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THE BUCCANEERS IN THE WEST INDIES IN THE XVII CENTURY
BY
C.H. HARING
WITH TEN MAPS AND ILLUSTRATIONS
METHUEN & CO. LTD.
36 ESSEX STREET W.C.
LONDON
METHUEN & CO. LTD.
36 ESSEX STREET W.C.
LONDON
First Published in 1910
First Published in 1910
PREFACE
The principal facts about the exploits of the English and French buccaneers of the seventeenth century in the West Indies are sufficiently well known to modern readers. The French Jesuit historians of the Antilles have left us many interesting details of their mode of life, and Exquemelin's history of the freebooters has been reprinted numerous times both in France and in England. Based upon these old, contemporary narratives, modern accounts are issued from the press with astonishing regularity, some of them purporting to be serious history, others appearing in the more popular and entertaining guise of romances. All, however, are alike in confining themselves for their information to what may almost be called the traditional sources—Exquemelin, the Jesuits, and perhaps a few narratives like those of Dampier and Wafer. To write another history of these privateers or pirates, for they have, unfortunately, more than once deserved that name, may seem a rather fruitless undertaking. It is justified only by the fact that there exist numerous other documents bearing upon the subject, documents which till now have been entirely neglected. Exquemelin has been reprinted, the story of the buccaneers has been re-told, yet no writer, whether editor or historian, has attempted to estimate the trustworthiness of the old tales by comparing them with these other sources, or to show the connection between the buccaneers and the history of the English colonies in the West Indies. The object of this volume, therefore, is not only to give a narrative, according to the most authentic, available sources, of the more brilliant exploits of these sea-rovers, but, what is of greater interest and importance, to trace the policy pursued toward them by the English and French Governments.
The main facts about the actions of the English and French pirates of the seventeenth century in the West Indies are pretty well known to today's readers. The French Jesuit historians of the Caribbean have provided many fascinating details about their lifestyle, and Exquemelin's account of the buccaneers has been reprinted numerous times in both France and England. Based on these old, firsthand narratives, modern accounts are published with surprising frequency, some claiming to be serious history, while others take the more popular and entertaining form of stories. However, they all rely mainly on what could be called traditional sources—Exquemelin, the Jesuits, and perhaps a few writings like those of Dampier and Wafer. Writing another history of these privateers or pirates—since they have unfortunately earned that label more than once—might seem like a pointless task. It is warranted only by the fact that there are many other documents relevant to the topic, documents that have been completely overlooked until now. Exquemelin has been reprinted, and the story of the buccaneers has been retold, yet no writer, whether an editor or historian, has tried to assess the reliability of the old stories by comparing them to these other sources or to demonstrate the connection between the buccaneers and the history of the English colonies in the West Indies. Therefore, the goal of this volume is not only to provide a narrative based on the most authentic, available sources regarding the more notable exploits of these sea raiders but, more importantly, to explore the policies adopted by the English and French Governments towards them.
The "Buccaneers in the West Indies" was presented as a thesis to the Board of Modern History of Oxford University in May 1909 to fulfil the requirements for the degree of Bachelor of Letters. It was written under the supervision of C.H. Firth, Regius Professor of Modern History in Oxford, and to him the writer owes a lasting debt of gratitude for his unfailing aid and sympathy during the course of preparation.
The "Buccaneers in the West Indies" was submitted as a thesis to the Board of Modern History at Oxford University in May 1909 to meet the requirements for a Bachelor of Letters degree. It was written under the guidance of C.H. Firth, Regius Professor of Modern History at Oxford, and the author is deeply grateful to him for his constant support and understanding throughout the preparation process.
C.H.H.
C.H.H.
Oxford, 1910
Oxford, 1910
CONTENTS
CHAPTER I. Introductory
CHAPTER II. The Beginnings of the Buccaneers
CHAPTER III. The Conquest of Jamaica
CHAPTER IV. Tortuga—1655-1664
CHAPTER V. Porto Bello and Panama
CHAPTER VI. The Government Suppresses the Buccaneers
CHAPTER VII. The Buccaneers Turn Pirate
APPENDIX I. English Buccaneers
APPENDIX II. List of Filibusters
SOURCES AND BIBLIGRAPHY
INDEX
CHAPTER I. Introductory
CHAPTER II. The Beginnings of the Buccaneers
CHAPTER III. The Conquest of Jamaica
CHAPTER IV. Tortuga—1655-1664
CHAPTER V. Porto Bello and Panama
CHAPTER VI. The Government Suppresses the Buccaneers
CHAPTER VII. The Buccaneers Turn Pirate
APPENDIX I. English Buccaneers
APPENDIX II. List of Filibusters
SOURCES AND BIBLIGRAPHY
INDEX
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS
Map of the West Indies
Spanish Periagua, From Exquemelin's Histoire des Aventuriers Trevoux, 1744
A Correct Map of Jamaica, From the Royal Magazine, 1760.
Map of San Domingo, From Charlevoix' Histoire de S. Domingue.
Plan of the Bay and Town of Portobelo, From Prevost d'Exiles' Voyages.
The Isthmus of Darien, From Exquelmelin's Bucaniers, 1684-5.
Plan of Vera-Cruz, From Charlevoix' Histoire de S. Domingue, 1730.
Plan of the Town and Roadstead of Cartegena
and of the Forts, From Baron de Pontis' Relation de ce qui c'est fait la prise de Carthagene, Bruxelles, 1698.
Map of the West Indies
Spanish Periagua, From Exquemelin's Histoire des Aventuriers Trevoux, 1744
A Correct Map of Jamaica, From the Royal Magazine, 1760.
Map of San Domingo, From Charlevoix Histoire de S. Domingue.
Plan of the Bay and Town of Portobelo, From Prevost d'Exiles Voyages.
The Isthmus of Darien, From Exquelmelin's Bucaniers, 1684-5.
Plan of Vera-Cruz, From Charlevoix Histoire de S. Domingue, 1730.
Plan of the Town and Roadstead of Cartegena
and of the Forts, From Baron de Pontis' Relation de ce qui c'est fait la prise de Carthagene, Bruxelles, 1698.
THE BUCCANEERS IN THE WEST INDIES IN THE XVII CENTURY
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTORY
I.—THE SPANISH COLONIAL SYSTEM
At the time of the discovery of America the Spaniards, as M. Leroy-Beaulieu has remarked, were perhaps less fitted than any other nation of western Europe for the task of American colonization. Whatever may have been the political rôle thrust upon them in the sixteenth century by the Hapsburg marriages, whatever certain historians may say of the grandeur and nobility of the Spanish national character, Spain was then neither rich nor populous, nor industrious. For centuries she had been called upon to wage a continuous warfare with the Moors, and during this time had not only found little leisure to cultivate the arts of peace, but had acquired a disdain for manual work which helped to mould her colonial administration and influenced all her subsequent history. And when the termination of the last of these wars left her mistress of a united Spain, and the exploitation of her own resources seemed to require all the energies she could muster, an entire new hemisphere was suddenly {2} thrown open to her, and given into her hands by a papal decree to possess and populate. Already weakened by the exile of the most sober and industrious of her population, the Jews; drawn into a foreign policy for which she had neither the means nor the inclination; instituting at home an economic policy which was almost epileptic in its consequences, she found her strength dissipated, and gradually sank into a condition of economic and political impotence.
At the time of America's discovery, the Spaniards, as M. Leroy-Beaulieu pointed out, were probably less suited than any other Western European nation for the job of colonizing America. No matter what political role they were given in the sixteenth century due to the Hapsburg marriages, and regardless of what some historians claim about the greatness and nobility of the Spanish national character, Spain was neither wealthy, populous, nor industrious at that time. For centuries, she had been engaged in ongoing battles with the Moors, which meant she had little time to focus on peaceful pursuits and developed a disdain for manual labor. This attitude shaped her colonial administration and impacted her future history. When the last of these wars ended and left her in control of a united Spain, while the exploitation of her own resources seemed to demand all her available energy, suddenly an entire new hemisphere was opened up to her, granted by a papal decree to occupy and populate. Already weakened by the exile of her most prudent and industrious citizens—the Jews; drawn into a foreign policy for which she had neither the resources nor the desire; and implementing an economic policy that was almost erratic in its outcomes—she found her strength depleted and slowly descended into a state of economic and political impotence.
Christopher Columbus, a Genoese sailor in the service of the Castilian Crown, wishing to find a western route by sea to India and especially to Zipangu (Japan), the magic land described by the Venetian traveller, Marco Polo, landed on 12th October 1492, on "Guanahani," one of the Bahama Islands. From "Guanahani" he passed on to other islands of the same group, and thence to Hispaniola, Tortuga and Cuba. Returning to Spain in March 1493, he sailed again in September of the same year with seventeen vessels and 1500 persons, and this time keeping farther to the south, sighted Porto Rico and some of the Lesser Antilles, founded a colony on Hispaniola, and discovered Jamaica in 1494. On a third voyage in 1498 he discovered Trinidad, and coasted along the shores of South America from the Orinoco River to the island of Margarita. After a fourth and last voyage in 1502-04, Columbus died at Valladolid in 1506, in the firm belief that he had discovered a part of the Continent of Asia.
Christopher Columbus, a sailor from Genoa working for the Castilian Crown, wanted to find a western sea route to India, especially to Zipangu (Japan), the legendary land described by the Venetian traveler Marco Polo. He landed on October 12, 1492, on "Guanahani," one of the Bahama Islands. From "Guanahani," he moved on to other islands in the group and then to Hispaniola, Tortuga, and Cuba. He returned to Spain in March 1493 and sailed again in September of the same year with seventeen ships and 1,500 people. This time, staying farther south, he sighted Puerto Rico and some of the Lesser Antilles, founded a colony on Hispaniola, and discovered Jamaica in 1494. On his third voyage in 1498, he discovered Trinidad and traveled along the South American coast from the Orinoco River to Margarita Island. After his fourth and final voyage from 1502 to 1504, Columbus died in Valladolid in 1506, firmly believing he had discovered a part of the Asian continent.
The entire circle of the Antilles having thus been revealed before the end of the fifteenth century, the Spaniards pushed forward to the continent. While Hojida, Vespucci, Pinzon and de Solis were exploring the eastern coast from La Plata to Yucatan, Ponce de Leon in 1512 discovered Florida, and in 1513 Vasco Nunez de {3} Balboa descried the Pacific Ocean from the heights of Darien, revealing for the first time the existence of a new continent. In 1520 Magellan entered the Pacific through the strait which bears his name, and a year later was killed in one of the Philippine Islands. Within the next twenty years Cortez had conquered the realm of Montezuma, and Pizarro the empire of Peru; and thus within the space of two generations all of the West Indies, North America to California and the Carolinas, all of South America except Brazil, which the error of Cabral gave to the Portuguese, and in the east the Philippine Islands and New Guinea passed under the sway of the Crown of Castile.
The entire circle of the Antilles was revealed before the end of the fifteenth century, leading the Spaniards to push onto the continent. While Hojida, Vespucci, Pinzon, and de Solis explored the eastern coast from La Plata to Yucatan, Ponce de Leon discovered Florida in 1512, and in 1513, Vasco Nunez de Balboa saw the Pacific Ocean from the heights of Darien, marking the first time the existence of a new continent was revealed. In 1520, Magellan entered the Pacific through the strait that now bears his name, and a year later, he was killed in one of the Philippine Islands. Over the next twenty years, Cortez conquered Montezuma's realm, and Pizarro took control of the empire of Peru; thus, within just two generations, all of the West Indies, North America from California to the Carolinas, and all of South America except Brazil— which Cabral mistakenly gave to the Portuguese—along with the Philippine Islands and New Guinea in the east, came under the control of the Crown of Castile.
Ferdinand and Isabella in 1493 had consulted with several persons of eminent learning to find out whether it was necessary to obtain the investiture of the Pope for their newly-discovered possessions, and all were of opinion that this formality was unnecessary.1 Nevertheless, on 3rd May 1493, a bull was granted by Pope Alexander VI., which divided the sovereignty of those parts of the world not possessed by any Christian prince between Spain and Portugal by a meridian line 100 leagues west of the Azores or of Cape Verde. Later Spanish writers made much of this papal gift; yet, as Georges Scelle points out,2 it is possible that this bull was not so much a deed of conveyance, investing the Spaniards with the proprietorship of America, as it was an act of ecclesiastical jurisdiction according them, on the strength of their acquired right and proven Catholicism, a monopoly as it were in the propagation of the faith. At that time, even Catholic {4} princes were no longer accustomed to seek the Pope's sanction when making a new conquest, and certainly in the domain of public law the Pope was not considered to have temporal jurisdiction over the entire world. He did, however, intervene in temporal matters when they directly influenced spiritual affairs, and of this the propagation of the faith was an instance. As the compromise between Spain and Portugal was very indecisive, owing to the difference in longitude of the Azores and Cape Verde, a second Act was signed on 7th June 1494, which placed the line of demarcation 270 leagues farther to the west.
In 1493, Ferdinand and Isabella consulted several knowledgeable individuals to determine whether they needed the Pope's approval for their newly-discovered lands, and everyone agreed that this was not necessary.1 However, on May 3, 1493, Pope Alexander VI issued a bull that divided the sovereignty of unclaimed parts of the world between Spain and Portugal, using a meridian line 100 leagues west of the Azores or Cape Verde. Later Spanish writers emphasized this papal grant; however, as Georges Scelle notes,2 the bull may not have been so much a transfer of ownership giving Spaniards control over America, but rather an act of ecclesiastical authority granting them a sort of monopoly on spreading the faith due to their established rights and proven Catholicism. At that time, even Catholic monarchs typically did not seek the Pope's approval when pursuing new conquests, and in fact, the Pope was not regarded as having temporal authority over the entire world within public law. Nevertheless, he would intervene in temporal issues when they affected spiritual matters, as was the case with the spread of the faith. Since the agreement between Spain and Portugal was unclear due to the differences in longitude between the Azores and Cape Verde, a second agreement was signed on June 7, 1494, which moved the line of demarcation 270 leagues further west.
The colonization of the Spanish Indies, on its social and administrative side, presents a curious contrast. On the one hand we see the Spanish Crown, with high ideals of order and justice, of religious and political unity, extending to its ultramarine possessions its faith, its language, its laws and its administration; providing for the welfare of the aborigines with paternal solicitude; endeavouring to restrain and temper the passions of the conquerors; building churches and founding schools and monasteries; in a word, trying to make its colonies an integral part of the Spanish monarchy, "une société vieille dans une contrée neuve." Some Spanish writers, it is true, have exaggerated the virtues of their old colonial system; yet that system had excellences which we cannot afford to despise. If the Spanish kings had not choked their government with procrastination and routine; if they had only taken their task a bit less seriously and had not tried to apply too strictly to an empty continent the paternal administration of an older country; we might have been privileged to witness the development and operation of as complete and benign a system of colonial government as has been devised in modern times. The public initiative {5} of the Spanish government, and the care with which it selected its colonists, compare very favourably with the opportunism of the English and the French, who colonized by chance private activity and sent the worst elements of their population, criminals and vagabonds, to people their new settlements across the sea. However much we may deprecate the treatment of the Indians by the conquistadores, we must not forget that the greater part of the population of Spanish America to-day is still Indian, and that no other colonizing people have succeeded like the Spaniards in assimilating and civilizing the natives. The code of laws which the Spaniards gradually evolved for the rule of their transmarine provinces, was, in spite of defects which are visible only to the larger experience of the present day, one of the wisest, most humane and best co-ordinated of any to this day published for any colony. Although the Spaniards had to deal with a large population of barbarous natives, the word "conquest" was suppressed in legislation as ill-sounding, "because the peace is to be sealed," they said, "not with the sound of arms, but with charity and good-will."3
The colonization of the Spanish Indies, in terms of its social and administrative aspects, offers an interesting contrast. On one side, we see the Spanish Crown, with lofty ideals of order and justice, as well as religious and political unity, extending its faith, language, laws, and administration to its overseas possessions; caring for the well-being of the indigenous people with a parental attitude; attempting to control the passions of the conquerors; building churches and establishing schools and monasteries; in short, trying to make its colonies a true part of the Spanish monarchy, "an old society in a new land." While some Spanish writers have overstated the strengths of their colonial system, it had merits that should not be overlooked. If the Spanish kings hadn't weighed down their government with delays and routine, and if they had approached their task with a bit more flexibility, avoiding the strict application of the paternal administration typical of an older country to a largely uncharted continent, we might have seen the evolution of a highly effective and benevolent colonial governance system, one of the most impressive in modern history. The public initiatives of the Spanish government and its careful selection of colonists stand in stark contrast to the opportunism of the English and French, who often colonized through private ventures and sent the worst segments of their population, including criminals and wanderers, to populate their new settlements overseas. Regardless of our criticism of how the Indians were treated by the conquistadores, it's important to recognize that a significant portion of today's population in Spanish America is still Indigenous, and no other colonizers have managed to assimilate and civilize the natives as effectively as the Spaniards. The legal code that the Spaniards gradually developed for governing their overseas provinces was, despite some flaws that are evident only to today's more informed perspective, one of the wisest, most humane, and best-organized systems ever created for any colony. Even though the Spaniards had to deal with a large population of uncivilized natives, the term "conquest" was deliberately avoided in legislation due to its negative connotations, as they believed that peace should be achieved "not through the sound of arms, but through charity and goodwill."
The actual results, however, of the social policy of the Spanish kings fell far below the ideals they had set for themselves. The monarchic spirit of the crown was so strong that it crushed every healthy, expansive tendency in the new countries. It burdened the colonies with a numerous, privileged nobility, who congregated mostly in the larger towns and set to the rest of the colonists a pernicious example of idleness and luxury. In its zeal for the propagation of the Faith, the Crown constituted {6} a powerfully endowed Church, which, while it did splendid service in converting and civilizing the natives, engrossed much of the land in the form of mainmort, and filled the new world with thousands of idle, unproductive, and often licentious friars. With an innate distrust and fear of individual initiative, it gave virtual omnipotence to royal officials and excluded all creoles from public employment. In this fashion was transferred to America the crushing political and ecclesiastical absolutism of the mother country. Self-reliance and independence of thought or action on the part of the creoles was discouraged, divisions and factions among them were encouraged and educational opportunities restricted, and the American-born Spaniards gradually sank into idleness and lethargy, indifferent to all but childish honours and distinctions and petty local jealousies. To make matters worse, many of the Spaniards who crossed the seas to the American colonies came not to colonize, not to trade or cultivate the soil, so much as to extract from the natives a tribute of gold and silver. The Indians, instead of being protected and civilized, were only too often reduced to serfdom and confined to a laborious routine for which they had neither the aptitude nor the strength; while the government at home was too distant to interfere effectively in their behalf. Driven by cruel taskmasters they died by thousands from exhaustion and despair, and in some places entirely disappeared.
The actual results of the social policy of the Spanish kings fell far short of their ideals. The strong monarchic spirit of the crown stifled any healthy, expansive tendencies in the new territories. The colonies were burdened with a large, privileged nobility, mostly concentrated in the larger towns, who set a harmful example of idleness and luxury for the rest of the colonists. In its eagerness to spread the Faith, the Crown established a highly endowed Church that, while it did a great job converting and civilizing the natives, took a lot of land through mainmort, and filled the New World with thousands of idle, unproductive, and often immoral friars. With a natural distrust and fear of individual initiative, it gave almost total power to royal officials and sidelined all creoles from public roles. This way, the heavy political and ecclesiastical absolutism of the mother country was transferred to America. Creoles were discouraged from being self-reliant and independent in thought or action, divisions and factions among them were encouraged, educational opportunities were limited, and American-born Spaniards gradually sank into idleness and apathy, caring only for trivial honors and petty local rivalries. To make matters worse, many Spaniards who came to the American colonies were not there to settle, trade, or farm, but to extract gold and silver from the natives. The Indians, instead of being protected and civilised, were often reduced to serfdom and confined to laborious tasks for which they had neither the ability nor the strength, while the government back home was too far away to help them. Driven by cruel taskmasters, they died by the thousands from exhaustion and despair, and in some areas, they completely vanished.
The Crown of Castile, moreover, in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries sought to extend Spanish commerce and monopolize all the treasure of the Indies by means of a rigid and complicated commercial system. Yet in the end it saw the trade of the New World pass into the hands of its rivals, its own marine reduced to a {7} shadow of its former strength, its crews and its vessels supplied by merchants from foreign lands, and its riches diverted at their very source.
The Crown of Castile, during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, aimed to expand Spanish trade and control all the wealth from the Indies through a strict and complex commercial system. However, in the end, it watched as the trade of the New World fell into the hands of its competitors, its navy diminished to a mere shadow of its previous power, its crews and ships provided by foreign merchants, and its riches redirected right at the source.
This Spanish commercial system was based upon two distinct principles. One was the principle of colonial exclusivism, according to which all the trade of the colonies was to be reserved to the mother country. Spain on her side undertook to furnish the colonies with all they required, shipped upon Spanish vessels; the colonies in return were to produce nothing but raw materials and articles which did not compete with the home products with which they were to be exchanged. The second principle was the mercantile doctrine which, considering as wealth itself the precious metals which are but its symbol, laid down that money ought, by every means possible, to be imported and hoarded, never exported.4 This latter theory, the fallacy of which has long been established, resulted in the endeavour of the Spanish Hapsburgs to conserve the wealth of the country, not by the encouragement of industry, but by the increase and complexity of imposts. The former doctrine, adopted by a non-producing country which was in no position to fulfil its part in the colonial compact, led to the most disastrous consequences.
This Spanish commercial system was based on two key principles. One was the idea of colonial exclusivism, which stated that all trade in the colonies should be reserved for the mother country. Spain, for its part, promised to supply the colonies with everything they needed, transported on Spanish ships; in return, the colonies were to produce only raw materials and items that wouldn't compete with the home products they would exchange for. The second principle was the mercantile doctrine, which viewed precious metals as wealth itself and claimed that money should be imported and saved by any means possible, but never exported.4 This latter theory, which has long been proven flawed, led the Spanish Hapsburgs to try to maintain the country’s wealth not by promoting industry, but by tightening and complicating taxes. The first principle, adopted by a non-producing country that couldn't fulfill its responsibilities in the colonial agreement, resulted in extremely negative consequences.
While the Spanish Crown was aiming to concentrate and monopolize its colonial commerce, the prosperity of Spain itself was slowly sapped by reason of these mistaken economic theories. Owing to the lack of workmen, the increase of imposts, and the prejudice against the mechanic arts, industry was being ruined; while the increased depopulation of the realm, the mainmort of ecclesiastical lands, the majorats of the nobility and {8} the privileges of the Mesta, brought agriculture rapidly into decay. The Spaniards, consequently, could not export the products of their manufacture to the colonies, when they did not have enough to supply their own needs. To make up for this deficiency their merchants were driven to have recourse to foreigners, to whom they lent their names in order to elude a law which forbade commerce between the colonies and traders of other nations. In return for the manufactured articles of the English, Dutch and French, and of the great commercial cities like Genoa and Hamburg, they were obliged to give their own raw materials and the products of the Indies—wool, silks, wines and dried fruits, cochineal, dye-woods, indigo and leather, and finally, indeed, ingots of gold and silver. The trade in Spain thus in time became a mere passive machine. Already in 1545 it had been found impossible to furnish in less than six years the goods demanded by the merchants of Spanish America. At the end of the seventeenth century, foreigners were supplying five-sixths of the manufactures consumed in Spain itself, and engrossed nine-tenths of that American trade which the Spaniards had sought so carefully to monopolize.5
While the Spanish Crown aimed to consolidate and monopolize its colonial trade, Spain's own prosperity was gradually undermined by flawed economic theories. Due to a shortage of workers, rising taxes, and a bias against skilled trades, the industry was suffering; at the same time, the decline in population, the mortgaging of church lands, the inheritance laws of the nobility, and the privileges of the Mesta caused agriculture to rapidly decline. Consequently, Spaniards couldn’t export their manufactured goods to the colonies because they lacked enough supplies for their own needs. To address this shortage, their merchants turned to foreign countries, lending their names to evade a law that prohibited trade between the colonies and merchants from other nations. In exchange for manufactured products from the English, Dutch, and French, as well as from major trading cities like Genoa and Hamburg, they were forced to send their own raw materials and products from the Indies—such as wool, silks, wines, dried fruits, cochineal, dye-woods, indigo, leather, and ultimately, gold and silver ingots. Over time, trade in Spain became a simple passive operation. By 1545, it was already impossible to supply the goods requested by merchants of Spanish America in less than six years. By the late seventeenth century, foreigners were providing five-sixths of the manufactured goods consumed in Spain and controlled nine-tenths of the American trade that the Spaniards had so diligently tried to monopolize.5
In the colonies the most striking feature of Spanish economic policy was its wastefulness. After the conquest of the New World, it was to the interest of the Spaniards to gradually wean the native Indians from barbarism by teaching them the arts and sciences of Europe, to encourage such industries as were favoured by the soil, and to furnish the growing colonies with those articles which they could not produce themselves, and of which they stood in need. Only thus could they justify their monopoly of the markets of Spanish America. The same test, {10} indeed, may be applied to every other nation which adopted the exclusivist system. Queen Isabella wished to carry out this policy, introduced into the newly-discovered islands wheat, the olive and the vine, and acclimatized many of the European domestic animals.6 Her efforts, unfortunately, were not seconded by her successors, nor by the Spaniards who went to the Indies. In time the government itself, as well as the colonist, came to be concerned, not so much with the agricultural products of the Indies, but with the return of the precious metals. Natives were made to work the mines, while many regions adapted to agriculture, Guiana, Caracas and Buenos Ayres, were neglected, and the peopling of the colonies by Europeans was slow. The emperor, Charles V., did little to stem this tendency, but drifted along with the tide. Immigration was restricted to keep the colonies free from the contamination of heresy and of foreigners. The Spanish population was concentrated in cities, and the country divided into great estates granted by the crown to the families of the conquistadores or to favourites at court. The immense areas of Peru, Buenos Ayres and Mexico were submitted to the most unjust and arbitrary regulations, with no object but to stifle growing industry and put them in absolute dependence upon the metropolis. It was forbidden to exercise the trades of dyer, fuller, weaver, shoemaker or hatter, and the natives were compelled to buy of the Spaniards even the stuffs they wore on their backs. Another ordinance prohibited the cultivation of the vine and the olive except in Peru and Chili, and even these provinces might not send their oil and wine to Panama, Gautemala or any other place which could be supplied from Spain.7 To maintain the commercial {11} monopoly, legitimate ports of entry in Spanish America were made few and far apart—for Mexico, Vera Cruz, for New Granada, the town of Cartagena. The islands and most of the other provinces were supplied by uncertain "vaisseaux de registre," while Peru and Chili, finding all direct commerce by the Pacific or South Sea interdicted, were obliged to resort to the fever-ridden town of Porto Bello, where the mortality was enormous and the prices increased tenfold.
In the colonies, the most obvious aspect of Spanish economic policy was its wastefulness. After the conquest of the New World, it was in the best interest of the Spaniards to gradually help the native Indians move away from their primitive ways by teaching them European arts and sciences, promoting industries suited to the land, and providing the growing colonies with things they couldn’t produce themselves and needed. Only in this way could they justify their monopoly over Spanish America’s markets. The same criteria could actually be applied to every nation that adopted an exclusivist system. Queen Isabella wanted to carry out this policy, bringing wheat, olives, and vines to the newly discovered islands and acclimatizing many European domestic animals. Unfortunately, her efforts were not supported by her successors or by the Spaniards who went to the Indies. Over time, both the government and the colonists became more focused on extracting precious metals than on agricultural products from the Indies. Natives were forced to work in the mines while agricultural regions like Guiana, Caracas, and Buenos Aires were neglected, and the influx of Europeans into the colonies was slow. Emperor Charles V. did little to reverse this trend and just went along with it. Immigration was limited to keep the colonies free from what was seen as the contamination of heresy and foreigners. The Spanish population was concentrated in cities, while rural areas were divided into large estates granted by the crown to families of the conquistadors or favored individuals at court. The vast areas of Peru, Buenos Aires, and Mexico were subjected to unfair and arbitrary regulations, aimed solely at stifling emerging industries and making them completely dependent on the mother country. It was forbidden to practice trades like dyeing, fulling, weaving, shoemaking, or hat-making, and the natives had to buy the fabrics they wore from the Spaniards. Another rule restricted the cultivation of vines and olives to Peru and Chile, and even these provinces couldn’t send their wine and oil to Panama, Guatemala, or anywhere else that could be supplied from Spain. To maintain the commercial monopoly, legitimate ports of entry in Spanish America were limited and widely spaced—for Mexico, Vera Cruz; for New Granada, the town of Cartagena. The islands and most other provinces were supplied by unreliable "vaisseaux de registre," while Peru and Chile, with their direct commerce across the Pacific or South Sea blocked, had no choice but to rely on the disease-ridden town of Porto Bello, where mortality rates were high and prices skyrocketed.
In Spain, likewise, the colonial commerce was restricted to one port—Seville. For in the estimation of the crown it was much more important to avoid being defrauded of its dues on import and export, than to permit the natural development of trade by those towns best fitted to acquire it. Another reason, prior in point of time perhaps, why Seville was chosen as the port for American trade, was that the Indies were regarded as the exclusive appanage of the crown of Castile, and of that realm Seville was then the chief mercantile city. It was not a suitable port, however, to be distinguished by so high a privilege. Only ships of less than 200 tons were able to cross the bar of San Lucar, and goods therefore had to be transhipped—a disability which was soon felt when traffic and vessels became heavier.8 The fact, nevertheless, that the official organization called the Casa dé Contratacion was seated in Seville, together with the influence of the vested interests of the merchants whose prosperity depended upon the retention of that city as the one port for Indian commerce, were sufficient to bear down all opposition. The maritime towns of Galicia and Asturia, inhabited by better seamen {12} and stronger races, often protested, and sometimes succeeded in obtaining a small share of the lucrative trade.9 But Seville retained its primacy until 1717, in which year the Contratacion was transferred to Cadiz.
In Spain, similarly, colonial trade was limited to one port—Seville. The crown believed it was more important to prevent losing its taxes on imports and exports than to let the natural growth of trade occur in towns more suited for it. Another reason, perhaps earlier in time, why Seville was selected as the port for American trade was that the Indies were seen as the exclusive domain of the crown of Castile, and at that time, Seville was the main commercial city of that kingdom. However, it wasn't an ideal port for such an important privilege. Only ships under 200 tons could pass the bar of San Lucar, so goods had to be transferred—a challenge that soon became apparent as traffic and vessels grew larger. 8 The presence of the official organization known as the Casa de Contratacion in Seville, along with the influence of merchants whose success relied on keeping that city as the sole port for Indian trade, was enough to suppress any opposition. Coastal towns in Galicia and Asturias, home to better sailors and tougher people, often protested and sometimes managed to secure a small portion of the profitable trade. 9 But Seville maintained its dominance until 1717, when the Contratacion was moved to Cadiz.
The administration of the complex rules governing the commerce between Spain and her colonies was entrusted to two institutions located at Seville,—the Casa de Contratacion, mentioned above, and the Consulado. The Casa de Contratacion, founded by royal decree as early as 1503, was both a judicial tribunal and a house of commerce. Nothing might be sent to the Indies without its consent; nothing might be brought back and landed, either on the account of merchants or of the King himself, without its authorization. It received all the revenues accruing from the Indies, not only the imposts on commerce, but also all the taxes remitted by colonial officers. As a consultative body it had the right to propose directly to the King anything which it deemed necessary to the development and organization of American commerce; and as a tribunal it possessed an absolute competence over all crimes under the common law, and over all infractions of the ordinances governing the trade of the Indies, to the exclusion of {13} every ordinary court. Its jurisdiction began at the moment the passengers and crews embarked and the goods were put on board, and ended only when the return voyage and disembarkation had been completed.10 The civil jurisdiction of the Casa was much more restricted and disputes purely commercial in character between the merchants were reserved to the Consulado, which was a tribunal of commerce chosen entirely by the merchants themselves. Appeals in certain cases might be carried to the Council of the Indies.11
The management of the complex rules governing trade between Spain and its colonies was assigned to two institutions based in Seville—the Casa de Contratacion, mentioned earlier, and the Consulado. The Casa de Contratacion, established by royal decree as early as 1503, served both as a judicial tribunal and a commercial hub. No goods could be sent to the Indies without its approval; nothing could be returned and unloaded, whether for merchants or for the King himself, without its authorization. It collected all the revenues from the Indies, including not only trade taxes but also all the taxes sent by colonial officials. As an advisory body, it had the authority to directly propose anything to the King that it considered essential for the growth and organization of American trade; and as a tribunal, it had full authority over all common law crimes and violations of the ordinances governing trade with the Indies, excluding every regular court. Its jurisdiction began when passengers and crews boarded and goods were loaded, and did not end until the return voyage and unloading were completed.10 The civil jurisdiction of the Casa was much more limited, and purely commercial disputes between merchants were handled by the Consulado, which was a commercial tribunal made up entirely of the merchants themselves. In certain cases, appeals could be taken to the Council of the Indies.11
The first means adopted by the northern maritime nations to appropriate to themselves a share of the riches of the New World was open, semi-piratical attack upon the Spanish argosies returning from those distant El Dorados. The success of the Norman and Breton corsairs, for it was the French, not the English, who started the game, gradually forced upon the Spaniards, as a means of protection, the establishment of great merchant fleets sailing periodically at long intervals and accompanied by powerful convoys. During the first half of the sixteenth century any ship which had fulfilled the conditions required for engaging in American commerce was allowed to depart alone and at any time of the year. From about 1526, however, merchant vessels were ordered to sail together, and by a cedula of July 1561, the system of fleets was made permanent and obligatory. This decree prohibited any ship from sailing alone to America from Cadiz or San Lucar on pain of forfeiture of ship and {14} cargo.12 Two fleets were organized each year, one for Terra Firma going to Cartagena and Porto Bello, the other designed for the port of San Juan d'Ulloa (Vera Cruz) in New Spain. The latter, called the Flota, was commanded by an "almirante," and sailed for Mexico in the early summer so as to avoid the hurricane season and the "northers" of the Mexican Gulf. The former was usually called the galeones (anglice "galleons"), was commanded by a "general," and sailed from Spain earlier in the year, between January and March. If it departed in March, it usually wintered at Havana and returned with the Flota in the following spring. Sometimes the two fleets sailed together and separated at Guadaloupe, Deseada or another of the Leeward Islands.13
The first way the northern maritime nations tried to claim their share of the wealth from the New World was through open, semi-pirate attacks on the Spanish ships returning from those far-off El Dorados. The success of the Norman and Breton privateers—since it was the French, not the English, who started this practice—gradually forced the Spaniards to set up large merchant fleets sailing at long intervals, accompanied by powerful escorts, as a means of protection. During the first half of the sixteenth century, any ship that met the requirements for engaging in American trade could leave on its own and at any time of year. However, starting around 1526, merchant vessels were required to sail together. By a cedula of July 1561, the system of fleets became permanent and mandatory. This decree banned any ship from departing alone to America from Cadiz or San Lucar, under the penalty of losing the ship and its cargo.{14} 12 Two fleets were organized each year: one for Terra Firma going to Cartagena and Porto Bello, and another for the port of San Juan d'Ulloa (Vera Cruz) in New Spain. The latter, known as the Flota, was led by an "almirante" and departed for Mexico in early summer to avoid the hurricane season and the "norther” winds of the Mexican Gulf. The former, typically called the galeones (anglice "galleons"), was led by a "general" and sailed from Spain earlier in the year, between January and March. If it left in March, it usually spent the winter in Havana and returned with the Flota the following spring. Sometimes, the two fleets would depart together and separate at Guadaloupe, Deseada, or another of the Leeward Islands.13
The galleons generally consisted of from five to eight war-vessels carrying from forty to fifty guns, together with several smaller, faster boats called "pataches," and a fleet of merchantmen varying in number in different years. In the time of Philip II. often as many as forty ships supplied Cartagena and Porto Bello, but in succeeding reigns, although the population of the Indies was rapidly increasing, American commerce fell off so sadly that eight or ten were sufficient for all the trade of South and Central America. The general of the galleons, on his departure, received from the Council of the Indies three sealed packets. The first, opened at the Canaries, contained the name of the island in the West Indies at which the fleet was first to call. The second was unsealed after the galleons {15} arrived at Cartagena, and contained instructions for the fleet to return in the same year or to winter in America. In the third, left unopened until the fleet had emerged from the Bahama Channel on the homeward voyage, were orders for the route to the Azores and the islands they should touch in passing, usually Corvo and Flores or Santa Maria.14
The galleons typically included five to eight warships equipped with forty to fifty cannons, along with several smaller, faster boats known as "pataches," and a varying number of merchant ships each year. During Philip II's reign, there were often as many as forty ships supplying Cartagena and Porto Bello. However, in later years, despite the growing population in the Indies, American trade declined significantly, and just eight or ten ships were enough for all the commerce of South and Central America. When the general of the galleons set off, he received three sealed packets from the Council of the Indies. The first packet, opened at the Canaries, revealed the name of the island in the West Indies where the fleet would first stop. The second packet, opened once the galleons reached Cartagena, contained instructions for the fleet to either return that same year or to spend the winter in America. The third packet, which remained unopened until the fleet had passed through the Bahama Channel on the way home, included orders for the route to the Azores and the islands they should visit along the way, typically Corvo and Flores or Santa Maria.{15}
The course of the galleons from San Lucar was south-west to Teneriffe on the African coast, and thence to the Grand Canary to call for provisions—considered in all a run of eight days. From the Canaries one of the pataches sailed on alone to Cartagena and Porto Bello, carrying letters and packets from the Court and announcing the coming of the fleet. If the two fleets sailed together, they steered south-west from the Canaries to about the latitude of Deseada, 15' 30", and then catching the Trade winds continued due west, rarely changing a sail until Deseada or one of the other West Indian islands was sighted. From Deseada the galleons steered an easy course to Cape de la Vela, and thence to Cartagena. When the galleons sailed from Spain alone, however, they entered the Caribbean Sea by the channel between Tobago and Trinidad, afterwards named the Galleons' Passage. Opposite Margarita a second patache left the fleet to visit the island and collect the royal revenues, although after the exhaustion of the pearl fisheries the island lost most of its importance. As the fleet advanced into regions where more security was felt, merchant ships too, which were intended to unload and trade on the coasts they were passing, detached themselves during the night and made for Caracas, Santa Marta or Maracaibo {16} to get silver, cochineal, leather and cocoa. The Margarita patache, meanwhile, had sailed on to Cumana and Caracas to receive there the king's treasure, mostly paid in cocoa, the real currency of the country, and thence proceeded to Cartagena to rejoin the galleons.15
The galleons from San Lucar traveled southwest to Tenerife on the African coast, and then to the Grand Canary to pick up supplies—this journey took about eight days in total. From the Canaries, one of the smaller boats set off on its own to Cartagena and Porto Bello, carrying letters and packages from the Court and announcing the fleet’s arrival. If both fleets traveled together, they headed southwest from the Canaries to around the latitude of Deseada, 15° 30", and then caught the Trade winds to continue west, hardly changing sails until they spotted Deseada or one of the other West Indian islands. From Deseada, the galleons sailed easily to Cape de la Vela, and then on to Cartagena. However, when the galleons sailed alone from Spain, they entered the Caribbean Sea through the channel between Tobago and Trinidad, later known as the Galleons' Passage. Near Margarita, a second smaller boat left the fleet to visit the island and collect the royal taxes, though the island's significance diminished after the pearl fisheries were depleted. As the fleet moved into safer areas, merchant ships that were meant to unload and trade at the coasts they were passing often separated at night and headed for Caracas, Santa Marta, or Maracaibo to get silver, cochineal, leather, and cocoa. Meanwhile, the boat from Margarita had gone on to Cumana and Caracas to collect the king's treasure, mostly paid in cocoa, the actual currency of the region, and then it proceeded to Cartagena to reunite with the galleons.{16}
The fleet reached Cartagena ordinarily about two months after its departure from Cadiz. On its arrival, the general forwarded the news to Porto Bello, together with the packets destined for the viceroy at Lima. From Porto Bello a courier hastened across the isthmus to the President of Panama, who spread the advice amongst the merchants in his jurisdiction, and, at the same time, sent a dispatch boat to Payta, in Peru. The general of the galleons, meanwhile, was also sending a courier overland to Lima, and another to Santa Fe, the capital of the interior province of New Granada, whence runners carried to Popagan, Antioquia, Mariguita, and adjacent provinces, the news of his arrival.16 The galleons were instructed to remain at Cartagena only a month, but bribes from the merchants generally made it their interest to linger for fifty or sixty days. To Cartagena came the gold and emeralds of New Granada, the pearls of Margarita and Rancherias, and the indigo, tobacco, cocoa and other products of the Venezuelan coast. The merchants of Gautemala, likewise, shipped their commodities to Cartagena by way of Lake Nicaragua and the San Juan river, for they feared to send goods across the Gulf of Honduras to Havana, because of the French and English buccaneers hanging about Cape San Antonio.17
The fleet usually arrived in Cartagena about two months after leaving Cadiz. Upon arrival, the general sent news to Porto Bello, along with the packages for the viceroy in Lima. From Porto Bello, a courier quickly crossed the isthmus to notify the President of Panama, who shared the news with merchants in his area and also sent a dispatch boat to Payta, Peru. Meanwhile, the general of the galleons was sending a courier overland to Lima and another to Santa Fe, the capital of the interior province of New Granada, from where runners spread the news to Popagan, Antioquia, Mariguita, and nearby provinces. The galleons were told to stay in Cartagena for only a month, but bribes from merchants usually made it beneficial for them to stay for fifty or sixty days. Cartagena received gold and emeralds from New Granada, pearls from Margarita and Rancherias, and indigo, tobacco, cocoa, and other products from the Venezuelan coast. Merchants from Guatemala also shipped their goods to Cartagena via Lake Nicaragua and the San Juan River, as they were afraid to send products across the Gulf of Honduras to Havana due to the French and English buccaneers hanging around Cape San Antonio.
Meanwhile the viceroy at Lima, on receipt of his letters, ordered the Armada of the South Sea to prepare to sail, and sent word south to Chili and throughout the province of Peru from Las Charcas to Quito, to forward the King's revenues for shipment to Panama. Within less than a fortnight all was in readiness. The Armada, carrying a considerable treasure, sailed from Callao and, touching at Payta, was joined by the Navio del Oro (golden ship), which carried the gold from the province of Quito and adjacent districts. While the galleons were approaching Porto Bello the South Sea fleet arrived before Panama, and the merchants of Chili and Peru began to transfer their merchandise on mules across the high back of the isthmus.18
Meanwhile, the viceroy in Lima, upon receiving his letters, ordered the South Sea Armada to get ready to sail and informed the southern regions of Chile and throughout the province of Peru, from Las Charcas to Quito, to send the King's revenues for shipment to Panama. In less than two weeks, everything was set. The Armada, carrying a significant treasure, left Callao and, stopping at Payta, was joined by the Navio del Oro (golden ship), which brought the gold from the province of Quito and nearby areas. As the galleons were nearing Porto Bello, the South Sea fleet arrived at Panama, and merchants from Chile and Peru began moving their goods on mules across the high spine of the isthmus.18
Then began the famous fair of Porto Bello.19 The {18} town, whose permanent population was very small and composed mostly of negroes and mulattos, was suddenly called upon to accommodate an enormous crowd of merchants, soldiers and seamen. Food and shelter were to be had only at extraordinary prices. When Thomas Gage was in Porto Bello in 1637 he was compelled to pay 120 crowns for a very small, meanly-furnished room for a fortnight. Merchants gave as much as 1000 crowns for a moderate-sized shop in which to sell their commodities. Owing to overcrowding, bad sanitation, and an extremely unhealthy climate, the place became an open grave, ready to swallow all who resorted there. In 1637, during the fifteen days that the galleons remained at Porto Bello, 500 men died of sickness. Meanwhile, day by day, the mule-trains from Panama were winding their way into the town. Gage in one day counted 200 mules laden with wedges of silver, which were unloaded in the market-place and permitted to lie about like heaps of stones in the streets, without causing any fear or suspicion of being lost.20 While the treasure of the King of Spain was being transferred to the galleons in the harbour, the merchants were making their trade. There was little liberty, however, in commercial transactions, for the prices were fixed and published beforehand, and when negotiations began exchange was purely mechanical. The fair, which was supposed to be open for forty days, was, in later times, generally completed in ten or twelve. At the beginning of the eighteenth century the volume of business transacted {19} was estimated to amount to thirty or forty million pounds sterling.21
Then began the famous fair of Porto Bello.19 The {18} town, which had a very small permanent population mostly made up of Black people and mixed-race individuals, suddenly had to accommodate a massive influx of merchants, soldiers, and sailors. Food and lodging were available only at outrageous prices. When Thomas Gage visited Porto Bello in 1637, he had to pay 120 crowns for a tiny, barely furnished room for two weeks. Merchants paid as much as 1000 crowns for a reasonably sized shop to sell their goods. Due to overcrowding, poor sanitation, and an extremely unhealthy climate, the place turned into a graveyard, claiming anyone who came there. In 1637, during the fifteen days the galleons stayed in Porto Bello, 500 men died from illness. Meanwhile, day by day, mule trains from Panama were arriving in town. Gage once counted 200 mules loaded with silver bars, which were unloaded in the marketplace and left lying around like piles of stones in the streets, without anyone worrying about them being stolen.20 As the treasure of the King of Spain was being loaded onto the galleons in the harbor, the merchants engaged in their trades. However, there was very little freedom in commercial transactions since the prices were set and published in advance, and when negotiations began, the exchange process was entirely mechanical. The fair, originally intended to last for forty days, often wrapped up in ten or twelve days in later times. By the early eighteenth century, the total amount of business done was estimated to be around thirty or forty million pounds sterling.21
In view of the prevailing east wind in these regions, and the maze of reefs, cays and shoals extending far out to sea from the Mosquito Coast, the galleons, in making their course from Porto Bello to Havana, first sailed back to Cartagena upon the eastward coast eddy, so as to get well to windward of Nicaragua before attempting the passage through the Yucatan Channel.22 The fleet anchored at Cartagena a second time for ten or twelve days, where it was rejoined by the patache of Margarita23 and by the merchant ships which had been sent to trade in Terra-Firma. From Cartagena, too, the general sent dispatches to Spain and to Havana, giving the condition of the vessels, the state of trade, the day when he expected to sail, and the probable time of arrival.24 For when the galleons were in the Indies all ports were closed by the Spaniards, for fear that precious information of the whereabouts of the fleet and of the value of its cargo might inconveniently leak out to their rivals. From Cartagena the course was north-west past Jamaica and the Caymans to the Isle of Pines, and thence round Capes Corrientes and San Antonio to Havana. The fleet generally required about eight days for the journey, and arrived at Havana late in the summer. Here the galleons refitted and revictualled, received tobacco, sugar, and other Cuban exports, and if not ordered to return with the Flota, sailed for Spain no later than the middle of September. The course for Spain was from Cuba through {20} the Bahama Channel, north-east between the Virginian Capes and the Bermudas to about 38°, in order to recover the strong northerly winds, and then east to the Azores. In winter the galleons sometimes ran south of the Bermudas, and then slowly worked up to the higher latitude; but in this case they often either lost some ships on the Bermuda shoals, or to avoid these slipped too far south, were forced back into the West Indies and missed their voyage altogether.25 At the Azores the general, falling in with his first intelligence from Spain, learned where on the coast of Europe or Africa he was to sight land; and finally, in the latter part of October or the beginning of November, he dropped anchor at San Lucar or in Cadiz harbour.
Given the consistent east wind in these areas, along with the complex network of reefs, cays, and shallows extending far into the sea from the Mosquito Coast, the galleons, while traveling from Porto Bello to Havana, first sailed back to Cartagena along the eastern coast current. This was done to ensure they were well positioned against the wind of Nicaragua before attempting the passage through the Yucatan Channel.22 The fleet anchored in Cartagena for another ten to twelve days, where they were joined by the patache of Margarita23 and the merchant ships sent to trade in Terra-Firma. From Cartagena, the general also sent reports to Spain and Havana, detailing the condition of the vessels, the state of trade, the expected departure date, and the estimated time of arrival.24 While the galleons were in the Indies, all ports were closed by the Spaniards to prevent any valuable information about the fleet's whereabouts and the worth of its cargo from becoming known to their competitors. From Cartagena, the route was northwest past Jamaica and the Cayman Islands to the Isle of Pines, and then around Cape Corrientes and Cape San Antonio to Havana. The fleet typically took about eight days for this journey and arrived in Havana late in the summer. Here, the galleons were refitted and stocked up with supplies, received tobacco, sugar, and other Cuban exports, and if they weren’t ordered to return with the Flota, they sailed for Spain no later than mid-September. The route to Spain was from Cuba through the {20} Bahama Channel, northeast between the Virginia Capes and the Bermudas to around 38°, to catch the strong northern winds, and then east to the Azores. In winter, the galleons sometimes traveled south of the Bermudas and then gradually worked up to a higher latitude. However, in this scenario, they often either lost some ships on the Bermuda shoals or, to avoid these hazards, slipped too far south, were forced back into the West Indies, and missed their voyage entirely.25 Upon reaching the Azores, the general received his first updates from Spain, which informed him where along the coasts of Europe or Africa he was to sight land; and finally, in late October or early November, he dropped anchor at San Lucar or in the harbor of Cadiz.
The Flota or Mexican fleet, consisting in the seventeenth century of two galleons of 800 or 900 tons and from fifteen to twenty merchantmen, usually left Cadiz between June and July and wintered in America; but if it was to return with the galleons from Havana in September it sailed for the Indies as early as April. The course from Spain to the Indies was the same as for the fleet of Terra-Firma. From Deseada or Guadeloupe, however, the Flota steered north-west, passing Santa Cruz and Porto Rico on the north, and sighting the little isles of Mona and Saona, as far as the Bay of Neyba in Hispaniola, where the ships took on fresh wood and water.26 Putting to sea again, and circling round Beata and Alta Vela, the fleet sighted in turn Cape Tiburon, Cape de Cruz, the Isle of Pines, and Capes Corrientes and San Antonio at the {21} west end of Cuba. Meanwhile merchant ships had dropped away one by one, sailing to San Juan de Porto Rico, San Domingo, St. Jago de Cuba and even to Truxillo and Cavallos in Honduras, to carry orders from Spain to the governors, receive cargoes of leather, cocoa, etc., and rejoin the Flota at Havana. From Cape San Antonio to Vera Cruz there was an outside or winter route and an inside or summer route. The former lay north-west between the Alacranes and the Negrillos to the Mexican coast about sixteen leagues north of Vera Cruz, and then down before the wind into the desired haven. The summer track was much closer to the shore of Campeache, the fleet threading its way among the cays and shoals, and approaching Vera Cruz by a channel on the south-east.
The Flota, or Mexican fleet, in the seventeenth century included two galleons of 800 or 900 tons and about fifteen to twenty merchant ships. It usually left Cadiz between June and July and spent the winter in America; however, if it needed to return with the galleons from Havana in September, it would set sail for the Indies as early as April. The route from Spain to the Indies was the same as for the Terra-Firma fleet. From Deseada or Guadeloupe, the Flota went north-west, passing Santa Cruz and Puerto Rico to the north, and spotting the small islands of Mona and Saona, until reaching the Bay of Neyba in Hispaniola, where the ships would take on fresh wood and water.26 Once back at sea, circling around Beata and Alta Vela, the fleet would then see Cape Tiburon, Cape de Cruz, the Isle of Pines, and the Capes Corrientes and San Antonio at the west end of Cuba. Meanwhile, merchant ships gradually left the fleet, heading to San Juan de Puerto Rico, San Domingo, St. Jago de Cuba, and even Truxillo and Cavallos in Honduras, to deliver orders from Spain to the governors, pick up cargoes of leather, cocoa, etc., and then meet the Flota in Havana. From Cape San Antonio to Vera Cruz, there were two routes: an outside or winter route and an inside or summer route. The winter route went north-west between the Alacranes and the Negrillos to the Mexican coast about sixteen leagues north of Vera Cruz, and then downwind into the harbor. The summer route was much closer to the Campeche shore, with the fleet navigating through cays and shoals, and approaching Vera Cruz via a channel from the southeast.
If the Flota sailed from Spain in July it generally arrived at Vera Cruz in the first fifteen days of September, and the ships were at once laid up until March, when the crews reassembled to careen and refit them. If the fleet was to return in the same year, however, the exports of New Spain and adjacent provinces, the goods from China and the Philippines carried across Mexico from the Pacific port of Acapulco, and the ten or twelve millions of treasure for the king, were at once put on board and the ships departed to join the galleons at Havana. Otherwise the fleet sailed from Vera Cruz in April, and as it lay dead to the leeward of Cuba, used the northerly winds to about 25°, then steered south-east and reached Havana in eighteen or twenty days. By the beginning of June it was ready to sail for Spain, where it arrived at the end of July, by the same course as that followed by the galleons.27
If the Flota left Spain in July, it usually reached Vera Cruz within the first fifteen days of September, and the ships were immediately put away until March, when the crews came back to careen and repair them. However, if the fleet was set to return that same year, the exports from New Spain and nearby provinces, the goods from China and the Philippines transported across Mexico from the Pacific port of Acapulco, and the ten to twelve million in treasure for the king were loaded onto the ships right away, and they would depart to join the galleons in Havana. Otherwise, the fleet would leave Vera Cruz in April, and as it faced away from Cuba, it would take advantage of the northern winds up to about 25°, then turn southeast and reach Havana in about eighteen to twenty days. By early June, it would be ready to leave for Spain, arriving by the end of July, following the same route as the galleons.27
We are accustomed to think of Spanish commerce {22} with the Indies as being made solely by great fleets which sailed yearly from Seville or Cadiz to Mexico and the Isthmus of Darien. There were, however, always exceptions to this rule. When, as sometimes happened, the Flota did not sail, two ships of 600 or 700 tons were sent by the King of Spain to Vera Cruz to carry the quicksilver necessary for the mines. The metal was divided between New Spain and Peru by the viceroy at Mexico, who sent via Gautemala the portion intended for the south. These ships, called "azogues," carried from 2000 to 2500 quintals28 of silver, and sometimes convoyed six or seven merchant vessels. From time to time an isolated ship was also allowed to sail from Spain to Caracas with licence from the Council of the Indies and the Contratacion, paying the king a duty of five ducats on the ton. It was called the "register of Caracas," took the same route as the galleons, and returned with one of the fleets from Havana. Similar vessels traded at Maracaibo, in Porto Rico and at San Domingo, at Havana and Matanzas in Cuba and at Truxillo and Campeache.29 There was always, moreover, a special traffic with Buenos Ayres. This port was opened to a limited trade in negroes in 1595. In 1602 permission was given to the inhabitants of La Plata to export for six years the products of their lands to other Spanish possessions, in exchange for goods of which they had need; and when in 1616 the colonists demanded an indefinite renewal of this privilege, the sop thrown to them was the bare right of trade to the amount of 100 tons every three years. Later in the century the Council of the Indies extended {23} the period to five years, so as not to prejudice the trade of the galleons.30
We tend to think of Spanish trade with the Indies as being carried out exclusively by large fleets that sailed each year from Seville or Cadiz to Mexico and the Isthmus of Darien. However, there were always exceptions to this pattern. When, as sometimes happened, the Flota didn’t sail, the King of Spain would send two ships of 600 or 700 tons to Vera Cruz to transport the quicksilver needed for the mines. The viceroy in Mexico would distribute the metal between New Spain and Peru, sending the portion meant for the south through Guatemala. These ships, known as "azogues," transported between 2000 and 2500 quintals of silver and occasionally escorted six or seven merchant vessels. From time to time, a single ship was also permitted to depart from Spain to Caracas with a license from the Council of the Indies and the Contratacion, paying the king a fee of five ducats per ton. This was referred to as the "register of Caracas," took the same route as the galleons, and returned with one of the fleets from Havana. Similar ships conducted trade at Maracaibo, in Puerto Rico, and in San Domingo, as well as in Havana and Matanzas in Cuba, and at Truxillo and Campeache. Additionally, there was a distinct trade with Buenos Ayres. This port was opened to a limited trade in enslaved people in 1595. In 1602, the residents of La Plata were allowed to export their local products to other Spanish territories for six years in exchange for goods they needed; and when the colonists requested an indefinite extension of this privilege in 1616, they were granted the minimal right to trade up to 100 tons every three years. Later in the century, the Council of the Indies extended this period to five years to avoid harming the galleons' trade.
It was this commerce, which we have noticed at such length, that the buccaneers of the West Indies in the seventeenth century came to regard as their legitimate prey. These "corsarios Luteranos," as the Spaniards sometimes called them, scouring the coast of the Main from Venezuela to Cartagena, hovering about the broad channel between Cuba and Yucatan, or prowling in the Florida Straits, became the nightmare of Spanish seamen. Like a pack of terriers they hung upon the skirts of the great unwieldy fleets, ready to snap up any unfortunate vessel which a tempest or other accident had separated from its fellows. When Thomas Gage was sailing in the galleons from Porto Bello to Cartagena in 1637, four buccaneers hovering near them carried away two merchant-ships under cover of darkness. As the same fleet was departing from Havana, just outside the harbour two strange vessels appeared in their midst, and getting to the windward of them singled out a Spanish ship which had strayed a short distance from the rest, suddenly gave her a broadside and made her yield. The vessel was laden with sugar and other goods to the value of 80,000 crowns. The Spanish vice-admiral and two other galleons gave chase, but without success, for the wind was against them. The whole action lasted only half an hour.31
It was this trade, which we have discussed at length, that the buccaneers of the West Indies in the seventeenth century came to see as their rightful target. These "Lutheran privateers," as the Spaniards sometimes referred to them, roamed the coastline from Venezuela to Cartagena, lingered in the wide channel between Cuba and Yucatan, or lurked in the Florida Straits, becoming the terror of Spanish sailors. Like a pack of terriers, they followed the edges of the large, cumbersome fleets, ready to snatch up any unfortunate ship that a storm or other mishap had separated from the rest. When Thomas Gage was sailing in the galleons from Porto Bello to Cartagena in 1637, four buccaneers nearby captured two merchant ships under the cover of night. As the same fleet was leaving Havana, just outside the harbor, two strange ships appeared among them, and getting the wind on their side, they singled out a Spanish ship that had strayed a short distance from the others, suddenly firing a broadside and forcing her to surrender. The ship was loaded with sugar and other goods worth 80,000 crowns. The Spanish vice-admiral and two other galleons chased them, but with no success, as the wind was against them. The entire encounter lasted only half an hour.31
The Spanish ships of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries were notoriously clumsy and unseaworthy. With short keel and towering poop and forecastle they were an easy prey for the long, low, close-sailing sloops {24} and barques of the buccaneers. But this was not their only weakness. Although the king expressly prohibited the loading of merchandise on the galleons except on the king's account, this rule was often broken for the private profit of the captain, the sailors, and even of the general. The men-of-war, indeed, were sometimes so embarrassed with goods and passengers that it was scarcely possible to defend them when attacked. The galleon which bore the general's flag had often as many as 700 souls, crew, marines and passengers, on board, and the same number were crowded upon those carrying the vice-admiral and the pilot. Ship-masters frequently hired guns, anchors, cables, and stores to make up the required equipment, and men to fill up the muster-rolls, against the time when the "visitadors" came on board to make their official inspection, getting rid of the stores and men immediately afterward. Merchant ships were armed with such feeble crews, owing to the excessive crowding, that it was all they could do to withstand the least spell of bad weather, let alone outmanœuvre a swift-sailing buccaneer.32
The Spanish ships of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries were famously awkward and unreliable at sea. With a short keel and tall poop and forecastle, they were easy targets for the long, low, fast-moving sloops and barques of the buccaneers. But this wasn’t their only vulnerability. Even though the king strictly forbade loading merchandise on the galleons except for royal needs, this rule was frequently ignored for the personal gain of the captain, the sailors, and even the general. The warships were sometimes so overloaded with goods and passengers that it was nearly impossible to defend them when attacked. The galleon flying the general's flag often had as many as 700 people on board, including crew, marines, and passengers, and the same number crowded onto those carrying the vice-admiral and the pilot. Ship captains commonly rented guns, anchors, cables, and supplies to meet the required equipment standards and hired extra crew members to fill the muster rolls for the official inspections by the "visitadors," only to let go of those supplies and crew right after. Merchant ships were equipped with such weak crews due to the severe overcrowding that all they could manage was to endure even mild bad weather, let alone outmaneuver a fast-moving buccaneer.{24}
By Spanish law strangers were forbidden to resort to, or reside in, the Indies without express permission of the king. By law, moreover, they might not trade with the Indies from Spain, either on their own account or through the intermediary of a Spaniard, and they were forbidden even to associate with those engaged in such a trade. Colonists were stringently enjoined from having anything to do with them. In 1569 an order was issued for the seizure of all goods sent to the colonies on the account of foreigners, and a royal cedula of 1614 decreed the penalty of death and confiscation upon any who connived at the {25} participation of foreigners in Spanish colonial commerce.33 It was impossible, however, to maintain so complete an exclusion when the products of Spain fell far short of supplying the needs of the colonists. Foreign merchants were bound to have a hand in this traffic, and the Spanish government tried to recompense itself by imposing on the out-going cargoes tyrannical exactions called "indults." The results were fatal. Foreigners often eluded these impositions by interloping in the West Indies and in the South Sea.34 And as the Contratacion, by fixing each year the nature and quantity of the goods to be shipped to the colonies, raised the price of merchandise at will and reaped enormous profits, the colonists welcomed this contraband trade as an opportunity of enriching themselves and adding to the comforts and luxuries of living.
By Spanish law, foreigners were prohibited from going to or living in the Indies without the king's explicit permission. Legally, they couldn’t trade with the Indies from Spain, either by themselves or through a Spaniard, and they were forbidden from even associating with anyone involved in such trade. Colonists were strictly ordered to have no dealings with them. In 1569, an order was issued to confiscate all goods sent to the colonies on behalf of foreigners, and a royal cedula from 1614 declared the death penalty and confiscation for anyone who allowed foreigners to participate in Spanish colonial commerce.33 However, it was impossible to maintain such complete exclusion when Spain's products didn't meet the colonists' needs. Foreign merchants inevitably became involved in this trade, and the Spanish government tried to compensate by imposing harsh fees on outgoing shipments called "indults." The consequences were severe. Foreigners often avoided these charges by sneaking into the West Indies and the South Sea.34 And since the Contratacion determined the type and amount of goods to be shipped to the colonies each year, raising merchandise prices at will and yielding huge profits, the colonists welcomed this illegal trade as a way to enrich themselves and enhance their comforts and luxuries.
From the beginning of the seventeenth century as many as 200 ships sailed each year from Portugal with rich cargoes of silks, cloths and woollens intended for Spanish America.35 The Portuguese bought these articles of the Flemish, English, and French, loaded them at Lisbon and Oporto, ran their vessels to Brazil and up the La Plata as far as navigation permitted, and then transported the goods overland through Paraguay and Tucuman to Potosi and even to Lima. The Spanish merchants of Peru kept factors in Brazil as well as in Spain, and as {26} Portuguese imposts were not so excessive as those levied at Cadiz and Seville, the Portuguese could undersell their Spanish rivals. The frequent possession of Assientos by the Portuguese and Dutch in the first half of the seventeenth century also facilitated this contraband, for when carrying negroes from Africa to Hispaniola, Cuba and the towns on the Main, they profited by their opportunities to sell merchandise also, and generally without the least obstacle.
From the start of the seventeenth century, around 200 ships left Portugal each year with valuable cargoes of silks, fabrics, and wool intended for Spanish America.35 The Portuguese purchased these items from the Flemish, English, and French, loaded them in Lisbon and Oporto, sailed their ships to Brazil and up the La Plata as far as navigation allowed, and then transported the goods overland through Paraguay and Tucuman to Potosi and even to Lima. Spanish merchants in Peru maintained agents in both Brazil and Spain, and since Portuguese taxes were not as high as those charged in Cadiz and Seville, the Portuguese could sell their products at lower prices than their Spanish competitors. The frequent possession of Assientos by the Portuguese and Dutch in the first half of the seventeenth century also made this smuggling easier, as they took the opportunity to sell goods while transporting enslaved people from Africa to Hispaniola, Cuba, and towns along the Main, often without any issues.
Other nations in the seventeenth century were not slow to follow the same course; and two circumstances contributed to make that course easy. One was the great length of coast line on both the Atlantic and Pacific slopes over which a surveillance had to be exercised, making it difficult to catch the interlopers. The other was the venal connivance of the governors of the ports, who often tolerated and even encouraged the traffic on the plea that the colonists demanded it.36 The subterfuges adopted by the interlopers were very simple. When a vessel wished to enter a Spanish port to trade, the captain, pretending that provisions had run low, or that the ship suffered from a leak or a broken mast, sent a polite note to the governor accompanied by a considerable gift. He generally obtained permission to enter, unload, and put the ship into {27} a seaworthy condition. All the formalities were minutely observed. The unloaded goods were shut up in a storehouse, and the doors sealed. But there was always found another door unsealed, and by this they abstracted the goods during the night, and substituted coin or bars of gold and silver. When the vessel was repaired to the captain's satisfaction, it was reloaded and sailed away.
Other countries in the seventeenth century quickly followed suit, and two factors made this path easier. One was the extensive coastline along both the Atlantic and Pacific sides that had to be monitored, making it hard to catch the smugglers. The other was the corrupt complicity of the port governors, who often accepted and even promoted the trade by claiming it was what the colonists wanted.36 The tricks used by the smugglers were quite straightforward. When a ship wanted to dock at a Spanish port to trade, the captain, pretending that the ship was low on supplies, leaking, or had a broken mast, sent a polite note to the governor along with a substantial bribe. He usually got permission to enter, unload, and make the ship seaworthy again. All the required protocols were strictly followed. The unloaded goods were stored in a warehouse, and the doors were sealed. But there was always another door left unsealed, through which they secretly took the goods at night and replaced them with coins or gold and silver bars. Once the ship was repaired to the captain's satisfaction, it was reloaded and set sail again.
There was also, especially on the shores of the Caribbean Sea, a less elaborate commerce called "sloop-trade," for it was usually managed by sloops which hovered near some secluded spot on the coast, often at the mouth of a river, and informed the inhabitants of their presence in the neighbourhood by firing a shot from a cannon. Sometimes a large ship filled with merchandise was stationed in a bay close at hand, and by means of these smaller craft made its trade with the colonists. The latter, generally in disguise, came off in canoes by night. The interlopers, however, were always on guard against such dangerous visitors, and never admitted more than a few at a time; for when the Spaniards found themselves stronger than the crew, and a favourable opportunity presented itself, they rarely failed to attempt the vessel.
There was also, especially along the shores of the Caribbean Sea, a simpler trade called "sloop-trade." This was usually run by sloops that would hang around in some secluded spot on the coast, often at the mouth of a river, and would let the locals know they were nearby by firing a shot from a cannon. Sometimes a large ship loaded with goods would be anchored in a nearby bay, and these smaller boats would handle trade with the colonists. The colonists, usually in disguise, would come out in canoes at night. However, the interlopers were always on guard against these risky visitors and never allowed more than a few of them at a time; because when the Spaniards felt they had the upper hand and a good opportunity came up, they often tried to take over the vessel.
Thus the Spaniards of the seventeenth century, by persisting, both at home and in their colonies, in an economic policy which was fatally inconsistent with their powers and resources, saw their commerce gradually extinguished by the ships of the foreign interloper, and their tropical possessions fall a prey to marauding bands of half-piratical buccaneers. Although struggling under tremendous initial disabilities in Europe, they had attempted, upon the slender pleas of prior discovery and papal investiture, to reserve half the world to themselves. Without a marine, without maritime traditions, {28} they sought to hold a colonial empire greater than any the world had yet seen, and comparable only with the empire of Great Britain three centuries later. By discouraging industry in Spain, and yet enforcing in the colonies an absolute commercial dependence on the home-country, by combining in their rule of distant America a solicitous paternalism with a restriction of initiative altogether disastrous in its consequences, the Spaniards succeeded in reducing their colonies to political impotence. And when, to make their grip the more firm, they evolved, as a method of outwitting the foreigner of his spoils, the system of great fleets and single ports of call, they found the very means they had contrived for their own safety to be the instrument of commercial disaster.
Thus, the Spaniards of the seventeenth century, by stubbornly sticking to an economic policy that was fundamentally mismatched with their capabilities and resources, watched their trade slowly vanish as foreign ships invaded their markets, and their tropical territories fell victim to roaming bands of semi-piratical buccaneers. Despite facing significant initial challenges in Europe, they tried, based on the flimsy claims of prior discovery and papal endorsement, to claim half the world for themselves. Lacking a navy and maritime traditions, they aimed to maintain a colonial empire larger than anything the world had seen, comparable only to Great Britain's empire three centuries later. By discouraging industry in Spain while enforcing strict commercial dependence in the colonies, and by mixing a concerned paternalism with restrictions on initiative that had disastrous outcomes, the Spaniards managed to render their colonies politically powerless. When they developed a system of large fleets and single ports of call to tighten their control and outsmart foreign rivals, they discovered that the very measures they created for their own security became instruments of commercial ruin.
II.—THE FREEBOOTERS OF THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY
It was the French chronologist, Scaliger, who in the sixteenth century asserted, "nulli melius piraticam exercent quam Angli"; and although he had no need to cross the Channel to find men proficient in this primitive calling, the remark applies to the England of his time with a force which we to-day scarcely realise. Certainly the inveterate hostility with which the Englishman learned to regard the Spaniard in the latter half of the sixteenth and throughout the seventeenth centuries found its most remarkable expression in the exploits of the Elizabethan "sea-dogs" and of the buccaneers of a later period. The religious differences and political jealousies which grew out of the turmoil of the Reformation, and the moral anarchy incident to the dissolution of ancient religious institutions, were the {29} motive causes for an outburst of piratical activity comparable only with the professional piracy of the Barbary States.
It was the French chronologist, Scaliger, who in the sixteenth century claimed, "no one practices piracy better than the English"; and although he didn’t need to cross the Channel to find skilled men in this rough trade, his remark strongly applies to England during his time in a way we can hardly grasp today. The deep-seated hostility that the English developed towards the Spaniards in the latter half of the sixteenth century and throughout the seventeenth century found its most notable expression in the actions of the Elizabethan "sea-dogs" and the later buccaneers. The religious divisions and political rivalries arising from the turmoil of the Reformation, along with the moral chaos resulting from the breakdown of ancient religious institutions, were the driving forces behind a surge of pirate activity that can only be compared to the professional piracy of the Barbary States. {29}
Even as far back as the thirteenth century, indeed, lawless sea-rovers, mostly Bretons and Flemings, had infested the English Channel and the seas about Great Britain. In the sixteenth this mode of livelihood became the refuge for numerous young Englishmen, Catholic and Protestant, who, fleeing from the persecutions of Edward VI. and of Mary, sought refuge in French ports or in the recesses of the Irish coast, and became the leaders of wild roving bands living chiefly upon plunder. Among them during these persecutions were found many men belonging to the best families in England, and although with the accession of Elizabeth most of the leaders returned to the service of the State, the pirate crews remained at their old trade. The contagion spread, especially in the western counties, and great numbers of fishermen who found their old employment profitless were recruited into this new calling.37 At the beginning of Elizabeth's reign we find these Anglo-Irish pirates venturing farther south, plundering treasure galleons off the coast of Spain, and cutting vessels out of the very ports of the Spanish king. Such outrages of course provoked reprisals, and the pirates, if caught, were sent to the galleys, rotted in the dungeons of the Inquisition, or, least of all, were burnt in the plaza at Valladolid. These cruelties only added fuel to a deadly hatred which was kindling between the two nations, a hatred which it took one hundred and fifty years to quench.
Even as far back as the 1300s, lawless sea raiders, mostly from Brittany and Flanders, had been plaguing the English Channel and the seas around Great Britain. In the 1500s, this way of life became an option for many young Englishmen, both Catholic and Protestant, who were fleeing the persecutions under Edward VI and Mary. They sought safety in French ports or on the isolated coasts of Ireland and became the leaders of wild gangs who lived mainly off stealing. Among them were many men from England's best families, and although most of the leaders returned to serve the State with Elizabeth's rise to power, the pirate crews continued their old ways. The problem spread, especially in the western counties, and many fishermen who found their previous work unprofitable turned to this new occupation.37 At the beginning of Elizabeth's reign, we see these Anglo-Irish pirates venturing further south, raiding treasure ships off the Spanish coast and capturing vessels straight from the ports of the Spanish king. These actions, of course, led to retaliation, and if the pirates were caught, they were sent to the galleys, rotted away in the dungeons of the Inquisition, or, at best, burned in the square at Valladolid. These cruelties only intensified the deadly hatred that was growing between the two nations, a hatred that took one hundred and fifty years to subside.
The most venturesome of these sea-rovers, however, {30} were soon attracted to a larger and more distant sphere of activity. Spain, as we have seen, was then endeavouring to reserve to herself in the western hemisphere an entire new world; and this at a time when the great northern maritime powers, France, England and Holland, were in the full tide of economic development, restless with new thoughts, hopes and ambitions, and keenly jealous of new commercial and industrial outlets. The famous Bull of Alexander VI. had provoked Francis I. to express a desire "to see the clause in Adam's will which entitled his brothers of Castile and Portugal to divide the New World between them," and very early the French corsairs had been encouraged to test the pretensions of the Spaniards by the time-honoured proofs of fire and steel. The English nation, however, in the first half of the sixteenth century, had not disputed with Spain her exclusive trade and dominion in those regions. The hardy mariners of the north were still indifferent to the wonders of a new continent awaiting their exploitation, and it was left to the Spaniards to unfold before the eyes of Europe the vast riches of America, and to found empires on the plateaus of Mexico and beyond the Andes. During the reign of Philip II. all this was changed. English privateers began to extend their operations westward, and to sap the very sources of Spanish wealth and power, while the wars which absorbed the attention of the Spaniards in Europe, from the revolt of the Low Countries to the Treaty of Westphalia, left the field clear for these ubiquitous sea-rovers. The maritime powers, although obliged by the theory of colonial exclusion to pretend to acquiesce in the Spaniard's claim to tropical America, secretly protected and supported their mariners who coursed those western seas. France and England {31} were now jealous and fearful of Spanish predominance in Europe, and kept eyes obstinately fixed on the inexhaustible streams of gold and silver by means of which Spain was enabled to pay her armies and man her fleets. Queen Elizabeth, while she publicly excused or disavowed to Philip II. the outrages committed by Hawkins and Drake, blaming the turbulence of the times and promising to do her utmost to suppress the disorders, was secretly one of the principal shareholders in their enterprises.
The most adventurous of these sea-rovers, however, {30} were soon drawn to a larger and more distant area of activity. Spain, as we’ve seen, was then trying to claim an entire new world for herself in the western hemisphere; this was happening at a time when the major northern maritime powers, France, England, and Holland, were immersed in economic growth, full of fresh ideas, hopes, and ambitions, and eager for new commercial and industrial opportunities. The famous Bull of Alexander VI had caused Francis I to express a desire “to see the clause in Adam's will that allowed his brothers from Castile and Portugal to divide the New World between them,” and early on, the French corsairs had been encouraged to challenge the Spanish claims through the traditional means of fire and steel. However, the English nation, in the first half of the sixteenth century, did not contest Spain’s exclusive trade and control in those regions. The brave sailors from the north were still indifferent to the wonders of a new continent waiting for their exploration, and it was left to the Spaniards to reveal to Europe the vast riches of America and to establish empires on the plateaus of Mexico and beyond the Andes. During the reign of Philip II, all this changed. English privateers began to expand their operations westward, undermining the very sources of Spanish wealth and power, while the wars that occupied the Spaniards in Europe, from the revolt of the Low Countries to the Treaty of Westphalia, cleared the way for these pervasive sea-rovers. The maritime powers, although required by the colonial exclusion theory to pretend to accept the Spanish claim to tropical America, secretly supported and protected their sailors who roamed those western seas. France and England {31} were now jealous and fearful of Spanish dominance in Europe, keeping their eyes stubbornly fixed on the endless streams of gold and silver that allowed Spain to pay her armies and crew her fleets. Queen Elizabeth, while publicly dismissing or disavowing to Philip II the outrages committed by Hawkins and Drake, blaming the turbulence of the times and promising to do her best to put an end to the chaos, was secretly one of the main investors in their ventures.
The policy of the marauders was simple. The treasure which oiled the machinery of Spanish policy came from the Indies where it was accumulated; hence there were only two means of obtaining possession of it:—bold raids on the ill-protected American continent, and the capture of vessels en route.38 The counter policy of the Spaniards was also two-fold:—on the one hand, the establishment of commerce by means of annual fleets protected by a powerful convoy; on the other, the removal of the centres of population from the coasts to the interior of the country far from danger of attack.39 The Spaniards in America, however, proved to be no match for the bold, intrepid mariners who disputed their supremacy. The descendants of the Conquistadores had deteriorated sadly from the type of their forbears. Softened by tropical heats and a crude, uncultured luxury, they seem to have lost initiative and power of resistance. The disastrous {32} commercial system of monopoly and centralization forced them to vegetate; while the policy of confining political office to native-born Spaniards denied any outlet to creole talent and energy. Moreover, the productive power and administrative abilities of the native-born Spaniards themselves were gradually being paralyzed and reduced to impotence under the crushing obligation of preserving and defending so unwieldy an empire and of managing such disproportionate riches, a task for which they had neither the aptitude nor the means.40 Privateering in the West Indies may indeed be regarded as a challenge to the Spaniards of America, sunk in lethargy and living upon the credit of past glory and achievement, a challenge to prove their right to retain their dominion and extend their civilization and culture over half the world.41
The policy of the marauders was straightforward. The wealth that fueled Spanish policy came from the Indies, where it was gathered; thus, there were only two ways to obtain it: daring raids on the poorly defended American continent and capturing ships en route.38 The Spanish counter strategy was also two-fold: first, establishing trade through annual fleets guarded by a strong convoy; and second, relocating population centers from the coasts to the interior of the country, far from the threat of attack.39 However, the Spaniards in America proved to be no match for the bold, daring sailors who challenged their dominance. The descendants of the Conquistadores had sadly declined from their ancestors. Softened by tropical heat and a crude, unrefined luxury, they seemed to have lost their drive and ability to resist. The disastrous commercial system of monopoly and centralization forced them into a stagnant existence; meanwhile, the policy of reserving political positions for native-born Spaniards stifled any outlet for creole talent and energy. Furthermore, the productive capacity and administrative skills of the native-born Spaniards were gradually being weakened and rendered ineffective under the heavy burden of managing and defending such an unwieldy empire and handling such massive wealth, a task for which they had neither the skills nor the resources.40 Privateering in the West Indies can indeed be seen as a challenge to the lethargic Spaniards in America, who were living off the remnants of past glory and achievements, a challenge to prove their right to keep their control and spread their civilization and culture over half the world.41
There were other motives which lay behind these piratical aggressions of the French and English in Spanish America. The Spaniards, ever since the days of the Dominican monk and bishop, Las Casas, had been reprobated as the heartless oppressors and murderers of the native Indians. The original owners of the soil had been dispossessed and reduced to slavery. In the West Indies, the great islands, Cuba and Hispaniola, were rendered desolate for want of inhabitants. Two great empires, Mexico and Peru, had been subdued by treachery, their kings murdered, and their people made to suffer a {33} living death in the mines of Potosi and New Spain. Such was the Protestant Englishman's conception, in the sixteenth century, of the results of Spanish colonial policy. To avenge the blood of these innocent victims, and teach the true religion to the survivors, was to glorify the Church militant and strike a blow at Antichrist. Spain, moreover, in the eyes of the Puritans, was the lieutenant of Rome, the Scarlet Woman of the Apocalypse, who harried and burnt their Protestant brethren whenever she could lay hands upon them. That she was eager to repeat her ill-starred attempt of 1588 and introduce into the British Isles the accursed Inquisition was patent to everyone. Protestant England, therefore, filled with the enthusiasm and intolerance of a new faith, made no bones of despoiling the Spaniards, especially as the service of God was likely to be repaid with plunder.
There were other reasons behind the pirate actions of the French and English in Spanish America. The Spaniards, ever since the days of the Dominican monk and bishop, Las Casas, had been condemned as the ruthless oppressors and murderers of the native Indians. The original owners of the land had been dispossessed and turned into slaves. In the West Indies, the large islands, Cuba and Hispaniola, were left desolate due to a lack of inhabitants. Two great empires, Mexico and Peru, had been toppled through deceit, their kings killed, and their people made to suffer a living death in the mines of Potosi and New Spain. This was the Protestant Englishman's view, in the sixteenth century, of the consequences of Spanish colonial policy. To avenge the blood of these innocent victims and teach the true religion to the survivors was seen as a way to glorify the Church militant and strike a blow at Antichrist. Furthermore, to the Puritans, Spain was the lieutenant of Rome, the Scarlet Woman of the Apocalypse, who persecuted and burned their Protestant brethren whenever she could get her hands on them. It was clear to everyone that she was eager to repeat her disastrous attempt of 1588 and introduce the dreaded Inquisition into the British Isles. Therefore, Protestant England, filled with the enthusiasm and intolerance of a new faith, had no reservations about robbing the Spaniards, especially since serving God was likely to come with the reward of plunder.
A pamphlet written by Dalby Thomas in 1690 expresses with tolerable accuracy the attitude of the average Englishman toward Spain during the previous century. He says:—"We will make a short reflection on the unaccountable negligence, or rather stupidity, of this nation, during the reigns of Henry VII., Henry VIII., Edward VI. and Queen Mary, who could contentedly sit still and see the Spanish rifle, plunder and bring home undisturbed, all the wealth of that golden world; and to suffer them with forts and castles to shut up the doors and entrances unto all the rich provinces of America, having not the least title or pretence of right beyond any other nation; except that of being by accident the first discoverer of some parts of it; where the unprecedented cruelties, exorbitances and barbarities, their own histories witness, they practised on a poor, naked and innocent people, which inhabited the islands, as well as upon those {34} truly civilized and mighty empires of Peru and Mexico, called to all mankind for succour and relief against their outrageous avarice and horrid massacres.... (We) slept on until the ambitious Spaniard, by that inexhaustible spring of treasure, had corrupted most of the courts and senates of Europe, and had set on fire, by civil broils and discords, all our neighbour nations, or had subdued them to his yoke; contriving too to make us wear his chains and bear a share in the triumph of universal monarchy, not only projected but near accomplished, when Queen Elizabeth came to the crown ... and to the divided interests of Philip II. and Queen Elizabeth, in personal more than National concerns, we do owe that start of hers in letting loose upon him, and encouraging those daring adventurers, Drake, Hawkins, Rawleigh, the Lord Clifford and many other braves that age produced, who, by their privateering and bold undertaking (like those the buccaneers practise) now opened the way to our discoveries, and succeeding settlements in America."42
A pamphlet by Dalby Thomas in 1690 accurately reflects the average English attitude towards Spain during the previous century. He states:—"Let’s consider the incredible negligence, or rather foolishness, of this country during the reigns of Henry VII., Henry VIII., Edward VI., and Queen Mary, who could calmly sit by and watch the Spanish invade, plunder, and quietly take home all the riches of that golden world. They allowed the Spanish to build forts and castles that blocked access to all the wealthy regions of America, having no real claim or right more than any other nation, aside from being the accidental first discoverers of some parts of it; where the unprecedented cruelty, excesses, and barbarities, as recorded in their own histories, they inflicted on a poor, defenseless, and innocent population living on the islands, as well as on the truly civilized and powerful empires of Peru and Mexico, who called out for help against their outrageous greed and horrific massacres.... (We) remained asleep until the ambitious Spaniard, with that endless supply of treasure, had bribed most of the courts and senates in Europe, igniting civil wars and conflicts among our neighboring nations or subduing them under his rule; even planning to make us wear his chains and share in the triumph of a worldwide monarchy, which was not only proposed but nearly accomplished when Queen Elizabeth came to the throne... and we owe her sudden action against him, and her encouragement of daring adventurers like Drake, Hawkins, Rawleigh, the Lord Clifford, and many others from that era, to their privateering and bold undertakings (similar to those carried out by the buccaneers), which opened the path to our discoveries and subsequent settlements in America."42
On the 19th of November 1527, some Spaniards in a caravel loading cassava at the Isle of Mona, between Hispaniola and Porto Rico, sighted a strange vessel of about 250 tons well-armed with cannon, and believing it to be a ship from Spain sent a boat to make inquiries. The new-comers at the same time were seen to launch a pinnace carrying some twenty-five men, all armed with corselets and bows. As the two boats approached the Spaniards inquired the nationality of the strangers and were told that they were English. The story given by the English master was that his ship and another had {35} been fitted out by the King of England and had sailed from London to discover the land of the Great Khan; that they had been separated in a great storm; that this ship afterwards ran into a sea of ice, and unable to get through, turned south, touched at Bacallaos (Newfoundland), where the pilot was killed by Indians, and sailing 400 leagues along the coast of "terra nueva" had found her way to this island of Porto Rico. The Englishmen offered to show their commission written in Latin and Romance, which the Spanish captain could not read; and after sojourning at the island for two days, they inquired for the route to Hispaniola and sailed away. On the evening of 25th November this same vessel appeared before the port of San Domingo, the capital of Hispaniola, where the master with ten or twelve sailors went ashore in a boat to ask leave to enter and trade. This they obtained, for the alguazil mayor and two pilots were sent back with them to bring the ship into port. But early next morning, when they approached the shore, the Spanish alcaide, Francisco de Tapia, commanded a gun to be fired at the ship from the castle; whereupon the English, seeing the reception accorded them, sailed back to Porto Rico, there obtained some provisions in exchange for pewter and cloth, and departed for Europe, "where it is believed that they never arrived, for nothing is known of them." The alcaide, says Herrera, was imprisoned by the oidores, because he did not, instead of driving the ship away, allow her to enter the port, whence she could not have departed without the permission of the city and the fort.43
On November 19, 1527, some Spaniards on a caravel loading cassava at the Isle of Mona, located between Hispaniola and Puerto Rico, spotted a strange ship that was about 250 tons and well-armed with cannons. Thinking it was a ship from Spain, they sent a boat to ask questions. At the same time, the newcomers launched a small boat with about twenty-five armed men wearing corselets and carrying bows. As the two boats got closer, the Spaniards asked about the strangers' nationality and were told they were English. The English captain explained that his ship and another had been sent by the King of England to explore the land of the Great Khan; however, they got separated in a huge storm. His ship encountered a sea of ice and, unable to get through, headed south, stopping at Bacallaos (Newfoundland), where the pilot was killed by Indians. They then sailed 400 leagues down the coast of "terra nueva" and arrived at this island of Puerto Rico. The English offered to show their commission written in Latin and Romance languages, which the Spanish captain couldn't read. After staying on the island for two days, they asked for directions to Hispaniola and sailed away. On the evening of November 25, the same ship arrived in front of the port of San Domingo, the capital of Hispaniola, where the captain and ten or twelve sailors went ashore in a boat to request permission to enter and trade. They received permission, and the alguazil mayor and two pilots went back with them to guide the ship into port. But early the next morning, as they approached the shore, the Spanish alcaide, Francisco de Tapia, ordered a cannon to be fired at the ship from the castle. Seeing this hostile reception, the English turned back to Puerto Rico, where they managed to get some provisions in exchange for pewter and cloth, and left for Europe, from where it is believed they never returned, as nothing is known about them. According to Herrera, the alcaide was imprisoned by the oidores for not allowing the ship to enter the port instead of driving it away, as it would not have been able to leave without the city's and the fort's permission.
This is the earliest record we possess of the appearance of an English ship in the waters of Spanish America. Others, however, soon followed. In 1530 William Hawkins, father of the famous John Hawkins, ventured in "a tall and goodly ship ... called the 'Polo of Plymouth,'" down to the coast of Guinea, trafficked with the natives for gold-dust and ivory, and then crossed the ocean to Brazil, "where he behaved himself so wisely with those savage people" that one of the kings of the country took ship with him to England and was presented to Henry VIII. at Whitehall.44 The real occasion, however, for the appearance of foreign ships in Spanish-American waters was the new occupation of carrying negroes from the African coast to the Spanish colonies to be sold as slaves. The rapid depopulation of the Indies, and the really serious concern of the Spanish crown for the preservation of the indigenes, had compelled the Spanish government to permit the introduction of negro slaves from an early period. At first restricted to Christian slaves carried from Spain, after 1510 licences to take over a certain number, subject of course to governmental imposts, were given to private individuals; and in August 1518, owing to the incessant clamour of the colonists for more negroes, Laurent de Gouvenot, Governor of Bresa and one of the foreign favourites of {37} Charles V., obtained the first regular contract to carry 4000 slaves directly from Africa to the West Indies.45 With slight modifications the contract system became permanent, and with it, as a natural consequence, came contraband trade. Cargoes of negroes were frequently "run" from Africa by Spaniards and Portuguese, and as early as 1506 an order was issued to expel all contraband slaves from Hispaniola.46 The supply never equalled the demand, however, and this explains why John Hawkins found it so profitable to carry ship-loads of blacks across from the Guinea coast, and why Spanish colonists could not resist the temptation to buy them, notwithstanding the stringent laws against trading with foreigners.
This is the earliest record we have of an English ship appearing in the waters of Spanish America. Others soon followed. In 1530, William Hawkins, father of the famous John Hawkins, ventured in "a tall and goodly ship ... called the 'Polo of Plymouth,'" down to the coast of Guinea, traded with the locals for gold dust and ivory, and then crossed the ocean to Brazil, "where he behaved himself so wisely with those savage people" that one of the kings from the region sailed back to England with him and was presented to Henry VIII at Whitehall.44 The real reason for the arrival of foreign ships in Spanish-American waters was the new task of transporting African slaves from the coast of Africa to the Spanish colonies. The rapid decline in the population of the Indies and the genuine concern of the Spanish crown for the well-being of the indigenous peoples forced the Spanish government to allow the introduction of African slaves from an early stage. Initially limited to Christian slaves brought from Spain, after 1510 licenses were issued to private individuals to bring over a certain number, subject to government taxes, and in August 1518, due to the constant demands of the colonists for more slaves, Laurent de Gouvenot, Governor of Bresa and one of the foreign favorites of {37} Charles V, secured the first official contract to bring 4,000 slaves directly from Africa to the West Indies.45 With only slight changes, the contract system became a permanent arrangement, which naturally led to smuggling. Cargoes of slaves were often "run" from Africa by Spaniards and Portuguese, and as early as 1506, an order was issued to remove all illegal slaves from Hispaniola.46 The supply never met the demand, which explains why John Hawkins found it so profitable to transport shiploads of Africans from the Guinea coast and why Spanish colonists couldn’t resist the urge to buy them, despite strict laws against trading with foreigners.
