces all rights, titles and privileges conferred on her by the General Act of Algeciras of April 7, 1906, and by the Franco-German Agreements, of Feb. 9, 1909, and Nov. 4, 1911...."
[33] Art. 141: "Germany gives up all rights, titles, and privileges granted to her by the General Act of Algeciras from April 7, 1906, and by the Franco-German Agreements from February 9, 1909, and November 4, 1911...."
[34] Art. 148: "All treaties, agreements, arrangements and contracts concluded by Germany with Egypt are regarded as abrogated from Aug. 4, 1914." Art. 153: "All property and possessions in Egypt of the German Empire and the German States pass to the Egyptian Government without payment."
[34] Art. 148: "All treaties, agreements, arrangements, and contracts made between Germany and Egypt are considered canceled as of August 4, 1914." Art. 153: "All property and assets in Egypt owned by the German Empire and the German States are transferred to the Egyptian Government at no cost."
[35] Art. 289.
[36] Art. 45.
[38] "We take over the ownership of the Sarre mines, and in order not to be inconvenienced in the exploitation of these coal deposits, we constitute a distinct little estate for the 600,000 Germans who inhabit this coal basin, and in fifteen years we shall endeavor by a plebiscite to bring them to declare that they want to be French. We know what that means. During fifteen years we are going to work on them, to attack them from every point, till we obtain from them a declaration of love. It is evidently a less brutal proceeding than the coup de force which detached from us our Alsatians and Lorrainers. But if less brutal, it is more hypocritical. We know quite well between ourselves that it is an attempt to annex these 600,000 Germans. One can understand very well the reasons of an economic nature which have led Clemenceau to wish to give us these Sarre coal deposits, but in order to acquire them must we give ourselves the appearance of wanting to juggle with 600,000 Germans in order to make Frenchmen of them in fifteen years?" (M. Hervé in La Victorie, May 31, 1919).
[38] "We are taking ownership of the Sarre mines, and to avoid complications in exploiting these coal deposits, we're creating a separate little region for the 600,000 Germans living in this coal basin. In fifteen years, we'll try to have a plebiscite to get them to declare that they want to be French. We know what that entails. Over the next fifteen years, we'll work on them, approach them from every angle, until we get a declaration of love from them. Clearly, this is a less brutal approach than the coup de force that separated our Alsatians and Lorrainers from us. But while it's less brutal, it is more hypocritical. We know very well that this is an effort to annex these 600,000 Germans. One can easily understand the economic reasons that led Clemenceau to want to give us these Sarre coal deposits, but do we really have to pretend we're trying to negotiate with 600,000 Germans to turn them into French citizens in fifteen years?" (M. Hervé in La Victorie, May 31, 1919).
[39] This plebiscite is the most important of the concessions accorded to Germany in the Allies' Final Note, and one for which Mr. Lloyd George, who never approved the Allies' policy on the Eastern frontiers of Germany, can claim the chief credit. The vote cannot take place before the spring of 1920, and may be postponed until 1921. In the meantime the province will be governed by an Allied Commission. The vote will be taken by communes, and the final frontiers will be determined by the Allies, who shall have regard, partly to the results of the vote in each commune, and partly "to the geographical and economic conditions of the locality." It would require great local knowledge to predict the result. By voting Polish, a locality can escape liability for the indemnity, and for the crushing taxation consequent on voting German, a factor not to be neglected. On the other hand, the bankruptcy and incompetence of the new Polish State might deter those who were disposed to vote on economic rather than on racial grounds. It has also been stated that the conditions of life in such matters as sanitation and social legislation are incomparably better in Upper Silesia than in the adjacent districts of Poland, where similar legislation is in its infancy. The argument in the text assumes that Upper Silesia will cease to be German. But much may happen in a year, and the assumption is not certain. To the extent that it proves erroneous the conclusions must be modified.
[39] This referendum is the most significant of the concessions granted to Germany in the Allies' Final Note, and Mr. Lloyd George, who never supported the Allies' stance on Germany's eastern borders, deserves the most credit for it. The vote can't happen before spring 1920 and might be delayed until 2021. In the meantime, the province will be managed by an Allied Commission. Voting will occur by communes, and the final borders will be set by the Allies, taking into account the results of the vote in each commune as well as the "geographical and economic conditions of the area." Understanding the local context is crucial to predict the outcome. By voting for Poland, an area can avoid the indemnity and high taxes that come with voting for Germany, which is an important consideration. Conversely, the financial struggles and inefficiencies of the new Polish State could discourage those who might vote based on economic concerns instead of ethnic ones. It's also noted that living conditions regarding sanitation and social legislation are significantly better in Upper Silesia than in neighboring areas of Poland, where similar laws are just beginning to develop. The argument here presumes that Upper Silesia will no longer be German. However, a lot can change in a year, and this assumption is not guaranteed. If proven wrong, the conclusions will need to be adjusted accordingly.
[40] German authorities claim, not without contradiction, that to judge from the votes cast at elections, one-third of the population would elect in the Polish interest, and two-thirds in the German.
[40] German authorities argue, somewhat inconsistently, that based on the election votes, one-third of the population would vote for Polish interests, while two-thirds would vote for German interests.
[41] It must not be overlooked, however, that, amongst the other concessions relating to Silesia accorded in the Allies' Final Note, there has been included Article 90, by which "Poland undertakes to permit for a period of fifteen years the exportation to Germany of the products of the mines in any part of Upper Silesia transferred to Poland in accordance with the present Treaty. Such products shall be free from all export duties or other charges or restrictions on exportation. Poland agrees to take such steps as may be necessary to secure that any such products shall be available for sale to purchasers in Germany on terms as favorable as are applicable to like products sold under similar conditions to purchasers in Poland or in any other country." This does not apparently amount to a right of preemption, and it is not easy to estimate its effective practical consequences. It is evident, however, that in so far as the mines are maintained at their former efficiency, and in so far as Germany is in a position to purchase substantially her former supplies from that source, the loss is limited to the effect on her balance of trade, and is without the more serious repercussions on her economic life which are contemplated in the text. Here is an opportunity for the Allies to render more tolerable the actual operation of the settlement. The Germans, it should be added, have pointed out that the same economic argument which adds the Saar fields to France allots Upper Silesia to Germany. For whereas the Silesian mines are essential to the economic life of Germany, Poland does not need them. Of Poland's pre-war annual demand of 10,500,000 tons, 6,800,000 tons were supplied by the indisputably Polish districts adjacent to Upper Silesia. 1,500,000 tons from Upper Silesia (out of a total Upper Silesian output of 43,500,000 tons), and the balance from what is now Czecho-Slovakia. Even without any supply from Upper Silesia and Czecho-Slovakia, Poland could probably meet her requirements by the fuller exploitation of her own coalfields which are not yet scientifically developed, or from the deposits of Western Galicia which are now to be annexed to her.
[41] It shouldn't be forgotten, though, that among the other concessions regarding Silesia included in the Allies' Final Note, Article 90 states that "Poland agrees to allow the export of products from the mines in any part of Upper Silesia transferred to Poland under this Treaty to Germany for fifteen years. These products will be free from all export duties or other charges or restrictions on export. Poland commits to ensure that these products will be available for sale to buyers in Germany under terms as favorable as those for similar products sold under comparable conditions to buyers in Poland or any other country." This doesn’t seem to grant a right of first refusal, and it's hard to predict the actual practical outcomes. However, it’s clear that as long as the mines are kept running efficiently, and Germany can buy a substantial amount of the supplies it previously sourced from there, the loss is mostly limited to its impact on Germany's trade balance, rather than causing more serious effects on its economic situation as suggested in the text. This presents an opportunity for the Allies to ease the implementation of the settlement. It's worth noting that the Germans have argued that the same economic reasoning assigning the Saar fields to France would also allocate Upper Silesia to Germany. While the Silesian mines are crucial for Germany's economy, Poland has no pressing need for them. Of Poland's pre-war annual demand of 10,500,000 tons, 6,800,000 tons came from the clearly Polish areas near Upper Silesia, 1,500,000 tons from Upper Silesia (out of a total output of 43,500,000 tons), and the rest from what is now Czecho-Slovakia. Even without supplies from Upper Silesia and Czecho-Slovakia, Poland could likely fulfill its needs by more fully exploiting its own coalfields, which are not yet developed scientifically, or from the deposits in Western Galicia that are now set to be added to Poland.
[43] The Reparation Commission is authorized under the Treaty (Part VIII Annex V. para. 10) "to postpone or to cancel deliveries" if they consider "that the full exercise of the foregoing options would interfere unduly with the industrial requirements of Germany." In the event of such postponements or cancellations "the coal to replace coal from destroyed mines shall receive priority over other deliveries." This concluding clause is of the greatest importance, if, as will be seen, it is physically impossible for Germany to furnish the full 45,000,000; for it means that France will receive 20,000,000 tons before Italy receives anything. The Reparation Commission has no discretion to modify this. The Italian Press has not failed to notice the significance of the provision, and alleges that this clause was inserted during the absence of the Italian representatives from Paris (Corriere della Sera, July 19, 1919).
[43] The Reparation Commission is authorized under the Treaty (Part VIII Annex V. para. 10) "to postpone or cancel deliveries" if they believe "that fully exercising the above options would unduly interfere with Germany's industrial needs." If there are any postponements or cancellations, "the coal to replace coal from destroyed mines will be prioritized over other deliveries." This final clause is extremely important because, as will be shown, it is physically impossible for Germany to provide the full 45,000,000; it means that France will get 20,000,000 tons before Italy receives any. The Reparation Commission has no authority to change this. The Italian Press has pointed out the significance of this provision, claiming that it was added while the Italian representatives were not present in Paris (Corriere della Sera, July 19, 1919).
[44] It follows that the current rate of production in Germany has sunk to about 60 per cent of that of 1913. The effect on reserves has naturally been disastrous, and the prospects for the coming winter are dangerous.
[44] As a result, the current production rate in Germany has dropped to around 60 percent of what it was in 1913. This has obviously had a terrible impact on reserves, and the outlook for the upcoming winter is risky.
[47] The reader must be reminded in particular that the above calculations take no account of the German production of lignite, which yielded in 1913 13,000,000 tons of rough lignite in addition to an amount converted into 21,000,000 tons of briquette. This amount of lignite, however, was required in Germany before the war in addition to the quantities of coal assumed above. I am not competent to speak on the extent to which the loss of coal can be made good by the extended use of lignite or by economies in its present employment; but some authorities believe that Germany may obtain substantial compensation for her loss of coal by paying more attention to her deposits of lignite.
[47] The reader should note that the calculations mentioned earlier do not include Germany's lignite production, which produced 13,000,000 tons of raw lignite in 1913, along with an additional 21,000,000 tons converted into briquettes. This lignite was necessary in Germany before the war, on top of the coal amounts estimated above. I'm not qualified to discuss how much the loss of coal can be offset by increased use of lignite or by savings in its current usage; however, some experts think that Germany could make up for its coal loss by focusing more on its lignite resources.
[48] Mr. Hoover, in July, 1919, estimated that the coal output of Europe, excluding Russia and the Balkans, had dropped from 679,500,000 tons to 443,000,000 tons,—as a result in a minor degree of loss of material and labor, but owing chiefly to a relaxation of physical effort after the privations and sufferings of the war, a lack of rolling-stock and transport, and the unsettled political fate of some of the mining districts.
[48] Mr. Hoover, in July 1919, estimated that Europe’s coal production, excluding Russia and the Balkans, had fallen from 679,500,000 tons to 443,000,000 tons. This decline was partly due to some loss of materials and labor, but mainly because of a decline in physical effort after the hardships of the war, a shortage of equipment and transportation, and the uncertain political situation in some mining areas.
[49] Numerous commercial agreements during the war ware arranged on these lines. But in the month of June, 1919, alone, minor agreements providing for payment in coal were made by Germany with Denmark, Norway, and Switzerland. The amounts involved were not large, but without them Germany could not have obtained butter from Denmark, fats and herrings from Norway, or milk and cattle from Switzerland.
[49] Many commercial agreements during the war were set up this way. However, in June 1919 alone, Germany made minor agreements for payment in coal with Denmark, Norway, and Switzerland. The amounts weren't significant, but without these deals, Germany wouldn't have been able to get butter from Denmark, fats and herring from Norway, or milk and cattle from Switzerland.
[50] "Some 60,000 Ruhr miners have agreed to work extra shifts—so-called butter-shifts—for the purpose of furnishing coal for export to Denmark hence butter will be exported in return. The butter will benefit the miners in the first place, as they have worked specially to obtain it" (Kölnische Zeitung, June 11, 1919).
[50] "About 60,000 miners in the Ruhr have agreed to work extra shifts—known as butter-shifts—so that they can provide coal for export to Denmark, in exchange for butter. This butter will primarily benefit the miners, as they have put in extra effort to earn it" (Kölnische Zeitung, June 11, 1919).
[52] As early as September, 1919, the Coal Commission had to face the physical impracticability of enforcing the demands of the Treaty, and agreed to modify them as follows:—"Germany shall in the next six months make deliveries corresponding to an annual delivery of 20 million tons as compared with 43 millions as provided in the Peace Treaty. If Germany's total production exceeds the present level of about 108 millions a year, 60 per cent of extra production, up to 128 millions, shall be delivered to the Entente and 50 per cent of any extra beyond that, until the figure provided in the Peace Treaty is reached. If the total production falls below 108 millions the Entente will examine the situation, after hearing Germany, and take account of it."
[52] As early as September 1919, the Coal Commission had to deal with the reality that enforcing the demands of the Treaty was physically impractical, and they agreed to modify them as follows:—"Germany shall make deliveries over the next six months that correspond to an annual total of 20 million tons, compared to 43 million as outlined in the Peace Treaty. If Germany's total production exceeds the current level of about 108 million a year, 60 percent of the extra production, up to 128 million, will be delivered to the Entente, and 50 percent of any extra beyond that will be delivered until the amount stated in the Peace Treaty is reached. If total production falls below 108 million, the Entente will review the situation after hearing from Germany and take it into account."
[53] 21,136,265 tons out of a total of 28,607,903 tons. The loss of iron-ore in respect of Upper Silesia is insignificant. The exclusion of the iron and steel of Luxemburg from the German Customs Union is, however, important, especially when this loss is added to that of Alsace-Lorraine. It may be added in passing that Upper Silesia includes 75 per cent of the zinc production of Germany.
[53] 21,136,265 tons out of a total of 28,607,903 tons. The loss of iron ore in Upper Silesia is minor. However, the exclusion of Luxembourg's iron and steel from the German Customs Union is significant, especially when combined with the losses from Alsace-Lorraine. Additionally, it's worth noting that Upper Silesia accounts for 75 percent of Germany's zinc production.
[54] In April, 1919, the British Ministry of Munitions despatched an expert Commission to examine the conditions of the iron and steel works in Lorraine and the occupied areas of Germany. The Report states that the iron and steel works in Lorraine, and to a lesser extent in the Saar Valley, are dependent on supplies of coal and coke from Westphalia. It is necessary to mix Westphalian coal with Saar coal to obtain a good furnace coke. The entire dependence of all the Lorraine iron and steel works upon Germany for fuel supplies "places them," says the Report, "in a very unenviable position."
[54] In April 1919, the British Ministry of Munitions sent a team of experts to look into the conditions of the iron and steel industries in Lorraine and the occupied parts of Germany. The report indicates that the iron and steel industries in Lorraine, and to a lesser extent in the Saar Valley, rely on coal and coke supplies from Westphalia. It's necessary to mix Westphalian coal with Saar coal to produce quality furnace coke. The complete reliance of all the Lorraine iron and steel works on Germany for fuel supplies "puts them," according to the report, "in a very difficult situation."
[56] Art. 268 (a).
__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Art. 268 (a).
[57] Art. 268 (b) and (c).
[58] The Grand Duchy is also deneutralized and Germany binds herself to "accept in advance all international arrangements which may be concluded by the Allied and Associated Powers relating to the Grand Duchy" (Art. 40). At the end of September, 1919, a plebiscite was held to determine whether Luxemburg should join the French or the Belgian Customs Union, which decided by a substantial majority in favour of the former. The third alternative of the maintenance of the union with Germany was not left open to the electorate.
[58] The Grand Duchy is also deneutralized, and Germany commits to "accept in advance all international arrangements that may be made by the Allied and Associated Powers regarding the Grand Duchy" (Art. 40). At the end of September 1919, a plebiscite was held to determine whether Luxembourg should join the French or the Belgian Customs Union, with a significant majority voting in favor of the former. The third option of maintaining the union with Germany was not presented to the voters.
[59] Art. 269.
[60] Art. 270.
[61] The occupation provisions may be conveniently summarized at this point. German territory situated west of the Rhine, together with the bridge-heads, is subject to occupation for a period of fifteen years (Art. 428). If, however, "the conditions of the present Treaty are faithfully carried out by Germany," the Cologne district will be evacuated after five years, and the Coblenz district after ten years (Art. 429). It is, however, further provided that if at the expiration of fifteen years "the guarantees against unprovoked aggression by Germany are not considered sufficient by the Allied and Associated Governments, the evacuation of the occupying troops may be delayed to the extent regarded as necessary for the purpose of obtaining the required guarantees" (Art. 429); and also that "in case either during the occupation or after the expiration of the fifteen years, the Reparation Commission finds that Germany refuses to observe the whole or part of her obligations under the present Treaty with regard to Reparation, the whole or part of the areas specified in Article 429 will be re-occupied immediately by the Allied and Associated Powers" (Art. 430). Since it will be impossible for Germany to fulfil the whole of her Reparation obligations, the effect of the above provisions will be in practice that the Allies will occupy the left bank of the Rhine just so long as they choose. They will also govern it in such manner as they may determine (e.g. not only as regards customs, but such matters as the respective authority of the local German representatives and the Allied Governing Commission), since "all matters relating to the occupation and not provided for by the present Treaty shall be regulated by subsequent agreements, which Germany hereby undertakes to observe" (Art. 432). The actual Agreement under which the occupied areas are to be administered for the present has been published as a White Paper [Cd. 222]. The supreme authority is to be in the hands of an Inter-Allied Rhineland Commission, consisting of a Belgian, a French, a British, and an American member. The articles of this Agreement are very fairly and reasonably drawn.
[61] The occupation rules can be summarized here. The German territory located west of the Rhine, along with the bridgeheads, will be occupied for fifteen years (Art. 428). However, if Germany fully complies with "the conditions of the present Treaty," the Cologne area will be evacuated after five years and the Coblenz area after ten years (Art. 429). It also states that if, after fifteen years, "the guarantees against unprovoked aggression by Germany are deemed insufficient by the Allied and Associated Governments, the withdrawal of the occupying troops may be postponed for as long as necessary to secure the required guarantees" (Art. 429). Additionally, "if during the occupation or after the fifteen years, the Reparation Commission finds that Germany does not fulfill all or part of its Reparation obligations under this Treaty, the specified areas in Article 429 will be immediately re-occupied by the Allied and Associated Powers" (Art. 430). Since it will be impossible for Germany to fully meet its Reparation obligations, in practice, the Allies will occupy the left bank of the Rhine for as long as they wish. They will manage it in whatever way they see fit (e.g., not only regarding customs but also concerning the authority of local German representatives and the Allied Governing Commission), as "all matters related to the occupation not covered by the present Treaty will be governed by subsequent agreements, which Germany agrees to observe" (Art. 432). The specific Agreement regarding the administration of the occupied areas has been published as a White Paper [Cd. 222]. The supreme authority will be held by an Inter-Allied Rhineland Commission, made up of one Belgian, one French, one British, and one American member. The articles of this Agreement are quite fair and reasonable.
[63] The German Government withdrew, as from September 1, 1919, all preferential railway tariffs for the export of iron and steel goods, on the ground that these privileges would have been more than counterbalanced by the corresponding privileges which, under this Article of the Treaty, they would have been forced to give to Allied traders.
[63] The German Government canceled all special railway rates for exporting iron and steel products starting September 1, 1919, arguing that these benefits would have been outweighed by the equivalent benefits they would have had to offer to Allied traders under this Article of the Treaty.
[64] Art. 367.
__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Art. 367.
[66] Art. 250.
__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Art. 250.
[67] Art 371. This provision is even applied "to the lines of former Russian Poland converted by Germany to the German gage, such lines being regarded as detached from the Prussian State System."
[67] Art 371. This rule also applies "to the former Russian Poland railways that were changed by Germany to the German gauge, with these railways considered separate from the Prussian State System."
[68] Arts. 332-337. Exception may be taken, however, to the second paragraph of Art. 332, which allows the vessels of other nations to trade between German towns but forbids German vessels to trade between non-German towns except with special permission; and Art. 333, which prohibits Germany from making use of her river system as a source of revenue, may be injudicious.
[68] Arts. 332-337. However, there can be objections to the second paragraph of Art. 332, which permits foreign vessels to trade between German towns but prohibits German vessels from trading between non-German towns unless they have special permission; and Art. 333, which prevents Germany from using its river system as a source of income, might be unwise.
[70] Art. 338.
[71] Art. 344. This is with particular reference to the Elbe and the Oder; the Danube and the Rhine are dealt with in relation to the existing Commissions.
[71] Art. 344. This specifically refers to the Elbe and the Oder; the Danube and the Rhine are addressed in connection with the current Commissions.
[72] Art. 339.
[73] Art. 357.
__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Art. 357.
[75] Art. 66.
Chapter 5
Restitution
I. Undertakings given prior to the Peace Negotiations
The categories of damage in respect of which the Allies were entitled to ask for Reparation are governed by the relevant passages in President Wilson's Fourteen Points of January 8, 1918, as modified by the Allied Governments in their qualifying Note, the text of which the President formally communicated to the German Government as the basis of peace on November 5, 1918. These passages have been quoted in full at the beginning of Chapter IV. That is to say, "compensation will be made by Germany for all damage done to the civilian population of the Allies and to their property by the aggression of Germany by land, by sea, and from the air." The limiting quality of this sentence is reinforced by the passage in the President's speech before Congress on February 11, 1918 (the terms of this speech being an express part of the contract with the enemy), that there shall be "no contributions" and "no punitive damages."
The types of damages the Allies could claim for reparations are outlined in President Wilson's Fourteen Points from January 8, 1918, as amended by the Allied Governments in their qualifying Note, which the President officially communicated to the German Government as the basis for peace on November 5, 1918. Those passages have been quoted in full at the beginning of Chapter IV. In other words, "Germany will compensate for all damage caused to the civilian population of the Allies and their property by Germany's aggression on land, at sea, and in the air." The limiting nature of this statement is emphasized by a section of the President's speech before Congress on February 11, 1918 (the terms of this speech being a clear part of the agreement with the enemy), which stated there would be "no contributions" and "no punitive damages."
It has sometimes been argued that the preamble to paragraph 19[76] of the Armistice Terms, to the effect "that any future claims and demands of the Allies and the United States of America remain unaffected," wiped out all precedent conditions, and left the Allies free to make whatever demands they chose. But it is not possible to maintain that this casual protective phrase, to which no one at the time attached any particular importance, did away with all the formal communications which passed between the President and the German Government as to the basis of the Terms of Peace during the days preceding the Armistice, abolished the Fourteen Points, and converted the German acceptance of the Armistice Terms into unconditional surrender, so far as it affects the Financial Clauses. It is merely the usual phrase of the draftsman, who, about to rehearse a list of certain claims, wishes to guard himself from the implication that such list is exhaustive. In any case, this contention is disposed of by the Allied reply to the German observations on the first draft of the Treaty, where it is admitted that the terms of the Reparation Chapter must be governed by the President's Note of November 5.
It has occasionally been suggested that the introduction to paragraph 19[76] of the Armistice Terms, which states "that any future claims and demands of the Allies and the United States of America remain unaffected," eliminated all previous conditions and allowed the Allies to make any demands they wanted. However, it's not reasonable to say that this simple protective phrase, which no one took seriously at the time, nullified all the formal communications between the President and the German Government regarding the basis of the Terms of Peace in the days leading up to the Armistice, abolished the Fourteen Points, or turned the German acceptance of the Armistice Terms into an unconditional surrender, particularly concerning the Financial Clauses. This is just a typical phrase used by the draftsman, who, before listing certain claims, wants to protect himself from the assumption that the list is complete. In any event, this argument is countered by the Allied response to the German comments on the first draft of the Treaty, where it is acknowledged that the terms of the Reparation Chapter must be determined by the President's Note from November 5.
Assuming then that the terms of this Note are binding, we are left to elucidate the precise force of the phrase—"all damage done to the civilian population of the Allies and to their property by the aggression of Germany by land, by sea, and from the air." Few sentences in history have given so much work to the sophists and the lawyers, as we shall see in the next section of this chapter, as this apparently simple and unambiguous statement. Some have not scrupled to argue that it covers the entire cost of the war; for, they point out, the entire cost of the war has to be met by taxation, and such taxation is "damaging to the civilian population." They admit that the phrase is cumbrous, and that it would have been simpler to have said "all loss and expenditure of whatever description"; and they allow that the apparent emphasis of damage to the persons and property of civilians is unfortunate; but errors of draftsmanship should not, in their opinion, shut off the Allies from the rights inherent in victors.
Assuming the terms of this Note are binding, we need to clarify the exact meaning of the phrase—"all damage done to the civilian population of the Allies and to their property by the aggression of Germany by land, by sea, and from the air." Few statements in history have caused as much debate among thinkers and lawyers, as we’ll see in the next section of this chapter, as this seemingly straightforward and clear-cut statement. Some have argued that it encompasses the entire cost of the war; they point out that the whole cost of the war has to be covered by taxation, and that such taxation is "damaging to the civilian population." They acknowledge that the phrase is clumsy, and that it would have been easier to say "all loss and expenditure of whatever kind"; and they recognize that the focus on damage to the persons and property of civilians is unfortunate; however, they believe that drafting errors should not prevent the Allies from the rights that come with being victors.
But there are not only the limitations of the phrase in its natural meaning and the emphasis on civilian damages as distinct from military expenditure generally; it must also be remembered that the context of the term is in elucidation of the meaning of the term "restoration" in the President's Fourteen Points. The Fourteen Points provide for damage in invaded territory—Belgium, France, Roumania, Serbia, and Montenegro (Italy being unaccountably omitted)—but they do not cover losses at sea by submarine, bombardments from the sea (as at Scarborough), or damage done by air raids. It was to repair these omissions, which involved losses to the life and property of civilians not really distinguishable in kind from those effected in occupied territory, that the Supreme Council of the Allies in Paris proposed to President Wilson their qualifications. At that time—the last days of October, 1918—I do not believe that any responsible statesman had in mind the exaction from Germany of an indemnity for the general costs of the war. They sought only to make it clear (a point of considerable importance to Great Britain) that reparation for damage done to non-combatants and their property was not limited to invaded territory (as it would have been by the Fourteen Points unqualified), but applied equally to all such damage, whether "by land, by sea, or from the air" It was only at a later stage that a general popular demand for an indemnity, covering the full costs of the war, made it politically desirable to practise dishonesty and to try to discover in the written word what was not there.
But it's not just about the limits of the phrase in its literal sense and the focus on civilian damage compared to military spending overall; we also have to remember that the context of the term is to clarify the meaning of "restoration" in the President's Fourteen Points. The Fourteen Points address damage in invaded territories—Belgium, France, Romania, Serbia, and Montenegro (Italy being inexplicably left out)—but they don’t account for losses at sea due to submarines, bombings from the sea (like at Scarborough), or damage from air raids. To address these gaps, which involved losses to civilian lives and property that are actually similar to those in occupied territories, the Supreme Council of the Allies in Paris proposed their adjustments to President Wilson. At that time—the last days of October 1918—I don’t believe any responsible statesman was thinking about demanding an indemnity from Germany for the overall costs of the war. They only wanted to make it clear (a point that was very important to Great Britain) that reparations for damage done to non-combatants and their property weren’t restricted to invaded territories (as the unqualified Fourteen Points would suggest), but applied equally to all such damage, whether "by land, by sea, or from the air." It was only later when a widespread public demand for an indemnity that covered the full costs of the war made it politically necessary to be dishonest and try to find things in the written text that simply weren’t there.
What damages, then, can be claimed from the enemy on a strict interpretation of our engagements?[77] In the case of the United Kingdom the bill would cover the following items:—
What damages can we claim from the enemy based on a strict interpretation of our agreements?[77] For the United Kingdom, the bill would include the following items:—
(a) Damage to civilian life and property by the acts of an enemy Government including damage by air raids, naval bombardments, submarine warfare, and mines.
(a) Damage to civilian life and property caused by enemy actions, including damage from air raids, naval bombardments, submarine warfare, and mines.
(b) Compensation for improper treatment of interned civilians.
(b) Compensation for mistreatment of detained civilians.
It would not include the general costs of the war, or (e.g.) indirect damage due to loss of trade.
It wouldn't cover the overall costs of the war, or (e.g.) the indirect damage from lost trade.
The French claim would include, as well as items corresponding to the above:—
The French claim would include, along with items related to the above:—
(c) Damage done to the property and persons of civilians in the war area, and by aerial warfare behind the enemy lines.
(c) Damage caused to civilian property and people in the war zone, as well as from airstrikes behind enemy lines.
(d) Compensation for loot of food, raw materials, live-stock, machinery, household effects, timber, and the like by the enemy Governments or their nationals in territory occupied by them.
(d) Compensation for the theft of food, raw materials, livestock, machinery, household items, timber, and similar goods by enemy governments or their citizens in areas they occupy.
(e) Repayment of fines and requisitions levied by the enemy Governments or their officers on French municipalities or nationals.
(e) Repayment of fines and demands imposed by enemy governments or their officials on French towns or citizens.
(f) Compensation to French nationals deported or compelled to do forced labor.
(f) Compensation for French nationals who were deported or forced to work.
In addition to the above there is a further item of more doubtful character, namely—
In addition to the above, there's another item of more uncertain nature, which is—
(g) The expenses of the Relief Commission in providing necessary food and clothing to maintain the civilian French population in the enemy-occupied districts.
(g) The costs of the Relief Commission for supplying essential food and clothing to support the civilian French population in the areas occupied by the enemy.
The Belgian claim would include similar items.[78] If it were argued that in the case of Belgium something more nearly resembling an indemnity for general war costs can be justified, this could only be on the ground of the breach of International Law involved in the invasion of Belgium, whereas, as we have seen, the Fourteen Points include no special demands on this ground.[79] As the cost of Belgian Belief under (g), as well as her general war costs, has been met already by advances from the British, French, and United States Governments, Belgium would presumably employ any repayment of them by Germany in part discharge of her debt to these Governments, so that any such demands are, in effect, an addition to the claims of the three lending Governments.
The Belgian claim would include similar items.[78] If it were argued that Belgium's situation warranted compensation for general war expenses, it could only be justified by the violation of international law stemming from the invasion of Belgium. However, as we've noted, the Fourteen Points do not include any specific demands on this basis.[79] Since the costs related to Belgian relief under (g), as well as her overall war expenses, have already been covered by advances from the British, French, and United States Governments, Belgium would likely use any repayment from Germany to offset her debt to these governments. Therefore, any such claims essentially add to the claims of the three lending governments.
The claims of the other Allies would be compiled on similar lines. But in their case the question arises more acutely how far Germany can be made contingently liable for damage done, not by herself, but by her co-belligerents, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey. This is one of the many questions to which the Fourteen Points give no clear answer; on the one hand, they cover explicitly in Point 11 damage done to Roumania, Serbia, and Montenegro, without qualification as to the nationality of the troops inflicting the damage; on the other hand, the Note of the Allies speaks of "German" aggression when it might have spoken of the aggression of "Germany and her allies." On a strict and literal interpretation, I doubt if claims lie against Germany for damage done,—e.g. by the Turks to the Suez Canal, or by Austrian submarines in the Adriatic. But it is a case where, if the Allies wished to strain a point, they could impose contingent liability on Germany without running seriously contrary to the general intention of their engagements.
The claims of the other Allies would be organized similarly. However, in their situation, the question arises more sharply about how far Germany can be held partially responsible for damage caused, not by herself, but by her allies, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey. This is one of the many questions that the Fourteen Points do not clearly address; on one hand, they explicitly mention in Point 11 the damage done to Romania, Serbia, and Montenegro, without any qualification regarding the nationality of the troops responsible for the damage; on the other hand, the Allies' Note refers to "German" aggression when it could have mentioned the aggression of "Germany and her allies." Taking a strict and literal interpretation, I doubt that there are valid claims against Germany for damage caused—e.g. by the Turks to the Suez Canal, or by Austrian submarines in the Adriatic. But it is a situation where, if the Allies wanted to stretch their interpretation, they could hold Germany partially liable without seriously contradicting the overall intent of their agreements.
As between the Allies themselves the case is quite different. It would be an act of gross unfairness and infidelity if France and Great Britain were to take what Germany could pay and leave Italy and Serbia to get what they could out of the remains of Austria-Hungary. As amongst the Allies themselves it is clear that assets should be pooled and shared out in proportion to aggregate claims.
As for the Allies, the situation is quite different. It would be a serious injustice and betrayal if France and Great Britain took what Germany could pay and let Italy and Serbia take whatever they could from the leftover resources of Austria-Hungary. Among the Allies, it's clear that assets should be combined and distributed according to the total claims.
In this event, and if my estimate is accepted, as given below, that Germany's capacity to pay will be exhausted by the direct and legitimate claims which the Allies hold against her, the question of her contingent liability for her allies becomes academic. Prudent and honorable statesmanship would therefore have given her the benefit of the doubt, and claimed against her nothing but the damage she had herself caused.
In this case, if my estimate below is agreed upon, that Germany's ability to pay will be completely used up by the direct and legitimate claims the Allies have against her, then the question of her potential liability for her allies becomes irrelevant. Responsible and honorable leadership would have therefore given her the benefit of the doubt and only claimed compensation for the damage she directly caused.
What, on the above basis of claims, would the aggregate demand amount to? No figures exist on which to base any scientific or exact estimate, and I give my own guess for what it is worth, prefacing it with the following observations.
What would the overall demand be based on the claims above? There are no figures to support any scientific or precise estimate, so I'll share my own guess for what it's worth, starting with the following thoughts.
The amount of the material damage done in the invaded districts has been the subject of enormous, if natural, exaggeration. A journey through the devastated areas of France is impressive to the eye and the imagination beyond description. During the winter of 1918-19, before Nature had cast over the scene her ameliorating mantle, the horror and desolation of war was made visible to sight on an extraordinary scale of blasted grandeur. The completeness of the destruction was evident. For mile after mile nothing was left. No building was habitable and no field fit for the plow. The sameness was also striking. One devastated area was exactly like another—a heap of rubble, a morass of shell-holes, and a tangle of wire.[80] The amount of human labor which would be required to restore such a countryside seemed incalculable; and to the returned traveler any number of milliards of dollars was inadequate to express in matter the destruction thus impressed upon his spirit. Some Governments for a variety of intelligible reasons have not been ashamed to exploit these feelings a little.
The extent of the damage in the invaded areas has been the focus of significant, though understandable, exaggeration. Traveling through the devastated regions of France is visually and emotionally overwhelming beyond words. During the winter of 1918-19, before nature had covered the area with her healing touch, the horrors and ruin of war were starkly visible on an extraordinary scale. The total destruction was clear. For miles on end, nothing remained. No building was livable, and no field was suitable for farming. The uniformity was also striking. Each ruined area looked just like the last—a pile of debris, a swamp of shell holes, and tangled wire.[80] The amount of human effort needed to restore such a landscape seemed impossible to calculate; and to any returning traveler, no sum of billions of dollars could adequately capture the destruction that weighed on their spirit. Some governments, for various understandable reasons, have not hesitated to take advantage of these emotions a bit.
Popular sentiment is most at fault, I think, in the case of Belgium. In any event Belgium is a small country, and in its case the actual area of devastation is a small proportion of the whole. The first onrush of the Germans in 1914 did some damage locally; after that the battle-line in Belgium did not sway backwards and forwards, as in France, over a deep belt of country. It was practically stationary, and hostilities were confined to a small corner of the country, much of which in recent times was backward, poor, and sleepy, and did not include the active industry of the country. There remains some injury in the small flooded area, the deliberate damage done by the retreating Germans to buildings, plant, and transport, and the loot of machinery, cattle, and other movable property. But Brussels, Antwerp, and even Ostend are substantially intact, and the great bulk of the land, which is Belgium's chief wealth, is nearly as well cultivated as before. The traveler by motor can pass through and from end to end of the devastated area of Belgium almost before he knows it; whereas the destruction in France is on a different kind of scale altogether. Industrially, the loot has been serious and for the moment paralyzing; but the actual money cost of replacing machinery mounts up slowly, and a few tens of millions would have covered the value of every machine of every possible description that Belgium ever possessed. Besides, the cold statistician must not overlook the fact that the Belgian people possess the instinct of individual self-protection unusually well developed; and the great mass of German bank-notes[81] held in the country at the date of the Armistice, shows that certain classes of them at least found a way, in spite of all the severities and barbarities of German rule, to profit at the expense of the invader. Belgian claims against Germany such as I have seen, amounting to a sum in excess of the total estimated pre-war wealth of the whole country, are simply irresponsible.[82]
Popular opinion is mainly to blame, I think, when it comes to Belgium. Anyway, Belgium is a small country, and the actual area affected by devastation is a small part of the whole. The initial invasion by the Germans in 1914 caused some local damage; after that, the front line in Belgium didn’t shift back and forth like it did in France, covering a wide area. It remained mostly stationary, and fighting was limited to a small corner of the country, much of which was recently underdeveloped, poor, and quiet, and didn’t include the country's active industries. Some damage still exists in the small flooded region, the intentional destruction caused by the retreating Germans to buildings, equipment, and transportation, and the theft of machinery, livestock, and other movable property. But Brussels, Antwerp, and even Ostend are mostly unscathed, and the majority of the land, which is Belgium's main asset, is nearly as well-farmed as it was before. A traveler by car can pass through the devastated part of Belgium almost without realizing it; meanwhile, the destruction in France is on a completely different scale. Industrially, the theft has been severe and temporarily crippling; however, the actual financial cost of replacing machinery adds up slowly, and a few tens of millions would have covered the value of every machine of any type that Belgium ever owned. Moreover, the cold statistician shouldn’t overlook the fact that the Belgian people have a well-developed instinct for self-preservation; and the large amount of German banknotes[81] held in the country at the time of the Armistice indicates that at least certain groups found a way to profit at the invader’s expense, despite all the harshness and brutality of German rule. The Belgian claims against Germany that I’ve seen, which total more than the entire estimated pre-war wealth of the country, are simply irresponsible.[82]
It will help to guide our ideas to quote the official survey of Belgian wealth, published in 1913 by the Finance Ministry of Belgium, which was as follows:
It will help to guide our ideas to quote the official survey of Belgian wealth, published in 1913 by the Finance Ministry of Belgium, which was as follows:
Land | $1,320,000,000 | tons. | ||
Buildings | 1,175,000,000 | " | ||
Personal wealth | 2,725,000,000 | " | ||
Cash | 85,000,000 | " | ||
Furniture, etc. | 600,000,000 | " | ||
$5,905,000,000 | " |
This total yields an average of $780 per inhabitant, which Dr. Stamp, the highest authority on the subject, is disposed to consider as prima facie too low (though he does not accept certain much higher estimates lately current), the corresponding wealth per head (to take Belgium's immediate neighbors) being $835 for Holland, $1,220 for Germany, and $1,515 for France.[83] A total of $7,500,000,000, giving an average of about $1,000 per head, would, however, be fairly liberal. The official estimate of land and buildings is likely to be more accurate than the rest. On the other hand, allowance has to be made for the increased costs of construction.
This total comes to an average of $780 per person, which Dr. Stamp, the leading expert on the topic, believes is prima facie too low (even though he doesn't agree with some of the much higher estimates that have been circulating lately). For comparison, the average wealth per person for Belgium's immediate neighbors is $835 in Holland, $1,220 in Germany, and $1,515 in France.[83] A total of $7,500,000,000, averaging about $1,000 per person, would be reasonably generous. The official estimate of land and buildings is likely to be more accurate than the others. However, we also need to consider the rising costs of construction.
Having regard to all these considerations, I do not put the money value of the actual physical loss of Belgian property by destruction and loot above $750,000,000 as a maximum, and while I hesitate to put yet lower an estimate which differs so widely from those generally current, I shall be surprised if it proves possible to substantiate claims even to this amount. Claims in respect of levies, fines, requisitions, and so forth might possibly amount to a further $500,000,000. If the sums advanced to Belgium by her allies for the general costs of the war are to be included, a sum of about $1,250,000,000 has to be added (which includes the cost of relief), bringing the total to $2,500,000,000.
Considering all these factors, I don't value the actual physical loss of Belgian property due to destruction and looting at more than $750,000,000 as a maximum. While I'm hesitant to suggest an estimate that is so far off from the usual figures, I would be surprised if we can even back up claims at this amount. Claims for levies, fines, requisitions, and so on might add up to another $500,000,000. If we also include the funds provided to Belgium by its allies for overall war expenses, we should add about $1,250,000,000 (which includes relief costs), bringing the total to $2,500,000,000.
The destruction in France was on an altogether more significant scale, not only as regards the length of the battle line, but also on account of the immensely deeper area of country over which the battle swayed from time to time. It is a popular delusion to think of Belgium as the principal victim of the war; it will turn out, I believe, that taking account of casualties, loss of property and burden of future debt, Belgium has made the least relative sacrifice of all the belligerents except the United States. Of the Allies, Serbia's sufferings and loss have been proportionately the greatest, and after Serbia, France. France in all essentials was just as much the victim of German ambition as was Belgium, and France's entry into the war was just as unavoidable. France, in my judgment, in spite of her policy at the Peace Conference, a policy largely traceable to her sufferings, has the greatest claims on our generosity.
The destruction in France was on a much larger scale, both in terms of the length of the battle line and the much larger area of land that the fighting affected from time to time. It’s a common misconception to think of Belgium as the main victim of the war; I believe that when you consider casualties, loss of property, and future debt, Belgium has made the smallest relative sacrifice of all the countries involved, except for the United States. Among the Allies, Serbia suffered the most in proportion to its size, followed by France. France, in every essential way, was just as much a victim of German ambition as Belgium, and France's entry into the war was just as inevitable. In my opinion, despite her actions at the Peace Conference, which were largely influenced by her suffering, France has the strongest claims on our generosity.
The special position occupied by Belgium in the popular mind is due, of course, to the fact that in 1914 her sacrifice was by far the greatest of any of the Allies. But after 1914 she played a minor rôle. Consequently, by the end of 1918, her relative sacrifices, apart from those sufferings from invasion which cannot be measured in money, had fallen behind, and in some respects they were not even as great, for example, as Australia's. I say this with no wish to evade the obligations towards Belgium under which the pronouncements of our responsible statesmen at many different dates have certainly laid us. Great Britain ought not to seek any payment at all from Germany for herself until the just claims of Belgium have been fully satisfied. But this is no reason why we or they should not tell the truth about the amount.
The special place Belgium holds in the public's mind is primarily due to its significant sacrifices in 1914, which were the greatest among the Allies. However, after 1914, its role became less prominent. By the end of 1918, Belgium's relative sacrifices, aside from the immeasurable suffering from invasion, had decreased, and in some ways were even less than those of Australia. I mention this not to avoid the responsibilities we have towards Belgium, which our leaders have acknowledged at various times. Great Britain should not demand any reparations from Germany until Belgium's rightful claims have been completely addressed. However, that doesn't mean we or they shouldn't speak honestly about the extent of those sacrifices.
While the French claims are immensely greater, here too there has been excessive exaggeration, as responsible French statisticians have themselves pointed out. Not above 10 per cent of the area of France was effectively occupied by the enemy, and not above 4 per cent lay within the area of substantial devastation. Of the sixty French towns having a population exceeding 35,000, only two were destroyed—Reims (115,178) and St. Quentin (55,571); three others were occupied—Lille, Roubaix, and Douai—and suffered from loot of machinery and other property, but were not substantially injured otherwise. Amiens, Calais, Dunkerque, and Boulogne suffered secondary damage by bombardment and from the air; but the value of Calais and Boulogne must have been increased by the new works of various kinds erected for the use of the British Army.
While the French claims are much larger, there has also been significant exaggeration here, as responsible French statisticians have pointed out. Only about 10 percent of France was actually occupied by the enemy, and less than 4 percent experienced serious destruction. Out of the sixty French towns with populations over 35,000, only two were destroyed—Reims (115,178) and St. Quentin (55,571); three others were occupied—Lille, Roubaix, and Douai—and faced theft of machinery and other property but were not seriously damaged otherwise. Amiens, Calais, Dunkerque, and Boulogne experienced secondary damage from bombings and aerial attacks; however, the value of Calais and Boulogne likely increased due to the new infrastructure built for the British Army's use.
The Annuaire Statistique de la France, 1917, values the entire house property of France at $11,900,000,000 (59.5 milliard francs).[84] An estimate current in France of $4,000,000,000 (20 milliard francs) for the destruction of house property alone is, therefore, obviously wide of the mark.[85] $600,000,000 at pre-war prices, or say $1,250,000,000 at the present time, is much nearer the right figure. Estimates of the value of the land of France (apart from buildings) vary from $12,400,000,000 to $15,580,000,000, so that it would be extravagant to put the damage on this head as high as $500,000,000. Farm Capital for the whole of France has not been put by responsible authorities above $2,100,000,000.[86] There remain the loss of furniture and machinery, the damage to the coal-mines and the transport system, and many other minor items. But these losses, however serious, cannot be reckoned in value by hundreds of millions of dollars in respect of so small a part of France. In short, it will be difficult to establish a bill exceeding $2,500,000,000 for physical and material damage in the occupied and devastated areas of Northern France.[87] I am confirmed in this estimate by the opinion of M. René Pupin, the author of the most comprehensive and scientific estimate of the pre-war wealth of France,[88] which I did not come across until after my own figure had been arrived at. This authority estimates the material losses of the invaded regions at from $2,000,000,000 to $3,000,000,000 (10 to 15 milliards),[89] between which my own figure falls half-way.
The Statistical Yearbook of France, 1917, values the entire residential property of France at $11,900,000,000 (59.5 billion francs).[84] An estimate currently in France of $4,000,000,000 (20 billion francs) for the destruction of residential property alone is, therefore, clearly inaccurate.[85] $600,000,000 at pre-war prices, or about $1,250,000,000 today, is much closer to the correct figure. Estimates of the value of the land in France (excluding buildings) range from $12,400,000,000 to $15,580,000,000, so it would be excessive to claim the damage in this area as high as $500,000,000. The total Farm Capital for all of France has not been assessed by credible sources to be above $2,100,000,000.[86] There are also losses from furniture and machinery, damage to coal mines and the transport system, and many other minor details. However, these losses, serious as they may be, cannot be valued at hundreds of millions of dollars for such a small part of France. In short, it will be hard to establish a total for physical and material damage in the occupied and devastated areas of Northern France that exceeds $2,500,000,000.[87] My estimate is supported by the opinion of M. René Pupin, the author of the most thorough and scientific assessment of France’s pre-war wealth,[88] which I only discovered after arriving at my own figure. This expert estimates the material losses in the invaded regions at between $2,000,000,000 and $3,000,000,000 (10 to 15 billion),[89] with my own figure landing right in the middle.
Nevertheless, M. Dubois, speaking on behalf of the Budget Commission of the Chamber, has given the figure of $13,000,000,000 (65 milliard francs) "as a minimum" without counting "war levies, losses at sea, the roads, or the loss of public monuments." And M. Loucheur, the Minister of Industrial Reconstruction, stated before the Senate on the 17th February, 1919, that the reconstitution of the devastated regions would involve an expenditure of $15,000,000,000 (75 milliard francs),—more than double M. Pupin's estimate of the entire wealth of their inhabitants. But then at that time M. Loucheur was taking a prominent part in advocating the claims of France before the Peace Conference, and, like others, may have found strict veracity inconsistent with the demands of patriotism.[90]
Nevertheless, Mr. Dubois, speaking on behalf of the Budget Commission of the Chamber, has reported a figure of $13,000,000,000 (65 billion francs) "as a minimum" without factoring in "war taxes, sea losses, road repairs, or the loss of public monuments." And Mr. Loucheur, the Minister of Industrial Reconstruction, stated before the Senate on February 17, 1919, that rebuilding the devastated regions would require spending $15,000,000,000 (75 billion francs)—more than double Mr. Pupin's estimate of the total wealth of their residents. However, at that time, Mr. Loucheur was actively involved in supporting France's claims at the Peace Conference and, like others, may have found strict honesty at odds with the demands of patriotism.[90]
The figure discussed so far is not, however, the totality of the French claims. There remain, in particular, levies and requisitions on the occupied areas and the losses of the French mercantile marine at sea from the attacks of German cruisers and submarines. Probably $1,000,000,000 would be ample to cover all such claims; but to be on the safe side, we will, somewhat arbitrarily, make an addition to the French claim of $1,500,000,000 on all heads, bringing it to $4,000,000,000 in all.
