Published by the New York Times.

[Pg 209]

From the Balcony of the Palace, Berlin, July 31, 1914.

A fateful hour has fallen for Germany.

Envious peoples everywhere are compelling us to our just defense.

The sword is being forced into our hand. I hope that if my efforts at the last hour do not succeed in bringing our opponents to see eye to eye with us and in maintaining peace we shall with God's help so wield the sword that we shall restore it to its sheath again with honor.

War would demand enormous sacrifices of blood and property from the German people, but we should show our enemies what it means to provoke Germany.

And now I commend you to God. Go to church. Kneel down before God and pray for His help for our gallant Army.

Kaiser Wilhelm's Speech from the Balcony of the Palace, Berlin, Aug. 2.[Pg 210]

I thank you for the love and loyalty shown me. When I enter upon a fight let all party strife cease. We are German brothers and nothing else. All parties have attacked me in times of peace. I forgive them with all my heart. I hope and wish that the good German sword will emerge victorious in the right.

Kaiser Wilhelm II., Opening Special Session of the Reichstag in White Room of the Royal Palace, Berlin, Aug. 4.

Honored Sirs: It is in an hour fraught with fate that I have assembled about me all the representatives of the German people. For almost half a century we have been able to keep to the path of peace. The attempts to attribute a warlike temperament to Germany and to circumscribe its position in the world have often put to severe tests the patience of our people. With unswerving honesty, my Government, even in provoking circumstances, has pursued as its highest aim the development of all moral, spiritual, and economic powers. The world has been witness how tirelessly we strove in the first rank during the pressure and confusion of the last few years to spare the nations of Europe a war between the great powers.

The very grave dangers which had arisen owing to the events in the Balkans appeared to have been overcome, but then the murder of my friend, the Archduke Francis Ferdinand, opened up a great abyss. My high ally, the Emperor and King Francis Joseph, was compelled to take up arms to defend the security of his empire against dangerous intrigues from a neighboring State. In the pursuit of her proper interests the Dual Monarchy has found her path obstructed by the Russian Empire. Not only our duty as an ally calls us to the side of Austria-Hungary, but on us falls also the mighty task of defending the ancient community of culture of the two kingdoms and our own position in the world against the attack of hostile powers. With a heavy heart I have been compelled to mobilize my army against a neighbor with whom it has fought side by side on so many fields of battle. With sincere sorrow I saw a friendship broken of which Germany had given faithful proofs. The Imperial Russian Government, yielding to the pressure of an insatiable nationalism, has taken sides with a State which by encouraging criminal attacks has brought on the evil of this war. That France, also, placed herself on the side of our enemies could not surprise us. Too often have our efforts to arrive at friendlier relations with the French Republic come in collision with old hopes and ancient malice.

Honored Sirs: What human insight and power could do to arm a people against the last extremities has been done with your patriotic help. The hostility which has been smouldering for a long time in the East and in the West has now burst into bright flames. The present situation did not proceed from transient conflicts of interest or diplomatic entanglements, it is the result of an ill will which has for many years been active against the strength and the prosperity of the German Empire. We are not incited by lust for conquest, we are inspired by the unyielding determination to keep for ourselves and all future generations the place which God has given us.

From the proofs which have been given you, you will see how my Government, and especially my Chancellor, strove up to the last moment to avert the worst. We grasp the sword in compulsory self-defense, with clean hands and a clean conscience.

To the peoples and races of the German Empire my call goes forth to defend with all their strength and in brotherly co-operation with our ally that which we have created by peaceful labor. After the example of our fathers, firmly and [Pg 211]faithfully, sincerely and with chivalry, humbly before God and battling joyfully before the enemy, let us place our trust in the eternal Omnipotence, and may He strengthen our defense and bring it to a good end!

To you, honored sirs, the whole German people, assembled about its Princes and its leaders, look this day. Make your decision unanimously and quickly. That is my heartfelt wish.

Gentlemen (addressing the Deputies directly): You have read what I said to my people the other day from the balcony of my castle. I repeat now that I no longer know any parties. I know only Germans. And in order to testify that you are firmly resolved without distinction of party to stand by my side through danger and death, I call upon the leaders of the different parties in this House to come forward and lay their hands in mine as a pledge.

Proclamation by Kaiser Wilhelm II.

After three and forty years of peace I call the men of Germany to arms.

It has become necessary to protect our most sacred possessions, the Fatherland, our very hearths against ruthless destruction.

Enemies on every hand! That is the situation. A mighty struggle, a great sacrifice confronts us.

I trust that the old spirit of battle still lives on in the German people, that powerful spirit of battle which grapples with the foe wherever it meets it, be the cost what it may, which has ever been the terror and fear of our enemies.

Soldiers of Germany, in you I place my trust! In each one of you lives the passionate will to conquer, which nothing can subdue. Each one of you knows, if need be, how to die a hero's death.

Remember our great and glorious past!

Remember that you are Germans!

God help us!

WILHELM.

Berlin, Schloss, Aug. 6, 1914.

An Appeal from the Kaiserin.

On the summons of the Emperor our people are preparing for an unprecedented struggle, which it did not invoke and which it is only carrying on in its defense. Whoever can bear arms will joyfully hasten to the colors to defend the Fatherland with his blood. The struggle will be gigantic and the wounds to be healed innumerable, therefore I call upon you women and girls of Germany, and all to whom it is not given to fight for our beloved home, for help. Let every one now do what lies in her power to lighten the struggle for our husbands, sons, and brothers. I know that in all ranks of our people, without exception, the will exists to fulfill this high ideal, but may the Lord God strengthen us in our holy work of love, which summons us women to devote all our strength to the Fatherland in its decisive struggle.

The organizations primarily concerned who should be supported first have already sent out notices regarding the mustering of volunteers and the collection of gifts of all kinds.

AUGUSTE VICTORIA.

Berlin, Aug. 6.

Proclamation by Kaiser Wilhelm II.

Since the foundation of the empire it has been for forty-three years the object of the efforts of myself and my ancestors to preserve the peace of the world and to advance by peaceful means our vigorous development. But our adversaries were jealous of the successes of our work. There has been latent hostility on the east and on the west and beyond the sea. It was borne by us till now, as we were aware of our responsibility and power. Now, however, these adversaries wish to humiliate us, asking that we should look on with crossed arms and watch our enemies preparing themselves for a coming attack. [pg 212]They will not suffer that we maintain resolute fidelity to our ally who is fighting for its position as a great power and with whose humiliation our power and honor would equally be lost. So the sword must decide.

In the midst of perfect peace the enemy surprises us. Therefore to arms! Any dallying, any temporizing would be which our fathers founded; to be or not to be, is the question for the empire which our fathers founded. To be or not to be German power and German existence. We shall resist to the last breath of man and horse, and shall fight out the struggle even against a world of enemies. Never has Germany been subdued when it was united. Forward with God, who will be with us as He was with our ancestors!

Berlin, Aug. 6. WILHELM.

Speech of Kaiser at a Parade During Swift German Advance Toward Paris.

Comrades: I have gathered you around me here in order to take joy with you in the glorious victory which our comrades have in several days of hot battle won with their swords. Troops out of every nook and cranny of the empire helped one another in invincible bravery and unshakable loyalty to win great results. There stood together under the leadership of the son of the Bavarian King and fought, with equal blades, troops of all ages, active, reservists, and landwehr.

For our victory we are thankful, in the first place, to our God, (unserem alten Gott.) He will not desert us, since we stand for a holy cause. Many of our comrades have already fallen in battle. They died as heroes for the Fatherland. We will think of them with honor here, and shout to the honor of those still in the field. Hurrah! Hurrah! Hurrah!

We still have many a bloody battle before us. Let us hope for further successes like this. We shall not relent, and we shall get to the enemy's hide. We shall not lose our faith and trust in our good old God up there, (unserem guten alten Gott dort oben.) We are determined to win, and we must win.

Telegram from Kaiser Wilhelm II. to Chief of Troops in Upper Alsace, Aug. 15.

Grateful to God, Who was with us. I thank you and your troops for the first victory. Please convey to all the troops which took part in the fight my imperial thanks in the name of the Fatherland.

YOUR CHIEF WAR CAPTAIN.

By the Kaiser's Order to Supreme Council of the Evangelical Church—To Be Included in the Liturgy Throughout the War.

Almighty and merciful God! God of the armies! We beseech Thee in humility for Thy almighty aid for our German Fatherland. Bless the entire German war force, lead us to victory, and give us grace that we may show ourselves to be Christians toward our enemies as well. Let us soon arrive at the peace which will everlastingly safeguard our free and independent Germany.

Kaiser's Farewell Speech to First Regiment of Foot Guards at Potsdam.

I draw the sword that with God's help I have kept all these years in the scabbard. I have drawn the sword, which without victory and without honor I cannot sheath again. All of you will see to it that only in honor is it returned to the scabbard. You are my guarantee that I can dictate peace to my enemies. Up and at the foes, and down with the enemies of Brandenburg!

From Cabinet Order of Kaiser Wilhelm II., Published in Berlin Aug. 23.[Pg 213]

The mobilization and concentration of the army is now complete, the German railways having carried out the enormous transport movements with unparalleled certainty and punctuality. With a heart filled with gratitude my first thoughts turn to those who since 1870-71 have worked quietly upon the development of an organization which has emerged from its first serious test with such glorious success. To all who have co-operated with them I wish to express my imperial thanks for their loyal devotion to duty in making possible in obedience to my call the transportation of armed masses of German troops against my enemies. The present achievement [near Metz] convinces me that the railways of the country will be equal to the heaviest demands that might be made upon them during the course of the gigantic struggle in which we are engaged for the future of the German Nation.

Kaiser's Telegram from Dresden to the King of Saxony, Oct. 2.

I am very glad to be able to send you the best reports of the Nineteenth Army Corps and the Twelfth Reserve Corps. I visited yesterday the Third Army and greeted especially the brave 181st Regiment, to which I expressed my recognition. I found your third son and your brother Max as well as Laffert and Kirchbach in the best of health. The spirit among the men is splendid. With such an army we shall be able to complete victoriously the rest of our difficult task. To this end may the Almighty stand by us.

WILHELM.

Interview With Kaiser Wilhelm II., Oct. 28, 1908, and Its Consequences.

An interview between the German Emperor and "a representative Englishman, who long since passed from public to private life," appeared in The London Telegraph on Oct. 28, 1908, and was the next day authenticated by the German Foreign Office in Berlin with the comment that it was "intended as a message to the English people." This last expression of the Kaiser toward Great Britain—until his declarations on the eve of the present war—deeply stirred the German people in protest and resulted in the Kaiser's pledge to Chancellor von Buelow that henceforth the imperial views would be subject to the bridle of the Ministry and the Council of the Empire. The interview as recorded by the "representative Englishman" was as follows:

Resents a Personal Insult.

Kaiser and the Boer War.

Reverting to his efforts to show his friendship for England, the Kaiser said they had not been confined to words. It was commonly believed that Germany was hostile to England throughout the Boer war. Undoubtedly the newspapers were hostile and public opinion was hostile. "But what," he asked, "of official Germany? What brought to a sudden stop, indeed, to an absolute collapse, the European tour of the Boer delegates, who were striving to obtain European intervention?"

The German Navy.

Touching then upon the English conviction that Germany is increasing her navy for the purpose of attacking Great Britain, the Kaiser reiterated the explanation that Chancellor von Bülow and other Ministers have made familiar, dwelling upon Germany's worldwide commerce, her manifold interests in distant seas, and the necessity for being prepared to protect them. He said:

The interviewer concludes:

The Consequences.

On Nov. 17 following Prince von Bülow met the Kaiser at Kiel, taking with him evidence of the feeling in Germany regarding the Emperor's published interview and setting forth:

The Kaiser's reply was published on the same date in the Reichsanzeiger, in the form of a communication, which read:

Published by The Morning Post of London, Oct. 30, 1914.

The subjoined letter written to the late Lord Tweedmouth by the German Emperor is made public for the first time. It is a literal transcript of the original document in which occur a few slight errors in spelling. The existence of the document was first made known to the public by the military correspondent of The Times, who published a letter on the subject on March 6, 1908, but its contents were not divulged.

The significance of the letter can be understood only in the light of the naval and political situation six years ago. During the preceding year, 1907, The Hague Conference, ostensibly convened in the interests of international peace, had resolved itself into a committee to determine how to diminish the severities of war. There was a section of opinion in this country which was persuaded that the only method of seeking peace was to reduce the navy and army. At the same time the Imperial German Navy was making swift and steady progress, and its menace to British supremacy aroused considerable alarm in this country. Although the British Navy held superiority over the German Navy in ships not of the dreadnought type, the balance in dreadnoughts was virtually even.

Dreadnought Supremacy.

It was stated in Parliament that in the year 1916 Germany, according to her naval law, would have thirty-six dreadnoughts, a number which would involve the building by this country of forty-four such vessels in the same period, toward which the Government was only providing two in the current year. It was also stated that in the year 1911 Germany would possess thirteen dreadnoughts and Great Britain only twelve, which statement was founded upon reasonable assumptions. Could Germany reckon upon the continuance of such a relative position, the advantage to her would be very great.

It was at this critical moment that the German Emperor indited his letter to the First Lord of the Admiralty, which is printed below. When the fact became known there was a good deal of public feeling aroused both in this country and abroad. Lord Tweedmouth stated that the letter was a private letter and purely personal. Prince von Bülow informed the Reichstag that the letter was of both a private and political character, adding some remarks concerning the "purely defensive character of our naval programme which," said the Chancellor, "cannot be emphasized too frequently."

The German Foreign Office officially announced that "in his letter the Emperor merely corrected certain erroneous views prevalent in England regarding the development of the German fleet."

Readers are now in a position to judge for themselves the accuracy of these statements. It should be remembered that the reduced navy estimates of 1908-9 were followed by national alarm and the publication of Admiral Lord Charles Beresford's shipbuilding programme and large increase in estimates of the following year. Here is the letter:

The Kaiser's Letter.

Thirty to Forty Battleships in 1920.

Fears German Retaliation.

Attacks Kaiser's Veracity.

The Morning Post, commenting on the letter of the Kaiser, says:

As Interpreted by Theobald von Bethmann-Hollweg, German Imperial Chancellor.[pg 219]

Speech from Balcony of Chancellor's Official Residence, Berlin, Aug. 1.

At this serious hour in order to give expression to your feelings for your Fatherland you have come to the house of Bismarck, who with Emperor William the Great and Field Marshal von Moltke welded the German Empire for us.

We wished to go on living in peace in the empire which we have developed in forty-four years of peaceful labor.

The whole work of Emperor William has been devoted to the maintenance of peace. To the last hour he has worked for peace in Europe, and he is still working for it. Should all his efforts prove vain and should the sword be forced into our hands we will take the field with a clear conscience in the knowledge that we did not seek war. We shall then wage war for our existence and for the national honor to the last drop of our blood.

In the gravity of this hour I remind you of the words of Prince Frederick Charles to the men of Brandenburg:

"Let your hearts beat for God and your fists on the enemy."

Speech from Balcony of Royal Palace, Berlin, Aug. 2.

All stand as one man for our Kaiser, whatever our opinions or our creeds. I am sure that all the young German men are ready to shed their blood for the fame and greatness of Germany. We can only trust in God, Who hitherto has always given us victory.

Speech Delivered in the Reichstag, Berlin, Afternoon of Aug. 4.

A mighty fate has descended upon Europe. Because we were struggling for the esteem of the German Empire in the world, we have for forty-four years lived in peace and safeguarded the peace of Europe. In peaceful industry we have become strong and mighty and in consequence envied. With patience we have borne that, under the pretext that Germany was desirous of war, hostility toward us was being nursed and chains forged for us both in the East and in the West.

We wished to continue to live in peaceful industry, and, like an unexpressed vow, there was passed on from Kaiser to the youngest soldier: "Only in defense of a righteous cause shall our sword be drawn." (Hearty applause.) The day when we must draw it has appeared, contrary to our desire, contrary to our honest efforts to avoid it. Russia has applied the firebrand to the house. We find ourselves in a forced war with Russia and France.

Gentlemen, a series of documents, composed in the rush of events, is in your hands. Allow me to place before you the facts which characterize our attitude.

From the very beginning of the Austrian conflict we strove and worked toward the end that this trouble remain confined to Austria-Hungary and Servia. All Cabinets, especially that of England, take the same stand; only Russia declares [pg 220] that she must have a word in the decision of this conflict. Therewith the danger of European entanglements arises. As soon as the first authentic reports of the military preparations in Russia reached us we declared in a friendly but emphatic manner in St. Petersburg that war measures and military preparations would force us also to prepare, and that mobilization is closely akin to war.

Russia asserts in what is an apparently friendly manner that she is not mobilizing against us. In the meantime England tries to mediate between Vienna and St. Petersburg, in which she is warmly supported by us. On July 28 the Kaiser telegraphed the Czar, asking him to consider that Austria-Hungary has the right and that it is her duty to defend herself against Servian intrigues, which threaten to undermine her existence. The Kaiser called the attention of the Czar to their common monarchical interests with regard to the Serajevo outrage, and asked him personally to support him in order to establish harmony between Vienna and St. Petersburg.

At about the same hour in which this telegram was sent the Czar asked the Kaiser for his support and requested him to advise Vienna to be moderate in its demands. The Kaiser assumed the role of mediator. Hardly had he begun his activity when Russia mobilized its entire fighting force against Austria-Hungary. Austria-Hungary, however, had mobilized only those army corps which were directed against Servia; in the north there were only two army corps and these far from the Russian border.

The Kaiser immediately called the attention of the Czar to the fact that this mobilization of his forces against Austria-Hungary made his position as mediator difficult or absolutely impossible. In spite of this we continued our mediatorial activities in Vienna, going to the utmost limits of consistency with the terms of our federal treaty. ["Very true! Hear, hear!"] During this time Russia again spontaneously assured us that her military preparations were not directed against us. ["Hear, hear, fie!"]

The 31st of July arrived. In Vienna the decision was to be made. In the meantime we had succeeded with our negotiations to reaching a point where Vienna resumed intercourse with St. Petersburg, which for some time had been discontinued, but before the final [pg 221] decision was reached in Vienna the news arrived that Russia had mobilized its entire fighting force, which meant also against us. ["Hear, hear!"]

Russia's Mobilization.

The Russian Government, which from repeated admonitions knew what mobilizing on our borders meant, did not notify us of this mobilization and gave us absolutely no explanation. ["Hear! hear!"] Not until the afternoon of July 31 did the Kaiser receive a message from the Czar in which he assured him that the attitude of his army was not hostile toward us. ["Hear! hear!" and laughter.]

However, the mobilization against us on the Russian border was on the night of July 31 already in full progress. While we, at the request of Russia, were mediating in Vienna, the Russian Army appeared on our long, almost entirely open border. France, although not yet mobilizing, was making preparations for war. And we, up to this point, had intentionally not then called a single soldier of the reserve, for the sake of European peace. ["Bravo!"]

Should we continue to wait with patience until the powers by which we are surrounded choose the moment for attack? ["No!"] To expose Germany to this danger would have been criminal! [Stormy, concerted, prolonged "Very true and bravo!"—also from the Social Democrats.] Therefore, on July 31 we demanded that Russia demobilize, this being the only measure which could save the peace of Europe. [Hearty approval.] The Imperial Ambassador received, furthermore, the order to declare to the Russian Government that in case they did not comply with our demands they should consider that a state of war exists.

The Imperial Ambassador performed this mission. Up till the present we have not learned Russia's answer to this demand. ["Hear, hear!"] Telegraphic reports concerning it have not yet reached us, although the wire still transmits less important messages. ["Hear, hear!"] Therefore, on Aug. 1, at 5 o'clock, when the appointed period of grace was long past, the Kaiser considered it necessary to mobilize.

At the same time we had to make sure of the position France would take. To our direct question whether in case of a German-Russian war she would remain neutral, France answered that she would do what she had to do in her own interests. [Laughter.] That was an evasive if not a negative answer to our question.

Declares France Began War.

In spite of this the Kaiser gave the order that the French border should be respected. The command was strictly enforced, with a single exception. France, which mobilized simultaneously with us, declared that she would respect a zone of ten kilometers from the border. ["Hear, hear!"] And what happened in reality? There were bomb-throwing flyers, cavalry patrols, invading companies in the Reichsland, Alsace-Lorraine. ["Unheard of!"] Thereby France, although the condition of war had not yet been declared, had attacked our territory.

Concerning the French complaints in regard to violations of the border, I have received from the Chief of the General Staff the following report: Only one offense has been committed. Contrary to an emphatic order a patrol of the Fourteenth Army Corps, led by an officer, crossed the border on Aug. 2. They apparently were killed. Only one man returned. However, long before the crossing of the border French flyers were dropping bombs in Southern Germany, and at Schluchtpass the French troops had attacked our border troops.

Until the present our troops have confined their activity to the protection of our borders. They are now on the defense, and necessity recognizes no law. ["Very true!"]

Our troops have occupied Luxemburg, and perhaps have also found it necessary to enter Belgian territory. [Hearty applause.] This is contrary to international law. The French Government has declared in Brussels they will respect the neutrality of Belgium as long as she respects the opponent. We knew, however, that France was ready to invade [pg 222] Belgium. ["Hear, hear!"] France could wait; we, however, could not, because a French invasion in our lower Rhein flank would have proved fatal.

So we were forced to disregard the protests of the Luxemburg and Belgian Governments. We shall try to make good the injustice we have committed as soon as our military goal has been reached. [Applause.] Who like we are fighting for the highest, must only consider how victory can be gained. [Enthusiastic applause in entire house.]

Gentlemen, we are standing shoulder to shoulder with Austria-Hungary. With reference to England, the declaration which Sir Edward Grey made in the House of Commons yesterday plainly shows our attitude. We have assured England that as long as she remains neutral our fleet will not attack the northern coast of France and that the territorial integrity and independence of Belgium will not be violated. This declaration I repeat before the whole world, and I can add that so long as England remains neutral we are prepared in case of reciprocity to refrain from all hostile operations against French merchant vessels. [Applause.]

Gentlemen, so much for the events. I repeat the words of the Kaiser: "With a clear conscience Germany goes to the battlefield." [Enthusiastic approval.] We are fighting for the fruits of our peaceful industry, for the inheritance of a great past, and for our future.

The fifty years of which Moltke spoke, and in which we should stand armed and ready to protect our inheritance and the acquisitions of 1870, have not yet passed. The hour of trial for the German nation has struck, but we are facing it with confidence. [Stormy approval.]

Our army is in the field, our fleet is ready for battle, and behind it stands the entire German Nation. [Enthusiastic applause from the entire house.] The entire nation! [with a gesture particularly directed toward the Social Democrats. Renewed applause, in which the Social Democrats also joined.] You, gentlemen, realize your duty in its entirety. The question needs no further consideration, and I request speedy action. [Enthusiastic applause.]

Issued to The Associated Press from General Headquarters, Sept. 2.

The statement of the Chancellor concludes as follows:

Speech Delivered in the Reichstag, March 30, 1911.

I have asked to speak in order to make a few brief remarks on the question of disarmament and arbitration. The Social Democratic motion proposes that I should take steps to bring about a general limitation of armaments. As a matter of fact, the idea of disarmament is being constantly discussed by pacifists in Parliaments and in Congresses far and wide. Even the first peace conference at The Hague had to confine itself to expressing the wish that the Governments should devote themselves to the continued study of the question.

Germany has responded to this desire, but has been able to find no suitable formula, and I am not aware that other Governments have been more successful. The time when wars were made by Cabinets is past. The feelings which here in Europe may lead to war lie elsewhere.

They have their roots in antagonisms which must be found in popular sentiment. Everybody knows how easily this [pg 224] sentiment is influenced and how, unfortunately, in many cases, it abandons itself helplessly to irresponsible press agitations. A counterpoise to all such and similar influences can but be desired. I shall be the first to welcome it whenever international efforts succeed in creating such a counterpoise.

But if I am to take practical steps and am to propose mutual disarmament to the other powers, then general pacific assurances and adjurations are not enough. With Germany there is no need for such assurances or adjurations, in view of her constant policy throughout forty years, which shows that we seek no quarrels in the world. I should have to submit a fixed, definite programme. Then I should have to consider in all sobriety whether such a programme could be drawn up and carried out. Any one who makes uncertain and vague proposals can easily become a disturber of the peace rather than a peacemaker.

I shall have to decline to draw up such a formula and submit it to an international congress.

England's Naval Police.

England is convinced, and has repeatedly declared, in spite of her desires for the limitation of expenditure on armaments and for the adjustment of any disputes that may arise by arbitral procedure, that her fleet must in all circumstances be superior, or at any rate equal, to any possible combination in the world. England has a perfect right to strive for such a state of things, and, precisely because of the position that I take up toward the disarmament question, I am the last to cast doubts upon it. It is quite another thing, however, to make such a claim the basis of a convention which must be recognized by all the other powers in peaceful agreement. What if counterclaims are raised and the other powers are not satisfied with the rôles assigned to them?

One only requires to propound these questions in order to see things would not go well for European dignity at any world congress which had to decide upon such claims.

And then armies. If, for example, Germany should be required to reduce her army by 100,000 men, by how many men must the other powers diminish their armies? Notwithstanding all the pacific assurances which, thank God, are being given everywhere, every nation would reply to me at any preliminary inquiry that it claims that position in the world which corresponds with the sum of its national power, that the strength of its defensive forces must be adapted to this claim. At any rate, I would give no other reply for Germany. I should be touching the honor and national sentiment of any other people if I expected any other statement from it.

Question of Control.

Every attempt at international disarmament must break down on the question of control, which is absolutely impracticable. A classic example of that is afforded by Prussia when overthrown by Napoleon. Her army was to be limited to 45,000 men, but her patriotism, notwithstanding the most ruthless application of every means of control, managed to raise an army four times as large. The question of disarmament is insoluble so long as men are men and States are States.

In the course of the debate reference has been made to the recent utterances of the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in the House of Commons on the disarmament question. The English Minister gave expression to the idea that a reciprocal exchange of information concerning the naval construction of both countries would insure them against surprises, and that thereby both countries would be convinced that they were not trying mutually to outstrip each other, while other powers would thereby be kept informed regarding the relations of Germany and England, and so the exchange of announcements would, on the whole, serve to promote peace.

We were all the more able to adhere to this idea as our naval building programme has always lain open. We have already declared our readiness to come to an understanding on this point with [pg 225] England, in the hope that it may bring about a desired appeasement.

World-embracing international arbitration treaties dictated by an international areopagus I consider just as impossible as general international disarmament. Germany takes up no hostile position toward arbitration. In all the new German treaties of commerce there are arbitration clauses. In the main it was due to Germany's initiative that an agreement was arrived at at the second Hague conference for the establishment of an International Prize Court.

Arbitration treaties can certainly contribute in a great measure to maintain and fortify peaceful relations. But strength must depend on readiness for war. The dictum still holds good that the weak becomes the prey of the strong. If a nation can not or will not spend enough on her defensive forces for her to be able to make her way in the world, then she falls back into the second rank.

By Kaiser Franz Josef and Count Berchtold.

The Imperial Rescript and Manifesto.

Ischl, July 28.

Dear Count Stürgkh:

I have resolved to instruct the Ministers of my Household and Foreign Affairs to notify the Royal Servian Government of the beginning of a state of war between the Monarchy and Servia. In this fateful hour I feel the need of turning to my beloved peoples. I command you, therefore, to publish the inclosed manifesto.

To my peoples! It was my fervent wish to consecrate the years which, by the grace of God, still remain to me, to the works of peace and to protect my peoples from the heavy sacrifices and burdens of war. Providence, in its wisdom, has otherwise decreed. The intrigues of a malevolent opponent compel me, in the defense of the honor of my Monarchy, for the protection of its dignity and its position as a power, for the security of its possessions, to grasp the sword after long years of peace.

With a quickly forgetful ingratitude, the Kingdom of Servia, which, from the first beginnings of its independence as a State until quite recently, had been supported and assisted by my ancestors, has for years trodden the path of open hostility to Austria-Hungary. When, after three decades of fruitful work for peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, I extended my Sovereign rights to those lands, my decree called forth in the Kingdom of Servia, whose rights were in nowise injured, outbreaks of unrestrained passion and the bitterest hate. My Government at that time employed the handsome privileges of the stronger, and with extreme consideration and leniency only requested Servia to reduce her army to a peace footing and to promise that, for the future, she would tread the path of peace and friendship. Guided by the same spirit of moderation, my Government, when Servia, two years ago, was embroiled in a struggle with the Turkish Empire, restricted its action to the defense of the most serious and vital interests of the Monarchy. It was to this attitude that Servia primarily owed the attainment of the objects of that war.

The hope that the Servian Kingdom would appreciate the patience and love of peace of my Government and would keep its word has not been fulfilled. The flame of its hatred for myself and my house has blazed always higher; the design to tear from us by force inseparable portions of Austria-Hungary has been made manifest with less and less disguise. A criminal propaganda has extended over the frontier with the object of destroying the foundations of [pg 226] State order in the southeastern part of the monarchy; of making the people, to whom I, in my paternal affection, extended my full confidence, waver in its loyalty to the ruling house and to the Fatherland; of leading astray its growing youth and inciting it to mischievous deeds of madness and high treason. A series of murderous attacks, an organized, carefully prepared, and well carried out conspiracy, whose fruitful success wounded me and my loyal peoples to the heart, forms a visible bloody track of those secret machinations which were operated and directed in Servia.

A halt must be called to these intolerable proceedings and an end must be put to the incessant provocations of Servia. The honor and dignity of my monarchy must be preserved unimpaired, and its political, economic, and military development must be guarded from these continual shocks. In vain did my Government make a last attempt to accomplish this object by peaceful means and to induce Servia, by means of a serious warning, to desist. Servia has rejected the just and moderate demands of my Government and refused to conform to those obligations the fulfillment of which forms the natural and necessary foundation of peace in the life of peoples and States. I must therefore proceed by force of arms to secure those indispensable pledges which alone can insure tranquillity to my States within and lasting peace without.

In this solemn hour I am fully conscious of the whole significance of my resolve and my responsibility before the Almighty. I have examined and weighed everything, and with a serene conscience I set out on the path to which my duty points. I trust in my peoples, who, throughout every storm, have always rallied in unity and loyalty around my throne, and have always been prepared for the severest sacrifices for the honor, the greatness, and the might of the Fatherland. I trust in Austria-Hungary's brave and devoted forces, and I trust in the Almighty to give the victory to my arms.

FRANZ JOSEF.

Published in Special Edition of Official Gazette, Vienna, July 28.

The Royal Government of Servia not having given a satisfactory reply to the note presented to it by the Austro-Hungarian Minister in Belgrade on July 23, 1914, the Imperial and Royal Government of Austria-Hungary finds it necessary itself to safeguard its rights and interests and to have recourse for this purpose to force of arms. Austria-Hungary, therefore, considers itself from this moment in a state of war with Servia.

Congratulatory Telegram to Kaiser Wilhelm II., Aug. 27.

Victory after victory. God is with you. He will be with us also. I most sincerely congratulate you, dear friend, also the young hero, your dear son, the Crown Prince, and the Crown Prince Rupprecht, as well as the incomparably brave German Army. Words fail to express what moves me and, with me, my army, in these days of world's history.

"FRANZ JOSEPH."

Kaiser Franz Josef's Address in Bestowing the Great Cross on the German Kaiser, September, 1914.

The glorious victories, so crushing to the foe, which the German Army has won in battle under your chief command owe their begetting and their success to your iron will, which sharpened and swung the heavy sword.

To the laurel that crowns you as victor I wish to add, if I may, the highest military honor which we possess, in begging you to take in true brotherhood of arms and as a token of my appreciation the Great Cross of my military Order of Marie Theresa. The decoration itself, dear friend, shall be handed to you by a special envoy as soon as it is convenient for you.

[pg 227]By Count Berchtold, Foreign Minister for Austria-Hungary.

(Copyright, Evening News Publishing Company of Newark, N.J., 1914.)

Austria-Hungary looks upon this war as a purely defensive one, which has been forced on her by the agitation directed by Russia against her very existence. Austria-Hungary has given many proofs in late years of her peaceful intention. She refrained from any interference with arms in the Balkan war, though her interests were at stake. Subsequent events have proved what a serious danger the increase in territory and prestige which it brought Servia were for Austria-Hungary. Servia's ambitions have since grown and have been solely directed against the Dual Monarchy. Russia has tacitly approved of Servia's action because Russian statesmen wish to form an iron ring of enemies around Austria-Hungary and Germany in order that Russia's grasp on Constantinople and on Asia should never again be meddled with. Austro-Hungarian soldiers are fighting for their homes and for the maintenance of their country, the Russians are fighting to help the Russian Czar to gain the rule of the world, to destroy all his neighbors who may be dangerous to Russian ambitions. England is helping the Russians to oust her German rival. She feared for some time that German culture and German scientific methods would prove the stronger in a peaceful competition, and she now hopes to crush Germany with the help of Russia and France. And France is fighting to win back Alsace-Lorraine, to take her revenge on Germany, which the French nation has been aiming at for the last forty-four years.

That is how Austria-Hungary looks upon the war. She never wished for territorial increase, she wished for peace and that her people should develop in safety.

Germany equally had nothing to gain by a war, but Germany knows that Austria-Hungary's enemies are her enemies and that the dismemberment of the Hapsburg monarchy would mean the isolation of the German Empire.

And so, after all efforts to keep Russia and England from breaking the peace of Europe had failed, she drew her sword to defend her and her allies' (ally's) interests.

Truth and honor are on the side of the two empires in this war, the unspeakable inventions and prevarications published by the French, Russian, and English press in the last weeks alone must prove to the American people who can afford to tell the truth and nothing but the truth in this war.

The Austro-Hungarian and German people have a clear conscience and need fear no misrepresentation of their action.

By Count Michael Karolyi, Leader of Hungarian Independent Party, New York, July 27.

If Austria had pursued a policy of directly helping the Balkan countries, if Austria had in the past made it a point to be actively their friend, this war would not confront us. Since it has come, of course all Hungarians will support the empire and internal differences will be dismissed while the empire is imperiled.

As for the loyalty of the many Serbs within Austria-Hungary it is hard to say. There again we must hope that they will take the Austrian side. But the Austrian policy toward the Balkan countries has been wrong, all wrong.

Certified by Dr. Bernhard Dernburg, German Ex-Colonial Secretary.[pg 228]

The following is presented as a complete defense of the German position in the present war and is based upon examination of the German and English "White Papers." It was prepared in Germany and forwarded to Dr. Bernhard Dernburg, who had it translated for THE NEW YORK TIMES of Nov. 1, 1914.

Dr. Dernburg gives this statement his full approval and accepts complete responsibility for it.

Two of the five great European powers that are at present engaged in war, Austria-Hungary and Russia, whose differences for years have been constantly increasing in sharpness, and after the tragedy in Serajevo became impossible to be bridged by diplomacy, conjured up the frightful struggle.

With these two, two other powers are so closely united by alliances that their participation in the war also was unavoidable; they are Germany and France.

There are two other great European powers whose relations to the two aforesaid groups before the war were very much alike in the essential points. Just as Italy was politically tied by alliance to the central powers, so England was with the Franco-Russian Alliance. Hence it was uncertain how these countries, each geographically removed from the main body of the Continent, would act in a war, and it seemed quite possible that both would decide to remain neutral.

As a matter of fact, the Italian Government came to the view that such a stand would be for the best interests of its country.

This decision might have made it considerably more easy for England to also maintain her neutrality, which, from political, economical, and ethical reasons, would have been advantageous and natural for the Island Empire. To the surprise and indignation of all those Germans who for years had been working toward an adjustment of the conflicting interests of both countries—among these ought to be mentioned, above all, the Kaiser and the Imperial Chancellor—the Liberal British Ministry immediately declared war on Germany, and did not confine itself to a naval war, but, in keeping with agreements reached years ago between the English and the French General Staffs, as is now admitted, equipped an expeditionary army, thus considerably strengthening the French forces.

The question arises, "What reasons led British politics to this monstrous step?"

Much has been written during the last weeks from the German side, criticising most sharply and with great justification the motive of the London Cabinet. In the following discussion we will confine ourselves to an impartial review of the documents published by the English Government itself in its own defense.

The essential part of this justification is contained in the "Correspondence Concerning the European Crisis," placed before the British Parliament shortly after the start of the war, which is known as the British "White Paper." In amplification are to be considered the "White Book" placed by the German Government before the Reichstag and the "Orange Book" published by Russia.

In a public speech, delivered Sept. 19, the Secretary of the Treasury, Mr. Lloyd George, according to the report of The Westminster Gazette, which may be considered as his organ, characterized the quarrel between Germany and Russia in the picturesque manner which this statesman prefers, as follows:

We will not waste words in considering the flippant form here used in a discussion of an unspeakably bloody and world-historic conflict. But this expression in very pregnant form makes Russia appear in the light in which the London powers-that-be desire to show the empire of the Czar to the British people, viz., in the role of the noble-hearted protector of persecuted innocence, while Germany, supporting and egging on Austria-Hungary, is shown as morally responsible for the war.