The first voyage of John Hawkins was made in 1562-63. In conjunction with Thomas Hampton he fitted out three vessels and sailed for Sierra Leone. There he collected, "partly by the sword and partly by other means," some 300 negroes, and with this valuable human freight crossed the Atlantic to San Domingo in Hispaniola. Uncertain as to his reception, Hawkins on his arrival pretended that he had been driven in by foul weather, and was in need of provisions, but without ready money to pay for them. He therefore requested permission to sell "certain slaves he had with him." The opportunity was eagerly welcomed by the planters, and the governor, not thinking it necessary to construe his orders from home too stringently, allowed two-thirds of the cargo to be sold. As neither Hawkins nor the Spanish colonists anticipated any serious displeasure on the part of Philip II., the remaining 100 slaves were left as a {38} deposit with the Council of the island. Hawkins invested the proceeds in a return cargo of hides, half of which he sent in Spanish vessels to Spain under the care of his partner, while he returned with the rest to England. The Spanish Government, however, was not going to sanction for a moment the intrusion of the English into the Indies. On Hampton's arrival at Cadiz his cargo was confiscated and he himself narrowly escaped the Inquisition. The slaves left in San Domingo were forfeited, and Hawkins, although he "cursed, threatened and implored," could not obtain a farthing for his lost hides and negroes. The only result of his demands was the dispatch of a peremptory order to the West Indies that no English vessel should be allowed under any pretext to trade there.47
The first voyage of John Hawkins took place in 1562-63. Together with Thomas Hampton, he outfitted three ships and set sail for Sierra Leone. There, he gathered, “partly by force and partly by other means,” around 300 Africans, and with this valuable cargo, he crossed the Atlantic to San Domingo in Hispaniola. Uncertain about how he’d be received, Hawkins pretended he had been stranded by bad weather and was in need of supplies but had no money to pay for them. He requested permission to sell “certain slaves he had with him.” The planters eagerly accepted this opportunity, and the governor, not seeing a need to strictly follow his orders, allowed two-thirds of the cargo to be sold. Since neither Hawkins nor the Spanish colonists expected any serious backlash from Philip II, the remaining 100 slaves were left as a {38} deposit with the Council of the island. Hawkins used the proceeds to invest in a return shipment of hides, half of which he sent to Spain on Spanish ships under the care of his partner, while he took the other half back to England. However, the Spanish Government was not going to allow the English to intrude into the Indies. When Hampton arrived in Cadiz, his cargo was confiscated, and he narrowly escaped the Inquisition. The slaves left in San Domingo were forfeited, and Hawkins, despite “cursing, threatening, and begging,” couldn't get a penny for his lost hides and Africans. The only outcome of his demands was a strict order sent to the West Indies stating that no English ship should be allowed to trade there under any circumstances.47
The second of the great Elizabethan sea-captains to beard the Spanish lion was Hawkins' friend and pupil, Francis Drake. In 1567 he accompanied Hawkins on his third expedition. With six ships, one of which was lent by the Queen herself, they sailed from Plymouth in October, picked up about 450 slaves on the Guinea coast, sighted Dominica in the West Indies in March, and coasted along the mainland of South America past Margarita and Cape de la Vela, carrying on a "tolerable good trade." Rio de la Hacha they stormed with 200 men, losing only two in the encounter; but they were scattered by a tempest near Cartagena and driven into the Gulf of Mexico, where, on 16th September, they entered the narrow port of S. Juan d'Ulloa or Vera Cruz. The next day the fleet of New Spain, consisting of thirteen large ships, appeared outside, and after an exchange of pledges of peace and amity with the English {39} intruders, entered on the 20th. On the morning of the 24th, however, a fierce encounter was begun, and Hawkins and Drake, stubbornly defending themselves against tremendous odds, were glad to escape with two shattered vessels and the loss of £100,000 treasure. After a voyage of terrible suffering, Drake, in the "Judith," succeeded in reaching England on 20th January 1569, and Hawkins followed five days later.48 Within a few years, however, Drake was away again, this time alone and with the sole, unblushing purpose of robbing the Dons. With only two ships and seventy-three men he prowled about the waters of the West Indies for almost a year, capturing and rifling Spanish vessels, plundering towns on the Main and intercepting convoys of treasure across the Isthmus of Darien. In 1577 he sailed on the voyage which carried him round the world, a feat for which he was knighted, promoted to the rank of admiral, and visited by the Queen on board his ship, the "Golden Hind." While Drake was being feted in London as the hero of the hour, Philip of Spain from his cell in the Escorial must have execrated these English sea-rovers whose visits brought ruin to his colonies and menaced the safety of his treasure galleons.
The second of the famous Elizabethan sea captains to challenge the Spanish was Hawkins' friend and student, Francis Drake. In 1567, he joined Hawkins on his third expedition. With six ships, one of which was loaned by the Queen herself, they set sail from Plymouth in October, picked up about 450 slaves on the Guinea coast, spotted Dominica in the West Indies in March, and sailed along the South American coast past Margarita and Cape de la Vela, engaging in a "fairly good trade." They stormed Rio de la Hacha with 200 men, losing only two in the fight; however, a storm scattered them near Cartagena, pushing them into the Gulf of Mexico, where, on September 16th, they entered the narrow port of S. Juan d'Ulloa or Vera Cruz. The next day, the fleet of New Spain, made up of thirteen large ships, appeared outside, and after exchanging vows of peace and friendship with the English intruders, they entered on the 20th. But on the morning of the 24th, a fierce battle began, and Hawkins and Drake, valiantly defending themselves against overwhelming odds, managed to escape with two badly damaged ships and a loss of £100,000 in treasure. After enduring a terrible journey, Drake, aboard the "Judith," managed to reach England on January 20, 1569, and Hawkins followed five days later.48 Within a few years, though, Drake was off again, this time solo and with the unapologetic aim of robbing the Spanish. With just two ships and seventy-three men, he roamed the waters of the West Indies for nearly a year, capturing and looting Spanish vessels, pillaging towns on the mainland, and intercepting treasure convoys across the Isthmus of Darien. In 1577, he embarked on the journey that would take him around the world, a feat that earned him a knighthood, a promotion to admiral, and a royal visit from the Queen on his ship, the "Golden Hind." While Drake was celebrated in London as the hero of the moment, Philip of Spain, from his cell in the Escorial, must have cursed these English sea raiders whose incursions brought devastation to his colonies and threatened the safety of his treasure ships.
In the autumn of 1585 Drake was again in command of a formidable armament intended against the West Indies. Supported by 2000 troops under General Carleill, and by Martin Frobisher and Francis Knollys in the fleet, he took and plundered San Domingo, and after occupying Cartagena for six weeks ransomed the city for 110,000 ducats. This fearless old Elizabethan sailed from Plymouth on his last voyage in August 1595. Though under the joint command of Drake and Hawkins, the {40} expedition seemed doomed to disaster throughout its course. One vessel, the "Francis," fell into the hands of the Spaniards. While the fleet was passing through the Virgin Isles, Hawkins fell ill and died. A desperate attack was made on S. Juan de Porto Rico, but the English, after losing forty or fifty men, were compelled to retire. Drake then proceeded to the Main, where in turn he captured and plundered Rancherias, Rio de la Hacha, Santa Marta and Nombre de Dios. With 750 soldiers he made a bold attempt to cross the isthmus to the city of Panama, but turned back after the loss of eighty or ninety of his followers. A few days later, on 15th January 1596, he too fell ill, died on the 28th, and was buried in a leaden coffin off the coast of Darien.49
In the autumn of 1585, Drake was once again in charge of a powerful military force aimed at the West Indies. Backed by 2,000 troops under General Carleill, along with Martin Frobisher and Francis Knollys in the fleet, he captured and raided San Domingo, and after holding Cartagena for six weeks, he ransomed the city for 110,000 ducats. This bold old Elizabethan set sail from Plymouth on his final voyage in August 1595. Despite being under the joint leadership of Drake and Hawkins, the {40} expedition appeared to be fated for failure from the start. One ship, the "Francis," was captured by the Spaniards. While the fleet was navigating through the Virgin Islands, Hawkins became ill and passed away. A desperate assault on San Juan de Puerto Rico was launched, but the English, after losing around forty to fifty men, had to pull back. Drake then moved on to the mainland, where he captured and plundered Rancherias, Rio de la Hacha, Santa Marta, and Nombre de Dios. With 750 soldiers, he made a daring attempt to cross the isthmus to the city of Panama but retreated after losing around eighty to ninety of his men. A few days later, on January 15, 1596, he also fell ill, died on the 28th, and was laid to rest in a lead coffin off the coast of Darien.49
Hawkins and Drake, however, were by no means the only English privateers of that century in American waters. Names like Oxenham, Grenville, Raleigh and Clifford, and others of lesser fame, such as Winter, Knollys and Barker, helped to swell the roll of these Elizabethan sea-rovers. To many a gallant sailor the Caribbean Sea was a happy hunting-ground where he might indulge at his pleasure any propensities to lawless adventure. If in 1588 he had helped to scatter the Invincible Armada, he now pillaged treasure ships on the coasts of the Spanish Main; if he had been with Drake to flout his Catholic Majesty at Cadiz, he now closed with the Spaniards within their distant cities beyond the seas. Thus he lined his own pockets with Spanish doubloons, and incidentally curbed Philip's power of invading England. Nor must we think these mariners the same as the lawless buccaneers of a later period. The men of this generation were of a {41} sterner and more fanatical mould, men who for their wildest acts often claimed the sanction of religious convictions. Whether they carried off the heathen from Africa, or plundered the fleets of Romish Spain, they were but entering upon "the heritage of the saints." Judged by the standards of our own century they were pirates and freebooters, but in the eyes of their fellow-countrymen their attacks upon the Spaniards seemed fair and honourable.
Hawkins and Drake, however, were far from being the only English privateers in American waters during that century. Names like Oxenham, Grenville, Raleigh, and Clifford, along with others like Winter, Knollys, and Barker, contributed to the roster of these Elizabethan sea rovers. For many brave sailors, the Caribbean Sea was an ideal playground where they could freely pursue their adventurous, lawless inclinations. If in 1588 they had helped to scatter the Invincible Armada, they now looted treasure ships along the Spanish Main; if they had joined Drake to defy the Catholic King in Cadiz, they now confronted the Spaniards in their distant cities across the sea. This way, they filled their pockets with Spanish doubloons while also limiting Philip's ability to invade England. We should not confuse these sailors with the lawless buccaneers who followed. The men of this time were of a stricter and more fanatical nature, often justifying their wild actions with religious beliefs. Whether they captured heathens from Africa or raided the fleets of Catholic Spain, they believed they were claiming what was rightfully "the heritage of the saints." By the standards of our own time, they were pirates and looters, but to their fellow countrymen, their assaults on the Spaniards appeared noble and justified.
The last of the great privateering voyages for which Drake had set the example was the armament which Lord George Clifford, Earl of Cumberland, sent against Porto Rico in 1598. The ill-starred expeditions of Raleigh to Guiana in 1595 and again in 1617 belong rather to the history of exploration and colonization. Clifford, "courtier, gambler and buccaneer," having run through a great part of his very considerable fortune, had seized the opportunity offered him by the plunder of the Spanish colonies to re-coup himself; and during a period of twelve years, from 1586 to 1598, almost every year fitted out, and often himself commanded, an expedition against the Spaniards. In his last and most ambitious effort, in 1598, he equipped twenty vessels entirely at his own cost, sailed from Plymouth in March, and on 6th June laid siege to the city of San Juan, which he proposed to clear of Spaniards and establish as an English stronghold. Although the place was captured, the expedition proved a fiasco. A violent sickness broke out among the troops, and as Clifford had already sailed away with some of the ships to Flores to lie in wait for the treasure fleet, Sir Thomas Berkeley, who was left in command in Porto Rico, abandoned the island and returned to rejoin the Earl.50
The last of the major privateering voyages that Drake inspired was the expedition that Lord George Clifford, Earl of Cumberland, launched against Puerto Rico in 1598. The unfortunate attempts by Raleigh to explore Guiana in 1595 and again in 1617 are more about exploration and colonization. Clifford, who was a "courtier, gambler, and buccaneer," had depleted a large part of his substantial fortune and saw the chance to recover his losses through raiding the Spanish colonies; for twelve years, from 1586 to 1598, he organized almost yearly expeditions against the Spaniards, often commanding them himself. In his final and most ambitious mission in 1598, he outfitted twenty ships at his own expense, set sail from Plymouth in March, and on June 6 he laid siege to the city of San Juan, aiming to drive out the Spanish and establish it as an English stronghold. Although the city was taken, the mission ended in disaster. A severe illness broke out among the troops, and since Clifford had already left with some of the ships to wait for the treasure fleet at Flores, Sir Thomas Berkeley, who remained in command in Puerto Rico, abandoned the island and returned to join the Earl.50
The English in the sixteenth century, however, had no monopoly of this piratical game. The French did something in their own way, and the Dutch were not far behind. Indeed, the French may claim to have set the example for the Elizabethan freebooters, for in the first half of the sixteenth century privateers flocked to the Spanish Indies from Dieppe, Brest and the towns of the Basque coast. The gleam of the golden lingots of Peru, and the pale lights of the emeralds from the mountains of New Granada, exercised a hypnotic influence not only on ordinary seamen but on merchants and on seigneurs with depleted fortunes. Names like Jean Terrier, Jacques Sore and François le Clerc, the latter popularly called "Pie de Palo," or "wooden-leg," by the Spaniards, were as detestable in Spanish ears as those of the great English captains. Even before 1500 French corsairs hovered about Cape St Vincent and among the Azores and the Canaries; and their prowess and audacity were so feared that Columbus, on returning from his third voyage in 1498, declared that he had sailed for the island of Madeira by a new route to avoid meeting a French fleet which was awaiting him near St Vincent.51 With the establishment of the system of armed convoys, however, and the presence of Spanish fleets on the coast of Europe, the corsairs suffered some painful reverses which impelled them to transfer their operations to American waters. Thereafter Spanish records are full of references to attacks by Frenchmen on Havana, St. Jago de Cuba, San Domingo and towns on {43} the mainland of South and Central America; full of appeals, too, from the colonies to the neglectful authorities in Spain, urging them to send artillery, cruisers and munitions of war for their defence.52
The English in the sixteenth century didn’t have the exclusive right to this piratical game. The French had their own approach, and the Dutch weren’t far behind. In fact, the French can claim to have set the example for the Elizabethan raiders because, in the first half of the sixteenth century, privateers were heading to the Spanish Indies from Dieppe, Brest, and the towns along the Basque coast. The allure of the gold bars from Peru and the sparkling emeralds from the mountains of New Granada captivated not just regular sailors but also merchants and noblemen with empty pockets. Names like Jean Terrier, Jacques Sore, and François le Clerc, the latter nicknamed "Pie de Palo," or "wooden-leg," by the Spaniards, were as loathed in Spanish ears as those of the great English captains. Even before 1500, French corsairs roamed around Cape St. Vincent and among the Azores and the Canaries; their skill and boldness were so intimidating that Columbus, upon returning from his third voyage in 1498, said he had taken a new route to the island of Madeira to steer clear of a French fleet that was lying in wait for him near St. Vincent.51 With the establishment of the armed convoy system and the presence of Spanish fleets off the European coast, the corsairs faced some tough setbacks that forced them to move their operations to American waters. After that, Spanish records frequently mention French attacks on Havana, Santiago de Cuba, Santo Domingo, and towns on the mainland of South and Central America; they are also filled with pleas from the colonies to the indifferent authorities in Spain, urging them to send artillery, cruisers, and munitions for their defense.52
A letter dated 8th April 1537, written by Gonzalo de Guzman to the Empress, furnishes us with some interesting details of the exploits of an anonymous French corsair in that year. In November 1536 this Frenchman had seized in the port of Chagre, on the Isthmus of Darien, a Spanish vessel laden with horses from San Domingo, had cast the cargo into the sea, put the crew on shore and sailed away with his prize. A month or two later he appeared off the coast of Havana and dropped anchor in a small bay a few leagues from the city. As there were then five Spanish ships lying in the harbour, the inhabitants compelled the captains to attempt the seizure of the pirate, promising to pay for the ships if they were lost. Three vessels of 200 tons each sailed out to the attack, and for several days they fired at the French corsair, which, being a patache of light draught, had run up the bay beyond their reach. Finally one morning the Frenchmen were seen pressing with both sail and oar to escape from the port. A Spanish vessel cut her cables to follow in pursuit, but encountering a heavy sea and contrary winds was abandoned by her crew, who made for shore in boats. The other two Spanish ships were deserted in similar fashion, whereupon the French, observing this new turn of affairs, re-entered the bay and easily recovered the three drifting vessels. Two of the prizes they burnt, and arming the third sailed away to cruise in the Florida {44} straits, in the route of ships returning from the West Indies to Spain.53
A letter dated April 8, 1537, written by Gonzalo de Guzman to the Empress, gives us some interesting details about the adventures of an unnamed French corsair that year. In November 1536, this Frenchman had seized a Spanish ship loaded with horses from San Domingo at the port of Chagre on the Isthmus of Darien. He threw the cargo into the sea, put the crew ashore, and sailed away with his prize. A month or two later, he showed up off the coast of Havana and anchored in a small bay a few leagues from the city. Since there were five Spanish ships in the harbor at that time, the locals urged the captains to go after the pirate, promising to pay for the ships if they got lost. Three vessels of 200 tons each set out to attack, and for several days they fired at the French corsair, which, being a small ship with a shallow draft, had moved up the bay out of their reach. Finally, one morning, the French were seen trying to escape from the port using both sails and oars. A Spanish vessel cut its anchor cables to pursue them but faced rough seas and strong winds, leading the crew to abandon the ship and head for shore in boats. The other two Spanish ships were similarly deserted. Seeing this change in circumstances, the French returned to the bay and easily retrieved the three drifting vessels. They burned two of the prizes and armed the third before sailing off to patrol the Florida straits, which were along the route for ships returning from the West Indies to Spain. {44} 53
The corsairs, however, were not always so uniformly successful. A band of eighty, who attempted to plunder the town of St. Jago de Cuba, were repulsed with some loss by a certain Diego Perez of Seville, captain of an armed merchant ship then in the harbour, who later petitioned for the grant of a coat-of-arms in recognition of his services.54 In October 1544 six French vessels attacked the town of Santa Maria de los Remedios, near Cape de la Vela, but failed to take it in face of the stubborn resistance of the inhabitants. Yet the latter a few months earlier had been unable to preserve their homes from pillage, and had been obliged to flee to La Granjeria de las Perlas on the Rio de la Hacha.55 There is small wonder, indeed, that the defenders were so rarely victorious. The Spanish towns were ill-provided with forts and guns, and often entirely without ammunition or any regular soldiers. The distance between the settlements as a rule was great, and the inhabitants, as soon as informed of the presence of the enemy, knowing that they had no means of resistance and little hope of succour, left their homes to the mercy of the freebooters and fled to the hills and woods with their families and most precious belongings. Thus when, in October 1554, another band of three hundred French privateers swooped down upon the unfortunate town of St. Jago de Cuba, they were able to hold it for thirty days, and plundered it to the value of 80,000 pieces of eight.56 The following year, however, witnessed an even more remarkable action. In July 1555 the celebrated {45} captain, Jacques Sore, landed two hundred men from a caravel a half-league from the city of Havana, and before daybreak marched on the town and forced the surrender of the castle. The Spanish governor had time to retire to the country, where he gathered a small force of Spaniards and negroes, and returned to surprise the French by night. Fifteen or sixteen of the latter were killed, and Sore, who himself was wounded, in a rage gave orders for the massacre of all the prisoners. He burned the cathedral and the hospital, pillaged the houses and razed most of the city to the ground. After transferring all the artillery to his vessel, he made several forays into the country, burned a few plantations, and finally sailed away in the beginning of August. No record remains of the amount of the booty, but it must have been enormous. To fill the cup of bitterness for the poor inhabitants, on 4th October there appeared on the coast another French ship, which had learned of Sore's visit and of the helpless state of the Spaniards. Several hundred men disembarked, sacked a few plantations neglected by their predecessors, tore down or burned the houses which the Spaniards had begun to rebuild, and seized a caravel loaded with leather which had recently entered the harbour.57 It is true that during these years there was almost constant war in Europe between the Emperor and France; yet this does not entirely explain the activity of the French privateers in Spanish America, for we find them busy there in the years when peace reigned at home. Once unleash the sea-dogs and it was extremely difficult to bring them again under restraint.
The corsairs, however, weren't always consistently successful. A group of eighty who tried to raid the town of St. Jago de Cuba were pushed back, losing some men, by a certain Diego Perez from Seville, captain of an armed merchant ship in the harbor at the time, who later requested the grant of a coat-of-arms in recognition of his efforts.54 In October 1544, six French ships attacked the town of Santa Maria de los Remedios, near Cape de la Vela, but failed to take it due to the fierce resistance from the locals. Just a few months earlier, though, they could not defend their homes from looting and had to flee to La Granjeria de las Perlas on the Rio de la Hacha.55 It’s no surprise that the defenders rarely won. Spanish towns were poorly equipped with forts and guns, often completely lacking ammunition or regular soldiers. The settlements were usually far apart, and once the residents learned of the enemy’s presence, knowing they had no means to fight back and little hope of assistance, they left their homes to the mercy of the raiders and fled to the hills and forests with their families and their most valued possessions. Thus, when another group of three hundred French privateers attacked the unfortunate town of St. Jago de Cuba in October 1554, they managed to hold it for thirty days and looted it for a total value of 80,000 pieces of eight.56 The following year, however, saw an even more astonishing event. In July 1555, the famous captain Jacques Sore landed two hundred men from a caravel half a league from the city of Havana, and before dawn, marched on the town and forced the surrender of the castle. The Spanish governor had enough time to retreat to the countryside, where he gathered a small force of Spaniards and Africans, and came back to surprise the French at night. Fifteen or sixteen of the French were killed, and Sore, who was himself wounded, angrily ordered the massacre of all the prisoners. He burned the cathedral and the hospital, looted the houses, and destroyed most of the city. After transferring all the artillery to his ship, he made several raids into the countryside, burned a few plantations, and finally set sail at the beginning of August. There’s no record of the amount of loot, but it must have been huge. To worsen the situation for the poor residents, on October 4th, another French ship appeared on the coast, having learned about Sore's visit and the vulnerable state of the Spaniards. Several hundred men got off, ransacked a few plantations left behind by their predecessors, tore down or burned houses that the Spaniards had started to rebuild, and seized a caravel filled with leather that had recently entered the harbor.57 It’s true that during these years, there was almost constant war in Europe between the Emperor and France; however, this doesn't fully explain the activity of the French privateers in Spanish America, as we find them active there even during the years of peace back home. Once you unleash the sea-dogs, it was extremely hard to rein them in.
With the seventeenth century began a new era in the history of the West Indies. If in the sixteenth the {46} English, French and Dutch came to tropical America as piratical intruders into seas and countries which belonged to others, in the following century they came as permanent colonisers and settlers. The Spaniards, who had explored the whole ring of the West Indian islands before 1500, from the beginning neglected the lesser for the larger Antilles—Cuba, Hispaniola, Porto Rico and Jamaica—and for those islands like Trinidad, which lie close to the mainland. And when in 1519 Cortez sailed from Cuba for the conquest of Mexico, and twelve years later Pizarro entered Peru, the emigrants who left Spain to seek their fortunes in the New World flocked to the vast territories which the Conquistadores and their lieutenants had subdued on the Continent. It was consequently to the smaller islands which compose the Leeward and Windward groups that the English, French and Dutch first resorted as colonists. Small, and therefore "easy to settle, easy to depopulate and to re-people, attractive not only on account of their own wealth, but also as a starting-point for the vast and rich continent off which they lie," these islands became the pawns in a game of diplomacy and colonization which continued for 150 years.
With the seventeenth century came a new chapter in the history of the West Indies. In the previous century, the English, French, and Dutch entered tropical America as pirate intruders in seas and lands that belonged to others. In the following century, they arrived as permanent colonizers and settlers. The Spaniards, who had explored the entire ring of the West Indian islands before 1500, initially overlooked the smaller Antilles in favor of the larger ones—Cuba, Hispaniola, Puerto Rico, and Jamaica—along with islands like Trinidad that are close to the mainland. When Cortés set sail from Cuba in 1519 to conquer Mexico, and twelve years later Pizarro entered Peru, the emigrants leaving Spain to seek their fortunes in the New World flocked to the vast territories that the Conquistadores and their lieutenants had conquered on the continent. As a result, it was the smaller islands that make up the Leeward and Windward groups where the English, French, and Dutch first settled as colonists. Small and therefore "easy to settle, easy to depopulate and to repopulate, attractive not only because of their own wealth but also as a starting point for the vast and rich continent nearby," these islands became pawns in a game of diplomacy and colonization that lasted for 150 years.
In the seventeenth century, moreover, the Spanish monarchy was declining rapidly both in power and prestige, and its empire, though still formidable, no longer overshadowed the other nations of Europe as in the days of Charles V. and Philip II. France, with the Bourbons on the throne, was entering upon an era of rapid expansion at home and abroad, while the Dutch, by the truce of 1609, virtually obtained the freedom for which they had struggled so long. In England Queen Elizabeth had died in 1603, and her Stuart successor exchanged her policy of dalliance, {47} of balance between France and Spain, for one of peace and conciliation. The aristocratic free-booters who had enriched themselves by harassing the Spanish Indies were succeeded by a less romantic but more business-like generation, which devoted itself to trade and planting. Abortive attempts at colonization had been made in the sixteenth century. The Dutch, who were trading in the West Indies as early as 1542, by 1580 seem to have gained some foothold in Guiana;58 and the French Huguenots, under the patronage of the Admiral de Coligny, made three unsuccessful efforts to form settlements on the American continent, one in Brazil in 1555, another near Port Royal in South Carolina in 1562, and two years later a third on the St. John's River in Florida. The only English effort in the sixteenth century was the vain attempt of Sir Walter Raleigh between 1585 and 1590 to plant a colony on Roanoke Island, on the coast of what is now North Carolina. It was not till 1607 that the first permanent English settlement in America was made at Jamestown in Virginia. Between 1609 and 1619 numerous stations were established by English, Dutch and French in Guiana between the mouth of the Orinoco and that of the Amazon. In 1621 the Dutch West India Company was incorporated, and a few years later proposals for a similar company were broached in England. Among the West Indian Islands, St. Kitts received its first English settlers in 1623; and two years later the island was formally divided with the French, thus becoming the earliest nucleus of English and French colonization in those regions. Barbadoes was colonized in 1624-25. In 1628 English settlers from St. Kitts spread to Nevis and {48} Barbuda, and within another four years to Antigua and Montserrat; while as early as 1625 English and Dutch took joint possession of Santa Cruz. The founders of the French settlement on St. Kitts induced Richelieu to incorporate a French West India Company with the title, "The Company of the Isles of America," and under its auspices Guadeloupe, Martinique and other islands of the Windward group were colonized in 1635 and succeeding years. Meanwhile between 1632 and 1634 the Dutch had established trading stations on St. Eustatius in the north, and on Tobago and Curaçao in the south near the Spanish mainland.
In the seventeenth century, the Spanish monarchy was quickly losing power and prestige, and although its empire remained strong, it no longer dominated other European nations as it had during the reigns of Charles V and Philip II. France, under the Bourbons, was entering a time of rapid growth both domestically and internationally, while the Dutch, following the truce of 1609, essentially achieved the independence they had long fought for. In England, Queen Elizabeth passed away in 1603, and her Stuart successor replaced her policy of flirtation and balance between France and Spain with one focused on peace and reconciliation. The aristocratic pirates who had made their fortunes by raiding the Spanish Indies were replaced by a more practical generation that focused on trade and colonization. Failed colonization attempts occurred in the sixteenth century. The Dutch had been trading in the West Indies as early as 1542, and by 1580 they seemed to have established a foothold in Guiana; the French Huguenots, supported by Admiral de Coligny, made three unsuccessful attempts to settle in America: one in Brazil in 1555, another near Port Royal in South Carolina in 1562, and a third on the St. John's River in Florida two years later. The only English attempt in the sixteenth century was Sir Walter Raleigh's unsuccessful endeavor to establish a colony on Roanoke Island, off the coast of present-day North Carolina, between 1585 and 1590. It wasn’t until 1607 that the first permanent English settlement in America was established in Jamestown, Virginia. Between 1609 and 1619, numerous trading posts were set up by the English, Dutch, and French in Guiana, from the Orinoco River to the Amazon River. In 1621, the Dutch West India Company was formed, and shortly after, plans for a similar company emerged in England. Among the West Indian Islands, St. Kitts received its first English settlers in 1623, and two years later, the island was officially divided with the French, marking the beginning of English and French colonization in the area. Barbadoes was colonized in 1624-25. In 1628, English settlers from St. Kitts moved to Nevis and Barbuda, and within four years to Antigua and Montserrat; as early as 1625, English and Dutch jointly claimed Santa Cruz. The founders of the French settlement on St. Kitts convinced Richelieu to create a French West India Company named "The Company of the Isles of America," which led to the colonization of Guadeloupe, Martinique, and other islands in the Windward group in 1635 and the following years. Meanwhile, between 1632 and 1634, the Dutch established trading posts on St. Eustatius in the north and on Tobago and Curaçao in the south near the Spanish mainland.
While these centres of trade and population were being formed in the very heart of the Spanish seas, the privateers were not altogether idle. To the treaty of Vervins between France and Spain in 1598 had been added a secret restrictive article whereby it was agreed that the peace should not hold good south of the Tropic of Cancer and west of the meridian of the Azores. Beyond these two lines (called "les lignes de l'enclos des Amitiés") French and Spanish ships might attack each other and take fair prize as in open war. The ministers of Henry IV. communicated this restriction verbally to the merchants of the ports, and soon private men-of-war from Dieppe, Havre and St. Malo flocked to the western seas.59 Ships loaded with contraband goods no longer sailed for the Indies unless armed ready to engage all comers, and many ship-captains renounced trade altogether for the more profitable and exciting occupation of privateering. In the early years of the seventeenth century, moreover, Dutch fleets harassed the coasts of Chile and Peru,60 while {49} in Brazil61 and the West Indies a second "Pie de Palo," this time the Dutch admiral, Piet Heyn, was proving a scourge to the Spaniards. Heyn was employed by the Dutch West India Company, which from the year 1623 onwards, carried the Spanish war into the transmarine possessions of Spain and Portugal. With a fleet composed of twenty-six ships and 3300 men, of which he was vice-admiral, he greatly distinguished himself at the capture of Bahia, the seat of Portuguese power in Brazil. Similar expeditions were sent out annually, and brought back the rich spoils of the South American colonies. Within two years the extraordinary number of eighty ships, with 1500 cannon and over 9000 sailors and soldiers, were despatched to American seas, and although Bahia was soon retaken, the Dutch for a time occupied Pernambuco, as well as San Juan de Porto Rico in the West Indies.62 In 1628 Piet Heyn was in command of a squadron designed to intercept the plate fleet which sailed every year from Vera Cruz to Spain. With thirty-one ships, 700 cannon and nearly 3000 men he cruised along the northern coast of Cuba, and on 8th September fell in with his quarry near Cape San Antonio. The Spaniards made a running fight along the coast until they reached the Matanzas River near Havana, into which they turned with the object of running the great-bellied galleons aground and escaping with what treasure they could. The Dutch followed, however, and most of the rich cargo was diverted into the coffers of the Dutch West India Company. The gold, silver, indigo, sugar and logwood were sold in the Netherlands for fifteen million guilders, {50} and the company was enabled to distribute to its shareholders the unprecedented dividend of 50 per cent. It was an exploit which two generations of English mariners had attempted in vain, and the unfortunate Spanish general, Don Juan de Benavides, on his return to Spain was imprisoned for his defeat and later beheaded.63
While these centers of trade and population were developing in the heart of the Spanish seas, the privateers were not completely inactive. A secret restrictive article was added to the 1598 treaty of Vervins between France and Spain, agreeing that peace would not apply south of the Tropic of Cancer and west of the Azores meridian. Beyond these lines (called "les lignes de l'enclos des Amitiés"), French and Spanish ships could attack each other and seize fair prizes as if in open war. The ministers of Henry IV. communicated this restriction verbally to the merchants at the ports, and soon private warships from Dieppe, Havre, and St. Malo flocked to the western seas.59 Ships loaded with contraband goods no longer sailed for the Indies unless armed and ready to engage anyone, and many ship captains abandoned trade altogether for the more profitable and exciting venture of privateering. In the early years of the seventeenth century, Dutch fleets also targeted the coasts of Chile and Peru,60 while {49} in Brazil61 and the West Indies, a new "Pie de Palo," this time the Dutch admiral Piet Heyn, was wreaking havoc on the Spaniards. Heyn was employed by the Dutch West India Company, which starting in 1623 launched the Spanish conflict into Spain and Portugal’s overseas territories. With a fleet of twenty-six ships and 3,300 men, of which he was vice-admiral, he made a name for himself by capturing Bahia, the center of Portuguese power in Brazil. Similar expeditions were sent out every year, returning with rich spoils from the South American colonies. Within two years, an astounding number of eighty ships, armed with 1,500 cannons and over 9,000 sailors and soldiers, were dispatched to the American seas, and although Bahia was soon retaken, the Dutch temporarily held Pernambuco, as well as San Juan de Porto Rico in the West Indies.62 In 1628, Piet Heyn led a squadron aimed at intercepting the treasure fleet that sailed annually from Vera Cruz to Spain. With thirty-one ships, 700 cannons, and nearly 3,000 men, he cruised along the northern coast of Cuba and, on September 8, encountered his target near Cape San Antonio. The Spaniards fought a running battle along the coast until they reached the Matanzas River near Havana, where they turned in an attempt to run the heavily laden galleons aground and escape with whatever treasure they could. The Dutch pursued, however, and most of the valuable cargo ended up in the hands of the Dutch West India Company. The gold, silver, indigo, sugar, and logwood were sold in the Netherlands for fifteen million guilders,{50} and the company was able to distribute to its shareholders an unprecedented dividend of 50 percent. It was an exploit that two generations of English sailors had tried in vain, and the unfortunate Spanish general, Don Juan de Benavides, was imprisoned upon his return to Spain for his defeat and subsequently beheaded.63
In 1639 we find the Spanish Council of War for the Indies conferring with the King on measures to be taken against English piratical ships in the Caribbean;64 and in 1642 Captain William Jackson, provided with an ample commission from the Earl of Warwick65 and duplicates under the Great Seal, made a raid in which he emulated the exploits of Sir Francis Drake and his contemporaries. Starting out with three ships and about 1100 men, mostly picked up in St. Kitts and Barbadoes, he cruised along the Main from Caracas to Honduras and plundered the towns of Maracaibo and Truxillo. On 25th March 1643 he dropped anchor in what is now Kingston Harbour in Jamaica, landed about 500 men, and after some sharp fighting and the loss of forty of his followers, entered the town of St. Jago de la Vega, which he ransomed for 200 beeves, 10,000 lbs. of cassava bread and 7000 pieces of eight. Many of the English were so captivated by the beauty and fertility of the island that twenty-three deserted in one night to the Spaniards.66
In 1639, the Spanish Council of War for the Indies met with the King to discuss actions against English pirate ships in the Caribbean;64 and in 1642, Captain William Jackson, armed with a significant commission from the Earl of Warwick65 and copies under the Great Seal, launched a raid that mirrored the adventures of Sir Francis Drake and his peers. Starting with three ships and around 1,100 men, mostly recruited in St. Kitts and Barbados, he sailed along the mainland from Caracas to Honduras, plundering the towns of Maracaibo and Truxillo. On March 25, 1643, he anchored in what is now Kingston Harbour in Jamaica, landed about 500 men, and after some fierce fighting that resulted in the loss of forty of his men, took control of the town of St. Jago de la Vega, which he extorted for 200 cattle, 10,000 lbs. of cassava bread, and 7,000 pieces of eight. Many Englishmen were so taken with the island's beauty and fertility that twenty-three deserted in one night to join the Spaniards.66
The first two Stuart Kings, like the great Queen who preceded them, and in spite of the presence of a {51} powerful Spanish faction at the English Court, looked upon the Indies with envious eyes, as a source of perennial wealth to whichever nation could secure them. James I., to be sure, was a man of peace, and soon after his accession patched up a treaty with the Spaniards; but he had no intention of giving up any English claims, however shadowy they might be, to America. Cornwallis, the new ambassador at Madrid, from a vantage ground where he could easily see the financial and administrative confusion into which Spain, in spite of her colonial wealth, had fallen, was most dissatisfied with the treaty. In a letter to Cranborne, dated 2nd July 1605, he suggested that England never lost so great an opportunity of winning honour and wealth as by relinquishing the war with Spain, and that Philip and his kingdom "were reduced to such a state as they could not in all likelihood have endured for the space of two years more."67 This opinion we find repeated in his letters in the following years, with covert hints that an attack upon the Indies might after all be the most profitable and politic thing to do. When, in October 1607, Zuniga, the Spanish ambassador in London, complained to James of the establishment of the new colony in Virginia, James replied that Virginia was land discovered by the English and therefore not within the jurisdiction of Philip; and a week later Salisbury, while confiding to Zuniga that he thought the English might not justly go to Virginia, still refused to prohibit their going or command their return, for it would be an acknowledgment, he said, that the King of Spain was lord of all the Indies.68 In 1609, {52} in the truce concluded between Spain and the Netherlands, one of the stipulations provided that for nine years the Dutch were to be free to trade in all places in the East and West Indies except those in actual possession of the Spaniards on the date of cessation of hostilities; and thereafter the English and French governments endeavoured with all the more persistence to obtain a similar privilege. Attorney-General Heath, in 1625, presented a memorial to the Crown on the advantages derived by the Spaniards and Dutch in the West Indies, maintaining that it was neither safe nor profitable for them to be absolute lords of those regions; and he suggested that his Majesty openly interpose or permit it to be done underhand.69 In September 1637 proposals were renewed in England for a West India Company as the only method of obtaining a share in the wealth of America. It was suggested that some convenient port be seized as a safe retreat from which to plunder Spanish trade on land and sea, and that the officers of the company be empowered to conquer and occupy any part of the West Indies, build ships, levy soldiers and munitions of war, and make reprisals.70 The temper of Englishmen at this time was again illustrated in 1640 when the Spanish ambassador, Alonzo de Cardenas, protested to Charles I. against certain ships which the Earls of Warwick and Marlborough were sending to the West Indies with the intention, Cardenas declared, of committing hostilities against the Spaniards. The Earl of Warwick, it seems, pretended to have received great injuries from the latter and threatened to recoup his losses at their expense. He procured from the king a broad commission which gave {53} him the right to trade in the West Indies, and to "offend" such as opposed him. Under shelter of this commission the Earl of Marlborough was now going to sea with three or four armed ships, and Cardenas prayed the king to restrain him until he gave security not to commit any acts of violence against the Spanish nation. The petition was referred to a committee of the Lords, who concluded that as the peace had never been strictly observed by either nation in the Indies they would not demand any security of the Earl. "Whether the Spaniards will think this reasonable or not," concludes Secretary Windebank in his letter to Sir Arthur Hopton, "is no great matter."71
The first two Stuart kings, like the great queen before them, and despite the strong Spanish faction at the English Court, eyed the Indies enviously as a source of endless wealth for whichever nation could claim them. James I was, of course, a man of peace, and shortly after he took the throne, he worked out a treaty with the Spaniards; however, he had no intention of surrendering any English claims, no matter how tenuous, to America. Cornwallis, the new ambassador in Madrid, from a position where he could clearly observe the financial and administrative chaos that Spain, despite its colonial riches, had fallen into, was quite unhappy with the treaty. In a letter to Cranborne dated July 2, 1605, he pointed out that England was letting slip a great opportunity to gain honor and wealth by giving up the war with Spain, and that Philip and his kingdom "were reduced to such a state that they likely could not endure it for another two years."67 This sentiment is echoed in his letters in the following years, with subtle hints that attacking the Indies might ultimately be the most lucrative and sensible action to take. When, in October 1607, Zuniga, the Spanish ambassador in London, complained to James about the establishment of the new colony in Virginia, James replied that Virginia was land discovered by the English and therefore not under Philip's control; just a week later, Salisbury, while confiding in Zuniga that he thought the English might not have a justifiable reason to go to Virginia, still refused to stop them or order their return, arguing that doing so would mean acknowledging that the King of Spain was the lord of all the Indies.68 In 1609, in the truce made between Spain and the Netherlands, one of the stipulations allowed the Dutch to trade freely in all areas of the East and West Indies, except for those under Spanish control at the time hostilities ceased, and afterward, English and French governments worked even harder to secure similar privileges. Attorney-General Heath, in 1625, presented a report to the Crown on the advantages that Spaniards and Dutch gained in the West Indies, arguing that it was neither safe nor beneficial for them to be the absolute lords of those regions; he suggested that the king should either intervene openly or allow it to be done secretly.69 In September 1637, proposals for a West India Company were revived in England as the only way to gain a share of America's wealth. It was proposed that they seize a suitable port as a safe base from which to plunder Spanish trade on land and sea and that the company's officers be given the authority to conquer and occupy any part of the West Indies, build ships, enlist soldiers and war munitions, and carry out reprisals.70 The attitude of the English at this time was again evident in 1640 when the Spanish ambassador, Alonzo de Cardenas, protested to Charles I about certain ships that the Earls of Warwick and Marlborough were sending to the West Indies with the intention, Cardenas declared, of launching attacks against the Spaniards. The Earl of Warwick claimed to have suffered great injuries from the Spaniards and threatened to recover his losses at their expense. He obtained from the king a broad commission that allowed him the right to trade in the West Indies and to "offend" those who opposed him. Under the protection of this commission, the Earl of Marlborough was preparing to set sail with three or four armed ships, and Cardenas requested that the king restrain him until he provided security not to commit any violent acts against the Spanish nation. The petition was sent to a committee of the Lords, who determined that since peace had never been strictly observed by either side in the Indies, they would not demand any security from the Earl. "Whether the Spaniards will think this reasonable or not," concludes Secretary Windebank in his letter to Sir Arthur Hopton, "is no great matter."71
During this century and a half between 1500 and 1650, the Spaniards were by no means passive or indifferent to the attacks made upon their authority and prestige in the New World. The hostility of the mariners from the north they repaid with interest, and woe to the foreign interloper or privateer who fell into their clutches. When Henry II. of France in 1557 issued an order that Spanish prisoners be condemned to the galleys, the Spanish government retaliated by commanding its sea-captains to mete out the same treatment to their French captives, except that captains, masters and officers taken in the navigation of the Indies were to be hung or cast into the sea.72 In December 1600 the governor of Cumana had suggested to the King, as a means of keeping Dutch and English ships from the salt mines of Araya, the ingenious scheme of poisoning the salt. This advice, it seems, was not followed, but a few years later, in 1605, a Spanish fleet {54} of fourteen galleons sent from Lisbon surprised and burnt nineteen Dutch vessels found loading salt at Araya, and murdered most of the prisoners.73 In December 1604 the Venetian ambassador in London wrote of "news that the Spanish in the West Indies captured two English vessels, cut off the hands, feet, noses and ears of the crews and smeared them with honey and tied them to trees to be tortured by flies and other insects. The Spanish here plead," he continued, "that they were pirates, not merchants, and that they did not know of the peace. But the barbarity makes people here cry out."74 On 22nd June 1606, Edmondes, the English Ambassador at Brussels, in a letter to Cornwallis, speaks of a London ship which was sent to trade in Virginia, and putting into a river in Florida to obtain water, was surprised there by Spanish vessels from Havana, the men ill-treated and the cargo confiscated.75 And it was but shortly after that Captain Chaloner's ship on its way to Virginia was seized by the Spaniards in the West Indies, and the crew sent to languish in the dungeons of Seville or condemned to the galleys.
During the century and a half between 1500 and 1650, the Spaniards were definitely not passive or indifferent to the challenges posed to their authority and reputation in the New World. They retaliated fiercely against the aggression from northern mariners, and any foreign intruder or privateer who fell into their hands was doomed. When Henry II of France ordered in 1557 that Spanish prisoners should be sent to the galleys, the Spanish government responded by ordering their sea captains to do the same to their French captives—except that captains, masters, and officers captured during voyages to the Indies were to be hanged or thrown into the sea.72 In December 1600, the governor of Cumana suggested to the King, as a way to keep Dutch and English ships away from the salt mines of Araya, the clever idea of poisoning the salt. It seems this advice was not taken, but a few years later, in 1605, a Spanish fleet of fourteen galleons sent from Lisbon surprised and burned nineteen Dutch vessels that were loading salt at Araya and killed most of the prisoners.73 In December 1604, the Venetian ambassador in London reported that "the Spanish in the West Indies captured two English vessels, cut off the hands, feet, noses, and ears of the crews, smeared them with honey, and tied them to trees to be tortured by flies and other insects. The Spanish here claim," he continued, "that they were pirates, not merchants, and that they were unaware of the peace. But the cruelty has people here outraged."74 On June 22, 1606, Edmondes, the English Ambassador in Brussels, wrote in a letter to Cornwallis about a London ship that had been sent to trade in Virginia. It had stopped in a river in Florida to get water but was unexpectedly attacked by Spanish vessels from Havana, where the crew was mistreated and the cargo seized.75 Shortly after that, Captain Chaloner's ship, on its way to Virginia, was captured by the Spaniards in the West Indies, and the crew was sent to suffer in the dungeons of Seville or condemned to the galleys.
By attacks upon some of the English settlements, too, the Spaniards gave their threats a more effective form. Frequent raids were made upon the English and Dutch plantations in Guiana;76 and on 8th-18th September 1629 a Spanish fleet of over thirty sail, commanded by Don Federico de Toledo, nearly annihilated the joint French and English colony on St. Kitts. Nine English ships were captured and the settlements burnt. The French inhabitants temporarily evacuated the island and sailed {55} for Antigua; but of the English some 550 were carried to Cartagena and Havana, whence they were shipped to England, and all the rest fled to the mountains and woods.77 Within three months' time, however, after the departure of the Spaniards, the scattered settlers had returned and re-established the colony. Providence Island and its neighbour, Henrietta, being situated near the Mosquito Coast, were peculiarly exposed to Spanish attack;78 while near the north shore of Hispaniola the island of Tortuga, which was colonized by the same English company, suffered repeatedly from the assaults of its hostile neighbours. In July 1635 a Spanish fleet from the Main assailed the island of Providence, but unable to land among the rocks, was after five days beaten off "considerably torn" by the shot from the fort.79 On the strength of these injuries received and of others anticipated, the Providence Company obtained from the king the liberty "to right themselves" by making reprisals, and during the next six years kept numerous vessels preying upon Spanish commerce in those waters. King Philip was therefore all the more intent upon destroying the plantation.80 He bided his time, however, until the early summer of 1641, when the general of the galleons, Don Francisco Diaz Pimienta, with twelve sail and 2000 men, fell upon the colony, razed the forts and carried off all the English, about 770 in number, together with forty cannon and half a million of plunder.81 It was just ten years later that a {56} force of 800 men from Porto Rico invaded Santa Cruz, whence the Dutch had been expelled by the English in 1646, killed the English governor and more than 100 settlers, seized two ships in the harbour and burnt and pillaged most of the plantations. The rest of the inhabitants escaped to the woods, and after the departure of the Spaniards deserted the colony for St. Kitts and other islands.82
By attacking some English settlements, the Spaniards made their threats more impactful. They frequently raided the English and Dutch plantations in Guiana; 76 and from September 8th to 18th, 1629, a Spanish fleet of over thirty ships, led by Don Federico de Toledo, almost wiped out the joint French and English colony on St. Kitts. Nine English ships were captured, and the settlements were burned. The French residents temporarily left the island and went to Antigua; about 550 English were taken to Cartagena and Havana and then shipped to England, while the rest fled to the hills and forests.77 However, within three months after the Spaniards left, the scattered settlers returned and rebuilt the colony. Providence Island and its neighbor, Henrietta, located near the Mosquito Coast, were especially vulnerable to Spanish attacks;78 while near the north shore of Hispaniola, Tortuga, which was settled by the same English company, faced repeated assaults from hostile neighbors. In July 1635, a Spanish fleet from the Mainland attacked Providence Island, but after five days of trying and unable to land amid the rocks, they were repelled, "considerably torn" by cannon fire from the fort.79 Because of these injuries and others expected, the Providence Company received permission from the king "to right themselves" through reprisals, and for the next six years, they sent out numerous ships to attack Spanish trade in those waters. King Philip was therefore even more determined to destroy the plantation.80 However, he waited until early summer of 1641, when Don Francisco Diaz Pimienta, the general of the galleons, with twelve ships and 2000 men, attacked the colony, destroyed the forts, and captured all the English, about 770 of them, along with forty cannons and half a million in loot.81 It was ten years later that a force of 800 men from Porto Rico invaded Santa Cruz, from which the Dutch had been expelled by the English in 1646, killed the English governor and over 100 settlers, seized two ships in the harbor, and burned and looted most of the plantations. The remaining inhabitants fled to the woods, and after the Spaniards left, abandoned the colony for St. Kitts and other islands.82
Footnote 1: (return)Herrera: Decades II. 1, p. 4, cited in Scelle: la Traite Négrière, I. p. 6. Note 2.
Herrera: Decades II. 1, p. 4, referenced in Scelle: the Slave Trade, I. p. 6. Note 2.
Footnote 3: (return)"Por cuanto los pacificaciones no se han de hacer con ruido de armas, sino con caridad y buen modo."—Recop. de leyes ... de las Indias, lib. vii. tit. 1.
"Pacifications should be achieved through kindness and good manners, not through the noise of weapons."—Recop. de leyes ... de las Indias, lib. vii. tit. 1.
Footnote 5: (return)Weiss: L'Espagne depuis Philippe II. jusqu'aux Bourbons., II. pp. 204 and 215. Not till 1722 was legislative sanction given to this practice.
Weiss: Spain from Philip II to the Bourbons, II, pp. 204 and 215. It wasn't until 1722 that this practice got legal approval.
M. Lemonnet wrote to Colbert in 1670 concerning this commerce:—"Quelque perquisition qu'on ait faite dans ce dernier temps aux Indes pour découvrir les biens des François, ils ont plustost souffert la prison que de rien déclarer ... toute les merchandises qu'on leur donne à porter aux Indes sont chargées sous le nom d'Espagnols, que bien souvent n'en ont pas connaissance, ne jugeant pas à propos de leur en parler, afin de tenir les affaires plus secrètes et qu'il n'y ait que le commissionaire à le savoir, lequel en rend compte à son retour des Indes, directement à celui qui en a donne la cargaison en confiance sans avoir nul egard pour ceux au nom desquels le chargement à été fait, et lorsque ces commissionaires reviennent des Indes soit sur le flottes galions ou navires particuliers, ils apportent leur argent dans leurs coffres, la pluspart entre pont et sans connoissement." (Margry: Relations et mémoires inédits pour servir à l'histoire de la France dans les pays d'outremer, p. 185.)
M. Lemonnet wrote to Colbert in 1670 about this trade:—"Despite the recent investigations in India to uncover the assets of the French, they preferred to face imprisonment rather than reveal anything... all the goods they transport to India are listed under the names of Spaniards, who are often unaware of it. They think it's better not to mention it to keep things more secret, with only the commissioner aware of it. The commissioner reports back after returning from India directly to the person who entrusted him with the cargo, without considering those whose names were used for the shipment. And when these commissioners come back from India, either on the fleet of galleons or on private ships, they bring their money back in their chests, often hidden under the deck and without any acknowledgment." (Margry: Relations et mémoires inédits pour servir à l'histoire de la France dans les pays d'outremer, p. 185.)
The importance to the maritime powers of preserving and protecting this clandestine trade is evident, especially as the Spanish government frequently found it a convenient instrument for retaliating upon those nations against which it harboured some grudge. All that was necessary was to sequester the vessels and goods of merchants belonging to the nation at which it wished to strike. This happened frequently in the course of the seventeenth century. Thus Lerma in 1601 arrested the French merchants in Spain to revenge himself on Henry IV. In 1624 Olivares seized 160 Dutch vessels. The goods of Genoese merchants were sequestered by Philip IV. in 1644; and in 1684 French merchandize was again seized, and Mexican traders whose storehouses contained such goods were fined 500,000 ecus, although the same storehouses contained English and Dutch goods which were left unnoticed. The fine was later restored upon Admiral d'Estrées' threat to bombard Cadiz. The solicitude of the French government for this trade is expressed in a letter of Colbert to the Marquis de Villars, ambassador at Madrid, dated 5th February 1672:—"Il est tellement necessaire d'avoir soin d'assister les particuliers qui font leur trafic en Espagne, pour maintenir le plus important commerce que nous ayons, que je suis persuadé que vous ferez toutes les instances qui pourront dépendre de vous ... en sorte que cette protection produira des avantages considérables au commerce des sujets de Sa Majesté" (ibid., p. 188).
The importance of maintaining and protecting this secret trade is evident for maritime powers, especially since the Spanish government often used it as a way to retaliate against nations it had conflicts with. All it took was to seize the ships and goods of merchants from the targeted nation. This was a frequent occurrence during the seventeenth century. For example, in 1601, Lerma arrested French merchants in Spain to get back at Henry IV. In 1624, Olivares captured 160 Dutch vessels. Philip IV seized the goods of Genoese merchants in 1644, and in 1684, French merchandise was taken again, with Mexican traders whose warehouses held such goods being fined 500,000 ecus, even though those warehouses also contained English and Dutch goods that were ignored. The fine was later lifted after Admiral d'Estrées threatened to bomb Cadiz. The French government's concern for this trade is emphasized in a letter from Colbert to the Marquis de Villars, the ambassador in Madrid, dated February 5, 1672:—"It is crucial to support the people engaged in trade in Spain to maintain our most important commerce, and I’m convinced you will do everything possible to ensure this protection brings substantial benefits for the trade of His Majesty's subjects" (ibid., p. 188).
Cf. also the instructions of Louis XIV. to the Comte d'Estrées, 1st April 1680. The French admiral was to visit all the ports of the Spaniards in the West Indies, especially Cartagena and San Domingo; and to be always informed of the situation and advantages of these ports, and of the facilities and difficulties to be met with in case of an attack upon them; so that the Spaniards might realise that if they failed to do justice to the French merchants on the return of the galleons, his Majesty was always ready to force them to do so, either by attacking these galleons, or by capturing one of their West Indian ports (ibid.).
See also the instructions of Louis XIV. to the Comte d'Estrées, April 1, 1680. The French admiral was to visit all Spanish ports in the West Indies, particularly Cartagena and San Domingo, and to stay informed about the status and benefits of these ports, as well as the challenges and opportunities in case of an attack on them. This was so that the Spaniards would understand that if they didn’t treat French merchants fairly upon the return of the galleons, His Majesty was always ready to compel them to do so, either by attacking those galleons or by seizing one of their West Indian ports (ibid.).
Footnote 8: (return)Oppenheim: The Naval Tracts of Sir Wm. Monson. Vol. II. Appendix B., p. 316.
Oppenheim: The Naval Tracts of Sir Wm. Monson. Vol. II. Appendix B., p. 316.
Footnote 9: (return)In 1509, owing to the difficulties experienced by merchants in ascending the Guadalquivir, ships were given permission to load and register at Cadiz under the supervision of an inspector or "visitador," and thereafter commerce and navigation tended more and more to gravitate to that port. After 1529, in order to facilitate emigration to America, vessels were allowed to sail from certain other ports, notably San Sebastian, Bilboa, Coruna, Cartagena and Malaga. The ships might register in these ports, but were obliged always to make their return voyage to Seville. But either the cedula was revoked, or was never made use of, for, according to Scelle, there are no known instances of vessels sailing to America from those towns. The only other exceptions were in favour of the Company of Guipuzcoa in 1728, to send ships from San Sebastian to Caracas, and of the Company of Galicia in 1734, to send two vessels annually to Campeache and Vera Cruz. (Scelle, op. cit., i. pp. 48-49 and notes.)
In 1509, because of the difficulties faced by merchants traveling up the Guadalquivir, ships were allowed to load and register in Cádiz under the supervision of an inspector or "visitador," which led to commerce and navigation increasingly moving to that port. After 1529, to facilitate emigration to America, ships were permitted to leave from several other ports, especially San Sebastián, Bilbao, Coruña, Cartagena, and Málaga. These vessels could register in these ports but were always required to return to Seville. However, either the cedula was revoked or was never put to use, as Scelle notes that there are no recorded instances of ships departing for America from those towns. The only other exceptions were granted to the Company of Guipuzcoa in 1728, which sent ships from San Sebastián to Caracas, and to the Company of Galicia in 1734, which was allowed to send two vessels each year to Campeche and Vera Cruz. (Scelle, op. cit., i. pp. 48-49 and notes.)
Footnote 11: (return)In Nov. 1530 Charles V., against the opposition of the Contratacion, ordered the Council of the Indies to appoint a resident judge at Cadiz to replace the officers of the Casa there. This institution, called the "Juzgado de Indias," was, until the removal of the Casa to Cadiz in 1717, the source of constant disputes and irritation.
In November 1530, Charles V, despite the objections from the Contratacion, directed the Council of the Indies to assign a resident judge in Cadiz to replace the officials of the Casa there. This institution, known as the "Juzgado de Indias," was a cause of continuous disputes and frustrations until the Casa was relocated to Cadiz in 1717.
Footnote 12: (return)Scelle, op. cit., i. p. 52 and note; Duro: Armada Espanola, I. p. 204.
Scelle, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 52 and note; Duro: Spanish Armada, vol. 1, p. 204.
Footnote 13: (return)The distinction between the Flota or fleet for New Spain and the galleons intended for Terra Firma only began with the opening of the great silver mines of Potosi, the rich yields of which after 1557 made advisable an especial fleet for Cartagena and Nombre de Dios. (Oppenheim, II. Appendix B., p. 322.)
The distinction between the fleet for New Spain and the galleons designated for Terra Firma began with the opening of the major silver mines in Potosi. The significant production that started in 1557 required a dedicated fleet for Cartagena and Nombre de Dios. (Oppenheim, II. Appendix B., p. 322.)
Footnote 14: (return)Memoir of MM. Duhalde and de Rochefort to the French king, 1680 (Margry, op. cit., p. 192 ff.).
Memoir of MM. Duhalde and de Rochefort to the French king, 1680 (Margry, op. cit., p. 192 ff.).
Footnote 15: (return)Memoir of MM. Duhalde and de Rochefort to the French king, 1680 (Margry, op. cit., p. 192 ff.)
Memoir of MM. Duhalde and de Rochefort to the French king, 1680 (Margry, op. cit., p. 192 ff.)
Footnote 16: (return)Scelle, op. cit., i. p. 64; Dampier: Voyages, ed. 1906, i. p. 200.
Scelle, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 64; Dampier: Voyages, ed. 1906, vol. 1, p. 200.
Footnote 17: (return)Gage: A New Survey of the West Indies, ed. 1655, pp. 185-6. When Gage was at Granada, in February 1637, strict orders were received from Gautemala that the ships were not to sail that year, because the President and Audiencia were informed of some Dutch and English ships lying in wait at the mouth of the river.
Gage: A New Survey of the West Indies, ed. 1655, pp. 185-6. In February 1637, when Gage was in Granada, strict orders arrived from Guatemala stating that the ships were not to set sail that year because the President and Audiencia had been informed of some Dutch and English ships waiting at the river's mouth.
Footnote 18: (return)Scelle, op. cit., i. pp. 64-5; Duhalde and de Rochefort. There were two ways of sending goods from Panama to Porto Bello. One was an overland route of 18 leagues, and was used only during the summer. The other was by land as far as Venta Cruz, 7 leagues from Panama, and thence by water on the river Chagre to its mouth, a distance of 26 leagues. When the river was high the transit might be accomplished in two or three days, but at other times from six to twelve days were required. To transfer goods from Chagre to Porto Bello was a matter of only eight or nine hours. This route was used in winter when the roads were rendered impassable by the great rains and floods. The overland journey, though shorter, was also more difficult and expensive. The goods were carried on long mule-trains, and the "roads, so-called, were merely bridle paths ... running through swamps and jungles, over hills and rocks, broken by unbridged rivers, and situated in one of the deadliest climates in the world." The project of a canal to be cut through the isthmus was often proposed to the Councils in Spain, but was never acted upon. (Descript. ... of Cartagena; Oppenheim, i. p. 333.)
Scelle, op. cit., i. pp. 64-5; Duhalde and de Rochefort. There were two ways to transport goods from Panama to Porto Bello. One was an 18-league overland route, used only during the summer. The other involved traveling by land to Venta Cruz, 7 leagues from Panama, and then by water on the Chagre River to its mouth, a distance of 26 leagues. When the river was high, the journey could take two or three days, but at other times, it took six to twelve days. Transferring goods from Chagre to Porto Bello took just eight or nine hours. This route was used in winter when heavy rains and flooding made the roads impassable. Although the overland journey was shorter, it was also harder and more expensive. Goods were transported on long mule trains, and the so-called "roads" were merely bridle paths winding through swamps and jungles, over hills and rocks, interrupted by unbridged rivers, all in one of the deadliest climates in the world. Proposals for a canal through the isthmus were frequently suggested to the Councils in Spain, but they were never carried out. (Descript. ... of Cartagena; Oppenheim, i. p. 333.)
Footnote 19: (return)Nombre de Dios, a few leagues to the east of Porto Bello, had formerly been the port where the galleons received the treasure brought from Panama, but in 1584 the King of Spain ordered the settlement to be abandoned on account of its unhealthiness, and because the harbour, being open to the sea, afforded little shelter to shipping. Gage says that in his time Nombre de Dios was almost forsaken because of its climate. Dampier, writing thirty years later, describes the site as a waste. "Nombre de Dios," he says, "is now nothing but a name. For I have lain ashore in the place where that City stood, but it is all overgrown with Wood, so as to have no sign that any Town hath been there." (Voyages, ed. 1906, i. p. 81.)
Nombre de Dios, located a few leagues east of Porto Bello, used to be the port where galleons collected the treasure brought from Panama. However, in 1584, the King of Spain ordered the settlement to be abandoned due to its unhealthy conditions and the fact that the harbor, being open to the sea, provided little protection for ships. Gage notes that during his time, Nombre de Dios was nearly deserted because of its climate. Dampier, writing thirty years later, describes the area as a wasteland. "Nombre de Dios," he writes, "is now just a name. I have been ashore in the place where that city once stood, but it's completely overgrown with trees, offering no evidence that any town ever existed there." (Voyages, ed. 1906, i. p. 81.)
Footnote 23: (return)When the Margarita patache failed to meet the galleons at Cartagena, it was given its clearance and allowed to sail alone to Havana—a tempting prey to buccaneers hovering in those seas.
When the Margarita patache was unable to meet the galleons in Cartagena, it was cleared and permitted to sail alone to Havana—a tempting target for pirates hiding in those waters.
Footnote 25: (return)Rawl. MSS., A. 175, 313 b; Oppenheim, ii. p. 338.
Rawl. MSS., A. 175, 313 b; Oppenheim, ii. p. 338.
Footnote 26: (return)Here I am following the MSS. quoted by Oppenheim (ii. pp. 335 ff.). Instead of watering in Hispaniola, the fleet sometimes stopped at Dominica, or at Aguada in Porto Rico.
Here, I'm following the manuscripts referenced by Oppenheim (ii. pp. 335 ff.). Instead of refueling in Hispaniola, the fleet would occasionally stop at Dominica or Aguada in Puerto Rico.
Footnote 29: (return)These "vaisseaux de registre" were supposed not to exceed 300 tons, but through fraud were often double that burden.
These "registered vessels" were meant to be no more than 300 tons, but because of fraud, they were often twice that weight.
Footnote 30: (return)Duhalde and de Rochefort; Scelle, op. cit., i. p. 54.
Duhalde and de Rochefort; Scelle, op. cit., i. p. 54.
Footnote 32: (return)Duhalde and de Rochefort; Oppenheim, ii. p. 318.
Duhalde and de Rochefort; Oppenheim, ii. p. 318.
Footnote 33: (return)Scelle, op. cit., i. p. 45; Recop., t. i. lib. iii. tit. viii.
Scelle, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 45; Recop., vol. 1, book 3, title 8.
Footnote 34: (return)There seems to have been a contraband trade carried on at Cadiz itself. Foreign merchants embarked their goods upon the galleons directly from their own vessels in the harbour, without registering them with the Contratacion; and on the return of the fleets received the price of their goods in ingots of gold and silver by the same fraud. It is scarcely possible that this was done without the tacit authorization of the Council of the Indies at Madrid, for if the Council had insisted upon a rigid execution of the laws regarding registration, detection would have been inevitable.
It seems there was an illegal trade happening right in Cadiz. Foreign merchants were loading their goods onto the galleons directly from their own ships in the harbor, without registering them with the Contratacion; and when the fleets returned, they were paid for their goods in gold and silver ingots through the same trick. It's hard to believe this could have happened without the quiet approval of the Council of the Indies in Madrid, because if the Council had insisted on strict enforcement of the registration laws, it would have been impossible to keep it a secret.
Footnote 36: (return)Most of the offices in the Spanish Indies were venal. No one obtained a post without paying dearly for it, except the viceroys of Mexico and Peru, who were grandees, and received their places through favour at court. The governors of the ports, and the presidents of the Audiencias established at Panama, San Domingo, and Gautemala, bought their posts in Spain. The offices in the interior were in the gift of the viceroys and sold to the highest bidder. Although each port had three corregidors who audited the finances, as they also paid for their places, they connived with the governors. The consequence was inevitable. Each official during his tenure of office expected to recover his initial outlay, and amass a small fortune besides. So not only were the bribes of interlopers acceptable, but the officials often themselves bought and sold the contraband articles.
Most offices in the Spanish Indies were up for sale. No one got hired without paying a significant amount, except for the viceroys of Mexico and Peru, who were nobles and got their positions through favoritism at court. The governors of the ports and the presidents of the Audiencias set up in Panama, San Domingo, and Guatemala purchased their positions in Spain. The inland jobs were controlled by the viceroys and sold to the highest bidder. Even though each port had three corregidors who audited the finances, they too had to pay for their positions, so they worked alongside the governors. The result was predictable. Each official aimed to recover their initial investment and make a nice profit during their term. As a result, not only were bribes from outsiders accepted, but the officials often engaged in buying and selling smuggled goods themselves.
Footnote 37: (return)Froude: History of England, viii. p. 436 ff.
Froude: History of England, viii. p. 436 and the following pages
Footnote 38: (return)1585, August 12th. Ralph Lane to Sir Philip Sidney. Port Ferdinando, Virginia.—He has discovered the infinite riches of St. John (Porto Rico?) and Hispaniola by dwelling on the islands five weeks. He thinks that if the Queen finds herself burdened with the King of Spain, to attempt them would be most honourable, feasible and profitable. He exhorts him not to refuse this good opportunity of rendering so great a service to the Church of Christ. The strength of the Spaniards doth altogether grow from the mines of her treasure. Extract, C.S.P. Colon., 1574-1660.
August 12, 1585. Ralph Lane to Sir Philip Sidney. Port Ferdinando, Virginia.—He has found the immense wealth of St. John (Puerto Rico?) and Hispaniola after spending five weeks on the islands. He thinks that if the Queen finds herself in a difficult position with the King of Spain, pursuing these lands would be very honorable, practical, and profitable. He encourages him not to miss this great chance to do significant service to the Church of Christ. The strength of the Spaniards comes entirely from the wealth of their mines. Extract, C.S.P. Colon., 1574-1660.
Footnote 41: (return)1611, February 28. Sir Thos. Roe to Salisbury. Port d'Espaigne, Trinidad.—He has seen more of the coast from the River Amazon to the Orinoco than any other Englishman alive. The Spaniards here are proud and insolent, yet needy and weak, their force is reputation, their safety is opinion. The Spaniards treat the English worse than Moors. The government is lazy and has more skill in planting and selling tobacco than in erecting colonies and marching armies. Extract, C.S.P. Colon., 1574-1660. (Roe was sent by Prince Henry upon a voyage of discovery to the Indies.)
February 28, 1611. Sir Thomas Roe to Salisbury. Port d'Espaigne, Trinidad.—He has explored more of the coastline from the River Amazon to the Orinoco than any other Englishman alive. The Spaniards here are proud and arrogant, but also needy and weak; their strength comes from their reputation, and their safety relies on public opinion. The Spaniards treat the English worse than they do the Moors. The government is lazy and is better at growing and selling tobacco than at establishing colonies and leading armies. Extract from C.S.P. Colon., 1574-1660. (Roe was sent by Prince Henry on a discovery voyage to the Indies.)
Footnote 42: (return)"An historical account of the rise and growth of the West India Colonies." By Dalby Thomas, Lond., 1690. (Harl. Miscell., 1808, ii. 357.)
"A historical account of the rise and growth of the West India Colonies." By Dalby Thomas, London, 1690. (Harl. Miscell., 1808, ii. 357.)
Footnote 43: (return)Oviedo: Historia general de las Indias, lib. xix. cap. xiii.; Coleccion de documentos ... de ultramar, tom. iv. p. 57 (deposition of the Spanish captain at the Isle of Mona); Pacheco, etc.: Coleccion de documentos ... de las posesiones espanoles en America y Oceania, tom. xl. p. 305 (cross-examination of witnesses by officers of the Royal Audiencia in San Domingo just after the visit of the English ship to that place); English Historical Review, XX. p. 115.
Oviedo: General History of the Indies, Book XIX, Chapter XIII; Collection of Documents... from Overseas, Vol. IV, p. 57 (statement by the Spanish captain at the Isle of Mona); Pacheco, etc.: Collection of Documents... of Spanish Possessions in America and Oceania, Vol. XL, p. 305 (questioning of witnesses by officers of the Royal Audiencia in San Domingo shortly after the English ship's visit to that location); English Historical Review, Vol. XX, p. 115.
The ship is identified with the "Samson" dispatched by Henry VIII. in 1527 "with divers cunning men to seek strange regions," which sailed from the Thames on 20th May in company with the "Mary of Guildford," was lost by her consort in a storm on the night of 1st July, and was believed to have foundered with all on board. (Ibid.)
The ship is referred to as the "Samson," which was dispatched by Henry VIII in 1527 "with various skilled individuals to explore distant lands." It left the Thames on May 20, together with the "Mary of Guildford," but lost contact with its partner in a storm on the night of July 1 and was believed to have sunk with everyone on board. (Ibid.)
Footnote 44: (return)Hakluyt, ed. 1600, iii. p. 700; Froude, op. cit., viii. p. 427.
Hakluyt, ed. 1600, iii. p. 700; Froude, op. cit., viii. p. 427.
Footnote 45: (return)Scelle., op. cit., i. pp. 123-25, 139-61.
Scelle., op. cit., i. pp. 123-25, 139-61.
Footnote 46: (return)Colecc. de doc. ... de ultramar. tom. vi. p. 15.
Collection of documents ... from overseas. Volume VI, page 15.
Footnote 48: (return)Corbett: Drake and the Tudor Navy, i. ch. 3.
Corbett: Drake and the Tudor Navy, 1. ch. 3.
Footnote 49: (return)Corbett: Drake and the Tudor Navy, ii. chs. 1, 2, 11.
Corbett: Drake and the Tudor Navy, vol. 2, chs. 1, 2, 11.
Footnote 50: (return)Corbett: The Successors of Drake, ch. x.
Corbett: The Successors of Drake, ch. x.
Footnote 51: (return)Marcel: Les corsaires français au XVIe siècle, p. 7. As early as 1501 a royal ordinance in Spain prescribed the construction of carracks to pursue the privateers, and in 1513 royal cedulas were sent to the officials of the Casa de Contratacion ordering them to send two caravels to guard the coasts of Cuba and protect Spanish navigation from the assaults of French corsairs. (Ibid., p. 8).
Marcel: French privateers in the 16th century, p. 7. As early as 1501, a royal decree in Spain required the building of carracks to pursue the privateers, and in 1513, royal cedulas were sent to the officials of the Casa de Contratacion directing them to send two caravels to patrol the coasts of Cuba and protect Spanish navigation from attacks by French privateers. (Ibid., p. 8).
Footnote 52: (return)Colecc. de doc. ... de ultramar, tomos i., iv., vi.; Ducéré: Les corsaires sous l'ancien régime. Append. II.; Duro., op. cit., i. Append. XIV.
Collection of documents... from overseas, volumes I, IV, VI; Ducéré: The Privateers Under the Ancien Régime. Appendix II; Duro, op. cit., I. Appendix XIV.
Footnote 53: (return)Colecc. de doc. ... de ultramar, tom. vi. p. 22.
Collection of documents... from overseas, volume vi, page 22.
Footnote 56: (return)Colecc. de doc. ... de ultramar, tom. vi. p. 360.
Collection of documents ... from overseas, volume vi, page 360.
Footnote 57: (return)Colecc. de doc. ... de ultramar, tom. vi. p. 360.
Collection of documents ... from overseas, volume vi, page 360.
Footnote 58: (return)Lucas: A Historical Geography of the British Colonies, vol. ii. pp. 37, 50.
Lucas: A Historical Geography of the British Colonies, vol. ii. pp. 37, 50.
Footnote 60: (return)Duro, op. cit., iii. ch. xvi.; iv. chs. iii., viii.
Duro, same source as before, iii. chapter sixteen; iv. chapters three, eight.
Footnote 61: (return)Portugal between 1581 and 1640 was subject to the Crown of Spain, and Brazil, a Portuguese colony, was consequently within the pale of Spanish influence and administration.
From 1581 to 1640, Portugal was ruled by Spain, which meant that Brazil, a Portuguese colony, was influenced and governed by Spanish authorities.
Footnote 62: (return)Blok: History of the People of the Netherlands, iv. p. 36.
Blok: History of the People of the Netherlands, vol. iv, p. 36.
Footnote 63: (return)Blok: History of the People of the Netherlands, iv. p. 37; Duro, op. cit., iv. p. 99; Gage, ed. 1655, p. 80.
Blok: History of the People of the Netherlands, vol. iv, p. 37; Duro, op. cit., vol. iv, p. 99; Gage, ed. 1655, p. 80.
Footnote 64: (return)Brit. Mus., Add. MSS., 36,325, No. 10.
British Museum, Additional Manuscripts, 36,325, No. 10.
Footnote 65: (return)Robert Rich, Earl of Warwick, was created admiral of the fleet by order of Parliament in March 1642, and although removed by Charles I. was reinstated by Parliament on 1st July.
Robert Rich, Earl of Warwick, was appointed admiral of the fleet by Parliament in March 1642. Although Charles I removed him, Parliament reinstated him on July 1st.
Footnote 66: (return)Brit. Mus., Sloane MSS., 793 or 894; Add. MSS., 36,327, No. 9.
British Museum, Sloane Manuscripts, 793 or 894; Additional Manuscripts, 36,327, No. 9.
Footnote 68: (return)Brown: Genesis of the United States, i. pp. 120-25, 172.
Brown: Genesis of the United States, vol. 1, pp. 120-25, 172.
Footnote 71: (return)Clarendon State Papers, ii. p. 87; Rymer: Fœdera, xx. p. 416.
Clarendon State Papers, ii. p. 87; Rymer: Fœdera, xx. p. 416.
Footnote 76: (return)Brit. Mus., Add. MSS., 36,319, No. 7; 36,320, No. 8; 36,321, No. 24; 36,322, No. 23.
British Museum, Additional Manuscripts, 36,319, No. 7; 36,320, No. 8; 36,321, No. 24; 36,322, No. 23.
Footnote 77: (return)C.S.P. Colon., 1574-1660:—1629, 5th and 30th Nov.; 1630, 29th July.
C.S.P. Colon., 1574-1660:—Nov. 5 and 30, 1629; July 29, 1630.
Footnote 78: (return)Gage saw at Cartagena about a dozen English prisoners captured by the Spaniards at sea, and belonging to the settlement on Providence Island.
Gage saw about twelve English prisoners in Cartagena who had been captured by the Spaniards at sea and were part of the colony on Providence Island.
Footnote 79: (return)C.S.P. Colon., 1574-1660:—1635, 19th March; 1636, 26th March.
C.S.P. Colon., 1574-1660:—March 19, 1635; March 26, 1636.
Footnote 80: (return)Brit. Mus., Add. MSS., 36,323, No. 10.
British Museum, Additional Manuscripts, 36,323, No. 10.
Footnote 81: (return)Duro, Tomo., iv. p. 339; cf. also in Bodleian Library:—"A letter written upon occasion in the Low Countries, etc. Whereunto is added avisos from several places, of the taking of the Island of Providence, by the Spaniards from the English. London. Printed for Nath. Butter, Mar. 22, 1641.
Duro, Tomo., iv. p. 339; see also in Bodleian Library:—"A letter written on the occasion in the Low Countries, etc. Includes updates from various places about the capture of Providence Island by the Spaniards from the English. London. Printed for Nath. Butter, Mar. 22, 1641.
"I have letter by an aviso from Cartagena, dated the 14th of September, wherein they advise that the galleons were ready laden with the silver, and would depart thence the 6th of October. The general of the galleons, named Francisco Dias Pimienta, had beene formerly in the moneth of July with above 3000 men, and the least of his ships, in the island of S. Catalina, where he had taken and carried away with all the English, and razed the forts, wherein they found 600 negroes, much gold and indigo, so that the prize is esteemed worth above halfe a million."
I received a letter from Cartagena, dated September 14, stating that the galleons were fully loaded with silver and would sail on October 6. The commander of the galleons, Francisco Dias Pimienta, had previously been in July with over 3,000 men and his smallest ship at the island of San Catalina, where he captured all the English and destroyed the forts. They found 600 enslaved Africans, a lot of gold, and indigo there, making the total value of the prize over half a million.
CHAPTER II
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE BUCCANEERS
In the second half of the sixteenth and the early part of the seventeenth centuries, strangers who visited the great Spanish islands of Hispaniola, Jamaica or Porto Rico, usually remarked the extraordinary number of wild cattle and boars found roaming upon them. These herds were in every case sprung from domestic animals originally brought from Spain. For as the aborigines in the Greater Antilles decreased in numbers under the heavy yoke of their conquerors, and as the Spaniards themselves turned their backs upon the Antilles for the richer allurements of the continent, less and less land was left under cultivation; and cattle, hogs, horses and even dogs ran wild, increased at a rapid rate, and soon filled the broad savannas and deep woods which covered the greater part of these islands. The northern shore of Hispaniola the Spaniards had never settled, and thither, probably from an early period, interloping ships were accustomed to resort when in want of victuals. With a long range of uninhabited coast, good anchorage and abundance of provisions, this northern shore could not fail to induce some to remain. In time we find there scattered groups of hunters, mostly French and English, who gained a rude livelihood by killing wild cattle for their skins, and curing the flesh to supply the needs of passing vessels. The origin of these men we do not know. They may have been deserters from ships, crews of wrecked {58} vessels, or even chance marooners. In any case the charm of their half-savage, independent mode of life must soon have attracted others, and a fairly regular traffic sprang up between them and the ubiquitous Dutch traders, whom they supplied with hides, tallow and cured meat in return for the few crude necessities and luxuries they required. Their numbers were recruited in 1629 by colonists from St. Kitts who had fled before Don Federico de Toledo. Making common lot with the hunters, the refugees found sustenance so easy and the natural bounty of the island so rich and varied, that many remained and settled.
In the late 1500s and early 1600s, visitors to the large Spanish islands of Hispaniola, Jamaica, or Puerto Rico often commented on the huge number of wild cattle and pigs wandering around. These herds were all descendants of livestock originally brought from Spain. As the native people in the Greater Antilles dwindled under the harsh oppression of their conquerors, and as the Spaniards shifted their attention to the wealthier mainland, less and less land was cultivated. Consequently, cattle, pigs, horses, and even dogs ran wild, multiplied quickly, and soon occupied the vast grasslands and dense forests that covered most of these islands. The Spaniards had never settled the northern coast of Hispaniola, and it is likely that, from an early stage, ships looking for food would come there. With a long stretch of uninhabited coastline, good places to anchor, and plenty of provisions, this northern shore surely attracted some who chose to stay. Over time, scattered groups of mostly French and English hunters emerged, making a rough living by hunting wild cattle for their hides and curing the meat to supply passing ships. We don't know where these men came from; they could have been deserters from ships, survivors of wrecks, or even random escapees. In any case, the appeal of their semi-wild, free lifestyle must have attracted more people, and a steady trade developed between them and the ever-present Dutch traders, who they supplied with hides, tallow, and cured meat in exchange for the few basic goods and luxuries they needed. Their numbers grew in 1629 when colonists from St. Kitts, fleeing from Don Federico de Toledo, joined them. By sharing this lifestyle, the refugees found it so easy to sustain themselves and the island's natural bounty so rich and diverse that many decided to stay and settle.
To the north-west of Hispaniola lies a small, rocky island about eight leagues in length and two in breadth, separated by a narrow channel from its larger neighbour. From the shore of Hispaniola the island appears in form like a monster sea-turtle floating upon the waves, and hence was named by the Spaniards "Tortuga." So mountainous and inaccessible on the northern side as to be called the Côte-de-Fer, and with only one harbour upon the south, it offered a convenient refuge to the French and English hunters should the Spaniards become troublesome. These hunters probably ventured across to Tortuga before 1630, for there are indications that a Spanish expedition was sent against the island from Hispaniola in 1630 or 1631, and a division of the spoil made in the city of San Domingo after its return.83 It was then, apparently, that the Spaniards left upon Tortuga an officer and twenty-eight men, the small garrison which, says Charlevoix, was found there when the hunters returned. The Spanish soldiers were already tired of their exile upon this lonely, inhospitable rock, and evacuated with the same satisfaction with which the French and English resumed their occupancy. From the testimony of some documents in the {59} English colonial archives we may gather that the English from the first were in predominance in the new colony, and exercised almost sole authority. In the minutes of the Providence Company, under date of 19th May 1631, we find that a committee was "appointed to treat with the agents for a colony of about 150 persons, settled upon Tortuga";84 and a few weeks later that "the planters upon the island of Tortuga desired the company to take them under their protection, and to be at the charge of their fortification, in consideration of a twentieth part of the commodities raised there yearly."85 At the same time the Earl of Holland, governor of the company, and his associates petitioned the king for an enlargement of their grant "only of 3 or 4 degrees of northerly latitude, to avoid all doubts as to whether one of the islands (Tortuga) was contained in their former grant."86 Although there were several islands named Tortuga in the region of the West Indies, all the evidence points to the identity of the island concerned in this petition with the Tortuga near the north coast of Hispaniola.87
To the northwest of Hispaniola is a small, rocky island about eight leagues long and two leagues wide, separated by a narrow channel from its larger neighbor. From the shore of Hispaniola, the island looks like a massive sea turtle floating on the waves, which is why the Spaniards named it "Tortuga." The northern side is so mountainous and difficult to access that it’s called Côte-de-Fer, and it has only one harbor on the south, making it a convenient refuge for French and English hunters if the Spaniards became a problem. These hunters probably ventured over to Tortuga before 1630, as there are signs that a Spanish expedition was sent against the island from Hispaniola in 1630 or 1631, with a division of the spoils reported in the city of San Domingo after their return.83 It seems that during this time, the Spaniards left behind an officer and twenty-eight men on Tortuga, the small garrison that Charlevoix mentions as being found there when the hunters returned. The Spanish soldiers were already weary of their isolation on this desolate, inhospitable rock and left with the same relief that the French and English had when they returned. According to some documents from the {59} English colonial archives, it appears from the beginning that the English were the majority in this new colony and held almost all the authority. In the records of the Providence Company from May 19, 1631, there is mention of a committee "appointed to negotiate with the agents for a colony of about 150 people settled on Tortuga";84 and a few weeks later it was reported that "the planters on the island of Tortuga requested that the company take them under their protection and cover the costs of their fortification, in exchange for a twentieth of the goods produced there each year."85 At the same time, the Earl of Holland, governor of the company, and his associates asked the king for an expansion of their grant "only by 3 or 4 degrees of northerly latitude, to eliminate any doubts regarding whether one of the islands (Tortuga) was included in their previous grant."86 Even though several islands in the West Indies are named Tortuga, all the evidence suggests that the island referenced in this petition is the Tortuga located near the north coast of Hispaniola.87
The Providence Company accepted the offer of the settlers upon Tortuga, and sent a ship to reinforce the little colony with six pieces of ordnance, a supply of ammunition and provisions, and a number of apprentices or engagés. A Captain Hilton was appointed governor, with Captain Christopher Wormeley to succeed him in case of the governor's death or absence, and the name of {60} the island was changed from Tortuga to Association.88 Although consisting for the most part of high land covered with tall cedar woods, the island contained in the south and west broad savannas which soon attracted planters as well as cattle-hunters. Some of the inhabitants of St. Kitts, wearied of the dissensions between the French and English there, and allured by reports of quiet and plenty in Tortuga, deserted St. Kitts for the new colony. The settlement, however, was probably always very poor and struggling, for in January 1634 the Providence Company received advice that Captain Hilton intended to desert the island and draw most of the inhabitants after him; and a declaration was sent out from England to the planters, assuring them special privileges of trade and domicile, and dissuading them from "changing certain ways of profit already discovered for uncertain hopes suggested by fancy or persuasion."89 The question of remaining or departing, indeed, was soon decided for the colonists without their volition, for in December 1634 a Spanish force from Hispaniola invaded the island and drove out all the English and French they found there. It seems that an Irishman named "Don Juan Morf" (John Murphy?),90 who had been "sargento-mayor" in Tortuga, became discontented with the régime there and fled to Cartagena. The Spanish governor of Cartagena sent him to Don Gabriel de Gaves, President of the Audiencia in San Domingo, thinking that with the information the renegade was able to supply the Spaniards of Hispaniola might drive out the foreigners. The President of San Domingo, however, died three months later without bestirring himself, and it was left to his successor to carry out the project. With the {61} information given by Murphy, added to that obtained from prisoners, he sent a force of 250 foot under command of Rui Fernandez de Fuemayor to take the island.91 At this time, according to the Spaniards' account, there were in Tortuga 600 men bearing arms, besides slaves, women and children. The harbour was commanded by a platform of six cannon. The Spaniards approached the island just before dawn, but through the ignorance of the pilot the whole armadilla was cast upon some reefs near the shore. Rui Fernandez with about thirty of his men succeeded in reaching land in canoes, seized the fort without any difficulty, and although his followers were so few managed to disperse a body of the enemy who were approaching, with the English governor at their head, to recover it. In the mêlée the governor was one of the first to be killed—stabbed, say the Spaniards, by the Irishman, who took active part in the expedition and fought by the side of Rui Fernandez. Meanwhile some of the inhabitants, thinking that they could not hold the island, had regained the fort, spiked the guns and transferred the stores to several ships in the harbour, which sailed away leaving only two dismantled boats and a patache to fall into the hands of the Spaniards. Rui Fernandez, reinforced by some 200 of his men who had succeeded in escaping from the stranded armadilla, now turned his attention to the settlement. He found his way barred by another body of several hundred English, but dispersed them too, and took seventy prisoners. The houses were then sacked and the tobacco plantations burned by the soldiers, and the Spaniards returned to San Domingo with four captured banners, the six pieces of artillery and 180 muskets.92
The Providence Company accepted the offer of the settlers on Tortuga and sent a ship to support the small colony with six pieces of artillery, ammunition, supplies, and several apprentices or engagés. Captain Hilton was appointed governor, with Captain Christopher Wormeley to take over in case the governor died or was absent, and the name of the island was changed from Tortuga to Association.88 Although largely made up of high land covered in tall cedar forests, the island had broad savannas in the south and west that quickly attracted planters and cattle hunters. Some of the residents of St. Kitts, tired of the conflicts between the French and English there and drawn by rumors of peace and abundance in Tortuga, left St. Kitts for the new colony. However, the settlement was likely always very poor and struggling, as in January 1634, the Providence Company learned that Captain Hilton planned to abandon the island and take most of the inhabitants with him; a declaration was sent from England to the planters, assuring them of special trading and residency privileges, and advising them against "changing certain ways of profit already discovered for uncertain hopes suggested by fancy or persuasion."89 The decision to stay or leave was soon made for the colonists without their choice, for in December 1634, a Spanish force from Hispaniola invaded the island and expelled all the English and French they found. An Irishman named "Don Juan Morf" (possibly John Murphy?),90 who had been the "sargento-mayor" on Tortuga, became unhappy with the regime there and fled to Cartagena. The Spanish governor of Cartagena sent him to Don Gabriel de Gaves, President of the Audiencia in San Domingo, thinking that the information the renegade could provide would help the Spaniards of Hispaniola drive out the foreigners. However, the President of San Domingo died three months later without taking action, leaving it to his successor to implement the plan. With the information provided by Murphy, along with that obtained from prisoners, he sent a force of 250 infantry led by Rui Fernandez de Fuemayor to take the island.91 At this time, according to the Spaniards' account, there were 600 armed men in Tortuga, along with slaves, women, and children. The harbor was defended by a platform of six cannons. The Spaniards approached the island just before dawn, but due to the pilot's mistake, their entire fleet ran aground on some reefs near the shore. Rui Fernandez, with about thirty of his men, managed to reach the shore in canoes and easily captured the fort. Although his group was small, they were able to disperse a body of enemy forces led by the English governor, who were advancing to reclaim it. In the chaos, the governor was one of the first to be killed—stabbed, according to the Spaniards, by the Irishman who actively participated in the expedition and fought alongside Rui Fernandez. Meanwhile, some of the inhabitants, believing they could not hold the island, took back the fort, spiked the guns, and transferred supplies to several ships in the harbor, which then left, leaving only two dismantled boats and a patache for the Spaniards. Rui Fernandez, reinforced by about 200 of his men who had managed to escape from the stranded fleet, then focused on the settlement. He encountered another group of several hundred English but scattered them as well and captured seventy prisoners. The soldiers then looted the houses and burned the tobacco plantations, returning to San Domingo with four captured banners, the six pieces of artillery, and 180 muskets.92
The Spanish occupation apparently did not last very long, for in the following April the Providence Company appointed Captain Nicholas Riskinner to be governor of Tortuga in place of Wormeley, and in February 1636 it learned that Riskinner was in possession of the island.93 Two planters just returned from the colony, moreover, informed the company that there were then some 80 English in the settlement, besides 150 negroes. It is evident that the colonists were mostly cattle-hunters, for they assured the company that they could supply Tortuga with 200 beasts a month from Hispaniola, and would deliver calves there at twenty shillings apiece.94 Yet at a later meeting of the Adventurers on 20th January 1637, a project for sending more men and ammunition to the island was suddenly dropped "upon intelligence that the inhabitants had quitted it and removed to Hispaniola."95 For three years thereafter the Providence records are silent concerning Tortuga. A few Frenchmen must have remained on the island, however, for Charlevoix informs us that in 1638 the general of the galleons swooped down upon the colony, put to the sword all who failed to escape to the hills and woods, and again destroyed all the habitations.96 Persuaded that the hunters would not expose themselves to a repetition of such treatment, the Spaniards neglected to leave a garrison, and a few scattered Frenchmen gradually filtered back to their ruined homes. It was about this time, it seems, that the President of San Domingo formed a body {63} of 500 armed lancers in an effort to drive the intruders from the larger island of Hispaniola. These lancers, half of whom were always kept in the field, were divided into companies of fifty each, whence they were called by the French, "cinquantaines." Ranging the woods and savannas this Spanish constabulary attacked isolated hunters wherever they found them, and they formed an important element in the constant warfare between the French and Spanish colonists throughout the rest of the century.97
The Spanish occupation didn’t seem to last very long, because in the following April, the Providence Company appointed Captain Nicholas Riskinner as governor of Tortuga, replacing Wormeley. By February 1636, they found out that Riskinner had taken control of the island.93 Two planters who had just returned from the colony told the company that there were about 80 English settlers in the community, along with 150 Africans. It was clear that the colonists were mainly cattle hunters, as they assured the company that they could provide Tortuga with 200 animals each month from Hispaniola and deliver calves there for twenty shillings each.94 However, during a later meeting of the Adventurers on January 20, 1637, a plan to send more men and supplies to the island was unexpectedly abandoned "upon learning that the inhabitants had left and moved to Hispaniola."95 For the next three years, the Providence records have nothing to say about Tortuga. A few Frenchmen must have stayed on the island, though, because Charlevoix tells us that in 1638, the general of the galleons attacked the colony, killing anyone who didn’t escape to the hills and forests, and destroyed all the homes again.96 Believing that the hunters wouldn’t risk facing such treatment again, the Spaniards left no garrison behind, and a few scattered Frenchmen gradually returned to their ruined homes. Around this time, it seems, the President of San Domingo organized a group of 500 armed lancers to try to drive the intruders away from the larger island of Hispaniola. These lancers, half of whom were always deployed in the field, were divided into companies of fifty each, which is why the French called them "cinquantaines." Patrolling the woods and savannas, this Spanish cavalry attacked isolated hunters wherever they found them, playing a significant role in the ongoing conflict between the French and Spanish colonists for the rest of the century.97
Meanwhile an English adventurer, some time after the Spanish descent of 1638, gathered a body of 300 of his compatriots in the island of Nevis near St. Kitts, and sailing for Tortuga dispossessed the few Frenchmen living there of the island. According to French accounts he was received amicably by the inhabitants and lived with them for four months, when he turned upon his hosts, disarmed them and marooned them upon the opposite shore of Hispaniola. A few made their way to St. Kitts and complained to M. de Poincy, the governor-general of the French islands, who seized the opportunity to establish a French governor in Tortuga. Living at that time in St. Kitts was a Huguenot gentleman named Levasseur, who had been a companion-in-arms of d'Esnambuc when the latter settled St. Kitts in 1625, and after a short visit to France had returned and made his fortune in trade. He was a man of courage and command as well as a skilful engineer, and soon rose high in the councils of de Poincy. Being a Calvinist, however, he had drawn upon the governor the reproaches of the authorities at home; and de Poincy proposed to get rid of his presence, now become inconvenient, by sending him to subdue Tortuga. Levasseur received his commission from de Poincy in May 1640, assembled forty or fifty followers, all Calvinists, and sailed in a barque {64} to Hispaniola. He established himself at Port Margot, about five leagues from Tortuga, and entered into friendly relations with his English neighbours. He was but biding his time, however, and on the last day of August 1640, on the plea that the English had ill-used some of his followers and had seized a vessel sent by de Poincy to obtain provisions, he made a sudden descent upon the island with only 49 men and captured the governor. The inhabitants retired to Hispaniola, but a few days later returned and besieged Levasseur for ten days. Finding that they could not dislodge him, they sailed away with all their people to the island of Providence.98
Meanwhile, an English adventurer, sometime after the Spanish landing in 1638, gathered a group of 300 fellow countrymen on the island of Nevis near St. Kitts. He then sailed to Tortuga and took control of the island from the few Frenchmen living there. According to French accounts, he was welcomed by the locals and lived among them for four months before turning on his hosts, disarming them, and marooning them on the opposite shore of Hispaniola. A few managed to reach St. Kitts and complained to M. de Poincy, the governor-general of the French islands, who took advantage of the situation to establish a French governor in Tortuga. At that time, in St. Kitts, lived a Huguenot gentleman named Levasseur, who had been a comrade of d'Esnambuc when he settled St. Kitts in 1625, and after a brief visit to France, returned and amassed wealth through trade. He was a man of courage and leadership, as well as a skilled engineer, and quickly rose to a prominent position in de Poincy's council. However, as a Calvinist, he drew criticism from the authorities back home, and de Poincy sought to remove him, now seen as an inconvenience, by sending him to conquer Tortuga. Levasseur received his commission from de Poincy in May 1640, gathered forty or fifty followers, all Calvinists, and sailed to Hispaniola in a small ship. He set himself up at Port Margot, about five leagues from Tortuga, and established friendly ties with his English neighbors. However, he was just waiting for the right moment, and on the last day of August 1640, using the excuse that the English had mistreated some of his followers and had seized a vessel sent by de Poincy for supplies, he launched a sudden attack on the island with only 49 men and captured the governor. The locals retreated to Hispaniola, but a few days later returned and besieged Levasseur for ten days. Realizing that they could not dislodge him, they sailed away with all their people to the island of Providence.{64}
Levasseur, fearing perhaps another descent of the Spaniards, lost no time in putting the settlement in a state of defence. Although the port of Tortuga was little more than a roadstead, it offered a good anchorage on a bottom of fine sand, the approaches to which were easily defended by a hill or promontory overlooking the harbour. The top of this hill, situated 500 or 600 paces from the shore, was a level platform, and upon it rose a steep rock some 30 feet high. Nine or ten paces from the base of the rock gushed forth a perennial fountain of fresh water. The new governor quickly made the most of these natural advantages. The platform he shaped into terraces, with means for accommodating several hundred men. On the top of the rock he built a house for himself, as well as a magazine, and mounted a battery of two guns. The only access to the {65} rock was by a narrow approach, up half of which steps were cut in the stone, the rest of the ascent being by means of an iron ladder which could easily be raised and lowered.99 This little fortress, in which the governor could repose with a feeling of entire security, he euphuistically called his "dove-cote." The dove-cote was not finished any too soon, for the Spaniards of San Domingo in 1643 determined to destroy this rising power in their neighbourhood, and sent against Levasseur a force of 500 or 600 men. When they tried to land within a half gunshot of the shore, however, they were greeted with a discharge of artillery from the fort, which sank one of the vessels and forced the rest to retire. The Spaniards withdrew to a place two leagues to leeward, where they succeeded in disembarking, but fell into an ambush laid by Levasseur, lost, according to the French accounts, between 100 and 200 men, and fled to their ships and back to Hispaniola. With this victory the reputation of Levasseur spread far and wide throughout the islands, and for ten years the Spaniards made no further attempt to dislodge the French settlement.100
Levasseur, probably worried about another attack from the Spaniards, quickly prepared the settlement for defense. Although the port of Tortuga was mostly just a roadstead, it provided good anchorage on a sandy bottom, and a hill or promontory overlooking the harbor made it easy to defend. The top of this hill, located about 500 or 600 paces from the shore, was flat, and there was a steep rock about 30 feet high. A perennial fountain of fresh water gushed out just nine or ten paces from the base of the rock. The new governor quickly took advantage of these natural features. He transformed the flat area into terraces that could accommodate several hundred men. At the top of the rock, he built himself a house and a storage area, and installed a battery with two guns. The only way to access the rock was via a narrow pathway, half of which had steps cut into the stone, while the other half was accessible by an iron ladder that could easily be raised or lowered. This small fortress, where the governor could feel completely secure, he fancifully referred to as his "dove-cote." The dove-cote was completed just in time, as the Spaniards from San Domingo decided in 1643 to eliminate this growing power in their vicinity and sent a force of 500 or 600 men against Levasseur. However, when they attempted to land within half a cannon shot of the shore, they were met with cannon fire from the fort, which sank one of their ships and forced the rest to retreat. The Spaniards withdrew to a location two leagues downwind, where they managed to disembark but fell into an ambush set by Levasseur, losing, according to French reports, between 100 and 200 men, before fleeing back to their ships and returning to Hispaniola. With this victory, Levasseur's reputation spread widely across the islands, and for ten years, the Spaniards made no further efforts to dislodge the French settlement.