The figure we've talked about so far isn't the complete picture of the French claims. Specifically, there are still levies and requisitions from the occupied areas, as well as losses suffered by the French merchant marine at sea due to attacks from German cruisers and submarines. It’s likely that around $1,000,000,000 would be sufficient to cover all these claims; however, to be cautious, we'll add an additional $1,500,000,000 to the French claim for all categories, bringing the total to $4,000,000,000.
The statements of M. Dubois and M. Loucheur were made in the early spring of 1919. A speech delivered by M. Klotz before the French Chamber six months later (Sept. 5, 1919) was less excusable. In this speech the French Minister of Finance estimated the total French claims for damage to property (presumably inclusive of losses at sea, etc., but apart from pensions and allowances) at $26,800,000,000 (134 milliard francs), or more than six times my estimate. Even if my figure prove erroneous, M. Klotz's can never have been justified. So grave has been the deception practised on the French people by their Ministers that when the inevitable enlightenment comes, as it soon must (both as to their own claims and as to Germany's capacity to meet them), the repercussions will strike at more than M. Klotz, and may even involve the order of Government and Society for which he stands.
The statements from M. Dubois and M. Loucheur were made in early spring 1919. A speech given by M. Klotz before the French Chamber six months later (Sept. 5, 1919) was even less justifiable. In this speech, the French Minister of Finance estimated the total French claims for property damages (likely including losses at sea, etc., but excluding pensions and allowances) at $26,800,000,000 (134 billion francs), which is more than six times my estimate. Even if my figure turns out to be wrong, M. Klotz's estimate was never justifiable. The deception imposed on the French people by their Ministers has been so serious that when the inevitable truth comes out, as it soon will (regarding both their own claims and Germany's ability to meet them), the fallout will affect more than just M. Klotz and could even challenge the very order of Government and Society that he represents.
British claims on the present basis would be practically limited to losses by sea—losses of hulls and losses of cargoes. Claims would lie, of course, for damage to civilian property in air raids and by bombardment from the sea, but in relation to such figures as we are now dealing with, the money value involved is insignificant,—$25,000,000 might cover them all, and $50,000,000 would certainly do so.
British claims at this point would mostly be restricted to losses at sea—losses of ships and cargo. There would be claims, of course, for damage to civilian property from air raids and bombardment from the sea, but in terms of the figures we're discussing, the monetary value is minimal—$25 million could cover all of them, and $50 million would definitely suffice.
The British mercantile vessels lost by enemy action, excluding fishing vessels, numbered 2479, with an aggregate of 7,759,090 tons gross.[91] There is room for considerable divergence of opinion as to the proper rate to take for replacement cost; at the figure of $150 per gross ton, which with the rapid growth of shipbuilding may soon be too high but can be replaced by any other which better authorities[92] may prefer, the aggregate claim is $1,150,000,000. To this must be added the loss of cargoes, the value of which is almost entirely a matter of guesswork. An estimate of $200 per ton of shipping lost may be as good an approximation as is possible, that is to say $1,550,000,000, making $2,700,000,000 altogether.
The British merchant ships lost to enemy action, excluding fishing vessels, totaled 2,479, with a combined weight of 7,759,090 tons gross.[91] There's a lot of debate about the right replacement cost rate; using $150 per gross ton, which might quickly become outdated with the fast pace of shipbuilding, or any figure preferred by other more reliable sources[92], the total claim is $1,150,000,000. On top of this, we have to consider the loss of cargoes, which is mostly guesswork. An estimate of $200 per ton for the lost shipping might be a reasonable approximation, which would total $1,550,000,000, bringing the total to $2,700,000,000.
An addition to this of $150,000,000, to cover air raids, bombardments, claims of interned civilians, and miscellaneous items of every description, should be more than sufficient,—making a total claim for Great Britain of $2,850,000,000. It is surprising, perhaps, that the money value of Great Britain's claim should be so little short of that of France and actually in excess of that of Belgium. But, measured either by pecuniary loss or real loss to the economic power of the country, the injury to her mercantile marine was enormous.
An additional $150,000,000 to cover air raids, bombings, claims from interned civilians, and various other expenses should be more than enough, bringing Great Britain's total claim to $2,850,000,000. It's somewhat surprising that Great Britain's claim is so close to France's and even higher than Belgium's. However, when considering either financial loss or the actual impact on the country's economic strength, the damage to its shipping industry was significant.
There remain the claims of Italy, Serbia, and Roumania for damage by invasion and of these and other countries, as for example Greece,[93] for losses at sea. I will assume for the present argument that these claims rank against Germany, even when they were directly caused not by her but by her allies; but that it is not proposed to enter any such claims on behalf of Russia.[94] Italy's losses by invasion and at sea cannot be very heavy, and a figure of from $250,000,000 to $500,000,000 would be fully adequate to cover them. The losses of Serbia, although from a human point of view her sufferings were the greatest of all,[95] are not measured pecuniarily by very great figures, on account of her low economic development. Dr. Stamp (loc. cit.) quotes an estimate by the Italian statistician Maroi, which puts the national wealth of Serbia at $2,400,000,000 or $525 per head,[96] and the greater part of this would be represented by land which has sustained no permanent damage.[97] In view of the very inadequate data for guessing at more than the general magnitude of the legitimate claims of this group of countries, I prefer to make one guess rather than several and to put the figure for the whole group at the round sum of $1,250,000,000.
There are still the claims from Italy, Serbia, and Romania for damages caused by invasion, as well as from these and other countries, like Greece, for losses at sea. For the sake of this argument, I'll assume these claims are against Germany, even when they were directly caused by her allies; however, no claims are being proposed on behalf of Russia. Italy's losses from invasion and at sea likely aren't very high, and an estimate of between $250 million to $500 million would be sufficient to cover them. Serbia's losses, though her suffering was the worst from a humanitarian standpoint, are not quantified in very high figures due to her low economic development. Dr. Stamp quotes an estimate by the Italian statistician Maroi, which values Serbia's national wealth at $2.4 billion or $525 per person, and most of this is represented by land that hasn't sustained any permanent damage. Given the very limited data to estimate more than the general magnitude of legitimate claims from this group of countries, I'd prefer to make one estimate rather than several, placing the total for the whole group at a round figure of $1.25 billion.
We are finally left with the following—
We are finally left with this—
Belgium | $2,500,000,000 | [98] | |
France | 4,000,000,000 | ||
Great Britain | 2,850,000,000 | ||
Other Allies | 1,250,000,000 | ||
Total | $10,600,000,000 |
I need not impress on the reader that there is much guesswork in the above, and the figure for France in particular is likely to be criticized. But I feel some confidence that the general magnitude, as distinct from the precise figures, is not hopelessly erroneous; and this may be expressed by the statement that a claim against Germany, based on the interpretation of the pre-Armistice engagements of the Allied Powers which is adopted above, would assuredly be found to exceed $8,000,000,000 and to fall short of $15,000,000,000.
I don't need to emphasize to the reader that there's a lot of guesswork involved in the above, and the estimate for France in particular is likely to attract criticism. However, I feel fairly confident that the general magnitude, as opposed to the exact figures, is not way off; this can be summed up by saying that a claim against Germany, based on the interpretation of the pre-Armistice commitments of the Allied Powers mentioned above, would definitely be found to be over $8,000,000,000 but under $15,000,000,000.
This is the amount of the claim which we were entitled to present to the enemy. For reasons which will appear more fully later on, I believe that it would have been a wise and just act to have asked the German Government at the Peace Negotiations to agree to a sum of $10,000,000,000 in final settlement, without further examination of particulars. This would have provided an immediate and certain solution, and would have required from Germany a sum which, if she were granted certain indulgences, it might not have proved entirely impossible for her to pay. This sum should have been divided up amongst the Allies themselves on a basis of need and general equity.
This is the amount we could have claimed from the enemy. For reasons that will be explained in more detail later, I believe it would have been wise and fair to ask the German Government at the Peace Negotiations to agree to a final settlement of $10,000,000,000, without further details. This would have offered an immediate and certain solution, and it would have asked Germany for an amount that, with some flexibility granted, might not have been completely impossible for her to pay. This amount should have been distributed among the Allies based on need and fair sharing.
But the question was not settled on its merits.
But the question wasn't resolved based on its true value.
II. The Conference and the Terms of the Treaty
I do not believe that, at the date of the Armistice, responsible authorities in the Allied countries expected any indemnity from Germany beyond the cost of reparation for the direct material damage which had resulted from the invasion of Allied territory and from the submarine campaign. At that time there were serious doubts as to whether Germany intended to accept our terms, which in other respects were inevitably very severe, and it would have been thought an unstatesmanlike act to risk a continuance of the war by demanding a money payment which Allied opinion was not then anticipating and which probably could not be secured in any case. The French, I think, never quite accepted this point of view; but it was certainly the British attitude; and in this atmosphere the pre-Armistice conditions were framed.
I don’t think that by the time the Armistice was signed, the leaders in the Allied countries expected any compensation from Germany beyond covering the costs of repairing the direct material damage caused by the invasion of Allied territory and the submarine campaign. At that moment, there were serious doubts about whether Germany would agree to our terms, which were already quite harsh in other ways, and it would have seemed unwise to risk extending the war by demanding a financial payment that the Allied public was not anticipating and which probably couldn’t be secured anyway. The French, I believe, didn’t fully accept this perspective; however, it was definitely the British stance, and in this environment, the pre-Armistice conditions were established.
A month later the atmosphere had changed completely. We had discovered how hopeless the German position really was, a discovery which some, though not all, had anticipated, but which no one had dared reckon on as a certainty. It was evident that we could have secured unconditional surrender if we had determined to get it.
A month later, the mood had shifted entirely. We had realized just how desperate the German situation truly was, a realization that some had expected, though not everyone, but no one had truly counted on it as a sure thing. It was clear that we could have achieved unconditional surrender if we had been committed to making it happen.
But there was another new factor in the situation which was of greater local importance. The British Prime Minister had perceived that the conclusion of hostilities might soon bring with it the break-up of the political bloc upon which he was depending for his personal ascendency, and that the domestic difficulties which would be attendant on demobilization, the turn-over of industry from war to peace conditions, the financial situation, and the general psychological reactions of men's minds, would provide his enemies with powerful weapons, if he were to leave them time to mature. The best chance, therefore, of consolidating his power, which was personal and exercised, as such, independently of party or principle, to an extent unusual in British politics, evidently lay in active hostilities before the prestige of victory had abated, and in an attempt to found on the emotions of the moment a new basis of power which might outlast the inevitable reactions of the near future. Within a brief period, therefore, after the Armistice, the popular victor, at the height of his influence and his authority, decreed a General Election. It was widely recognized at the time as an act of political immorality. There were no grounds of public interest which did not call for a short delay until the issues of the new age had a little defined themselves and until the country had something more specific before it on which to declare its mind and to instruct its new representatives. But the claims of private ambition determined otherwise.
But there was another new factor in the situation that was more important locally. The British Prime Minister realized that the end of hostilities could soon lead to the collapse of the political bloc he was counting on for his personal power. He feared that the domestic issues that would come with demobilization, the shift of industry from war to peace, the financial situation, and the general psychological reactions of people would give his opponents strong weapons if he allowed them time to develop. Therefore, his best chance to solidify his power—which was personal and operated independently of party or principle, in a way that was unusual in British politics—lay in keeping hostilities active before the prestige of victory faded. He aimed to build a new basis of power on the emotions of the moment that might outlast the inevitable reactions to come. So, shortly after the Armistice, the popular victor, at the peak of his influence and authority, called for a General Election. At the time, this was widely seen as an act of political immorality. There was no public interest justification that didn’t call for a short delay until the issues of the new age were better defined and until the country had something more concrete on which to express its opinion and guide its new representatives. But the demands of personal ambition dictated otherwise.
For a time all went well. But before the campaign was far advanced Government candidates were finding themselves handicapped by the lack of an effective cry. The War Cabinet was demanding a further lease of authority on the ground of having won the war. But partly because the new issues had not yet defined themselves, partly out of regard for the delicate balance of a Coalition Party, the Prime Minister's future policy was the subject of silence or generalities. The campaign seemed, therefore, to fall a little flat. In the light of subsequent events it seems improbable that the Coalition Party was ever in real danger. But party managers are easily "rattled." The Prime Minister's more neurotic advisers told him that he was not safe from dangerous surprises, and the Prime Minister lent an ear to them. The party managers demanded more "ginger." The Prime Minister looked about for some.
For a while, everything was going smoothly. But as the campaign progressed, government candidates started struggling due to a lack of a strong message. The War Cabinet was asking for more authority because they had won the war. However, since the new issues weren't clearly defined yet and considering the fragile balance of the Coalition Party, the Prime Minister's upcoming policies were mostly left unspoken or were vague. As a result, the campaign seemed a bit lackluster. Looking back at what happened later, it seems unlikely that the Coalition Party was ever truly at risk. Still, party managers can easily get anxious. The Prime Minister's more nervous advisors warned him that he could face unexpected challenges, and he listened to them. The party managers insisted they needed more energy. The Prime Minister began searching for some.
On the assumption that the return of the Prime Minister to power was the primary consideration, the rest followed naturally. At that juncture there was a clamor from certain quarters that the Government had given by no means sufficiently clear undertakings that they were not going "to let the Hun off." Mr. Hughes was evoking a good deal of attention by his demands for a very large indemnity,[99] and Lord Northcliffe was lending his powerful aid to the same cause. This pointed the Prime Minister to a stone for two birds. By himself adopting the policy of Mr. Hughes and Lord Northcliffe, he could at the same time silence those powerful critics and provide his party managers with an effective platform cry to drown the increasing voices of criticism from other quarters.
Assuming that the Prime Minister's return to power was the main priority, everything else fell into place naturally. At that time, there was a loud demand from some groups that the Government had not made it clear enough that they were not going to "let the Hun off." Mr. Hughes was getting a lot of attention with his calls for a very large indemnity,[99] and Lord Northcliffe was strongly supporting the same cause. This gave the Prime Minister a way to kill two birds with one stone. By adopting the policies of Mr. Hughes and Lord Northcliffe, he could silence those powerful critics while also giving his party managers a strong rallying cry to drown out the growing criticism from other areas.
The progress of the General Election of 1918 affords a sad, dramatic history of the essential weakness of one who draws his chief inspiration not from his own true impulses, but from the grosser effluxions of the atmosphere which momentarily surrounds him. The Prime Minister's natural instincts, as they so often are, were right and reasonable. He himself did not believe in hanging the Kaiser or in the wisdom or the possibility of a great indemnity. On the 22nd of November he and Mr. Bonar Law issued their Election Manifesto. It contains no allusion of any kind either to the one or to the other but, speaking, rather, of Disarmament and the League of Nations, concludes that "our first task must be to conclude a just and lasting peace, and so to establish the foundations of a new Europe that occasion for further wars may be for ever averted." In his speech at Wolverhampton on the eve of the Dissolution (November 24), there is no word of Reparation or Indemnity. On the following day at Glasgow, Mr. Bonar Law would promise nothing. "We are going to the Conference," he said, "as one of a number of allies, and you cannot expect a member of the Government, whatever he may think, to state in public before he goes into that Conference, what line he is going to take in regard to any particular question." But a few days later at Newcastle (November 29) the Prime Minister was warming to his work: "When Germany defeated France she made France pay. That is the principle which she herself has established. There is absolutely no doubt about the principle, and that is the principle we should proceed upon—that Germany must pay the costs of the war up to the limit of her capacity to do so." But he accompanied this statement of principle with many "words of warning" as to the practical difficulties of the case: "We have appointed a strong Committee of experts, representing every shade of opinion, to consider this question very carefully and to advise us. There is no doubt as to the justice of the demand. She ought to pay, she must pay as far as she can, but we are not going to allow her to pay in such a way as to wreck our industries." At this stage the Prime Minister sought to indicate that he intended great severity, without raising excessive hopes of actually getting the money, or committing himself to a particular line of action at the Conference. It was rumored that a high city authority had committed himself to the opinion that Germany could certainly pay $100,000,000,000 and that this authority for his part would not care to discredit a figure of twice that sum. The Treasury officials, as Mr. Lloyd George indicated, took a different view. He could, therefore, shelter himself behind the wide discrepancy between the opinions of his different advisers, and regard the precise figure of Germany's capacity to pay as an open question in the treatment of which he must do his best for his country's interests. As to our engagements under the Fourteen Points he was always silent.
The progress of the 1918 General Election tells a sad, dramatic story of someone whose main inspiration doesn’t come from their own true feelings, but from the more base influences of the environment around them. The Prime Minister’s natural instincts were often right and sensible. He didn’t believe in executing the Kaiser or in the wisdom or possibility of a huge indemnity. On November 22, he and Mr. Bonar Law released their Election Manifesto. It makes no reference to either issue but instead focuses on Disarmament and the League of Nations, concluding that "our first task must be to achieve a just and lasting peace, and to establish the foundations of a new Europe that can prevent further wars." In his speech at Wolverhampton on the eve of Dissolution (November 24), he said nothing about Reparation or Indemnity. The next day in Glasgow, Mr. Bonar Law wouldn’t make any promises. "We are going to the Conference," he stated, "as one of several allies, and you can’t expect a government member, no matter what he thinks, to publicly declare his stance on any particular issue before going into that Conference." However, a few days later in Newcastle (November 29), the Prime Minister was getting more engaged: "When Germany defeated France, she made France pay. That’s the principle she established. There’s no doubt about that principle, and we should proceed on it—that Germany must cover the costs of the war to the limit of her ability." But he paired this principle with many "words of caution" regarding the practical challenges: "We have appointed a strong Committee of experts from every perspective to carefully consider this issue and advise us. There’s no doubt about the fairness of the demand. She should pay, she must pay as much as she can, but we won’t let her pay in a way that destroys our industries." At this point, the Prime Minister aimed to show that he intended to be quite tough, while not raising unrealistic hopes of actually receiving the money or locking himself into a specific course of action at the Conference. It was rumored that a senior city official had expressed the opinion that Germany could definitely pay $100,000,000,000 and that this official wouldn’t mind endorsing a figure twice that amount. The Treasury officials, as Mr. Lloyd George pointed out, viewed things differently. He could therefore take cover behind the significant differences between the views of his advisers and see Germany's exact ability to pay as an open question, in which he needed to do his best for his country’s interests. He always remained silent about our commitments under the Fourteen Points.
On November 30, Mr. Barnes, a member of the War Cabinet, in which he was supposed to represent Labor, shouted from a platform, "I am for hanging the Kaiser."
On November 30, Mr. Barnes, a member of the War Cabinet, who was meant to represent Labor, shouted from a platform, "I support hanging the Kaiser."
On December 6, the Prime Minister issued a statement of policy and aims in which he stated, with significant emphasis on the word European, that "All the European Allies have accepted the principle that the Central Powers must pay the cost of the war up to the limit of their capacity."
On December 6, the Prime Minister released a statement outlining policy and objectives, emphasizing the word European, in which he said, "All the European Allies have agreed that the Central Powers must cover the cost of the war to the best of their abilities."
But it was now little more than a week to Polling Day, and still he had not said enough to satisfy the appetites of the moment. On December 8, the Times, providing as usual a cloak of ostensible decorum for the lesser restraint of its associates, declared in a leader entitled "Making Germany Pay," that "The public mind was still bewildered by the Prime Minister's various statements." "There is too much suspicion," they added, "of influences concerned to let the Germans off lightly, whereas the only possible motive in determining their capacity to pay must be the interests of the Allies." "It is the candidate who deals with the issues of to-day," wrote their Political Correspondent, "who adopts Mr. Barnes's phrase about 'hanging the Kaiser' and plumps for the payment of the cost of the war by Germany, who rouses his audience and strikes the notes to which they are most responsive."
But it was just over a week until Polling Day, and he still hadn't said enough to satisfy the current demands. On December 8, the Times, as usual providing a veneer of decorum for the lesser restraint of its associates, declared in an editorial titled "Making Germany Pay" that "The public is still confused by the Prime Minister's various statements." "There is too much suspicion," they added, "about influences that may let the Germans off lightly, while the only real motive in assessing their ability to pay should be the interests of the Allies." "It’s the candidate who addresses today’s issues," wrote their Political Correspondent, "who uses Mr. Barnes's phrase about 'hanging the Kaiser' and pushes for Germany to cover the war costs, who energizes his audience and strikes the chords to which they are most responsive."
On December 9, at the Queen's Hall, the Prime Minister avoided the subject. But from now on, the debauchery of thought and speech progressed hour by hour. The grossest spectacle was provided by Sir Eric Geddes in the Guildhall at Cambridge. An earlier speech in which, in a moment of injudicious candor, he had cast doubts on the possibility of extracting from Germany the whole cost of the war had been the object of serious suspicion, and he had therefore a reputation to regain. "We will get out of her all you can squeeze out of a lemon and a bit more," the penitent shouted, "I will squeeze her until you can hear the pips squeak"; his policy was to take every bit of property belonging to Germans in neutral and Allied countries, and all her gold and silver and her jewels, and the contents of her picture-galleries and libraries, to sell the proceeds for the Allies' benefit. "I would strip Germany," he cried, "as she has stripped Belgium."
On December 9, at the Queen's Hall, the Prime Minister avoided the topic. But from that point on, the chaos of ideas and speeches escalated hour by hour. The most outrageous display came from Sir Eric Geddes at the Guildhall in Cambridge. In a previous speech, he had, in a moment of unguarded honesty, questioned whether it was possible to extract the full cost of the war from Germany, which led to serious doubts about him, and he needed to restore his reputation. "We'll get everything you can squeeze out of a lemon and then some," he proclaimed, "I'll squeeze her until you can hear the seeds popping"; his plan was to seize every asset belonging to Germans in neutral and Allied countries, along with all their gold, silver, jewels, and the contents of their art galleries and libraries, to sell the proceeds for the benefit of the Allies. "I would strip Germany," he declared, "as she has stripped Belgium."
By December 11 the Prime Minister had capitulated. His Final Manifesto of Six Points issued on that day to the electorate furnishes a melancholy comparison with his program of three weeks earlier. I quote it in full:
By December 11, the Prime Minister had surrendered. His Final Manifesto of Six Points, released that day to the voters, provides a sad contrast to his program from three weeks earlier. I quote it in full:
" |
1. Trial of the Kaiser. 2. Punishment of those responsible for atrocities. 3. Fullest Indemnities from Germany. 4. Britain for the British, socially and industrially. 5. Rehabilitation of those broken in the war. 6. A happier country for all." |
Here is food for the cynic. To this concoction of greed and sentiment, prejudice and deception, three weeks of the platform had reduced the powerful governors of England, who but a little while before had spoken not ignobly of Disarmament and a League of Nations and of a just and lasting peace which should establish the foundations of a new Europe.
Here’s something for the cynics. This mix of greed and sentiment, prejudice and deception, had reduced the influential governors of England—who not long ago had spoken nobly about disarmament, a League of Nations, and a fair and lasting peace that would lay the groundwork for a new Europe—to mere shadows of their former selves.
On the same evening the Prime Minister at Bristol withdrew in effect his previous reservations and laid down four principles to govern his Indemnity Policy, of which the chief were: First, we have an absolute right to demand the whole cost of the war; second, we propose to demand the whole cost of the war; and third, a Committee appointed by direction of the Cabinet believe that it can be done.[100] Four days later he went to the polls.
On the same evening, the Prime Minister in Bristol effectively retracted his earlier concerns and established four principles to guide his Indemnity Policy, the main ones being: First, we have the complete right to claim the total cost of the war; second, we intend to claim the total cost of the war; and third, a Committee, as directed by the Cabinet, believes that this can be achieved.[100] Four days later, he went to the polls.
The Prime Minister never said that he himself believed that Germany could pay the whole cost of the war. But the program became in the mouths of his supporters on the hustings a great deal more than concrete. The ordinary voter was led to believe that Germany could certainly be made to pay the greater part, if not the whole cost of the war. Those whose practical and selfish fears for the future the expenses of the war had aroused, and those whose emotions its horrors had disordered, were both provided for. A vote for a Coalition candidate meant the Crucifixion of Anti-Christ and the assumption by Germany of the British National Debt.
The Prime Minister never claimed that he believed Germany could cover the entire cost of the war. However, the program became a lot more than just a tangible idea in the rhetoric of his supporters on the campaign trail. The average voter was led to think that Germany could definitely be made to pay for most, if not all, of the war's expenses. This approach catered to both those who were worried about the future costs of the war and those whose emotions were heightened by its tragedies. Voting for a Coalition candidate was portrayed as a means to eliminate the Anti-Christ and for Germany to take on the British National Debt.
It proved an irresistible combination, and once more Mr. George's political instinct was not at fault. No candidate could safely denounce this program, and none did so. The old Liberal Party, having nothing comparable to offer to the electorate, was swept out of existence.[101] A new House of Commons came into being, a majority of whose members had pledged themselves to a great deal more than the Prime Minister's guarded promises. Shortly after their arrival at Westminster I asked a Conservative friend, who had known previous Houses, what he thought of them. "They are a lot of hard-faced men," he said, "who look as if they had done very well out of the war."
It was an irresistible mix, and once again Mr. George's political instincts were spot on. No candidate could safely criticize this program, and none did. The old Liberal Party, having nothing comparable to offer voters, was completely wiped out. [101] A new House of Commons was formed, where most members had committed to a lot more than the Prime Minister's cautious promises. Shortly after they arrived at Westminster, I asked a Conservative friend, who had seen previous Houses, what he thought of them. "They're a bunch of tough-looking guys," he said, "who seem like they've done really well from the war."
This was the atmosphere in which the Prime Minister left for Paris, and these the entanglements he had made for himself. He had pledged himself and his Government to make demands of a helpless enemy inconsistent with solemn engagements on our part, on the faith of which this enemy had laid down his arms. There are few episodes in history which posterity will have less reason to condone,—a war ostensibly waged in defense of the sanctity of international engagements ending in a definite breach of one of the most sacred possible of such engagements on the part of victorious champions of these ideals.[102]
This was the atmosphere as the Prime Minister headed to Paris, and these were the complications he had created for himself. He had committed himself and his Government to make demands of a defenseless enemy that went against our own serious promises, which this enemy relied on when they laid down their weapons. There are few moments in history that future generations will look back on with less forgiveness—a war that was supposedly fought to uphold the importance of international agreements ending in a clear violation of one of the most sacred of these agreements by the victorious defenders of these ideals.[102]
Apart from other aspects of the transaction, I believe that the campaign for securing out of Germany the general costs of the war was one of the most serious acts of political unwisdom for which our statesmen have ever been responsible. To what a different future Europe might have looked forward if either Mr. Lloyd George or Mr. Wilson had apprehended that the most serious of the problems which claimed their attention were not political or territorial but financial and economic, and that the perils of the future lay not in frontiers or sovereignties but in food, coal, and transport. Neither of them paid adequate attention to these problems at any stage of the Conference. But in any event the atmosphere for the wise and reasonable consideration of them was hopelessly befogged by the commitments of the British delegation on the question of Indemnities. The hopes to which the Prime Minister had given rise not only compelled him to advocate an unjust and unworkable economic basis to the Treaty with Germany, but set him at variance with the President, and on the other hand with competing interests to those of France and Belgium. The clearer it became that but little could be expected from Germany, the more necessary it was to exercise patriotic greed and "sacred egotism" and snatch the bone from the juster claims and greater need of France or the well-founded expectations of Belgium. Yet the financial problems which were about to exercise Europe could not be solved by greed. The possibility of their cure lay in magnanimity.
Aside from other factors in the deal, I think that the push to force Germany to cover the overall costs of the war was one of the most foolish political moves by our leaders. Just imagine how different Europe’s future could have looked if either Mr. Lloyd George or Mr. Wilson understood that the biggest issues they faced weren't political or territorial, but rather financial and economic. The real dangers ahead were not about borders or sovereignty, but about food, coal, and transport. Neither of them paid enough attention to these issues at any point during the Conference. Additionally, the atmosphere for a sensible discussion on these matters was completely clouded by the commitments of the British delegation regarding Indemnities. The hopes the Prime Minister raised not only forced him to push for an unfair and unfeasible economic foundation for the Treaty with Germany, but also put him at odds with the President and in conflict with the interests of France and Belgium. As it became clearer that little could be expected from Germany, it was all the more tempting to act out of patriotic greed and "sacred egotism," seizing resources from the more just claims and greater needs of France or the valid expectations of Belgium. However, the financial issues about to challenge Europe couldn't be resolved through greed. Their resolution lay in generosity.
Europe, if she is to survive her troubles, will need so much magnanimity from America, that she must herself practice it. It is useless for the Allies, hot from stripping Germany and one another, to turn for help to the United States to put the States of Europe, including Germany, on to their feet again. If the General Election of December, 1918, had been fought on lines of prudent generosity instead of imbecile greed, how much better the financial prospect of Europe might now be. I still believe that before the main Conference, or very early in its proceedings, the representatives of Great Britain should have entered deeply, with those of the United States, into the economic and financial situation as a whole, and that the former should have been authorized to make concrete proposals on the general lines (1) that all inter-allied indebtedness be canceled outright; (2) that the sum to be paid by Germany be fixed at $10,000,000,000; (3) that Great Britain renounce all claim to participation in this sum and that any share to which she proves entitled be placed at the disposal of the Conference for the purpose of aiding the finances of the New States about to be established; (4) that in order to make some basis of credit immediately available an appropriate proportion of the German obligations representing the sum to be paid by her should be guaranteed by all parties to the Treaty; and (5) that the ex-enemy Powers should also be allowed, with a view to their economic restoration, to issue a moderate amount of bonds carrying a similar guarantee. Such proposals involved an appeal to the generosity of the United States. But that was inevitable; and, in view of her far less financial sacrifices, it was an appeal which could fairly have been made to her. Such proposals would have been practicable. There is nothing in them quixotic or Utopian. And they would have opened up for Europe some prospect of financial stability and reconstruction.
Europe, if she wants to overcome her troubles, will need a lot of generosity from America, which means she has to practice it herself. It's pointless for the Allies, fresh from taking from Germany and each other, to ask the United States for help in getting Europe, including Germany, back on its feet. If the General Election of December 1918 had been focused on sensible generosity instead of foolish greed, Europe’s financial situation might be much better now. I still believe that before the main Conference, or very early in its discussions, representatives from Great Britain should have thoroughly examined the economic and financial situation with those from the United States, and that they should have been authorized to make specific proposals along these lines: (1) that all debts between the Allies be completely canceled; (2) that Germany's payment be set at $10,000,000,000; (3) that Great Britain give up any claim to this payment and that any amount she might be entitled to be allocated to the Conference to help finance the new states being established; (4) that to make some credit available immediately, proportionate German obligations representing her payment should be guaranteed by all parties to the Treaty; and (5) that the former enemy countries should be allowed to issue a reasonable amount of bonds with similar guarantees to aid their economic recovery. Such proposals would have required an appeal to the generosity of the United States. But that was unavoidable; considering her much smaller financial sacrifices, it was a reasonable request. These proposals would have been feasible. There’s nothing unrealistic or idealistic about them. They would have provided Europe with some hope for financial stability and rebuilding.
The further elaboration of these ideas, however, must be left to Chapter VII., and we must return to Paris. I have described the entanglements which Mr. Lloyd George took with him. The position of the Finance Ministers of the other Allies was even worse. We in Great Britain had not based our financial arrangements on any expectations of an indemnity. Receipts from such a source would have been more or less in the nature of a windfall; and, in spite of subsequent developments, there was an expectation at that time of balancing our budget by normal methods. But this was not the case with France or Italy. Their peace budgets made no pretense of balancing and had no prospects of doing so, without some far-reaching revision of the existing policy. Indeed, the position was and remains nearly hopeless. These countries were heading for national bankruptcy. This fact could only be concealed by holding out the expectation of vast receipts from the enemy. As soon as it was admitted that it was in fact impossible to make Germany pay the expenses of both sides, and that the unloading of their liabilities upon the enemy was not practicable, the position of the Ministers of Finance of France and Italy became untenable.
The further explanation of these ideas will be covered in Chapter VII, so we need to go back to Paris. I've described the complications Mr. Lloyd George faced. The situation for the Finance Ministers of the other Allies was even worse. In Great Britain, we hadn’t based our financial plans on expecting any indemnity. Money from that source would have been like a bonus; and despite what happened later, at that time, we expected to balance our budget through normal means. But that wasn't true for France or Italy. Their peace budgets didn't even pretend to balance and had no chance of doing so without a major change in their current policies. In fact, the situation was and still is nearly hopeless. These countries were on the brink of national bankruptcy. This reality could only be hidden by holding out hope for huge payments from the enemy. Once it was acknowledged that it was actually impossible for Germany to cover the expenses for both sides, and that shifting their debts onto the enemy wasn't feasible, the position of the Finance Ministers of France and Italy became unsustainable.
Thus a scientific consideration of Germany's capacity to pay was from the outset out of court. The expectations which the exigencies of politics had made it necessary to raise were so very remote from the truth that a slight distortion of figures was no use, and it was necessary to ignore the facts entirely. The resulting unveracity was fundamental. On a basis of so much falsehood it became impossible to erect any constructive financial policy which was workable. For this reason amongst others, a magnanimous financial policy was essential. The financial position of France and Italy was so bad that it was impossible to make them listen to reason on the subject of the German Indemnity, unless one could at the same time point out to them some alternative mode of escape from their troubles.[103] The representatives of the United States were greatly at fault, in my judgment, for having no constructive proposals whatever to offer to a suffering and distracted Europe.
Thus, a scientific assessment of Germany's ability to pay was off the table from the start. The expectations that political pressures created were so far from reality that even a slight manipulation of numbers wouldn’t help, and it was necessary to completely disregard the facts. The resulting dishonesty was foundational. Based on so much untruth, it became impossible to establish any feasible financial policy. For this reason, among others, a generous financial approach was crucial. The financial situations in France and Italy were so dire that it was unlikely they would listen to reason regarding the German Indemnity unless an alternative solution to their problems was presented at the same time. [103] In my view, the representatives of the United States were greatly to blame for not having any constructive ideas to offer a suffering and troubled Europe.
It is worth while to point out in passing a further element in the situation, namely, the opposition which existed between the "crushing" policy of M. Clemenceau and the financial necessities of M. Klotz. Clemenceau's aim was to weaken and destroy Germany in every possible way, and I fancy that he was always a little contemptuous about the Indemnity; he had no intention of leaving Germany in a position to practise a vast commercial activity. But he did not trouble his head to understand either the indemnity or poor M. Klotz's overwhelming financial difficulties. If it amused the financiers to put into the Treaty some very large demands, well there was no harm in that; but the satisfaction of these demands must not be allowed to interfere with the essential requirements of a Carthaginian Peace. The combination of the "real" policy of M. Clemenceau on unreal issues, with M. Klotz's policy of pretense on what were very real issues indeed, introduced into the Treaty a whole set of incompatible provisions, over and above the inherent impracticabilities of the Reparation proposals.
It’s important to mention another factor in the situation: the clash between M. Clemenceau's "crushing" policy and M. Klotz's financial needs. Clemenceau aimed to weaken and dismantle Germany in every way possible and seemed somewhat dismissive of the Indemnity; he had no plans to keep Germany in a position to engage in significant commercial activity. However, he didn’t bother trying to understand either the indemnity or the overwhelming financial troubles faced by M. Klotz. If the financiers wanted to include some hefty demands in the Treaty, that was fine; but meeting those demands shouldn't interfere with the main goals of a Carthaginian Peace. The mix of M. Clemenceau's "real" policy focused on unrealistic issues and M. Klotz's approach of pretending the issues were not serious led to a whole set of conflicting provisions in the Treaty, in addition to the inherent impracticalities of the Reparation proposals.
I cannot here describe the endless controversy and intrigue between the Allies themselves, which at last after some months culminated in the presentation to Germany of the Reparation Chapter in its final form. There can have been few negotiations in history so contorted, so miserable, so utterly unsatisfactory to all parties. I doubt if any one who took much part in that debate can look back on it without shame. I must be content with an analysis of the elements of the final compromise which is known to all the world.
I can't describe the endless conflict and drama among the Allies, which eventually led to Germany being presented with the Reparation Chapter in its final form after several months. There can't have been many negotiations in history that were as twisted, miserable, and completely unsatisfactory for everyone involved. I doubt anyone who was deeply involved in that debate can look back on it without feeling ashamed. I can only offer an analysis of the components of the final compromise that is known worldwide.
The main point to be settled was, of course, that of the items for which Germany could fairly be asked to make payment. Mr. Lloyd George's election pledge to the effect that the Allies were entitled to demand from Germany the entire costs of the war was from the outset clearly untenable; or rather, to put it more impartially, it was clear that to persuade the President of the conformity of this demand with our pro-Armistice engagements was beyond the powers of the most plausible. The actual compromise finally reached is to be read as follows in the paragraphs of the Treaty as it has been published to the world.
The main thing that needed to be decided was what Germany could reasonably be asked to pay. Mr. Lloyd George's campaign promise that the Allies had the right to demand the full cost of the war from Germany was obviously unrealistic from the start; or to be fairer, it was clear that convincing the President that this demand aligned with our pro-Armistice commitments was beyond even the most persuasive arguments. The actual compromise that was eventually reached can be found in the paragraphs of the Treaty that have been published to the world.
Article 231 reads: "The Allied and Associated Governments affirm and Germany accepts the responsibility of Germany and her allies for causing all the loss and damage to which the Allied and Associated Governments and their nationals have been subjected as a consequence of the war imposed upon them by the aggression of Germany and her allies." This is a well and carefully drafted Article; for the President could read it as statement of admission on Germany's part of moral responsibility for bringing about the war, while the Prime Minister could explain it as an admission of financial liability for the general costs of the war. Article 232 continues: "The Allied and Associated Governments recognize that the resources of Germany are not adequate, after taking into account permanent diminutions of such resources which will result from other provisions of the present Treaty, to make complete reparation for all such loss and damage." The President could comfort himself that this was no more than a statement of undoubted fact, and that to recognize that Germany cannot pay a certain claim does not imply that she is liable to pay the claim; but the Prime Minister could point out that in the context it emphasizes to the reader the assumption of Germany's theoretic liability asserted in the preceding Article. Article 232 proceeds: "The Allied and Associated Governments, however, require, and Germany undertakes, that she will make compensation for all damage done to the civilian population of the Allied and Associated Powers and to their property during the period of the belligerency of each as an Allied or Associated Power against Germany by such aggression by land, by sea, and from the air, and in general all damage as defined in Annex I. hereto."[104] The words italicized being practically a quotation from the pre-Armistice conditions, satisfied the scruples of the President, while the addition of the words "and in general all damage as defined in Annex I. hereto" gave the Prime Minister a chance in Annex I.
Article 231 states: "The Allied and Associated Governments affirm and Germany accepts responsibility for Germany and her allies in causing all the loss and damage suffered by the Allied and Associated Governments and their nationals as a result of the war forced upon them by the aggression of Germany and her allies." This is a carefully crafted article; it allows the President to interpret it as Germany's admission of moral responsibility for causing the war, while the Prime Minister could see it as an acknowledgment of financial liability for the overall costs of the war. Article 232 continues: "The Allied and Associated Governments recognize that Germany's resources are not sufficient, taking into account permanent reductions in those resources due to other provisions of this Treaty, to fully compensate for all such loss and damage." The President might find comfort in the fact that this is merely a statement of undeniable fact and acknowledging that Germany cannot pay a specific claim does not mean that she is liable to pay it; however, the Prime Minister could emphasize that within this context, it reinforces the idea of Germany's theoretical liability mentioned in the previous Article. Article 232 goes on: "The Allied and Associated Governments, however, require, and Germany agrees, that she will compensate for all damage done to the civilian population of the Allied and Associated Powers and their property during the time each was at war with Germany through aggression by land, by sea, and from the air, and generally for all damage as defined in Annex I." [104] The italicized words are almost a direct quote from the pre-Armistice conditions, which satisfied the President's concerns, while the addition of "and generally all damage as defined in Annex I." gave the Prime Minister an opportunity in Annex I.
So far, however, all this is only a matter of words, of virtuosity in draftsmanship, which does no one any harm, and which probably seemed much more important at the time than it ever will again between now and Judgment Day. For substance we must turn to Annex I.
So far, though, this is all just talk, skilled writing that doesn’t hurt anyone and probably felt a lot more significant back then than it ever will again until Judgment Day. For the real content, we need to check Annex I.
A great part of Annex I. is in strict conformity with the pre-Armistice conditions, or, at any rate, does not strain them beyond what is fairly arguable. Paragraph 1 claims damage done for injury to the persons of civilians, or, in the case of death, to their dependents, as a direct consequence of acts of war; Paragraph 2, for acts of cruelty, violence, or maltreatment on the part of the enemy towards civilian victims; Paragraph 3, for enemy acts injurious to health or capacity to work or to honor towards civilians in occupied or invaded territory; Paragraph 8, for forced labor exacted by the enemy from civilians; Paragraph 9, for damage done to property "with the exception of naval and military works or materials" as a direct consequence of hostilities; and Paragraph 10, for fines and levies imposed by the enemy upon the civilian population. All these demands are just and in conformity with the Allies' rights.
A significant portion of Annex I is in strict alignment with the pre-Armistice conditions, or at least doesn't stretch them beyond what can be reasonably argued. Paragraph 1 claims compensation for harm caused to civilians or, in cases of death, to their dependents, as a direct result of acts of war; Paragraph 2 addresses acts of cruelty, violence, or mistreatment by the enemy towards civilian victims; Paragraph 3 concerns enemy actions that harm the health, ability to work, or dignity of civilians in occupied or invaded territories; Paragraph 8 is about forced labor imposed by the enemy on civilians; Paragraph 9 discusses damage to property "excluding naval and military works or materials" as a direct outcome of hostilities; and Paragraph 10 covers fines and levies that the enemy has imposed on the civilian population. All these claims are fair and in line with the rights of the Allies.
Paragraph 4, which claims for "damage caused by any kind of maltreatment of prisoners of war," is more doubtful on the strict letter, but may be justifiable under the Hague Convention and involves a very small sum.
Paragraph 4, which addresses "damage caused by any kind of mistreatment of prisoners of war," is more questionable regarding the strict wording, but might be justifiable under the Hague Convention and involves a very small amount.
In Paragraphs 5, 6, and 7, however, an issue of immensely greater significance is involved. These paragraphs assert a claim for the amount of the Separation and similar Allowances granted during the war by the Allied Governments to the families of mobilized persons, and for the amount of the pensions and compensations in respect of the injury or death of combatants payable by these Governments now and hereafter. Financially this adds to the Bill, as we shall see below, a very large amount, indeed about twice as much again as all the other claims added together.
In Paragraphs 5, 6, and 7, however, a much more significant issue is at stake. These paragraphs make a claim for the total amount of Separation and similar Allowances that were provided during the war by the Allied Governments to the families of mobilized individuals, as well as the amount of pensions and compensations for the injury or death of combatants that these Governments are responsible for now and in the future. Financially, this adds a substantial amount to the Bill, which, as we will see below, is about twice as much as all the other claims combined.
The reader will readily apprehend what a plausible case can be made out for the inclusion of these items of damage, if only on sentimental grounds. It can be pointed out, first of all, that from the point of view of general fairness it is monstrous that a woman whose house is destroyed should be entitled to claim from the enemy whilst a woman whose husband is killed on the field of battle should not be so entitled; or that a farmer deprived of his farm should claim but that a woman deprived of the earning power of her husband should not claim. In fact the case for including Pensions and Separation Allowances largely depends on exploiting the rather arbitrary character of the criterion laid down in the pre-Armistice conditions. Of all the losses caused by war some bear more heavily on individuals and some are more evenly distributed over the community as a whole; but by means of compensations granted by the Government many of the former are in fact converted into the latter. The most logical criterion for a limited claim, falling short of the entire costs of the war, would have been in respect of enemy acts contrary to International engagements or the recognized practices of warfare. But this also would have been very difficult to apply and unduly unfavorable to French interests as compared with Belgium (whose neutrality Germany had guaranteed) and Great Britain (the chief sufferer from illicit acts of submarines).
The reader will easily understand the strong argument for including these damage claims, even just based on sentiment. First of all, from a fairness perspective, it's outrageous that a woman whose house is destroyed can claim compensation from the enemy, while a woman whose husband is killed in battle cannot. Or that a farmer who loses his farm can claim, but a woman who loses her husband’s income cannot. In fact, the case for including Pensions and Separation Allowances largely relies on the somewhat arbitrary nature of the criteria set out in the pre-Armistice conditions. Among all the losses caused by war, some hit individuals harder while others are more widely spread across the community. However, through government compensations, many of the individual losses end up being distributed more evenly. The most logical basis for a limited claim, falling short of covering all war costs, would have been regarding enemy actions that violate International agreements or recognized warfare practices. But this would have also been very challenging to implement and could have disproportionately harmed French interests compared to Belgium (whose neutrality Germany promised to respect) and Great Britain (the main victim of unlawful submarine actions).
In any case the appeals to sentiment and fairness outlined above are hollow; for it makes no difference to the recipient of a separation allowance or a pension whether the State which pays them receives compensation on this or on another head, and a recovery by the State out of indemnity receipts is just as much in relief of the general taxpayer as a contribution towards the general costs of the war would have been. But the main consideration is that it was too late to consider whether the pre-Armistice conditions were perfectly judicious and logical or to amend them; the only question at issue was whether these conditions were not in fact limited to such classes of direct damage to civilians and their property as are set forth in Paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 8, 9, and 10 of Annex I. If words have any meaning, or engagements any force, we had no more right to claim for those war expenses of the State, which arose out of Pensions and Separation Allowances, than for any other of the general costs of the war. And who is prepared to argue in detail that we were entitled to demand the latter?
In any case, the appeals to emotion and fairness mentioned earlier are empty; it doesn’t matter to the person receiving a separation allowance or a pension whether the State that pays them gets compensation in this area or another. A recovery by the State from indemnity payments helps relieve the overall taxpayer as much as a contribution to the general costs of the war would have. However, the key point is that it was too late to question whether the pre-Armistice conditions were completely wise and reasonable or to change them; the only issue at hand was whether these conditions were limited to the kinds of direct damage to civilians and their property outlined in Paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 8, 9, and 10 of Annex I. If words have any meaning or agreements any significance, we had no more right to claim for those war expenses of the State that came from Pensions and Separation Allowances than we did for any other general costs of the war. And who is ready to argue in detail that we were entitled to demand the latter?
What had really happened was a compromise between the Prime Minister's pledge to the British electorate to claim the entire costs of the war and the pledge to the contrary which the Allies had given to Germany at the Armistice. The Prime Minister could claim that although he had not secured the entire costs of the war, he had nevertheless secured an important contribution towards them, that he had always qualified his promises by the limiting condition of Germany's capacity to pay, and that the bill as now presented more than exhausted this capacity as estimated by the more sober authorities. The President, on the other hand, had secured a formula, which was not too obvious a breach of faith, and had avoided a quarrel with his Associates on an issue where the appeals to sentiment and passion would all have been against him, in the event of its being made a matter of open popular controversy. In view of the Prime Minister's election pledges, the President could hardly hope to get him to abandon them in their entirety without a struggle in public; and the cry of pensions would have had an overwhelming popular appeal in all countries. Once more the Prime Minister had shown himself a political tactician of a high order.
What really happened was a compromise between the Prime Minister's promise to the British public to cover the full costs of the war and the commitment the Allies made to Germany during the Armistice. The Prime Minister could argue that while he hadn't secured the entire costs of the war, he did manage to get a significant contribution towards them, that he had always qualified his promises by noting Germany's ability to pay, and that the current bill far exceeded this ability according to more reasonable estimates. The President, on the other hand, had secured a statement that wasn't too clearly a breach of trust and avoided a conflict with his colleagues on an issue that would have rallied public sentiment against him had it turned into an open controversy. Considering the Prime Minister's election promises, the President could hardly expect him to abandon them completely without a public fight; and the issue of pensions would have resonated strongly with the public in all countries. Once again, the Prime Minister demonstrated himself to be a highly skilled political strategist.
A further point of great difficulty may be readily perceived between the lines of the Treaty. It fixes no definite sum as representing Germany's liability. This feature has been the subject of very general criticism,—that it is equally inconvenient to Germany and to the Allies themselves that she should not know what she has to pay or they what they are to receive. The method, apparently contemplated by the Treaty, of arriving at the final result over a period of many months by an addition of hundreds of thousands of individual claims for damage to land, farm buildings, and chickens, is evidently impracticable; and the reasonable course would have been for both parties to compound for a round sum without examination of details. If this round sum had been named in the Treaty, the settlement would have been placed on a more business-like basis.
A further point of great difficulty can be easily seen in the Treaty. It doesn't specify a definite amount for Germany's liability. This aspect has faced widespread criticism—it's problematic for both Germany and the Allies that Germany doesn't know what she has to pay, nor do they know what they will receive. The method outlined in the Treaty, which involves determining the final amount over many months by adding up hundreds of thousands of individual claims for damage to land, farm buildings, and chickens, is clearly impractical; the sensible approach would have been for both sides to agree on a round figure without getting into the details. If that round figure had been included in the Treaty, it would have made the settlement more straightforward.