Cites English Documents.

This, also, is the chain of thought in the speech of the British Prime Minister in the House of Commons on Aug. 4. Translations of this speech have been spread by the British Government in neutral countries in hundreds of thousands of copies under the title: "The Power Responsible for War Is Germany."

Now, we claim that the British "White Paper" itself furnishes irrefutable proof that not Germany, which up to the last moment offered the hand of mediation, but Russia is responsible for the war, and that the Foreign Office at London was fully cognizant of this fact.

Furthermore, the "White Paper" shows that England's claim that she entered this war solely as a protector of the small nations is a fable.

The documents reproduced in the "White Paper" do not begin until July 20, and only a few introductory dispatches before the 24th are given. The first of the very important reports of the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg, Sir George Buchanan, to the Secretary of State, Grey, is dated on that day; on the same day the note addressed by Austria-Hungary to the Servian Government had been brought to the knowledge of the European Cabinets, and the British Ambassador conferred with the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, M. Sazonof, over this matter. The French Minister also took part in this conference. When the latter and M. Sazonof, in the most insistent way, tried to prove to Buchanan that England, together with Russia and France, must assume a threatening attitude toward Austria-Hungary and Germany, the British Ambassador replied:

The British Ambassador thereupon asked the question whether Russia was thinking of eventually declaring war on Austria. The following was the answer:

The dispatch continues:

This shows plainly that the Russian mobilization must have been planned even before July 24, for otherwise M. Sazonof could not have spoken of the necessity of carrying it through.

It is furthermore very remarkable that the Russian Minister on this early day spoke of the mobilization in general and not of the partial mobilization against Austria-Hungary.

Finally we find that the British Government was fully informed at the very latest on July 24—it may have had before it previous documents, but they are not contained in the "White Paper"—concerning Russian mobilization and thereby the development of Russian and French politics that had to be anticipated.

Russian Aggression.

Had there been any doubts concerning these matters on the part of the British Government, the continual urging of Russian and French diplomatists must have [pg 230]made things plain. Russia's aggressive policy, and not the Austrian declaration of war on Servia, which did not come until five days later, led to the European war. Servia meant so little to England, although England traditionally poses as a protector of small nations, that the British Ambassador in St. Petersburg was able to describe England's interest in the kingdom on the Save as "nil." Only later, after the beginning of the war, England warmed up to Servia, and in the aforementioned speech Mr. Lloyd George found the most hearty tones in speaking of the heroic fight of this "little nation," although he was obliged to admit simultaneously that its' history is not untainted.

On the day following that conversation, on July 25, the British Ambassador had another talk with M. Sasonof, during the course of which he felt obliged to express to the Russian Government a serious warning concerning its mobilization.

A more convincing contradiction of the claim that Germany fell upon unexpectant Russia can hardly be imagined. Sazonof's conversation with the British Ambassador shows that Russia had decided from the beginning to bring about the war, unless Austria would subject itself to Russia's dictation.

Now, Russia was not alone concerned about Servia, but from its viewpoint Austria-Hungary must not maintain the preponderant position in the Balkans.

Sure of French help, Russia was determined to work against this. The reports of the British representative do not suggest with a word that Germany was responsible for the war; on the contrary, Sir Buchanan again, on his own account, warned the Russian Government to keep aloof from military measures, in his conversation with M. Sazonof on July 27, although the "White Paper" does not show that he had received any instructions by Sir Edward Grey.

Just as its own Ambassador in Petersburg pointed out to the British Government the dangers of Russian mobilization, England did not lack German warnings. On July 28 the British Ambassador in Berlin, Sir E. Goschen, reported as follows by wire concerning a conversation with the Imperial Chancellor:

In a telegram of Mr. Goschen's of July 30, reporting a conversation with the Secretary of State, von Jagow, it is stated:

The British Government has added a few further publications to its "White Paper." Among these is a report of the hitherto British Ambassador in Vienna, Sir Maurice de Bunsen. The document is dated Sept. 1; that is, a full month after the outbreak of the war. The tendency of this publication is not only to unburden Russia and England from all blame and to put it upon German and Austro-Hungarian politics, but it attempts to make Germany responsible for the war to greater extent than Austria-Hungary in trying to sow dissension between the two allies.

Ambassador de Bunsen represents matters as if Germany, through its ultimatum to Russia on July 31, had roughly interrupted negotiations promising success then going on between Vienna and Petersburg. In this report it is stated:

On the other hand, be it remembered that the fact that any negotiations between Austria and Russia were carried on up to the last hour was solely the result of the uninterrupted German efforts to maintain peace, which fact Sir Maurice de Bunsen very wisely buries in silence. These negotiations, by the way, hardly were as promising of success as is made to appear. The Austrian version of it is found in the Vienna Fremdenblatt of Sept. 25, 1914. There the most important spots of Bunsen's report, that Austria-Hungary had been ready to moderate several points of its note to Servia, are mentioned, as follows:

A glance at the date shows that the Bunsen report is misleading, for he himself tells that Count Berchtold, on July 30, had expressed his consent to a continuation of the exchange of thought in Petersburg; the latter, therefore, could not begin before the 31st, while in the night from July 30 to 31 the mobilization of the entire Russian Army against Germany was ordered in Petersburg, finally making impossible the continuation of the last German attempt at mediation in Vienna.

The truth is, in spite of Russian and English twistings, that without the interval caused by Germany's efforts in Vienna, which interval England allowed to pass unused in Petersburg, the war would have broken out a few days sooner.

Let us consider how the fact of the Russian mobilization, the dimensions and tendency of which was brought to the knowledge of the London Cabinet at the very latest on July 24, must affect Germany.

On July 24 the Russian Government declared, in an official communiqué, it would be impossible for it to remain indifferent in an Austro-Servian conflict.

Germany's Hand Forced.

This declaration was followed immediately by military measures which represented the beginning of Russian mobilization long planned. But even on July 27 the Russian Minister of War, Suchomlinof, [pg 232]assured the German Military Attaché upon word of honor (Annex 11 of the German "White Paper") that no order for mobilization had been given and no reservists had been drawn and no horse had been commandeered.

Although in this conversation there had been left no doubt to the Russian Minister of War concerning the fact that measures of mobilization against Austria must be considered by Germany also as very threatening toward itself, during the next days news of the Russian mobilization arrived in quick succession.

On the 29th mobilization of Southern and Southwestern Russia was ordered, which was extended on the 30th to twenty-three provinces.

On the night of the 30th to the 31st, while the efforts of the Kaiser to maintain peace were continuing and were receiving friendly attention in Vienna, in St. Petersburg the mobilization of the entire Russian Army was ordered. Even as late as 2 P.M. on the 31st, however, (German "White Paper," Page 18, of NEW YORK TIMES reprint,) the Czar telegraphed the Kaiser that the military measures now being taken were meant for defensive purposes against Austria's preparations, and he gave his pledge as far away from desiring war.

In the face of such evident duplicity of Russian politics, a further delay such as was desired by Sir Maurice de Bunsen would have been for every German statesman a crime against the security of his own country.

On the other hand, upon what German measures did the Russian Government base its order for mobilization? The British "White Paper" proves how frivolously steps leading to the most serious results were ordered in St. Petersburg. On July 30 Sir George Buchanan telegraphed:

Proofs Lacking.

On the other hand, Buchanan's telegram of July 31 (British "White Paper" No. 113) states:

So, from one day to the next the "absolute proof" changed to a reason for the assumption. In reality, both were assertions that lack all proof.

The finishing part of a telegram sent by the British Ambassador in Berlin to Sir Edward Grey on July 31 deserves special mention:

Therefore, the German Chancellor, in his memorandum placed before the Reichstag, stated with full justification:

We have seen from the "Blue Book" that the Secretary of State in London was informed at the very latest on July 24 by his Ambassador in St. Petersburg of the plan of the Russian mobilization and consequently of the tremendous seriousness of the European situation. Yet eight to nine days had to elapse before the beginning of the war. Let us see whether Sir Edward Grey used this time [pg 233]to preserve peace, according to his own documents.

From this testimony it appears that even at the beginning of the last and decisive part of the European crisis, which began on June 28, 1914, with the assassination of the Austrian heir to the throne, Sir Edward Grey refrained from considering a direct participation of his country in the possible world war. At least, this must be the impression gained from his remarks to the representatives of the two powers with whom England is today at war. Thus, he said to the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador, Count Mensdorff, on July 23:

Here Grey speaks only of four of the big powers at most that may go to war, without even hinting at the fifth, namely, England. On July 24 he had another conversation with the Austrian Ambassador, the theme of which was the note—meanwhile presented to Servia. It caused apprehensions on his part, but he declared again:

We are already striking the fateful peculiarity of Grey's policy to hesitate where prompt action, or at least a clear and open conduct, would have been his duty. This weakness of his nature has been used with great art by French and Russian diplomacy. This is illustrated by the conversation of July 24 between him and the French Ambassador, Cambon, in London:

Thus, England must not give any advice to Russia before it knows Russia's intent and even its measures. But inasmuch as Austria will have proceeded against Servia by that time Russia must make war, and the conclusion is that even on July 24 the catastrophe is considered unavoidable. Grey shows himself more and more hypnotized by the fatalistic view that it is too late. Hence he reports also on July 24 a conversation of the German Ambassador, Prince Lichnowsky:

From a conversation of Grey with the Prince Lichnowsky, the German Ambassador, on July 25:

If Sir Edward Grey sincerely desired the maintenance of peace, he must have had to use his entire influence at St. Petersburg to bring about the stopping of the threatening military measures taken by Russia, whereas he was waiting for the opinion of the French Government. He was bound to do this, so much the more in view of the fact that he demanded from Germany that it should exert its influence with Austria.

That this request of Grey's was complied with by Germany in so far as it [pg 234]was in any way in accord with the alliance with Austria-Hungary, and that in Vienna every effort was made to conciliate matters, is shown by the assurance of the Chancellor; he declares:

Grey well knew that Germany was doing all it could to mediate in Vienna. He expressed his recognition and his joy over it on July 28 ("Blue Book," Page 67):

Neither has Grey been left in the dark by the German side concerning the difficulties, which by the Russian mobilization made every attempt to mediate in Vienna abortive. Even on July 31 the British Ambassador in Berlin telegraphed:

England and Russia.

How, on the other hand, about Grey's action with Russia? From the very beginning one should have had a right to expect that, as Germany acted in Vienna, thus France, if it was active in Grey's spirit, would be working in St. Petersburg for peace. Of this no trace whatsoever can be found. The French Government thus far has not published any series of documents concerning its activity during the crisis, and neither in the Russian "Orange Book" nor in the English "Blue Book" is anything mentioned of the mediating activity on the part of France.

On the contrary, the latter power, wherever she puts in an appearance—as for instance in the conversation of the English Ambassador in St. Petersburg with his French colleague and M. Sazonof, as mentioned above—appears as fully identical with Russia.

It is also stated on July 24:

One should think that Grey, who in view of this could not possibly expect an influence for peace being brought to bear by France, but only a strengthening of the Russian desire for aggression, now would have acted in the most energetic manner in St. Petersburg for the maintenance of peace.

In reality, however, during the days that still remained, aside from a weak and in St. Petersburg absolutely ineffective advice to postpone mobilization, he did nothing whatsoever, and later placed himself in a manner constantly more recognizable on the side of Russia.

The claim that the time limit given by the Austrian note to Servia was the cause of the war, that Grey's mediation had only miscarried owing to the haste of Germany, is disproved by the British [pg 235]documents themselves. De Bunsen on July 26 telegraphed to Grey from Vienna:

Therefore Russia has paid little attention to the very shy and timid efforts to maintain peace by the London Secretary of State, even where these were concerned in the attempt to change the position taken by Austria.

Another proof: Sazonof on July 27 sent a telegram to the Russian Ambassador in London which the latter transmitted to Grey, and which concerns itself with the much mentioned proposition of the latter to have the conflict investigated by a conference of the four great powers not immediately concerned.

Russian Sincerity Questioned.

The conference plan was declined without much hesitation and openly by Germany, because it was compelled to see therein an attempt to place Austria before a European court of arbitration, and because it knew the serious determination of its ally in this matter. But did Russia really want the conference? Minister Sazonof declares:

Here it is shown plainly how little the conference plan was after the heart of the Russians. Had they accepted it it would have had to be done immediately. As soon as the situation had grown very much more serious by the failure of the negotiations with Austria-Hungary there would have been no more time for this.[03]

A telegram of the English Ambassador in St. Petersburg, dated July 27, (British "White Paper" No. 55,) shows how this conference was expected to be conducted in St. Petersburg:

Russian shrewdness evidently expected to control the conference by keeping in touch with Grey, who of course would have been the Chairman. The dispatches of his own Ambassadors lying before him should have enabled the Secretary of State to see the perfidy of the Russian policy. Buchanan wrote on the 28th from St. Petersburg:

Entirely in contrast herewith is one [pg 236]report of the British representative in Vienna, dated Aug. 1, and speaking of a conversation with the Russian Ambassador there:

What, then, may one ask, was the opinion which Sir Edward Grey had formed concerning Russia's real intentions? He learns from Russian sources and notes faithfully that Russia will accept Austrian guarantees for independence of Servia, and also that it will not accept such guarantees. It is the same duplicity which Russia, when its own mobilization was concerned, showed toward Germany. Did Sir Edward not notice this duplicity, or did he not wish to notice it? If the documents of the English Government have not been selected with the purpose to confuse, then in London the decision to take part in the war does not seem to have been a certainty at the beginning. We have seen that Ambassador Buchanan in St. Petersburg on July 24 gave the Russian Minister to understand that England was not of a mind to go to war on account of Servia. This position, taken by the Ambassador, was approved by Sir Edward Grey on the following day in the following words:

Based upon these instructions, Sir George Buchanan, even on July 27, stated to M. Sazonof, who continued to urge England to unconditionally join Russia and France:

But on this same 27th day of July, Grey, submitting to the intrigues of Russian and French diplomacy, had committed one very fateful step (Telegram to Buchanan, July 27):

For Russia this order to the fleet meant very much more than a diplomatic action. Sazonof saw that the wind in London was turning in his favor and he made use of it. Among themselves the Russian diplomatists seem to have for a long time been clear and open in their discussion of their real object. You find among the documents of the Russian "Orange Book" the following telegram of Sazonof of July 25 to the Russian Ambassador in London:

There is no mention of Servia here, but Austria should not triumph. Russia's real intention, of course, was not placed so nakedly before the British Secretary of State, hence to him the appearance was maintained that the little State of the Sawe was the only consideration, although the Russian Army was already being mobilized with all energy.

On the 28th he wires to the Russian Ambassador, Count Benckendorff, to London to inform the British Government:

The opinion subtly suggested upon him by Paris and Petersburg diplomacy, namely, that he should not use any pressure upon Russia, but upon Germany, now takes hold of Grey more and more. On July 29 he writes to the German Ambassador as follows:

Petersburg, now assured of the support of Grey, becomes more and more outspoken for war. On the 28th Grey again expressed one of his softhearted propositions for peace. Mr. Sazonof hardly made the effort to hide his contempt. Buchanan telegraphs on the 29th as follows:

Naivete or Cynicism?

Here it really becomes impossible to judge where the naïveté of the British Secretary of State ends and cynicism begins, for Sazonof could not have told to him more plainly than in these lines that all Russia's ostensible readiness for peace served no other purpose than to win time to complete the strategical location of the Russian troops.

This point is emphasized by one document coming from a writer presumably unbiased, but presumably distrustful of Germany, wherein the confirmation is found that England and Russia had come to a full agreement during these days.

On July 30 the Belgian Chargé d'Affaires de l'Escaille in Petersburg reported to the Belgian Government upon the European crisis. Owing to the fast developing events of a warlike nature, this letter did not reach its address by mail, and it was published later on. The Belgian diplomatist writes:

And after M. de l'Escaille has told that Russia—what the Czar and his War Minister with their highest assurances toward Germany had denied—was mobilizing its own army, he continues:

This settles Grey's pretended "attempts at mediation." The truth is that British politics decided to prevent a diplomatic success of Germany and Austria, now worked openly toward the Russian aim. "The exertion of pressure upon Berlin" included already a certain threat, mingled with good advice.

On July 23 Grey had only spoken of four possible powers in war; hence when on the German side some hope of England maintaining neutrality was indulged in, this impression rested upon Grey's own explanations. On July 29, however, after a political conversation with Prince Lichnowsky, German Ambassador in London, he adds an important personal bit of information. He wires concerning it to Berlin, to Goschen:

[pg 238]But what is especially wrong is that Grey brought this warning, which only could have any effect if it remained an absolute, confidential secret between the English and German Governments, also to the French Ambassador, so that the entire Entente could mischievously look on and see whether Germany really would give in to British pressure. Of course, in his manner of swaying to and fro, he did not wish either that Cambon should not accept this information to the German Ambassador as a decided taking of a position on the part of England:

Stirring Up Trouble.

On the German side Grey's open threat, which was presented, however, with smooth and friendly sounding words, was received with quiet politeness. Goschen telegraphed on the 30th concerning a talk with State Secretary von Jagow:

Now the work of stirring up trouble is continued unceasingly. On July 30 the British Ambassador in Paris, Sir F. Bertie, concerning a conversation with the President of the Republic, reports:

Did Grey really think for one moment that the German Empire would change its position immediately, in other words, would suddenly leave its ally in need, or is all this only a mass of diplomatic blandishments?

On the same day Grey steps from the personal warning which he had given to the German Ambassador to the sharpest official threat. In a telegram to the Ambassador in Berlin upon the question placed before him by the Chancellor of the empire on the day prior, (British "White Paper" No. 85,) whether England would remain neutral if Germany would bind itself, after possible war, to claim no French territory in Europe whatever, while in lieu of the French colonies a like guarantee could not be accepted, Grey answers with thundering words:

With this telegram the war on Germany was practically declared, for as a price of British neutrality an open humiliation of Germany was demanded. If France—the question of French colonies is of very minor importance in this connection—must not be defeated by Germany, then England forbade the German Government to make war. It was furthermore stated that Germany was absolutely compelled to accept Russian-French dictates, and would have to leave Austria to its own resources. This would have meant Germany's retirement from the position of a great power, even if she had backed down before such a challenge.[pg 239]

Only in the light of the developments concerning England's relation to France, given at the beginning of the war, Grey's policy, swaying between indecision and precipitate action, becomes apparent.

In all the explanations which the British Government in the course of eight years had presented to the British Parliament concerning the relations to other large powers, the assurance had been repeated that no binding agreements with the two partners of the Franco-Russian alliance had been made, above all, that no agreement with France existed. Only in his speech in the House of Commons on Aug, 3, 1914, which meant the war with Germany, Grey gave to the representatives of the people news of certain agreements which made it a duty for Great Britain to work together with France in any European crisis.

The fateful document, which in the form of an apparently private letter to the French Ambassador, dealt with one of the most important compacts of modern history, was written toward the end of the year 1912, and is published in the British "White Paper" No. 105, Annex 1:

Was Parliament Deceived?

A few members of the English Parliament who on Aug. 3 dared to gingerly protest against the war may have had reason to complain about the hiding of facts from the House of Commons. When such understandings can be made without any one having an idea of their existence, then—so far as England is concerned—the supervision of the Government, theoretically being exercised by a Parliament, becomes a fiction.

Veiled Defensive Alliance.

As a matter of fact, Grey does not desire to have accepted as political obligations the conversations of the French and English Army and Navy General Staffs concerning the future plans of campaign which took place from time to time in times of peace. However, the true tendency of this agreement, for such it is, gives itself away in the promise to immediately enter with France into a political and military exchange of opinions in every critical situation; it means in realty nothing less than a veiled defensive alliance which by clever diplomatic manipulations can be changed without any difficulty to an offensive one, for inasmuch as the English Government promises to consult and work together with France, and consequently also with its ally, Russia, in every crisis, before a serious investigation of the moments of danger, it waives all right of taking an independent position.

How would England ever have been able to enter a war against France without throwing upon itself the accusation of faithlessness against one with whose plans for war it had become acquainted through negotiations lasting through years?

Here a deviation may be permissible, which leaves for a moment the basis of documentary proof.

[pg 240]If one considers how this agreement of such immeasurable consequences was not only hidden from the British Parliament by the Cabinet, but how to the very edge of conscious deceit its existence was denied—in the year 1913 Premier Asquith answered a query of a member of the House of Commons that there were no unpublished agreements in existence which in a case of war between European powers would interfere with or limit free decision on the part of the British Government or Parliament as to whether or not Britain should take part at a war—then certain reports making their appearance with great persistency in June, 1914, concerning an Anglo-Russian naval agreement are seen in a different light.

Persons who were acquainted with the happenings in diplomacy then stated that the Russian Ambassador in Paris, M. Iswolski, during the visit which the King of England and Sir Edward Grey were paying to Paris, had succeeded in winning the English statesmen for the plan of such an agreement. A formal alliance, it was said, was not being demanded by Russia immediately, for good reasons. M. Iswolski was attempting to go nearer to his goal, carefully, step by step.

It had been preliminarily agreed that negotiations should be started between the British Admiralty and the Russian Naval Attaché in London, Capt. Wolkow. As a matter of fact Wolkow during June went to St. Petersburg for a few days to, as was assumed, obtain instructions and then return to London.

Grey's "Twisty" Answer.

These happenings aroused so much attention in England that questions were raised in Parliament concerning them. It was noted how twisty Grey's answer was. He referred to the answer of the Premier, already mentioned, stated that the situation is unchanged, and said then that no negotiations were under way concerning a naval agreement with any foreign nation. "As far as he was able to judge the matter," no such negotiations would be entered into later on.

The big Liberal newspaper, The Manchester Guardian, was not at all satisfied with this explanation; it assumed that certain conditional preliminary agreements might not be excluded.

This Russian plan, which was later worked out in St. Petersburg, went into oblivion on account of the rapidly following European war. In the light of the following revelation of Grey's agreement with France, the news of the naval agreement desired by Iswolski assumed another aspect.

Let us return to the Anglo-French agreement. The following remarks by the French Ambassador in London, reported by Grey, prove that, on the ground of this agreement, France, with very little trouble, would be able to make out of a diplomatic entanglement a case for Allies' interest as far as England is concerned.

A German "Attack."

He [Cambon] anticipated that the [German] aggression would take the form of either a demand to cease her preparations or a demand that she should engage to remain neutral if there was war between Germany and Russia. Neither of these things would France admit.—(British "White Paper" No. 105.)

Therefore, even the demand addressed to France not to, jointly with Russia, attack Germany became a German "attack," which obliged England to come to the aid!

In spite of this, even on July 27 in a conversation with Cambon, Grey gave himself the appearance as if his hands were free. He told the Frenchman:

M. Cambon remarked in reply that the Secretary of State had clearly pictured the situation, but on the very following day the French Ambassador took the liberty to remind Grey of the letter written in 1912. (British "White Paper" No. 105.)

Grey did not deny the claim implied in this reminder, but even as late as July 31 he reports as follows concerning the conversation with Cambon:

Now, if we remember that even on the day before Grey had informed the German Imperial Chancellor that it would be a shame for England to remain neutral and allow France to be crushed, we here find a new proof of the unreliability of his conduct. If he has been gullible, the declaration of 1912, the dangerous character of which is increased by its apparently undefined tenor, has enmeshed him more and more. Also the military and naval circles, whose consultations with the representatives of the French Army and Navy certainly have been continued diligently since the beginning of the Servian crisis, were forcing toward a decision.

At all events, it became more impossible with every hour for Germany to keep England out of the way by any offers whatsoever. This is proved by Grey's conversation of Aug. 1 with the German Ambassador:

Belgium Not the Cause.

Hence, only if Germany would permit herself to be humiliated war with England could be avoided. The violation of Belgium's neutrality was in no way the cause of England joining Germany's enemies, for while German troops did not enter Belgium until the night from Aug. 3 to 4, Grey gave on Aug. 2 the following memorandum to the French Ambassador after a session of the Cabinet in London:

As the aim of this decision, of which M. Cambon was informed verbally, was to give France an assurance that it would be placed in a position "to settle the disposition of its own Mediterranean fleet," Grey would not accept the version of Cambon that England would take part in a war with Germany. This is a case of splitting hairs in order to put the blame of starting the war on Germany, for while England promised to protect the French coast and to make it possible for the French fleet to stay in the Mediterranean, she almost immediately proceeded to a warlike action against Germany, especially as the English Minister simultaneously refused to bind himself to maintain even this peculiar neutrality.

The highest representatives of the German Empire with emphatic seriousness declared that it was with a heavy heart and only following the law of self-preservation that they decided to violate the neutrality of the Kingdom of Belgium, guaranteed by the great powers in the treaties of 1831 and 1839.

The German Secretary of State on Aug. 4 informed the English Government through the embassy in London that Germany intended to retain no Belgian territory, and added:

In answer Grey caused the English Ambassador in Berlin to demand his [pg 242]passports and to tell the German Government that England would take all steps for defense of Belgian neutrality. This, therefore, represents, in the view which very cleverly has been spread broadcast by British publicity, the real reason for the war. But in spite of the moral indignation that is apparent against Germany, the consideration for Belgium, up until very late, does not seem in any way to have been in the foreground. We find on July 31 Grey stated to Cambon:

Here, therefore, there was no talk about England grasping the sword on account of Belgium. Now no one will claim that the assumption that the German troops could march through Belgium would be new or unheard of. For years this possibility had been discussed in military literature.[04]

This expression on the part of the historical Faculty is very interesting. It shows that a plan of campaign between the English and French had long been considered, and that the Belgian entry into the alliance against Germany was a matter agreed upon.

A Sudden Decision.

It must also be assumed that the Belgian Government knew toward the end of July at the latest that the war between Germany and France was probable and the march of Germans through Belgium very possible.

If England had not taken part in the war against Germany, it may be assumed that it would have given Belgium the advice to permit the marching through of the German Army, somewhat in the same manner as the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg did, with a protest. In doing so the Belgian people would have been spared a great deal of misery and loss of blood. On Aug. 3 the Belgian Government replied to an offer of military help by France as follows:

One day later London decided to make Belgian neutrality the cause of the war against Germany before the eyes of the world. The Ambassador in Brussels received the following orders:

Not until England thus stirred Belgium up, holding out the deceptive hope of effective French and English help, did Belgian fanaticism break loose against Germany. Without the intervention of England in Brussels the events in Belgium, one may safely assert, would have taken an entirely different course, which would have been far more favorable to Belgium.

But, of course, England had thus found a very useful reason for war against Germany. Even on the 31st of July Grey had spoken of the violation of Belgian neutrality as not a decisive factor. On Aug. 1 he declined to promise Prince Lichnowsky England's neutrality, even if Germany would not violate Belgium's neutrality. On Aug. 4, however, the Belgian question was the cause that suddenly drove England to maintain the moral fabric of the world and to draw the sword.

[pg 243]This suddenly became the new development, which was still lacking for Grey in order to justify this war before public opinion in England.

Another English Advantage.

And something else was secured by the drawing of Belgium into the war by the British Government, which had decided to make war on Germany for entirely different reasons: the thankful part of the protector of the weak and the oppressed.

As an English diplomat, when Russia was mobilizing, openly stated, the interests of his country in Servia were nil, so for Grey even Belgium, immediately before the break with Germany, was not decisive. However, when England had irrevocably decided to enter the war it stepped out before the limelight of the world as the champion of—the small nations.

Attested by Thirty-four German Dignitaries.[05]

Board of Editors.[pg 244]

Honorary Committee.

[pg 245]Try to realize, every one of you, what we are going through! Only a few weeks ago all of us were peacefully following our several vocations. The peasant was gathering in this Summer's plentiful crop, the factory hand was working with accustomed vigor. Not one human being among us dreamed of war. We are a nation that wishes to lead a quiet and industrious life. This need hardly be stated to you Americans. You, of all others, know the temper of the German who lives within your gates. Our love of peace is so strong that it is not regarded by us in the light of a virtue, we simply know it to be an inborn and integral portion of ourselves. Since the foundation of the German Empire in the year 1871, we, living in the centre of Europe, have given an example of tranquillity and peace, never once seeking to profit by any momentary difficulties of our neighbors. Our commercial extension, our financial rise in the world, is far removed from any love of adventure, it is the fruit of painstaking and plodding labor.

We are not credited with this temper, because we are insufficiently known. Our situation and our way of thinking are not easily grasped.

Every one is aware that we have produced great philosophers and poets, we have preached the gospel of humanity with impassioned zeal. America fully appreciates Goethe and Kant, looks upon them as cornerstones of elevated culture. Do you really believe that we have changed our natures, that our souls can be satisfied with military drill and servile obedience? We are soldiers because we have to be soldiers, because otherwise Germany and German civilization would be swept away from the face of the earth. It has cost us long and weary struggles to attain our independence, and we know full well that, in order to preserve it, we must not content ourselves with building schools and factories, we must look to our garrisons and forts. We and all our soldiers have remained, however, the same lovers of music and lovers of exalted thought. We have retained our old devotion to all peaceable sciences and arts; as all the world knows, we work in the foremost rank of all those who strive to advance the exchange of commodities, who further useful technical knowledge. But we have been forced to become a nation of soldiers in order to be free. And we are bound to follow our Kaiser, because he [pg 246]symbolizes and represents the unity of our nation. Today, knowing no distinction of party, no difference of opinion, we rally around him, willing to shed the last drop of our blood. For though it takes a great deal to rouse us Germans, when once aroused our feelings run deep and strong. Every one is filled with this passion, with the soldier's ardor. But when the waters of the deluge shall have subsided, gladly will we return to the plow and to the anvil.

It deeply distresses us to see two highly civilized nations, England and France, joining the onslaught of autocratic Russia. That this could happen will remain one of the anomalies of history. It is not our fault; we firmly believed in the desirability of the great nations working together, we peaceably came to terms with France and England in sundry difficult African questions. There was no cause for war between Western Europe and us, no reason why Western Europe should feel itself constrained to further the power of the Czar.

The Czar, as an individual, is most certainly not the instigator of the unspeakable horrors that are now inundating Europe. But he bears before God and posterity the responsibility of having allowed himself to be terrorized by an unscrupulous military clique.

Ever since the weight of the crown has pressed upon him, he has been the tool of others. He did not desire the brutalities in Finland, he did not approve of the iniquities of the Jewish pogroms, but his hand was too weak to stop the fury of the reactionary party. Why would he not permit Austria to pacify her southern frontier? It was inconceivable that Austria should calmly see her heir apparent murdered. How could she? All the nationalities under her rule realized the impossibility of tamely allowing Servia's only too evident and successful intrigues to be carried on under her very eyes. The Austrians could not allow their venerable and sorely stricken monarch to be wounded and insulted any longer. This reasonable and honorable sentiment on the part of Austria has caused Russia to put itself forward as the patron of Servia, as the enemy of European thought and civilization.

Russia has an important mission to fulfill in its own country and in Asia. It would do better in its own interest to leave the rest of the world in peace. But the die is cast, and all nations must decide whether they wish to further us by sentiments and by deeds, or the government of the Czar. This is the real significance of this appalling struggle, all the rest is immaterial. Russia's attitude alone has forced us to go to war with France and with their great ally.

The German Nation is serious and conscientious. Never would a German Government dare to contemplate a war for the sake of dynastic interest, or for the sake of glory. This would be against the entire bent of our character. Firmly believing in the justice of our cause, all parties, the Conservatives and the Clericals, the Liberals and the Socialists, have joined hands. All disputes are forgotten, one duty exists for all, the duty of defending our country and vanquishing the enemy.

Will not this calm, self-reliant and unanimous readiness to sacrifice all, to die or to win, appeal to other nations and force them to understand our real character and the situation in which we are placed?

The war has severed us from the rest of the world, all our cable communications are destroyed. But the winds will carry the mighty voice of justice even across the ocean. We trust in God, we have confidence in the judgment of right-minded men. And through the roar of battle, we call to you all. Do not believe the mischievous lies that our enemies are spreading about! We do not know if victory will be ours, the Lord alone knows. We have not chosen our path, we must continue doing our duty, even to the very end. We bear the misery of war, the death of our sons, believing in Germany, believing in duty.

And we know that Germany cannot be wiped from the face of the earth.

It is an old and common experience that after the outbreak of a war the very parties and persons that wanted the war, either at once or later, assert that the enemy wanted and began it. The German Empire especially always had to suffer from such untruthful assertions, and the very first days of the present terrible European war confirm again this old experience. Again Russian, French, and British accounts represent the German Empire as having wanted the war.

Only a few months ago influential men and newspapers of Great Britain as well as of Paris could be heard to express the opinion that nobody in Europe wanted war and that especially the German Emperor and his Government had sincerely and effectively been working for peace. Especially the English Government, in the course of the last two years, asserted frequently and publicly, and was supported by The Westminster Gazette and a number of influential English newspapers in the assertion, that Great Britain and the German Empire during the Balkan crisis of the last few years had always met on the same platform for the preservation of peace. The late Secretary of State, von Kiderlen-Waechter, his successor, Mr. von Jagow, and the Imperial Chancellor, von Bethmann-Hollweg, likewise declared repeatedly in the Reichstag, how great their satisfaction was that a close and confidential diplomatic co-operation with Great Britain, especially in questions concerning the Near East, had become a fact. And it has to be acknowledged today that at that time the German and British interests in the Near East were identical or at any rate ran in parallel lines.

The collapse of European Turkey in the war against the Balkan Alliance created an entirely new situation. At first Bulgaria was victorious and great, then it was beaten and humiliated by the others with the intellectual help of Russia. There could be no doubt about Russia's intentions: she was preparing for the total subjection of weakened Turkey and for taking possession of the Dardanelles and Constantinople in order to rule from this powerful position Turkey and the other Balkan States. Great Britain and the German Empire, which only had economic interests in Turkey, were bound to wish to strengthen Turkey besides trying to prevent the Muscovite rule on the whole Balkan peninsula.

Servia had come out of the second Balkan war greatly strengthened and with her territory very much increased. Russia had done everything to strengthen this bitter enemy of our ally, Austria-Hungary. For a great number of years Servian politicians and conspirators had planned to undermine the southeastern provinces of Austria-Hungary and to separate them from the Dual Monarchy. In Servia as well as in Russia prevailed the opinion that, at the first attack, Austria-Hungary would fall to pieces. In this case Servia was to receive South Austria and Russia was to dictate the peace in Vienna. The Balkan war had ruined Turkey almost entirely, had paralyzed Bulgaria, that was friendly, and had strengthened the Balkan States that were hostile to Austria. At the same time there began in Rumania a Russian and French propaganda, that promised this country, if it should join the dual alliance, the Hungarian Province of Siebenbuergen.

Thus it became evident in Germany and in Austria that at St. Petersburg, first by diplomatic and political, then also by military, action a comprehensive attack of Slavism under Russian guidance was being prepared. The party of the Grand Dukes in St. Petersburg, the party of the Russian officers, always ready for war, and the Pan-Slavists, the brutal and unscrupulous representatives of the idea that the Russian Czarism was destined to rule Europe—all these declared openly that their aim was the destruction of Austria-Hungary. In Russia the army, already of an immense [pg 248]size, was increased secretly but comprehensively and as quick as possible; in Servia the same was done, and the Russian Ambassador in Belgrade, Mr. von Hartwig, was, after the second Balkan war, the principal promoter of the plan to form against Austria a new Balkan alliance. In Bosnia, during all this time, the Servian propaganda was at work with high treason, and in the end with revolver and the bomb.

In Vienna and in Berlin the greatness and the purpose of the new danger could not remain doubtful, especially as it was openly said in St. Petersburg, in Belgrade, and elsewhere that the destruction of Austria-Hungary was imminent. As soon as the Balkan troubles began Austria-Hungary had been obliged to put a large part of her army in readiness for war, because the Russians and Servians had mobilized on their frontiers. The Germans felt that what was a danger for their ally was also a danger for them and that they must do all in the power to maintain Austria-Hungary in the position of a great power. They felt that this could only be done by keeping perfect faith with their ally and by great military strength, so that Russia might possibly be deterred from war and peace be preserved, or else that, in case war was forced upon them, they could wage it with honor and success. Now it was clear in Berlin that in view of the Russian and Servian preparations, Austria-Hungary, in case of a war, would be obliged to use a great part of her forces against Servia and therefore would have to send against Russia fewer troops than would have been possible under the conditions formerly prevailing in Europe. Formerly even European Turkey could have been counted upon for assistance, that after her recent defeat seemed very doubtful. These reasons and considerations, which were solely of a defensive nature, led to the great German military bills of the last two years. Also Austria-Hungary was obliged to increase its defensive strength.