Planters, hunters and corsairs now came in greater numbers to Tortuga. The hunters, using the smaller island merely as a headquarters for supplies and a retreat in time of danger, penetrated more boldly than ever into the interior of Hispaniola, plundering the Spanish plantations in their path, and establishing settlements on the north shore at Port Margot and Port de Paix. Corsairs, after cruising and robbing along the Spanish coasts, retired to Tortuga to refit and find a market for their spoils. Plantations of tobacco and sugar were cultivated, and although the soil never yielded such rich returns as upon the other islands, Dutch and French trading ships frequently resorted there for these commodities, and especially for the skins prepared by the hunters, bringing in exchange {66} brandy, guns, powder and cloth. Indeed, under the active, positive administration of Levasseur, Tortuga enjoyed a degree of prosperity which almost rivalled that of the French settlements in the Leeward Islands.
Planters, hunters, and pirates were arriving in greater numbers in Tortuga. The hunters used the smaller island mainly as a supply hub and a safe place during dangerous times, venturing deeper into Hispaniola than ever before, raiding Spanish plantations in their way, and setting up settlements on the north coast at Port Margot and Port de Paix. Pirates, after sailing and looting along the Spanish coasts, came back to Tortuga to fix their ships and sell their loot. They grew tobacco and sugar on plantations, and even though the soil didn’t produce as richly as on other islands, Dutch and French trading ships often stopped by for these goods, especially the skins prepared by hunters, trading them for {66} brandy, guns, gunpowder, and cloth. Indeed, under the strong and proactive leadership of Levasseur, Tortuga experienced a level of prosperity that was almost on par with the French settlements in the Leeward Islands.
The term "buccaneer," though usually applied to the corsairs who in the seventeenth century ravaged the Spanish possessions in the West Indies and the South Seas, should really be restricted to these cattle-hunters of west and north-west Hispaniola. The flesh of the wild-cattle was cured by the hunters after a fashion learnt from the Caribbee Indians. The meat was cut into long strips, laid upon a grate or hurdle constructed of green sticks, and dried over a slow wood fire fed with bones and the trimmings of the hide of the animal. By this means an excellent flavour was imparted to the meat and a fine red colour. The place where the flesh was smoked was called by the Indians a "boucan," and the same term, from the poverty of an undeveloped language, was applied to the frame or grating on which the flesh was dried. In course of time the dried meat became known as "viande boucannée," and the hunters themselves as "boucaniers" or "buccaneers." When later circumstances led the hunters to combine their trade in flesh and hides with that of piracy, the name gradually lost its original significance and acquired, in the English language at least, its modern and better-known meaning of corsair or freebooter. The French adventurers, however, seem always to have restricted the word "boucanier" to its proper signification, that of a hunter and curer of meat; and when they developed into corsairs, by a curious contrast they adopted an English name and called themselves "filibustiers," which is merely the French sailor's way of pronouncing the English word "freebooter."101
The term "buccaneer," while typically used to describe the pirates who plundered Spanish territories in the Caribbean and the South Seas during the seventeenth century, should actually be limited to the cattle-hunters of western and northwestern Hispaniola. The wild cattle meat was preserved by the hunters using a method learned from the Caribbee Indians. The meat was sliced into long strips, placed on a grate made of green sticks, and dried over a slow wood fire fueled by bones and leftover hide scraps from the animal. This process gave the meat a great flavor and a nice red color. The smoking area for the meat was called a "boucan" by the Indians, and due to the simplicity of an undeveloped language, the same term was used for the rack on which the meat was dried. Over time, the dried meat became known as "viande boucannée," and the hunters themselves as "boucaniers" or "buccaneers." When the hunters later combined their trade in meat and hides with piracy, the name gradually shifted from its original meaning and adopted the modern English definition of corsair or freebooter. However, the French adventurers seem to have consistently used "boucanier" to refer specifically to a hunter and preserver of meat; when they became corsairs, interestingly enough, they adopted an English term and called themselves "filibustiers," which is just the French way of saying "freebooter."101
The buccaneers or West Indian corsairs owed their origin as well as their name to the cattle and hog-hunters of Hispaniola and Tortuga. Doubtless many of the wilder, more restless spirits in the smaller islands of the Windward and Leeward groups found their way into the ranks of this piratical fraternity, or were willing at least to lend a hand in an occasional foray against their Spanish neighbours. We know that Jackson, in 1642, had no difficulty in gathering 700 or 800 men from Barbadoes and St. Kitts for his ill-starred dash upon the Spanish Main. And when the French in later years made their periodical descents upon the Dutch stations on Tobago, Curaçao and St. Eustatius, they always found in their island colonies of Martinique and Guadeloupe buccaneers enough and more, eager to fill their ships. It seems to be generally agreed, however, among the Jesuit historians of the West Indies—and upon these writers we are almost entirely dependent for our knowledge of the origins of buccaneering—that the corsairs had their source and nucleus in the hunters who infested the coasts of Hispaniola. Between the hunter and the pirate at first no impassable line was drawn. The same person combined in himself the occupations of cow-killing and cruising, varying the monotony of the one by occasionally trying his hand at the other. In either case he lived at constant enmity with the Spaniards. With the passing of time the sea attracted more and more away from their former pursuits. Even the planters who were beginning to filter into the new settlements found the attractions of coursing against the Spaniards to be irresistible. Great extremes of fortune, such as those to which the buccaneers were subject, have always exercised an attraction over minds of an adventurous stamp. It was the same allurement which drew the "forty-niners" to California, and in 1897 the gold-seekers to the Canadian Klondyke. If the suffering endured was often {68} great, the prize to be gained was worth it. Fortune, if fickle one day, might the next bring incredible bounty, and the buccaneers who sweltered in a tropical sea, with starvation staring them in the face, dreamed of rolling in the oriental wealth of a Spanish argosy. Especially to the cattle-hunter must this temptation have been great, for his mode of life was the very rudest. He roamed the woods by day with his dog and apprentices, and at night slept in the open air or in a rude shed hastily constructed of leaves and skins, which served as a house, and which he called after the Indian name, "ajoupa" or "barbacoa." His dress was of the simplest—coarse cloth trousers, and a shirt which hung loosely over them, both pieces so black and saturated with the blood and grease of slain animals that they looked as if they had been tarred ("de toile gaudronnée").102 A belt of undressed bull's hide bound the shirt, and supported on one side three or four large knives, on the other a pouch for powder and shot. A cap with a short pointed brim extending over the eyes, rude shoes of cowhide or pigskin made all of one piece bound over the foot, and a short, large-bore musket, completed the hunter's grotesque outfit. Often he carried wound about his waist a sack of netting into which he crawled at night to keep off the pestiferous mosquitoes. With creditable regularity he and his apprentices arose early in the morning and started on foot for the hunt, eating no food until they had killed and skinned as many wild cattle or swine as there were persons in the company. After having skinned the last animal, the master-hunter broke its softest bones and made a meal for himself and his followers on the marrow. Then each took up a hide and returned to the boucan, where they dined on the flesh they had killed.103 In this {69} fashion the hunter lived for the space of six months or a year. Then he made a division of the skins and dried meat, and repaired to Tortuga or one of the French settlements on the coast of Hispaniola to recoup his stock of ammunition and spend the rest of his gains in a wild carouse of drunkenness and debauchery. His money gone, he returned again to the hunt. The cow-killers, as they had neither wife nor children, commonly associated in pairs with the right of inheriting from each other, a custom which was called "matelotage." These private associations, however, did not prevent the property of all from being in a measure common. Their mode of settling quarrels was the most primitive—the duel. In other things they governed themselves by a certain "coutumier," a medley of bizarre laws which they had originated among themselves. At any attempt to bring them under civilised rules, the reply always was, "telle étoit la coutume de la côte"; and that definitely closed the matter. They based their rights thus to live upon the fact, they said, of having passed the Tropic, where, borrowing from the sailor's well-known superstition, they pretended to have drowned all their former obligations.104 Even their family names they discarded, and the saying was in those days that one knew a man in the Isles only when he was married. From a life of this sort, cruising against Spanish ships, if not an unmixed good, was at least always a desirable recreation. Every Spanish prize brought into Tortuga, moreover, was an incitement to fresh adventure against the common foe. The "gens de la côte," as they called themselves, ordinarily associated a score or more together, and having taken or built themselves a canoe, put to sea with intent to seize a Spanish barque or some other coasting vessel. With silent paddles, under cover of darkness, they approached the unsuspecting {70} prey, killed the frightened sailors or drove them overboard, and carried the prize to Tortuga. There the raiders either dispersed to their former occupations, or gathered a larger crew of congenial spirits and sailed away for bigger game.
The buccaneers, or West Indian corsairs, got their start—and their name—from the cattle and hog hunters of Hispaniola and Tortuga. Many of the wilder, more restless individuals from the smaller islands in the Windward and Leeward groups likely joined this piratical community or were at least eager to help out in occasional raids against their Spanish neighbors. We know that Jackson had no trouble gathering 700 or 800 men from Barbados and St. Kitts in 1642 for his ill-fated attempt on the Spanish Main. Later, when the French periodically attacked Dutch outposts on Tobago, Curaçao, and St. Eustatius, they always found plenty of buccaneers in their colonies of Martinique and Guadeloupe, ready to man their ships. However, it seems generally accepted among Jesuit historians of the West Indies—and we rely almost entirely on these writers for our understanding of buccaneering's origins—that the corsairs originated from the hunters who roamed the coasts of Hispaniola. At first, there was no hard line drawn between the hunter and the pirate. The same person would switch between cow-killing and raiding, breaking the monotony of one with the thrill of the other. In either case, he lived in constant conflict with the Spaniards. Over time, more and more former hunters were drawn to the sea. Even the planters who started settling in the new communities found the allure of attacking the Spaniards irresistible. The extreme fortunes tied to pirating have always fascinated adventurous minds. It was the same draw that led the "forty-niners" to California and, in 1897, the gold seekers to Canada's Klondike. Although the hardships could be severe, the potential rewards made it worthwhile. Fortune, if unreliable on one day, could deliver incredible riches the next, and buccaneers suffering in the tropical heat, facing starvation, dreamed of rolling in the vast wealth of a Spanish ship. This temptation must have been particularly strong for hunters, whose lives were quite harsh. They roamed the woods by day with their dogs and apprentices, and at night often slept outdoors or in a makeshift shelter made from leaves and skins, which they called by the Indian name “ajoupa” or “barbacoa.” Their clothing was very basic—rough cloth trousers and a loose shirt, both so stained with blood and grease from slaughtered animals that they appeared to be coated in tar. A belt made from raw bull hide held the shirt in place, with three or four large knives on one side and a pouch for powder and shot on the other. A cap with a short pointed brim over the eyes, crude shoes made from cowhide or pigskin, and a short musket completed the hunter's odd outfit. Often, he wore a netting sack around his waist, crawling into it at night to fend off irritating mosquitoes. He and his apprentices would reliably get up early in the morning and set out on foot for the hunt, eating no food until they had killed and skinned enough wild cattle or pigs for everyone in the group. After skinning the last animal, the lead hunter would break its softest bones to make a meal for himself and his followers from the marrow. Each would then take a hide and head back to the boucan, where they would feast on the meat they had killed. In this way, the hunter would survive for six months to a year. Then he would divide the skins and dried meat and travel to Tortuga or one of the French settlements on Hispaniola to replenish his ammunition and spend the rest of his earnings on wild drinking and debauchery. Once his money was gone, he would return to hunting. Since the cow-killers had no wives or children, they often paired up with the right of inheritance, a practice known as "matelotage." However, these private partnerships didn’t stop their property from being common in a way. They settled disputes in the most primitive manner—the duel. In other matters, they governed themselves by a set of quirky rules they’d created among themselves. Any attempt to impose civil regulations was met with, “that was the custom of the coast,” which effectively ended the discussion. They justified their way of life by claiming they had crossed the Tropic, where, borrowing from sailors’ well-known superstitions, they said they had drowned all their previous obligations. They even discarded their family names, and the saying back then was that you only knew a man in the Islands if he was married. From this lifestyle of raiding Spanish ships, even if it was not purely good, was at least always a welcome change of pace. Every Spanish prize brought into Tortuga served as a motivation for fresh adventures against their common enemy. The "gens de la côte," as they called themselves, usually banded together in groups of twenty or more and would take to the sea in canoes they either seized or built, aiming to capture a Spanish barque or another coastal vessel. With silent paddles, under the cover of darkness, they would approach the unsuspecting target, kill the terrified sailors or force them overboard, and take the prize to Tortuga. There, the raiders would either disperse back into their previous lives or gather a larger crew of like-minded individuals and set out for bigger targets.
All the Jesuit historians of the West Indies, Dutertre, Labat and Charlevoix, have left us accounts of the manners and customs of the buccaneers. The Dutch physician, Exquemelin, who lived with the buccaneers for several years, from 1668 to 1674, and wrote a picturesque narrative from materials at his disposal, has also been a source for the ideas of most later writers on the subject. It may not be out of place to quote his description of the men whose deeds he recorded.
All the Jesuit historians of the West Indies—Dutertre, Labat, and Charlevoix—have provided us with accounts of the lifestyles and traditions of the buccaneers. The Dutch doctor, Exquemelin, who lived among the buccaneers for several years, from 1668 to 1674, and wrote a vivid narrative based on the information he gathered, has also been a key source for many later writers on this topic. It might be worth quoting his description of the men whose actions he documented.
"Before the Pirates go out to sea," he writes, "they give notice to every one who goes upon the voyage of the day on which they ought precisely to embark, intimating also to them their obligation of bringing each man in particular so many pounds of powder and bullets as they think necessary for that expedition. Being all come on board, they join together in council, concerning what place they ought first to go wherein to get provisions—especially of flesh, seeing they scarce eat anything else. And of this the most common sort among them is pork. The next food is tortoises, which they are accustomed to salt a little. Sometimes they resolve to rob such or such hog-yards, wherein the Spaniards often have a thousand heads of swine together. They come to these places in the dark of night, and having beset the keeper's lodge, they force him to rise, and give them as many heads as they desire, threatening withal to kill him in case he disobeys their command or makes any noise. Yea, these menaces are oftentimes put in execution, without giving any quarter to the miserable swine-keepers, or any other person that endeavours to hinder their robberies.
"Before the Pirates set sail," he writes, "they inform everyone who’s going on the trip about the exact day they should embark, also letting them know they need to bring specific amounts of powder and bullets as they see fit for the journey. Once everyone is on board, they hold a meeting to discuss where they should go first to gather supplies—especially meat, since they hardly eat anything else. The most common food for them is pork. Next are tortoises, which they usually salt a bit. Sometimes, they plan to raid certain pig farms, where the Spaniards often keep a thousand pigs together. They arrive at these places under the cover of darkness, and after surrounding the keeper's lodge, they force him to get up and hand over as many pigs as they want, threatening to kill him if he doesn’t comply or makes any noise. Indeed, these threats are often carried out without mercy towards the unfortunate pig keepers or anyone else who tries to stop their thefts."
"Having got provisions of flesh sufficient for their voyage, they return to their ship. Here their allowance, twice a day to every one, is as much as he can eat, without either weight or measure. Neither does the steward of the vessel give any greater proportion of flesh or anything else to the captain than to the meanest mariner. The ship being well victualled, they call another council, to deliberate towards what place they shall go, to seek their desperate fortunes. In this council, likewise, they agree upon certain Articles, which are put in writing, by way of bond or obligation, which everyone is bound to observe, and all of them, or the chief, set their hands to it. Herein they specify, and set down very distinctly, what sums of money each particular person ought to have for that voyage, the fund of all the payments being the common stock of what is gotten by the whole expedition; for otherwise it is the same law, among these people, as with other Pirates, 'No prey, no pay.' In the first place, therefore, they mention how much the Captain ought to have for his ship. Next the salary of the carpenter, or shipwright, who careened, mended and rigged the vessel. This commonly amounts to 100 or 150 pieces of eight, being, according to the agreement, more or less. Afterwards for provisions and victualling they draw out of the same common stock about 200 pieces of eight. Also a competent salary for the surgeon and his chest of medicaments, which is usually rated at 200 or 250 pieces of eight. Lastly they stipulate in writing what recompense or reward each one ought to have, that is either wounded or maimed in his body, suffering the loss of any limb, by that voyage. Thus they order for the loss of a right arm 600 pieces of eight, or six slaves; for the loss of a left arm 500 pieces of eight, or five slaves; for a right leg 500 pieces of eight, or five slaves; for the left leg 400 pieces of eight, or four slaves; for an eye 100 {72} pieces of eight or one slave; for a finger of the hand the same reward as for the eye. All which sums of money, as I have said before, are taken out of the capital sum or common stock of what is got by their piracy. For a very exact and equal dividend is made of the remainder among them all. Yet herein they have also regard to qualities and places. Thus the Captain, or chief Commander, is allotted five or six portions to what the ordinary seamen have; the Master's Mate only two; and other Officers proportionate to their employment. After whom they draw equal parts from the highest even to the lowest mariner, the boys not being omitted. For even these draw half a share, by reason that, when they happen to take a better vessel than their own, it is the duty of the boys to set fire to the ship or boat wherein they are, and then retire to the prize which they have taken.
"After getting enough meat for their trip, they head back to their ship. Everyone gets as much food as they can eat, twice a day, with no weighing or measuring. The ship’s steward doesn’t give the captain a bigger share of the food than he gives to the lowest crew member. With the ship well-stocked, they have another meeting to decide where to go to try their luck. In this meeting, they also agree on some Articles, which are written down as a bond or obligation that everyone must follow, and all of them, or their leaders, sign it. They clearly outline how much money each person should receive for the trip, with all payments coming from the common fund collected during the expedition; otherwise, like other pirates, the rule is 'No loot, no pay.' First, they specify how much the Captain should get for his ship. Then they note the payment for the carpenter, who repaired and fitted the vessel. This usually amounts to 100 or 150 pieces of eight, depending on the agreement. Next, they allocate about 200 pieces of eight from the common fund for supplies and food. They also specify a fair wage for the surgeon and his medical supplies, typically rated at 200 or 250 pieces of eight. Lastly, they document what compensation each person should receive if they are injured or lose a limb during the voyage. For the loss of a right arm, it's 600 pieces of eight or six slaves; for the left arm, 500 pieces of eight or five slaves; for a right leg, 500 pieces of eight or five slaves; for the left leg, 400 pieces of eight or four slaves; for an eye, 100 pieces of eight or one slave; and for a finger, the same compensation as for an eye. All these amounts are taken from the shared pool of their loot. They make sure to divide the remaining money fairly among everyone. The Captain or chief Commander gets five or six shares compared to what ordinary sailors get; the Master's Mate receives two; and other officers get proportional amounts based on their roles. Then they distribute equal shares from the highest-ranking to the lowest crew member, including the boys. Even they get half a share because, when they capture a better ship than their own, it’s their job to set fire to the ship or boat they’re in and then retreat to the prize they’ve taken."
"They observe among themselves very good orders. For in the prizes they take it is severely prohibited to everyone to usurp anything in particular to themselves. Hence all they take is equally divided, according to what has been said before. Yea, they make a solemn oath to each other not to abscond or conceal the least thing they find amongst the prey. If afterwards anyone is found unfaithful, who has contravened the said oath, immediately he is separated and turned out of the society. Among themselves they are very civil and charitable to each other. Insomuch that if any wants what another has, with great liberality they give it one to another. As soon as these pirates have taken any prize of ship or boat, the first thing they endeavour is to set on shore the prisoners, detaining only some few for their own help and service, to whom also they give their liberty after the space of two or three years. They put in very frequently for refreshment at one island or another; but more especially into {73} those which lie on the southern side of the Isle of Cuba. Here they careen their vessels, and in the meanwhile some of them go to hunt, others to cruise upon the seas in canoes, seeking their fortune. Many times they take the poor fishermen of tortoises, and carrying them to their habitations they make them work so long as the pirates are pleased."
"They have a very good system among themselves. When it comes to the prizes they capture, it is strictly forbidden for anyone to keep anything for themselves. Everything they take is shared equally, as previously mentioned. They even make a serious promise to each other not to hide or keep any small item they find among their loot. If anyone is later caught being untrustworthy and breaking this oath, they are immediately kicked out of the group. They treat each other with a lot of courtesy and kindness. If one person wants something that another has, they generously give it to each other. After these pirates capture a ship or boat, their first priority is to release the prisoners, keeping only a few for their own help and services, and they also grant these captives their freedom after two or three years. They often stop at various islands for supplies, especially at {73} those located on the southern side of the Isle of Cuba. Here, they repair their ships while some go hunting, and others scout the seas in canoes, looking for opportunities. Many times, they capture poor turtle fishermen and take them to their hideouts, forcing them to work as long as the pirates see fit."
The articles which fixed the conditions under which the buccaneers sailed were commonly called the "chasse-partie."105 In the earlier days of buccaneering, before the period of great leaders like Mansfield, Morgan and Grammont, the captain was usually chosen from among their own number. Although faithfully obeyed he was removable at will, and had scarcely more prerogative than the ordinary sailor. After 1655 the buccaneers generally sailed under commissions from the governors of Jamaica or Tortuga, and then they always set aside one tenth of the profits for the governor. But when their prizes were unauthorised they often withdrew to some secluded coast to make a partition of the booty, and on their return to port eased the governor's conscience with politic gifts; and as the governor generally had little control over these difficult people he found himself all the more obliged to dissimulate. Although the buccaneers were called by the Spaniards "ladrones" and "demonios," names which they richly deserved, they often gave part of their spoil to churches in the ports which they frequented, especially if among the booty they found any ecclesiastical ornaments or the stuffs for making them—articles which not infrequently formed an important part of the cargo of Spanish treasure ships. In March 1694 the Jesuit writer, Labat, took part in a Mass at Martinique which was {74} performed for some French buccaneers in pursuance of a vow made when they were taking two English vessels near Barbadoes. The French vessel and its two prizes were anchored near the church, and fired salutes of all their cannon at the beginning of the Mass, at the Elevation of the Host, at the Benediction, and again at the end of the Te Deum sung after the Mass.106 Labat, who, although a priest, is particularly lenient towards the crimes of the buccaneers, and who we suspect must have been the recipient of numerous "favours" from them out of their store of booty, relates a curious tale of the buccaneer, Captain Daniel, a tale which has often been used by other writers, but which may bear repetition. Daniel, in need of provisions, anchored one night off one of the "Saintes," small islands near Dominica, and landing without opposition, took possession of the house of the curé and of some other inhabitants of the neighbourhood. He carried the curé and his people on board his ship without offering them the least violence, and told them that he merely wished to buy some wine, brandy and fowls. While these were being gathered, Daniel requested the curé to celebrate Mass, which the poor priest dared not refuse. So the necessary sacred vessels were sent for and an altar improvised on the deck for the service, which they chanted to the best of their ability. As at Martinique, the Mass was begun by a discharge of artillery, and after the Exaudiat and prayer for the King was closed by a loud "Vive le Roi!" from the throats of the buccaneers. A single incident, however, somewhat disturbed the devotions. One of the buccaneers, remaining in an indecent attitude during the Elevation, was rebuked by the captain, and instead of heeding the correction, replied with an impertinence and a fearful oath. Quick as a flash Daniel whipped out his pistol and shot the buccaneer through the head, {75} adjuring God that he would do as much to the first who failed in his respect to the Holy Sacrifice. The shot was fired close by the priest, who, as we can readily imagine, was considerably agitated. "Do not be troubled, my father," said Daniel; "he is a rascal lacking in his duty and I have punished him to teach him better." A very efficacious means, remarks Labat, of preventing his falling into another like mistake. After the Mass the body of the dead man was thrown into the sea, and the curé was recompensed for his pains by some goods out of their stock and the present of a negro slave.107
The rules that defined how the buccaneers operated were often referred to as the "chasse-partie."105 In the early days of buccaneering, before the era of great leaders like Mansfield, Morgan, and Grammont, the captain was usually chosen from among their group. Although they obeyed him faithfully, he could be dismissed at any time and had hardly more authority than a regular sailor. After 1655, the buccaneers typically sailed with commissions from the governors of Jamaica or Tortuga, and they always set aside ten percent of their profits for the governor. However, when they captured prizes without authorization, they often retreated to a remote shore to divide the loot, and upon returning to port, they eased the governor's conscience with political gifts; and since the governor usually had little control over these rebellious people, he felt compelled to pretend. Although the Spaniards called the buccaneers "thieves" and "demons," names they richly earned, they often donated part of their spoils to churches in the ports they visited, especially if they found any church artifacts or materials for making them—items that frequently made up a significant part of the cargo on Spanish treasure ships. In March 1694, the Jesuit writer, Labat, participated in a Mass at Martinique that was held for some French buccaneers following a vow made when they captured two English vessels near Barbados. The French ship and its two prizes were anchored near the church, and they fired salutes from all their cannons at the start of the Mass, during the Elevation of the Host, at the Benediction, and again at the end of the Te Deum sung after the Mass.106 Labat, who, despite being a priest, is notably lenient towards the wrongdoings of the buccaneers and who we suspect must have benefited from numerous "favors" from them out of their loot, tells a curious story about the buccaneer, Captain Daniel, a tale often recounted by other writers, but which deserves repeating. In need of supplies, Daniel anchored one night near one of the "Saintes," small islands off Dominica, and landing without any opposition, took over the house of the curé and some other local inhabitants. He brought the curé and his people on board his ship without using any violence and told them he only wanted to buy some wine, brandy, and chickens. While these items were being gathered, Daniel asked the curé to celebrate Mass, which the poor priest couldn’t refuse. So the necessary sacred vessels were fetched and an altar was set up on the deck for the service, which they performed to the best of their abilities. Just like at Martinique, the Mass began with the firing of artillery, and after the Exaudiat and the prayer for the King, it concluded with a loud "Vive le Roi!" from the buccaneers. However, one incident somewhat disrupted the service. One of the buccaneers maintained an inappropriate posture during the Elevation, prompting the captain to rebuke him, and instead of listening to the correction, the buccaneer responded with disrespectful words and a curse. In an instant, Daniel drew his pistol and shot the buccaneer in the head, calling upon God to do the same to the first person who showed disrespect during the Holy Sacrifice. The shot was fired close to the priest, who, as one can imagine, was quite shaken. "Do not worry, my father," said Daniel; "he is a scoundrel lacking in duty, and I have punished him to teach him better." A very effective way, notes Labat, of ensuring he wouldn’t make the same mistake again. After the Mass, the body of the dead man was thrown into the sea, and the curé was compensated for his troubles with some goods from their stock and the gift of a black slave.107
The buccaneers preferred to sail in barques, vessels of one mast and rigged with triangular sails. This type of boat, they found, could be more easily manœuvred, was faster and sailed closer to the wind. The boats were built of cedar, and the best were reputed to come from Bermuda. They carried very few guns, generally from six to twelve or fourteen, the corsairs believing that four muskets did more execution than one cannon.108 The buccaneers sometimes used brigantines, vessels with two masts, the fore or mizzenmast being square-rigged with two sails and the mainmast rigged like that of a barque. The corsair at Martinique of whom Labat speaks was captain of a corvette, a boat like a brigantine, except that all the sails were square-rigged. At the beginning of a voyage the freebooters were generally so crowded in their small vessels that they suffered much from lack of room. Moreover, they had little protection from sun and rain, and with but a small stock of provisions often faced starvation. It was this as much as anything which frequently inspired them to attack without reflection any possible prize, great or small, and to make themselves masters of it or perish in the attempt. Their first object was to come to close quarters; and although a single broadside would have {76} sunk their small craft, they manœuvred so skilfully as to keep their bow always presented to the enemy, while their musketeers cleared the enemy's decks until the time when the captain judged it proper to board. The buccaneers rarely attacked Spanish ships on the outward voyage from Europe to America, for such ships were loaded with wines, cloths, grains and other commodities for which they had little use, and which they could less readily turn into available wealth. Outgoing vessels also carried large crews and a considerable number of passengers. It was the homeward-bound ships, rather, which attracted their avarice, for in such vessels the crews were smaller and the cargo consisted of precious metals, dye-woods and jewels, articles which the freebooters could easily dispose of to the merchants and tavern-keepers of the ports they frequented.
The buccaneers preferred to sail in small ships called barques, which had one mast and triangular sails. They found that these boats were easier to maneuver, faster, and could sail closer to the wind. The boats were made of cedar, and the best ones were said to come from Bermuda. They carried very few cannons, typically between six and fourteen, since the pirates believed that four muskets were more effective than one cannon.108 The buccaneers sometimes used brigantines, which had two masts, with either the front or back mast rigged with squares and two sails, while the mainmast was rigged like a barque. The corsair in Martinique that Labat mentions was the captain of a corvette, a type of boat similar to a brigantine, but with all its sails squared. At the start of a voyage, the freebooters were often so packed into their small boats that they suffered from cramped conditions. Furthermore, they had little shelter from sun and rain, and with only a limited supply of food, they often faced hunger. This led them, more than anything, to impulsively attack any potential target, large or small, determined to take control or die trying. Their primary goal was to get close to the enemy; and even though a single broadside could sink their small vessels, they maneuvered skillfully to keep their bows aimed at the enemy while their musketeers cleared the enemy's decks until the captain deemed it the right time to board. The buccaneers rarely targeted Spanish ships on their way from Europe to America, as these ships were carrying wines, textiles, grains, and other goods that were of little use to them and harder to convert into immediate wealth. Outgoing ships also had larger crews and a good number of passengers. Instead, it was the ships returning home that piqued their greed, as these vessels had smaller crews and carried precious metals, dye-woods, and jewels—items the freebooters could easily sell to the merchants and tavern-keepers in the ports they frequented.
The Gulf of Honduras and the Mosquito Coast, dotted with numerous small islands and protecting reefs, was a favourite retreat for the buccaneers. As the clumsy Spanish war-vessels of the period found it ticklish work threading these tortuous channels, where a sudden adverse wind usually meant disaster, the buccaneers there felt secure from interference; and in the creeks, lagoons and river-mouths densely shrouded by tropical foliage, they were able to careen and refit their vessels, divide their booty, and enjoy a respite from their sea-forays. Thence, too, they preyed upon the Spanish ships which sailed from the coast of Cartagena to Porto Bello, Nicaragua, Mexico, and the larger Antilles, and were a constant menace to the great treasure galleons of the Terra-Firma fleet. The English settlement on the island of Providence, lying as it did off the Nicaragua coast and in the very track of Spanish commerce in those regions, was, until captured in 1641, a source of great fear to Spanish mariners; and when in 1642 some English occupied the island of Roatan, near {77} Truxillo, the governor of Cuba and the Presidents of the Audiencias at Gautemala and San Domingo jointly equipped an expedition of four vessels under D. Francisco de Villalba y Toledo, which drove out the intruders.109 Closer to the buccaneering headquarters in Tortuga (and later in Jamaica) were the straits separating the great West Indian islands:—the Yucatan Channel at the western end of Cuba, the passage between Cuba and Hispaniola in the east, and the Mona Passage between Hispaniola and Porto Rico. In these regions the corsairs waited to pick up stray Spanish merchantmen, and watched for the coming of the galleons or the Flota.110 When the buccaneers returned from their cruises they generally squandered in a few days, in the taverns of the towns which they frequented, the wealth which had cost them such peril and labour. Some of these outlaws, says Exquemelin, would spend 2000 or 3000 pieces of eight111 in one night, not leaving themselves a good shirt to wear on their backs in the morning. "My own master," he continues, "would buy, on like occasions, a whole pipe of wine, and placing it in the street would force every one that passed by to drink with him; threatening also to pistol them in case they would not do it. At other times he would do the same with barrels of ale or beer. And, very often, with both in his hands, he would throw these liquors about the streets, and wet the clothes of such as walked by, without regarding whether he spoiled their apparel or not, were they men or women." The taverns and ale-houses always welcomed the arrival of these dissolute corsairs; and although they extended long credits, they {78} also at times sold as indentured servants those who had run too deeply into debt, as happened in Jamaica to this same patron or master of whom Exquemelin wrote.
The Gulf of Honduras and the Mosquito Coast, filled with many small islands and protective reefs, was a popular hideout for pirates. Since the bulky Spanish warships of the time had a tough time navigating these twisted channels, where a sudden unfavorable wind could lead to disaster, the pirates felt safe from interference there. In the creeks, lagoons, and river mouths covered in tropical foliage, they were able to repair and maintain their ships, split their loot, and take a break from their sea raids. From this location, they also attacked Spanish ships sailing from Cartagena to Porto Bello, Nicaragua, Mexico, and the larger Antilles, posing a constant threat to the wealthy treasure galleons of the Terra-Firma fleet. The English settlement on Providence Island, positioned off the coast of Nicaragua and right in the path of Spanish trade in those waters, was, until it was captured in 1641, a major source of fear for Spanish sailors. Then, in 1642, when some English settlers occupied Roatan Island near Truxillo, the governor of Cuba and the Presidents of the Audiencias in Guatemala and San Domingo jointly organized an expedition of four ships under D. Francisco de Villalba y Toledo to drive them out.109 Closer to the pirates' main bases in Tortuga (and later in Jamaica) were the straits separating the large West Indian islands: the Yucatan Channel at the western end of Cuba, the passage between Cuba and Hispaniola in the east, and the Mona Passage between Hispaniola and Puerto Rico. Here, the corsairs waited to ambush stray Spanish merchant ships and watched for the arrival of the galleons or the Flota.110 When the pirates returned from their voyages, they often wasted their riches in just a few days at the taverns in the towns they visited, spending wealth that had cost them great risk and effort. Some of these outlaws, as Exquemelin mentions, would blow 2000 or 3000 pieces of eight111 in a single night, not leaving themselves a decent shirt to wear the next morning. "My own captain," he continues, "would buy, on such occasions, an entire barrel of wine, and placing it in the street, he would force everyone who passed by to drink with him; he would also threaten to shoot them if they refused. At other times, he would do the same with barrels of ale or beer. Often, with both in his hands, he would spill these drinks all over the streets, soaking the clothes of those walking by, without caring whether he ruined their outfits or not, whether they were men or women." The taverns and pubs always welcomed these reckless pirates, and while they offered long credit terms, they sometimes sold those who had fallen too deeply into debt as indentured servants, as happened to the same captain in Jamaica that Exquemelin wrote about.
Until 1640 buccaneering in the West Indies was more or less accidental, occasional, in character. In the second half of the century, however, the numbers of the freebooters greatly increased, and men entirely deserted their former occupations for the excitement and big profits of the "course." There were several reasons for this increase in the popularity of buccaneering. The English adventurers in Hispaniola had lost their profession of hunting very early, for with the coming of Levasseur the French had gradually elbowed them out of the island, and compelled them either to retire to the Lesser Antilles or to prey upon their Spanish neighbours. But the French themselves were within the next twenty years driven to the same expedient. The Spanish colonists on Hispaniola, unable to keep the French from the island, at last foolishly resolved, according to Charlevoix's account, to remove the principal attraction by destroying all the wild cattle. If the trade with French vessels and the barter of hides for brandy could be arrested, the hunters would be driven from the woods by starvation. This policy, together with the wasteful methods pursued by the hunters, caused a rapid decrease in the number of cattle. The Spaniards, however, did not dream of the consequences of their action. Many of the French, forced to seek another occupation, naturally fell into the way of buccaneering. The hunters of cattle became hunters of Spaniards, and the sea became the savanna on which they sought their game. Exquemelin tells us that when he arrived at the island there were scarcely three hundred engaged in hunting, and even these found their livelihood precarious. It was from this time forward to the end of the century {79} that the buccaneers played so important a rôle on the stage of West Indian history.
Until 1640, buccaneering in the West Indies was mostly random and occasional. However, in the latter half of the century, the number of freebooters skyrocketed, and many people completely left their old jobs for the thrill and big profits of piracy. Several factors contributed to this rise in buccaneering's popularity. English adventurers in Hispaniola lost their hunting profession early on, as the French gradually pushed them out of the island with the arrival of Levasseur, forcing them to retreat to the Lesser Antilles or prey on their Spanish neighbors. In the following twenty years, the French faced similar circumstances. The Spanish colonists on Hispaniola, unable to keep the French off the island, foolishly decided to eliminate the main attraction by destroying all the wild cattle. They thought that if they could stop trade with French ships and the exchange of hides for brandy, the hunters would be forced out of the woods by starvation. This strategy, along with the wasteful practices of the hunters, led to a rapid decline in the number of cattle. However, the Spaniards did not foresee the consequences of their actions. Many of the French, pushed to find new work, naturally turned to buccaneering. Cattle hunters became hunters of Spaniards, and the sea became the savanna where they searched for their prey. Exquemelin tells us that when he arrived on the island, there were barely three hundred people engaged in hunting, and even they found it difficult to make a living. From that point until the end of the century, {79} the buccaneers played a significant role in the history of the West Indies.
Another source of recruits for the freebooters were the indentured servants or engagés. We hear a great deal of the barbarity with which West Indian planters and hunters in the seventeenth century treated their servants, and we may well believe that many of the latter, finding their situation unendurable, ran away from their plantations or ajoupas to join the crew of a chance corsair hovering in the neighbourhood. The hunters' life, as we have seen, was not one of revelry and ease. On the one side were all the insidious dangers lurking in a wild, tropical forest; on the other, the relentless hostility of the Spaniards. The environment of the hunters made them rough and cruel, and for many an engagé his three years of servitude must have been a veritable purgatory. The servants of the planters were in no better position. Decoyed from Norman and Breton towns and villages by the loud-sounding promises of sea-captains and West Indian agents, they came to seek an El Dorado, and often found only despair and death. The want of sufficient negroes led men to resort to any artifice in order to obtain assistance in cultivating the sugar-cane and tobacco. The apprentices sent from Europe were generally bound out in the French Antilles for eighteen months or three years, among the English for seven years. They were often resold in the interim, and sometimes served ten or twelve years before they regained their freedom. They were veritable convicts, often more ill-treated than the slaves with whom they worked side by side, for their lives, after the expiration of their term of service, were of no consequence to their masters. Many of these apprentices, of good birth and tender education, were unable to endure the debilitating climate and hard labour, let alone the cruelty of their employers. Exquemelin, himself originally {80} an engagé, gives a most piteous description of their sufferings. He was sold to the Lieutenant-Governor of Tortuga, who treated him with great severity and refused to take less than 300 pieces of eight for his freedom. Falling ill through vexation and despair, he passed into the hands of a surgeon, who proved kind to him and finally gave him his liberty for 100 pieces of eight, to be paid after his first buccaneering voyage.112
Another source of recruits for the pirates were the indentured servants or engagés. We often hear about the brutal way West Indian planters and hunters in the seventeenth century treated their servants, and it’s easy to believe that many of them, finding their situation unbearable, ran away from their plantations or camps to join the crew of a passing pirate ship nearby. The life of hunters, as we’ve seen, wasn’t one of partying and relaxation. On one side were all the hidden dangers lurking in a wild, tropical forest; on the other, the constant threat of the Spanish. The harsh environment made the hunters rough and cruel, and for many engagés, those three years of servitude must have felt like a true purgatory. The servants of the planters were in no better position. Lured from towns and villages in Normandy and Brittany by the tempting promises of sea captains and West Indian agents, they came in search of fortune and often found only despair and death. The shortage of enough Black workers led people to use any trick to get help in cultivating sugarcane and tobacco. Apprentices sent from Europe were usually contracted in the French Caribbean for eighteen months or three years, and in the English territories for seven years. They were often sold off in the meantime, sometimes serving ten or twelve years before they regained their freedom. They were like prisoners, often treated worse than the slaves they worked alongside, since their lives after their term of service meant nothing to their masters. Many of these apprentices, from good backgrounds and with refined upbringings, could not handle the draining climate and hard labor, let alone the cruelty of their employers. Exquemelin, who was originally an engagé, provides a heart-wrenching account of their sufferings. He was sold to the Lieutenant-Governor of Tortuga, who was very harsh and wouldn’t accept less than 300 pieces of eight for his freedom. After becoming ill from frustration and despair, he ended up in the care of a surgeon, who was kind to him and eventually gave him his freedom for 100 pieces of eight, to be paid after his first buccaneering voyage.112
We left Levasseur governor in Tortuga after the abortive Spanish attack of 1643. Finding his personal ascendancy so complete over the rude natures about him, Levasseur, like many a greater man in similar circumstances, lost his sense of the rights of others. His character changed, he became suspicious and intolerant, and the settlers complained bitterly of his cruelty and overbearing temper. Having come as the leader of a band of Huguenots, he forbade the Roman Catholics to hold services on the island, burnt their chapel and turned out their priest. He placed heavy imposts on trade, and soon amassed a considerable fortune.113 In his eyrie upon the rock fortress, he is said to have kept for his enemies a cage of iron, in which the prisoner could neither stand nor lie down, and which Levasseur, with grim humour, called his "little hell." A dungeon in his castle he termed in like fashion his "purgatory." All these stories, however, are reported by the Jesuits, his natural foes, and must be taken with a grain of salt. De Poincy, who himself ruled with despotic authority and was guilty of similar cruelties, would have turned a deaf ear to the denunciations against his lieutenant, had not his jealousy been aroused by the suspicion that Levasseur intended to declare himself an independent prince.114 So the governor-general, already in {81} bad odour at court for having given Levasseur means of establishing a little Geneva in Tortuga, began to disavow him to the authorities at home. He also sent his nephew, M. de Lonvilliers, to Tortuga, on the pretext of complimenting Levasseur on his victory over the Spaniards, but really to endeavour to entice him back to St. Kitts. Levasseur, subtle and penetrating, skilfully avoided the trap, and Lonvilliers returned to St. Kitts alone.
We left Levasseur in charge as governor in Tortuga after the failed Spanish attack of 1643. Observing his complete control over the rough people around him, Levasseur, like many others in his position, lost sight of other people's rights. His personality shifted; he became distrustful and intolerant, and the settlers complained bitterly about his cruelty and harsh temperament. Initially a leader of a group of Huguenots, he prohibited Roman Catholics from holding services on the island, burned down their chapel, and expelled their priest. He imposed heavy taxes on trade and soon amassed a significant fortune.113 In his lofty perch on the rock fortress, it's said he kept a cage made of iron for his enemies where prisoners couldn't stand or lie down, which Levasseur darkly humorously referred to as his "little hell." He also referred to a dungeon in his castle as his "purgatory." However, all these accounts come from the Jesuits, his natural adversaries, so they should be taken with skepticism. De Poincy, who also ruled with an iron fist and committed similar acts of cruelty, would have ignored the accusations against his lieutenant if he hadn't become jealous, suspecting that Levasseur intended to declare himself an independent ruler.114 Therefore, the governor-general, already in trouble at court for enabling Levasseur to set up a little Geneva in Tortuga, began to distance himself from him with the authorities back home. He also sent his nephew, M. de Lonvilliers, to Tortuga under the pretense of congratulating Levasseur on his victory over the Spaniards, but in reality, he aimed to lure him back to St. Kitts. Levasseur, clever and perceptive, skillfully avoided the trap, and Lonvilliers returned to St. Kitts alone.
Charlevoix relates an amusing instance of the governor's stubborn resistance to de Poincy's authority. A silver statue of the Virgin, captured by some buccaneer from a Spanish ship, had been appropriated by Levasseur, and de Poincy, desiring to decorate his chapel with it, wrote to him demanding the statue, and observing that a Protestant had no use for such an object. Levasseur, however, replied that the Protestants had a great adoration for silver virgins, and that Catholics being "trop spirituels pour tenir à la matière," he was sending him, instead, a madonna of painted wood.
Charlevoix shares a funny story about the governor’s stubborn refusal to acknowledge de Poincy’s authority. A silver statue of the Virgin, seized by a pirate from a Spanish ship, had been taken by Levasseur. De Poincy, wanting to decorate his chapel with it, wrote to Levasseur demanding the statue and pointed out that a Protestant wouldn’t have any use for such an item. Levasseur, however, responded that Protestants had a strong appreciation for silver virgins, and since Catholics were “too spiritual to care about material things,” he was sending him, instead, a painted wooden madonna.
After a tenure of power for twelve years, Levasseur came to the end of his tether. While de Poincy was resolving upon an expedition to oust him from authority, two adventurers named Martin and Thibault, whom Levasseur had adopted as his heirs, and with whom, it is said, he had quarrelled over a mistress, shot him as he was descending from the fort to the shore, and completed the murder by a poniard's thrust. They then seized the government without any opposition from the inhabitants.115 Meanwhile there had arrived at St. Kitts the Chevalier de Fontenay, a soldier of fortune who had distinguished himself against the Turks and was attracted by the gleam of Spanish gold. He it was whom de Poincy chose as the man to succeed Levasseur. The opportunity for action was eagerly accepted by de Fontenay, but the project was {82} kept secret, for if Levasseur had got wind of it all the forces in St. Kitts could not have dislodged him. Volunteers were raised on the pretext of a privateering expedition to the coasts of Cartagena, and to complete the deception de Fontenay actually sailed for the Main and captured several prizes. The rendezvous was on the coast of Hispaniola, where de Fontenay was eventually joined by de Poincy's nephew, M. de Treval, with another frigate and materials for a siege. Learning of the murder of Levasseur, the invaders at once sailed for Tortuga and landed several hundred men at the spot where the Spaniards had formerly been repulsed. The two assassins, finding the inhabitants indisposed to support them, capitulated to de Fontenay on receiving pardon for their crime and the peaceful possession of their property. Catholicism was restored, commerce was patronized and buccaneers encouraged to use the port. Two stone bastions were raised on the platform and more guns were mounted.116 De Fontenay himself was the first to bear the official title of "Governor for the King of Tortuga and the Coast of S. Domingo."
After being in power for twelve years, Levasseur reached his breaking point. While de Poincy was planning a mission to remove him from power, two adventurers named Martin and Thibault—who Levasseur had taken in as his heirs and reportedly had a falling out with over a mistress—shot him while he was coming down from the fort to the shore, finishing him off with a knife. They then took control of the government without any resistance from the locals.115 Meanwhile, the Chevalier de Fontenay arrived at St. Kitts; he was a mercenary who had made a name for himself fighting the Turks and was lured by the prospect of Spanish gold. De Poincy chose him to succeed Levasseur. De Fontenay eagerly accepted this chance for action, but they kept the plan under wraps because if Levasseur had found out, he would have been impossible to remove with all the forces in St. Kitts. They gathered volunteers under the pretense of a privateering mission to the coasts of Cartagena, and to add to the ruse, de Fontenay actually set sail for the Main and captured several prizes. The meeting point was on the coast of Hispaniola, where de Fontenay was eventually joined by de Poincy's nephew, M. de Treval, with another frigate and supplies for a siege. Upon learning about Levasseur's murder, the invaders immediately set sail for Tortuga and landed several hundred men at the location where the Spaniards had previously been driven back. The two assassins, finding that the local population was unwilling to support them, surrendered to de Fontenay in exchange for forgiveness for their crime and assurance of their property. Catholicism was reinstated, commerce was encouraged, and buccaneers were invited to use the port. Two stone bastions were built on the platform, and more cannons were installed.116 De Fontenay was the first to officially hold the title of "Governor for the King of Tortuga and the Coast of S. Domingo."
The new governor was not fated to enjoy his success for any length of time. The President of S. Domingo, Don Juan Francisco de Montemayor, with orders from the King of Spain, was preparing for another effort to get rid of his troublesome neighbour, and in November 1653 sent an expedition of five vessels and 400 infantry against the French, under command of Don Gabriel Roxas de Valle-Figueroa. The ships were separated by a storm, {83} two ran aground and a third was lost, so that only the "Capitana" and "Almirante" reached Tortuga on 10th January. Being greeted with a rough fire from the platform and fort as they approached the harbour, they dropped anchor a league to leeward and landed with little opposition. After nine days of fighting and siege of the fort, de Fontenay capitulated with the honours of war.117 According to the French account, the Spaniards, lashing their cannon to rough frames of wood, dragged a battery of eight or ten guns to the top of some hills commanding the fort, and began a furious bombardment. Several sorties of the besieged to capture the battery were unsuccessful. The inhabitants began to tire of fighting, and de Fontenay, discovering some secret negotiations with the enemy, was compelled to sue for terms. With incredible exertions, two half-scuttled ships in the harbour were fitted up and provisioned within three days, and upon them the French sailed for Port Margot.118 The Spaniards claimed that the booty would have been considerable but for some Dutch trading-ships in the harbour which conveyed all the valuables from the island. They burned the settlements, however, carried away with them some guns, munitions of war and slaves, and this time taking the precaution to leave behind a garrison of 150 men, sailed for Hispaniola. Fearing that the French might join forces with the buccaneers and attack their small squadron on the way back, they retained de Fontenay's brother as a hostage until they reached the city of San Domingo. De Fontenay, indeed, after his brother's release, did determine to try and recover the island. Only 130 of his men {84} stood by him, the rest deserting to join the buccaneers in western Hispaniola. While he was careening his ship at Port Margot, however, a Dutch trader arrived with commodities for Tortuga, and learning of the disaster, offered him aid with men and supplies. A descent was made upon the smaller island, and the Spaniards were besieged for twenty days, but after several encounters they compelled the French to withdraw. De Fontenay, with only thirty companions, sailed for Europe, was wrecked among the Azores, and eventually reached France, only to die a short time afterwards.
The new governor wasn't destined to enjoy his success for long. The President of S. Domingo, Don Juan Francisco de Montemayor, following orders from the King of Spain, was gearing up for another attempt to get rid of his troublesome neighbor. In November 1653, he sent an expedition of five ships and 400 infantry against the French, led by Don Gabriel Roxas de Valle-Figueroa. The ships were split apart by a storm; two ran aground and a third was lost, leaving only the "Capitana" and "Almirante" to reach Tortuga on January 10th. As they approached the harbor, they were met with heavy fire from the platform and fort, so they dropped anchor a league downwind and landed with little resistance. After nine days of fighting and laying siege to the fort, de Fontenay surrendered with honors. According to the French account, the Spaniards, securing their cannons to rough wood frames, hauled a battery of eight or ten guns to the top of some hills overlooking the fort and launched an intense bombardment. Several attempts by the besieged to capture the battery failed. The local population started to tire of the fighting, and de Fontenay, discovering secret negotiations with the enemy, was forced to seek terms. With great effort, two half-sunk ships in the harbor were repaired and stocked with supplies within three days, and the French set sail for Port Margot. The Spaniards claimed that the loot would have been substantial but for some Dutch trading ships in the harbor that transported all the valuables from the island. However, they burned the settlements, took some guns, munitions, and slaves with them, and this time made sure to leave behind a garrison of 150 men before heading for Hispaniola. Worried that the French might team up with the buccaneers and attack their small squadron on the way back, they held de Fontenay's brother as a hostage until they reached the city of San Domingo. After his brother was released, de Fontenay decided to try to reclaim the island. Only 130 of his men remained loyal to him, as the rest deserted to join the buccaneers in western Hispaniola. While he was repairing his ship at Port Margot, a Dutch trader arrived with goods for Tortuga and, upon learning of the disaster, offered him help with men and supplies. A raid was carried out on the smaller island, and the Spaniards were besieged for twenty days, but after several encounters, they forced the French to retreat. De Fontenay, with just thirty companions, set sail for Europe, shipwrecked among the Azores, and eventually reached France, only to die shortly afterward.
Footnote 83: (return)Bibl. Nat., Nouv. Acq., 9334, f. 48.
Bibliothèque Nationale, Nouvelles Acquisitions, 9334, page 48.
Footnote 84: (return)C.S.P. Colon., 1574-1660, p. 130. This company had been organised under the name of "The Governor and Company of Adventurers for the Plantations of the Islands of Providence, Henrietta and the adjacent islands, between 10 and 20 degrees of north latitude and 290 and 310 degrees of longitude." The patent of incorporation is dated 4th December 1630 (ibid., p. 123).
C.S.P. Colon., 1574-1660, p. 130. This group was established under the name "The Governor and Company of Adventurers for the Plantations of the Islands of Providence, Henrietta, and the nearby islands, situated between 10 and 20 degrees north latitude and 290 and 310 degrees longitude." The incorporation patent is dated December 4, 1630 (ibid., p. 123).
Footnote 87: (return)This identity was first pointed out by Pierre de Vaissière in his recent book: "Saint Domingue (1629-1789). La societé et la vie créoles sous l'ancien régime," Paris, 1909, p. 7.
This identity was first emphasized by Pierre de Vaissière in his recent book: "Saint Domingue (1629-1789). The Society and Creole Life under the Old Regime," Paris, 1909, p. 7.
Footnote 90: (return)This was probably the same man as the "Don Juan de Morfa Geraldino" who was admiral of the fleet which attacked Tortuga in 1654. Cf. Duro, op. cit., v. p. 35.
This was probably the same individual as "Don Juan de Morfa Geraldino," who served as the admiral of the fleet that assaulted Tortuga in 1654. See Duro, op. cit., v. p. 35.
Footnote 91: (return)In 1642 Rui Fernandez de Fuemayor was governor and captain-general of the province of Venezuela. Cf. Doro, op. cit., iv. p. 341; note 2.
In 1642, Rui Fernandez de Fuemayor served as the governor and captain-general of the province of Venezuela. See Doro, op. cit., iv. p. 341; note 2.
Footnote 92: (return)Brit. Mus., Add. MSS., 13,977, f. 505. According to the minutes of the Providence Company, a certain Mr. Perry, newly arrived from Association, gave information on 19th March 1635 that the island had been surprised by the Spaniards (C.S.P. Colon., 1574-1660, p. 200). This news was confirmed by a Mrs. Filby at another meeting of the company on 10th April, when Capt. Wormeley, "by reason of his cowardice and negligence in losing the island," was formally deprived of his office as governor and banished from the colony (ibid., p. 201).
The British Museum, Additional Manuscripts, 13,977, f. 505. According to the minutes of the Providence Company, a man named Mr. Perry, who had just come from Association, reported on March 19, 1635, that the Spaniards had unexpectedly taken the island (C.S.P. Colon., 1574-1660, p. 200). This was confirmed by a Mrs. Filby at another meeting of the company on April 10, when Capt. Wormeley was officially removed from his role as governor and banished from the colony due to his cowardice and negligence in losing the island (ibid., p. 201).
Footnote 93: (return)Brit. Mus., Add. MSS., 13,977, pp. 222-23.
British Museum, Additional Manuscripts, 13,977, pages 222-23.
Footnote 96: (return)Charlevoix: Histoire de. ... Saint Domingue, liv. vii. pp. 9-10. The story is repeated by Duro (op. cit., v. p. 34), who says that the Spaniards were led by "el general D. Carlos Ibarra."
Charlevoix: History of ... Saint Domingue, book vii, pages 9-10. The account is also recounted by Duro (op. cit., vol. p. 34), who mentions that the Spanish were led by "General D. Carlos Ibarra."
Footnote 97: (return)Charlevoix, op. cit., liv. vii. p. 10; Bibl. Nat. Nouv. Acq., 9334, p. 48 ff.
Charlevoix, op. cit., vol. 7, p. 10; Bibl. Nat. Nouv. Acq., 9334, p. 48 ff.
Footnote 98: (return)Charlevoix, op. cit., liv. vii. pp. 10-12; Vaissière., op. cit., Appendix I ("Mémoire envoyé aux seigneurs de la Compagnie des Isles de l'Amérique par M. de Poincy, le 15 Novembre 1640").
Charlevoix, op. cit., vol. vii, pp. 10-12; Vaissière, op. cit., Appendix I ("Memoir sent to the lords of the Company of the Isles of America by Mr. de Poincy, on November 15, 1640").
According to the records of the Providence Company, Tortuga in 1640 had 300 inhabitants. A Captain Fload, who had been governor, was then in London to clear himself of charges preferred against him by the planters, while a Captain James was exercising authority as "President" in the island. (C.S.P. Colon., 1574-1660. pp. 313, 314.) Fload was probably the "English captain" referred to in de Poincy's memoir. His oppressive rule seems to have been felt as well by the English as by the French.
According to the records of the Providence Company, Tortuga had 300 residents in 1640. A Captain Fload, who had previously been the governor, was in London dealing with accusations from the planters, while a Captain James was serving as "President" on the island. (C.S.P. Colon., 1574-1660, pp. 313, 314.) Fload was probably the "English captain" mentioned in de Poincy's memoir. His strict leadership seemed to affect both the English and the French.
Footnote 99: (return)Dutertre: Histoire générale des Antilles, tom. i. p. 171.
Dutertre: General History of the Antilles, vol. I, p. 171.
Footnote 100: (return)Charlevoix: op. cit., liv. vii. pp. 12-13.
Charlevoix: same source, book seven, pages 12-13.
Footnote 101: (return)In this monograph, by "buccaneers" are always meant the corsairs and filibusters, and not the cattle and hog killers of Hispaniola and Tortuga.
In this document, "buccaneers" specifically refers to the corsairs and filibusters, not the cattle and hog hunters of Hispaniola and Tortuga.
Footnote 102: (return)Labat: Nouveau voyage aux isles de l'Amerique, ed. 1742, tom. vii. p. 233.
Labat: New Voyage to the Islands of America, ed. 1742, vol. vii. p. 233.
Footnote 105: (return)Dampier writes that "Privateers are not obliged to any ship, but free to go ashore where they please, or to go into any other ship that will entertain them, only paying for their provision." (Edition 1906, i. p. 61).
Dampier states that "Privateers aren't bound to any specific ship; they can land wherever they choose or join any other ship that will accept them, as long as they cover their expenses." (Edition 1906, i. p. 61).
Footnote 110: (return)A Spaniard, writing from S. Domingo in 1635, complains of an English buccaneer settlement at Samana (on the north coast of Hispaniola, near the Mona Passage), where they grew tobacco, and preyed on the ships sailing from Cartagena and S. Domingo for Spain. (Add. MSS., 13,977, f. 508.)
A Spanish writer from Santo Domingo in 1635 expresses frustration about an English buccaneer settlement in Samana (located on the north coast of Hispaniola, near the Mona Passage), where they cultivated tobacco and attacked ships traveling from Cartagena and Santo Domingo to Spain. (Add. MSS., 13,977, f. 508.)
Footnote 111: (return)A piece of eight was worth in Jamaica from 4s. 6d. to 5s.
A piece of eight was worth between 4 shillings and 6 pence and 5 shillings in Jamaica.
Footnote 112: (return)Exquemelin, ed. 1684, Part I. pp. 21-22.
Exquemelin, ed. 1684, Part I, pp. 21-22.
Footnote 115: (return)Charlevoix, op. cit., liv. vii. pp. 17-18.
Charlevoix, same source as before, book vii, pp. 17-18.
Footnote 116: (return)According to a Spanish MS., there were in Tortuga in 1653 700 French inhabitants, more than 200 negroes, and 250 Indians with their wives and children. The negroes and Indians were all slaves; the former seized on the coasts of Havana and Cartagena, the latter brought over from Yucatan. In the harbour the platform had fourteen cannon, and in the fort above were forty-six cannon, many of them of bronze (Add. MSS., 13,992, f. 499 ff.). The report of the amount of ordnance is doubtless an exaggeration.
According to a Spanish manuscript, in 1653 Tortuga had 700 French residents, over 200 Black people, and 250 Indigenous people along with their wives and children. The Black people and Indigenous people were all enslaved; the former were taken from the coasts of Havana and Cartagena, while the latter were brought over from Yucatán. In the harbor, the platform had fourteen cannons, and in the fort above, there were forty-six cannons, many of which were made of bronze (Add. MSS., 13,992, f. 499 ff.). The reported number of cannons is likely an exaggeration.
Footnote 118: (return)According to Dutertre, one vessel was commanded by the assassins, Martin and Thibault, and contained the women and children. The latter, when provisions ran low, were marooned on one of the Caymans, north-west of Jamaica, where they would have perished had not a Dutch ship found and rescued them. Martin and Thibault were never heard of again.
Dutertre reports that one ship was commanded by the assassins, Martin and Thibault, which carried the women and children. When their supplies ran out, the women and children were left stranded on one of the Caymans, northwest of Jamaica, where they would have died if a Dutch ship hadn't discovered and rescued them. Martin and Thibault were never seen again.
CHAPTER III
THE CONQUEST OF JAMAICA
The capture of Jamaica by the expedition sent out by Cromwell in 1655 was the blundering beginning of a new era in West Indian history. It was the first permanent annexation by another European power of an integral part of Spanish America. Before 1655 the island had already been twice visited by English forces. The first occasion was in January 1597, when Sir Anthony Shirley, with little opposition, took and plundered St. Jago de la Vega. The second was in 1643, when William Jackson repeated the same exploit with 500 men from the Windward Islands. Cromwell's expedition, consisting of 2500 men and a considerable fleet, set sail from England in December 1654, with the secret object of "gaining an interest" in that part of the West Indies in possession of the Spaniards. Admiral Penn commanded the fleet, and General Venables the land forces.119 The expedition reached Barbadoes at the end of January, where some 4000 additional troops were raised, {86} besides about 1200 from Nevis, St. Kitts, and neighbouring islands. The commanders having resolved to direct their first attempt against Hispaniola, on 13th April a landing was effected at a point to the west of San Domingo, and the army, suffering terribly from a tropical sun and lack of water, marched thirty miles through woods and savannahs to attack the city. The English received two shameful defeats from a handful of Spaniards on 17th and 25th April, and General Venables, complaining loudly of the cowardice of his men and of Admiral Penn's failure to co-operate with him, finally gave up the attempt and sailed for Jamaica. On 11th May, in the splendid harbour on which Kingston now stands, the English fleet dropped anchor. Three small forts on the western side were battered by the guns from the ships, and as soon as the troops began to land the garrisons evacuated their posts. St. Jago, six miles inland, was occupied next day. The terms offered by Venables to the Spaniards (the same as those exacted from the English settlers on Providence Island in 1641—emigration within ten days on pain of death, and forfeiture of all their property) were accepted on the 17th; but the Spaniards were soon discovered to have entered into negotiations merely to gain time and retire with their families and goods to the woods and mountains, whence they continued their resistance. Meanwhile the army, wretchedly equipped with provisions and other necessities, was decimated by sickness. On the 19th two long-expected store-ships arrived, but the supplies brought by them were limited, and an appeal for assistance was sent to New England. Admiral Penn, disgusted with the fiasco in Hispaniola and on bad terms with Venables, sailed for England with part of his fleet on 25th June; and Venables, so ill that his life was despaired of, and also anxious to clear himself of the responsibility for the initial failure of the expedition, followed in the {87} "Marston Moor" nine days later. On 20th September both commanders appeared before the Council of State to answer the charge of having deserted their posts, and together they shared the disgrace of a month in the Tower.120
The capture of Jamaica by the expedition sent by Cromwell in 1655 marked a clumsy start to a new era in West Indian history. It was the first permanent takeover by another European power of a significant part of Spanish America. Before 1655, the island had already been visited twice by English forces. The first visit was in January 1597, when Sir Anthony Shirley easily took and plundered St. Jago de la Vega. The second was in 1643, when William Jackson repeated the same feat with 500 men from the Windward Islands. Cromwell's expedition, made up of 2,500 men and a sizable fleet, set sail from England in December 1654, with the covert aim of "gaining an interest" in that part of the West Indies controlled by the Spaniards. Admiral Penn led the fleet, while General Venables commanded the land forces.119 The expedition reached Barbados at the end of January, where around 4,000 additional troops were gathered, along with about 1,200 from Nevis, St. Kitts, and nearby islands. The commanders decided to focus their first attempt on Hispaniola, and on April 13, they landed west of San Domingo. The army, suffering greatly from the tropical sun and lack of water, marched thirty miles through forests and savannahs to attack the city. The English faced two humiliating defeats by a small group of Spaniards on April 17 and 25, and General Venables, loudly criticizing the cowardice of his men and Admiral Penn's lack of support, ultimately abandoned the effort and headed for Jamaica. On May 11, in the beautiful harbor where Kingston now stands, the English fleet dropped anchor. Three small forts on the western side were bombarded by the ship's guns, and as soon as the troops began to land, the garrisons fled. St. Jago, six miles inland, was occupied the next day. The terms proposed by Venables to the Spaniards (the same as those imposed on the English settlers on Providence Island in 1641—emigration within ten days under threat of death and the loss of all their property) were accepted on the 17th; however, it soon became clear that the Spaniards had entered negotiations just to buy time and retreat with their families and belongings into the forests and mountains, where they continued to resist. Meanwhile, the army, poorly equipped with supplies and other essentials, was ravaged by illness. On the 19th, two long-awaited supply ships arrived, but the provisions brought were limited, leading to a plea for help to New England. Admiral Penn, frustrated with the failure in Hispaniola and on bad terms with Venables, sailed for England with part of his fleet on June 25; and Venables, so ill that his life was considered in danger and desperate to absolve himself of the blame for the expedition's initial failure, followed on the "Marston Moor" nine days later. On September 20, both commanders appeared before the Council of State to respond to the accusation of abandoning their posts, and together they faced the disgrace of a month in the Tower.120
The army of General Venables was composed of very inferior and undisciplined troops, mostly the rejected of English regiments or the offscourings of the West Indian colonies; yet the chief reasons for the miscarriage before San Domingo were the failure of Venables to command the confidence of his officers and men, his inexcusable errors in the management of the attack, and the lack of cordial co-operation between him and the Admiral. The difficulties with which he had to struggle were, of course, very great. On the other hand, he seems to have been deficient both in strength of character and in military capacity; and his ill-health made still more difficult a task for which he was fundamentally incompetent. The comparative failure of this, Cromwell's pet enterprise, was a bitter blow to the Protector. For a whole day he shut himself up in his room, brooding over the disaster for which he, more than any other, was responsible. He had aimed not merely to plant one more colony in America, but to make himself master of such parts of the West Indian islands and Spanish Main as would enable him to dominate the route of the Spanish-American treasure fleets. To this end Jamaica contributed few advantages beyond those possessed by Barbadoes and St. Kitts, and it was too early for him to realize that island for island Jamaica was much more suitable than Hispaniola as the seat of an English colony.121
The army of General Venables was made up of poorly trained and disorganized soldiers, mostly rejects from English regiments or the dregs of the West Indian colonies; however, the main reasons for the failure at San Domingo were Venables' inability to earn the trust of his officers and troops, his unforgivable mistakes in handling the attack, and the lack of cooperation between him and the Admiral. The challenges he faced were certainly significant. On the flip side, he appears to have lacked both strong character and military skill; his poor health made an already difficult job even harder, given that he was fundamentally unqualified for it. This relative failure of what was Cromwell's favored project was a harsh blow to the Protector. For an entire day, he locked himself in his room, reflecting on the disaster for which he was, more than anyone else, responsible. He wasn't just trying to establish another colony in America; he aimed to take control of parts of the West Indian islands and the Spanish Main to dominate the route of the Spanish-American treasure fleets. In this regard, Jamaica offered few advantages compared to Barbados and St. Kitts, and it was too early for him to see that, island for island, Jamaica was far more suitable than Hispaniola as the center of an English colony.121
Religious and economic motives form the key to Cromwell's foreign policy, and it is difficult to discover {88} which, the religious or the economic, was uppermost in his mind when he planned this expedition. He inherited from the Puritans of Elizabeth's time the traditional religious hatred of Spain as the bulwark of Rome, and in his mind as in theirs the overthrow of the Spaniards in the West Indies was a blow at antichrist and an extension of the true religion. The religious ends of the expedition were fully impressed upon Venables and his successors in Jamaica.122 Second only, however, to Oliver's desire to protect "the people of God," was his ambition to extend England's empire beyond the seas. He desired the unquestioned supremacy of England over the other nations of Europe, and that supremacy, as he probably foresaw, was to be commercial and colonial. Since the discovery of America the world's commerce had enormously increased, and its control brought with it national power. America had become the treasure-house of Europe. If England was to be set at the head of the world's commerce and navigation, she must break through Spain's monopoly of the Indies and gain a control in Spanish America. San Domingo was to be but a preliminary step, after which the rest of the Spanish dominions in the New World would be gradually absorbed.123
Religious and economic motivations are central to Cromwell's foreign policy, and it's hard to determine which was more significant for him when planning this expedition. He inherited a strong religious animosity toward Spain from the Puritans of Elizabeth's era, viewing it as the stronghold of Rome. For him, just like for them, defeating the Spanish in the West Indies was a strike against antichrist and a means to spread true religion. The religious purpose of the expedition was clearly communicated to Venables and his successors in Jamaica.122 However, second only to Oliver's desire to protect "the people of God" was his ambition to expand England's empire overseas. He wanted England to be the dominant power among European nations, and he likely foresaw that this dominance would be commercial and colonial. Since the discovery of America, global trade had significantly increased, and controlling it meant national strength. America had become Europe's treasure chest. For England to lead in global commerce and navigation, it had to break Spain's monopoly on the Indies and establish control in Spanish America. San Domingo was intended as just the first step, after which the rest of Spain's territories in the New World would be gradually taken over.123
The immediate excuse for the attack on Hispaniola and Jamaica was the Spaniards' practice of seizing English ships and ill-treating English crews merely because they were found in some part of the Caribbean Sea, and even though bound for a plantation actually in possession of English colonists. It was the old question of effective occupation versus papal donation, and both {89} Cromwell and Venables convinced themselves that Spanish assaults in the past on English ships and colonies supplied a sufficient casus belli.124 There was no justification, however, for a secret attack upon Spain. She had been the first to recognize the young republic, and was willing and even anxious to league herself with England. There had been actual negotiations for an alliance, and Cromwell's offers, though rejected, had never been really withdrawn. Without a declaration of war or formal notice of any sort, a fleet was fitted out and sent in utmost secrecy to fall unawares upon the colonies of a friendly nation. The whole aspect of the exploit was Elizabethan. It was inspired by Drake and Raleigh, a reversion to the Elizabethan gold-hunt. It was the first of the great buccaneering expeditions.125
The immediate reason for the attack on Hispaniola and Jamaica was the Spaniards' habit of seizing English ships and mistreating English crews simply because they were in some part of the Caribbean Sea, even if they were heading to a plantation owned by English colonists. It was the old debate of effective occupation versus papal donation, and both Cromwell and Venables believed that past Spanish attacks on English ships and colonies provided enough justification for war. However, there was no reason for a secret attack on Spain. Spain had been the first to recognize the new republic and was willing—and even eager—to ally with England. There had been actual negotiations for an alliance, and Cromwell's offers, though declined, had never been officially withdrawn. Without a declaration of war or formal notice, a fleet was secretly assembled and sent to ambush the colonies of a friendly nation. The entire operation had an Elizabethan feel to it. It was inspired by Drake and Raleigh, reminiscent of the Elizabethan quest for gold. It was the first of the major buccaneering expeditions.
Cromwell was doubtless influenced, too, by the representations of Thomas Gage. Gage was an Englishman who had joined the Dominicans and had been sent by his Order out to Spanish America. In 1641 he returned to England, announced his conversion to Protestantism, took the side of Parliament and became a minister. His experiences in the West Indies and Mexico he published in 1648 under the name of "The English-American, or a New Survey of the West Indies," a most entertaining book, which aimed to arouse Englishmen against Romish "idolatries," to show how valuable the Spanish-American provinces might be to England in trade and bullion and how easily they might be seized. In the summer of 1654, moreover, Gage had laid before the Protector a memorial in which he recapitulated the conclusions of his book, assuring Cromwell that the Spanish colonies were sparsely peopled and that the few whites were unwarlike and scantily provided with arms and ammunition. He asserted that the conquest of Hispaniola and Cuba would be a matter of no difficulty, and that even Central America was too weak to oppose a long resistance.126 All this was true, and had Cromwell but sent a respectable force under an efficient leader the result would have been different. The exploits of the buccaneers a few years later proved it.
Cromwell was definitely influenced by the views of Thomas Gage. Gage was an Englishman who joined the Dominicans and was sent by his Order to Spanish America. In 1641, he returned to England, announced his conversion to Protestantism, sided with Parliament, and became a minister. He published his experiences in the West Indies and Mexico in 1648 under the title "The English-American, or a New Survey of the West Indies," which was a very entertaining book aimed at rallying Englishmen against Roman Catholic "idolatries." It also highlighted how valuable the Spanish-American provinces could be for England in terms of trade and precious metals, and how easily they could be taken. In the summer of 1654, Gage presented a memo to the Protector, summarizing the conclusions of his book, assuring Cromwell that the Spanish colonies were sparsely populated and that the few white inhabitants were not warlike and poorly equipped with weapons and ammunition. He claimed that conquering Hispaniola and Cuba would be easy, and that even Central America was too weak to mount a long resistance.126 All of this was accurate, and if Cromwell had sent a solid force with a competent leader, the outcome would have been different. The actions of the buccaneers a few years later proved this.
It was fortunate, considering the distracted state of affairs in Jamaica in 1655-56, that the Spaniards were in no condition to attempt to regain the island. Cuba, the nearest Spanish territory to Jamaica, was being ravaged by the most terrible pestilence known there in years, and the inhabitants, alarmed for their own safety, instead of trying to dispossess the English, were {91} busy providing for the defence of their own coasts.127 In 1657, however, some troops under command of the old Spanish governor of Jamaica, D. Christopher Sasi Arnoldo, crossed from St. Jago de Cuba and entrenched themselves on the northern shore as the advance post of a greater force expected from the mainland. Papers of instructions relating to the enterprise were intercepted by Colonel Doyley, then acting-governor of Jamaica; and he with 500 picked men embarked for the north side, attacked the Spaniards in their entrenchments and utterly routed them.128 The next year about 1000 men, the long-expected corps of regular Spanish infantry, landed and erected a fort at Rio Nuevo. Doyley, displaying the same energy, set out again on 11th June with 750 men, landed under fire on the 22nd, and next day captured the fort in a brilliant attack in which about 300 Spaniards were killed and 100 more, with many officers and flags, captured. The English lost about sixty in killed and wounded.129 After the failure of a similar, though weaker, attempt in 1660, the Spaniards despaired of regaining Jamaica, and most of those still upon the island embraced the first opportunity to retire to Cuba and other Spanish settlements.
It was fortunate, considering the chaotic situation in Jamaica in 1655-56, that the Spaniards were not in a position to try to take back the island. Cuba, the closest Spanish territory to Jamaica, was suffering from a devastating plague that had not been seen in years, and the locals, concerned for their own safety, were more focused on defending their own shores rather than trying to push out the English. In 1657, however, some troops led by the former Spanish governor of Jamaica, D. Christopher Sasi Arnoldo, crossed over from St. Jago de Cuba and set up positions on the northern shore as the initial force of a larger group expected from the mainland. Colonel Doyley, who was acting as the governor of Jamaica at the time, intercepted orders related to this plan; he then took 500 chosen men, sailed to the north side, attacked the Spaniards in their entrenched positions, and completely defeated them. The following year, about 1000 men, the long-awaited group of regular Spanish infantry, arrived and built a fort at Rio Nuevo. Doyley, showing the same determination, launched another attack on June 11 with 750 men, landed under fire on the 22nd, and the next day seized the fort in a brilliant offensive, resulting in about 300 Spaniards killed and 100 more captured, including many officers and flags. The English suffered roughly sixty casualties, both dead and wounded. After a similar but weaker attempt in 1660 failed, the Spaniards gave up on recapturing Jamaica, and most of those who remained on the island took the first chance to return to Cuba and other Spanish colonies.
As colonists the troops in Jamaica proved to be very discouraging material, and the army was soon in a wretched state. The officers and soldiers plundered and mutinied instead of working and planting. Their wastefulness led to scarcity of food, and scarcity of food brought disease and death.130 They wished to force the {92} Protector to recall them, or to employ them in assaulting the opulent Spanish towns on the Main, an occupation far more lucrative than that of planting corn and provisions for sustenance. Cromwell, however, set himself to develop and strengthen his new colony. He issued a proclamation encouraging trade and settlement in the island by exempting the inhabitants from taxes, and the Council voted that 1000 young men and an equal number of girls be shipped over from Ireland. The Scotch government was instructed to apprehend and transport idlers and vagabonds, and commissioners were sent into New England and to the Windward and Leeward Islands to try and attract settlers.131 Bermudians, Jews, Quakers from Barbadoes and criminals from Newgate, helped to swell the population of the new colony, and in 1658 the island is said to have contained 4500 whites, besides 1500 or more negro slaves.132
As colonists, the troops in Jamaica turned out to be very disappointing, and the army quickly fell into a terrible state. The officers and soldiers looted and rebelled instead of farming and cultivating the land. Their wastefulness led to food shortages, and those shortages caused disease and death.130 They wanted to pressure the Protector to bring them back or to use them in attacking the wealthy Spanish towns on the mainland, which would be much more profitable than growing corn and food for survival. However, Cromwell focused on developing and strengthening his new colony. He issued a proclamation encouraging trade and settlement on the island by exempting the residents from taxes, and the Council voted to send over 1,000 young men and an equal number of young women from Ireland. The Scottish government was instructed to catch and transport idlers and vagrants, and commissioners were sent to New England and the Windward and Leeward Islands to attract settlers.131 Bermudians, Jews, Quakers from Barbados, and criminals from Newgate contributed to the growing population of the new colony, and by 1658, the island reportedly had 4,500 white residents, along with 1,500 or more black slaves.132
To dominate the Spanish trade routes was one of the principal objects of English policy in the West Indies. This purpose is reflected in all of Cromwell's instructions to the leaders of the Jamaican design, and it appears again in his instructions of 10th October 1655 to Major-General Fortescue and Vice-Admiral Goodson. Fortescue was given power and authority to land men upon territory claimed by the Spaniards, to take their forts, castles and places of strength, and to pursue, kill and destroy all who opposed him. The Vice-Admiral was to assist him with his sea-forces, and to use his best endeavours to seize all {93} ships belonging to the King of Spain or his subjects in America.133 The soldiers, as has been said, were more eager to fight the Spaniards than to plant, and opportunities were soon given them to try their hand. Admiral Penn had left twelve ships under Goodson's charge, and of these, six were at sea picking up a few scattered Spanish prizes which helped to pay for the victuals supplied out of New England.134 Goodson, however, was after larger prey, no less than the galleons or a Spanish town upon the mainland. He did not know where the galleons were, but at the end of July he seems to have been lying with eight vessels before Cartagena and Porto Bello, and on 22nd November he sent Captain Blake with nine ships to the same coast to intercept all vessels going thither from Spain or elsewhere. The fleet was broken up by foul weather, however, and part returned on 14th December to refit, leaving a few small frigates to lie in wait for some merchantmen reported to be in that region.135 The first town on the Main to feel the presence of this new power in the Indies was Santa Marta, close to Cartagena on the shores of what is now the U.S. of Columbia. In the latter part of October, just a month before the departure of Blake, Goodson sailed with a fleet of eight vessels to ravage the Spanish coasts. According to one account his original design had been against Rio de la Hacha near the pearl fisheries, "but having missed his aim" he sailed for Santa Marta. He landed 400 sailors and soldiers under the protection of his guns, took and demolished the two forts which barred his way, and entered the town. Finding that the inhabitants had already fled with as much of their belongings as they could carry, he pursued {94} them some twelve miles up into the country; and on his return plundered and burnt their houses, embarked with thirty pieces of cannon and other booty, and sailed for Jamaica.136 It was a gallant performance with a handful of men, but the profits were much less than had been expected. It had been agreed that the seamen and soldiers should receive half the spoil, but on counting the proceeds it was found that their share amounted to no more than £400, to balance which the State took the thirty pieces of ordnance and some powder, shot, hides, salt and Indian corn.137 Sedgwick wrote to Thurloe that "reckoning all got there on the State's share, it did not pay for the powder and shot spent in that service."138 Sedgwick was one of the civil commissioners appointed for the government of Jamaica. A brave, pious soldier with a long experience and honourable military record in the Massachusetts colony, he did not approve of this type of warfare against the Spaniards. "This kind of marooning cruising West India trade of plundering and burning towns," he writes, "though it hath been long practised in these parts, yet is not honourable for a princely navy, neither was it, I think, the work designed, though perhaps it may be tolerated at present." If Cromwell was to accomplish his original purpose of blocking up the Spanish treasure route, he wrote again, permanent foothold must be gained in some important Spanish fortress, either Cartagena or Havana, places strongly garrisoned, however, and requiring for their reduction a considerable army and fleet, such as Jamaica did not then possess. But to waste and burn towns of inferior rank without retaining them merely dragged on the war indefinitely and effected little advantage or profit to anybody.139 Captain Nuberry {95} visited Santa Marta several weeks after Goodson's descent, and, going on shore, found that about a hundred people had made bold to return and rebuild their devastated homes. Upon sight of the English the poor people again fled incontinently to the woods, and Nuberry and his men destroyed their houses a second time.140
To control the Spanish trade routes was one of the main goals of English policy in the West Indies. This aim is evident in all of Cromwell's instructions to the leaders of the Jamaican initiative, and it appears again in his instructions from October 10, 1655, to Major-General Fortescue and Vice-Admiral Goodson. Fortescue was given the power to land troops on territory claimed by the Spaniards, to capture their forts, castles, and strongholds, and to pursue, kill, and destroy anyone who resisted him. The Vice-Admiral was to support him with his naval forces and do his best to seize all ships belonging to the King of Spain or his subjects in America.{93} The soldiers, as mentioned, were more eager to fight the Spaniards than to settle, and they soon got opportunities to prove themselves. Admiral Penn had left twelve ships under Goodson's command, and six of these were at sea capturing a few scattered Spanish prizes that helped pay for supplies sent from New England.134 However, Goodson was aiming for bigger targets, specifically the galleons or a Spanish town on the mainland. He didn't know where the galleons were, but by the end of July, he was watching with eight vessels in front of Cartagena and Porto Bello. On November 22, he sent Captain Blake with nine ships to that same coast to intercept any vessels coming from Spain or elsewhere. Unfortunately, the fleet was scattered by rough weather, and some ships returned on December 14 to refit, leaving a small number of frigates waiting for merchantmen reported to be in the area.135 The first town on the mainland to feel the impact of this new power in the Indies was Santa Marta, near Cartagena, in what is now the U.S. of Colombia. In late October, just a month before Blake's departure, Goodson sailed with a fleet of eight vessels to raid the Spanish coasts. According to one account, his original target had been Rio de la Hacha near the pearl fisheries, "but having missed his aim," he headed for Santa Marta instead. He landed 400 sailors and soldiers under the protection of his guns, captured and destroyed the two forts in his way, and entered the town. Finding that the inhabitants had already fled with as much of their belongings as they could carry, he pursued them about twelve miles inland; on his return, he looted and burned their homes, took thirty cannons and other spoils, and sailed back to Jamaica.136 It was a brave act with a small number of men, but the profits were much lower than expected. It was agreed that the seamen and soldiers would receive half of the spoils; however, when the proceeds were tallied, their share amounted to only £400, whereas the State took the thirty pieces of artillery and some powder, shot, hides, salt, and corn.137 Sedgwick wrote to Thurloe that "considering all that was gained for the State, it didn't even cover the costs of the powder and shot used in that operation."138 Sedgwick was one of the civil commissioners appointed for Jamaica's government. A brave, religious soldier with extensive experience and a commendable military record in Massachusetts, he did not agree with this style of warfare against the Spaniards. "This kind of raiding the West Indies trade by plundering and burning towns," he wrote, "though long practiced here, is not honorable for a royal navy, nor was it, I believe, the intended mission, though maybe it can be tolerated for now." If Cromwell aimed to achieve his original goal of blocking the Spanish treasure route, he wrote again, a permanent foothold must be secured in a significant Spanish fortress, either Cartagena or Havana, both heavily fortified and requiring a considerable army and fleet that Jamaica did not have at that time. But wasting and burning towns of lesser importance without holding them just extended the war indefinitely and provided little advantage or benefit to anyone.139 Captain Nuberry visited Santa Marta several weeks after Goodson's raid, and upon going ashore, he found that about a hundred people had dared to return and rebuild their destroyed homes. Upon seeing the English, the poor people fled once again into the woods, and Nuberry and his men destroyed their houses for a second time.140
On 5th April 1656 Goodson, with ten of his best ships, set sail again and steered eastward along the coast of Hispaniola as far as Alta Vela, hoping to meet with some Spanish ships reported in that region. Encountering none, he stood for the Main, and landed on 4th May with about 450 men at Rio de la Hacha. The story of the exploit is merely a repetition of what happened at Santa Marta. The people had sight of the English fleet six hours before it could drop anchor, and fled from the town to the hills and surrounding woods. Only twelve men were left behind to hold the fort, which the English stormed and took within half an hour. Four large brass cannon were carried to the ships and the fort partly demolished. The Spaniards pretended to parley for the ransom of their town, but when after a day's delay they gave no sign of complying with the admiral's demands, he burned the place on 8th May and sailed away.141 Goodson called again at Santa Marta on the 11th to get water, and on the 14th stood before Cartagena to view the harbour. Leaving three vessels to ply there, he returned to Jamaica, bringing back with him only two small prizes, one laden with wine, the other with cocoa.