But this was impossible for two reasons. Two different kinds of false statements had been widely promulgated, one as to Germany's capacity to pay, the other as to the amount of the Allies' just claims in respect of the devastated areas. The fixing of either of these figures presented a dilemma. A figure for Germany's prospective capacity to pay, not too much in excess of the estimates of most candid and well-informed authorities, would have fallen hopelessly far short of popular expectations both in England and in France. On the other hand, a definitive figure for damage done which would not disastrously disappoint the expectations which had been raised in France and Belgium might have been incapable of substantiation under challenge,[105] and open to damaging criticism on the part of the Germans, who were believed to have been prudent enough to accumulate considerable evidence as to the extent of their own misdoings.
But this was impossible for two reasons. Two different kinds of false statements had been widely spread, one about Germany's ability to pay and the other about the amount of the Allies' just claims regarding the devastated areas. Establishing either of these figures created a dilemma. A figure for Germany's expected ability to pay, not significantly higher than the estimates of most honest and knowledgeable authorities, would have fallen significantly short of public expectations in both England and France. On the flip side, a concrete figure for the damage done that wouldn't severely disappoint the expectations raised in France and Belgium might not have stood up to scrutiny and could have faced harsh criticism from the Germans, who were thought to have been smart enough to gather a lot of evidence regarding the extent of their own wrongdoings.
By far the safest course for the politicians was, therefore, to mention no figure at all; and from this necessity a great deal of the complication of the Reparation Chapter essentially springs.
By far the safest approach for the politicians was to not mention any figures at all; and because of this necessity, a lot of the complexities in the Reparation Chapter actually arise.
The reader may be interested, however, to have my estimate of the claim which can in fact be substantiated under Annex I. of the Reparation Chapter. In the first section of this chapter I have already guessed the claims other than those for Pensions and Separation Allowances at $15,000,000,000 (to take the extreme upper limit of my estimate). The claim for Pensions and Separation Allowances under Annex I. is not to be based on the actual cost of these compensations to the Governments concerned, but is to be a computed figure calculated on the basis of the scales in force in France at the date of the Treaty's coming into operation. This method avoids the invidious course of valuing an American or a British life at a higher figure than a French or an Italian. The French rate for Pensions and Allowances is at an intermediate rate, not so high as the American or British, but above the Italian, the Belgian, or the Serbian. The only data required for the calculation are the actual French rates and the numbers of men mobilized and of the casualties in each class of the various Allied Armies. None of these figures are available in detail, but enough is known of the general level of allowances, of the numbers involved, and of the casualties suffered to allow of an estimate which may not be very wide of the mark. My guess as to the amount to be added in respect of Pensions and Allowances is as follows:
The reader might be curious to know my estimate of the claims that can actually be backed up under Annex I of the Reparation Chapter. In the first section of this chapter, I've already estimated the claims other than those for Pensions and Separation Allowances at $15,000,000,000 (taking the extreme upper limit of my estimate). The claim for Pensions and Separation Allowances under Annex I will not be based on the actual costs of these compensations to the involved Governments but will be a calculated figure based on the scales in place in France when the Treaty went into effect. This approach avoids the unfairness of assigning a higher value to an American or British life compared to a French or Italian one. The French rate for Pensions and Allowances is at a mid-range level—not as high as the American or British rates but higher than the Italian, Belgian, or Serbian ones. The only information needed for the calculation is the actual French rates and the numbers of men mobilized and casualties in each category of the various Allied Armies. While detailed figures aren't available, enough is known about the general level of allowances, the numbers involved, and the casualties incurred to make an estimate that shouldn’t be very wide of the mark. My estimation for the amount to be added concerning Pensions and Allowances is as follows:
British Empire | $7,000,000,000 | [106] | |
France | 12,000,000,000 | [106] | |
Italy | 2,500,000,000 | ||
Others (Including United States) | 3,500,000,000 | ||
Total | $25,000,000,000 |
I feel much more confidence in the approximate accuracy of the total figure[107] than in its division between the different claimants. The reader will observe that in any case the addition of Pensions and Allowances enormously increases the aggregate claim, raising it indeed by nearly double. Adding this figure to the estimate under other heads, we have a total claim against Germany of $40,000,000,000.[108] I believe that this figure is fully high enough, and that the actual result may fall somewhat short of it.[109] In the next section of this chapter the relation of this figure to Germany's capacity to pay will be examined. It is only necessary here to remind the reader of certain other particulars of the Treaty which speak for themselves:
I have a lot more confidence in the rough accuracy of the total amount[107] than in how it’s divided among the different claimants. You’ll notice that the addition of Pensions and Allowances significantly increases the overall claim, nearly doubling it. When we add this amount to the estimates from other categories, we come to a total claim against Germany of $40,000,000,000.[108] I think this figure is high enough, and the actual outcome might be a bit lower than that.[109] In the next part of this chapter, we’ll look at how this figure relates to Germany's ability to pay. For now, it’s important to highlight some other aspects of the Treaty that are self-evident:
1. Out of the total amount of the claim, whatever it eventually turns out to be, a sum of $5,000,000,000 must be paid before May 1, 1921. The possibility of this will be discussed below. But the Treaty itself provides certain abatements. In the first place, this sum is to include the expenses of the Armies of Occupation since the Armistice (a large charge of the order of magnitude of $1,000,000,000 which under another Article of the Treaty—No. 249—is laid upon Germany).[110] But further, "such supplies of food and raw materials as may be judged by the Governments of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers to be essential to enable Germany to meet her obligations for Reparation may also, with the approval of the said Governments, be paid for out of the above sum."[111] This is a qualification of high importance. The clause, as it is drafted, allows the Finance Ministers of the Allied countries to hold out to their electorates the hope of substantial payments at an early date, while at the same time it gives to the Reparation Commission a discretion, which the force of facts will compel them to exercise, to give back to Germany what is required for the maintenance of her economic existence. This discretionary power renders the demand for an immediate payment of $5,000,000,000 less injurious than it would otherwise be, but nevertheless it does not render it innocuous. In the first place, my conclusions in the next section of this chapter indicate that this sum cannot be found within the period indicated, even if a large proportion is in practice returned to Germany for the purpose of enabling her to pay for imports. In the second place, the Reparation Commission can only exercise its discretionary power effectively by taking charge of the entire foreign trade of Germany, together with the foreign exchange arising out of it, which will be quite beyond the capacity of any such body. If the Reparation Commission makes any serious attempt to administer the collection of this sum of $5,000,000,000 and to authorize the return to Germany of a part it, the trade of Central Europe will be strangled by bureaucratic regulation in its most inefficient form.
1. Out of the total claim amount, whatever it eventually turns out to be, a payment of $5,000,000,000 must be made before May 1, 1921. The possibility of this will be discussed below. However, the Treaty itself provides for certain reductions. First, this amount will include the costs of the occupation armies since the Armistice (a significant burden estimated around $1,000,000,000, which is imposed on Germany under another Article of the Treaty—No. 249).[110] Additionally, "supplies of food and raw materials deemed essential by the Governments of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers for Germany to meet its Reparation obligations may also, with the approval of said Governments, be paid from this amount."[111] This is a critically important qualification. The clause, as it stands, allows the Finance Ministers of the Allied countries to offer their electorates the hope of receiving sizable payments soon while also giving the Reparation Commission the discretion, which their circumstances will force them to use, to return what is necessary for Germany's economic survival. This discretionary power makes the demand for an immediate payment of $5,000,000,000 less damaging than it would otherwise be, but it still doesn't make it harmless. First, my findings in the next section of this chapter suggest that this amount cannot be covered within the given timeframe, even if a large portion is practically returned to Germany to allow for imports. Second, the Reparation Commission can only effectively exercise its discretionary power by overseeing Germany’s entire foreign trade and the foreign exchange that comes from it, which will far exceed the capacity of any such organization. If the Reparation Commission seriously attempts to manage the collection of this $5,000,000,000 and approve the return of part of it to Germany, Central Europe's trade will be suffocated by bureaucratic regulation in its most inefficient form.
2. In addition to the early payment in cash or kind of a sum of $5,000,000,000, Germany is required to deliver bearer bonds to a further amount of $10,000,000,000, or, in the event of the payments in cash or kind before May 1, 1921, available for Reparation, falling short of $5,000,000,000 by reason of the permitted deductions, to such further amount as shall bring the total payments by Germany in cash, kind, and bearer bonds up to May 1, 1921, to a figure of $15,000,000,000 altogether.[112] These bearer bonds carry interest at 2-1/2 per cent per annum from 1921 to 1925, and at 5 per cent plus 1 per cent for amortization thereafter. Assuming, therefore, that Germany is not able to provide any appreciable surplus towards Reparation before 1921, she will have to find a sum of $375,000,000 annually from 1921 to 1925, and $900,000,000 annually thereafter.[113]
2. Besides the initial payment in cash or kind of $5,000,000,000, Germany must deliver bearer bonds totaling an additional $10,000,000,000, or, if the cash or kind payments before May 1, 1921, fall short of $5,000,000,000 due to allowed deductions, then to an amount that will make the total payments from Germany in cash, kind, and bearer bonds by May 1, 1921, reach $15,000,000,000 in total.[112] These bearer bonds will earn interest at 2.5% per year from 1921 to 1925, and 5% plus 1% for amortization after that. So, if Germany can't provide any significant surplus toward Reparations before 1921, it will need to come up with $375,000,000 each year from 1921 to 1925, and $900,000,000 each year after that.[113]
3. As soon as the Reparation Commission is satisfied that Germany can do better than this, 5 per cent bearer bonds are to be issued for a further $10,000,000,000, the rate of amortization being determined by the Commission hereafter. This would bring the annual payment to $1,400,000,000 without allowing anything for the discharge of the capital of the last $10,000,000,000.
3. Once the Reparation Commission is convinced that Germany can do better than this, 5 percent bearer bonds will be issued for an additional $10,000,000,000, with the amortization rate to be decided by the Commission later. This would raise the annual payment to $1,400,000,000 without accounting for the repayment of the principal on the last $10,000,000,000.
4. Germany's liability, however, is not limited to $25,000,000,000, and the Reparation Commission is to demand further instalments of bearer bonds until the total enemy liability under Annex I. has been provided for. On the basis of my estimate of $40,000,000,000 for the total liability, which is more likely to be criticized as being too low than as being too high, the amount of this balance will be $15,000,000,000. Assuming interest at 5 per cent, this will raise the annual payment to $2,150,000,000 without allowance for amortization.
4. Germany's liability is not capped at $25,000,000,000, and the Reparation Commission is set to request additional installments of bearer bonds until the complete enemy liability under Annex I is accounted for. Based on my estimate of $40,000,000,000 for the total liability, which is likely to be seen as too low rather than too high, the remaining amount will be $15,000,000,000. If we consider interest at 5 percent, this will bring the annual payment to $2,150,000,000 without factoring in amortization.
5. But even this is not all. There is a further provision of devastating significance. Bonds representing payments in excess of $15,000,000,000 are not to be issued until the Commission is satisfied that Germany can meet the interest on them. But this does not mean that interest is remitted in the meantime. As from May 1, 1921, interest is to be debited to Germany on such part of her outstanding debt as has not been covered by payment in cash or kind or by the issue of bonds as above,[114] and "the rate of interest shall be 5 per cent unless the Commission shall determine at some future time that circumstances justify a variation of this rate." That is to say, the capital sum of indebtedness is rolling up all the time at compound interest. The effect of this provision towards increasing the burden is, on the assumption that Germany cannot pay very large sums at first, enormous. At 5 per cent compound interest a capital sum doubles itself in fifteen years. On the assumption that Germany cannot pay more than $750,000,000 annually until 1936 (i.e. 5 per cent interest on $15,000,000,000) the $25,000,000,000 on which interest is deferred will have risen to $50,000,000,000, carrying an annual interest charge of $2,500,000,000. That is to say, even if Germany pays $750,000,000 annually up to 1936, she will nevertheless owe us at that date more than half as much again as she does now ($65,000,000,000 as compared with $40,000,000,000). From 1936 onwards she will have to pay to us $3,250,000,000 annually in order to keep pace with the interest alone. At the end of any year in which she pays less than this sum she will owe more than she did at the beginning of it. And if she is to discharge the capital sum in thirty years from 1930, i.e. in forty-eight years from the Armistice, she must pay an additional $650,000,000 annually, making $3,900,000,000 in all.[115]
5. But that's not all. There's another provision of serious importance. Bonds that represent payments over $15,000,000,000 won't be issued until the Commission is sure that Germany can handle the interest on them. However, this doesn't mean that interest is put on hold in the meantime. Starting May 1, 1921, interest will be charged to Germany on any part of her outstanding debt that hasn't been covered by cash payments, goods, or the issuance of bonds as mentioned,[114] and "the interest rate will be 5 percent unless the Commission decides later that the circumstances warrant a change in this rate." This means that the total amount of debt keeps increasing with compound interest. If we assume that Germany can't pay large amounts at first, this provision significantly raises the financial burden. At a 5 percent compound interest, a principal amount doubles in fifteen years. If we consider that Germany can't pay more than $750,000,000 each year until 1936 (which is 5 percent interest on $15,000,000,000), the $25,000,000,000 on which interest is deferred will grow to $50,000,000,000, resulting in an annual interest charge of $2,500,000,000. This means that even if Germany pays $750,000,000 every year until 1936, she will still owe us more than half again what she owes now ($65,000,000,000 compared to $40,000,000,000). After 1936, she will need to pay us $3,250,000,000 a year just to keep up with the interest alone. At the end of any year when she pays less than this amount, her debt will be higher than it was at the start of the year. Furthermore, to pay off the principal in thirty years starting from 1930, which is forty-eight years after the Armistice, she would need to pay an extra $650,000,000 a year, making it $3,900,000,000 in total.[115]
It is, in my judgment, as certain as anything can be, for reasons which I will elaborate in a moment, that Germany cannot pay anything approaching this sum. Until the Treaty is altered, therefore, Germany has in effect engaged herself to hand over to the Allies the whole of her surplus production in perpetuity.
In my opinion, it's as certain as anything can be, for reasons I'll explain shortly, that Germany can't pay anything close to this amount. Until the Treaty is changed, Germany is basically obligated to give the Allies all of her surplus production indefinitely.
6. This is not less the case because the Reparation Commission has been given discretionary powers to vary the rate of interest, and to postpone and even to cancel the capital indebtedness. In the first place, some of these powers can only be exercised if the Commission or the Governments represented on it are unanimous.[116] But also, which is perhaps more important, it will be the duty of the Reparation Commission, until there has been a unanimous and far-reaching change of the policy which the Treaty represents, to extract from Germany year after year the maximum sum obtainable. There is a great difference between fixing a definite sum, which though large is within Germany's capacity to pay and yet to retain a little for herself, and fixing a sum far beyond her capacity, which is then to be reduced at the discretion of a foreign Commission acting with the object of obtaining each year the maximum which the circumstances of that year permit. The first still leaves her with some slight incentive for enterprise, energy, and hope. The latter skins her alive year by year in perpetuity, and however skilfully and discreetly the operation is performed, with whatever regard for not killing the patient in the process, it would represent a policy which, if it were really entertained and deliberately practised, the judgment of men would soon pronounce to be one of the most outrageous acts of a cruel victor in civilized history.
6. This is no less true because the Reparation Commission has been given the power to change the interest rate and to delay or even cancel the debt. First of all, some of these powers can only be used if the Commission or the member Governments agree unanimously.[116] But more importantly, it will be the duty of the Reparation Commission, until there is a unanimous and significant change in the policy established by the Treaty, to extract from Germany the maximum amount possible year after year. There’s a significant difference between setting a specific amount that, while large, is within Germany's ability to pay, allowing her to keep a little for herself, and setting an amount far beyond what she can handle, which is then reduced at the discretion of a foreign Commission aiming to get the most each year based on the circumstances. The first option still gives her some incentive for enterprise, energy, and hope. The latter method strips her of resources year by year indefinitely, and regardless of how skillfully and carefully it's done, with consideration for not harming the patient in the process, it would represent a policy that, if genuinely pursued and systematically applied, would soon be seen by public opinion as one of the most shocking acts of a cruel victor in civilized history.
There are other functions and powers of high significance which the Treaty accords to the Reparation Commission. But these will be most conveniently dealt with in a separate section.
There are other important functions and powers that the Treaty gives to the Reparation Commission. However, it will be most convenient to address these in a separate section.
III. Germany's Capacity to pay
The forms in which Germany can discharge the sum which she has engaged herself to pay are three in number—
The ways Germany can pay the amount she has committed to are three in total—
1. Immediately transferable wealth in the form of gold, ships, and foreign securities;
1. Wealth that can be quickly converted into cash, like gold, ships, and international investments;
2. The value of property in ceded territory, or surrendered under the Armistice;
2. The value of property in areas that were given up or surrendered under the Armistice;
3. Annual payments spread over a term of years, partly in cash and partly in materials such as coal products, potash, and dyes.
3. Yearly payments distributed over several years, partly in cash and partly in materials like coal products, potash, and dyes.
There is excluded from the above the actual restitution of property removed from territory occupied by the enemy, as, for example, Russian gold, Belgian and French securities, cattle, machinery, and works of art. In so far as the actual goods taken can be identified and restored, they must clearly be returned to their rightful owners, and cannot be brought into the general reparation pool. This is expressly provided for in Article 238 of the Treaty.
There is an exception to the above regarding the actual return of property taken from land occupied by the enemy, such as Russian gold, Belgian and French securities, livestock, machinery, and artworks. To the extent that the specific items taken can be identified and returned, they must definitely be restored to their rightful owners, and cannot be included in the overall reparation fund. This is clearly stated in Article 238 of the Treaty.
1. Immediately Transferable Wealth
(a) Gold.—After deduction of the gold to be returned to Russia, the official holding of gold as shown in the Reichsbank's return of the 30th November, 1918, amounted to $577,089,500. This was a very much larger amount than had appeared in the Reichsbank's return prior to the war,[117] and was the result of the vigorous campaign carried on in Germany during the war for the surrender to the Reichsbank not only of gold coin but of gold ornaments of every kind. Private hoards doubtless still exist, but, in view of the great efforts already made, it is unlikely that either the German Government or the Allies will be able to unearth them. The return can therefore be taken as probably representing the maximum amount which the German Government are able to extract from their people. In addition to gold there was in the Reichsbank a sum of about $5,000,000 in silver. There must be, however, a further substantial amount in circulation, for the holdings of the Reichsbank were as high as $45,500,000 on the 31st December, 1917, and stood at about $30,000,000 up to the latter part of October, 1918, when the internal run began on currency of every kind.[118] We may, therefore, take a total of (say) $625,000,000 for gold and silver together at the date of the Armistice.
(a) Gold.—After deducting the gold to be returned to Russia, the official gold holding reported by the Reichsbank on November 30, 1918, was $577,089,500. This was significantly larger than the amount reported by the Reichsbank before the war,[117] and it resulted from an intense campaign in Germany during the war to collect not just gold coins but also all kinds of gold jewelry. While private reserves likely still exist, it's improbable that either the German Government or the Allies will manage to find them, given the extensive efforts that have already been made. Thus, this figure probably represents the maximum amount the German Government can extract from its people. In addition to gold, the Reichsbank also held about $5,000,000 in silver. However, there must be a significant amount still in circulation, as the Reichsbank's holdings were as high as $45,500,000 on December 31, 1917, and around $30,000,000 until late October 1918, when the internal run on all types of currency began.[118] Therefore, we can estimate a total of about $625,000,000 for gold and silver combined at the time of the Armistice.
These reserves, however, are no longer intact. During the long period which elapsed between the Armistice and the Peace it became necessary for the Allies to facilitate the provisioning of Germany from abroad. The political condition of Germany at that time and the serious menace of Spartacism rendered this step necessary in the interests of the Allies themselves if they desired the continuance in Germany of a stable Government to treat with. The question of how such provisions were to be paid for presented, however, the gravest difficulties. A series of Conferences was held at Trèves, at Spa, at Brussels, and subsequently at Château Villette and Versailles, between representatives of the Allies and of Germany, with the object of finding some method of payment as little injurious as possible to the future prospects of Reparation payments. The German representatives maintained from the outset that the financial exhaustion of their country was for the time being so complete that a temporary loan from the Allies was the only possible expedient. This the Allies could hardly admit at a time when they were preparing demands for the immediate payment by Germany of immeasurably larger sums. But, apart from this, the German claim could not be accepted as strictly accurate so long as their gold was still untapped and their remaining foreign securities unmarketed. In any case, it was out of the question to suppose that in the spring of 1919 public opinion in the Allied countries or in America would have allowed the grant of a substantial loan to Germany. On the other hand, the Allies were naturally reluctant to exhaust on the provisioning of Germany the gold which seemed to afford one of the few obvious and certain sources for Reparation. Much time was expended in the exploration of all possible alternatives; but it was evident at last that, even if German exports and saleable foreign securities had been available to a sufficient value, they could not be liquidated in time, and that the financial exhaustion of Germany was so complete that nothing whatever was immediately available in substantial amounts except the gold in the Reichsbank. Accordingly a sum exceeding $250,000,000 in all out of the Reichsbank gold was transferred by Germany to the Allies (chiefly to the United States, Great Britain, however, also receiving a substantial sum) during the first six months of 1919 in payment for foodstuffs.
These reserves, however, are no longer intact. During the lengthy period between the Armistice and the Peace, the Allies had to enable the supply of provisions to Germany from overseas. The political situation in Germany at that time and the serious threat of Spartacism made this step necessary for the Allies if they wanted to maintain a stable government in Germany to negotiate with. However, figuring out how these provisions would be paid for posed serious challenges. A series of conferences took place in Trèves, Spa, Brussels, and later in Château Villette and Versailles, bringing together representatives from the Allies and Germany to find a payment method that would be as least harmful as possible to the future possibilities of Reparation payments. From the beginning, the German representatives insisted that their country's financial situation was so dire that a temporary loan from the Allies was the only viable solution. The Allies could hardly accept this when they were preparing to demand immediate payments from Germany of much larger amounts. Additionally, the German claim couldn’t be seen as completely accurate while their gold reserves remained untapped and their foreign securities unsold. In any case, it was unrealistic to think that in the spring of 1919 public opinion in Allied countries or in America would have supported granting a significant loan to Germany. On the other hand, the Allies were understandably hesitant to spend the gold that appeared to be one of the few clear and certain resources for Reparation on provisioning Germany. Much time was spent exploring all possible alternatives; however, it became clear that, even if German exports and sellable foreign securities had been sufficient, they couldn't be liquidated in time, and that Germany's financial situation was so severe that nothing substantial was immediately available except the gold in the Reichsbank. As a result, Germany transferred over $250,000,000 in gold from the Reichsbank to the Allies (mainly to the United States, with Great Britain also receiving a significant sum) during the first six months of 1919 in exchange for food supplies.
But this was not all. Although Germany agreed, under the first extension of the Armistice, not to export gold without Allied permission, this permission could not be always withheld. There were liabilities of the Reichsbank accruing in the neighboring neutral countries, which could not be met otherwise than in gold. The failure of the Reichsbank to meet its liabilities would have caused a depreciation of the exchange so injurious to Germany's credit as to react on the future prospects of Reparation. In some cases, therefore, permission to export gold was accorded to the Reichsbank by the Supreme Economic Council of the Allies.
But that wasn't all. Even though Germany agreed, under the first extension of the Armistice, not to export gold without permission from the Allies, they couldn't always deny that permission. The Reichsbank had debts in nearby neutral countries that could only be settled in gold. If the Reichsbank failed to meet its obligations, it would lead to a drop in the exchange rate that would severely harm Germany's credit and impact future Reparation prospects. In some instances, the Supreme Economic Council of the Allies did grant permission for the Reichsbank to export gold.
The net result of these various measures was to reduce the gold reserve of the Reichsbank by more than half, the figures falling from $575,000,000 to $275,000,000 in September, 1919.
The overall effect of these different actions was to cut the gold reserve of the Reichsbank by over half, with the amount dropping from $575,000,000 to $275,000,000 in September 1919.
It would be possible under the Treaty to take the whole of this latter sum for Reparation purposes. It amounts, however, as it is, to less than 4 per cent of the Reichsbank's Note Issue, and the psychological effect of its total confiscation might be expected (having regard to the very large volume of mark notes held abroad) to destroy the exchange value of the mark almost entirely. A sum of $25,000,000, $50,000,000, or even $100,000,000 might be taken for a special purpose. But we may assume that the Reparation Commission will judge it imprudent, having regard to the reaction on their future prospects of securing payment, to ruin the German currency system altogether, more particularly because the French and Belgian Governments, being holders of a very large volume of mark notes formerly circulating in the occupied or ceded territory, have a great interest in maintaining some exchange value for the mark, quite apart from Reparation prospects.
It would be possible under the Treaty to use the entire amount for Reparation purposes. However, as it stands, it represents less than 4 percent of the Reichsbank's Note Issue, and completely confiscating it could be expected (considering the large amount of mark notes held abroad) to nearly destroy the exchange value of the mark. An amount of $25,000,000, $50,000,000, or even $100,000,000 could be allocated for a specific purpose. But we can assume that the Reparation Commission will find it unwise, considering the impact on their future ability to collect payments, to completely undermine the German currency system, especially since the French and Belgian Governments, holding a significant amount of mark notes that used to circulate in the occupied or ceded territory, have a strong interest in preserving some exchange value for the mark, beyond just Reparation concerns.
It follows, therefore, that no sum worth speaking of can be expected in the form of gold or silver towards the initial payment of $5,000,000,000 due by 1921.
It follows that no significant amount can be expected in gold or silver for the initial payment of $5,000,000,000 due by 1921.
(b) Shipping.—Germany has engaged, as we have seen above, to surrender to the Allies virtually the whole of her merchant shipping. A considerable part of it, indeed, was already in the hands of the Allies prior to the conclusion of Peace, either by detention in their ports or by the provisional transfer of tonnage under the Brussels Agreement in connection with the supply of foodstuffs.[119] Estimating the tonnage of German shipping to be taken over under the Treaty at 4,000,000 gross tons, and the average value per ton at $150 per ton, the total money value involved is $600,000,000.[120]
(b) Shipping.—Germany has agreed, as mentioned earlier, to give up almost all of her merchant ships to the Allies. In fact, a significant portion of them was already in the hands of the Allies before the Peace agreement was finalized, either due to being held in their ports or through the temporary transfer of tonnage under the Brussels Agreement in relation to food supply.[119] If we estimate the tonnage of German ships being taken over under the Treaty at 4,000,000 gross tons, and the average value per ton at $150, the total monetary value involved is $600,000,000.[120]
(c) Foreign Securities.—Prior to the census of foreign securities carried out by the German Government in September, 1916,[121] of which the exact results have not been made public, no official return of such investments was ever called for in Germany, and the various unofficial estimates are confessedly based on insufficient data, such as the admission of foreign securities to the German Stock Exchanges, the receipts of the stamp duties, consular reports, etc. The principal German estimates current before the war are given in the appended footnote.[122] This shows a general consensus of opinion among German authorities that their net foreign investments were upwards of $6,250,000,000. I take this figure as the basis of my calculations, although I believe it to be an exaggeration; $5,000,000,000 would probably be a safer figure.
(c) Foreign Securities.—Before the German Government conducted a census of foreign securities in September 1916,[121] the specific results of which have not been released, no official record of such investments was ever required in Germany. The various unofficial estimates are admittedly based on inadequate data, such as the inclusion of foreign securities in the German Stock Exchanges, collection of stamp duties, consular reports, etc. The main German estimates that were prevalent before the war are provided in the footnote below.[122] This indicates a general agreement among German authorities that their net foreign investments exceeded $6,250,000,000. I will use this figure as the basis for my calculations, even though I think it’s an overstatement; $5,000,000,000 would likely be a more accurate figure.
Deductions from this aggregate total have to be made under four heads.
Deductions from this total have to be made under four categories.
(i.) Investments in Allied countries and in the United States, which between them constitute a considerable part of the world, have been sequestrated by Public Trustees, Custodians of Enemy Property, and similar officials, and are not available for Reparation except in so far as they show a surplus over various private claims. Under the scheme for dealing with enemy debts outlined in Chapter IV., the first charge on these assets is the private claims of Allied against German nationals. It is unlikely, except in the United States, that there will be any appreciable surplus for any other purpose.
(i.) Investments in Allied countries and the United States, which together make up a significant portion of the world, have been taken over by Public Trustees, Custodians of Enemy Property, and similar officials, and are not accessible for Reparation except insofar as they exceed various private claims. According to the plan for handling enemy debts described in Chapter IV., the top priority for these assets is the private claims of Allied nations against German nationals. It's unlikely, except in the United States, that there will be any significant surplus for any other uses.
(ii.) Germany's most important fields of foreign investment before the war were not, like ours, oversea, but in Russia, Austria-Hungary, Turkey, Roumania, and Bulgaria. A great part of these has now become almost valueless, at any rate for the time being; especially those in Russia and Austria-Hungary. If present market value is to be taken as the test, none of these investments are now saleable above a nominal figure. Unless the Allies are prepared to take over these securities much above their nominal market valuation, and hold them for future realization, there is no substantial source of funds for immediate payment in the form of investments in these countries.
(ii.) Germany's biggest foreign investment areas before the war weren’t overseas like ours, but rather in Russia, Austria-Hungary, Turkey, Romania, and Bulgaria. A large portion of these investments has now lost almost all its value, at least for the time being; particularly those in Russia and Austria-Hungary. If current market value is the standard, none of these investments can be sold for more than a nominal amount. Unless the Allies are willing to acquire these securities for much more than their nominal market value and hold onto them for future profit, there isn't a significant source of funds for immediate payments from investments in these countries.
(iii.) While Germany was not in a position to realize her foreign investments during the war to the degree that we were, she did so nevertheless in the case of certain countries and to the extent that she was able. Before the United States came into the war, she is believed to have resold a large part of the pick of her investments in American securities, although some current estimates of these sales (a figure of $300,000,000 has been mentioned) are probably exaggerated. But throughout the war and particularly in its later stages, when her exchanges were weak and her credit in the neighboring neutral countries was becoming very low, she was disposing of such securities as Holland, Switzerland, and Scandinavia would buy or would accept as collateral. It is reasonably certain that by June, 1919, her investments in these countries had been reduced to a negligible figure and were far exceeded by her liabilities in them. Germany has also sold certain overseas securities, such as Argentine cedulas, for which a market could be found.
(iii.) While Germany couldn't cash in on her foreign investments during the war as much as we could, she still managed to do so in some cases and to the extent she was able. Before the United States entered the war, it's believed she resold a significant portion of her best investments in American securities, although some estimates of these sales (a figure of $300,000,000 has been mentioned) are likely inflated. Throughout the war, especially in its later stages when her exchanges were weak and her credit in neighboring neutral countries was declining, she sold whichever securities Holland, Switzerland, and Scandinavia would buy or accept as collateral. By June 1919, it's quite certain that her investments in these countries had dropped to a minimal amount and were far outweighed by her liabilities in them. Germany also sold some overseas securities, like Argentine cedulas, wherever a market could be found.
(iv.) It is certain that since the Armistice there has been a great flight abroad of the foreign securities still remaining in private hands. This is exceedingly difficult to prevent. German foreign investments are as a rule in the form of bearer securities and are not registered. They are easily smuggled abroad across Germany's extensive land frontiers, and for some months before the conclusion of peace it was certain that their owners would not be allowed to retain them if the Allied Governments could discover any method of getting hold of them. These factors combined to stimulate human ingenuity, and the efforts both of the Allied and of the German Governments to interfere effectively with the outflow are believed to have been largely futile.
(iv.) It’s clear that since the Armistice, there has been a significant movement of foreign securities still held by private individuals going abroad. Preventing this is extremely challenging. Typically, German foreign investments are in the form of bearer securities and aren’t registered. They can be easily smuggled out of the country across Germany’s extensive land borders, and for several months leading up to the peace agreement, it was clear that their owners wouldn’t be allowed to keep them if the Allied Governments found a way to seize them. These factors led to a surge in human creativity, and it’s believed that the attempts by both the Allied and German Governments to effectively stop this outflow were largely unsuccessful.
In face of all these considerations, it will be a miracle if much remains for Reparation. The countries of the Allies and of the United States, the countries of Germany's own allies, and the neutral countries adjacent to Germany exhaust between them almost the whole of the civilized world; and, as we have seen, we cannot expect much to be available for Reparation from investments in any of these quarters. Indeed there remain no countries of importance for investments except those of South America.
Given all these factors, it will be a miracle if there's anything left for reparations. The Allied countries, the United States, Germany’s own allies, and the neutral nations surrounding Germany together make up almost the entire civilized world; and, as we’ve observed, we can’t expect much to come from investments in any of these places for reparations. In fact, the only major countries left for investments are in South America.
To convert the significance of these deductions into figures involves much guesswork. I give the reader the best personal estimate I can form after pondering the matter in the light of the available figures and other relevant data.
To turn the importance of these deductions into numbers involves a lot of guessing. I provide the reader with my best personal estimate after thinking it over in light of the available figures and other relevant data.
I put the deduction under (i.) at $1,500,000,000, of which $500,000,000 may be ultimately available after meeting private debts, etc.
I listed the deduction under (i.) at $1.5 billion, of which $500 million may eventually be available after covering private debts, etc.
As regards (ii.)—according to a census taken by the Austrian Ministry of Finance on the 31st December, 1912, the nominal value of the Austro-Hungarian securities held by Germans was $986,500,000. Germany's pre-war investments in Russia outside Government securities have been estimated at $475,000,000, which is much lower than would be expected, and in 1906 Sartorius v. Waltershausen estimated her investments in Russian Government securities at $750,000,000. This gives a total of $1,225,000,000, which is to some extent borne out by the figure of $1,000,000,000 given in 1911 by Dr. Ischchanian as a deliberately modest estimate. A Roumanian estimate, published at the time of that country's entry in the war, gave the value of Germany's investments in Roumania at $20,000,000 to $22,000,000, of which $14,000,000 to $16,000,000 were in Government securities. An association for the defense of French interests in Turkey, as reported in the Temps (Sept. 8, 1919), has estimated the total amount of German capital invested in Turkey at about $295,000,000, of which, according to the latest Report of the Council of Foreign Bondholders, $162,500,000 was held by German nationals in the Turkish External Debt. No estimates are available to me of Germany's investments in Bulgaria. Altogether I venture a deduction of $2,500,000,000 in respect of this group of countries as a whole.
Regarding (ii.)—according to a survey conducted by the Austrian Ministry of Finance on December 31, 1912, the total nominal value of Austro-Hungarian securities owned by Germans was $986,500,000. Germany's pre-war investments in Russia, excluding government securities, were estimated at $475,000,000, which is considerably lower than expected. In 1906, Sartorius v. Waltershausen estimated Germany's investments in Russian government securities at $750,000,000. This results in a combined total of $1,225,000,000, somewhat supported by the $1,000,000,000 figure cited in 1911 by Dr. Ischchanian as a deliberately conservative estimate. A Romanian estimate published when that country entered the war indicated Germany's investments in Romania to be $20,000,000 to $22,000,000, with $14,000,000 to $16,000,000 in government securities. An organization advocating for French interests in Turkey, as reported in the Temps (Sept. 8, 1919), estimated the total German capital invested in Turkey at around $295,000,000, of which, according to the latest report from the Council of Foreign Bondholders, $162,500,000 was held by German nationals in the Turkish External Debt. I have no available estimates for Germany's investments in Bulgaria. Overall, I estimate a total of $2,500,000,000 for this group of countries as a whole.
Resales and the pledging as collateral of securities during the war under (iii.) I put at $500,000,000 to $750,000,000, comprising practically all Germany's holding of Scandinavian, Dutch, and Swiss securities, a part of her South American securities, and a substantial proportion of her North American securities sold prior to the entry of the United States into the war.
Resales and using securities as collateral during the war under (iii.) is estimated at $500 million to $750 million, including almost all of Germany's holdings of Scandinavian, Dutch, and Swiss securities, some of her South American securities, and a significant portion of her North American securities sold before the U.S. entered the war.
As to the proper deduction under (iv.) there are naturally no available figures. For months past the European press has been full of sensational stories of the expedients adopted. But if we put the value of securities which have already left Germany or have been safely secreted within Germany itself beyond discovery by the most inquisitorial and powerful methods at $500,000,000, we are not likely to overstate it.
As for the proper deduction under (iv.), there are obviously no available figures. For months, the European press has been filled with sensational stories about the methods being used. However, if we estimate the value of securities that have either already left Germany or have been securely hidden within Germany, beyond discovery by the most thorough and powerful means, at $500,000,000, we are probably not overstating it.
These various items lead, therefore, in all to a deduction of a round figure of about $5,000,000,000, and leave us with an amount of $1,250,000,000 theoretically still available.[123]
These various items result in a total deduction of around $5,000,000,000, leaving us with an amount of $1,250,000,000 theoretically still available.[123]
To some readers this figure may seem low, but let them remember that it purports to represent the remnant of saleable securities upon which the German Government might be able to lay hands for public purposes. In my own opinion it is much too high, and considering the problem by a different method of attack I arrive at a lower figure. For leaving out of account sequestered Allied securities and investments in Austria, Russia, etc., what blocks of securities, specified by countries and enterprises, can Germany possibly still have which could amount to as much as $1,250,000,000? I cannot answer the question. She has some Chinese Government securities which have not been sequestered, a few Japanese perhaps, and a more substantial value of first-class South American properties. But there are very few enterprises of this class still in German hands, and even their value is measured by one or two tens of millions, not by fifties or hundreds. He would be a rash man, in my judgment, who joined a syndicate to pay $500,000,000 in cash for the unsequestered remnant of Germany's overseas investments. If the Reparation Commission is to realize even this lower figure, it is probable that they will have to nurse, for some years, the assets which they take over, not attempting their disposal at the present time.
To some readers, this number might seem low, but they should remember that it’s supposed to represent the remaining saleable securities that the German Government might access for public purposes. In my opinion, it’s actually way too high. If I consider the problem from a different angle, I come up with a lower number. Ignoring the sequestered Allied securities and investments in Austria, Russia, and so on, what blocks of securities, categorized by countries and enterprises, could Germany realistically still have that would amount to as much as $1,250,000,000? I can't answer that. They have some Chinese Government securities that haven’t been sequestered, maybe a few Japanese ones, and a more significant value of high-quality South American properties. But there are very few enterprises of this kind still in German hands, and even their value would be measured in tens of millions, not fifties or hundreds. In my opinion, anyone who joins a syndicate to pay $500,000,000 in cash for the unsequestered remnants of Germany's overseas investments would be quite reckless. If the Reparation Commission hopes to even reach this lower figure, it's likely that they will need to carefully manage the assets they take over for several years without trying to sell them off right away.
We have, therefore, a figure of from $500,000,000 to $1,250,000,000 as the maximum contribution from Germany's foreign securities.
We have a figure of between $500,000,000 and $1,250,000,000 as the maximum contribution from Germany's foreign securities.
Her immediately transferable wealth is composed, then, of—
Her immediately transferable wealth consists of—
(a) Gold and silver—say $300,000,000.
Gold and silver—about $300 million.
(b) Ships—$600,000,000.
Ships—$600 million.
(c) Foreign securities—$500,000,000 to $1,250,000,000.
Foreign securities—$500 million to $1.25 billion.
Of the gold and silver, it is not, in fact, practicable to take any substantial part without consequences to the German currency system injurious to the interests of the Allies themselves. The contribution from all these sources together which the Reparation Commission can hope to secure by May, 1921, may be put, therefore, at from $1,250,000,000 to $1,750,000,000 as a maximum.[124]
Of the gold and silver, it really isn't feasible to take any significant amount without negatively impacting the German currency system, which could also harm the interests of the Allies. The total contribution the Reparation Commission can expect to secure by May 1921 can be estimated to be between $1,250,000,000 and $1,750,000,000 as a maximum.[124]
2. Property in ceded Territory or surrendered under the Armistice
As the Treaty has been drafted Germany will not receive important credits available towards meeting reparation in respect of her property in ceded territory.
As the Treaty is written, Germany will not receive significant credits that could help cover reparations related to its property in the territories it lost.
Private property in most of the ceded territory is utilized towards discharging private German debts to Allied nationals, and only the surplus, if any, is available towards Reparation. The value of such property in Poland and the other new States is payable direct to the owners.
Private property in most of the transferred territory is used to settle private German debts to Allied nationals, and only any surplus is available for Reparations. The value of this property in Poland and the other new States is payable directly to the owners.
Government property in Alsace-Lorraine, in territory ceded to Belgium, and in Germany's former colonies transferred to a Mandatory, is to be forfeited without credit given. Buildings, forests, and other State property which belonged to the former Kingdom of Poland are also to be surrendered without credit. There remain, therefore, Government properties, other than the above, surrendered to Poland, Government properties in Schleswig surrendered to Denmark,[125] the value of the Saar coalfields, the value of certain river craft, etc., to be surrendered under the Ports, Waterways, and Railways Chapter, and the value of the German submarine cables transferred under Annex VII. of the Reparation Chapter.
Government property in Alsace-Lorraine, in territory given to Belgium, and in Germany's former colonies handed over to a Mandatory, will be confiscated without any compensation. Buildings, forests, and other State property that were part of the former Kingdom of Poland will also be given up without any credit. Therefore, there are still Government properties, other than the above, returned to Poland, Government properties in Schleswig given to Denmark,[125] the value of the Saar coalfields, the value of certain river vessels, etc., to be given up under the Ports, Waterways, and Railways Chapter, and the value of the German submarine cables transferred under Annex VII. of the Reparation Chapter.
Whatever the Treaty may say, the Reparation Commission will not secure any cash payments from Poland. I believe that the Saar coalfields have been valued at from $75,000,000 to $100,000,000. A round figure of $150,000,000 for all the above items, excluding any surplus available in respect of private property, is probably a liberal estimate.
Whatever the Treaty says, the Reparation Commission won't get any cash payments from Poland. I think the Saar coalfields have been valued between $75 million to $100 million. A rough estimate of $150 million for all the items mentioned, not including any extra available for private property, is probably a generous estimate.
Then remains the value of material surrendered under the Armistice. Article 250 provides that a credit shall be assessed by the Reparation Commission for rolling-stock surrendered under the Armistice as well as for certain other specified items, and generally for any material so surrendered for which the Reparation Commission think that credit should be given, "as having non-military value." The rolling-stock (150,000 wagons and 5,000 locomotives) is the only very valuable item. A round figure of $250,000,000, for all the Armistice surrenders, is probably again a liberal estimate.
Then there's the value of the materials surrendered under the Armistice. Article 250 states that the Reparation Commission will evaluate a credit for the rolling stock given up under the Armistice, along with certain other specific items, and generally for any materials surrendered that the Reparation Commission believes should be credited "as having non-military value." The rolling stock, which includes 150,000 wagons and 5,000 locomotives, is the only truly valuable item. A ballpark figure of $250,000,000 for all the surrenders under the Armistice is likely a generous estimate.
We have, therefore, $400,000,000 to add in respect of this heading to our figure of $1,250,000,000 to $1,750,000,000 under the previous heading. This figure differs from the preceding in that it does not represent cash capable of benefiting the financial situation of the Allies, but is only a book credit between themselves or between them and Germany.
We have, therefore, $400,000,000 to add to our total of $1,250,000,000 to $1,750,000,000 from the previous category. This amount is different from the earlier one in that it doesn't represent cash that could improve the financial situation of the Allies; it's just a bookkeeping entry between the Allies or between them and Germany.
The total of $1,650,000,000 to $2,150,000,000 now reached is not, however, available for Reparation. The first charge upon it, under Article 251 of the Treaty, is the cost of the Armies of Occupation both during the Armistice and after the conclusion of Peace. The aggregate of this figure up to May, 1921, cannot be calculated until the rate of withdrawal is known which is to reduce the monthly cost from the figure exceeding $100,000,000, which prevailed during the first part of 1919, to that of $5,000,000, which is to be the normal figure eventually. I estimate, however, that this aggregate may be about $1,000,000,000. This leaves us with from $500,000,000 to $1,000,000,000 still in hand.
The total amount of $1,650,000,000 to $2,150,000,000 that's been reached is not, however, available for reparations. The first priority for it, according to Article 251 of the Treaty, is the cost of the Occupation Forces both during the Armistice and after the Peace Agreement is finalized. The total of this amount up to May 1921 can’t be determined until we know the withdrawal rate that will reduce the monthly cost from the figure over $100,000,000 that was established in the first part of 1919, to the normal amount of $5,000,000 that is expected eventually. However, I estimate that this total might be around $1,000,000,000. This leaves us with between $500,000,000 and $1,000,000,000 still available.
Out of this, and out of exports of goods, and payments in kind under the Treaty prior to May, 1921 (for which I have not as yet made any allowance), the Allies have held out the hope that they will allow Germany to receive back such sums for the purchase of necessary food and raw materials as the former deem it essential for her to have. It is not possible at the present time to form an accurate judgment either as to the money-value of the goods which Germany will require to purchase from abroad in order to re-establish her economic life, or as to the degree of liberality with which the Allies will exercise their discretion. If her stocks of raw materials and food were to be restored to anything approaching their normal level by May, 1921, Germany would probably require foreign purchasing power of from $500,000,000 to $1,000,000,000 at least, in addition to the value of her current exports. While this is not likely to be permitted, I venture to assert as a matter beyond reasonable dispute that the social and economic condition of Germany cannot possibly permit a surplus of exports over imports during the period prior to May, 1921, and that the value of any payments in kind with which she may be able to furnish the Allies under the Treaty in the form of coal, dyes, timber, or other materials will have to be returned to her to enable her to pay for imports essential to her existence.[126]
Out of this, and from exports of goods and payments in kind under the Treaty before May 1921 (for which I haven't accounted yet), the Allies have expressed hope that they will allow Germany to receive back sums necessary for purchasing essential food and raw materials as they see fit. Right now, it's impossible to accurately assess either the monetary value of the goods Germany will need to buy from abroad to revive its economy or how generously the Allies will use their discretion. If Germany's stocks of raw materials and food could be restored to something close to normal by May 1921, it would likely need foreign purchasing power of at least $500 million to $1 billion, in addition to the value of its current exports. While this is unlikely to be allowed, I firmly believe it’s clear that Germany's social and economic situation won't allow for a surplus of exports over imports before May 1921, and any value in payments in kind that she might supply to the Allies under the Treaty, like coal, dyes, timber, or other materials, will need to be returned to her so she can buy the imports essential for her survival.[126]
The Reparation Commission can, therefore, expect no addition from other sources to the sum of from $500,000,000 to $1,000,000,000 with which we have hypothetically credited it after the realization of Germany's immediately transferable wealth, the calculation of the credits due to Germany under the Treaty, and the discharge of the cost of the Armies of Occupation. As Belgium has secured a private agreement with France, the United States, and Great Britain, outside the Treaty, by which she is to receive, towards satisfaction of her claims, the first $500,000,000 available for Reparation, the upshot of the whole matter is that Belgium may possibly get her $500,000,000 by May, 1921, but none of the other Allies are likely to secure by that date any contribution worth speaking of. At any rate, it would be very imprudent for Finance Ministers to lay their plans on any other hypothesis.
The Reparation Commission should not expect any additional funding from other sources beyond the estimated amount of $500,000,000 to $1,000,000,000 that we have tentatively assigned to it after assessing Germany's immediately transferable wealth, calculating the credits owed to Germany under the Treaty, and covering the costs of the Occupation Forces. Since Belgium has reached a private agreement with France, the United States, and Great Britain, separate from the Treaty, to receive the first $500,000,000 available for Reparation in order to fulfill her claims, the bottom line is that Belgium may possibly receive her $500,000,000 by May 1921, but it's unlikely that any of the other Allies will obtain any significant contributions by that time. In any case, it would be very risky for Finance Ministers to base their plans on any other assumptions.
3. Annual Payments spread over a Term of Years
It is evident that Germany's pre-war capacity to pay an annual foreign tribute has not been unaffected by the almost total loss of her colonies, her overseas connections, her mercantile marine, and her foreign properties, by the cession of ten per cent of her territory and population, of one-third of her coal and of three-quarters of her iron ore, by two million casualties amongst men in the prime of life, by the starvation of her people for four years, by the burden of a vast war debt, by the depreciation of her currency to less than one-seventh its former value, by the disruption of her allies and their territories, by Revolution at home and Bolshevism on her borders, and by all the unmeasured ruin in strength and hope of four years of all-swallowing war and final defeat.
It’s clear that Germany's ability to pay an annual tribute to foreign countries has been significantly impacted by the near-total loss of her colonies, overseas connections, merchant fleet, and foreign assets, the giving up of ten percent of her territory and population, one-third of her coal, and three-quarters of her iron ore, two million casualties among men in their prime, the starvation of her population for four years, the burden of a massive war debt, the devaluation of her currency to less than one-seventh of its previous value, the breakdown of her allies and their territories, revolution at home, and Bolshevism on her borders, along with the immense devastation and loss of hope caused by four years of relentless war and ultimate defeat.
All this, one would have supposed, is evident. Yet most estimates of a great indemnity from Germany depend on the assumption that she is in a position to conduct in the future a vastly greater trade than ever she has had in the past.
All of this seems obvious. However, most estimates of a large compensation from Germany are based on the idea that she is able to conduct a much larger trade in the future than she ever has in the past.