Whoever considers carefully the course of events that has been briefly sketched here will pronounce the assertion of our enemies, that Germany wanted the war, ridiculous and absurd. On the contrary, it can be said that Germany never before endeavored more eagerly to preserve peace than during the last few years. Germany had plenty of opportunities to attack and good opportunities to boot, for we knew for years that the army of France was no more ready than that of Russia. But the Germans are not a warlike nation and the German Emperor, with his Government, has always shown how earnestly he meant his reiterated assertions that the preservation of peace was his principal aim. He was actuated in this by general considerations of humanity, justice, and culture, as well as by the consideration of the German trade and commerce. This, especially the transoceanic commerce of Germany, has increased from year to year. War, however, means the ruin of commerce. Why expose Germany needlessly to this terrible risk, especially as everything in Germany prospered and her wealth increased? No, the German Army bills were merely meant to protect us against, and prepare us for, the attacks of Muscovite barbarism. But nobody in Germany has ever doubted for a moment that France would attack us at the first Russian signal. Since the first days of the Franco-Russian alliance things have become entirely reversed. Then France wanted to win Russia for a war of revenge against Germany; now, on the contrary, France thought herself obliged to place her power and her existence at the disposal of the Russian lust of conquest.

In the Spring of 1914 the German press reported from St. Petersburg detailed accounts of Russia's comprehensive preparations for war. They were not denied in Russia, and Paris declared that Russia would be ready in two or three years and then pursue a policy corresponding to her power; France, too, would then be at the height of her power. If the German Government had desired war, on the strength of these accounts, which were true, it could have waged a preventive war at once and easily. It did not do so, considering that a war is just only when it is forced upon one by the enemy. Thus Spring went by with [pg 249]the atmosphere at high tension. From St. Petersburg and Paris overbearing threats came in increasing numbers to the effect that the power of the Dual Alliance was now gigantic and that Germany and Austria soon would begin to feel it. We remained quiet and watchful, endeavoring with perseverance and with all our might to win over Great Britain to the policy of preserving peace. Colonial and economic questions were being discussed by the German and English Governments, and the cordiality between the two great powers seemed only to be equaled by their mutual confidence.

Then on the 28th of June occurred that frightful assassination by Servians of the successor to the Austro-Hungarian throne, Archduke Francis Ferdinand. The Greater Servia propaganda of action had put aside the man who was especially hated in Servia as the powerful exponent of Austro-Hungarian unity and strength. This murder is the real cause of the present European war. Austria-Hungary was able to prove to a shuddering world, a few days after the murder, that it had been prepared and planned systematically, yea, that the Servian Government had been cognizant of the plan. The immense extent of the Servian revolutionary organization in the provinces of Southern Austria, the warlike spirit of the Servians and its instigation by Russia and France, imposed upon the Vienna Government the duty to insist upon quiet and peace within and without its borders. It addressed to the Servian Government a number of demands which aimed at nothing but the suppression of the anti-Austrian propaganda. Servia was on the point of accepting the demand, when there arrived a dispatch from St. Petersburg, and Servia mobilized. Then Austria, too, had to act. Thus arose the Austro-Servian war. But a few days later the Russian Army was being mobilized, and the mobilization was begun also in France. At the same time, as the German "White Book" clearly proves, the diplomacy of Russia and France asserted its great love of peace and tried to prolong the negotiations in order to gain time, for, as is well known, the Russian mobilization proceeds slowly. Germany was waiting, and again and again the German Emperor tried to win the Czar over to the preservation of peace, for he considered him sincere and thought him his personal friend. Emperor William was to be cruelly disappointed. He finally saw himself obliged to proclaim a state of war for Germany. But at that time the Russian and French armies were already in a state of complete mobilization. At that time The London Daily Graphic wrote the following article, which shows how an English paper that was only slightly friendly to Germany judged of the situation at that time:

When Russia had let pass the time limit set by Germany, when France had answered that she would act according to her own interests, then the German Empire had to mobilize its army and go ahead. Before one German soldier had crossed the German frontier a large number of French aeroplanes came flying into our country across the neutral territory of Belgium and Luxemburg [pg 250]without a word of warning on the part of the Belgian Government. At the same time the German Government learned that the French were about to enter Belgium. Then our Government, with great reluctance, had to decide upon requesting the Belgian Government to allow our troops to march through its territory. Belgium was to be indemnified after the war, was to retain its sovereignty and integrity. Belgium protested, at the same time allowing, by an agreement with France, that the French troops might enter Belgium. After all this, and not till France and Belgium itself had broken the neutrality, our troops entered the neutral territory. Germany wanted nothing from Belgium, but had to prevent that Belgian soil be used as a gate of entrance into German territory.

Little has as yet been said of Great Britain. It was Germany's conviction that the sincerity of Britain's love for peace could be trusted. At any rate, Sir Edward Grey and Mr. Asquith asserted again and again in the course of the last few years that England wished friendly relations with Germany and never would lend its support to a Franco-Russian attack on Germany. Now this attack had been made; Germany was on the defensive against two powerful enemies. What would Great Britain do about it? That was the question. Great Britain asked in return for its neutrality that the German forces should not enter Belgium. In other words, it asked that Germany should allow the French and Belgian troops to form on Belgian territory for a march against our frontier! This we could not allow. It would have been suicidal. The German Government made Great Britain, in return for its neutrality, the following offers: we would not attack the northern coast of France, we would leave unmolested the maritime commerce of France and would indemnify Belgium after the war and safeguard its sovereignty and integrity. In spite of this Great Britain declared war on Germany and sides today with those Continental powers that have united for our destruction, in order that Muscovite barbarism may rule Europe. We know that Germany did not deserve such treatment on the part of Great Britain, and do not believe that Great Britain by this action did a service to humanity and civilization.

Today we are facing hard facts. Germany has to fight for her existence. She will fight knowing that the great powers beyond the ocean will do her justice as soon as they know the truth.

The last days of the month of July were days of anxiety and distress for the German people. They hoped that they would be permitted to preserve an honorable peace. A few months earlier, in 1913, when the centennial of the war for independence from French oppression and the twenty-fifth anniversary of Emperor William's ascent of the throne had been celebrated, they had willingly taken upon their shoulders the great sacrifice of the so-called "Wehrvorlage," which increased the peace strength of the standing army enormously and cost 1,000,000,000 marks. They considered it simply as an increase of their peace insurance premium. Our diplomats worked hard for the maintenance of peace, for the localization of the Austro-Servian war. So sure were the leading men of the empire of the preservation of general peace that at the beginning of the week which was to bring general mobilization they said to each other joyfully: Next week our vacation time begins. But they were fearfully disappointed. Russia's unexpected, treacherous mobilization compelled Germany to draw the sword also. On the evening of the first day of August the one word, Mobilization! was flashed by the electric spark all over the country. There was no more anxiety and uncertainty. Cool, firm resolution at once permeated the entire German folk. The Reichstag was called together for an extra session.

Three days later, on the anniversary of the battles of Weissenburg and Spichern, the representatives of the German people met. This session, which lasted only a few hours, proved worthy of the great historical moment marking the beginning of such a conflagration as the world had never seen before. The railroad lines were under military control and used almost exclusively for purposes of mobilization. In spite of all such difficulties, more than 300 of the 397 Deputies managed to get to Berlin in time. The rest sent word that they were unable to come. On the evening of Aug. 3 the Imperial Chancellor called the leaders of all parties, including the Socialists, to his house and explained to them in a concise and impressive statement how frivolously Germany had been driven to war. At the time of this meeting the unanimous acceptance of all war measures by the Reichstag was already assured. In numerous conferences the heads of the several departments explained the content and meaning of the bills to be submitted to the Reichstag. The participants of the conferences showed already what spirit would characterize the next day. The session of the Reichstag filled the entire German nation with pride and enthusiasm; the Reichstag maintained the dignity of the German Empire and the German people.

In greater numbers than ever before the Deputies, high officers of the army and navy and the Civil Government assembled on Aug. 4, first in houses of worship to pray to God, and then in the Royal Castle of Berlin. The military character of the ceremony at the opening of the session showed under what auspices this memorable act took place. The Kaiser entered the hall in the simple gray field uniform, without the usual pomp, unaccompanied by chamberlains and court officials and pages in glittering court dresses. Only State Ministers, Generals, and Admirals followed him to the throne, from where he read his speech, after covering his head with his helmet. His voice betrayed the strain under which he was laboring. Repeatedly he was interrupted by enthusiastic applause, and when he closed, a rousing cheer thundered through the famous White Hall, something that had never before occurred there since the erection of the old castle. Then came a surprise. The Emperor laid down the manuscript of his speech and continued speaking. From now on he knew only Germans, he said, no differences of party, creed, religion or social position, and he requested the party leaders to give him their hands as a pledge that they all would stand by him "in Not und Tod"—in death and distress. This scene was entirely impromptu, and thus so much more impressive and touching. And it was hardly over when the Reichstag—an unheard of proceeding in such surroundings—began to sing the German national hymn, "Heil Dir im Siegerkranz." The magnificent hall, until then only the scene of pompous court festivities, witnessed an outburst of patriotism such as was never seen there before. To the accompaniment of loud cheers the Kaiser walked out, after shaking the hands of the Imperial Chancellor and the Chief of the General Staff, von Moltke.

One hour later the Reichstag met in its own house. The Emperor had begged for quick and thorough work. He was not to be disappointed. Without any formalities the presiding officers of the last session were re-elected—in times of peace and party strife this would have been impossible. This short curtain raiser being over, the first act of the drama began. Before an overcrowded house the Chancellor described simply and clearly the efforts of the Government for the preservation of peace. He stated cold facts, showing unmistakably Russia's double dealing and justifying Germany's beginning of a war which she did not want. The Chancellor had begun in a quiet, subdued tone. Then he raised his voice and when, in words that rang through the hall, he declared that the entire nation was united, the Deputies and the spectators in the galleries could sit still no longer. They rose, with them at first some Socialists, then all of them, carried away by the impulse of the moment; [pg 252]the members of the Federal Council, of the press, diplomats and the crowds in the galleries joined them. The whole multitude cheered and clapped its hands frantically. It reflected truly the spirit of the whole nation. The Speaker, who under ordinary circumstances would have suppressed the clapping of hands as unparliamentary and the demonstrations of the galleries as undignified, let the patriotic outburst go on to its end.

After a short intermission the business meeting began. Sixteen war measures had been introduced, the most important of which was the one asking for 5,000,000,000 marks to carry on the war. The leader of the Social Democrats read a statement explaining why his party, despite its opposition on principle to all army and navy appropriations, would vote for the proposed bills. Without further debates all the bills were passed, and shortly after 5 P.M. the Reichstag adjourned. At 7 P.M. the Emperor received the presiding officers of the Reichstag to thank them for their prompt and useful work. He signed the bills, which were immediately published and thus became laws.

The resolute attitude and quick work of the Reichstag reflected the unity and resolution of the entire nation. Sixty-seven millions of Germans feel, think, and act with their elected representatives. No party, no class, no creed is standing back; all are imbued with one single thought: United Germany is unconquerable.

The entire German people are united as never before in their history. Even 101 years ago, in 1813, the entire population cannot have been so uniformly seized by the spirit of war as at the outbreak of this struggle, which is the people's war in the truest sense of the word, and which was predicted by Bismarck. All reigning Princes are going out to fight with the army and have appointed their wives as regents. Instances include the Kaiser's son-in-law, the Duke of Brunswick, who appointed his consort, the only daughter of the Emperor, as regent. The Princes call their people to arms, and they themselves all stand ready to sacrifice all they have. This example from above carries the nation with them. The Reichstag knew parties and factions no more, and neither does the nation. The Emperor sounded the word which has become common property from Königsberg to Constance, from Upper Silesia to the Belgian frontier: "I know only Germans!" And yet how terribly is our nation otherwise disrupted by party strife. Ill-advised persons across our frontiers hoped that creed differences would make for disunion, Frenchmen and Russians expected to weaken our empire with the aid of Alsatians and Poles. This hope has been destroyed—we are a united people, as united as was the Reichstag, the Socialists included. The latter have for years voted against all army and navy appropriations, have advocated international peace, and last year voted against the bills increasing the army strength. In many foreign quarters strong hopes were nourished that this party would help them. But those men did not know our German people. Our civilization, our independence as a nation was threatened, and in that moment party interest or creed existed no more. The true German heart is beating only for the Fatherland, east and west, north and south, Protestants, Catholics, and Jews are "a united people of brethren in the hour of danger." When Germany was so threatened by Russia, when the German "Peace Emperor" was shamefully betrayed by the Czar of all the Russians, then there was but one sacred party in existence: The party of Germans.

The German mobilization was the greatest movement of people that the world has ever seen. Nearly four million men had to be transported from every part of the empire to her borders. The manner in which the population is distributed [pg 253]made this task extremely difficult. Berlin, Rhenish Westphalia, Upper Silesia and Saxony especially had to send their contingents in every direction, since the eastern provinces are more thinly settled and had to have a stronger guard for the borders immediately. The result was a hurrying to and fro of thousands and hundreds of thousands of soldiers, besides a flood of civilians who had to reach their homes as soon as possible. Countries where the population is more regularly distributed have an easier task than Germany, with its predominating urban population. The difficulties of the gigantic undertaking were also increased by the necessity for transporting war materials of every sort. In the west are chiefly industrial undertakings, in the east mainly agricultural. Horse raising is mostly confined to the provinces on the North Sea and the Baltic, but chiefly to East Prussia, and this province, the furthest away from France, had to send its best horses to the western border, as did also Schleswig-Holstein and Hanover. Coal for our warships had to go in the other direction. From the Rhenish mines it went to the North Sea, from Upper Silesia to the Baltic. Ammunition and heavy projectiles were transported from the central part of the empire to the borders. And everywhere these operations had to be carried on with haste. One can thus say that the German mobilization was the greatest movement of men and materials that the world has ever seen.

And how was it carried on? No one could have wondered if there had been hundreds of unforeseen incidents, if military trains had arrived at their stations with great delays, if there had resulted in many places a wild hugger-mugger from the tremendous problems on hand. But there was not a trace of this. On the Monday evening of the first week of mobilization a high officer of the General Staff said: "It had to go well today, but how about tomorrow, the main day?" Tuesday evening saw no reason for complaint, no delay, no requests for instructions. All had moved with the regularity of clockwork. Regiments that had been ordered to mobilize in the forenoon left in the evening for the field, fully equipped. Not a man was lacking. There were no deserters, no shirkers, no cowards. Instead, there were volunteers whose numbers far exceeded the number that could be used. Every German wanted to do his duty.

The most noteworthy thing was the earnest quietness with which the gigantic gathering proceeded. Not a city, not a village reported unrest or even an untoward incident. The separation was hard for many a soldier. Many a volunteer tore himself away from his dear ones with bleeding heart, but with face beaming with the light of one who looks forward to victory. Following the Kaiser's wish, those who remained behind filled the churches and, kneeling, prayed to God for victory for the just German cause. The folk-war, brought on by the wantonness of the opponents, in itself brought peace and order, safety and discipline. Never, probably, have the police had fewer excesses to deal with than in the days of the mobilization, although great crowds gathered constantly in every city.

The best criterion of the enthusiasm of the people is without doubt the number of volunteers. More than 1,000,000 of these, a number greater than that of the standing army, presented themselves within a few days. They came from all classes. There were sons of the nobility, university students, farmers, merchants, common laborers. No calling hung back. Every young man sorrowed when he was rejected. No section of the Fatherland was unrepresented, not even the Reichsland Alsace-Lorraine, where, indeed, the number of volunteers was conspicuously great. When the lists in various cities had to be closed, the young men who had not been accepted turned away with tears in their eyes, and telegraphed from regiment to regiment, hoping to find one where there were still vacancies. Where the sons of the wealthy renounced the pleasures of youth and the comforts of their homes to accept the hardships of war in serving the Fatherland, the poor and the poorest appeared in like degree. In families having four or five sons subject [pg 254]to military duty a youngest son, not yet liable for service, volunteered. The year 1870, truly a proud year in our history, saw nothing like this.

A thing that raised the national enthusiasm still higher was the appearance of the troops in brand-new uniforms, complete from head to foot. The first sight of these new uniforms of modest field gray, faultlessly made, evoked everywhere the question: Where did they come from? On the first day of mobilization dozens of cloth manufacturers appeared at the War Ministry with offers of the new material. "We don't need any," was the astonishing reply. Equal amazement was caused by the faultless new boots and shoes of the troops, especially in view of the recent famous "boot speech" of the French Senator Humbert.

Small arms, cannons, and ammunition are so plentiful that they have merely to be unpacked. In view of all this, it is no wonder that the regiments marching in were everywhere greeted with jubilation, and that those marching out took leave of their garrisons with joyful songs. No one thinks of death and destruction, every one of victory and a happy reunion. German discipline, once so slandered, now celebrates its triumph.

There was still another matter in which the troops gave their countrymen cause for rejoicing. Not one drunken man was seen during these earnest days in the city streets. The General Staff had, moreover, wisely ordered that during the mobilization, when every one had money in his pockets, alcoholic drinks were not to be sold at the railroad stations. Despite this, the soldiers did not lack for refreshments on their journey. Women and girls offered their services to the Red Cross, and there was no station where coffee, tea, milk, and substantial food were not at the disposal of the soldiers. They were not required to suffer hunger or any other discomfort. The German anti-alcoholists are rejoicing at this earnest tribute to their principles, which were at first laughed at and then pitied, but triumphed in the days of the mobilization.

The army is increased to many times its ordinary strength by the mobilization. It draws from everywhere millions of soldiers, workmen, horses, wagons, and other material. The entire railway service is at its disposal. The mobilization of the fleet goes on more quietly and less conspicuously, but not less orderly and smoothly. Indeed, it is, even in peace times, practically mobilized as to its greatest and strongest units. For this reason its transports are smaller than those of the army; they are concentrated in a few harbors, and, therefore, do not attract so much public attention. The naval transports, working according to plans in connection with those of the army, have moved their quotas of men and materials with the most punctual exactitude. The naval reserve of fully trained officers and men is practically inexhaustible. The faithful work of our shipbuilding concerns, carried on uninterruptedly day and night under plans carefully prepared in time of peace, has wrought for our navy a strong increase in powerful warships.

As is known, the German fleet is built on the so-called "assumption-of-risk" plan. That is, it is intended that it shall be so strong that even the strongest sea power, in a conflict with the Germans, risks forfeiting its former rôle as a world factor. This "risk" idea has been hammered into the heart of every German seaman, and they are all eager to win for the fleet such glory that it can be favorably contrasted with the deeds of the old and the new armies.

Contrary to general expectation, the German fleet has taken the offensive, and the first loss of the war was on the English side and in English waters, the English cruiser Amphion running on to German mines in the mouth of the Thames. In the Baltic and the Mediterranean also German ships have taken the offensive against the enemies' coast, as is shown by the bombardment by the Germans of the war harbor of Libau and of fortified landing places on the Algerian coast.

Thus the fleet, confiding in the "risk" idea now proved to be true, and in its earnest and courageous spirit, may look [pg 255]forward with confidence to coming events.

But will not civilians have to hunger and thirst in these days? That is an earnest question. The answer is, No. Even in Berlin, city of millions, the milk supply did not fail for a day. Infants will not have to bear the privations of war. All provisions are to be had at reasonable prices. Empire, municipalities and merchants are working successfully together to insure that there shall be a sufficient food supply at not too great a cost. Not only is our great army mobilized, but the whole folk is mobilized, and the distribution of labor, the food question and the care of the sick and wounded are all being provided for. The whole German folk has become a gigantic war camp, all are mobilized to protect Kaiser, Folk and Fatherland, as the closing report of the Reichstag put it. And all Germany pays the tribute of a salute to the chiefs of the army and navy, who work with deeds, not words.

There can be no greater contrast than that between the United States and Germany in one of the most important questions of existence with which a State is confronted. In its whole history the United States has never had a foreign hostile force of invaders upon its territory, foreign armies have never laid waste its fields. Until late in the last century, however, Germany was the battlefield for the then most powerful nations of Europe. The numerous German States and provinces, too, fought among themselves, often on behalf of foreign powers. The European great powers of that day were able, unhindered and unpunished, to take for themselves piece after piece of German territory. In the United States, on the other hand, it was years before the steadily increasing population attained to the boundaries set for it by nature.

Our Bismarck was finally able, in the years from 1864 to 1871, to create a great empire from the many small German States. As he himself often remarked, however, this was possible only because his policies and diplomacy rested upon and were supported by a well trained and powerful army. How the German Empire came into being at that time is well known. A war was necessary because of the fact that the then so powerful France did not desire that North and South Germany should unite. She was not able to prevent this union, was defeated and had to give back to us two old German provinces which she had stolen from the Germans. The old Field Marshal von Moltke said not long after the war of 1870-71 that the Germans would still have to defend Alsace-Lorraine for fifty years more. Perhaps he little realized how prophetic his words were, but he and those who followed him, the German Emperors and the German War Ministers, prepared themselves for this coming defensive struggle and unremittingly devoted their attention to the German Army.

From 1887 on there had been no doubt that in the event of war with France we should have to reckon also with Russia. This meant that the army must be strong enough to be equal to the coming fight on two borders—a tremendous demand upon the resources of a land when one considers that a peaceful folk, devoted to agriculture, industry, and trade, must live for decades in the constant expectation of being obliged, be it tomorrow, be it in ten years, to fight for its life against its two great military neighbors simultaneously. There are, moreover, the great money expenditures, and also the burden of universal military service, which, as is well known, requires every able-bodied male German to serve a number of years with the colors, and later to hold himself ready, first as a reservist, then as member of the Landwehr, and finally as member of the Landsturm, to spring to arms at the call of [pg 256]his supreme war lord, the German Emperor. A warlike, militant nation would not long have endured such conditions, but would have compelled a war and carried it through swiftly. As Bismarck said, however, the German Army, since it is an army of the folk itself, is not a weapon for frivolous aggression. Since the German Army, when it is summoned to war, represents the whole German people, and since the whole German people is peaceably disposed, it follows that the army can only be a defensive organization. If war comes, millions of Germans must go to the front, must leave their parents, their families, their children. They must. And this "must" means not only the command of their Emperor, but also the necessity to defend their own land. Did not this necessity exist, these sons, husbands, and fathers would assuredly not go gladly to the battlefield, and it is likewise certain that those who stayed at home would not rejoice so enthusiastically to see them go as we Germans have seen them rejoicing in these days. Again, then, let us repeat that the German Army is a weapon which can be and is used only for defense against foreign aggressions. When these aggressions come, the whole German folk stands with its army, as it does now.

The German Army is divided into 25 corps in times of peace. In war times reservists, members of the Landwehr, and occasionally also of the Landsturm, are called to the colors. The result is that the German Army on a war footing is a tremendously powerful organ.

Our opponents in foreign countries have for years consistently endeavored to awaken the belief that the German soldier does his obligatory service very unwillingly, that he does not get enough to eat and is badly treated. These assertions are false, and anybody who has seen in these weeks of mobilization how our soldiers, reservists, and Landwehr men departed for the field or reported at the garrisons, anybody who has seen their happy, enthusiastic and fresh faces knows that mishandled men, men who have been drilled as machines, cannot present such an appearance.

On the day the German mobilization was ordered we traveled with some Americans from the western border to Berlin. These Americans said: "We do not know much about your army, but judging by what we have seen in these days there prevails in it and all its arrangements such system that it must win. System must win every time." In this saying there is, indeed, much of truth—order and system are the basis upon which the mighty organization of our army is built.

Now a word concerning the German officer. He, too, has been much maligned, he is often misunderstood by foreigners, and yet we believe that the people of the United States in particular must be able to understand the German officer. One of the greatest sons of free America, George Washington, gave his countrymen the advice to select only gentlemen as officers, and it is according to this principle that the officers of the German Army and Navy are chosen. Their selection is made, moreover, upon a democratic basis, in that the officers' corps of the various regiments decide for themselves whether they will or will not accept as a comrade the person whose name is proposed to them.

One sees that the German Army is not, as many say, a tremendous machine, but rather a great, living organism, which draws its strength and lifeblood from all classes of the whole German folk. The German Army can develop its entire strength only in a war which the folk approve, that is, when a defensive war has been forced upon them. That this is true will have been realized by our friends in the United States before this comes into their hands.

The German fleet is in like manner a weapon of defense. It was very small up to the end of the last century, but has since then been consistently built up according to the ground principles which Mr. Roosevelt has so often in his powerful manner laid down for the American fleet. The question has often been asked, what is there for the German fleet to defend, [pg 257]since the German coastline is so short? The answer is that the strength of a fleet must not be made to depend upon the length of coastlines, but upon how many ships and how much merchandise go out from and enter the harbors, how great oversea interests there are, how large the colonies are and how they are situated, and, finally, how strong the sea powers are with which Germany may have to carry on a war and how they are situated. To meet all these requirements there is but one remedy, namely, either that our fleet shall be strong enough to prevent the strongest sea power from conducting war against us, or that, if war does come, it shall be able so to battle against the mightiest opponent that the latter shall be seriously weakened.

Germany, as especially the Americans know, has become a great merchant marine nation, whose colonies are flourishing. Furthermore, since the land's growing population has greatly increased its strength in the course of the last years, the mistrust and jealousy of Great Britain have in particular been directed steadily against the development of our ocean commerce, and later of our navy. To the upbuilding of the German Navy were ascribed all manner of plans—to attack Great Britain, to make war on Japan, &c. It was even declared by the English press that Germany intended to attack the United States as soon as its fleet was strong enough. Today, when Great Britain has needlessly declared war upon us, the Americans will perhaps believe that our fleet was never planned or built for an attack on any one. Germany desired simply to protect its coasts and its marine interests in the same manner in which it protects its land boundaries. It is realized in the United States as well as here that a fleet can be powerful only when it has a sufficient number of vessels of all classes, and when it is thoroughly and unremittingly schooled in times of peace. We have tried to attain this ideal in Germany, and it may be remarked that the training of the personnel requires greater efforts here, since the principle of universal service is also applied to the fleet, with a resulting short term of service, whereas all foreign fleets have a long term of enlistment.

The nominal strength of the German fleet is regulated by statute, as is also the term—twenty years—at the expiration of which old vessels must automatically be replaced by new ones. This fleet strength is set at forty-one line-of-battle ships, twenty armored cruisers and forty small cruisers, besides 144 torpedo boats and seventy-two submarine vessels. These figures, however, have not been reached. To offset this fact, however, almost the whole German fleet has been kept together in home waters. Great Britain's fleet is much stronger than ours, but despite this the German fleet faces its great opponent with coolness and assurance and with that courage and readiness to undertake great deeds that mark those who know that their land has been unjustifiably attacked. It is utterly incorrect to say, as has been said, that the German naval officers are filled with hatred for other navies, especially for the British. On the contrary, the relations between German and English officers and men have always been good, almost as good as those of the Germans with the American officers. It is not personal hatred that inspires our officers and men with the lust for battle, but their indignation over the unprovoked attack and the realization that, if every one will do his best for the Fatherland in this great hour, it will not be in vain even against the greatest naval power. We, too, are confident of this, for strenuous and faithful effort always has its reward, and this is especially true of our fleet organization. The United States realizes this as well as we, for it, too, has built up a strong and admirably trained fleet by prodigious labor. As is the case with the German fleet, the American Navy also is not built for aggression, but for defense.

Neutrality by the Grace of England.

Janus, a mighty god of the ancient Romans, was represented as having two faces. He could smile and frown simultaneously.

[pg 258]This god Janus is the personification of neutrality according to English ideas. Neutrality smiles when violated by England and frowns when violated by other powers.

The United States got a taste of England's neutrality when, a century ago, the English impressed thousands of American sailors, taking them from American ships on the high seas, when they searched neutral ships and confiscated the enemy's property on board of them, until Congress in Washington voted for the declaration of war against England.

In the great civil war, 1861 to 1864, England had counted on the victory of the Southern States; she recognized them as belligerents and supplied them with warships. This was not considered by England a breach of neutrality until the Minister of the United States declared, on Sept. 5, 1863, that unless England desisted war would result. England yielded.

But, according to the old German proverb, "A cat cannot resist catching mice," she secretly permitted the fitting out of privateers (the Alabama) for the Southern States and was finally forced to pay an indemnity of $15,000,000. England gained, however, more than she lost by this interpretation of neutrality, for by the aid of her privateers American maritime trade passed into English hands and was lost to the Americans.

May God's vengeance fall on Germany! She has violated Belgium's neutrality! the English piously ejaculate. They call themselves God's chosen people, the instrument of Providence for the benefit of the whole universe. They look down upon all other peoples with open or silent contempt, and claim for themselves various prerogatives, in particular the supremacy of the sea, even in American waters, from Jamaica to Halifax.

England's policy has always been to take all, to give back nothing, to constantly demand more, to begrudge others everything. Only where the New World is concerned has England, conscious of her own weakness, become less grasping, since Benjamin Franklin "wrested the sceptre from the tyrants," since the small colonies that fought so valiantly for their liberty rose to form the greatest dominion of the white race.

In the Summer of 1911, during the Franco-German Morocco dispute, the English were determined to assist their old enemies, the French, against Germany, and stationed 160,000 troops along their coast ready for embarkation. For the French coast? No, indeed! For transportation to Antwerp, where the English were to unite with the French Army and combine in the destruction of the German forces. But things did not reach that stage. England was not ready. England and France were resolved not to respect the neutrality of Belgium—the same England that solemnly assures the world that she has never at any time or place committed a breach of neutrality. England has observed neutrality only when compatible with her own interests, which has not often been the case. Her whole dissimulating policy is much more questionable than our one breach of neutrality, committed in self-defense and accompanied by the most solemn promises of indemnity and restitution.

England and France did not give up their plan of attacking Germany through Belgium, and by this means won the approval of the Muscovites. Three against one! It would have been a crime against the German people if the German General Staff had not anticipated this intention. The inalienable right of self-defense gives the individual, whose very existence is at stake, the moral liberty to resort to weapons which would be forbidden except in times of peril. As Belgium would, nevertheless, not acquiesce in a friendly neutrality which would permit the unobstructed passage of German troops through small portions of her territory, although her integrity was guaranteed, the German General Staff was obliged to force this passage in order to avoid the necessity of meeting the enemy on the most unfavorable ground.

The Germans have not forgotten the tone in which the French and Belgian [pg 259]press reported the frequent excursions of French Staff officers and Generals for the purpose of making an exhaustive study of the territory through which the armies are now moving, and who were received with open arms in Belgium and treated like brothers. Belgium has become the vassal of France.

In our place the Government of the United States would not have acted differently. "Inter arma silent leges"—in the midst of arms the laws are silent. Besides, England had interfered beforehand in Germany's plan of campaign by declaring that she would not tolerate an attack upon the northern coast of France.

The German troops, with their iron discipline, will respect the personal liberty and property of the individual in Belgium, just as they did in France in 1870.

The Belgians would have been wise if they had permitted the passage of the German troops. They would have preserved their integrity, and, besides that, would have fared well from the business point of view, for the army would have proved a good customer and paid cash.

Germany has always been a good and just neighbor, to Belgium as well as to the other small powers such as Holland, Denmark and Switzerland, which England in her place would have swallowed up one and all long ago.

The development of industry on the lower Rhine has added to the prosperity of Belgium and has made Antwerp one of the first ports on the Continent, as well as one of the most important centres of exchange for German-American trade.

Without Germany Belgium could never have acquired the Congo.

When England meditated taking possession of the Congo, claiming that great rivers are nothing but arms of the sea and consequently belong to the supreme maritime power, King Leopold turned to Germany for protection and received it from Bismarck, who called the Congo Conference of 1884-5 and obtained the recognition by the powers of the independence of the Congo State.

The struggle of the German States in Europe has some points in common with the struggle of the Independent States of North America (from 1778 to 1783), for it is directed chiefly against England's scheming guardianship, and her practice of weakening the Continental powers by sowing or fostering dissension among them.

While continually protesting her love of peace, England has carried on no fewer than forty wars during the latter half of the nineteenth century, including the great Boer war. She has long imperiled, and in the end has succeeded in disturbing, the peace of Europe by her invidious policy of isolating Germany. Germany, on the other hand, has proved herself since 1871 to be the strongest and most reliable security for the peace of Europe.

The policy of sowing dissension, practiced by England more industriously than ever in recent years, cannot possibly meet with the approval of the peace-loving citizens of the United States, and should be condemned on merely humanitarian as well as commercial grounds.

England aims at being mistress of the Old World in order to occupy either an equal, or a menacing, position toward the New World, as circumstances may dictate. For this purpose she has encouraged this war. The German Federated States of Europe are defending themselves with might and main, and are counting in this struggle for existence on the good-will of the United States of America, for whose citizens they cherish the friendliest feelings, as they have proved at all times. All Americans who have visited Germany will surely bear witness to that effect.

It goes without saying that in time of war the respective participants seek to gain for themselves every possible advantage, including as not the least of these advantages that of having public opinion on their side. It is equally understandable that Governments, for political or military reasons, often endeavor [pg 260]to conceal their real intentions until the decisive moment. In this matter, however, as in the conduct of war itself, there exists the basic principle, acknowledged throughout the civilized world, that no methods may be employed which could not be employed by men of honor even when they are opponents. One cannot, unfortunately, acquit Russia of the charge of employing improper policies against Germany. It must, unfortunately, be said that even the Czar himself did not, at the breaking out of hostilities against Germany, show himself the gentleman upon a throne which he had formerly been believed by every one to be.

The Russian Emperor addressed himself to Kaiser William in moving and friendly expressions, in which, pledging his solemn word and appealing to the grace of God, he besought the Kaiser, shortly before the outbreak of the war, to intervene at Vienna. There exists between Austria-Hungary and Germany an ancient and firm alliance, which makes it the duty of both Governments to afford unconditional support to each other in the moment that either one's vital interests come into question. There can be no doubt that the existence of Austria-Hungary is threatened by the Servian agitation. Despite this, the German Emperor, in offering his final counsels respecting the treatment of Servia and the concessions to be made to Russia, went, in his desire for peace, almost to the point where Austria could have had doubts of Germany's fidelity to the obligations of the alliance. Nevertheless, Russia at this very time not only continued its mobilization against Austria, but also simultaneously brought its troops into a state of preparedness for war against Germany. It is impossible that this could have been done without the order of the Czar. The conduct of the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, of the Chief of the General Staff and of the War Minister was of a piece with this attitude of the ruler. They assured the German Ambassador and the German Military Attaché upon their word of honor that troops were not being mobilized against Germany and that no attack upon Germany was planned. The facts, however, have proved that the decision to make war upon Germany had already been reached at that time.

The reason which impelled the Czar and his chief advisers to employ such base tactics with the help of their word of honor and appeals to the Supreme Being is plain. Russia requires a longer time for mobilization than Germany. In order to offset this disadvantage, to deceive Germany and to win a few days' start, the Russian Government stooped to a course of conduct as to which there can be but one judgment among brave and upright opponents. No one knew better than the Czar the German Emperor's love of peace. This love of peace was reckoned upon in the whole despicable game. Fortunately the plan was perceived on the German side at the right time. Advices received by Germany's representative in St. Petersburg concerning the actual Russian mobilization against Germany moved him to add to the report given him upon the Russian word of honor a statement of his own conviction that an attempt was obviously being made to deceive him. We find also that the character of the Russian operations had been rightly comprehended by so unimpeachable an organ as the English Daily Graphic of Aug. 1, which said: "If the mobilization order is also carried through in the provinces bordering on Germany, the work of the preservers of peace is ended, for Germany will be compelled to answer with the mobilization of her armed forces. We confess that we are unable to understand this attitude of Russia in connection with the renewal of the negotiations with Austria."

It is customary among civilized nations that a formal declaration of war shall precede the beginning of hostilities, and all powers, with the exception of some unimportant, scattered States, have obligated themselves under international law to observe this custom. Neither Russia nor France has observed this obligation. Without a declaration of war Russian troops crossed the German border, [pg 261]opened fire on German troops, and attempted to dynamite bridges and buildings. In like manner, without a declaration of war, French aviators appeared above unfortified cities in South Germany and sought, by throwing bombs, to destroy the railways. French detachments crossed the German border and occupied German villages. French aviators flew across neutral Holland and the then neutral Belgium to carry out warlike plans against the lower Rhine district of Germany. A considerable number of French officers, disguised in German uniforms, tried to cross the Dutch-German frontier in an automobile in order to destroy institutions in German territory. It is plain that both France and Russia desired to compel Germany to make the first step in declaring war, so that the appearance of having broken the peace might, in the eyes of the world, rest upon Germany. The Russian Government even attempted to disseminate through a foreign news agency the report that Germany had declared war on Russia, and it refused, contrary to the usage among civilized nations, to permit to be telegraphed the report of the German Ambassador that Russia had rejected the final German note concerning war and peace.