On April 5, 1656, Goodson set sail again with ten of his best ships, heading east along the coast of Hispaniola as far as Alta Vela, hoping to encounter some Spanish ships reported in that area. Not finding any, he directed his course toward the mainland, landing on May 4 with about 450 men at Rio de la Hacha. The story of this operation is just a repetition of what happened at Santa Marta. The locals saw the English fleet six hours before it could anchor and fled to the hills and surrounding woods. Only twelve men stayed behind to defend the fort, which the English stormed and captured in half an hour. They took four large brass cannons to the ships and partially demolished the fort. The Spaniards pretended to negotiate for the ransom of their town, but after a day's delay with no signs of compliance with the admiral's demands, he burned the place on May 8 and sailed away.141 Goodson stopped at Santa Marta again on the 11th to get water, and on the 14th, he approached Cartagena to check out the harbor. He left three vessels there and returned to Jamaica, bringing back only two small prizes, one loaded with wine and the other with cocoa.
The seamen of the fleet, however, were restless and eager for further enterprises of this nature, and Goodson by the middle of June had fourteen of his vessels lying off the Cuban coast near Cape S. Antonio in wait for the galleons or the Flota, both of which fleets were then expected at Havana. His ambition to repeat the achievement {96} of Piet Heyn was fated never to be realised. The fleet of Terra-Firma, he soon learned, had sailed into Havana on 15th May, and on 13th June, three days before his arrival on that coast, had departed for Spain.142 Meanwhile, one of his own vessels, the "Arms of Holland," was blown up, with the loss of all on board but three men and the captain, and two other ships were disabled. Five of the fleet returned to England on 23rd August, and with the rest Goodson remained on the Cuban coast until the end of the month, watching in vain for the fleet from Vera Cruz which never sailed.143
The sailors in the fleet were restless and eager for more adventures like this, and by mid-June, Goodson had fourteen of his ships positioned off the Cuban coast near Cape S. Antonio, waiting for the galleons or the Flota, both of which fleets were expected in Havana. His ambition to replicate Piet Heyn's success was doomed to remain unfulfilled. He soon learned that the Terra-Firma fleet had entered Havana on May 15 and had set sail for Spain three days before he arrived on that coast, on June 13.142 In the meantime, one of his own ships, the "Arms of Holland," exploded, resulting in the loss of everyone on board except for three men and the captain, while two other ships were damaged. Five of the fleet returned to England on August 23, and Goodson stayed on the Cuban coast with the others until the end of the month, watching in vain for the fleet from Vera Cruz, which never set out.143
Colonel Edward Doyley, the officer who so promptly defeated the attempts of the Spaniards in 1657-58 to re-conquer Jamaica, was now governor of the island. He had sailed with the expedition to the West Indies as lieutenant-colonel in the regiment of General Venables, and on the death of Major-General Fortescue in November 1655 had been chosen by Cromwell's commissioners in Jamaica as commander-in-chief of the land forces. In May 1656 he was superseded by Robert Sedgwick, but the latter died within a few days, and Doyley petitioned the Protector to appoint him to the post. William Brayne, however, arrived from England in December 1656 to take chief command; and when he, like his two predecessors, was stricken down by disease nine months later, the place devolved permanently upon Doyley. Doyley was a very efficient governor, and although he has been accused of showing little regard or respect for planting and trade, the {97} charge appears to be unjust.144 He firmly maintained order among men disheartened and averse to settlement, and at the end of his service delivered up the colony a comparatively well-ordered and thriving community. He was confirmed in his post by Charles II. at the Restoration, but superseded by Lord Windsor in August 1661. Doyley's claim to distinction rests mainly upon his vigorous policy against the Spaniards, not only in defending Jamaica, but by encouraging privateers and carrying the war into the enemies' quarters. In July 1658, on learning from some prisoners that the galleons were in Porto Bello awaiting the plate from Panama, Doyley embarked 300 men on a fleet of five vessels and sent it to lie in an obscure bay between that port and Cartagena to intercept the Spanish ships. On 20th October the galleons were espied, twenty-nine vessels in all, fifteen galleons and fourteen stout merchantmen. Unfortunately, all the English vessels except the "Hector" and the "Marston Moor" were at that moment absent to obtain fresh water. Those two alone could do nothing, but passing helplessly through the Spaniards, hung on their rear and tried without success to scatter them. The English fleet later attacked and burnt the town of Tolu on the Main, capturing two Spanish ships in the road; and afterwards paid another visit to the unfortunate Santa Marta, where they remained three days, marching several miles into the country and burning and destroying everything in their path.145
Colonel Edward Doyley, the officer who quickly defeated the Spaniards' attempts to retake Jamaica in 1657-58, was now the governor of the island. He had joined the expedition to the West Indies as lieutenant-colonel in General Venables’ regiment, and after Major-General Fortescue died in November 1655, Cromwell's commissioners in Jamaica chose him as the commander-in-chief of the land forces. In May 1656, he was replaced by Robert Sedgwick, but Sedgwick died just a few days later, prompting Doyley to ask the Protector to appoint him to the position. William Brayne then arrived from England in December 1656 to take command; however, he also fell ill like his two predecessors nine months later, and the role passed permanently to Doyley. Doyley was a very effective governor, and although he has been criticized for not showing much regard for agriculture and trade, the charge seems unfair.{97}144 He maintained order among men who were discouraged and resistant to settling, and by the end of his term, he handed over a relatively well-organized and prosperous community. He was confirmed in his position by Charles II at the Restoration, but was replaced by Lord Windsor in August 1661. Doyley's reputation mainly stems from his strong stance against the Spaniards, not only in defending Jamaica but also by supporting privateers and taking the fight to the enemy. In July 1658, after learning from some prisoners that the galleons were in Porto Bello waiting for the silver from Panama, Doyley sent 300 men on a fleet of five vessels to hide in a secluded bay between that port and Cartagena to intercept the Spanish ships. On October 20th, they spotted the galleons—twenty-nine ships in total, with fifteen galleons and fourteen sturdy merchant vessels. Unfortunately, all of the English ships except the "Hector" and the "Marston Moor" were away at that time fetching fresh water. Those two alone were powerless to act, but they helplessly trailed behind the Spaniards and tried, without success, to break them apart. Later, the English fleet attacked and burned the town of Tolu on the Main, capturing two Spanish ships in the process, and then made another visit to the unfortunate Santa Marta, where they spent three days marching several miles inland and destroying everything in their way.145
On 23rd April 1659, however, there returned to Port Royal another expedition whose success realised the wildest dreams of avarice. Three frigates under command {98} of Captain Christopher Myngs,146 with 300 soldiers on board, had been sent by Doyley to harry the South American coast. They first entered and destroyed Cumana, and then ranging along the coast westward, landed again at Puerto Cabello and at Coro. At the latter town they followed the inhabitants into the woods, where besides other plunder they came upon twenty-two chests of royal treasure intended for the King of Spain, each chest containing 400 pounds of silver.147 Embarking this money and other spoil in the shape of plate, jewels and cocoa, they returned to Port Royal with the richest prize that ever entered Jamaica. The whole pillage was estimated at between £200,000 and £300,000.148 The abundance of new wealth introduced into Jamaica did much to raise the spirits of the colonists, and set the island well upon the road to more prosperous times. The sequel to this brilliant exploit, however, was in some ways unfortunate. Disputes were engendered between the officers of the expedition and the governor and other authorities on shore over the disposal of the booty, and in the early part of June 1659 Captain Myngs was sent home in the "Marston Moor," suspended for disobeying orders and plundering the hold of one of the prizes to the value of 12,000 pieces of eight. Myngs was an active, intrepid commander, but apparently avaricious and impatient of {99} control. He seems to have endeavoured to divert most of the prize money into the pockets of his officers and men, by disposing of the booty on his own initiative before giving a strict account of it to the governor or steward-general of the island. Doyley writes that there was a constant market aboard the "Marston Moor," and that Myngs and his officers, alleging it to be customary to break and plunder the holds, permitted the twenty-two chests of the King of Spain's silver to be divided among the men without any provision whatever for the claims of the State.149 There was also some friction over the disposal of six Dutch prizes which Doyley had picked up for illegal trading at Barbadoes on his way out from England. These, too, had been plundered before they reached Jamaica, and when Myngs found that there was no power in the colony to try and condemn ships taken by virtue of the Navigation Laws, it only added fuel to his dissatisfaction. When Myngs reached England he lodged counter-complaints against Governor Doyley, Burough, the steward-general, and Vice-Admiral Goodson, alleging that they received more than their share of the prize money; and a war of mutual recrimination followed.150 Amid the distractions of the Restoration, however, little seems ever to have been made of the matter in England. The insubordination of officers in 1659-60 was a constant source of difficulty and impediment to the governor in his efforts to establish peace and order in the colony. In England nobody was sure where the powers of government actually resided. As Burough wrote from Jamaica on 19th January 1660, "We are here just like you at home; when we heard of the Lord-Protector's {100} death we proclaimed his son, and when we heard of his being turned out we proclaimed a Parliament and now own a Committee of safety."151 The effect of this uncertainty was bound to be prejudicial in Jamaica, a new colony filled with adventurers, for it loosened the reins of authority and encouraged lawless spirits to set the governor at defiance.
On April 23, 1659, another expedition returned to Port Royal that fulfilled the most ambitious dreams of greed. Three frigates commanded by Captain Christopher Myngs, with 300 soldiers on board, had been sent by Doyley to raid the South American coast. They first entered and destroyed Cumana, then moved west along the coast, landing again at Puerto Cabello and at Coro. In Coro, they followed the locals into the woods, where they found twenty-two chests of royal treasure meant for the King of Spain, each containing 400 pounds of silver. They loaded this money and other loot, including plates, jewels, and cocoa, and returned to Port Royal with the richest prize ever to arrive in Jamaica. The total loot was estimated between £200,000 and £300,000. The influx of new wealth into Jamaica greatly boosted the spirits of the colonists and set the island on a path to more prosperous times. However, the aftermath of this remarkable exploit was somewhat unfortunate. Disputes arose between the officers of the expedition and the governor and other officials on shore over the distribution of the loot, and in early June 1659, Captain Myngs was sent back on the "Marston Moor," suspended for disobeying orders and robbing the hold of one of the captured ships valued at 12,000 pieces of eight. Myngs was an active, daring commander, but seemed greedy and impatient with authority. He appeared to try to funnel most of the prize money into the pockets of his officers and men by selling the loot on his own before giving a detailed account to the governor or steward-general of the island. Doyley reported that there was a constant market onboard the "Marston Moor," and that Myngs and his officers, claiming it was customary to break open and loot the holds, allowed the twenty-two chests of the King of Spain's silver to be divided among the crew without any consideration for the State's claims. There was also some tension over the handling of six Dutch prizes Doyley had captured for illegal trading in Barbados on his way from England. These had also been looted before reaching Jamaica, and when Myngs discovered there was no authority in the colony to try and convict ships based on the Navigation Laws, it only added to his frustration. When Myngs arrived in England, he filed complaints against Governor Doyley, Burough, the steward-general, and Vice-Admiral Goodson, claiming they took more than their fair share of the prize money, leading to a war of mutual accusations. Amid the chaos of the Restoration, though, it seems little was done about the issue in England. The insubordination of officers in 1659-60 was a constant hurdle for the governor in his attempts to establish peace and order in the colony. In England, no one was sure where the powers of government really lay. As Burough wrote from Jamaica on January 19, 1660, "We're just like you at home; when we heard about the Lord-Protector's death, we proclaimed his son, and when we heard he was ousted, we proclaimed a Parliament and now we recognize a Committee of Safety." This uncertainty was bound to create problems in Jamaica, a new colony filled with adventurers, as it weakened the authority and encouraged irresponsible individuals to defy the governor.
On 8th May 1660 Charles II. was proclaimed King of England, and entered London on 29th May. The war which Cromwell had begun with Spain was essentially a war of the Commonwealth. The Spanish court was therefore on friendly terms with the exiled prince, and when he returned into possession of his kingdom a cessation of hostilities with Spain naturally followed. Charles wrote a note to Don Luis de Haro on 2nd June 1660, proposing an armistice in Europe and America which was to lead to a permanent peace and a re-establishment of commercial relations between the two kingdoms.152 At the same time Sir Henry Bennett, the English resident in Madrid, made similar proposals to the Spanish king. A favourable answer was received in July, and the cessation of arms, including a revival of the treaty of 1630 was proclaimed on 10th-20th September 1660. Preliminary negotiations for a new treaty were entered upon at Madrid, but the marriage of Charles to Catherine of Braganza in 1662, and the consequent alliance with Portugal, with whom Spain was then at war, put a damper upon all such designs. The armistice with Spain was not published in Jamaica until 5th February of the following year. On 4th February Colonel Doyley received from the governor of St. Jago de Cuba a letter enclosing an order from Sir Henry Bennett for the cessation of arms, and this order Doyley immediately made public.153 {101} About thirty English prisoners were also returned by the Spaniards with the letter. Doyley was confirmed in his command of Jamaica by Charles II., but his commission was not issued till 8th February 1661.154 He was very desirous, however, of returning to England to look after his private affairs, and on 2nd August another commission was issued to Lord Windsor, appointing him as Doyley's successor.155 Just a year later, in August 1662, Windsor arrived at Port Royal, fortified with instructions "to endeavour to obtain and preserve a good correspondence and free commerce with the plantations belonging to the King of Spain," even resorting to force if necessary.156
On May 8, 1660, Charles II was declared King of England and entered London on May 29. The war that Cromwell started with Spain was primarily a conflict of the Commonwealth. Therefore, the Spanish court maintained good relations with the exiled prince, and when he reclaimed his kingdom, it naturally led to a halt in hostilities with Spain. On June 2, 1660, Charles wrote a letter to Don Luis de Haro suggesting a truce in Europe and America, aiming for a permanent peace and the restoration of trade between the two kingdoms.152 Meanwhile, Sir Henry Bennett, the English representative in Madrid, made similar proposals to the Spanish king. A positive response was received in July, and the ceasefire, which included the revival of the treaty of 1630, was announced on September 10-20, 1660. Initial discussions for a new treaty began in Madrid, but Charles's marriage to Catherine of Braganza in 1662 and the resulting alliance with Portugal, which was at war with Spain, hindered these plans. The truce with Spain was not announced in Jamaica until February 5 of the following year. On February 4, Colonel Doyley received a letter from the governor of St. Jago de Cuba that included an order from Sir Henry Bennett to cease hostilities, which Doyley promptly made public.153{101} About thirty English prisoners were also returned by the Spaniards along with the letter. Doyley was confirmed in his position as commander of Jamaica by Charles II, but his official appointment wasn't issued until February 8, 1661.154 However, he was eager to return to England to manage his personal affairs, and on August 2, another commission was issued to Lord Windsor, naming him as Doyley's successor.155 Just a year later, in August 1662, Windsor arrived at Port Royal, equipped with instructions "to work towards maintaining good relations and free trade with the plantations belonging to the King of Spain," even using force if necessary.156
The question of English trade with the Spanish colonies in the Indies had first come to the surface in the negotiations for the treaty of 1604, after the long wars between Elizabeth and Philip II. The endeavour of the Spaniards to obtain an explicit prohibition of commerce was met by the English demand for entire freedom. The Spaniards protested that it had never been granted in former treaties or to other nations, or even without restriction to Spanish subjects, and clamoured for at least a private article on the subject; but the English commissioners steadfastly refused, and offered to forbid trade only with ports actually under Spanish authority. Finally a compromise was reached in the words "in quibus ante bellum fuit commercium, juxta et secundum usum et observantiam."157 This article was renewed in Cottington's {102} Treaty of 1630. The Spaniards themselves, indeed, in 1630, were willing to concede a free navigation in the American seas, and even offered to recognise the English colony of Virginia if Charles I. would admit articles prohibiting trade and navigation in certain harbours and bays. Cottington, however, was too far-sighted, and wrote to Lord Dorchester: "For my own part, I shall ever be far from advising His Majesty to think of such restrictions, for certainly a little more time will open the navigation to those parts so long as there are no negative capitulations or articles to hinder it."158 The monopolistic pretensions of the Spanish government were evidently relaxing, for in 1634 the Conde de Humanes confided to the English agent, Taylor, that there had been talk in the Council of the Indies of admitting the English to a share in the freight of ships sent to the West Indies, and even of granting them a limited permission to go to those regions on their own account. And in 1637 the Conde de Linhares, recently appointed governor of Brazil, told the English ambassador, Lord Aston, that he was very anxious that English ships should do the carrying between Lisbon and Brazilian ports.
The issue of English trade with the Spanish colonies in the Indies first emerged during the negotiations for the treaty of 1604, following the lengthy conflicts between Elizabeth and Philip II. The Spaniards sought a clear ban on commerce, while the English insisted on complete freedom. The Spaniards argued that such freedom had never been granted in previous treaties or to other nations, nor even without restrictions for Spanish subjects, and demanded at least a private clause on the matter; however, the English commissioners firmly refused, agreeing only to ban trade with ports directly under Spanish control. Ultimately, a compromise was established with the wording "in quibus ante bellum fuit commercium, juxta et secundum usum et observantiam."157 This clause was reaffirmed in Cottington's Treaty of 1630. In fact, by 1630, the Spaniards were prepared to allow free navigation in the American seas and even proposed recognizing the English colony of Virginia if Charles I would accept articles prohibiting trade and navigation in certain harbors and bays. However, Cottington was too visionary and wrote to Lord Dorchester: "For my own part, I shall always be far from advising His Majesty to consider such restrictions, for surely a little more time will open up navigation to those areas as long as there are no negative agreements or articles to obstruct it."158 The monopolistic claims of the Spanish government were clearly starting to ease, as in 1634 the Conde de Humanes revealed to the English agent, Taylor, that there had been discussions in the Council of the Indies about allowing the English to participate in the freight of ships sent to the West Indies and even granting them limited permission to travel to those areas independently. In 1637, the Conde de Linhares, recently appointed governor of Brazil, informed the English ambassador, Lord Aston, that he was very eager for English ships to handle the transport between Lisbon and Brazilian ports.
The settlement of the Windward and Leeward Islands and the conquest of Jamaica had given a new impetus to contraband trade. The commercial nations were setting up shop, as it were, at the very doors of the Spanish Indies. The French and English Antilles, condemned by the Navigation Laws to confine themselves to agriculture and a passive trade with the home country, had no recourse but to traffic with their Spanish neighbours. {103} Factors of the Assiento established at Cartagena, Porto Bello and Vera Cruz every year supplied European merchants with detailed news of the nature and quantity of the goods which might be imported with advantage; while the buccaneers, by dominating the whole Caribbean Sea, hindered frequent communication between Spain and her colonies. It is not surprising, therefore, that the commerce of Seville, which had hitherto held its own, decreased with surprising rapidity, that the sailings of the galleons and the Flota were separated by several years, and that the fairs of Porto Bello and Vera Cruz were almost deserted. To put an effective restraint, moreover, upon this contraband trade was impossible on either side. The West Indian dependencies were situated far from the centre of authority, while the home governments generally had their hands too full of other matters to adequately control their subjects in America. The Spanish viceroys, meanwhile, and the governors in the West Indian Islands, connived at a practice which lined their own pockets with the gold of bribery, and at the same time contributed to the public interest and prosperity of their respective colonies. It was this illicit commerce with Spanish America which Charles II., by negotiation at Madrid and by instructions to his governors in the West Indies, tried to get within his own control. At the Spanish court, Fanshaw, Sandwich and Godolphin in turn were instructed to sue for a free trade with the Colonies. The Assiento of negroes was at this time held by two Genoese named Grillo and Lomelin, and with them the English ambassadors several times entered into negotiation for the privilege of supplying blacks from the English islands. By the treaty of 1670 the English colonies in America were for the first time formally recognised by the Spanish Crown. Freedom of commerce, however, was as far as ever from realisation, and after this date Charles {104} seems to have given up hope of ever obtaining it through diplomatic channels.
The settlement of the Windward and Leeward Islands and the takeover of Jamaica had sparked a boost in illegal trade. Trade nations were essentially setting up shop right at the doorsteps of the Spanish Indies. The French and English Antilles, restricted by the Navigation Laws to focus solely on agriculture and limited trading with their home country, had no choice but to engage in trade with their Spanish neighbors. {103} Factors of the Assiento established in Cartagena, Porto Bello, and Vera Cruz provided European merchants with regular updates on the types and amounts of goods that could be profitably imported; meanwhile, the buccaneers, by controlling the entire Caribbean Sea, disrupted frequent interactions between Spain and its colonies. So, it's not surprising that the commerce of Seville, which had previously thrived, began to decline rapidly, that the departures of the galleons and the Flota were spaced out by several years, and that the fairs of Porto Bello and Vera Cruz were nearly empty. Moreover, effectively curbing this illegal trade was impossible on either side. The West Indian territories were far from the center of authority, while home governments were generally too busy with other issues to properly oversee their subjects in America. The Spanish viceroys and governors in the West Indian Islands turned a blind eye to this practice, which lined their own pockets with bribery and simultaneously supported the public interest and prosperity of their colonies. It was this illegal trade with Spanish America that Charles II tried to control through negotiation in Madrid and by directing his governors in the West Indies. At the Spanish court, Fanshaw, Sandwich, and Godolphin were successively instructed to advocate for free trade with the Colonies. During this time, the Assiento of enslaved people was held by two Genoese named Grillo and Lomelin, and the English ambassadors engaged in negotiations with them multiple times for the right to supply enslaved individuals from the English islands. By the treaty of 1670, the Spanish Crown formally recognized the English colonies in America for the first time. However, the dream of free trade remained unrealized, and after this, Charles {104} seemed to lose hope of ever achieving it through diplomatic means.
The peace of 1660 between England and Spain was supposed to extend to both sides of the "Line." The Council in Jamaica, however, were of the opinion that it applied only to Europe,159 and from the tenor of Lord Windsor's instructions it may be inferred that the English Court at that time meant to interpret it with the same limitations. Windsor, indeed, was not only instructed to force the Spanish colonies to a free trade, but was empowered to call upon the governor of Barbadoes for aid "in case of any considerable attempt by the Spaniards against Jamaica."160 The efforts of the Governor, however, to come to a good correspondence with the Spanish colonies were fruitless. In the minutes of the Council of Jamaica of 20th August 1662, we read: "Resolved that the letters from the Governors of Porto Rico and San Domingo are an absolute denial of trade, and that according to His Majesty's instructions to Lord Windsor a trade by force or otherwise be endeavoured;"161 and under 12th September we find another resolution "that men be enlisted for a design by sea with the 'Centurion' and other vessels."162 This "design" was an expedition to capture and destroy St. Jago de Cuba, the Spanish port nearest to Jamaican shores. An attack upon St. Jago had been projected by Goodson as far back as 1655. "The Admiral," wrote Major Sedgwick to Thurloe just after his arrival in Jamaica, "was intended before our coming in to have taken some few soldiers and gone over to St. Jago de Cuba, a town upon Cuba, but our coming hindered him without whom we could not well tell how to do anything."163 In January 1656 the plan was definitely abandoned, because {105} the colony could not spare a sufficient number of soldiers for the enterprise.164 It was to St. Jago that the Spaniards, driven from Jamaica, mostly betook themselves, and from St. Jago as a starting-point had come the expedition of 1658 to reconquer the island. The instructions of Lord Windsor afforded a convenient opportunity to avenge past attacks and secure Jamaica from molestation in that quarter for the future. The command of the expedition was entrusted to Myngs, who in 1662 was again in the Indies on the frigate "Centurion." Myngs sailed from Port Royal on 21st September with eleven ships and 1300 men,165 but, kept back by unfavourable winds, did not sight the castle of St. Jago until 5th October. Although he had intended to force the entrance of the harbour, he was prevented by the prevailing land breeze; so he disembarked his men to windward, on a rocky coast, where the path up the bluffs was so narrow that but one man could march at a time. Night had fallen before all were landed, and "the way (was) soe difficult and the night soe dark that they were forced to make stands and fires, and their guides with brands in their hands, to beat the path."166 At daybreak they reached a plantation by a river's side, some six miles from the place of landing and three from St. Jago. There they refreshed themselves, and advancing upon the town surprised the enemy, who knew of the late landing and the badness of the way and did not expect them so soon. They found 200 Spaniards at the entrance to the town, drawn up under their governor, Don Pedro de Moralis, and supported by Don Christopher de Sasi Arnoldo, the former Spanish governor of Jamaica, with a reserve of 500 more. The Spaniards fled before the first charge of the Jamaicans, and the place was easily mastered.
The peace treaty of 1660 between England and Spain was supposed to apply to both sides of the "Line." However, the Council in Jamaica believed it only covered Europe,159 and from Lord Windsor's instructions, it can be inferred that the English Court at that time intended to interpret it with the same restrictions. Windsor was instructed not only to push the Spanish colonies for open trade but was also given the authority to ask the governor of Barbados for help "in case of any significant attempt by the Spaniards against Jamaica."160 However, the Governor's attempts to establish good relations with the Spanish colonies were unsuccessful. In the minutes of the Jamaica Council from August 20, 1662, we read: "Resolved that the letters from the Governors of Puerto Rico and San Domingo are a complete denial of trade, and according to His Majesty's instructions to Lord Windsor, trade by force or otherwise should be attempted;"161 and on September 12, there was another resolution stating "that men be recruited for a sea expedition with the 'Centurion' and other vessels."162 This "expedition" was planned to capture and destroy St. Jago de Cuba, the nearest Spanish port to Jamaica. An attack on St. Jago had been planned by Goodson as early as 1655. "The Admiral," Major Sedgwick wrote to Thurloe soon after arriving in Jamaica, "was supposed to have taken some soldiers and gone to St. Jago de Cuba, a town in Cuba, but our arrival stopped him, without whom we couldn't figure out how to proceed."163 In January 1656, the plan was ultimately scrapped because the colony couldn't spare enough soldiers for the mission.164 The Spaniards, driven from Jamaica, mainly sought refuge in St. Jago, and it was from St. Jago that the 1658 expedition to retake the island had originated. Lord Windsor's instructions provided a convenient chance to retaliate for past assaults and ensure Jamaica's security from that area in the future. The mission was given to Myngs, who was back in the Indies in 1662 on the frigate "Centurion." Myngs set sail from Port Royal on September 21 with eleven ships and 1300 men,165 but unfavorable winds delayed them until they finally spotted the castle of St. Jago on October 5. Although he had planned to force his way into the harbor, he couldn't due to the wind conditions, so he disembarked his men upwind, on a rocky shore, where the path up the cliffs was so narrow that only one person could march at a time. Night fell before everyone was landed, and "the way (was) so difficult and the night so dark that they had to stop and make fires, with their guides holding torches to light the path."166 At dawn, they reached a plantation by a river, about six miles from where they landed and three from St. Jago. They took a break there and then advanced on the town, catching the enemy off guard, who were aware of the recent landing and the challenging path but did not expect them so soon. They encountered 200 Spaniards at the town's entrance, lined up under their governor, Don Pedro de Moralis, with support from Don Christopher de Sasi Arnoldo, the former Spanish governor of Jamaica, and a reserve of 500 more. The Spaniards retreated at the first charge from the Jamaicans, and the town was easily taken.
The next day parties were despatched into the country to pursue the enemy, and orders sent to the fleet to attack the forts at the mouth of the harbour. This was successfully done, the Spaniards deserting the great castle after firing but two muskets. Between scouring the country for hidden riches, most of which had been carried far inland beyond their reach, and dismantling and demolishing the forts, the English forces occupied their time until October 19th. Thirty-four guns were found in the fortifications and 1000 barrels of powder. Some of the guns were carried to the ships and the rest flung over the precipice into the sea; while the powder was used to blow up the castle and the neighbouring country houses.167 The expedition returned to Jamaica on 22nd October.168 Only six men had been killed by the Spaniards, twenty more being lost by other "accidents." Of these twenty some must have been captured by the enemy, for when Sir Richard Fanshaw was appointed ambassador to Spain in January 1664, he was instructed among other things to negotiate for an exchange of prisoners taken in the Indies. In July we find him treating for the release of Captain Myngs' men from the prisons of Seville and Cadiz,169 and on 7th November an order to this effect was obtained from the King of Spain.170
The next day, teams were sent into the countryside to track down the enemy, and orders were given to the fleet to attack the forts at the harbor entrance. This was done successfully, with the Spaniards abandoning the large castle after firing just two muskets. While searching the area for hidden treasures, most of which had already been taken far inland, and taking apart the forts, the English forces kept busy until October 19th. Thirty-four cannons were discovered in the fortifications along with 1,000 barrels of gunpowder. Some of the cannons were transported to the ships, while the rest were thrown over the cliff into the sea; the gunpowder was used to blow up the castle and nearby country houses.167 The expedition returned to Jamaica on October 22nd.168 Only six men were killed by the Spaniards, while twenty more were lost due to other "accidents." Some of these twenty must have been captured by the enemy, because when Sir Richard Fanshaw was appointed ambassador to Spain in January 1664, he was tasked with negotiating for the exchange of prisoners taken in the Indies. In July, we find him negotiating for the release of Captain Myngs' men from the prisons in Seville and Cadiz,169 and on November 7th, an order to this effect was obtained from the King of Spain.170
The instructions of Lord Windsor gave him leave, as soon as he had settled the government in Jamaica, to appoint a deputy and return to England to confer with the King on colonial affairs. Windsor sailed for England on 28th October, and on the same day Sir Charles Lyttleton's commission as deputy-governor was read in the Jamaican Council.171 During his short sojourn of three months the {107} Governor had made considerable progress toward establishing an ordered constitution in the island. He disbanded the old army, and reorganised the military under a stricter discipline and better officers. He systematised legal procedure and the rules for the conveyance of property. He erected an Admiralty Court at Port Royal, and above all, probably in pursuance of the recommendation of Colonel Doyley,172 had called in all the privateering commissions issued by previous governors, and tried to submit the captains to orderly rules by giving them new commissions, with instructions to bring their Spanish prizes to Jamaica for judicature.173
The instructions from Lord Windsor allowed him, once he established the government in Jamaica, to appoint a deputy and head back to England to discuss colonial affairs with the King. Windsor set sail for England on October 28, and on the same day, Sir Charles Lyttleton's commission as deputy-governor was announced in the Jamaican Council.171 During his brief three-month stay, the Governor made significant strides toward creating a structured constitution on the island. He disbanded the old army and reorganized the military under stricter discipline and better officers. He standardized legal procedures and property transfer rules. He established an Admiralty Court in Port Royal and, most importantly, likely following Colonel Doyley's recommendation,172 recalled all privateering commissions issued by previous governors and aimed to bring the captains under orderly regulations by issuing them new commissions, directing them to bring their Spanish prizes to Jamaica for legal judgment.173
The departure of Windsor did not put a stop to the efforts of the Jamaicans to "force a trade" with the Spanish plantations, and we find the Council, on 11th December 1662, passing a motion that to this end an attempt should be made to leeward on the coasts of Cuba, Honduras and the Gulf of Campeache. On 9th and 10th January between 1500 and 1600 soldiers, many of them doubtless buccaneers, were embarked on a fleet of twelve ships and sailed two days later under command of the redoubtable Myngs. About ninety leagues this side of Campeache the fleet ran into a great storm, in which one of the vessels foundered and three others were separated from their fellows. The English reached the coast of Campeache, however, in the early morning of Friday, 9th February, and landing a league and a half from the town, marched without being seen along an Indian path with "such speed and good fortune" that by ten o'clock in the morning they were already masters of the city and of all the forts save one, the Castle of Santa Cruz. At the second fort Myngs was wounded by a gun in three places. The town itself, Myngs reported, might have been defended like a fortress, for the houses {108} were contiguous and strongly built of stone with flat roofs.174 The forts were partly demolished, a portion of the town was destroyed by fire, and the fourteen sail lying in the harbour were seized by the invaders. Altogether the booty must have been considerable. The Spanish licentiate, Maldonado de Aldana, placed it at 150,000 pieces of eight,175 and the general damage to the city in the destruction of houses and munitions by the enemy, and in the expenditure of treasure for purposes of defence, at half a million more. Myngs and his fleet sailed away on 23rd February, but the "Centurion" did not reach Port Royal until 13th April, and the rest of the fleet followed a few days later. The number of casualties on each side was surprisingly small. The invaders lost only thirty men killed, and the Spaniards between fifty and sixty, but among the latter were the two alcaldes and many other officers and prominent citizens of the town.176
The departure of Windsor didn’t stop the Jamaicans from trying to "force a trade" with the Spanish plantations. On December 11, 1662, the Council decided that they should make an attempt along the coast of Cuba, Honduras, and the Gulf of Campeache. On January 9 and 10, about 1500 to 1600 soldiers, many likely buccaneers, were put on a fleet of twelve ships and sailed two days later under the command of the formidable Myngs. About ninety leagues from Campeache, the fleet encountered a severe storm, causing one ship to sink and three others to be separated from the group. However, the English reached the coast of Campeache early on the morning of February 9, landing a mile and a half from the town. They marched unseen along an Indian path with "such speed and good fortune" that by ten o'clock they had already taken control of the city and all the forts except for one, the Castle of Santa Cruz. Myngs was wounded in three places by a gun at the second fort. He reported that the town could have been defended like a fortress since the houses were close together and strongly built of stone with flat roofs. The forts were partly destroyed, a portion of the town was burned down, and the fourteen ships in the harbor were captured by the invaders. The total amount of loot was significant. The Spanish licentiate, Maldonado de Aldana, estimated it at 150,000 pieces of eight, and the overall damage to the city from the destruction of buildings and munitions, as well as the money spent on defense, at around half a million more. Myngs and his fleet left on February 23, but the "Centurion" didn’t reach Port Royal until April 13, and the rest of the fleet followed a few days later. The number of casualties on both sides was surprisingly low. The invaders lost only thirty men, while the Spaniards lost between fifty and sixty, including two alcaldes and many other officials and prominent citizens of the town.
To satisfactorily explain at Madrid these two presumptuous assaults upon Spanish territory in America {109} was an embarrassing problem for the English Government, especially as Myngs' men imprisoned at Seville and Cadiz were said to have produced commissions to justify their actions.177 The Spanish king instructed his resident in London to demand whether Charles accepted responsibility for the attack upon St. Jago, and the proceedings of English cases in the Spanish courts arising from the depredations of Galician corsairs were indefinitely suspended.178 When, however, there followed upon this, in May 1663, the news of the sack and burning of Campeache, it stirred up the greatest excitement in Madrid.179 Orders and, what was rarer in Spain, money were immediately sent to Cadiz to the Duke of Albuquerque to hasten the work on the royal Armada for despatch to the Indies; and efforts were made to resuscitate the defunct Armada de Barlovento, a small fleet which had formerly been used to catch interlopers and protect the coasts of Terra-Firma. In one way the capture of Campeache had touched Spain in her most vulnerable spot. The Mexican Flota, which was scheduled to sail from Havana in June 1663, refused to stir from its retreat at Vera Cruz until the galleons from Porto Bello came to convoy it. The arrival of the American treasure in Spain was thus delayed for two months, and the bankrupt government put to sore straits for money.
To adequately explain in Madrid these two bold attacks on Spanish territory in America {109} was a tricky issue for the English Government, especially since Myngs' men, who were imprisoned in Seville and Cadiz, allegedly had documents to justify their actions.177 The Spanish king instructed his representative in London to ask whether Charles was taking responsibility for the attack on St. Jago, and the cases involving English parties in the Spanish courts due to the actions of Galician corsairs were indefinitely put on hold.178 However, when news broke in May 1663 about the looting and burning of Campeche, it caused a massive stir in Madrid.179 Orders and, what was unusual in Spain, funding were quickly sent to Cadiz for the Duke of Albuquerque to speed up the preparations for the royal Armada to be dispatched to the Indies; and efforts were made to revive the defunct Armada de Barlovento, a small fleet that had previously been used to catch interlopers and protect the coasts of Terra-Firma. In a way, the capture of Campeche had struck Spain in its most vulnerable area. The Mexican Flota, which was set to leave Havana in June 1663, refused to move from its safe spot at Vera Cruz until the galleons from Porto Bello arrived to escort it. This delay pushed back the arrival of the American treasure to Spain by two months, leaving the already bankrupt government in a tight financial situation.
The activity of the Spaniards, however, was merely a blind to hide their own impotence, and their clamours were eventually satisfied by the King of England's writing to Deputy-Governor Lyttleton a letter forbidding all such undertakings for the future. The text of the letter is as follows: "Understanding with what jealousy and offence the Spaniards look upon our island of Jamaica, and how disposed they are to make some attempt upon it, and {110} knowing how disabled it will remain in its own defence if encouragement be given to such undertakings as have lately been set on foot, and are yet pursued, and which divert the inhabitants from that industry which alone can render the island considerable, the king signifies his dislike of all such undertakings, and commands that no such be pursued for the future, but that they unitedly apply themselves to the improvement of the plantation and keeping the force in proper condition."180 The original draft of the letter was much milder in tone, and betrays the real attitude of Charles II. toward these half-piratical enterprises: "His Majesty has heard of the success of the undertaking upon Cuba, in which he cannot choose but please himself in the vigour and resolution wherein it was performed ... but because His Majesty cannot foresee any utility likely to arise thereby ... he has thought fit hereby to command him to give no encouragement to such undertakings unless they may be performed by the frigates or men-of-war attending that place without any addition from the soldiers or inhabitants."181 Other letters were subsequently sent to Jamaica, which made it clear that the war of the privateers was not intended to be called off by the king's instructions; and Sir Charles Lyttleton, therefore, did not recall their commissions. Nevertheless, in the early part of 1664, the assembly in Jamaica passed an act prohibiting public levies of men upon foreign designs, and forbidding any person to leave the island on any such design without first obtaining leave from the governor, council and assembly.182
The actions of the Spaniards, though, were just a cover for their own weakness, and their demands were eventually met when the King of England wrote to Deputy-Governor Lyttleton with a letter banning all such efforts in the future. The letter states: "Understanding how jealously and offensively the Spaniards view our island of Jamaica, and their willingness to attempt something against it, and {110} knowing how vulnerable it will be in its defense if support is given to the recent operations that have been initiated and are still ongoing, which distract the inhabitants from the work that is essential for making the island significant, the king expresses his disapproval of such activities and orders that none should be carried out in the future, but that they should all focus on improving the plantation and maintaining the military force effectively."180 The original draft of the letter was much softer in tone and reveals King Charles II's actual attitude towards these semi-piratical ventures: "His Majesty has heard of the success of the operation in Cuba, which he cannot help but feel pleased about because of the energy and determination with which it was executed... but since His Majesty cannot foresee any benefits likely to come from it... he has deemed it fitting to command that no support be given to such ventures unless they can be carried out by the frigates or warships present there without any extra help from soldiers or locals."181 Other letters were later sent to Jamaica that clarified the king's instructions did not aim to halt the privateers' war; therefore, Sir Charles Lyttleton did not revoke their commissions. However, in early 1664, the assembly in Jamaica passed a law prohibiting the public conscription of men for foreign missions and forbidding anyone from leaving the island for such purposes without first getting permission from the governor, council, and assembly.182
When the instructions of the authorities at home were so ambiguous, and the incentives to corsairing so alluring, it was natural that this game of baiting the Spaniards {111} should suffer little interruption. English freebooters who had formerly made Hispaniola and Tortuga their headquarters now resorted to Jamaica, where they found a cordial welcome and a better market for their plunder. Thus in June 1663 a certain Captain Barnard sailed from Port Royal to the Orinoco, took and plundered the town of Santo Tomas and returned in the following March.183 On 19th October another privateer named Captain Cooper brought into Port Royal two Spanish prizes, the larger of which, the "Maria" of Seville, was a royal azogue and carried 1000 quintals of quicksilver for the King of Spain's mines in Mexico, besides oil, wine and olives.184 Cooper in his fight with the smaller vessel so disabled his own ship that he was forced to abandon it and enter the prize; and it was while cruising off Hispaniola in this prize that he fell in with the "Maria," and captured her after a four hours' combat. There were seventy prisoners, among them a number of friars going to Campeache and Vera Cruz. Some of the prize goods were carried to England, and Don Patricio Moledi, the Spanish resident in London, importuned the English government for its restoration.185 Sir Charles Lyttleton had sailed for England on 2nd May 1664, leaving the government of Jamaica in the hands of the Council with Colonel Thomas Lynch as president;186 and on his arrival in England he made formal answer to the complaints of Moledi. His excuse was that Captain Cooper's commission had been derived not from the deputy-governor himself but from Lord Windsor; and that the deputy-governor had never received any order from the king for recalling commissions, or for the cessation of hostilities against the Spaniards.187 Lyttleton {112} and the English government were evidently attempting the rather difficult circus feat of riding two mounts at the same time. The instructions from England, as Lyttleton himself acknowledged in his letter of 15th October 1663, distinctly forbade further hostilities against the Spanish plantations; on the other hand, there were no specific orders that privateers should be recalled. Lyttleton was from first to last in sympathy with the freebooters, and probably believed with many others of his time that "the Spaniard is most pliable when best beaten." In August 1664 he presented to the Lord Chancellor his reasons for advocating a continuance of the privateers in Jamaica. They are sufficiently interesting to merit a résumé of the principal points advanced. 1st. Privateering maintained a great number of seamen by whom the island was protected without the immediate necessity of a naval force. 2nd. If privateering were forbidden, the king would lose many men who, in case of a war in the West Indies, would be of incalculable service, being acquainted, as they were, with the coasts, shoals, currents, winds, etc., of the Spanish dominions. 3rd. Without the privateers, the Jamaicans would have no intelligence of Spanish designs against them, or of the size or neighbourhood of their fleets, or of the strength of their resources. 4th. If prize-goods were no longer brought into Port Royal, few merchants would resort to Jamaica and prices would become excessively high. 5th. To reduce the privateers would require a large number of frigates at considerable trouble and expense; English seamen, moreover, generally had the privateering spirit and would be more ready to join with them than oppose them, as previous experience had shown. Finally, the privateers, if denied the freedom of Jamaican ports, would not take to planting, but would resort to the islands of other nations, and perhaps prey upon English commerce.188
When the instructions from the authorities back home were so unclear, and the temptations of piracy so appealing, it was only natural that this game of baiting the Spaniards {111} would experience little disruption. English pirates, who had previously made Hispaniola and Tortuga their bases, now turned to Jamaica, where they were warmly welcomed and found a better market for their loot. Thus, in June 1663, a certain Captain Barnard sailed from Port Royal to the Orinoco, raided and plundered the town of Santo Tomas, and returned the following March.183 On October 19, another privateer named Captain Cooper brought two Spanish prizes into Port Royal, the larger of which, the "Maria" from Seville, carried a royal azogue and 1000 quintals of quicksilver meant for the King of Spain's mines in Mexico, as well as oil, wine, and olives.184 In his confrontation with the smaller vessel, Cooper severely damaged his own ship, forcing him to abandon it and board the prize; and it was while cruising off Hispaniola in this prize that he encountered the "Maria" and captured her after a four-hour battle. There were seventy prisoners, including several friars heading to Campeache and Vera Cruz. Some of the captured goods were sent to England, and Don Patricio Moledi, the Spanish resident in London, urged the English government to return them.185 Sir Charles Lyttleton had sailed for England on May 2, 1664, leaving Jamaica's government in the hands of the Council with Colonel Thomas Lynch as president;186 and upon arriving in England, he formally responded to Moledi's complaints. He claimed that Captain Cooper's commission had come not from the deputy-governor but from Lord Windsor; and that the deputy-governor had never received any royal orders to revoke commissions or halt hostilities against the Spaniards.187 Lyttleton {112} and the English government were evidently attempting the tricky act of trying to please both sides at once. The instructions from England, as Lyttleton himself acknowledged in his letter of October 15, 1663, clearly prohibited further hostilities against Spanish territories; however, there were no specific orders to recall privateers. Lyttleton was always sympathetic to the pirates and likely believed, like many others of his time, that "the Spaniard is most pliable when best beaten." In August 1664, he presented his case for continuing the privateers in Jamaica to the Lord Chancellor. His arguments were interesting enough to deserve a résumé of the main points made. 1st. Privateering provided a great number of sailors who protected the island without the immediate need for a naval force. 2nd. If privateering were banned, the king would lose many men who would be invaluable in the event of a war in the West Indies, as they were familiar with the coasts, shoals, currents, winds, etc., of the Spanish territories. 3rd. Without privateers, the people of Jamaica would have no information about Spanish plans against them, the size or location of their fleets, or the strength of their resources. 4th. If prize-goods were no longer brought into Port Royal, few merchants would come to Jamaica, and prices would skyrocket. 5th. Reducing the number of privateers would require many frigates, which would be a significant hassle and expense; English sailors, furthermore, generally had a privateering spirit and would be more inclined to join them than fight against them, as previous experiences had shown. Finally, if denied access to Jamaican ports, the privateers would not turn to farming but would go to other nations' islands and might prey on English commerce.188
Footnote 119: (return)Venables was not bound by his instructions to any definite plan. It had been proposed, he was told, to seize Hispaniola or Porto Rico or both, after which either Cartagena or Havana might be taken, and the Spanish revenue-fleets obstructed. An alternative scheme was to make the first attempt on the mainland at some point between the mouth of the Orinoco and Porto Bello, with the ultimate object of securing Cartagena. It was left to Venables, however, to consult with Admiral Penn and three commissioners, Edward Winslow (former governor of Plymouth colony in New England), Daniel Searle (governor of Barbadoes), and Gregory Butler, as to which, if any, of these schemes should be carried out. Not until some time after the arrival of the fleet at Barbadoes was it resolved to attack Hispaniola. (Narrative of Gen. Venables, edition 1900, pp. x, 112-3.)
Venables wasn't committed to any specific plan according to his instructions. He was told that there were suggestions to take Hispaniola or Puerto Rico, or both, after which they could capture Cartagena or Havana and disrupt the Spanish revenue fleets. Another option was to start by attacking the mainland at a point between the mouth of the Orinoco and Porto Bello, ultimately aiming to secure Cartagena. However, it was up to Venables to discuss with Admiral Penn and three commissioners—Edward Winslow (the former governor of Plymouth colony in New England), Daniel Searle (governor of Barbados), and Gregory Butler—about which, if any, of these plans should be carried out. It wasn't until some time after the fleet arrived in Barbados that they decided to pursue Hispaniola. (Narrative of Gen. Venables, edition 1900, pp. x, 112-3.)
Footnote 120: (return)Gardiner: Hist. of the Commonwealth and Protectorate, vol. iii. ch. xlv.; Narrative of Gen. Venables.
Gardiner: History of the Commonwealth and Protectorate, vol. iii, ch. xlv; Narrative of General Venables.
Footnote 122: (return)Cf. the "Commission of the Commissioners for the West Indian Expedition." (Narrative of Gen. Venables, p. 109.)
See the "Commission of the Commissioners for the West Indian Expedition." (Narrative of Gen. Venables, p. 109.)
Footnote 123: (return)Cf. American Hist. Review, vol. iv. p. 228; "Instructions unto Gen. Robt. Venables." (Narrative of Gen. Venables, p. 111.)
Compare. American Historical Review, vol. 4, p. 228; "Instructions to Gen. Robt. Venables." (Narrative of Gen. Venables, p. 111.)
Footnote 124: (return)Cf. Narrative of Gen. Venables, pp. 3, 90; "Instructions unto Generall Penn," etc., ibid., p. 107.
See: Narrative of Gen. Venables, pp. 3, 90; "Instructions to General Penn," etc., ibid., p. 107.
After the outbreak of the Spanish war, Cromwell was anxious to clear his government of the charges of treachery and violation of international duties. The task was entrusted to the Latin Secretary, John Milton, who on 26th October 1655 published a manifesto defending the actions of the Commonwealth. He gave two principal reasons for the attempt upon the West Indies:—(1) the cruelties of the Spaniards toward the English in America and their depredations on English colonies and trade; (2) the outrageous treatment and extermination of the Indians. He denied the Spanish claims to all of America, either as a papal gift, or by right of discovery alone, or even by right of settlement, and insisted upon both the natural and treaty rights of Englishmen to trade in Spanish seas.
Following the start of the Spanish war, Cromwell aimed to clear his government of accusations of treachery and breaches of international obligations. He tasked the Latin Secretary, John Milton, with this responsibility, leading to the publication of a manifesto on October 26, 1655, that defended the Commonwealth's actions. Milton provided two main reasons for the attempt on the West Indies: (1) the brutal treatment of the English in America by the Spaniards and their assaults on English colonies and trade; (2) the terrible treatment and extermination of the Indigenous people. He dismissed Spanish claims to all of America, whether based on a Papal grant, the right of discovery alone, or the right of settlement, and asserted both the natural and treaty rights of Englishmen to trade in Spanish waters.
Footnote 125: (return)The memory of the exploits of Drake and his contemporaries was not allowed to die in the first half of the seventeenth century. Books like "Sir Francis Drake Revived," and "The World encompassed by Sir Francis Drake," were printed time and time again. The former was published in 1626 and again two years later; "The World Encompassed" first appeared in 1628 and was reprinted in 1635 and 1653. A quotation from the title-page of the latter may serve to illustrate the temper of the times:—
The memory of Drake's adventures and those of his contemporaries was preserved during the first half of the seventeenth century. Books such as "Sir Francis Drake Revived" and "The World Encompassed by Sir Francis Drake" were published multiple times. The first was released in 1626 and again two years later; "The World Encompassed" was first published in 1628 and reprinted in 1635 and 1653. A line from the title page of the latter reflects the spirit of that era:—
Drake, Sir Francis. The world encompassed. Being his next voyage to that to Nombre de Dios, formerly imprinted ... offered ... especially for the stirring up of heroick spirits, to benefit their country and eternize their names by like bold attempts. Lon. 1628.
Drake, Sir Francis. The world encompassed. This is his next voyage after the one to Nombre de Dios, previously published ... aimed ... particularly at inspiring heroic spirits to serve their country and immortalize their names through similar daring endeavors. Lon. 1628.
Cf. also Gardiner, op. cit., iii. pp. 343-44.
Cf. also Gardiner, op. cit., iii. pp. 343-44.
Footnote 126: (return)Gardiner, op. cit., iii. p. 346; cf. also "Present State of Jamaica, 1683."
Gardiner, op. cit., vol. III, p. 346; see also "Present State of Jamaica, 1683."
Footnote 127: (return)Long: "History of Jamaica," i. p. 260; C.S.P. Colon., 1675-76. Addenda, No. 274.
Long: "History of Jamaica," vol. 1, p. 260; C.S.P. Colon., 1675-76. Addenda, No. 274.
Footnote 129: (return)Ibid.; Thurloe Papers, VI. p. 540; vii. p. 260; "Present State of Jamaica, 1683"; C.S.P. Colon., 1675-76. Addenda, Nos. 303-308.
Same source.; Thurloe Papers, Volume VI, page 540; Volume VII, page 260; "Current Situation in Jamaica, 1683"; C.S.P. Colon., 1675-76. Addenda, Numbers 303-308.
Footnote 130: (return)Long, op. cit., i. p. 245; C.S.P. Colon., 1675-76. Addenda, Nos. 236, 261, 276, etc.
Long, op. cit., i. p. 245; C.S.P. Colon., 1675-76. Addenda, Nos. 236, 261, 276, etc.
The conditions in Jamaica directly after its capture are in remarkable contrast to what might have been expected after reading the enthusiastic descriptions of the island, its climate, soil and products, left us by Englishmen who visited it. Jackson in 1643 compared it with the Arcadian plains and Thessalien Tempe, and many of his men wanted to remain and live with the Spaniards. See also the description of Jamaica contained in the Rawlinson MSS. and written just after the arrival of the English army:—"As for the country ... more than this." (Narrative of Gen. Venables, pp. 138-9.)
The situation in Jamaica right after it was captured is very different from what you might expect based on the enthusiastic descriptions of the island, its climate, soil, and resources from English visitors. Jackson in 1643 compared it to the beautiful plains and Thessalian Tempe, and many of his men expressed a wish to stay and live with the Spaniards. Also, check out the description of Jamaica in the Rawlinson MSS., written soon after the English army's arrival:—"As for the country ... more than this." (Narrative of Gen. Venables, pp. 138-9.)
Footnote 131: (return)C.S.P. Colon., 1675-76. Addenda, Nos. 229, 232; Lucas: Historical Geography of the British Colonies, ii. p. 101, and note.
C.S.P. Colon., 1675-76. Addenda, Nos. 229, 232; Lucas: Historical Geography of the British Colonies, vol. ii, p. 101, and note.
Footnote 133: (return)C.S.P. Colon., 1675-76. Addenda, Nos. 230, 231. Fortescue was Gen. Venables' successor in Jamaica.
C.S.P. Colon., 1675-76. Addenda, Nos. 230, 231. Fortescue succeeded Gen. Venables in Jamaica.
Footnote 134: (return)Ibid., No. 218; Long, op. cit., i. p. 262.
Ibid., No. 218; Long, op. cit., i. p. 262.
Footnote 135: (return)C.S.P. Colon., 1675-76. Addenda, Nos. 218, 252; Thurloe Papers, IV. pp. 451, 457.
C.S.P. Colon., 1675-76. Addenda, Nos. 218, 252; Thurloe Papers, IV. pp. 451, 457.
Footnote 137: (return)C.S.P. Colon., 1675-76. Addenda, No. 236.
C.S.P. Colon., 1675-76. Addenda, No. 236.
Footnote 142: (return)This was the treasure fleet which Captain Stayner's ship and two other frigates captured off Cadiz on 9th September. Six galleons were captured, sunk or burnt, with no less than £600,000 of gold and silver. The galleons which Blake burnt in the harbour of Santa Cruz, on 20th April 1657, were doubtless the Mexican fleet for which Admiral Goodson vainly waited before Havana in the previous summer.
This was the treasure fleet that Captain Stayner's ship and two other frigates seized off Cadiz on September 9th. They captured, sank, or burned six galleons, totaling £600,000 in gold and silver. The galleons that Blake set on fire in the harbor of Santa Cruz on April 20, 1657, were probably the Mexican fleet that Admiral Goodson had been waiting for in vain the summer before near Havana.
Footnote 143: (return)C.S.P. Colon., 1675-76, Addenda, Nos. 260, 263, 266, 270, 275; Thurloe Papers, V. p. 340.
C.S.P. Colon., 1675-76, Addenda, Nos. 260, 263, 266, 270, 275; Thurloe Papers, V. p. 340.
Footnote 144: (return)Cf. Brit. Mus., Add. MSS., 12,430: Journal of Col. Beeston. Col. Beeston seems to have harboured a peculiar spite against Doyley. For the contrary view of Doyley, cf. Long, op. cit., i. p. 284.
See Brit. Mus., Add. MSS., 12,430: Journal of Col. Beeston. Col. Beeston seems to have had a personal vendetta against Doyley. For a different viewpoint on Doyley, see Long, op. cit., i. p. 284.
Footnote 145: (return)C.S.P. Colon., 1675-76. Addenda., Nos. 309, 310. In these letters the towns are called "Tralo" and "St. Mark." Cf. also Thurloe Papers, VII. p. 340.
C.S.P. Colon., 1675-76. Addenda., Nos. 309, 310. In these letters, the towns are mentioned as "Tralo" and "St. Mark." See also Thurloe Papers, VII. p. 340.
Footnote 146: (return)Captain Christopher Myngs had been appointed to the "Marston Moor," a frigate of fifty-four guns, in October 1654, and had seen two years' service in the West Indies under Goodson in 1656 and 1657. In May 1656 he took part in the sack of Rio de la Hacha. In July 1657 the "Marston Moor" returned to England and was ordered to be refitted, but by 20th February 1658 Myngs and his frigate were again at Port Royal (C.S.P. Colon., 1675-76, Addenda, Nos. 295, 297). After Admiral Goodson's return to England (Ibid., No. 1202) Myngs seems to have been the chief naval officer in the West Indies, and greatly distinguished himself in his naval actions against the Spaniards.
Captain Christopher Myngs was assigned to the "Marston Moor," a frigate with fifty-four guns, in October 1654. He served for two years in the West Indies under Goodson during 1656 and 1657. In May 1656, he took part in the raid on Rio de la Hacha. By July 1657, the "Marston Moor" had returned to England for repairs, but by February 20, 1658, Myngs and his frigate were back at Port Royal (C.S.P. Colon., 1675-76, Addenda, Nos. 295, 297). After Admiral Goodson went back to England (Ibid., No. 1202), Myngs seemed to be the leading naval officer in the West Indies, earning a strong reputation in his battles against the Spaniards.
Footnote 148: (return)C.S.P. Colon., 1675-76, Addenda, Nos. 315, 316. Some figures put it as high as £500,000.
C.S.P. Colon., 1675-76, Addenda, Nos. 315, 316. Some estimates suggest it was as high as £500,000.
Footnote 149: (return)C.S.P. Colon., 1675-76, Addenda, Nos. 315, 318. Captain Wm. Dalyson wrote home, on 23rd January 1659/60, that he verily believed if the General (Doyley) were at home to answer for himself, Captain Myngs would be found no better than he is, a proud-speaking vain fool, and a knave in cheating the State and robbing merchants. Ibid., No. 328.
C.S.P. Colon., 1675-76, Addenda, Nos. 315, 318. Captain Wm. Dalyson wrote home on January 23, 1659/60, expressing his strong belief that if General Doyley were at home to defend himself, Captain Myngs would prove to be just as terrible, an arrogant, vain fool, and a scam artist for deceiving the State and stealing from merchants. Ibid., No. 328.
Footnote 151: (return)C.S.P. Colon., 1675-76, Addenda, No. 326.
C.S.P. Colon., 1675-76, Addenda, No. 326.
Footnote 156: (return)Ibid., Nos. 259, 278. In Lord Windsor's original instructions of 21st March 1662 he was empowered to search ships suspected of trading with the Spaniards and to adjudicate the same in the Admiralty Court. A fortnight later, however, the King and Council seem to have completely changed their point of view, and this too in spite of the Navigation Laws which prohibited the colonies from trading with any but the mother-country.
Ibid., Nos. 259, 278. In Lord Windsor's original instructions from March 21, 1662, he was granted the power to search ships suspected of trading with the Spaniards and to manage these cases in the Admiralty Court. However, two weeks later, the King and Council seemingly changed their stance completely, even though the Navigation Laws prohibited the colonies from trading with anyone other than the mother country.
Footnote 157: (return)Art. ix. of the treaty. Cf. Dumont: Corps diplomatique, T.V., pt. ii. p. 625. Cf. also C.S.P. Venetian, 1604, p. 189:—"I wished to hear from His Majesty's own lips" (wrote the Venetian ambassador in November 1604), "how he read the clause about the India navigation, and I said, 'Sire, your subjects may trade with Spain and Flanders but not with the Indies.' 'Why not?' said the King. 'Because,' I replied, 'the clause is read in that sense.' 'They are making a great error, whoever they are that hold this view,' said His Majesty; 'the meaning is quite clear.'"
Article IX of the treaty. See Dumont: Diplomatic Corps, Vol. V, Part II, p. 625. Also see C.S.P. Venetian, 1604, p. 189:—"I wanted to hear directly from His Majesty" (wrote the Venetian ambassador in November 1604), "how he understood the clause about navigation to India, and I said, 'Sire, your subjects can trade with Spain and Flanders but not with the Indies.' 'Why not?' asked the King. 'Because,' I replied, 'that's how the clause is interpreted.' 'Anyone who thinks this is making a big mistake,' said His Majesty; 'the meaning is very clear.'
Footnote 166: (return)Calendar of the Heathcote MSS. (pr. by Hist. MSS. Commiss.), p. 34.
Calendar of the Heathcote MSS. (published by Hist. MSS. Commiss.), p. 34.
Footnote 167: (return)Calendar of the Heathcote MSS., p. 34. Cf. also C.S.P. Colon., 1661-68, No. 384:—"An act for the sale of five copper guns taken at St. Jago de Cuba."
Calendar of the Heathcote MSS., p. 34. Also, see C.S.P. Colon., 1661-68, No. 384:—"A law for selling five copper cannons captured at St. Jago de Cuba."
Footnote 172: (return)Brit. Mus., Add. MSS., 11,410, f. 16.
British Museum, Additional Manuscripts, 11,410, page 16.
Footnote 174: (return)Dampier also says of Campeache that "it makes a fine show, being built all with good stone ... the roofs flattish after the Spanish fashion, and covered with pantile."—Ed. 1906, ii. p. 147.
Dampier also talks about Campeache, saying that "it looks impressive, built completely with quality stone... the roofs are flat in the Spanish style and covered with pantiles."—Ed. 1906, ii. p. 147.
Footnote 175: (return)However, the writer of the "Present State of Jamaica" says (p. 39) that Myngs got no great plunder, neither at Campeache nor at St. Jago.
However, the writer of the "Present State of Jamaica" mentions (p. 39) that Myngs didn’t acquire much treasure, either at Campeache or at St. Jago.
Footnote 176: (return)Beeston's Journal; Brit. Mus., Add. MSS., 13,964, f. 16:—"Original letter from the Licentiate Maldonado de Aldana to Don Francisco Calderon y Romero, giving him an account of the taking of Campeache in 1663"; dated Campeache, March 1663.
Beeston's Journal; Brit. Mus., Add. MSS., 13,964, f. 16:—"Original letter from Licentiate Maldonado de Aldana to Don Francisco Calderon y Romero, explaining the capture of Campeache in 1663"; dated Campeache, March 1663.
According to the Spanish relation there were fourteen vessels in the English fleet, one large ship of forty-four guns (the "Centurion"?) and thirteen smaller ones. The discrepancy in the numbers of the fleet may be explained by the probability that other Jamaican privateering vessels joined it after its departure from Port Royal. Beeston writes in his Journal that the privateer "Blessing," Captain Mitchell, commander, brought news on 28th February that the Spaniards in Campeache had notice from St. Jago of the English design and made elaborate preparations for the defence of the town. This is contradicted by the Spanish report, in which it appears that the authorities in Campeache had been culpably negligent in not maintaining the defences with men, powder or provisions.
According to the Spanish account, there were fourteen ships in the English fleet, including one large ship with forty-four guns (possibly the "Centurion"?) and thirteen smaller vessels. The discrepancy in the fleet numbers may be due to other privateering ships from Jamaica joining after departing from Port Royal. Beeston notes in his Journal that the privateer "Blessing," commanded by Captain Mitchell, reported on February 28th that the Spaniards in Campeache had received information from St. Jago about the English plans and were making significant preparations to defend the town. However, this contradicts the Spanish report, which implies that the authorities in Campeache had been seriously negligent in failing to maintain their defenses with sufficient manpower, gunpowder, or supplies.
Footnote 177: (return)S.P. Spain, vol. 46. Fanshaw to Sec. Bennet, 13th-23rd July 1664.
S.P. Spain, vol. 46. Fanshaw to Sec. Bennet, July 13-23, 1664.
Footnote 178: (return)Ibid., vol. 45. Letter of Consul Rumbold, 31st March 1663.
Ibid., vol. 45. Letter from Consul Rumbold, March 31, 1663.
Footnote 180: (return)C.S.P. Colon., 1661-68, No. 443. Dated 28th April 1663.
C.S.P. Colon., 1661-68, No. 443. Dated April 28, 1663.
Footnote 184: (return)C.S.P. Colon., 1661-68, No. 571; Beeston's Journal.
C.S.P. Colon., 1661-68, No. 571; Beeston's Journal.
Footnote 185: (return)S.P. Spain, vol. 46, ff. 94, 96, 108, 121, 123, 127, 309 (April-August 1664).
S.P. Spain, vol. 46, ff. 94, 96, 108, 121, 123, 127, 309 (April-August 1664).
Footnote 186: (return)C.S.P. Colon., 1661-68, Nos. 697, 744, 812.
C.S.P. Colon., 1661-68, Nos. 697, 744, 812.
CHAPTER IV
TORTUGA—1655-1664
When the Chevalier de Fontenay was driven from Tortuga in January 1654, the Spaniards left a small garrison to occupy the fort and prevent further settlements of French and English buccaneers. These troops possessed the island for about eighteen months, but on the approach of the expedition under Penn and Venables were ordered by the Conde de Penalva, President of S. Domingo, to demolish the fort, bury the artillery and other arms, and retire to his aid in Hispaniola.189 {114} Some six months later an Englishman, Elias Watts,190 with his family and ten or twelve others, came from Jamaica in a shallop, re-settled the island, and raised a battery of four guns upon the ruins of the larger fort previously erected by the French. Watts received a commission for the island from General Brayne, who was then governor of Jamaica, and in a short time gathered about him a colony of about 150, both English and French. Among these new-comers was a "poor distressed gentleman" by the name of James Arundell, formerly a colonel in the Royalist army and now banished from England, who eventually married Watts' daughter and became the head of the colony.
When the Chevalier de Fontenay was forced out of Tortuga in January 1654, the Spaniards left a small garrison to occupy the fort and stop further settlements by French and English buccaneers. These troops held the island for about eighteen months, but as the expedition led by Penn and Venables drew near, the Conde de Penalva, President of S. Domingo, ordered them to demolish the fort, bury the artillery and other weapons, and retreat to his assistance in Hispaniola.189 {114} About six months later, an Englishman named Elias Watts,190 along with his family and ten or twelve others, arrived from Jamaica in a small boat, resettled the island, and built a battery of four guns on the ruins of the larger fort that had been erected by the French. Watts received a commission for the island from General Brayne, who was then the governor of Jamaica, and soon gathered a colony of around 150 people, both English and French. Among these newcomers was a "poor distressed gentleman" named James Arundell, who had formerly been a colonel in the Royalist army and was now exiled from England. He eventually married Watts' daughter and became the head of the colony.
It was while Watts was governor of Tortuga, if we are to believe the Jesuit, Dutertre, that the buccaneers determined to avenge the treachery of the Spaniards to a French vessel in that neighbourhood by plundering the city of St. Jago in Hispaniola. According to this historian, who from the style of the narrative seems to be reporting the words of an eye-witness, the buccaneers, including doubtless both hunters and corsairs, formed a party of 400 men under the leadership of four captains and obtained a commission for the enterprise from the English governor, who was very likely looking forward to a share {115} of the booty. Compelling the captain of a frigate which had just arrived from Nantes to lend his ship, they embarked in it and in two or three other boats found on the coast for Puerta de Plata, where they landed on Palm Sunday of 1659.191 St. Jago, which lay in a pleasant, fertile plain some fifteen or twenty leagues in the interior of Hispaniola, they approached through the woods on the night of Holy Wednesday, entered before daybreak, and surprised the governor in his bed. The buccaneers told him to prepare to die, whereupon he fell on his knees and prayed to such effect that they finally offered him his life for a ransom of 60,000 pieces of eight. They pillaged for twenty-four hours, taking even the bells, ornaments and sacred vessels of the churches, and after refreshing themselves with food and drink, retreated with their plunder and prisoners, including the governor and chief inhabitants. Meanwhile the alarm had been given for ten or twelve leagues round about. Men came in from all directions, and rallying with the inhabitants of the town till they amounted to about 1000 men, marched through the woods by a by-route, got ahead of the buccaneers and attacked them from ambush. The English and French stood their ground in spite of inferior numbers, for they were all good marksmen and every shot told. As the Spaniards persisted, however, they finally threatened to stab the governor and all the other prisoners, whereupon the Spaniards took counsel and retired to their homes. The invaders lost only ten killed and five or six wounded. They tarried on the coast several days waiting for the rest of the promised ransom, but as it failed to arrive they liberated the prisoners and returned to Tortuga, each adventurer receiving 300 crowns as his share of the pillage.192
It was while Watts was governor of Tortuga, according to the Jesuit Dutertre, that the buccaneers decided to take revenge on the Spaniards for their betrayal of a French ship in the area by raiding the city of St. Jago in Hispaniola. This historian, whose narrative suggests he is recounting the words of an eyewitness, mentions that the buccaneers, likely including both hunters and pirates, assembled a group of 400 men led by four captains and obtained permission for the mission from the English governor, who probably anticipated a share of the loot. Forcing the captain of a frigate that had just arrived from Nantes to lend them his ship, they boarded it and a couple of other boats found on the coast and headed for Puerta de Plata, where they landed on Palm Sunday of 1659. St. Jago, situated in a lush, fertile region about fifteen to twenty leagues inland from Hispaniola, was approached through the woods on the night of Holy Wednesday. They entered before dawn and caught the governor off guard in his bed. The buccaneers told him to get ready to die, and he fell to his knees to pray so convincingly that they eventually offered to spare his life for a ransom of 60,000 pieces of eight. They looted for a full day, taking everything from bells and decorations to sacred vessels from the churches, and after feasting, they retreated with their stolen goods and captives, including the governor and other prominent citizens. Meanwhile, an alarm was raised for ten or twelve leagues around. Men came from all directions, and alongside the townspeople they gathered into a force of about 1,000 men, marched through the woods via a back route, and ambushed the buccaneers. The English and French held their ground despite being outnumbered, as they were all skilled marksmen and made every shot count. However, as the Spaniards continued their assault, they ultimately threatened to kill the governor and the other prisoners, which led the Spaniards to regroup and withdraw to their homes. The invaders suffered only ten killed and five or six wounded. They lingered along the coast for several days waiting for the rest of the promised ransom, but when it did not arrive, they released the prisoners and returned to Tortuga, each adventurer receiving 300 crowns as their share of the loot.
In the latter part of 1659 a French gentleman, Jérémie Deschamps, seigneur du Rausset, who had been one of the first inhabitants of Tortuga under Levasseur and de Fontenay, repaired to England and had sufficient influence there to obtain an order from the Council of State to Colonel Doyley to give him a commission as governor of Tortuga, with such instructions as Doyley might think requisite.193 This same du Rausset, it seems, had received a French commission from Louis XIV. as early as November 1656.194 At any rate, he came to Jamaica in 1660 and obtained his commission from Doyley on condition that he held Tortuga in the English interest.195 Watts, it seems, had meanwhile learnt that he was to be superseded by a Frenchman, whereupon he embarked with his family and all his goods and sought refuge in New England. About two months later, according to one story, Doyley heard that Deschamps had given a commission to a privateer and committed insolences for which Doyley feared to be called to account. He sent to remonstrate with him, but Deschamps answered that he possessed a French commission and that he had better interest with the powers in England than had the governor of Jamaica. As there were more French than English on the island, Deschamps then proclaimed the King of France and set up the French colours.196 Doyley as yet had received no authority from the newly-restored king, {117} Charles II., and hesitated to use any force; but he did give permission to Arundell, Watts' son-in-law, to surprise Deschamps and carry him to Jamaica for trial. Deschamps was absent at the time at Santa Cruz, but Arundell, relying upon the friendship and esteem which the inhabitants had felt for his father-in-law, surprised the governor's nephew and deputy, the Sieur de la Place, and possessed himself of the island. By some mischance or neglect, however, he was disarmed by the French and sent back to Jamaica.197 This was not the end of his misfortunes. On the way to Jamaica he and his company were surprised by Spaniards in the bay of Matanzas in Cuba, and carried to Puerto Principe. There, after a month's imprisonment, Arundell and Barth. Cock, his shipmaster, were taken out by negroes into the bush and murdered, and their heads brought into the town.198 Deschamps later returned to France because of ill-health, leaving la Place to govern the island in his stead, and when the property of the French Antilles was vested in the new French West India Company in 1664 he was arrested and sent to the Bastille. The cause of his arrest is obscure, but it seems that he had been in correspondence with the English government, to whom he had offered to restore Tortuga on condition of being reimbursed with £6000 sterling. A few days in the Bastille made him think better of his resolution. He ceded his rights to the company for 15,000 livres, and was released from confinement in November.199
In the later part of 1659, a French gentleman, Jérémie Deschamps, Seigneur du Rausset, who was one of the first settlers of Tortuga under Levasseur and de Fontenay, went to England and had enough influence to secure an order from the Council of State for Colonel Doyley to give him a commission as governor of Tortuga, with any instructions Doyley deemed necessary.193 It appears that du Rausset had received a French commission from Louis XIV. as early as November 1656.194 Regardless, he arrived in Jamaica in 1660 and received his commission from Doyley on the condition that he would maintain Tortuga in the English interest.195 Meanwhile, Watts had found out he was going to be replaced by a Frenchman, prompting him to leave with his family and belongings in search of refuge in New England. About two months later, according to one account, Doyley learned that Deschamps had given a commission to a privateer and committed acts that could bring Doyley into question. He sent a message to confront him, but Deschamps replied that he had a French commission and better connections with the powers in England than the governor of Jamaica. With more French than English on the island, Deschamps then proclaimed the King of France and raised the French flag.196 Doyley had yet to receive any authority from the newly restored King Charles II and was reluctant to use force; however, he allowed Arundell, Watts' son-in-law, to attempt to capture Deschamps and bring him to Jamaica for trial. Deschamps was away at the time in Santa Cruz, but Arundell, relying on the goodwill the locals had for his father-in-law, surprised Deschamps’ nephew and deputy, the Sieur de la Place, and took control of the island. Unfortunately, he was disarmed by the French due to a mishap and sent back to Jamaica.197 This was not the end of his troubles. On the way to Jamaica, he and his crew were ambushed by Spaniards in the bay of Matanzas in Cuba and taken to Puerto Principe. After a month of imprisonment there, Arundell and Barth. Cock, his ship captain, were taken into the bushes by African slaves and murdered, with their heads brought back to town.198 Deschamps eventually returned to France due to poor health, leaving la Place to govern the island in his absence. When the property of the French Antilles was given to the new French West India Company in 1664, he was arrested and sent to the Bastille. The reason for his arrest is unclear, but it seems he had been in contact with the English government, offering to return Tortuga in exchange for £6000 sterling. After a few days in the Bastille, he reconsidered his decision. He gave up his rights to the company for 15,000 livres and was released from confinement in November.199
The fiasco of Arundell's attempt was not the only effort of the English to recover the island. In answer to a memorial presented by Lord Windsor before his departure for Jamaica, an Order in Council was delivered to him in {118} February 1662, empowering him to use his utmost endeavours to reduce Tortuga and its governor to obedience.200 The matter was taken up by the Jamaican Council in September, shortly after Windsor's arrival;201 and on 16th December an order was issued by deputy-governor Lyttleton to Captain Robert Munden of the "Charles" frigate for the transportation of Colonel Samuel Barry and Captain Langford to Tortuga, where Munden was to receive orders for reducing the island.202 The design miscarried again, however, probably because of ill-blood between Barry and Munden. Clement de Plenneville, who accompanied Barry, writes that "the expedition failed through treachery";203 and Beeston says in his Journal that Barry, approaching Tortuga on 30th January, found the French armed and ready to oppose him, whereupon he ordered Captain Munden to fire. Munden however refused, sailed away to Corydon in Hispaniola, where he put Barry and his men on shore, and then "went away about his merchandize."204 Barry made his way in a sloop to Jamaica where he arrived on 1st March. Langford, however, was sent to Petit-Goave, an island about the size of Tortuga in the cul-de-sac at the western end of Hispaniola, where he was chosen governor by the inhabitants and raised the first English standard. Petit-Goave had been frequented by buccaneers since 1659, and after d'Ogeron succeeded {119} du Rausset as governor for the French in those regions, it became with Tortuga one of their chief resorts. In the latter part of 1664 we find Langford in England petitioning the king for a commission as governor of Tortuga and the coast of Hispaniola, and for two ships to go and seize the smaller island.205 Such a design, however, with the direct sanction and aid of the English government, might have endangered a rupture with France. Charles preferred to leave such irregular warfare to his governor in Jamaica, whom he could support or disown as best suited the exigencies of the moment. Langford, moreover, seems not to have made a brilliant success of his short stay at Petit-Goave, and was probably distrusted by the authorities both in England and in the West Indies. When Modyford came as governor to Jamaica, the possibility of recovering Tortuga was still discussed, but no effort to effect it was ever made again.
The failure of Arundell's attempt wasn't the only effort by the English to reclaim the island. In response to a memorial submitted by Lord Windsor before he left for Jamaica, an Order in Council was handed to him in {118} February 1662, giving him the authority to do everything he could to bring Tortuga and its governor into compliance.200 The Jamaican Council took up the issue in September, shortly after Windsor arrived;201 and on December 16, deputy-governor Lyttleton issued orders to Captain Robert Munden of the "Charles" frigate to transport Colonel Samuel Barry and Captain Langford to Tortuga, where Munden was to await orders to take the island.202 However, the plan failed again, likely due to a feud between Barry and Munden. Clement de Plenneville, who accompanied Barry, wrote that "the expedition failed due to treachery";203 and Beeston noted in his Journal that when Barry approached Tortuga on January 30, he found the French prepared to resist him, at which point he ordered Captain Munden to fire. Munden, however, refused, sailed away to Corydon in Hispaniola, dropped Barry and his men off, and then "went off to do his trading."204 Barry made his way to Jamaica in a sloop, arriving on March 1. Langford, however, was sent to Petit-Goave, an island about the same size as Tortuga located in the cul-de-sac at the western end of Hispaniola, where he was appointed governor by the locals and raised the first English flag. Petit-Goave had been visited by buccaneers since 1659, and after d'Ogeron replaced du Rausset as the French governor in those areas, it became one of their main hangouts along with Tortuga. In late 1664, Langford petitioned the king in England for a commission as governor of Tortuga and the Hispaniola coast, along with two ships to seize the smaller island.205 However, such a plan, with direct backing from the English government, could have risked a conflict with France. Charles preferred to leave such unconventional warfare to his governor in Jamaica, whom he could support or deny as the situation demanded. Additionally, Langford didn’t seem to have a successful tenure at Petit-Goave, and likely faced distrust from the authorities both in England and in the West Indies. When Modyford became governor of Jamaica, the idea of reclaiming Tortuga was still considered, but no further attempts were ever made.
Footnote 189: (return)Dutertre, t. iii. p. 126; Add. MSS., 13,992, f. 499.
Dutertre, t. iii. p. 126; Add. MSS., 13,992, f. 499.
On 26th February 1656 there arrived at Jamaica a small vessel the master of which, touching at Tortuga, had found upon the deserted island two papers, one in Spanish, the other in "sorrie English" (Thurloe Papers, IV. p. 601). These papers were copies of a proclamation forbidding settlement on the island, and the English paper (Rawl. MSS., A. 29, f. 500) is printed in Firth's "Venables" as follows:—
On February 26, 1656, a small ship arrived in Jamaica. The captain had stopped at Tortuga, where he found two documents on a deserted island, one in Spanish and the other in "poor English" (Thurloe Papers, IV. p. 601). These documents were copies of a proclamation that forbade settlement on the island. The English document (Rawl. MSS., A. 29, f. 500) is printed in Firth's "Venables" as follows:
"The Captane and Sarginge Mager Don Baltearsor Calderon and Spenoso, Nopte to the President that is now in the sity of Santo-domingo, and Captane of the gones of the sitye, and Governor and Lord Mare of this Island, and stranch of this Lland of Tortogo, and Chefe Comander of all for the Khinge of Spaine.
"The Captain and Sergeant Major Don Baltearsor Calderon and Spenoso, note to the President who is currently in the city of Santo Domingo, the Captain of the city’s guns, and the Governor and Lord Mayor of this Island, and representative of this Land of Tortuga, and Chief Commander of all for the King of Spain."
"Yoo moust understand that all pepell what soever that shall com to this Iland of the Khinge of Spaine Catholok wich is name is Don Pilep the Ostere the forth of this name, that with his harmes he hath put of Feleminge and French men and Englesh with lefee heare from the yeare of 1630 tell the yeare of thurty fouer and tell the yeare of fifte fouer in wich the Kinge of Spane uesenge all curtyse and given good quartell to all that was upon this Iland, after that came and with oute Recepet upon this Iland knowinge that the Kinge of Spane had planted upon it and fortified in the name of the Kinge came the forth time the 15th of Augost the last yeare French and Fleminges to govern this Iland the same Governeore that was heare befor his name was Themeleon hot man De founttana gentleman of the ourder of Guresalem for to take this Iland put if fources by se and land and forsed us to beate him oute of this place with a greate dale of shame, and be caues yoo shall take notes that wee have puelld doune the Casill and carid all the gonenes and have puelld doune all the houes and have lefte no thinge, the same Captane and Sargint-mager in the name of the Kinge wich God blesh hath given yoo notis that what souer nason souer that shall com to live upon this Iland that thare shall not a man mother or children cape of the sorde, thare fore I give notiss to all pepell that they shall have a care with out anye more notis for this is the order of the Kinge and with out fall you will not want yooer Pamente and this is the furst and second and thorde time, and this whe leave heare for them that comes hear to take notis, that when wee com upon you, you shall not pleate that you dod not know is riten the 25 of August 1656."
"It must be understood that all those who come to this island of the King of Spain, Catholic, named Don Philip IV, have been removed by him with authority from Flemish, French, and English settlers here from the year 1630 until 1634 and up until 1654, during which the King of Spain, showing great courtesy, treated everyone on this island well. After that, without invitation, those who knew that the King of Spain had settled and fortified this island in his name came for the fourth time on August 15 of last year—French and Flemish—to govern this island. The same governor was here before; his name was Themelon Hotman De Fontana, a gentleman of the Order of Jerusalem, who sought to take this island by force from both land and sea and forced us to drive him out with considerable shame. You should take note that we have dismantled the castle, taken away all the cannons, and removed all the houses, leaving nothing behind. The same captain and sergeant-major, in the name of the King, whom God bless, give you notice that anyone who comes to live on this island, whether man, mother, or child, will not escape the sword. Therefore, I inform everyone to be careful without any further warning because this is the order of the King, and you will not want to disregard it. This is the first, second, and third time, and we leave it to those who come here to take notice that when we confront you, you cannot claim you didn’t know, written on August 25, 1656."
Baltesar Calderon y Espinosa
Baltesar Calderon y Espinosa
Por Mandado de Senor Gouor.
By Order of the Lord Governor.
Pedro Franco de riva deney xasuss.
Pedro Franco de Riva Deney Xasuss.
Footnote 190: (return)In Dutertre's account the name is Eliazouard (Elias Ward).
In Dutertre's account, the name is Eliazouard (Elias Ward).
Footnote 191: (return)According to a Spanish account of the expedition the date was 1661. Brit. Mus., Add. MSS., 13,992, f. 499.
A Spanish report on the expedition states that the date was 1661. Brit. Mus., Add. MSS., 13,992, f. 499.
Footnote 193: (return)Rawl. MSS., A. 347, ff. 31 and 36; S.P. Spain, vol. 47:—Deposition of Sir Charles Lyttleton; Margry, op. cit., p. 281.
Rawl. MSS., A. 347, ff. 31 and 36; S.P. Spain, vol. 47:—Statement of Sir Charles Lyttleton; Margry, op. cit., p. 281.
Footnote 194: (return)Charlevoix, op. cit., liv. vii. p. 36; Vaissière, op. cit., p. 10.
Charlevoix, op. cit., book VII, p. 36; Vaissière, op. cit., p. 10.
Footnote 195: (return)According to Dutertre, Deschamps' commission extended only to the French inhabitants upon Tortuga, the French and English living thereafter under separate governments as at St. Kitts. Dutertre, t. iii. p. 135.
Dutertre states that Deschamps' commission was only for the French residents on Tortuga, with the French and English living under separate governments, similar to what was happening in St. Kitts. Dutertre, t. iii. p. 135.
Footnote 196: (return)Rawl. MSS., A. 347, f. 36.
Rawl. MSS., A. 347, f. 36.
According to Dutertre's version, Watts had scarcely forsaken the island when Deschamps arrived in the Road, and found that the French inhabitants had already made themselves masters of the colony and had substituted the French for the English standard. Dutertre, t. iii. p. 136.
According to Dutertre's account, Watts had just left the island when Deschamps arrived in the harbor and found out that the French inhabitants had already taken over the colony and replaced the English flag with the French one. Dutertre, t. iii. p. 136.
Footnote 199: (return)Dutertre, t. iii. p. 138; Vaissière, op. cit., p. 11, note 2.
Dutertre, vol. iii, p. 138; Vaissière, op. cit., p. 11, note 2.
Footnote 202: (return)Ibid., No. 390; cf. also No. 474 (1).
Same source., No. 390; see also No. 474 (1).
Footnote 204: (return)Beeston's Journal, 1st March 1663.
Beeston's Journal, 1st March 1663.
According to Dutertre, some inhabitants of Tortuga ran away to Jamaica and persuaded the governor that they could no longer endure French domination, and that if an armed force was sent, it would find no obstacle in restoring the English king's authority. Accordingly Col. Barry was despatched to receive their allegiance, with orders to use no violence but only to accept their voluntary submission. When Barry landed on Tortuga, however, with no other support than a proclamation and a harangue, the French inhabitants laughed in his face, and he returned to Jamaica in shame and confusion. Dutertre, t. iii. pp. 137-38.
According to Dutertre, some people from Tortuga fled to Jamaica and persuaded the governor that they could no longer endure French control. They argued that if an armed force were sent, it would encounter no resistance in reinstating the authority of the English king. Consequently, Col. Barry was dispatched to secure their loyalty, with orders to avoid violence and only accept their voluntary submission. However, when Barry reached Tortuga armed only with a proclamation and a speech, the French residents mocked him, and he returned to Jamaica feeling embarrassed and bewildered. Dutertre, t. iii. pp. 137-38.