For the purpose of arriving at a figure it is of no great consequence whether payment takes the form of cash (or rather of foreign exchange) or is partly effected in kind (coal, dyes, timber, etc.), as contemplated by the Treaty. In any event, it is only by the export of specific commodities that Germany can pay, and the method of turning the value of these exports to account for Reparation purposes is, comparatively, a matter of detail.
For determining a figure, it doesn’t really matter whether payment is made in cash (or actually in foreign exchange) or partly in goods (like coal, dyes, timber, etc.), as outlined in the Treaty. In any case, Germany can only pay by exporting certain commodities, and the way to convert the value of these exports for Reparation purposes is, relatively speaking, a minor detail.
We shall lose ourselves in mere hypothesis unless we return in some degree to first principles, and, whenever we can, to such statistics as there are. It is certain that an annual payment can only be made by Germany over a series of years by diminishing her imports and increasing her exports, thus enlarging the balance in her favor which is available for effecting payments abroad. Germany can pay in the long-run in goods, and in goods only, whether these goods are furnished direct to the Allies, or whether they are sold to neutrals and the neutral credits so arising are then made over to the Allies. The most solid basis for estimating the extent to which this process can be carried is to be found, therefore, in an analysis of her trade returns before the war. Only on the basis of such an analysis, supplemented by some general data as to the aggregate wealth-producing capacity of the country, can a rational guess be made as to the maximum degree to which the exports of Germany could be brought to exceed her imports.
We'll get lost in just speculation if we don't go back to some basic principles and, wherever possible, look at the available statistics. It's clear that Germany can only make annual payments over several years by reducing its imports and boosting its exports, thereby increasing the balance in its favor that can be used for payments abroad. In the long run, Germany can only pay with goods, whether those goods go directly to the Allies or are sold to neutral countries and the resulting neutral credits are then transferred to the Allies. The best way to estimate how far this process can go is to analyze Germany's trade figures before the war. Only with such an analysis, along with some general information about the total wealth-producing capacity of the country, can a reasonable estimate be made regarding how much Germany's exports could exceed its imports.
In the year 1913 Germany's imports amounted to $2,690,000,000, and her exports to $2,525,000,000, exclusive of transit trade and bullion. That is to say, imports exceeded exports by about $165,000,000. On the average of the five years ending 1913, however, her imports exceeded her exports by a substantially larger amount, namely, $370,000,000. It follows, therefore, that more than the whole of Germany's pre-war balance for new foreign investment was derived from the interest on her existing foreign securities, and from the profits of her shipping, foreign banking, etc. As her foreign properties and her mercantile marine are now to be taken from her, and as her foreign banking and other miscellaneous sources of revenue from abroad have been largely destroyed, it appears that, on the pre-war basis of exports and imports, Germany, so far from having a surplus wherewith to make a foreign payment, would be not nearly self-supporting. Her first task, therefore, must be to effect a readjustment of consumption and production to cover this deficit. Any further economy she can effect in the use of imported commodities, and any further stimulation of exports will then be available for Reparation.
In 1913, Germany's imports totaled $2,690,000,000, while her exports were $2,525,000,000, not including transit trade and bullion. This means that imports surpassed exports by about $165,000,000. However, over the average of the five years leading up to 1913, her imports exceeded exports by a significantly larger amount, specifically $370,000,000. Therefore, more than the entirety of Germany's pre-war balance for new foreign investments came from the interest on her existing foreign securities and the profits from her shipping, foreign banking, and similar activities. Since her foreign assets and shipping fleet are now being taken from her, and her foreign banking and other income sources from abroad have largely been destroyed, it seems that based on the pre-war trade balance, Germany lacks a surplus for making foreign payments and is far from being self-sufficient. Consequently, her primary task must be to adjust consumption and production to address this shortfall. Any additional savings she can achieve in importing goods, as well as any increase in exports, will then be available for reparations.
Two-thirds of Germany's import and export trade is enumerated under separate headings in the following tables. The considerations applying to the enumerated portions may be assumed to apply more or less to the remaining one-third, which is composed of commodities of minor importance individually.
Two-thirds of Germany's import and export trade is listed under separate headings in the following tables. The factors that apply to the listed portions can be assumed to apply to the remaining one-third as well, which consists of commodities that are less significant on an individual basis.
German Exports, 1913 | Amount: Million Dollars |
Percent of Total Exports |
Iron products (including tin plates, etc.) | 330.65 | 13.2 |
Machinery and parts (including cars) |
187.75 | 7.5 |
Coal, coke, and briquettes | 176.70 | 7.0 |
Woolen goods (including raw and combed wool and clothing |
147.00 | 5.9 |
Cotton goods (including raw cotton, yarn and thread |
140.75 | 5.6 |
982.85 | 39.2 | |
Cereals, etc. (including rye, oats, wheat, hops |
105.90 | 4.1 |
Leather and leather goods | 77.35 | 3.0 |
Sugar | 66.00 | 2.6 |
Paper, etc. | 65.50 | 2.6 |
Furs | 58.75 | 2.2 |
Electrical goods (installations, ma- machinery, lamps, cables |
54.40 | 2.2 |
Silk goods | 50.50 | 2.0 |
Dyes | 48.80 | 1.9 |
Copper goods | 32.50 | 1.3 |
Toys | 25.75 | 1.0 |
Rubber and rubber goods | 21:35 | 0.9 |
Books, maps, and music | 18:55 | 0.8 |
Potash | 15.90 | 0.6 |
Glass | 15.70 | 0.6 |
Potassium chloride | 14:55 | 0.6 |
Pianos, organs, and parts | 13.85 | 0.6 |
Raw zinc | 13.70 | 0.5 |
Porcelain | 12.65 | 0.5 |
711.70 | 67.2 | |
Other goods, not listed | 829.69 | 32.8 |
Total | 2,524.15 | 100.0 |
German Imports, 1913 | Amount: Million Dollars |
Percent of Total Exports |
I. Materials:— | ||
Cotton fabric | 151.75 | 5.6 |
Furs and hides | 124.30 | 4.6 |
Wool | 118.35 | 4.4 |
Copper | 83.75 | 3.1 |
Coal | 68.30 | 2.5 |
Wood | 58.00 | 2.2 |
Iron ore | 56.75 | 2.1 |
Fur items | 46.75 | 1.7 |
Flax and flaxseed | 46.65 | 1.7 |
Saltpeter | 42.75 | 1.6 |
Silk | 39.50 | 1.5 |
Rubber | 36.50 | 1.4 |
Jute fiber | 23.50 | 0.9 |
Oil | 5:45 PM | 0.7 |
Tin | 14:55 | 0.5 |
Phosphorus chalk | 11.60 | 0.4 |
Lube oil | 11:45 | 0.4 |
951.90 | 35.3 | |
II. Food, tobacco, etc.:— | ||
Cereals, etc. (wheat, barley, bran, rice, corn, oats, rye, clover |
327.55 | 12.2 |
Oilseeds and cake, etc. (in- including palm kernels, copra, cocoa beans |
102.65 | 3.8 |
Beef, lamb fat, bladders | 73.10 | 2.8 |
Coffee | 54.75 | 2.0 |
Eggs | 48.50 | 1.8 |
Cigarettes | 33.50 | 1.2 |
Butter | 29.65 | 1.1 |
Horses | 29.05 | 1.1 |
Fruit | 18.25 | 0.7 |
Fish | 14.95 | 0.6 |
Chicken | 2:00 PM | 0.6 |
Wine | 13:35 | 0.5 |
759.30 | 28.3 | |
III. Manufacturing:— | ||
Cotton yarn and thread cotton products |
47.05 | 1.8 |
Wool yarn and wool products |
37.85 | 1.4 |
Equipment | 20.10 | 0.7 |
105.00 | 3.9 | |
IV. Unenumerated | 876.40 | 32.5 |
Total | 2,692.60 | 100.0 |
These tables show that the most important exports consisted of:—
These tables show that the most important exports included:—
- Iron Goods, including tin plates (13.2 per cent),
- Machinery, etc. (7.5 per cent),
- Coal, coke, and briquettes (7 per cent),
- Woolen goods, including raw and combed wool (5.9 per cent), and
- Cotton goods, including cotton yarn and thread and raw cotton (5.6 per cent),
these five classes between them accounting for 39.2 per cent. of the total exports. It will be observed that all these goods are of a kind in which before the war competition between Germany and the United Kingdom was very severe. If, therefore, the volume of such exports to overseas or European destinations is very largely increased the effect upon British export trade must be correspondingly serious. As regards two of the categories, namely, cotton and woolen goods, the increase of an export trade is dependent upon an increase of the import of the raw material, since Germany produces no cotton and practically no wool. These trades are therefore incapable of expansion unless Germany is given facilities for securing these raw materials (which can only be at the expense of the Allies) in excess of the pre-war standard of consumption, and even then the effective increase is not the gross value of the exports, but only the difference between the value of the manufactured exports and of the imported raw material. As regards the other three categories, namely, machinery, iron goods, and coal, Germany's capacity to increase her exports will have been taken from her by the cessions of territory in Poland, Upper Silesia, and Alsace-Lorraine. As has been pointed out already, these districts accounted for nearly one-third of Germany's production of coal. But they also supplied no less than three-quarters of her iron-ore production, 38 per cent of her blast furnaces, and 9.5 per cent of her iron and steel foundries. Unless, therefore, Alsace-Lorraine and Upper Silesia send their iron ore to Germany proper, to be worked up, which will involve an increase in the imports for which she will have to find payment, so far from any increase in export trade being possible, a decrease is inevitable.[127]
these five classes together make up 39.2 percent of the total exports. It's clear that all these goods belong to categories where competition between Germany and the UK was very intense before the war. Therefore, if the volume of exports to overseas or European destinations increases significantly, the impact on British export trade will be quite serious. For two specific categories, cotton and woolen goods, the growth of export trade relies on an increase in the import of raw materials, since Germany doesn't produce any cotton and very little wool. These industries can't expand unless Germany is allowed to secure these raw materials (which would come at the expense of the Allies) beyond the pre-war levels of consumption. Even then, the actual increase isn't just the gross value of the exports, but rather the difference between the value of the manufactured exports and the imported raw materials. In terms of the other three categories—machinery, iron goods, and coal—Germany's ability to boost her exports has been limited by the loss of territory in Poland, Upper Silesia, and Alsace-Lorraine. As previously mentioned, these regions accounted for nearly one-third of Germany's coal production. Additionally, they provided about three-quarters of her iron ore production, 38 percent of her blast furnace capacity, and 9.5 percent of her iron and steel foundries. Unless Alsace-Lorraine and Upper Silesia send their iron ore to mainland Germany for processing, which would mean an increase in imports that she would have to pay for, a decrease in export trade is unavoidable. [127]
Next on the list come cereals, leather goods, sugar, paper, furs, electrical goods, silk goods, and dyes. Cereals are not a net export and are far more than balanced by imports of the same commodities. As regards sugar, nearly 90 per cent of Germany's pre-war exports came to the United Kingdom.[128] An increase in this trade might be stimulated by a grant of a preference in this country to German sugar or by an arrangement by which sugar was taken in part payment for the indemnity on the same lines as has been proposed for coal, dyes, etc. Paper exports also might be capable of some increase. Leather goods, furs, and silks depend upon corresponding imports on the other side of the account. Silk goods are largely in competition with the trade of France and Italy. The remaining items are individually very small. I have heard it suggested that the indemnity might be paid to a great extent in potash and the like. But potash before the war represented 0.6 per cent of Germany's export trade, and about $15,000,000 in aggregate value. Besides, France, having secured a potash field in the territory which has been restored to her, will not welcome a great stimulation of the German exports of this material.
Next on the list are cereals, leather goods, sugar, paper, furs, electrical goods, silk goods, and dyes. Cereals aren't a net export and are overshadowed by imports of the same products. Regarding sugar, nearly 90 percent of Germany's pre-war exports went to the United Kingdom.[128] An uptick in this trade could be encouraged by granting a preference for German sugar in this country or setting up a deal where sugar is accepted as partial payment for the indemnity, like has been proposed for coal, dyes, etc. Paper exports may also have potential for increase. Leather goods, furs, and silks rely on corresponding imports on the other side of the equation. Silk goods face significant competition from France and Italy. The other items are individually quite minor. I've heard suggestions that the indemnity could largely be paid in potash and similar materials. However, potash before the war made up just 0.6 percent of Germany's export trade, totaling about $15,000,000 in value. Additionally, France, having secured a potash field in the territory returned to her, won't be keen on a significant boost in German exports of this material.
An examination of the import list shows that 63.6 per cent are raw materials and food. The chief items of the former class, namely, cotton, wool, copper, hides, iron-ore, furs, silk, rubber, and tin, could not be much reduced without reacting on the export trade, and might have to be increased if the export trade was to be increased. Imports of food, namely, wheat, barley, coffee, eggs, rice, maize, and the like, present a different problem. It is unlikely that, apart from certain comforts, the consumption of food by the German laboring classes before the war was in excess of what was required for maximum efficiency; indeed, it probably fell short of that amount. Any substantial decrease in the imports of food would therefore react on the efficiency of the industrial population, and consequently on the volume of surplus exports which they could be forced to produce. It is hardly possible to insist on a greatly increased productivity of German industry if the workmen are to be underfed. But this may not be equally true of barley, coffee, eggs, and tobacco. If it were possible to enforce a régime in which for the future no German drank beer or coffee, or smoked any tobacco, a substantial saving could be effected. Otherwise there seems little room for any significant reduction.
A look at the import list shows that 63.6 percent consists of raw materials and food. The main items in the raw materials category—like cotton, wool, copper, hides, iron ore, furs, silk, rubber, and tin—can’t be significantly reduced without impacting the export trade, and may need to be increased if we want to boost exports. Food imports, which include wheat, barley, coffee, eggs, rice, maize, and similar items, present a different issue. It’s unlikely that, aside from a few comforts, the food consumption of German workers before the war exceeded what was necessary for optimal efficiency; in fact, it probably fell short of that level. Any major decrease in food imports would likely affect the efficiency of the workforce, which in turn would impact the volume of surplus exports they could produce. It’s nearly impossible to demand much higher productivity from German industry if workers are underfed. However, this might not be equally applicable to barley, coffee, eggs, and tobacco. If it were feasible to implement a system where Germans stopped drinking beer or coffee and smoking tobacco, significant savings could be achieved. Otherwise, there doesn’t seem to be much potential for any substantial cuts.
The following analysis of German exports and imports, according to destination and origin, is also relevant. From this it appears that of Germany's exports in 1913, 18 per cent went to the British Empire, 17 per cent to France, Italy, and Belgium, 10 per cent to Russia and Roumania, and 7 per cent to the United States; that is to say, more than half of the exports found their market in the countries of the Entente nations. Of the balance, 12 per cent went to Austria-Hungary, Turkey, and Bulgaria, and 35 per cent elsewhere. Unless, therefore, the present Allies are prepared to encourage the importation of German products, a substantial increase in total volume can only be effected by the wholesale swamping of neutral markets.
The following analysis of German exports and imports, based on their destination and origin, is also relevant. It shows that in 1913, 18 percent of Germany's exports went to the British Empire, 17 percent to France, Italy, and Belgium, 10 percent to Russia and Romania, and 7 percent to the United States; that is, more than half of the exports were sold in the countries of the Entente nations. Of the remaining exports, 12 percent went to Austria-Hungary, Turkey, and Bulgaria, and 35 percent went elsewhere. Therefore, unless the current Allies are willing to allow the importation of German products, a significant increase in total volume can only happen by flooding neutral markets.
German Trade (1913) by Destination and Origin | |||||||||
Destination of Germany's Exports |
Origin of Germany's Imports |
||||||||
Million Dollars |
Per cent | Million Dollars |
Per cent | ||||||
Great Britain | 359.65 | 14.2 | 219.00 | 8.1 | |||||
India | 37.65 | 1.5 | 135.20 | 5.0 | |||||
Egypt | 10.85 | 0.4 | 29.60 | 1.1 | |||||
Canada | 15.10 | 0.6 | 16.00 | 0.6 | |||||
Australia | 22.10 | 0.9 | 74.00 | 2.8 | |||||
South Africa | 11.70 | 0.5 | 17.40 | 0.6 | |||||
Total: UK Empire | 456.95 | 18.1 | 491.20 | 18.2 | |||||
France | 197.45 | 7.8 | 146.65 | 5.4 | |||||
Belgium | 137.75 | 5.5 | 86.15 | 3.2 | |||||
Italy | 98.35 | 3.9 | 79.40 | 3.0 | |||||
U. S. A. | 178.30 | 7.1 | 427.80 | 15.9 | |||||
Russia | 220.00 | 8.7 | 356.15 | 13.2 | |||||
Roumania | 35.00 | 1.4 | 19.95 | 0.7 | |||||
Austria-Hungary | 276.20 | 10.9 | 206.80 | 7.7 | |||||
Turkey | 24.60 | 1.0 | 18.40 | 0.7 | |||||
Bulgaria | 7.55 | 0.3 | 2.00 | Please provide the text you'd like modernized. | |||||
Other countries | 800.20 | 35.3 | 858.70 | 32.0 | |||||
2,522.35 | 100.0 | 2,692.60 | 100.0 |
The above analysis affords some indication of the possible magnitude of the maximum modification of Germany's export balance under the conditions which will prevail after the Peace. On the assumptions (1) that we do not specially favor Germany over ourselves in supplies of such raw materials as cotton and wool (the world's supply of which is limited), (2) that France, having secured the iron-ore deposits, makes a serious attempt to secure the blast-furnaces and the steel trade also, (3) that Germany is not encouraged and assisted to undercut the iron and other trades of the Allies in overseas market, and (4) that a substantial preference is not given to German goods in the British Empire, it is evident by examination of the specific items that not much is practicable.
The analysis above gives some insight into how much Germany's export balance might change after the Peace conditions are in place. Under the assumptions that (1) we don't prioritize Germany for supplies of limited raw materials like cotton and wool, (2) France, having gained control of the iron-ore deposits, actively works to secure the blast-furnaces and the steel trade as well, (3) Germany isn't encouraged or supported to undercut the iron and other industries of the Allies in overseas markets, and (4) German goods aren't given a significant advantage in the British Empire, it's clear from examining the specific details that not much can be done.
Let us run over the chief items again: (1) Iron goods. In view of Germany's loss of resources, an increased net export seems impossible and a large decrease probable. (2) Machinery. Some increase is possible. (3) Coal and coke. The value of Germany's net export before the war was $110,000,000; the Allies have agreed that for the time being 20,000,000 tons is the maximum possible export with a problematic (and in fact) impossible increase to 40,000,000 tons at some future time; even on the basis of 20,000,000 tons we have virtually no increase of value, measured in pre-war prices;[129] whilst, if this amount is exacted, there must be a decrease of far greater value in the export of manufactured articles requiring coal for their production. (4) Woolen goods. An increase is impossible without the raw wool, and, having regard to the other claims on supplies of raw wool, a decrease is likely. (5) Cotton goods. The same considerations apply as to wool. (6) Cereals. There never was and never can be a net export. (7) Leather goods. The same considerations apply as to wool.
Let's review the main points again: (1) Iron goods. Given Germany's loss of resources, a higher net export seems unlikely and a significant decrease is probable. (2) Machinery. Some increase is possible. (3) Coal and coke. Before the war, the value of Germany's net export was $110,000,000; the Allies have agreed that for now, 20,000,000 tons is the maximum possible export, with a questionable (and frankly) impossible increase to 40,000,000 tons in the future; even at 20,000,000 tons, there's virtually no increase in value when compared to pre-war prices;[129] while, if this amount is enforced, there will be a much greater decrease in the export of manufactured articles that require coal for their production. (4) Woolen goods. An increase isn't possible without the raw wool, and considering other demands for raw wool, a decrease is likely. (5) Cotton goods. The same issues apply as with wool. (6) Cereals. There never was and cannot be a net export. (7) Leather goods. The same issues apply as with wool.
We have now covered nearly half of Germany's pre-war exports, and there is no other commodity which formerly represented as much as 3 per cent of her exports. In what commodity is she to pay? Dyes?—their total value in 1913 was $50,000,000. Toys? Potash?—1913 exports were worth $15,000,000. And even if the commodities could be specified, in what markets are they to be sold?—remembering that we have in mind goods to the value not of tens of millions annually, but of hundreds of millions.
We’ve almost covered half of Germany's pre-war exports, and there isn’t any other product that used to account for as much as 3 percent of her exports. What product will she use to pay? Dyes?—their total value in 1913 was $50 million. Toys? Potash?—exports in 1913 were worth $15 million. And even if we could identify the products, where will they be sold?—keeping in mind that we’re talking about goods worth not just tens of millions each year, but hundreds of millions.
On the side of imports, rather more is possible. By lowering the standard of life, an appreciable reduction of expenditure on imported commodities may be possible. But, as we have already seen, many large items are incapable of reduction without reacting on the volume of exports.
On the imports side, there's definitely more that can be done. By reducing the standard of living, we could significantly cut down on spending for imported goods. However, as we've already noted, many major expenses can't be reduced without impacting the volume of exports.
Let us put our guess as high as we can without being foolish, and suppose that after a time Germany will be able, in spite of the reduction of her resources, her facilities, her markets, and her productive power, to increase her exports and diminish her imports so as to improve her trade balance altogether by $500,000,000 annually, measured in pre-war prices. This adjustment is first required to liquidate the adverse trade balance, which in the five years before the war averaged $370,000,000; but we will assume that after allowing for this, she is left with a favorable trade balance of $250,000,000 a year. Doubling this to allow for the rise in pre-war prices, we have a figure of $500,000,000. Having regard to the political, social, and human factors, as well as to the purely economic, I doubt if Germany could be made to pay this sum annually over a period of 30 years; but it would not be foolish to assert or to hope that she could.
Let’s make our best guess without being unrealistic, and assume that eventually Germany will be able, despite having fewer resources, facilities, markets, and productive capacity, to boost its exports and cut its imports so that it improves its trade balance by $500,000,000 each year, based on pre-war prices. This adjustment is necessary to cover the trade deficit, which averaged $370,000,000 in the five years leading up to the war; however, let’s assume that once that is accounted for, Germany would still have a favorable trade balance of $250,000,000 a year. If we double that to account for the increase in pre-war prices, we arrive at $500,000,000. Considering the political, social, and human factors alongside the purely economic ones, I have doubts about whether Germany could realistically pay this amount annually over 30 years, but it's not unreasonable to assert or hope that it could.
Such a figure, allowing 5 per cent for interest, and 1 per cent for repayment of capital, represents a capital sum having a present value of about $8,500,000,000.[130]
Such a figure, allowing for 5 percent interest and 1 percent for capital repayment, represents a capital sum with a present value of about $8,500,000,000.[130]
I reach, therefore, the final conclusion that, including all methods of payment—immediately transferable wealth, ceded property, and an annual tribute—$10,000,000,000 is a safe maximum figure of Germany's capacity to pay. In all the actual circumstances, I do not believe that she can pay as much. Let those who consider this a very low figure, bear in mind the following remarkable comparison. The wealth of France in 1871 was estimated at a little less than half that of Germany in 1913. Apart from changes in the value of money, an indemnity from Germany of $2,500,000,000 would, therefore, be about comparable to the sum paid by France in 1871; and as the real burden of an indemnity increases more than in proportion to its amount, the payment of $10,000,000,000 by Germany would have far severer consequences than the $1,000,000,000 paid by France in 1871.
I come to the final conclusion that, considering all forms of payment—immediately available cash, transferred property, and an annual tribute—$10 billion is a reasonable maximum for Germany's ability to pay. Given the current situation, I don't think she can actually pay that much. For those who see this as a low figure, keep in mind the following notable comparison: France's wealth in 1871 was estimated at just under half of Germany's in 1913. Aside from fluctuations in the value of money, a $2.5 billion indemnity from Germany would be roughly equivalent to what France paid in 1871; and because the true burden of an indemnity increases more than proportionately to its amount, a payment of $10 billion by Germany would have much harsher consequences than the $1 billion paid by France in 1871.
There is only one head under which I see a possibility of adding to the figure reached on the line of argument adopted above; that is, if German labor is actually transported to the devastated areas and there engaged in the work of reconstruction. I have heard that a limited scheme of this kind is actually in view. The additional contribution thus obtainable depends on the number of laborers which the German Government could contrive to maintain in this way and also on the number which, over a period of years, the Belgian and French inhabitants would tolerate in their midst. In any case, it would seem very difficult to employ on the actual work of reconstruction, even over a number of years, imported labor having a net present value exceeding (say) $1,250,000,000; and even this would not prove in practice a net addition to the annual contributions obtainable in other ways.
There’s only one way I see a chance to increase the figure mentioned in the argument above: if German workers are actually sent to the devastated areas to help with reconstruction. I’ve heard that there’s a limited plan like this in mind. The extra contribution that could be gained depends on how many laborers the German government could manage to keep in this way and how many the Belgian and French locals would be willing to accept over the years. In any case, it seems really challenging to employ imported labor for the actual reconstruction work, even over several years, with a net present value exceeding (let’s say) $1,250,000,000; and even this wouldn’t actually result in a net increase in the annual contributions that could be obtained through other means.
A capacity of $40,000,000,000 or even of $25,000,000,000 is, therefore, not within the limits of reasonable possibility. It is for those who believe that Germany can make an annual payment amounting to hundreds of millions sterling to say in what specific commodities they intend this payment to be made and in what markets the goods are to be sold. Until they proceed to some degree of detail, and are able to produce some tangible argument in favor of their conclusions, they do not deserve to be believed.[131]
A capacity of $40 billion or even $25 billion is, therefore, not within the realm of reasonable possibility. It's up to those who think Germany can make annual payments totaling hundreds of millions of pounds to specify exactly what goods they plan to use for these payments and which markets the goods will be sold in. Until they provide some specifics and can present a solid argument for their conclusions, they shouldn't be taken seriously.[131]
I make three provisos only, none of which affect the force of my argument for immediate practical purposes.
I have just three conditions, none of which impact the strength of my argument for immediate practical use.
First: if the Allies were to "nurse" the trade and industry of Germany for a period of five or ten years, supplying her with large loans, and with ample shipping, food, and raw materials during that period, building up markets for her, and deliberately applying all their resources and goodwill to making her the greatest industrial nation in Europe, if not in the world, a substantially larger sum could probably be extracted thereafter; for Germany is capable of very great productivity.
First: if the Allies were to "nurture" Germany's trade and industry for five to ten years, providing large loans along with enough shipping, food, and raw materials during that time, creating markets for her, and intentionally directing all their resources and goodwill to making her the top industrial nation in Europe, if not the world, a much larger amount could likely be gained afterward; because Germany has the potential for very high productivity.
Second: whilst I estimate in terms of money, I assume that there is no revolutionary change in the purchasing power of our unit of value. If the value of gold were to sink to a half or a tenth of its present value, the real burden of a payment fixed in terms of gold would be reduced proportionately. If a sovereign comes to be worth what a shilling is worth now, then, of course, Germany can pay a larger sum than I have named, measured in gold sovereigns.
Second: While I calculate in terms of money, I assume that there isn't any drastic change in the purchasing power of our unit of value. If the value of gold were to drop to half or a tenth of its current value, the actual burden of a payment set in terms of gold would be reduced accordingly. If a sovereign becomes worth what a shilling is worth now, then, of course, Germany can pay a larger amount than I have mentioned, measured in gold sovereigns.
Third: I assume that there is no revolutionary change in the yield of Nature and material to man's labor. It is not impossible that the progress of science should bring within our reach methods and devices by which the whole standard of life would be raised immeasurably, and a given volume of products would represent but a portion of the human effort which it represents now. In this case all standards of "capacity" would be changed everywhere. But the fact that all things are possible is no excuse for talking foolishly.
Third: I believe that there won't be any revolutionary change in the yield of nature and the materials available to human labor. It’s not impossible that advancements in science could introduce methods and devices that would significantly improve our standard of living, making a certain amount of products require only a fraction of the human effort they do now. If that were to happen, all definitions of "capacity" would shift everywhere. However, just because everything is possible doesn't mean we should speak foolishly.
It is true that in 1870 no man could have predicted Germany's capacity in 1910. We cannot expect to legislate for a generation or more. The secular changes in man's economic condition and the liability of human forecast to error are as likely to lead to mistake in one direction as in another. We cannot as reasonable men do better than base our policy on the evidence we have and adapt it to the five or ten years over which we may suppose ourselves to have some measure of prevision; and we are not at fault if we leave on one side the extreme chances of human existence and of revolutionary changes in the order of Nature or of man's relations to her. The fact that we have no adequate knowledge of Germany's capacity to pay over a long period of years is no justification (as I have heard some people claim that, it is) for the statement that she can pay $50,000,000,000.
It's true that in 1870, no one could have predicted Germany's strength in 1910. We can't expect to make laws for a generation or more. The ongoing changes in people's economic conditions and the unpredictability of human forecasts are equally likely to lead us to mistakes in one direction as another. As reasonable people, we can only base our policies on the evidence we have and adjust them for the next five to ten years, which is about as far ahead as we can realistically plan; it’s not unreasonable to overlook the extreme possibilities of human existence and the drastic shifts in nature or humanity's relationship with it. The fact that we lack sufficient knowledge of Germany's ability to pay over a long time doesn’t justify claims (as I've heard some people suggest) that she can pay $50 billion.
Why has the world been so credulous of the unveracities of politicians? If an explanation is needed, I attribute this particular credulity to the following influences in part.
Why has the world been so gullible about the lies of politicians? If an explanation is required, I partly attribute this gullibility to the following influences.
In the first place, the vast expenditures of the war, the inflation of prices, and the depreciation of currency, leading up to a complete instability of the unit of value, have made us lose all sense of number and magnitude in matters of finance. What we believed to be the limits of possibility have been so enormously exceeded, and those who founded their expectations on the past have been so often wrong, that the man in the street is now prepared to believe anything which is told him with some show of authority, and the larger the figure the more readily he swallows it.
First, the huge costs of the war, rising prices, and the drop in currency value have caused complete instability in how we measure worth, making us lose all sense of numbers and scale when it comes to finances. What we thought were the limits of possibility have been so dramatically surpassed, and those who based their hopes on past experiences have often been mistaken, that the average person is now ready to believe anything presented with some degree of authority, and the bigger the number, the more easily he accepts it.
But those who look into the matter more deeply are sometimes misled by a fallacy, much more plausible to reasonableness. Such a one might base his conclusions on Germany's total surplus of annual productivity as distinct from her export surplus. Helfferich's estimate of Germany's annual increment of wealth in 1913 was $2,000,000,000 to $2,125,000,000 (exclusive of increased money value of existing land and property). Before the war, Germany spent between $250,000,000 and $500,000,000 on armaments, with which she can now dispense. Why, therefore, should she not pay over to the Allies an annual sum of $2,500,000,000? This puts the crude argument in its strongest and most plausible form.
But those who examine the issue more closely can sometimes be misled by a fallacy that seems more reasonable. Someone might base their conclusions on Germany's total annual productivity surplus instead of just her export surplus. Helfferich estimated Germany's annual increase in wealth in 1913 was between $2,000,000,000 and $2,125,000,000 (not counting the increased money value of existing land and property). Before the war, Germany spent between $250,000,000 and $500,000,000 on arms, which she no longer needs. So why shouldn't she pay the Allies an annual amount of $2,500,000,000? This presents the basic argument in its strongest and most believable form.
But there are two errors in it. First of all, Germany's annual savings, after what she has suffered in the war and by the Peace, will fall far short of what they were before, and, if they are taken from her year by year in future, they cannot again reach their previous level. The loss of Alsace-Lorraine, Poland, and Upper Silesia could not be assessed in terms of surplus productivity at less than $250,000,000 annually. Germany is supposed to have profited about $500,000,000 per annum from her ships, her foreign investments, and her foreign banking and connections, all of which have now been taken from her. Her saving on armaments is far more than balanced by her annual charge for pensions now estimated at $1,250,000,000,[132] which represents a real loss of productive capacity. And even if we put on one side the burden of the internal debt, which amounts to 24 milliards of marks, as being a question of internal distribution rather than of productivity, we must still allow for the foreign debt incurred by Germany during the war, the exhaustion of her stock of raw materials, the depletion of her live-stock, the impaired productivity of her soil from lack of manures and of labor, and the diminution in her wealth from the failure to keep up many repairs and renewals over a period of nearly five years. Germany is not as rich as she was before the war, and the diminution in her future savings for these reasons, quite apart from the factors previously allowed for, could hardly be put at less than ten per cent, that is $200,000,000 annually.
But there are two mistakes in this. First, Germany's annual savings, after everything she’s been through during the war and the Peace treaty, will be far lower than they were before. If her savings are taken away year after year in the future, they won't be able to reach those previous levels again. The loss of Alsace-Lorraine, Poland, and Upper Silesia could be estimated at a loss of at least $250,000,000 annually in terms of surplus productivity. Germany was making about $500,000,000 a year from her ships, foreign investments, and banking connections, all of which have now been lost. The savings from reducing arms spending are more than offset by her annual pension costs, now estimated at $1,250,000,000,[132], which represents a real loss of productive capacity. Even if we set aside the burden of internal debt, which totals 24 billion marks, because that's a matter of internal distribution rather than productivity, we still have to consider the foreign debt Germany took on during the war, the depletion of her raw materials, the reduction in livestock, the decline in soil productivity due to lack of fertilizers and labor, and the decrease in her wealth from failing to maintain repairs over nearly five years. Germany is not as wealthy as she was before the war, and the reduction in her future savings for these reasons, apart from the earlier mentioned factors, could hardly be estimated at less than ten percent, or $200,000,000 a year.
These factors have already reduced Germany's annual surplus to less than the $500,000,000 at which we arrived on other grounds as the maximum of her annual payments. But even if the rejoinder be made, that we have not yet allowed for the lowering of the standard of life and comfort in Germany which may reasonably be imposed on a defeated enemy,[133] there is still a fundamental fallacy in the method of calculation. An annual surplus available for home investment can only be converted into a surplus available for export abroad by a radical change in the kind of work performed. Labor, while it may be available and efficient for domestic services in Germany, may yet be able to find no outlet in foreign trade. We are back on the same question which faced us in our examination of the export trade—in what export trade is German labor going to find a greatly increased outlet? Labor can only he diverted into new channels with loss of efficiency, and a large expenditure of capital. The annual surplus which German labor can produce for capital improvements at home is no measure, either theoretically or practically, of the annual tribute which she can pay abroad.
These factors have already decreased Germany's annual surplus to under $500,000,000, which we determined earlier to be the maximum of her annual payments. But even if we argue that we haven't accounted for the lower standard of living and comfort in Germany that can reasonably be expected from a defeated enemy,[133] there is still a fundamental flaw in the calculation method. An annual surplus available for domestic investment can only be transformed into a surplus available for export with a major change in the type of work being done. Labor, while it may be efficient and available for domestic services in Germany, might not find any opportunities in foreign trade. We return to the same question we faced when examining the export trade—what export market is German labor going to find a significantly greater outlet? Labor can only be redirected into new areas with a decline in efficiency and a significant investment of capital. The annual surplus that German labor can generate for capital improvements at home is not a true measure, theoretically or practically, of the annual tribute that she can pay abroad.
IV. The Reparation Commission.
IV. The Reparation Commission.
This body is so remarkable a construction and may, if it functions at all, exert so wide an influence on the life of Europe, that its attributes deserve a separate examination.
This body is such an impressive creation and may, if it works at all, have such a broad impact on life in Europe, that its characteristics deserve a closer look.
There are no precedents for the indemnity imposed on Germany under the present Treaty; for the money exactions which formed part of the settlement after previous wars have differed in two fundamental respects from this one. The sum demanded has been determinate and has been measured in a lump sum of money; and so long as the defeated party was meeting the annual instalments of cash no consequential interference was necessary.
There are no examples for the compensation required from Germany in the current Treaty; the financial demands that were part of the agreements after earlier wars have varied in two key ways from this situation. The amount requested has been specific and has been stated as a total sum of money; as long as the defeated party was paying the yearly installments of cash, no further interference was needed.
But for reasons already elucidated, the exactions in this case are not yet determinate, and the sum when fixed will prove in excess of what can be paid in cash and in excess also of what can be paid at all. It was necessary, therefore, to set up a body to establish the bill of claim, to fix the mode of payment, and to approve necessary abatements and delays. It was only possible to place this body in a position to exact the utmost year by year by giving it wide powers over the internal economic life of the enemy countries, who are to be treated henceforward as bankrupt estates to be administered by and for the benefit of the creditors. In fact, however, its powers and functions have been enlarged even beyond what was required for this purpose, and the Reparation Commission has been established as the final arbiter on numerous economic and financial issues which it was convenient to leave unsettled in the Treaty itself.[134]
But for reasons already explained, the demands in this case aren't clear yet, and the final amount will end up being more than can be paid in cash and also more than can be paid at all. Therefore, it was necessary to create a body to establish the claim amount, determine the payment method, and approve any needed reductions and delays. This body had to be given broad powers over the economic management of the enemy countries, which should now be treated as bankrupt estates managed for the benefit of the creditors. However, in reality, its powers and functions have been extended even beyond what was necessary for this purpose, and the Reparation Commission has been established as the ultimate decision-maker on various economic and financial issues that were intentionally left unresolved in the Treaty itself.[134]
The powers and constitution of the Reparation Commission are mainly laid down in Articles 233-241 and Annex II. of the Reparation Chapter of the Treaty with Germany. But the same Commission is to exercise authority over Austria and Bulgaria, and possibly over Hungary and Turkey, when Peace is made with these countries. There are, therefore, analogous articles mutatis mudandis in the Austrian Treaty[135] and in the Bulgarian Treaty.[136]
The powers and setup of the Reparation Commission are mainly defined in Articles 233-241 and Annex II of the Reparation Chapter of the Treaty with Germany. However, this Commission will also have authority over Austria and Bulgaria, and possibly over Hungary and Turkey, once peace agreements are made with these countries. Therefore, there are similar articles mutatis mudandis in the Austrian Treaty[135] and in the Bulgarian Treaty.[136]
The principal Allies are each represented by one chief delegate. The delegates of the United States, Great Britain, France, and Italy take part in all proceedings; the delegate of Belgium in all proceedings except those attended by the delegates of Japan or the Serb-Croat- Slovene State; the delegate of Japan in all proceedings affecting maritime or specifically Japanese questions; and the delegate of the Serb-Croat-Slovene State when questions relating to Austria, Hungary, or Bulgaria are under consideration. Other allies are to be represented by delegates, without the power to vote, whenever their respective claims and interests are under examination.
The main Allies each have one chief delegate. The delegates from the United States, Great Britain, France, and Italy participate in all meetings; the delegate from Belgium attends all meetings except those with the delegates from Japan or the Serb-Croat-Slovene State; the delegate from Japan is involved in discussions about maritime issues or specific Japanese matters; and the delegate from the Serb-Croat-Slovene State takes part when topics related to Austria, Hungary, or Bulgaria are being discussed. Other allies will be represented by delegates who do not have voting rights whenever their claims and interests are being considered.
In general the Commission decides by a majority vote, except in certain specific cases where unanimity is required, of which the most important are the cancellation of German indebtedness, long postponement of the instalments, and the sale of German bonds of indebtedness. The Commission is endowed with full executive authority to carry out its decisions. It may set up an executive staff and delegate authority to its officers. The Commission and its staff are to enjoy diplomatic privileges, and its salaries are to be paid by Germany, who will, however, have no voice in fixing them, If the Commission is to discharge adequately its numerous functions, it will be necessary for it to establish a vast polyglot bureaucratic organization, with a staff of hundreds. To this organization, the headquarters of which will be in Paris, the economic destiny of Central Europe is to be entrusted.
In general, the Commission makes decisions by majority vote, except for specific cases where unanimous agreement is required, including the cancellation of Germany's debt, long delays in payments, and the sale of German bonds. The Commission has full executive authority to implement its decisions. It can create an executive team and delegate power to its members. The Commission and its staff will have diplomatic privileges, and their salaries will be paid by Germany, although Germany won’t have any input in setting those salaries. To effectively carry out its many responsibilities, the Commission will need to establish a large, diverse bureaucratic organization with a staff of hundreds. This organization, which will be headquartered in Paris, will be responsible for the economic future of Central Europe.
Its main functions are as follows:—
Its main functions are as follows:—
1. The Commission will determine the precise figure of the claim against the enemy Powers by an examination in detail of the claims of each of the Allies under Annex I. of the Reparation Chapter. This task must be completed by May, 1921. It shall give to the German Government and to Germany's allies "a just opportunity to be heard, but not to take any part whatever in the decisions of the Commission." That is to say, the Commission will act as a party and a judge at the same time.
1. The Commission will figure out the exact amount of the claim against the enemy Powers by thoroughly reviewing the claims of each of the Allies under Annex I of the Reparation Chapter. This work needs to be done by May 1921. It will provide the German Government and Germany's allies "a fair chance to present their case, but they won't have any say in the Commission's decisions." In other words, the Commission will play both the role of a party and a judge at the same time.
2. Having determined the claim, it will draw up a schedule of payments providing for the discharge of the whole sum with interest within thirty years. From time to time it shall, with a view to modifying the schedule within the limits of possibility, "consider the resources and capacity of Germany . . . giving her representatives a just opportunity to be heard."
2. After deciding on the claim, it will create a payment schedule that ensures the full amount is paid off with interest within thirty years. Occasionally, it will look into adjusting the schedule if possible, "considering the resources and capacity of Germany . . . giving her representatives a fair chance to speak."
"In periodically estimating Germany's capacity to pay, the Commission shall examine the German system of taxation, first, to the end that the sums for reparation which Germany is required to pay shall become a charge upon all her revenues prior to that for the service or discharge of any domestic loan, and secondly, so as to satisfy itself that, in general, the German scheme of taxation is fully as heavy proportionately as that of any of the Powers represented on the Commission."
"In regularly assessing Germany's ability to pay, the Commission will review the German tax system. First, this is to ensure that the payments for reparations Germany must make take priority over all its revenues before any domestic loans are serviced or settled. Second, the Commission wants to confirm that, overall, Germany's tax system is just as burdensome proportionately as those of any of the Powers represented on the Commission."
3. Up to May, 1921, the Commission has power, with a view to securing the payment of $5,000,000,000, to demand the surrender of any piece of German property whatever, wherever situated: that is to say, "Germany shall pay in such installments and in such manner, whether in gold, commodities, ships, securities, or otherwise, as the Reparation Commission may fix."
3. Until May 1921, the Commission has the authority to demand the surrender of any German property, no matter where it is located, to ensure the payment of $5,000,000,000. In other words, "Germany will pay in installments and in the manner determined by the Reparation Commission, whether in gold, goods, ships, securities, or other forms."
4. The Commission will decide which of the rights and interests of German nationals in public utility undertakings operating in Russia, China, Turkey, Austria, Hungary, and Bulgaria, or in any territory formerly belonging to Germany or her allies, are to be expropriated and transferred to the Commission itself; it will assess the value of the interests so transferred; and it will divide the spoils.
4. The Commission will determine which rights and interests of German nationals in public utility companies operating in Russia, China, Turkey, Austria, Hungary, and Bulgaria, or in any territory that used to belong to Germany or its allies, will be taken and handed over to the Commission itself; it will evaluate the value of the interests that are transferred; and it will distribute the assets.
5 The Commission will determine how much of the resources thus stripped from Germany must be returned to her to keep enough life in her economic organization to enable her to continue to make Reparation payments in future.[137]
5 The Commission will decide how much of the resources taken from Germany must be returned to keep her economy alive enough to continue making Reparation payments in the future.[137]
6. The Commission will assess the value, without appeal or arbitration, of the property and rights ceded under the Armistice, and under the Treaty,—roiling-stock, the mercantile marine, river craft, cattle, the Saar mines, the property in ceded territory for which credit is to be given, and so forth.
6. The Commission will determine the value, without any option for appeal or arbitration, of the property and rights transferred under the Armistice and the Treaty—rolling stock, the commercial fleet, river boats, livestock, the Saar mines, property in the ceded territory for which credit is to be given, and so on.
7. The Commission will determine the amounts and values (within certain defined limits) of the contributions which Germany is to make in kind year by year under the various Annexes to the Reparation Chapter.
7. The Commission will decide the amounts and values (within specific limits) of the contributions that Germany needs to provide in kind each year according to the different Annexes in the Reparation Chapter.
8. The Commission will provide for the restitution by Germany of property which can be identified.
8. The Commission will ensure that Germany returns identifiable property.
9. The Commission will receive, administer, and distribute all receipts from Germany in cash or in kind. It will also issue and market German bonds of indebtedness.
9. The Commission will accept, manage, and distribute all payments from Germany, whether in cash or kind. It will also issue and sell German bonds.
10. The Commission will assign the share of the pre-war public debt to be taken over by the ceded areas of Schleswig, Poland, Danzig, and Upper Silesia. The Commission will also distribute the public debt of the late Austro-Hungarian Empire between its constituent parts.
10. The Commission will allocate the portion of the pre-war public debt to be assumed by the ceded regions of Schleswig, Poland, Danzig, and Upper Silesia. The Commission will also divide the public debt of the former Austro-Hungarian Empire among its constituent parts.
11. The Commission will liquidate the Austro-Hungarian Bank, and will supervise the withdrawal and replacement of the currency system of the late Austro-Hungarian Empire.
11. The Commission will close down the Austro-Hungarian Bank and will oversee the removal and replacement of the currency system from the former Austro-Hungarian Empire.
12. It is for the Commission to report if, in their judgment, Germany is falling short in fulfillment of her obligations, and to advise methods of coercion.
12. It is the Commission's responsibility to report if, in their opinion, Germany is not meeting its obligations, and to suggest methods of enforcement.
13. In general, the Commission, acting through a subordinate body, will perform the same functions for Austria and Bulgaria as for Germany, and also, presumably, for Hungary and Turkey.[138]
13. Overall, the Commission, through a subordinate group, will carry out the same functions for Austria and Bulgaria as it does for Germany, and likely for Hungary and Turkey as well.[138]
There are also many other relatively minor duties assigned to the Commission. The above summary, however, shows sufficiently the scope and significance of its authority. This authority is rendered of far greater significance by the fact that the demands of the Treaty generally exceed Germany's capacity. Consequently the clauses which allow the Commission to make abatements, if in their judgment the economic conditions of Germany require it, will render it in many different particulars the arbiter of Germany's economic life. The Commission is not only to inquire into Germany's general capacity to pay, and to decide (in the early years) what import of foodstuffs and raw materials is necessary; it is authorized to exert pressure on the German system of taxation (Annex II. para. 12(b))[139] and on German internal expenditure, with a view to insuring that Reparation payments are a first charge on the country's entire resources; and it is to decide on the effect on German economic life of demands for machinery, cattle, etc., and of the scheduled deliveries of coal.
There are also many other relatively minor tasks assigned to the Commission. However, the summary above clearly shows the scope and importance of its authority. This authority becomes even more significant because the demands of the Treaty generally exceed Germany's capacity. As a result, the clauses that allow the Commission to make adjustments, if they believe Germany's economic conditions require it, will make it, in many ways, the judge of Germany's economic life. The Commission is not only responsible for assessing Germany's overall ability to pay and deciding (in the early years) what imports of food and raw materials are necessary; it also has the power to influence Germany's tax system (Annex II. para. 12(b))[139] and internal spending, ensuring that Reparation payments take priority over the country's entire resources; it will also determine the impact of demands for machinery, livestock, etc., and the scheduled deliveries of coal on German economic life.
By Article 240 of the Treaty Germany expressly recognizes the Commission and its powers "as the same may be constituted by the Allied and Associated Governments," and "agrees irrevocably to the possession and exercise by such Commission of the power and authority given to it under the present Treaty." She undertakes to furnish the Commission with all relevant information. And finally in Article 241, "Germany undertakes to pass, issue, and maintain in force any legislation, orders, and decrees that may be necessary to give complete effect to these provisions."
By Article 240 of the Treaty, Germany explicitly acknowledges the Commission and its powers "as they may be established by the Allied and Associated Governments," and "irrevocably agrees to the possession and exercise of the power and authority granted to it under this Treaty." Germany commits to providing the Commission with all relevant information. Lastly, in Article 241, "Germany agrees to enact, issue, and uphold any laws, orders, and decrees that may be necessary to fully implement these provisions."
The comments on this of the German Financial Commission at Versailles were hardly an exaggeration:—"German democracy is thus annihilated at the very moment when the German people was about to build it up after a severe struggle—annihilated by the very persons who throughout the war never tired of maintaining that they sought to bring democracy to us.... Germany is no longer a people and a State, but becomes a mere trade concern placed by its creditors in the hands of a receiver, without its being granted so much as the opportunity to prove its willingness to meet its obligations of its own accord. The Commission, which is to have its permanent headquarters outside Germany, will possess in Germany incomparably greater rights than the German Emperor ever possessed, the German people under its régime would remain for decades to come shorn of all rights, and deprived, to a far greater extent than any people in the days of absolutism, of any independence of action, of any individual aspiration in its economic or even in its ethical progress."