Germany for its part, in the hope that peace might yet be maintained, subjected itself to the great disadvantage of delaying its mobilization in the first decisive days in the face of the measures of its probable enemy. When, however, the German Emperor realized that peace was no longer possible, he declared war against France and Russia honorably, before the beginning of hostilities, thus bringing into contrast the moral courage to assume the responsibility for the beginning of the conflict as against the moral cowardice of both opponents, whose fear of public opinion was such that they did not dare openly to admit their intentions to attack Germany.

Germany, moreover, cared in a humane and proper manner at the outbreak of the war for those non-combatant subjects of hostile States—traveling salesmen, travelers for pleasure, patients in health resorts, &c.—who happened to be in the country at the time. In isolated cases, where the excitement of the public grew disquieting, the authorities immediately intervened to protect persons menaced. In Russia, however, in France and especially in Belgium the opposite of decency and humanity prevailed. Instead of referring feelings of national antipathy and of national conflicting interests to the decision of the battlefield, the French mishandled in the most brutal manner the German population and German travelers in Paris and other cities, who neither could nor wished to defend themselves, and who desired solely to leave the hostile country at once. The mob threatened and mishandled Germans in the streets, in the railway stations and in the trains, and the authorities permitted it.

The occurrences in Belgium are infamous beyond all description. Germany would have exposed itself to the danger of a military defeat if it had still respected the neutrality of Belgium after it had been announced that strong French detachments stood ready to march through that country against the advancing German Army. The Belgium Government was assured that its interests would be conscientiously guarded if it would permit the German Army to march through its territory. Its answer to this assurance was a declaration of war. In making this declaration it acted perhaps not wisely but unquestionably within its formal rights. It was, however, not right, but, on the contrary, a disgraceful breach of right, that the eyes of wounded German soldiers in Belgium were gouged out, and their ears and noses cut off; that surgeons and persons carrying the wounded were shot at from houses.

Private dwellings of Germans in Antwerp were plundered, German women were dragged naked through the streets by the mob and shot to death before the eyes of the police and the militia. Captains of captured German ships in Antwerp were told that the authorities could not guarantee their lives, German [pg 262]tourists were robbed of their baggage, insulted and mishandled, sick persons were driven from the German hospital, children were thrown from the windows of German homes into the streets and their limbs were broken. Trustworthy reports of all these occurrences, from respectable and responsible men, are at hand. We perceive with the deepest indignation that the cruelties of the Congo have been outdone by the motherland. When it comes to pass that in time of war among nations the laws of humanity respecting the helpless and the unarmed, the women and children, are no longer observed, the world is reverting to barbarism. Even in wartimes humanity and honor should still remain the distinguishing marks of civilization. That French and Russians, in their endeavors to spy upon Germany and destroy her institutions, should disguise themselves in German uniforms is a sorry testimony to the sense of honor possessed by our opponents. He who ventures to conduct espionage in a hostile land, or secretly to plant bombs, realizes that he risks the penalty of death, whether he be a civilian or a member of the army. Up to the present, however, it has not been customary to use a uniform, which should be respected even by the enemy, to lessen the personal risk of the spy and to facilitate his undertaking.

For a number of years there have been increasing indications that France, Russia and England were systematically spying upon the military institutions of Germany. In the eight years from 1906 to 1913; 113 persons were found guilty of attempted or accomplished espionage of a grave nature. The methods employed by these spies included theft, attacks upon military posts and the employment of German officers' uniforms as disguises. The court proceedings threw a clear light upon the organization and operations of espionage in Germany. This espionage was directed from central points in foreign countries, often in the small neighboring neutral States. Repeatedly it appeared that the foreign embassies and consulates in Germany assisted in this work; it was also discovered that Russia, France and England were exchanging reports which they had received concerning Germany's means of defense.

This espionage system was supported with large funds. It endeavored whenever possible to seduce military persons and officials to betray their country, and, when this was not possible, it devoted its attention to doubtful characters of every sort. It began its work with petty requests of a harmless appearance, followed these with inducements to violations of duty, and then proceeded with threats of exposure to compel its victims to betray their country further. Exact instructions, complete in the minutest detail, were given to the spies for the carrying on of their work; they were equipped with photographic apparatus, with skeleton keys, forged passes, &c.; they received fixed monthly salaries, special bonuses for valuable information, and high rewards for especially secret matters, such as army orders, descriptions of weapons and plans of fortifications. Principal attention was paid to our boundaries, railroads, bridges and important buildings on lines of traffic, which were spied upon by specially trained men. With the reports of these spies as their basis, our opponents have carefully planned the destruction of the important German lines of communication. The extraordinary watchfulness of the German military officials immediately before the declaration of war and since then has been able to render futile the whole system of foreign attempts against our means of communication in every single instance, but a great number of such attempts have been made. All these things prove beyond doubt that a war against Germany has long been planned by our opponents.

Germany has now not only to battle against a world in arms, but it must also defend itself against lies and slanders [pg 263]which have been piled up around it like a hostile rampart. There is no cable at our disposal. England has either cut the cables, or is in possession of them. No German description of what has actually occurred can be sent by telegraph; the wires are carrying into the world only the distortions of our enemies. Germany is shut off as with a hedge from the outside world, and the world is supplied solely with news given out by our enemies. This language is strictly true; for the boldest, nay, the most impudent imagination would be unable to invent anything to exceed the false and absurd reports already printed by foreign newspapers.

In view of what we have experienced during this first week of the war we can already calmly assert that when the editors of foreign newspapers come later to compare their daily news of this week with the actual occurrences as testified to by authentic history, they will all open their eyes in astonishment and anger over all the lies which the countries hostile to Germany have sent over the cables to bamboozle the whole world. Much of all this has already become ridiculous; we must laugh over it despite the solemnity of the crisis in which we are living—for example, the bestowal of the cross of the Legion of Honor upon the city of Liége by the French President because it victoriously repulsed the attack of the Germans. Witness, too, the telegrams of congratulation sent by the King of England and the Czar of Russia to the Belgian King upon the victory of Liége! The joy over such "German defeats" will prove just as brief as the jubilation over such "Belgian victories." Such lies have short legs, and the truth will in any case soon overtake them.

But there are other lies of a more serious character and of more dangerous import—all such as misrepresent Germany's attitude and defame German character. Such defamation is designed to disturb old friendships and transform them into bitter estrangement; such defamation can also attain its hostile purpose wherever people do not say daily to themselves, "It is an enemy that reports such things about Germany; let us be wise and suspend our judgment till we know actual results, till we know what is surely the truth."

Let us select several facts as examples and as evidence—facts connected with the preparation for this war, as well as with the conduct of it thus far.

All the cables controlled by the English-French-Russian coalition disseminate the lie about the ostensibly "preventive war" that Germany wished and prepared for. The German "White Book" prints documents proving the white purity of the German conscience as represented by Kaiser, Chancellor, and people. It reveals also the profound grief of the German Kaiser over the sly and insidious perfidy of the Czar, toward whom he steadily maintained German fidelity even in hours of grave danger. What Russia did was more than a mere attack, it was a treacherous assault. The following facts prove this:

And France?

And England?

In London war must already have been decided upon by July 31; the English Admiralty had even before that date advised Lloyd's against insuring German ships. On the same day the German Government gave emphatic support in Vienna to the English mediatory proposal of Sir Edward Grey. But the entire English fleet had already been assembled.

Of course, English public opinion was and still is divided. As late as Aug. 1 The Daily Graphic wrote in reference to the Russian mobilization order: "Will the Russian order also be carried out in the provinces on the German frontier? If so, then the labor of the peace-preservers is at an end, for Germany is compelled to answer with the mobilization of its armed forces. We confess that we are not able to understand this attitude of Russia, in view of the resumption of negotiations at Vienna."

And a leaflet distributed in the streets of London said that "a war for Russia is a war against civilization."

So much as to the preparations for the war—and now we take up the conduct of the war itself.

By glancing at the foreign press during this one week we have been able to collect the following specimen pieces of news:

There is not one word of truth in this. The Admiralty itself appears later to have recovered its senses; at least, it denied a Reuter story about a "great English naval victory near the Dogger Bank." But the English manufactories of lies are already so actively at work that members of Parliament have protested in the House itself against the "lying reports of the English press."

Not a single word of this is true. At present not one English soldier has been landed.

In a similar way the Baltic Sea has become the scene of invented "battles"—of "German defeats," of course; the Russian Baltic Fleet sank a German war vessel in a battle that never occurred.

And, "The Russian vanguard has crossed the German frontier without meeting with opposition." As a matter of fact there is not a single Russian [pg 265]soldier on German soil. All inroads have been repulsed, and the German offensive has everywhere been successful.

A Dutch newspaper prints the following report from France:

Such absurdity in the face of the unbroken unanimity of the entire German people and despite the manifest enthusiasm of the Alsace-Lorrainers for the German cause!

Equally stupid and made up for incurably credulous readers is an official report of the French War Ministry—not a private rumor, be it noted, but an official communication. It says:

Does such stuff call for any refutation at all?

A typical example of how it is sought to work upon public opinion by means of systematic lying is afforded by the capture of Liége.

The fact is that this Belgian stronghold, along with its forts, which contained a garrison of 20,000 men, was taken by storm on Aug. 7 by the German troops, who fought with unparalleled bravery, and that 3,000 to 4,000 Belgian prisoners of war are already on their way to Germany.

Yet on Aug. 9—two days after the fall of Liége—a dispatch was still sent to the Dutch press, saying: "The Liége forts are still in Belgian hands."

And on Aug. 8, thirty-six hours after the fall of Liége—a dispatch was sent from Paris to the newspapers of Rome, saying:

Another newspaper reported as follows: "The King of England sent a congratulatory dispatch to the King of Belgium upon his victory at Liége; seven German regiments were slain."

At Paris itself a note of the French War Ministry—published on the evening of Aug. 7, Liége having fallen in the early morning of that day—mentions the resistance of Liége and says that the forts are still holding out; that the Germans who had entered the city on Thursday by passing between the forts had evacuated it on Friday; and that the Belgian division that went to the assistance of the city had therefore not even made an attack. The official note concludes from all this that the resistance of the Belgians was seriously disturbing the plan of the Germans, who were building hopes upon a rapid success.

And four full days after the capture of Liége the French Minister at Berne reported officially: "Liége has not yet been taken; the German troops were repulsed."

At Copenhagen the following dispatches were published: "The English and French troops had effected a junction with the Belgian Army and had entered Liége and made many German prisoners, among them a nephew of the German Kaiser."

Similarly at Stockholm: "The Germans had suffered a severe repulse."

Again a dispatch from Paris to Rome: "The Germans had been driven back behind the Moselle and were begging for an armistice; the French had passed Namur and were pressing forward in forced marches, while 500,000 English were falling upon the German flank."

[pg 266]Still another official report from Paris: "Liége is becoming the grave of the 150,000 Germans who are breaking their heads against its walls; the Belgians had taken 3,000 prisoners, who were in a terrible condition; but for their good fortune of falling into captivity they would have starved to death."

In contrast to all this let us take the unvarnished truth as in the reported simple words of the German Quartermaster General:

It is not the German people alone that will have cause to remember Liége; the whole world will do well to learn from the case of Liége that an organized manufactory of lies is trying to deceive the public opinion of all the nations. Glorious victories are converted into "defeats with heavy losses," and the strong moral discipline of the German troops is slanderously described in the reports of the imaginative, phrase-loving French as cruelty—just as in 1870 the Prussian Uhlans were described as thrusting through with their lances all the French babies and pinning them fast to the walls.

How far the "grande nation" has already degenerated, and how far the Belgian population, akin to the French both in blood and in sentiments, imitate the French in their Balkan brutality, is illustrated by two examples. One of these, in the form of a German official warning, says: "The reports at hand about the fighting around Liége show that the population of the country took part in the battle. Our troops were fired upon from ambush. Physicians were shot at while following their profession. Cruelties were practiced by the population on wounded soldiers. There is also news at hand showing that German patrols in the vicinity of Metz were fired at from ambush from the French side. It may be that these occurrences are due to the composition of the population in those industrial regions, but it may also be that France and Belgium are preparing for a guerrilla warfare upon our troops. If the latter alternative should prove true, and this proof be strengthened through repetitions of these occurrences, then our opponents will have themselves to thank if this war be carried on with unrelenting severity even against the guilty population. The German troops, who are accustomed to preserve discipline and to wage war only against the armed forces of the hostile State, cannot be blamed if, in just self-defense, they give no quarter. The hope of influencing the result of the war by turning loose the passions of the populace will be frustrated by the unshaken energy of our leaders and our troops. Before neutral foreign countries, however, it must be demonstrated, even at the beginning of this war, that it was not the German troops who caused the war to take on such forms."

The details of the cruelties, here only [pg 267]hinted at, on the Belgian and French side, are supplied and proved by an eye-witness, a German physician, who reports:

Enemies on all sides! With dishonorable weapons against us, and with documentary lies for the rest of the world! Let us calmly allow them to continue lying and slandering as they have begun—it will result finally in injuring themselves. The world will very soon see through this impudent, unabashed game; and it will finally side with the people which keeps to the truth, Only the weakling lies and swindles; the strong man loves and honors truth. Let us act like the strong man in this struggle!

Respect for the foreigner, protection for his person and property have at all times been considered sacred among civilized people. Germany can without exaggeration claim to have upheld this respect and this protection in these fateful days. Except for a few insignificant incidents which took place in several large cities, where the natural excitement of the people and the legitimate defense against an insolent system of spying led to the molesting and arrest of foreigners—mostly Russians—the measures taken against the citizens of hostile nations did not exceed what was absolutely necessary to the safety of the country. The Imperial Government and likewise the Federated States have refrained from expelling "en masse" Frenchmen, Russians, Belgians and Englishmen. It was, of course, unavoidable to take measures for the detention of such persons as seemed suspicious and for the internation of strangers liable to be called to take arms against Germany. This took place in cities, e.g., Berlin, where these men were taken away as "prisoners of war," as soon as the "state of war" had been proclaimed, and placed in special rooms or camps. Lodgings and food are such as seem requisite and the treatment of these prisoners is according to their own opinion very kind. The Russian agricultural laborers constitute a special group of foreigners in Germany: There are about 40,000 to 50,000 of them, men and women.

From various parts of the country it is unanimously announced that these people are very glad not to be obliged to return to Russia. They are glad to remain in Germany, and willingly continue their work of gathering the rich German grain, potato and hay crops. Should there be any difficulties, these workmen would also have to be internated. No measures at all have been taken against women and children belonging to hostile States. They are left free to move about as they wish. Should they remain in Germany they can be sure that they will be subject to no other inconvenience except such as the general state of war inflicts upon Germans. The authorities will protect their persons, and their private property is respected. Nobody will touch it—as nobody has touched it so far.

If the German people and the German Government consider the respect they owe the foreigner as a sacred law, even though the foreigner belongs to the enemy, this respect is enhanced by affection and gratitude in the case of foreigners [pg 268]whose countries are friendly or neutral. Thousands and thousands of Americans, Swiss, Dutch, Italians and Scandinavians are still living in German countries. They may be sure that they can live as freely here as any German citizen. Should it be possible for them to return home, the best wishes will accompany them. The property they leave here will be protected. This is guaranteed by the authorities and by influential private persons. Should they stay in Germany, however, the German people will express their sense of gratitude for any friendly help they may lend, by increased respect and protection.

A strong contrast is noticeable between Germany's attitude toward foreigners and the facts revealed just now as to the treatment meted out in inimical countries not only to Germans but to other foreigners. Truly, in England there has been some effort to act according to the usages of civilized nations when engaged in warfare. Germans and Austrians have been insulted and molested; there has been some occasional destruction of property in stores; but as far as can be judged these were excesses of an uncontrollable mob. A general expulsion has not been ordered, and it is to be hoped that the Germans living in the United Kingdom and in its colonies will not suffer too heavy damages, in person or in property. Russia, France and Belgium, on the other hand, have by the ill-treatment and plundering of foreigners living in their countries struck themselves out of the list of civilized nations. Innumerable reports from expelled or fugitive people prove this, and official reports confirm them. Also the press of neutral, neighboring countries, such as Switzerland, Holland, and Italy, is full of similar complaints. Owing to the scarcity of news from Russia, the facts known so far only concern Petersburg, where German and Austrian men and women, residents or transients, were beaten and stoned in the streets. Here were also some cruel mutilations and murders. The beautiful building of the German Embassy in Petersburg was attacked by the mob. And the police watched all these misdeeds with crossed arms or even assisted. Probably what took place in Petersburg also occurred in other Russian cities; we shall soon know.

There are a great many complaints against the French and the Belgians. On the evening of Aug. 1 the mobilization was announced, and the next morning the official order was posted on the walls, that within twenty-four hours from the beginning of that day all Germans and Austrians, irrespective of sex, age or profession, would have to leave France. Those who remained and could not reach the boundary would be taken to the southwestern part of the country and imprisoned. There were few trains for Belgium or Switzerland. Thousands and thousands who had to abandon their property rushed to the stations with wife and children, fought for room in the overcrowded trains, surrounded by a howling mob, and even then were punched and slapped by policemen. During the trip there was nothing but misery. Men and women fell ill, children died. The refugees had to cross the Belgian boundary, walking a distance of six or seven kilometers in the middle of the night, dead tired, their luggage stolen—sometimes, it is said, by officials. In Belgium the same tragedy occurred as in France. And then came the salvation. The cordial, hospitable reception by the Germans in Holland and Switzerland is unanimously praised and appreciated.

The reports of brutal acts from Paris, Antwerp, Brussels, would be incredible were they not confirmed hundredfold. The most brutal and insulting threats of death were flung by processions of people going through the streets to all those who looked like foreigners. They were severely ill-treated. Houses and stores were upset, furniture and the like were thrown into the streets, employers and working people were dragged out, women were stripped and pushed through the streets, children were thrown out of windows. Knives, swords, sticks and revolvers were used. One could fill books with the details, but they are all equally [pg 269]cruel. Not only Germans and Austrians were expelled and ill-treated, but citizens of neutral States shared this awful lot. Thousands of Italians were expelled, as well as numerous Rumanians. The press in both countries complains bitterly and asks what has become of those who remained in France and were imprisoned in the south—but nobody knows.

History will place this ill-treatment and oppression of foreigners on record. The responsibility rests, not with an uncontrollable mob, but with the Government and the authorities of the two countries who have always boasted of their culture.

Politicians and commercial men must base their plans upon facts, as they are and not as they wish they were, otherwise they fail. France has closed its eyes not only to the great intellectual and moral assists of Germany but also to its commercial resources.

France has repeatedly declared that Germany could not effect a serious political opposition, because a war would result in the ruin of its commercial and financial strength. This we heard in the Morocco crisis, also in the Balkan wars. Germany's love of peace which was tested in the above-mentioned cases strengthened the French in their error. He, however, who has taken the trouble to visit Germany and the Germans in their places of employment—and especially Americans in recent years have done this, however, also many Englishmen, who in vain have protested against the war with Germany—he can testify to the astonishing commercial advancement which Germany has made since its political union by Bismarck.

A few facts and statistics may recall this to memory. The population of Germany has since 1870, immigrants excluded, increased from 40,000,000 to 67,000,000, round numbers. Incomes and wages in particular have approximately doubled during the last generation; savings deposits have increased sixfold. Although, only a generation ago, commerce and trade employed only about two-fifths of the population, now more than three-fifths are engaged in this field of work, and Germany, as a result of its agricultural economy and increased intense farming, is today the third largest agricultural country of the world. In the coal and iron industries Germany is second only to America. In one generation its coal production increased two and a half fold, its raw iron production almost fourfold. During the same period of time the capital of the German banks increased fourfold and their reserve fund eightfold. Characteristic of Germany is the fact that hand in hand with this active private initiative is a strong feeling for the great universal interests and for organic co-operation of private and State resources. This feeling explains the perfect working of our State activities, in particular our railways, 95 per cent. of which are owned by the Government and which yield an essentially higher revenue than those in England or France; it explains further the willing assumption of the great financial burdens which general insurance imposes upon those engaged in private enterprises and which today is proving a blessing to almost the entire laboring force of Germany, to an extent which has not yet been realized by any other country.

What economic value to the world has a nation which for more than forty years has concentrated all its energy in peaceful industry? Does any one deny that Germany's great technical and commercial advancement has been a blessing in respect to the development of the world? Has not the commercial advancement in Germany had the effect of awakening new productive powers in all parts of the world and of adding new territories which engage in the exchange of goods with the civilized nations of the world? Since the founding of the new German [pg 270]Empire, German foreign trade has increased from 5½ to approximately 20 billion marks. Germany has become the best customer of a great number of countries. Not only has the German consumption of provisions and luxuries increased in an unusual degree, also that of meat, tropical fruits, sugar, tobacco and colonial products, but above all else that of raw materials, such as coal, iron, copper and other metals, cotton, petroleum, wood, skins, &c. Germany furnishes a market for articles of manufacture also, for American machinery, English wool, French luxury articles, &c. One is absolutely wrong in the belief that the competition of German industry in the world market has been detrimental to other commercial nations. Legitimate competition increases the business of all concerned.

The United States of America has reaped especial profit from Germany's flourishing commercial condition. Germany purchases more from the United States of America than from any other country of the world. Germany buys annually from the United States of America approximately $170,000,000 worth of cotton, $75,000,000 worth of copper, $60,000,000 worth of wheat, $40,000,000 animal fat, $20,000,000 mineral oil and the same amount of vegetable oil. In 1890 the import and export trade between Germany and the United States amounted to only $100,000,000, in 1913 to about $610,000,000. Germany today imports from the United States goods to the value of $430,000,000, while she exports to the United States nearly $180,000,000 worth. No nation therefore can judge as well as the United States what German commerce means to the world.

In what condition are the finances of Germany? In this field our opponents will be obliged to change their views. In 1912 Germany's national debt was about 14 marks per capita lower than England's. The public debt of France per capita was far more than double that of Germany. Germany, however, has large national assets which offset its liabilities. For example, the stocks of the Prussian railways alone exceed by far the aggregate amount of the Prussian debt, the income of the railways alone is essentially greater than the amount which the interest and amortization of the entire State debt demand. The war, which, according to the French conception, was destined to bring about the financial and commercial ruin of Germany, has brought forth the astonishing result that the famous French money market was the first to fail in this crisis. As early as July 25, before the rejection of the Austrian ultimatum by Servia had been made known, the offer of 3 per cent. redeemable French notes to the French Exchange was so great that the Chambre Syndicale des Agents de Change in the interest of the public prohibited the quotation of a lower rate than 78 per cent., while bids of 74 per cent. had already been submitted. Sale in blank was absolutely forbidden, and in the coulisse business was at a standstill. A few days later the July liquidation, in the official market as well as in the coulisse, was postponed until the end of August, which action proved the necessity of a period of grace. On July 31 the French savings banks, at the command of the Government, suspended daily payments and paid out sums to the amount of 50 francs, fourteen days' notice being necessary. The London money market, too, has hardly stood the war test. On July 30 the Bank of England was obliged to raise its rate of discount from 3 to 4 per cent., several days later to 8 per cent., and again after a few days to the incredible rate of 10 per cent. In contrast to this the President of the German Reichsbank was able, on the 1st of August, to declare that the directorate, because of the strength of the Reichsbank and the solid constitution of the German money market, did not consider it necessary to follow England's example. The German Reichsbank has therefore not exceeded the rate of 6 per cent. Worse yet was the fact that England, on Aug. 2, was obliged to require grace on exchange, and France, on Aug. 3, grace on its accounts-current and Lombard loans. Although along with England and France, also Russia, Austria, Italy, Belgium, and other nations required temporary credit, [pg 271]Germany to date has not deemed it necessary to ask for time in meeting its obligations. Savings banks, other banks and financial institutions are meeting all demands without restriction. The fact that the English money market, which up to the present time has been considered the financial centre of international trade, has failed, will bring many a serious thought to all commercial men interested in the world market.

German commerce has doubtless been temporarily injured by the war, but the esprit de corps and organization which animate the German Nation are not only a firm foundation for German commerce, but also a strong support for the further development of the commerce and trade of the entire civilized world, if, as we hope, peace soon be re-established.

An appeal to American friends

The American citizen who is now leaving Europe, which has been turned into an enormous military camp, may consider himself fortunate that he will soon be able to set foot in the New World, where he will be enabled again to take up his business pursuits. In the meantime old Europe is being torn asunder by a terrible war among its various peoples. It will make him happy again to greet mountain and valley, field and garden which are not threatened nor trampled down by armies or covered with blood; again to see cities in which business and traffic are not brought to a standstill by calling in all men capable of military service; and he may thank fortune that his people have been given room enough in which to expand and to permit them freely to unfold their power; that they are spared the great necessity of resisting the tightening ring of enemies in the east and west, on land and water, in a struggle for national existence.

But the American will feel the effects of the fate of the Old World. Even though he knows his own country is not directly involved, he will certainly realize that the great net of international traffic and the progress of his country are connected by many strong ties to the life and prosperity of European peoples. He will be affected by every victory and defeat, just as by the sun and rain in his own country. He will doubtless remember that of all European countries Germany is the best customer of the United States, from which she purchases yearly over 1,000,000,000 marks in cotton, food, metal, and technical products. If Germany is economically ruined, which is the wish of Russia, France, and England and all allied friends of wretched Servia, it would mean the loss of a heavy buyer to America, and thereby cause a serious loss to America which could not easily be made good. It would be a great blow to American export trade, of which Germany handles not less than 14 per cent. yearly.

The material loss is not the only feature. In the economic struggle in the world markets American and German commercial men have learned mutually to appreciate one another, to appreciate one another more highly than do any other two rivals. The time is long past when the American pictured the German as one of thousands, shut up in a room, surrounded by documents and parchments, speculating about the unknown outside world, and the same is true of the German's idea of the American—a money-hungry barbarian. Two nations in which so much kindred blood flows and which are connected by so many historical events understand each other better today than formerly. Above all, they have a mutual understanding regarding the ideal in commercial life: A man engaged in work not for the sake of the profit, but for the sake of the work he is doing; one who gives all his strength to his task, and who works for the general welfare of the people as a whole, considering his position as an office and his wealth as an obligation, not as the final aim, but as a basis for the realization of higher attainments. He places the value of character and the development of the creative powers of man higher than all economic success. Two nations united by such common inclinations [pg 272]and ideals, boldness of enterprise, far-sightedness, quickness of decision, and admiration for intellectual achievements, cannot help being exceedingly congenial to each other. What concerns one today concerns the other.

Does it sound like a paradox when I say Germany's struggle concerns not only her own destiny, but to a considerable extent that of America? Does the United States consider itself entirely immune from the warlike complications brought about by the Servian murder of Princes and Russia's breach of faith? In any event, it will be difficult for it to say: "What's Hecuba to me?" One thing should be clearly understood on the shores of the five oceans, that the cause of this most terrible war does not emanate from the dark Balkans, or from a Russian military group, but from envy and hate which healthy, young and striving Germany has aroused in her older rivals; not because this or that demand was made by one Cabinet and refused by another, but because it was believed there was finally an opportunity to destroy the hated opponent who threatened to put the older Western European powers in the shade, and for this reason England and France put their strength into the service of criminal and brutal Servia. The following statistics will, perhaps, throw some light on the development of the foreign trade of the principal countries from 1870 to 1913 (in billions of marks):

In these forty-three years, which have been decisive in the development of international economy, England, France and Russia have not been able even to increase their foreign trade three times, while Germany and the United States have increased theirs five times. The trade of Germany and the United States has increased from 7.6 to 38 billion marks. If these figures show nothing else, they show on which side the American sympathy will be. This war, provoked by Russia because of an outrageous desire for revenge, supported by England and France, has no other motive than envy of Germany's position in economic life, and of her people, who are fighting for a place in the sun. "Right or wrong, Germany must not grow." That is the turning point of a policy which the French Republic drilled into the Muscovites. Let us consider the adversaries of Germany. Russia, the classic land of power and terrible exploitation of the people for the benefit of a degenerated aristocracy. France, a type of a nation in which there is not even enough enterprise to increase the productiveness of the country. England, which has so long felt its glory vanishing and in the meantime has remained far behind its younger rival in financial and economic equipment. One can easily imagine the feelings of these peoples when they observe the rapid and successful growth of Germany, and wonders if these same feelings will not one day be directed against the youthful North American giant. In this war it shall be decided which is the stronger—the organized inertia of the tired and envious, or the unfolding of power in the service of a strong and sacrificing life. To know that we have American friendship in this struggle will mean a great moral support for us in the coming trying days, for we know that the country of George Washington and Abraham Lincoln places itself only on the side of a just cause and one worthy of humanity's blessing.

By The Associated Press.

WASHINGTON, Sept. 17.—Germany has suggested informally that the United States should undertake to elicit from Great Britain, France, and Russia a statement of the terms under which the Allies would make peace.

The suggestion was made by the Imperial Chancellor, von Bethmann-Hollweg, to Ambassador Gerard at Berlin as a result of an inquiry sent by the American Government to learn whether Emperor William was desirous of discussing peace, as recently had been reported.

No reply was made by Emperor William himself, nor did the Imperial Chancellor indicate whether or not he spoke on behalf of the Emperor. Ambassador Gerard, in a cable dispatch to President Wilson, repeated the Chancellor's remarks from recollection, substantially as follows:

The above is all that Ambassador Gerard communicated as to his conversation. He added only the brief comment that he, himself, thought the way might possibly be opened to mediation. President Wilson did not regard the message, however, as bringing anything tangible. He referred to the Chancellor's conversation as non-committal and incidental to the acknowledgment of the American Government's inquiry. The President indicated that he rather expected a reply to the inquiry to be sent eventually from the Emperor himself, although he realizes that the Imperial Chancellor may have consulted the Kaiser by telegraph before talking informally with the American Ambassador.

President Wilson took no action as a result of the message, waiting to hear from Ambassador Gerard whether anything of a more formal character could be obtained by him which the United States might communicate to Great Britain, France, and Russia. It was understood tonight that the British and French Ambassadors who are in Washington were not informed officially or unofficially by Secretary Bryan of the conversation between the Imperial German Chancellor and Ambassador Gerard.

Germany's position is that she will give her opinion on terms of peace when she has received a definite statement from the Allies of their proposals. The statement that Germany did not want war, but had it forced upon her, as well as the declaration that she wanted a lasting peace, is almost identical with the remarks which Sir Edward Grey made to Ambassador Page in London last week. The British Foreign Secretary said England wanted no temporary truce, but a permanent peace, and one that would safeguard her against sudden attacks such as Germany had made.

President's Future Course.

The general belief in well-informed circles tonight was that the President, [pg 274]after waiting a few days for more information from Berlin, probably would instruct the American Ambassadors at London, Paris, and Petrograd to communicate what the Imperial German Chancellor had said to Ambassador Gerard. It was believed the Ambassadors would be asked to reiterate the wish of the American Government to be of service in bringing about peace and to point out the readiness of the United States to communicate to Germany and Austria any statement of terms which the Allies might care to make.

Diplomatists are disposed to believe that through such informal conversations something definite in the way of peace terms may yet be obtained as a working basis. If a concord of opinion for the discussion of peace terms were reached President Wilson then would endeavor to obtain an acceptance by all the belligerents of the original tender of good offices. This would not mean a cessation of hostilities, unless the mediating power specifically made it a condition of mediation and all the belligerents agreed to it. An armistice would not hinder military movements or preparations, serving merely as a truce while peace was discussed.

President Wilson already has indicated that he believes that the final reckoning of the war should be made in a conference of the European powers, and it would be the function of the United States to preside at such a conference if its services as a mediator were accepted.

Various reports were current today that Germany had named several conditions under which she would make peace, that she had refused proposals to alter the territorial status of her empire and possessions, and would cede no territory or dismantle her fleet, but it was said authoritatively that nothing of this character was contained in any of the messages from Berlin to the American Government.

A statement made at the White House today was the first authoritative acknowledgment that any inquiry on the subject of Germany's attitude concerning peace had been made by the United States. Officials heretofore have maintained silence in regard to the effort made by the Government to get at the bottom of the expression in favor of peace reported to have been made by the German Emperor to the Imperial Chancellor and mentioned in a private conversation in New York by Count von Bernstorff, the German Ambassador to the United States.

What was said by Count von Bernstorff in that conversation brought Oscar S. Straus post-haste to Washington, and as a result of what he told Secretary Bryan instructions were sent to Ambassador Gerard to ascertain whether the remarks attributed to the Emperor were to be taken as an indication that the German Government would not be averse to the exercise of the good offices of the United States in an effort to end the hostilities in Europe.

The conversation at which the German Ambassador made the statement occurred at the house of James Speyer, the banker, in New York. Oscar S. Straus, a member of the Permanent Tribunal of Arbitration at The Hague, was present. In the course of a discussion of the war in Europe and the prospects of peace Count von Bernstorff, it is understood, said that, while he had no advices from the Imperial Government since he had left Berlin, he recalled that the Imperial Chancellor had told him that he believed Emperor William would be willing to discuss a proposal of peace through mediation.

With the permission of Count von Bernstorff, Mr. Straus came to Washington and told Secretary Bryan of what the German Ambassador had said. On the following day Count von Bernstorff made a trip from New York to Washington and had an interview with Secretary Bryan.

It has been understood that Mr. Bryan, in an excess of caution, desired to ask Count von Bernstorff personally if he would consent to having Ambassador [pg 275]Gerard instructed to make inquiry of the German Government as to whether the conversation between the Emperor and the Imperial Chancellor might be regarded as indicating that an offer of mediation of the United States would not be unwelcome to Germany. Count von Bernstorff is understood to have assented to Mr. Bryan's suggestion, and the instructions to Mr. Gerard followed.

Speeches by British Ministers.

[pg 276]Sir John Simon, British Attorney General, in Speech Before Altrincham Liberals, at Manchester, July 25.

We have been so filled with our own political development that some of us may not have noticed how serious a situation is threatening on the Continent of Europe. All I will say about it this afternoon is this—if times of anxiety are coming into relationships between different European powers, we in this country, and I think not only Liberals among us, have reason to be glad that our foreign administration is in the calm, cool hands of Sir Edward Grey.[06] [Cheers.] And let us all resolve that, whatever may be the difficulties and dangers which threaten the peaceful relations in Europe, the part which this country plays shall from beginning to end be the part of a mediator simply desirous of promoting better and more peaceful relations.

[pg 277]London Times Report, July 27, of Speech by Under Secretary Acland.

F.D. Acland, Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs, speaking at an open-air Liberal demonstration at Steyning, Sussex, on Saturday [July 25], said there was a cloud over Europe, the position there being far graver and more serious than the position in Ireland. No one could imagine the disasters which a war in which a great European power was involved might bring to the whole world. He hoped the power of accommodating the difficulties in the same way as in the Balkan trouble last year would be found effective. The whole of the influence of this country would be used in the interests of peace.

Statement in House of Commons, July 27, by Sir Edward Grey, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

The House will, of course, be aware from the public press of what the nature of the situation in Europe is at the present moment. I think it is due to the House that I should give in short narrative form the position which his Majesty's Government have so far taken up. ["Hear, hear."] Last Friday morning I received from the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador the text of the communication made by the Austro-Hungarian Government to the powers, which has appeared in the press, and which included textually the demand made by the Austro-Hungarian Government upon Servia.

In the afternoon I saw other Ambassadors, and expressed the view that as long as the dispute was one between Austria-Hungary and Servia alone I felt that we had no title to interfere, but that if the relations between Austria-Hungary and Russia became threatening, the question would then be one of the peace of Europe—a matter that concerned us all.

[pg 278]I did not then know what view the Russian Government had taken of the situation, and without knowing how things were likely to develop I could not make any immediate proposition; but I said that if relations between Austria-Hungary and Russia did become threatening, the only chance of peace appeared to me to be that the four powers—Germany, France, Italy, and Great Britain—who were not directly interested in the Servian question, should work together both in St. Petersburg and Vienna simultaneously to get both Austria-Hungary and Russia to suspend military operations while the four powers endeavored to arrange a settlement.

After I had heard that Austria-Hungary had broken off diplomatic relations with Servia I made, by telegraph yesterday afternoon, the following proposal, as a practical method of applying the views that I had already expressed:

I instructed his Majesty's Ambassadors in Paris, Berlin, and Rome to ask the Governments to which they were accredited whether they would be willing to arrange that the French, German, and Italian Ambassadors in London should meet me in a conference to be held in London immediately to endeavor to find a means of arranging the present difficulties. At the same time I instructed his Majesty's Ambassadors to ask those Governments to authorize their representatives in Vienna, St. Petersburg, and Belgrade to inform the Governments there of the proposed conference and to ask them to suspend all active military operations pending the result of the conference.

To that I have not yet received complete replies, and it is of course a proposal in which the co-operation of all four powers is essential. In a crisis so grave as this the efforts of one power alone to preserve the peace must be quite ineffective.