CHAPTER V
PORTO BELLO AND PANAMA
On 4th January 1664, the king wrote to Sir Thomas Modyford in Barbadoes that he had chosen him governor of Jamaica.206 Modyford, who had lived as a planter in Barbadoes since 1650, had taken a prominent share in the struggles between Parliamentarians and Royalists in the little island. He was a member of the Council, and had been governor for a short time in 1660. His commission and instructions for Jamaica207 were carried to the West Indies by Colonel Edward Morgan, who went as Modyford's deputy-governor and landed in Barbadoes on 21st April.208 Modyford was instructed, among other things, to prohibit the granting of letters of marque, and particularly to encourage trade and maintain friendly relations with the Spanish dominions. Sir Richard Fanshaw had just been appointed to go to Spain and negotiate a treaty for wider commercial privileges in the Indies, and Charles saw that the daily complaints of violence and depredation done by Jamaican ships on the King of Spain's subjects were scarcely calculated to increase the good-will and compliance of the Spanish Court. Nor had the attempt in the Indies to force a trade upon the Spaniards been brilliantly successful. It was soon evident that another course of action was demanded. Sir Thomas Modyford seems at first to have been sincerely {121} anxious to suppress privateering and conciliate his Spanish neighbours. On receiving his commission and instructions he immediately prepared letters to the President of San Domingo, expressing his fair intentions and requesting the co-operation of the Spaniards.209 Modyford himself arrived in Jamaica on 1st June,210 proclaimed an entire cessation of hostilities,211 and on the 16th sent the "Swallow" ketch to Cartagena to acquaint the governor with what he had done. On almost the same day letters were forwarded from England and from Ambassador Fanshaw in Madrid, strictly forbidding all violences in the future against the Spanish nation, and ordering Modyford to inflict condign punishment on every offender, and make entire restitution and satisfaction to the sufferers.212
On January 4, 1664, the king wrote to Sir Thomas Modyford in Barbados, informing him that he had appointed him as governor of Jamaica.206 Modyford, who had been a planter in Barbados since 1650, was actively involved in the conflicts between Parliamentarians and Royalists on the small island. He was a member of the Council and briefly served as governor in 1660. His commission and instructions for Jamaica207 were delivered to the West Indies by Colonel Edward Morgan, who was sent as Modyford's deputy-governor and arrived in Barbados on April 21.208 Modyford was instructed, among other things, to prohibit the issuance of letters of marque and particularly to boost trade and maintain friendly relations with Spanish territories. Sir Richard Fanshaw had just been appointed to travel to Spain and negotiate a treaty for broader commercial privileges in the Indies, and Charles recognized that the ongoing complaints of violence and theft by Jamaican ships against the King of Spain's subjects were unlikely to foster goodwill and cooperation from the Spanish Court. The attempt to force trade upon the Spaniards in the Indies had not been very successful either. It quickly became clear that a different approach was necessary. At first, Sir Thomas Modyford genuinely seemed to want to end privateering and improve relations with his Spanish neighbors. Upon receiving his commission and instructions, he promptly drafted letters to the President of San Domingo, expressing his good intentions and seeking cooperation from the Spaniards.209 Modyford himself arrived in Jamaica on June 1,210 announced a complete end to hostilities,211 and on the 16th sent the "Swallow" ketch to Cartagena to inform the governor of his actions. On almost the same day, letters were sent from England and from Ambassador Fanshaw in Madrid, strictly prohibiting any future violence against the Spanish nation and instructing Modyford to impose appropriate punishment on any offenders, as well as to fully compensate the victims.212
The letters for San Domingo, which had been forwarded to Jamaica with Colonel Morgan and thence dispatched to Hispaniola before Modyford's arrival, received a favourable answer, but that was about as far as the matter ever got. The buccaneers, moreover, the principal grievance of the Spaniards, still remained at large. As Thomas Lynch wrote on 25th May, "It is not in the power of the governor to have or suffer a commerce, nor will any necessity or advantage bring private Spaniards to Jamaica, for we and they have used too many mutual barbarisms to have a sudden correspondence. When the king was restored, the Spaniards thought the manners of the English nation changed too, and adventured twenty or thirty vessels to Jamaica for blacks, but the surprises and irruptions by C. Myngs, for whom the governor of San Domingo has upbraided the commissioners, made the Spaniards redouble their malice, and nothing but an order from Spain can give {122} us admittance or trade."213 For a short time, however, a serious effort was made to recall the privateers. Several prizes which were brought into Port Royal were seized and returned to their owners, while the captors had their commissions taken from them. Such was the experience of one Captain Searles, who in August brought in two Spanish vessels, both of which were restored to the Spaniards, and Searles deprived of his rudder and sails as security against his making further depredations upon the Dons.214 In November Captain Morris Williams sent a note to Governor Modyford, offering to come in with a rich prize of logwood, indigo and silver, if security were given that it should be condemned to him for the payment of his debts in Jamaica; and although the governor refused to give any promises the prize was brought in eight days later. The goods were seized and sold in the interest of the Spanish owner.215 Nevertheless, the effects of the proclamation were not at all encouraging. In the first month only three privateers came in with their commissions, and Modyford wrote to Secretary Bennet on 30th June that he feared the only effect of the proclamation would be to drive them to the French in Tortuga. He therefore thought it prudent, he continued, to dispense somewhat with the strictness of his instructions, "doing by degrees and moderation what he had at first resolved to execute suddenly and severely."216
The letters for San Domingo, which were sent to Jamaica with Colonel Morgan and then dispatched to Hispaniola before Modyford arrived, got a positive response, but that was as far as it went. The buccaneers, who were the main concern of the Spaniards, were still roaming free. As Thomas Lynch wrote on May 25, "The governor can't manage or allow a trade, nor will any necessity or benefit attract private Spaniards to Jamaica, because we both have committed too many acts of cruelty to suddenly start a collaboration. When the king was restored, the Spaniards assumed the English would change their ways too and sent twenty or thirty ships to Jamaica for enslaved people, but the attacks and incursions by C. Myngs, whom the governor of San Domingo has criticized the commissioners for, made the Spaniards even more resentful, and only a decree from Spain can grant us permission or trade." For a brief period, though, there was a serious attempt to recall the privateers. Several prizes brought into Port Royal were seized and returned to their owners, while the captors lost their commissions. Such was the case for Captain Searles, who in August brought in two Spanish ships, both of which were returned to the Spaniards, and Searles had his rudder and sails taken as collateral against any further attacks on the Spaniards. In November, Captain Morris Williams sent a note to Governor Modyford, offering to come in with a valuable shipment of logwood, indigo, and silver, if he received assurance that it would be allocated to him to pay off his debts in Jamaica; although the governor refused to make any promises, the shipment arrived eight days later. The goods were seized and sold for the benefit of the Spanish owner. Nevertheless, the effects of the proclamation were not encouraging. In the first month, only three privateers came in with their commissions, and Modyford wrote to Secretary Bennet on June 30 that he feared the only result of the proclamation would be to push them towards the French in Tortuga. He therefore thought it wise to relax the strictness of his orders, "doing gradually and with moderation what he had initially planned to execute suddenly and harshly."
Tortuga was really the crux of the whole difficulty. Back in 1662 Colonel Doyley, in his report to the Lord Chancellor after his return to England, had suggested the {123} reduction of Tortuga to English obedience as the only effective way of dealing with the buccaneers;217 and Modyford in 1664 also realized the necessity of this preliminary step.218 The conquest of Tortuga, however, was no longer the simple task it might have been four or five years earlier. The inhabitants of the island were now almost entirely French, and with their companions on the coast of Hispaniola had no intention of submitting to English dictation. The buccaneers, who had become numerous and independent and made Tortuga one of their principal retreats, would throw all their strength in the balance against an expedition the avowed object of whose coming was to make their profession impossible. The colony, moreover, received an incalculable accession of strength in the arrival of Bertrand d'Ogeron, the governor sent out in 1665 by the new French West India Company. D'Ogeron was one of the most remarkable figures in the West Indies in the second half of the seventeenth century. Of broad imagination and singular kindness of heart, with an indomitable will and a mind full of resource, he seems to have been an ideal man for the task, not only of reducing to some semblance of law and order a people who had never given obedience to any authority, but also of making palatable the régime and exclusive privileges of a private trading company. D'Ogeron first established himself at Port Margot on the coast of Hispaniola opposite Tortuga in the early part of 1665; and here the adventurers at once gave him to understand that they would never submit to any mere company, much less suffer an interruption of their trade with the Dutch, who had supplied them with necessities at a time when it was not even known in France that there were Frenchmen in that region. {124} D'Ogeron pretended to subscribe to these conditions, passed over to Tortuga where he received the submission of la Place, and then to Petit-Goave and Leogane, in the cul-de-sac of Hispaniola. There he made his headquarters, adopted every means to attract planters and engagés, and firmly established his authority. He made advances from his own purse without interest to adventurers who wished to settle down to planting, bought two ships to facilitate trade between the colony and France, and even contrived to have several lots of fifty women each brought over from France to be sold and distributed as wives amongst the colonists. The settlements soon put on a new air of prosperity, and really owed their existence as a permanent French colony to the efforts of this new governor.219 It was under the administration of d'Ogeron that l'Olonnais,220 Michel le Basque, and most of the French buccaneers flourished, whose exploits are celebrated in Exquemelin's history.
Tortuga was really the heart of the whole issue. Back in 1662, Colonel Doyley, in his report to the Lord Chancellor after returning to England, suggested that bringing Tortuga under English control was the only effective way to deal with the buccaneers; {123} and Modyford in 1664 also recognized that this preliminary step was necessary.218 However, conquering Tortuga was no longer as straightforward as it might have been four or five years earlier. The island's inhabitants were now almost entirely French, and together with their allies on the coast of Hispaniola, they had no intention of submitting to English orders. The buccaneers, who had become numerous and independent, made Tortuga one of their main hideouts and would rally all their strength against any expedition whose main goal was to make their way of life impossible. Additionally, the colony gained significant strength with the arrival of Bertrand d'Ogeron, the governor sent out in 1665 by the new French West India Company. D'Ogeron was one of the most remarkable figures in the West Indies during the latter half of the seventeenth century. With broad imagination and exceptional kindness, along with an indomitable will and a resourceful mind, he seemed like the ideal person for the task not only of imposing some law and order on a group that had never obeyed any authority but also of making the regime and exclusive privileges of a private trading company acceptable. D'Ogeron first established himself at Port Margot on the coast of Hispaniola, across from Tortuga, in early 1665; and here, the adventurers quickly made it clear that they would never submit to any mere company, let alone allow their trade with the Dutch to be disrupted, as the Dutch had supplied them with essentials at a time when it wasn’t even known in France that there were Frenchmen in that area. {124} D'Ogeron pretended to agree to these conditions, crossed over to Tortuga, where he received the submission of la Place, and then went to Petit-Goave and Leogane in the cul-de-sac of Hispaniola. There, he made his headquarters, employed every means to attract planters and engagés, and firmly established his authority. He personally lent money without interest to adventurers who wanted to settle down to farming, bought two ships to facilitate trade between the colony and France, and even managed to bring over several groups of fifty women each from France to be sold and distributed as wives amongst the colonists. The settlements soon took on a fresh air of prosperity, and their continued existence as a permanent French colony can truly be attributed to the efforts of this new governor.219 It was under d'Ogeron’s administration that l'Olonnais,220 Michel le Basque, and most of the French buccaneers thrived, whose exploits are celebrated in Exquemelin's history.
The conquest of Tortuga was not the only measure necessary for the effectual suppression of the buccaneers. Five or six swift cruisers were also required to pursue and bring to bay those corsairs who refused to come in with their commissions.221 Since the Restoration the West Indies had been entirely denuded of English men-of-war; while the buccaneers, with the tacit consent or encouragement of Doyley, had at the same time increased both in numbers and boldness. Letters written from Jamaica in 1664 placed the number scattered abroad in privateering at from 1500 to 2000, sailing in fourteen or fifteen ships.222 They were desperate men, accustomed to living at sea, with no trade but burning and plundering, and unlikely {125} to take orders from any but stronger and faster frigates. Nor was this condition of affairs surprising when we consider that, in the seventeenth century, there flowed from Europe to the West Indies adventurers from every class of society; men doubtless often endowed with strong personalities, enterprising and intrepid; but often, too, of mediocre intelligence or little education, and usually without either money or scruples. They included many who had revolted from the narrow social laws of European countries, and were disinclined to live peaceably within the bounds of any organized society. Many, too, had belonged to rebellious political factions at home, men of the better classes who were banished or who emigrated in order to keep their heads upon their shoulders. In France the total exhaustion of public and private fortune at the end of the religious wars disposed many to seek to recoup themselves out of the immense colonial riches of the Spaniards; while the disorders of the Rebellion and the Commonwealth in England caused successive emigrations of Puritans and Loyalists to the newer England beyond the seas. At the close of the Thirty Years' War, too, a host of French and English adventurers, who had fattened upon Germany and her misfortunes, were left without a livelihood, and doubtless many resorted to emigration as the sole means of continuing their life of freedom and even of licence. Coming to the West Indies these men, so various in origin and character, hoped soon to acquire there the riches which they lost or coveted at home; and their expectations deceived, they often broke in a formal and absolute manner the bonds which attached them to their fellow humanity. Jamaica especially suffered in this respect, for it had been colonized in the first instance by a discontented, refractory soldiery, and it was being recruited largely by transported criminals and vagabonds. In contrast with the policy of Spain, who placed the {126} most careful restrictions upon the class of emigrants sent to her American possessions, England from the very beginning used her colonies, and especially the West Indian islands, as a dumping-ground for her refuse population. Within a short time a regular trade sprang up for furnishing the colonies with servile labour from the prisons of the mother country. Scots captured at the battles of Dunbar and Worcester,223 English, French, Irish and Dutch pirates lying in the gaols of Dorchester and Plymouth,224 if "not thought fit to be tried for their lives," were shipped to Barbadoes, Jamaica, and the other Antilles. In August 1656 the Council of State issued an order for the apprehension of all lewd and dangerous persons, rogues, vagrants and other idlers who had no way of livelihood and refused to work, to be transported by contractors to the English plantations in America;225 and in June 1661 the Council for Foreign Plantations appointed a committee to consider the same matter.226 Complaints were often made that children and apprentices were "seduced or spirited away" from their parents and masters and concealed upon ships sailing for the colonies; and an office of {127} registry was established to prevent this abuse.227 In 1664 Charles granted a licence for five years to Sir James Modyford, brother of Sir Thomas, to take all felons convicted in the circuits and at the Old Bailey who were afterwards reprieved for transportation to foreign plantations, and to transmit them to the governor of Jamaica;228 and this practice was continued throughout the whole of the buccaneering period.
The conquest of Tortuga wasn’t the only action needed to effectively deal with the buccaneers. Five or six fast ships were also necessary to chase down and capture those pirates who refused to cooperate with their commissions.221 Since the Restoration, the West Indies had been completely stripped of English warships, while the buccaneers, with implicit approval or support from Doyley, had simultaneously increased in both numbers and daring. Letters from Jamaica in 1664 estimated that between 1,500 and 2,000 were engaged in privateering, sailing in fourteen or fifteen ships.222 They were desperate men, used to life at sea, with no trade other than burning and looting, and they were unlikely to take orders from anything but stronger and faster ships. This situation wasn’t surprising when we consider that, in the seventeenth century, people from all walks of life were flocking to the West Indies; many were undoubtedly strong personalities, adventurous and fearless, but often they had mediocre intelligence, little education, and typically lacked both money and morals. This group included many who had revolted against the strict social rules of European countries and were unwilling to live peacefully within any organized society. Many had also belonged to rebellious political factions back home—better-off individuals who were banished or who left to save their lives. In France, the total depletion of public and private wealth at the end of the religious wars drove many to seek recuperation in the vast colonial wealth of the Spaniards, while the chaos caused by the Rebellion and Commonwealth in England led to successive waves of Puritans and Loyalists emigrating to the new England beyond the seas. After the Thirty Years’ War concluded, numerous French and English adventurers, who had thrived on Germany and her misfortunes, found themselves without a means of livelihood, and many likely turned to emigration as their only option to continue their free-spirited, often reckless lives. Upon arriving in the West Indies, these men, varying in backgrounds and characteristics, hoped to quickly recover the riches they had lost or coveted at home; when their dreams fell short, they often broke ties with their fellow humanity in a formal and definitive way. Jamaica, in particular, suffered from this since it had initially been settled by a disgruntled, rebellious military, and was heavily supplemented by transported criminals and vagrants. Unlike Spain, which took great care to restrict the types of emigrants sent to its American possessions, England, from the very start, regarded her colonies, especially the West Indian islands, as a dumping ground for her unwanted population. It didn't take long for a regular trade to develop, bringing labor from the prisons of the mother country to the colonies. Scots captured at the battles of Dunbar and Worcester,223 English, French, Irish, and Dutch pirates sitting in the jails of Dorchester and Plymouth,224 if "not deemed fit to be tried for their lives," were shipped off to Barbadoes, Jamaica, and the other Caribbean islands. In August 1656, the Council of State issued an order to arrest all lewd and dangerous individuals, rogues, vagrants, and other idlers who had no means of support and refused to work, to be transported by contractors to the English plantations in America;225 and in June 1661, the Council for Foreign Plantations set up a committee to address the same issue.226 There were frequent complaints that children and apprentices were "seduced or spirited away" from their parents and masters and hidden on ships bound for the colonies; an office of registration was created to prevent this abuse.227 In 1664, Charles granted a five-year license to Sir James Modyford, brother of Sir Thomas, to take all felons convicted in the circuits and at the Old Bailey who were later reprieved for transportation to foreign plantations, and to send them to the governor of Jamaica;228 and this practice continued throughout the entire buccaneering era.
Privateering opened a channel by which these disorderly spirits, impatient of the sober and laborious life of the planter, found an employment agreeable to their tastes. An example had been set by the plundering expeditions sent out by Fortescue, Brayne and Doyley, and when these naval excursions ceased, the sailors and others who had taken part in them fell to robbing on their private account. Sir Charles Lyttleton, we have seen, zealously defended and encouraged the freebooters; and Long, the historian of Jamaica, justified their existence on the ground that many traders were attracted to the island by the plunder with which Port Royal was so abundantly stocked, and that the prosperity of the colony was founded upon the great demand for provisions for the outfit of the privateers. These effects, however, were but temporary and superficial, and did not counterbalance the manifest evils of the practice, especially the discouragement to planting, and the element of turbulence and unrest ever present in the island. Under such conditions Governor Modyford found it necessary to temporise with the marauders, and perhaps he did so the more readily because he felt that they were still needed for the security of the colony. A war between England and the States-General then seemed imminent, and the governor considered that unless he allowed the buccaneers to dispose of their booty {128} when they came in to Port Royal, they might, in event of hostilities breaking out, go to the Dutch at Curaçao and other islands, and prey upon Jamaican commerce. On the other hand, if, by adopting a conciliatory attitude, he retained their allegiance, they would offer the handiest and most effective instrument for driving the Dutch themselves out of the Indies.229 He privately told one captain, who brought in a Spanish prize, that he only stopped the Admiralty proceedings to "give a good relish to the Spaniard"; and that although the captor should have satisfaction, the governor could not guarantee him his ship. So Sir Thomas persuaded some merchants to buy the prize-goods and contributed one quarter of the money himself, with the understanding that he should receive nothing if the Spaniards came to claim their property.230 A letter from Secretary Bennet, on 12th November 1664, confirmed the governor in this course;231 and on 2nd February 1665, three weeks before the declaration of war against Holland, a warrant was issued to the Duke of York, High Admiral of England, to grant, through the colonial governors and vice-admirals, commissions of reprisal upon the ships and goods of the Dutch.232 Modyford at once took advantage of this liberty. Some fourteen pirates, who in the beginning of February had been tried and condemned to death, were pardoned; and public declaration was made that commissions would be granted against the Hollanders. Before nightfall two commissions had been taken out, and all the rovers were making applications and planning how to seize Curaçao.233 Modyford drew up an elaborate design234 for rooting out at one and the same time the Dutch settlements and the French buccaneers, and on 20th April he {129} wrote that Lieutenant-Colonel Morgan had sailed with ten ships and some 500 men, chiefly "reformed prisoners," resolute fellows, and well armed with fusees and pistols.235 Their plan was to fall upon the Dutch fleet trading at St. Kitts, capture St. Eustatius, Saba, and perhaps Curaçao, and on the homeward voyage visit the French settlements on Hispaniola and Tortuga. "All this is prepared," he wrote, "by the honest privateer, at the old rate of no purchase no pay, and it will cost the king nothing considerable, some powder and mortar-pieces." On the same day, 20th April, Admiral de Ruyter, who had arrived in the Indies with a fleet of fourteen sail, attacked the forts and shipping at Barbadoes, but suffered considerable damage and retired after a few hours. At Montserrat and Nevis, however, he was more successful and captured sixteen merchant ships, after which he sailed for Virginia and New York.236
Privateering created a way for those restless individuals, tired of the hard, steady life of farming, to find work that suited their preferences. There were already examples from the raiding missions sent out by Fortescue, Brayne, and Doyley, and when these naval expeditions ended, the sailors and others involved started robbing on their own. Sir Charles Lyttleton, as we've seen, strongly defended and encouraged the pirates; and Long, the historian of Jamaica, supported their existence by noting that many traders were drawn to the island by the wealth that Port Royal had accumulated, and that the colony thrived on the demand for supplies for the privateers. However, these benefits were only temporary and superficial, failing to outweigh the clear issues caused by this practice, particularly the discouragement of agriculture and the ongoing element of unrest on the island. Given these circumstances, Governor Modyford found it necessary to deal with the marauders, possibly more so because he believed they were still essential for the colony's safety. A war between England and the States-General seemed about to happen, and the governor thought that if he didn’t let the buccaneers sell their loot when they came into Port Royal, they might, in the event of hostilities, turn to the Dutch at Curaçao and attack Jamaican trade. On the flip side, by taking a friendly approach, he could maintain their loyalty, making them a useful and effective force to push the Dutch out of the Indies. He privately told one captain, who had brought in a Spanish ship, that he only halted the Admiralty action to "give a good laugh to the Spaniard"; and that while the captor deserved compensation, the governor couldn’t promise him his ship. So Sir Thomas convinced some merchants to buy the prize goods and even put in a quarter of the money himself, understanding that he wouldn't get anything if the Spaniards came to claim their stuff. A letter from Secretary Bennet on November 12, 1664, confirmed the governor's approach; and on February 2, 1665, just three weeks before the declaration of war against Holland, a warrant was issued to the Duke of York, High Admiral of England, to authorize, through the colonial governors and vice-admirals, commissions for seizing Dutch ships and goods. Modyford quickly took advantage of this opportunity. About fourteen pirates, who had been tried and sentenced to death earlier in February, were pardoned; and a public announcement was made that commissions would be available against the Dutch. Before night fell, two commissions had been granted, and all the pirates were filing applications and scheming how to capture Curaçao. Modyford created a detailed plan to simultaneously eliminate the Dutch settlements and the French pirates, and on April 20, he noted that Lieutenant-Colonel Morgan had set sail with ten ships and about 500 men, mostly "reformed prisoners," determined individuals well-armed with muskets and pistols. Their plan was to attack the Dutch fleet trading at St. Kitts, take St. Eustatius, Saba, and possibly Curaçao, and on their way back, visit the French settlements on Hispaniola and Tortuga. "All this is arranged," he wrote, "by the honest privateer, under the old deal of no pay, no prize, and it will cost the king little beyond some gunpowder and cannon." On the same day, April 20, Admiral de Ruyter, who had arrived in the Indies with a fleet of fourteen ships, attacked the forts and shipping at Barbados, but suffered significant damage and withdrew after a few hours. However, he was more successful at Montserrat and Nevis, capturing sixteen merchant ships before heading for Virginia and New York.
The buccaneers enrolled in Colonel Morgan's expedition proved to be troublesome allies. Before their departure from Jamaica most of them mutinied, and refused to sail until promised by Morgan that the plunder should be equally divided.237 On 17th July, however, the expedition made its rendezvous at Montserrat, and on the 23rd arrived before St. Eustatius. Two vessels had been lost sight of, a third, with the ironical name of the "Olive Branch," had sailed for Virginia, and many stragglers had been left behind at Montserrat, so that Morgan could muster only 326 men for the assault. There was only one landing-place on the island, with a narrow path accommodating but two men at a time leading to an eminence which was crowned with a fort and 450 Dutchmen. Morgan landed his division first, and Colonel Carey followed. The enemy, it seems, gave them but one small {130} volley and then retreated to the fort. The governor sent forward three men to parley, and on receiving a summons to surrender, delivered up the fort with eleven large guns and considerable ammunition. "It is supposed they were drunk or mad," was the comment made upon the rather disgraceful defence.238 During the action Colonel Morgan, who was an old man and very corpulent, was overcome by the hard marching and extraordinary heat, and died. Colonel Carey, who succeeded him in command, was anxious to proceed at once to the capture of the Dutch forts on Saba, St. Martins and Tortola; but the buccaneers refused to stir until the booty got at St. Eustatius was divided—nor were the officers and men able to agree on the manner of sharing. The plunder, besides guns and ammunition, included about 900 slaves, negro and Indian, with a large quantity of live stock and cotton. Meanwhile a party of seventy had crossed over to the island of Saba, only four leagues distant, and secured its surrender on the same terms as St. Eustatius. As the men had now become very mutinous, and on a muster numbered scarcely 250, the officers decided that they could not reasonably proceed any further and sailed for Jamaica, leaving a small garrison on each of the islands. Most of the Dutch, about 250 in number, were sent to St. Martins, but a few others, with some threescore English, Irish and Scotch, took the oath of allegiance and remained.239
The buccaneers who joined Colonel Morgan's expedition turned out to be difficult allies. Before leaving Jamaica, most of them rebelled and refused to sail until Morgan promised that the loot would be divided equally.237 On July 17th, however, the expedition regrouped at Montserrat, and on the 23rd arrived at St. Eustatius. They had lost sight of two ships, a third ship ironically named the "Olive Branch" had headed for Virginia, and many stragglers were left behind at Montserrat, so Morgan could gather only 326 men for the attack. There was only one landing spot on the island, with a narrow path wide enough for only two people at a time leading to a hilltop where a fort was located with 450 Dutchmen inside. Morgan landed his group first, followed by Colonel Carey. The enemy seemingly only gave them one small volley before retreating to the fort. The governor sent three men to negotiate, and upon receiving a demand to surrender, he gave up the fort, which had eleven large guns and a decent amount of ammunition. "It is thought they were drunk or mad," was the remark made about the rather shameful defense.238 During the conflict, Colonel Morgan, who was an older and very overweight man, collapsed from the intense marching and extreme heat and died. Colonel Carey, who took over command, was eager to immediately capture the Dutch forts on Saba, St. Martins, and Tortola; however, the buccaneers refused to move until the loot taken at St. Eustatius was divided—nor could the officers and men agree on how to share it. The plunder included guns and ammunition, around 900 slaves, both Black and Indian, along with a large quantity of livestock and cotton. In the meantime, a group of seventy had crossed over to the nearby island of Saba and secured its surrender under the same terms as St. Eustatius. As the men had now become very rebellious and only numbered about 250 when counted, the officers decided they couldn't reasonably continue and sailed back to Jamaica, leaving a small garrison on each island. Most of the Dutch, about 250 in total, were sent to St. Martins, but a few others, along with around sixty English, Irish, and Scottish, pledged their allegiance and stayed behind.239
Encouraged by a letter from the king,240 Governor Modyford continued his exertions against the Dutch. In January (?) 1666 two buccaneer captains, Searles and Stedman, with two small ships and only eighty men took the island of Tobago, near Trinidad, and destroyed everything they could not carry away. Lord Willoughby, governor of Barbadoes, had also fitted out an expedition to take the island, but the Jamaicans were three or four days before him. The latter were busy with their work of pillage, when Willoughby arrived and demanded the island in the name of the king; and the buccaneers condescended to leave the fort and the governor's house standing only on condition that Willoughby gave them liberty to sell their plunder in Barbadoes.241 Modyford, meanwhile, greatly disappointed by the miscarriage of the design against Curaçao, called in the aid of the "old privateer," Captain Edward Mansfield, and in the autumn of 1665, with the hope of sending another armament against the island, appointed a rendezvous for the buccaneers in Bluefields Bay.242
Encouraged by a letter from the king,240 Governor Modyford continued his efforts against the Dutch. In January 1666, two buccaneer captains, Searles and Stedman, with two small ships and only eighty men, took the island of Tobago, near Trinidad, and destroyed everything they couldn't take with them. Lord Willoughby, governor of Barbados, had also set up an expedition to capture the island, but the Jamaicans got there three or four days ahead of him. They were busy looting when Willoughby arrived and demanded the island in the name of the king. The buccaneers agreed to leave the fort and the governor's house intact only if Willoughby allowed them to sell their loot in Barbados.241 Meanwhile, Modyford, greatly disappointed by the failed attempt against Curaçao, called for the help of the "old privateer," Captain Edward Mansfield, and in the autumn of 1665, hoping to send another mission against the island, organized a meeting for the buccaneers in Bluefields Bay.242
In January 1666 war against England was openly declared by France in support of her Dutch allies, and in the following month Charles II. sent letters to his governors in the West Indies and the North American colonies, apprising them of the war and urging them to attack their French neighbours.243 The news of the outbreak of hostilities did not reach Jamaica until 2nd July, but already in December of the previous year warning had {132} been sent out to the West Indies of the coming rupture.244 Governor Modyford, therefore, seeing the French very much increased in Hispaniola, concluded that it was high time to entice the buccaneers from French service and bind them to himself by issuing commissions against the Spaniards. The French still permitted the freebooters to dispose of Spanish prizes in their ports, but the better market afforded by Jamaica was always a sufficient consideration to attract not only the English buccaneers, but the Dutch and French as well. Moreover, the difficulties of the situation, which Modyford had repeatedly enlarged upon in his letters, seem to have been appreciated by the authorities in England, for in the spring of 1665, following upon Secretary Bennet's letter of 12th November and shortly after the outbreak of the Dutch war, the Duke of Albemarle had written to Modyford in the name of the king, giving him permission to use his own discretion in granting commissions against the Dons.245 Modyford was convinced that all the circumstances were favourable to such a course of action, and on 22nd February assembled the Council. A resolution was passed that it was to the interest of the island to grant letters of marque against the Spaniards,246 and a proclamation to this effect was published by the governor at Port Royal and Tortuga. In the following August Modyford sent home to Bennet, now become Lord Arlington, an elaborate defence of his actions. "Your Lordship very well knows," wrote Modyford, "how great an aversion I had for the privateers while at Barbadoes, but after I had put His Majesty's orders for restitution in strict execution, I found my error in the decay of the forts and wealth of this place, and also the affections of this people to His Majesty's service; yet I {133} continued discountenancing and punishing those kind of people till your Lordship's of the 12th November 1664 arrived, commanding a gentle usage of them; still we went to decay, which I represented to the Lord General faithfully the 6th of March following, who upon serious consideration with His Majesty and the Lord Chancellor, by letter of 1st June 1665, gave me latitude to grant or not commissions against the Spaniard, as I found it for the advantage of His Majesty's service and the good of this island. I was glad of this power, yet resolved not to use it unless necessity drove me to it; and that too when I saw how poor the fleets returning from Statia were, so that vessels were broken up and the men disposed of for the coast of Cuba to get a livelihood and so be wholly alienated from us. Many stayed at the Windward Isles, having not enough to pay their engagements, and at Tortuga and among the French buccaneers; still I forebore to make use of my power, hoping their hardships and great hazards would in time reclaim them from that course of life. But about the beginning of March last I found that the guards of Port Royal, which under Colonel Morgan were 600, had fallen to 138, so I assembled the Council to advise how to strengthen that most important place with some of the inland forces; but they all agreed that the only way to fill Port Royal with men was to grant commissions against the Spaniards, which they were very pressing in ... and looking on our weak condition, the chief merchants gone from Port Royal, no credit given to privateers for victualling, etc., and rumours of war with the French often repeated, I issued a declaration of my intentions to grant commissions against the Spaniards. Your Lordship cannot imagine what an universal change there was on the faces of men and things, ships repairing, great resort of workmen and labourers to Port Royal, many returning, many debtors released out of {134} prison, and the ships from the Curaçao voyage, not daring to come in for fear of creditors, brought in and fitted out again, so that the regimental forces at Port Royal are near 400. Had it not been for that seasonable action, I could not have kept my place against the French buccaneers, who would have ruined all the seaside plantations at least, whereas I now draw from them mainly, and lately David Marteen, the best man of Tortuga, that has two frigates at sea, has promised to bring in both."247
In January 1666, France officially declared war on England to support its Dutch allies. In the following month, Charles II sent letters to his governors in the West Indies and North American colonies, informing them of the war and urging them to attack the French. The news of the war didn't reach Jamaica until July 2nd, but warnings had already been sent to the West Indies about the impending conflict in December of the previous year. Governor Modyford, noticing a significant increase in French presence in Hispaniola, realized it was essential to attract the buccaneers away from the French and secure their loyalty by granting them commissions against the Spaniards. The French allowed these privateers to sell Spanish prizes in their ports, but the better market provided by Jamaica was enough to draw not just English buccaneers, but also Dutch and French ones. Moreover, Modyford’s concerns about the situation had been recognized by the authorities in England. In the spring of 1665, following a letter from Secretary Bennet dated November 12th and soon after the start of the Dutch war, the Duke of Albemarle wrote to Modyford on behalf of the king, giving him permission to use his discretion in issuing commissions against the Spaniards. Modyford believed the circumstances were favorable for this approach, so on February 22nd, he gathered the Council. They agreed that it would be in the island's best interest to grant letters of marque against the Spaniards, and the governor issued a proclamation to this effect in Port Royal and Tortuga. In August, Modyford sent a detailed defense of his actions back to Bennet, now Lord Arlington. "Your Lordship knows well," Modyford wrote, "how much I opposed privateers while in Barbados, but after I rigorously enforced His Majesty's orders for restitution, I recognized my mistake in the decline of the forts, the wealth of this place, and the loyalty of its people to His Majesty's service; yet, I continued to discourage and punish those people until I received your Lordship's letter from November 12, 1664, allowing a more lenient approach toward them. Still, we were in decline, which I reported honestly to the Lord General on March 6th following. After careful consideration with His Majesty and the Lord Chancellor, I received a letter on June 1, 1665, granting me the authority to issue commissions against the Spaniards as I deemed beneficial for His Majesty's service and the welfare of the island. I was pleased with this authority but resolved not to use it unless absolutely necessary; particularly when I saw the poor state of the fleets returning from Statia, leading vessels to break apart and their crews to seek livelihoods on the coast of Cuba, which distanced them from us. Many remained in the Windward Isles, unable to meet their obligations, and among the French buccaneers; yet I refrained from exercising my authority, hoping that their hardships and dangers would eventually bring them back. However, by early March, I saw that the guards at Port Royal, which had numbered 600 under Colonel Morgan, had dwindled to 138. I called a Council meeting to discuss bolstering that vital location with some inland forces, but they all concurred that granting commissions against the Spaniards was the only way to man Port Royal, which they urged eagerly. Recognizing our weak condition, with the leading merchants absent from Port Royal and no credit given to privateers for supplies, along with persistent rumors of war with the French, I declared my intention to issue commissions against the Spaniards. You can't imagine the dramatic change that swept over people and circumstances; ships were being repaired, a great influx of workers and laborers came to Port Royal, many returned, and debtors were released from prison. The ships from the Curaçao voyage, which had hesitated to dock for fear of creditors, were brought in and fitted out again, resulting in the regimental forces at Port Royal numbering nearly 400. If I hadn’t taken that timely action, I wouldn’t have kept my position against the French buccaneers, who could have devastated all the coastal plantations. Now, I primarily draw from them, and recently, David Marteen, the best man from Tortuga, who has two frigates at sea, promised to bring in both."
In so far as the buccaneers affected the mutual relations of England and Spain, it after all could make little difference whether commissions were issued in Jamaica or not, for the plundering and burning continued, and the harassed Spanish-Americans, only too prone to call the rogues English of whatever origin they might really be, continued to curse and hate the English nation and make cruel reprisals whenever possible. Moreover, every expedition into Spanish territory, finding the Spaniards very weak and very rich, gave new incentive to such endeavour. While Modyford had been standing now on one foot, now on the other, uncertain whether to repulse the buccaneers or not, secretly anxious to welcome them, but fearing the authorities at home, the corsairs themselves had entirely ignored him. The privateers whom Modyford had invited to rendezvous in Bluefield's Bay in November 1665 had chosen Captain Mansfield as their admiral, and in the middle of January sailed from the south cays of Cuba for Curaçao. In the meantime, however, because they had been refused provisions which, according to Modyford's account, they sought to buy from the Spaniards in Cuba, they had marched forty-two miles into the island, and on the strength of Portuguese commissions which they held against the Spaniards, had plundered and burnt the town of Sancti Spiritus, routed a body of 200 horse, carried {135} some prisoners to the coast, and for their ransom extorted 300 head of cattle.248 The rich and easy profits to be got by plundering the Spaniards were almost too much for the loyalty of the men, and Modyford, hearing of many defections from their ranks, had despatched Captain Beeston on 10th November to divert them, if possible, from Sancti Spiritus, and confirm them in their designs against Curaçao.249 The officers of the expedition, indeed, sent to the governor a letter expressing their zeal for the enterprise; but the men still held off, and the fleet, in consequence, eventually broke up. Two vessels departed for Tortuga, and four others, joined by two French rovers, sailed under Mansfield to attempt the recapture of Providence Island, which, since 1641, had been garrisoned by the Spaniards and used as a penal settlement.250 Being resolved, as Mansfield afterwards told the governor of Jamaica, never to see Modyford's face until he had done some service to the king, he sailed for Providence with about 200 men,251 and approaching the island in the night by an unusual passage among the reefs, landed early in {136} the morning, and surprised and captured the Spanish commander. The garrison of about 200 yielded up the fort on the promise that they would be carried to the mainland. Twenty-seven pieces of ordnance were taken, many of which, it is said, bore the arms of Queen Elizabeth engraved upon them. Mansfield left thirty-five men under command of a Captain Hattsell to hold the island, and sailed with his prisoners for Central America. After cruising along the shores of the mainland, he ascended the San Juan River and entered and sacked Granada, the capital of Nicaragua. From Granada the buccaneers turned south into Costa Rica, burning plantations, breaking the images in the churches, ham-stringing cows and mules, cutting down the fruit trees, and in general destroying everything they found. The Spanish governor had only thirty-six soldiers at his disposal and scarcely any firearms; but he gathered the inhabitants and some Indians, blocked the roads, laid ambuscades, and did all that his pitiful means permitted to hinder the progress of the invaders. The freebooters had designed to visit Cartago, the chief city of the province, and plunder it as they had plundered Granada. They penetrated only as far as Turrialva, however, whence weary and footsore from their struggle through the Cordillera, and harassed by the Spaniards, they retired through the province of Veragua in military order to their ships.252 On 12th June the buccaneers, laden with booty, sailed into Port Royal. There was at that moment no declared war between England and {137} Spain. Yet the governor, probably because he believed Mansfield to be justified, ex post facto, by the issue of commissions against the Spaniards in the previous February, did no more than mildly reprove him for acting without his orders; and "considering its good situation for favouring any design on the rich main," he accepted the tender of the island in behalf of the king. He despatched Major Samuel Smith, who had been one of Mansfield's party, with a few soldiers to reinforce the English garrison;253 and on 10th November the Council in England set the stamp of their approval upon his actions by issuing a commission to his brother, Sir James Modyford, to be lieutenant-governor of the new acquisition.254
As far as the buccaneers impacted the relationship between England and Spain, it hardly mattered whether commissions were issued in Jamaica, because the looting and destruction continued. The stressed Spanish-Americans, always quick to label anyone as English regardless of their actual origins, continued to curse and despise the English nation, retaliating harshly whenever they could. Furthermore, every expedition into Spanish territory, finding the Spaniards to be very weak and very wealthy, fueled more of these adventures. While Modyford was indecisively trying to decide whether to reject the buccaneers or not, secretly wanting to welcome them but afraid of the authorities back home, the corsairs completely disregarded him. The privateers that Modyford had called to meet in Bluefield's Bay in November 1665 chose Captain Mansfield as their leader and in mid-January set sail from the southern cays of Cuba to Curaçao. Meanwhile, because they were denied supplies that they tried to purchase from the Spaniards in Cuba, they marched forty-two miles into the island and, armed with Portuguese commissions against the Spaniards, plundered and burned the town of Sancti Spiritus, defeated a group of 200 cavalry, took some prisoners to the coast, and extorted 300 cattle for ransom. The tempting and easy profits from robbing the Spaniards almost swayed the loyalty of the men, and Modyford, hearing about many defections from their ranks, sent Captain Beeston on November 10 to try to divert them from Sancti Spiritus and solidify their plans against Curaçao. The officers of the expedition did send a letter to the governor expressing their enthusiasm for the mission; however, the men were still hesitant, resulting in the fleet eventually breaking up. Two ships went to Tortuga while four others, joined by two French privateers, sailed under Mansfield to try to recapture Providence Island, which had been garrisoned by the Spaniards and used as a penal settlement since 1641. Mansfield, determined not to see Modyford again until he had accomplished something for the king, sailed to Providence with around 200 men and approached the island at night through an unusual route among the reefs, landing early in the morning and surprising and capturing the Spanish commander. The garrison of about 200 surrendered the fort on the condition they would be taken to the mainland. They captured twenty-seven cannons, many of which, it is said, had Queen Elizabeth's arms engraved on them. Mansfield left thirty-five men under Captain Hattsell to hold the island and sailed with his prisoners to Central America. After cruising along the mainland's shores, he ascended the San Juan River and entered Granada, the capital of Nicaragua, where the buccaneers headed south into Costa Rica, burning plantations, destroying religious icons, hamstringing cattle and mules, cutting down fruit trees, and generally wreaking havoc wherever they went. The Spanish governor had only thirty-six soldiers at his disposal and very few firearms; however, he gathered the local population and some Indians, blocked the roads, set ambushes, and did everything he could with his limited resources to slow the invaders' advance. The freebooters intended to visit Cartago, the primary city of the province, and loot it just as they had looted Granada. However, they only made it as far as Turrialba, and after becoming exhausted and sore from their trek through the mountains and facing harassment from the Spaniards, they retreated in an organized manner through the province of Veragua to their ships. On June 12, the buccaneers, loaded with treasure, sailed into Port Royal. At that time, there was no official war between England and Spain. Yet, the governor, likely believing that Mansfield was justified retroactively by the commissions issued against the Spaniards the previous February, merely mildly reprimanded him for acting without his orders; and recognizing the island's strategic position for any plans against the rich mainland, he accepted the island as a gift for the king. He sent Major Samuel Smith, who had been part of Mansfield's party, along with a few soldiers to reinforce the English garrison; and on November 10, the Council in England officially approved his actions by issuing a commission to his brother, Sir James Modyford, to be lieutenant-governor of the newly acquired territory.
In August 1665, only two months before the departure of Mansfield from Jamaica, there had returned to Port Royal from a raid in the same region three privateer captains named Morris, Jackman and Morgan.255 These men, with their followers, doubtless helped to swell the ranks of Mansfield's buccaneers, and it was probably their report of the wealth of Central America which induced Mansfield to emulate their performance. In the previous January these three captains, still pretending to sail under commissions from Lord Windsor, had ascended the river {138} Tabasco, in the province of Campeache, with 107 men, and guided by Indians made a detour of 300 miles, according to their account, to Villa de Mosa,256 which they took and plundered. When they returned to the mouth of the river, they found that their ships had been seized by Spaniards, who, on their approach, attacked them 300 strong. The Spaniards, softened by the heat and indolent life of the tropics, were no match for one-third their number of desperadoes, and the buccaneers beat them off without the loss of a man. The freebooters then fitted up two barques and four canoes, sailed to Rio Garta and stormed the place with only thirty men; crossed the Gulf of Honduras to the Island of Roatan to rest and obtain fresh water, and then captured and plundered the port of Truxillo. Down the Mosquito Coast they passed like a devouring flame, consuming all in their path. Anchoring in Monkey Bay, they ascended the San Juan River in canoes for a distance of 100 miles to Lake Nicaragua. The basin into which they entered they described as a veritable paradise, the air cool and wholesome, the shores of the lake full of green pastures and broad savannahs dotted with horses and cattle, and round about all a coronal of azure mountains. Hiding by day among the numerous islands and rowing all night, on the fifth night they landed near the city of Granada, just a year before Mansfield's visit to the place. The buccaneers marched unobserved to the central square of the city, overturned eighteen cannon mounted there, seized the magazine, and {139} took and imprisoned in the cathedral 300 of the citizens. They plundered for sixteen hours, then released their prisoners, and taking the precaution to scuttle all the boats, made their way back to the sea coast. The town was large and pleasant, containing seven churches besides several colleges and monasteries, and most of the buildings were constructed of stone. About 1000 Indians, driven to rebellion by the cruelty and oppression of the Spaniards, accompanied the marauders and would have massacred the prisoners, especially the religious, had they not been told that the English had no intentions of retaining their conquest. The news of the exploit produced a lively impression in Jamaica, and the governor suggested Central America as the "properest place" for an attack from England on the Spanish Indies.257
In August 1665, just two months before Mansfield left Jamaica, three privateer captains named Morris, Jackman, and Morgan returned to Port Royal from a raid in the same area.255 These men, along with their crew, likely boosted the ranks of Mansfield's buccaneers, and it was probably their reports of the riches in Central America that inspired Mansfield to follow in their footsteps. Back in January, these three captains, still pretending to operate under commissions from Lord Windsor, had traveled up the Tabasco River in the Campeache province with 107 men, and with guidance from local Indians, took a 300-mile detour to Villa de Mosa,256 which they captured and looted. When they returned to the river mouth, they found their ships had been seized by Spaniards, who attacked them with a force of 300. However, the Spaniards, weakened by the heat and laziness of tropical life, stood no chance against a third of their number of desperate raiders, and the buccaneers drove them off without losing a single man. The freebooters then outfitted two barques and four canoes, sailed to Rio Garta, and attacked the location with only thirty men; they then crossed the Gulf of Honduras to the Island of Roatan to rest and gather fresh water, before capturing and looting the port of Truxillo. They swept down the Mosquito Coast like a consuming fire, taking everything in their way. After anchoring in Monkey Bay, they navigated up the San Juan River in canoes for about 100 miles to Lake Nicaragua. They described the basin they found as a paradise, with cool, clean air, lake shores filled with green pastures and open fields dotted with horses and cattle, and surrounded by blue mountains. They hid by day among the many islands and rowed all night, and on the fifth night, they landed near the city of Granada, just a year before Mansfield’s visit. The buccaneers marched unnoticed to the city’s central square, overturned eighteen cannons there, seized the armory, and captured about 300 citizens, imprisoning them in the cathedral. They looted for sixteen hours, then released their prisoners, and to be safe, sank all the boats before making their way back to the coast. The town was large and pleasant, featuring seven churches, several colleges, and monasteries, with most buildings constructed of stone. Around 1,000 Indians, angered by the cruelty and oppression from the Spaniards, joined the raiders and would have killed the prisoners, especially the religious ones, had they not been told that the English had no plans to keep the area they conquered. The news of this raid made a big impression in Jamaica, and the governor proposed Central America as the "best place" for England to launch an attack on the Spanish Indies.257
Providence Island was now in the hands of an English garrison, and the Spaniards were not slow to realise that the possession of this outpost by the buccaneers might be but the first step to larger conquests on the mainland. The President of Panama, Don Juan Perez de Guzman, immediately took steps to recover the island. He transferred himself to Porto Bello, embargoed an English ship of thirty guns, the "Concord," lying at anchor there with licence to trade in negroes, manned it with 350 Spaniards under command of José Sánchez Jiménez, and sent it to Cartagena. The governor of Cartagena contributed several small vessels and a hundred or more men to the enterprise, and on 10th August 1666 the united Spanish fleet appeared off the shores of Providence. On the refusal of Major Smith to surrender, the Spaniards {140} landed, and on 15th August, after a three days' siege, forced the handful of buccaneers, only sixty or seventy in number, to capitulate. Some of the English defenders later deposed before Governor Modyford that the Spaniards had agreed to let them depart in a barque for Jamaica. However this may be, when the English came to lay down their arms they were made prisoners by the Spaniards, carried to Porto Bello, and all except Sir Thomas Whetstone, Major Smith and Captain Stanley, the three English captains, submitted to the most inhuman cruelties. Thirty-three were chained to the ground in a dungeon 12 feet by 10. They were forced to work in the water from five in the morning till seven at night, and at such a rate that the Spaniards themselves confessed they made one of them do more work than any three negroes; yet when weak for want of victuals and sleep, they were knocked down and beaten with cudgels so that four or five died. "Having no clothes, their backs were blistered with the sun, their heads scorched, their necks, shoulders and hands raw with carrying stones and mortar, their feet chopped and their legs bruised and battered with the irons, and their corpses were noisome to one another." The three English captains were carried to Panama, and there cast into a dungeon and bound in irons for seventeen months.258
Providence Island was now controlled by an English garrison, and the Spaniards quickly realized that the buccaneers' hold on this outpost might just be the beginning of bigger conquests on the mainland. The President of Panama, Don Juan Perez de Guzman, immediately worked to reclaim the island. He moved to Porto Bello, seized an English ship with thirty guns, the "Concord," which was anchored there with permission to trade in enslaved people, crewed it with 350 Spaniards led by José Sánchez Jiménez, and sent it to Cartagena. The governor of Cartagena contributed several small vessels and over a hundred men to the mission, and on August 10, 1666, the combined Spanish fleet appeared off the shores of Providence. When Major Smith refused to surrender, the Spaniards landed, and on August 15, after a three-day siege, forced the small group of buccaneers, only sixty or seventy in total, to capitulate. Some of the English defenders later testified to Governor Modyford that the Spaniards had promised to let them leave in a barque for Jamaica. Regardless, when the English surrendered, they were taken prisoner by the Spaniards, transported to Porto Bello, and all except Sir Thomas Whetstone, Major Smith, and Captain Stanley, the three English captains, endured extreme cruelty. Thirty-three were shackled to the ground in a dungeon measuring 12 by 10 feet. They were made to work in the water from five in the morning until seven at night, at such a pace that the Spaniards themselves admitted one of them accomplished more work than any three enslaved people; yet when they became weak from a lack of food and sleep, they were beaten with clubs, resulting in the deaths of four or five. "With no clothing, their backs were burned by the sun, their heads scorched, their necks, shoulders, and hands raw from carrying stones and mortar, their feet mutilated and their legs bruised and battered by the shackles, and their bodies became unbearable to each other." The three English captains were taken to Panama, where they were thrown into a dungeon and shackled for seventeen months.258
On 8th January 1664 Sir Richard Fanshaw, formerly ambassador to Portugal, had arrived in Madrid from England to negotiate a treaty of commerce with Spain, and if possible to patch up a peace between the Spanish and Portuguese crowns. He had renewed the old demand for a free commerce in the Indies; and the negotiations had dragged through the years of 1664 and {141} 1665, hampered and crossed by the factions in the Spanish court, the hostile machinations of the Dutch resident in Madrid, and the constant rumours of cruelties and desolations by the freebooters in America.259 The Spanish Government insisted that by sole virtue of the articles of 1630 there was peace on both sides of the "Line," and that the violences of the buccaneers in the West Indies, and even the presence of English colonists there, was a breach of the articles. In this fashion they endeavoured to reduce Fanshaw to the position of a suppliant for favours which they might only out of their grace and generosity concede. It was a favourite trick of Spanish diplomacy, which had been worked many times before. The English ambassador was, in consequence, compelled strenuously to deny the existence of any peace in America, although he realised how ambiguous his position had been rendered by the original orders of Charles II. to Modyford in 1664.260 After the death of Philip IV. in 1665, negotiations were renewed with the encouragement of the Queen Regent, and on 17th December provisional articles were signed by Fanshaw and the Duke de Medina de los Torres and sent to England for ratification.261 Fanshaw died shortly after, and Lord Sandwich, his successor, finally succeeded in concluding a treaty on 23rd May 1667.262 The provisions of the treaty extended to places "where hitherto trade and commerce hath been accustomed," and the only privileges obtained in America were those which had been granted to the Low Countries by the Treaty of Munster. On 21st July of the same year a general peace was concluded at Breda between England, Holland and France.
On January 8, 1664, Sir Richard Fanshaw, who had previously served as ambassador to Portugal, arrived in Madrid from England to negotiate a trade treaty with Spain and, if possible, to broker a peace between the Spanish and Portuguese crowns. He reinstated the old demand for open trade in the Indies, and the negotiations dragged on through 1664 and 1665, hindered by factions within the Spanish court, the hostile actions of the Dutch representative in Madrid, and constant rumors of violence and devastation caused by pirates in America.259 The Spanish Government maintained that, according to the articles of 1630, there was peace on both sides of the "Line," and that the actions of the buccaneers in the West Indies and even the presence of English settlers there constituted a violation of the articles. In this way, they sought to force Fanshaw into the position of pleading for favors that they might only grant out of their own goodwill and generosity. This was a common tactic of Spanish diplomacy, which had been used many times before. As a result, the English ambassador was compelled to firmly deny any existence of peace in America, even though he knew how unclear his position had become due to the original orders Charles II. had given to Modyford in 1664.260 After the death of Philip IV in 1665, negotiations resumed with the support of the Queen Regent, and on December 17, provisional articles were signed by Fanshaw and the Duke de Medina de los Torres and sent to England for ratification.261 Fanshaw died shortly after, and Lord Sandwich, his successor, eventually managed to finalize a treaty on May 23, 1667.262 The treaty's provisions extended to places "where trade and commerce had previously been customary," and the only privileges won in America were those that had been granted to the Low Countries by the Treaty of Munster. On July 21 of the same year, a general peace was established at Breda between England, Holland, and France.
It was in the very midst of Lord Sandwich's negotiations that Modyford had, as Beeston expresses it in his Journal, declared war against the Spaniards by the re-issue of privateering commissions. He had done it all in his own name, however, so that the king might disavow him should the exigencies of diplomacy demand it.263 Moreover, at this same time, in the middle of 1666, Albemarle was writing to Modyford that notwithstanding the negotiations, in which, as he said, the West Indies were not at all concerned, the governor might still employ the privateers as formerly, if it be for the benefit of English interests in the Indies.264 The news of the general peace reached Jamaica late in 1667; yet Modyford did not change his policy. It is true that in February Secretary Lord Arlington had sent directions to restrain the buccaneers from further acts of violence against the Spaniards;265 but Modyford drew his own conclusions from the contradictory orders received from England, and was conscious, perhaps, that he was only reflecting the general policy of the home government when he wrote to Arlington:—"Truly it must be very imprudent to run the hazard of this place, for obtaining a correspondence which could not but by orders from Madrid be had.... The Spaniards look on us as intruders and trespassers, wheresoever they find us in the Indies, and use us accordingly; and were it in their power, as it is fixed in their wills, would soon turn us out of all our plantations; and is it reasonable that we should quietly let them grow upon us until they are able to do it? It must be force alone that can cut in sunder that unneighbourly maxim of their government to deny all access to strangers."266
It was during Lord Sandwich's negotiations that Modyford, as Beeston notes in his Journal, declared war on the Spaniards by reissuing privateering commissions. He did it all in his own name, though, so the king could disavow him if diplomacy required it.263 Additionally, around the middle of 1666, Albemarle was writing to Modyford, saying that despite the negotiations—which, he claimed, didn't involve the West Indies—the governor could still use privateers as before if it benefited English interests in the Indies.264 News of the general peace reached Jamaica late in 1667, but Modyford didn't change his approach. It's true that in February Secretary Lord Arlington had sent instructions to restrain the buccaneers from further violence against the Spaniards;265 but Modyford drew his own conclusions from the mixed messages he received from England, and he likely realized that he was merely reflecting the general policy of the home government when he wrote to Arlington: “It must be very reckless to risk this place for a relationship that could only be fostered through orders from Madrid... The Spaniards view us as intruders and trespassers wherever they find us in the Indies and treat us accordingly; if it were within their power, as it is their intention, they would quickly remove us from all our plantations. Is it fair that we should allow them to strengthen their position until they're able to do so? Only force can challenge that unfriendly principle of their government that denies all access to outsiders.”266
These words were very soon translated into action, for in June 1668 Henry Morgan, with a fleet of nine or ten ships and between 400 and 500 men, took and sacked Porto Bello, one of the strongest cities of Spanish America, and the emporium for most of the European trade of the South American continent. Henry Morgan was a nephew of the Colonel Edward Morgan who died in the assault of St. Eustatius. He is said to have been kidnapped at Bristol while he was a mere lad and sold as a servant in Barbadoes, whence, on the expiration of his time, he found his way to Jamaica. There he joined the buccaneers and soon rose to be captain of a ship. It was probably he who took part in the expedition with Morris and Jackman to Campeache and Central America. He afterwards joined the Curaçao armament of Mansfield and was with the latter when he seized the island of Providence. After Mansfield's disappearance Morgan seems to have taken his place as the foremost buccaneer leader in Jamaica, and during the next twenty years he was {144} one of the most considerable men in the colony. He was but thirty-three years old when he led the expedition against Porto Bello.267
These words quickly turned into action, because in June 1668, Henry Morgan, with a fleet of nine or ten ships and between 400 and 500 men, captured and plundered Porto Bello, one of the strongest cities in Spanish America, and the hub for most of the European trade in South America. Henry Morgan was the nephew of Colonel Edward Morgan, who died in the assault on St. Eustatius. He is said to have been kidnapped in Bristol as a young boy and sold as a servant in Barbados, from where, after his term ended, he made his way to Jamaica. There, he joined the buccaneers and quickly rose to become a ship captain. It was probably him who participated in the expedition with Morris and Jackman to Campeache and Central America. He later joined Mansfield's armament in Curaçao and was with him when they took the island of Providence. After Mansfield's disappearance, Morgan seems to have taken over as the leading buccaneer in Jamaica, and for the next twenty years, he was one of the most significant figures in the colony. He was only thirty-three years old when he led the expedition against Porto Bello.{144}267
In the beginning of 1668 Sir Thomas Modyford, having had "frequent and strong advice" that the Spaniards were planning an invasion of Jamaica, had commissioned Henry Morgan to draw together the English privateers and take some Spanish prisoners in order to find out if these rumours were true. The buccaneers, according to Morgan's own report to the governor, were driven to the south cays of Cuba, where being in want of victuals and "like to starve," and meeting some Frenchmen in a similar plight, they put their men ashore to forage. They found all the cattle driven up into the country, however, and the inhabitants fled. So the freebooters marched twenty leagues to Puerto Principe on the north side of the island, and after a short encounter, in which the Spanish governor was killed, possessed themselves of the place. Nothing of value escaped the rapacity of the invaders, who resorted to the extremes of torture to draw from their prisoners confessions of hidden wealth. On the entreaty of the Spaniards they forebore to fire the town, and for a ransom of 1000 head of cattle released all the prisoners; but they compelled the Spaniards to salt the beef and carry it to the ships.268 Morgan reported, with what degree of truth we have no means of judging, that seventy men had been impressed in Puerto Principe to go against Jamaica, and that a similar {145} levy had been made throughout the island. Considerable forces, moreover, were expected from the mainland to rendezvous at Havana and St. Jago, with the final object of invading the English colony.
In early 1668, Sir Thomas Modyford, after receiving "frequent and strong advice" that the Spaniards were planning to invade Jamaica, commissioned Henry Morgan to gather the English privateers and capture some Spanish prisoners to see if these rumors were true. According to Morgan's report to the governor, the buccaneers were driven to the southern cays of Cuba, where they were short on food and "about to starve." They encountered some Frenchmen in a similar situation, so they sent some men ashore to forage. However, they found that all the cattle had been moved inland, and the locals had fled. The freebooters then marched twenty leagues to Puerto Principe on the north side of the island, and after a brief fight—during which the Spanish governor was killed—they took control of the area. Nothing of value escaped the greed of the invaders, who resorted to extreme torture to extract confessions of hidden wealth from their prisoners. At the request of the Spaniards, they refrained from burning the town, and for a ransom of 1000 head of cattle, they released all the prisoners, but they forced the Spaniards to salt the beef and carry it to the ships.268 Morgan reported, with no way for us to verify the truth of it, that seventy men had been pressed in Puerto Principe to go against Jamaica, and that a similar recruitment had occurred throughout the island. Additionally, significant forces were expected from the mainland to gather at Havana and St. Jago, with the ultimate goal of invading the English colony.
On returning to the ships from the sack of Puerto Principe, Morgan unfolded to his men his scheme of striking at the very heart of Spanish power in the Indies by capturing Porto Bello. The Frenchmen among his followers, it seems, wholly refused to join him in this larger design, full of danger as it was; so Morgan sailed away with only the English freebooters, some 400 in number, for the coasts of Darien. Exquemelin has left us a narrative of this exploit which is more circumstantial than any other we possess, and agrees so closely with what we know from other sources that we must accept the author's statement that he was an eye-witness. He relates the whole story, moreover, in so entertaining and picturesque a manner that he deserves quotation.
On returning to the ships after raiding Puerto Principe, Morgan shared his plan with his crew to hit the very heart of Spanish power in the Indies by capturing Porto Bello. The French among his followers completely refused to join him in this ambitious but risky venture; so, Morgan sailed off with only the English buccaneers, about 400 in total, toward the coasts of Darien. Exquemelin has provided us with a detailed account of this feat, more comprehensive than any other we have, and it aligns so closely with what we know from other sources that we must take the author's claim of being an eyewitness seriously. He tells the entire tale in such an entertaining and vivid way that he deserves to be quoted.
"Captain Morgan," he says, "who knew very well all the avenues of this city, as also all the neighbouring coasts, arrived in the dusk of the evening at the place called Puerto de Naos, distant ten leagues towards the west of Porto Bello.269 Being come unto this place, they mounted the river in their ships, as far as another harbour called Puerto Pontin, where they came to anchor. Here they put themselves immediately into boats and canoes, leaving in the ships only a few men to keep them and conduct {146} them the next day unto the port. About midnight they came to a certain place called Estera longa Lemos, where they all went on shore, and marched by land to the first posts of the city. They had in their company a certain Englishman, who had been formerly a prisoner in those parts, and who now served them for a guide. Unto him, and three or four more, they gave commission to take the sentry, if possible, or to kill him upon the place. But they laid hands on him and apprehended him with such cunning as he had no time to give warning with his musket, or make any other noise. Thus they brought him, with his hands bound, unto Captain Morgan, who asked him: 'How things went in the city, and what forces they had'; with many other circumstances, which he was desirous to know. After every question they made him a thousand menaces to kill him, in case he declared not the truth. Thus they began to advance towards the city, carrying always the said sentry bound before them. Having marched about one quarter of a league, they came to the castle that is nigh unto the city, which presently they closely surrounded, so that no person could get either in or out of the said fortress.
"Captain Morgan," he says, "who was very familiar with all the routes of this city, as well as the nearby coasts, arrived in the evening twilight at a place called Puerto de Naos, which is ten leagues west of Porto Bello.269 Upon reaching this location, they sailed up the river in their ships to another harbor called Puerto Pontin, where they anchored. They immediately transferred to boats and canoes, leaving only a few men on the ships to guard them and guide them the next day to the port. Around midnight, they reached a place called Estera longa Lemos, where they all went ashore and marched overland to the outskirts of the city. They were accompanied by an Englishman who had previously been a prisoner in that area and was now acting as their guide. They assigned him, along with three or four others, the task of capturing the sentry, or eliminating him if necessary. They managed to seize him quietly, without giving him any chance to alert anyone with his musket or make any noise. They brought him, hands bound, to Captain Morgan, who asked him about the city's situation and its forces, along with many other details he wanted to know. After each question, they threatened him countless times with death if he didn’t tell the truth. They then began to move toward the city, always keeping the captured sentry bound before them. After marching about a quarter of a league, they arrived at the castle near the city, which they quickly surrounded to ensure that no one could enter or leave the fortress."
"Being thus posted under the walls of the castle, Captain Morgan commanded the sentry, whom they had taken prisoner, to speak to those that were within, charging them to surrender, and deliver themselves up to his discretion; otherwise they should be all cut in pieces, without giving quarter to any one. But they would hearken to none of these threats, beginning instantly to fire; which gave notice unto the city, and this was suddenly alarmed. Yet, notwithstanding, although the Governor and soldiers of the said castle made as great resistance as could be performed, they were constrained to surrender unto the Pirates. These no sooner had taken the castle, than they resolved to be as good as their words, in putting the {147} Spaniards to the sword, thereby to strike a terror into the rest of the city. Hereupon, having shut up all the soldiers and officers as prisoners into one room, they instantly set fire to the powder (whereof they found great quantity), and blew up the whole castle into the air, with all the Spaniards that were within. This being done, they pursued the course of their victory, falling upon the city, which as yet was not in order to receive them. Many of the inhabitants cast their precious jewels and moneys into wells and cisterns or hid them in other places underground, to excuse, as much as were possible, their being totally robbed. One party of the Pirates being assigned to this purpose, ran immediately to the cloisters, and took as many religious men and women as they could find. The Governor of the city not being able to rally the citizens, through the huge confusion of the town, retired unto one of the castles remaining, and from thence began to fire incessantly at the Pirates. But these were not in the least negligent either to assault him or defend themselves with all the courage imaginable. Thus it was observed that, amidst the horror of the assault, they made very few shot in vain. For aiming with great dexterity at the mouths of the guns, the Spaniards were certain to lose one or two men every time they charged each gun anew.
"Positioned outside the castle walls, Captain Morgan ordered the captured sentry to speak to those inside, demanding they surrender and give themselves up to him; otherwise, they would be slaughtered without mercy. However, they refused to listen to these threats and immediately opened fire, alerting the city, which quickly went into alarm. Despite the Governor and soldiers of the castle putting up a fierce resistance, they were forced to surrender to the Pirates. As soon as the Pirates took the castle, they decided to follow through on their threats and kill the Spaniards to instill fear in the rest of the city. They locked all the soldiers and officers in one room, then set fire to the large stash of gunpowder they found, blowing up the entire castle with all the Spaniards inside. With this done, they continued their victory by attacking the city, which was still unprepared for their arrival. Many residents threw their valuable jewelry and money into wells and cisterns or hid them underground to minimize their losses. One group of Pirates was tasked with capturing religious men and women from the cloisters. The Governor of the city, unable to organize the citizens amidst the chaos, retreated to one of the remaining castles and started firing relentlessly at the Pirates. The Pirates, undeterred, bravely fought back while also defending themselves. It was noted that during the assault, they were very accurate, rarely wasting shots. The Spaniards were sure to lose one or two men every time they reloaded their cannons."
"The assault of this castle where the Governor was continued very furious on both sides, from break of day until noon. Yea, about this time of the day the case was very dubious which party should conquer or be conquered. At last the Pirates, perceiving they had lost many men and as yet advanced but little towards the gaining either this or the other castles remaining, thought to make use of fireballs, which they threw with their hands, designing, if possible, to burn the doors of the castle. But going about to put this in execution, the Spaniards from the walls let fall great quantity of stones and earthen pots full of powder {148} and other combustible matter, which forced them to desist from that attempt. Captain Morgan, seeing this generous defence made by the Spaniards, began to despair of the whole success of the enterprise. Hereupon many faint and calm meditations came into his mind; neither could he determine which way to turn himself in that straitness of affairs. Being involved in these thoughts, he was suddenly animated to continue the assault, by seeing the English colours put forth at one of the lesser castles, then entered by his men, of whom he presently after spied a troop that came to meet him proclaiming victory with loud shouts of joy. This instantly put him upon new resolutions of making new efforts to take the rest of the castles that stood out against him; especially seeing the chief citizens were fled unto them, and had conveyed thither great part of their riches, with all the plate belonging to the churches, and other things dedicated to divine service.
The attack on the castle where the Governor was stationed was intense on both sides, lasting from dawn until noon. By this time, it was unclear which side would win or lose. Eventually, the Pirates, realizing they had lost many men and hadn’t made much progress toward capturing either of the other remaining castles, decided to use fireballs, which they threw by hand, hoping to burn the castle doors. However, as they attempted this, the Spaniards on the walls dropped a large number of stones and earthen pots filled with powder and other flammable materials, forcing them to abandon that plan. Captain Morgan, witnessing the Spaniards' brave defense, began to lose hope in the success of the mission. Doubts and calm reflections filled his mind, and he couldn’t figure out how to proceed in such a difficult situation. While caught up in these thoughts, he was suddenly inspired to continue the assault when he saw the English colors displayed at one of the smaller castles, which had been breached by his men. Soon, he spotted a group coming to meet him, celebrating victory with loud shouts of joy. This motivated him to make new plans to capture the remaining castles that resisted him, especially since he noticed that the main citizens had taken refuge there, bringing with them a significant portion of their wealth, including all the church silver and other items meant for worship.
"To this effect, therefore, he ordered ten or twelve ladders to be made, in all possible haste, so broad that three or four men at once might ascend by them. These being finished, he commanded all the religious men and women whom he had taken prisoners to fix them against the walls of the castle. Thus much he had beforehand threatened the Governor to perform, in case he delivered not the castle. But his answer was: 'He would never surrender himself alive.' Captain Morgan was much persuaded that the Governor would not employ his utmost forces, seeing religious women and ecclesiastical persons exposed in the front of the soldiers to the greatest dangers. Thus the ladders, as I have said, were put into the hands of religious persons of both sexes; and these were forced, at the head of the companies, to raise and apply them to the walls. But Captain Morgan was deceived in his judgment of this design. For the Governor, who acted like a brave and courageous soldier, refused not, in performance {149} of his duty, to use his utmost endeavours to destroy whosoever came near the walls. The religious men and women ceased not to cry unto him and beg of him by all the Saints of Heaven he would deliver the castle, and hereby spare both his and their own lives. But nothing could prevail with the obstinacy and fierceness that had possessed the Governor's mind. Thus many of the religious men and nuns were killed before they could fix the ladders. Which at last being done, though with great loss of the said religious people, the Pirates mounted them in great numbers, and with no less valour; having fireballs in their hands, and earthen pots full of powder. All which things, being now at the top of the walls, they kindled and cast in among the Spaniards.
"To this end, he ordered ten or twelve ladders to be made as quickly as possible, wide enough for three or four men to climb at once. Once they were finished, he told all the religious men and women he had captured to prop them against the castle walls. He had previously warned the Governor that he would do this if he didn't surrender the castle. The Governor's response was that he would never give himself up alive. Captain Morgan was quite sure that the Governor wouldn't use all his forces since he had religious women and church figures exposed in front of his soldiers to the greatest dangers. So, the ladders were handed over to the religious people of both genders, and they were forced to take the lead in raising and placing them against the walls. However, Captain Morgan misjudged this plan. The Governor, acting like a brave and determined soldier, didn't hesitate to do everything in his power to wipe out anyone who came near the walls. The religious men and women kept crying out to him, begging him by all the Saints in Heaven to spare the castle and save both their lives and his. Yet nothing could change the stubbornness and aggression that had taken hold of the Governor's mind. Many religious men and nuns were killed before they could secure the ladders. Once that was finally done, despite the great loss of these religious individuals, the Pirates climbed them in large numbers and with equal bravery, carrying fireballs and clay pots full of gunpowder. Once they reached the top of the walls, they lit these and threw them down among the Spaniards."
"This effort of the Pirates was very great, insomuch as the Spaniards could no longer resist nor defend the castle, which was now entered. Hereupon they all threw down their arms, and craved quarter for their lives. Only the Governor of the city would admit or crave no mercy; but rather killed many of the Pirates with his own hands, and not a few of his own soldiers, because they did not stand to their arms. And although the Pirates asked him if he would have quarter, yet he constantly answered: 'By no means; I had rather die as a valiant soldier, than be hanged as a coward.' They endeavoured as much as they could to take him prisoner. But he defended himself so obstinately that they were forced to kill him; notwithstanding all the cries and tears of his own wife and daughter, who begged of him upon their knees he would demand quarter and save his life. When the Pirates had possessed themselves of the castle, which was about night, they enclosed therein all the prisoners they had taken, placing the women and men by themselves, with some guards upon them. All the wounded were put into a certain apartment by itself, to the intent their own complaints {150} might be the cure of their diseases; for no other was afforded them.
"This effort by the Pirates was significant, to the point that the Spaniards could no longer resist or defend the castle, which had just been taken. They all dropped their weapons and begged for their lives. Only the Governor of the city refused to ask for mercy; instead, he killed many of the Pirates with his own hands and also killed several of his own soldiers for not standing their ground. Even when the Pirates asked him if he wanted to surrender, he firmly replied: 'Not a chance; I’d rather die like a brave soldier than be hanged like a coward.' They tried as hard as they could to capture him, but he fought back so fiercely that they had no choice but to kill him, despite the pleas and tears of his wife and daughter, who begged him on their knees to ask for mercy and save his life. After the Pirates took control of the castle, which was around nightfall, they locked up all the prisoners they had captured, separating the women and men with some guards watching over them. All the wounded were placed in a separate room so their own groans could heal them; no other care was provided for them." {150}
"This being done, they fell to eating and drinking after their usual manner; that is to say, committing in both these things all manner of debauchery and excess.... After such manner they delivered themselves up unto all sort of debauchery, that if there had been found only fifty courageous men, they might easily have re-taken the city, and killed all the Pirates. The next day, having plundered all they could find, they began to examine some of the prisoners (who had been persuaded by their companions to say they were the richest of the town), charging them severely to discover where they had hidden their riches and goods. But not being able to extort anything out of them, as they were not the right persons that possessed any wealth, they at last resolved to torture them. This they performed with such cruelty that many of them died upon the rack, or presently after. Soon after, the President of Panama had news brought him of the pillage and ruin of Porto Bello. This intelligence caused him to employ all his care and industry to raise forces, with design to pursue and cast out the Pirates from thence. But these cared little for what extraordinary means the President used, as having their ships nigh at hand, and being determined to set fire unto the city and retreat. They had now been at Porto Bello fifteen days, in which space of time they had lost many of their men, both by the unhealthiness of the country and the extravagant debaucheries they had committed.270
"This done, they started eating and drinking like they usually do; that is to say, indulging in all kinds of excess and debauchery. In this way, they fully surrendered themselves to every kind of vice, so that if there had just been fifty brave men, they could have easily taken back the city and killed all the pirates. The next day, after looting everything they could find, they began to question some of the prisoners (who had been convinced by their friends to claim they were the wealthiest in town), insisting they reveal where they had hidden their riches and goods. But they couldn’t extract anything from them, as they weren’t the right people with any wealth, so they ultimately decided to torture them. They did this with such brutality that many died on the rack, or soon after. Shortly afterward, the President of Panama received news of the looting and destruction of Porto Bello. This news prompted him to dedicate all his efforts to raise troops, intending to chase out the pirates from there. However, the pirates cared little about what extraordinary measures the President took, since they had their ships nearby and were determined to set fire to the city and escape. They had now been in Porto Bello for fifteen days, during which time they had lost many men, both due to the unhealthy conditions of the area and the wild debauchery they participated in.270
"Hereupon they prepared for a departure, carrying on {151} board their ships all the pillage they had gotten. But, before all, they provided the fleet with sufficient victuals for the voyage. While these things were getting ready, Captain Morgan sent an injunction unto the prisoners, that they should pay him a ransom for the city, or else he would by fire consume it to ashes, and blow up all the castles into the air. Withal, he commanded them to send speedily two persons to seek and procure the sum he demanded, which amounted to one hundred thousand pieces of eight. Unto this effect, two men were sent to the President of Panama, who gave him an account of all these tragedies. The President, having now a body of men in readiness, set forth immediately towards Porto Bello, to encounter the Pirates before their retreat. But these people, hearing of his coming, instead of flying away, went out to meet him at a narrow passage through which of necessity he ought to pass. Here they placed an hundred men very well armed; the which, at the first encounter, put to flight a good party of those of Panama. This accident obliged the President to retire for that time, as not being yet in a posture of strength to proceed any farther. Presently after this rencounter he sent a message unto Captain Morgan to tell him: 'That in case he departed not suddenly with all his forces from Porto Bello, he ought to expect no quarter for himself nor his companions, when he should take them, as he hoped soon to do.' Captain Morgan, who feared not his threats knowing he had a secure retreat in his ships which were nigh at hand, made him answer: 'He would not deliver the castles, before he had received the contribution money he had demanded. Which in case it were not paid down, he would certainly burn the whole city, and then leave it, demolishing beforehand the castles and killing the prisoners.'
"Then they got ready to leave, loading all the treasure they had taken onto their ships. But first, they made sure the fleet had enough supplies for the journey. While these preparations were underway, Captain Morgan sent a warning to the prisoners that they needed to pay him a ransom for the city, or he would burn it to the ground and blow up all the castles. He also ordered them to quickly send two people to find and deliver the ransom he demanded, which totaled one hundred thousand pieces of eight. In response, two men were sent to the President of Panama to report everything that had happened. The President, having assembled a group of men, immediately set out for Porto Bello to confront the pirates before they could escape. However, the pirates, upon hearing of his approach, instead of fleeing, went out to confront him at a narrow pass that he had to go through. They stationed a hundred well-armed men there, who, at the first clash, managed to rout a good number of the Panama forces. This incident forced the President to withdraw for the time being, as he was not yet strong enough to continue. Shortly after this encounter, he sent a message to Captain Morgan stating, 'If you do not leave Porto Bello immediately with all your men, you can expect no mercy for yourself or your crew when I capture you, which I hope to do soon.' Captain Morgan, not intimidated by his threats since he had a safe retreat on his nearby ships, replied, 'I will not surrender the castles until I receive the ransom money I requested. If it's not paid, I will definitely burn the entire city and then leave, destroying the castles and killing the prisoners first.'"
"The Governor of Panama perceived by this answer {152} that no means would serve to mollify the hearts of the Pirates, nor reduce them to reason. Hereupon he determined to leave them; as also those of the city, whom he came to relieve, involved in the difficulties of making the best agreement they could with their enemies.271 Thus, in a few days more, the miserable citizens gathered the contribution wherein they were fined, and brought the entire sum of one hundred thousand pieces of eight unto the Pirates, for a ransom of the cruel captivity they were fallen into. But the President of Panama, by these transactions, was brought into an extreme admiration, considering that four hundred men had been able to take such a great city, with so many strong castles; especially seeing they had no pieces of cannon, nor other great guns, wherewith to raise batteries against them. And what was more, knowing that the citizens of Porto Bello had always great repute of being good soldiers themselves, and who had never wanted courage in their own defence. This astonishment was so great, that it occasioned him, for to be satisfied therein, to send a messenger unto Captain Morgan, desiring him to send him some small pattern of those arms wherewith he had taken with such violence so great a city. Captain Morgan received this messenger very kindly, and treated him with great civility. Which being done, he gave him a pistol and a few small bullets of lead, to carry back unto the President, his Master, telling him withal: 'He desired him to accept that slender pattern of the arms wherewith he had taken Porto Bello and keep them for a twelvemonth; after which time he promised to come to Panama and fetch them away.' The governor of Panama returned the present very soon unto Captain Morgan, giving him thanks for the favour of lending him such weapons as he needed not, and withal sent {153} him a ring of gold, with this message: 'That he desired him not to give himself the labour of coming to Panama, as he had done to Porto Bello; for he did certify unto him, he should not speed so well here as he had done there.'
The Governor of Panama realized from this response that no approach would calm the hearts of the Pirates or bring them to reason. Therefore, he decided to leave them, as well as the citizens of the city, who he had come to assist, tangled in the challenge of negotiating the best deal they could with their enemies.271 In just a few days, the desperate citizens collected the tribute they were fined for and handed over a total of one hundred thousand pieces of eight to the Pirates as ransom for their brutal captivity. The President of Panama was left in complete amazement by these events, reflecting on how four hundred men managed to capture such a large city, which had so many strong fortifications, especially considering they had no cannons or heavy artillery to attack. What astonished him even more was that the citizens of Porto Bello had a long-standing reputation for being brave soldiers who had never lacked courage in defending themselves. This astonishment was so intense that he decided to send a messenger to Captain Morgan, requesting a sample of the weaponry he used to forcefully take such a significant city. Captain Morgan welcomed the messenger warmly and treated him with great courtesy. Afterward, he gave him a pistol and a few small lead bullets to take back to the President, telling him to accept this modest sample of the weapons he used to capture Porto Bello and to hold onto them for a year; after that, he promised he would come to Panama and retrieve them. The governor of Panama quickly returned the gift to Captain Morgan, thanking him for offering weapons he had no need for, and also sent him a gold ring with a message: 'He requested that Morgan not trouble himself to come to Panama as he had to Porto Bello; he assured him that he would not be as fortunate here as he had been there.'
"After these transactions, Captain Morgan (having provided his fleet with all necessaries, and taken with him the best guns of the castles, nailing the rest which he could not carry away) set sail from Porto Bello with all his ships. With these he arrived in a few days unto the Island of Cuba, where he sought out a place wherein with all quiet and repose he might make the dividend of the spoil they had gotten. They found in ready money two hundred and fifty thousand pieces of eight, besides all other merchandises, as cloth, linen, silks and other goods. With this rich purchase they sailed again from thence unto their common place of rendezvous, Jamaica. Being arrived, they passed here some time in all sorts of vices and debauchery, according to their common manner of doing, spending with huge prodigality what others had gained with no small labour and toil."272
"After these transactions, Captain Morgan (having equipped his fleet with everything they needed and taken the best cannons from the castles, leaving behind the rest that he couldn't carry) set sail from Porto Bello with all his ships. A few days later, he arrived at the Island of Cuba, where he looked for a place to quietly split the loot they had acquired. They found ready cash amounting to two hundred and fifty thousand pieces of eight, along with various other goods like cloth, linen, silks, and more. With this valuable haul, they sailed back to their usual meeting point in Jamaica. Once there, they spent some time indulging in every vice and excess, as was their custom, squandering what others had earned through hard work and struggle." 272
Morgan and his officers, on their return to Jamaica in the middle of August, made an official report which places their conduct in a peculiarly mild and charitable light,273 and forms a sharp contrast to the account left us by Exquemelin. According to Morgan the town and castles were restored "in as good condition as they found them," and the people were so well treated that "several ladies of great quality and other prisoners" who were offered "their liberty to go to the President's camp, refused, saying they were now prisoners to a person of quality, who was more tender of their honours than they doubted to find in the president's camp, and so voluntarily continued with them till the surrender of the town and castles." This scarcely tallies with what we know of the manners of the freebooters, and Exquemelin's evidence is probably nearer the truth. When Morgan returned to Jamaica Modyford at first received him somewhat doubtfully, for Morgan's commission, as the Governor told him, was only against ships, and the Governor was not at all sure how the exploit would be taken in England. Morgan, however, had reported that at Porto Bello, as well as in Cuba, levies were being made for an attack upon Jamaica, and Modyford laid great stress upon this point when he forwarded the buccaneer's narrative to the Duke of Albemarle.
Morgan and his officers, when they returned to Jamaica in the middle of August, made an official report that presents their actions in an unusually mild and charitable way,273 creating a stark contrast to the account left by Exquemelin. According to Morgan, the town and forts were restored "in as good condition as they found them," and the people were treated so well that "several ladies of high status and other prisoners" who were offered "their freedom to go to the President's camp, refused, saying they were now prisoners to a person of quality, who was more considerate of their honor than they feared they would find in the president's camp, and so voluntarily stayed with them until the surrender of the town and forts." This doesn't really align with what we know about the behavior of the freebooters, and Exquemelin's evidence is likely closer to the truth. When Morgan returned to Jamaica, Modyford initially received him with some skepticism, as Morgan's commission, according to the Governor, was only against ships, and the Governor was uncertain how the affair would be viewed in England. However, Morgan reported that at Porto Bello, as well as in Cuba, there were preparations being made for an attack on Jamaica, and Modyford emphasized this point when he sent the buccaneer's narrative to the Duke of Albemarle.
The sack of Porto Bello was nothing less than an act of open war against Spain, and Modyford, now that he had taken the decisive step, was not satisfied with half measures. Before the end of October 1668 the whole fleet of privateers, ten sail and 800 men, had gone out again under Morgan to cruise on the coasts of Caracas, while Captain Dempster with several other vessels and 300 {155} followers lay before Havana and along the shores of Campeache.274 Modyford had written home repeatedly that if the king wished him to exercise any adequate control over the buccaneers, he must send from England two or three nimble fifth-rate frigates to command their obedience and protect the island from hostile attacks. Charles in reply to these letters sent out the "Oxford," a frigate of thirty-four guns, which arrived at Port Royal on 14th October. According to Beeston's Journal, it brought instructions countenancing the war, and empowering the governor to commission whatever persons he thought good to be partners with His Majesty in the plunder, "they finding victuals, wear and tear."275 The frigate was immediately provisioned for a several months' cruise, and sent under command of Captain Edward Collier to join Morgan's fleet as a private ship-of-war. Morgan had appointed the Isle la Vache, or Cow Island, on the south side of Hispaniola, as the rendezvous for the privateers; and thither flocked great numbers, both English and French, for the name of Morgan was, by his exploit at Porto Bello, rendered famous in all the neighbouring islands. Here, too, arrived the "Oxford" in December. Among the French privateers were two men-of-war, one of which, the "Cour Volant" of La Rochelle, commanded by M. la Vivon, was seized by Captain Collier for having robbed an English vessel of provisions. A few days later, on 2nd January, a council of war was held aboard the "Oxford," where it was decided that the privateers, now numbering about 900 men, should attack Cartagena. While the captains were at dinner on the quarter-deck, however, the frigate blew up, and about 200 men, including five captains, were lost.276 "I was eating my dinner with {156} the rest," writes the surgeon, Richard Browne, "when the mainmasts blew out, and fell upon Captains Aylett, Bigford, and others, and knocked them on the head; I saved myself by getting astride the mizzenmast." It seems that out of the whole ship only Morgan and those who sat on his side of the table were saved. The accident was probably caused by the carelessness of a gunner. Captain Collier sailed in la Vivon's ship for Jamaica, where the French captain was convicted of piracy in the Admiralty Court, and reprieved by Governor Modyford, but his ship confiscated.277
The sack of Porto Bello was nothing short of an open act of war against Spain, and Modyford, having made a decisive move, wanted no part of half measures. Before the end of October 1668, the entire fleet of privateers, consisting of ten ships and 800 men, set out again under Morgan to patrol the coasts of Caracas, while Captain Dempster, with several other vessels and 300 followers, positioned themselves before Havana and along the shores of Campeche. Modyford had repeatedly written home that if the king wanted him to effectively control the buccaneers, he needed two or three fast fifth-rate frigates sent from England to enforce their obedience and protect the island from enemy attacks. In response to these letters, Charles sent out the "Oxford," a thirty-four-gun frigate, which arrived at Port Royal on October 14th. According to Beeston's Journal, it brought instructions supporting the war and allowed the governor to appoint anyone he deemed suitable to become partners with His Majesty in the plunder, "they finding victuals, wear and tear." The frigate was quickly stocked for several months of cruising and sent under Captain Edward Collier to join Morgan's fleet as a private warship. Morgan had designated Isle la Vache, or Cow Island, on the south side of Hispaniola, as the meet-up point for the privateers, attracting many both English and French, as Morgan's name had become well-known after his exploits at Porto Bello. The "Oxford" also arrived there in December. Among the French privateers were two warships, one of which, the "Cour Volant" from La Rochelle, commanded by M. la Vivon, was seized by Captain Collier for having robbed an English ship of provisions. A few days later, on January 2nd, a council of war took place aboard the "Oxford," where they decided that the privateers, now numbering around 900 men, would attack Cartagena. However, while the captains were having dinner on the quarter-deck, the frigate exploded, resulting in about 200 men, including five captains, being lost. "I was eating my dinner with the rest," writes the surgeon, Richard Browne, "when the mainmasts blew out and fell on Captains Aylett, Bigford, and others, knocking them unconscious; I saved myself by getting astride the mizzenmast." It appears that only Morgan and those sitting on his side of the table escaped the disaster. The accident was likely caused by a gunner's negligence. Captain Collier sailed on la Vivon's ship to Jamaica, where the French captain was convicted of piracy in the Admiralty Court and spared by Governor Modyford, but his ship was confiscated.
Morgan, from the rendezvous at the Isle la Vache, had coasted along the southern shores of Hispaniola and made several inroads upon the island for the purpose of securing beef and other provisions. Some of his ships, meanwhile, had been separated from the body of the fleet, and at last he found himself with but eight vessels and 400 or 500 men, scarcely more than half his original company. With these small numbers he changed his resolution to attempt Cartagena, and set sail for Maracaibo, a town situated on the great lagoon of that name in Venezuela. This town had been pillaged in 1667, just before the peace of Aix-la-Chapelle, by 650 buccaneers led by two French captains, L'Olonnais and Michel le Basque, and had suffered all the horrors attendant upon such a visit. In March 1669 Morgan appeared at the entrance to the lake, forced the passage after a day's hot bombardment, dismantled the fort which commanded it, and entered Maracaibo, from which the inhabitants had fled before him. The {157} buccaneers sacked the town, and scoured the woods in search of the Spaniards and their valuables. Men, women and children were brought in and cruelly tortured to make them confess where their treasures were hid. Morgan, at the end of three weeks, "having now got by degrees into his hands about 100 of the chief families," resolved to go to Gibraltar, near the head of the lake, as L'Olonnais had done before him. Here the scenes of inhuman cruelty, "the tortures, murders, robberies and such like insolences," were repeated for five weeks; after which the buccaneers, gathering up their rich booty, returned to Maracaibo, carrying with them four hostages for the ransom of the town and prisoners, which the inhabitants promised to send after them. At Maracaibo Morgan learnt that three large Spanish men-of-war were lying off the entrance of the lake, and that the fort, in the meantime, had been armed and manned and put into a posture of defence. In order to gain time he entered into negotiations with the Spanish admiral, Don Alonso del Campo y Espinosa, while the privateers carefully made ready a fireship disguised as a man-of-war. At dawn on 1st May 1669, according to Exquemelin, they approached the Spanish ships riding at anchor within the entry of the lake, and sending the fireship ahead of the rest, steered directly for them. The fireship fell foul of the "Almirante," a vessel of forty guns, grappled with her and set her in flames. The second Spanish ship, when the plight of the Admiral was discovered, was run aground and burnt by her own men. The third was captured by the buccaneers. As no quarter was given or taken, the loss of the Spaniards must have been considerable, although some of those on the Admiral, including Don Alonso, succeeded in reaching shore. From a pilot picked up by the buccaneers, Morgan learned that in the flagship was a great quantity of plate to the value of 40,000 pieces of eight. Of this he succeeded {158} in recovering about half, much of it melted by the force of the heat. Morgan then returned to Maracaibo to refit his prize, and opening negotiations again with Don Alonso, he actually succeeded in obtaining 20,000 pieces of eight and 500 head of cattle as a ransom for the city. Permission to pass the fort, however, the Spaniard refused. So, having first made a division of the spoil,278 Morgan resorted to an ingenious stratagem to effect his egress from the lake. He led the Spaniards to believe that he was landing his men for an attack on the fort from the land side; and while the Spaniards were moving their guns in that direction, Morgan in the night, by the light of the moon, let his ships drop gently down with the tide till they were abreast of the fort, and then suddenly spreading sail made good his escape. On 17th May the buccaneers returned to Port Royal.