The comments from the German Financial Commission at Versailles were hardly an exaggeration: "German democracy is destroyed at the very moment when the German people were about to establish it after a tough struggle—destroyed by those who, throughout the war, never tired of claiming that they wanted to bring democracy to us... Germany is no longer a nation and a state, but has become just a business managed by its creditors, without even being given the chance to show its willingness to meet its obligations on its own. The Commission, which will have its permanent headquarters outside Germany, will have far greater powers in Germany than the German Emperor ever had; the German people under its rule will remain stripped of all rights for decades to come and will have even less independence and fewer opportunities for personal ambition in their economic or ethical development than any people did during the age of absolutism."
In their reply to these observations the Allies refused to admit that there was any substance, ground, or force in them. "The observations of the German Delegation," they pronounced, "present a view of this Commission so distorted and so inexact that it is difficult to believe that the clauses of the Treaty have been calmly or carefully examined. It is not an engine of oppression or a device for interfering with German sovereignty. It has no forces at its command; it has no executive powers within the territory of Germany; it cannot, as is suggested, direct or control the educational or other systems of the country. Its business is to ask what is to be paid; to satisfy itself that Germany can pay; and to report to the Powers, whose delegation it is, in case Germany makes default. If Germany raises the money required in her own way, the Commission cannot order that it shall be raised in some other way; if Germany offers payment in kind, the Commission may accept such payment, but, except as specified in the Treaty itself, the Commission cannot require such a payment."
In their response to these comments, the Allies refused to acknowledge that there was any truth, basis, or validity to them. "The comments made by the German Delegation," they stated, "present such a distorted and inaccurate view of this Commission that it's hard to believe the clauses of the Treaty have been thoroughly or carefully reviewed. It's not a tool of oppression or a means to interfere with German sovereignty. It has no forces at its disposal; it has no executive authority within Germany; it cannot, as suggested, control or influence the educational or any other systems of the country. Its role is to determine what is to be paid; to ensure that Germany can pay; and to report to the Powers it represents if Germany fails to meet its obligations. If Germany raises the required funds in its own way, the Commission cannot dictate that it must be done differently; if Germany proposes payment in kind, the Commission may accept it, but, except as specified in the Treaty itself, the Commission cannot demand such payment."
This is not a candid statement of the scope and authority of the Reparation Commission, as will be seen by a comparison of its terms with the summary given above or with the Treaty itself. Is not, for example, the statement that the Commission "has no forces at its command" a little difficult to justify in view of Article 430 of the Treaty, which runs:—"In case, either during the occupation or after the expiration of the fifteen years referred to above, the Reparation Commission finds that Germany refuses to observe the whole or part of her obligations under the present Treaty with regard to Reparation, the whole or part of the areas specified in Article 429 will be reoccupied immediately by the Allied and Associated Powers"? The decision, as to whether Germany has kept her engagements and whether it is possible for her to keep them, is left, it should be observed, not to the League of Nations, but to the Reparation Commission itself; and an adverse ruling on the part of the Commission is to be followed "immediately" by the use of armed force. Moreover, the depreciation of the powers of the Commission attempted in the Allied reply largely proceeds from the assumption that it is quite open to Germany to "raise the money required in her own way," in which case it is true that many of the powers of the Reparation Commission would not come into practical effect; whereas in truth one of the main reasons for setting up the Commission at all is the expectation that Germany will not be able to carry the burden nominally laid upon her.
This isn't a straightforward explanation of the scope and authority of the Reparation Commission, as can be seen by comparing its terms with the summary provided above or with the Treaty itself. For instance, the claim that the Commission "has no forces at its command" is a bit hard to justify considering Article 430 of the Treaty, which states: "If, during the occupation or after the fifteen years mentioned above, the Reparation Commission finds that Germany refuses to meet its obligations under this Treaty concerning Reparation, the areas specified in Article 429 will be immediately reoccupied by the Allied and Associated Powers." It's important to note that the decision about whether Germany has fulfilled its commitments and whether it can fulfill them is not left to the League of Nations, but rather to the Reparation Commission itself; and if the Commission rules against Germany, armed force will be used "immediately." Furthermore, the attempt to downplay the powers of the Commission in the Allied response largely comes from the assumption that Germany can simply "raise the money it needs in its own way," which means that many of the powers of the Reparation Commission wouldn’t come into play. In reality, one of the main reasons for establishing the Commission is the expectation that Germany will not be able to handle the burden placed upon it.
It is reported that the people of Vienna, hearing that a section of the Reparation Commission is about to visit them, have decided characteristically to pin their hopes on it. A financial body can obviously take nothing from them, for they have nothing; therefore this body must be for the purpose of assisting and relieving them. Thus do the Viennese argue, still light-headed in adversity. But perhaps they are right. The Reparation Commission will come into very close contact with the problems of Europe; and it will bear a responsibility proportionate to its powers. It may thus come to fulfil a very different rôle from that which some of its authors intended for it. Transferred to the League of Nations, an appanage of justice and no longer of interest, who knows that by a change of heart and object the Reparation Commission may not yet be transformed from an instrument of oppression and rapine into an economic council of Europe, whose object is the restoration of life and of happiness, even in the enemy countries?
It’s said that the people of Vienna, hearing that a part of the Reparation Commission is coming to visit them, have decided, as is typical of them, to pin their hopes on it. A financial organization can obviously take nothing from them because they have nothing; therefore, this organization must be here to help and support them. That’s how the Viennese see it, still hopeful despite their struggles. But maybe they’re right. The Reparation Commission will directly engage with Europe’s issues and will carry a responsibility that matches its power. It might end up playing a very different role than what some of its creators intended. Now part of the League of Nations, it is an entity of justice rather than self-interest, and who knows, maybe through a shift in attitude and purpose, the Reparation Commission can change from being a tool of oppression and exploitation into an economic council for Europe, aimed at restoring life and happiness, even in the countries that were once enemies?
V. The German Counter-Proposals
The German counter-proposals were somewhat obscure, and also rather disingenuous. It will be remembered that those clauses of the Reparation Chapter which dealt with the issue of bonds by Germany produced on the public mind the impression that the Indemnity had been fixed at $25,000,000,000, or at any rate at this figure as a minimum. The German Delegation set out, therefore, to construct their reply on the basis of this figure, assuming apparently that public opinion in Allied countries would not be satisfied with less than the appearance of $25,000,000,000; and, as they were not really prepared to offer so large a figure, they exercised their ingenuity to produce a formula which might be represented to Allied opinion as yielding this amount, whilst really representing a much more modest sum. The formula produced was transparent to any one who read it carefully and knew the facts, and it could hardly have been expected by its authors to deceive the Allied negotiators. The German tactic assumed, therefore, that the latter were secretly as anxious as the Germans themselves to arrive at a settlement which bore some relation to the facts, and that they would therefore be willing, in view of the entanglements which they had got themselves into with their own publics, to practise a little collusion in drafting the Treaty,—a supposition which in slightly different circumstances might have had a good deal of foundation. As matters actually were, this subtlety did not benefit them, and they would have done much better with a straightforward and candid estimate of what they believed to be the amount of their liabilities on the one hand, and their capacity to pay on the other.
The German counter-proposals were somewhat unclear and also quite insincere. It should be noted that the parts of the Reparation Chapter related to Germany's bonds led the public to believe that the Indemnity was set at $25,000,000,000, or at least this amount as a minimum. The German Delegation therefore aimed to build their response around this figure, apparently assuming that public opinion in Allied countries wouldn't be satisfied with anything less than the appearance of $25,000,000,000. Since they were not genuinely prepared to offer such a large figure, they used their creativity to come up with a formula that could be portrayed to Allied opinion as yielding this amount while actually representing a much smaller sum. The formula was obvious to anyone who read it closely and understood the facts, and it could hardly have been expected to deceive the Allied negotiators. The German tactic assumed, therefore, that the Allied negotiators were secretly just as eager as the Germans to reach a settlement that related somewhat to the facts, and that they would be willing to engage in a little collusion in drafting the Treaty due to the complicated situations they had gotten into with their own publics—a supposition that, under slightly different circumstances, might have had some basis. As it turned out, this subtlety did not benefit them, and they would have been much better off with a straightforward and honest estimate of what they believed their liabilities to be on one hand and their ability to pay on the other.
The German offer of an alleged sum of $25,000,000,000 amounted to the following. In the first place it was conditional on concessions in the Treaty insuring that "Germany shall retain the territorial integrity corresponding to the Armistice Convention,[140] that she shall keep her colonial possessions and merchant ships, including those of large tonnage, that in her own country and in the world at large she shall enjoy the same freedom of action as all other peoples, that all war legislation shall be at once annulled, and that all interferences during the war with her economic rights and with German private property, etc., shall be treated in accordance with the principle of reciprocity";—that is to say, the offer is conditional on the greater part of the rest of the Treaty being abandoned. In the second place, the claims are not to exceed a maximum of $25,000,000,000, of which $5,000,000,000 is to be discharged by May 1, 1926; and no part of this sum is to carry interest pending the payment of it.[141] In the third place, there are to be allowed as credit against it (amongst other things): (a) the value of all deliveries under the Armistice, including military material (e.g. Germany's navy); (b) the value of all railways and State property in ceded territory; (c) the pro rata share of all ceded territory in the German public debt (including the war debt) and in the Reparation payments which this territory would have had to bear if it had remained part of Germany; and (d) the value of the cession of Germany's claims for sums lent by her to her allies in the war.[142]
The German proposal of an alleged sum of $25,000,000,000 included the following. First, it was conditional on concessions in the Treaty ensuring that "Germany will maintain the territorial integrity outlined in the Armistice Convention,[140] that it will keep its colonies and merchant ships, including those of large tonnage, that it will have the same freedom of action as all other nations both domestically and globally, that all war legislation will be immediately repealed, and that all interferences with its economic rights and German private property during the war will be resolved based on reciprocity";—meaning the offer is contingent on most of the rest of the Treaty being disregarded. Secondly, the claims are not to exceed a maximum of $25,000,000,000, with $5,000,000,000 to be paid by May 1, 1926; and none of this amount will accrue interest before it is paid.[141] Thirdly, the following will be considered as credits against it (among other things): (a) the value of all deliveries under the Armistice, including military materials (e.g. Germany's navy); (b) the value of all railways and state property in ceded territories; (c) the pro rata share of all ceded territories in the German public debt (including the war debt) and in the Reparation payments that these territories would have been responsible for if they had remained part of Germany; and (d) the value of the transfer of Germany's claims for amounts lent to its allies during the war.[142]
The credits to be deducted under (a), (b), (c), and (d) might be in excess of those allowed in the actual Treaty, according to a rough estimate, by a sum of as much as $10,000,000,000, although the sum to be allowed under (d) can hardly be calculated.
The credits that should be deducted under (a), (b), (c), and (d) could exceed what is permitted in the actual Treaty by an estimated amount of up to $10,000,000,000, although it’s nearly impossible to determine the amount allowed under (d).
If, therefore, we are to estimate the real value of the German offer of $25,000,000,000 on the basis laid down by the Treaty, we must first of all deduct $10,000,000,000 claimed for offsets which the Treaty does not allow, and then halve the remainder in order to obtain the present value of a deferred payment on which interest is not chargeable. This reduces the offer to $7,500,000,000, as compared with the $40,000,000,000 which, according to my rough estimate, the Treaty demands of her.
If we want to evaluate the actual value of the German offer of $25 billion based on the guidelines set by the Treaty, we first need to subtract $10 billion that is claimed for offsets that the Treaty doesn't permit. Then, we divide the remaining amount in half to find the current value of a payment that doesn't incur interest. This brings the offer down to $7.5 billion, compared to the $40 billion that, based on my rough estimate, the Treaty requires from her.
This in itself was a very substantial offer—indeed it evoked widespread criticism in Germany—though, in view of the fact that it was conditional on the abandonment of the greater part of the rest of the Treaty, it could hardly be regarded as a serious one.[143] But the German Delegation would have done better if they had stated in less equivocal language how far they felt able to go.
This was a very significant offer—it even sparked a lot of criticism in Germany—but since it depended on giving up most of the rest of the Treaty, it couldn't really be seen as a serious proposal.[143] The German Delegation would have done better if they had clearly expressed how far they were willing to compromise.
In the final reply of the Allies to this counter-proposal there is one important provision, which I have not attended to hitherto, but which can be conveniently dealt with in this place. Broadly speaking, no concessions were entertained on the Reparation Chapter as it was originally drafted, but the Allies recognized the inconvenience of the indeterminacy of the burden laid upon Germany and proposed a method by which the final total of claim might be established at an earlier date than May 1, 1921. They promised, therefore, that at any time within four months of the signature of the Treaty (that is to say, up to the end of October, 1919), Germany should be at liberty to submit an offer of a lump sum in settlement of her whole liability as defined in the Treaty, and within two months thereafter (that is to say, before the end of 1919) the Allies "will, so far as may be possible, return their answers to any proposals that may be made."
In the Allies' final response to this counter-proposal, there's one important point that I haven't addressed until now, but it's convenient to discuss it here. Generally speaking, no concessions were made on the Reparation Chapter as it was originally written, but the Allies acknowledged the problem of the unclear burden placed on Germany and suggested a way to finalize the total amount owed sooner than May 1, 1921. They promised that within four months of signing the Treaty (i.e., by the end of October 1919), Germany could submit a lump sum offer to settle her entire liability as outlined in the Treaty, and within two months after that (i.e., before the end of 1919), the Allies "will, as far as possible, respond to any proposals that may be made."
This offer is subject to three conditions. "Firstly, the German authorities will be expected, before making such proposals, to confer with the representatives of the Powers directly concerned. Secondly, such offers must be unambiguous and must be precise and clear. Thirdly, they must accept the categories and the Reparation clauses as matters settled beyond discussion."
This offer depends on three conditions. "First, the German authorities will need to consult with the representatives of the affected Powers before making any proposals. Second, these offers must be straightforward and must be clear and precise. Third, they must accept the categories and the Reparation clauses as settled matters, not open for discussion."
The offer, as made, does not appear to contemplate any opening up of the problem of Germany's capacity to pay. It is only concerned with the establishment of the total bill of claims as defined in the Treaty—whether (e.g.) it is $35,000,000,000, $40,000,000,000, or $50,000,000,000. "The questions," the Allies' reply adds, "are bare questions of fact, namely, the amount of the liabilities, and they are susceptible of being treated in this way."
The offer, as presented, doesn’t seem to consider any discussion about Germany’s ability to pay. It’s solely focused on determining the total amount of claims as outlined in the Treaty—whether that is $35,000,000,000, $40,000,000,000, or $50,000,000,000. "The issues," the Allies' response continues, "are straightforward factual matters, specifically the total liabilities, and they can be addressed in this manner."
If the promised negotiations are really conducted on these lines, they are not likely to be fruitful. It will not be much easier to arrive at an agreed figure before the end of 1919 that it was at the time of the Conference; and it will not help Germany's financial position to know for certain that she is liable for the huge sum which on any computation the Treaty liabilities must amount to. These negotiations do offer, however, an opportunity of reopening the whole question of the Reparation payments, although it is hardly to be hoped that at so very early a date, public opinion in the countries of the Allies has changed its mood sufficiently.[144]
If the promised negotiations actually happen along these lines, they’re unlikely to be effective. It won’t be much easier to agree on a figure before the end of 1919 than it was during the Conference, and it won’t improve Germany's financial position to know for sure that she owes the huge amount that the Treaty liabilities must come to. However, these negotiations do provide an opportunity to revisit the entire issue of the Reparation payments, even though it’s hard to expect that public opinion in the Allied countries has shifted enough so soon.[144]
I cannot leave this subject as though its just treatment wholly depended either on our own pledges or on economic facts. The policy of reducing Germany to servitude for a generation, of degrading the lives of millions of human beings, and of depriving a whole nation of happiness should be abhorrent and detestable,—abhorrent and detestable, even if it were possible, even if it enriched ourselves, even if it did not sow the decay of the whole civilized life of Europe. Some preach it in the name of Justice. In the great events of man's history, in the unwinding of the complex fates of nations Justice is not so simple. And if it were, nations are not authorized, by religion or by natural morals, to visit on the children of their enemies the misdoings of parents or of rulers.
I can’t just walk away from this topic as if its proper handling depends solely on our commitments or economic realities. The idea of reducing Germany to a state of servitude for a generation, lowering the quality of life for millions, and robbing an entire nation of happiness should be revolting and unacceptable—revolting and unacceptable, even if it were feasible, even if it benefited us, even if it didn’t lead to the decay of the entire civilized world in Europe. Some advocate for it in the name of Justice. When it comes to the major events in human history, and the complicated destinies of nations, Justice is not that straightforward. And even if it were, nations aren’t justified, either by religion or natural morals, to punish the children of their enemies for the wrongdoings of their parents or leaders.
FOOTNOTES:
[76] "With reservation that any future claims and demands of the Allies and the United States of America remain unaffected, the following financial conditions are required: Reparation for damage done. Whilst Armistice lasts, no public securities shall be removed by the enemy which can serve as a pledge to the Allies for recovery or reparation of war losses. Immediate restitution of cash deposit in National Bank of Belgium, and, in general, immediate return of all documents, of specie, stock, shares, paper money, together with plant for issue thereof, touching public or private interests in invaded countries. Restitution of Russian and Roumanian gold yielded to Germany or taken by that Power. This gold to be delivered in trust to the Allies until signature of peace."
[76] "With the understanding that any future claims and demands from the Allies and the United States of America remain unchanged, the following financial conditions must be met: Payment for damages caused. While the Armistice is in effect, no public securities that could serve as collateral for the Allies to recover or compensate for war losses shall be taken by the enemy. Immediate return of the cash deposit in the National Bank of Belgium, and in general, prompt return of all documents, cash, stocks, shares, paper currency, along with the means to issue them, related to public or private interests in occupied countries. Return of Russian and Romanian gold handed over to Germany or taken by that Power. This gold is to be held in trust for the Allies until a peace treaty is signed."
[77] It is to be noticed, in passing, that they contain nothing which limits the damage to damage inflicted contrary to the recognized rules of warfare. That is to say, it is permissible to include claims arising out of the legitimate capture of a merchantman at sea, as well as the costs of illegal submarine warfare.
[77] It’s worth noting that they don’t specify any limits on damage caused contrary to the accepted rules of war. In other words, it’s allowed to include claims related to the lawful capture of a merchant ship at sea, as well as the expenses from unlawful submarine warfare.
[78] Mark-paper or mark-credits owned in ex-occupied territory by Allied nationals should be included, if at all, in the settlement of enemy debts, along with other sums owed to Allied nationals, and not in connection with reparation.
[78] Mark-paper or mark-credits owned in formerly occupied territories by Allied nationals should be included, if at all, in the resolution of enemy debts, along with other amounts owed to Allied nationals, and not in relation to reparations.
[79] A special claim on behalf of Belgium was actually included In the Peace Treaty, and was accepted by the German representatives without demur.
[79] A specific request on behalf of Belgium was actually included in the Peace Treaty and was accepted by the German representatives without any objection.
[80] To the British observer, one scene, however, stood out distinguished from the rest—the field of Ypres. In that desolate and ghostly spot, the natural color and humors of the landscape and the climate seemed designed to express to the traveler the memories of the ground. A visitor to the salient early in November, 1918, when a few German bodies still added a touch of realism and human horror, and the great struggle was not yet certainly ended, could feel there, as nowhere else, the present outrage of war, and at the same time the tragic and sentimental purification which to the future will in some degree transform its harshness.
[80] For the British observer, one scene stood out from the rest—the Ypres field. In that desolate and eerie place, the natural colors and moods of the landscape and climate seemed to convey the memories of the area. A visitor to the salient in early November 1918, when a few German bodies still added a touch of realism and horror, and when the great struggle was not yet certainly over, could feel more intensely there than anywhere else the current brutality of war, while also sensing the tragic and sentimental cleansing that would, in some way, transform its harshness in the future.
[81] These notes, estimated to amount to no less than six thousand million marks, are now a source of embarrassment and great potential loss to the Belgian Government, inasmuch as on their recovery of the country they took them over from their nationals in exchange for Belgian notes at the rate of Fr. 120 = Mk. 1. This rate of exchange, being substantially in excess of the value of the mark-notes at the rate of exchange current at the time (and enormously in excess of the rate to which the mark notes have since fallen, the Belgian franc being now worth more than three marks), was the occasion of the smuggling of mark-notes into Belgium on an enormous scale, to take advantage of the profit obtainable. The Belgian Government took this very imprudent step, partly because they hoped to persuade the Peace Conference to make the redemption of these bank-notes, at the par of exchange, a first charge on German assets. The Peace Conference held, however, that Reparation proper must take precedence of the adjustment of improvident banking transactions effected at an excessive rate of exchange. The possession by the Belgian Government of this great mass of German currency, in addition to an amount of nearly two thousand million marks held by the French Government which they similarly exchanged for the benefit of the population of the invaded areas and of Alsace-Lorraine, is a serious aggravation of the exchange position of the mark. It will certainly be desirable for the Belgian and German Governments to come to some arrangement as to its disposal, though this is rendered difficult by the prior lien held by the Reparation Commission over all German assets available for such purposes.
[81] These notes, estimated to be at least six billion marks, are now a source of embarrassment and significant potential loss for the Belgian Government. When they regained control of the country, they took these notes from their nationals in exchange for Belgian notes at the rate of Fr. 120 = Mk. 1. This exchange rate was much higher than the actual value of the mark-notes at the time (and far greater than the value to which the mark notes have since fallen, with the Belgian franc now worth more than three marks), leading to a massive smuggling of mark-notes into Belgium to profit from the discrepancy. The Belgian Government made this unwise decision partly because they hoped to convince the Peace Conference to prioritize the redemption of these bank-notes at the exchange rate as a first claim on German assets. However, the Peace Conference determined that proper Reparations must take precedence over the adjustment of imprudent banking transactions made at an inflated exchange rate. The possession of this large amount of German currency by the Belgian Government, along with nearly two billion marks held by the French Government which they similarly exchanged for the benefit of the invaded regions and Alsace-Lorraine, worsens the exchange situation for the mark. It will certainly be important for the Belgian and German Governments to reach an agreement on how to handle it, although this is complicated by the prior claim held by the Reparation Commission over all German assets available for such purposes.
[82] It should be added, in fairness, that the very high claims put forward on behalf of Belgium generally include not only devastation proper, but all kinds of other items, as, for example, the profits and earnings which Belgians might reasonably have expected to earn if there had been no war.
[82] It should be noted, to be fair, that the very high claims made on behalf of Belgium usually include not just the actual destruction, but also various other items, such as the profits and earnings that Belgians could have reasonably expected to make if there hadn’t been any war.
[87] Even when the extent of the material damage has been established, it will be exceedingly difficult to put a price on it, which must largely depend on the period over which restoration is spread, and the methods adopted. It would be impossible to make the damage good in a year or two at any price, and an attempt to do so at a rate which was excessive in relation to the amount of labor and materials at hand might force prices up to almost any level. We must, I think, assume a cost of labor and materials about equal to that current in the world generally. In point of fact, however, we may safely assume that literal restoration will never be attempted. Indeed, it would be very wasteful to do so. Many of the townships were old and unhealthy, and many of the hamlets miserable. To re-erect the same type of building in the same places would be foolish. As for the land, the wise course may be in some cases to leave long strips of it to Nature for many years to come. An aggregate money sum should be computed as fairly representing the value of the material damage, and France should be left to expend it in the manner she thinks wisest with a view to her economic enrichment as a whole. The first breeze of this controversy has already blown through France. A long and inconclusive debate occupied the Chamber during the spring of 1919, as to whether inhabitants of the devastated area receiving compensation should be compelled to expend it in restoring the identical property, or whether they should be free to use it as they like. There was evidently a great deal to be said on both sides; in the former case there would be much hardship and uncertainty for owners who could not, many of them, expect to recover the effective use of their property perhaps for years to come, and yet would not be free to set themselves up elsewhere; on the other hand, if such persons were allowed to take their compensation and go elsewhere, the countryside of Northern France would never be put right. Nevertheless I believe that the wise course will be to allow great latitude and let economic motives take their own course.
[87] Even after assessing the extent of the material damage, it will be very challenging to determine its cost, as this will primarily depend on the duration of the restoration efforts and the methods used. Trying to fix everything in just a year or two, no matter the price, would be impossible, and pushing for a quick fix using excessive rates relative to available labor and materials could drive prices up significantly. We should probably assume that the costs of labor and materials will be similar to the global average. In reality, we can safely conclude that a full restoration will likely never be attempted. In fact, that would be quite wasteful. Many of the townships were old and unhealthy, and many of the villages were in miserable condition. Rebuilding the same types of structures in the same locations would be unwise. Regarding the land, it might be best to let some areas return to nature for many years. A total financial sum should be calculated to fairly represent the value of the material damage, and France should be allowed to spend it however it believes will best support its overall economic recovery. The initial sparks of this debate have already surfaced in France. A lengthy and inconclusive discussion took place in the Chamber during the spring of 1919 about whether residents in the affected areas receiving compensation should be required to use it to restore their original properties or be free to spend it as they wish. There are compelling arguments on both sides; enforcing the former could create significant hardship and uncertainty for owners who might not be able to regain effective use of their properties for years, while the latter could lead to the countryside of Northern France never being restored. Still, I believe the best approach would be to allow considerable flexibility and let economic factors guide the process.
[89] Revue Bleue, February 3, 1919. This is quoted in a very valuable selection of French estimates and expressions of opinion, forming chapter iv. of La Liquidation financière de la Guerre, by H. Charriaut and R. Hacault. The general magnitude of my estimate is further confirmed by the extent of the repairs already effected, as set forth in a speech delivered by M. Tardieu on October 10, 1919, in which he said: "On September 16 last, of 2246 kilomètres of railway track destroyed, 2016 had been repaired; of 1075 kilomètres of canal, 700; of 1160 constructions, such as bridges and tunnels, which had been blown up, 588 had been replaced; of 550,000 houses ruined by bombardment, 60,000 had been rebuilt; and of 1,800,000 hectares of ground rendered useless by battle, 400,000 had been recultivated, 200,000 hectares of which are now ready to be sown. Finally, more than 10,000,000 mètres of barbed wire had been removed."
[89] Revue Bleue, February 3, 1919. This is quoted in a very valuable selection of French estimates and opinions, forming chapter iv. of La Liquidation financière de la Guerre, by H. Charriaut and R. Hacault. The overall scale of my estimate is further supported by the repairs already made, as outlined in a speech by M. Tardieu on October 10, 1919, where he stated: "On September 16, out of 2,246 kilometers of railway track that had been destroyed, 2,016 had been repaired; out of 1,075 kilometers of canals, 700 had been fixed; of 1,160 structures, such as bridges and tunnels, that were destroyed, 588 had been replaced; of 550,000 houses wrecked by bombing, 60,000 had been rebuilt; and of 1,800,000 hectares of land that became unusable due to battles, 400,000 had been rehabilitated, with 200,000 hectares now ready for planting. Lastly, more than 10,000,000 meters of barbed wire had been taken down."
[92] The fact that no separate allowance is made in the above for the sinking of 675 fishing vessels of 71,765 tons gross, or for the 1855 vessels of 8,007,967 tons damaged or molested, but not sunk, may be set off against what may be an excessive figure for replacement cost.
[92] The fact that the above does not separately account for the loss of 675 fishing vessels totaling 71,765 gross tons, or for the 1,855 vessels with a total of 8,007,967 tons that were damaged or compromised but not sunk, could balance out what might be an inflated figure for replacement costs.
[93] The losses of the Greek mercantile marine were excessively high, as a result of the dangers of the Mediterranean; but they were largely incurred on the service of the other Allies, who paid for them directly or indirectly. The claims of Greece for maritime losses incurred on the service of her own nationals would not be very considerable.
[93] The losses of the Greek merchant fleet were extremely high due to the dangers of the Mediterranean. However, most of these losses were incurred while serving the other Allies, who paid for them either directly or indirectly. Greece's claims for maritime losses incurred by its own nationals wouldn't be very significant.
[94] There is a reservation in the Peace Treaty on this question. "The Allied and Associated Powers formally reserve the right of Russia to obtain from Germany restitution and reparation based on the principles of the present Treaty" (Art. 116).
[94] The Peace Treaty includes a clause regarding this issue. "The Allied and Associated Powers formally reserve the right of Russia to receive restitution and reparations from Germany based on the principles of this Treaty" (Art. 116).
[95] Dr. Diouritch in his "Economic and Statistical Survey of the Southern Slav Nations" (Journal of Royal Statistical Society, May, 1919), quotes some extraordinary figures of the loss of life: "According to the official returns, the number of those fallen in battle or died in captivity up to the last Serbian offensive, amounted to 320,000, which means that one half of Serbia's male population, from 18 to 60 years of age, perished outright in the European War. In addition, the Serbian Medical Authorities estimate that about 300,000 people have died from typhus among the civil population, and the losses among the population interned in enemy camps are estimated at 50,000. During the two Serbian retreats and during the Albanian retreat the losses among children and young people are estimated at 200,000. Lastly, during over three years of enemy occupation, the losses in lives owing to the lack of proper food and medical attention are estimated at 250,000." Altogether, he puts the losses in life at above 1,000,000, or more than one-third of the population of Old Serbia.
[95] Dr. Diouritch in his "Economic and Statistical Survey of the Southern Slav Nations" (Journal of Royal Statistical Society, May, 1919), cites some shocking numbers regarding loss of life: "According to official reports, the number of individuals who fell in battle or died in captivity up to the last Serbian offensive reached 320,000, which means that half of Serbia's male population aged 18 to 60 perished during the European War. Additionally, Serbian Medical Authorities estimate that about 300,000 people have died from typhus among the civilian population, and losses among those interned in enemy camps are estimated at 50,000. During the two Serbian retreats and the Albanian retreat, the losses among children and young people are estimated at 200,000. Finally, during more than three years of enemy occupation, the loss of life due to lack of adequate food and medical care is estimated at 250,000." In total, he estimates the losses at over 1,000,000, which is more than one-third of Old Serbia's population.
[97] Very large claims put forward by the Serbian authorities include many hypothetical items of indirect and non-material damage; but these, however real, are not admissible under our present formula.
[97] The Serbian authorities have made some very large claims that include a lot of hypothetical indirect and non-material damages; however, regardless of how real they may be, these types of claims don't fit within our current framework.
[99] It must be said to Mr. Hughes' honor that he apprehended from the first the bearing of the pre-Armistice negotiations on our right to demand an indemnity covering the full costs of the war, protested against our ever having entered into such engagements, and maintained loudly that he had been no party to them and could not consider himself bound by them. His indignation may have been partly due to the fact that Australia, not having been ravaged, would have no claims at all under the more limited interpretation of our rights.
[99] It's important to give credit to Mr. Hughes, as he recognized from the start how the pre-Armistice negotiations would affect our right to demand compensation for the total costs of the war. He protested against us ever entering into those agreements and loudly claimed that he was not involved in them and shouldn't be held accountable. His anger might have been partly because Australia, having not faced devastation, wouldn't have any claims at all under the stricter interpretation of our rights.
[100] The whole cost of the war has been estimated at from $120,000,000,000 upwards. This would mean an annual payment for interest (apart from sinking fund) of $6,000,000,000. Could any expert Committee have reported that Germany can pay this sum?
[100] The total cost of the war is estimated to be over $120 billion. This would require an annual interest payment (not including the sinking fund) of $6 billion. Could any expert committee have concluded that Germany could afford this amount?
[101] But unhappily they did not go down with their flags flying very gloriously. For one reason or another their leaders maintained substantial silence. What a different position in the country's estimation they might hold now if they had suffered defeat amidst firm protests against the fraud, chicane, and dishonor of the whole proceedings.
[101] But unfortunately, they didn't go down with their flags flying high. For various reasons, their leaders stayed mostly quiet. Imagine what a different place they might occupy in the country's view if they had faced defeat while strongly protesting the deceit, trickery, and dishonor of the entire process.
[102] Only after the most painful consideration have I written these words. The almost complete absence of protest from the leading Statesmen of England makes one feel that one must have made some mistake. But I believe that I know all the facts, and I can discover no such mistake. In any case I have set forth all the relevant engagements in Chapter IV. and at the beginning of this chapter, so that the reader can form his own judgment.
[102] I've only written these words after a lot of painful thought. The almost total lack of opposition from the leading politicians in England makes me think I must have made some error. But I believe I understand all the facts, and I can't find any mistake. In any case, I've laid out all the relevant commitments in Chapter IV. and at the start of this chapter, so that the reader can make their own judgment.
[103] In conversation with Frenchmen who were private persons and quite unaffected by political considerations, this aspect became very clear. You might persuade them that some current estimates as to the amount to be got out of Germany were quite fantastic. Yet at the end they would always come back to where they had started: "But Germany must pay; for, otherwise, what is to happen to France?"
[103] In discussions with French individuals who were not tied to political agendas, this point became very apparent. You could convince them that some current predictions about how much could be taken from Germany were unrealistic. However, in the end, they always returned to their initial stance: "But Germany has to pay; otherwise, what will happen to France?"
[104] A further paragraph claims the war costs of Belgium "in accordance with Germany's pledges, already given, as to complete restoration for Belgium."
[104] Another paragraph states that the war costs for Belgium are "in line with Germany's promises, which have already been made, regarding full restoration for Belgium."
[105] The challenge of the other Allies, as well as the enemy, had to be met; for in view of the limited resources of the latter, the other Allies had perhaps a greater interest than the enemy in seeing that no one of their number established an excessive claim.
[105] The other Allies, along with the enemy, posed a challenge that had to be addressed; given the limited resources of the latter, the other Allies likely had an even bigger stake than the enemy in ensuring that none of them made an unreasonable claim.
[106] M. Klotz has estimated the French claims on this head at $15,000,000,000 (75 milliard francs, made up of 13 milliard for allowances, 60 for pensions, and 2 for widows). If this figure is correct, the others should probably be scaled up also.
[106] M. Klotz has estimated the French claims on this matter at $15,000,000,000 (75 billion francs, comprised of 13 billion for allowances, 60 for pensions, and 2 for widows). If this estimate is accurate, the other figures should likely be increased as well.
[108] In his speech of September 5, 1919, addressed to the French Chamber, M. Klotz estimated the total Allied claims against Germany under the Treaty at $75,000,000,000, which would accumulate at interest until 1921, and be paid off thereafter by 34 annual installments of about $5,000,000,000 each, of which France would receive about $2,750,000,000 annually. "The general effect of the statement (that France would receive from Germany this annual payment) proved," it is reported, "appreciably encouraging to the country as a whole, and was immediately reflected in the improved tone on the Bourse and throughout the business world in France." So long as such statements can be accepted in Paris without protest, there can be no financial or economic future for France, and a catastrophe of disillusion is not far distant.
[108] In his speech on September 5, 1919, to the French Chamber, M. Klotz estimated the total Allied claims against Germany under the Treaty at $75 billion, which would accumulate interest until 1921, and then be paid off in 34 annual installments of about $5 billion each, with France receiving about $2.75 billion annually. "The overall impact of the statement (that France would receive this annual payment from Germany) was," it is reported, "significantly encouraging to the country as a whole, and was immediately reflected in the improved mood on the Bourse and across the business world in France." As long as such statements can be accepted in Paris without objection, there can be no financial or economic future for France, and a disaster of disillusionment is not far off.
[109] As a matter of subjective judgment, I estimate for this figure an accuracy of 10 per cent in deficiency and 20 per cent in excess, i.e. that the result will lie between $32,000,000,000 and $44,000,000,000.
[109] Based on personal judgment, I estimate that this figure has an accuracy of 10 percent under and 20 percent over, i.e. that the result will fall between $32,000,000,000 and $44,000,000,000.
[110] Germany is also liable under the Treaty, as an addition to her liabilities for Reparation, to pay all the costs of the Armies of Occupation after Peace is signed for the fifteen subsequent years of occupation. So far as the text of the Treaty goes, there is nothing to limit the size of these armies, and France could, therefore, by quartering the whole of her normal standing army in the occupied area, shift the charge from her own taxpayers to those of Germany,—though in reality any such policy would be at the expense not of Germany, who by hypothesis is already paying for Reparation up to the full limit of her capacity, but of France's Allies, who would receive so much less in respect of Reparation. A White Paper (Cmd. 240) has, however, been issued, in which is published a declaration by the Governments of the United States, Great Britain, and France engaging themselves to limit the sum payable annually by Germany to cover the cost of occupation to $60,000,000 "as soon as the Allied and Associated Powers concerned are convinced that the conditions of disarmament by Germany are being satisfactorily fulfilled." The word which I have italicized is a little significant. The three Powers reserve to themselves the liberty to modify this arrangement at any time if they agree that it is necessary.
[110] Germany is also responsible under the Treaty to pay all costs for the Occupation Armies in addition to her Reparation liabilities, for the fifteen years following the signing of Peace. As far as the Treaty text goes, there’s nothing to limit the size of these armies, which means France could place her entire regular standing army in the occupied area, shifting the financial burden from her own taxpayers to those of Germany. However, in reality, any such policy would not cost Germany, who is already paying for Reparation to her full capacity, but rather would reduce what France's Allies receive in Reparation. A White Paper (Cmd. 240) has been issued, which includes a statement from the Governments of the United States, Great Britain, and France committing to limit the amount Germany pays annually for the occupation costs to $60,000,000 "as soon as the Allied and Associated Powers concerned are convinced that the conditions of disarmament by Germany are being satisfactorily fulfilled." The word I italicized holds some significance. The three Powers reserve the right to change this arrangement at any time if they believe it’s necessary.
[111] Art. 235. The force of this Article is somewhat strengthened by Article 251, by virtue of which dispensations may also be granted for "other payments" as well as for food and raw material.
[111] Art. 235. This Article is somewhat reinforced by Article 251, which allows for exceptions to be made for "other payments" in addition to food and raw materials.
[112] This is the effect of Para. 12 (c) of Annex II. of the Reparation Chapter, leaving minor complications on one side. The Treaty fixes the payments in terms of gold marks, which are converted in the above rate of 20 to $5.
[112] This is the effect of Para. 12 (c) of Annex II of the Reparation Chapter, disregarding minor complications. The Treaty sets the payments in gold marks, which are converted at the above rate of 20 to $5.
[113] If, per impossibile, Germany discharged $2,500,000,000 in cash or kind by 1921, her annual payments would be at the rate of $312,500,000 from 1921 to 1925 and of $750,000,000 thereafter.
[113] If, for the sake of argument, Germany paid off $2,500,000,000 in cash or kind by 1921, her annual payments would be $312,500,000 from 1921 to 1925 and $750,000,000 after that.
[114] Para. 16 of Annex II. of The Reparation Chapter. There is also an obscure provision by which interest may be charged "on sums arising out of material damage as from November 11, 1918, up to May 1, 1921." This seems to differentiate damage to property from damage to the person in favor of the former. It does not affect Pensions and Allowances, the cost of which is capitalized as at the date of the coming into force of the Treaty.
[114] Para. 16 of Annex II. of The Reparation Chapter. There's also a vague clause that allows for interest to be charged "on sums arising out of material damage from November 11, 1918, to May 1, 1921." This appears to treat damage to property more favorably than personal injury. It does not impact Pensions and Allowances, which are calculated based on their value as of the date the Treaty takes effect.
[115] On the assumption which no one supports and even the most optimistic fear to be unplausible, that Germany can pay the full charge for interest and sinking fund from the outset, the annual payment would amount to $2,400,000,000.
[115] Assuming something that no one really believes and even the most hopeful fear is unrealistic, that Germany can cover the entire cost of interest and the sinking fund right from the start, the yearly payment would be $2,400,000,000.
[116] Under Para. 13 of Annex II. unanimity is required (i.) for any postponement beyond 1930 of installments due between 1921 and 1926, and (ii.) for any postponement for more than three years of instalments due after 1926. Further, under Art. 234, the Commission may not cancel any part of the indebtedness without the specific authority of all the Governments represented on the Commission.
[116] Under Para. 13 of Annex II, unanimous agreement is required (i.) for any delay beyond 1930 for payments due between 1921 and 1926, and (ii.) for any delay longer than three years for payments due after 1926. Additionally, under Art. 234, the Commission cannot cancel any part of the debt without the explicit approval of all the Governments represented on the Commission.
[118] Owing to the very high premium which exists on German silver coin, as the combined result of the depreciation of the mark and the appreciation of silver, it is highly improbable that it will be possible to extract such coin out of the pockets of the people. But it may gradually leak over the frontier by the agency of private speculators, and thus indirectly benefit the German exchange position as a whole.
[118] Due to the extremely high price of German silver coin, which results from the devaluation of the mark and the increase in silver value, it's very unlikely that it will be possible to get this coin from people's pockets. However, it may slowly cross the border through private speculators, and this could indirectly improve Germany's overall exchange position.
[119] The Allies made the supply of foodstuffs to Germany during the Armistice, mentioned above, conditional on the provisional transfer to them of the greater part of the Mercantile Marine, to be operated by them for the purpose of shipping foodstuffs to Europe generally, and to Germany in particular. The reluctance of the Germans to agree to this was productive of long and dangerous delays in the supply of food, but the abortive Conferences of Trèves and Spa (January 16, February 14-16, and March 4-5, 1919) were at last followed by the Agreement of Brussels (March 14, 1919). The unwillingness of the Germans to conclude was mainly due to the lack of any absolute guarantee on the part of the Allies that, if they surrendered the ships, they would get the food. But assuming reasonable good faith on the part of the latter (their behavior in respect of certain other clauses of the Armistice, however, had not been impeccable and gave the enemy some just grounds for suspicion), their demand was not an improper one; for without the German ships the business of transporting the food would have been difficult, if not impossible, and the German ships surrendered or their equivalent were in fact almost wholly employed in transporting food to Germany itself. Up to June 30, 1919, 176 German ships of 1,025,388 gross tonnage had been surrendered, to the Allies in accordance with the Brussels Agreement.
[119] The Allies made the delivery of food to Germany during the previously mentioned Armistice dependent on the temporary transfer to them of most of the Mercantile Marine, which they would operate to ship food to Europe in general and Germany in particular. The Germans' hesitation to agree caused long and concerning delays in food supply, but after the unsuccessful Conferences of Trèves and Spa (January 16, February 14-16, and March 4-5, 1919), the Agreement of Brussels was finally reached on March 14, 1919. The Germans' reluctance to finalize the deal was mainly because the Allies did not provide any solid guarantee that they would receive the food if they handed over the ships. However, assuming a reasonable level of good faith from the Allies (given that their actions regarding certain other clauses of the Armistice had not been flawless, which led to some justifiable suspicion on the Germans' part), their request was not unreasonable; without the German ships, transporting food would have been challenging, if not impossible, and the surrendered German ships or their equivalents were primarily used to transport food to Germany itself. By June 30, 1919, 176 German ships totaling 1,025,388 gross tonnage had been surrendered to the Allies in line with the Brussels Agreement.
[120] The amount of tonnage transferred may be rather greater and the value per ton rather less. The aggregate value involved is not likely, however, to be less than $500,000,000 or greater than $750,000,000.
[120] The total tonnage transferred might be significantly higher, and the value per ton might be lower. However, the overall value is expected to be no less than $500,000,000 and no more than $750,000,000.
[121] This census was carried out by virtue of a Decree of August 23, 1918. On March 22, 1917, the German Government acquired complete control over the utilization of foreign securities in German possession; and in May, 1917, it began to exercise these powers for the mobilization of certain Swedish, Danish, and Swiss securities.
[121] This census was conducted based on a decree from August 23, 1918. On March 22, 1917, the German government took full control over the use of foreign securities held in Germany, and in May 1917, it started using these powers to mobilize specific Swedish, Danish, and Swiss securities.
1892. | Schmoller | $2.5 billion | |
1892. | Christians | 3.25 billion | |
1893-94. | Koch | 3 billion | |
1905. | v. Halle | 4 billion | [A] |
1913. | Helfferich | 5 billion | [B] |
1914 | Ballod | 6.25 billion | |
1914. | Pistorius | 6.25 billion | |
1919. | Hans David | 5.25 billion | [C] |
[C] This estimate, given in the Weltwirtschaftszeitung (June 13, 1919), is an estimate of the value of Germany's foreign investments as at the outbreak of war.
[C] This estimate, published in the Weltwirtschaftszeitung (June 13, 1919), reflects the value of Germany's foreign investments at the start of the war.
[124] In all these estimates, I am conscious of being driven by a fear of overstating the case against the Treaty, of giving figures in excess of my own real judgment. There is a great difference between putting down on paper fancy estimates of Germany's resources and actually extracting contributions in the form of cash. I do not myself believe that the Reparation Commission will secure real resources from the above items by May, 1921, even as great as the lower of the two figures given above.
[124] In all these estimates, I'm aware that I might be driven by a fear of overstating the case against the Treaty, of providing numbers that exceed my true judgment. There’s a big difference between writing down exaggerated estimates of Germany's resources and actually collecting contributions in cash. I personally don’t think the Reparation Commission will manage to secure real resources from the items listed above by May 1921, even if they’re as substantial as the lower of the two figures mentioned.
[125] The Treaty (see Art. 114) leaves it very dubious how far the Danish Government is under an obligation to make payments to the Reparation Commission in respect of its acquisition of Schleswig. They might, for instance, arrange for various offsets such as the value of the mark notes held by the inhabitants of ceded areas. In any case the amount of money involved is quite small. The Danish Government is raising a loan for $33,000,000 (kr. 120,000,000) for the joint purposes of "taking over Schleswig's share of the German debt, for buying German public property, for helping the Schleswig population, and for settling the currency question."
[125] The Treaty (see Art. 114) makes it pretty unclear how much the Danish Government is required to pay to the Reparation Commission regarding its acquisition of Schleswig. They could, for example, arrange various offsets like the value of the mark notes held by the residents of the ceded areas. In any case, the amount of money involved is relatively small. The Danish Government is securing a loan for $33,000,000 (kr. 120,000,000) for the combined purposes of "taking on Schleswig's share of the German debt, purchasing German public property, assisting the Schleswig population, and addressing the currency issue."
[126] Here again my own judgment would carry me much further and I should doubt the possibility of Germany's exports equaling her imports during this period. But the statement in the text goes far enough for the purpose of my argument.
[126] Once again, I would go much further in my reasoning and doubt that Germany's exports could match her imports during this time. However, the statement in the text is sufficient for my argument.
[127] It has been estimated that the cession of territory to France, apart from the loss of Upper Silesia, may reduce Germany's annual pre-war production of steel ingots from 20,000,000 tons to 14,000,000 tons, and increase France's capacity from 5,000,000 tons to 11,000,000 tons.
[127] It’s estimated that giving up territory to France, besides losing Upper Silesia, could lower Germany's annual steel ingot production from 20 million tons to 14 million tons, while boosting France's capacity from 5 million tons to 11 million tons.
[128] Germany's exports of sugar in 1913 amounted to 1,110,073 tons of the value of $65,471,500, of which 838,583 tons were exported to the United Kingdom at a value of $45,254,000. These figures were in excess of the normal, the average total exports for the five years ending 1913 being about $50,000,000.
[128] In 1913, Germany exported 1,110,073 tons of sugar worth $65,471,500, with 838,583 tons going to the United Kingdom for a total of $45,254,000. These numbers were higher than usual, as the average total exports for the five years leading up to 1913 were around $50,000,000.
[130] If the amount of the sinking fund be reduced, and the annual payment is continued over a greater number of years, the present value—so powerful is the operation of compound interest—cannot be materially increased. A payment of $500,000,000 annually in perpetuity, assuming interest, as before, at 5 per cent, would only raise the present value to $10,000,000,000.
[130] If the sinking fund amount is decreased, and the annual payment continues over more years, the present value—thanks to the powerful effect of compound interest—won't significantly increase. An annual payment of $500,000,000 forever, assuming an interest rate of 5 percent, would only bring the present value up to $10,000,000,000.
[131] As an example of public misapprehension on economic affairs, the following letter from Sir Sidney Low to The Times of the 3rd December, 1918, deserves quotation: "I have seen authoritative estimates which place the gross value of Germany's mineral and chemical resources as high as $1,250,000,000,000 or even more; and the Ruhr basin mines alone are said to be worth over $225,000,000,000. It is certain, at any rate, that the capital value of these natural supplies is much greater than the total war debts of all the Allied States. Why should not some portion of this wealth be diverted for a sufficient period from its present owners and assigned to the peoples whom Germany has assailed, deported, and injured? The Allied Governments might justly require Germany to surrender to them the use of such of her mines, and mineral deposits as would yield, say, from $500,000,000 to $1,000,000,000 annually for the next 30, 40, or 50 years. By this means we could obtain sufficient compensation from Germany without unduly stimulating her manufactures and export trade to our detriment." It is not clear why, if Germany has wealth exceeding $1,250,000,000,000. Sir Sidney Low is content with the trifling sum of $500,000,000 to $1,000,000,000 annually. But his letter is an admirable reductio ad absurdum of a certain line of thought. While a mode of calculation, which estimates the value of coal miles deep in the bowels of the earth as high as in a coal scuttle, of an annual lease of $5000 for 999 years at $4,995,000 and of a field (presumably) at the value of all the crops it will grow to the end of recorded time, opens up great possibilities, it is also double-edged. If Germany's total resources are worth $1,250,000,000,000, those she will part with in the cession of Alsace-Lorraine and Upper Silesia should be more than sufficient to pay the entire costs of the war and reparation together. In point of fact, the present market value of all the mines in Germany of every kind has been estimated at $1,500,000,000, or a little more than one-thousandth part of Sir Sidney Low's expectations.