The time allowed in this matter has been so short that I have had to take the risk of making a proposal without the usual preliminary steps of trying to ascertain whether it would be well received. But, where matters are so grave and the time so short, the risk of proposing something that is unwelcome or ineffective cannot be avoided. I cannot but feel, however, assuming that the text of the Servian reply as published this morning in the press is accurate, as I believe it to be, that it should at least provide a basis on which a friendly and impartial group of powers, including powers who are equally in the confidence of Austria-Hungary and of Russia, should be able to arrange a settlement that would be generally acceptable.

It must be obvious to any person who reflects upon the situation that the moment the dispute ceases to be one between Austria-Hungary and Servia and becomes one in which another great power is involved, it can but end in the greatest catastrophe that has ever befallen the Continent of Europe at one blow; no one can say what would be the limit of the issues that might be raised by such a conflict; the consequences of it, direct and indirect, would be incalculable.

Statement in House of Commons, July 29, by H.H. Asquith, British Prime Minister.

Mr. Bonar Law (Lancs, Bootle)—May I ask the Prime Minister whether he has any information to give the House with regard to the European situation?

Mr. Asquith—As the House is aware, a formal declaration of war was issued yesterday by Austria against Servia. The situation at this moment is one of extreme gravity and I can only say—usefully say—that his Majesty's Government are not relaxing their efforts to do everything in their power to circumscribe the area of possible conflict. ["Hear! hear!"]

Declaration in House of Commons, July 30, by Prime Minister Asquith.

We meet today under conditions of gravity which are almost unparalleled in the experience of every one of us. The [pg 279]issues of peace and war are hanging in the balance, and with them the risk of a catastrophe of which it is impossible to measure either the dimensions or the effects. In these circumstances it is of vital importance in the interests of the whole world that this country, which has no interests of its own directly at stake, should present a united front and be able to speak and act with the authority of an undivided nation. If we were to proceed today with the first order on the paper we should inevitably, unless the debate was conducted with an artificial tone, be involved in acute controversy in regard to domestic differences whose importance to ourselves no one here in any quarter of the House is disposed to disparage or to belittle. I need not say more than that such a use of our time at such a moment might have injurious, and lastingly injurious, effects on the international situation. I have had the advantage of consultation with the leader of the Opposition, who, I know, shares to the full the view which I have expressed. We shall therefore propose to put off for the present the consideration of the second reading of the amending bill—of course, without prejudice to its future—in the hope that by a postponement of the discussion the patriotism of all parties will contribute what lies in our power, if not to avert at least to circumscribe the calamities which threaten the world. In the meantime the business which we shall take will be confined to necessary matters which will not be of a controversial character.

Assent of Bonar Law, Leader of the British Opposition, and of Sir Edward Carson, July 30.

As the Prime Minister has informed the House, it is with our concurrence that he has made the suggestion which we have just heard. At a moment like the present, when even those of us who do not share diplomatic secrets feel that the statement of the Prime Minister is true, that peace and war may be trembling in the balance, I think it is of the utmost importance that it should be made plain to every one that, whatever our domestic differences may be, they do not prevent us from presenting a united front in the councils of the world. I am obliged to the Prime Minister for saying that in the meantime party controversial business will not be taken. I am sure that it is his intention, as it would be the wish of the whole House, that this postponement will not in any way prejudice the interests of any of the parties to the controversy. I should like to add—and I do so, not to give information to the House, the members of which quite understand the position, but in order that it may be plain outside that in what I have now said I speak not only, so far as I am entitled to speak, for the Unionist Party, but for Ulster—that in what I have just said I have the concurrence of my right honorable friend the member for Trinity College [Sir Edward Carson].

Statement by Sir Edward Grey in House of Commons, July 30.

I regret that I cannot say the situation is less grave than it was yesterday. The outstanding facts are much the same. Austria has begun war against Servia. Russia has ordered a partial mobilization. This has not hitherto led to any corresponding steps by other powers, so far as our information goes. We continue to pursue the one great object of preserving European peace, and for this purpose we are keeping in close touch with other powers. In thus keeping in touch we have, I am glad to say, had no difficulty so far; though it has not been possible for the powers to unite in diplomatic action as was proposed on Monday.

Statement in House of Commons by Prime Minister Asquith, Aug. 1.

We have just heard, not from St. Petersburg but from Germany, that [pg 280]Russia has proclaimed a general mobilization of her army and fleet, and in consequence of this martial law is to be proclaimed in Germany.

We understand this to mean that mobilization will follow in Germany if the Russian mobilization is general and is proceeded with.

In these circumstances I should prefer not to answer any further question until Monday.

Editorial Article of The London Times, Aug. 3.

The die is cast. The great European struggle which the nations have so long struggled to avert has begun. Germany declared war upon Russia on Saturday evening, and yesterday her troops entered Luxemburg and crossed the French frontier in Lorraine without any declaration at all. It is idle to dwell upon events such as these. They speak for themselves in a fashion which all can understand. They mean that Europe is to be the scene of the most terrible war that she has witnessed since the fall of the Roman Empire. The losses in human life and in the accumulated wealth of generations which such a contest must involve are frightful to think on. That it should have come about despite the zealous efforts of diplomacy, and against the wishes of almost all the nations whom it is destined to afflict, is a grim satire upon the professions of peace yet fresh upon the lips of those who have plunged the Continent into its miseries and its calamities. The blame must fall mainly upon Germany. She could have stayed the plague had she chosen to speak in Vienna as she speaks when she is in earnest. She has not chosen to do so. She has preferred to make demands in St. Petersburg and in Paris which no Government could entertain, and to defeat by irrevocable acts the last efforts of this country and of others for mediation. She has lived up to the worst principles of the Frederician tradition—the tradition which disregards all obligations of right and wrong at the bidding of immediate self-interest. She believes that her admirable military organization has enabled her to steal a march upon her rivals. She has been mobilizing in all but name, while their mobilization has been retarded by the "conversations" she continued until her moment had come. Then she flung the mask aside. While her Ambassador was still in Paris, while by the customs traditional with all civilized peoples she was still at peace with France, she has sent her soldiers into Luxemburg, and invaded the territory of the republic. It is hard to say which of these acts is the grosser infringement of public right. With Luxemburg she makes no pretense of quarrel. She is herself a party to the guarantee of its neutrality contained in the Treaty of 1867. The other guarantors are Great Britain, France, Russia, Italy, Austria-Hungary, Belgium, and the Netherlands. She solemnly pledged herself with some of them, including France and ourselves, to respect this neutrality. The world sees how Germany keeps her word. She has been weak enough, or cynical enough, to issue an explanation of her breach of faith. Let Englishmen, who have been disposed to trust her, judge it for themselves. She has not, she says, committed a hostile act by crossing the frontiers, by forcibly seizing the Government offices, and by forcibly interrupting the telephonic communication. These are merely measures to protect the railways from a possible attack by the French. For the sudden invasion of France no excuse has yet been published. When it comes it will doubtless be of about equal worth.

The whole situation has been revolutionized by the events of yesterday. The doubts which many of us tried hard to cherish as to Germany's real intentions have been dispelled by her high-handed contempt for public law. The Government and the nation now realize that she has been bent on a European war—a European war to be waged in the first instance against France, and through at least one of those neutral States whose safety we have bound ourselves to defend because it is indispensable to our [pg 281]own. The Cabinet, which has been sitting almost uninterruptedly since Saturday morning, reached a decision at an early hour yesterday, which shows that they know what is before us. They have called up the Naval Reserves. They would not have taken this step had they not felt that in this quarrel our interests are now directly at stake. After the example of what Germany has done in Luxemburg and on the French border we can no longer rely upon the presence of her Ambassador as a security against some sudden surprise. We have no controversy with her, it is true. We have been willing and anxious to develop those better relations with her which had of late sprung up. We were eager to work with her for mediation and for peace. Now she has shown her hand. She is resolved to crush France, and to trample upon the rights of those who happen to stand in her way. Yesterday it was Luxemburg. Today it may be Belgium or Holland, or she may treat us as she has treated our French friends, and assail us without a declaration of war. She will find the empire ready. Here at home and in the far-off dominions the sure instinct of our peoples teaches them that the ruin of France or of the Low Countries would be the prelude to our own. We can no more tolerate a German hegemony in Europe than we can tolerate the hegemony of any other power. As our fathers fought Spain and France in the days of their greatest strength to defeat their pretense to Continental supremacy, and their menace to the narrow seas, which are the bulwark of our independence, so shall we be ready, with the same unanimity and the same stubborn tenacity of purpose, to fight any other nation which shows by her acts that she is advancing a like claim and confronting us with a like threat. If any individual member of the Cabinet dissents from this view, the sooner he quits the Government the better. Mr. Asquith may find it no disadvantage to take fresh blood into his Administration, as M. Viviani has undoubtedly strengthened the French Government by the admission of M. Delcassé and M. Clemenceau. The controversy between Austria-Hungary and Servia, and that between Austria-Hungary and Russia, have passed away from the eyes of the nation. These are fixed on the German attack upon the French Republic and upon Luxemburg. In that conflict the nation know their duty. With the blessing of Heaven they will do it to the uttermost.

Sir Edward Grey's Speech in House of Commons, Aug. 3.

Last week I stated that we were working for peace not only for this country, but to preserve the peace of Europe. Today events move so rapidly that it is exceedingly difficult to state with technical accuracy the actual state of affairs, but it is clear that the peace of Europe cannot be preserved. Russia and Germany, at any rate, have declared war upon each other.

Before I proceed to state the position of his Majesty's Government I would like to clear the ground so that, before I come to state to the House what our attitude is with regard to the present crisis, the House may know exactly under what obligations the Government is, or the House can be said to be, in coming to a decision on the matter. First of all, let me say, very shortly, that we have consistently worked with a single mind, with all the earnestness in our power, to preserve peace. The House may be satisfied on that point. We have always done it. During these last years, as far as his Majesty's Government are concerned, we would have no difficulty in proving that we have done so. Throughout the Balkan crisis, by general admission, we worked for peace. The co-operation of the great powers of Europe was successful in working for peace in the Balkan crisis. It is true that some of the powers had great difficulty in adjusting their points of view. It took much time and labor and discussion before they could settle their differences, but peace was secured, because peace was their [pg 282]main object, and they were willing to give time and trouble rather than accentuate differences rapidly.

In the present crisis it has not been possible to secure the peace of Europe; because there has been little time, and there has been a disposition—at any rate in some quarters on which I will not dwell—to force things rapidly to an issue, at any rate to the great risk of peace, and, as we now know, the result of that is that the policy of peace as far as the great powers generally are concerned is in danger. I do not want to dwell on that, and to comment on it, and to say where the blame seems to us to lie, which powers were most in favor of peace, which were most disposed to risk war or endanger peace, because I would like the House to approach this crisis in which we are now from the point of view of British interests, British honor, and British obligations, free from all passion as to why peace has not been preserved.

We shall publish papers as soon as we can regarding what took place last week when we were working for peace, and when those papers are published I have no doubt that to every human being they will make it clear how strenuous and genuine and whole-hearted our efforts for peace were, and that they will enable people to form their own judgment as to what forces were at work which operated against peace.

I come first, now, to the question of British obligations. I have assured the House—and the Prime Minister has assured the House more than once—that if any crisis such as this arose we should come before the House of Commons and be able to say to the House that it was free to decide what the British attitude should be, that we would have no secret engagement which we should spring upon the House, and tell the House that because we had entered into that engagement there was an obligation of honor upon the country. I will deal with that point to clear the ground first.

There have been in Europe two diplomatic groups, the Triple Alliance and what came to be called the Triple Entente, for some years past. The Triple Entente was not an alliance—it was a diplomatic group. The House will remember that in 1908 there was a crisis—also a Balkan crisis—originating in the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Russian Minister, M. Isvolsky, came to London, or happened to come to London, because his visit was planned before the crisis broke out. I told him definitely then, this being a Balkan crisis, a Balkan affair, I did not consider that public opinion in this country would justify us in promising to give anything more than diplomatic support. More was never asked from us, more was never given, and more was never promised.

In this present crisis, up till yesterday, we have also given no promise of anything more than diplomatic support—up till yesterday no promise of more than diplomatic support. Now I must make this question of obligation clear to the House. I must go back to the first Moroccan crisis of 1906. That was the time of the Algeciras Conference, and it came at a time of very great difficulty to his Majesty's Government when a general election was in progress, and Ministers were scattered over the country, and I—spending three days a week in my constituency and three days at the Foreign Office—was asked the question whether, if that crisis developed into war between France and Germany, we would give armed support. I said then that I could promise nothing to any foreign power unless it was subsequently to receive the whole-hearted support of public opinion here if the occasion arose. I said, in my opinion, if war was forced upon France then on the question of Morocco—a question which had just been the subject of agreement between this country and France, an agreement exceedingly popular on both sides—that if out of that agreement war was forced on France at that time, in my view public opinion in this country would have rallied to the material support of France.

I gave no promise, but I expressed that opinion during the crisis, as far as I remember [pg 283]almost in the same words, to the French Ambassador and the German Ambassador at the time. I made no promise and I used no threats; but I expressed that opinion. That position was accepted by the French Government, but they said to me at the time, and I think very reasonably, "If you think it possible that the public opinion of Great Britain might, should a sudden crisis arise, justify you in giving to France the armed support which you cannot promise in advance, you will not be able to give that support, even if you wish it, when the time comes, unless some conversations have already taken place between naval and military experts." There was force in that. I agreed to it, and authorized those conversations to take place, but on the distinct understanding that nothing which passed between military or naval experts should bind either Government or restrict in any way their freedom to make a decision as to whether or not they would give that support when the time arose.

As I have told the House, upon that occasion a general election was in prospect; I had to take the responsibility of doing that without the Cabinet. It could not be summoned. An answer had to be given. I consulted Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, the Prime Minister; I consulted, I remember, Lord Haldane, who was then Secretary of State for War, and the present Prime Minister, who was then Chancellor of the Exchequer. That was the most I could do, and they authorized that, on the distinct understanding that it left the hands of the Government free whenever the crisis arose. The fact that conversations between military and naval experts took place was later on—I think much later on, because that crisis passed, and the thing ceased to be of importance—but later on it was brought to the knowledge of the Cabinet.

The Agadir crisis came—another Morocco crisis—and throughout that I took precisely the same line that had been taken in 1906. But subsequently, in 1912, after discussion and consideration in the Cabinet, it was decided that we ought to have a definite understanding in writing, which was to be only in the form of an unofficial letter, that these conversations which took place were not binding upon the freedom of either Government; and on the 22d November, 1912, I wrote to the French Ambassador the letter which I will now read to the House, and I received from him a letter in similar terms in reply. The letter which I have to read to the House is this, and it will be known to the public now as the record that, whatever took place between military and naval experts, they were not binding engagements upon the Government:

Lord Charles Beresford—What is the date of that?

Sir E. Grey—The 22nd November, 1912. That is the starting point for the Government with regard to the present crisis. I think it makes it clear that what the Prime Minister and I said to the House of Commons was perfectly justified, and that, as regards our freedom to decide in a crisis what our line should be, whether we should intervene or whether we should abstain, the Government [pg 284]remained perfectly free, and, a fortiori, the House of Commons remains perfectly free. That I say to clear the ground from the point of view of obligation. I think it was due to prove our good faith to the House of Commons that I should give that full information to the House now, and say what I think is obvious from the letter I have just read, that we do not construe anything which has previously taken place in our diplomatic relations with other powers in this matter as restricting the freedom of the Government to decide what attitude they should take now, or restrict the freedom of the House of Commons to decide what their attitude should be.

Well, Sir, I will go further, and I will say this: The situation in the present crisis is not precisely the same as it was in the Morocco question. In the Morocco question it was primarily a dispute which concerned France—a dispute which concerned France and France primarily—a dispute, as it seemed to us, affecting France out of an agreement subsisting between us and France, and published to the whole world, in which we engaged to give France diplomatic support. No doubt we were pledged to give nothing but diplomatic support; we were, at any rate, pledged by a definite public agreement to stand with France diplomatically in that question.

The present crisis has originated differently. It has not originated with regard to Morocco. It has not originated as regards anything with which we had a special agreement with France; it has not originated with anything which primarily concerned France. It has originated in a dispute between Austria and Servia. I can say this with the most absolute confidence—no Government and no country has less desire to be involved in war over a dispute with Austria and Servia than the Government and the Country of France. They are involved in it because of their obligation of honor under a definite alliance with Russia. Well, it is only fair to say to the House that that obligation of honor cannot apply in the same way to us. We are not parties to the Franco-Russian alliance. We do not even know the terms of that alliance. So far I have, I think, faithfully and completely cleared the ground with regard to the question of obligation.

I now come to what we think the situation requires of us. For many years we have had a long-standing friendship with France. I remember well the feeling in the House—and my own feeling—for I spoke on the subject, I think, when the late Government made their agreement with France—the warm and cordial feeling resulting from the fact that these two nations, who had had perpetual differences in the past, had cleared these differences away; I remember saying, I think, that it seemed to me that some benign influence had been at work to produce the cordial atmosphere that had made that possible. But how far that friendship entails obligation—it has been a friendship between the nations and ratified by the nations—how far that entails an obligation, let every man look into his own heart, and his own feelings, and construe the extent of the obligation for himself. I construe it myself as I feel it, but I do not wish to urge upon any one else more than their feelings dictate as to what they should feel about the obligation. The House, individually and collectively, may judge for itself. I speak my personal view, and I have given the House my own feeling in the matter.

The French fleet is now in the Mediterranean, and the northern and western coasts of France are absolutely undefended. The French fleet being concentrated in the Mediterranean, the situation is very different from what it used to be, because the friendship which has grown up between the two countries has given them a sense of security that there was nothing to be feared from us.

The French coasts are absolutely undefended. The French fleet is in the Mediterranean, and has for some years been concentrated there because of the feeling of confidence and friendship which has existed between the two countries. My own feeling is that if a foreign fleet, engaged in a war which France had not sought, and in which she had not been the aggressor, came down the English [pg 285]Channel and bombarded and battered the undefended coasts of France, we could not stand aside, and see this going on practically within sight of our eyes, with our arms folded, looking on dispassionately, doing nothing. I believe that would be the feeling of this country. There are times when one feels that if these circumstances actually did arise, it would be a feeling which would spread with irresistible force throughout the land.

But I also want to look at the matter without sentiment, and from the point of view of British interests, and it is on that that I am going to base and justify what I am presently going to say to the House. If we say nothing at this moment, what is France to do with her fleet in the Mediterranean? If she leaves it there, with no statement from us as to what we will do, she leaves her northern and western coasts absolutely undefended, at the mercy of a German fleet coming down the Channel to do as it pleases in a war which is a war of life and death between them. If we say nothing, it may be that the French fleet is withdrawn from the Mediterranean. We are in the presence of a European conflagration; can anybody set limits to the consequences that may arise out of it? Let us assume that today we stand aside in an attitude of neutrality, saying, "No, we cannot undertake and engage to help either party in this conflict." Let us suppose the French fleet is withdrawn from the Mediterranean; and let us assume that the consequences—which are already tremendous in what has happened in Europe even to countries which are at peace—in fact, equally whether countries are at peace or at war—let us assume that out of that come consequences unforeseen, which make it necessary at a sudden moment that, in defense of vital British interests, we shall go to war; and let us assume—which is quite possible—that Italy, who is now neutral—because, as I understand, she considers that this war is an aggressive war, and the Triple Alliance being a defensive alliance her obligation did not arise—let us assume that consequences which are not yet foreseen and which, perfectly legitimately consulting her own interests, make Italy depart from her attitude of neutrality at a time when we are forced in defense of vital British interests ourselves to fight—what then will be the position in the Mediterranean? It might be that at some critical moment those consequences would be forced upon us because our trade routes in the Mediterranean might be vital to this country.

Nobody can say that in the course of the next few weeks there is any particular trade route, the keeping open of which may not be vital to this country. What will be our position then? We have not kept a fleet in the Mediterranean which is equal to dealing alone with a combination of other fleets in the Mediterranean. It would be the very moment when we could not detach more ships to the Mediterranean, and we might have exposed this country from our negative attitude at the present moment to the most appalling risk. I say that from the point of view of British interests. We feel strongly that France was entitled to know—and to know at once—whether or not in the event of attack upon her unprotected northern and western coasts she could depend upon British support. In that emergency, and in these compelling circumstances, yesterday afternoon I gave to the French Ambassador the following statement:

I read that to the House, not as a declaration of war on our part, not as entailing immediate aggressive action on our part, but as binding us to take aggressive action should that contingency arise. Things move very hurriedly from hour to hour. Fresh news comes in, and I cannot give this in any very formal [pg 286]way; but I understand that the German Government would be prepared, if we would pledge ourselves to neutrality, to agree that its fleet would not attack the northern coast of France. I have only heard that shortly before I came to the House, but it is far too narrow an engagement for us. And, Sir, there is the more serious consideration—becoming more serious every hour—there is the question of the neutrality of Belgium.

I shall have to put before the House at some length what is our position in regard to Belgium. The governing factor is the Treaty of 1839, but this is a treaty with a history—a history accumulated since. In 1870, when there was war between France and Germany, the question of the neutrality of Belgium arose, and various things were said. Among other things, Prince Bismarck gave an assurance to Belgium that—confirming his verbal assurance, he gave in writing a declaration which he said was superfluous in reference to the treaty in existence—that the German Confederation and its allies would respect the neutrality of Belgium, it being always understood that that neutrality would be respected by the other belligerent powers. That is valuable as a recognition in 1870 on the part of Germany of the sacredness of these treaty rights.

What was our own attitude? The people who laid down the attitude of the British Government were Lord Granville in the House of Lords and Mr. Gladstone in the House of Commons. Lord Granville on the 8th August, 1870, used these words. He said:

Mr. Gladstone, spoke as follows two days later:

The treaty is an old treaty—1839—and that was the view taken of it in 1870. It is one of those treaties which are founded, not only on consideration for Belgium, which benefits under the treaty, but in the interests of those who guarantee the neutrality of Belgium. The honor and interests are, at least, as strong today as in 1870, and we cannot take a more narrow view or a less serious view of our obligations, and of the importance of those obligations, than was taken by Mr. Gladstone's Government in 1870.

I will read to the House what took place last week on this subject. When mobilization was beginning, I knew that this question must be a most important element in our policy—a most important subject for the House of Commons. I telegraphed at the same time in similar terms to both Paris and Berlin to say that it was essential for us to know whether the French and German Governments respectively were prepared to undertake an engagement to respect the neutrality of Belgium. These are the replies. I got from the French Government this reply:

From the German Government the reply was:

Sir Edward Goschen, to whom I had said it was important to have an answer soon, said he hoped the answer would not be too long delayed. The German Minister for Foreign Affairs then gave Sir Edward Goschen to understand that he rather doubted whether they could answer at all, as any reply they might give could not fail, in the event of war, to have the undesirable effect of disclosing, to a certain extent, part of their plan of campaign. I telegraphed at the same time to Brussels to the Belgian Government, and I got the following reply from Sir Francis Villiers:

It now appears from the news I have received today—which has come quite recently, and I am not yet quite sure how far it has reached me in an accurate form—that an ultimatum has been given to Belgium by Germany, the object of which was to offer Belgium friendly relations with Germany on condition that she would facilitate the passage of German troops through Belgium. Well, Sir, until one has these things absolutely definitely, up to the last moment, I do not wish to say all that one would say if one were in a position to give the House full, complete, and absolute information upon the point. We were sounded in the course of last week as to whether, if a guarantee were given that, after the war, Belgian integrity would be preserved, that would content us. We replied that we could not bargain away whatever interests or obligations we had in Belgian neutrality.

Shortly before I reached the House I was informed that the following telegram had been received from the King of the Belgians by our King—King George:

Diplomatic intervention took place last week on our part. What can diplomatic intervention do now? We have great and vital interests in the independence—and integrity is the least part—of Belgium. If Belgium is compelled to submit to allow her neutrality to be violated, of course the situation is clear. Even if by agreement she admitted the violation of her neutrality, it is clear she could only do so under duress. The smaller States in that region of Europe ask but one thing. Their one desire is that they should be left alone and independent. The one thing they fear is, I think, not so much that their integrity but that their independence should be interfered with. If in this war which is before Europe the neutrality of one of those countries is violated, if the troops of one of the combatants violate its neutrality and no action be taken to resent it, at the end of the war, whatever the integrity may be, the independence will be gone.

I have one further quotation from Mr. Gladstone as to what he thought about the independence of Belgium. It will be found in "Hansard," Vol. 203, Page 1,787. I have not had time to read the whole speech and verify the context, but the thing seems to me so clear that no context could make any difference to the meaning of it. Mr. Gladstone said:

No, Sir, if it be the case that there has been anything in the nature of an ultimatum to Belgium, asking her to compromise or violate her neutrality, whatever may have been offered to her in return, her independence is gone if that holds. If her independence goes, the independence of Holland will follow. I ask the House from the point of view of British interests to consider what may be at stake. If France is beaten in a struggle of life and death, beaten to her knees, loses her position as a great power, becomes subordinate to the will and power of one greater than herself—consequences which I do not anticipate, because I am sure that France has the power to defend herself with all the energy and ability and patriotism which she has shown so often—still, if that were to happen, and if Belgium fell under the same dominating influence, and then Holland, and then Denmark, then would not Mr. Gladstone's words come true, that just opposite to us there would be a common interest against the unmeasured aggrandizement of any power?

It may be said, I suppose, that we might stand aside, husband our strength, and that, whatever happened in the course of this war, at the end of it intervene with effect to put things right, and to adjust them to our own point of view. If, in a crisis like this, we run away from those obligations of honor and interest as regards the Belgian treaty, I doubt whether, whatever material force we might have at the end, it would be of very much value in face of the respect that we should have lost. And do not believe, whether a great power stands outside this war or not, it is going to be in a position at the end of it to exert its superior strength. For us, with a powerful fleet, which we believe able to protect our commerce, to protect our shores, and to protect our interests, if we are engaged in war, we shall suffer but little more than we shall suffer even if we stand aside.

We are going to suffer, I am afraid, terribly in this war, whether we are in it or whether we stand aside. Foreign trade is going to stop, not because the trade routes are closed, but because there is no trade at the other end. Continental nations engaged in war—all their populations, all their energies, all their wealth, engaged in a desperate struggle—they cannot carry on the trade with us that they are carrying on in times of peace, whether we are parties to the war or whether we are not. I do not believe for a moment that at the end of this war, even if we stood aside and remained aside, we should be in a position, a material position, to use our force decisively to undo what had happened in the course of the war, to prevent the whole of the west of Europe opposite to us—if that had been the result of the war—falling under the domination of a single power, and I am quite sure that our moral position would be such as to have lost us all respect. I can only say that I have put the question of Belgium somewhat hypothetically, because I am not yet sure of all the facts, but, if the facts turn out to be as they have reached us at present, it is quite clear that there is an obligation on this country to do its utmost to prevent the consequences to which those facts will lead if they are undisputed.

I have read to the House the only engagements that we have yet taken definitely with regard to the use of force. I think it is due to the House to say that we have taken no engagement yet with regard to sending an expeditionary armed force out of the country. Mobilization of the fleet has taken place; mobilization of the army is taking place; but we have as yet taken no engagement, because I feel that—in the case of a European conflagration such as this, unprecedented, with our enormous responsibilities in India and other parts of the empire, or in countries in British occupation, with all the unknown factors—we must take very carefully into consideration the use [pg 289]which we make of sending an expeditionary force out of the country until we know how we stand. One thing I would say.

The one bright spot in the whole of this, terrible situation is Ireland. The general feeling throughout Ireland—and I would like this to be clearly understood abroad—does not make the Irish question a consideration which we feel we have now to take into account. I have told the House how far we have at present gone in commitments and the conditions which influence our policy, and I have put to the House and dwelt at length upon how vital is the condition of the neutrality of Belgium.

What other policy Is there before the House? There is but one way in which the Government could make certain at the present moment of keeping outside this war, and that would be that it should immediately issue a proclamation of unconditional neutrality. We cannot do that. We have made the commitment to France that I have read to the House which prevents us doing that. We have got the consideration of Belgium which prevents us also from any unconditional neutrality, and, without these conditions absolutely satisfied and satisfactory, we are bound not to shrink from proceeding to the use of all the forces in our power. If we did take that line by saying, "We will have nothing whatever to do with this matter" under no conditions—the Belgian treaty obligations, the possible position in the Mediterranean, with damage to British interests, and what may happen to France from our failure to support France—if we were to say that all those things mattered nothing, were as nothing, and to say we would stand aside, we should, I believe, sacrifice our respect and good name and reputation before the world, and should not escape the most serious and grave economic consequences.

My object has been to explain the view of the Government, and to place before the House the issue and the choice. I do not for a moment conceal, after what I have said, and after the information, incomplete as it is, that I have given to the House with regard to Belgium, that we must be prepared, and we are prepared, for the consequences of having to use all the strength we have at any moment—we know not how soon—to defend ourselves and to take our part. We know, if the facts all be as I have stated them, though I have announced no intending aggressive action on our part, no final decision to resort to force at a moment's notice, until we know the whole of the case, that the use of it may be forced upon us. As far as the forces of the Crown are concerned, we are ready. I believe the Prime Minister and my right honorable friend the First Lord of the Admiralty have no doubt whatever that the readiness and the efficiency of those forces were never at a higher mark than they are today, and never was there a time when confidence was more justified in the power of the navy to protect our commerce and to protect our shores. The thought is with us always of the suffering and misery entailed, from which no country in Europe will escape by abstention, and from which no neutrality will save us. The amount of harm that can be done by an enemy ship to our trade is infinitesimal, compared with the amount of harm that must be done by the economic condition that is caused on the Continent.

The most awful responsibility is resting upon the Government in deciding what to advise the House of Commons to do. We have disclosed our minds to the House of Commons. We have disclosed the issue, the information which we have, and made clear to the House, I trust, that we are prepared to face that situation, and that should it develop, as probably it may develop, we will face it. We worked for peace up to the last moment, and beyond the last moment. How hard, how persistently, and how earnestly we strove for peace last week the House will see from the papers that will be before it.

But that is over, as far as the peace of Europe is concerned. We are now face to face with a situation and all the consequences which it may yet have to unfold. We believe we shall have the support [pg 290]of the House at large in proceeding to whatever the consequences may be and whatever measures may be forced upon us by the development of facts or action taken by others. I believe the country, so quickly has the situation been forced upon it, has not had time to realize the issue. It perhaps is still thinking of the quarrel between Austria and Servia, and not the complications of this matter which have grown out of the quarrel between Austria and Servia. Russia and Germany we know are at war. We do not yet know officially that Austria, the ally whom Germany is to support, is yet at war with Russia. We know that a good deal has been happening on the French frontier. We do not know that the German Ambassador has left Paris.

The situation has developed so rapidly that technically, as regards the condition of the war, it is most difficult to describe what has actually happened. I wanted to bring out the underlying issues which would affect our own conduct, and our own policy, and to put them clearly. I have now put the vital facts before the House, and if, as seems not improbable, we are forced, and rapidly forced, to take our stand upon those issues, then I believe, when the country realizes what is at stake, what the real issues are, the magnitude of the impending dangers in the west of Europe, which I have endeavored to describe to the House, we shall be supported throughout, not only by the House of Commons, but by the determination, the resolution, the courage, and the endurance of the whole country.

Further Statement by Sir Edward Grey in House of Commons, Aug. 3, 1914.

I want to give the House some information which I have received, and which was not in my possession when I made my statement this afternoon. It is information I have received from the Belgian Legation in London, and is to the following effect:

Of course, I can only say that the Government are prepared to take into grave consideration the information which they have received. I make no further comment upon it.

Statement by Bonar Law, Opposition Leader, in House of Commons, Aug. 3.

The right honorable gentleman has made an appeal for support and it is necessary that I should say a word or two, but they shall be very few. I wish to say in the first place that I do not believe there is a single member in this House who doubts that not only the right honorable gentleman himself, but the Government which he represents, have done everything in their power up to the last moment to preserve peace. [Cheers.] And I think we may be sure that if any other course is taken it is because it is forced upon them and that they have absolutely no alternative. [Cheers.] One thing only further I should like to say. The right honorable gentleman spoke of the bright spot in the picture which only a day or two ago was a black spot in the political horizon. Everything that he has said I am sure is true and I should like to say this further—that if the contingencies which he has not put into words, but which are in all our minds as possible, arise, then we have already had indications that there is another bright spot—that every one of his Majesty's dominions beyond the seas will be behind us in whatever act it is necessary to take. [Cheers.] This only I should add. The Government already know, but I give them now the assurance on behalf of the party of which I am [pg 291]leader in this House, that in whatever steps they think it necessary to take for the honor and security of this country they can rely upon the unhesitating support of the Opposition. [Loud Ministerial and Opposition cheers.]

Statement in House of Commons, Aug. 3, by John E. Redmond, M.P.

I hope the House will not consider it improper on my part in the grave circumstances in which we are assembled if I intervene for a very few moments. I was moved a great deal by that sentence in the speech of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in which he said that the one bright spot in the situation was the changed feeling in Ireland. In past times, when this empire has been engaged in these terrible enterprises it is true—it would be the utmost affectation and folly on my part to deny it—the sympathy of the Nationalists of Ireland, for reasons to be found deep down in centuries of history, has been estranged from this country. But allow me to say that what has occurred in recent years has altered the situation completely. [Ministerial cheers.] I must not touch, and I may be trusted not to touch, on any controversial topics, but this I may be allowed to say—that a wider knowledge of the real facts of Irish history have, I think, altered the view of the democracy of this country toward the Irish question, and today I honestly believe that the democracy of Ireland will turn with the utmost anxiety and sympathy to this country in every trial and every danger that may overtake it. [General cheers.] There is a possibility at any rate of history repeating itself. The House will remember that in 1778, at the end of the disastrous American war, when it might, I think, truly be said that the military power of this country was almost at its lowest ebb, and when the shores of Ireland were threatened with foreign invasion, a body of 100,000 Irish volunteers sprang into existence for the purpose of defending her shores. At first no Catholic—ah! how sad the reading of the history of those days is—was allowed to be enrolled in that body of volunteers, and yet from the very first day the Catholics of the South and West subscribed money and sent it toward the arming of their Protestant fellow-countrymen. Ideas widened as time went on, and finally the Catholics in the South were armed and enrolled brothers in arms with their fellow-countrymen of a different creed in the North. May history repeat itself! [Cheers.] Today there are in Ireland two large bodies of volunteers. One of them sprang into existence in the North. Another has sprung into existence in the South. I say to the Government that they may tomorrow withdraw every one of their troops from Ireland. [General cheers.] I say that the coasts of Ireland will be defended from foreign invasion by her armed sons, and for this purpose armed Nationalist Catholics in the South will be only too glad to join arms with the armed Protestant Ulstermen in the North. [Cheers.] Is it too much to hope that out of this situation there may spring a result which will be good not merely for the empire, but good for the future welfare and integrity of the Irish Nation. [Cheers.] I ought to apologize for having intervened [cries of "No"], but while Irishmen generally are in favor of peace, and would desire to save the democracy of this country from all the horrors of war, while we would make any possible sacrifice for that purpose, still if the dire necessity is forced upon this country we offer to the Government of the day that they may take their troops away, and that if it is allowed to us in comradeship with our brethren in the North we will ourselves defend the coasts of our country. [Loud cheers.]

Prime Minister Asquith Explains Its Nature in House of Commons, Aug. 4, 1914.

Mr. Bonar Law—I wish to ask the Prime Minister whether he has any [pg 292]statement that he can now make to the House?

The Prime Minister (Mr. Asquith)—In conformity with the statement of policy made here by my right honorable friend the Foreign Secretary yesterday, a telegram was early this morning sent by him to our Ambassador in Berlin. It was to this effect:

We received this morning from our Minister at Brussels the following telegram:

Simultaneously—almost immediately afterward—we received from the Belgian Legation here in London the following telegram:

Subsequent information tended to show that the German force has penetrated still further into Belgian territory. We also received this morning from the German Ambassador here the telegram sent to him by the German Foreign Secretary, and communicated by the Ambassador to us. It is in these terms:

I have to add this on behalf of his Majesty's Government: We cannot regard this as in any sense a satisfactory communication. We have, in reply to it, repeated the request we made last week to the German Government, that they should give us the same assurance in regard to Belgian neutrality as was given to us and to Belgium by France last week. We have asked that a reply to that request and a satisfactory answer to the telegram of this morning—which I have read to the House—should be given before midnight.

Statement by Prime Minister Asquith in House of Commons, Aug. 5.

Mr. Bonar Law—May I ask the Prime Minister if he has any information he can give us today?

The Prime Minister—Our Ambassador at Berlin received his passports at 7 o'clock last evening and since 11 o'clock last night a state of war has existed between Germany and ourselves.

We have received from our Minister at Brussels the following telegram:

We have also received today from the French Ambassador here the following telegram received by the French Government from the French Minister at Brussels:

This is all the information I am at the moment able to give to the House, but I take the opportunity of giving notice that tomorrow, in Committee of Supply, I shall move a vote of credit of £100,000,000.