Morgan, after meeting up at Isle la Vache, had traveled along the southern shores of Hispaniola and had made several landings on the island to gather beef and other supplies. Some of his ships had gotten separated from the main fleet, and eventually, he found himself with only eight vessels and between 400 and 500 men, barely half of his original crew. With these small numbers, he changed his plans to go after Cartagena and instead set sail for Maracaibo, a town on the large lagoon of the same name in Venezuela. This town had been raided in 1667, just before the peace of Aix-la-Chapelle, by 650 buccaneers led by two French captains, L'Olonnais and Michel le Basque, and had suffered greatly from that attack. In March 1669, Morgan showed up at the entrance to the lake, forced his way in after a day of heavy bombardment, destroyed the fort that overlooked it, and entered Maracaibo, which the residents had fled. The buccaneers looted the town and searched the nearby woods for Spaniards and their valuables. Men, women, and children were brought in and brutally tortured to reveal where their treasures were hidden. After three weeks, "having gradually gotten hold of about 100 of the leading families," Morgan decided to head to Gibraltar, near the end of the lake, just like L'Olonnais had done before him. Here, the scenes of inhuman brutality, "the tortures, murders, robberies, and such insolences," continued for five weeks; afterward, the buccaneers gathered their rich loot and returned to Maracaibo, taking with them four hostages for the town's ransom and prisoners, which the residents promised to send after them. In Maracaibo, Morgan learned that three large Spanish warships were anchored at the lake's entrance and that the fort had been armed and manned, prepared for defense. To buy time, he negotiated with the Spanish admiral, Don Alonso del Campo y Espinosa, while the privateers secretly prepared a fireship disguised as a warship. At dawn on May 1, 1669, according to Exquemelin, they approached the anchored Spanish ships and sent the fireship ahead, steering directly toward them. The fireship collided with the "Almirante," a ship with forty guns, grappled her, and set her ablaze. The second Spanish ship, realizing the Admiral's peril, was run aground and burned by her own crew. The third ship was captured by the buccaneers. Since no mercy was given or accepted, the Spanish losses must have been significant, although some crew members from the Admiral's ship, including Don Alonso, managed to escape to the shore. From a pilot captured by the buccaneers, Morgan learned that the flagship carried a large amount of silver worth 40,000 pieces of eight. He managed to recover about half of it, much of which had melted from the heat. Morgan then returned to Maracaibo to repair his prize, and by negotiating again with Don Alonso, he actually managed to secure 20,000 pieces of eight and 500 cattle as the ransom for the city. However, the Spaniard refused to allow him to pass the fort. So, after dividing the loot, Morgan resorted to a clever trick to get out of the lake. He led the Spaniards to think he was landing his men to attack the fort from land; while they were moving their cannons that way, Morgan quietly let his ships drift down with the tide by moonlight until they were opposite the fort, then suddenly spread sail and made his escape. On May 17, the buccaneers returned to Port Royal.
These events in the West Indies filled the Spanish Court with impotent rage, and the Conde de Molina, ambassador in England, made repeated demands for the punishment of Modyford, and for the restitution of the plate and other captured goods which were beginning to flow into England from Jamaica. The English Council replied that the treaty of 1667 was not understood to include the Indies, and Charles II. sent him a long list of complaints of ill-usage to English ships at the hands of the Spaniards in America.279 Orders seem to have been sent to Modyford, however, to stop hostilities, for in May 1669 Modyford again called in all commissions,280 and Beeston writes in his Journal, under 14th June, that peace was publicly proclaimed with the Spaniards. In November, {159} moreover, the governor told Albemarle that most of the buccaneers were turning to trade, hunting or planting, and that he hoped soon to reduce all to peaceful pursuits.281 The Spanish Council of State, in the meantime, had determined upon a course of active reprisal. A commission from the queen-regent, dated 20th April 1669, commanded her governors in the Indies to make open war against the English;282 and a fleet of six vessels, carrying from eighteen to forty-eight guns, was sent from Spain to cruise against the buccaneers. To this fleet belonged the three ships which tried to bottle up Morgan in Lake Maracaibo. Port Royal was filled with report and rumour of English ships captured and plundered, of cruelties to English prisoners in the dungeons of Cartagena, of commissions of war issued at Porto Bello and St. Jago de Cuba, and of intended reprisals upon the settlements in Jamaica. The privateers became restless and spoke darkly of revenge, while Modyford, his old supporter the Duke of Albemarle having just died, wrote home begging for orders which would give him liberty to retaliate.283 The last straw fell in June 1670, when two Spanish men-of-war from St. Jago de Cuba, commanded by a Portuguese, Manuel Rivero Pardal, landed men on the north side of the island, burnt some houses and carried off a number of the inhabitants as prisoners.284 On 2nd July the governor and council issued a commission to Henry Morgan, as {160} commander-in-chief of all ships of war belonging to Jamaica, to get together the privateers for the defence of the island, to attack, seize and destroy all the enemy's vessels he could discover, and in case he found it feasible, "to land and attack St. Jago or any other place where ... are stores for this war or a rendezvous for their forces." In the accompanying instructions he was bidden "to advise his fleet and soldiers that they were upon the old pleasing account of no purchase, no pay, and therefore that all which is got, shall be divided amongst them, according to the accustomed rules."285
These events in the West Indies filled the Spanish Court with frustration, and the Conde de Molina, ambassador in England, repeatedly demanded punishment for Modyford and the return of the silver and other stolen goods that were starting to flow into England from Jamaica. The English Council responded that the treaty of 1667 didn’t cover the Indies, and Charles II sent a long list of complaints about mistreatment of English ships by the Spaniards in America.279 However, it seems orders were sent to Modyford to cease hostilities, because in May 1669 Modyford recalled all commissions,280 and Beeston noted in his Journal on June 14 that peace was publicly declared with the Spaniards. In November, the governor informed Albemarle that most of the buccaneers were shifting to trade, farming, or hunting, and he hoped to eventually steer everyone towards peaceful activities.281 Meanwhile, the Spanish Council of State decided on a course of active retaliation. A commission from the queen-regent, dated April 20, 1669, instructed her governors in the Indies to wage open war against the English;282 a fleet of six ships, armed with between eighteen and forty-eight guns, was dispatched from Spain to hunt down the buccaneers. This fleet included the three ships that attempted to corner Morgan in Lake Maracaibo. Port Royal buzzed with reports and rumors of English ships being captured and pillaged, of mistreatment of English prisoners in the dungeons of Cartagena, of war commissions issued at Porto Bello and St. Jago de Cuba, and of planned reprisals against settlements in Jamaica. The privateers grew restless and spoke darkly of revenge, while Modyford, now without his longtime supporter the Duke of Albemarle who had just died, wrote back pleading for orders that would allow him to strike back.283 The final straw came in June 1670, when two Spanish warships from St. Jago de Cuba, commanded by a Portuguese, Manuel Rivero Pardal, landed troops on the north side of the island, burned some houses, and took several residents as prisoners.284 On July 2, the governor and council issued a commission to Henry Morgan, as commander-in-chief of all warships belonging to Jamaica, to gather the privateers for the island's defense, to attack, seize, and destroy any enemy vessels he could find, and if possible, "to land and attack St. Jago or any other location where there are supplies for this war or a gathering place for their forces." In the accompanying instructions, he was instructed "to inform his fleet and soldiers that they were on the old arrangement of no purchase, no pay, and therefore everything taken will be divided among them, according to the usual rules."285
Morgan sailed from Jamaica on 14th August 1670 with eleven vessels and 600 men for the Isle la Vache, the usual rendezvous, whence during the next three months squadrons were detailed to the coast of Cuba and the mainland of South America to collect provisions and intelligence. Sir William Godolphin was at that moment in Madrid concluding articles for the establishment of peace and friendship in America; and on 12th June Secretary Arlington wrote to Modyford that in view of these negotiations his Majesty commanded the privateers to forbear all hostilities on land against the Spaniards.286 These orders reached Jamaica on 13th August, whereupon the governor recalled Morgan, who had sailed from the harbour the day before, and communicated them to him, "strictly charging him to observe the same and behave with all moderation possible in carrying on the war." The admiral replied that necessity would compel him to land in the Spaniards' country for wood, water and provisions, but unless he was assured that the enemy in their towns were making hostile preparations against the Jamaicans, he would not touch any of them.287 On 6th September, however, Vice-Admiral Collier with six sail {161} and 400 men was dispatched by Morgan to the Spanish Main. There on 4th November he seized, in the harbour of Santa Marta, two frigates laden with provisions for Maracaibo. Then coasting eastward to Rio de la Hacha, he attacked and captured the fort with its commander and all its garrison, sacked the city, held it to ransom for salt, maize, meat and other provisions, and after occupying it for almost a month returned on 28th October to the Isle la Vache.288 One of the frigates captured at Santa Marta, "La Gallardina," had been with Pardal when he burnt the coast of Jamaica. Pardal's own ship of fourteen guns had been captured but a short time before by Captain John Morris at the east end of Cuba, and Pardal himself shot through the neck and killed.289 He was called by the Jamaicans "the vapouring admiral of St. Jago," for in June he had nailed a piece of canvas to a tree on the Jamaican coast, with a curious challenge written both in English and Spanish:—
Morgan set sail from Jamaica on August 14, 1670, with eleven ships and 600 men heading to Isle la Vache, the usual meeting point. Over the next three months, groups were sent to the coast of Cuba and mainland South America to gather supplies and information. At that time, Sir William Godolphin was in Madrid finalizing agreements for peace and friendship in America. On June 12, Secretary Arlington wrote to Modyford, stating that due to these negotiations, the King ordered the privateers to refrain from any land attacks against the Spaniards.286 These orders arrived in Jamaica on August 13, prompting the governor to recall Morgan, who had left the harbor the day before, and to inform him, "strictly charging him to observe them and act as moderately as possible in conducting the war." The admiral responded that he would need to land in Spanish territory for wood, water, and provisions, but unless he was sure that the enemy in their towns was preparing to attack the Jamaicans, he wouldn't engage with them.287 However, on September 6, Vice-Admiral Collier, with six ships and 400 men, was sent by Morgan to the Spanish Main. There, on November 4, he captured two frigates loaded with supplies for Maracaibo in the harbor of Santa Marta. He then moved eastward to Rio de la Hacha, where he attacked and took the fort along with its commander and all the garrison, looted the city, held it for ransom for salt, corn, meat, and other supplies, and after occupying it for nearly a month, returned to Isle la Vache on October 28.288 One of the frigates captured at Santa Marta, "La Gallardina," had been with Pardal when he raided the coast of Jamaica. Pardal's own ship, armed with fourteen guns, had been recently captured by Captain John Morris at the east end of Cuba, and Pardal himself was shot through the neck and killed.289 The Jamaicans referred to him as "the boasting admiral of St. Jago," as in June he had nailed a piece of canvas to a tree on the Jamaican coast with a peculiar challenge written in both English and Spanish:—
"I, Captain Manuel Rivero Pardal, to the chief of the squadron of privateers in Jamaica. I am he who this year have done that which follows. I went on shore at Caimanos, and burnt 20 houses, and fought with Captain Ary, and took from him a catch laden with provisions and a canoe. And I am he who took Captain Baines and did carry the prize to Cartagena, and now am arrived to this coast, and have burnt it. And I come to seek General Morgan, with 2 ships of 20 guns, and having seen this, I crave he would come out upon the coast and seek me, that he might see the valour of the Spaniards. And because I had no time I did not come to the mouth of Port Royal to speak by word of mouth in the name of my king, whom God preserve. Dated the 5th of July 1670."290
"I, Captain Manuel Rivero Pardal, to the chief of the squadron of privateers in Jamaica. This year, I have accomplished the following: I went ashore at Caimanos, burned 20 houses, fought with Captain Ary, and took from him a catch loaded with provisions and a canoe. I also captured Captain Baines and carried the prize to Cartagena. Now I have arrived on this coast and have burned it. I come to seek General Morgan with 2 ships of 20 guns, and having seen this, I request that he come out to the coast to find me, so he may witness the bravery of the Spaniards. Since I didn’t have time, I did not go to the mouth of Port Royal to speak in person on behalf of my king, whom God preserve. Dated the 5th of July, 1670." 290
Meanwhile, in the middle of October, there sailed into Port Royal three privateers, Captains Prince, Harrison and Ludbury, who six weeks before had ascended the river San Juan in Nicaragua with 170 men and again plundered the unfortunate city of Granada. The town had rapidly decayed, however, under the repeated assaults of the buccaneers, and the plunderers secured only £20 or £30 per man. Modyford reproved the captains for acting without commissions, but "not deeming it prudent to press the matter too far in this juncture," commanded them to join Morgan at the Isle la Vache.291 There Morgan was slowly mustering his strength. He negotiated with the French of Tortuga and Hispaniola who were then in revolt against the régime of the French Company; and he added to his forces seven ships and 400 men sent him by the indefatigable Governor of Jamaica. On 7th October, indeed, the venture was almost ruined by a violent storm which cast the whole fleet, except the Admiral's vessel, upon the shore. All of the ships but three, however, were eventually got off and repaired, and on 6th December Morgan was able to write to Modyford that he had 1800 buccaneers, including several hundred French, and thirty-six ships under his command.292 Upon consideration of the reports brought from the Main by his own men, and the testimony of prisoners they had taken, Morgan decided that it was impossible to attempt what seems to have been his original design, a descent upon St. Jago de Cuba, {163} without great loss of men and ships. On 2nd December, therefore, it was unanimously agreed by a general council of all the captains, thirty-seven in number, "that it stands most for the good of Jamaica and safety of us all to take Panama, the President thereof having granted several commissions against the English."293 Six days later the fleet put to sea from Cape Tiburon, and on the morning of the 14th sighted Providence Island. The Spanish governor capitulated next day, on condition of being transported with his garrison to the mainland, and four of his soldiers who had formerly been banditti in the province of Darien agreed to become guides for the English.294 After a delay of five days more, Lieutenant-Colonel {164} Joseph Bradley, with between 400 and 500 men in three ships, was sent ahead by Morgan to the isthmus to seize the Castle of San Lorenzo, situated at the mouth of the Chagre river.
Meanwhile, in mid-October, three privateers, Captains Prince, Harrison, and Ludbury, sailed into Port Royal. Six weeks earlier, they had traveled up the San Juan River in Nicaragua with 170 men and plundered the unfortunate city of Granada again. However, the town had rapidly declined due to the repeated attacks by buccaneers, and the raiders only made about £20 or £30 each. Modyford criticized the captains for acting without commissions but, "not wanting to push the issue too hard at this moment," ordered them to join Morgan at Isle la Vache.291 There, Morgan was gradually building up his forces. He was negotiating with the French from Tortuga and Hispaniola, who were rebelling against the French Company’s rule, and he added seven ships and 400 men sent by the tireless Governor of Jamaica. On October 7, the mission nearly fell apart due to a violent storm that drove all the ships, except for the Admiral's, onto the shore. Eventually, all but three ships were salvaged and repaired, and by December 6, Morgan was able to inform Modyford that he had 1,800 buccaneers, including several hundred French, and thirty-six ships under his command.292 After considering reports brought back from the Main by his men and the accounts of captured prisoners, Morgan concluded that trying to carry out what seemed to be his original plan—to attack St. Jago de Cuba—would result in significant losses of both men and ships. Therefore, on December 2, a general council of all thirty-seven captains unanimously agreed "that it serves the interests of Jamaica and our safety to take Panama, as its President had granted several commissions against the English."293 Six days later, the fleet set sail from Cape Tiburon, and on the morning of the 14th, they spotted Providence Island. The Spanish governor surrendered the next day on the condition that he and his garrison would be transported to the mainland, and four of his soldiers, who had previously been bandits in the Darien province, agreed to act as guides for the English.294 After a further delay of five days, Lieutenant-Colonel {164} Joseph Bradley, commanding between 400 and 500 men in three ships, was sent ahead by Morgan to the isthmus to capture the Castle of San Lorenzo, located at the mouth of the Chagre River.
The President of Panama, meanwhile, on 15th December, had received a messenger from the governor of Cartagena with news of the coming of the English.295 The president immediately dispatched reinforcements to the Castle of Chagre, which arrived fifteen days before the buccaneers and raised its strength to over 350 men. Two hundred men were sent to Porto Bello, and 500 more were stationed at Venta Cruz and in ambuscades along the Chagre river to oppose the advance of the English. The president himself rose from a bed of sickness to head a reserve of 800, but most of his men were raw recruits without a professional soldier amongst them. This militia in a few days became so panic-stricken that one-third deserted in a night, and the president was compelled to retire to Panama. There the Spaniards managed to load some of the treasure upon two or three ships lying in the roadstead; and the nuns and most of the citizens of importance also embarked with their wives, children and personal property.296
The President of Panama, on December 15th, received a message from the governor of Cartagena about the incoming English forces.295 The president quickly sent reinforcements to the Castle of Chagre, which arrived fifteen days before the buccaneers, boosting its strength to over 350 men. Two hundred men were sent to Porto Bello, and another 500 were positioned at Venta Cruz and in ambush along the Chagre River to stop the English advance. The president himself got out of bed despite being sick to lead a reserve of 800 men, but most of his troops were inexperienced recruits without a single professional soldier among them. This militia soon became so frightened that one-third deserted overnight, forcing the president to retreat to Panama. There, the Spaniards were able to load some treasure onto two or three ships in the harbor, and the nuns and most of the important citizens also boarded the ships with their wives, children, and personal belongings.296
The fort or castle of San Lorenzo, which stood on a hill commanding the river Chagre, seems to have been built of double rows of wooden palisades, the space between being filled with earth; and it was protected by a ditch 12 feet deep and by several smaller batteries nearer the water's edge. Lieutenant-Colonel Bradley, who, according to Exquemelin, had been on these coasts before with Captain Mansfield, landed near the fort on the 27th of December. He and his men fought in the trenches from early afternoon till eight o'clock next morning, when they {165} stormed and carried the place. The buccaneers suffered severely, losing about 150 in killed and wounded, including Bradley himself who died ten days later. Exquemelin gives a very vivid account of the action. The buccaneers, he writes, "came to anchor in a small port, at the distance of a league more or less from the castle. The next morning very early they went on shore, and marched through the woods, to attack the castle on that side. This march continued until two o'clock, afternoon, by reason of the difficulties of the way, and its mire and dirt. And although their guides served them exactly, notwithstanding they came so nigh the castle at first that they lost many of their men with the shot from the guns, they being in an open place where nothing could cover nor defend them. This much perplexed the Pirates ..." (but) "at last after many doubts and disputes among themselves they resolved to hazard the assault and their lives after a most desperate manner. Thus they advanced towards the castle, with their swords in one hand and fireballs in the other. The Spaniards defended themselves very briskly, ceasing not to fire at them with their great guns and muskets continually crying withal: 'Come on, ye English dogs, enemies to God and our King; let your other companions that are behind come on too, ye shall not go to Panama this bout.' After the Pirates had made some trial to climb up the walls, they were forced to retreat, which they accordingly did, resting themselves until night. This being done, they returned to the assault, to try if by the help of their fireballs they could overcome and pull down the pales before the wall. This they attempted to do, and while they were about it there happened a very remarkable accident, which gave them the opportunity of the victory. One of the Pirates was wounded with an arrow in his back, which pierced his body to the other side. This he instantly pulled out with great valour at the side of his breast; then taking a little cotton {166} that he had about him, he wound it about the said arrow, and putting it into his musket, he shot it back into the castle. But the cotton being kindled by the powder, occasioned two or three houses that were within the castle, being thatched with palm-leaves, to take fire, which the Spaniards perceived not so soon as was necessary. For this fire meeting with a parcel of powder, blew it up and thereby caused great ruin, and no less consternation to the Spaniards, who were not able to account for this accident, not having seen the beginning thereof.
The fort or castle of San Lorenzo, sitting on a hill overlooking the Chagres River, appears to have been constructed with two rows of wooden palisades filled with earth in between; it was protected by a ditch that was 12 feet deep and smaller batteries closer to the water's edge. Lieutenant-Colonel Bradley, who, according to Exquemelin, had been to these shores previously with Captain Mansfield, landed near the fort on December 27th. He and his men fought in the trenches from early afternoon until eight o'clock the next morning when they stormed and captured the fort. The buccaneers suffered heavy losses, with about 150 killed or wounded, including Bradley himself, who died ten days later. Exquemelin provides a very vivid account of the battle. The buccaneers, he writes, "came to anchor in a small port, about a league away from the castle. The next morning, very early, they went ashore and marched through the woods to attack the castle from that side. This march went on until two o'clock in the afternoon due to the difficulties of the terrain and the mud. Even though their guides were accurate, they got so close to the castle at first that they lost many men to cannon fire, as they were in an open area with no cover. This greatly troubled the Pirates..." (but) "eventually, after much hesitation and argument among themselves, they decided to risk the assault and their lives in a very desperate manner. They moved toward the castle, swords in one hand and fireballs in the other. The Spaniards defended themselves fiercely, firing at them continuously with their cannons and muskets, shouting all the while: 'Come on, you English dogs, enemies of God and our King; let your other companions behind you come too; you won't get to Panama this time.' After the Pirates tried to scale the walls, they were forced to retreat, which they did, resting until night. Having done this, they returned to the assault, hoping that their fireballs would help them break down the palisades in front of the wall. As they attempted this, a remarkable incident occurred that provided them with the chance to win. One of the Pirates was shot in the back with an arrow that pierced through his body. With great bravery, he pulled it out from the side of his chest; then, taking a piece of cotton he had, he wrapped it around the arrow and shot it back into the castle with his musket. The cotton ignited from the gunpowder, setting fire to two or three thatched houses within the castle made of palm leaves, which the Spaniards did not notice in time. The fire then ignited a stash of gunpowder, causing an explosion that resulted in significant destruction and panic among the Spaniards, who could not explain the incident since they hadn't seen how it began."
"Thus the Pirates perceiving the good effect of the arrow and the beginning of the misfortune of the Spaniards, were infinitely gladdened thereat. And while they were busied in extinguishing the fire, which caused great confusion in the whole castle, having not sufficient water wherewithal to do it, the Pirates made use of this opportunity, setting fire likewise to the palisades. Thus the fire was seen at the same time in several parts about the castle, which gave them huge advantage against the Spaniards. For many breaches were made at once by the fire among the pales, great heaps of earth falling down into the ditch. Upon these the Pirates climbed up, and got over into the castle, notwithstanding that some Spaniards, who were not busied about the fire, cast down upon them many flaming pots, full of combustible matter and odious smells, which occasioned the loss of many of the English.
"Seeing the effectiveness of the arrow and the start of the Spaniards' troubles, the Pirates were extremely pleased. While they were busy trying to put out the fire, which caused a lot of chaos throughout the castle, and not having enough water to do so, the Pirates seized this chance and set fire to the palisades as well. So, fire was visible in several areas around the castle at the same time, giving the Pirates a huge advantage over the Spaniards. Many breaches were created at once by the fire among the pales, causing large amounts of earth to fall into the ditch. The Pirates climbed up these mounds and got over into the castle, even though some Spaniards who weren't dealing with the fire threw down numerous flaming pots filled with flammable materials and foul-smelling substances, resulting in the loss of many English lives."
"The Spaniards, notwithstanding the great resistance they made, could not hinder the palisades from being entirely burnt before midnight. Meanwhile the Pirates ceased not to persist in their intention of taking the castle. Unto which effect, although the fire was great, they would creep upon the ground, as nigh unto it as they could, and shoot amidst the flames, against the Spaniards they could perceive on the other side, and thus cause many to fall dead from the walls. When day was come, they observed {167} all the moveable earth that lay between the pales to be fallen into the ditch in huge quantity. So that now those within the castle did in a manner lie equally exposed to them without, as had been on the contrary before. Whereupon the Pirates continued shooting very furiously against them, and killed great numbers of Spaniards. For the Governor had given them orders not to retire from those posts which corresponded to the heaps of earth fallen into the ditch, and caused the artillery to be transported unto the breaches.
"The Spaniards, despite their strong resistance, couldn’t prevent the palisades from being completely burned down before midnight. Meanwhile, the Pirates continued their efforts to take the castle. To that end, even though the fire was intense, they crept along the ground as close as possible and shot through the flames at the Spaniards they could see on the other side, causing many to fall dead from the walls. When day broke, they noticed {167} that all the loose earth between the palisades had fallen into the ditch in large amounts. Now those inside the castle were nearly as exposed to the attackers outside as they had previously been in reverse. Consequently, the Pirates kept firing furiously at them, killing many Spaniards. The Governor had instructed them not to retreat from the positions corresponding to the piles of earth fallen into the ditch and had the artillery moved to the breaches."
"Notwithstanding, the fire within the castle still continued, and now the Pirates from abroad used what means they could to hinder its progress, by shooting incessantly against it. One party of the Pirates was employed only to this purpose, and another commanded to watch all the motions of the Spaniards, and take all opportunities against them. About noon the English happened to gain a breach, which the Governor himself defended with twenty-five soldiers. Here was performed a very courageous and warlike resistance by the Spaniards, both with muskets, pikes, stones and swords. Yet notwithstanding, through all these arms the Pirates forced and fought their way, till at last they gained the castle. The Spaniards who remained alive cast themselves down from the castle into the sea, choosing rather to die precipitated by their own selves (few or none surviving the fall) than to ask any quarter for their lives. The Governor himself retreated unto the corps du garde, before which were placed two pieces of cannon. Here he intended still to defend himself, neither would he demand any quarter. But at last he was killed with a musket shot, which pierced his skull into the brain.
"Despite everything, the fire inside the castle continued to rage, and now the Pirates from overseas used whatever means they could to stop it, firing continuously at the flames. One group of Pirates was specifically assigned for this purpose, while another was tasked with keeping an eye on the movements of the Spaniards and seizing any chance to attack them. Around noon, the English managed to breach the castle, which the Governor himself defended with twenty-five soldiers. The Spaniards mounted a brave and fierce resistance using muskets, pikes, stones, and swords. Nevertheless, through all this weaponry, the Pirates fought their way in and eventually took the castle. The remaining Spaniards jumped from the castle into the sea, preferring to die by their own hand (with few or none surviving the fall) rather than ask for mercy. The Governor retreated to the guardhouse, where two cannons were positioned. He planned to keep defending himself and refused to ask for quarter. But in the end, he was shot in the head by a musket ball that penetrated his skull."
"The Governor being dead, and the corps du garde surrendered, they found still remaining in it alive to the number of thirty men, whereof scarce ten were not wounded. These informed the Pirates that eight or nine {168} of their soldiers had deserted their colours, and were gone to Panama to carry news of their arrival and invasion. These thirty men alone were remaining of three hundred and fourteen, wherewith the castle was garrisoned, among which number not one officer was found alive. These were all made prisoners, and compelled to tell whatsoever they knew of their designs and enterprises."297
"The Governor was dead, and the guard had surrendered. They found thirty men still alive, with only about ten uninjured. These men told the Pirates that eight or nine of their soldiers had deserted and gone to Panama to inform others about their arrival and invasion. Only these thirty men remained out of the three hundred and fourteen who had been stationed at the castle, and not a single officer was left alive. All of them were taken prisoner and forced to share everything they knew about their plans and missions." 297
Five days after the taking of the castle, Morgan arrived from Providence Island with the rest of the armament; but at the entrance to the Chagre river, in passing over the bar, his flagship and five or six smaller boats were wrecked, and ten men were drowned. After repairing and provisioning the castle, and leaving 300 men to guard it and the ships, Morgan, on 9th January 1671, at the head of 1400 men, began the ascent of the river in seven small vessels and thirty-six canoes.298 The story of this brilliant march we will again leave to Exquemelin, who took part in it, to relate. The first day "they sailed only six leagues, and came to a place called De los Bracos. Here a party of his men went on shore, only to sleep some few hours and stretch their limbs, they being almost crippled with lying too much crowded in the boats. After they had rested awhile, they went abroad, to see if any victuals could be found in the neighbouring plantations. But they could find none, the Spaniards being fled and carrying with them all the provisions they had. This day, being the first of their journey, there was amongst them such scarcity of victuals that the greatest part were forced to pass with only a pipe of tobacco, without any other refreshment.
Five days after capturing the castle, Morgan arrived from Providence Island with the rest of the supplies. However, at the entrance to the Chagre River, while crossing the bar, his flagship and five or six smaller boats were wrecked, and ten men drowned. After repairing and stocking the castle and leaving 300 men to guard it and the ships, Morgan, on January 9, 1671, led 1,400 men up the river in seven small vessels and thirty-six canoes.298 We'll let Exquemelin, who participated in this impressive journey, tell the story. On the first day, "they sailed only six leagues and reached a place called De los Bracos. Here, a group of his men went ashore just to sleep for a few hours and stretch their legs, as they were nearly crippled from being too cramped in the boats. After resting for a bit, they went out to see if they could find any food in the nearby plantations. But they found nothing, as the Spaniards had fled, taking all their supplies with them. On this first day of their journey, there was such a shortage of food that most had to get by with just a pipe of tobacco, without any other snacks.
"The next day, very early in the morning, they continued their journey, and came about evening to a place {169} called Cruz de Juan Gallego. Here they were compelled to leave their boats and canoes, by reason the river was very dry for want of rain, and the many obstacles of trees that were fallen into it. The guides told them that about two leagues farther on the country would be very good to continue the journey by land. Hereupon they left some companies, being in all one hundred and sixty men,299 on board the boats to defend them, with intent they might serve for a place of refuge in case of necessity.
"The next day, very early in the morning, they continued their journey and arrived by evening at a place called Cruz de Juan Gallego. Here, they had to leave their boats and canoes because the river was very dry due to a lack of rain and the many fallen trees in it. The guides informed them that about two leagues further on, the land would be much better for continuing their journey. As a result, they left some groups behind, totaling one hundred and sixty men, on board the boats to defend them, intending for them to serve as a refuge in case of emergency.
"The next morning, being the third day of their journey, they all went ashore, excepting those above-mentioned who were to keep the boats. Unto these Captain Morgan gave very strict orders, under great penalties, that no man, upon any pretext whatsoever, should dare to leave the boats and go ashore. This he did, fearing lest they should be surprised and cut off by an ambuscade of Spaniards, that might chance to lie thereabouts in the neighbouring woods, which appeared so thick as to seem almost impenetrable. Having this morning begun their march, they found the ways so dirty and irksome, that Captain Morgan thought it more convenient to transport some of the men in canoes (though it could not be done without great labour) to a place farther up the river, called Cedro Bueno. Thus they re-embarked, and the canoes returned for the rest that were left behind. So that about night they found themselves all together at the said place. The Pirates were extremely desirous to meet any Spaniards, or Indians, hoping to fill their bellies with what provisions they should take from them. For now they were reduced almost to the very extremity of hunger.
The next morning, on the third day of their journey, everyone went ashore except for those mentioned earlier who stayed with the boats. Captain Morgan gave strict orders to these men, warning that anyone who dared to leave the boats and go ashore for any reason would face serious consequences. He was concerned they could be ambushed by Spaniards hiding in the nearby woods, which looked thick enough to be nearly impenetrable. As they started their march that morning, they found the paths so muddy and difficult that Captain Morgan decided it would be easier to transport some of the men in canoes (which required a lot of effort) to a spot further up the river called Cedro Bueno. They re-embarked, and the canoes went back for the others left behind. By nightfall, they were all together at that location. The pirates were very eager to encounter any Spaniards or Indians, hoping to take food from them because they were nearly starving.
"On the fourth day, the greatest part of the Pirates marched by land, being led by one of the guides. The rest went by water, farther up with the canoes, being conducted {170} by another guide, who always went before them with two of the said canoes, to discover on both sides the river the ambuscades of the Spaniards. These had also spies, who were very dextrous, and could at any time give notice of all accidents or of the arrival of the Pirates, six hours at least before they came to any place. This day about noon they found themselves nigh unto a post, called Torna Cavallos. Here the guide of the canoes began to cry aloud he perceived an ambuscade. His voice caused infinite joy unto all the Pirates, as persuading themselves they should find some provisions wherewith to satiate their hunger, which was very great. Being come unto the place, they found nobody in it, the Spaniards who were there not long before being every one fled, and leaving nothing behind unless it were a small number of leather bags, all empty, and a few crumbs of bread scattered upon the ground where they had eaten.300 Being angry at this misfortune, they pulled down a few little huts which the Spaniards had made, and afterwards fell to eating the leathern bags, as being desirous to afford something to the ferment of their stomachs, which now was grown so sharp that it did gnaw their very bowels, having nothing else to prey upon. Thus they made a huge banquet upon those bags of leather, which doubtless had been more grateful unto them, if divers quarrels had not risen concerning who should have the greatest share. By the circumference of the place they conjectured five hundred Spaniards, more or less, had been there. And these, finding no victuals, they were now infinitely desirous to meet, intending to devour some of them rather than perish. Whom they would certainly in that occasion have roasted or {171} boiled, to satisfy their famine, had they been able to take them.
"On the fourth day, most of the Pirates marched overland, guided by one of the local guides. The rest traveled by canoe, pushing further upstream with another guide, who led the way with two canoes to scout out any ambushes by the Spaniards on both sides of the river. The Spaniards also had spies, who were quite skilled and could alert them about any incidents or the Pirates' arrival at least six hours in advance. Around noon, they found themselves near a post called Torna Cavallos. Here, the canoe guide suddenly shouted that he spotted an ambush. His shout brought immense joy to the Pirates, as they hoped to find some food to satisfy their intense hunger. Upon reaching the spot, they discovered that no one was there; the Spaniards who had been there recently had all fled, leaving behind only a few empty leather bags and some crumbs of bread scattered on the ground where they had eaten. Frustrated by this disappointment, they tore down a few small huts that the Spaniards had built and then began to eat the leather bags, desperate for anything to soothe their stomachs, which were now gnawing at them intensely, with nothing else to consume. So, they ended up having a large feast on those leather bags, which would have been more satisfying if not for the arguments that broke out over who would get the biggest share. From the surrounding area, they guessed that around five hundred Spaniards had been there. Now, filled with the urge to find food, they were eager to encounter any Spaniards, planning to eat them rather than starve. They would certainly have roasted or boiled them to satisfy their hunger, if they had been able to catch them."
"After they had feasted themselves with those pieces of leather, they quitted the place, and marched farther on, till they came about night to another post called Torna Munni. Here they found another ambuscade, but as barren and desert as the former. They searched the neighbouring woods, but could not find the least thing to eat. The Spaniards having been so provident as not to leave behind them anywhere the least crumb of sustenance, whereby the Pirates were now brought to the extremity aforementioned. Here again he was happy, that had reserved since noon any small piece of leather whereof to make his supper, drinking after it a good draught of water for his greatest comfort. Some persons who never were out of their mothers' kitchens may ask how these Pirates could eat, swallow and digest those pieces of leather, so hard and dry. Unto whom I only answer: That could they once experiment what hunger, or rather famine, is, they would certainly find the manner, by their own necessity, as the Pirates did. For these first took the leather, and sliced it in pieces. Then did they beat it between two stones and rub it, often dipping it in the water of the river, to render it by these means supple and tender. Lastly they scraped off the hair, and roasted or broiled it upon the fire. And being thus cooked they cut it into small morsels, and eat it, helping it down with frequent gulps of water, which by good fortune they had nigh at hand.
"After they filled themselves with those pieces of leather, they left the place and continued on until they reached another location called Torna Munni around nightfall. Here they found another ambush, but it was as barren and desolate as the previous one. They searched the nearby woods but couldn't find anything to eat. The Spaniards had been careful not to leave behind even a crumb of food, which left the Pirates in the dire situation mentioned earlier. Once again, those who had saved a small piece of leather since noon were fortunate, making it their dinner and washing it down with a good drink of water for comfort. Some people who have never left their mothers' kitchens might wonder how these Pirates could eat, swallow, and digest such tough and dry pieces of leather. To them, I can only say that if they ever experienced true hunger, or rather famine, they would definitely find a way, just as the Pirates did. First, they took the leather and sliced it into pieces. Then, they pounded it between two stones and rubbed it, often dipping it in the river water to make it more pliable and tender. Finally, they scraped off the hair and roasted or grilled it over the fire. Once cooked, they cut it into small bites and ate it, washing it down with frequent gulps of water, which they fortunately had nearly within reach."
"They continued their march the fifth day, and about noon came unto a place called Barbacoa. Here likewise they found traces of another ambuscade, but the place totally as unprovided as the two precedent were. At a small distance were to be seen several plantations, which they searched very narrowly, but could not find any {172} person, animal or other thing that was capable of relieving their extreme and ravenous hunger. Finally, having ranged up and down and searched a long time, they found a certain grotto which seemed to be but lately hewn out of a rock, in which they found two sacks of meal, wheat and like things, with two great jars of wine, and certain fruits called Platanos. Captain Morgan, knowing that some of his men were now, through hunger, reduced almost to the extremity of their lives, and fearing lest the major part should be brought into the same condition, caused all that was found to be distributed amongst them who were in greatest necessity. Having refreshed themselves with these victuals, they began to march anew with greater courage than ever. Such as could not well go for weakness were put into the canoes, and those commanded to land that were in them before. Thus they prosecuted their journey till late at night, at which time they came unto a plantation where they took up their rest. But without eating anything at all; for the Spaniards, as before, had swept away all manner of provisions, leaving not behind them the least signs of victuals.
They continued their march on the fifth day and around noon arrived at a place called Barbacoa. Here, they also found signs of another ambush, but the location was as bare as the two previous ones. Not far away, they could see several farms, which they searched thoroughly, but couldn’t find any person, animal, or anything that could ease their extreme and gnawing hunger. After searching for a long time, they finally discovered a cave that looked like it had been recently carved out of a rock. Inside, they found two sacks of flour, wheat, and similar items, along with two large jars of wine and some fruits called Platanos. Captain Morgan, knowing that some of his men were almost at the brink of starvation, and fearing that most of them might suffer the same fate, ordered that everything found be distributed among those in the greatest need. After refreshing themselves with this food, they set out again with more courage than before. Those who were too weak to walk were put into the canoes, while others were commanded to disembark. They continued their journey until late at night, when they reached a plantation where they decided to rest. But they didn’t eat anything, as the Spaniards had once again taken all the food, leaving no trace of provisions behind.
"On the sixth day they continued their march, part of them by land through the woods, and part by water in the canoes. Howbeit they were constrained to rest themselves very frequently by the way, both for the ruggedness thereof and the extreme weakness they were under. Unto this they endeavoured to occur, by eating some leaves of trees and green herbs, or grass, such as they could pick, for such was the miserable condition they were in. This day, at noon, they arrived at a plantation, where they found a barn full of maize. Immediately they beat down the doors, and fell to eating of it dry, as much as they could devour. Afterwards they distributed great quantity, giving to every man a good allowance thereof. Being thus provided they prosecuted their journey, which having continued {173} for the space of an hour or thereabouts, they met with an ambuscade of Indians. This they no sooner had discovered, but they threw away their maize, with the sudden hopes they conceived of finding all things in abundance. But after all this haste, they found themselves much deceived, they meeting neither Indians nor victuals, nor anything else of what they had imagined. They saw notwithstanding on the other side of the river a troop of a hundred Indians more or less, who all escaped away through the agility of their feet. Some few Pirates there were who leapt into the river, the sooner to reach the shore to see if they could take any of the said Indians prisoners. But all was in vain; for being much more nimble on their feet than the Pirates they easily baffled their endeavours. Neither did they only baffle them, but killed also two or three of the Pirates with their arrows, shooting at them at a distance, and crying: 'Ha! perros, a la savana, a la savana. Ha! ye dogs, go to the plain, go to the plain.'
On the sixth day, they continued their march, with some traveling by land through the woods and others by water in canoes. However, they had to rest often due to the rough terrain and their extreme weakness. To cope, they tried to eat some tree leaves, green herbs, or grass that they could find, reflecting their miserable situation. This day, at noon, they reached a plantation and found a barn full of corn. They immediately broke down the doors and started eating it dry as much as they could. Afterward, they shared a large amount, giving each man a generous portion. Equipped with this food, they continued their journey, and after about an hour of travel, they encountered an ambush of Indians. As soon as they spotted it, they dropped their corn, suddenly hopeful of finding plenty. But after all the rush, they found themselves greatly misled; they encountered neither Indians nor food, nor anything else they had expected. They did see, however, across the river, a group of about a hundred Indians, all of whom escaped quickly. A few Pirates jumped into the river, hoping to reach the shore and capture some of these Indians. But it was all in vain; the Indians were much quicker, easily outrunning the Pirates. Not only did they escape, but they also shot two or three of the Pirates with arrows from a distance, shouting: 'Ha! perros, a la savana, a la savana. Ha! you dogs, go to the plain, go to the plain.'
"This day they could advance no further, by reason they were necessitated to pass the river hereabouts to continue their march on the other side. Hereupon they took up their repose for that night. Howbeit their sleep was not heavy nor profound, for great murmurings were heard that night in the camp, many complaining of Captain Morgan and his conduct in that enterprise, and being desirous to return home. On the contrary, others would rather die there than go back one step from what they had undertaken. But others who had greater courage than any of these two parties did laugh and joke at all their discourses. In the meanwhile they had a guide who much comforted them, saying: 'It would not now be long before they met with people, from whom they should reap some considerable advantage.'
"This day they couldn’t move any further because they needed to cross the river here to continue their march on the other side. So, they decided to rest for the night. However, their sleep wasn’t deep or peaceful, as there were many complaints about Captain Morgan and his leadership in this mission, with some wanting to go back home. On the other hand, some would rather die than take a step back from what they had started. But there were others, braver than both of these groups, who laughed and joked about all their talk. In the meantime, they had a guide who reassured them, saying, 'It won’t be long before we meet people who will provide us with some significant benefits.'"
"The seventh day in the morning they all made clean their arms, and every one discharged his pistol or musket {174} without bullet, to examine the security of their firelocks. This being done, they passed to the other side of the river in the canoes, leaving the post where they had rested the night before, called Santa Cruz. Thus they proceeded on their journey till noon, at which time they arrived at a village called Cruz.301 Being at a great distance as yet from the place, they perceived much smoke to arise out of the chimneys. The sight hereof afforded them great joy and hopes of finding people in the town, and afterwards what they most desired, which was plenty of good cheer. Thus they went on with as much haste as they could, making several arguments to one another upon those external signs, though all like castles built in the air. 'For,' said they, 'there is smoke coming out of every house, and therefore they are making good fires to roast and boil what we are to eat.' With other things to this purpose.
"On the morning of the seventh day, they all cleaned their weapons, and each person fired their pistol or musket without bullets to check the safety of their firearms. Once that was done, they crossed to the other side of the river in canoes, leaving the spot where they had camped the night before, called Santa Cruz. They continued on their journey until noon, when they reached a village called Cruz. From a distance, they noticed a lot of smoke rising from the chimneys. This sight brought them great joy and gave them hope of finding people in the town, and afterwards what they most wanted, which was plenty of good food. They hurried along as fast as they could, reasoning among themselves about those external signs, even though they were all like castles in the air. 'Because,' they said, 'there’s smoke coming from every house, so they must be making good fires to cook what we’re going to eat.' And other similar thoughts."
"At length they arrived there in great haste, all sweating and panting, but found no person in the town, nor anything that was eatable wherewith to refresh themselves, unless it were good fires to warm themselves, which they wanted not. For the Spaniards before their departure, had every one set fire to his own house, excepting only the storehouses and stables belonging to the King.
"Finally, they got there in a rush, all sweaty and out of breath, but found no one in the town, nor anything to eat to refresh themselves, except for some good fires to keep warm, which they didn’t need. For the Spaniards, before leaving, had set fire to their own houses, except for the king's storehouses and stables."
"They had not left behind them any beast whatsoever, either alive or dead. This occasioned much confusion in their minds, they not finding the least thing to lay hold on, unless it were some few cats and dogs, which they immediately killed and devoured with great appetite. At last in the King's stables they found by good fortune fifteen or sixteen jars of Peru wine, and a leather sack full {175} of bread. But no sooner had they begun to drink of the said wine when they fell sick, almost every man. This sudden disaster made them think that the wine was poisoned, which caused a new consternation in the whole camp, as judging themselves now to be irrecoverably lost. But the true reason was, their huge want of sustenance in that whole voyage, and the manifold sorts of trash which they had eaten upon that occasion. Their sickness was so great that day as caused them to remain there till the next morning, without being able to prosecute their journey as they used to do, in the afternoon. This village is seated in the latitude in 9 degrees and 2 minutes, northern latitude, being distant from the river of Chagre twenty-six Spanish leagues, and eight from Panama. Moreover, this is the last place unto which boats or canoes can come; for which reason they built here store-houses, wherein to keep all sorts of merchandise, which from hence to and from Panama are transported upon the backs of mules.
They hadn’t left behind any animals at all, either alive or dead. This caused a lot of confusion for them, as they couldn’t find anything to grab onto, except for a few cats and dogs, which they quickly killed and consumed with great hunger. Eventually, they lucked out and discovered fifteen or sixteen jars of Peru wine and a leather sack full of bread in the King’s stables. But as soon as they started drinking the wine, almost everyone got sick. This sudden disaster made them think that the wine was poisoned, leading to a new panic throughout the camp, as they believed they were now irretrievably doomed. The real problem was their extreme lack of food during the entire journey and the various kinds of junk they had eaten along the way. Their sickness was so severe that it kept them there until the next morning, preventing them from continuing their journey as they normally would in the afternoon. This village is located at a latitude of 9 degrees and 2 minutes north, about twenty-six Spanish leagues from the Chagre River and eight from Panama. Additionally, this is the last place where boats or canoes can reach; for that reason, they built storehouses here to keep all kinds of merchandise, which are then transported to and from Panama on the backs of mules.
"Here therefore Captain Morgan was constrained to leave his canoes and land all his men, though never so weak in their bodies. But lest the canoes should be surprised, or take up too many men for their defence, he resolved to send them all back to the place where the boats were, excepting one, which he caused to be hidden, to the intent it might serve to carry intelligence according to the exigency of affairs. Many of the Spaniards and Indians belonging to this village were fled to the plantations thereabouts. Hereupon Captain Morgan gave express orders that none should dare to go out of the village, except in whole companies of a hundred together. The occasion hereof was his fear lest the enemy should take an advantage upon his men, by any sudden assault. Notwithstanding, one party of English soldiers stickled not to contravene these commands, being thereunto {176} tempted with the desire of finding victuals. But these were soon glad to fly into the town again, being assaulted with great fury by some Spaniards and Indians, who snatched up one of the Pirates, and carried him away prisoner. Thus the vigilance and care of Captain Morgan was not sufficient to prevent every accident that might happen.
"Here Captain Morgan had to leave his canoes and land all his men, even though they were physically weak. To avoid his canoes being surprised or having too many men needed for their defense, he decided to send all of them back to the location of the boats, keeping only one hidden, so it could be used to carry messages if needed. Many of the Spaniards and Indians from this village had fled to the nearby plantations. So, Captain Morgan gave strict orders that no one should leave the village, unless in groups of a hundred. This was due to his fear that the enemy might take advantage of his men with a sudden attack. However, one group of English soldiers didn’t hesitate to ignore these orders, tempted by the desire to find food. But they soon rushed back into the town, being fiercely attacked by some Spaniards and Indians, who took one of the pirates as a prisoner. Thus, Captain Morgan's vigilance and care weren't enough to prevent every mishap that could occur."
"On the eighth day, in the morning, Captain Morgan sent two hundred men before the body of his army, to discover the way to Panama, and see if they had laid any ambuscades therein. Especially considering that the places by which they were to pass were very fit for that purpose, the paths being so narrow that only ten or twelve persons could march in a file, and oftentimes not so many. Having marched about the space of ten hours, they came unto a place called Quebrada Obscura. Here, all on a sudden, three or four thousand arrows were shot at them, without being able to perceive from whence they came, or who shot them. The place, from whence it was presumed they were shot was a high rocky mountain, excavated from one side to the other, wherein was a grotto that went through it, only capable of admitting one horse, or other beast laden. This multitude of arrows caused a huge alarm among the Pirates, especially because they could not discover the place from whence they were discharged. At last, seeing no more arrows to appear, they marched a little farther, and entered into a wood. Here they perceived some Indians to fly as fast as they could possible before them, to take the advantage of another post, and thence observe the march of the Pirates. There remained, notwithstanding one troop of Indians upon the place, with full design to fight and defend themselves. This combat they performed with huge courage, till such time as their captain fell to the ground wounded, who although he was now in despair of life, yet his valour being greater than his {177} strength, would demand no quarter, but, endeavouring to raise himself, with undaunted mind laid hold of his azagaya, or javelin, and struck at one of the Pirates. But before he could second the blow, he was shot to death with a pistol. This was also the fate of many of his companions, who like good and courageous soldiers lost their lives with their captain, for the defence of their country.
"On the eighth day, in the morning, Captain Morgan sent two hundred men ahead of his army to scout the way to Panama and see if there were any ambushes set up. This was especially important because the routes they needed to take were very suitable for that purpose, with paths so narrow that only ten or twelve people could walk in a line, and often even fewer. After marching for about ten hours, they reached a place called Quebrada Obscura. Suddenly, three or four thousand arrows rained down on them, and they couldn't tell where they were coming from or who was shooting them. It was assumed they were shot from a high, rocky mountain that had a tunnel going through it, wide enough for only one horse or another beast loaded. The sheer number of arrows caused a huge panic among the pirates, especially since they couldn’t find the source of the attacks. Eventually, when the arrows stopped, they moved a bit further and entered a wooded area. Here, they noticed some Indians fleeing as quickly as they could to take up a better position and watch the pirates' movement. However, one group of Indians remained behind, determined to fight and defend themselves. They fought bravely until their captain fell, wounded. Even though he was close to death, his bravery outweighed his strength, and he refused to surrender. Trying to get back up, with a fearless spirit, he grabbed his azagaya, or javelin, and struck at one of the pirates. But before he could follow through, he was shot dead with a pistol. Many of his companions shared the same fate; like good and courageous soldiers, they lost their lives alongside their captain in defense of their land."
"The Pirates endeavoured, as much as was possible, to lay hold on some of the Indians and take them prisoners. But they being infinitely swifter than the Pirates, every one escaped, leaving eight Pirates dead upon the place and ten wounded.302 Yea, had the Indians been more dextrous in military affairs, they might have defended that passage, and not let one sole man to pass. Within a little while after they came to a large campaign field open and full of variegated meadows. From here they could perceive at a distance before them a parcel of Indians who stood on the top of a mountain, very nigh unto the way by which the Pirates were to pass. They sent a troop of fifty men, the nimblest they could pick out, to see if they could catch any of them, and afterwards force them to declare whereabouts their companions had their mansions. But all their industry was in vain, for they escaped through their nimbleness, and presently after showed themselves in another place, hallooing unto the English, and crying: 'A la savana, a la savana, cornudos, perros Ingleses;' that is, 'To the plain, to the plain, ye cockolds, ye English dogs!' While these things passed, the ten Pirates that were wounded a little before were dressed and plastered up.
The Pirates tried as much as they could to capture some of the Indians and take them as prisoners. However, the Indians were much faster than the Pirates, and all of them managed to escape, leaving eight Pirates dead on the spot and ten wounded.302 If the Indians had been more skilled in military tactics, they could have defended that pass and not let a single man through. Shortly after, they arrived at a large open field filled with colorful meadows. From there, they spotted a group of Indians standing on top of a nearby mountain, right by the path the Pirates were supposed to take. They sent a team of fifty of their fastest men to see if they could capture any of them and force them to reveal where their companions lived. But all their efforts were in vain, as the Indians escaped due to their agility and soon appeared in another location, calling out to the English, "To the plain, to the plain, you cowards, you English dogs!" While this was happening, the ten wounded Pirates were being treated and bandaged up.
"At this place there was a wood and on each side thereof a mountain. The Indians had possessed themselves of the one, and the Pirates took possession of the other that was opposite unto it. Captain Morgan was persuaded that in the wood the Spaniards had placed an ambuscade, as lying so conveniently for that purpose. Hereupon he sent before two hundred men to search it. The Spaniards and Indians, perceiving the Pirates to descend the mountain, did so too, as if they designed to attack them. But being got into the wood, out of sight of the Pirates, they disappeared, and were seen no more, leaving the passage open unto them.
"At this location, there was a forest, and on each side, there were mountains. The Native Americans had taken control of one side, while the Pirates claimed the opposite one. Captain Morgan believed that the Spaniards had set up an ambush in the woods since it was so suitable for that purpose. He then sent ahead two hundred men to investigate. The Spaniards and Native Americans, noticing the Pirates coming down the mountain, also began to descend, as if they planned to confront them. However, once they reached the woods, out of sight of the Pirates, they vanished and were never seen again, leaving the path clear for the Pirates."
"About night there fell a great rain, which caused the Pirates to march the faster and seek everywhere for houses wherein to preserve their arms from being wet. But the Indians had set fire to every one thereabouts, and transported all their cattle unto remote places, to the end that the Pirates, finding neither houses nor victuals, might be constrained to return homewards. Notwithstanding, after diligent search, they found a few little huts belonging to shepherds, but in them nothing to eat. These not being capable of holding many men, they placed in them out of every company a small number, who kept the arms of the rest of the army. Those who remained in the open field endured much hardship that night, the rain not ceasing to fall until the morning.
"That night, a heavy rain fell, forcing the Pirates to move faster and look for places to protect their weapons from getting wet. But the Indians had burned all the nearby houses and moved their livestock to distant areas to make sure the Pirates couldn’t find shelter or food, pushing them to head back home. However, after a thorough search, they discovered a few small huts belonging to shepherds, but there was nothing to eat in them. Since these huts couldn't hold many people, they placed a small number from each group inside to guard the weapons of the rest of the soldiers. Those who stayed out in the open endured a lot of hardship that night, with the rain continuing to pour until morning."
"The next morning, about break of day, being the ninth of this tedious journey, Captain Morgan continued his march while the fresh air of the morning lasted. For the clouds then hanging as yet over their heads were much more favourable unto them than the scorching rays of the sun, by reason the way was now more difficult and laborious than all the precedent. After two hours' march, they discovered a troop of about twenty Spaniards. who observed the motions of the Pirates. They endeavoured {179} to catch some of them, but could lay hold on none, they suddenly disappearing, and absconding themselves in caves among the rocks, totally unknown to the Pirates. At last they came to a high mountain, which, when they ascended, they discovered from the top thereof the South Sea. This happy sight, as if it were the end of their labours, caused infinite joy among the Pirates. From hence they could descry also one ship and six boats, which were set forth from Panama, and sailed towards the islands of Tavoga and Tavogilla. Having descended this mountain, they came unto a vale, in which they found great quantity of cattle, whereof they killed good store. Here while some were employed in killing and flaying of cows, horses, bulls and chiefly asses, of which there was greatest number, others busied themselves in kindling of fires and getting wood wherewith to roast them. Thus cutting the flesh of these animals into convenient pieces, or gobbets, they threw them into the fire and, half carbonadoed or roasted, they devoured them with incredible haste and appetite. For such was their hunger that they more resembled cannibals than Europeans at this banquet, the blood many times running down from their beards to the middle of their bodies.
"The next morning, at dawn, on the ninth day of this long journey, Captain Morgan continued his march while the fresh morning air lasted. The clouds hanging over them were much more favorable than the scorching sun, as the path was now tougher and more exhausting than before. After two hours of marching, they spotted a group of about twenty Spaniards who were watching the Pirates' movements. They tried to catch some of them, but the Pirates vanished quickly, hiding in caves among the rocks, completely unknown to them. Eventually, they reached a high mountain, and upon climbing to the top, they saw the South Sea. This amazing sight, as if it marked the end of their struggles, filled the Pirates with immense joy. From there, they could also see one ship and six boats that had set out from Panama, heading toward the islands of Tavoga and Tavogilla. After descending the mountain, they came to a valley where they found a large number of cattle and killed quite a few. While some were busy killing and skinning cows, horses, bulls, and especially donkeys, which were in the greatest number, others were gathering wood and starting fires to roast them. They cut the meat into manageable pieces and tossed it into the fire, and half-charred or roasted, they devoured it with astonishing speed and appetite. Their hunger was so fierce that they looked more like cannibals than Europeans at this feast, with blood often running down their beards to their chests."
"Having satisfied their hunger with these delicious meats, Captain Morgan ordered them to continue the march. Here again he sent before the main body fifty men, with intent to take some prisoners, if possibly they could. For he seemed now to be much concerned that in nine days' time he could not meet one person who might inform him of the condition and forces of the Spaniards. About evening they discovered a troop of two hundred Spaniards, more or less, who hallooed unto the Pirates, but these could not understand what they said. A little while after they came the first time within sight of the highest steeple of Panama. This steeple they no sooner {180} had discovered but they began to show signs of extreme joy, casting up their hats into the air, leaping for mirth, and shouting, even just as if they had already obtained the victory and entire accomplishment of their designs. All their trumpets were sounded and every drum beaten, in token of this universal acclamation and huge alacrity of their minds. Thus they pitched their camp for that night with general content of the whole army, waiting with impatience for the morning, at which time they intended to attack the city. This evening there appeared fifty horse who came out of the city, hearing the noise of the drums and trumpets of the Pirates, to observe, as it was thought, their motions. They came almost within musket-shot of the army, being preceded by a trumpet that sounded marvellously well. Those on horseback hallooed aloud unto the Pirates, and threatened them, saying, 'Perros! nos veremos,' that is, 'Ye dogs! we shall meet ye.' Having made this menace they returned to the city, excepting only seven or eight horsemen who remained hovering thereabouts, to watch what motions the Pirates made. Immediately after, the city began to fire and ceased not to play with their biggest guns all night long against the camp, but with little or no harm unto the Pirates, whom they could not conveniently reach. About this time also the two hundred Spaniards whom the Pirates had seen in the afternoon appeared again within sight, making resemblance as if they would block up the passages, to the intent no Pirates might escape the hands of their forces. But the Pirates, who were now in a manner besieged, instead of conceiving any fear of their blockades, as soon as they had placed sentries about their camp, began every one to open their satchels, and without any preparation of napkins or plates, fell to eating very heartily the remaining pieces of bulls' and horses' flesh which they had reserved since noon. This being done, they laid themselves down to sleep upon {181} the grass with great repose and huge satisfaction, expecting only with impatience for the dawnings of the next day.
"After satisfying their hunger with the delicious meats, Captain Morgan ordered the men to continue marching. Once again, he sent ahead fifty men with the goal of capturing some prisoners, if possible. He was clearly concerned that after nine days, he had not encountered anyone who could inform him about the condition and strength of the Spaniards. By evening, they spotted a group of around two hundred Spaniards who called out to the Pirates, but the Pirates couldn’t understand what was said. Shortly after, they got their first glimpse of the tallest steeple in Panama. As soon as they saw it, they expressed their joy by throwing their hats in the air, jumping for joy, and shouting as if they had already achieved victory and fulfilled their plans. All of their trumpets were blown, and every drum was beaten in a show of collective celebration and enthusiasm. They set up camp for the night, feeling satisfied as a whole army, eagerly awaiting the morning when they planned to attack the city. That evening, fifty horsemen emerged from the city, drawn by the sound of the Pirates' drums and trumpets, presumably to observe their activities. They approached close enough to be within gunshot of the army, marked by a trumpet that sounded quite good. The horsemen shouted at the Pirates, threatening them, saying, 'Perros! nos veremos,' which means, 'You dogs! We will meet you.' After issuing this threat, they returned to the city, leaving behind seven or eight horsemen who lingered around to keep an eye on the Pirates' movements. Soon after, the city began firing, relentlessly bombarding the camp with their largest cannons all night, but caused little to no harm to the Pirates, who were out of their effective range. Around this time, the two hundred Spaniards the Pirates had seen earlier reappeared, trying to block any escape routes to ensure that no Pirates could flee their forces. However, instead of being afraid, the Pirates, who felt they were practically under siege, set up sentries around their camp and immediately opened their satchels. Without any napkins or plates, they dug into the remaining pieces of bull and horse meat they had saved since noon. Once they finished, they laid down to sleep on the grass, feeling content and looking forward to the break of day."
"On the tenth day, betimes in the morning, they put all their men in convenient order, and with drums and trumpets sounding, continued their march directly towards the city. But one of the guides desired Captain Morgan not to take the common highway that led thither, fearing lest they should find in it much resistance and many ambuscades. He presently took his advice, and chose another way that went through the wood, although very irksome and difficult. Thus the Spaniards, perceiving the Pirates had taken another way, which they scarce had thought on or believed, were compelled to leave their stops and batteries, and come out to meet them. The Governor of Panama put his forces in order, consisting of two squadrons, four regiments of foot, and a huge number of wild bulls, which were driven by a great number of Indians, with some negroes and others to help them.
"On the tenth day, early in the morning, they arranged all their men in good order, and with drums and trumpets playing, continued their march directly towards the city. But one of the guides asked Captain Morgan not to take the usual road that led there, worried that they would encounter a lot of resistance and ambushes. He quickly followed this advice and chose another path that went through the woods, although it was very challenging and tough. So the Spaniards, realizing the Pirates had taken a different route that they barely expected or believed, were forced to abandon their traps and defenses and head out to meet them. The Governor of Panama organized his forces, which consisted of two squadrons, four regiments of foot soldiers, and a large number of wild bulls driven by many Indians, with some Black people and others to assist them."
"The Pirates being now upon their march, came unto the top of a little hill, from whence they had a large prospect of the city and campaign country underneath. Here they discovered the forces of the people of Panama, extended in battle array, which, when they perceived to be so numerous, they were suddenly surprised with great fear, much doubting the fortune of the day. Yea, few or none there were but wished themselves at home, or at least free from the obligation of that engagement, wherein they perceived their lives must be so narrowly concerned. Having been some time at a stand, in a wavering condition of mind, they at last reflected upon the straits they had brought themselves into, and that now they ought of necessity either to fight resolutely or die, for no quarter could be expected from an enemy against whom they had committed so many cruelties on all occasions. Hereupon they encouraged one another, and resolved either to {182} conquer, or spend the very last drop of blood in their bodies. Afterwards they divided themselves into three battalions, or troops, sending before them one of two hundred buccaneers, which sort of people are infinitely dextrous at shooting with guns.303 Thus the Pirates left the hill and descended, marching directly towards the Spaniards, who were posted in a spacious field, waiting for their coming. As soon as they drew nigh unto them, the Spaniards began to shout and cry, 'Viva el Rey! God save the King!' and immediately their horse began to move against the Pirates. But the field being full of quags and very soft under foot, they could not ply to and fro and wheel about, as they desired. The two hundred buccaneers who went before, every one putting one knee to the ground, gave them a full volley of shot, wherewith the battle was instantly kindled very hot. The Spaniards defended themselves very courageously, acting all they could possibly perform, to disorder the Pirates. Their foot, in like manner, endeavoured to second the horse, but were constrained by the Pirates to separate from them. Thus finding themselves frustrated of their designs, they attempted to drive the bulls against them at their backs, and by this means to put them into disorder. But the greatest part of that wild cattle ran away, being frightened with the noise of the battle. And some few that broke through the English companies did no other harm than to tear the colours in pieces; whereas the buccaneers, shooting them dead, left not one to trouble them thereabouts.
"The pirates, now on the move, reached the top of a small hill, where they had a wide view of the city and the surrounding countryside below. From this vantage point, they spotted the forces of the people of Panama arrayed for battle. When they realized how numerous they were, they felt a wave of fear, doubting the outcome of the day. Indeed, very few wished to be anywhere other than home, or at least free from the obligation of engaging in a battle that they knew could threaten their lives. After standing in uncertainty for a while, they ultimately recognized the predicament they had put themselves in, realizing they had no choice but to either fight fiercely or die, as no mercy could be expected from an enemy they had treated so cruelly. They motivated each other, resolving to either conquer or give their very last drop of blood. They then split into three battalions, sending ahead two hundred buccaneers, who were exceptionally skilled at shooting. Thus, the pirates left the hill and marched straight towards the Spaniards, who were positioned in a large field, waiting for their approach. As the pirates got closer, the Spaniards began to shout, 'Viva el Rey! God save the King!' and their cavalry began to charge against the pirates. However, the ground was muddy and soft, making it difficult for them to maneuver as they wanted. The two hundred buccaneers who went ahead knelt down, delivering a full volley of gunfire, igniting the battle fiercely. The Spaniards defended themselves valiantly, doing all they could to disrupt the pirates. Their infantry tried to support the cavalry but were forced back by the pirates. Frustrated by their failed plans, the Spaniards attempted to drive bulls against the pirates from behind in hopes of causing chaos. However, most of the wild cattle fled in fear from the battle noise. The few that broke through the English lines did little harm other than tearing the banners apart; meanwhile, the buccaneers took them down quickly, leaving none to trouble them for the moment."
"The battle having now continued for the space of two hours, at the end thereof the greatest part of the Spanish {183} horse was ruined and almost all killed. The rest fled away. Which being perceived by the foot, and that they could not possibly prevail, they discharged the shot they had in their muskets, and throwing them on the ground, betook themselves to flight, every one which way he could run. The Pirates could not possibly follow them, as being too much harassed and wearied with the long journey they had lately made. Many of them not being able to fly whither they desired, hid themselves for that present among the shrubs of the seaside. But very unfortunately; for most of them being found out by the Pirates, were instantly killed, without giving quarter to any.304 Some religious men were brought prisoners before Captain Morgan; but he being deaf to their cries and lamentations, commanded them all to be immediately pistoled, which was accordingly done. Soon after they brought a captain to his presence, whom he examined very strictly about several things, particularly wherein consisted the forces of those of Panama. Unto which he answered: Their whole strength did consist in four hundred horse, twenty-four companies of foot, each being of one hundred men complete, sixty Indians and some negroes, who were to drive two thousand wild bulls and cause them to run over the English camp, and thus by breaking their files put them {184} into a total disorder and confusion.305 He discovered more, that in the city they had made trenches and raised batteries in several places, in all which they had placed many guns. And that at the entry of the highway which led to the city they had built a fort, which was mounted with eight great guns of brass and defended by fifty men.
The battle had now gone on for two hours, and by the end, most of the Spanish cavalry was destroyed and nearly all were killed. The rest fled. When the foot soldiers saw this and knew they had no chance of winning, they fired the shots left in their muskets, threw them to the ground, and took off in every direction they could run. The Pirates couldn’t chase them, as they were too worn out from their long journey. Many of them, unable to escape where they wanted, hid among the seaside shrubs. Unfortunately, most of them were found by the Pirates and were immediately killed without mercy. Some religious men were captured and brought before Captain Morgan; however, he ignored their cries and pleas, ordering them all to be shot, which was done. Soon after, they brought a captain to him, whom he interrogated closely about various matters, especially the strength of the forces from Panama. The captain replied that their entire strength consisted of four hundred cavalry, twenty-four companies of foot soldiers, each with one hundred men, sixty Indians, and some Black people, who were supposed to drive two thousand wild bulls to charge through the English camp, causing total chaos and confusion. He also revealed that in the city, they had dug trenches and set up batteries in various locations, all equipped with many cannons. At the entrance of the road leading to the city, they had built a fort, which had eight large brass cannons and was defended by fifty men.
"Captain Morgan, having heard this information, gave orders instantly they should march another way. But before setting forth, he made a review of all his men, whereof he found both killed and wounded a considerable number, and much greater than he had believed. Of the Spaniards were found six hundred dead upon the place, besides the wounded and prisoners.306 The Pirates were nothing discouraged, seeing their number so much diminished, but rather filled with greater pride than before, perceiving what huge advantage they had obtained against their enemies. Thus having rested themselves some while, they prepared to march courageously towards the city, plighting their oaths to one another in general they would fight till never a man was left alive. With this courage they recommenced their march, either to conquer or be conquered, carrying with them all the prisoners.
"Captain Morgan, after hearing this news, quickly ordered his men to take a different route. Before they set off, he inspected all his soldiers and found a significant number were killed and wounded—much more than he had realized. They discovered six hundred Spaniards dead on the spot, not counting the wounded and prisoners.306 The Pirates weren’t discouraged by their reduced numbers; in fact, they felt even more pride, realizing the major advantage they had against their foes. After resting for a while, they geared up to march bravely toward the city, swearing to each other that they would fight until no one was left alive. With this determination, they resumed their march, prepared to either conquer or be conquered, taking all the prisoners with them."
"They found much difficulty in their approach unto the city. For within the town the Spaniards had placed many great guns, at several quarters thereof, some of which were charged with small pieces of iron, and others with musket bullets. With all these they saluted the {185} Pirates, at their drawing nigh unto the place, and gave them full and frequent broadsides, firing at them incessantly. Whence it came to pass that unavoidably they lost, at every step they advanced, great numbers of men. But neither these manifest dangers of their lives, nor the sight of so many of their own as dropped down continually at their sides, could deter them from advancing farther, and gaining ground every moment upon the enemy. Thus, although the Spaniards never ceased to fire and act the best they could for their defence, yet notwithstanding they were forced to deliver the city after the space of three hours' combat.307 And the Pirates, having now possessed themselves thereof, both killed and destroyed as many as attempted to make the least opposition against them. The inhabitants had caused the best of their goods to be transported to more remote and occult places. Howbeit they found within the city as yet several warehouses, very well stocked with all sorts of merchandise, as well silks and cloths as linen, and other things of considerable value. As soon as the first fury of their entrance into the city was over, Captain Morgan assembled all his men at a certain place which he assigned, and there commanded them under very great penalties that none of them should dare to drink or taste any wine. The reason he gave for this injunction was, because he had received private intelligence that it had been all poisoned by the Spaniards. Howbeit it was the opinion of many he gave these prudent orders to prevent the debauchery of his people, which he foresaw would be very great at the beginning, after so much hunger sustained by {186} the way. Fearing withal lest the Spaniards, seeing them in wine, should rally their forces and fall upon the city, and use them as inhumanly as they had used the inhabitants before."
They encountered a lot of challenges while approaching the city. Inside, the Spaniards had set up numerous large cannons in various locations, some loaded with small iron shot and others with musket balls. They greeted the approaching Pirates with heavy cannon fire, launching continuous blasts at them. As a result, they inevitably lost many men with each step they took closer. Yet, neither the clear dangers to their lives nor the sight of their fallen comrades could stop them from pushing forward and gaining ground against the enemy. Although the Spaniards kept firing and did their best to defend themselves, they were eventually forced to surrender the city after three hours of fighting. The Pirates, having taken control, killed or destroyed anyone who tried to resist. The locals had moved most of their valuables to safer, hidden locations. However, they found several warehouses in the city still well-stocked with all kinds of goods, including silks, cloth, linen, and other valuable items. Once the initial chaos of entering the city subsided, Captain Morgan gathered all his men in a designated area and ordered, under severe penalties, that none of them should drink or taste any wine. He explained that he had received information that it had all been poisoned by the Spaniards. However, many believed he issued these wise orders to prevent his men from indulging too much after enduring hunger on the way. He also feared that, if the Spaniards saw them drinking, they might rally and counterattack the city, treating them as brutally as they had treated the locals before.
Exquemelin accuses Morgan of setting fire to the city and endeavouring to make the world believe that it was done by the Spaniards. Wm. Frogge, however, who was also present, says distinctly that the Spaniards fired the town, and Sir William Godolphin, in a letter from Madrid to Secretary Arlington on 2nd June 1671, giving news of the exploit which must have come from a Spanish source, says that the President of Panama left orders that the city if taken should be burnt.308 Moreover the President of Panama himself, in a letter to Spain describing the event which was intercepted by the English, admits that not the buccaneers but the slaves and the owners of the houses set fire to the city.309 The buccaneers tried in vain to extinguish the flames, and the whole town, which was built mostly of wood, was consumed by twelve o'clock midnight. The only edifices which escaped were the government buildings, a few churches, and about 300 houses in the suburbs. The freebooters remained at Panama twenty-eight days seeking plunder and indulging in every variety of excess. Excursions were made daily into the country for twenty leagues round about to search for booty, and 3000 prisoners were brought in. Exquemelin's story of the sack is probably in the main true. In describing the city he writes: "There belonged to this city (which is also the head of a bishopric) eight monasteries, whereof seven were for men and one for women, two stately churches and one hospital. The churches and monasteries were all richly adorned with altar-pieces and paintings, huge quantity of gold and silver, with other {187} precious things; all which the ecclesiastics had hidden and concealed. Besides which ornaments, here were to be seen two thousand houses of magnificent and prodigious building, being all or the greatest part inhabited by merchants of that country, who are vastly rich. For the rest of the inhabitants of lesser quality and tradesmen, this city contained five thousand houses more. Here were also great numbers of stables, which served for the horses and mules, that carry all the plate, belonging as well unto the King of Spain as to private men, towards the coast of the North Sea. The neighbouring fields belonging to this city are all cultivated with fertile plantations and pleasant gardens, which afford delicious prospects unto the inhabitants the whole year long."310 The day after the capture, continues Exquemelin, "Captain Morgan dispatched away two troops of Pirates of one hundred and fifty men each, being all very stout soldiers and well armed with orders to seek for the inhabitants of Panama who were escaped from the hands of their enemies. These men, having made several excursions up and down the campaign fields, woods and mountains, adjoining to Panama, returned after two days' time bringing with them above 200 prisoners, between men, women and slaves. The same day returned also the boat ... which Captain Morgan had sent into the South Sea, bringing with her three other boats, which they had taken in a little while. But all these prizes they could willingly have given, yea, although they had employed greater labour into the bargain, for one certain galleon, which miraculously escaped their industry, being very richly laden with all the King's plate and great quantity of riches of gold, pearl, jewels and other most precious goods, of all of the {188} best and richest merchants of Panama. On board of this galleon were also the religious women, belonging to the nunnery of the said city, who had embarked with them all the ornaments of their church, consisting in great quantity of gold, plate, and other things of great value....
Exquemelin accuses Morgan of burning the city and trying to convince everyone that the Spaniards were responsible. However, Wm. Frogge, who was also there, clearly states that the Spaniards burned the town. Sir William Godolphin, in a letter from Madrid to Secretary Arlington on June 2, 1671, sharing news of the event that likely came from a Spanish source, mentions that the President of Panama ordered that the city should be burned if it was taken.308 Additionally, the President of Panama himself, in a letter to Spain about the incident that was intercepted by the English, admits that it wasn’t the buccaneers but the slaves and the homeowners who set the city on fire.309 The buccaneers tried unsuccessfully to put out the flames, and by midnight, the entire town, primarily made of wood, was destroyed. The only buildings that survived were the government structures, a few churches, and about 300 houses in the suburbs. The pirates stayed in Panama for twenty-eight days looking for loot and indulging in all kinds of excesses. Daily excursions were made into the surrounding countryside for twenty leagues to search for treasure, and 3,000 prisoners were captured. Exquemelin's account of the sack is likely mostly accurate. When he describes the city, he writes: "This city, which is also the seat of a bishopric, had eight monasteries, seven for men and one for women, two grand churches, and one hospital. The churches and monasteries were all richly decorated with altarpieces and paintings, and there was a huge amount of gold and silver, along with other precious items; all of which the clergy had hidden away. There were also about two thousand houses of impressive and magnificent design, most of which were inhabited by wealthy merchants from the region. Additionally, the city included five thousand more houses occupied by people of lesser status and tradesmen. There were many stables for horses and mules that carried all the treasure belonging to both the King of Spain and private individuals to the North Sea coast. The surrounding fields were cultivated with fertile farms and beautiful gardens, offering delightful views to the residents year-round."310 The day after the capture, Exquemelin continues, "Captain Morgan sent out two groups of pirates, each with 150 well-armed soldiers, ordered to search for the residents of Panama who had escaped from their enemies. These men made several excursions through the fields, woods, and mountains around Panama and returned after two days with over 200 prisoners, including men, women, and slaves. That same day, the boat that Captain Morgan had sent to the South Sea returned, bringing back three more boats they had captured shortly before. But they would have happily traded all these prizes, even if it required more effort, for just one particular galleon that miraculously escaped their grasp, which was heavily loaded with all the King’s treasure and a large amount of wealth in gold, pearls, jewels, and other highly valuable items from the richest merchants of Panama. This galleon also carried the nuns from the city who had taken all the church's treasures, which included a significant amount of gold, silver, and other precious items....
"Notwithstanding the Pirates found in the ports of the islands of Tavoga and Tavogilla several boats that were laden with many sorts of very good merchandise; all which they took and brought unto Panama; where being arrived, they made an exact relation of all that had passed while they were abroad to Captain Morgan. The prisoners confirmed what the Pirates had said, adding thereto, that they undoubtedly knew whereabouts the said galleon might be at that present, but that it was very probable they had been relieved before now from other places. These relations stirred up Captain Morgan anew to send forth all the boats that were in the port of Panama, with design to seek and pursue the said galleon till they could find her. The boats aforesaid being in all four, set sail from Panama, and having spent eight days in cruising to and fro, and searching several ports and creeks, they lost all their hopes of finding what they so earnestly sought for. Hereupon they resolved to return unto the isles of Tavoga and Tavogilla. Here they found a reasonable good ship, that was newly come from Payta, being laden with cloth, soap, sugar and biscuit, with twenty thousand pieces of eight in ready money. This vessel they instantly seized, not finding the least resistance from any person within her. Nigh unto the said ship was also a boat whereof in like manner they possessed themselves. Upon the boat they laded great part of the merchandises they had found in the ship, together with some slaves they had taken in the said islands. With this purchase they returned to Panama, something better satisfied of their {189} voyage, yet withal much discontented they could not meet with the galleon....
"Despite this, the pirates found several boats in the ports of the Tavoga and Tavogilla islands that were loaded with various kinds of good merchandise, all of which they took and brought to Panama. Once they arrived, they gave Captain Morgan a detailed account of everything that had happened during their time at sea. The prisoners confirmed the pirates' story and added that they definitely knew where the galleon was at that moment, but it was likely that it had already been rescued from other places. This information motivated Captain Morgan to send out all the boats in the Panama port, planning to search for and pursue the galleon until they found her. The four boats set sail from Panama and spent eight days cruising back and forth, searching various ports and creeks, but they lost all hope of finding what they desperately sought. They then decided to return to the Tavoga and Tavogilla islands, where they found a fairly good ship that had just arrived from Payta, loaded with cloth, soap, sugar, and biscuits, along with twenty thousand pieces of eight in cash. They immediately seized this vessel, facing no resistance from anyone on board. Nearby was also a boat, which they took possession of as well. They loaded a large portion of the goods they had found on the ship onto the boat, including some slaves they had captured in the islands. With this haul, they returned to Panama, somewhat more satisfied with their voyage but still frustrated that they could not find the galleon...."
"Captain Morgan used to send forth daily parties of two hundred men, to make inroads into all the fields and country thereabouts, and when one party came back, another consisting of two hundred more was ready to go forth. By this means they gathered in a short time huge quantity of riches, and no lesser number of prisoners. These being brought into the city, were presently put unto the most exquisite tortures imaginable, to make them confess both other people's goods and their own. Here it happened, that one poor and miserable wretch was found in the house of a gentleman of great quality, who had put on, amidst that confusion of things, a pair of taffety breeches belonging to his master with a little silver key hanging at the strings thereof. This being perceived by the Pirates they immediately asked him where was the cabinet of the said key? His answer was: he knew not what was become of it, but only that finding those breeches in his master's house, he had made bold to wear them. Not being able to extort any other confession out of him, they first put him upon the rack, wherewith they inhumanly disjointed his arms. After this they twisted a cord about his forehead, which they wrung so hard, that his eyes appeared as big as eggs, and were ready to fall out of his skull. But neither with these torments could they obtain any positive answer to their demands. Whereupon they soon after hung him up, giving him infinite blows and stripes, while he was under that intolerable pain and posture of body. Afterwards they cut off his nose and ears, and singed his face with burning straw, till he could speak nor lament his misery no longer. Then losing all hopes of hearing any confession from his mouth, they commanded a negro to run him through with a lance, which put an end to his life and a period to their {190} cruel and inhuman tortures. After this execrable manner did many others of those miserable prisoners finish their days, the common sport and recreation of these Pirates being these and other tragedies not inferior to these.
"Captain Morgan used to send out daily teams of two hundred men to raid the surrounding fields and countryside. When one team returned, another group of two hundred would be ready to head out. This way, they quickly gathered a massive amount of wealth and captured many prisoners. Once brought into the city, these captives were subjected to the most extreme tortures imaginable to force them to confess to their own possessions and those of others. One unfortunate soul was discovered in the home of a high-ranking gentleman, wearing a pair of fancy breeches that belonged to his master, with a small silver key hanging from the strings. When the pirates saw this, they immediately asked him where the cabinet for the key was. He replied that he didn’t know what had happened to it; he had just found the breeches in his master’s house and decided to wear them. Unable to extract any further confession from him, they first placed him on the rack, which cruelly dislocated his arms. Then they tightened a cord around his forehead so tightly that his eyes bulged out like eggs, threatening to pop out of his head. Yet even with these torments, they couldn’t get him to say anything useful. So, they hung him up and mercilessly beat him while he was in unbearable pain. After that, they cut off his nose and ears and burned his face with flaming straw, leaving him unable to speak or express his suffering any longer. Losing all hope of getting a confession from him, they ordered a negro to stab him with a lance, ending his life and putting a stop to their cruel and inhumane tortures. Many other wretched prisoners met their end in similarly dreadful ways, as these awful acts and other equally horrific tragedies were the common amusement of the pirates." {190}
"They spared in these their cruelties no sex nor condition whatsoever. For as to religious persons and priests, they granted them less quarter than unto others, unless they could produce a considerable sum of money, capable of being a sufficient ransom. Women themselves were no better used ... and Captain Morgan, their leader and commander, gave them no good example in this point....311
"They showed no mercy in their cruelty to anyone, regardless of their gender or status. When it came to religious people and priests, they were treated even worse than the others, unless they could come up with a significant amount of money to serve as a ransom. Women didn't fare any better... and Captain Morgan, their leader, set a poor example in this regard....311
"Captain Morgan having now been at Panama the full space of three weeks, commanded all things to be put in order for his departure. Unto this effect he gave orders to every company of his men, to seek out for so many beasts of carriage as might suffice to convey the whole spoil of the city unto the river where his canoes lay. About this time a great rumour was spread in the city, of a considerable number of Pirates who intended to leave Captain Morgan; and that, by taking a ship which was in the port, they determined to go and rob upon the South Sea till they had got as much as they thought fit, and then return homewards by the way of the East Indies into Europe. For which purpose they had already gathered great quantity of provisions which they had hidden in private places, with sufficient store of powder, bullets and all other sorts of ammunition; likewise some great guns belonging to the town, muskets and other {191} things, wherewith they designed not only to equip the said vessel but also to fortify themselves and raise batteries in some island or other, which might serve them for a place of refuge.
"Captain Morgan had now been in Panama for a full three weeks and ordered everything to be prepared for his departure. To this end, he instructed each group of his men to find as many pack animals as needed to transport all the loot from the city to the river where his canoes were waiting. Around this time, a significant rumor spread through the city about a considerable number of pirates who intended to leave Captain Morgan. They planned to take a ship that was in the port and sail off to plunder the South Sea until they had gathered as much as they deemed sufficient, then return home via the East Indies to Europe. For this purpose, they had already collected a large quantity of supplies, which they had hidden in secret locations, along with plenty of gunpowder, bullets, and other types of ammunition. They also had acquired some heavy cannons belonging to the town, muskets, and other {191} equipment, with which they intended not only to outfit the vessel but also to fortify themselves and establish batteries on some island, which could serve as a safe haven."
"This design had certainly taken effect as they intended, had not Captain Morgan had timely advice thereof given him by one of their comrades. Hereupon he instantly commanded the mainmast of the said ship should be cut down and burnt, together with all the other boats that were in the port. Hereby the intentions of all or most of his companions were totally frustrated. After this Captain Morgan sent forth many of the Spaniards into the adjoining fields and country, to seek for money wherewith to ransom not only themselves but also all the rest of the prisoners, as likewise the ecclesiastics, both secular and regular. Moreover, he commanded all the artillery of the town to be spoiled, that is to say, nailed and stopped up. At the same time he sent out a strong company of men to seek for the Governor of Panama, of whom intelligence was brought that he had laid several ambuscades in the way, by which he ought to pass at his return. But those who were sent upon this design returned soon after, saying they had not found any sign or appearance of any such ambuscades. For a confirmation whereof they brought with them some prisoners they had taken, who declared how that the said Governor had had an intention of making some opposition by the way, but that the men whom he had designed to effect it were unwilling to undertake any such enterprise; so that for want of means he could not put his design into execution.312
"This plan had definitely worked as they hoped, if Captain Morgan hadn't received a timely warning from one of their allies. So, he immediately ordered the mainmast of the ship to be cut down and burned, along with all the other boats in the port. This completely ruined the plans of most of his companions. After this, Captain Morgan sent many Spaniards into the nearby fields and countryside to look for money to ransom not just themselves but also all the other prisoners, including the clergy, both secular and regular. He also ordered that all the town's artillery be damaged, meaning nailed and blocked up. At the same time, he dispatched a strong group of men to find the Governor of Panama, who had set up several ambushes along the route he would take on his return. However, those sent on this mission came back soon after, saying they found no signs of any ambushes. To confirm this, they brought back some prisoners they had captured, who said that the Governor had planned to make some resistance but that the men he intended to use for the task were unwilling to take on such a venture; thus, lacking resources, he couldn't carry out his plan.312"
"On the 24th of February of the year 1671,313 Captain Morgan departed from the city of Panama, or rather from the place where the said city of Panama did stand. Of the spoils whereof he carried with him one hundred and seventy-five beasts of carriage, laden with silver, gold and other precious things, besides 600 prisoners, more or less, between men, women, children and slaves. That day they came unto a river that passeth through a delicious campaign field, at the distance of a league from Panama. Here Captain Morgan put all his forces into good order of martial array in such manner that the prisoners were in the middle of the camp, surrounded on all sides with Pirates. At which present conjuncture nothing else was to be heard but lamentations, cries, shrieks and doleful sighs, of so many women and children, who were persuaded Captain Morgan designed to transport them all, and carry them into his own country for slaves. Besides that, among all those miserable prisoners, there was extreme hunger and thirst endured at that time. Which hardship and misery Captain Morgan designedly caused them to sustain, with intent to excite them more earnestly to seek for money wherewith to ransom themselves, according to the tax he had set upon every one. Many of the women begged of Captain Morgan upon their knees, with infinite sighs and tears, he would permit them to return unto Panama, there to live in company of their dear husbands and children, in little huts of straw which they would erect, seeing they had no houses until the rebuilding of the city. But his answer was: he came not thither to hear lamentations and cries, but rather to seek money. Therefore, they ought to seek out for that {193} in the first place, wherever it were to be had, and bring it to him, otherwise he would assuredly transport them all to such places whither they cared not to go....
"On February 24, 1671,313 Captain Morgan left the city of Panama, or rather from where the city once stood. He took with him one hundred seventy-five pack animals loaded with silver, gold, and other valuable items, along with around 600 prisoners, including men, women, children, and slaves. That day they arrived at a river passing through a beautiful countryside, about a league from Panama. Here, Captain Morgan organized his forces into military formation so that the prisoners were in the middle of the camp, surrounded on all sides by pirates. At that moment, all you could hear were the cries, wails, and sad sighs of countless women and children, who believed Captain Morgan planned to take them all away as slaves to his own country. Additionally, the prisoners were suffering from extreme hunger and thirst. Captain Morgan intentionally made them endure this hardship to encourage them to find money to buy their freedom, based on the ransom he had set for each of them. Many women pleaded with Captain Morgan on their knees, filled with sighs and tears, asking him to let them return to Panama to live with their husbands and children in the little straw huts they would build, since they had no homes until the city could be rebuilt. But he replied that he hadn't come to listen to their cries, but to seek money instead. Therefore, they should first find it wherever they could and bring it to him; otherwise, he would certainly take them all to places they didn't want to go....
"As soon as Captain Morgan arrived, upon his march, at the town called Cruz, seated on the banks of the river Chagre, as was mentioned before, he commanded an order to be published among the prisoners, that within the space of three days every one of them should bring in their ransom, under the penalty aforementioned, of being transported unto Jamaica. In the meanwhile he gave orders for so much rice and maize to be collected thereabouts as was necessary for the victualling all his ships. At this place some of the prisoners were ransomed, but many others could not bring in their moneys in so short a time. Hereupon he continued his voyage ... carrying with him all the spoil that ever he could transport. From this village he likewise led away some new prisoners, who were inhabitants of the said place. So that these prisoners were added to those of Panama who had not as yet paid their ransoms, and all transported.... About the middle of the way unto the Castle of Chagre, Captain Morgan commanded them to be placed in due order, according to their custom, and caused every one to be sworn, that they had reserved nor concealed nothing privately to themselves, even not so much as the value of sixpence. This being done, Captain Morgan having had some experience that those lewd fellows would not much stickle to swear falsely in points of interest, he commanded them every one to be searched very strictly, both in their clothes and satchels and everywhere it might be presumed they had reserved anything. Yea, to the intent this order might not be ill taken by his companions, he permitted himself to be searched, even to the very soles of his shoes. To this effect by common consent, there was assigned one out of every company to be the {194} searchers of all the rest. The French Pirates that went on this expedition with Captain Morgan were not well satisfied with this new custom of searching. Yet their number being less than that of the English, they were forced to submit unto it, as well as the others had done before them. The search being over, they re-embarked in their canoes and boats, which attended them on the river, and arrived at the Castle of Chagre.314 ... Here they found all things in good order, excepting the wounded men, whom they had left there at the time of their departure. For of these the greatest number were dead, through the wounds they had received.
"As soon as Captain Morgan arrived at the town called Cruz, located on the banks of the Chagre River, he ordered an announcement to be made to the prisoners that they had three days to pay their ransom, or else they would be sent to Jamaica. Meanwhile, he instructed the collection of enough rice and maize needed to feed all his ships. Some of the prisoners managed to pay their ransoms, but many others couldn’t come up with the money in time. As a result, he continued his journey, taking all the loot he could carry. From this village, he also took some new prisoners who lived there. These prisoners were added to those from Panama who had not yet paid their ransoms and were all transported. About halfway to the Castle of Chagre, Captain Morgan had them arranged in order and made everyone swear that they hadn’t hidden anything for themselves, not even something worth sixpence. After this, knowing that some of these shady characters might lie for their own benefit, he ordered a thorough search of them, both in their clothing and bags, wherever they might have hidden anything. To ensure his crew didn’t take offense, he allowed himself to be searched, even down to the soles of his shoes. By mutual agreement, one person from each group was chosen to search the others. The French pirates on this expedition with Captain Morgan weren’t happy with this new search routine. However, since their numbers were fewer than those of the English, they had to go along with it, just like everyone else had before. Once the searches were done, they got back into their canoes and boats waiting on the river and arrived at the Castle of Chagre. Here, everything was in order except for the wounded men they had left behind when they departed. Unfortunately, most of those men had died from their injuries."