[131] As an example of public misunderstanding about economic issues, the following letter from Sir Sidney Low to The Times on December 3, 1918, is worth quoting: "I've seen credible estimates suggesting that the total value of Germany's mineral and chemical resources could be as high as $1.25 trillion or even more; and the mines in the Ruhr basin alone are said to be worth over $225 billion. It’s clear that the capital value of these natural resources significantly exceeds the total war debts of all the Allied nations. Why shouldn’t some portion of this wealth be temporarily taken from its current owners and given to the people whom Germany has attacked, deported, and harmed? The Allied Governments could reasonably demand that Germany surrender the rights to her mines and mineral resources that would generate, say, between $500 million and $1 billion a year for the next 30, 40, or 50 years. This way, we could obtain enough compensation from Germany without overly boosting her manufacturing and export sectors to our detriment." It's unclear why, if Germany has wealth surpassing $1.25 trillion, Sir Sidney Low settles for the modest sum of $500 million to $1 billion annually. But his letter effectively illustrates a flaw in a particular line of thinking. While a method of estimation that values coal deep underground as highly as coal on the surface, considers an annual lease of $5,000 for 999 years to be worth $4,995,000, and values a field based on all the crops it could ever produce, presents exciting prospects, it also has its drawbacks. If Germany’s total resources are worth $1.25 trillion, the assets she would relinquish in the cession of Alsace-Lorraine and Upper Silesia should be more than enough to cover the full costs of the war and reparations together. In reality, the current market value of all types of mines in Germany has been estimated at $1.5 billion, which is slightly more than one-thousandth of Sir Sidney Low's expectations.
[132] The conversion at par of 5,000 million marks overstates, by reason of the existing depreciation of the mark, the present money burden of the actual pensions payments, but not, in all probability, the real loss of national productivity as a result of the casualties suffered in the war.
[132] Converting 5,000 million marks at face value exaggerates the current financial impact of pension payments due to the depreciation of the mark. However, it likely does not accurately reflect the true loss in national productivity stemming from the casualties experienced during the war.
[133] It cannot be overlooked, in passing, that in its results on a country's surplus productivity a lowering of the standard of life acts both ways. Moreover, we are without experience of the psychology of a white race under conditions little short of servitude. It is, however, generally supposed that if the whole of a man's surplus production is taken from him, his efficiency and his industry are diminished, The entrepreneur and the inventor will not contrive, the trader and the shopkeeper will not save, the laborer will not toil, if the fruits of their industry are set aside, not for the benefit of their children, their old age, their pride, or their position, but for the enjoyment of a foreign conqueror.
[133] It’s important to note that when a country’s standard of living drops, it affects surplus productivity in two ways. Also, we don’t have much understanding of how a white race behaves when subjected to conditions close to servitude. However, it’s widely believed that if a person’s entire surplus production is taken away, their drive and productivity decrease. The entrepreneur and the inventor won’t innovate, the trader and the shopkeeper won’t save, and the laborer won’t work hard if the rewards of their efforts are taken away, not for the benefit of their children, their retirement, their pride, or their status, but for the enjoyment of a foreign conqueror.
[134] In the course of the compromises and delays of the Conference, there were many questions on which, in order to reach any conclusion at all, it was necessary to leave a margin of vagueness and uncertainty. The whole method of the Conference tended towards this,—the Council of Four wanted, not so much a settlement, as a treaty. On political and territorial questions the tendency was to leave the final arbitrament to the League of Nations. But on financial and economic questions, the final decision has generally be a left with the Reparation Commission,—in spite of its being an executive body composed of interested parties.
[134] During the compromises and delays of the Conference, there were many issues where, to come to any conclusion, it was necessary to leave some ambiguity and uncertainty. The overall approach of the Conference leaned towards this— the Council of Four wanted not just a resolution, but a treaty. For political and territorial matters, the trend was to leave the final decision to the League of Nations. However, for financial and economic issues, the ultimate decision has generally been left to the Reparation Commission—despite it being an executive body made up of interested parties.
[135] The sum to be paid by Austria for Reparation is left to the absolute discretion of the Reparation Commission, no determinate figure of any kind being mentioned in the text of the Treaty Austrian questions are to be handled by a special section of the Reparation Commission, but the section will have no powers except such as the main Commission may delegate.
[135] The amount Austria has to pay for reparations is entirely up to the Reparation Commission, and the Treaty doesn't specify any exact figure. Issues related to Austria will be dealt with by a specific section of the Reparation Commission, but this section will only have the authority that the main Commission chooses to give it.
[136] Bulgaria is to pay an indemnity of $450,000,000 by half-yearly instalments, beginning July 1, 1920. These sums will be collected, on behalf of the Reparation Commission, by an Inter-Ally Commission of Control, with its seat at Sofia. In some respects the Bulgarian Inter-Ally Commission appears to have powers and authority independent of the Reparation Commission, but it is to act, nevertheless, as the agent of the latter, and is authorized to tender advice to the Reparation Commission as to, for example, the reduction of the half-yearly instalments.
[136] Bulgaria will pay $450,000,000 in damages in half-yearly installments starting July 1, 1920. These payments will be collected on behalf of the Reparation Commission by an Inter-Allied Commission of Control based in Sofia. In some ways, the Bulgarian Inter-Allied Commission seems to have powers and authority that are independent of the Reparation Commission, but it will still act as the agent for the latter and is allowed to provide advice to the Reparation Commission regarding, for example, the reduction of the half-yearly installments.
[137] Under the Treaty this is the function of any body appointed for the purpose by the principal Allied and Associated Governments, and not necessarily of the Reparation Commission. But it may be presumed that no second body will be established for this special purpose.
[137] According to the Treaty, this is the role of any group designated for this purpose by the main Allied and Associated Governments, and it doesn't have to be the Reparation Commission. However, it can be assumed that a second group won't be created for this specific task.
[138] At the date of writing no treaties with these countries have been drafted. It is possible that Turkey might be dealt with by a separate Commission.
[138] As of the time of writing, no treaties with these countries have been created. It's possible that Turkey may be handled by a separate Commission.
[139] This appears to me to be in effect the position (if this paragraph means anything at all), in spite of the following disclaimer of such intentions in the Allies' reply:—"Nor does Paragraph 12(b) of Annex II. give the Commission powers to prescribe or enforce taxes or to dictate the character of the German budget."
[139] To me, this seems to be the stance (if this paragraph has any meaning at all), despite the following disclaimer of such intentions in the Allies' response:—"Paragraph 12(b) of Annex II does not give the Commission the authority to impose or enforce taxes or to dictate the nature of the German budget."
[140] Whatever that may mean.
Whatever that means.
[141] Assuming that the capital sum is discharged evenly over a period as short as thirty-three years, this has the effect of halving the burden as compared with the payments required on the basis of 5 per cent interest on the outstanding capital.
[141] If we assume that the total amount is paid off evenly over a period as short as thirty-three years, this effectively reduces the burden by half compared to the payments required at 5 percent interest on the remaining amount.
[143] For this reason it is not strictly comparable with my estimate of Germany's capacity in an earlier section of this chapter, which estimate is on the basis of Germany's condition as it will be when the rest of the Treaty has come into effect.
[143] For this reason, it can't be directly compared to my estimate of Germany's capacity in an earlier section of this chapter, which is based on Germany's condition as it will be once the rest of the Treaty has been implemented.
[144] Owing to delays on the part of the Allies in ratifying the Treaty, the Reparation Commission had not yet been formally constituted by the end of October, 1919. So far as I am aware, therefore, nothing has been done to make the above offer effective. But, perhaps in view of the circumstances, there has been an extension of the date.
[144] Because the Allies delayed ratifying the Treaty, the Reparation Commission hadn’t been officially set up by the end of October 1919. As far as I know, nothing has been done to put the offer into action. However, given the situation, the deadline has likely been extended.
Chapter 6
Europe post-Treaty
This chapter must be one of pessimism. The Treaty includes no provisions for the economic rehabilitation of Europe,—nothing to make the defeated Central Empires into good neighbors, nothing to stabilize the new States of Europe, nothing to reclaim Russia; nor does it promote in any way a compact of economic solidarity amongst the Allies themselves; no arrangement was reached at Paris for restoring the disordered finances of France and Italy, or to adjust the systems of the Old World and the New.
This chapter is all about pessimism. The Treaty doesn’t include any plans for rebuilding Europe’s economy—nothing to help the defeated Central Empires become good neighbors, nothing to stabilize the new countries in Europe, and nothing to bring Russia back into the fold. It also doesn’t encourage any form of economic cooperation among the Allies themselves. No agreements were made in Paris to fix the financial chaos in France and Italy or to reconcile the systems of the Old World and the New.
The Council of Four paid no attention to these issues, being preoccupied with others,—Clemenceau to crush the economic life of his enemy, Lloyd George to do a deal and bring home something which would pass muster for a week, the President to do nothing that was not just and right. It is an extraordinary fact that the fundamental economic problems of a Europe starving and disintegrating before their eyes, was the one question in which it was impossible to arouse the interest of the Four. Reparation was their main excursion into the economic field, and they settled it as a problem of theology, of polities, of electoral chicane, from every point of view except that of the economic future of the States whose destiny they were handling.
The Council of Four paid no attention to these issues, focusing instead on their own concerns—Clemenceau was intent on crippling the economic life of his enemy, Lloyd George wanted to strike a deal that would yield something presentable for a week, and the President aimed to ensure that nothing he did was unjust or wrong. It’s remarkable that the core economic challenges facing a starving and crumbling Europe right before them were the one topic that failed to capture the interest of the Four. Reparations were their main foray into economic matters, and they addressed it as if it were a matter of theology, politics, or electoral maneuvering, ignoring completely the economic future of the nations whose fate they were determining.
I leave, from this point onwards, Paris, the Conference, and the Treaty, briefly to consider the present situation of Europe, as the War and the Peace have made it; and it will no longer be part of my purpose to distinguish between the inevitable fruits of the War and the avoidable misfortunes of the Peace.
I now step away from discussing Paris, the Conference, and the Treaty to take a moment to reflect on the current state of Europe, shaped by both War and Peace; and I will no longer aim to separate the unavoidable outcomes of the War from the preventable troubles of the Peace.
The essential facts of the situation, as I see them, are expressed simply. Europe consists of the densest aggregation of population in the history of the world. This population is accustomed to a relatively high standard of life, in which, even now, some sections of it anticipate improvement rather than deterioration. In relation to other continents Europe is not self-sufficient; in particular it cannot feed Itself. Internally the population is not evenly distributed, but much of it is crowded into a relatively small number of dense industrial centers. This population secured for itself a livelihood before the war, without much margin of surplus, by means of a delicate and immensely complicated organization, of which the foundations were supported by coal, iron, transport, and an unbroken supply of imported food and raw materials from other continents. By the destruction of this organization and the interruption of the stream of supplies, a part of this population is deprived of its means of livelihood. Emigration is not open to the redundant surplus. For it would take years to transport them overseas, even, which is not the case, if countries could be found which were ready to receive them. The danger confronting us, therefore, is the rapid depression of the standard of life of the European populations to a point which will mean actual starvation for some (a point already reached in Russia and approximately reached in Austria). Men will not always die quietly. For starvation, which brings to some lethargy and a helpless despair, drives other temperaments to the nervous instability of hysteria and to a mad despair. And these in their distress may overturn the remnants of organization, and submerge civilization itself in their attempts to satisfy desperately the overwhelming needs of the individual. This is the danger against which all our resources and courage and idealism must now co-operate.
The key facts of the situation, as I see it, are straightforward. Europe has the highest population density in history. This population is used to a relatively high standard of living, and even now, some parts of it expect improvements rather than declines. Compared to other continents, Europe is not self-sufficient; in particular, it can’t feed itself. The population isn’t evenly spread out either; many people are concentrated in a few dense industrial hubs. Before the war, this population managed to make a living with little surplus, relying on a delicate and extremely complex system supported by coal, iron, transportation, and a steady flow of imported food and raw materials from other continents. With the collapse of this system and the disruption of supplies, some of the population has lost its means of livelihood. Emigration isn’t an option for the surplus. It would take years to move them overseas, and that’s if there were countries willing to accept them, which isn’t the case. The threat we face is the rapid decline in living standards for European populations to a level that will lead to starvation for some (a situation already happening in Russia and nearly so in Austria). People won’t just sit back and accept this. Starvation, which causes some to become lethargic and hopeless, can drive others into nervous breakdowns and madness. In their desperation, these individuals might dismantle what remains of our organizations and jeopardize civilization as they struggle to meet their basic needs. This is the crisis that requires all our resources, courage, and ideals to come together to confront.
On the 13th May, 1919, Count Brockdorff-Rantzau addressed to the Peace Conference of the Allied and Associated Powers the Report of the German Economic Commission charged with the study of the effect of the conditions of Peace on the situation of the German population. "In the course of the last two generations," they reported, "Germany has become transformed from an agricultural State to an industrial State. So long as she was an agricultural State, Germany could feed forty million inhabitants. As an industrial State she could insure the means of subsistence for a population of sixty-seven millions; and in 1913 the importation of foodstuffs amounted, in round figures, to twelve million tons. Before the war a total of fifteen million persons in Germany provided for their existence by foreign trade, navigation, and the use, directly or indirectly, of foreign raw material." After rehearsing the main relevant provisions of the Peace Treaty the report continues: "After this diminution of her products, after the economic depression resulting from the loss of her colonies, her merchant fleet and her foreign investments, Germany will not be in a position to import from abroad an adequate quantity of raw material. An enormous part of German industry will, therefore, be condemned inevitably to destruction. The need of importing foodstuffs will increase considerably at the same time that the possibility of satisfying this demand is as greatly diminished. In a very short time, therefore, Germany will not be in a position to give bread and work to her numerous millions of inhabitants, who are prevented from earning their livelihood by navigation and trade. These persons should emigrate, but this is a material impossibility, all the more because many countries and the most important ones will oppose any German immigration. To put the Peace conditions into execution would logically involve, therefore, the loss of several millions of persons in Germany. This catastrophe would not be long in coming about, seeing that the health of the population has been broken down during the War by the Blockade, and during the Armistice by the aggravation of the Blockade of famine. No help, however great, or over however long a period it were continued, could prevent those deaths en masse." "We do not know, and indeed we doubt," the report concludes, "whether the Delegates of the Allied and Associated Powers realize the inevitable consequences which will take place if Germany, an industrial State, very thickly populated, closely bound up with the economic system of the world, and under the necessity of importing enormous quantities of raw material and foodstuffs, suddenly finds herself pushed back to the phase of her development, which corresponds to her economic condition and the numbers of her population as they were half a century ago. Those who sign this Treaty will sign the death sentence of many millions of German men, women and children."
On May 13, 1919, Count Brockdorff-Rantzau presented the Report of the German Economic Commission to the Peace Conference of the Allied and Associated Powers. The report examined the impact of peace conditions on the German population. "Over the last two generations," they stated, "Germany has shifted from an agricultural nation to an industrial one. While an agricultural nation, Germany could feed forty million people. As an industrial country, it could support a population of sixty-seven million; in 1913, food imports were about twelve million tons. Before the war, fifteen million individuals in Germany relied on foreign trade, shipping, and the use of foreign raw materials, directly or indirectly, for their livelihoods." After summarizing the main points of the Peace Treaty, the report continued: "Following this reduction in production, alongside the economic downturn caused by losing its colonies, merchant fleet, and foreign investments, Germany will struggle to import enough raw materials. A significant part of German industry will likely face destruction. The demand for food imports will rise sharply while the ability to meet this demand will greatly decrease. Soon, Germany won't have the means to provide bread and jobs for its millions of citizens who rely on trade and shipping for their income. While these individuals should emigrate, this is practically impossible, especially since many countries, particularly the most significant ones, will resist any immigration from Germany. Therefore, enforcing the Peace conditions would inevitably lead to the loss of several million people in Germany. This catastrophe wouldn't take long to occur, as the population's health has deteriorated during the War due to the Blockade, and even more during the Armistice with the exacerbation of starvation. No amount of help, regardless of its duration, could prevent these mass deaths." "We do not know, and we doubt," the report concludes, "if the Delegates of the Allied and Associated Powers understand the inevitable consequences to come if Germany, an industrial nation with a dense population that is tightly integrated into the global economic system and reliant on importing large amounts of raw materials and food, suddenly finds itself regressing to an economic state that matches its conditions and population size from fifty years ago. Those who sign this Treaty will be endorsing the death sentence of millions of German men, women, and children."
I know of no adequate answer to these words. The indictment is at least as true of the Austrian, as of the German, settlement. This is the fundamental problem in front of us, before which questions of territorial adjustment and the balance of European power are insignificant. Some of the catastrophes of past history, which have thrown back human progress for centuries, have been due to the reactions following on the sudden termination, whether in the course of nature or by the act of man, of temporarily favorable conditions which have permitted the growth of population beyond what could be provided for when the favorable conditions were at an end.
I don't have a good answer to these words. The criticism applies just as much to the Austrian situation as it does to the German one. This is the core issue we face, making questions of land adjustments and the balance of power in Europe seem unimportant. Some of the disasters in history that set human progress back for centuries happened because of the reactions that followed the abrupt end, either from natural causes or human actions, of temporary favorable conditions that allowed population growth beyond what could be sustained once those conditions ended.
The significant features of the immediate situation can be grouped under three heads: first, the absolute falling off, for the time being, in Europe's internal productivity; second, the breakdown of transport and exchange by means of which its products could be conveyed where they were most wanted; and third, the inability of Europe to purchase its usual supplies from overseas.
The key aspects of the current situation can be categorized into three main points: first, the significant decline, for now, in Europe's internal productivity; second, the collapse of transportation and trade that allowed its products to be delivered where they were needed most; and third, Europe's inability to buy its usual supplies from abroad.
The decrease of productivity cannot be easily estimated, and may be the subject of exaggeration. But the primâ facie evidence of it is overwhelming, and this factor has been the main burden of Mr. Hoover's well-considered warnings. A variety of causes have produced it;—violent and prolonged internal disorder as in Russia and Hungary; the creation of new governments and their inexperience in the readjustment of economic relations, as in Poland and Czecho-Slovakia; the loss throughout the Continent of efficient labor, through the casualties of war or the continuance of mobilization; the falling-off in efficiency through continued underfeeding in the Central Empires; the exhaustion of the soil from lack of the usual applications of artificial manures throughout the course of the war; the unsettlement of the minds of the laboring classes on the fundamental economic issues of their lives. But above all (to quote Mr. Hoover), "there is a great relaxation of effort as the reflex of physical exhaustion of large sections of the population from privation and the mental and physical strain of the war." Many persons are for one reason or another out of employment altogether. According to Mr. Hoover, a summary of the unemployment bureaus in Europe in July, 1919, showed that 15,000,000 families were receiving unemployment allowances in one form or another, and were being paid in the main by a constant inflation of currency. In Germany there is the added deterrent to labor and to capital (in so far as the Reparation terms are taken literally), that anything, which they may produce beyond the barest level of subsistence, will for years to come be taken away from them.
The drop in productivity is hard to measure and might be exaggerated. However, the initial evidence of it is overwhelming, and this has been the main focus of Mr. Hoover's well-thought-out warnings. Many factors contributed to this situation: severe and ongoing internal conflict like that in Russia and Hungary; the establishment of new governments and their lack of experience in adjusting economic relations, as seen in Poland and Czechoslovakia; the loss of skilled labor across the continent due to war casualties or ongoing mobilization; reduced efficiency caused by persistent underfeeding in the Central Empires; soil depletion from the absence of typical artificial fertilizers during the war; and the confusion among the working class regarding the essential economic issues in their lives. Most importantly (to quote Mr. Hoover), "there is a great relaxation of effort as a result of the physical exhaustion of large segments of the population from deprivation and the mental and physical strain of the war." Many people are completely out of work for various reasons. According to Mr. Hoover, a summary from the unemployment bureaus in Europe in July 1919 indicated that 15,000,000 families were receiving unemployment benefits in one form or another, primarily funded by constant currency inflation. In Germany, there's an additional disincentive for labor and capital (as long as the Reparation terms are interpreted literally), that anything they produce above the most basic level of survival will be taken from them for years to come.
Such definite data as we possess do not add much, perhaps, to the general picture of decay. But I will remind the reader of one or two of them. The coal production of Europe as a whole is estimated to have fallen off by 30 per cent; and upon coal the greater part of the industries of Europe and the whole of her transport system depend. Whereas before the war Germany produced 85 per cent of the total food consumed by her inhabitants, the productivity of the soil is now diminished by 40 per cent and the effective quality of the live-stock by 55 per cent.[145] Of the European countries which formerly possessed a large exportable surplus, Russia, as much by reason of deficient transport as of diminished output, may herself starve. Hungary, apart from her other troubles, has been pillaged by the Romanians immediately after harvest. Austria will have consumed the whole of her own harvest for 1919 before the end of the calendar year. The figures are almost too overwhelming to carry conviction to our minds; if they were not quite so bad, our effective belief in them might be stronger.
The concrete data we have doesn't add much, perhaps, to the overall picture of decline. But let me point out a couple of those facts. Europe's coal production is estimated to have dropped by 30 percent, and the bulk of Europe's industries and entire transportation system rely on coal. Before the war, Germany produced 85 percent of the total food consumed by its people, but now soil productivity has decreased by 40 percent and the quality of livestock by 55 percent.[145] Of the European countries that used to have a large export surplus, Russia may now face starvation due to both poor transportation and reduced output. Hungary, in addition to her other issues, was looted by the Romanians right after the harvest. Austria will have used up all of her own 1919 harvest before the end of the year. The figures are almost too staggering to believe; if they weren’t quite this bad, we might have a stronger belief in them.
But even when coal can be got and grain harvested, the breakdown of the European railway system prevents their carriage; and even when goods can be manufactured, the breakdown of the European currency system prevents their sale. I have already described the losses, by war and under the Armistice surrenders, to the transport system of Germany. But even so, Germany's position, taking account of her power of replacement by manufacture, is probably not so serious as that of some of her neighbors. In Russia (about which, however, we have very little exact or accurate information) the condition of the rolling-stock is believed to be altogether desperate, and one of the most fundamental factors in her existing economic disorder. And in Poland, Roumania, and Hungary the position is not much better. Yet modern industrial life essentially depends on efficient transport facilities, and the population which secured its livelihood by these means cannot continue to live without them. The breakdown of currency, and the distrust in its purchasing value, is an aggravation of these evils which must be discussed in a little more detail in connection with foreign trade.
But even when coal is available and grain can be harvested, the collapse of the European railway system makes it impossible to transport them; and even when goods can be produced, the failure of the European currency system stops them from being sold. I have already mentioned the losses to Germany's transport system due to war and the Armistice surrenders. However, considering Germany's ability to replace goods through manufacturing, her situation is likely not as dire as that of some neighboring countries. In Russia (about which we have very limited reliable information), the state of the rolling stock is thought to be completely hopeless, contributing significantly to its current economic chaos. The conditions in Poland, Romania, and Hungary are not much better. Yet modern industrial life relies heavily on efficient transportation, and the populations that depend on these services can't survive without them. The collapse of currency and the lack of trust in its purchasing power exacerbate these problems, which need to be discussed in more detail regarding foreign trade.
What then is our picture of Europe? A country population able to support life on the fruits of its own agricultural production but without the accustomed surplus for the towns, and also (as a result of the lack of imported materials and so of variety and amount in the saleable manufactures of the towns) without the usual incentives to market food in return for other wares; an industrial population unable to keep its strength for lack of food, unable to earn a livelihood for lack of materials, and so unable to make good by imports from abroad the failure of productivity at home. Yet, according to Mr. Hoover, "a rough estimate would indicate that the population of Europe is at least 100,000,000 greater than can be supported without imports, and must live by the production and distribution of exports."
What does our view of Europe look like now? It's a population that can sustain itself on its own agricultural output but lacks the usual surplus for the cities. As a result of not having imported goods, there's a shortage in the variety and quantity of sellable products in urban areas, leading to less motivation to trade food for other goods. This industrial population can't maintain its strength due to a lack of food, can't earn a living because of insufficient materials, and therefore can't compensate for the decreased productivity at home with imports from abroad. However, according to Mr. Hoover, "a rough estimate would indicate that the population of Europe is at least 100,000,000 greater than can be supported without imports, and must live by the production and distribution of exports."
The problem of the re-inauguration of the perpetual circle of production and exchange in foreign trade leads me to a necessary digression on the currency situation of Europe.
The issue of restarting the endless loop of production and exchange in foreign trade makes it necessary for me to pause here and discuss the currency situation in Europe.
Lenin is said to have declared that the best way to destroy the Capitalist System was to debauch the currency. By a continuing process of inflation, governments can confiscate, secretly and unobserved, an important part of the wealth of their citizens. By this method they not only confiscate, but they confiscate arbitrarily; and, while the process impoverishes many, it actually enriches some. The sight of this arbitrary rearrangement of riches strikes not only at security, but at confidence in the equity of the existing distribution of wealth. Those to whom the system brings windfalls, beyond their deserts and even beyond their expectations or desires, become "profiteers,", who are the object of the hatred of the bourgeoisie, whom the inflationism has impoverished, not less than of the proletariat. As the inflation proceeds and the real value of the currency fluctuates wildly from month to month, all permanent relations between debtors and creditors, which form the ultimate foundation of capitalism, become so utterly disordered as to be almost meaningless; and the process of wealth-getting degenerates into a gamble and a lottery.
Lenin is said to have claimed that the best way to destroy the capitalist system was to undermine the currency. Through ongoing inflation, governments can secretly and unnoticed take a significant part of their citizens' wealth. This method not only leads to confiscation but does so arbitrarily; and while it impoverishes many, it actually enriches some. The view of this arbitrary redistribution of wealth undermines not just security but also trust in the fairness of the current wealth distribution. Those who benefit from the system unexpectedly and beyond what they deserve or even hope for become "profiteers," who are despised by both the bourgeoisie, who have been made poor by inflation, and the working class. As inflation continues and the real value of currency fluctuates drastically from month to month, all stable relationships between debtors and creditors—the foundation of capitalism—become so completely disordered that they are nearly meaningless; and the process of accumulating wealth turns into a gamble and a lottery.
Lenin was certainly right. There is no subtler, no surer means of overturning the existing basis of society than to debauch the currency. The process engages all the hidden forces of economic law on the side of destruction, and does it in a manner which not one man in a million is able to diagnose.
Lenin was definitely right. There’s no more subtle or reliable way to undermine the current structure of society than to corrupt the currency. This process activates all the hidden forces of economic law in favor of destruction, and it does so in a way that almost nobody can recognize.
In the latter stages of the war all the belligerent governments practised, from necessity or incompetence, what a Bolshevist might have done from design. Even now, when the war is over, most of them continue out of weakness the same malpractices. But further, the Governments of Europe, being many of them at this moment reckless in their methods as well as weak, seek to direct on to a class known as "profiteers" the popular indignation against the more obvious consequences of their vicious methods. These "profiteers" are, broadly speaking, the entrepreneur class of capitalists, that is to say, the active and constructive element in the whole capitalist society, who in a period of rapidly rising prices cannot help but get rich quick whether they wish it or desire it or not. If prices are continually rising, every trader who has purchased for stock or owns property and plant inevitably makes profits. By directing hatred against this class, therefore, the European Governments are carrying a step further the fatal process which the subtle mind of Lenin had consciously conceived. The profiteers are a consequence and not a cause of rising prices. By combining a popular hatred of the class of entrepreneurs with the blow already given to social security by the violent and arbitrary disturbance of contract and of the established equilibrium of wealth which is the inevitable result of inflation, these Governments are fast rendering impossible a continuance of the social and economic order of the nineteenth century. But they have no plan for replacing it.
In the later stages of the war, all the warring governments acted, whether from necessity or incompetence, in ways that a Bolshevik might have done intentionally. Even now, with the war over, many of them continue these harmful practices out of weakness. Additionally, the Governments of Europe, many of which are currently reckless in their strategies and weak, are trying to redirect public anger at a group labeled "profiteers" rather than addressing the clearer consequences of their harmful actions. These "profiteers" are, broadly speaking, the entrepreneurial class of capitalists, meaning the active and constructive part of capitalist society, who, during a time of rapidly rising prices, inevitably end up getting rich quickly, whether they want to or not. If prices keep going up, any trader who has bought stock or owns property and equipment will end up making profits. By shifting hatred towards this group, the European Governments are advancing a dangerous trend that Lenin's clever mind had consciously laid out. The profiteers are a result, not a cause, of rising prices. By combining public disdain for entrepreneurs with the damage already inflicted on social security by the violent and arbitrary disruption of contracts and the established wealth equilibrium caused by inflation, these Governments are quickly making it impossible to maintain the social and economic order of the nineteenth century. Yet, they have no plans for what to replace it with.
We are thus faced in Europe with the spectacle of an extraordinary weakness on the part of the great capitalist class, which has emerged from the industrial triumphs of the nineteenth century, and seemed a very few years ago our all-powerful master. The terror and personal timidity of the individuals of this class is now so great, their confidence in their place in society and in their necessity to the social organism so diminished, that they are the easy victims of intimidation. This was not so in England twenty-five years ago, any more than it is now in the United States. Then the capitalists believed in themselves, in their value to society, in the propriety of their continued existence in the full enjoyment of their riches and the unlimited exercise of their power. Now they tremble before every insult;—call them pro-Germans, international financiers, or profiteers, and they will give you any ransom you choose to ask not to speak of them so harshly. They allow themselves to be ruined and altogether undone by their own instruments, governments of their own making, and a press of which they are the proprietors. Perhaps it is historically true that no order of society ever perishes save by its own hand. In the complexer world of Western Europe the Immanent Will may achieve its ends more subtly and bring in the revolution no less inevitably through a Klotz or a George than by the intellectualisms, too ruthless and self-conscious for us, of the bloodthirsty philosophers of Russia.
We are faced in Europe with the sight of an extraordinary weakness among the great capitalist class, which rose from the industrial successes of the nineteenth century and seemed, just a few years ago, to be our unstoppable master. The fear and personal hesitation of individuals in this class is now so profound, and their confidence in their status in society and their importance to the social structure so diminished, that they have become easy targets for intimidation. This was not the case in England twenty-five years ago, nor is it now in the United States. Back then, capitalists had faith in themselves, in their value to society, and in the legitimacy of their continued existence while enjoying their wealth and exercising their power without limits. Now they flinch at every insult; call them pro-Germans, international financiers, or profiteers, and they will offer you any amount you want to avoid such harsh labels. They let themselves be destroyed and completely undone by their own tools, the governments they created, and a press that they own. Perhaps it's historically true that no social order ever falls except by its own actions. In the more complex world of Western Europe, the Immanent Will might achieve its goals more subtly and bring about revolution just as inevitably through a Klotz or a George as through the ruthless and self-aware intellectuals among the bloodthirsty philosophers of Russia.
The inflationism of the currency systems of Europe has proceeded to extraordinary lengths. The various belligerent Governments, unable, or too timid or too short-sighted to secure from loans or taxes the resources they required, have printed notes for the balance. In Russia and Austria-Hungary this process has reached a point where for the purposes of foreign trade the currency is practically valueless. The Polish mark can be bought for about three cents and the Austrian crown for less than two cents, but they cannot be sold at all. The German mark is worth less than four cents on the exchanges. In most of the other countries of Eastern and South-Eastern Europe the real position is nearly as bad. The currency of Italy has fallen to little more than a half of its nominal value in spite of its being still subject to some degree of regulation; French currency maintains an uncertain market; and even sterling is seriously diminished in present value and impaired in its future prospects.
The inflation of currency systems in Europe has reached extreme levels. The various warring governments, either unable, too hesitant, or too shortsighted to obtain the resources they needed through loans or taxes, have resorted to printing money to cover the gap. In Russia and Austria-Hungary, this situation has escalated to the point where the currency is nearly worthless for foreign trade. The Polish mark can be purchased for about three cents, and the Austrian crown for less than two cents, but neither can be sold at all. The German mark is valued at less than four cents in exchanges. In many other countries in Eastern and Southeastern Europe, the situation is almost as dire. The value of the Italian currency has dropped to just over half its nominal value, despite still being regulated to some extent; French currency holds an unstable market; and even the British pound has significantly decreased in current value and is facing bleak future prospects.
But while these currencies enjoy a precarious value abroad, they have never entirely lost, not even in Russia, their purchasing power at home. A sentiment of trust in the legal money of the State is so deeply implanted in the citizens of all countries that they cannot but believe that some day this money must recover a part at least of its former value. To their minds it appears that value is inherent in money as such, and they do not apprehend that the real wealth, which this money might have stood for, has been dissipated once and for all. This sentiment is supported by the various legal regulations with which the Governments endeavor to control internal prices, and so to preserve some purchasing power for their legal tender. Thus the force of law preserves a measure of immediate purchasing power over some commodities and the force of sentiment and custom maintains, especially amongst peasants, a willingness to hoard paper which is really worthless.
But while these currencies have a shaky value abroad, they’ve never completely lost their purchasing power at home, not even in Russia. People’s trust in their country's legal money is so deeply ingrained that they can’t help but believe that someday this money will regain at least some of its former value. They think that value is an inherent quality of money, and they don’t realize that the actual wealth this money was supposed to represent has been permanently lost. This belief is reinforced by various legal regulations that governments use to control local prices and maintain some purchasing power for their legal tender. Thus, the law helps preserve a certain level of immediate purchasing power for some goods, while sentiment and tradition, especially among peasants, keep them willing to save paper currency that is essentially worthless.
The presumption of a spurious value for the currency, by the force of law expressed in the regulation of prices, contains in itself, however, the seeds of final economic decay, and soon dries up the sources of ultimate supply. If a man is compelled to exchange the fruits of his labors for paper which, as experience soon teaches him, he cannot use to purchase what he requires at a price comparable to that which he has received for his own products, he will keep his produce for himself, dispose of it to his friends and neighbors as a favor, or relax his efforts in producing it. A system of compelling the exchange of commodities at what is not their real relative value not only relaxes production, but leads finally to the waste and inefficiency of barter. If, however, a government refrains from regulation and allows matters to take their course, essential commodities soon attain a level of price out of the reach of all but the rich, the worthlessness of the money becomes apparent, and the fraud upon the public can be concealed no longer.
The assumption of a false value for currency, enforced by laws that regulate prices, carries the potential for economic decline and quickly depletes sources of ultimate supply. When someone is forced to trade the results of their labor for paper money that they soon realize can’t buy what they actually need at a fair price, they will either keep their goods for themselves, sell them to friends and neighbors as a favor, or reduce their efforts in producing them. A system that forces the exchange of goods at prices that don’t reflect their true value not only diminishes production but also ultimately results in waste and inefficiency in barter. However, if a government avoids regulation and lets the market operate freely, essential goods quickly become priced out of reach for everyone except the wealthy, the uselessness of the currency becomes obvious, and the deception of the public cannot be hidden any longer.
The effect on foreign trade of price-regulation and profiteer-hunting as cures for inflation is even worse. Whatever may be the case at home, the currency must soon reach its real level abroad, with the result that prices inside and outside the country lose their normal adjustment. The price of imported commodities, when converted at the current rate of exchange, is far in excess of the local price, so that many essential goods will not be imported at all by private agency, and must be provided by the government, which, in re-selling the goods below cost price, plunges thereby a little further into insolvency. The bread subsidies, now almost universal throughout Europe, are the leading example of this phenomenon.
The impact of price controls and the hunting of profiteers as solutions for inflation on foreign trade is even worse. No matter what’s happening domestically, the currency will soon align with its true value internationally, which causes prices inside and outside the country to lose their usual balance. The cost of imported goods, when converted at the current exchange rate, is significantly higher than the local price, resulting in many essential items not being imported by private businesses and having to be supplied by the government. By reselling these goods below their cost, the government becomes even more insolvent. The bread subsidies, which are now nearly widespread across Europe, are a prime example of this issue.
The countries of Europe fall into two distinct groups at the present time as regards their manifestations of what is really the same evil throughout, according as they have been cut off from international intercourse by the Blockade, or have had their imports paid for out of the resources of their allies. I take Germany as typical of the first, and France and Italy of the second.
The countries of Europe can be divided into two clear groups right now based on how they are affected by the same underlying issue, depending on whether they have been isolated from international trade due to the Blockade or if their imports have been funded by their allies' resources. I use Germany as an example of the first group, and France and Italy as examples of the second.
The note circulation of Germany is about ten times[146] what it was before the war. The value of the mark in terms of gold is about one-eighth of its former value. As world-prices in terms of gold are more than double what they were, it follows that mark-prices inside Germany ought to be from sixteen to twenty times their pre-war level if they are to be in adjustment and proper conformity with prices outside Germany.[147] But this is not the case. In spite of a very great rise in German prices, they probably do not yet average much more than five times their former level, so far as staple commodities are concerned; and it is impossible that they should rise further except with a simultaneous and not less violent adjustment of the level of money wages. The existing maladjustment hinders in two ways (apart from other obstacles) that revival of the import trade which is the essential preliminary of the economic reconstruction of the country. In the first place, imported commodities are beyond the purchasing power of the great mass of the population,[148] and the flood of imports which might have been expected to succeed the raising of the blockade was not in fact commercially possible.[149] In the second place, it is a hazardous enterprise for a merchant or a manufacturer to purchase with a foreign credit material for which, when he has imported it or manufactured it, he will receive mark currency of a quite uncertain and possibly unrealizable value. This latter obstacle to the revival of trade is one which easily escapes notice and deserves a little attention. It is impossible at the present time to say what the mark will be worth in terms of foreign currency three or six months or a year hence, and the exchange market can quote no reliable figure. It may be the case, therefore, that a German merchant, careful of his future credit and reputation, who is actually offered a short period credit in terms of sterling or dollars, may be reluctant and doubtful whether to accept it. He will owe sterling or dollars, but he will sell his product for marks, and his power, when the time comes, to turn these marks into the currency in which he has to repay his debt is entirely problematic. Business loses its genuine character and becomes no better than a speculation in the exchanges, the fluctuations in which entirely obliterate the normal profits of commerce.
The amount of money in circulation in Germany is about ten times what it was before the war. The value of the mark in terms of gold is around one-eighth of its previous value. Since global prices in gold have more than doubled, mark prices in Germany should ideally be between sixteen to twenty times their pre-war levels to align correctly with prices outside Germany. However, this is not happening. Despite a significant increase in German prices, they are probably still only about five times their former level for staple goods. It’s impossible for prices to rise further without a simultaneous and equally drastic adjustment in money wages. This mismatch creates two main issues—besides other challenges—that prevent the revival of the import trade, which is crucial for the country’s economic recovery. First, imported goods are out of reach for most people, and the surge in imports that was expected after the blockade was lifted didn't materialize commercially. Second, it's risky for merchants or manufacturers to buy materials on foreign credit because once they import or produce these goods, they'll only receive marks that have an uncertain and possibly unrealistic value. This issue often goes unnoticed but is worth considering. Right now, it's impossible to predict what the mark will be worth in foreign currency in three, six, or twelve months, and the exchange market can’t provide any reliable figures. Therefore, a German merchant concerned about his future credit and reputation may hesitate to accept a short-term credit offer in pounds or dollars. He will owe those currencies, but he will sell his product for marks, and his ability to convert those marks back into the currency needed to pay his debt at the right time is completely uncertain. Business loses its true nature and turns into mere speculation on currency exchanges, with fluctuations wiping out the normal profits of trade.
There are therefore three separate obstacles to the revival of trade: a maladjustment between internal prices and international prices, a lack of individual credit abroad wherewith to buy the raw materials needed to secure the working capital and to re-start the circle of exchange, and a disordered currency system which renders credit operations hazardous or impossible quite apart from the ordinary risks of commerce.
There are three main barriers to the revival of trade: a mismatch between domestic prices and international prices, a lack of individual credit abroad to purchase the raw materials needed to secure working capital and restart the cycle of exchange, and a disorganized currency system that makes credit transactions risky or impossible, in addition to the usual challenges of doing business.
The note circulation of France is more than six times its pre-war level. The exchange value of the franc in terms of gold is a little less than two-thirds its former value; that is to say, the value of the franc has not fallen in proportion to the increased volume of the currency.[150] This apparently superior situation of France is due to the fact that until recently a very great part of her imports have not been paid for, but have been covered by loans from the Governments of Great Britain and the United States. This has allowed a want of equilibrium between exports and imports to be established, which is becoming a very serious factor, now that the outside assistance is being gradually discontinued. The internal economy of France and its price level in relation to the note circulation and the foreign exchanges is at present based on an excess of imports over exports which cannot possibly continue. Yet it is difficult to see how the position can be readjusted except by a lowering of the standard of consumption in France, which, even if it is only temporary, will provoke a great deal of discontent.[151]
The amount of money in circulation in France is now more than six times what it was before the war. The exchange rate of the franc in terms of gold is just under two-thirds of its former value; in other words, the value of the franc hasn't dropped in proportion to the increase in the amount of currency. This seemingly better situation for France is because, until recently, a large portion of its imports hasn't been paid for, as they've been financed by loans from the governments of Great Britain and the United States. This has created a significant imbalance between exports and imports, which is becoming a serious issue now that outside support is slowly being cut off. The domestic economy of France and its price levels, in relation to the money in circulation and foreign exchanges, are currently dependent on imports exceeding exports, a situation that definitely can't last. However, it's hard to see how things can be adjusted without lowering consumption levels in France, which, even if only for a short time, will lead to a lot of dissatisfaction.
The situation of Italy is not very different. There the note circulation is five or six times its pre-war level, and the exchange value of the lira in terms of gold about half its former value. Thus the adjustment of the exchange to the volume of the note circulation has proceeded further in Italy than in France. On the other hand, Italy's "invisible" receipts, from emigrant remittances and the expenditure of tourists, have been very injuriously affected; the disruption of Austria has deprived her of an important market; and her peculiar dependence on foreign shipping and on imported raw materials of every kind has laid her open to special injury from the increase of world prices. For all these reasons her position is grave, and her excess of imports as serious a symptom as in the case of France.[152]
The situation in Italy isn't much different. There, the amount of money in circulation is five or six times what it was before the war, and the exchange value of the lira in terms of gold is about half of its previous value. As a result, the adjustment of the exchange rate to the amount of money in circulation has gone further in Italy than in France. On the other hand, Italy's "invisible" earnings, from money sent home by immigrants and tourist spending, have been seriously impacted; the breakup of Austria has taken away a key market; and its unique reliance on foreign shipping and imported raw materials of all kinds has made it especially vulnerable to rising global prices. For all these reasons, its situation is dire, and its high levels of imports are as concerning as in the case of France.[152]
The existing inflation and the maladjustment of international trade are aggravated, both in France and in Italy, by the unfortunate budgetary position of the Governments of these countries.
The current inflation and the misalignment of international trade are worsened, both in France and Italy, by the unfortunate budget situation of their governments.
In France the failure to impose taxation is notorious. Before the war the aggregate French and British budgets, and also the average taxation per head, were about equal; but in France no substantial effort has been made to cover the increased expenditure. "Taxes increased in Great Britain during the war," it has been estimated, "from 95 francs per head to 265 francs, whereas the increase in France was only from 90 to 103 francs." The taxation voted in France for the financial year ending June 30, 1919, was less than half the estimated normal post-bellum expenditure. The normal budget for the future cannot be put below $4,400,000,000 (22 milliard francs), and may exceed this figure; but even for the fiscal year 1919-20 the estimated receipts from taxation do not cover much more than half this amount. The French Ministry of Finance have no plan or policy whatever for meeting this prodigious deficit, except the expectation of receipts from Germany on a scale which the French officials themselves know to be baseless. In the meantime they are helped by sales of war material and surplus American stocks and do not scruple, even in the latter half of 1919, to meet the deficit by the yet further expansion of the note issue of the Bank of France.[153]
In France, the lack of tax implementation is well-known. Before the war, the combined budgets of France and Britain, as well as the average tax per person, were roughly the same; however, France hasn't made any significant efforts to address the increased spending. "Taxes in Great Britain during the war," it has been estimated, "rose from 95 francs per person to 265 francs, while in France the increase was only from 90 to 103 francs." The taxes approved in France for the financial year ending June 30, 1919, were less than half of the estimated normal post-war spending. The expected normal budget for the future cannot be set below $4,400,000,000 (22 milliard francs), and it may go beyond that; yet, even for the fiscal year 1919-20, the estimated tax income barely covers more than half of this amount. The French Ministry of Finance has no plan or strategy to address this huge deficit, aside from the hope for payments from Germany at a level that even French officials recognize is unrealistic. In the meantime, they are supported by sales of military equipment and surplus American supplies and don’t hesitate, even in the latter half of 1919, to cover the deficit by further increasing the note issue of the Bank of France.[153]
The budgetary position of Italy is perhaps a little superior to that of France. Italian finance throughout the war was more enterprising than the French, and far greater efforts were made to impose taxation and pay for the war. Nevertheless Signor Nitti, the Prime Minister, in a letter addressed to the electorate on the eve of the General Election (Oct., 1919), thought it necessary to make public the following desperate analysis of the situation:—(1) The State expenditure amounts to about three times the revenue. (2) All the industrial undertakings of the State, including the railways, telegraphs, and telephones, are being run at a loss. Although the public is buying bread at a high price, that price represents a loss to the Government of about a milliard a year. (3) Exports now leaving the country are valued at only one-quarter or one-fifth of the imports from abroad. (4) The National Debt is increasing by about a milliard lire per month. (5) The military expenditure for one month is still larger than that for the first year of the war.
The budget situation in Italy is perhaps slightly better than in France. Throughout the war, Italian finance was more proactive than the French, and there were much greater efforts to impose taxes and fund the war. Still, Prime Minister Nitti felt it necessary to share the following dire analysis of the situation in a letter to the voters just before the General Election (Oct., 1919):—(1) The State's expenditure is about three times higher than its revenue. (2) All state-run industries, including railways, telegraphs, and telephones, are operating at a loss. Even though the public is paying high prices for bread, that cost results in a loss of about a billion a year for the Government. (3) Exports leaving the country are currently valued at only a quarter or a fifth of the imports coming in from abroad. (4) The National Debt is increasing by about a billion lire each month. (5) Monthly military spending is still greater than the total for the first year of the war.
But if this is the budgetary position of France and Italy, that of the rest of belligerent Europe is yet more desperate. In Germany the total expenditure of the Empire, the Federal States, and the Communes in 1919-20 is estimated at 25 milliards of marks, of which not above 10 milliards are covered by previously existing taxation. This is without allowing anything for the payment of the indemnity. In Russia, Poland, Hungary, or Austria such a thing as a budget cannot be seriously considered to exist at all.[154]
But if this is the budget situation in France and Italy, the budget situation for the rest of war-torn Europe is even worse. In Germany, the total spending by the Empire, Federal States, and Municipalities in 1919-20 is estimated to be 25 billion marks, with only 10 billion covered by existing taxes. This doesn’t even account for the payment of reparations. In Russia, Poland, Hungary, or Austria, there’s no way to seriously consider that a budget exists at all.[154]
Thus the menace of inflationism described above is not merely a product of the war, of which peace begins the cure. It is a continuing phenomenon of which the end is not yet in sight.
Thus the threat of inflation mentioned above isn't just a result of the war, from which peace starts to heal. It's an ongoing issue, and there's no end in sight yet.
All these influences combine not merely to prevent Europe from supplying immediately a sufficient stream of exports to pay for the goods she needs to import, but they impair her credit for securing the working capital required to re-start the circle of exchange and also, by swinging the forces of economic law yet further from equilibrium rather than towards it, they favor a continuance of the present conditions instead of a recovery from them. An inefficient, unemployed, disorganized Europe faces us, torn by internal strife and international hate, fighting, starving, pillaging, and lying. What warrant is there for a picture of less somber colors?
All these factors not only stop Europe from quickly providing enough exports to pay for the goods it needs to import, but they also damage its ability to secure the working capital necessary to restart the flow of trade. By pushing economic forces further away from balance instead of moving toward it, they promote the continuation of the current situation rather than any recovery. An ineffective, unemployed, disorganized Europe is present before us, torn apart by internal conflict and international animosity, filled with fighting, starvation, looting, and dishonesty. What reason is there to believe in a less bleak picture?
I have paid little heed in this book to Russia, Hungary, or Austria.[155] There the miseries of life and the disintegration of society are too notorious to require analysis; and these countries are already experiencing the actuality of what for the rest of Europe is still in the realm of prediction. Yet they comprehend a vast territory and a great population, and are an extant example of how much man can suffer and how far society can decay. Above all, they are the signal to us of how in the final catastrophe the malady of the body passes over into malady of the mind. Economic privation proceeds by easy stages, and so long as men suffer it patiently the outside world cares little. Physical efficiency and resistance to disease slowly diminish,[156] but life proceeds somehow, until the limit of human endurance is reached at last and counsels of despair and madness stir the sufferers from the lethargy which precedes the crisis. Then man shakes himself, and the bonds of custom are loosed. The power of ideas is sovereign, and he listens to whatever instruction of hope, illusion, or revenge is carried to him on the air. As I write, the flames of Russian Bolshevism seem, for the moment at least, to have burnt themselves out, and the peoples of Central and Eastern Europe are held in a dreadful torpor. The lately gathered harvest keeps off the worst privations, and Peace has been declared at Paris. But winter approaches. Men will have nothing to look forward to or to nourish hopes on. There will be little fuel to moderate the rigors of the season or to comfort the starved bodies of the town-dwellers.