[pg 294]Message from King George V. to the House of Commons, Aug. 5.

Mr. Asquith then proceeded to the bar amid cheers and, on being called upon by the Speaker, announced: A message from his Majesty signed by his own hand. The announcement was received with loud cheers, which were continued as Mr. Asquith advanced up the floor and handed the document to the Speaker. All the members uncovered.

The Speaker read the message as follows:

Message from George V. to Admiral Sir John Jellicoe, Aug. 5.

At this grave moment in our national history I send to you, and through you to the officers and men of the fleets of which you have assumed command, the assurance of my confidence that under your direction they will revive and renew the old glories of the royal navy, and prove once again the sure shield of Britain and of her empire in the hour of trial.

GEORGE R. I.

Speech by Bonar Law, Opposition Leader, in House of Commons, Aug. 6.

No Minister has ever fulfilled a duty more responsible or in regard to which the responsibility was more acutely felt than that which has just been fulfilled by the right honorable gentleman. This is not a time for speech-making, and I should have been quite ready to leave the statement which he has given to the committee as the expression of the view, not of a party, but of a nation. [Cheers.] But as this, I think, will be the only opportunity which will be given for expressing the views of a large section of this House, I feel that I am bound to make it clear to the committee and to the country what is the attitude of his Majesty's Opposition on this question. There are two things which I desire to impress upon the committee. The first is that we have dreaded war and have longed for peace as strongly as any section of this committee; and the second is that in our belief we are in a state of war against our will, and that we, as a nation, have done everything in our power to prevent such a condition of things arising. [Cheers.] When this crisis first arose I confess that I was one of those who had the impulse to hope that even though a European conflagration took place we might be able to stay out. I had that hope strongly. But in a short time I became convinced that into this war we should inevitably be drawn [pg 295]and that it really was a question only whether we should enter it honorably or be dragged into it with dishonor. [Cheers.]

Folly and Wickedness.

I remember that on the first occasion after the retirement of my right honorable friend (Mr. Balfour) when I had to speak on foreign affairs I made this statement. It perhaps is wrong, though I do not think so even yet. I said that if ever war arose between Great Britain and Germany it would not be due to inevitable causes, for I did not believe in an inevitable war, but it would be due to human folly. [Cheers.] It is due to human folly and to human wickedness [cheers], but neither the folly nor the wickedness is here. [Cheers.] What other course was open to us? It is quite true, as the Foreign Secretary explained to the House the other day, that we were under no formal obligations to take part in such a struggle. But every member in this House knows that the entente meant this in the minds of this Government and of every other Government, that if any of the three powers were attacked aggressively the others would be expected to step in and to give their aid. ["Hear, hear!"] The question, therefore, to my mind was this: Was this war in any way provoked by those who will now be our allies? No one who has read the "White Paper" can hesitate to answer that question. I am not going to go into it even as fully as the Prime Minister has done; but I would remind the House of this, that in this "White Paper" is contained a statement made by the German Ambassador, I think at Vienna, that Russia was not in a condition and could not go to war. And in the same letter are found these words: "As for Germany, she knew very well what she was about in backing up Austria-Hungary in this matter." Now, every one for years has known that the key to peace or war lay in Berlin, and at this crisis no one doubts that Berlin, if it had chosen, could have prevented this terrible conflict. [Cheers.] I am afraid that the miscalculation which was made about Russia was made also about us. The dispatch which the right honorable gentleman referred to is a dispatch of a nature which I believe would not have been addressed to Great Britain if it had been believed that our hands were free and that we held the position which we had always held before the entente. That, at least, is my belief.

Napoleonism Without a Napoleon.

We are fighting, as the Prime Minister said, for the honor and, what with the honor is bound up always, the interest of our nation. But we are fighting also for the whole basis of the civilization for which we stand and for which Europe stands. [Cheers.] I do not wish, any more than the Prime Minister, to inflame passion. I only ask the House to consider one aspect. Look at the way Belgium is being treated today. There is a report—if it is not true now it may be true tomorrow—that the City of Liége is invaded by German troops and that civilians, as in the days of the Middle Ages, are fighting for their hearths and homes against trained troops. How has that been brought about? In a state of war, war must be waged. But remember that this plan is not of today or of yesterday; that it has been long matured; that the Germans knew that they would have this to face; and that they were ready to take the course which they took the other day of saying to Belgium, "Destroy your independence. Allow our troops to go through, or we will come down upon you with a might which it is impossible for you to resist." If we had allowed that to be done, our position as one of the great nations of the world and our honor as one of the nations of the world would in my opinion have been gone forever. [Cheers.] This is no small struggle. It is the greatest, perhaps, that this country has ever engaged in. It is Napoleonism once again. ["Hear, hear!"] Thank Heaven, so far as we know, there is no Napoleon.

I am not going to say anything more about the causes of the war, for I do not desire to encourage controversy on this subject. But if I may be allowed to say so, I should like to say that I read yesterday [pg 296]with real pleasure an article in a paper which does not generally commend itself to me—The Manchester Guardian. ["Hear, hear!"] In that article it still held that the war ought not to have been entered upon; but it took this view, that that was a question for history, and that now we are in it there is only one question for us, and that is to bring it to a successful issue. [Cheers.]

Sir, I have full sympathy far more than at any other time for the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary. I can imagine nothing more terrible than that the Foreign Secretary should have a feeling that perhaps he has brought his country into an unnecessary war. No feeling could be worse. I can say this, and, whether we are right or wrong, the whole House agrees with it, I am sure, that that is a burden which the right honorable gentleman can carry with a good conscience, [cheers,] and that every one of us can put up unhesitatingly this prayer: "May God defend the right."

Trade and Food Supplies.

I should like, if I may, to pass to another topic, for this is the only opportunity I can have. Consider the conditions under which this war is going to be carried on. I was pleased to hear the Prime Minister say the other day in answer to a speech of the honorable member for Merthyr Tydvil—he has developed it in describing the terms of this vote of credit—that he realized, as we all must realize, that in a country situated like ours the development of industry and the supply of food at home is just as much an operation of war as the conduct of our armed forces. [Cheers.] I do not wish to minimize our difficulties, but I am quite sure—as sure as I can be of anything—that there is no danger of a scarcity of food. ["Hear, hear!"] The only danger is the fear of a scarcity of food. ["Hear, hear!"] Every one who has been in business knows that what causes panic prices is not an actual scarcity at the time, but a fear of scarcity coming. This is a case where every one of us must do all he can to impress upon the people of this country that there is, as I believe, no danger. [Cheers.] Here I should like to give one warning note. Remember—at least I believe it—that this war, unexpected by us, is not unexpected by our enemies; and I shall be greatly surprised if we do not find that at first on our trade routes there is a destruction of our property which might create a panic. That is inevitable, I think, at the outset. Let us be prepared for it, and let us realize that it has no bearing whatever on the ultimate course of the war. [Cheers.]

There is something else which I think it is important to say. We had a discussion yesterday about credit. That is the basis of a successful war, as it is of every branch of industry at this moment. I think the Government have taken the right course. I have followed it closely, and I know that they have been supported by those who best understand the situation. I think the danger is minimized as much as it can be. But, after all, the question of credit really depends on what we believe is going to be the effect of this war upon our trade and our industry.

The Command of the Sea.

I hope the House will not think that I am too optimistic, but I do think there is a danger of our taking too gloomy a view of what the effects will be, ["Hear, hear!"] and, by taking that gloomy view, helping to bring about the very state of things which we all desire to avert. Again I wish to guard myself against seeming to be too hopeful; but let us look at the effect as if we were examining a chess problem. If we keep the command of the sea, what is going to happen? It all depends on that. I admit that if that goes the position is gloomy indeed; but of that I have no fear. [Cheers.] If we keep the command of the sea what is going to happen? Five-sixths of our production is employed in the home trade. What goes abroad is very important, and, of course, if the population which supplies this one-sixth were thrown out of work that would react on the whole. But, after all, the total amount of our exports to all the [pg 297]European countries which are now at war is only a small part of our total exports. There is here no question of fiscal policy. We are far beyond that. It is a question of fact. Our total exports to all the countries which are now at war do not, in my belief—I have not looked into the figures—exceed our exports to India and Australia taken alone. Now, consider this, we shall have freedom of trade, if the command of the sea is maintained, with the colonies and with the whole of the American Continent, while, unfortunately for them, both our allies and our enemies will not be competing with us in these markets. Look at it as a problem. I think we have a right to believe, not that trade will be good, but that it will be much more nearly normal than is generally supposed. [Cheers.] I hope the House will not think that that is a useless thing to say at such a time. [Cheers.]

There is one thing more only I wish to say. This is the affair of the nation. Every one would desire to help. There will be a great deal of work to be done which cannot be done by the Government. I was glad the Prime Minister has already asked the co-operation of my right honorable friends the members for West Birmingham and the Strand. They gladly came. But I am sure I speak not for this bench but for the whole of our party when I say that the Government has only got to requisition any one of us and we will serve them and our country to the best of our ability. [Loud cheers.]

Statement Issued by British Foreign Office, Sept. 5.

Semi-Official Statement in The London Times, Sept. 6.

The declaration of the Allied Governments that they will not conclude peace separately during the war or demand terms of peace without previous agreement with each other is an opportune counterstroke to the campaign initiated by Germany for the purpose of detaching France from Russia and especially from Britain. Overtures in this sense have doubtless been made to France.

The German Government has not yet realized the strength of the moral forces it has ranged against itself by its wanton attack upon European civilization. It appears to imagine that, after having been sufficiently "punished" for her temerity in opposing the Kaiser's hosts, France would be open to a bargain, under which she would be "let off" lightly on condition that she should agree to become the ally of Germany.

This idea has been clearly expressed of late in the German press. It is based on the belief that the war was prepared by skillful British intrigues inspired by jealousy of Germany. German statesmen cannot conceive that nations should fight for any cause loftier than material "interests." Hence the constant mistakes of their diplomacy and its failure to foresee that little Belgium would resist German pretensions or that England would go to war for "a scrap of paper." Now they imagine that the determination [pg 298]of France to fight to the last in defense of her honor and her superior civilization can be undermined by an offer to mitigate the material losses she may suffer from the war.

The German view was most clearly expressed in the remarkable dispatch to the Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant from its Berlin correspondent, which was reproduced in The Times of yesterday. Politicians in Berlin, he wrote,

The German error, which the declaration of the Allies should go far to correct, is all the more remarkable in view of the stipulations of the Austro-German Treaty of Alliance. Concluded in 1879 by Bismarck and Andrássy, this treaty still governs the relationship between Germany and Austria-Hungary. Its first clause runs:

However low the German estimate of the moral cohesion of France, Russia, and England, German statesmen must be singularly lacking in shrewdness if they suppose the Allies to be less alive than were Bismarck and Andrássy to the need for complete co-operation between allies, not only in war, but also in the negotiation of peace.

The futile German campaign for the detachment of France from her allies is, indeed, the most striking indication yet forthcoming of the misgivings with which the resolute action of the Allies is beginning to inspire the Kaiser and his Government.

King George V. to the Self-Governing Peoples and the Empire of India, Sept. 9, 1914.

To the Governments and Peoples of my Self-Governing Dominions: During the past few weeks the peoples of my whole empire at home and overseas have moved with one mind and purpose to confront and overthrow an unparalleled assault upon the continuity of civilization and the peace of mankind.

The calamitous conflict is not of my seeking, my voice has been cast throughout on the side of peace. My Ministers earnestly strove to allay the causes of strife and to appease differences with which my empire was not concerned. Had I stood aside when, in defiance of pledges to which my kingdom was a party, the soil of Belgium was violated and her cities laid desolate, when the very life of the French Nation was threatened with extinction, I should have sacrificed my honor and given to destruction the liberties of my empire and of mankind. I rejoice that every part of the empire is with me in this decision.

Paramount regard for treaty faith and the pledged word of rulers and peoples is the common heritage of Great Britain and of the empire.

My peoples in the self-governing dominions have shown beyond all doubt that they wholeheartedly indorse the grave decision which it was necessary to take.

My personal knowledge of the loyalty and devotion of my oversea dominions had led me to expect that they would cheerfully make the great efforts and bear the great sacrifices which the present conflict entails. The full measure in which they have placed their services and resources at my disposal fills me with gratitude and I am proud to be able to show to the world that my peoples oversea [pg 299]are as determined as the people of the United Kingdom to prosecute a just cause to a successful end.

The Dominion of Canada, the Commonwealth of Australia, and the Dominion of New Zealand have placed at my disposal their naval forces, which have already rendered good service for the empire. Strong expeditionary forces are being prepared in Canada, in Australia, and in New Zealand for service at the front, and the Union of South Africa has released all British troops and has undertaken important military responsibilities the discharge of which will be of the utmost value to the empire. Newfoundland has doubled the numbers of its branch of the royal naval reserve and is sending a body of men to take part in the operations at the front. From the Dominion and Provincial Governments of Canada large and welcome gifts of supplies are on their way for the use both of my naval and military forces and for the relief of the distress in the United Kingdom which must inevitably follow in the wake of war. All parts of my oversea dominions have thus demonstrated in the most unmistakable manner the fundamental unity of the empire amid all its diversity of situation and circumstance.

Message to India.

To the Princes and peoples of my Indian Empire: Among the many incidents that have marked the unanimous uprising of the populations of my empire in defense of its unity and integrity, nothing has moved me more than the passionate devotion to my throne expressed both by my Indian subjects and by the Feudatory Princes and the ruling chiefs of India, and their prodigal offers of their lives and their resources in the cause of the realm. Their one-voiced demand to be foremost in the conflict has touched my heart, and has inspired to the highest issues the love and devotion which, as I well know, have ever linked my Indian subjects and myself. I recall to mind India's gracious message to the British Nation of good-will and fellowship which greeted my return in February, 1912, after the solemn ceremony of my Coronation Durbar at Delhi, and I find in this hour of trial a full harvest and a noble fulfillment of the assurance given by you that the destinies of Great Britain and India are indissolubly linked.

Statements in House of Commons, Sept. 10, by Prime Minister Asquith and Bonar Law.

The House went into Committee of Supply, Mr. Whitley in the chair.

Mr. Asquith (Fife E.) said: The House of Commons voted earlier in the session, before any outbreak of war was anticipated, under normal conditions, under Vote A, 186,000-odd men for the regular army. It is perhaps not necessary to point out, but it may be convenient to put it on record, that the total number of men under Vote A does not include either the army reserve, the special reserve, or the territorial forces. When we come to vote the financial provision under Vote 1 of the army estimates, which is consequential upon the passing of Vote A, we make provision not only for the 186,000 men already sanctioned for the regular army, but also for the army reserve. In the subsequent Votes 3 and 4 provision is made for the special reserve and territorial force. The army reserve and the special reserve are not called upon to serve until, under regular constitutional machinery, consequent upon the outbreak or imminence of war, they are summoned to do so. It may be convenient to the committee to know that at the time when war broke out and when the reserves were called to the colors the state of things was this: Parliament had voted 186,000-odd men—call it roughly 200,000. The army reserve and the special reserve then became available as part of the regular forces of the country, amounting also roughly to another 200,000 men. That [pg 300]was altogether 400,000 men. On Aug. 6, after war had been declared, I made a motion in committee which was assented to in committee and by the House on report, for the addition of 500,000 men to the regular forces. These 500,000 men, assuming them all to have been raised, would, in addition to the 400,000 I have just mentioned, amount to a total of 900,000 men. I think it will be interesting to the committee before I state the reasons for which I am going to ask them to make this further vote to know what has actually happened in consequence of the vote of Aug. 6.

Enlistments Since the War.

The number of recruits who have enlisted in the army since the declaration of war—that is, exclusive of those who have joined the territorial force—is 438,000, [cheers,] practically 439,000. That is up to the evening of Sept. 9. The committee will therefore see that, having sanctioned, as it did, very little more than a month ago, the addition to the regular forces of the Crown of half a million of men, we are now within some 60,000 of having attained that total. The numbers enlisted in London since Sunday, Aug. 30, have exceeded 30,000 men, and the stamp and character of the recruits has been in every way satisfactory and gratifying. [Cheers.] The high-water mark was reached on Sept. 3, when the total recruits enlisted in the United Kingdom on one day was 33,204. [Cheers.] I may mention—I am sure it will be gratifying to honorable members on both sides who represent Lancashire constituencies—that on that day 2,151 men were enlisted in Manchester alone. That is a very satisfactory result, but it by no means exhausts the requirements of the case. The response to the call for recruits has been in every way gratifying. But I am aware, not only from a discussion that took place in the House yesterday, but from communications which reached us from various parts of the country, that there are complaints of grievances, causing legitimate or otherwise deeply felt dissatisfaction at the manner in which some parts—I say advisedly only some parts—of this operation of recruiting have been conducted. I should like the committee to realize what were the conditions of the case. ["Hear, hear!"]

A Year's Recruits in a Day.

We have been recruiting during the last ten days every day substantially the same number of recruits that in past years we have recruited in every year. [Cheers.] I suppose our annual recruiting amounts to about 35,000 men for the regular army. As I pointed out a moment ago, on Sept. 3 we recruited 33,200 men. No machinery in the world which man has ever contrived or conceived could suddenly meet in an emergency and under great pressure the difficulty of bringing in to the colors and making adequate provision in a day for that in which past experience we only had to provide for in the course of a year, and that, be it observed, by a department which during the whole of this time has been engaged in superintending and executing an operation I believe unexampled in the history of war—the dispatch to a foreign country of an expeditionary force—I will not give the exact number, but roughly 150,000 men, which has had to be, as the committee I am sure is well aware, in consequence of the necessary and regrettable losses caused by the operations of war, constantly repaired by reinforcements of men, guns, supplies, transport, and every other form of warlike material. [Cheers.]

War Office's Double Task.

If our critics—I do not complain of legitimate criticism even at times like this—but if they will try to imagine themselves equipped with the machinery which was possessed by the War Office at the time the war broke out, and then consider that side by side with the smooth, frictionless, and most successful dispatch of the expeditionary force [cheers] which left these shores and arrived at its destination—I am speaking the literal truth—without the loss of a horse or a man, [cheers,] the wastage day by day and week by week has had to be repaired in men and in material, repaired often at a moment's notice, and it has been necessary to keep constantly [pg 301]in reserve, and not only in reserve, but ready for immediate use, the material to replace further wastage as days and weeks rolled on—if you remember that that was the primary call on the War Office, and that side by side with that they had to provide for recruits in these few weeks of no less than 430,000 men, he will be a very censorious, and, I venture to say, a very unpatriotic, critic who would make much of small difficulties and friction and who would not recognize that in a great emergency this department has played a worthy part. [Cheers.] My tenure at the War Office was a brief one, but no one who has ever had the honor to preside over that department can possibly exaggerate the degree of efficiency to which it has been brought under the administration of recent years. Everything, as the experience of this war has shown, was foreseen and provided for in advance with the single exception of the necessity of this enormous increase in our regular forces.

Steps for Dealing with Recruits.

What provision has been made for dealing with this influx of recruits? In the first place, and I think very wisely, my noble friend the Secretary of State for War appealed for the assistance of the county associations, which rendered such great and patriotic services in connection with the territorial forces. The great bulk of these county associations have responded to the call and enormously facilitated the work of providing for this large body of new recruits. Next, he, in conjunction with his advisers, has largely multiplied, and is continuing to multiply, the various training centres. There has been—unfortunately, no one can deny that there has been—a congestion of men ready and willing to recruit and actually enlisting at particular places which has produced, for the moment at any rate, a certain amount of discomfort and a certain amount of difficulty in the provision of food and all the other requirements of such a body. But in that connection I should like, although I think the difficulty is now being almost got over, to make an appeal strongly to local authorities—county councils, town councils, urban and rural district councils—that when a situation of this kind arises in consequence of a national necessity they should show themselves—and I am sure they are most willing to do so—not only zealous, but able to provide accommodation for the moment in the public buildings which are under their charge. I think a great deal of the congestion which has taken place could have been avoided if more liberal use had been made, and could be made—I am not reproaching any one: the circumstances were exceptional and the pressure very great on our public buildings, our town halls, schools, and the other edifices which are under the control of municipal and county authorities for the purpose, at any rate at the moment, of relieving the great pressure of recruiting, and I am quite sure that appeal will not go unheeded. But we recognize fully, and no one more fully than my noble friend Lord Kitchener, the necessity of facilitating this process and rendering it more easy. We do not think the time has come in which we ought in any way to relax our recruiting efforts, [cheers,] and when people tell me, as they do every day, "These recruits are coming in in their tens of thousands; you are being blocked by them and you cannot provide adequately either for their equipment or for their training," my answer is, "We shall want more rather than less, and let us get the men," [Cheers.] That is the first necessity of the State—let us get the men. Knowing as we all do the patriotic spirit which now, as always—now, of course, with increased emphasis and enthusiasm—animates every class of the community, I am perfectly certain they will be ready to endure hardship and discomforts for the moment if they are satisfied that their services are really required by the State, and that in due course of time they will be supplied with adequate provision for training and equipment and for rendering themselves fit for taking their places in the field.

Two Important Steps.

With that object a few days ago—and [pg 302]the process is now in complete operation—a very important step was taken which I am sure will be generally welcomed by the committee and by the country—whenever it is necessary to allow men who are recruited and have gone through the process of attestation, medical examination, and actual enrollment, so that they are not only potential but actual members of the regular army—to allow these men to go back to their own homes until the occasion arises for them to be called upon for actual training. In that way we hope to relieve—indeed relief has already been given and will be given more amply in the near future—the undoubted block and congestion which have taken place in certain districts to the natural disappointment of the men who have come forward under an impulse of public duty to serve their country and, finding themselves sent back home and put for the time being in the reserve, have felt perhaps that their services were not duly appreciated by the country. That, I think, the committee will agree is a very important step in advance. I have to announce another step which I believe will give universal satisfaction and will go a long way to solve the practical difficulty, such as it is. We propose from today that there shall be given to those recruits for whom we are unable to find accommodation for the time being 3s. per day. [Cheers.] This is not an extravagant proposal, or anything in the nature of a bribe. A shilling a day is their pay. [An Honorable Member—1s. 3d.] I am speaking in round figures; we will call it a shilling. Then if we take the value of what we may roughly call the board and lodging of a soldier receiving 1s. a day when accommodated in barracks and price that at 2s., I do not think you are putting it extravagantly high. We think that these men who have come forward to join the colors and have been actually enrolled, and are, in fact, members of the regular army, for whom we cannot make immediate provision by way of accommodation, should be no worse off than they would be if they were actually in barracks. I believe the provision of that 3s. a day for these men will put them in a position in which they are entitled to say that they have not been prejudiced or penalized by their patriotic desires.

Mr. Lawson (Mile End, Opp.)—And their return railway fares?

An Honorable Member—And their separation allowances?

Mr. Asquith—The separation allowance does not begin, but as the honorable member has interjected that phrase I will add—because honorable members generally have been very good in not pressing us in regard to the separation allowances to soldiers who are actually serving—that that matter is receiving our daily and constant consideration, and I hope before the session comes to an end to be able to make a further announcement. But it does not arise with regard to this vote. Having made that defense, if defense were needed—I do not think it was—having made that statement of what has actually been done by the War Office in these very anxious days, and also having indicated that in those two important respects we are endeavoring to facilitate the process of recruitment and to remove any possibility of hardship, either to the individual recruit or to recruits collectively, I hope the committee will agree to pass a vote for another 500,000 men. I am perfectly certain if they do so the response will be no less keen—keen in spirit—and no less ample in scale than it has been in the days which have just gone by.

An Army of 1,200,000.

We shall then be in a position, as is apparent from the figures I have already read, to put something like—I am not giving exact figures—something like 1,200,000 men in the field.

Mr. Long (Strand)—Does that include the Indians?

Mr. Asquith—No, it is entirely exclusive of them. This is the provision made by the mother country. And of course it is exclusive of the territorials.

Mr. F. Hall—And of the national reserve?

Mr. Asquith—Exclusive of the territorials, exclusive of the national reserve, [pg 303]and exclusive of the magnificent contributions promised from India and from our dominions, we here in these islands, this mother country, will be in a position to put into the field, enrolled as our regular army, something like 1,200,000 men. That is an effort which it is worth while making great sacrifices to attain. As regards money, I am perfectly certain that this House will be ready, willing, and even eager to grant it, if and when the occasion arises. What we want now is to make it clear, to those who are showing all over the kingdom this patriotic desire to assist their country in one of the most supreme and momentous crises in the whole of its long history, that they are not going to be treated either in a niggardly or unaccommodating spirit; but that they are going to be welcomed and that every possible provision is going to be made for their comfort and well-being, so that under the best possible conditions they will take their place and play their part in that magnificent army of ours which, as every one who has read the moving dispatch Sir John French [cheers] published this morning, will realize has never done its work better, never shown itself more worthy of long centuries of splendid tradition than in the last fortnight. [Cheers.] I ask the House to pass this vote for 500,000 men.

Bonar Law's Support.

Mr. Bonar Law—The right honorable gentleman in the statement he has just made has left me nothing to say except to express our hearty support of all the measures which the Government are taking in this crisis. From the point of view of the Government and of this House we welcome the putting down of this vote as showing that both the Government and the House of Commons are determined, whatever the cost, whatever the sacrifice, to see this thing through. [Cheers.] I agree entirely with the words which I heard the Prime Minister use in another place the other day, that in what has taken place so far we have every ground for encouragement and every reason for pride in what is being done by our troops. I agree entirely with what the Prime Minister has said about the action of our soldiers on the field of battle. It does not surprise us. We knew that the old spirit was there still. But I think it has to some extent at least surprised our enemies. But while we have reason to be gratified by the action which the Government has taken and which this House has supported them in taking, I think as a nation we have quite as much reason to be proud of the spirit which is shown by our countrymen in rushing to the standard as we have even in what has been done by our soldiers on the field of battle. I never sympathized with—I always resented—the view expressed at one time that our citizens were holding back. There was no justification for it. [Cheers.] At the outset they did not realize what it meant, but the moment they did realize it they have shown that they are prepared to do their share to fight the battles of their country. I am not going to say anything about the difficulties in connection with recruiting this great force to which the Prime Minister has referred. No one could have doubted that difficulties of that kind would arise and that hardships would occur. Criticism, I am sure, is not deprecated by the right honorable gentleman, and ought not to be, if it is framed entirely with this view—to make sure that everything that can be done is being done to minimize the hardships and difficulties with which the authorities were confronted. As the Prime Minister said, the machine was not framed to deal with an emergency like this. No one could expect it to deal with it smoothly. But we have a right to expect that the difficulties are understood at the War Office, and we have the right also to ask that since they cannot be met by the central machine, every effort should be made in the direction of devolution, and that the difficulties shall be met where they locally arise. I am sure it is a satisfaction to the House, as it was to me, to find that before the discussion arose yesterday not only had Lord Kitchener realized the difficulties, but that he had taken every step possible to meet them, and that the [pg 304]step which he did take was in the direction, which we all feel is a wise one, of putting the responsibility on those at a distance from the War Office and expecting them to bear it. Many of us have been asked to take part in helping the recruiting. When I was asked to join in this I had in my mind the feeling to which I gave expression the other day, that I was not satisfied that too much sacrifice was not being required from those who are going to fight our battles and that a full share of sacrifice was being borne by those who remain behind. Nothing could be more unfair than that this country should expect all the sacrifice to come from the men who are actually going to risk their lives in our behalf. [Cheers.] We know with what splendid spirit they are coming forward. I suppose every member of the House could give instances that would surprise us all. Perhaps it would interest the House if I give one. The son of a friend of mine, who is well off, had been writing to the War Office, taking every step to try to be accepted in order to fight. He was a partner in a big business in Glasgow and with splendid prospects; he threw them all up. He came and hung about the doors of the War Office as if he was seeking some fat job, when all he wanted was to be placed, not as an officer, but as a private, in one of the most dangerous branches of the service. [Cheers.] That is a spirit which is universal. I do not say in what way further provision should be made, but I am sure the House welcomes the statement of the Prime Minister that the Government are going to reconsider the whole question of separation allowances for the families of the men and for the pensions. I am sure I am expressing the view not of our own party, but of the whole House, when I say that the country realizes that when these men risk their lives for us they are making a big enough sacrifice, and that the country will be glad that in every way every possible generosity at the expense of those who remain behind should be extended to those who go out to fight. [Cheers.]

Delivered in the House of Lords, Sept. 17.

Your lordships will expect that some statement should be made by me on the general military situation before the session ends, and I will, therefore, endeavor as briefly as possible to supplement the remarks which I had the honor to address to your lordships' House three weeks ago.

I need not retell the story of the British expeditionary force in France, which has been read and appreciated by us all in Sir John French's dispatch. The quiet restraint of his account of their achievements only brings into relief the qualities which enabled our troops successfully to carry out the most difficult of all military operations. There is, however, one aspect of this feat of arms upon which the dispatch is naturally silent. I refer to the consummate skill and calm courage of the Commander in Chief himself, [cheers,] in the conduct of this strategic withdrawal in the face of vastly superior forces. His Majesty's Government appreciate to the full the value of the service which Sir John French has rendered to this country and to the cause of the Allies, and I may perhaps be permitted here and now, on their behalf, to pay a tribute to his leadership, as well as to the marked ability of the Generals under his command, and the bravery and endurance of the officers and men of the expeditionary force.

The German Retirement.

As your lordships are aware the tide has now turned, and for some days past we have received the gratifying intelligence of the forced retirement of the German armies. The latest news from Sir John French does not materially change the published statement describing the military situation. In his telegram Sir John reports that the troops are all in good heart and are ready to move forward when the moment arrives. The gallant French armies, with whom we are so proud to be co-operating, will receive every support from our troops in [pg 305]their desire effectually to clear their country of the invading foe, and the undaunted and vigilant activity of the Belgian Army in the north materially conduces to this end. I would also like to take this opportunity of offering our respectful congratulations to Russia upon the conspicuous successes which have added fresh lustre to her arms. Although, therefore, we have good grounds for quiet confidence, it is only right that we should remind ourselves that the struggle is bound to be a long one, and that it behooves us strenuously to prosecute our labors in developing our armed forces to carry on and bring to a successful issue the mighty conflict in which we are engaged.

Troops in the Field.

There are now in the field rather more than six divisions of British troops and two cavalry divisions. These are being, and will be, maintained at full strength by a steady flow of reinforcements. To meet the wastage of war in this field force our reserve units are available. To augment the expeditionary force further regular divisions and additional cavalry are now being organized from units withdrawn from oversea garrisons, whose places, where necessary, will be taken by territorial troops, who, with fine patriotism, have volunteered to exchange a home for an imperial service obligation. On their way from India are certain divisions from the Indian Army, composed of highly trained and very efficient troops, and a body of cavalry, including regiments of historic fame. The dominions beyond the seas are sending us freely of their best. Several divisions will be available, formed of men who have been locally trained in the light of the experience of the South African war, and, in the case of Australia and New Zealand, under the system of general national training introduced a few years ago.

The Call to Arms.

In the response to the call for recruits for the new armies which it is considered necessary to raise we have had a most remarkable demonstration of the energy and patriotism of the young men of this country. We propose to organize this splendid material into four new armies, and, although it takes time to train an army, the zeal and good-will displayed will greatly simplify our task. If some of those who have so readily come forward have suffered inconvenience, they will not, I am sure, allow their ardor to be damped. They will reflect that the War Office has had in a day to deal with as many recruits as were usually forthcoming in twelve months. No effort is being spared to meet the influx of soldiers, and the War Office will do its utmost to look after them and give them the efficient training necessary to enable them to join their comrades in the field. The divisions of the first two armies are now collected at our training centres; the third army is being formed on new camping grounds; the fourth army is being created by adding to the establishment of the reserve battalions, from which the units will be detached and organized similarly to the other three armies. The whole of the special reserve and extra special reserve units will be maintained at their full establishments as feeders to the expeditionary force. In addition to the four new armies a considerable number of what may be designated local battalions have been specially raised by the public-spirited initiative of cities, towns, or individuals. Several more are in course of formation, and I have received many offers of this character. The territorial force is making great strides in efficiency and will before many months be ready to take a share in the campaign. This force is proving its military value to the empire by the willing subordination of personal feelings to the public good in the acceptance of whatever duty may be assigned to it in any portion of the empire. A division has already left for Egypt, a brigade for Malta, and a garrison for Gibraltar. The soldierlike qualities evinced by the force are an assurance to the Government that they may count to the full upon its readiness to play its part wherever the exigencies of the military situation may demand. Nor must I omit to refer to the assistance which we shall receive from the [pg 306]division of the gallant royal marines and bluejackets now being organized by my right honorable friend the First Lord of the Admiralty; their presence in the field will be very welcome, for their fighting qualities are well known.

The Supply of Officers.

The creation of the new armies referred to is fraught with considerable difficulties, one of which is the provision of regimental officers. I hope the problem of supplying officers may be solved by the large numbers coming forward to fill vacancies, and by promotions from the non-commissioned officer ranks of the regular forces. In a country which prides itself on its skill in and love of outdoor sports, we ought to be able to find sufficient young men who will train and qualify as officers under the guidance of the nucleus of trained officers which we are able to provide from India and elsewhere. If any retired officer competent to train troops has not yet applied or has not received an answer to a previous application, I hope he will communicate with me at the War Office in writing. But our chief difficulty is one of material rather than personnel. It would not be in the public interest that I should refer in greater detail to this question, beyond saying that strenuous endeavors are being made to cope with the unprecedented situation, and that, thanks to the public spirit of all grades in the various industries affected to whom we have appealed to co-operate with us, and who are devoting all their energy to the task, our requirements will, I feel sure, be met with all possible speed.

I am confident that by the Spring we shall have ready to take the field armies which will be well trained and will prove themselves formidable opponents to the enemy. The Government fully recognize the fine spirit which animates those who have come forward to fight for their country, and will spare no effort to secure that everything is done that can be done to enable them worthily to contribute to the ultimate success of our arms. [Cheers.]

The Secretary of State for War concluded his speech by giving details of the increase in the separation allowances made to wives of soldiers, both regular and territorial, which Mr. Asquith had announced in the House of Commons.

Tribute of the Opposition.

The Marquess of Lansdowne—I feel that it would be almost impertinent on my part to say a word after the extraordinarily interesting statement to which we have just listened. But I should be sorry if complete silence on our part lent itself to the interpretation that we are indifferent to the great topics which the Secretary of State for War has dealt with in his speech. May we be permitted to say that we regard with the profoundest admiration and gratitude what the noble Field Marshal described as the great feat of arms which has been accomplished by the British force since its arrival at the seat of war, and to add also that we share the feelings which the noble and gallant lord has expressed with regard to the immense services rendered by Sir John French to this country, services which he, of course, could not bear witness to in the dispatch he sent home? [Cheers.] There are only two other remarks which, with great deference, I would venture to make. One has reference to the noble and gallant lord's statement in regard to the response made to his appeal to the country for recruits. That response has been memorable and admirable and, considering the immense influx of recruits which have come in, we can scarcely be surprised that in the early days the strain should have been rather greater than either the War Office or the local authorities were able to cope with. But we have every reason to believe that that has been corrected, and I have no doubt that all will now go smoothly and well. We have all heard with the greatest satisfaction the announcement that the separation allowances to the wives of regulars and territorials are to be considerably increased. ["Hear, hear!"] Considering what our soldiers are doing for us at the seat of war, the least we can do is to provide liberally for the relatives whom they have left behind in this country. [Cheers.]

[pg 307]Speech by King George V. Read Before Both Houses, Sept. 18.

The Lord Chancellor read the King's speech, which was in the following terms:

Then a commission for proroguing the Parliament was read, after which the Lord Chancellor said:

British People Roused by Their Leaders.

[pg 308]Earl Curzon of Kedleston Suggests Holding of Public Meetings.

Addressed to the Lord Mayor of London, the Lord Provost of Edinburgh, the Lord Mayor of Dublin, and the Lord Mayor of Cardiff.

Speech at the Guildhall, Sept. 5.

My Lord Mayor and Citizens of London: It is three and a half years since I last had the honor of addressing in this hall a gathering of the citizens. We were then met under the Presidency of one of your predecessors, men of all creeds and parties, to celebrate and approve the joint declaration of the two great English-speaking States that for the future any differences between them should be settled, if not by agreement, at least by judicial inquiry and arbitration, and never in any circumstances by war. [Cheers.] Those of us who hailed that great Eirenicon between the United States and ourselves as a landmark on the road of progress were not sanguine enough to think, or even to hope, that the era of war was drawing to a close. But still less were we prepared to anticipate the terrible spectacle which now confronts us of a contest which for the number and importance of the powers engaged, the scale of their armaments and armies, the width of the theatre of conflict, the outpouring of blood and the loss of life, the incalculable toll of suffering levied upon non-combatants, the material and moral loss accumulating day by day to the higher interests of civilized mankind—a contest which in every one of these aspects is without precedent in the annals of the world. ["Hear, hear!"] We were very confident three years ago in the rightness of our position, when we welcomed the new securities for peace. We are equally confident in it today, when reluctantly, and against our will, but with a clear judgment and a clean conscience, [cheers,] we find ourselves involved with the whole strength of this empire in a bloody arbitration between might and right [Cheers.] The issue has passed out of the domain of argument into another field, but let me ask you, and through you the world outside, what would have been our condition as a nation today if we had been base enough through timidity or through perverted calculation of self-interest, or through a paralysis of the sense of honor and duty, [cheers,] if we had been base enough to be false to our word and faithless to our friends?