"From Chagre, Captain Morgan sent presently after his arrival, a great boat unto Porto Bello, wherein were all the prisoners he had taken at the Isle of St. Catherine, demanding by them a considerable ransom for the Castle of Chagre, where he then was, threatening otherwise to ruin and demolish it even to the ground. To this message those of Porto Bello made answer: they would not give one farthing towards the ransom of the said castle, and that the English might do with it as they pleased. This answer being come, the dividend was made of all the spoil they had purchased in that voyage. Thus every company and every particular person therein included received their portion of what was gotten; or rather what part thereof Captain Morgan was pleased to give them. For so it was, that the rest of his companions, even of his own nation, complained of his proceedings in this particular, and feared not to tell him openly to his face, that he had reserved the best jewels to himself. For they judged it impossible that no greater share should belong unto them than two hundred pieces of eight per capita, of so many valuable purchases and robberies as they had obtained. Which small sum they {195} thought too little reward for so much labour and such huge and manifest dangers as they had so often exposed their lives unto. But Captain Morgan was deaf to all these and many other complaints of this kind, having designed in his mind to cheat them of as much as he could."315
"After arriving in Chagre, Captain Morgan quickly sent a large boat to Porto Bello, carrying all the prisoners he had captured at the Isle of St. Catherine. He demanded a hefty ransom for the Castle of Chagre, where he was at the time, threatening to destroy it completely if they refused. The people of Porto Bello replied that they would not offer a single penny towards the ransom for the castle, saying the English could do whatever they wanted with it. Once this message arrived, they divided up all the loot obtained during the voyage. Every group and individual was given their share of what was taken, or rather, what Captain Morgan chose to allocate to them. Many of his companions, including those from his own nation, openly criticized him for this, claiming he kept the best jewels for himself. They believed it was unreasonable that they were only receiving two hundred pieces of eight each, given the valuable gains and the significant dangers they had faced. They considered this small amount an insufficient reward for the hard work and grave risks they had endured. However, Captain Morgan ignored all these complaints and others like them, having made up his mind to take as much as he could."
On 6th March 1671, Morgan, after demolishing the fort and other edifices at Chagre and spiking all the guns, got secretly on board his own ship, if we are to believe Exquemelin, and followed by only three or four vessels of the fleet, returned to Port Royal. The rest of the fleet scattered, most of the ships having "much ado to find sufficient victuals and provisions for their voyage to Jamaica." At the end of August not more than ten vessels of the original thirty-six had made their way back to the English colony. Morgan, with very inadequate means, accomplished a feat which had been the dream of Drake and other English sailors for a century or more, and which Admiral Vernon in 1741 with a much greater armament feared even to attempt. For display of remarkable leadership and reckless bravery the expedition against Panama has never been surpassed. Its brilliance was only clouded by the cruelty and rapacity of the victors—a force levied without pay and little discipline, and unrestrained, if not encouraged, in brutality by Morgan himself. Exquemelin's accusation against Morgan, of avarice and dishonesty in the division of the spoil amongst his followers, is, unfortunately for the admiral's reputation, too well substantiated. Richard Browne, the surgeon-general of the fleet, estimated the plunder at over £70,000 "besides other rich goods," of which the soldiers were miserably cheated, each man receiving but £10 as his share. At Chagre, he writes, the leaders gave what they pleased "for which ... we must be content {196} or else be clapped in irons." The wronged seamen were loud in their complaints against Morgan, Collier and the other captains for starving, cheating and deserting them; but so long as Modyford was governor they could obtain no redress. The commanders "dared but seldom appear," writes Browne, "the widows, orphans and injured inhabitants who had so freely advanced upon the hopes of a glorious design, being now ruined through fitting out the privateers."316 The Spaniards reckoned their whole loss at 6,000,000 crowns.317
On March 6, 1671, after destroying the fort and other buildings at Chagre and disabling all the guns, Morgan secretly boarded his ship, if we believe Exquemelin. He was followed by only three or four vessels of the fleet as he returned to Port Royal. The rest of the fleet scattered, with most ships struggling to find enough food and supplies for their journey to Jamaica. By the end of August, only ten of the original thirty-six vessels had returned to the English colony. Morgan achieved a feat that had been a dream for Drake and other English sailors for over a century, a feat that Admiral Vernon, with a much larger force, was too afraid to attempt in 1741. The expedition against Panama displayed extraordinary leadership and reckless bravery that has never been matched. However, its success was marred by the cruelty and greed of the victors—a group that was undisciplined and often encouraged in their brutality by Morgan himself. Exquemelin's claims against Morgan regarding greed and dishonesty in dividing the spoils among his crew are unfortunately well backed up. Richard Browne, the fleet's surgeon-general, estimated the plunder at over £70,000 "plus other valuable goods," yet the soldiers were miserably cheated, each only receiving £10 of their share. At Chagre, he noted that leaders distributed what they wanted, stating "for which ... we must be content or else be clapped in irons." The disgruntled seamen complained loudly about Morgan, Collier, and the other captains for starving, cheating, and abandoning them; however, while Modyford was governor, they found no relief. The commanders "seldom dared to show up," Browne wrote, "the widows, orphans, and injured locals, who had eagerly supported the hopes of a glorious venture, were now ruined for having outfitted the privateers." The Spaniards calculated their total losses at 6,000,000 crowns.
On 31st May 1671, the Council of Jamaica extended a vote of thanks to Morgan for the execution of his late commission, and formally expressed their approval of the manner in which he had conducted himself.318 There can be no question but that the governor had full knowledge of Morgan's intentions before the fleet sailed from Cape Tiburon. After the decision of the council of officers on 2nd December to attack Panama, a boat was dispatched to Jamaica to inform Modyford, and in a letter written to Morgan ten days after the arrival of the vessel the governor gave no countermand to the decision.319 Doubtless the defence made, that the governor and council were trying to forestall an impending invasion of Jamaica by the Spaniards, was sincere. But it is also very probable that they were in part deceived into this belief by Morgan and his followers, who made it their first object to get prisoners, and obtain from them by force a confession that at Cartagena, Porto Bello or some other Spanish maritime port the Spaniards were mustering men and fitting a fleet to invade the island.
On May 31, 1671, the Council of Jamaica expressed their gratitude to Morgan for completing his recent mission and officially showed their approval of how he had behaved. There’s no doubt that the governor was fully aware of Morgan's plans before the fleet left Cape Tiburon. After the officers' council decided on December 2 to attack Panama, a boat was sent to Jamaica to inform Modyford, and in a letter sent to Morgan ten days after the ship's arrival, the governor didn’t cancel the decision. It’s clear that the defense made, claiming the governor and council were trying to prevent a possible Spanish invasion of Jamaica, was genuine. However, it's also likely that they were partially misled into this belief by Morgan and his crew, who aimed to capture prisoners and extract a confession from them by force that at Cartagena, Porto Bello, or another Spanish coastal port, the Spaniards were gathering men and preparing a fleet to invade the island.
By a strange irony of fate, on 8th-18th July 1670 a {197} treaty was concluded at Madrid by Sir William Godolphin for "composing differences, restraining depredations and establishing peace" in America. No trading privileges in the West Indies were granted by either crown, but the King of Spain acknowledged the sovereignty of the King of England over all islands, colonies, etc., in America then in possession of the English, and the ships of either nation, in case of distress, were to have entertainment and aid in the ports of the other. The treaty was to be published in the West Indies simultaneously by English and Spanish governors within eight months after its ratification.320 In May of the following year, a messenger from San Domingo arrived in Port Royal with a copy of the articles of peace, to propose that a day be fixed for their publication, and to offer an exchange of prisoners,321 Modyford had as yet received no official notice from England of the treaty, and might with justice complain to the authorities at home of their neglect.322 Shortly after, however, a new governor came to relieve him of further responsibility. Charles II. had probably placated the Spanish ambassador in 1670 by promising the removal of Modyford and the dispatch of another governor well-disposed to the Spaniards.323 At any rate, a commission was issued in September 1670, appointing Colonel Thomas Lynch Lieutenant-Governor of Jamaica, to command there in the "want, absence or disability" of the governor;324 and on 4th January following, in spite of a petition of the officers, freeholders and inhabitants of Jamaica in favour of Modyford,325 the commission of {198} the governor was revoked.326 Lynch arrived in Jamaica on 25th June with instructions, as soon as he had possession of the government and forts, to arrest Sir Thomas Modyford and send him home under guard to answer charges laid against him.327 Fearing to exasperate the friends of the old governor, Lynch hesitated to carry out his instructions until 12th August, when he invited Modyford on board the frigate "Assistance," with several members of the council, and produced the royal orders for his arrest. Lynch assured him, however, that his life and fortune were not in danger, the proceeding being merely a sop to the indignant Spaniards.328 Modyford arrived in England in November, and on the 17th of the month was committed to the Tower.329
By a strange twist of fate, from July 8th to 18th, 1670, a treaty was signed in Madrid by Sir William Godolphin to "settle disputes, prevent looting, and establish peace" in America. Neither crown granted any trading privileges in the West Indies, but the King of Spain acknowledged the King of England's sovereignty over all islands, colonies, etc., in America that were then under English control. Ships from either nation, in case of distress, would receive support and shelter in each other's ports. The treaty was to be announced in the West Indies simultaneously by English and Spanish governors within eight months of its ratification.320 In May of the following year, a messenger from San Domingo arrived in Port Royal with a copy of the peace articles, proposing a day for their announcement and offering a prisoner exchange,321 but Modyford had not yet received any official notice from England regarding the treaty and could rightfully complain to the authorities back home about their oversight.322 Shortly after, a new governor arrived to take over his responsibilities. Charles II likely appeased the Spanish ambassador in 1670 by promising to remove Modyford and send in another governor who would be more favorable to the Spaniards.323 In any case, a commission was issued in September 1670, appointing Colonel Thomas Lynch as Lieutenant-Governor of Jamaica, tasked to lead in the "absence, absence or inability" of the governor;324 and on January 4th following, despite a petition from the officers, landowners, and residents of Jamaica supporting Modyford,325 the governor's commission was revoked.326 Lynch arrived in Jamaica on June 25th with instructions, as soon as he took control of the government and forts, to arrest Sir Thomas Modyford and send him back home under guard to face charges against him.327 Wary of angering Modyford's supporters, Lynch delayed carrying out his orders until August 12th, when he invited Modyford aboard the frigate "Assistance," along with several council members, and presented the royal orders for his arrest. However, Lynch assured him that his life and property were not at risk, stating that this action was just a concession to the upset Spaniards.328 Modyford reached England in November and was committed to the Tower on the 17th of that month.329
The indignation of the Spaniards, when the news of the sack of Panama reached Spain, rose to a white heat. "It is impossible for me to paint to your Lordship," wrote Godolphin to Lord Arlington, "the face of Madrid upon the news of this action ... nor to what degree of indignation the queen and ministers of State, the particular councils and all sorts of people here, have taken it to heart."330 It seems that the ambassador or the Spanish consul in London had written to Madrid that this last expedition was made by private intimation, if not orders, from London, and that Godolphin had been commanded to provide in the treaty for a long term before publication, so as to give time for the execution of the design. Against these falsehoods the English ambassador found it difficult to make headway, although he assured the queen of the immediate punishment of the perpetrators, and the arrest and recall of the Governor of Jamaica. Only by the {199} greatest tact and prudence was he able to stave off, until an official disavowal of the expedition came from England, an immediate embargo on all the goods of English merchants in Spain. The Spanish government decided to send a fleet of 10,000 men with all speed to the Indies; and the Dukes of Albuquerque and Medina Coeli vied with each other in offering to raise the men at their own charge from among their own vassals. After Godolphin had presented his official assurance to the queen, however, nothing more was heard of this armament. "God grant," wrote the English ambassador, "that Sir Thomas Modyford's way of defending Jamaica (as he used to call it) by sending out the forces thereof to pillage, prove an infallible one; for my own part, I do not think it hath been our interest to awaken the Spaniards so much as this last action hath done."331
The anger of the Spaniards, when the news of the sack of Panama reached Spain, intensified dramatically. "I can't even begin to describe to your Lordship," Godolphin wrote to Lord Arlington, "the expression on the faces in Madrid upon hearing about this event... nor how deeply the queen, the ministers, the various councils, and everyone here have taken it to heart." 330 It appears that the ambassador or the Spanish consul in London had informed Madrid that this recent expedition was carried out on private instructions, if not orders, from London, and that Godolphin had been instructed to ensure the treaty was delayed for a long time before being made public, to allow for the execution of the plan. The English ambassador struggled to counter these false claims, even though he assured the queen that the perpetrators would be punished immediately, and that the Governor of Jamaica would be arrested and recalled. Only through great tact and caution was he able to prevent an immediate embargo on all English merchants' goods in Spain until an official denial of the expedition came from England. The Spanish government decided to quickly send a fleet of 10,000 men to the Indies; and the Dukes of Albuquerque and Medina Coeli competed with each other to raise the men at their own expense from their own vassals. However, after Godolphin presented his official assurance to the queen, nothing more was heard about this military mobilization. "God grant," wrote the English ambassador, "that Sir Thomas Modyford's way of defending Jamaica (as he used to call it) by sending out forces to loot proves to be effective; because personally, I don’t think it’s in our best interest to have stirred up the Spaniards as much as this last action has done." 331
Footnote 207: (return)Ibid., Nos. 656 and 664. Dated 15th and 18th February respectively.
Same source., Nos. 656 and 664. Dated February 15 and 18, respectively.
Footnote 209: (return)C.S.P. Colon., 1661-68, Nos. 739 and 744.
C.S.P. Colon., 1661-68, Nos. 739 and 744.
Footnote 212: (return)S.P. Spain, vol. 46, f. 192; C.S.P. Colon., 1661-68, No. 753.
S.P. Spain, vol. 46, f. 192; C.S.P. Colon., 1661-68, No. 753.
Footnote 213: (return)C.S.P. Colon., 1661-68, No. 744; cf. also No. 811, and Lyttleton's Report, No. 812.
C.S.P. Colon., 1661-68, No. 744; see also No. 811, and Lyttleton's Report, No. 812.
Footnote 215: (return)Ibid., Nos. 859, 964; Beeston's Journal. For disputes over the cargo of the Spanish prize captured by Williams, cf. C.S.P. Colon., 1661-68, Nos. 1140, 1150, 1177, 1264, 1266.
Same source., Nos. 859, 964; Beeston's Journal. For discussions about the cargo of the Spanish prize captured by Williams, see C.S.P. Colon., 1661-68, Nos. 1140, 1150, 1177, 1264, 1266.
Footnote 218: (return)C.S.P. Colon., 1661-68, No. 786; cf. also Add. MSS., 11,410, f. 303:—"Mr. Worseley's discourse of the Privateers of Jamaica."
C.S.P. Colon., 1661-68, No. 786; see also Add. MSS., 11,410, f. 303:—"Mr. Worseley's discussion on the Privateers of Jamaica."
Footnote 219: (return)Charlevoix, op. cit., liv. vii. pp. 57-65.
Charlevoix, op. cit., book 7, pp. 57-65.
Footnote 220: (return)For the biography of Jean-David Nau, surnamed l'Olonnais, cf. Nouvelle Biographie Générale, t. xxxviii. p. 654.
For the biography of Jean-David Nau, also known as l'Olonnais, see Nouvelle Biographie Générale, vol. xxxviii, p. 654.
Footnote 223: (return)C.S.P. Colon., 1574-1660, pp. 363, 421, 433.
C.S.P. Colon., 1574-1660, pp. 363, 421, 433.
Footnote 225: (return)Ibid., p. 447; Egerton MSS., 2395, f. 167.
Same source., p. 447; Egerton MSS., 2395, f. 167.
Footnote 226: (return)C.S.P. Colon., 1661-68, No. 101; cf. also Nos. 24, 32, 122. From orders contained in the MSS. of the Marquis of Ormonde issued on petitions of convicted prisoners, we find that reprieves were often granted on condition of their making arrangements for their own transportation for life to the West Indies, without expense to the government. The condemned were permitted to leave the gaols in which they were confined and embark immediately, on showing that they had agreed with a sea-captain to act as his servant, both during the voyage and after their arrival. The captains were obliged to give bond for the safe transportation of the criminals, and the latter were also to find security that they would not return to the British Isles without license, on pain of receiving the punishment from which they had been originally reprieved. (Hist. MSS. Comm. Rept. X., pt. 5, pp. 34, 42, 85, 94). Cf. also C.S.P. Colon., 1661-68, No. 1268.
C.S.P. Colon., 1661-68, No. 101; see also Nos. 24, 32, 122. From orders found in the manuscripts of the Marquis of Ormonde, issued in response to requests from convicted prisoners, we see that reprieves were often granted on the condition that prisoners arranged their own transportation for life to the West Indies, at no cost to the government. The condemned individuals were allowed to leave the jails where they were held and board a ship immediately, as long as they provided proof of an agreement with a sea captain to assist him during the journey and after arriving at their destination. The captains were required to provide a bond for the safe transport of the prisoners, who also had to secure arrangements to prevent their return to the British Isles without permission, under the threat of facing the punishment from which they had originally been reprieved. (Hist. MSS. Comm. Rept. X., pt. 5, pp. 34, 42, 85, 94). See also C.S.P. Colon., 1661-68, No. 1268.
Footnote 227: (return)C.S.P. Colon., 1661-68, Nos. 331, 769-772, 790, 791, 798, 847, 1720.
C.S.P. Colon., 1661-68, Nos. 331, 769-772, 790, 791, 798, 847, 1720.
Footnote 235: (return)C.S.P. Colon., 1661-68, No. 979. There were really nine ships and 650 men. Cf. ibid., No. 1088.
C.S.P. Colon., 1661-68, No. 979. There were actually nine ships and 650 men. See ibid., No. 1088.
Footnote 238: (return)C.S.P. Colon., 1661-68, Nos. 1073, 1088.
C.S.P. Colon., 1661-68, Nos. 1073, 1088.
Footnote 239: (return)Ibid., No. 1042, I. Lieutenant-Colonel Thomas Morgan (not to be confused with Colonel Edward Morgan), who was left in command of St. Eustatius and Saba, went in April 1666 with a company of buccaneers to the assistance of Governor Watts of St. Kitts against the French. In the rather shameful defence of the English part of the island Morgan's buccaneers were the only English who displayed any courage or discipline, and most of them were killed or wounded, Colonel Morgan himself being shot in both legs. (Ibid., Nos. 1204, 1205, 1212, 1220, 1257.) St. Eustatius was reconquered by a French force from St. Kitts in the early part of 1667. (Ibid., No. 1401.)
Ibid., No. 1042, I. Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Morgan (not to be confused with Colonel Edward Morgan), who was responsible for St. Eustatius and Saba, went with a group of buccaneers in April 1666 to assist Governor Watts of St. Kitts against the French. In the rather disgraceful defense of the English portion of the island, Morgan's buccaneers were the only English who displayed any courage or discipline, and most of them were killed or wounded, with Colonel Morgan himself getting shot in both legs. (Ibid., Nos. 1204, 1205, 1212, 1220, 1257.) St. Eustatius was recaptured by a French force from St. Kitts in early 1667. (Ibid., No. 1401.)
Footnote 241: (return)Ibid., No. 1125. Stedman was later in the year, after the outbreak of war with France, captured by a French frigate off Guadeloupe. With a small vessel and only 100 men he found himself becalmed and unable to escape, so he boldly boarded the Frenchman in buccaneer fashion and fought for two hours, but was finally overcome. (Ibid., No. 1212.)
Ibid., No. 1125. Later that year, after the war with France started, Stedman was captured by a French frigate near Guadeloupe. With a small ship and only 100 men, he got stuck in calm waters and couldn't escape, so he boldly boarded the French ship like a pirate and fought for two hours but was eventually defeated. (Ibid., No. 1212.)
Footnote 242: (return)Ibid., No. 1085; Beeston's Journal. Mansfield was the buccaneer whom Exquemelin disguises under the name of "Mansvelt."
Same source, No. 1085; Beeston's Journal. Mansfield was the pirate that Exquemelin refers to as "Mansvelt."
Footnote 243: (return)C.S.P. Colon., 1661-68, Nos. 1130, 1132-37.
C.S.P. Colon., 1661-68, Nos. 1130, 1132-37.
Footnote 244: (return)C.S.P. Colon., 1661-68, Nos. 1129, 1263.
C.S.P. Colon., 1661-68, Nos. 1129, 1263.
Footnote 247: (return)C.S.P. Colon., 1661-68, No. 1264, slightly condensed from the original.
C.S.P. Colon., 1661-68, No. 1264, slightly shortened from the original.
Footnote 248: (return)C.S.P. Colon., 1661-68, Nos. 1142, 1147. The Governor of Havana wrote concerning this same exploit, that on Christmas Eve of 1665 the English entered and sacked the town of Cayo in the jurisdiction of Havana, and meeting with a vessel having on board twenty-two Spaniards who were inhabitants of the town, put them all to the sword, cutting them to pieces with hangers. Afterwards they sailed to the town of Bayamo with thirteen vessels and 700 men, but altering their plans, went to Sancti Spiritus, landed 300, plundered the town, cruelly treated both men and women, burnt the best houses, and wrecked and desecrated the church in which they had made their quarters. (S.P. Spain, vol. 49, f. 50.)
C.S.P. Colon., 1661-68, Nos. 1142, 1147. The Governor of Havana reported that on Christmas Eve of 1665, the English invaded and looted the town of Cayo, which was under Havana's authority. They came across a ship carrying twenty-two Spaniards who lived in the town and executed them all, cutting them to pieces with swords. Afterwards, they set sail for the town of Bayamo with thirteen ships and 700 men, but changed their plans and went to Sancti Spiritus instead. They landed 300 troops, plundered the town, treated both men and women cruelly, burned the best houses, and destroyed and desecrated the church where they had set up camp. (S.P. Spain, vol. 49, f. 50.)
Col. Beeston says that Mansfield conducted the raid; but according to the Spanish account to which Duro had access, the leader was Pierre Legrand. (Duro, op. cit., v. p. 164).
Col. Beeston claims that Mansfield led the raid; however, according to the Spanish account that Duro had access to, the leader was Pierre Legrand. (Duro, op. cit., v. p. 164).
Footnote 249: (return)C.S.P. Colon., 1661-68, No. 1147; Beeston's Journal. Beeston reports that after a six weeks' search for Mansfield and his men he failed to find them and returned to Jamaica.
C.S.P. Colon., 1661-68, No. 1147; Beeston's Journal. Beeston states that after looking for Mansfield and his crew for six weeks, he was unable to locate them and went back to Jamaica.
Footnote 251: (return)Exquemelin, however, says that he had 500 men. If he attacked Providence Island with only 200 he must have received reinforcements later.
Exquemelin, however, claims that he had 500 men. If he only attacked Providence Island with 200, he must have received reinforcements afterward.
Footnote 252: (return)Duro, op. cit., v. p. 167; S.P. Spain, vol. 49, f. 50. The accounts that have come down to us of this expedition are obscure and contradictory. Modyford writes of the exploit merely that "they landed 600 men at Cape Blanco, in the kingdom of Veragua, and marched 90 miles into that country to surprise its chief city, Cartago; but understanding that the inhabitants had carried away their wealth, returned to their ships without being challenged." (C.S.P. Colon., 1661-68, No. 1213.) According to Exquemelin the original goal of the buccaneers was the town of Nata, north of Panama. The Spanish accounts make the numbers of the invaders much greater, from 800 to 1200.
Duro, op. cit., v. p. 167; S.P. Spain, vol. 49, f. 50. The information we have about this expedition is unclear and inconsistent. Modyford simply notes that "they landed 600 men at Cape Blanco, in the kingdom of Veragua, and marched 90 miles into the country to surprise its main city, Cartago; but upon realizing that the inhabitants had taken their riches, they returned to their ships without facing any opposition." (C.S.P. Colon., 1661-68, No. 1213.) According to Exquemelin, the buccaneers originally aimed for the town of Nata, north of Panama. The Spanish accounts indicate that the number of invaders was much larger, ranging from 800 to 1200.
Footnote 254: (return)Ibid., Nos. 1309, 1349. The capture of Providence Island was Mansfield's last exploit. According to a deposition found among the Colonial papers, he and his ship were later captured by the Spaniards and carried to Havana where the old buccaneer was put in irons and soon after executed. (Ibid., No. 1827.) Exquemelin says that Mansfield, having been refused sufficient aid by Modyford for the defence of Providence, went to seek assistance at Tortuga, when "death suddenly surprised him and put a period to his wicked life."
Ibid., Nos. 1309, 1349. The takeover of Providence Island was Mansfield's last act. According to a statement in the Colonial papers, he and his ship were later captured by the Spanish and taken to Havana, where the old buccaneer was imprisoned and soon executed. (Ibid., No. 1827.) Exquemelin notes that Mansfield, after not receiving enough support from Modyford for the defense of Providence, went to seek help in Tortuga, when "death suddenly caught up with him and ended his wicked life."
Footnote 255: (return)Exquemelin refers to a voyage of Henry Morgan to Campeache at about this time, and says that he afterwards accompanied Mansfield as his "vice-admiral." There were at least three Morgans then in the West Indies, but Colonel Edward and Lieutenant-Colonel Thomas were at this time doubtless busy preparing the armament against Curaçao.
Exquemelin talks about a trip that Henry Morgan took to Campeache around this time and notes that he later went with Mansfield as his "vice-admiral." There were at least three Morgans in the West Indies back then, but Colonel Edward and Lieutenant-Colonel Thomas were probably busy preparing the armament for Curaçao.
Footnote 256: (return)"Villa de Mosa is a small Town standing on the Starboard side of the River ... inhabited chiefly by Indians, with some Spaniards.... Thus far Ships come to bring Goods, especially European Commodities.... They arrive here in November or December, and stay till June or July, selling their Commodities, and then load chiefly with Cacao and some Sylvester. All the Merchants and petty Traders of the country Towns come thither about Christmas to Traffick, which makes this Town the chiefest in all these Parts, Campeache excepted."—Dampier, ed. 1906, ii. p. 206. The town was twelve leagues from the river's mouth.
"Villa de Mosa is a small town on the right bank of the river, mostly populated by Indigenous people, along with some Spaniards. Ships come here to deliver goods, particularly European products. They arrive in November or December and stay until June or July, selling their merchandise, and then mainly load up with cacao and some Sylvester. All the merchants and small traders from nearby towns come here around Christmas to trade, making this town the most important in the area, except for Campeache."—Dampier, ed. 1906, ii. p. 206. The town was twelve leagues from the river's mouth.
Footnote 257: (return)C.S.P. Colon., 1661-68, No. 1142; Beeston's Journal, 20th August 1665. The viceroy of New Spain, in a letter of 28th March 1665, reports the coming, in February, of 150 English in three ships to Tabasco, but gives the name of the plundered town as Santa Marta de la Vitoria. According to his story, the buccaneers seized royal treasure amounting to 50,000 pieces of eight, besides ammunition and slaves. (S.P. Spain, vol. 49, f. 122.)
C.S.P. Colon., 1661-68, No. 1142; Beeston's Journal, August 20, 1665. The viceroy of New Spain, in a letter dated March 28, 1665, reports that in February, 150 English arrived in three ships at Tabasco, but he refers to the plundered town as Santa Marta de la Vitoria. According to his account, the buccaneers seized royal treasure amounting to 50,000 pieces of eight, along with ammunition and slaves. (S.P. Spain, vol. 49, f. 122.)
Footnote 258: (return)C.S.P. Colon., 1661-68, Nos. 1826, 1827, 1851; Exquemelin, ed. 1684, Part II. pp. 65-74.
C.S.P. Colon., 1661-68, Nos. 1826, 1827, 1851; Exquemelin, ed. 1684, Part II. pp. 65-74.
Footnote 259: (return)S.P. Spain, vols. 46-49. Correspondence of Sir Richard Fanshaw.
S.P. Spain, vol. 46-49. Correspondence of Sir Richard Fanshaw.
Footnote 262: (return)Ibid., vol. 52, f. 138; Record Office, Treaties, etc., 466.
Same source, vol. 52, p. 138; Record Office, Treaties, etc., 466.
Footnote 266: (return)Ibid., No. 1264.
Ibid., No. 1264.
There was probably some disagreement in the Council in England over the policy to be pursued toward the buccaneers. On 21st August 1666 Modyford wrote to Albemarle: "Sir James Modyford will present his Grace with a copy of some orders made at Oxford, in behalf of some Spaniards, with Lord Arlington's letter thereon; in which are such strong inculcations of continuing friendship with the Spaniards here, that he doubts he shall be highly discanted on by some persons for granting commissions against them; must beg his Grace to bring him off, or at least that the necessity of this proceeding may be taken into serious debate and then doubts not but true English judges will confirm what he has done." On the other hand he writes to Arlington on 30th July 1667: "Had my abilities suited so well with my wishes as the latter did with your Lordship's, the privateers' attempts had been only practised on the Dutch and French, and the Spaniards free of them, but I had no money to pay them nor frigates to force them; the former they could not get from our declared enemies, nothing could they expect but blows from them, and (as they have often repeated to me) will that pay for new sails and rigging?... (but) will, suitable to your Lordship's directions, as far as I am able, restrain them from further acts of violence towards the Spaniards, unless provoked by new insolences." Yet in the following December the governor tells Albemarle that he has not altered his posture, nor does he intend until further orders. It seems clear that Arlington and Albemarle represented two opposite sets of opinion in the Council.
There was likely some disagreement in the Council in England about how to deal with the buccaneers. On August 21, 1666, Modyford wrote to Albemarle: "Sir James Modyford will provide His Grace with a copy of some orders made at Oxford on behalf of certain Spaniards, along with Lord Arlington's letter regarding this matter; in which there are strong recommendations for maintaining good relations with the Spaniards here, raising his concern that he might be heavily criticized by some for granting commissions against them; he must ask His Grace for support, or at least that the necessity of this action be thoroughly discussed, and he is confident that fair English judges will uphold what he has done." Conversely, he wrote to Arlington on July 30, 1667: "If my abilities had aligned with my desires like the latter aligns with your Lordship's, the privateers would have only targeted the Dutch and French, leaving the Spaniards alone; however, I had no money to pay them or frigates to pressure them; they could not obtain the former from our declared enemies, all they could expect from them was violence, and (as they have often told me) will that cover the costs for new sails and rigging?... (but) I will, following your Lordship's instructions, do my best to restrain them from further violence towards the Spaniards unless provoked by new offenses." Yet in the following December, the governor informs Albemarle that he has not changed his position and does not intend to until he receives further orders. It appears that Arlington and Albemarle represented two opposing viewpoints in the Council.
Footnote 267: (return)On 21st December 1671, Morgan in a deposition before the Council of Jamaica gave his age as thirty-six years. (C.S.P. Colon., 1669-74, No. 705.)
On December 21, 1671, Morgan testified in a deposition before the Council of Jamaica that he was thirty-six years old. (C.S.P. Colon., 1669-74, No. 705.)
Footnote 268: (return)C.S.P. Colon., 1661-68, No. 1838; Exquemelin, ed. 1684, Part II., pp. 79-88. According to Exquemelin the first design of the freebooters had been to cross the island of Cuba in its narrowest part and fall upon Havana. But on receiving advice that the governor had taken measures to defend and provision the city, they changed their minds and marched to Puerto Principe.
C.S.P. Colon., 1661-68, No. 1838; Exquemelin, ed. 1684, Part II., pp. 79-88. According to Exquemelin, the pirates initially planned to cross through the narrowest part of Cuba and attack Havana. However, after finding out that the governor had taken measures to defend and supply the city, they changed their plans and set off for Puerto Principe.
Footnote 269: (return)The city of Porto Bello with its large commodious harbour afforded a good anchorage and shelter for the annual treasure galleons. The narrow entrance was secured by the two forts mentioned in the narrative, the St. Jago on the left entering the harbour, and the San Felipe on the right; and within the port was a third called the San Miguel. The town lay at the bottom of the harbour bending round the shore like a half-moon. It was built on low swampy ground and had no walls or defences on the land side. (Cf. the descriptions of Wafer and Gage.) The garrison at this time probably did not exceed 300 men.
The city of Porto Bello, with its large and spacious harbor, offered a good anchorage and protection for the annual treasure ships. The narrow entrance was defended by the two forts mentioned in the story: St. Jago on the left as you enter the harbor and San Felipe on the right; inside the port was a third fort called San Miguel. The town was located at the base of the harbor, curving around the shore like a half-moon. It was built on low, swampy land and had no walls or defenses on the land side. (Cf. the descriptions by Wafer and Gage.) At that time, the garrison likely did not exceed 300 men.
Footnote 270: (return)This statement is confirmed by one of the captains serving under Morgan, who in his account of the expedition says: "After remaining some days ... sickness broke out among the troops, of which we lost half by sickness and fighting." (C.S.P. Colon., 1669-74, No. 1.) And in "The Present State of Jamaica, 1683," we read that Morgan brought to the island the plague "that killed my Lady Modyford and others."
This claim is supported by one of the captains working for Morgan, who reported on the expedition and said: "After staying for several days ... sickness spread among the troops, causing us to lose half due to illness and fighting." (C.S.P. Colon., 1669-74, No. 1.) Additionally, "The Present State of Jamaica, 1683," notes that Morgan brought the plague to the island "that killed my Lady Modyford and others."
Footnote 271: (return)Morgan reported, however, that the ransom was offered and paid by the President of Panama. (C.S.P. Colon., 1661-68, No. 1838.)
However, Morgan stated that the ransom was put forward and paid by the President of Panama. (C.S.P. Colon., 1661-68, No. 1838.)
Footnote 272: (return)Exquemelin, ed. 1684, Part II. pp. 89-103.
Exquemelin, ed. 1684, Part II. pp. 89-103.
The cruelties of the buccaneers at Porto Bello are confirmed by a letter from John Style to the Secretary of State, complaining of the disorder and injustice reigning in Jamaica. He writes: "It is a common thing among the privateers, besides burning with matches and such like slight torments, to cut a man in pieces, first some flesh, then a hand, an arm, a leg, sometimes tying a cord about his head and with a stick twisting it till the eyes shot out, which is called 'woolding.' Before taking Puerto Bello, thus some were used, because they refused to discover a way into the town which was not, and many in the town because they would not discover wealth they knew not of. A woman there was by some set bare upon a baking stone and roasted because she did not confess of money which she had only in their conceit; this he heard some declare with boasting, and one that was sick confess with sorrow." (C.S.P. Colon., 1669-74, No. 138.)
The violent actions of the buccaneers at Porto Bello are highlighted in a letter from John Style to the Secretary of State, in which he complains about the disorder and injustice in Jamaica. He writes: "It's common among the privateers, besides using matches and other minor tortures to burn people, to cut a person into pieces—first some flesh, then a hand, an arm, a leg—sometimes tying a cord around a person's head and using a stick to twist it until the eyes pop out, which is referred to as 'woolding.' Before taking Puerto Bello, some were subjected to this treatment because they wouldn’t reveal a nonexistent way into the town, and many in the town suffered because they wouldn’t share information about wealth they knew nothing about. There was a woman who was stripped and put on a hot baking stone and roasted because she wouldn’t admit to having money that only existed in their imagination; this is something he heard others brag about, and one sick individual confessed it with regret." (C.S.P. Colon., 1669-74, No. 138.)
Modyford writes concerning the booty got at Porto Bello, that the business cleared each privateer £60, and "to himself they gave only £20 for their commission, which never exceeded £300." (C.S.P. Colon., 1669-74, No. 103.) But it is very probable that the buccaneers did not return a full account of the booty to the governor, for it was a common complaint that they plundered their prizes and hid the spoil in holes and creeks along the coast so as to cheat the government of its tenths and fifteenths levied on all condemned prize-goods.
Modyford writes about the loot obtained at Porto Bello, stating that each privateer made £60, and "they only gave him £20 for their commission, which never exceeded £300." (C.S.P. Colon., 1669-74, No. 103.) However, it’s likely that the buccaneers didn’t report the full amount of the loot to the governor, as it was a common complaint that they plundered their prizes and hid the treasure in holes and creeks along the coast to avoid paying the government’s tenth and fifteenth on all seized prize goods.
Footnote 274: (return)C.S.P. Colon., 1661-68, Nos. 1863, 1867, 1892.
C.S.P. Colon., 1661-68, Nos. 1863, 1867, 1892.
Footnote 275: (return)Ibid., No. 1867; Beeston's Journal, 15th October 1668.
Ibid., No. 1867; Beeston's Journal, October 15, 1668.
Footnote 276: (return)Ibid., C.S.P. Colon., 1674-76, Addenda, No. 1207.
Same source., C.S.P. Colon., 1674-76, Addenda, No. 1207.
Footnote 277: (return)Exquemelin gives a French version of the episode, according to which the commander of the "Cour Volant" had given bills of exchange upon Jamaica and Tortuga for the provisions he had taken out of the English ship; but Morgan, because he could not prevail on the French captain to join his proposed expedition, used this merely as a pretext to seize the ship for piracy. The "Cour Volant," turned into a privateer and called the "Satisfaction," was used by Morgan as his flagship in the expedition against Panama.
Exquemelin offers a French perspective on the incident, stating that the commander of the "Cour Volant" had issued bills of exchange for provisions taken from the English ship in Jamaica and Tortuga. However, since Morgan couldn't convince the French captain to join his planned expedition, he used this as an excuse to seize the ship for piracy. The "Cour Volant," rebranded as a privateer and renamed "Satisfaction," became Morgan's flagship for the expedition against Panama.
Footnote 278: (return)According to Exquemelin the booty amounted to 250,000 crowns in money and jewels, besides merchandise and slaves. Modyford, however, wrote that the buccaneers received only £30 per man.
Exquemelin reported that the treasure was valued at 250,000 crowns in cash and jewels, plus additional goods and slaves. However, Modyford claimed that the buccaneers only received £30 each.
Footnote 279: (return)C.S.P. Colon., 1669-74, No. 1; S.P. Spain, vol. 54, f. 118; vol. 55, f. 177.
C.S.P. Colon., 1669-74, No. 1; S.P. Spain, vol. 54, f. 118; vol. 55, f. 177.
Footnote 282: (return)Ibid., No. 149.
Same source, No. 149.
In 1666 the Consejo de Almirantazgo of Flanders had offered the government to send its frigates to the Indies to pursue and punish the buccaneers, and protect the coasts of Spanish America; and in 1669 similar proposals were made by the "armadores" or owners of corsairing vessels in the seaport towns of Biscay. Both offers were refused, however, because the government feared that such privileges would lead to commercial abuses infringing on the monopoly of the Seville merchants. Duro, op. cit., V. p. 169.
In 1666, the Council of Admiralty of Flanders proposed sending its frigates to the Indies to hunt down and punish the buccaneers and to protect the coastlines of Spanish America. In 1669, similar suggestions came from the "armadores," or owners of privateer vessels, in the coastal towns of Biscay. However, both proposals were rejected because the government was concerned that allowing such privileges would lead to commercial abuses that would undermine the monopoly of the Seville merchants. Duro, op. cit., V. p. 169.
Footnote 283: (return)C.S.P. Colon., 1669-74, Nos. 113, 161, 162, 172, 182, 264, 280.
C.S.P. Colon., 1669-74, Nos. 113, 161, 162, 172, 182, 264, 280.
Footnote 285: (return)C.S.P. Colon., 1669-74, Nos. 207, 209-212, 226.
C.S.P. Colon., 1669-74, Nos. 207, 209-212, 226.
Footnote 288: (return)C.S.P. Colon., 1669-74; Nos. 310, 359, 504; Exquemelin, ed. 1684, Pt. III. pp. 3-7; Add. MSS., 13,964, f. 24.
C.S.P. Colon., 1669-74; Nos. 310, 359, 504; Exquemelin, ed. 1684, Pt. III. pp. 3-7; Add. MSS., 13,964, f. 24.
Footnote 291: (return)C.S.P. Colon., 1669-74, Nos. 293, 310; Add. MSS., 13,964, f. 26. The Spaniards estimated their loss at 100,000 pieces of eight. (Add. MSS. 11,268, f. 51.)
C.S.P. Colon., 1669-74, Nos. 293, 310; Add. MSS., 13,964, f. 26. The Spaniards estimated their loss at 100,000 pieces of eight. (Add. MSS. 11,268, f. 51.)
Footnote 292: (return)C.S.P. Colon., 1669-74, Nos. 310, 359, 504. In a report sent by Governor Modyford to England (ibid., No. 704, I.) we find a list of the vessels under command of Henry Morgan, with the name, captain, tonnage, guns and crew of each ship. There were twenty-eight English vessels of from 10 to 140 tons and from zero to 20 guns, carrying from 16 to 140 men; the French vessels were eight in number, of from 25 to 100 tons, with from 2 to 14 guns, and carrying from 30 to 110 men.
C.S.P. Colon., 1669-74, Nos. 310, 359, 504. In a report sent by Governor Modyford to England (ibid., No. 704, I.), there is a list of the ships commanded by Henry Morgan, detailing the name, captain, size, number of guns, and crew for each ship. There were twenty-eight English vessels ranging from 10 to 140 tons, carrying between zero and 20 guns, and with crew sizes between 16 and 140 members; the French had eight vessels, sized from 25 to 100 tons, equipped with 2 to 14 guns, and carrying between 30 and 110 men.
Footnote 293: (return)Ibid., No. 504. According to Exquemelin, before the fleet sailed all the officers signed articles regulating the disposal of the booty. It was stipulated that Admiral Morgan should have the hundredth part of all the plunder, "that every captain should draw the shares of eight men, for the expenses of his ship, besides his own; that the surgeon besides his ordinary pay should have two hundred pieces of eight, for his chest of medicaments; and every carpenter above his ordinary salary, should draw one hundred pieces of eight. As to recompenses and rewards they were regulated in this voyage much higher than was expressed in the first part of this book. For the loss of both legs they assigned one thousand five hundred pieces of eight or fifteen slaves, the choice being left to the election of the party; for the loss of both hands, one thousand eight hundred pieces of eight or eighteen slaves; for one leg, whether the right or left, six hundred pieces of eight or six slaves; for a hand as much as for a leg, and for the loss of an eye, one hundred pieces of eight or one slave. Lastly, unto him that in any battle should signalize himself, either by entering the first any castle, or taking down the Spanish colours and setting up the English, they constituted fifty pieces of eight for a reward. In the head of these articles it was stipulated that all these extraordinary salaries, recompenses and rewards should be paid out of the first spoil or purchase they should take, according as every one should then occur to be either rewarded or paid."
Ibid., No. 504. According to Exquemelin, before the fleet set sail, all the officers signed agreements that detailed how the loot would be divided. They agreed that Admiral Morgan would receive one percent of all the plunder; each captain would receive shares equivalent to eight men for the expenses of his ship, in addition to his own share; the surgeon would receive two hundred pieces of eight for his medical supplies, in addition to his regular pay; and every carpenter would get one hundred pieces of eight beyond his normal salary. The bonuses and rewards for this voyage were much higher than what was outlined in the first part of this book. For losing both legs, the compensation was set at one thousand five hundred pieces of eight or fifteen slaves, with the individual choosing between the two; for losing both hands, it was one thousand eight hundred pieces of eight or eighteen slaves; for losing one leg, whether right or left, it was six hundred pieces of eight or six slaves; for losing a hand, the amount was the same as for a leg, and for losing an eye, it was one hundred pieces of eight or one slave. Lastly, anyone who distinguished themselves in battle by being the first to enter a castle or by taking down the Spanish flag and raising the English flag would receive fifty pieces of eight as a reward. At the top of these agreements, it was stated that all these additional payments, bonuses, and rewards would be taken from the first loot or spoils they collected, as each individual was rewarded or paid."
Footnote 294: (return)Sir James Modyford, who, after the capture of Providence by Mansfield in 1666, had been commissioned by the king as lieutenant-governor of the island, now bestirred himself, and in May 1671 appointed Colonel Blodre Morgan (who commanded the rear-guard at the battle of Panama) to go as deputy-governor and take possession. Modyford himself intended to follow with some settlers shortly after, but the attempt at colonization seems to have failed. (C.S.P. Colon., 1669-74, Nos. 494, 534, 613.)
Sir James Modyford, who was appointed by the king as lieutenant-governor of the island after Mansfield captured Providence in 1666, took action and in May 1671 appointed Colonel Blodre Morgan (who led the rear guard at the battle of Panama) as deputy-governor to take charge. Modyford intended to follow with some settlers soon after, but the colonization effort seems to have been unsuccessful. (C.S.P. Colon., 1669-74, Nos. 494, 534, 613.)
Footnote 295: (return)Add. MSS., 11,268, f. 51 ff.; ibid., 13,964, f. 24-25.
Added manuscripts, 11,268, f. 51 ff.; ibid., 13,964, f. 24-25.
Footnote 296: (return)Ibid., 11,268, f. 51 ff.; S.P. Spain, vol. 58, f. 156.
Same source, 11,268, f. 51 and following; S.P. Spain, vol. 58, f. 156.
Footnote 297: (return)Exquemelin, ed. 1684, Part III. pp. 23-27.
Exquemelin, ed. 1684, Part III, pp. 23-27.
Footnote 298: (return)C.S.P. Colon., 1669-74, No. 504. Exquemelin says that there were 1200 men, five boats with artillery and thirty-two canoes.
C.S.P. Colon., 1669-74, No. 504. Exquemelin reports that there were 1,200 men, five boats equipped with cannons, and thirty-two canoes.
Footnote 299: (return)Morgan's report makes it 200 men. (C.S.P. Colon., 1669-74, No. 504.)
Morgan's report indicates there are 200 men. (C.S.P. Colon., 1669-74, No. 504.)
Footnote 300: (return)Morgan says: "The enemy had basely quitted the first entrenchment and set all on fire, as they did all the rest, without striking a stroke." The President of Panama also writes that the garrisons up the river, on receiving news of the fall of Chagre, were in a panic, the commanders forsaking their posts and retiring in all haste to Venta Cruz. (C.S.P. Colon., 1669-74, No. 547.)
Morgan states: "The enemy cowardly fled from the first fortification and set everything ablaze, just like they did before, without even putting up a fight." The President of Panama also mentions that the troops up the river, upon hearing about the fall of Chagre, went into a panic, with the commanders abandoning their posts and quickly retreating to Venta Cruz. (C.S.P. Colon., 1669-74, No. 547.)
Footnote 301: (return)Exquemelin makes the buccaneers arrive at Venta Cruz on the seventh day. According to Morgan they reached the village on the sixth day, and according to Frogge on the fifth. Morgan reports that two miles from Venta Cruz there was "a very narrow and dangerous passage where the enemy thought to put a stop to our further proceeding but were presently routed by the Forlorn commanded by Capt. Thomas Rogers."
Exquemelin states that the buccaneers reached Venta Cruz on the seventh day. Morgan reports they arrived at the village on the sixth day, while Frogge asserts it was the fifth. Morgan mentions that two miles from Venta Cruz, there was "a very narrow and dangerous passage where the enemy thought they could stop us, but they were quickly pushed back by the Forlorn led by Capt. Thomas Rogers."
Footnote 302: (return)Frogge says that after leaving Venta Cruz they came upon an ambuscade of 1000 Indians, but put them to flight with the loss of only one killed and two wounded, the Indians losing their chief and about thirty men. (S.P. Spain, vol. 58, f. 118.) Morgan reports three killed and six or seven wounded.
Frogge mentions that after departing from Venta Cruz, they were ambushed by 1,000 Indians but were able to fend them off, resulting in only one person killed and two injured, whereas the Indians lost their chief and about thirty men. (S.P. Spain, vol. 58, f. 118.) Morgan notes that there were three fatalities and six or seven injuries.
Footnote 303: (return)"Next morning drew up his men in the form of a tertia, the vanguard led by Lieutenant-Colonel Lawrence Prince and Major John Morris, in number 300, the main body 600, the right wing led by himself, the left by Colonel Edw. Collyer, the rearguard of 300 commanded by Colonel Bledry Morgan."—Morgan's Report. (C.S.P. Colon., 1669-74, No. 504.)
“The next morning, he organized his troops into three divisions: the vanguard led by Lieutenant-Colonel Lawrence Prince and Major John Morris, with a total of 300 men; the main body made up of 600; the right wing under his command; the left wing led by Colonel Edw. Collyer; and the rearguard of 300 commanded by Colonel Bledry Morgan.” — Morgan's Report. (C.S.P. Colon., 1669-74, No. 504.)
Footnote 304: (return)The close agreement between the accounts of the battle given by Morgan and Exquemelin is remarkable, and leads us to give much greater credence to those details in Exquemelin's narrative of the expedition which were omitted from the official report. Morgan says of the battle that as the Spaniards had the advantage of position and refused to move, the buccaneers made a flanking movement to the left and secured a hill protected on one side by a bog. Thereupon "One Francesco de Harro charged with the horse upon the vanguard so furiously that he could not be stopped till he lost his life; upon which the horse wheeled off, and the foot advanced, but met with such a warm welcome and were pursued so close that the enemies' retreat came to plain running, though they did work such a stratagem as has been seldom heard of, viz.:—attempting to drive two droves of 1500 cattle into their rear." (C.S.P. Colon., 1669-74, No. 504.)
The striking similarities between Morgan's and Exquemelin's accounts of the battle make us trust Exquemelin's details about the expedition that were omitted from the official report. Morgan notes that during the battle, with the Spaniards having the advantage and refusing to move, the buccaneers executed a flanking maneuver to the left and took a hill that was protected on one side by a swamp. Then, "One Francesco de Harro charged with the horse upon the vanguard so furiously that he could not be stopped until he lost his life; after which the horse turned away, and the foot advanced, but encountered such a fierce reception and were pursued so closely that the enemies' retreat turned into a full run, even though they used a tactic that is rarely heard of: trying to drive two herds of 1500 cattle into their rear." (C.S.P. Colon., 1669-74, No. 504.)
Footnote 305: (return)Morgan gives the number of Spaniards at 2100 foot and 600 horse, and Frogge reports substantially the same figures. The President of Panama, however, in his letter to the Queen, writes that he had but 1200 men, mostly negroes, mulattos and Indians, besides 200 slaves of the Assiento. His followers, he continues, were armed only with arquebuses and fowling-pieces, and his artillery consisted of three wooden guns bound with hide.
Morgan notes there were 2,100 foot soldiers and 600 cavalry, and Frogge reports almost the same numbers. However, the President of Panama, in his letter to the Queen, states he only had 1,200 men, primarily black individuals, mixed-race people, and Indigenous people, along with 200 slaves from the Assiento. He also mentions that his men were only armed with arquebuses and shotguns, and his artillery included three wooden cannons covered in hide.
Footnote 306: (return)According to Frogge the Spaniards lost 500 men in the battle, the buccaneers but one Frenchman. Morgan says that the whole day's work only cost him five men killed and ten wounded, and that the loss of the enemy was about 400.
Frogge states that the Spanish lost 500 soldiers in the battle, whereas the buccaneers lost only one Frenchman. Morgan asserts that throughout the day's fighting, he only lost five men killed and ten wounded, while the enemy's casualties were about 400.
Footnote 307: (return)"In the city they had 200 fresh men, two forts, all the streets barricaded and great guns in every street, which in all amounted to thirty-two brass guns, but instead of fighting commanded it to be fired, and blew up the chief fort, which was done in such haste that forty of their own soldiers were blown up. In the market-place some resistance was made, but at three o'clock they had quiet possession of the city...."—Morgan's Report.
"In the city, they had 200 fresh troops, two forts, all the streets blocked, and heavy artillery on every street, with a total of thirty-two brass cannons. Instead of engaging in combat, they ordered the cannons to be fired, destroying the main fort. This happened so quickly that forty of their own soldiers died in the explosion. Some resistance was shown in the market square, but by three o'clock, they had complete control of the city..."—Morgan's Report.
Footnote 310: (return)After the destruction of Panama in 1671, the old city was deserted by the Spaniards, and the present town raised on a site several miles to the westward, where there was a better anchorage and landing facilities.
After Panama was destroyed in 1671, the Spaniards abandoned the old city, and the current town was established several miles to the west, where there were better anchorage and landing facilities.
Footnote 311: (return)The incident of Morgan and the Spanish lady I have omitted because it is so contrary to the testimony of Richard Browne (who if anything was prejudiced against Morgan) that "as to their women, I know or ever heard of anything offered beyond their wills; something I know was cruelly executed by Captain Collier in killing a friar in the field after quarter given; but for the Admiral he was noble enough to the vanquished enemy." (C.S.P. Colon., 1669-74, No. 608.)
The incident between Morgan and the Spanish woman was omitted because it contradicts Richard Browne's testimony, which was somewhat biased against Morgan. He said, "Regarding their women, I have no knowledge or have ever heard of anything being done against their will; I do know that something cruel was carried out by Captain Collier when he killed a friar in the field after giving quarter; but the Admiral acted honorably toward the defeated enemy." (C.S.P. Colon., 1669-74, No. 608.)
Footnote 312: (return)The President had retired north to Nata de los Santos, and thence sent couriers with an account of what had happened over Darien to Cartagena, whence the news was forwarded by express boat to Spain. (S.P. Spain, vol. 58, f. 156). That the president made efforts to raise men to oppose the retreat of the buccaneers, but received no support from the inhabitants, is proved by Spanish documents in Add. MSS., 11,268, ff. 33, 37, etc.
The President moved north to Nata de los Santos and then sent messengers with a report about what happened in Darien to Cartagena, from where the news was sent by express boat to Spain. (S.P. Spain, vol. 58, f. 156). Spanish documents in Add. MSS., 11,268, ff. 33, 37, etc. confirm that the president attempted to rally people to resist the buccaneers’ retreat but received no support from the locals.
Footnote 313: (return)The President of Panama in his account contained in Add. MSS. 11,268, gives the date as 25th February. Morgan, however, says that they began the march for Venta Cruz on 14th February; but this discrepancy may be due to a confusion of the old and new style of dating.
The President of Panama, in his account found in Add. MSS. 11,268, lists the date as February 25th. However, Morgan mentions that they began the march to Venta Cruz on February 14th; this discrepancy could be due to confusion between the old and new dating systems.
Footnote 314: (return)The buccaneers arrived at Chagre on 26th February.—Morgan's account.
The pirates reached Chagre on February 26th.—Morgan's account.
Footnote 315: (return)Exquemelin, ed. 1684, Part III. pp. 31-76.
Exquemelin, ed. 1684, Part III, pp. 31-76.
Footnote 316: (return)C.S.P. Colon., 1669-74, No. 608. Wm. Frogge, too, says that the share of each man was only £10.
C.S.P. Colon., 1669-74, No. 608. Wm. Frogge also notes that each person's share was just £10.
Footnote 320: (return)S.P. Spain, vol. 57, f. 76; vol. 58, f. 27.
S.P. Spain, vol. 57, f. 76; vol. 58, f. 27.
Footnote 321: (return)C.S.P. Colon., 1669-74, Nos. 513, 531, 532, 544; Beeston's journal.
C.S.P. Colon., 1669-74, Nos. 513, 531, 532, 544; Beeston's journal.
Footnote 323: (return)Cf. Memorial of the Conde de Molina complaining that a new governor had not been sent to Jamaica, as promised, nor the old governor recalled, 26th Feb. 1671 (S.P. Spain, vol. 58, f. 62).
See also. Memorial from the Conde de Molina expressing concerns that a new governor had not been sent to Jamaica as promised, and that the previous governor had not been recalled, dated February 26, 1671 (S.P. Spain, vol. 58, f. 62).
Footnote 327: (return)Ibid., Nos. 405, 441, 452, 453, 552, 587.
Same source., Nos. 405, 441, 452, 453, 552, 587.
CHAPTER VI
THE GOVERNMENT SUPPRESSES THE BUCCANEERS
The new Lieutenant-Governor of Jamaica, Sir Thomas Lynch, brought with him instructions to publish and carefully observe the articles of 1670 with Spain, and at the same time to revoke all commissions issued by his predecessor "to the prejudice of the King of Spain or any of his subjects." When he proclaimed the peace he was likewise to publish a general pardon to privateers who came in and submitted within a reasonable time, of all offences committed since June 1660, assuring to them the possession of their prize-goods (except the tenths and the fifteenths which were always reserved to the crown as a condition of granting commissions), and offering them inducements to take up planting, trade, or service in the royal navy. But he was not to insist positively on the payment of the tenths and fifteenths if it discouraged their submission; and if this course failed to bring in the rovers, he was to use every means in his power "by force or persuasion" to make them submit.332 Lynch immediately set about to secure the good-will of his Spanish neighbours and to win back the privateers to more peaceful pursuits. Major Beeston was sent to Cartagena with the articles of peace, where he was given every satisfaction and secured the release of thirty-two English prisoners.333 On the 15th August the proclamation of pardon to privateers was issued at Port Royal;334 and those {201} who had railed against their commanders for cheating them at Panama, were given an opportunity of resorting to the law-courts.335 Similar proclamations were sent by the governor "to all their haunts," intimating that he had written to Bermuda, the Caribbees, New England, New York and Virginia for their apprehension, had sent notices to all Spanish ports declaring them pirates, and intended to send to Tortuga to prevent their reception there.336 However, although the governor wrote home in the latter part of the month that the privateers were entirely suppressed, he soon found that the task was by no means a simple one. Two buccaneers with a commission from Modyford, an Englishman named Thurston and a mulatto named Diego, flouted his offer of pardon, continued to prey upon Spanish shipping, and carried their prizes to Tortuga.337 A Dutchman named Captain Yallahs (or Yellowes) fled to Campeache, sold his frigate for 7000 pieces of eight to the Spanish governor, and entered into Spanish service to cruise against the English logwood-cutters. The Governor of Jamaica sent Captain Wilgress in pursuit, but Wilgress devoted his time to chasing a Spanish vessel ashore, stealing logwood and burning Spanish houses on the coast.338 A party of buccaneers, English and French, landed upon the north side of Cuba and burnt two towns, carrying away women and inflicting many cruelties on the inhabitants; and when the governors of Havana and St. Jago complained to Lynch, the latter could only disavow the English in the marauding party as rebels and pirates, and {202} bid the Spanish governors hang all who fell into their power.339 The governor, in fact, was having his hands full, and wrote in January 1672 that "this cursed trade has been so long followed, and there is so many of it, that like weeds or hydras, they spring up as fast as we can cut them down."340
The new Lieutenant-Governor of Jamaica, Sir Thomas Lynch, arrived with instructions to publish and strictly enforce the articles from 1670 with Spain. He was also to revoke all commissions issued by his predecessor that harmed the King of Spain or his subjects. When he announced the peace, he was to issue a general pardon to privateers who came forward and submitted within a reasonable timeframe for all offenses committed since June 1660. They would be assured the return of their prize goods (except the tenths and fifteenths, which were always reserved for the crown as a condition of granting commissions) and offered incentives to engage in farming, trade, or service in the royal navy. However, he was not to insist too firmly on the payment of the tenths and fifteenths if it discouraged their surrender. If this approach did not bring in the privateers, he was to use every means possible, “by force or persuasion,” to make them submit.332 Lynch quickly took steps to gain the goodwill of his Spanish neighbors and to encourage privateers to pursue more peaceful activities. Major Beeston was sent to Cartagena with the articles of peace, where he received a warm welcome and secured the release of thirty-two English prisoners.333 On August 15, the proclamation of pardon for privateers was issued at Port Royal;334 and those who had complained about their commanders cheating them at Panama were given the chance to go to court.335 Similar proclamations were sent by the governor “to all their hideouts,” letting them know that he had written to Bermuda, the Caribbees, New England, New York, and Virginia about their capture, sent notices to all Spanish ports declaring them pirates, and planned to reach out to Tortuga to prevent their reception there.336 However, although the governor wrote home later that month stating that the privateers were completely subdued, he soon realized that it was not a straightforward task. Two buccaneers with a commission from Modyford, an Englishman named Thurston and a mulatto named Diego, disregarded his offer of pardon, continued to attack Spanish shipping, and took their prizes to Tortuga.337 A Dutchman named Captain Yallahs (or Yellowes) fled to Campeache, sold his frigate for 7000 pieces of eight to the Spanish governor, and joined the Spanish service to raid English logwood-cutters. The Governor of Jamaica sent Captain Wilgress after him, but Wilgress spent his time pursuing a Spanish vessel ashore, stealing logwood, and burning Spanish houses along the coast.338 A group of English and French buccaneers landed on the north side of Cuba, burned two towns, took women captive, and committed many cruel acts against the inhabitants. When the governors of Havana and St. Jago complained to Lynch, he could only denounce the English in the marauding group as rebels and pirates, advising the Spanish governors to hang anyone they captured.339 The governor was clearly overwhelmed, and in January 1672, he wrote that “this cursed trade has been so long followed, and there are so many of them that like weeds or hydras, they spring up as fast as we can cut them down.”340
Some of the recalcitrant freebooters, however, were captured and brought to justice. Major Beeston, sent by the governor in January 1672, with a frigate and four smaller vessels, to seize and burn some pirate ships careening on the south cays of Cuba, fell in instead with two other vessels, one English and one French, which had taken part in the raids upon Cuba, and carried them to Jamaica. The French captain was offered to the Governor of St. Jago, but the latter refused to punish him for fear of his comrades in Tortuga and Hispaniola. Both captains were therefore tried and condemned to death at Port Royal. As the Spaniards, however, had refused to punish them, and as there was no reason why the Jamaicans should be the executioners, the captains of the port and some of the council begged for a reprieve, and the English prisoner, Francis Witherborn, was sent to England.341 Captain Johnson, one of the pirates after whom Beeston had originally been sent, was later in the year shipwrecked by a hurricane upon the coast of Jamaica. Johnson, immediately after the publication of the peace by Sir Thomas Lynch, had fled from Port Royal with about ten followers, and falling in with a Spanish ship of eighteen guns, had seized it and killed the captain and twelve or fourteen of the crew. Then gathering about him a party of a hundred or more, English and French, he had robbed Spanish vessels round Havana and the Cuban coast. {203} Finally, however, he grew weary of his French companions, and sailed for Jamaica to make terms with the governor, when on coming to anchor in Morant Bay he was blown ashore by the hurricane. The governor had him arrested, and gave a commission to Colonel Modyford, the son of Sir Thomas, to assemble the justices and proceed to trial and immediate execution. He adjured him, moreover, to see to it that the pirate was not acquitted. Colonel Modyford, nevertheless, sharing perhaps his father's sympathy with the sea-rovers, deferred the trial, acquainted none of the justices with his orders, and although Johnson and two of his men "confessed enough to hang a hundred honester persons," told the jury they could not find against the prisoner. Half an hour after the dismissal of the court, Johnson "came to drink with his judges." The baffled governor thereupon placed Johnson a second time under arrest, called a meeting of the council, from which he dismissed Colonel Modyford, and "finding material errors," reversed the judgment. The pirate was again tried—Lynch himself this time presiding over the court—and upon making a full confession, was condemned and executed, though "as much regretted," writes Lynch, "as if he had been as pious and as innocent as one of the primitive martyrs." The second trial was contrary to the fundamental principles of English law, howsoever guilty the culprit may have been, and the king sent a letter to Lynch reproving him for his rashness. He commanded the governor to try all pirates thereafter by maritime law, and if a disagreement arose to remit the case to the king for re-judgment. Nevertheless he ordered Lynch to suspend from all public employments in the island, whether civil or military, both Colonel Modyford and all others guilty with him of designedly acquitting Johnson.342
Some of the stubborn freebooters were captured and brought to justice. Major Beeston, sent by the governor in January 1672 with a frigate and four smaller ships to seize and destroy some pirate vessels stranded on the south cays of Cuba, instead encountered two other ships, one English and one French, that had participated in the raids on Cuba and took them to Jamaica. The French captain was offered to the Governor of St. Jago, but the governor declined to punish him out of fear of retribution from his fellow pirates in Tortuga and Hispaniola. Both captains were therefore tried and sentenced to death at Port Royal. However, since the Spaniards had refused to punish them, and there was no reason for the Jamaicans to carry out the executions, the port captain and some council members requested a reprieve, and the English prisoner, Francis Witherborn, was sent to England.341 Captain Johnson, one of the pirates for whom Beeston had originally been sent, was later shipwrecked by a hurricane off the coast of Jamaica that year. Johnson had fled Port Royal with about ten followers right after Sir Thomas Lynch announced the peace and had encountered a Spanish ship with eighteen guns, which he seized, killing the captain and twelve or fourteen crew members. Then, gathering a group of over a hundred English and French men, he had looted Spanish vessels around Havana and the Cuban coast. {203} Ultimately, he grew tired of his French companions and sailed for Jamaica to negotiate with the governor. However, upon anchoring in Morant Bay, he was blown ashore by the hurricane. The governor had him arrested and commissioned Colonel Modyford, the son of Sir Thomas, to gather the justices for a trial and immediate execution. He also urged him to ensure that the pirate was not acquitted. Nevertheless, Colonel Modyford, perhaps sharing his father's sympathy for the sea-rovers, postponed the trial, informed none of the justices of his orders, and although Johnson and two of his men "confessed enough to hang a hundred honester persons," told the jury they could not find against the prisoner. Half an hour after the court was dismissed, Johnson "came to drink with his judges." The frustrated governor then placed Johnson under arrest again, called a council meeting, dismissed Colonel Modyford, and "finding material errors," reversed the judgment. The pirate was tried again—this time with Lynch himself presiding—and after making a full confession, was condemned and executed, though "as much regretted," according to Lynch, "as if he had been as pious and innocent as one of the early martyrs." The second trial was contrary to the basic principles of English law, no matter how guilty the defendant may have been, and the king sent a letter to Lynch criticizing him for his rashness. He ordered the governor to try all pirates from then on by maritime law, and if any disagreements arose, to refer the case back to the king for re-judgment. Nonetheless, he instructed Lynch to suspend from all public duties in the island, whether civil or military, both Colonel Modyford and anyone else complicit in deliberately acquitting Johnson.342
The Spaniards in the West Indies, notwithstanding the {204} endeavours of Sir Thomas Lynch to clear their coasts of pirates, made little effort to co-operate with him. The governors of Cartagena and St. Jago de Cuba, pretending that they feared being punished for allowing trade, had forbidden English frigates to come into their ports, and refused them provisions and water; and the Governor of Campeache had detained money, plate and negroes taken out of an English trading-vessel, to the value of 12,000 pieces of eight. When Lynch sent to demand satisfaction, the governor referred him to Madrid for justice, "which to me that have been there," writes Lynch, "seems worse than the taking it away."343 The news also of the imposing armament, which the Spanish grandees made signs of preparing to send to the Indies on learning of the capture of Panama, was in November 1671 just beginning to filter into Jamaica; and the governor and council, fearing that the fleet was directed against them, made vigorous efforts, by repairing the forts, collecting stores and marshalling the militia, to put the island in a state of defence. The Spanish fleet never appeared, however, and life on the island soon subsided into its customary channels.344 Sir Thomas Lynch, meanwhile, was all the more careful to observe the peace with Spain and yet refrain from alienating the more troublesome elements of the population. It had been decided in England that Morgan, too, like Modyford, was to be sacrificed, formally at least, to the remonstrances of the Spanish Government; yet Lynch, because Morgan himself was ill, and fearing perhaps that two such {205} arrests might create a disturbance among the friends of the culprits, or at least deter the buccaneers from coming in under the declaration of amnesty, did not send the admiral to England until the following spring. On 6th April 1672 Morgan sailed from Jamaica a prisoner in the frigate "Welcome."345 He sailed, however, with the universal respect and sympathy of all parties in the colony. Lynch himself calls him "an honest, brave fellow," and Major James Banister in a letter to the Secretary of State recommends him to the esteem of Arlington as "a very well deserving person, and one of great courage and conduct, who may, with his Majesty's pleasure, perform good service at home, and be very advantageous to the island if war should break forth with the Spaniard."346
The Spaniards in the West Indies, despite Sir Thomas Lynch's efforts to rid their coasts of pirates, made little attempt to work with him. The governors of Cartagena and St. Jago de Cuba, claiming they feared punishment for allowing trade, banned English frigates from their ports and denied them food and water. Meanwhile, the Governor of Campeache had seized money, silver, and enslaved people taken from an English trading vessel, valued at 12,000 pieces of eight. When Lynch demanded compensation, the governor told him to seek justice in Madrid, which, as Lynch noted, “seems worse than the taking it away.” The news of the large naval force that the Spanish nobles were preparing to send to the Indies after the capture of Panama was just starting to reach Jamaica in November 1671; fearing the fleet was intended for them, the governor and council took strong measures by repairing forts, gathering supplies, and organizing the militia to defend the island. However, the Spanish fleet never showed up, and life on the island soon resumed its usual routine. Meanwhile, Sir Thomas Lynch was extra cautious to maintain peace with Spain while also avoiding upsetting the more troublesome parts of the population. It had been decided in England that Morgan, like Modyford, would have to be sacrificed formally to appease the Spanish Government; however, Lynch delayed sending the admiral to England until the following spring, as Morgan was ill and Lynch feared that arresting both men might cause unrest among their supporters or discourage buccaneers from coming forward under the amnesty offer. On April 6, 1672, Morgan set sail from Jamaica as a prisoner on the frigate "Welcome." He departed, however, with the respect and sympathy of everyone in the colony. Lynch described him as "an honest, brave fellow," and Major James Banister, in a letter to the Secretary of State, recommended him to Arlington as "a very well deserving person, and one of great courage and conduct, who may, with His Majesty's pleasure, perform good service at home and be very beneficial to the island if war should break out with the Spaniard."
Indeed Morgan, the buccaneer, was soon in high favour at the dissolute court of Charles II., and when in January 1674 the Earl of Carlisle was chosen Governor of Jamaica, Morgan was selected as his deputy347—an act which must have entirely neutralized in Spanish Councils the effect of his arrest a year and a half earlier. Lord Carlisle, however, did not go out to Jamaica until 1678, and meanwhile in April a commission to be governor was issued to Lord Vaughan,348 and several months later another to Morgan as lieutenant-governor.349 Vaughan arrived in Jamaica in the middle of March 1675; but Morgan, whom the king in the meantime had knighted, sailed ahead of Vaughan, apparently in defiance of the governor's orders, and although shipwrecked on the Isle la Vache, reached Jamaica a week before his superior.350 It seems that Sir Thomas Modyford {206} sailed for Jamaica with Morgan, and the return of these two arch-offenders to the West Indies filled the Spanish Court with new alarms. The Spanish ambassador in London presented a memorial of protest to the English king,351 and in Spain the Council of War blossomed into fresh activity to secure the defence of the West Indies and the coasts of the South Sea.352 Ever since 1672, indeed, the Spaniards moved by some strange infatuation, had persisted in a course of active hostility to the English in the West Indies. Could the Spanish Government have realized the inherent weakness of its American possessions, could it have been informed of the scantiness of the population in proportion to the large extent of territory and coast-line to be defended, could it have known how in the midst of such rich, unpeopled countries abounding with cattle, hogs and other provisions, the buccaneers could be extirpated only by co-operation with its English and French neighbours, it would have soon fallen back upon a policy of peace and good understanding with England. But the news of the sack of Panama, following so close upon the conclusion of the treaty of 1670, and the continued depredations of the buccaneers of Tortuga and the declared pirates of Jamaica, had shattered irrevocably the reliance of the Spaniards upon the good faith of the English Government. And when Morgan was knighted and sent back to Jamaica as lieutenant-governor, their suspicions seemed to be confirmed. A ketch, sent to Cartagena in 1672 by Sir Thomas Lynch to trade in negroes, was seized by the general of the galleons, the goods burnt in the market-place, and the negroes sold for the Spanish King's account.353 An Irish papist, named Philip Fitzgerald, commanding {207} a Spanish man-of-war of twelve guns belonging to Havana, and a Spaniard called Don Francisco with a commission from the Governor of Campeache, roamed the West Indian seas and captured English vessels sailing from Jamaica to London, Virginia and the Windward Islands, barbarously ill-treating and sometimes massacring the English mariners who fell into their hands.354 The Spanish governors, in spite of the treaty and doubtless in conformity with orders from home,355 did nothing to restrain the cruelties of these privateers. At one time eight English sailors who had been captured in a barque off Port Royal and carried to Havana, on attempting to escape from the city were pursued by a party of soldiers, and all of them murdered, the head of the master being set on a pole before the governor's door.356 At another time Fitzgerald sailed into the harbour of Havana with five Englishmen tied ready to hang, two at the main-yard arms, two at the fore-yard arms, and one at the mizzen peak, and as he approached the castle he had the wretches swung off, while he and his men shot at the dangling corpses from the decks of the vessel.357 The repeated complaints and demands for reparation made to the Spanish ambassador in London, and by Sir William Godolphin to the Spanish Court, were answered by counter-complaints of outrages committed by buccaneers who, though long ago disavowed and declared pirates by the Governor of Jamaica, were still charged by the Spaniards to the account of the English.358 Each return of the fleet from Porto Bello or Vera Cruz brought with it English prisoners from Cartagena and other Spanish fortresses, who were lodged in the dungeons of Seville and often condemned to the galleys or to the {208} quicksilver mines. The English ambassador sometimes secured their release, but his efforts to obtain redress for the loss of ships and goods received no satisfaction. The Spanish Government, believing that Parliament was solicitous of Spanish trade and would not supply Charles II. with the necessary funds for a war,359 would disburse nothing in damages. It merely granted to the injured parties despatches directed to the Governor of Havana, which ordered him to restore the property in dispute unless it was contraband goods. Godolphin realized that these delays and excuses were only the prelude to an ultimate denial of any reparation whatever, and wrote home to the Secretary of State that "England ought rather to provide against future injuries than to depend on satisfaction here, till they have taught the Spaniards their own interest in the West Indies by more efficient means than friendship."360 The aggrieved merchants and shipowners, often only too well acquainted with the dilatory Spanish forms of procedure, saw that redress at Havana was hopeless, and petitioned Charles II. for letters of reprisal.361 Sir Leoline Jenkins, Judge of the Admiralty, however, in a report to the king gave his opinion that although he saw little hope of real reparation, the granting of reprisals was not justified by law until the cases had been prosecuted at Havana according to the queen-regent's orders.362 This apparently was never done, and some of the cases dragged on for years without the petitioners ever receiving satisfaction.
Indeed, Morgan, the pirate, quickly became a favorite at the debauched court of Charles II. When the Earl of Carlisle was appointed Governor of Jamaica in January 1674, Morgan was chosen as his deputy347—a move that must have completely neutralized the impact of his arrest a year and a half earlier in the eyes of the Spanish authorities. However, Lord Carlisle did not leave for Jamaica until 1678, and in the meantime, a commission for governor was issued to Lord Vaughan in April348, with another commission for Morgan as lieutenant-governor issued a few months later.349 Vaughan arrived in Jamaica in mid-March 1675, but Morgan, who had been knighted by the king in the meantime, sailed ahead of Vaughan—apparently disregarding the governor's orders—and though he was shipwrecked on the Isle la Vache, he reached Jamaica a week before Vaughan did.350 It seems that Sir Thomas Modyford sailed for Jamaica with Morgan, and the return of these two notorious figures to the West Indies alarmed the Spanish government. The Spanish ambassador in London submitted a formal protest to the English king,351 and in Spain, the Council of War sprang into action to defend the West Indies and the South Sea coast.352 Ever since 1672, for some strange reason, the Spaniards had continued a policy of active hostility against the English in the West Indies. If the Spanish government had understood the inherent weaknesses of its American territories, recognized the small population compared to the vast land and coastline needing defense, and realized that the buccaneers could only be eliminated through cooperation with their English and French neighbors, they would have quickly shifted to a policy of peace and cooperation with England. However, the shocking news of the sack of Panama, coming so soon after the 1670 treaty, along with the ongoing attacks by Tortuga's buccaneers and the proclaimed pirates of Jamaica, completely shattered any Spanish trust in the English government. When Morgan was knighted and sent back to Jamaica as lieutenant-governor, their suspicions were confirmed. A ketch sent to Cartagena in 1672 by Sir Thomas Lynch to trade in enslaved people was captured by the galleon general, the goods were burned in the marketplace, and the enslaved were sold for the benefit of the Spanish king.353 An Irish Catholic named Philip Fitzgerald, commanding a twelve-gun Spanish warship from Havana, along with a Spaniard named Don Francisco holding a commission from the Governor of Campeche, roamed the West Indian seas, capturing English ships sailing from Jamaica to London, Virginia, and the Windward Islands, brutally mistreating and sometimes massacring the English sailors they took captive.354 Despite the treaty and likely following orders from the home government,355 the Spanish governors did nothing to stop the atrocities committed by these privateers. At one point, eight English sailors captured off Port Royal and taken to Havana were murdered by soldiers after attempting to escape, with the head of their captain displayed on a pole at the governor's door.356 On another occasion, Fitzgerald docked in the Havana harbor with five Englishmen tied up, ready to be hanged—two at the main yardarms, two at the fore yardarms, and one at the mizzen peak—and as he neared the castle, he had them hanged while he and his crew shot at their hanging bodies from the ship's deck.357 The numerous complaints and demands for reparations made to the Spanish ambassador in London, as well as by Sir William Godolphin to the Spanish Court, were met with counter-complaints about outrages committed by buccaneers who, despite being long disowned and labeled as pirates by the Governor of Jamaica, were still blamed by the Spaniards on the English.358 Each time the fleet returned from Porto Bello or Vera Cruz, it brought back English prisoners from Cartagena and other Spanish strongholds, who were thrown in dungeons in Seville and often sentenced to the galleys or to work in the quicksilver mines. The English ambassador sometimes managed to secure their release, but his attempts to obtain compensation for lost ships and goods were fruitless. The Spanish government, believing that Parliament was anxious about Spanish trade and would not provide Charles II. with the necessary funds for a conflict,359 refused to pay any damages. They only issued letters to the injured parties directing the Governor of Havana to return the disputed property unless it involved contraband goods. Godolphin realized that these delays and excuses were merely a prelude to a final refusal of any reparations and informed the Secretary of State that "England should prepare to avoid future injuries rather than rely on compensation here until they teach the Spaniards their own interests in the West Indies through means more effective than friendship."360 The aggrieved merchants and shipowners, who were often all too familiar with the sluggish Spanish legal processes, recognized that seeking justice in Havana was futile and petitioned Charles II. for letters of reprisal.361 Sir Leoline Jenkins, the Judge of the Admiralty, however, reported to the king that while he saw little hope for actual restitution, issuing reprisals was not legally justified until the cases had been pursued in Havana following the queen-regent's orders.362 This apparently never happened, and some cases dragged on for years without the petitioners receiving any satisfaction.
The excuse of the Spaniards for most of these seizures was that the vessels contained logwood, a dyewood found upon the coasts of Campeache, Honduras and Yucatan, the cutting and removal of which was forbidden to any but Spanish subjects. The occupation of cutting logwood had sprung up among the English about ten years after {209} the seizure of Jamaica. In 1670 Modyford writes that a dozen vessels belonging to Port Royal were concerned in this trade alone, and six months later he furnished a list of thirty-two ships employed in logwood cutting, equipped with seventy-four guns and 424 men.363 The men engaged in the business had most of them been privateers, and as the regions in which they sought the precious wood were entirely uninhabited by Spaniards, Modyford suggested that the trade be encouraged as an outlet for the energies of the buccaneers. By such means, he thought, these "soldiery men" might be kept within peaceable bounds, and yet be always ready to serve His Majesty in event of any new rupture. When Sir Thomas Lynch replaced Modyford, he realized that this logwood-cutting would be resented by the Spaniards and might neutralize all his efforts to effect a peace. He begged repeatedly for directions from the council in England. "For God's sake," he writes, "give your commands about the logwood."364 In the meantime, after consulting with Modyford, he decided to connive at the business, but he compelled all who brought the wood into Port Royal to swear that they had not stolen it or done any violence to the Spaniards.365 Secretary Arlington wrote to the governor, in November 1671, to hold the matter over until he obtained the opinion of the English ambassador at Madrid, especially as some colour was lent to the pretensions of the logwood cutters by the article of the peace of 1670 which confirmed the English King in the possession and sovereignty of all territory in America occupied by his subjects at that date.366 In May 1672 Ambassador Godolphin returned his answer. "The wood," he writes, "is brought from {210} Yucatan, a large province of New Spain, about 100 leagues in length, sufficiently peopled, having several great towns, as Merida, Valladolid, San Francisco de Campeache, etc., and the government one of the most considerable next to Peru and Mexico.... So that Spain has as well too much right as advantage not to assert the propriety of these woods, for though not all inhabited, these people may as justly pretend to make use of our rivers, mountains and commons, as we can to enjoy any benefit to those woods." So much for the strict justice of the matter. But when the ambassador came to give his own opinion on the trade, he advised that if the English confined themselves to cutting wood alone, and in places remote from Spanish settlements, the king might connive at, although not authorize, their so doing.367 Here was the kernel of the whole matter. Spain was too weak and impotent to take any serious revenge. So let us rob her quietly but decently, keeping the theft out of her sight and so sparing her feelings as much as possible. It was the same piratical motive which animated Drake and Hawkins, which impelled Morgan to sack Maracaibo and Panama, and which, transferred to the dignified council chambers of England, took on a more humane but less romantic guise. On 8th October 1672, the Council for the Plantations dispatched to Governor Lynch their approval of his connivance at the business, but they urged him to observe every care and prudence, to countenance the cutting only in desolate and uninhabited places, and to use every endeavour to prevent any just complaints by the Spaniards of violence and depredation.368
The Spaniards' excuse for most of these seizures was that the ships contained logwood, a type of dyewood found along the coasts of Campeache, Honduras, and Yucatan, the cutting and removal of which was forbidden to anyone except Spanish subjects. The practice of cutting logwood had emerged among the English about ten years after the seizure of Jamaica. In 1670, Modyford noted that a dozen vessels from Port Royal were involved in this trade alone, and six months later, he provided a list of thirty-two ships engaged in logwood cutting, equipped with seventy-four guns and 424 men. The men involved in this venture were mostly former privateers, and since the areas where they sought the valuable wood were completely uninhabited by Spaniards, Modyford suggested that the trade be encouraged as a way to channel the energies of the buccaneers. He believed this would help keep these "soldiery men" peaceful while still being ready to serve His Majesty in case of any new conflict. When Sir Thomas Lynch took over from Modyford, he realized that this logwood cutting would provoke resentment from the Spaniards and could undermine all his peace efforts. He repeatedly requested guidance from the council in England. "For God's sake," he wrote, "give your commands about the logwood." In the meantime, after consulting with Modyford, he decided to turn a blind eye to the activity but required everyone bringing the wood into Port Royal to swear they hadn't stolen it or harmed any Spaniards. Secretary Arlington wrote to the governor in November 1671, advising him to hold off until he heard from the English ambassador in Madrid, especially since some justification for the logwood cutters was provided by the article of the peace treaty of 1670, which affirmed the English King's possession and sovereignty over all territory in America occupied by his subjects at that time. In May 1672, Ambassador Godolphin sent his response. "The wood," he wrote, "is sourced from Yucatan, a large province of New Spain, about 100 leagues long, sufficiently populated and home to several large towns, such as Merida, Valladolid, San Francisco de Campeache, etc., and its government is one of the most significant next to Peru and Mexico.... Thus, Spain has both the right and the advantage to assert ownership of these woods, for while not all areas are inhabited, those people could justly claim rights to our rivers, mountains, and commons, just as we can claim benefit from those woods." That was the strict justice of the issue. However, when the ambassador expressed his own opinion on the trade, he advised that if the English limited themselves to cutting wood only in areas far from Spanish settlements, the king might overlook, though not officially authorize, their actions. This was the crux of the matter. Spain was too weak to take serious revenge. So, let’s quietly and decently take advantage, keeping the theft out of sight and sparing her feelings as much as possible. It was the same pirate spirit that drove Drake and Hawkins, which led Morgan to raid Maracaibo and Panama, and which, when taken to the esteemed council chambers in England, took on a more civilized yet less romantic form. On October 8, 1672, the Council for the Plantations sent their approval to Governor Lynch for his overlooking of the business, but they urged him to exercise caution and prudence, to restrict cutting only in deserted and uninhabited areas, and to do everything possible to prevent any legitimate complaints from the Spaniards about violence and looting.
The Spaniards nevertheless did, as we have seen, engage in active reprisal, especially as they knew the cutting of logwood to be but the preliminary step to the {211} growth of English settlements upon the coasts of Yucatan and Honduras, settlements, indeed, which later crystallized into a British colony. The Queen-Regent of Spain sent orders and instructions to her governors in the West Indies to encourage privateers to take and punish as pirates all English and French who robbed and carried away wood within their jurisdictions; and three small frigates from Biscay were sent to clear out the intruders.369 The buccaneer Yallahs, we have seen, was employed by the Governor of Campeache to seize the logwood-cutters; and although he surprised twelve or more vessels, the Governor of Jamaica, not daring openly to avow the business, could enter no complaint. On 3rd November 1672, however, he was compelled to issue a proclamation ordering all vessels sailing from Port Royal for the purpose of cutting dye-wood to go in fleets of at least four as security against surprise and capture. Under the governorship of Lord Vaughan, and after him of Lord Carlisle, matters continued in this same uncertain course, the English settlements in Honduras gradually increasing in numbers and vitality, and the Spaniards maintaining their right to take all ships they found at sea laden with logwood, and indeed, all English and French ships found upon their coasts. Each of the English governors in turn had urged that some equitable adjustment of the trade be made with the Spanish Crown, if peace was to be preserved in the Indies and the buccaneers finally suppressed; but the Spaniards would agree to no accommodation, and in {212} March 1679 the king wrote to Lord Carlisle bidding him discourage, as far as possible, the logwood-cutting in Campeache or any other of the Spanish dominions, and to try and induce the buccaneers to apply themselves to planting instead.370
The Spaniards did engage in active retaliation, especially since they understood that cutting logwood was just the first step toward the growth of English settlements along the coasts of Yucatan and Honduras—settlements that eventually became a British colony. The Queen-Regent of Spain sent orders and instructions to her governors in the West Indies to encourage privateers to capture and punish as pirates all English and French who stole and transported wood within their territories; three small frigates from Biscay were dispatched to drive out these intruders. The buccaneer Yallahs, as we've seen, was hired by the Governor of Campeache to apprehend the logwood-cutters, and although he managed to surprise twelve or more vessels, the Governor of Jamaica, fearing to openly acknowledge the issue, could not file any complaints. On November 3, 1672, however, he was forced to issue a proclamation requiring all vessels leaving Port Royal for logwood cutting to travel in groups of at least four for protection against surprise attacks and capture. Under the governorship of Lord Vaughan, and then Lord Carlisle, the situation continued to fluctuate, with English settlements in Honduras gradually growing in numbers and strength, while the Spaniards insisted on their right to seize any ships found at sea loaded with logwood, as well as all English and French ships encountered along their coasts. Each English governor had urged that some fair resolution of the trade be reached with the Spanish Crown if peace was to be maintained in the Indies and the buccaneers finally subdued; however, the Spaniards refused to agree to any compromise, and in March 1679, the king wrote to Lord Carlisle directing him to discourage, as much as possible, logwood cutting in Campeache or any other Spanish territories, and to encourage the buccaneers to focus on farming instead.