I haven't paid much attention in this book to Russia, Hungary, or Austria.[155] There, the struggles of life and the breakdown of society are so well known that they don’t need analysis; these countries are already living through what the rest of Europe is still predicting. Yet they cover a vast area and have a large population, serving as a real example of how much humans can endure and how far society can fall apart. More than anything, they remind us that, in the face of total disaster, physical suffering often turns into mental anguish. Economic hardship unfolds gradually, and as long as people endure it quietly, the outside world pays little attention. Physical strength and immunity to disease gradually decline,[156] but life somehow goes on, until the limits of human endurance are finally reached and feelings of despair and madness awaken the suffering from the lethargy that comes before a crisis. At that point, people start to react, and the constraints of tradition get loosened. The power of ideas reigns supreme, and they become open to any message of hope, illusion, or revenge that comes their way. As I write this, it seems like the flames of Russian Bolshevism have temporarily died down, and the people of Central and Eastern Europe are stuck in a terrible daze. The recently harvested crops are preventing the worst shortages, and peace has been declared in Paris. But winter is coming. People will have nothing to look forward to or hope for. There won't be enough fuel to ease the harshness of the season or to comfort the hungry bodies of city dwellers.
But who can say how much is endurable, or in what direction men will seek at last to escape from their misfortunes?
But who can say how much people can endure, or in which direction they'll ultimately try to escape their struggles?
FOOTNOTES:
[146] Including the Darlehenskassenscheine somewhat more.
Including the Darlehenskassenscheine a bit more.
[148] One of the moat striking and symptomatic difficulties which faced the Allied authorities in their administration of the occupied areas of Germany during the Armistice arose out of the fact that even when they brought food into the country the inhabitants could not afford to pay its cost price.
[148] One of the most striking and significant challenges that the Allied authorities encountered in managing the occupied areas of Germany during the Armistice was that even when they brought food into the country, the inhabitants couldn’t afford to pay the actual cost.
[149] Theoretically an unduly low level of home prices should stimulate exports and so cure itself. But in Germany, and still more in Poland and Austria, there is little or nothing to export. There must be imports before there can be exports.
[149] In theory, an unusually low level of home prices should boost exports and solve the issue on its own. However, in Germany, and even more so in Poland and Austria, there isn't much, if anything, to export. There need to be imports before exports can happen.
[150] Allowing for the diminished value of gold, the exchange value of the franc should be less than 40 per cent of its previous value, instead of the actual figure of about 60 per cent, if the fall were proportional to the increase in the volume of the currency.
[150] Considering the reduced value of gold, the franc's exchange value should be under 40 percent of its previous value, rather than the current figure of around 60 percent, if the decrease were consistent with the rise in the currency supply.
[151] How very far from equilibrium France's international exchange now is can be seen from the following table:
[151] The extent to which France's international exchange is out of balance can be observed in the following table:
Monthly Average | Imports $1,000 |
Exports $1,000 |
Excess of Imports $1,000 |
1913 | 140,355 | 114,670 | 25,685 |
1914 | 106,705 | 81,145 | 25,560 |
1918 | 331,915 | 69,055 | 262,860 |
Jan.-Mar. 1919 | 387,140 | 66,670 | 320,470 |
Apr.-June 1919 | 421,410 | 83,895 | 337,515 |
July 1919 | 467,565 | 123,675 | 343,890 |
These figures have been converted, at approximately par rates, but this is roughly compensated by the fact that the trade of 1918 and 1919 has been valued at 1917 official rates. French imports cannot possibly continue at anything approaching these figures, and the semblance of prosperity based on such a state of affairs is spurious.
These numbers have been adjusted using roughly equal exchange rates, but this is about balanced out by the fact that the trade for 1918 and 1919 has been calculated using the official rates from 1917. French imports can't realistically maintain these levels, and the appearance of prosperity based on this situation is misleading.
Monthly Average | Imports $1,000 |
Exports $1,000 |
Excess of Imports $1,000 |
1913 | 60,760 | 41,860 | 18,900 |
1914 | 48,720 | 36,840 | 11,880 |
1918 | 235,025 | 41,390 | 193,635 |
Jan.-Mar. 1919 | 229,240 | 38,685 | 191,155 |
Apr.-June 1919 | 331,035 | 69,250 | 261,785 |
July-Aug. 1919 | 223,535 | 84,515 | 139,020 |
[153] In the last two returns of the Bank of France available as I write (Oct. 2 and 9, 1919) the increases in the note issue on the week amounted to $93,750,000 and $94,125,000 respectively.
[153] In the last two reports from the Bank of France that I have (Oct. 2 and 9, 1919), the increases in the note circulation for the week were $93,750,000 and $94,125,000, respectively.
[154] On October 3, 1919, M. Bilinski made his financial statement to the Polish Diet. He estimated his expenditure for the next nine months at rather more than double his expenditure for the past nine months, and while during the first period his revenue had amounted to one-fifth of his expenditure, for the coming months he was budgeting for receipts equal to one-eighth of his outgoings. The Times correspondent at Warsaw reported that "in general M. Bilinski's tone was optimistic and appeared to satisfy his audience."
[154] On October 3, 1919, M. Bilinski presented his financial statement to the Polish Diet. He projected his expenses for the next nine months to be more than double what they were in the previous nine months, and while his revenue during the first period was only one-fifth of his expenses, for the coming months he anticipated that his income would be one-eighth of his expenditures. The Times correspondent in Warsaw reported that "overall, M. Bilinski's tone was optimistic and seemed to please his audience."
[155] The terms of the Peace Treaty imposed on the Austrian Republic bear no relation to the real facts of that State's desperate situation. The Arbeiter Zeitung of Vienna on June 4, 1919, commented on them as follows: "Never has the substance of a treaty of peace so grossly betrayed the intentions which were said to have guided its construction as is the case with this Treaty . . . in which every provision is permeated with ruthlessness and pitilessness, in which no breath of human sympathy can be detected, which flies in the face of everything which binds man to man, which is a crime against humanity itself, against a suffering and tortured people." I am acquainted in detail with the Austrian Treaty and I was present when some of its terms were being drafted, but I do not find it easy to rebut the justice of this outburst.
[155] The terms of the Peace Treaty imposed on the Austrian Republic have no connection to the real facts of the country's dire situation. The Arbeiter Zeitung of Vienna on June 4, 1919, commented on them as follows: "Never has the essence of a peace treaty so blatantly contradicted the intentions that were supposedly behind its creation as this one... in which every provision is filled with harshness and cruelty, where no hint of human compassion can be found, and which goes against everything that binds people together, which is a crime against humanity itself, against a suffering and tormented people." I am well-acquainted with the Austrian Treaty, and I was present when some of its terms were being drafted, but I find it difficult to argue against the accuracy of this statement.
[156] For months past the reports of the health conditions in the Central Empires have been of such a character that the imagination is dulled, and one almost seems guilty of sentimentality in quoting them. But their general veracity is not disputed, and I quote the three following, that the reader may not be unmindful of them: "In the last years of the war, in Austria alone at least 35,000 people died of tuberculosis, in Vienna alone 12,000. Today we have to reckon with a number of at least 350,000 to 400,000 people who require treatment for tuberculosis.... As the result of malnutrition a bloodless generation is growing up with undeveloped muscles, undeveloped joints, and undeveloped brain" (Neue Freie Presse, May 31, 1919). The Commission of Doctors appointed by the Medical Faculties of Holland, Sweden, and Norway to examine the conditions in Germany reported as follows in the Swedish Press in April, 1919: "Tuberculosis, especially in children, is increasing in an appalling way, and, generally speaking, is malignant. In the same way rickets is more serious and more widely prevalent. It is impossible to do anything for these diseases; there is no milk for the tuberculous, and no cod-liver oil for those suffering from rickets.... Tuberculosis is assuming almost unprecedented aspects, such as have hitherto only been known in exceptional cases. The whole body is attacked simultaneously, and the illness in this form is practically incurable.... Tuberculosis is nearly always fatal now among adults. It is the cause of 90 per cent of the hospital cases. Nothing can be done against it owing to lack of food-stuffs.... It appears in the most terrible forms, such as glandular tuberculosis, which turns into purulent dissolution." The following is by a writer in the Vossische Zeitung, June 5, 1919, who accompanied the Hoover Mission to the Erzgebirge: "I visited large country districts where 90 per cent of all the children were ricketty and where children of three years are only beginning to walk.... Accompany me to a school in the Erzgebirge. You think it is a kindergarten for the little ones. No, these are children of seven and eight years. Tiny faces, with large dull eyes, overshadowed by huge puffed, ricketty foreheads, their small arms just skin and bone, and above the crooked legs with their dislocated joints the swollen, pointed stomachs of the hunger œdema.... 'You see this child here,' the physician in charge explained; 'it consumed an incredible amount of bread, and yet did not get any stronger. I found out that it hid all the bread it received underneath its straw mattress. The fear of hunger was so deeply rooted in the child that it collected stores instead of eating the food: a misguided animal instinct made the dread of hunger worse than the actual pangs.'" Yet there are many persons apparently in whose opinion justice requires that such beings should pay tribute until they are forty or fifty years of age in relief of the British taxpayer.
[156] For months, the reports about health conditions in the Central Empires have been so grim that it almost makes one feel sentimental to quote them. However, their overall accuracy is not in question, and I mention the following three to ensure the reader remains aware: "In the last years of the war, at least 35,000 people died of tuberculosis in Austria alone, with 12,000 in Vienna. Today, we have to consider at least 350,000 to 400,000 people who need treatment for tuberculosis.... Due to malnutrition, a weak generation is developing with underdeveloped muscles, joints, and brains" (Neue Freie Presse, May 31, 1919). The Commission of Doctors appointed by the Medical Faculties of Holland, Sweden, and Norway, which examined the conditions in Germany, reported in the Swedish Press in April 1919: "Tuberculosis, especially among children, is rising alarmingly and is generally severe. Similarly, rickets is more serious and more widespread. There is nothing that can be done for these diseases; there’s no milk for those with tuberculosis, and no cod-liver oil for those suffering from rickets.... Tuberculosis is showing almost unprecedented severity, appearing in forms that have only been seen in rare cases. The entire body is affected at once, and this type of illness is practically incurable.... Tuberculosis is now nearly always fatal among adults. It accounts for 90 percent of hospital cases. There’s nothing that can be done about it due to a lack of food.... It manifests in horrific forms, like glandular tuberculosis, which leads to severe tissue breakdown." A writer for the Vossische Zeitung on June 5, 1919, who accompanied the Hoover Mission to the Erzgebirge, remarked: "I visited large rural areas where 90 percent of all the children had rickets and where three-year-olds were just starting to walk.... Come with me to a school in the Erzgebirge. You might think it’s a kindergarten for little ones. No, these are children aged seven and eight. Their tiny faces have large, dull eyes, overshadowed by big, swollen, rickety foreheads; their small arms are just skin and bone, and above their crooked legs with dislocated joints are the swollen, pointed bellies of hunger edema.... 'Look at this child here,' the physician in charge said; 'it consumed an incredible amount of bread, yet did not get any stronger. I discovered that it hid all the bread it got under its straw mattress. The fear of hunger was so ingrained in this child that it hoarded food instead of eating it: a misguided animal instinct made the fear of hunger worse than the actual hunger itself.'" Yet there are many people who apparently believe that justice requires such beings to contribute until they are forty or fifty years old to relieve the burden on the British taxpayer.
Chapter 7
Solutions
It is difficult to maintain true perspective in large affairs. I have criticized the work of Paris, and have depicted in somber colors the condition and the prospects of Europe. This is one aspect of the position and, I believe, a true one. But in so complex a phenomenon the prognostics do not all point one way; and we may make the error of expecting consequences to follow too swiftly and too inevitably from what perhaps are not all the relevant causes. The blackness of the prospect itself leads us to doubt its accuracy; our imagination is dulled rather than stimulated by too woeful a narration, and our minds rebound from what is felt "too bad to be true." But before the reader allows himself to be too much swayed by these natural reflections, and before I lead him, as is the intention of this chapter, towards remedies and ameliorations and the discovery of happier tendencies, let him redress the balance of his thought by recalling two contrasts—England and Russia, of which the one may encourage his optimism too much, but the other should remind him that catastrophes can still happen, and that modern society is not immune from the very greatest evils.
It’s tough to keep a true perspective on big issues. I’ve pointed out the flaws in Paris’s work and painted a grim picture of Europe’s situation and future. That’s one way to look at things, and I think it’s an accurate one. However, in something so complicated, not all predictions go in the same direction; we might make the mistake of expecting results to come too quickly and too necessarily from what might not be all the relevant causes. The bleakness of the outlook itself can lead us to question its truth; our imagination gets dulled instead of sparked by too dire a narrative, and our minds push back against what seems "too bad to be true." But before the reader gets too influenced by these natural thoughts, and before I steer him, as this chapter intends, toward solutions and improvements and finding more positive trends, he should balance his thinking by remembering two contrasts—England and Russia. While England might overly boost his optimism, Russia should remind him that disasters can still occur, and that modern society is not protected from the greatest evils.
In the chapters of this book I have not generally had in mind the situation or the problems of England. "Europe" in my narration must generally be interpreted to exclude the British Isles. England is in a state of transition, and her economic problems are serious. We may be on the eve of great changes in her social and industrial structure. Some of us may welcome such prospects and some of us deplore them. But they are of a different kind altogether from those impending on Europe. I do not perceive in England the slightest possibility of catastrophe or any serious likelihood of a general upheaval of society. The war has impoverished us, but not seriously;—I should judge that the real wealth of the country in 1919 is at least equal to what it was in 1900. Our balance of trade is adverse, but not so much so that the readjustment of it need disorder our economic life.[157] The deficit in our Budget is large, but not beyond what firm and prudent statesmanship could bridge. The shortening of the hours of labor may have somewhat diminished our productivity. But it should not be too much to hope that this is a feature of transition, and no one who is acquainted with the British workingman can doubt that, if it suits him, and if he is in sympathy and reasonable contentment with the conditions of his life, he can produce at least as much in a shorter working day as he did in the longer hours which prevailed formerly. The most serious problems for England have been brought to a head by the war, but are in their origins more fundamental. The forces of the nineteenth century have run their course and are exhausted. The economic motives and ideals of that generation no longer satisfy us: we must find a new way and must suffer again the malaise, and finally the pangs, of a new industrial birth. This is one element. The other is that on which I have enlarged in Chapter II.;—the increase in the real cost of food and the diminishing response of nature to any further increase in the population of the world, a tendency which must be especially injurious to the greatest of all industrial countries and the most dependent on imported supplies of food.
In the chapters of this book, I haven't mainly focused on the situation or problems specific to England. "Europe" in my discussion should generally be understood to exclude the British Isles. England is undergoing changes, and its economic issues are serious. We might be on the brink of significant shifts in its social and industrial structures. Some of us may welcome such changes, while others may lament them. However, these are entirely different from what’s happening in Europe. I don’t see any real chance of disaster or a serious likelihood of a social upheaval in England. The war has made us poorer, but not to a severe extent; I would say that the country's real wealth in 1919 is at least on par with what it was in 1900. Our trade balance isn't favorable, but it's not in such a state that it would disrupt our economic life. The deficit in our Budget is large, but it’s something that strong and careful leadership can manage. Reducing working hours may have slightly lowered our productivity. But I believe this is just a part of the transition, and anyone familiar with the British worker knows that if he is content and finds the conditions of his life agreeable, he can produce at least as much in a shorter day as he did in longer hours before. The most significant problems for England have been intensified by the war, but their roots are more fundamental. The forces of the nineteenth century have run their course and are depleted. The economic motives and ideals of that era no longer resonate with us; we need to find a new path and will have to endure the discomfort and eventually the challenges of a new industrial birth. This is one factor. The other, which I've elaborated on in Chapter II, is the increasing real cost of food and the declining ability of nature to support any further growth in the world's population, a trend that must be particularly harmful to the largest industrial nations that rely heavily on imported food supplies.
But these secular problems are such as no age is free from. They are of an altogether different order from those which may afflict the peoples of Central Europe. Those readers who, chiefly mindful of the British conditions with which they are familiar, are apt to indulge their optimism, and still more those whose immediate environment is American, must cast their minds to Russia, Turkey, Hungary, or Austria, where the most dreadful material evils which men can suffer—famine, cold, disease, war, murder, and anarchy—are an actual present experience, if they are to apprehend the character of the misfortunes against the further extension of which it must surely be our duty to seek the remedy, if there is one.
But these everyday problems are something every era deals with. They’re completely different from the issues affecting the people of Central Europe. Readers who mostly think about the British conditions they’re familiar with might tend to be overly optimistic, and even more so those whose immediate surroundings are American. They need to consider Russia, Turkey, Hungary, or Austria, where the worst material hardships imaginable—hunger, cold, sickness, war, murder, and chaos—are a current reality. If we are to understand the nature of the disasters we must try to address and find solutions for, we need to recognize this.
What then is to be done? The tentative suggestions of this chapter may appear to the reader inadequate. But the opportunity was missed at Paris during the six months which followed the Armistice, and nothing we can do now can repair the mischief wrought at that time. Great privation and great risks to society have become unavoidable. All that is now open to us is to redirect, so far as lies in our power, the fundamental economic tendencies which underlie the events of the hour, so that they promote the re-establishment of prosperity and order, instead of leading us deeper into misfortune.
What should we do now? The suggestions in this chapter might seem insufficient to the reader. However, the chance to act was lost in Paris during the six months after the Armistice, and nothing we do now can fix the damage done then. Significant hardships and serious risks to society are now unavoidable. All we can do is to try to steer the core economic forces driving current events toward promoting the restoration of prosperity and order, rather than pushing us further into trouble.
We must first escape from the atmosphere and the methods of Paris. Those who controlled the Conference may bow before the gusts of popular opinion, but they will never lead us out of our troubles. It is hardly to be supposed that the Council of Four can retrace their steps, even if they wished to do so. The replacement of the existing Governments of Europe is, therefore, an almost indispensable preliminary.
We need to first break away from the vibe and approaches of Paris. Those in charge of the Conference may yield to the waves of public opinion, but they won't guide us out of our problems. It's unlikely that the Council of Four can go back, even if they wanted to. So, replacing the current governments of Europe is basically a necessary first step.
I propose then to discuss a program, for those who believe that the Peace of Versailles cannot stand, under the following heads:
I would like to discuss a plan for those who think that the Peace of Versailles won't last, covering the following points:
- The Revision of the Treaty.
- The settlement of inter-Ally indebtedness.
- An international loan and the reform of the currency.
- The relations of Central Europe to Russia.
1. The Revision of the Treaty
Are any constitutional means open to us for altering the Treaty? President Wilson and General Smuts, who believe that to have secured the Covenant of the League of Nations outweighs much evil in the rest of the Treaty, have indicated that we must look to the League for the gradual evolution of a more tolerable life for Europe. "There are territorial settlements," General Smuts wrote in his statement on signing the Peace Treaty, "which will need revision. There are guarantees laid down which we all hope will soon be found out of harmony with the new peaceful temper and unarmed state of our former enemies. There are punishments foreshadowed over most of which a calmer mood may yet prefer to pass the sponge of oblivion. There are indemnities stipulated which cannot be enacted without grave injury to the industrial revival of Europe, and which it will be in the interests of all to render more tolerable and moderate.... I am confident that the League of Nations will yet prove the path of escape for Europe out of the ruin brought about by this war." Without the League, President Wilson informed the Senate when he presented the Treaty to them early in July, 1919, "...long-continued supervision of the task of reparation which Germany was to undertake to complete within the next generation might entirely break down;[158] the reconsideration and revision of administrative arrangements and restrictions which the Treaty prescribed, but which it recognized might not provide lasting advantage or be entirely fair if too long enforced, would be impracticable."
Are there any constitutional ways for us to change the Treaty? President Wilson and General Smuts, who believe that securing the Covenant of the League of Nations outweighs much of the negativity in the rest of the Treaty, have suggested that we should look to the League for a gradual improvement in Europe's conditions. "There are territorial settlements," General Smuts wrote in his statement upon signing the Peace Treaty, "that will need to be revised. There are guarantees set forth that we all hope will soon be out of sync with the new peaceful mindset and unarmed status of our former enemies. There are punishments anticipated that a calmer perspective may prefer to erase altogether. There are indemnities specified that cannot be enforced without severely harming Europe's industrial recovery, and it would be in everyone's interest to make these more bearable and reasonable... I am confident that the League of Nations will ultimately provide a way for Europe to rise above the devastation caused by this war." Without the League, President Wilson informed the Senate when he presented the Treaty to them in early July 1919, "...long-term supervision of the reparations that Germany was supposed to complete within the next generation might completely fail; the reconsideration and revision of administrative arrangements and restrictions that the Treaty mandated, but which it acknowledged might not be a lasting solution or entirely fair if enforced too long, would be impossible."
Can we look forward with fair hopes to securing from the operation of the League those benefits which two of its principal begetters thus encourage us to expect from it? The relevant passage is to be found in Article XIX. of the Covenant, which runs as follows:
Can we look ahead with reasonable optimism to gaining from the League those benefits that two of its main creators encourage us to anticipate? The relevant passage is found in Article XIX of the Covenant, which states:
But alas! Article V. provides that "Except where otherwise expressly provided in this Covenant or by the terms of the present Treaty, decisions at any meeting of the Assembly or of the Council shall require the agreement of all the Members of the League represented at the meeting." Does not this provision reduce the League, so far as concerns an early reconsideration of any of the terms of the Peace Treaty, into a body merely for wasting time? If all the parties to the Treaty are unanimously of opinion that it requires alteration in a particular sense, it does not need a League and a Covenant to put the business through. Even when the Assembly of the League is unanimous it can only "advise" reconsideration by the members specially affected.
But unfortunately! Article V states that "Except where otherwise expressly provided in this Covenant or by the terms of the present Treaty, decisions at any meeting of the Assembly or of the Council shall require the agreement of all the Members of the League represented at the meeting." Doesn't this provision turn the League, in terms of reexamining any of the Peace Treaty terms, into a group that just wastes time? If all parties to the Treaty agree that it needs changes in a specific way, there’s no need for a League and a Covenant to handle that. Even when the Assembly of the League is in full agreement, it can only "advise" reconsideration by the members specifically affected.
But the League will operate, say its supporters, by its influence on the public opinion of the world, and the view of the majority will carry decisive weight in practice, even though constitutionally it is of no effect. Let us pray that this be so. Yet the League in the hands of the trained European diplomatist may become an unequaled instrument for obstruction and delay. The revision of Treaties is entrusted primarily, not to the Council, which meets frequently, but to the Assembly, which will meet more rarely and must become, as any one with an experience of large Inter-Ally Conferences must know, an unwieldy polyglot debating society in which the greatest resolution and the best management may fail altogether to bring issues to a head against an opposition in favor of the status quo. There are indeed two disastrous blots on the Covenant,—Article V., which prescribes unanimity, and the much-criticized Article X., by which "The Members of the League undertake to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all Members of the League." These two Articles together go some way to destroy the conception of the League as an instrument of progress, and to equip it from the outset with an almost fatal bias towards the status quo. It is these Articles which have reconciled to the League some of its original opponents, who now hope to make of it another Holy Alliance for the perpetuation of the economic ruin of their enemies and the Balance of Power in their own interests which they believe themselves to have established by the Peace.
But supporters of the League say it will operate through its influence on global public opinion, and the majority's views will carry significant weight in practice, even though constitutionally they hold no power. Let’s hope this turns out to be true. However, in the hands of skilled European diplomats, the League could become a powerful tool for obstruction and delay. The revision of treaties is mainly assigned not to the Council, which meets frequently, but to the Assembly, which meets less often and is likely to become, as anyone with experience of large inter-Allied conferences would know, an unwieldy, multilingual debating group where the best resolutions and management may fail to address issues due to opposition favoring the status quo. There are indeed two serious flaws in the Covenant—Article V, which requires unanimity, and the often-criticized Article X, which states, "The Members of the League undertake to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all Members of the League." Together, these two Articles undermine the idea of the League as a tool for progress and give it a nearly fatal bias toward maintaining the status quo from the outset. It is these Articles that have brought some of its original opponents to accept the League, who now hope to turn it into another Holy Alliance to sustain the economic hardship of their enemies and maintain the Balance of Power in their own favor, which they believe they established through the Peace.
But while it would be wrong and foolish to conceal from ourselves in the interests of "idealism" the real difficulties of the position in the special matter of revising treaties, that is no reason for any of us to decry the League, which the wisdom of the world may yet transform into a powerful instrument of peace, and which in Articles XI.-XVII.[159] has already accomplished a great and beneficent achievement. I agree, therefore, that our first efforts for the Revision of the Treaty must be made through the League rather than in any other way, in the hope that the force of general opinion and, if necessary, the use of financial pressure and financial inducements, may be enough to prevent a recalcitrant minority from exercising their right of veto. We must trust the new Governments, whose existence I premise in the principal Allied countries, to show a profounder wisdom and a greater magnanimity than their predecessors.
But while it would be wrong and naive to hide from ourselves, for the sake of "idealism," the real challenges involved in revising treaties, that doesn’t mean any of us should criticize the League. The world's wisdom might still turn it into a strong tool for peace, and it has already achieved something significant and beneficial in Articles XI.-XVII.[159]. I agree, then, that our initial efforts for Treaty Revision should happen through the League instead of any other means, hoping that public opinion's power and, if necessary, financial pressure and incentives will be enough to stop a stubborn minority from using their veto. We need to trust the new governments, which I assume exist in the main Allied countries, to show greater wisdom and generosity than their predecessors.
We have seen in Chapters IV. and V. that there are numerous particulars in which the Treaty is objectionable. I do not intend to enter here into details, or to attempt a revision of the Treaty clause by clause. I limit myself to three great changes which are necessary for the economic life of Europe, relating to Reparation, to Coal and Iron, and to Tariffs.
We have seen in Chapters IV. and V. that there are many aspects of the Treaty that are problematic. I won't go into details or try to revise the Treaty point by point. I will focus on three major changes that are essential for the economic health of Europe, concerning Reparation, Coal and Iron, and Tariffs.
Reparation.—If the sum demanded for Reparation is less than what the Allies are entitled to on a strict interpretation of their engagements, it is unnecessary to particularize the items it represents or to hear arguments about its compilation. I suggest, therefore, the following settlement:—
Reparation.—If the amount requested for Reparation is less than what the Allies should receive based on a strict interpretation of their agreements, there's no need to specify the items it covers or to discuss how it was calculated. Therefore, I propose the following resolution:—
(1) The amount of the payment to be made by Germany in respect of Reparation and the costs of the Armies of Occupation might be fixed at $10,000,000,000.
(1) The payment amount that Germany has to make for reparations and the expenses of the occupying armies could be set at $10,000,000,000.
(2) The surrender of merchant ships and submarine cables under the Treaty, of war material under the Armistice, of State property in ceded territory, of claims against such territory in respect of public debt, and of Germany's claims against her former Allies, should be reckoned as worth the lump sum of $2,500,000,000, without any attempt being made to evaluate them item by item.
(2) The handover of merchant ships and submarine cables under the Treaty, the war materials under the Armistice, state property in transferred territory, claims against that territory regarding public debt, and Germany's claims against its former Allies should be considered valued at a total of $2,500,000,000, without trying to assess them individually.
(3) The balance of $7,500,000,000 should not carry interest pending its repayment, and should be paid by Germany in thirty annual instalments of $250,000,000, beginning in 1923.
(3) The balance of $7,500,000,000 shouldn't accrue interest until it's paid off, and Germany should pay it back in thirty annual installments of $250,000,000, starting in 1923.
(4) The Reparation Commission should be dissolved, or, if any duties remain for it to perform, it should become an appanage of the League of Nations and should include representatives of Germany and of the neutral States.
(4) The Reparation Commission should be disbanded, or if there are still responsibilities for it to handle, it should become a part of the League of Nations and should include representatives from Germany and the neutral countries.
(5) Germany would be left to meet the annual instalments in such manner as she might see fit, any complaint against her for non-fulfilment of her obligations being lodged with the League of Nations. That is to say, there would be no further expropriation of German private property abroad, except so far as is required to meet private German obligations out of the proceeds of such property already liquidated or in the hands of Public Trustees and Enemy Property Custodians in the Allied countries and in the United States; and, in particular, Article 260 (which provides for the expropriation of German interests in public utility enterprises) would be abrogated.
(5) Germany would handle the annual payments in whatever way she chose, with any complaints about not fulfilling her obligations submitted to the League of Nations. In other words, there would be no further seizure of German private property abroad, except as needed to cover private German debts from the proceeds of property that has already been sold or is currently managed by Public Trustees and Enemy Property Custodians in the Allied countries and the United States; specifically, Article 260 (which allows for the seizure of German interests in public utility companies) would be eliminated.
(6) No attempt should be made to extract Reparation payments from Austria.
(6) No attempt should be made to collect Reparation payments from Austria.
Coal and Iron.—(1) The Allies' options on coal under Annex V. should be abandoned, but Germany's obligation to make good France's loss of coal through the destruction of her mines should remain. That is to say, Germany should undertake "to deliver to France annually for a period not exceeding ten years an amount of coal equal to the difference between the annual production before the war of the coal mines of the Nord and Pas de Calais, destroyed as a result of the war, and the production of the mines of the same area during the years in question; such delivery not to exceed twenty million tons in any one year of the first five years, and eight million tons in any one year of the succeeding five years." This obligation should lapse, nevertheless, in the event of the coal districts of Upper Silesia being taken from Germany in the final settlement consequent on the plebiscite.
Coal and Iron.—(1) The Allies' options on coal under Annex V should be dropped, but Germany's responsibility to compensate France for its coal losses due to the destruction of its mines should stay in place. In other words, Germany should agree to "deliver to France each year for a period not exceeding ten years an amount of coal equal to the difference between the annual production before the war of the coal mines in Nord and Pas de Calais, which were destroyed as a result of the war, and the production of the mines in that area during the years in question; such delivery not to exceed twenty million tons in any one year of the first five years, and eight million tons in any one year of the following five years." However, this obligation should end if the coal regions of Upper Silesia are taken from Germany in the final settlement after the plebiscite.
(2) The arrangement as to the Saar should hold good, except that, on the one hand, Germany should receive no credit for the mines, and, on the other, should receive back both the mines and the territory without payment and unconditionally after ten years. But this should be conditional on France's entering into an agreement for the same period to supply Germany from Lorraine with at least 50 per cent of the iron-ore which was carried from Lorraine into Germany proper before the war, in return for an undertaking from Germany to supply Lorraine with an amount of coal equal to the whole amount formerly sent to Lorraine from Germany proper, after allowing for the output of the Saar.
(2) The plan regarding the Saar should remain in effect, except that, on one side, Germany shouldn’t get any credit for the mines, and on the other side, they should get both the mines and the territory back without payment and unconditionally after ten years. However, this should depend on France agreeing to supply Germany from Lorraine with at least 50 percent of the iron ore that was transported from Lorraine to Germany before the war for the same period. In return, Germany would promise to supply Lorraine with an amount of coal equal to what was previously sent to Lorraine from Germany, after accounting for the output from the Saar.
(3) The arrangement as to Upper Silesia should hold good. That is to say, a plebiscite should be held, and in coming to a final decision "regard will be paid (by the principal Allied and Associated Powers) to the wishes of the inhabitants as shown by the vote, and to the geographical and economic conditions of the locality." But the Allies should declare that in their judgment "economic conditions" require the inclusion of the coal districts in Germany unless the wishes of the inhabitants are decidedly to the contrary.
(3) The plan for Upper Silesia should still apply. In other words, a vote should take place, and when making a final decision, "the main Allied and Associated Powers will consider the preferences of the residents as indicated by the vote, along with the geographical and economic factors of the area." However, the Allies should state that in their view, "economic factors" necessitate that the coal regions remain part of Germany unless the residents clearly express a different opinion.
(4) The Coal Commission already established by the Allies should become an appanage of the League of Nations, and should be enlarged to include representatives of Germany and the other States of Central and Eastern Europe, of the Northern Neutrals, and of Switzerland. Its authority should be advisory only, but should extend over the distribution of the coal supplies of Germany, Poland, and the constituent parts of the former Austro-Hungarian Empire, and of the exportable surplus of the United Kingdom. All the States represented on the Commission should undertake to furnish it with the fullest information, and to be guided by its advice so far as their sovereignty and their vital interests permit.
(4) The Coal Commission already set up by the Allies should become a part of the League of Nations and should be expanded to include representatives from Germany and other countries in Central and Eastern Europe, the Northern Neutrals, and Switzerland. Its authority should be purely advisory, but it should oversee the distribution of coal supplies from Germany, Poland, and the regions that were part of the former Austro-Hungarian Empire, as well as the exportable surplus from the United Kingdom. All the countries represented on the Commission should commit to providing it with the most comprehensive information possible and to follow its advice as much as their sovereignty and essential interests allow.
Tariffs.—A Free Trade Union should be established under the auspices of the League of Nations of countries undertaking to impose no protectionist tariffs[160] whatever against the produce of other members of the Union, Germany, Poland, the new States which formerly composed the Austro-Hungarian and Turkish Empires, and the Mandated States should be compelled to adhere to this Union for ten years, after which time adherence would be voluntary. The adherence of other States would be voluntary from the outset. But it is to be hoped that the United Kingdom, at any rate, would become an original member.
Tariffs.—A Free Trade Union should be created under the guidance of the League of Nations, with countries agreeing not to impose any protectionist tariffs[160] on the products of other Union members. Germany, Poland, and the new states that once made up the Austro-Hungarian and Turkish Empires, along with the Mandated States, should be required to join this Union for ten years, after which participation would be voluntary. Other states would have the option to join from the start. However, it is hoped that the United Kingdom would, at least, be among the founding members.
By fixing the Reparation payments well within Germany's capacity to pay, we make possible the renewal of hope and enterprise within her territory, we avoid the perpetual friction and opportunity of improper pressure arising out of Treaty clauses which are impossible of fulfilment, and we render unnecessary the intolerable powers of the Reparation Commission.
By setting the Reparation payments at a level that Germany can realistically handle, we allow for a renewed sense of hope and initiative within the country. This approach helps us avoid ongoing tensions and the chance for unfair pressure stemming from Treaty clauses that can't be fulfilled, and it makes the extreme powers of the Reparation Commission unnecessary.
By a moderation of the clauses relating directly or indirectly to coal, and by the exchange of iron-ore, we permit the continuance of Germany's industrial life, and put limits on the loss of productivity which would be brought about otherwise by the interference of political frontiers with the natural localization of the iron and steel industry.
By softening the rules about coal, both directly and indirectly, and by swapping iron ore, we allow Germany's industrial sector to keep going and reduce the drop in productivity that would otherwise occur because political borders disrupt the natural locations of the iron and steel industry.
By the proposed Free Trade Union some part of the loss of organization and economic efficiency may be retrieved, which must otherwise result from the innumerable new political frontiers now created between greedy, jealous, immature, and economically incomplete nationalist States. Economic frontiers were tolerable so long as an immense territory was included in a few great Empires; but they will not be tolerable when the Empires of Germany, Austria-Hungary, Russia, and Turkey have been partitioned between some twenty independent authorities. A Free Trade Union, comprising the whole of Central, Eastern, and South-Eastern Europe, Siberia, Turkey, and (I should hope) the United Kingdom, Egypt, and India, might do as much for the peace and prosperity of the world as the League of Nations itself. Belgium, Holland, Scandinavia, and Switzerland might be expected to adhere to it shortly. And it would be greatly to be desired by their friends that France and Italy also should see their way to adhesion.
By the proposed Free Trade Union, some of the loss of organization and economic efficiency could be regained, which would otherwise happen due to the countless new political borders created between greedy, jealous, immature, and economically underdeveloped nationalist states. Economic borders were manageable as long as a vast territory was included in a few large empires; however, they will become unacceptable when the empires of Germany, Austria-Hungary, Russia, and Turkey have been divided among around twenty independent authorities. A Free Trade Union that includes all of Central, Eastern, and Southeastern Europe, Siberia, Turkey, and ideally the United Kingdom, Egypt, and India, could contribute significantly to global peace and prosperity, similar to the League of Nations. Belgium, the Netherlands, Scandinavia, and Switzerland are likely to join soon. It would also be highly desirable for their allies that France and Italy find a way to join as well.
It would be objected, I suppose, by some critics that such an arrangement might go some way in effect towards realizing the former German dream of Mittel-Europa. If other countries were so foolish as to remain outside the Union and to leave to Germany all its advantages, there might be some truth in this. But an economic system, to which every one had the opportunity of belonging and which gave special privilege to none, is surely absolutely free from the objections of a privileged and avowedly imperialistic scheme of exclusion and discrimination. Our attitude to these criticisms must be determined by our whole moral and emotional reaction to the future of international relations and the Peace of the World. If we take the view that for at least a generation to come Germany cannot be trusted with even a modicum of prosperity, that while all our recent Allies are angels of light, all our recent enemies, Germans, Austrians, Hungarians, and the rest, are children of the devil, that year by year Germany must be kept impoverished and her children starved and crippled, and that she must be ringed round by enemies; then we shall reject all the proposals of this chapter, and particularly those which may assist Germany to regain a part of her former material prosperity and find a means of livelihood for the industrial population of her towns. But if this view of nations and of their relation to one another is adopted by the democracies of Western Europe, and is financed by the United States, heaven help us all. If we aim deliberately at the impoverishment of Central Europe, vengeance, I dare predict, will not limp. Nothing can then delay for very long that final civil war between the forces of Reaction and the despairing convulsions of Revolution, before which the horrors of the late German war will fade into nothing, and which will destroy, whoever is victor, the civilization and the progress of our generation. Even though the result disappoint us, must we not base our actions on better expectations, and believe that the prosperity and happiness of one country promotes that of others, that the solidarity of man is not a fiction, and that nations can still afford to treat other nations as fellow-creatures?
Some critics might argue that such an arrangement could help fulfill Germany's old dream of Mittel-Europa. If other countries were foolish enough to stay outside the Union and let Germany keep all the benefits, there might be some validity to this. However, an economic system that everyone can join and that doesn't give special privileges to anyone is definitely free from the issues associated with a privileged and openly imperialistic system of exclusion and discrimination. Our response to these criticisms should be shaped by our overall moral and emotional views on the future of international relations and world peace. If we believe that for at least the next generation Germany can't be trusted with even a little prosperity, that while all our recent allies are saints, all our recent enemies—Germans, Austrians, Hungarians, and others—are evil, that Germany must be kept poor and her people starving and suffering, and that she must be surrounded by enemies, then we will reject all the proposals in this chapter, especially those that could help Germany regain some of her former economic strength and provide jobs for the industrial workers in her cities. But if this perspective on nations and their relationships is adopted by the democratic nations of Western Europe and backed by the United States, we will all be in trouble. If we intentionally aim for the impoverishment of Central Europe, I predict that vengeance will swiftly follow. Nothing will stop the inevitable civil conflict between the forces of Reaction and the desperate upheavals of Revolution, which will render the horrors of the recent German war insignificant and obliterate, regardless of who wins, the civilization and progress of our time. Even if the outcome disappoints us, shouldn't we act on more hopeful expectations and believe that the prosperity and happiness of one nation enhance that of others, that human solidarity is real, and that nations can still treat one another as fellow beings?
Such changes as I have proposed above might do something appreciable to enable the industrial populations of Europe to continue to earn a livelihood. But they would not be enough by themselves. In particular, France would be a loser on paper (on paper only, for she will never secure the actual fulfilment of her present claims), and an escape from her embarrassments must be shown her in some other direction. I proceed, therefore, to proposals, first, for the adjustment of the claims of America and the Allies amongst themselves; and second, for the provision of sufficient credit to enable Europe to re-create her stock of circulating capital.
The changes I mentioned above could help the industrial populations of Europe continue to make a living. However, they wouldn't be enough on their own. Specifically, France would appear to lose out (only on paper, since she won't actually get what she's currently claiming), and she needs a way to escape her troubles through another avenue. Therefore, I will outline proposals, first, for adjusting the claims between America and the Allies; and second, for providing sufficient credit to allow Europe to rebuild its circulating capital.
2. The Settlement of Inter-Ally Indebtedness
In proposing a modification of the Reparation terms, I have considered them so far only in relation to Germany. But fairness requires that so great a reduction in the amount should be accompanied by a readjustment of its apportionment between the Allies themselves. The professions which our statesmen made on every platform during the war, as well as other considerations, surely require that the areas damaged by the enemy's invasion should receive a priority of compensation. While this was one of the ultimate objects for which we said we were fighting, we never included the recovery of separation allowances amongst our war aims. I suggest, therefore, that we should by our acts prove ourselves sincere and trustworthy, and that accordingly Great Britain should waive altogether her claims for cash payment in favor of Belgium, Serbia, and France. The whole of the payments made by Germany would then be subject to the prior charge of repairing the material injury done to those countries and provinces which suffered actual invasion by the enemy; and I believe that the sum of $7,500,000,000 thus available would be adequate to cover entirely the actual costs of restoration. Further, it is only by a complete subordination of her own claims for cash compensation that Great Britain can ask with clean hands for a revision of the Treaty and clear her honor from the breach of faith for which she bears the main responsibility, as a result of the policy to which the General Election of 1918 pledged her representatives.
In suggesting a change to the Reparation terms, I have considered them so far only in relation to Germany. However, fairness demands that such a significant reduction in the amount should come with a reassessment of how it's divided among the Allies. The statements our leaders made on every platform during the war, along with other factors, definitely necessitate that the areas damaged by the enemy’s invasion should be prioritized for compensation. While this was one of the main reasons we stated we were fighting, we never included recovering separation allowances in our war goals. Therefore, I propose that we demonstrate our sincerity and trustworthiness through our actions, and thus Great Britain should completely drop her claims for cash payments in favor of Belgium, Serbia, and France. All payments made by Germany would then be dedicated first to repairing the material damages inflicted on those countries and regions that experienced actual invasion by the enemy; I believe that the total of $7,500,000,000 available would be enough to fully cover the actual costs of restoration. Furthermore, only by completely prioritizing her own claims for cash compensation can Great Britain fairly ask for a revision of the Treaty and restore her honor from the breach of faith for which she holds the primary responsibility, due to the policy her representatives committed to in the General Election of 1918.
With the Reparation problem thus cleared up it would be possible to bring forward with a better grace and more hope of success two other financial proposals, each of which involves an appeal to the generosity of the United States.
With the Reparation issue resolved, it would be possible to present two other financial proposals with more confidence and a greater chance of success, both of which rely on the goodwill of the United States.
The first is for the entire cancellation of Inter-Ally indebtedness (that is to say, indebtedness between the Governments of the Allied and Associated countries) incurred for the purposes of the war. This proposal, which has been put forward already in certain quarters, is one which I believe to be absolutely essential to the future prosperity of the world. It would be an act of far-seeing statesmanship for the United Kingdom and the United States, the two Powers chiefly concerned, to adopt it. The sums of money which are involved are shown approximately in the following table:—[161]
The first is to completely cancel the debt between the Allied and Associated countries' governments that was incurred during the war. This idea has been suggested in some circles, and I believe it is crucial for the future prosperity of the world. It would demonstrate forward-thinking leadership from the United Kingdom and the United States, the two main powers involved, to embrace it. The amounts of money at stake are roughly outlined in the following table:—[161]
Loans to | By United Airlines States |
By United Airlines Kingdom |
By France | Total | |||||||
Million Dollars |
Million Dollars |
Million Dollars |
Million Dollars |
||||||||
United Kingdom |
4,210 | .... | I'm sorry, but there is no text provided for me to modernize. Please provide the phrases you want to be updated. | 4,210 | |||||||
France | 2,750 | 2,540 | I'm sorry, but you've provided no text to modernize. Please provide a phrase for me to work on. | 5,290 | |||||||
Italy | 1,625 | 2,335 | 175 | 4,135 | |||||||
Russia | 190 | 2,840 | [162] | 800 | 3,830 | ||||||
Belgium | 400 | 490 | [163] | 450 | 1,340 | ||||||
Serbia and Yugoslavia |
100 | 100 | [163] | 100 | 300 | ||||||
Other Allies | 175 | 395 | 250 | 820 | |||||||
Total | 9,450 | [164] | 8,700 | 1,775 | 19,925 | ||||||
Thus the total volume of Inter-Ally indebtedness, assuming that loans from one Ally are not set off against loans to another, is nearly $20,000,000,000. The United States is a lender only. The United Kingdom has lent about twice as much as she has borrowed. France has borrowed about three times as much as she has lent. The other Allies have been borrowers only.
Thus the total amount of inter-Allied debt, assuming that loans from one Ally are not offset by loans to another, is nearly $20 billion. The United States is just a lender. The United Kingdom has lent about twice what it has borrowed. France has borrowed about three times what it has lent. The other Allies have only been borrowers.
If all the above Inter-Ally indebtedness were mutually forgiven, the net result on paper (i.e. assuming all the loans to be good) would be a surrender by the United States of about $10,000,000,000 and by the United Kingdom of about $4,500,000,000. France would gain about $3,500,000,000 and Italy about $4,000,000,000. But these figures overstate the loss to the United Kingdom and understate the gain to France; for a large part of the loans made by both these countries has been to Russia and cannot, by any stretch of imagination, be considered good. If the loans which the United Kingdom has made to her Allies are reckoned to be worth 50 per cent of their full value (an arbitrary but convenient assumption which the Chancellor of the Exchequer has adopted on more than one occasion as being as good as any other for the purposes of an approximate national balance sheet), the operation would involve her neither in loss nor in gain. But in whatever way the net result is calculated on paper, the relief in anxiety which such a liquidation of the position would carry with it would be very great. It is from the United States, therefore, that the proposal asks generosity.
If all the debt among the Allies were mutually canceled, the end result on paper (i.e., assuming all the loans are solid) would be that the United States would forfeit about $10 billion, and the United Kingdom would give up around $4.5 billion. France would gain about $3.5 billion, and Italy about $4 billion. However, these numbers exaggerate the loss for the United Kingdom and downplay the gain for France, since a significant portion of the loans from both countries has been to Russia and can't realistically be considered sound. If the loans the United Kingdom has given to its Allies are valued at 50 percent of their full worth (an arbitrary but practical assumption the Chancellor of the Exchequer has used multiple times as a reasonable basis for an approximate national balance sheet), the outcome would be neutral for them. Regardless of how the overall result is calculated on paper, the relief from anxiety that such a resolution would bring would be substantial. Therefore, the proposal is asking for generosity from the United States.
Speaking with a very intimate knowledge of the relations throughout the war between the British, the American, and the other Allied Treasuries, I believe this to be an act of generosity for which Europe can fairly ask, provided Europe is making an honorable attempt in other directions, not to continue war, economic or otherwise, but to achieve the economic reconstitution of the whole Continent, The financial sacrifices of the United States have been, in proportion to her wealth, immensely less than those of the European States. This could hardly have been otherwise. It was a European quarrel, in which the United States Government could not have justified itself before its citizens in expending the whole national strength, as did the Europeans. After the United States came into the war her financial assistance was lavish and unstinted, and without this assistance the Allies could never have won the war,[165] quite apart from the decisive influence of the arrival of the American troops. Europe, too, should never forget the extraordinary assistance afforded her during the first six months of 1919 through the agency of Mr. Hoover and the American Commission of Relief. Never was a nobler work of disinterested goodwill carried through with more tenacity and sincerity and skill, and with less thanks either asked or given. The ungrateful Governments of Europe owe much more to the statesmanship and insight of Mr. Hoover and his band of American workers than they have yet appreciated or will ever acknowledge. The American Relief Commission, and they only, saw the European position during those months in its true perspective and felt towards it as men should. It was their efforts, their energy, and the American resources placed by the President at their disposal, often acting in the teeth of European obstruction, which not only saved an immense amount of human suffering, but averted a widespread breakdown of the European system.[166]
Speaking with a deep understanding of the relationships during the war between the British, the Americans, and the other Allied Treasuries, I see this as a generous act that Europe can reasonably request, as long as Europe is making a sincere effort in other areas—not to continue warfare, be it economic or otherwise, but to achieve the economic recovery of the entire continent. The financial sacrifices of the United States have been, relative to its wealth, much smaller than those of the European nations. This was to be expected. It was a European conflict, and the U.S. government could not justify spending all its national resources, as the Europeans did, in front of its citizens. After the U.S. entered the war, its financial support was generous and unreserved, and without this support, the Allies could never have won the war,[165] especially considering the significant impact of American troops' arrival. Europe should also remember the exceptional support it received during the first half of 1919 through Mr. Hoover and the American Commission of Relief. Never was there a nobler act of selfless goodwill carried out with such persistence, sincerity, and skill, with little thanks requested or given. The ungrateful governments of Europe owe far more to the diplomacy and vision of Mr. Hoover and his team of American workers than they have yet recognized or will ever acknowledge. The American Relief Commission was the only group that truly understood the European situation during that time and reacted as people should. Their efforts, energy, and the American resources provided by the President, often in the face of European opposition, not only alleviated tremendous human suffering but also prevented a widespread collapse of the European system.[166]
But in speaking thus as we do of American financial assistance, we tacitly assume, and America, I believe, assumed it too when she gave the money, that it was not in the nature of an investment. If Europe is going to repay the $10,000,000,000 worth of financial assistance which she has had from the United States with compound interest at 5 per cent, the matter takes on quite a different complexion. If America's advances are to be regarded in this light, her relative financial sacrifice has been very slight indeed.