Blind Barbarian Vengeance.

Our eyes would have been turned at this moment with those of the whole civilized world to Belgium, a small State, which has lived for more than seventy years under the several and collective guarantee to which we in common with Prussia and Austria were parties, and we should have seen at the instance and by the action of two of these guaranteeing powers her neutrality violated, her independence strangled, her territory made use of as affording the easiest and the most convenient road to a war of unprovoked aggression against France. We, the British people, would at this moment have been standing by with folded arms and with such countenance as we could command while this small and unprotected State, in defense of her vital liberties, made a heroic stand against overweening and overwhelming force; we should have been admiring as detached spectators the siege of Liége, the steady and manful resistance of a [pg 310]small army to the occupation of their capital, with its splendid traditions and memories, the gradual forcing back of the patriotic defenders of their native land to the ramparts of Antwerp, countless outrages inflicted by buccaneering levies exacted from the unoffending civil population, and, finally, the greatest crime committed against civilization and culture since the Thirty Years' War, the sack of Louvain, [cries of "Shame!"] with its buildings, its pictures, its unique library, its unrivaled associations—a shameless holocaust of irreparable treasures lit up by blind barbarian vengeance. [Prolonged cheers.] What account should we, the Government and the people of this country, have been able to render to the tribunal of our national conscience and sense of honor if, in defiance of our plighted and solemn obligations, we had endured, nay, if we had not done our best to prevent, yes, and to avenge, [renewed cheers,] these intolerable outrages? For my part I say that sooner than be a silent witness—which means in effect a willing accomplice—of this tragic triumph of force over law and of brutality over freedom, I would see this country of ours blotted out of the pages of history. [Prolonged cheers.]

Germany's Aim—to Crush Freedom.

That is only a phase—a lurid and illuminating phase in the contest in which we have been called by the mandate of duty and of honor to bear our part. The cynical violation of the neutrality of Belgium was, after all, but a step—the first step—in a deliberate policy of which, if not the immediate, the ultimate, and the not far distant aim, was to crush the independence and autonomy of the free States of Europe. First Belgium, then Holland, then Switzerland, countries, like our own, imbued and sustained with the spirit of liberty, were one after another to be bent to the yoke, and these ambitions were fed and fostered by a body of new doctrines and new philosophies preached by professors and learned men. The free and full self-development which to these small States, to ourselves, to our great and growing dominions over the seas, to our kinsmen across the Atlantic, is the well-spring and life-breath of national existence—that free self-development is the one capital offense in the code of those who have made force their supreme divinity, and who upon its altars are prepared to sacrifice both the gathered fruits and the potential germs of the unfettered human spirit. [Cheers.] I use this language advisedly. This is not merely a material; it is also a spiritual conflict. [Cheers.] Upon its issues everything that contains promise and hope, that leads to emancipation and a fuller liberty for the millions who make up the mass of mankind will be found sooner or later to depend.

Our Efforts for Peace.

Let me now just for a moment turn to the actual situation in Europe. How do we stand? For the last ten years, by what I believe to be happy and well-considered diplomatic arrangements, we have established friendly and increasingly intimate relations with the two powers, France and Russia, with whom, in days gone by, we have had in various parts of the world occasions for constant friction, and now and again for possible conflict. Those new and better relations, based in the first instance upon business principles of give and take, matured into a settled temper of confidence and good-will. They were never in any sense or at any time, as I have frequently said in this hall, directed against other powers. No man in the history of the world has ever labored more strenuously or more successfully than my right honorable friend Sir Edward Grey [cheers] for that which is the supreme interest of the modern world, a general and abiding peace. It is, I venture to think, a very superficial criticism which suggests that under his guidance the policy of this country has ignored, still less that it has counteracted and hampered, the concert of Europe. It is little more than a year ago that under his Presidency, in the stress and strain of the Balkan crisis, the Ambassadors of all the great powers met here day after day curtailing the area of possible differences, reconciling warring ambitions and aims, and preserving [pg 311]against almost incalculable odds the general harmony. And it was in the same spirit and with the same purpose, when a few weeks ago Austria delivered her ultimatum to Servia, that our Foreign Secretary put forward the proposal for a mediating conference between the four powers who were not directly concerned—Germany, France, Italy, and ourselves. If that proposal had been accepted actual controversy would have been settled with honor to everybody, and the whole of this terrible welter would have been avoided. ["Hear, hear!"]

Germany's Responsibility.

And with whom does the responsibility rest [cries of "The Kaiser!"] for this refusal and for all the illimitable suffering which now confronts the world? One power and one power only, and that power—Germany. [Loud hisses.] That is the fount and origin of this worldwide catastrophe. We are persevering to the end. No one who has not been confronted as we were with the responsibility of determining the issues of peace and war can realize the strength and energy and persistency with which we labored for peace. We persevered by every expedient that diplomacy could suggest, straining almost to the breaking point our most cherished friendships and obligations, even to the last making effort upon effort, and hoping against hope. Then, and only then, when we were at last compelled to realize that the choice lay between honor and dishonor, between treachery and good faith, when at last we reached the dividing line which makes or mars a nation worthy of the name, it was then, and then only, that we declared for war. [Cheers.] Is there any one in this hall or in this United Kingdom or in the vast empire of which we here stand in the capital and centre who blames or repents our decision? [Cries of "No!"] For these reasons, as I believe, we must steel ourselves to the task, and in the spirit which animated our forefathers in their struggle against the domination of Napoleon we must and we shall persevere to the end. [Cheers.]

Memorable and Glorious Example of Belgium.

It would be a criminal mistake to underestimate either the magnitude, the fighting quality, or the staying power of the forces which are arrayed against us. But it would be equally foolish and equally indefensible to belittle our own resources, whether for resistance or attack. [Cheers.] Belgium has shown us by a memorable and a glorious example what can be done by a relatively small State when its citizens are animated and fired by the spirit of patriotism. In France and Russia we have as allies two of the greatest powers of the world engaged with us in a common cause, who do not mean to separate themselves from us any more than we mean to separate ourselves from them. [Cheers.] We have upon the seas the strongest and most magnificent fleet that has ever been seen. The expeditionary force which left our shores less than a month ago has never been surpassed, as its glorious achievements in the field have already made clear, not only in material and equipment but in the physical and the moral quality of its constituents. [Cheers.]

Work of the Navy.

As regards the navy, I am sure my right honorable friend (Mr. Winston Churchill) will tell you there is happily little more to be done. I do not flatter it when I say that its superiority is equally marked in every department and sphere of its activity. [Cheers.] We rely on it with the most absolute confidence, not only to guard our shores against the possibility of invasion, not only to seal up the gigantic battleships of the enemy in the inglorious seclusion of his own ports [laughter] whence, from time to time, he furtively steals forth to sow the seeds of murderous snares, which are more full of menace to neutral ships than to the British fleet. Our navy does all this, and while it is thirsting, I do not doubt, for that trial of strength in a fair and open fight, which is so far prudently denied it, it does a great deal more. It has hunted the German mercantile marine from the high seas. It has kept [pg 312]open our own sources of food supply and has largely curtailed those of the enemy, and when the few German cruisers which still infest the more distant ocean routes have been disposed of, as they will be disposed of very soon, [cheers,] it will achieve for British and neutral commerce passing backward and forward, from and to every part of our empire, a security as complete as it has ever enjoyed in the days of unbroken peace. Let us honor the memory of the gallant seamen who, in the pursuit of one or another of these varied and responsible duties, have already laid down their lives for their country.

Call for United Effort.

In regard to the army there is call for a new, a continuous, a determined, and a united effort. For, as the war goes on, we shall have not merely to replace the wastage caused by casualties, not merely to maintain our military power at its original level, but we must, if we are to play a worthy part, enlarge its scale, increase its numbers, and multiply many times its effectiveness as a fighting instrument. [Cheers.] The object of the appeal which I have made to you, my Lord Mayor, and to the other chief Magistrates of our capital cities, is to impress upon the people of the United Kingdom the imperious urgency of this supreme duty. Our self-governing dominions throughout the empire, without any solicitation on our part, have demonstrated with a spontaneousness and a unanimity unparalleled in history their determination to affirm their brotherhood with us and to make our cause their own. [Cheers.] From Canada, from Australia, from New Zealand, from South Africa, and from Newfoundland the children of the empire assert, not as an obligation, but as a privilege, their right and their willingness to contribute money and material, and, what is better than all, the strength and sinews, the fortunes, and the lives of their best manhood. [Cheers.] India, too, with no less alacrity, has claimed her share in the common task. [Cheers.] Every class, and creed, British and natives, Princes and people, Hindus and Mohammedans, vie with one another in noble and emulous rivalry. Two divisions of our magnificent Indian Army are already on their way. [Cheers.] We welcome with appreciation and affection their proffered aid. In an empire which knows no distinction of race or cause we all alike as subjects of the King-Emperor are joint and equal custodians of our common interests and fortunes. We are here to hail with profound and heartfelt gratitude their association, side by side and shoulder to shoulder, with our home and dominion troops, under the flag which is the symbol to all of a unity that a world in arms cannot dissever or dissolve. With these inspiring appeals and examples from our fellow-subjects all over the world, what are we doing and what ought we to do here at home?

Over a Quarter of a Million Men Enrolled.

Mobilization was ordered on the 4th of August; immediately afterward Lord Kitchener issued his call for 100,000 recruits for the regular army, which has been followed by a second call for another 100,000. The response up to today gives us between 250,000 and 300,000. [Cheers.] I am glad to say that London has done its share. The total number of Londoners accepted is not less than 42,000. [Cheers.] I need hardly say that that appeal involves no disparagement or discouragement of the territorial force. The number of units in that force who have volunteered for foreign service is most satisfactory and grows every day. We look to them with confidence to increase their numbers, to perfect their organization and training, and to play efficiently the part which has always been assigned to them, both offensive and defensive, in the military system of the empire. But to go back to the expansion of the regular army. We want more men—men of the best fighting quality, and if for a moment the number who offer themselves and are accepted should prove to be in excess of those who can at once be adequately trained and equipped, do not let them doubt that prompt provision will be made for the incorporation of all willing and able men [pg 313]in the fighting forces of the kingdom. We want, first of all, men, and we shall endeavor to secure them. Men desiring to serve together shall, wherever possible, be allotted to the same regiment or corps. The raising of battalions by counties or municipalities with this object will be in every way encouraged. But we want not less urgently a larger supply of ex-non-commissioned officers, and the pick of the men with whom in past days they served, men, therefore, whom in most cases we shall be asking to give up regular employment and to return to the work of the State, which they alone are competent to do. The appeal we make is addressed quite as much to their employers as to the men themselves. The men ought to be absolutely assured of reinstatement in their business at the end of the war. [Cheers.] Finally, there are numbers of commissioned officers now in retirement who are much experienced in the handling of troops and have served their country in the past. Let them come forward, too, and show their willingness, if need be, to train bodies of men for whom at the moment no cadre or unit can be found.

Abundant Ground for Pride and Confidence.

I have little more to say. Of the actual progress of the war I will not say anything, except that in my judgment in whatever direction we look there is abundant ground for pride and for confidence. [Cheers.] I say nothing more, because I think we should all bear in mind that we are at present watching the fluctuations of fortune only in the early stages of what is going to be a protracted struggle. We must learn to take long views, and to cultivate, above all, other faculties—those of patience, endurance, and steadfastness. Meanwhile, let us go, each of us, to his or her appropriate place in the great common task. Never had a people more or richer sources of encouragement and inspiration. Let us realize, first of all, that we are fighting as a united empire, in a cause worthy of the highest traditions of our race. Let us keep in mind the patient and indomitable seamen, who never relax for a moment, night or day, their stern vigil of the lonely sea. Let us keep in mind our gallant troops, who today, after a fortnight's continuous fighting under conditions which would try the metal of the best army that ever took the field, maintain not only an undefeated but an unbroken front. [Cheers.] Finally, let us recall the memories of the great men and the great deeds of the past, commemorated, some of them, in the monuments which we see around us on these walls, not forgetting the dying message of the younger Pitt, his last public utterance, made at the table of one of your predecessors, my Lord Mayor, in this very hall: "England has saved herself by her exertions, and will, as I trust, save Europe by her example." The England of those days gave a noble answer to his appeal, and did not sheath the sword until, after nearly twenty years of fighting, the freedom of Europe was secured. Let us go and do likewise. [Prolonged cheers.]

T. von Bethmann-Hollweg, German Imperial Chancellor, in Statement to Ritzau's Danish Press Bureau, Sept. 13, 1914.

The English Prime Minister, in his Guildhall speech, reserved to England the role of protector of the smaller and weaker States, and spoke about the neutrality of Holland, Belgium and Switzerland as being exposed to danger from the side of Germany. It is true that we have broken Belgium's neutrality because bitter necessity compelled us to do so, but we promised Belgium full indemnity and integrity if she would take account of this state of necessity. If so, she would not have suffered any damage, as, for example, Luxemburg. If England, as protector of the weaker States, had wished to spare Belgium infinite suffering she should have advised Belgium to accept our offer. England has not "protected" Belgium, so far as we know; I wonder, therefore, whether it can really be said that England is such a disinterested protector.

[pg 314]We knew perfectly well that the French plan of campaign involved a march through Belgium to attack the unprotected Rhineland. Does any one believe England would have interfered to protect Belgian freedom against France?

We have firmly respected the neutrality of Holland and Switzerland; we have also avoided the slightest violation of the frontier of the Dutch Province of Limburg.

It is strange that Mr. Asquith only mentioned the neutrality of Belgium, Holland and Switzerland, but not that of the Scandinavian countries. He might have mentioned Switzerland with reference to France, but Holland and Belgium are situated close to England on the opposite side of the Channel, and that is why England is so concerned for the neutrality of these countries.

Why is Mr. Asquith silent about the Scandinavian countries? Perhaps because he knows that it does not enter our head to touch these countries' neutrality; or would England possibly not consider Denmark's neutrality as a noli me tangere for an advance in the Baltic or for Russia's warlike operations.

Mr. Asquith wishes people to believe that England's fight against us is a fight of freedom against might. The world is accustomed to this manner of expression. In the name of freedom, England, with might and with the most recklessly egotistic policy, has founded her mighty colonial empire, in the name of freedom she has destroyed for a century the independence of the Boer republics, in the name of freedom she now treats Egypt as an English colony and thereby violates international treaties and solemn promises, in the name of freedom one after another of the Malay States is losing its independence for England's benefit, in the name of freedom she tries, by cutting German cables, to prevent the truth being spread in the world.

The English Prime Minister is mistaken. When England joined with Russia and Japan against Germany she, with a blindness unique in the history of the world, betrayed civilization and handed over to the German sword the care of freedom for European peoples and States.

Sir Edward Grey, Answering Chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg, London, Sept. 15.

"Does any one believe," asks the German Chancellor, "that England would have interfered to protect Belgian freedom against France?" The answer is that she would unquestionably have done so. Sir Edward Grey, as recorded in the "White Paper," asked the French Government "whether it was prepared to engage to respect the neutrality of Belgium so long as no other power violates it." The French Government replied that they were resolved to respect it. The assurance, it was added, had been given several times, and had formed the subject of conversation between President Poincaré and the King of the Belgians.

The German Chancellor entirely ignores the fact that England took the same line about Belgian neutrality in 1870 that she has taken now. In 1870 Prince Bismarck, when approached by England on the subject, admitted and respected the treaty obligations in relation to Belgium. The British Government stands in 1914 as it stood in 1870; it is Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg who refused to meet us in 1914 as Prince Bismarck met us in 1870.

Scandinavian Neutrality.

The Imperial Chancellor finds it strange that Mr. Asquith, in his Guildhall speech, did not mention the neutrality of the Scandinavian countries, and suggests that the reason for the omission was some sinister design on England's part. It is impossible for any public speaker to cover the whole ground in each speech. The German Chancellor's reference to Denmark and other Scandinavian countries can hardly be considered very tactful. With regard to Denmark, the Danes are not likely to have forgotten the parts played by Prussia and England respectively in 1863-4, [pg 315]when the Kingdom of Denmark was dismembered. And the integrity of Norway and Sweden was guaranteed by England and France in the Treaty of Stockholm in 1855.

The Imperial Chancellor refers to the dealings of Great Britain with the Boer republics, and suggests that she has been false therein to the cause of freedom. Without going into controversies now happily past, we may recall what Gen. Botha said in the South African Parliament a few days ago when expressing his conviction of the righteousness of Britain's cause and explaining the firm resolve of the South African Union to aid her in every possible way. "Great Britain had given them a Constitution under which they could create a great nationality, and had ever since regarded them as a free people and as a sister State. Although there might be many who in the past had been hostile toward the British flag, he could vouch for it that they would ten times rather be under the British than under the German flag."

Loyalty of the Empire.

The German Chancellor is equally unfortunate in his references to the "Colonial Empire." So far from British policy having been "recklessly egotistic," it has resulted in a great rally of affection and common interest by all the British dominions and dependencies, among which there is not one which is not aiding Britain by soldiers or other contributions or both in this war.

With regard to the matter of treaty obligations generally, the German Chancellor excuses the breach of Belgian neutrality by military necessity—at the same time making a virtue of having respected the neutrality of Holland and Switzerland, and saying that it does not enter his head to touch the neutrality of the Scandinavian countries. A virtue which admittedly is only practiced in the absence of temptation from self-interest and military advantage does not seem greatly worth vaunting. To the Chancellor's concluding statement that "to the German sword" is intrusted "the care of freedom for European peoples and States," the treatment of Belgium is a sufficient answer.

Speech in Usher Hall, Sept. 18.

A fortnight ago today, in the Guildhall of the City of London, I endeavored to present to the nation and to the world the reasons which have compelled us, the people of all others which have the greatest interest in the maintenance of peace, to engage in the hazards and horrors of war. I do not wish to repeat tonight in any detail what I then said.

The war has arisen immediately and ostensibly, as every one knows, out of a dispute between Austria and Servia, in which we in this country had no direct concern. The diplomatic history of those critical weeks—the last fortnight in July and the first few days of August—is now accessible to all the world. It has been supplemented during the last few days by the admirable and exhaustive dispatch of our late Ambassador at Vienna, Sir Maurice de Bunsen, a dispatch which I trust everybody will read, and no one who reads it can doubt that, largely through the efforts of my right honorable friend and colleague Sir Edward Grey [loud cheers] the conditions of a peaceful settlement of the actual controversy were already within sight when, on July 31, Germany [hisses] by her own deliberate act made war a certainty.

The facts are incontrovertible. They are not sought to be controverted, except, indeed, by the invention and circulation of such wanton falsehoods as that France was contemplating, and even commencing, the violation of Belgian territory as a first step on her road to Germany. The result is that we are at war, and, as I have already shown elsewhere, and as I repeat here tonight, we are at war for three reasons—in the first place, to vindicate the sanctity of treaty obligations ["Hear, hear!"] and of what is properly called the public law of Europe, ["Hear, hear!";] in the second place, to assert and to enforce the independence [pg 316]of free States, relatively small and weak, against the encroachments and the violence of the strong, [cheers,] and, in the third place, to withstand, as we believe in the best interests not only of our own empire but of civilization at large, the arrogant claim of a single power to dominate the development of the destinies of Europe. [Cheers.]

Meeting a Challenge.

Since I last spoke some faint attempts have been made in Germany to dispute the accuracy and the sincerity of this statement of our attitude and aim. It has been suggested, for instance, that our professed zeal for treaty rights and for the interests of small States is a newborn and simulated passion. What, we are asked, has Great Britain cared in the past for treaties or for the smaller nationalities except when she had some ulterior and selfish purpose of her own to serve? I am quite ready to meet that challenge, and to meet it in the only way in which it could be met, by reference to history. And out of many illustrations which I might take I will content myself here tonight with two, widely removed in point of time, but both, as it happens, very apposite to the present case.

I will go back first to the war carried on first against the revolutionary Government of France and then against Napoleon, which broke out in 1793, and which lasted for more than twenty years. We had then at the head of the Government in this country one of the most peace-loving Ministers who have ever presided over our fortunes—Mr. Pitt. For three years, from 1789 to 1792, he resolutely refused to interfere in any way with the revolutionary proceedings in France or in the wars that sprang out of them, and as lately, I think, as February in 1792, in a memorable speech in the House of Commons, which shows among other things the shortness of human foresight, he declared that there never was a time when we in this country could more reasonably expect fifteen years of peace.

And what was it, gentlemen, that, within a few months of that declaration, led this pacific Minister to war? It was the invasion of the treaty rights guaranteed by ourselves of a small European State, the then States General of Holland. [Cheers.] For nearly 200 years the great powers of Europe had guaranteed to Holland the exclusive navigation of the River Scheldt. The French revolutionary Government invaded what is now Belgium, and as a first act of hostility to Holland declared the navigation of the Scheldt to be open. Our interest in that matter then, as now, was relatively small and insignificant, but what was Mr. Pitt's reply?

Defense of Small States.

I quote you the exact words he used in the House of Commons, they are so applicable to the circumstances of the present moment. This is in 1793:

He went on to say:

And it was in consequence of that stubborn and unyielding determination to maintain treaties to defend small States, to resist the aggressive domination of a single power, that we were involved in a war which we had done everything to avoid, and which was carried on upon a scale, both as to area and as to duration, up to then unexampled in the history of mankind. That is one precedent. Let me give you one more.

I come down to 1870, when this very treaty to which we are parties, no less than Germany, and which guarantees the integrity and independence of Belgium, was threatened. Mr. Gladstone was then Prime Minister of this country, [cheers,] and he was, if possible, a stronger and more ardent advocate of peace even than Mr. Pitt himself. ["Hear, hear!"]

[pg 317]Mr. Gladstone's Dictum.

Mr. Gladstone, pacific as he was, felt so strongly the sanctity of our obligations that—though here again we had no direct interest of any kind at stake—he made agreements with France and Prussia to co-operate with either of the belligerents if the other violated Belgian territory, and I should like to read a passage from a speech ten years later, delivered in 1880, by Mr. Gladstone himself in this city, in which he reviewed that transaction and explained his reasons for it. He said: "If we had gone to war"—which he was prepared to do—"we should have gone to war for freedom; we should have gone to war for public right; we should have gone to war to save human happiness from being invaded by tyrannous and lawless power." That is what I call a good cause, though I detest war, and there are no epithets too strong if you will supply me with them that I will not endeavor to heap upon its head.

So much for our own action in the past in regard to treaties and small States. But faint as is this denial of this part of our case, it becomes fainter still, it dissolves into the thinnest of thin air, when it has to deal with our contention that we and our allies are withstanding a power whose aim is nothing less than the domination of Europe. ["Hear, hear!"]

It is, indeed, the avowed belief of the leaders of German thought—I will not say of the German people—of those who for many years past have controlled German policy, that such a domination, carrying with it the supremacy of what they call German culture [laughter] and the German spirit is the best thing that could happen to the world.

German "Culture."

Let me then ask for a moment what is this German culture, what is this German spirit of which the Emperor's armies are at present the missionaries in Belgium and in France? [Laughter.] Mankind owes much to Germany, a very great debt for the contributions she has made to philosophy, to science and to the arts; but that which is specifically German in the movement of the world in the last thirty years has been, on the intellectual side, the development of the doctrine of the supreme and ultimate prerogative in human affairs of material forces, and, on the practical side, taking of the foremost place in the fabrication and the multiplication of the machinery of destruction.

To the men who have adopted this gospel, who believe that power is the be all and end all of the State, naturally a treaty is nothing more than a piece of parchment, and all the Old World talk about the rights of the weak and the obligations of the strong is only so much threadbare and nauseating cant, for one very remarkable feature of this new school of doctrine is, whatever be its intellectual or its ethical merits, that it has turned out as an actual code for life to be a very purblind philosophy.

The German culture, the German spirit, did not save the Emperor and his people from delusions and miscalculations as dangerous as they were absurd in regard to the British Empire.

A Fantastic Dream.

We were believed by these cultivated observers [laughter] to be the decadent descendants of a people who, by a combination of luck and of fraud, [laughter,] had managed to obtain dominion over a vast quantity of the surface and the populations of the globe.

This fortuitous aggregation [laughter and cheers] which goes by the name of the British Empire was supposed to be so insecurely founded, and so loosely knit together, that at the first touch of serious menace from without it would fall to pieces and tumble to the ground. [Cheers.]

Our great dominions were getting heartily tired of the imperial connection. India, [loud cheers,] it was notorious to every German traveler, [laughter,] was on the verge of open revolt, and here at home we, the people of this United Kingdom, were riven by dissension so deep and so fierce that our energies, whether for resistance or for attack, would be completely paralyzed.

What a fantastic dream, ["Hear, hear!"] and what a rude awakening! [pg 318][Laughter and cheers.] And in this vast and grotesque and yet tragic miscalculation is to be found one of the roots, perhaps the main root, of the present war.

But let us go one step more. It has been said, "By their fruits ye shall know them," and history will record that when the die was cast and the struggle began, it was the disciples of that same creed who revived methods of warfare which have for centuries past been condemned by the common sense as well as by the humanity of the great mass of the civilized world. [Cheers.]

Branded on the Brow.

Louvain, Malines, Termonde—these are names which will henceforward be branded on the brow of German culture. The ruthless sacking of the ancient and famous towns of Belgium is fitly supplemented by the story that reaches us only today from our own headquarters in France of the proclamation issued less than a week ago by the German authorities, who were for a moment, and happily for little more than a moment, in occupation of the venerable city of Rheims.

Mr. Asquith then read the concluding paragraph of the proclamation which appeared in these columns yesterday.

Do not let it be forgotten that it is from a power whose intellectual leaders are imbued with the idea that I have described, and whose Generals in the field sanction and even direct those practices—it is from that power the claim proceeds to impose its culture, its spirit, which means its domination, upon the rest of Europe. That is a claim, I say to you, to all my fellow-countrymen, to every citizen and subject of the British Empire whose ears and eyes my words can reach—that is a claim that everything that is great in our past and everything that promises hope or progress in our future summons us to resist to the end. [Loud cheers.]

The task—do not let us deceive ourselves—will not be a light one. Its full accomplishment—and nothing short of full accomplishment [cheers]—is worthy of our traditions or will satisfy our resolve—will certainly take months. It may even take years.

I have come here tonight not to ask you to count the cost, for no price can be too high to pay when honor and freedom are at stake, but to put before you, as I have tried to do, the magnitude of the issue and the supreme necessity that lies upon us as a nation, nay as a brotherhood and family of nations, to rise to its height and acquit ourselves of our duty.

Our Favorable Position.

The war has now lasted more than six weeks. Our supremacy at sea [great cheers] has not been seriously questioned. [Laughter.] Full supplies of food and of raw materials are making their way to our shores from every quarter of the globe. [Cheers.] Our industries, with one or two exceptions, maintain their activities.

Unemployment is so far not seriously in excess of the average. The monetary situation has improved, and every effort that the zeal and the skill of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, [cheers,] with the co-operation and expert advice of the bankers and business men of the country, can devise—every effort is being made to achieve what is most essential, the complete re-establishment of the foreign exchanges.

Meanwhile, the merchant shipping of the enemy has been hunted from the seas [cheers] and our seaman are still patiently, or impatiently, [laughter,] waiting for a chance to try conclusions with the opposing fleet. Great and incalculable is the debt which we have owed during these weeks, and which in increasing measure we shall continue to owe, to our navy. [Cheers.] The navy needs no help, and as the months roll on—thanks to a far-sighted policy in the past—its proportionate strength will grow. [Cheers.]

Army's Glorious Record.

If we turn to our army [cheers] we can say with equal justice and pride that during these weeks it has rivaled the most glorious records of its past. [Cheers.] Sir John French [cheers] and his gallant officers and men live in [pg 319]our hearts, as they will live in the memories of those who come afterward. [Cheers,]

But splendid achievements such as these—equally splendid in retirement and in advance ["Hear, hear!"]—cannot be won without a heavy expenditure of life and limb, of equipment and supplies. Even now, at this very early stage, I suppose there is hardly a person here who is not suffering from anxiety and suspense. Some of us are plunged in sorrow for the loss of those we love; cut off, some of them, in the springtime of their young lives. We will not mourn for them overmuch. One crowded hour of glorious life is worth an age without a name. [Cheers.]

These gaps have to be filled. The wastage of modern war is relentless and almost inconceivable. We have—I mean his Majesty's Government have—since the war began dispatched to the front already considerably over 200,000 men [cheers] and the amplest provision has been made for keeping them supplied with all that was necessary in food, in stores, and in equipment. They will very soon be reinforced by regular troops from India, from Egypt, and the Mediterranean, and in due time by the contingents which our dominions are furnishing with such magnificent patriotism and liberality. [Cheers.]

Eager Territorials.

We have with us here our own gallant territorials, becoming every day a fitter and a finer force, eager and anxious to respond to any call either at home or abroad that may be made upon them. [Cheers.] But that is not enough. We must do still more. Already, in little more than a month, we have 500,000 recruits for the four new armies which, as Lord Kitchener told the country yesterday, he means to have ready to bring into the field. In a single day we have had as many men enlist as we have been accustomed to enlist in the course of a whole year. It is not, I think, surprising that the machinery has been overstrained, and there have been many cases of temporary inconvenience and hardship and discomfort. With time and patience and good organization these things will be set right, and the new scale of allowances which was announced in Parliament yesterday [cheers] will do much to mitigate the lot of wives and children and dependents who are left behind. [Cheers.]

We want more men, and, perhaps most of all, the help for training them. Every one in the whole of this kingdom who has in days gone by, as officer or as non-commissioned officer, served his country never had a greater or more fruitful opportunity for service than is presented to him today. [Cheers.] We appeal to the manhood of the three kingdoms. To such an appeal I know well, coming from your senior representative in the House of Commons, that Scotland will not turn a deaf ear. [Cheers.]

Scotland is doing well, and, indeed, more than well, and no part of Scotland I believe, in proportion, better than Edinburgh. I cannot say with what pleasure I heard the figures given out by the Lord Provost and those which have been supplied to me by the gallant gentleman who has the Scottish command [cheers,] which show, indeed, as we expected, that Scotland is more than holding her own. In that connection let me repeat what I said two weeks ago in London. We think it of the highest importance that so far as possible, and subject to the accidents of war, people belonging to the same place, breathing the same atmosphere, having the same associations, should be kept together.

Our recruits come to us spontaneously, under no kind of compulsion, [cheers,] of their own free will to meet a national and an imperial need. We present to them no material inducement in the shape either of bounty or bribe, and they have to face the prospect of a spell of hard training from which most of the comforts and all the luxuries that any of them have been accustomed to are rigorously banished. But then, when they are fully equipped for their patriotic task, they will have the opportunity of striking a blow, it may be even of laying down their lives, not to serve the cause of [pg 320]ambition or aggression, but to maintain the honor and the good faith of our country, to shield the independence of free States, to protect against brute force the principles of civilization and the liberties of Europe. [Loud cheers.]

Speech in the Round Room of the Mansion House, Sept. 25.

My Lord Mayor: Some weeks ago I took it upon myself to suggest to the four principal Magistrates of the United Kingdom that they should afford me an opportunity of making a personal appeal to their citizens at a great moment in our national history. I have already delivered my message in London and in Edinburgh. To the first of those great communities I was able to speak as an Englishman by birth and as a Londoner by early association and long residence. To the second, the capital of the ancient Kingdom of Scotland, I had special credentials as having been for the best part of thirty years one of their representatives in the House of Commons, ["Hear, hear!"] and now, indeed, by one of the melancholy privileges of time the senior among the Scottish members. [Laughter.] But, my Lord Mayor, tonight when I come to Dublin I can put forward neither the one claim nor the other. [A Voice—Home Rule.] I base my title, such as it is, to your hospitality and your hearing upon such service as during the whole of my political life I have tried with a whole heart and to the best of my faculties and opportunities to render to Ireland. [Cheers.] I come here, not as a partisan, not even as a politician, but I come here as for the time being the head of the King's Government, [cheers,] to summon Ireland, a loyal and patriotic Ireland, to take her place in the defense of our common cause. [Cheers.] My Lord Mayor, it is no part of my mission tonight, it is indeed at this time of day wholly unnecessary, to justify, still less to excuse, the part which the Government of the United Kingdom has taken in this supreme crisis in our national affairs. There have been wars in the past in regard to which there has been among us diversity of opinion, uneasiness as to the wisdom of our diplomacy, anxiety as to the expediency of our policy, doubts as to the essential righteousness of our cause.

Unity of the Empire.

That, my Lord Mayor, as you said, is not the case today. [Cheers.] Even in the memorable struggle which we waged a hundred years ago against the domination of Napoleon there was always a minority, respectable not merely in number, but in the sincerity and in the eminence of its adherents, which broke the front of our national unity. Again I say that is not the case today. We feel as a nation—or rather I ought to say, speaking here and looking round upon our vast empire in every quarter of the globe—as a family of nations, [prolonged cheers,] without distinction of creed or party, of race or climate, class or section, that we are united in defending principles and in maintaining interests which are vital, not only to the British Empire, but to all that is worth having in our common civilization, [cheers,] and all that is worth hoping for in the future progress of mankind. [Loud cheers.] What better or higher cause, my Lord Mayor, whether we succeed or fail? [Cries of "No failure."] We are going not to fail, but to succeed. [Enthusiastic cheers.] What higher cause than to arouse and enlist the best qualities of a free people, than to be engaged at one and the same time in the vindication of international good faith, in the protection of the weak against the violence of the strong, [cheers,] and in the assertion of the best ideals of all the free communities in all the ages of time and in every part of the world against the encroachments of those who believe and who preach and who practice the religion of force? It is not—I am sure you will agree with me—it is not necessary to demonstrate once more that of this war Germany is the real and the responsible author. [Cheers.] The proofs are patent, manifold and overwhelming. [Cheers.] Indeed, on the part of Germany [pg 321]herself we get upon this point, if denial at all, a denial only of the faintest and the most formal kind. For a generation past she has been preparing the ground, equipping herself, both by land and sea, fortifying herself with alliances, and, what is perhaps even more important, teaching her youth to seek and to pursue as the first and the most important of all human things the supremacy of the German power and the German spirit, and all that time biding her opportunity. Gentlemen, many of the great wars of history have been almost accidentally brought about by the blindness of blundering statesmen, or by some wave of popular passion. That is not so today. ["Hear, hear!"] There was nothing in a quarrel such as this between Austria and Servia that could not have been and that would not have been settled by pacific means. [Cheers.]

Germany's Profound Mistakes.

But in the judgment of those who guide and control German policy the hour had come to strike the blow that had been long and deliberately prepared. In their hands lay the choice between peace and war, and their election was for war. In so deciding, as everybody now knows, Germany made two profound miscalculations. [Cheers.] Both of them natural enough in a man who had come to believe that in international matters everything can be explained and measured in terms of material force. What, gentlemen, were those mistakes? The first was that Belgium, [cheers,] a small and prosperous country entirely disinterested in European quarrels, guaranteed by the joint and several compacts of the great powers, that Belgium would not resent, and certainly would not resist, the use of her territory as a highroad for an invading German force into France. How could they imagine that this little country, rather than allow her neutrality to be violated and her independence insulted and menaced, was prepared that her fields should be drenched with the blood of her soldiers, her towns and villages devastated by marauders, her splendid heritage of monuments and of treasures, built up for her by the piety, art, and learning of the past, ruthlessly laid in ruins? The passionate attachment of a numerically small population to the bit of territory, which looks so little upon the map, the pride and the unconquerable devotion of a free people to their own free State, these were things which apparently had never been dreamed of in the philosophy of Potsdam. [Laughter and "Hear, hear!"] Rarely in history has there been a greater material disparity between the invaders and the invaded, but the moral disparity was at least equally great. [Cheers.] For, gentlemen, the indomitable resistance of the Belgians did more than change the whole face of the campaign. [Cheers.] It proved to the world that ideas which cannot be weighed or measured by any material calculus can still inspire and dominate mankind. [Cheers.] And that is the reason why the whole sympathy of the civilized world at this moment is going out to these small States—Belgium, Servia, and Montenegro—that have played so worthy a part in this historic struggle. [Cheers.]

The Moral Bond of Civilization.

But, my Lord Mayor, Germany was guilty of another and a still more capital blunder in relation to ourselves. ["Hear, hear!"] I am not referring for the moment to the grotesque understanding upon which I dwelt a week ago at Edinburgh, their carefully fostered belief that we here were so rent with civil distraction, [laughter,] so paralyzed by luke-warmness or disaffection in our dominions and dependencies, that if it came to fighting we might be brushed aside as an impotent and even a negligible factor. [Cheers and cries of "Never!"] The German misconception went even deeper than that. They asked themselves what interest, direct or material, had the United Kingdom in this conflict? Could any nation, least of all the cold, calculating, phlegmatic, egotistic British nation, [laughter,] embark upon a costly and bloody contest from which it had nothing in the hope of profit to expect? ["Hear, hear!"] They forgot—they forgot that we, like the Belgians, had something at stake which [pg 322]cannot be translated into what one of our poets has called "The law of nicely calculated less or more." What was it we had at stake? First and foremost, the fulfillment to the small and relatively weak country of our plighted word [cheers] and behind and beyond that the maintenance of the whole system of international good-will which is the moral bond of the civilized world. [Cheers.] Here again they were wrong in thinking that the reign of ideas, Old World ideas like those of duty and good faith, had been superseded by the ascendency of force. My Lord Mayor, war is at all times a hideous thing; at the best an evil to be chosen in preference to worse evils, and at the worst little better than the letting loose of hell upon earth. The prophet of old spoke of the "confused noise of battle and the garments rolled in blood," but in these modern days, with the gigantic scale of the opposing armies and the scientific developments of the instruments of destruction, war has become an infinitely more devastating thing than it ever was before. The hope that the general recognition of a humaner code would soften or abate some of its worst brutalities has been rudely dispelled by the events of the last few weeks. ["Shame!"]

Shameful and Cynical Desecration.

The German invasion of Belgium and France contributes, indeed, some of the blackest pages to its sombre annals. Rarely has a non-combatant population suffered more severely, and rarely, if ever, have the monuments of piety and of learning and those sentiments of religion and national association, of which they are the permanent embodiment, even in the worst times of the most ruthless warriors, been so shamefully and cynically desecrated; and behind the actual theatre of conflict with its smoke and its carnage there are the sufferings of those who are left behind, the waste of wealth, the economic dislocation, the heritage, the long heritage of enmities and misunderstanding which war brings in its train. Why do I dwell upon these things? It is to say this, that great indeed is the responsibility of those who allow their country—as we have done—to be drawn into such a welter; but there is one thing much worse than to take such a responsibility, and that is, upon a fitting occasion, to shirk it. [Cheers.] Our record in the matter is clear. We strove up to the last moment for peace [cheers] and only when we were satisfied that the price of peace was the betrayal of other countries and the dishonor and degradation of our own we took up the sword. [Prolonged cheers.] I should like, if I might for a moment, beyond this inquiry into causes and motives, to ask your attention and that of my fellow-countrymen to the end which in this war we ought to keep in view. Forty-four years ago, at the time of the war of 1870, Mr. Gladstone used these words. He said: "The greatest triumph of our time will be the enthronement of the idea of public right as the governing idea of European politics." Nearly fifty years have passed. Little progress, it seems, has yet been made toward that good and beneficent change, but it seems to me to be now at this moment as good a definition as we can have of our European policy. The idea of public right; what does it mean when translated into concrete terms? It means, first and foremost, the clearing of the ground by the definite repudiation of militarism as the governing factor in the relation of States, and of the future molding of the European world. It means, next, that room must be found and kept for the independent existence and the free development of the smaller nationalities, [cheers,] each with a corporate consciousness of its own.

The Recognition of Nationality.

Belgium, Holland, and Switzerland and the Scandinavian countries, Greece, and the Balkan States, they must be recognized as having exactly as good a title as their more powerful neighbors—more powerful in strength and in wealth—exactly as good a title to a place in the sun. [Prolonged cheers and some laughter.] And it means, finally, or it ought to mean, perhaps by a slow and gradual process, the substitution for force, for the clash of competing ambition, for [pg 323]grouping and alliances and a precarious equipoise, the substitution for all these things of a real European partnership, based on the recognition of equal right and established and enforced by a common will. [Cheers.] A year ago that would have sounded like a Utopian idea. It is probably one that may not or will not be realized either today or tomorrow. If and when this war is decided in favor of the Allies, it will at once come within the range, and, before long, within the grasp of European statesmanship. [Cheers.] I go back for a moment, if I am not keeping you too long, ["Go on,"] to the peculiar aspects of the actual case upon which I have dwelt, because it seems to me that they ought to make a special appeal to the people of Ireland. Ireland is a loyal country, [cheers,] and she would, I know, respond with alacrity to any summons which called upon her to take her share in the assertion and the defense of our common interests. But, gentlemen, the issues raised by this war are of such a kind that, unless I mistake her people and misrepresent her history, they touch a vibrating chord both in her imagination and in her conscience. How can you Irishmen be deaf to the cry of the smaller nationalities to help them in their struggle for freedom [cheers] whether, as in the case of Belgium, in maintaining what she has won, or as in the case of Poland or the Balkan States in regaining what they have lost or in acquiring and putting upon a stable foundation what has never been fully theirs?

The Appeal to Ireland.

How again can you Irishmen—if I understand you—sit by in cool detachment and with folded arms while we, in company of our gallant allies of France and Russia, are opposing a worldwide resistance to pretensions which threaten to paralyze and sterilize all progress and the best destinies of mankind? [Cheers.] During the last few weeks Sir John French and his heroic forces have worthily sustained our cause. The casualties have been heavy. Ireland has had her share, although they have been increased during the last week from the ranks of our gallant navy by one of the hazards of warfare at sea. But of those who have fallen in both services we may ask how could men die better? [Cheers.]

The Indian Contingent.

They have left behind them an example and an appeal. From all quarters of the empire its best manhood is flowing in. The first Indian contingent is, I believe, landing today at Marseilles, [loud cheers,] and in all parts of our great dominions the convoys are already mustering. Over half a million recruits have joined the colors here at home, [cheers,] and I come to ask you in Ireland, though you don't need my asking, to take your part. [Cheers and shouts of "We must."] There was a time when, through the operations of laws which every one now acknowledges to have been both unjust and impolitic, ["Hear, hear!"] the martial spirit of and the capacity for which Irishmen have always been conspicuous, found its chief outlet in the alien armies of the Continent. I have seen it computed—I do not know whether with precise accuracy—but I have seen it computed upon good authority that in the first fifty years of the eighteenth century, when the penal laws were here in full swing, nearly half a million Irishmen enlisted under the banners of the empire of France and Spain, and we at home in the United Kingdom suffered a double loss; for, gentlemen, not only were we drained year by year of some of our best fighting material, ["Hear, hear!"] but over and over again we found ourselves engaged in battle array suffering and inflicting deadly loss upon those who might have been, and under happier conditions would have been, fellow-soldiers of our own. [Cheers.] The British Empire has always been proud, and with reason, of those Irish regiments [cheers] and their Irish leaders, [more cheers,] and was never prouder of them that it is today. [Great cheering.] We ask you here in Ireland to give us more, [cheers, and a Voice, "You'll get them,"] to give them without stinting. We ask Ireland to give of her sons, the most in number, the best in quality that a proud and loyal daughter [pg 324]of the empire ought to devote to the common cause. [Cheers.]

The Volunteers of Ireland.

The conditions seem to me to be exceptionally favorable for the purpose. We have of late been witnessing here in Ireland a spontaneous enrollment and organization in all parts of the country of bodies of volunteers. I say nothing—for I wish tonight to avoid trespassing upon even a square inch of controversial ground—I say nothing of the causes or motives which brought them originally into existence, [laughter,] and have fostered their growth and strength. I will only say—and this is my nearest approach to politics tonight—that there are two things which to my mind have become unthinkable. The first is that one section of Irishmen are going to fight. [Loud cheers.] The second is that Great Britain is going to fight either. [Renewed cheers.] Speaking here in Dublin, I may perhaps address myself for a moment particularly to the National Volunteers, and I am going to ask them all over Ireland—not only them, but I make the appeal to them particularly—to contribute with promptitude and enthusiasm a large and worthy contingent of recruits to the second new army of half a million, which is growing up as it were out of the ground. [Cheers.] I should like to see, and we all want to see, an Irish brigade, [cheers,] or, better still, an Irish army corps. [Loud cheers.] Do not let them be afraid that by joining the colors they will lose their identity and become absorbed in some invertebrate mass, or, what is perhaps equally repugnant, be artificially redistributed in units which have no national cohesion or character. We wish to the utmost limit that military exigencies will allow that men who have been already associated in this or that district in training and in common exercises should be kept together and continue to recognize the corporate bond which now unites them. ["Hear, hear!"] And of one thing further I am sure. We are in urgent need of competent officers, and we think that if the officers now engaged in training these men are proved equal to the test, there is no fear that their services will not be gladly and gratefully retained. I repeat that the empire needs recruits, and needs them at once, that they may be fully trained and equipped in time to take their part in what may well be the decisive fields of the greatest struggle in the history of the world. That is our immediate necessity, and no Irishman in responding to it need be afraid that he is prejudicing the future of the volunteers. [Cheers.] I do not say, and I can not say, under what precise form or organization, but I trust and believe, and indeed I am certain, that the volunteers will become a permanent part, an integral and a characteristic part, of the defensive forces of the Crown. [Cheers.] I have only one more thing to say to you. [Cries of "Go on."] If our need is great your opportunity is also great. [Cheers.] The call which I am making is, as you know well, backed by the sympathy of your fellow-Irishmen in all parts of the empire and the world. Old animosities between us are dead. [Loud and prolonged cheers.] Scattered like the Autumn leaves to the four winds of heaven, we are a united nation, [renewed cheers,] owing and paying to our sovereign the heartfelt allegiance of men who at home not only love but enjoy for themselves the liberty which our soldiers and our sailors are fighting by land and by sea to maintain and to extend for others. There is no question of compulsion or bribery. What we want we believe you are ready and eager to give as the free-will offering of a free people. [Great cheering.]

The Earl of Meath, Lord Lieutenant of County Dublin, who was next called on, declared that their gathering would be historic because for the first time in her history Irishmen of all classes, creeds, and politics had met on the same platform. The modern Attila might be known, as his predecessor was known, as the scourge of God. But for the constant vigilance of our army and our fleet Ireland might have met the fate of Belgium. He suggested that Earl Kitchener should, as far as possible, see that the Irish corps at the front should act together.

[pg 325]Speech in the Skating Rink, Oct. 2.

In the course of the last month I have addressed meetings in London, Edinburgh, and Dublin, and now in the completion of the task which I set myself and which the kindness of our great municipalities has allowed me to perform I have come to Cardiff. [Cheers.] England, Scotland, and Ireland have each of them a definite and a well-established capital city, but I have always understood that there was some doubt where the capital of the Principality of Wales was to be found on the map. [Laughter.] Wales is a single and indivisible entity with a life of its own, drawing its vitality from an ancient past, and both, I believe, in the volume and in the reality of its activity, never more virile than it is today. [Cheers.] But I do not know that there is any general agreement among Welshmen as to where their capital is to be found, [laughter, and a voice, "Here,"] and without attempting as an outsider to differentiate or to reconcile competing claims I stand here tonight on what I believe to be a safe coign of vantage under the hospitality and the authority of the Lord Mayor of Cardiff.

Though I am not altogether a stranger to Wales, you may nevertheless ask why I have requested your permission to address this great audience here tonight. I am not altogether an idle man, and during the last few months I can honestly say that there has hardly been a day, indeed there have been very few hours, which have not been preoccupied with grave cares and responsibility. But throughout them all I have been, and I am, sustained by a profound and unshakable belief in the righteousness of our cause [cheers] and by overwhelming evidence that in the pursuit and the maintenance of that cause the Government have behind them, without distinction of race, of party, or of class, the whole moral and material support of the British Empire. [Cheers.] Let me take the opportunity to acknowledge and to welcome the calm, reasoned, and dignified statement of our cause which the Christian Churches of the United Kingdom, through some of their most distinguished leaders and ministers, have this week presented to the world. [Cheers.]

The United Voice of the Empire.

I will not repeat, and I certainly cannot improve upon it, and indeed I am not here tonight to argue out propositions which British citizens in every part of the world today regard as beyond the reach of controversy. I do not suppose that in the history of mankind there has ever been in such a vast and diverse community agreement so unanimous in purpose and so concentrated, a corporate conscience so clear and so convinced, co-operation so spontaneous, so ardent, and so resolute. [Cheers.] Just consider what it means, here in this United Kingdom—England, Scotland, Ireland, and Wales—to hear one plain, harmonious, great united voice over the seas from our great dominions. [Cheers.] Canada, Australia, South Africa, New Zealand, our crown colonies, swell the chorus.

In India [cheers]—where whatever we won by the sword we hold and we retain by the more splendid title of just and disinterested rule by the authority, not of a despot, but of a trustee [cheers]—the response to our common appeal has moved all our feelings to their profoundest depths, and has been such as to shiver and to shatter the vain and ignorant imaginings of our enemies. [Cheers,] That is a remarkable and indeed a unique spectacle.

What is it that stirred the imagination, aroused the conscience, enlisted the manhood, welded into one compact and irresistible force the energies and the greatest imperial structure that the world has ever known? [Cheers.] That is a question which, for a moment at any rate, it is well worth asking and answering. Let me say, then, first negatively, that we are not impelled, any of us, by some of the motives which have occasioned the bloody struggles of the past. In this case, so far as we are concerned, ambition and aggression play no part. What [pg 326]do we want? What do we aim at? What have we to gain?

We are a great, worldwide, peace-loving partnership. By the wisdom and the courage of our forefathers, by great deeds of heroism and adventure by land and sea, by the insight and corporate sagacity, the tried and tested experience of many generations, we have built up a dominion which is buttressed by the two pillars of liberty and law. [Cheers.] We are not vain enough or foolish enough to think that in the course of a long process there have not been blunders, or worse than blunders, and that today our dominion does not fall short of what in our ideals it might and it ought and, we believe, it is destined to be. But such as we have received it and such as we hope to have it, with it we are content. [Cheers.]

Why We Are at War.

We do not covet any people's territory. We have no desire to impose our rule upon alien populations. The British Empire is enough for us. [Laughter and cheers.] All that we wished for, all that we wish for now, is to be allowed peaceably to consolidate our own resources, to raise within the empire the level of common opportunity, to draw closer the bond of affection and confidence between its parts, and to make it everywhere the worthy home of the best traditions of British liberty. [Cheers.] Does it not follow from that that nowhere in the world is there a people who have stronger motives to avoid war and to seek and ensue peace? Why, then, are the British people throughout the length and breadth of our empire everywhere turning their plowshares into swords? Why are the best of our ablebodied men leaving the fields and the factory and the counting house for the recruiting office and the training camp?

If, as I have said, we have no desire to add to our imperial burdens, either in area or in responsibility, it is equally true that in entering this war we had no ill-will to gratify nor wrongs of our own to avenge. ["Hear, hear!"] In regard to Germany in particular [groans] our policy—repeatedly stated in Parliament, resolutely pursued year after year both in London and in Berlin—our policy has been to remove one by one the outstanding causes of possible friction and so to establish a firm basis for cordial relations in the days to come.

We have said from the first—I have said it over and over again, and so has Sir Edward Grey—we have said from the first that our friendships with certain powers, with France, [cheers,] with Russia, and with Japan, were not to be construed as implying cold feelings and still less hostile purposes against any other power. But at the same time we have always made it clear, to quote words used by Sir Edward Grey as far back as November, 1911—I quote his exact words—"One does not make new friendships worth having by deserting old ones." New friendships by all means let us have, but not at the expense of the ones we have. That has been, and I trust will always be, the attitude of those whom the Kaiser in his now notorious proclamation describes as the treacherous English. [Laughter and "Oh, oh!"]

Germany's Demand in 1912.

We laid down, and I wish to call not only your attention but the attention of the whole world to this, when so many false legends are now being invented and circulated, in the following year—in the year 1912—we laid down in terms carefully approved by the Cabinet, and which I will textually quote, what our relations with Germany ought in our view to be. We said, and we communicated this to the German Government, "Britain declares that she will neither make nor join in any unprovoked attack upon Germany. Aggression upon Germany is not the subject and forms no part of any treaty, understanding, or combination to which Britain is now a party, nor will she become a party to anything that has such an object." There is nothing ambiguous or equivocal about that. ["Hear, hear!"]

But that was not enough for German statesmanship. They wanted us to go further. They asked us to pledge ourselves absolutely to neutrality in the event of Germany being engaged in war, [pg 327]and this, mind you, at a time when Germany was enormously increasing both her aggressive and defensive resources, and especially upon the sea. They asked us, to put it quite plainly, for a free hand, so far as we were concerned, when they selected the opportunity to overbear, to dominate the European world.

To such a demand but one answer was possible, and that was the answer we gave. [Cheers.] None the less we have continued during the whole of the last two years, and never more energetically and more successfully than during the Balkan crisis of last year, to work not only for the peace of Europe but for the creation of a better international atmosphere and a more cordial co-operation between all the powers. [Cheers.] From both points of view, that of our domestic interests as a kingdom and an empire, and that of our settled attitude and policy in the counsels of Europe, a war such as this, which injures the one and frustrates the other, was and could only be regarded as among the worst of catastrophes—among the worst of catastrophes, but not the worst. [Cheers.]

"The Blackest Annals of Barbarism."

Four weeks ago, speaking at the Guildhall, in the City of London, when the war was still in its early days, I asked my fellow-countrymen with what countenance, with what conscience, had we basely chose to stand aloof, we could have watched from day to day the terrible unrolling of events—public faith shamelessly broken, the freedom of a small people trodden in the dust, the wanton invasion of Belgium and then of France by hordes who leave behind them at every stage of their progress a dismal trail of savagery, of devastation, and of desecration worthy of the blackest annals in the history of barbarism. [Cheers.] That was four weeks ago. The war has now lasted for sixty days, and every one of those days has added to the picture its share of sombre and repulsive traits. We now see clearly written down in letters of carnage and spoliation the real aims and methods of this long-prepared and well-organized scheme Against the liberties of Europe. [Cheers.]

I say nothing of other countries. I pass no judgment upon them. But if we here in Great Britain had abstained and remained neutral, forsworn our word, deserted our friends, faltered and compromised with the plain dictates of our duty—nay, if we had not shown ourselves ready to strike with all our forces at the common enemy of civilization and freedom, there would have been nothing left for our country but to veil her face in shame and to be ready in her turn—for her time would have come—to share the doom which she would have richly deserved, and after centuries of glorious life to go down to her grave, unwept, unhonored, and unsung. [Loud cheers.]

Let us gladly acknowledge what becomes clearer and clearer every day, that the world is just as ready as it ever was, and no part of it readier than the British Empire, to understand and to respond to moral issues. [Cheers.] The new school of German thought has been teaching for a generation past that in the affairs of nations there is no code of ethics. According to their doctrine force and nothing but force is the test and the measure of right. As the events which are going on before our eyes have made it plain, they have succeeded only too well in indoctrinating with their creed—I will not say the people of Germany; like Burke, I will not attempt to draw up an indictment against a nation—I will not say the people of Germany, but those who control and execute German policy. [Cheers.]

But it is one of those products of German genius which, whether or not it was intended exclusively for home consumption, [laughter,] has not, I am happy to say, found a market abroad, and certainly not within the boundaries of the British Empire. [Cheers.] We still believe here, old-fashioned people as we are, in the sanctity of treaties, [cheers,] that the weak have rights and that the strong have duties, that small nationalities have every bit as good a title as large ones to life and independence, and that freedom for its own sake is as well worth fighting [pg 328]for today as it ever was in the past. [Cheers.] And we look forward at the end of this war to a Europe in which these great and simple and venerable truths will be recognized and safeguarded forever against the recrudescence of the era of blood and iron. [Cheers.] Stated in a few words that is the reason for our united front, the reason that has brought our gallant Indian warriors to Marseilles, that is extracting from our most distant dominions the best of their manhood, and which in the course of two months has transformed the United Kingdom into a vast recruiting ground. [Cheers.]

Greatest Emergency in Our History.

Now I have come here tonight not to talk but to do business. [Laughter and cheers.] Before I sit down I want to say to you a few practical words. We are confronted, as you all know and recognize, by the greatest emergency in our history. Every part of the United Kingdom and every man and every woman in every part of it is called upon to make his or her contribution and to do his or her share, [cheers,] and our primary business is to fill the ranks. There is, I find, in some quarters an apprehension that the recruiting for the new army and the functions to be assigned to that army when it is formed and trained may interfere with or may in some way belittle or disparage the territorial force. Believe me, no delusion could be more mischievous or more complete.

No praise could be too high for the patriotic and sustained efforts of the county associations or for the quality and efficiency of the territorial troops. It is a comparatively easy thing to make great efforts and sacrifices under the stress and strain, which we are now experiencing, of a supreme crisis. The territorials, without any such stimulus in the piping times of peace, when war and the sufferings and the struggles and glories of war were contingent and remote, these men gave their time, sacrificed their leisure—not only in their annual training, but in thousands of cases both officers and men devoted their spare hours to preparing themselves in the study and the practice of the art of war. They have now been embodied for two months, and I am expressing the considered opinion of one of the most eminent Generals when I say that the divisions now in camp in various parts of the country, and improving every day in efficiency, have completely justified their title to play any part that may be assigned to them, either in home defense, in the manning of our garrisons, or in the battle lines at the front. [Loud cheers.]

It is, then, no want of appreciation of the patriotism and of the efficiency of the territorial forces that leads me to ask you tonight for recruits for the regular army. We wish, so far as military exigencies permit, that the new battalions and squadrons and batteries should retain their local associations and their corporate and distinctive national character. [Cheers.] Why, the freedom and the autonomy of the smaller nationalities is one of the great issues of this gigantic contest.

A Welsh Army Corps.

I went a week ago to Dublin to make an appeal to Ireland. I asked Irishmen then, as I do now, on behalf of the Government and of the War Office, to enlist in and to make up the complement of an Irish army corps. I repeat that appeal tonight to the men of Wales. [Cheers.] We want that. We want you to fill up the ranks of the Welsh army corps. [Cheers.] We believe that the preservation of local and national ties, of the genius of a people which has a history of its own, is not only not hostile to or inconsistent with, but, on the contrary, fosters and strengthens and stimulates the spirit of a common purpose, of, a corporate brotherhood, of an underlying and binding imperial unity throughout every section and among all ranks of the forces of the Crown. [Cheers.]

Men of Wales, of whom I see so many thousands in this splendid gathering, let me say one last word to you. Remember your past. [Cheers.] Think of the villages and the mountains which in old days were the shelter of the recruiting [pg 329]ground of your fathers in the struggles which adorn and glorify your annals. Never has a stronger or a more compelling appeal been made to you of all that you as a nation honor and hold true. Be worthy of those who went before you, and leave to your children the richest of all inheritances—the memory of fathers who in a great cause put self-sacrifice before ease and honor above life itself. [Loud cheers.]

Lord Plymouth moved a resolution pledging support to the Prime Minister's appeal to the nation and to measures necessary for the prosecution of the war to a victorious conclusion, whereby alone the lasting peace of Europe could be assured.

Thomas Richards, M.P., seconded the resolution, which was carried with enthusiasm. The meeting concluded with the singing of "Men of Harlech" and the national anthem.

Union of All Parties Noted in Letter to The London Times.

Speech by Winston Spencer Churchill, First Lord of the Admiralty, at the London Opera House, Sept. 11.

These are serious times, and though we meet here in an abode of diversion and of pleasure in times of peace, and although we wish and mean to rouse and encourage each other in every way, yet we are not here for purposes of merriment or jollification. I am quite sure I associate my two friends who are here tonight and who are to speak after me, [pg 331]and my noble friend, your Chairman, with me when I say that we regard the cheers with which you have received us as being offered to us only because they are meant for our soldiers in the field and our sailors upon the sea, [cheers,] and it is in that sense that we accept them and thank you for them.

We meet here together in serious times, but I come to you tonight in good heart, [cheers,] and with good confidence for the future and for the task upon which we are engaged. It is too soon to speculate upon the results of the great battle which is waging in France. Everything that we have heard, during four long days of anxiety seems to point to a marked and substantial turning of the tide.

German Plans Miscarried.

We have seen the forces of the French and British Armies strong enough not only to contain and check the devastating avalanche which had swept across the French frontier, but now at last, not for an hour or for a day, but for four long days in succession, it has been rolled steadily back. [Cheers.] With battles taking place over a front of 100 or 150 miles one must be very careful not to build high hopes on results which are achieved even in a great area of the field of war. We are not children looking for light and vain encouragement, but men engaged upon a task which has got to be put through. Still, when every allowance has been made for the uncertainty with which these great operations are always enshrouded, I think it only fair and right to say that the situation tonight is better, far better, than a cold calculation of the forces available on both sides before the war should have led us to expect at this early stage. [Cheers.]

It is quite clear that what is happening now is not what the Germans planned, [laughter,] and they have yet to show that they can adapt themselves to the force of circumstances created by the military power of their enemies with the same efficiency that they have undoubtedly shown in regard to plans long prepared, methodically worked out, and executed with the precision of deliberation.

The battle, I say, gives us every reason to meet together tonight in good heart. But let me tell you frankly that if this battle had been as disastrous as, thank God, it appears to be triumphant, I should come before you with unabated confidence and with the certainty that we have only to continue in our efforts to bring this war to the conclusion which we wish and intend. [Cheers.]

We did not enter upon this war with the hope of easy victory; we did not enter upon it in any desire to extend our territory, or to advance and increase our position in the world; or in any romantic desire to shed our blood and spend our money in Continental quarrels. We entered upon this war reluctantly after we had made every effort compatible with honor to avoid being drawn in, and we entered upon it with a full realization of the sufferings, losses, disappointments, vexations, and anxieties, and of the appalling and sustained exertions which would be entailed upon us by our action. The war will be long and sombre. It will have many reverses of fortune and many hopes falsified by subsequent events, and we must derive from our cause and from the strength that is in us, and from the traditions and history of our race, and from the support and aid of our empire all over the world the means to make this country overcome obstacles of all kinds and continue to the end of the furrow, whatever the toil and suffering may be.

Making Sure of Victory.

But though we entered this war with no illusions as to the incidents which will mark its progress, as to the ebb and flow of fortune in this and that part of the gigantic field over which it is waged, we entered it, and entered it rightly, with the sure and strong hope and expectation of bringing it to a victorious conclusion. [Cheers.] I am quite certain that if we, the people of the British Empire, choose, whatever may happen in the interval, we can in the end make this war finish in accordance with our interests and the interests [pg 332]of civilization. [Cheers.] Let us build on a sure foundation. Let us not be the sport of fortune, looking for victories here and happy chances there; let us take measures, which are well within our power, which are practical measures, measures which we can begin upon at once and carry through from day to day with surety and effect. Let us enter upon measures which in the long run, whatever the accidents and incidents of the intervening period may be, will secure us that victory upon which our life and existence as a nation not less than the fortune of our allies and of Europe absolutely depends. [Cheers.]

The Deeds of the Navy.

I think we are building on a sure foundation. [Cheers.] Let us look first at the navy. [Cheers.] The war has now been in progress between five and six weeks. In that time we have swept German commerce from the seas. [Cheers.] We have either blocked in neutral harbors or blockaded in their own harbors [laughter] or hunted down the commerce destroyers of which we used to hear so much and from which we anticipated such serious loss and damage. All our ships, with inconsiderable exceptions, are arriving safely and punctually at their destinations, carrying on the commerce upon which the wealth and industry and the power of making war for this country depends. We are transporting easily, not without an element of danger, but hitherto safely and successfully, great numbers of soldiers across the seas from all quarters of the world to be directed upon the decisive theatre of the land struggle. [A voice, "Russians," and laughter.] And we have searched the so-called German Ocean without discovering the German flag. [Cheers.] Our enemies, in their carefully worked out calculations, which they have been toiling over during a great many years, when the people of this country, as a whole, credited them with quite different motives, ["Hear, hear!"] have always counted upon a process of attrition and the waste of shipping by mines and torpedoes and other methods of warfare of the weaker power, by which the numbers and strength of our fleet would be reduced to such a point that they would be able to steel their hearts and come out and fight. [Cheers.] We have been at war for five or six weeks, and so far—though I would certainly not underrate the risks and hazards attending upon warlike operations and the vanity of all overconfidence—but so far the attrition has been on their side and not on ours, [cheers,] while the losses which they have suffered greatly exceed any that we have at present sustained.

I have made careful inquiries as to the condition of our sailors in the fleet under the strain put upon them, and this continued watching and constant attention to their duty under war conditions, and I am glad to say that it is reported to me that the health of the fleet has been much better since the declaration of war than it was in time of peace, [loud cheers and laughter,] both as to the percentage of sickness and the character of the sickness, [laughter,] and that there is no reason why we should not keep up the same process of naval control and have the same exercises of sea power, on which we have lived and are living, for what is almost an indefinite period.

The Nose of the Bulldog.

By one of those dispensations of Providence, which appeals so strongly to the German Emperor, [laughter,] the nose of the bulldog has been slanted backward so that he can breathe with comfort without letting go. [Laughter and cheers.] We have been successful in maintaining naval control thus far in the struggle, and there are also sound reasons for believing that as it progresses the chances in our favor will not diminish but increase. In the next 12 months the number of great ships that will be completed for this country is more than double the number which will be completed for Germany, [cheers,] and the number of cruisers three or four times as great. [Cheers.] Therefore I think I am on solid ground when I come here tonight and say that you may count upon the naval supremacy of this country being [pg 333]effectively maintained as against the German power for as long as you wish. [Cheers.]

The Army's Share.

Now we must look at the army....

[Transcriber's Note:
Interlinear typesetter's error indicated by ellipses.]

... Government and during all periods of modern history the darling of the British Nation. On it have been lavished whatever public funds were necessary, and to its efficiency has been devoted the unceasing care and thought of successive Administrations. The result is that when the need came the navy was absolutely ready, [cheers,] and, as far as we can see from what has happened, thoroughly adequate to the task which was required from it. But we have not been in times of peace a military nation. The army has not had the facilities of obtaining the lavish supplies of men and money for its needs which have in times of peace and in the past, to our good fortune at the moment, been so freely given to the navy. And what you have to do now is to make a great army. [Cheers.] You have to make an army under the cover and shield of the navy strong enough to enable our country to play its full part in the decision of this terrible struggle. [Cheers.]

A Million Men Needed.

The sure way—the only sure way—to bring this war to an end is for the British Empire to put on the Continent and keep on the Continent an army of at least 1,000,000 men. [Cheers.] I take that figure because it is one well within the compass of the arrangements which are now on foot and because it is one which is well within the scope of the measures which Lord Kitchener—[Loud cheers drowned the rest of the sentence.]

I was reading in the newspapers the other day that the German Emperor made a speech to some of his regiments in which he urged them to concentrate their attention upon what he was pleased to call "French's contemptible little army." [Laughter.] Well, they are concentrating their attention upon it [laughter and cheers] and that army, which has been fighting with such extraordinary prowess, which has revived in a fortnight of adverse actions the ancient fame and glory of our arms upon the Continent, [cheers,] and which tonight, after a long, protracted, harassed, unbroken, and undaunted rearguard action—the hardest trial to which troops can be exposed—is advancing in spite of the loss of one-fifth of its numbers, and driving its enemies before it—that army must be reinforced and backed and supported and increased and enlarged in numbers, in power by every means and every method that every one of us can employ.

There is no reason why, if you set yourselves to it—I have not come here to make a speech of words, but to point out to you necessary and obvious things which you can do—there is no doubt that, if you set yourselves to it, the army which is now fighting so valiantly on your behalf and our allies can be raised from its present position to 250,000 of the finest professional soldiers in the world, and that in the new year something like 500,000 men, and from that again when the early Summer begins in 1915 to the full figure of twenty-five army corps fighting in line together. The vast population of these islands and all the empire is pressing forward to serve, its wealth is placed at your disposal, the navy opens the way for the passage of men and everything necessary for the equipment of our forces. Why should we hesitate when here is the sure and certain path to ending this war in the way we mean it to end? [Cheers.]

A Decisive Weight.

There is little doubt that an army so formed will in quality and character, in native energy, in the comprehension which each individual has of the cause for which he is fighting, exceed in merit any army in the world. We have only to have a chance of even numbers or anything approaching even numbers to demonstrate the superiority of free-thinking, active citizens over the docile sheep who serve the ferocious ambitions of drastic Kings. [Cheers.] Our enemies are now at the point which we have reached fully extended. On every front [pg 334]of the enormous field of conflict the pressure upon them is such that all their resources are deployed. With every addition to the growing weight of the Russian Army, [cheers,] with every addition to the forces at the disposal of Sir John French, [cheers,] the balance must sag down increasingly against them.

Fixing a Term to the War.

You have only to create steadily week by week and month by month the great military instrument of which I have been speaking to throw into the scales a weight which must be decisive. There will be no corresponding reserve of manhood upon which Germany can draw. There will be no corresponding force of soldiers and of equipment and of war material which can be brought into the line to face the forces which we in this island and in this empire can undoubtedly create. That will turn the scale. That will certainly decide the issue. Of course, if victory comes sooner so much the better. [Cheers.] But let us not count on fortune and good luck. [Cheers.] Let us assume at every point that things will go much less well than we hope and wish. Let us make arrangements which will override that. [Cheers.] We have it in our power to make such arrangements, and it is only common prudence, aye, and common humanity, to take steps which at any rate will fix some certain term to this devastating struggle throughout the whole of the European Continent.

Let me also say this. Let us concentrate all our warlike feeling upon fighting the enemy in the field and creating a great military weapon to carry out the purposes of the war. There is a certain class of person who likes to work his warlike feelings off upon the unfortunate alien enemy within our gates.

Fight Like Gentlemen.

Of course all necessary measures must be taken for the security of the country and for the proper carrying out of military needs; but let us always have this feeling in our heart that after the war is over people shall not only admire our victory but they shall say they fought like gentlemen. [Cheers.] The Romans had a motto—

Let that be the spirit in which we conduct this war. Let all those who feel under the horrible provocations of the struggle their hearts suffused with anger and with wrath—let them turn it into a practical channel—going to the front or if circumstances prevent them, helping others to go, keeping them maintained in the highest state of efficiency, giving them the supplies and weapons which they require, and looking after those they have left behind.

The Eloquence of Brutal Facts.

I have not spoken to you much about the justice of our cause, because it has been most eloquently set out by the Prime Minister, [cheers,] and Sir Edward Grey, [cheers,] and by Mr. Bonar Law, [cheers,] and other leaders of the Opposition; and much more eloquently than by any speakers in this or any other country the justice of our cause has been set out by the brutal facts which have occurred and which have marched upon us from day to day. [Cheers.] Some thought there would be a German war, some did not; but no one supposed that a great military nation would exhibit all the vices of military organization without those redeeming virtues which, God knows, are needed to redeem warlike operations from the taint of shame. We have been confronted with an exhibition of ruthlessness and outrage enforced upon the weak, enforced upon women and children. We have been confronted with repeated breaches of the law of enlightened warfare, practices analogous to those which in private life are regarded as cheating, and which deprive persons or country adopting them, or condoning them, of the credit and respect due to honorable soldiers.

We have been confronted with all this. Let us not imitate it. [Cheers.] Let us not try to make small retaliations and reprisals here and there. Let us concentrate upon the simple, obvious task of creating a military force so powerful that the war, even in default of any good fortune, can certainly be ended and [pg 335]brought to a satisfactory conclusion. However the war began, now that it is started it is a war of self-preservation for us. Our civilization, our way of doing things, our political and Parliamentary life, with its voting and its thinking, our party system, our party warfare, the free and easy tolerance of British life, our method of doing things and of keeping ourselves alive and self-respecting in the world—all these are brought into contrast, into collision, with the organized force of bureaucratic Prussian militarism.

That is the struggle which is opened now and which must go forward without pause or abatement until it is settled decisively and finally one way or the other. On that there can be no compromise or truce. It is our life or it is theirs. We are bound, having gone so far, to go forward without flinching to the very end. [Cheers.]

"The Terror of Europe."

This is the same great European war that would have fought in the year 1909 if Russia had not humbled herself and given way to German threats. It is the same war that Sir Edward Grey stopped last year. [Loud cheers.] Now it has come upon us. If you look back across the long periods of European history to the original cause, you will, I am sure, find it in the cruel terms enforced upon France in the year 1870, ["Hear, hear!"] and in the repeated bullyings and attempts to terrorize France which have been the characteristic of German policy ever since. [Cheers.] The more you study this question the more you will see that the use the Germans made of their three aggressive and victorious wars against Denmark, against Austria, and against France has been such as to make them the terror and the bully of Europe, the enemy and the menace of every small State upon their borders, and a perpetual source of unrest and disquietude to their powerful neighbors. [Cheers.]

Claims of Nationality.