But when we talk about American financial assistance like this, we quietly assume, and I believe America assumed it too when it gave the money, that it wasn't meant as an investment. If Europe is going to pay back the $10 billion in financial aid it received from the United States with compound interest at 5 percent, that changes things significantly. If we see America's contributions this way, her overall financial sacrifice has actually been pretty minimal.
Controversies as to relative sacrifice are very barren and very foolish also; for there is no reason in the world why relative sacrifice should necessarily be equal,—so many other very relevant considerations being quite different in the two cases. The two or three facts following are put forward, therefore, not to suggest that they provide any compelling argument for Americans, but only to show that from his own selfish point of view an Englishman is not seeking to avoid due sacrifice on his country's part in making the present suggestion. (1) The sums which the British Treasury borrowed from the American Treasury, after the latter came into the war, were approximately offset by the sums which England lent to her other Allies during the same period (i.e. excluding sums lent before the United States came into the war); so that almost the whole of England's indebtedness to the United States was incurred, not on her own account, but to enable her to assist the rest of her Allies, who were for various reasons not in a position to draw their assistance from the United States direct.[167] (2) The United Kingdom has disposed of about $5,000,000,000 worth of her foreign securities, and in addition has incurred foreign debt to the amount of about $6,000,000,000. The United States, so far from selling, has bought back upwards of $5,000,000,000, and has incurred practically no foreign debt. (3) The population of the United Kingdom is about one-half that of the United States, the income about one-third, and the accumulated wealth between one-half and one-third. The financial capacity of the United Kingdom may therefore be put at about two-fifths that of the United States. This figure enables us to make the following comparison:—Excluding loans to Allies in each case (as is right on the assumption that these loans are to be repaid), the war expenditure of the United Kingdom has been about three times that of the United Sates, or in proportion to capacity between seven and eight times.
Controversies about relative sacrifice are pointless and silly; there’s no reason why relative sacrifice should be equal, given that many other relevant factors are quite different in each case. The following two or three points are presented not to imply that they offer any strong argument for Americans, but just to illustrate that, from a self-interested perspective, an Englishman isn’t trying to evade proper sacrifice on his country’s part in making this suggestion. (1) The amounts the British Treasury borrowed from the American Treasury after the U.S. entered the war were roughly balanced by the amounts England lent to her other Allies during the same period (i.e., excluding amounts lent before the U.S. joined the war); thus, almost all of England's debt to the United States was incurred, not for her own sake, but to help the rest of her Allies, who for various reasons couldn’t obtain assistance directly from the United States.[167] (2) The United Kingdom has sold about $5,000,000,000 worth of her foreign securities and has taken on foreign debt of around $6,000,000,000. In contrast, the United States has not sold, but has bought back over $5,000,000,000, and has taken on practically no foreign debt. (3) The population of the United Kingdom is about half that of the United States, the income about one-third, and the accumulated wealth between one-half and one-third. Therefore, the financial capacity of the United Kingdom can be estimated at about two-fifths that of the United States. This figure allows us to make the following comparison:—Excluding loans to Allies in each case (which is fair on the assumption that these loans are to be repaid), the war spending of the United Kingdom has been about three times that of the United States, or in terms of capacity between seven and eight times greater.
Having cleared this issue out of the way as briefly as possible, I turn to the broader issues of the future relations between the parties to the late war, by which the present proposal must primarily be judged.
Having addressed this issue as briefly as possible, I now focus on the larger questions regarding the future relations between the parties involved in the recent war, which is how the current proposal should primarily be evaluated.
Failing such a settlement as is now proposed, the war will have ended with a network of heavy tribute payable from one Ally to another. The total amount of this tribute is even likely to exceed the amount obtainable from the enemy; and the war will have ended with the intolerable result of the Allies paying indemnities to one another instead of receiving them from the enemy.
If the proposed agreement doesn't go through, the war will finish with one Ally owing heavy tribute to another. The total amount of this tribute might end up being even more than what could be collected from the enemy; and the war will conclude with the unfair outcome of the Allies paying each other reparations instead of collecting them from the enemy.
For this reason the question of Inter-Allied indebtedness is closely bound up with the intense popular feeling amongst the European Allies on the question of indemnities,—a feeling which is based, not on any reasonable calculation of what Germany can, in fact, pay, but on a well-founded appreciation of the unbearable financial situation in which these countries will find themselves unless she pays. Take Italy as an extreme example. If Italy can reasonably be expected to pay $4,000,000,000, surely Germany can and ought to pay an immeasurably higher figure. Or if it is decided (as it must be) that Austria can pay next to nothing, is it not an intolerable conclusion that Italy should be loaded with a crushing tribute, while Austria escapes? Or, to put it slightly differently, how can Italy be expected to submit to payment of this great sum and see Czecho-Slovakia pay little or nothing? At the other end of the scale there is the United Kingdom. Here the financial position is different, since to ask us to pay $4,000,000,000 is a very different proposition from asking Italy to pay it. But the sentiment is much the same. If we have to be satisfied without full compensation from Germany, how bitter will be the protests against paying it to the United States. We, it will be said, have to be content with a claim against the bankrupt estates of Germany, France, Italy, and Russia, whereas the United States has secured a first mortgage upon us. The case of France is at least as overwhelming. She can barely secure from Germany the full measure of the destruction of her countryside. Yet victorious France must pay her friends and Allies more than four times the indemnity which in the defeat of 1870 she paid Germany. The hand of Bismarck was light compared with that of an Ally or of an Associate. A settlement of Inter-Ally indebtedness is, therefore, an indispensable preliminary to the peoples of the Allied countries facing, with other than a maddened and exasperated heart, the inevitable truth about the prospects of an indemnity from the enemy.
For this reason, the issue of Inter-Allied debt is closely tied to the strong feelings among the European Allies regarding reparations. This sentiment isn’t based on a realistic assessment of what Germany can actually pay but rather on a clear understanding of the unbearable financial situation these countries will face if Germany doesn’t contribute. Take Italy as an extreme example. If Italy is expected to pay $4,000,000,000, then surely Germany can and should pay a significantly larger amount. If it’s determined (as it must be) that Austria can pay almost nothing, is it not unacceptable that Italy should bear a heavy financial burden while Austria is let off the hook? Or, to put it another way, how can Italy be expected to pay such a large sum while Czecho-Slovakia pays little or nothing? On the opposite end, we have the United Kingdom. Here the financial situation is different; asking us to pay $4,000,000,000 is a very different situation than asking Italy to pay it. But the sentiment is largely the same. If we have to settle for less than full compensation from Germany, how bitter will the outcry be against paying anything to the United States? It will be argued that we are left with a claim against the bankrupt assets of Germany, France, Italy, and Russia, while the United States has a first claim on us. France’s situation is at least as compelling. She can hardly expect to get full compensation from Germany for the damage to her countryside. Yet victorious France must pay her allies more than four times the reparations she owed Germany after her defeat in 1870. The demands from Bismarck seem light compared to what an Ally or Associate is asking. Thus, resolving Inter-Allied debt is an essential first step for the people of the Allied countries to face the harsh reality about the likelihood of receiving reparations from the enemy without feeling anger and frustration.
It might be an exaggeration to say that it is impossible for the European Allies to pay the capital and interest due from them on these debts, but to make them do so would certainly be to impose a crushing burden. They may be expected, therefore, to make constant attempts to evade or escape payment, and these attempts will be a constant source of international friction and ill-will for many years to come. A debtor nation does not love its creditor, and it is fruitless to expect feelings of goodwill from France, Italy, and Russia towards this country or towards America, if their future development is stifled for many years to come by the annual tribute which they must pay us. There will be a great incentive to them to seek their friends in other directions, and any future rupture of peaceable relations will always carry with it the enormous advantage of escaping the payment of external debts, if, on the other hand, these great debts are forgiven, a stimulus will be given to the solidarity and true friendliness of the nations lately associated.
It may be a bit of an exaggeration to say that it’s impossible for the European Allies to pay back the principal and interest on these debts, but forcing them to do so would definitely create a heavy burden. Therefore, we can expect them to continually try to avoid or escape making payments, and these efforts will likely lead to constant international tension and resentment for many years ahead. A debtor nation typically does not have a fondness for its creditor, and it’s unrealistic to expect goodwill from France, Italy, and Russia toward this country or America if their future growth is hindered for many years by the annual payments they owe us. They’ll have a strong incentive to look for support elsewhere, and any future breakdown in friendly relations will always come with the huge benefit of avoiding payment on foreign debts. On the other hand, if these significant debts are forgiven, it would strengthen the unity and genuine friendship between the recently allied nations.
The existence of the great war debts is a menace to financial stability everywhere. There is no European country in which repudiation may not soon become an important political issue. In the case of internal debt, however, there are interested parties on both sides, and the question is one of the internal distribution of wealth. With external debts this is not so, and the creditor nations may soon find their interest inconveniently bound up with the maintenance of a particular type of government or economic organization in the debtor countries. Entangling alliances or entangling leagues are nothing to the entanglements of cash owing.
The existence of massive war debts threatens financial stability everywhere. There isn’t a European country where the issue of debt refusal won’t soon become a significant political topic. In the case of internal debt, however, there are interested parties on both sides, and the issue revolves around the internal distribution of wealth. With external debts, it's different; creditor nations may soon find their interests inconveniently tied to the maintenance of a particular kind of government or economic system in the debtor countries. Entangling alliances or leagues are nothing compared to the complications that come with cash owed.
The final consideration influencing the reader's attitude to this proposal must, however, depend on his view as to the future place in the world's progress of the vast paper entanglements which are our legacy from war finance both at home and abroad. The war has ended with every one owing every one else immense sums of money. Germany owes a large sum to the Allies, the Allies owe a large sum to Great Britain, and Great Britain owes a large sum to the United States. The holders of war loan in every country are owed a large sum by the State, and the State in its turn is owed a large sum by these and other taxpayers. The whole position is in the highest degree artificial, misleading, and vexatious. We shall never be able to move again, unless we can free our limbs from these paper shackles. A general bonfire is so great a necessity that unless we can make of it an orderly and good-tempered affair in which no serious injustice is done to any one, it will, when it comes at last, grow into a conflagration that may destroy much else as well. As regards internal debt, I am one of those who believe that a capital levy for the extinction of debt is an absolute prerequisite of sound finance in everyone of the European belligerent countries. But the continuance on a huge scale of indebtedness between Governments has special dangers of its own.
The last thing that affects how a reader feels about this proposal depends on their opinion about the future role of the massive financial entanglements we inherited from war financing, both domestically and internationally. The war has ended with everyone owing each other huge amounts of money. Germany owes a lot to the Allies, the Allies owe a lot to Great Britain, and Great Britain owes a lot to the United States. Every country's war loan holders are owed a significant amount by their government, and the government, in turn, is owed a large sum by these and other taxpayers. The entire situation is extremely artificial, misleading, and frustrating. We won't be able to move forward unless we can shake off these financial chains. A widespread debt forgiveness is so necessary that if we don’t handle it in a fair and friendly manner where no serious injustice happens to anyone, it could ultimately turn into a disaster that might destroy much more than just debt. When it comes to internal debt, I believe that a capital levy to eliminate debt is absolutely essential for sound finance in every European country involved in the war. However, the ongoing large-scale indebtedness between governments comes with its own significant risks.
Before the middle of the nineteenth century no nation owed payments to a foreign nation on any considerable scale, except such tributes as were exacted under the compulsion of actual occupation in force and, at one time, by absentee princes under the sanctions of feudalism. It is true that the need for European capitalism to find an outlet in the New World has led during the past fifty years, though even now on a relatively modest scale, to such countries as Argentine owing an annual sum to such countries as England. But the system is fragile; and it has only survived because its burden on the paying countries has not so far been oppressive, because this burden is represented by real assets and is bound up with the property system generally, and because the sums already lent are not unduly large in relation to those which it is still hoped to borrow. Bankers are used to this system, and believe it to be a necessary part of the permanent order of society. They are disposed to believe, therefore, by analogy with it, that a comparable system between Governments, on a far vaster and definitely oppressive scale, represented by no real assets, and less closely associated with the property system, is natural and reasonable and in conformity with human nature.
Before the mid-nineteenth century, no nation had significant debts to another country, except for tributes that were enforced through military occupation or by absentee rulers under feudalism. It’s true that the need for European capitalism to expand into the New World has led to nations like Argentina owing annual payments to countries like England over the past fifty years, although it's still on a relatively small scale. However, this system is fragile; it has only lasted because the financial burden on the debtor countries has not been too harsh, as this burden is backed by real assets and is tied to the overall property system. Additionally, the amounts already lent are not excessively large compared to the sums that are still hoped to be borrowed. Bankers are accustomed to this system and consider it an essential part of the social order. They tend to believe, by analogy, that a similar system between governments, operating on a much larger and clearly oppressive scale, lacking real assets, and less connected to the property system, is both natural and reasonable, and aligns with human nature.
I doubt this view of the world. Even capitalism at home, which engages many local sympathies, which plays a real part in the daily process of production, and upon the security of which the present organization of society largely depends, is not very safe. But however this may be, will the discontented peoples of Europe be willing for a generation to come so to order their lives that an appreciable part of their daily produce may be available to meet a foreign payment, the reason of which, whether as between Europe and America, or as between Germany and the rest of Europe, does not spring compellingly from their sense of justice or duty?
I question this perspective on the world. Even capitalism at home, which resonates with many locals, plays a significant role in our daily production, and on which the current structure of society heavily relies, isn't very secure. But regardless of this, will the dissatisfied people of Europe be willing to structure their lives for a generation so that a noticeable portion of their daily output goes to cover foreign payments, the justification for which, whether it's between Europe and America or Germany and the rest of Europe, doesn't arise out of a strong sense of justice or obligation?
On the one hand, Europe must depend in the long run on her own daily labor and not on the largesse of America; but, on the other hand, she will not pinch herself in order that the fruit of her daily labor may go elsewhere. In short, I do not believe that any of these tributes will continue to be paid, at the best, for more than a very few years. They do not square with human nature or agree with the spirit of the age.
On one hand, Europe needs to rely on her own daily work in the long term and not on America's generosity; on the other hand, she won't sacrifice her own efforts just so that the benefits can go elsewhere. In short, I don’t think any of these contributions will last, at best, for more than a few years. They don't align with human nature or fit the spirit of our times.
If there is any force in this mode of thought, expediency and generosity agree together, and the policy which will best promote immediate friendship between nations will not conflict with the permanent interests of the benefactor.[168]
If there's any truth to this way of thinking, practicality and kindness go hand in hand, and the strategy that best encourages quick friendships between nations won't clash with the long-term interests of the helper.[168]
3. An International Loan
I pass to a second financial proposal. The requirements of Europe are immediate. The prospect of being relieved of oppressive interest payments to England and America over the whole life of the next two generations (and of receiving from Germany some assistance year by year to the costs of restoration) would free the future from excessive anxiety. But it would not meet the ills of the immediate present,—the excess of Europe's imports over her exports, the adverse exchange, and the disorder of the currency. It will be very difficult for European production to get started again without a temporary measure of external assistance. I am therefore a supporter of an international loan in some shape or form, such as has been advocated in many quarters in France, Germany, and England, and also in the United States. In whatever way the ultimate responsibility for repayment is distributed, the burden of finding the immediate resources must inevitably fall in major part upon the United States.
I’m moving on to a second financial proposal. Europe’s needs are urgent. The chance to be freed from heavy interest payments to England and America for the next couple of generations (and to receive some yearly support from Germany for restoration costs) would help ease future worries. However, it wouldn’t solve the pressing issues we face right now—the gap between Europe’s imports and exports, the negative exchange rates, and the chaos in the currency. It will be really tough for European production to get back on its feet without some temporary external support. That’s why I support an international loan in some form, as many have suggested in France, Germany, England, and the United States. No matter how the ultimate responsibility for repayment is shared, the bulk of finding the immediate resources will most likely fall on the United States.
The chief objections to all the varieties of this species of project are, I suppose, the following. The United States is disinclined to entangle herself further (after recent experiences) in the affairs of Europe, and, anyhow, has for the time being no more capital to spare for export on a large scale. There is no guarantee that Europe will put financial assistance to proper use, or that she will not squander it and be in just as bad case two or three years hence as she is in now;—M. Klotz will use the money to put off the day of taxation a little longer, Italy and Jugo-Slavia will fight one another on the proceeds, Poland will devote it to fulfilling towards all her neighbors the military rôle which France has designed for her, the governing classes of Roumania will divide up the booty amongst themselves. In short, America would have postponed her own capital developments and raised her own cost of living in order that Europe might continue for another year or two the practices, the policy, and the men of the past nine months. And as for assistance to Germany, is it reasonable or at all tolerable that the European Allies, having stripped Germany of her last vestige of working capital, in opposition to the arguments and appeals of the American financial representatives at Paris, should then turn to the United States for funds to rehabilitate the victim in sufficient measure to allow the spoliation to recommence in a year or two?
The main objections to all the different types of this project are, I think, the following. The United States is reluctant to get further involved (after recent experiences) in European issues, and for now, has no extra capital to invest on a large scale. There's no guarantee that Europe will use any financial aid wisely, or that it won't waste it and end up just as bad off in two or three years as it is now;—M. Klotz will use the money to delay taxation a bit longer, Italy and Jugo-Slavia will fight over the funds, Poland will use it to fulfill the military role that France has planned for her, and the ruling class in Roumania will just pocket the profits. In short, America would have put off its own capital growth and increased its own cost of living just so Europe could keep its old habits, policies, and leaders for another year or two. And as for helping Germany, is it fair or even acceptable that the European Allies, having stripped Germany of all its working capital, despite the American financial representatives' arguments and pleas in Paris, should then ask the United States for money to help the victim enough to start the exploitation all over again in a year or two?
There is no answer to these objections as matters are now. If I had influence at the United States Treasury, I would not lend a penny to a single one of the present Governments of Europe. They are not to be trusted with resources which they would devote to the furtherance of policies in repugnance to which, in spite of the President's failure to assert either the might or the ideals of the people of the United States, the Republican and the Democratic parties are probably united. But if, as we must pray they will, the souls of the European peoples turn away this winter from the false idols which have survived the war that created them, and substitute in their hearts for the hatred and the nationalism, which now possess them, thoughts and hopes of the happiness and solidarity of the European family,—then should natural piety and filial love impel the American people to put on one side all the smaller objections of private advantage and to complete the work, that they began in saving Europe from the tyranny of organized force, by saving her from herself. And even if the conversion is not fully accomplished, and some parties only in each of the European countries have espoused a policy of reconciliation, America can still point the way and hold up the hands of the party of peace by having a plan and a condition on which she will give her aid to the work of renewing life.
There’s no answer to these objections as things stand now. If I had any influence at the United States Treasury, I wouldn’t lend a penny to any of the current governments in Europe. They can’t be trusted with resources that they would use to push policies that the Republican and Democratic parties likely both oppose, despite the President’s failure to assert either the power or the ideals of the American people. However, if, as we must hope, the people of Europe turn away this winter from the false idols that emerged after the war and replace the hatred and nationalism that consume them with thoughts and hopes for the happiness and unity of the European family, then natural compassion and love for our fellow beings should motivate the American people to set aside personal interests and continue the work they started by saving Europe from the tyranny of organized force, by saving it from itself. And even if this transformation isn’t fully realized, and only some groups in each European country have embraced a policy of reconciliation, America can still lead the way and support the peace movement by establishing a plan and conditions for providing aid in the renewal process.
The impulse which, we are told, is now strong in the mind of the United States to be quit of the turmoil, the complication, the violence, the expense, and, above all, the unintelligibility of the European problems, is easily understood. No one can feel more intensely than the writer how natural it is to retort to the folly and impracticability of the European statesmen,—Rot, then, in your own malice, and we will go our way—
The strong urge that we hear about in the United States to escape the chaos, complications, violence, costs, and especially the confusion of European issues is completely understandable. No one feels more deeply than I do how natural it is to respond to the foolishness and impracticality of European leaders with, “Fine, then, suffer in your own mess while we move on.”
Remote from Europe; from her blasted hopes; Her fields of carnage, and polluted air. |
But if America recalls for a moment what Europe has meant to her and still means to her, what Europe, the mother of art and of knowledge, in spite of everything, still is and still will be, will she not reject these counsels of indifference and isolation, and interest herself in what may prove decisive issues for the progress and civilization of all mankind?
But if America takes a moment to remember what Europe has meant to her and still means to her, what Europe, the birthplace of art and knowledge, still is and will continue to be, won't she turn away from these advice about indifference and isolation, and care about what could be crucial issues for the progress and development of all humanity?
Assuming then, if only to keep our hopes up, that America will be prepared to contribute to the process of building up the good forces of Europe, and will not, having completed the destruction of an enemy, leave us to our misfortunes,—what form should her aid take?
Assuming for the sake of optimism that America will be ready to help strengthen the positive forces in Europe and won’t abandon us to our misfortunes after defeating an enemy, what kind of support should that aid provide?
I do not propose to enter on details. But the main outlines of all schemes for an international loan are much the same, The countries in a position to lend assistance, the neutrals, the United Kingdom, and, for the greater portion of the sum required, the United States, must provide foreign purchasing credits for all the belligerent countries of continental Europe, allied and ex-enemy alike. The aggregate sum required might not be so large as is sometimes supposed. Much might be done, perhaps, with a fund of $1,000,000,000 in the first instance. This sum, even if a precedent of a different kind had been established by the cancellation of Inter-Ally War Debt, should be lent and should be borrowed with the unequivocal intention of its being repaid in full. With this object in view, the security for the loan should be the best obtainable, and the arrangements for its ultimate repayment as complete as possible. In particular, it should rank, both for payment of interest and discharge of capital, in front of all Reparation claims, all Inter-Ally War Debt, all internal war loans, and all other Government indebtedness of any other kind. Those borrowing countries who will be entitled to Reparation payments should be required to pledge all such receipts to repayment of the new loan. And all the borrowing countries should be required to place their customs duties on a gold basis and to pledge such receipts to its service.
I don’t plan to go into details. But the main outlines of all plans for an international loan are pretty much the same. The countries able to provide help, including neutral nations, the United Kingdom, and for most of the needed amount, the United States, must offer foreign purchasing credits for all the warring countries in continental Europe, both allies and former enemies. The total amount needed might not be as large as is often thought. A fund of $1,000,000,000 could probably do a lot initially. This amount, even if a different kind of precedent was set by canceling Inter-Ally War Debt, should be lent and borrowed with a clear intention of being fully repaid. With this goal in mind, the security for the loan should be the best possible, and the plans for its eventual repayment as thorough as possible. Specifically, payments of interest and repayment of the principal should take priority over all Reparation claims, all Inter-Ally War Debt, all internal war loans, and any other government debt. Countries borrowing money that are eligible for Reparation payments should be required to use all those payments to repay the new loan. Additionally, all borrowing countries should be required to set their customs duties in gold and dedicate those receipts to servicing the loan.
Expenditure out of the loan should be subject to general, but not detailed, supervision by the lending countries.
Expenditures from the loan should be under general, but not detailed, supervision by the lending countries.
If, in addition to this loan for the purchase of food and materials, a guarantee fund were established up to an equal amount, namely $1,000,000,000 (of which it would probably prove necessary to find only a part in cash), to which all members of the League of Nations would contribute according to their means, it might be practicable to base upon it a general reorganization of the currency.
If, along with this loan for buying food and supplies, a guarantee fund were set up for the same amount, that is, $1,000,000,000 (of which we would probably only need to find a portion in cash), and all members of the League of Nations contributed according to their means, it might be possible to use it as a foundation for a general reorganization of the currency.
In this manner Europe might be equipped with the minimum amount of liquid resources necessary to revive her hopes, to renew her economic organization, and to enable her great intrinsic wealth to function for the benefit of her workers. It is useless at the present time to elaborate such schemes in further detail. A great change is necessary in public opinion before the proposals of this chapter can enter the region of practical politics, and we must await the progress of events as patiently as we can.
In this way, Europe could be supplied with the bare minimum of financial resources needed to restore hope, revitalize its economic structure, and allow its significant natural wealth to work for the benefit of its workers. There's no point in going into more detail on such plans right now. A major shift in public opinion is required before the proposals in this chapter can become part of practical politics, and we must wait for events to unfold as patiently as possible.
4. The Relations of Central Europe to Russia
I have said very little of Russia in this book. The broad character of the situation there needs no emphasis, and of the details we know almost nothing authentic. But in a discussion as to how the economic situation of Europe can be restored there are one or two aspects of the Russian question which are vitally important.
I haven't said much about Russia in this book. The overall situation there speaks for itself, and we don't have much authentic information regarding the specifics. However, when discussing how to restore Europe's economic situation, there are a couple of key aspects of the Russian question that are crucial.
From the military point of view an ultimate union of forces between Russia and Germany is greatly feared in some quarters. This would be much more likely to take place in the event of reactionary movements being successful in each of the two countries, whereas an effective unity of purpose between Lenin and the present essentially middle-class Government of Germany is unthinkable. On the other hand, the same people who fear such a union are even more afraid of the success of Bolshevism; and yet they have to recognize that the only efficient forces for fighting it are, inside Russia, the reactionaries, and, outside Russia, the established forces of order and authority in Germany. Thus the advocates of intervention in Russia, whether direct or indirect, are at perpetual cross-purposes with themselves. They do not know what they want; or, rather, they want what they cannot help seeing to be incompatibles. This is one of the reasons why their policy is so inconstant and so exceedingly futile.
From a military perspective, a complete alliance between Russia and Germany is greatly feared in some circles. This is much more likely to happen if reactionary movements succeed in both countries, while a genuine unity of purpose between Lenin and the currently middle-class government of Germany seems unimaginable. On the flip side, those who are afraid of such an alliance are even more terrified of the success of Bolshevism; yet they have to acknowledge that the only effective forces fighting it are the reactionaries within Russia, and the established forces of order and authority in Germany from the outside. As a result, those advocating for intervention in Russia, whether direct or indirect, are constantly at odds with themselves. They don’t really know what they want; or rather, they want things that they can’t help but see are contradictory. This is one of the reasons why their policy is so inconsistent and ultimately pointless.
The same conflict of purpose is apparent in the attitude of the Council of the Allies at Paris towards the present Government of Germany. A victory of Spartacism in Germany might well be the prelude to Revolution everywhere: it would renew the forces of Bolshevism in Russia, and precipitate the dreaded union of Germany and Russia; it would certainly put an end to any expectations which have been built on the financial and economic clauses of the Treaty of Peace. Therefore Paris does not love Spartacus. But, on the other hand, a victory of reaction in Germany would be regarded by every one as a threat to the security of Europe, and as endangering the fruits of victory and the basis of the Peace. Besides, a new military power establishing itself in the East, with its spiritual home in Brandenburg, drawing to itself all the military talent and all the military adventurers, all those who regret emperors and hate democracy, in the whole of Eastern and Central and South-Eastern Europe, a power which would be geographically inaccessible to the military forces of the Allies, might well found, at least in the anticipations of the timid, a new Napoleonic domination, rising, as a phoenix, from the ashes of cosmopolitan militarism. So Paris dare not love Brandenburg. The argument points, then, to the sustentation of those moderate forces of order, which, somewhat to the world's surprise, still manage to maintain themselves on the rock of the German character. But the present Government of Germany stands for German unity more perhaps than for anything else; the signature of the Peace was, above all, the price which some Germans thought it worth while to pay for the unity which was all that was left them of 1870. Therefore Paris, with some hopes of disintegration across the Rhine not yet extinguished, can resist no opportunity of insult or indignity, no occasion of lowering the prestige or weakening the influence of a Government, with the continued stability of which all the conservative interests of Europe are nevertheless bound up.
The same conflict of purpose is clear in the attitude of the Allied Council in Paris towards the current government of Germany. A victory for Spartacism in Germany could easily lead to a revolution everywhere; it would revive Bolshevism in Russia and trigger the feared union of Germany and Russia. It would definitely end any hopes tied to the financial and economic clauses of the Peace Treaty. Therefore, Paris does not support Spartacus. However, a victory for reactionary forces in Germany would be seen as a threat to Europe's security and could jeopardize the gains from victory and the foundation of the Peace. Additionally, a new military power taking shape in the East, with its roots in Brandenburg, could attract all military talent and adventurers, especially those who long for emperors and despise democracy, from across Eastern, Central, and Southeastern Europe. A power that would be geographically out of reach for the Allies' military forces could very well give rise, at least in the minds of the fearful, to a new Napoleonic domination, emerging like a phoenix from the remnants of cosmopolitan militarism. Hence, Paris cannot support Brandenburg. The argument suggests support for those moderate forces of order, which, somewhat surprisingly to the world, still manage to hold on because of the German character. But the current German government represents German unity more than anything else; signing the Peace was, above all, the price that some Germans were willing to pay for the unity that was all that remained from 1870. Therefore, Paris, still harboring some hopes of disintegration across the Rhine, takes every chance to insult or demean the German government, seizing every opportunity to diminish its prestige or influence, despite the fact that the continued stability of this government is tied to all the conservative interests in Europe.
The same dilemma affects the future of Poland in the rôle which France has cast for her. She is to be strong, Catholic, militarist, and faithful, the consort, or at least the favorite, of victorious France, prosperous and magnificent between the ashes of Russia and the ruin of Germany. Roumania, if only she could be persuaded to keep up appearances a little more, is a part of the same scatter-brained conception. Yet, unless her great neighbors are prosperous and orderly, Poland is an economic impossibility with no industry but Jew-baiting. And when Poland finds that the seductive policy of France is pure rhodomontade and that there is no money in it whatever, nor glory either, she will fall, as promptly as possible, into the arms of somebody else.
The same dilemma impacts Poland's future based on the role that France has assigned to her. She is meant to be strong, Catholic, militaristic, and loyal, the partner, or at least the favorite, of victorious France, thriving and magnificent amidst the ruins of Russia and Germany. Romania, if only she could be persuaded to maintain appearances a bit better, is part of the same chaotic vision. However, unless her big neighbors are doing well and stable, Poland becomes an economic impossibility with no industry other than targeting Jews. And when Poland realizes that France's enticing policy is just empty talk and doesn't bring any money or glory, she will quickly turn to someone else.
The calculations of "diplomacy" lead us, therefore, nowhere. Crazy dreams and childish intrigue in Russia and Poland and thereabouts are the favorite indulgence at present of those Englishmen and Frenchmen who seek excitement in its least innocent form, and believe, or at least behave as if foreign policy was of the same genre as a cheap melodrama.
The discussions about "diplomacy" are ultimately pointless. Wild dreams and petty scheming in Russia, Poland, and nearby are currently the guilty pleasure of Englishmen and Frenchmen who crave excitement in its most unwholesome form, acting as if foreign policy is just like a low-budget melodrama.
Let us turn, therefore, to something more solid. The German Government has announced (October 30, 1919) its continued adhesion to a policy of non-intervention in the internal affairs of Russia, "not only on principle, but because it believes that this policy is also justified from a practical point of view." Let us assume that at last we also adopt the same standpoint, if not on principle, at least from a practical point of view. What are then the fundamental economic factors in the future relations of Central to Eastern Europe?
Let’s focus on something more concrete. The German Government announced (October 30, 1919) that it continues to support a policy of non-intervention in the internal affairs of Russia, "not just as a principle, but because it believes this policy is also justified from a practical standpoint." Let’s assume that we also adopt the same viewpoint, if not as a principle, at least for practical reasons. What are the key economic factors that will shape the future relationship between Central and Eastern Europe?
Before the war Western and Central Europe drew from Russia a substantial part of their imported cereals. Without Russia the importing countries would have had to go short. Since 1914 the loss of the Russian supplies has been made good, partly by drawing on reserves, partly from the bumper harvests of North America called forth by Mr. Hoover's guaranteed price, but largely by economies of consumption and by privation. After 1920 the need of Russian supplies will be even greater than it was before the war; for the guaranteed price in North America will have been discontinued, the normal increase of population there will, as compared with 1914, have swollen the home demand appreciably, and the soil of Europe will not yet have recovered its former productivity. If trade is not resumed with Russia, wheat in 1920-21 (unless the seasons are specially bountiful) must be scarce and very dear. The blockade of Russia, lately proclaimed by the Allies, is therefore a foolish and short-sighted proceeding; we are blockading not so much Russia as ourselves.
Before the war, Western and Central Europe relied on Russia for a large portion of their imported grains. Without Russia, those countries would have faced shortages. Since 1914, the loss of Russian supplies has been compensated, partly by using reserves, partly through the abundant harvests in North America encouraged by Mr. Hoover's guaranteed price, but mostly by cutting back on consumption and enduring hardships. After 1920, the demand for Russian supplies will be even greater than it was before the war; the guaranteed price in North America will have ended, the usual population growth there will have significantly increased home demand compared to 1914, and Europe's soil won't have regained its previous productivity. If trade with Russia doesn't resume, wheat in 1920-21 (unless the seasons are particularly fruitful) will likely be scarce and very expensive. The blockade of Russia, recently announced by the Allies, is therefore a foolish and shortsighted action; we are blocking not just Russia, but ourselves.
The process of reviving the Russian export trade is bound in any case to be a slow one. The present productivity of the Russian peasant is not believed to be sufficient to yield an exportable surplus on the pre-war scale. The reasons for this are obviously many, but amongst them are included the insufficiency of agricultural implements and accessories and the absence of incentive to production caused by the lack of commodities in the towns which the peasants can purchase in exchange for their produce. Finally, there is the decay of the transport system, which hinders or renders impossible the collection of local surpluses in the big centers of distribution.
Reviving the Russian export trade is definitely going to take time. Right now, the productivity of the Russian peasant isn't enough to produce an exportable surplus like it did before the war. There are many reasons for this, including a lack of agricultural tools and equipment, as well as a lack of motivation for production due to the limited goods available in towns that peasants can buy with their crops. Additionally, the decline of the transport system makes it difficult, if not impossible, to gather local surpluses in major distribution hubs.
I see no possible means of repairing this loss of productivity within any reasonable period of time except through the agency of German enterprise and organization. It is impossible geographically and for many other reasons for Englishmen, Frenchmen, or Americans to undertake it;—we have neither the incentive nor the means for doing the work on a sufficient scale. Germany, on the other hand, has the experience, the incentive, and to a large extent the materials for furnishing the Russian peasant with the goods of which he has been starved for the past five years, for reorganizing the business of transport and collection, and so for bringing into the world's pool, for the common advantage, the supplies from which we are now so disastrously cut off. It is in our interest to hasten the day when German agents and organizers will be in a position to set in train in every Russian village the impulses of ordinary economic motive. This is a process quite independent of the governing authority in Russia; but we may surely predict with some certainty that, whether or not the form of communism represented by Soviet government proves permanently suited to the Russian temperament, the revival of trade, of the comforts of life and of ordinary economic motive are not likely to promote the extreme forms of those doctrines of violence and tyranny which are the children of war and of despair.
I don’t see any way to fix this loss of productivity within a reasonable timeframe except through German innovation and organization. It’s geographically and for many other reasons impossible for the English, French, or Americans to do it; we lack both the incentive and the resources to work on a large enough scale. Germany, on the other hand, has the experience, the motivation, and largely the materials to provide the Russian peasant with the goods he has been deprived of for the last five years, to reorganize transport and collection, and to reintegrate supplies into the global market, which we are currently missing out on. It's in our best interest to speed up the day when German agents and organizers can start economic initiatives in every Russian village. This process is quite independent of the governing authority in Russia. However, we can reasonably predict that, whether or not the form of communism represented by the Soviet government is a good fit for the Russian people, the revival of trade, the comforts of life, and ordinary economic motivation are unlikely to encourage the extreme forms of violence and tyranny that arise from war and despair.
Let us then in our Russian policy not only applaud and imitate the policy of non-intervention which the Government of Germany has announced, but, desisting from a blockade which is injurious to our own permanent interests, as well as illegal, let us encourage and assist Germany to take up again her place in Europe as a creator and organizer of wealth for her Eastern and Southern neighbors.
Let’s not just praise and copy Germany's announced policy of non-intervention in our Russian policy, but also, by stopping a blockade that harms our own long-term interests and is illegal, let’s support and help Germany reclaim her role in Europe as a leader and organizer of wealth for her Eastern and Southern neighbors.
There are many persons in whom such proposals will raise strong prejudices. I ask them to follow out in thought the result of yielding to these prejudices. If we oppose in detail every means by which Germany or Russia can recover their material well-being, because we feel a national, racial, or political hatred for their populations or their Governments, we must be prepared to face the consequences of such feelings. Even if there is no moral solidarity between the nearly-related races of Europe, there is an economic solidarity which we cannot disregard. Even now, the world markets are one. If we do not allow Germany to exchange products with Russia and so feed herself, she must inevitably compete with us for the produce of the New World. The more successful we are in snapping economic relations between Germany and Russia, the more we shall depress the level of our own economic standards and increase the gravity of our own domestic problems. This is to put the issue on its lowest grounds. There are other arguments, which the most obtuse cannot ignore, against a policy of spreading and encouraging further the economic ruin of great countries.
There are many people who will have strong biases against such proposals. I ask them to think through the consequences of giving in to these biases. If we reject every way that Germany or Russia can recover their economic stability, just because we harbor national, racial, or political animosity towards their people or governments, we need to be ready to deal with the repercussions of those feelings. Even if there is no moral connection between the closely related races of Europe, there is an economic connection that we can't overlook. Right now, the global markets are interconnected. If we prevent Germany from trading with Russia and obtaining resources, it will inevitably start competing with us for goods from the New World. The more successful we are in cutting off economic ties between Germany and Russia, the more we will lower our own economic standards and worsen our domestic issues. This is looking at the issue from its most basic level. There are other arguments, which even the most stubborn cannot ignore, against a policy that promotes and worsens the economic collapse of large countries.
I see few signs of sudden or dramatic developments anywhere. Riots and revolutions there may be, but not such, at present, as to have fundamental significance. Against political tyranny and injustice Revolution is a weapon. But what counsels of hope can Revolution offer to sufferers from economic privation, which does not arise out of the injustices of distribution but is general? The only safeguard against Revolution in Central Europe is indeed the fact that, even to the minds of men who are desperate, Revolution offers no prospect of improvement whatever. There may, therefore, be ahead of us a long, silent process of semi-starvation, and of a gradual, steady lowering of the standards of life and comfort. The bankruptcy and decay of Europe, if we allow it to proceed, will affect every one in the long-run, but perhaps not in a way that is striking or immediate.
I see few signs of sudden or dramatic changes anywhere. There might be riots and revolutions, but not any right now that have fundamental significance. Revolution is a weapon against political tyranny and injustice. But what hopes can Revolution offer to those suffering from economic hardship that doesn’t stem from distribution injustices but is more widespread? The only thing keeping Revolution at bay in Central Europe is that, even for those who are desperate, it offers no chance for improvement. So, we might face a long, quiet period of semi-starvation and a gradual decline in living standards and comfort. If we let the bankruptcy and decay of Europe continue, it will ultimately impact everyone, but probably not in a way that is noticeable or immediate.
This has one fortunate side. We may still have time to reconsider our courses and to view the world with new eyes. For the immediate future events are taking charge, and the near destiny of Europe is no longer in the hands of any man. The events of the coming year will not be shaped by the deliberate acts of statesmen, but by the hidden currents, flowing continually beneath the surface of political history, of which no one can predict the outcome. In one way only can we influence these hidden currents,—by setting in motion those forces of instruction and imagination which change opinion. The assertion of truth, the unveiling of illusion, the dissipation of hate, the enlargement and instruction of men's hearts and minds, must be the means.
This has one lucky aspect. We might still have time to rethink our paths and see the world in a new way. In the near future, events are taking over, and the fate of Europe is no longer in anyone's hands. What happens in the coming year won’t be decided by the planned actions of politicians, but by the underlying forces that constantly move beneath the surface of political history, and no one can foresee the outcome. The only way we can influence these hidden forces is by activating those elements of education and creativity that change opinion. We must assert the truth, reveal illusions, eliminate hate, and expand and educate people's hearts and minds.
In this autumn of 1919, in which I write, we are at the dead season of our fortunes. The reaction from the exertions, the fears, and the sufferings of the past five years is at its height. Our power of feeling or caring beyond the immediate questions of our own material well-being is temporarily eclipsed. The greatest events outside our own direct experience and the most dreadful anticipations cannot move us.
In this autumn of 1919, as I write, we are in the bleak phase of our fortunes. The backlash from the efforts, fears, and hardships of the past five years is at its peak. Our ability to feel or care beyond the immediate concerns of our own material well-being is momentarily overshadowed. The biggest events outside our personal experiences and the most terrifying predictions fail to impact us.
In every human heart, fear endures. The ruin it has gorged: the loftiest fear All that they would disdain to think were true: Hypocrisy and custom make their minds The fanes of many a worship, now outworn. They dare not devise good for man's estate, And yet they know not that they do not dare. The good want power but to weep barren tears. The powerful goodness want: worse need for them. The wise want love; and those who love want wisdom; And all best things are thus confused to ill. Many are strong and rich, and would be just, But live among their suffering fellow-men As if none felt: they know not what they do. |
We have been moved already beyond endurance, and need rest. Never in the lifetime of men now living has the universal element in the soul of man burnt so dimly.
We have already been pushed to our limits and need a break. Never in the lives of people alive today has the universal spirit in humanity burned so faintly.
For these reasons the true voice of the new generation has not yet spoken, and silent opinion is not yet formed. To the formation of the general opinion of the future I dedicate this book.
For these reasons, the true voice of the new generation has not yet been heard, and a silent opinion has not yet developed. I dedicate this book to shaping the general opinion of the future.
The End
FOOTNOTES:
[157] The figures for the United Kingdom are as follows:
[157] The statistics for the United Kingdom are as follows:
Monthly Average | Net Imports $1,000 | Exports $1,000 |
Excess of Imports $1,000 |
1913 | 274,650 | 218,850 | 55,800 |
1914 | 250,485 | 179,465 | 71,020 |
Jan.-Mar. 1919 | 547,890 | 245,610 | 302,280 |
April-June 1919 | 557,015 | 312,315 | 244,700 |
July-Sept. 1919 | 679,635 | 344,315 | 335,320 |
But this excess is by no means so serious as it looks; for with the present high freight earnings of the mercantile marine the various "invisible" exports of the United Kingdom are probably even higher than they were before the war, and may average at least $225,000,000 monthly.
But this excess isn't as serious as it seems; with the current high shipping earnings of the commercial fleet, the various "invisible" exports of the United Kingdom are probably even greater than they were before the war, averaging at least $225,000,000 per month.
[158] President Wilson was mistaken in suggesting that the supervision of Reparation payments has been entrusted to the League of Nations. As I pointed out in Chapter V., whereas the League is invoked in regard to most of the continuing economic and territorial provisions of the Treaty, this is not the case as regards Reparation, over the problems and modifications of which the Reparation Commission is supreme without appeal of any kind to the League of Nations.
[158] President Wilson was wrong to say that the League of Nations is in charge of overseeing Reparation payments. As I mentioned in Chapter V., while the League is involved in most of the ongoing economic and territorial terms of the Treaty, that’s not the situation with Reparation. The Reparation Commission holds ultimate authority over the issues and changes surrounding Reparation, with no way to appeal to the League of Nations.
[159] These Articles, which provide safeguards against the outbreak of war between members of the League and also between members and non-members, are the solid achievement of the Covenant. These Articles make substantially less probable a war between organized Great Powers such as that of 1914. This alone should commend the League to all men.
[159] These Articles offer protection against the possibility of war among League members and also between members and non-members. They represent a significant accomplishment of the Covenant. These Articles greatly reduce the likelihood of a war between major powers, like the one in 1914. This fact alone should earn the League the respect of everyone.
[160] It would be expedient so to define a "protectionist tariff" as to permit (a) the total prohibition of certain imports; (b) the imposition of sumptuary or revenue customs duties on commodities not produced at home; (c) the imposition of customs duties which did not exceed by more than five per cent a countervailing excise on similar commodities produced at home; (d) export duties. Further, special exceptions might be permitted by a majority vote of the countries entering the Union. Duties which had existed for five years prior to a country's entering the Union might be allowed to disappear gradually by equal instalments spread over the five years subsequent to joining the Union.
[160] It would be practical to define a "protectionist tariff" in a way that allows for (a) the complete ban of certain imports; (b) the application of excise or revenue tariffs on goods not made domestically; (c) the implementation of tariffs that do not exceed by more than five percent a compensatory excise on similar goods produced locally; (d) export taxes. Additionally, special exceptions could be allowed through a majority vote of the countries joining the Union. Duties that were in place for five years before a country joined the Union might be phased out gradually in equal amounts over the five years following the country's accession to the Union.
[161] The figures in this table are partly estimated, and are probably not completely accurate in detail; but they show the approximate figures with sufficient accuracy for the purposes of the present argument. The British figures are taken from the White Paper of October 23, 1919 (Cmd. 377). In any actual settlement, adjustments would be required in connection with certain loans of gold and also in other respects, and I am concerned in what follows with the broad principle only. The total excludes loans raised by the United Kingdom on the market in the United States, and loans raised by France on the market in the United Kingdom or the United States, or from the Bank of England.
[161] The numbers in this table are partly estimates and may not be completely accurate in detail; however, they provide approximate figures that are sufficiently accurate for the purposes of this argument. The British figures are sourced from the White Paper dated October 23, 1919 (Cmd. 377). In any actual settlement, adjustments would be necessary regarding certain gold loans and other matters, and what follows will only focus on the broad principle. The total does not include loans that the United Kingdom raised on the market in the United States, or loans raised by France on the market in the United Kingdom or the United States, or from the Bank of England.
[165] The financial history of the six months from the end of the summer of 1916 up to the entry of the United States into the war in April, 1917, remains to be written. Very few persons, outside the half-dozen officials of the British Treasury who lived in daily contact with the immense anxieties and impossible financial requirements of those days, can fully realize what steadfastness and courage were needed, and how entirely hopeless the task would soon have become without the assistance of the United States Treasury. The financial problems from April, 1917, onwards were of an entirely different order from those of the preceding months.
[165] The financial history of the six months from the end of summer 1916 to when the United States entered the war in April 1917 still needs to be recorded. Very few people, aside from the handful of officials at the British Treasury who dealt daily with the immense anxieties and impossible financial demands of that time, can truly appreciate the steadfastness and courage required, and how utterly hopeless the situation would have become without the support of the United States Treasury. The financial challenges from April 1917 onward were completely different from those of the previous months.
[166] Mr. Hoover was the only man who emerged from the ordeal of Paris with an enhanced reputation. This complex personality, with his habitual air of weary Titan (or, as others might put it, of exhausted prize-fighter), his eyes steadily fixed on the true and essential facts of the European situation, imported into the Councils of Paris, when he took part in them, precisely that atmosphere of reality, knowledge, magnanimity, and disinterestedness which, if they had been found in other quarters also, would have given us the Good Peace.
[166] Mr. Hoover was the only person who came out of the Paris ordeal with a better reputation. This complicated individual, with his usual look of a weary giant (or, as some might say, a tired fighter), kept his focus on the true and essential facts of the European situation. When he participated in the Paris Councils, he brought with him an atmosphere of reality, knowledge, generosity, and selflessness that, if it had been present in other areas as well, could have led us to a Peace worth having.
[167] Even after the United States came into the war the bulk of Russian expenditure in the United States, as well as the whole of that Government's other foreign expenditure, had to be paid for by the British Treasury.
[167] Even after the United States joined the war, most of Russia's spending in the United States, along with all of that government's other foreign expenses, had to be covered by the British Treasury.
[168] It is reported that the United States Treasury has agreed to fund (i.e. to add to the principal sum) the interest owing them on their loans to the Allied Governments during the next three years. I presume that the British Treasury is likely to follow suit. If the debts are to be paid ultimately, this piling up of the obligations at compound interest makes the position progressively worse. But the arrangement wisely offered by the United States Treasury provides a due interval for the calm consideration of the whole problem in the light of the after-war position as it will soon disclose itself.
[168] It's reported that the United States Treasury has agreed to fund (i.e. to add to the principal amount) the interest owed on their loans to the Allied Governments over the next three years. I assume the British Treasury will likely follow this approach. If these debts are to be ultimately paid, this accumulation of obligations at compound interest worsens the situation progressively. However, the arrangement wisely proposed by the United States Treasury allows for a sufficient period to thoughtfully consider the entire problem in light of the post-war context as it will soon emerge.
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