The reprisals of the Spaniards on the score of logwood-cutting were not the only difficulties with which Lord Vaughan as governor had to contend. From the day of his landing in Jamaica he seems to have conceived a violent dislike of his lieutenant, Sir Henry Morgan, and this antagonism was embittered by Morgan's open or secret sympathy with the privateers, a race with whom Vaughan had nothing in common. The ship on which Morgan had sailed from England, and which was cast away upon the Isle la Vache, had contained the military stores for Jamaica, most of which were lost in the wreck. Morgan, contrary to Lord Vaughan's positive and written orders, had sailed before him, and assumed the authority in Jamaica a week before the arrival of the governor at Port Royal. This the governor seems to have been unable to forgive. He openly blamed Morgan for the wreck and the loss of the stores; and only two months after his coming to Jamaica, in May 1675, he wrote to England that for the good of His Majesty's service he thought Morgan ought to be removed, and the charge of so useless an officer saved.371 In September he wrote that he was "every day more convinced of (Morgan's) imprudence and unfitness to have anything to do in the Civil Government, and of what hazards the island may run by so dangerous a succession." Sir Henry, he continued, had made himself and his authority so cheap at the Port, drinking and gaming in the taverns, that the governor intended to remove thither speedily himself for the reputation {213} of the island and the security of the place.372 He recommended that his predecessor, Sir Thomas Lynch, whom he praises for "his prudent government and conduct of affairs," be appointed his deputy instead of Morgan in the event of the governor's death or absence.373 Lord Vaughan's chief grievance, however, was the lieutenant-governor's secret encouragement of the buccaneers. "What I most resent," he writes again, "is ... that I find Sir Henry, contrary to his duty and trust, endeavours to set up privateering, and has obstructed all my designs and purposes for the reducing of those that do use this course of life."374 When he had issued proclamations, the governor continued, declaring as pirates all the buccaneers who refused to submit, Sir Henry had encouraged the English freebooters to take French commissions, had himself fitted them out for sea, and had received authority from the French Governor of Tortuga to collect the tenths on prize goods brought into Jamaica under cover of these commissions. The quarrel came to a head over the arrest and trial of a buccaneer named John Deane, commander of the ship "St. David." Deane was accused of having stopped a ship called the "John Adventure," taken out several pipes of wine and a cable worth £100, and forcibly carried the vessel to Jamaica. He was also reported to be wearing Dutch, French and Spanish colours without commission.375 When the "John Adventure" entered Port Royal it was seized by the governor for landing goods without entry, contrary {214} to the Acts of Navigation, and on complaint of the master of the vessel that he had been robbed by Deane and other privateers, Sir Henry Morgan was ordered to imprison the offenders. The lieutenant-governor, however, seems rather to have encouraged them to escape,376 until Deane made so bold as to accuse the governor of illegal seizure. Deane was in consequence arrested by the governor, and on 27th April 1676, in a Court of Admiralty presided over by Lord Vaughan as vice-admiral, was tried and condemned to suffer death as a pirate.377 The proceedings, however, were not warranted by legal practice, for according to statutes of the twenty-seventh and twenty-eighth years of Henry VIII., pirates might not be tried in an Admiralty Court, but only under the Common Law of England by a Commission of Oyer and Terminer under the great seal.378 After obtaining an opinion to this effect from the Judge of the Admiralty, the English Council wrote to Lord Vaughan staying the execution of Deane, and ordering a new trial to be held under a proper commission about to be forwarded to him.379 The Governor of Jamaica, however, upon receiving a confession from Deane and frequent petitions for pardon, had reprieved the pirate a month before the letter from the council reached him.380 The incident had good effect in persuading the freebooters to come in, and that result assured, the governor could afford to bend to popular clamour in favour of the culprit. In the latter part of 1677 a standing commission of Oyer and Terminer for the {215} trial of pirates in Jamaica was prepared by the attorney-general and sent to the colony.381
The Spaniards' retaliation over logwood cutting wasn't the only challenge Lord Vaughan faced as governor. From the moment he arrived in Jamaica, he seemed to develop a strong dislike for his lieutenant, Sir Henry Morgan. This tension was worsened by Morgan's open or secret support for privateers, a group Vaughan wanted nothing to do with. The ship that Morgan had sailed from England was wrecked on Isle la Vache and had carried the military supplies for Jamaica, most of which were lost. Morgan, against Lord Vaughan's clear written orders, took off before him and assumed authority in Jamaica a week before the governor even arrived in Port Royal. Vaughan held this against him. He openly blamed Morgan for the wreck and the loss of supplies, and just two months after arriving in Jamaica, in May 1675, he wrote to England suggesting that for the good of the King’s service, Morgan should be removed to save from dealing with such a useless officer.371 In September, he expressed that he was "increasingly convinced of (Morgan's) recklessness and unfitness for any role in the civil government, worrying about the dangers the island might face with such a risky succession." Sir Henry, he noted, had devalued his position and authority at the Port by partying and gambling in taverns, leading the governor to consider moving there himself for the reputation of the island and the safety of the area.372 He recommended that his predecessor, Sir Thomas Lynch, whom he praised for "his prudent governance and management," be appointed his deputy instead of Morgan in case of the governor's death or absence.373 However, Vaughan's main issue was the lieutenant-governor's secret support of the buccaneers. "What I find most upsetting," he wrote again, "is... I see Sir Henry, against his duty and trust, trying to promote privateering and has obstructed all my plans and efforts to deal with those who engage in this lifestyle."374 When he had issued proclamations declaring as pirates all the buccaneers who refused to comply, Sir Henry encouraged the English freebooters to accept French commissions, fitted them for sea, and received authority from the French Governor of Tortuga to collect a percentage on prize goods brought into Jamaica under these commissions. The conflict intensified over the arrest and trial of a buccaneer named John Deane, captain of the ship "St. David." Deane was accused of stopping a ship called the "John Adventure," taking several pipes of wine and a cable worth £100, and forcibly bringing the vessel to Jamaica. He was also reported to be wearing Dutch, French, and Spanish colors without permission.375 When the "John Adventure" entered Port Royal, the governor seized it for unloading goods without declaration, which went against the Navigation Acts, and after the ship’s captain complained that he had been robbed by Deane and other privateers, Sir Henry Morgan was ordered to imprison the offenders. However, the lieutenant-governor seemed more inclined to help them escape,376 until Deane had the audacity to accuse the governor of illegal seizure. As a result, Deane was arrested by the governor, and on April 27, 1676, in a Court of Admiralty led by Lord Vaughan as vice-admiral, he was tried and sentenced to death as a pirate.377 The proceedings weren't legally justified, because according to the statutes from the twenty-seventh and twenty-eighth years of Henry VIII., pirates could only be tried in an Admiralty Court under the Common Law of England by a Commission of Oyer and Terminer under the great seal.378 After getting an opinion on this from the Judge of the Admiralty, the English Council wrote to Lord Vaughan to stop Deane's execution, and ordered a new trial to be held under a proper commission to be sent to him.379 The Governor of Jamaica, however, upon receiving a confession from Deane and frequent pardon requests, had spared the pirate a month before the council's letter arrived.380 This incident encouraged the freebooters to surrender, and with that outcome secured, the governor could afford to yield to public pressure in favor of the offender. In late 1677, a standing commission of Oyer and Terminer for the trial of pirates in Jamaica was prepared by the attorney-general and sent to the colony.381
After the trial of Deane, the lieutenant-governor, according to Lord Vaughan, had openly expressed himself, both in the taverns and in his own house, in vindication of the condemned man and in disparagement of Vaughan himself.382 The quarrel hung fire, however, until on 24th July when the governor, in obedience to orders from England,383 cited Morgan and his brother-in-law, Colonel Byndloss, to appear before the council. Against Morgan he brought formal charges of using the governor's name and authority without his orders in letters written to the captains of the privateers, and Byndloss he accused of unlawfully holding a commission from a foreign governor to collect the tenths on condemned prize goods.384 Morgan in his defence to Secretary Coventry flatly denied the charges, and denounced the letters written to the privateers as forgeries; and Byndloss declared his readiness "to go in this frigate with a tender of six or eight guns and so to deal with the privateers at sea, and in their holes (sic) bring in the chief of them to His Majesty's obedience or bring in their heads and destroy their ships."385 There seems to be little doubt that letters were written by Morgan to certain privateers soon after his arrival in Jamaica, offering them, in the name of the governor, favour and protection in Port Royal. Copies of these letters, indeed, still exist;386 but whether they were actually used is not so certain. Charles Barre, secretary to Sir Henry Morgan, confessed that such letters had been written, but with the understanding that the governor lent them his approval, and that when this was denied Sir Henry {216} refused to send them.387 It is natural to suppose that Morgan should feel a bond of sympathy with his old companions in the buccaneer trade, and it is probable that in 1675, in the first enthusiasm of his return to Jamaica, having behind him the openly-expressed approbation of the English Court for what he had done in the past, and feeling uncertain, perhaps, as to Lord Vaughan's real attitude toward the sea-rovers, Morgan should have done some things inconsistent with the policy of stern suppression pursued by the government. It is even likely that he was indiscreet in some of his expressions regarding the governor and his actions. His bluff, unconventional, easygoing manners, natural to men brought up in new countries and intensified by his early association with the buccaneers, may have been distasteful to a courtier accustomed to the urbanities of Whitehall. It is also clear, however, that Lord Vaughan from the first conceived a violent prejudice against his lieutenant, and allowed this prejudice to colour the interpretation he put upon all of Sir Henry's actions. And it is rather significant that although the particulars of the dispute and of the examination before the Council of Jamaica were sent to the Privy Council in England, the latter body did not see fit to remove Morgan from his post until six years later.
After Deane's trial, the lieutenant-governor, according to Lord Vaughan, openly spoke in defense of the condemned man and criticized Vaughan himself, both in taverns and at home. The conflict lingered, however, until July 24th when the governor, following orders from England, called Morgan and his brother-in-law, Colonel Byndloss, to appear before the council. He officially charged Morgan with using the governor's name and authority without permission in letters sent to the captains of the privateers and accused Byndloss of unlawfully holding a commission from a foreign governor to collect the tenths on condemned prize goods. In his defense to Secretary Coventry, Morgan outright denied the charges and claimed that the letters to the privateers were forgeries. Byndloss expressed his willingness "to go on this frigate with a tender of six or eight guns and deal with the privateers at sea, and in their hideouts bring in the chief of them to His Majesty's obedience or bring in their heads and destroy their ships." There seems to be little doubt that Morgan wrote letters to certain privateers shortly after arriving in Jamaica, offering them favor and protection in Port Royal in the governor's name. Copies of these letters still exist, but it's uncertain if they were actually used. Charles Barre, secretary to Sir Henry Morgan, admitted that such letters had been written, but only with the understanding that the governor approved them, and when that was denied, Sir Henry refused to send them. It's reasonable to assume that Morgan felt a sense of connection to his former companions in the buccaneer trade, and it's likely that in 1675, during the initial excitement of his return to Jamaica, bolstered by the English Court's open approval of his past actions, and feeling unsure about Lord Vaughan's true feelings toward the sea rovers, Morgan may have acted in ways that conflicted with the government's strict policy of suppression. He may have also been somewhat indiscreet in his comments about the governor and his actions. His straightforward, easygoing demeanor, typical of those raised in new territories and heightened by his background with the buccaneers, might have been unappealing to a courtier comfortable with the formalities of Whitehall. However, it's also clear that Lord Vaughan held a strong bias against his lieutenant from the start and allowed this bias to influence his interpretation of all of Sir Henry's actions. Notably, even though the details of the conflict and the examination before the Council of Jamaica were sent to the Privy Council in England, it took them six years to decide to remove Morgan from his position.
As in the case of Modyford and Lynch, so with Lord Vaughan, the thorn in his side was the French colony on Hispaniola and Tortuga. The English buccaneers who would not come in under the proclamation of pardon published at Port Royal, still continued to range the seas with French commissions, and carried their prizes into French ports. The governor protested to M. d'Ogeron and to his successor, M. de Pouançay, declaring that any English vessels or subjects caught with commissions against the Spaniards would be treated as pirates and {217} rebels; and in December 1675, in compliance with the king's orders of the previous August, he issued a public proclamation to that effect.388 In April 1677 an act was passed by the assembly, declaring it felony for any English subject belonging to the island to serve under a foreign prince or state without licence under the hand and seal of the governor;389 and in the following July the council ordered another proclamation to be issued, offering ample pardon to all men in foreign service who should come in within twelve months to claim the benefit of the act.390 These measures seem to have been fairly successful, for on 1st August Peter Beckford, Clerk of the Council in Jamaica, wrote to Secretary Williamson that since the passing of the law at least 300 privateers had come in and submitted, and that few men would now venture their lives to serve the French.391
As with Modyford and Lynch, Lord Vaughan's persistent issue was the French colony on Hispaniola and Tortuga. The English buccaneers who refused to accept the pardon declared in Port Royal continued to sail the seas with French commissions, bringing their captured prizes into French ports. The governor protested to M. d'Ogeron and his successor, M. de Pouançay, stating that any English ships or subjects found with commissions against the Spaniards would be treated as pirates and rebels; and in December 1675, following the king's orders from the previous August, he issued a public proclamation to that effect.388 In April 1677, the assembly passed a law making it a felony for any English subject from the island to serve under a foreign prince or state without a license signed and sealed by the governor;389 and in the following July, the council ordered another proclamation to be issued, offering full pardon to all who were serving foreign powers, as long as they came in within twelve months to take advantage of the act.390 These measures seemed to work quite well, as on August 1st, Peter Beckford, the Clerk of the Council in Jamaica, wrote to Secretary Williamson that since the law was passed, at least 300 privateers had come in and complied, and that few were now willing to risk their lives serving the French.391
Even with the success of this act, however, the path of the governor was not all roses. Buccaneering had always been so much a part of the life of the colony that it was difficult to stamp it out entirely. Runaway servants and others from the island frequently recruited the ranks of the freebooters; members of the assembly, and even of the council, were interested in privateering ventures; and as the governor was without a sufficient naval force to deal with the offenders independently of the council and assembly, he often found his efforts fruitless. In the early part of 1677 a Scotchman, named James Browne, with a commission from M. d'Ogeron and a mixed crew of English, Dutch and French, seized a Dutch ship trading in negroes off the coast of Cartagena, killed the Dutch captain and several of his men, and landed the negroes, {218} about 150 in number, in a remote bay of Jamaica. Lord Vaughan sent a frigate which seized about 100 of the negroes, and when Browne and his crew fell into the governor's hands he had them all tried and condemned for piracy. Browne was ordered to be executed, but his men, eight in number, were pardoned. The captain petitioned the assembly to have the benefit of the Act of Privateers, and the House twice sent a committee to the governor to endeavour to obtain a reprieve. Lord Vaughan, however, refused to listen and gave orders for immediate execution. Half an hour after the hanging, the provost-marshal appeared with an order signed by the speaker to observe the Chief-Justice's writ of Habeas Corpus, whereupon Vaughan, resenting the action, immediately dissolved the Assembly.392
Even with the success of this act, the governor's journey wasn’t smooth. Piracy had been such a big part of the colony's life that it was hard to completely eliminate it. Runaway servants and others from the island often joined the pirates; members of the assembly and even the council had their interests in privateering ventures. Since the governor didn’t have enough naval power to handle the offenders on his own, his efforts often ended up being pointless. In early 1677, a Scottish man named James Browne, with a commission from M. d'Ogeron and a mixed crew of English, Dutch, and French, captured a Dutch ship trading in enslaved people off the coast of Cartagena. He killed the Dutch captain and several of his crew members and brought about 150 enslaved people to a secluded bay in Jamaica. Lord Vaughan sent a frigate that rescued around 100 of the enslaved individuals, and when Browne and his crew were caught by the governor, they were all tried and convicted of piracy. Browne was sentenced to death, but his eight men were pardoned. The captain asked the assembly to invoke the Act of Privateers for protection, and the House sent a committee to the governor twice to try to get him a reprieve. However, Lord Vaughan wouldn’t entertain the idea and ordered an immediate execution. Half an hour after the hanging, the provost-marshal arrived with an order signed by the speaker to enforce the Chief Justice's writ of Habeas Corpus, which led Vaughan to angrily dissolve the Assembly.{218}
The French colony on Hispaniola was an object of concern to the Jamaicans, not only because it served as a refuge for privateers from Port Royal, but also because it threatened soon to overwhelm the old Spanish colony and absorb the whole island. Under the conciliatory, opportunist regime of M. d'Ogeron, the French settlements in the west of the island had grown steadily in number and size;393 while the old Spanish towns seemed every year to become weaker and more open to attack. D'Ogeron, who died in France in 1675, had kept always before him the project of capturing the Spanish capital, San Domingo; but he was too weak to accomplish so great a design without aid from home, and this was never vouchsafed him. His policy, however, was continued by his nephew {219} and successor, M. de Pouançay, and every defection from Jamaica seemed so much assistance to the French to accomplish their ambition. Yet it was manifestly to the English interest in the West Indies not to permit the French to obtain a pre-eminence there. The Spanish colonies were large in area, thinly populated, and ill-supported by the home government, so that they were not likely to be a serious menace to the English islands. With their great wealth and resources, moreover, they had few manufactures and offered a tempting field for exploitation by English merchants. The French colonies, on the other hand, were easily supplied with merchandise from France, and in event of a war would prove more dangerous as neighbours than the Spaniards. To allow the French to become lords of San Domingo would have been to give them an undisputed predominance in the West Indies and make them masters of the neighbouring seas.
The French colony on Hispaniola worried the Jamaicans, not just because it was a safe haven for pirates from Port Royal, but also because it threatened to take over the old Spanish colony and dominate the entire island. Under the flexible and opportunistic leadership of M. d'Ogeron, the French settlements in the west of the island had steadily increased in both number and size;393 while the old Spanish towns seemed to weaken and become more vulnerable to attack each year. D'Ogeron, who died in France in 1675, always aimed to capture the Spanish capital, San Domingo; however, he was too weak to carry out such a grand plan without help from home, which never came. His policies were continued by his nephew and successor, M. de Pouançay, and every act of defection from Jamaica seemed to aid the French in achieving their goals. Yet, it was clearly in the English interest in the West Indies to prevent the French from gaining dominance there. The Spanish colonies were vast but sparsely populated and poorly supported by the home government, making them unlikely to pose a significant threat to the English islands. With their abundant wealth and resources, they had few manufacturers and presented an attractive opportunity for English merchants. In contrast, the French colonies were easily supplied with goods from France, and in the event of a war, they would be more dangerous neighbors than the Spaniards. Allowing the French to take control of San Domingo would effectively give them undeniable superiority in the West Indies and make them the rulers of the surrounding seas.
In the second war of conquest waged by Louis XIV. against Holland, the French in the West Indies found the buccaneers to be useful allies, but as usually happened at such times, the Spaniards paid the bill. In the spring of 1677 five or six English privateers surprised the town of Santa Marta on the Spanish Main. According to the reports brought to Jamaica, the governor and the bishop, in order to save the town from being burnt, agreed with the marauders for a ransom; but the Governor of Cartagena, instead of contributing with pieces of eight, despatched a force of 500 men by land and three vessels by sea to drive out the invaders. The Spanish troops, however, were easily defeated, and the ships, seeing the French colours waving over the fort and the town, sailed back to Cartagena. The privateers carried away the governor and the bishop and came to Jamaica in July. The plunder amounted to only £20 per man. The English in the party, about 100 in number and led by Captains Barnes {220} and Coxon, submitted at Port Royal under the terms of the Act against Privateers, and delivered up the Bishop of Santa Marta to Lord Vaughan. Vaughan took care to lodge the bishop well, and hired a vessel to send him to Cartagena, at which "the good old man was exceedingly pleased." He also endeavoured to obtain the custody of the Spanish governor and other prisoners, but without success, "the French being obstinate and damnably enraged the English had left them" and submitted to Lord Vaughan.394
In the second war of conquest led by Louis XIV against Holland, the French in the West Indies found the buccaneers to be helpful allies. As was often the case, however, the Spaniards ended up footing the bill. In the spring of 1677, five or six English privateers surprised the town of Santa Marta on the Spanish Main. According to reports sent to Jamaica, the governor and the bishop agreed to pay a ransom to save the town from being burned. However, the Governor of Cartagena sent a force of 500 men on land and three ships by sea to drive out the invaders instead of contributing money. The Spanish troops were easily defeated, and when the ships saw the French colors flying over the fort and the town, they returned to Cartagena. The privateers took the governor and the bishop with them and arrived in Jamaica in July. The loot amounted to only £20 per man. The English in the group, about 100 in total and led by Captains Barnes and Coxon, surrendered in Port Royal under the terms of the Act against Privateers and handed over the Bishop of Santa Marta to Lord Vaughan. Vaughan ensured the bishop was well taken care of and hired a ship to send him back to Cartagena, which made "the good old man exceedingly pleased." He also tried to gain custody of the Spanish governor and other prisoners, but was unsuccessful, as "the French were stubborn and extremely angry the English had left them" and submitted to Lord Vaughan.{220}
In the beginning of the following year, 1678, Count d'Estrées, Vice-Admiral of the French fleet in the West Indies, was preparing a powerful armament to go against the Dutch on Curaçao, and sent two frigates to Hispaniola with an order from the king to M. de Pouançay to join him with 1200 buccaneers. De Pouançay assembled the men at Cap François, and embarking on the frigates and on some filibustering ships in the road, sailed for St. Kitts. There he was joined by a squadron of fifteen or more men-of-war from Martinique under command of Count d'Estrées. The united fleet of over thirty vessels sailed for Curaçao on 7th May, but on the fourth day following, at about eight o'clock in the evening, was wrecked upon some coral reefs near the Isle d'Aves.395 As the French pilots had been at odds among themselves as to the exact position of the fleet, the admiral had taken the precaution to send a fire-ship and three buccaneering vessels several miles in advance of the rest of the squadron. Unfortunately these scouts drew too little water and passed over the reefs without touching them. A buccaneer was the first to strike and fired three shots to warn the admiral, who at {221} once lighted fires and discharged cannon to keep off the rest of the ships. The latter, however, mistaking the signals, crowded on sail, and soon most of the fleet were on the reefs. Those of the left wing, warned in time by a shallop from the flag-ship, succeeded in veering off. The rescue of the crews was slow, for the seas were heavy and the boats approached the doomed ships with difficulty. Many sailors and marines were drowned, and seven men-of-war, besides several buccaneering ships, were lost on the rocks. Count d'Estrées himself escaped, and sailed with the remnant of his squadron to Petit Goave and Cap François in Hispaniola, whence on 18th June he departed for France.396
At the start of the next year, 1678, Count d'Estrées, Vice-Admiral of the French fleet in the West Indies, was getting ready to launch a strong attack against the Dutch in Curaçao. He sent two frigates to Hispaniola with an order from the king for M. de Pouançay to join him with 1,200 buccaneers. De Pouançay gathered the men at Cap François and, after boarding the frigates and some filibuster ships in the harbor, set sail for St. Kitts. There, he was joined by a squadron of fifteen or more warships from Martinique under Count d'Estrées' command. The combined fleet of over thirty vessels departed for Curaçao on May 7, but on the fourth day, around eight in the evening, they wrecked on some coral reefs near Isle d'Aves.395 The French pilots had disagreed about the fleet's exact location, so the admiral had wisely sent a fire-ship and three buccaneering vessels several miles ahead of the main squadron. Unfortunately, these scouts were too shallow-drafted and passed over the reefs without noticing them. A buccaneer was the first to hit the reef and fired three shots to alert the admiral, who immediately lit fires and fired cannons to warn the remaining ships off. However, the others misinterpreted the signals and pressed on, soon getting most of the fleet stuck on the reefs. Those on the left flank, alerted in time by a boat from the flagship, managed to turn away. The rescue of the crews was slow because the seas were rough, and the boats struggled to reach the stranded ships. Many sailors and marines drowned, and seven warships, along with several buccaneering ships, were lost to the rocks. Count d'Estrées himself made it out and sailed with the remaining squadron to Petit Goave and Cap François in Hispaniola, from where he left for France on June 18.396
The buccaneers were accused in the reports which reached Barbadoes of deserting the admiral after the accident, and thus preventing the reduction of Curaçao, which d'Estrées would have undertaken in spite of the shipwreck.397 However this may be, one of the principal buccaneer leaders, named de Grammont, was left by de Pouançay at the Isle d'Aves to recover what he could from the wreck, and to repair some of the privateering vessels.398 {222} When he had accomplished this, finding himself short of provisions, he sailed with about 700 men to make a descent on Maracaibo; and after spending six months in the lake, seizing the shipping and plundering all the settlements in that region, he re-embarked in the middle of December. The booty is said to have been very small.399 Early in the same year the Marquis de Maintenon, commanding the frigate "La Sorcière," and aided by some French filibusters from Tortuga, was on the coast of Caracas, where he ravaged the islands of Margarita and Trinidad. He had arrived in the West Indies from France in the latter part of 1676, and when he sailed from Tortuga was at the head of 700 or 800 men. His squadron met with little success, however, and soon scattered.400 Other bands of filibusters pillaged Campeache, Puerto Principe in Cuba, Santo Tomas on the Orinoco, and Truxillo in the province of Honduras; and de Pouançay, to console the buccaneers for their losses at the Isle d'Aves, sent 800 men under the Sieur de Franquesnay to make a descent upon St. Jago de Cuba, but the expedition seems to have been a failure.401
The buccaneers were reported in Barbadoes to have deserted the admiral after the accident, which prevented the capture of Curaçao that d'Estrées would have undertaken despite the shipwreck.397 Regardless, one of the main buccaneer leaders, named de Grammont, was left by de Pouançay at the Isle d'Aves to salvage as much as he could from the wreck and to repair some of the privateering ships.398 {222} After finishing this, he found himself low on supplies and set sail with about 700 men to raid Maracaibo. After spending six months in the lake seizing ships and plundering all the settlements in that area, he re-embarked in mid-December. The loot was reportedly quite small.399 Earlier that year, Marquis de Maintenon, commanding the frigate "La Sorcière," along with some French filibusters from Tortuga, operated off the coast of Caracas, where he ravaged the islands of Margarita and Trinidad. He had arrived in the West Indies from France in the late part of 1676 and had around 700 or 800 men when he sailed from Tortuga. However, his squadron had little success and quickly scattered.400 Other groups of filibusters plundered Campeache, Puerto Principe in Cuba, Santo Tomas on the Orinoco, and Truxillo in the province of Honduras. To appease the buccaneers for their losses at the Isle d'Aves, de Pouançay sent 800 men under Sieur de Franquesnay to raid St. Jago de Cuba, but the expedition seems to have been unsuccessful.401
On 1st March 1678 a commission was again issued to the Earl of Carlisle, appointing him governor of Jamaica.402 Carlisle arrived in his new government on 18th July,403 but Lord Vaughan, apparently because of ill-health, had already sailed for England at the end of March, leaving Sir Henry Morgan, who retained his place under the new governor, deputy in his absence.404 Lord Carlisle, immediately upon his arrival, invited the privateers to come in and encouraged them to stay, hoping, according to his own {223} account, to be able to wean them from their familiar courses, and perhaps to use them in the threatened war with France, for the island then had "not above 4000 whites able to bear arms, a secret not fit to be made public."405 If the governor was sincere in his intentions, the results must have been a bitter disappointment. Some of the buccaneers came in, others persevered in the old trade, and even those who returned abused the pardon they had received. In the autumn of 1679, several privateering vessels under command of Captains Coxon, Sharp and others who had come back to Jamaica, made a raid in the Gulf of Honduras, plundered the royal storehouses there, carried off 500 chests of indigo,406 besides cocoa, cochineal, tortoiseshell, money and plate, and returned with their plunder to Jamaica. Not knowing what their reception might be, one of the vessels landed her cargo of indigo in an unfrequented spot on the coast, and the rest sent word that unless they were allowed to bring their booty to Port Royal and pay the customs duty, they would sail to Rhode Island or to one of the Dutch plantations. The governor had taken security for good behaviour from some of the captains before they sailed from Jamaica; yet in spite of this they were permitted to enter the indigo at the custom house and divide it in broad daylight; and the frigate "Success" was ordered to coast round Jamaica in search of other privateers who failed to come in and pay duty on their plunder at Port Royal. The glut of indigo in Jamaica disturbed trade considerably, and for a time the imported product took the place of native sugar and indigo as a medium of exchange. Manufacture on the island was {224} hindered, prices were lowered, and only the king's customs received any actual benefit.407
On March 1, 1678, a commission was once again issued to the Earl of Carlisle, appointing him governor of Jamaica.402 Carlisle arrived in his new role on July 18,403 but Lord Vaughan had already sailed for England at the end of March due to poor health, leaving Sir Henry Morgan, who kept his position under the new governor, as deputy in his absence.404 Upon his arrival, Lord Carlisle welcomed the privateers and encouraged them to remain, hoping, as he stated, to steer them away from their usual ways and perhaps utilize them in the upcoming war with France, since the island then had "no more than 4,000 whites able to bear arms, a detail that shouldn't be made public."405 If the governor's intentions were genuine, the outcome must have been a bitter disappointment. Some of the buccaneers came in, while others continued their old trade, and even those who returned took advantage of the pardon they had received. In the fall of 1679, several privateering ships led by Captains Coxon, Sharp, and others who had returned to Jamaica raided in the Gulf of Honduras, plundering royal storehouses and seizing 500 chests of indigo,406 along with cocoa, cochineal, tortoiseshell, money, and silver, and returned with their loot to Jamaica. Not knowing how they would be received, one of the ships unloaded its indigo at a remote spot along the coast, while the others sent word that unless they were allowed to bring their loot to Port Royal and pay customs duties, they would sail to Rhode Island or one of the Dutch plantations. The governor had taken security for good behavior from some of the captains before they set sail from Jamaica; yet, despite this, they were allowed to bring the indigo to the customs house and divide it in broad daylight; and the frigate "Success" was ordered to patrol around Jamaica in search of other privateers who did not come in and pay duties on their loot at Port Royal. The influx of indigo in Jamaica significantly disturbed trade, and for a time, the imported product replaced local sugar and indigo as a form of currency. Manufacturing on the island was hindered, prices dropped, and only the king's customs truly benefited from the situation.407
These same privateers, however, were soon out upon a much larger design. Six captains, Sharp, Coxon, Essex, Allison, Row, and Maggott, in four barques and two sloops, met at Point Morant in December 1679, and on 7th January set sail for Porto Bello. They were scattered by a terrible storm, but all eventually reached their rendezvous in safety. There they picked up another barque commanded by Captain Cooke, who had sailed from Jamaica on the same design, and likewise a French privateering vessel commanded by Captain Lessone. They set out for Porto Bello in canoes with over 300 men, and landing twenty leagues from the town, marched for four days along the seaside toward the city. Coming to an Indian village about three miles from Porto Bello, they were discovered by the natives, and one of the Indians ran to the city, crying, "Ladrones! ladrones!" The buccaneers, although "many of them were weak, being three days without any food, and their feet cut with the rocks for want of shoes," made all speed for the town, which they entered without difficulty on 17th February 1680. Most of the inhabitants sought refuge in the castle, whence they made a counter-attack without success upon the invaders. On the evening of the following day, the buccaneers retreated with their prisoners and booty down to a cay or small island about three and a half leagues from Porto Bello, where they were joined by their ships. They had just left in time to avoid a force of some 700 Spanish troops who were sent from Panama and arrived the day after the buccaneers departed. After capturing two {225} Spanish vessels bound for Porto Bello with provisions from Cartagena, they divided the plunder, of which each man received 100 pieces of eight, and departed for Boca del Toro some fifty leagues to the north. There they careened and provisioned, and being joined by two other Jamaican privateers commanded by Sawkins and Harris, sailed for Golden Island, whence on 5th April 1680, with 334 men, they began their march across the Isthmus of Darien to the coasts of Panama and the South Seas.408
These same privateers soon embarked on a much bigger plan. Six captains—Sharp, Coxon, Essex, Allison, Row, and Maggott—on four barques and two sloops, met at Point Morant in December 1679, and set sail for Porto Bello on January 7. They were scattered by a terrible storm, but all eventually reached their meeting point safely. There, they picked up another barque commanded by Captain Cooke, who had sailed from Jamaica with a similar mission, along with a French privateering vessel led by Captain Lessone. They launched canoes with over 300 men and landed twenty leagues from the town, marching for four days along the coast toward the city. Upon reaching an Indian village about three miles from Porto Bello, they were spotted by the locals, and one of the Indians ran to the city shouting, "Thieves! Thieves!" The buccaneers, although many were weakened after three days without food and suffering from foot injuries caused by the rocky terrain, hurried to the town, which they entered without difficulty on February 17, 1680. Most of the residents fled to the castle, where they attempted a counter-attack against the invaders but were unsuccessful. The next evening, the buccaneers retreated with their captives and loot to a cay, or small island, about three and a half leagues from Porto Bello, where their ships joined them. They had just left in time to avoid a force of around 700 Spanish troops sent from Panama, who arrived the day after the buccaneers had departed. After capturing two Spanish vessels bound for Porto Bello with supplies from Cartagena, they divided the spoils, giving each man 100 pieces of eight, and set off for Boca del Toro, about fifty leagues to the north. There, they careened and resupplied, and after being joined by two more Jamaican privateers, led by Sawkins and Harris, they sailed for Golden Island, where on April 5, 1680, with 334 men, they began their trek across the Isthmus of Darien to the coasts of Panama and the South Seas.408
Lord Carlisle cannot escape the charge of culpable negligence for having permitted these vessels in the first place to leave Jamaica. All the leaders in the expedition were notorious privateers, men who had repeatedly been {226} concerned in piratical outrages against the Dutch and Spaniards. Coxon and Harris had both come in after taking part in the expedition against Santa Marta; Sawkins had been caught with his vessel by the frigate "Success" and sent to Port Royal, where on 1st December 1679 he seems to have been in prison awaiting trial;410 while Essex had been brought in by another frigate, the "Hunter," in November, and tried with twenty of his crew for plundering on the Jamaican coast, two of his men being sentenced to death.411 The buccaneers themselves declared that they had sailed with permission from Lord Carlisle to cut logwood.412 This was very likely true; yet after the exactly similar ruse of these men when they went to Honduras, the governor could not have failed to suspect their real intentions.
Lord Carlisle cannot avoid the accusation of serious negligence for having allowed these ships to leave Jamaica in the first place. All the leaders of the expedition were well-known privateers, men who had repeatedly engaged in pirate attacks against the Dutch and Spaniards. Coxon and Harris had returned after participating in the expedition against Santa Marta; Sawkins had been captured with his ship by the frigate "Success" and taken to Port Royal, where on December 1, 1679, he was seemingly in prison awaiting trial;{226} while Essex had been brought in by another frigate, the "Hunter," in November, and tried with twenty of his crew for plundering on the Jamaican coast, with two of his men being sentenced to death.410 The buccaneers themselves claimed that they had sailed with permission from Lord Carlisle to cut logwood.411 This was likely true; however, after the exactly similar trick these men used when they went to Honduras, the governor should have suspected their true intentions. 412
At the end of May 1680 Lord Carlisle suddenly departed for England in the frigate "Hunter," leaving Morgan again in charge as lieutenant-governor.413 On his passage home the governor met with Captain Coxon, who, having quarrelled with his companions in the Pacific, had returned across Darien to the West Indies and was again hanging about the shores of Jamaica. The "Hunter" gave chase for twenty-four hours, but being outsailed was content to take two small vessels in the company of Coxon which had been deserted by their crews.414 In England Samuel Long, whom the governor had suspended from the council and dismissed from his post as chief justice of the colony for his opposition to the new Constitution, accused the governor before the Privy Council of collusion with pirates and encouraging them to bring their plunder to Jamaica. The charges were doubtless conceived in a spirit of revenge; nevertheless the two years during {227} which Carlisle was in Jamaica were marked by an increased activity among the freebooters, and by a lukewarmness and negligence on the part of the government, for which Carlisle alone must be held responsible. To accuse him of deliberately supporting and encouraging the buccaneers, however, may be going too far. Sir Henry Morgan, during his tenure of the chief command of the island, showed himself very zealous in the pursuit of the pirates, and sincerely anxious to bring them to justice; and as Carlisle and Morgan always worked together in perfect harmony, we may be justified in believing that Carlisle's mistakes were those of negligence rather than of connivance. The freebooters who brought goods into Jamaica increased the revenues of the island, and a governor whose income was small and tastes extravagant, was not apt to be too inquisitive about the source of the articles which entered through the customs. There is evidence, moreover, that French privateers, being unable to obtain from the merchants on the coast of San Domingo the cables, anchors, tar and other naval stores necessary for their armaments, were compelled to resort to other islands to buy them, and that Jamaica came in for a share of this trade. Provisions, too, were more plentiful at Port Royal than in the cul-de-sac of Hispaniola, and the French governors complained to the king that the filibusters carried most of their money to foreign plantations to exchange for these commodities. Such French vessels if they came to Jamaica were not strictly within the scope of the laws against piracy which had been passed by the assembly, and their visits were the more welcome as they paid for their goods promptly and liberally in good Spanish doubloons.415
At the end of May 1680, Lord Carlisle suddenly left for England on the frigate "Hunter," leaving Morgan in charge as lieutenant-governor.413 On his way home, the governor ran into Captain Coxon, who had a falling out with his crewmates in the Pacific, then returned across Darien to the West Indies and was again lingering around the shores of Jamaica. The "Hunter" chased him for twenty-four hours, but unable to catch up, decided to seize two small ships that were deserted by Coxon's crew.414 Back in England, Samuel Long, whom the governor had suspended from the council and removed from his position as chief justice of the colony due to his opposition to the new Constitution, accused the governor before the Privy Council of colluding with pirates and encouraging them to bring their loot to Jamaica. These charges were likely fueled by revenge; however, the two years that Carlisle spent in Jamaica saw a notable rise in pirate activity and a lack of urgency and diligence from the government, for which Carlisle must be solely blamed. Nevertheless, accusing him of intentionally supporting and encouraging the buccaneers might be overstating things. Sir Henry Morgan, during his time as the island's chief commander, was very committed to pursuing the pirates and was genuinely eager to bring them to justice. Since Carlisle and Morgan always worked seamlessly together, we can reasonably assume that Carlisle's errors were more due to negligence than complicity. The pirates who brought goods into Jamaica boosted the island's revenue, and a governor with a small income and expensive tastes would be less inclined to scrutinize where the imported goods came from. Furthermore, there's evidence that French privateers, unable to obtain cables, anchors, tar, and other necessary naval supplies from merchants on the coast of San Domingo, had to go to other islands to purchase them, with Jamaica benefiting from that trade. Additionally, provisions were more abundant at Port Royal than in the cul-de-sac of Hispaniola, and French governors complained to the king that the filibusters took most of their money to foreign plantations to trade for these goods. Such French vessels, if they arrived in Jamaica, were not strictly covered by the anti-piracy laws passed by the assembly, and their visits were especially welcome since they paid for their goods promptly and generously in valuable Spanish doubloons.415
A general warrant for the apprehension of Coxon, {228} Sharp and the other men who had plundered Porto Bello had been issued by Lord Carlisle in May 1680, just before his departure for England. On 1st July a similar warrant was issued by Morgan, and five days later a proclamation was published against all persons who should hold any correspondence whatever with the outlawed crews.416 Three men who had taken part in the expedition were captured and clapped into prison until the next meeting of the court. The friends of Coxon, however, including, it seems, almost all the members of the council, offered to give £2000 security, if he was allowed to come to Port Royal, that he would never take another commission except from the King of England; and Morgan wrote to Carlisle seeking his approbation.417 At the end of the following January Morgan received word that a notorious Dutch privateer, named Jacob Everson, commanding an armed sloop, was anchored on the coast with a brigantine which he had lately captured. The lieutenant-governor manned a small vessel with fifty picked men and sent it secretly at midnight to seize the pirate. Everson's sloop was boarded and captured with twenty-six prisoners, but Everson himself and several others escaped by jumping overboard and swimming to the shore. The prisoners, most of whom were English, were tried six weeks later, convicted of piracy and sentenced to death; but the lieutenant-governor suspended the execution and wrote to the king for instructions. On 16th June 1681, the king in council ordered the execution of the condemned men.418
A general warrant for the arrest of Coxon, Sharp, and the other men who had looted Porto Bello was issued by Lord Carlisle in May 1680, just before he left for England. On July 1st, a similar warrant was issued by Morgan, and five days later, a proclamation was announced against anyone who had any communication with the outlawed crews.416 Three men involved in the expedition were captured and thrown into prison until the next court meeting. However, Coxon’s friends, which apparently included almost all the council members, offered to pay £2000 in security if he was allowed to come to Port Royal, promising that he would only accept commissions from the King of England; Morgan wrote to Carlisle requesting his approval.417 By the end of the following January, Morgan learned that a notorious Dutch privateer named Jacob Everson, commanding an armed sloop, was anchored along the coast with a brigantine he had recently captured. The lieutenant-governor equipped a small vessel with fifty selected men and sent it out secretly at midnight to capture the pirate. Everson’s sloop was boarded and taken with twenty-six prisoners, but Everson himself and several others escaped by jumping overboard and swimming to shore. The prisoners, most of whom were English, were tried six weeks later, found guilty of piracy, and sentenced to death; however, the lieutenant-governor postponed the execution and wrote to the king for guidance. On June 16, 1681, the king in council ordered the execution of the condemned men.418
The buccaneers who, after plundering Porto Bello, crossed the Isthmus of Darien to the South Seas, had a remarkable history. For eighteen months they cruised up and down the Pacific coast of South America, burning and plundering Spanish towns, giving and taking hard blows with equal courage, keeping the Spanish provinces of Equador, Peru and Chili in a fever of apprehension, finally sailing the difficult passage round Cape Horn, and returning to the Windward Islands in January of 1682. Touching at the island of Barbadoes, they learned that the English frigate "Richmond" was lying in the road, and fearing seizure they sailed on to Antigua. There the governor, Colonel Codrington, refused to give them leave to enter the harbour. So the party, impatient of their dangerous situation, determined to separate, some landing on Antigua, and Sharp and sixteen others going to Nevis where they obtained passage to England. On their arrival in England several, including Sharp, were arrested at the instance of the Spanish ambassador, and tried for committing piracy in the South Seas; but from the defectiveness of the evidence produced they escaped conviction.419 Four of the party came to Jamaica, where they were apprehended, tried and condemned. One of the four, who had given himself up voluntarily, turned State's evidence; two were represented by the judges as fit objects of the king's mercy; and the other, "a bloody and notorious villein," was recommended to be executed as an example to the rest.420
The buccaneers who plundered Porto Bello and crossed the Isthmus of Darien to the South Seas had quite a history. For eighteen months, they sailed up and down the Pacific coast of South America, burning and looting Spanish towns, bravely exchanging blows with their enemies, and keeping the Spanish provinces of Ecuador, Peru, and Chile in a state of constant fear. They finally navigated the challenging waters around Cape Horn and returned to the Windward Islands in January of 1682. Stopping at the island of Barbados, they discovered that the English frigate "Richmond" was anchored there, and fearing capture, they continued on to Antigua. There, Governor Colonel Codrington denied them entry into the harbor. Frustrated with their precarious situation, the group decided to split up; some landed on Antigua, while Sharp and sixteen others went to Nevis, where they found passage to England. Upon their arrival in England, several of them, including Sharp, were arrested at the request of the Spanish ambassador and put on trial for piracy in the South Seas; however, due to insufficient evidence, they were acquitted.419 Four of the group made their way to Jamaica, where they were arrested, put on trial, and sentenced. One of the four, who turned himself in voluntarily, agreed to testify against the others; two were portrayed by the judges as deserving of the king's mercy; and the last, described as "a bloody and notorious villain," was recommended for execution as a warning to others.420
The recrudescence of piratical activity between the years 1679 and 1682 had, through its evil effects, been strongly felt in Jamaica; and public opinion was now {230} gradually changing from one of encouragement and welcome to the privateers and of secret or open opposition to the efforts of the governors who tried to suppress them, to one of distinct hostility to the old freebooters. The inhabitants were beginning to realize that in the encouragement of planting, and not of buccaneering, lay the permanent welfare of the island. Planting and buccaneering, side by side, were inconsistent and incompatible, and the colonists chose the better course of the two. In spite of the frequent trials and executions at Port Royal, the marauders seemed to be as numerous as ever, and even more troublesome. Private trade with the Spaniards was hindered; runaway servants, debtors and other men of unfortunate or desperate condition were still, by every new success of the buccaneers, drawn from the island to swell their ranks; and most of all, men who were now outlawed in Jamaica, driven to desperation turned pirate altogether, and began to wage war indiscriminately on the ships of all nationalities, including those of the English. Morgan repeatedly wrote home urging the dispatch of small frigates of light draught to coast round the island and surprise the freebooters, and he begged for orders for himself to go on board and command them, for "then I shall not much question," he concludes, "to reduce them or in some time to leave them shipless."421 "The governor," wrote the Council of Jamaica to the Lords of Trade and Plantations in May 1680, "can do little from want of ships to reduce the privateers, and of plain laws to punish them"; and they urged the ratification of the Act passed by the assembly two years before, making it felony for any British subject in the West Indies to serve under a foreign prince without leave from the governor.422 This Act, and another for the more effectual punishment of pirates, had been under consideration in the {231} Privy Council in February 1678, and both were returned to Jamaica with certain slight amendments. They were again passed by the assembly as one Act in 1681, and were finally incorporated into the Jamaica Act of 1683 "for the restraining and punishing of privateers and pirates."423
The increase in piracy between 1679 and 1682 had a significant negative impact on Jamaica, leading public opinion to shift. Initially, the locals welcomed privateers, opposing the governors' attempts to suppress them. However, over time, they began to openly oppose the old pirates. The people started to understand that supporting agriculture, rather than piracy, was key to the island's long-term success. Agriculture and piracy were incompatible, and the colonists chose the better option. Despite frequent trials and executions in Port Royal, pirates continued to be just as numerous and troublesome. Illegal trade with the Spaniards was hindered; runaways, debtors, and other desperate individuals were increasingly drawn to piracy by the success of the privateers. Many who were now outlaws in Jamaica turned to piracy out of desperation and waged war indiscriminately against ships of all nationalities, including English ones. Morgan repeatedly wrote requesting the dispatch of small, shallow-draft frigates to patrol around the island and surprise the pirates. He asked to be given command of these ships, stating, "then I shall not much question," he concluded, "to reduce them or eventually to leave them without ships." The governor, the Council of Jamaica wrote to the Lords of Trade and Plantations in May 1680, "can do little due to the lack of ships to reduce the privateers and insufficient laws to punish them." They urged the approval of the Act passed by the assembly two years earlier, which made it a felony for any British subject in the West Indies to serve under a foreign prince without the governor's permission. This Act, along with another aimed at more effectively punishing pirates, had been considered by the Privy Council in February 1678 and returned to Jamaica with a few minor changes. They were re-passed by the assembly as a single Act in 1681 and ultimately incorporated into the Jamaica Act of 1683 "for the restraining and punishing of privateers and pirates."
Footnote 333: (return)Ibid., Nos. 604, 608, 729; Beeston's Journal.
Same source., Nos. 604, 608, 729; Beeston's Journal.
Footnote 337: (return)Ibid., Nos. 638, 640, 663, 697. This may be the Diego Grillo to whom Duro (op. cit., V. p. 180) refers—a native of Havana commanding a vessel of fifteen guns. He defeated successively in the Bahama Channel three armed ships sent out to take him, and in all of them he massacred without exception the Spaniards of European birth. He was captured in 1673 and suffered the fate he had meted out to his victims.
Same source., Nos. 638, 640, 663, 697. This might be the Diego Grillo that Duro (same work cited, V. p. 180) mentions—a native of Havana who commanded a ship armed with fifteen cannons. He successfully defeated three armed ships that were sent to capture him in the Bahama Channel, killing all the Spaniards of European descent in each encounter. He was captured in 1673 and faced the same fate he had imposed on his victims.
Footnote 339: (return)C.S.P. Colon., 1669-74, Nos. 733, 742, 796.
C.S.P. Colon., 1669-74, Nos. 733, 742, 796.
Footnote 341: (return)Ibid., Nos. 742, 777, 785, 789, 794, 796.
Same source., Nos. 742, 777, 785, 789, 794, 796.
Footnote 342: (return)C.S.P. Colon., 1669-74, Nos. 742, 945, 1042.
C.S.P. Colon., 1669-74, Nos. 742, 945, 1042.
Footnote 343: (return)C.S.P. Colon., 1669-74, Nos. 733, 742, 779, 796, 820, 1022.
C.S.P. Colon., 1669-74, Nos. 733, 742, 779, 796, 820, 1022.
Footnote 344: (return)Ibid., Nos. 650, 663, 697. Seventeen months later, after the outbreak of the Dutch war, the Jamaicans had a similar scare over an expected invasion of the Dutch and Spaniards, but this, too, was dissolved by time into thin air. (C.S.P. Colon., 1669-74, Nos. 887, 1047, 1055, 1062). In this connection, cf. Egerton MSS., 2375, f. 491:—Letter written by the Governor of Cumana to the Duke of Veragua, 1673, seeking his influence with the Council of the Indies to have the Governor of Margarita send against Jamaica 1500 or 2000 Indians, "guay quies," as they are valient bowmen, seamen and divers.
Same source., Nos. 650, 663, 697. Seventeen months later, after the start of the Dutch war, the Jamaicans faced a similar fear about a possible invasion by the Dutch and Spaniards, but this worry also faded over time. (C.S.P. Colon., 1669-74, Nos. 887, 1047, 1055, 1062). In this context, see Egerton MSS., 2375, f. 491:—Letter from the Governor of Cumana to the Duke of Veragua, 1673, asking for his help with the Council of the Indies to have the Governor of Margarita send 1,500 or 2,000 Indians, "guay quies," as they are skilled archers, sailors, and divers.
Footnote 345: (return)C.S.P. Colon., 1669-74, Nos. 697, 789, 794, 900, 911; Beeston's Journal.
C.S.P. Colon., 1669-74, Nos. 697, 789, 794, 900, 911; Beeston's Journal.
Footnote 348: (return)Ibid., No. 1259, cf. also 1374, 1385, 1394.
Same source., No. 1259, see also 1374, 1385, 1394.
Footnote 350: (return)Ibid., 1675-76, Nos. 458, 467, 484, 521, 525, 566.
Ibid., 1675-76, Nos. 458, 467, 484, 521, 525, 566.
Footnote 352: (return)C.S.P. Colon., 1669-74, No. 1389; ibid. 1675-76, No. 564; Add. MSS., 36,330, No. 28.
C.S.P. Colon., 1669-74, No. 1389; ibid. 1675-76, No. 564; Add. MSS., 36,330, No. 28.
Footnote 354: (return)C.S.P. Colon., 1669-74, Nos. 1178, 1180, 1226; ibid., 1675-76, No. 579.
C.S.P. Colon., 1669-74, Nos. 1178, 1180, 1226; ibid., 1675-76, No. 579.
Footnote 355: (return)Ibid., 1669-74, No. 1423; ibid., 1675-76, No. 707.
Same source., 1669-74, No. 1423; same source., 1675-76, No. 707.
Footnote 358: (return)Ibid., 1669-74, Nos. 1335, 1351, 1424; S.P. Spain, vols. 60, 62, 63.
Same source., 1669-74, Nos. 1335, 1351, 1424; S.P. Spain, vols. 60, 62, 63.
Footnote 363: (return)C.S.P. Colon., 1669-74, Nos. 310, 704, iv. It was a very profitable business for the wood then sold at £25 or £30 a ton. For a description of the life of the logwood-cutters cf. Dampier, Voyages, ed. 1906, ii. pp. 155-56. 178-79, 181 ff.
C.S.P. Colon., 1669-74, Nos. 310, 704, iv. It was a very profitable business since wood was sold for £25 or £30 a ton. For a description of the lives of the logwood-cutters, see Dampier, Voyages, ed. 1906, ii. pp. 155-56, 178-79, 181 ff.
Footnote 369: (return)Ibid., Nos. 954, 1389. Fernandez Duro (t.v., p. 181) mentions a Spanish ordinance of 22nd February 1674, which authorized Spanish corsairs to go out in the pursuit and punishment of pirates. Periaguas, or large flat-bottomed canoes, were to be constructed for use in shoal waters. They were to be 90 feet long and from 16 to 18 feet wide, with a draught of only 4 or 5 feet, and were to be provided with a long gun in the bow and four smaller pieces in the stern. They were to be propelled by both oars and sails, and were to carry 120 men.
Ibid., Nos. 954, 1389. Fernandez Duro (t.v., p. 181) refers to a Spanish law from February 22, 1674, that permitted Spanish corsairs to pursue and punish pirates. They were to construct large flat-bottomed boats, called periaguas, for operation in shallow waters. These boats were meant to be 90 feet long and 16 to 18 feet wide, with a draft of only 4 or 5 feet. Each would be fitted with a long gun at the front and four smaller guns at the back. The boats would be powered by oars and sails and were designed to carry 120 men.
Footnote 370: (return)C.S.P. Colon., 1669-74, Nos. 950, 1094; Beeston's Journal, Aug. 1679.
C.S.P. Colon., 1669-74, Nos. 950, 1094; Beeston's Journal, August 1679.
Footnote 373: (return)Ibid., No. 526. In significant contrast to Lord Vaughan's praise of Lynch, Sir Henry Morgan, who could have little love for the man who had shipped him and Modyford as prisoners to England, filled the ears of Secretary Williamson with veiled accusations against Lynch of having tampered with the revenues and neglected the defences of the island. (Ibid., No. 521.)
Ibid., No. 526. Unlike Lord Vaughan's support for Lynch, Sir Henry Morgan, who harbored no fondness for the man who sent him and Modyford as prisoners to England, inundated Secretary Williamson with subtle claims against Lynch for manipulating finances and neglecting the island's defenses. (Ibid., No. 521.)
Footnote 374: (return)Ibid., No. 912. In testimony of Lord Vaughan's straightforward policy toward buccaneering, cf. Beeston's Journal, June 1676.
Same source., No. 912. To show Lord Vaughan's strong position on piracy, see Beeston's Journal, June 1676.
Footnote 376: (return)Leeds MSS. (Hist. MSS. Comm., XI. pt. 7, p. 13)—Depositions in which Sir Henry Morgan is represented as endeavouring to hush up the matter, saying "the privateers were poore, honest fellows," to which the plundered captain replied "that he had not found them soe."
Leeds MSS. (Hist. MSS. Comm., XI. pt. 7, p. 13)—Accounts where Sir Henry Morgan is seen attempting to downplay the situation, claiming "the privateers were just poor, honest people," to which the captain who was robbed replied "that he hadn't seen them that way."
Footnote 378: (return)Statutes at Large, vol. ii. (Lond. 1786), pp. 210, 247.
Statutes at Large, vol. ii. (London, 1786), pp. 210, 247.
Footnote 379: (return)C.S.P. Colon., 1675-76; Nos. 993-995, 1001.
C.S.P. Colon., 1675-76; Nos. 993-995, 1001.
Footnote 386: (return)Ibid., No. 1129 (vii., viii.); cf. also No. 657.
Same source., No. 1129 (7, 8); see also No. 657.
Footnote 387: (return)C.S.P. Colon., 1675-76, No. 1129 (xiv., xvii.).
C.S.P. Colon., 1675-76, No. 1129 (xiv., xvii.).
Footnote 389: (return)Ibid., 1677-80, No. 313; cf. also Nos. 478, 486.
Same source, 1677-80, No. 313; see also Nos. 478, 486.
Footnote 390: (return)Ibid., No. 368. A similar proclamation was issued in May 1681; cf. Ibid., 1681-85, No. 102.
Same source., No. 368. A similar statement was made in May 1681; see Same source., 1681-85, No. 102.
Footnote 392: (return)C.S.P. Colon., 1677-80, Nos. 243, 365, 383; Egerton MSS., 2395, f. 591.
C.S.P. Colon., 1677-80, Nos. 243, 365, 383; Egerton MSS., 2395, f. 591.
Footnote 393: (return)In a memoir to Mme. de Montespan, dated 8th July 1677, the population of French San Domingo is given as between four and five thousand, white and black. The colony embraced a strip of coast 80 leagues in length and 9 or 10 miles wide, and it produced 2,000,000 lbs. of tobacco annually. (Bibl. Nat., Nouv. Acq., 9325, f. 258).
In a letter to Madame de Montespan, dated July 8, 1677, it is reported that the population of French San Domingo is between four and five thousand, including both white and black individuals. The colony spanned a coastal area 80 leagues long and 9 or 10 miles wide, producing 2,000,000 pounds of tobacco each year. (Bibl. Nat., Nouv. Acq., 9325, f. 258).
Footnote 394: (return)C.S.P. Colon., 1677-80, Nos. 347, 375, 383, 1497; S.P. Spain, vol. 65, f. 102.
C.S.P. Colon., 1677-80, Nos. 347, 375, 383, 1497; S.P. Spain, vol. 65, f. 102.
Footnote 395: (return)A small island east of Curaçao, in latitude 12° north, longitude 67° 41' west.
A small island situated to the east of Curaçao, at 12° north latitude and 67° 41' west longitude.
Footnote 396: (return)Saint Yves, G. Les campagnes de Jean d'Estrées dans la mer des Antilles, 1676-78; cf. also C.S.P. Colon., 1677-80, Nos. 604, 642, 665, 687-90, 718, 741 (xiv., xv.), 1646-47.
Saint Yves, G. The campaigns of Jean d'Estrées in the Caribbean Sea, 1676-78; see also C.S.P. Colon., 1677-80, Nos. 604, 642, 665, 687-90, 718, 741 (xiv., xv.), 1646-47.
According to one story, the Dutch governor of Curaçao sent out three privateers with orders to attend the French fleet, but to run no risk of capture. The French, discovering them, gave chase, but being unacquainted with those waters were decoyed among the reefs.
According to one account, the Dutch governor of Curaçao sent out three privateers with instructions to keep an eye on the French fleet, but they were to avoid any risk of being captured. When the French discovered them, they pursued, but since they were not familiar with the waters, they were lured among the reefs.
Footnote 398: (return)Dampier says of this occasion: "The privateers ... told me that if they had gone to Jamaica with £30 a man in their Pockets, they could not have enjoyed themselves more. For they kept in a Gang by themselves, and watched when the Ships broke, to get the Goods that came from them; and though much was staved against the Rocks, yet abundance of Wine and Brandy floated over the Riff, where the Privateers waited to take it up. They lived here about three Weeks, waiting an Opportunity to transport themselves back again to Hispaniola; in all which Time they were never without two or three Hogsheads of Wine and Brandy in their Tents, and Barrels of Beef and Pork."—Dampier, ed. 1906, i. p. 81.
Dampier describes this situation: "The privateers... told me that if they had gone to Jamaica with £30 each, they wouldn't have had more fun. They stuck together as a group and waited for ships to wreck so they could collect the goods that came from them; even though a lot was broken against the rocks, a ton of wine and brandy floated over the reef, where the privateers were ready to grab it. They stayed here for about three weeks, looking for a chance to get back to Hispaniola, and during that time, they always had two or three barrels of wine and brandy in their tents, along with barrels of beef and pork."—Dampier, ed. 1906, i. p. 81.
Footnote 399: (return)Charlevoix, op. cit., liv. viii. p. 120.
Charlevoix, op. cit., vol. viii, p. 120.
Footnote 400: (return)Bibl. Nat., Nouv. Acq., 9325, f. 260; Charlevoix, op. cit., liv. viii. p. 122.
Bibl. Nat., Nouv. Acq., 9325, f. 260; Charlevoix, op. cit., vol. viii, p. 122.
Footnote 401: (return)Ibid., p. 119; C.S.P. Colon., 1677-80, Nos. 815, 869; Beeston's Journal, 18th October 1678.
Same source., p. 119; C.S.P. Colon., 1677-80, Nos. 815, 869; Beeston's Journal, October 18, 1678.
Footnote 402: (return)C.S.P. Colon., 1677-80, Nos. 569, 575, 618.
C.S.P. Colon., 1677-80, Nos. 569, 575, 618.
Footnote 405: (return)C.S.P. Colon., 1677-80, Nos. 770, 815, 1516: Beeston's Journal, 18th October 1678.
C.S.P. Colon., 1677-80, Nos. 770, 815, 1516: Beeston's Journal, October 18, 1678.
Footnote 406: (return)The Spanish ambassador, Don Pedro Ronquillo, in his complaint to Charles II. in September 1680, placed the number at 1000. (C.S.P. Colon., 1677-80, No. 1498.)
In September 1680, the Spanish ambassador, Don Pedro Ronquillo, told Charles II that the count was 1000. (C.S.P. Colon., 1677-80, No. 1498.)
Footnote 407: (return)C.S.P. Colon., 1677-80, Nos. 1150, 1188, 1199, 1516; Beeston's Journal, 29th September and 6th October 1678. Lord Carlisle, in answer to the complaints of the Spanish ambassador, pretended ignorance of the source of the indigo thus admitted through the customs, and maintained that it was brought into Port Royal "in lawful ships by lawful men."
C.S.P. Colon., 1677-80, Nos. 1150, 1188, 1199, 1516; Beeston's Journal, September 29 and October 6, 1678. Lord Carlisle, addressing the concerns raised by the Spanish ambassador, said he had no idea where the indigo that passed through customs originated and insisted it was brought to Port Royal "on lawful ships by lawful men."
Footnote 408: (return)Sloane MSS., 2752, f. 29; S.P. Spain, vol. 65, f. 121. According to the latter account, which seems to be derived from a Spanish source, the loss suffered by the city amounted to about 100,000 pieces of eight, over half of which was plunder carried away by the freebooters. Thirteen of the inhabitants were killed and four wounded, and of the buccaneers thirty were killed.
Sloane MSS., 2752, f. 29; S.P. Spain, vol. 65, f. 121. According to this account, which seems to come from a Spanish source, the city's losses amounted to about 100,000 pieces of eight, over half of which was plunder taken by the pirates. Thirteen residents were killed, and four were injured, while thirty of the buccaneers also lost their lives.
Dampier writes concerning this first irruption of the buccaneers into the Pacific:—"Before my first going over into the South Seas with Captain Sharp ... I being then on Board Captain Coxon, in company with 3 or 4 more Privateers, about 4 leagues to the East of Portobel, we took the Pacquets bound thither from Cartagena. We open'd a great quantity of the Merchants Letters, and found ... the Merchants of several parts of Old Spain thereby informing their Correspondents of Panama and elsewhere of a certain Prophecy that went about Spain that year, the Tenour of which was, That there would be English Privateers that Year in the West Indies, who would ... open a Door into the South Seas; which they supposed was fastest shut: and the Letters were accordingly full of Cautions to their Friends to be very watchful and careful of their Coasts.
Dampier describes the first invasion of the buccaneers into the Pacific:—"Before my initial journey to the South Seas with Captain Sharp ... I was aboard with Captain Coxon, along with 3 or 4 other privateers, about 4 leagues east of Portobelo when we intercepted the packets coming from Cartagena. We opened many letters from merchants and discovered ... merchants from various parts of Old Spain warning their contacts in Panama and elsewhere about a certain prophecy that was circulating in Spain that year. It claimed that there would be English privateers in the West Indies that year who would ... open a door into the South Seas, which they believed was firmly closed. The letters were filled with alerts to their friends to be very careful and watchful regarding their coasts.
"This Door they spake of we all concluded must be the Passage over Land through the Country of the Indians of Darien, who were a little before this become our Friends, and had lately fallen out with the Spaniards, ... and upon calling to mind the frequent Invitations we had from these Indians a little before this time, to pass through their Country, and fall upon the Spaniards in the South Seas, we from henceforward began to entertain such thoughts in earnest, and soon came to a Resolution to make those Attempts which we afterwards did, ... so that the taking these Letters gave the first life to those bold undertakings: and we took the advantage of the fears the Spaniards were in from that Prophecy ... for we sealed up most of the Letters again, and sent them ashore to Portobel."—Ed. 1906, I. pp. 200-201.
"This Door they mentioned, we all agreed, must be the route across land through the territory of the Indians of Darien, who had recently become our allies and had just had a dispute with the Spaniards, ... and remembering the numerous invitations we received from these Indians not long before, to cross their land and attack the Spaniards in the South Seas, we began to take those ideas seriously and quickly decided to act on them, ... so that seizing these letters marked the start of those bold ventures: and we capitalized on the fears the Spaniards had because of that prophecy ... as we resealed most of the letters and sent them ashore to Portobel."—Ed. 1906, I. pp. 200-201.
Footnote 413: (return)C.S.P. Colon., 1677-80, Nos. 1344, 1370.
C.S.P. Colon., 1677-80, Nos. 1344, 1370.
Footnote 415: (return)Cf. Archives Coloniales—Correspondance générale de St Domingue, vol. i.; Martinique, vol. iv.
See. Colonial Archives—General Correspondence of St. Domingue, vol. i.; Martinique, vol. iv.
Footnote 416: (return)C.S.P. Colon., 1677-80, Nos. 1420, 1425; Sloane MSS., 2724, f. 3.
C.S.P. Colon., 1677-80, Nos. 1420, 1425; Sloane MSS., 2724, f. 3.
Footnote 417: (return)Sloane MSS., 2724, f. 198.
Sloane MSS., 2724, f. 198.
Coxon probably did not submit, for Dampier tells us that at the end of May 1681, Coxon was lying with seven or eight other privateers at the Samballas, islands on the coast of Darien, with a ship of ten guns and 100 men.—Ed. 1906, i. p. 57.
Coxon likely didn’t surrender, as Dampier notes that by the end of May 1681, Coxon was with seven or eight other privateers at the Samballas, islands off the coast of Darien, commanding a ship armed with ten guns and carrying 100 men.—Ed. 1906, i. p. 57.
Footnote 418: (return)Ibid., f. 200; C.S.P. Colon., 1681-85, Nos. 16, 51, 144, 431. Everson was not shot and killed in the water, as Morgan's account implies, for he flourished for many years afterwards as one of the most notorious of the buccaneer captains.
Ibid., p. 200; C.S.P. Colon., 1681-85, Nos. 16, 51, 144, 431. Everson was not shot and killed in the water, as Morgan's account suggests, because he lived for many years afterward as one of the most notorious buccaneer captains.
Footnote 419: (return)Ringrose's Journal. Cf. also S.P. Spain, vol. 67, f. 169; C.S.P. Colon., 1681-85, No. 872.
Ringrose's Journal. Also see S.P. Spain, vol. 67, f. 169; C.S.P. Colon., 1681-85, No. 872.
Footnote 420: (return)C.S.P. Colon., 1681-85, Nos. 431, 632, 713; Hist. MSS. Commiss., VII., 405 b.
C.S.P. Colon., 1681-85, Nos. 431, 632, 713; Hist. MSS. Commiss., VII., 405 b.
Footnote 421: (return)C.S.P Colon., 1677-80, Nos. 1425, 1462.
C.S.P Colon., 1677-80, Nos. 1425, 1462.
Footnote 423: (return)C.S.P. Colon., 1677-80, Nos. 601, 606, 607, 611; ibid., 1681-85, No. 160; Add. MSS., 22, 676; Acts of Privy Council, Colonial Series I. No. 1203.
C.S.P. Colon., 1677-80, Nos. 601, 606, 607, 611; ibid., 1681-85, No. 160; Add. MSS., 22, 676; Acts of Privy Council, Colonial Series I. No. 1203.
CHAPTER VII
THE BUCCANEERS TURN PIRATE
On 25th May 1682, Sir Thomas Lynch returned to Jamaica as governor of the colony.424 Of the four acting governors since 1671, Lynch stood apart as the one who had endeavoured with singleness and tenacity of purpose to clear away the evils of buccaneering. Lord Vaughan had displayed little sympathy for the corsairs, but he was hampered by an irascible temper, and according to some reports by an avarice which dimmed the lustre of his name. The Earl of Carlisle, if he did not directly encourage the freebooters, had been grossly negligent in the performance of his duty of suppressing them; while Morgan, although in the years 1680 and 1681 he showed himself very zealous in punishing his old associates, cannot escape the suspicion of having secretly aided them under the governorship of Lord Vaughan. The task of Sir Thomas Lynch in 1671 had been a very difficult one. Buccaneering was then at flood-tide; three wealthy Spanish cities on the mainland had in turn been plundered, and the stolen riches carried to Jamaica; the air was alive with the exploits of these irregular warriors, and the pockets of the merchants and tavern-keepers of Port Royal were filled with Spanish doubloons, with emeralds and pearls from New Granada and the coasts of Rio de la Hacha, and with gold and silver plate from the Spanish churches and cathedrals of Porto Bello and Panama. The old governor, Sir Thomas Modyford, had been popular in {233} his person, and his policy had been more popular still. Yet Lynch, by a combination of tact and firmness, and by an untiring activity with the small means at his disposal, had inaugurated a new and revolutionary policy in the island, which it was the duty of his successors merely to continue. In 1682 the problem before him, although difficult, was much simpler. Buccaneering was now rapidly being transformed into pure piracy. By laws and repeated proclamations, the freebooters had been offered an opportunity of returning to civilized pursuits, or of remaining ever thereafter outlawed. Many had come in, some to remain, others to take the first opportunity of escaping again. But many entirely refused to obey the summons, trusting to the protection of the French in Hispaniola, or so hardened to their cruel, remorseless mode of livelihood that they preferred the dangerous risks of outlawry. The temper of the inhabitants of the island, too, had changed. The planters saw more clearly the social and economic evils which the buccaneers had brought upon the island. The presence of these freebooters, they now began to realize, had discouraged planting, frightened away capital, reduced the number of labourers, and increased drunkenness, debauchery and every sort of moral disorder. The assembly and council were now at one with the governor as to the necessity of curing this running sore, and Lynch could act with the assurance which came of the knowledge that he was backed by the conscience of his people.
On May 25, 1682, Sir Thomas Lynch returned to Jamaica as the governor of the colony.424 Among the four acting governors since 1671, Lynch was unique for his dedicated efforts to eradicate the issues caused by buccaneering. Lord Vaughan showed little sympathy for the pirates but was hindered by a short temper and, according to some reports, by greed that tarnished his reputation. The Earl of Carlisle, while not directly supporting the pirates, had been grossly negligent in his duty to suppress them; and Morgan, despite being very active in punishing his former allies in 1680 and 1681, raises suspicion of having secretly helped them during Lord Vaughan's governorship. Sir Thomas Lynch’s challenges in 1671 were significant. Buccaneering was at its peak; three wealthy Spanish cities on the mainland had been looted, and the stolen treasures were brought to Jamaica. The tales of these unconventional warriors filled the air, and the pockets of Port Royal's merchants and tavern owners were stuffed with Spanish doubloons, emeralds and pearls from New Granada, as well as gold and silver artifacts from the Spanish churches and cathedrals of Porto Bello and Panama. The previous governor, Sir Thomas Modyford, was well-liked, and his policies were even more popular. However, through a blend of tact, firmness, and relentless effort with limited resources, Lynch had introduced a new and transformative policy on the island that his successors were expected to continue. By 1682, although the problem he faced was difficult, it was much more straightforward. Buccaneering was swiftly turning into outright piracy. Laws and repeated proclamations had given the pirates a chance to return to lawful pursuits or remain forever outlaws. Many had complied—some stayed, while others took the first chance to escape again. However, many outright refused to heed the call, relying on the protection of the French in Hispaniola, or so accustomed to their brutal way of life that they preferred the perilous life of an outlaw. The mood of the island’s inhabitants had also shifted. The planters began to see more clearly the social and economic problems the pirates had brought to the island. They started to realize that the presence of these pirates had discouraged agricultural development, scared away investment, decreased the labor force, and increased drunkenness, debauchery, and all forms of moral decay. The assembly and council were now united with the governor on the need to address this ongoing issue, allowing Lynch to act with the confidence that stemmed from knowing he had the support of his people.
One of the earliest and most remarkable cases of buccaneer turning pirate was that of "La Trompeuse." In June 1682, before Governor Lynch's arrival in Jamaica, a French captain named Peter Paine (or Le Pain), commander of a merchant ship called "La Trompeuse" belonging to the French King, came to Port Royal from Cayenne in Guiana. He told Sir Henry Morgan and the council that, having heard of the inhuman treatment of {234} his fellow Protestants in France, he had resolved to send back his ship and pay what was due under his contract; and he petitioned for leave to reside with the English and have English protection. The Council, without much inquiry as to the petitioner's antecedents, allowed him to take the oath of allegiance and settle at St. Jago, while his cargo was unloaded and entered customs-free. The ship was then hired by two Jamaican merchants and sent to Honduras to load logwood, with orders to sail eventually for Hamburg and be delivered to the French agent.425 The action of the Council had been very hasty and ill-considered, and as it turned out, led to endless trouble. It soon transpired that Paine did not own the cargo, but had run away with it from Cayenne, and had disposed of both ship and goods in his own interest. The French ambassador in London made complaints to the English King, and letters were sent out to Sir Thomas Lynch and to Governor Stapleton of the Leeward Isles to arrest Paine and endeavour to have the vessel lade only for her right owners.426 Meanwhile a French pirate named Jean Hamlin, with 120 desperadoes at his back, set out in a sloop in pursuit of "La Trompeuse," and coming up with her invited the master and mate aboard his own vessel, and then seized the ship. Carrying the prize to some creek or bay to careen her and fit her up as a man-of-war, he then started out on a mad piratical cruise, took sixteen or eighteen Jamaican vessels, barbarously ill-treated the crews, and demoralized the whole trade of the island.427 Captain Johnson was dispatched by Lynch in a frigate in October 1682 to find and destroy the pirate; but after a fruitless search of two months round Porto Rico and Hispaniola, he returned to {235} Port Royal. In December Lynch learned that "La Trompeuse" was careening in the neighbourhood of the Isle la Vache, and sent out another frigate, the "Guernsey," to seize her; but the wary pirate had in the meantime sailed away. On 15th February the "Guernsey" was again dispatched with positive orders not to stir from the coast of Hispaniola until the pirate was gone or destroyed; and Coxon, who seems to have been in good odour at Port Royal, was sent to offer to a privateer named "Yankey," men, victuals, pardon and naturalization, besides £200 in money for himself and Coxon, if he would go after "La Trompeuse."428 The next news of Hamlin was from the Virgin Islands, where he was received and entertained by the Governor of St. Thomas, a small island belonging to the King of Denmark.429 Making St. Thomas his headquarters, he robbed several English vessels that came into his way, and after first obtaining from the Danish governor a promise that he would find shelter at St. Thomas on his return, stood across for the Gulf of Guinea. In May 1683 Hamlin arrived on the west side of Africa disguised as an English man-of-war, and sailing up and down the coast of Sierra Leone captured or destroyed within several weeks seventeen ships, Dutch and English, robbing them of gold-dust and negroes.430 The pirates then quarrelled over the division of their plunder and separated into two companies, most of the English following a Captain Morgan in one of the prizes, and the rest returning in "La Trompeuse" to the West Indies. The latter arrived at Dominica in July, where forty of the crew deserted the ship, leaving but sixteen white men and twenty-two negroes on board. Finally on the 27th the pirates dropped anchor at St. Thomas. They were admitted and kindly received by the governor, and allowed to bring their plunder ashore.431 {236} Three days later Captain Carlile of H.M.S. "Francis," who had been sent out by Governor Stapleton to hunt for pirates, sailed into the harbour, and on being assured by the pilot and by an English sloop lying at anchor there that the ship before him was the pirate "La Trompeuse," in the night of the following day he set her on fire and blew her up. Hamlin and some of the crew were on board, but after firing a few shots, escaped to the shore. The pirate ship carried thirty-two guns, and if she had not been under-manned Carlile might have encountered a formidable resistance. The Governor of St. Thomas sent a note of protest to Carlile for having, as he said, secretly set fire to a frigate which had been confiscated to the King of Denmark.432 Nevertheless he sent Hamlin and his men for safety in a boat to another part of the island, and later selling him a sloop, let him sail away to join the French buccaneers in Hispaniola.433
One of the earliest and most notable cases of a buccaneer becoming a pirate was that of "La Trompeuse." In June 1682, before Governor Lynch arrived in Jamaica, a French captain named Peter Paine (or Le Pain), who commanded a merchant ship called "La Trompeuse," owned by the French King, came to Port Royal from Cayenne in Guiana. He told Sir Henry Morgan and the council that after hearing about the terrible treatment of his fellow Protestants in France, he decided to send his ship back and fulfill his contract; and he requested permission to live with the English and receive their protection. The Council, without digging into his background, allowed him to take the oath of allegiance and settle in St. Jago while his cargo was unloaded and entered customs-free. The ship was then hired by two Jamaican merchants and sent to Honduras to pick up logwood, with orders to ultimately sail to Hamburg and deliver it to the French agent. The Council's decision turned out to be very rushed and poorly thought out, and it resulted in endless problems. It soon became clear that Paine didn't own the cargo but had stolen it from Cayenne and had sold both the ship and goods for his own benefit. The French ambassador in London complained to the English King, which led to letters being sent to Sir Thomas Lynch and to Governor Stapleton of the Leeward Isles to arrest Paine and ensure the vessel was loaded only for her rightful owners. Meanwhile, a French pirate named Jean Hamlin, backed by 120 criminals, set out in a sloop to chase "La Trompeuse." When he caught up with her, he invited the captain and first mate aboard his ship and then seized the vessel. Taking his prize to a nearby creek or bay to repair and outfit her as a warship, he then embarked on a reckless piratical voyage, capturing sixteen or eighteen Jamaican vessels, treating the crews brutally, and wreaking havoc on the island's commerce. Captain Johnson was dispatched by Lynch in a frigate in October 1682 to find and destroy the pirate; however, after a fruitless two-month search around Puerto Rico and Hispaniola, he returned to Port Royal. In December, Lynch learned that "La Trompeuse" was being repaired near Isle la Vache and sent out another frigate, the "Guernsey," to seize her; but the cautious pirate had already sailed away. On February 15, the "Guernsey" was dispatched again with specific orders not to leave the coast of Hispaniola until the pirate was gone or destroyed; and Coxon, who seemed to be in good favor at Port Royal, was sent to offer a privateer named "Yankey" men, supplies, a pardon, and naturalization in addition to £200 for himself and Coxon if he would go after "La Trompeuse." The next news of Hamlin came from the Virgin Islands, where he was welcomed and entertained by the Governor of St. Thomas, a small island owned by the King of Denmark. Making St. Thomas his base, he robbed several English vessels that came his way, and after securing a promise from the Danish governor that he would find shelter at St. Thomas upon his return, he sailed for the Gulf of Guinea. In May 1683, Hamlin arrived on the west coast of Africa disguised as an English warship and sailed up and down the coast of Sierra Leone, capturing or destroying seventeen ships, Dutch and English, within several weeks, stealing gold dust and enslaved people. The pirates then argued over how to divide their loot and split into two groups, with most of the English following Captain Morgan on one of the prizes, while the rest returned on "La Trompeuse" to the West Indies. The latter arrived in Dominica in July, where forty of the crew deserted the ship, leaving only sixteen white men and twenty-two enslaved people on board. Finally, on the 27th, the pirates anchored at St. Thomas. They were received warmly by the governor and allowed to bring their loot ashore. Three days later, Captain Carlile of H.M.S. "Francis," sent by Governor Stapleton to hunt down pirates, sailed into the harbor, and after being assured by the pilot and an English sloop anchored there that the ship before him was the pirate "La Trompeuse," he set her on fire and blew her up the following night. Hamlin and some crew members were on board but managed to escape to shore after firing a few shots. The pirate ship carried thirty-two guns, and if it had not been undermanned, Carlile could have faced significant resistance. The Governor of St. Thomas protested to Carlile, claiming he had secretly set fire to a frigate that had been confiscated for the King of Denmark. Nevertheless, he sent Hamlin and his men to safety in a boat to another part of the island and later sold him a sloop, allowing him to sail away and join the French buccaneers in Hispaniola.
The Danish governor of St. Thomas, whose name was Adolf Esmit, had formerly been himself a privateer, and had used his popularity on the island to eject from authority his brother Nicholas Esmit, the lawful governor. By protecting and encouraging pirates—for a consideration, of course—he proved a bad neighbour to the surrounding English islands. Although he had but 300 or 350 people on St. Thomas, and most of these British subjects, he laid claim to all the Virgin Islands, harboured runaway servants, seamen and debtors, fitted out pirate vessels with arms and provisions, and refused to restore captured ships and crews {237} which the pirates brought into his port.434 The King of Denmark had sent out a new governor, named Everson, to dispossess Esmit, but he did not arrive in the West Indies until October 1684, when with the assistance of an armed sloop which Sir William Stapleton had been ordered by the English Council to lend him, he took possession of St. Thomas and its pirate governor.435
The Danish governor of St. Thomas, Adolf Esmit, had previously been a privateer and used his popularity on the island to remove his brother, Nicholas Esmit, the rightful governor, from power. By protecting and encouraging pirates—for a price, of course—he was a bad neighbor to the nearby English islands. Even though he only had about 300 or 350 people on St. Thomas, most of whom were British subjects, he claimed authority over all the Virgin Islands, sheltered runaway servants, seamen, and debtors, outfitted pirate ships with weapons and supplies, and refused to return captured ships and crews that the pirates brought to his port. {237} The King of Denmark sent a new governor, Everson, to remove Esmit, but he didn’t arrive in the West Indies until October 1684. With the help of an armed sloop that Sir William Stapleton had been instructed by the English Council to lend him, he took control of St. Thomas and dealt with its pirate governor. 435
A second difficulty encountered by Sir Thomas Lynch, in the first year of his return, was the privateering activity of Robert Clarke, Governor of New Providence, one of the Bahama Islands. Governor Clarke, on the plea of retaliating Spanish outrages, gave letters of marque to several privateers, including Coxon, the same famous chief who in 1680 had led the buccaneers into the South Seas. Coxon carried his commission to Jamaica and showed it to Governor Lynch, who was greatly incensed and wrote to Clarke a vigorous note of reproof.436 To grant such letters of marque was, of course, contrary to the Treaty of Madrid, and by giving the pirates only another {238} excuse for their actions, greatly complicated the task of the Governor of Jamaica. Lynch forwarded Coxon's commission to England, where in August 1682 the proprietors of the Bahama Islands were ordered to attend the council and answer for the misdeeds of their governor.437 The proprietors, however, had already acted on their own initiative, for on 29th July they issued instructions to a new governor, Robert Lilburne, to arrest Clarke and keep him in custody till he should give security to answer accusations in England, and to recall all commissions against the Spaniards.438 The whole trouble, it seems, had arisen over the wreck of a Spanish galleon in the Bahamas, to which Spaniards from St. Augustine and Havana were accustomed to resort to fish for ingots of silver, and from which they had been driven away by the governor and inhabitants of New Providence. The Spaniards had retaliated by robbing vessels sailing to and from the Bahamas, whereupon Clarke, without considering the illegality of his action, had issued commissions of war to privateers.
A second challenge faced by Sir Thomas Lynch during his first year back was the privateering activities of Robert Clarke, the Governor of New Providence, one of the Bahama Islands. Governor Clarke, claiming he was retaliating against Spanish attacks, issued letters of marque to several privateers, including Coxon, the notorious leader who had taken buccaneers to the South Seas in 1680. Coxon brought his commission to Jamaica and showed it to Governor Lynch, who was extremely angry and sent a strong reprimand to Clarke.436 Granting such letters of marque was, of course, against the Treaty of Madrid, and by giving pirates yet another justification for their actions, it severely complicated the work of the Governor of Jamaica. Lynch sent Coxon's commission to England, where in August 1682, the proprietors of the Bahama Islands were ordered to attend the council and explain their governor's wrongdoing.437 However, the proprietors had already taken matters into their own hands; on July 29, they instructed a new governor, Robert Lilburne, to arrest Clarke and hold him in custody until he could provide security to face accusations in England, and to revoke all commissions against the Spaniards.438 The entire situation seems to have stemmed from the wreck of a Spanish galleon in the Bahamas, which Spaniards from St. Augustine and Havana used to frequent to fish for silver ingots, and from which they had been expelled by the governor and residents of New Providence. In retaliation, the Spaniards robbed ships traveling to and from the Bahamas, prompting Clarke, without considering the illegality of his actions, to issue war commissions to privateers.
The Bahamas, however, were a favourite resort for pirates and other men of desperate character, and Lilburne soon discovered that his place was no sinecure. He found it difficult moreover to refrain from hostilities against a neighbour who used every opportunity to harm and plunder his colony. In March 1683, a former privateer named Thomas Pain439 had entered into a conspiracy with four other captains, who were then fishing for silver at the wreck, to seize St. Augustine in Florida. They landed before the city under French colours, but finding the Spaniards {239} prepared for them, gave up the project and looted some small neighbouring settlements. On the return of Pain and two others to New Providence, Governor Lilburne tried to apprehend them, but he failed for lack of means to enforce his authority. The Spaniards, however, were not slow to take their revenge. In the following January they sent 250 men from Havana, who in the early morning surprised and plundered the town and shipping at New Providence, killed three men, and carried away money and provisions to the value of £14,000.440 When Lilburne in February sent to ask the Governor of Havana whether the plunderers had acted under his orders, the Spaniard not only acknowledged it but threatened further hostilities against the English settlement. Indeed, later in the same year the Spaniards returned, this time, it seems, without a commission, and according to report burnt all the houses, murdered the governor in cold blood, and carried many of the women, children and negroes to Havana.441 About 200 of the inhabitants made their way to Jamaica, and a number of the men, thirsting for vengeance, joined the English pirates in the Carolinas.442
The Bahamas, however, were a popular spot for pirates and other desperate characters, and Lilburne quickly realized that his position was anything but easy. He found it hard to avoid conflict with a neighbor who took every chance to harm and loot his colony. In March 1683, a former privateer named Thomas Pain439 teamed up with four other captains, who were fishing for silver at a wreck, to seize St. Augustine in Florida. They landed near the city under French flags, but when they found the Spaniards ready for them, they abandoned the plan and looted some small nearby settlements. Upon Pain and two others returning to New Providence, Governor Lilburne tried to capture them, but he failed due to a lack of means to enforce his authority. However, the Spaniards were quick to take their revenge. The following January, they sent 250 men from Havana, who surprised and raided the town and shipping at New Providence early in the morning, killed three men, and took away money and supplies worth £14,000.440 When Lilburne asked the Governor of Havana in February if the raiders had acted under his orders, the Spaniard not only confirmed it but also threatened further attacks on the English settlement. Indeed, later that same year, the Spaniards returned, this time apparently without a commission, and reportedly burned all the houses, murdered the governor in cold blood, and took many of the women, children, and enslaved individuals to Havana.441 About 200 of the residents made their way to Jamaica, and several men, eager for revenge, joined the English pirates in the Carolinas.442
In French Hispaniola corsairing had been forbidden for several years, yet the French governor found the problem of suppressing the evil even more difficult than it was in Jamaica. M. de Pouançay, the successor of d'Ogeron, died toward the end of 1682 or the beginning of 1683, and in spite of his efforts to establish order in the colony he left it in a deplorable condition. The old fraternity of hunters or cow-killers had almost disappeared; but the corsairs and the planters were strongly united, and galled by the oppression of the West India Company, displayed their strength in a spirit of indocility which caused great embarrassment to the governor. Although in time of {240} peace the freebooters kept the French settlements in continual danger of ruin by reprisal, in time of war they were the mainstay of the colony. As the governor, therefore, was dependent upon them for protection against the English, Spanish and Dutch, although he withdrew their commissions he dared not punish them for their crimes. The French buccaneers, indeed, occupied a curious and anomalous position. They were not ordinary privateers, for they waged war without authority; and they were still less pirates, for they had never been declared outlaws, and they confined their attentions to the Spaniards. They served under conditions which they themselves imposed, or which they deigned to accept, and were always ready to turn against the representatives of authority if they believed they had aught of which to complain.443
In French Hispaniola, corsairing had been banned for several years, yet the French governor found it even more challenging to deal with the issue than it was in Jamaica. M. de Pouançay, who succeeded d'Ogeron, died around the end of 1682 or the start of 1683. Despite his attempts to restore order in the colony, he left it in a terrible state. The old brotherhood of hunters or cow-killers had nearly vanished; however, the corsairs and the planters were closely aligned and, frustrated by the West India Company's oppression, showed their strength through a rebellious spirit that caused significant trouble for the governor. Although in peacetime the freebooters kept French settlements constantly at risk of destruction by retaliation, in wartime they were the backbone of the colony. As a result, the governor relied on them for protection against the English, Spanish, and Dutch. Although he revoked their commissions, he didn’t dare punish them for their offenses. The French buccaneers held a strange and unusual position. They weren't typical privateers, as they waged war without official approval; even more so, they weren’t pirates because they had never been labeled outlaws, and they focused solely on attacking the Spaniards. They operated under terms they set themselves or reluctantly accepted and were always prepared to turn against authorities if they felt they had any grievances.
The buccaneers almost invariably carried commissions from the governors of French Hispaniola, but they did not scruple to alter the wording of their papers, so that a permission to privateer for three months was easily transformed into a licence to plunder for three years. These papers, moreover, were passed about from one corsair to another, until long after the occasion for their issue had ceased to exist. Thus in May or June of 1680, de Grammont, on the strength of an old commission granted him by de Pouançay before the treaty of Nimuegen, had made a brilliant night assault upon La Guayra, the seaport of Caracas. Of his 180 followers only forty-seven took part in the actual seizure of the town, which was amply protected by two forts and by cannon upon the walls. On the following day, however, he received word that 2000 men were approaching from Caracas, and as the enemy {241} were also rallying in force in the vicinity of the town he was compelled to retire to the ships. This movement was executed with difficulty, and for two hours de Grammont with a handful of his bravest companions covered the embarkation from the assaults of the Spaniards. Although he himself was dangerously wounded in the throat, he lost only eight or nine men in the whole action. He carried away with him the Governor of La Guayra and many other prisoners, but the booty was small. De Grammont retired to the Isle d'Aves to nurse his wound, and after a long convalescence returned to Petit Goave.444
The buccaneers usually had commissions from the governors of French Hispaniola, but they didn't hesitate to change the wording of their documents, turning a three-month privateering permission into a license to loot for three years. Furthermore, these documents were circulated among corsairs long after they were originally issued. So, in May or June of 1680, de Grammont, relying on an old commission granted to him by de Pouançay before the Treaty of Nijmegen, launched a daring nighttime attack on La Guayra, the port of Caracas. Out of his 180 followers, only forty-seven participated in the actual capture of the town, which was well-defended by two forts and cannons on the walls. The next day, he learned that 2,000 men were coming from Caracas, and since the enemy was also gathering nearby, he had to retreat to the ships. This maneuver was challenging, and for two hours, de Grammont and a handful of his bravest companions protected the evacuation from the Spanish attacks. Although he was severely wounded in the throat, he lost only eight or nine men in the entire engagement. He managed to take the Governor of La Guayra and several other prisoners with him, but the loot was minimal. De Grammont went to Isle d'Aves to recover from his injury and returned to Petit Goave after a long convalescence.444
In 1683, however, these filibusters of Hispaniola carried out a much larger design upon the coasts of New Spain. In April of that year eight buccaneer captains made a rendezvous in the Gulf of Honduras for the purpose of attacking Vera Cruz. The leaders of the party were two Dutchmen named Vanhorn and Laurens de Graff. Of the other six captains, three were Dutch, one was French, and two were English. Vanhorn himself had sailed from England in the autumn of 1681 in command of a merchant ship called the "Mary and Martha," alias the "St. Nicholas." He soon, however, revealed the rogue he was by turning two of his merchants ashore at Cadiz and stealing four Spanish guns. He then sailed to the Canaries and to the coast of Guinea, plundering ships and stealing negroes, and finally, in November 1682, arrived at the city of San Domingo, where he tried to dispose of his black cargo. From San Domingo he made for Petit Goave picked up 300 men, and sailed to join Laurens in the Gulf of Honduras.445 Laurens, too, had distinguished himself but a short time before by capturing a Spanish ship bound from Havana for San Domingo and Porto Rico with about 120,000 pieces of eight to pay off the soldiers. The freebooters {242} had shared 700 pieces of eight per man, and carrying their prize to Petit Goave had compounded with the French governor for a part of the booty.446
In 1683, however, these raiders from Hispaniola had a much bigger plan targeting the coasts of New Spain. In April of that year, eight pirate captains gathered in the Gulf of Honduras to attack Vera Cruz. The leaders of this group were two Dutchmen named Vanhorn and Laurens de Graff. Of the other six captains, three were Dutch, one was French, and two were English. Vanhorn had set sail from England in the fall of 1681 commanding a merchant ship called the "Mary and Martha," also known as the "St. Nicholas." However, he soon showed his true colors by abandoning two of his merchants at Cadiz and stealing four Spanish cannons. He then headed to the Canaries and the coast of Guinea, raiding ships and enslaving people, and finally, in November 1682, arrived in the city of San Domingo, where he tried to sell his cargo of enslaved people. From San Domingo, he went to Petit Goave, gathered 300 men, and sailed to join Laurens in the Gulf of Honduras.445 Laurens had also made a name for himself not long before by capturing a Spanish ship that was on its way from Havana to San Domingo and Puerto Rico, carrying around 120,000 pieces of eight meant to pay the soldiers. The pirates had split 700 pieces of eight each among themselves and, after bringing their prize to Petit Goave, had negotiated with the French governor for a share of the loot.446
The buccaneers assembled near Cape Catoche to the number of about 1000 men, and sailed in the middle of May for Vera Cruz. Learning from some prisoners that the Spaniards on shore were expecting two ships from Caracas, they crowded the landing party of about 800 upon two of their vessels, displayed the Spanish colours, and stood in for the city. The unfortunate inhabitants mistook them for their own people, and even lighted fires to pilot them in. The pirates landed at midnight on 17th May about two miles from the town, and by daybreak had possession of the city and its forts. They found the soldiers and sentinels asleep, and "all the people in the houses as quiet and still as if in their graves." For four days they held the place, plundering the churches, houses and convents; and not finding enough plate and jewels to meet their expectations, they threatened to burn the cathedral and all the prisoners within it, unless a ransom was brought in from the surrounding country. The governor, Don Luis de Cordova, was on the third day discovered by an Englishman hidden in the hay in a stable, and was ransomed for 70,000 pieces of eight. Meanwhile the Spanish Flota of twelve or fourteen ships from Cadiz had for two days been lying outside the harbour and within sight of the city; yet it did not venture to land or to attack the empty buccaneer vessels. The proximity of such an armament, however, made the freebooters uneasy, especially as the Spanish viceroy was approaching with an army from the direction of Mexico. On the fourth day, therefore, they sailed away in the very face of the Flota to a neighbouring cay, where they divided the pillage into a thousand or more shares of 800 pieces of eight each. {243} Vanhorn alone is said to have received thirty shares for himself and his two ships. He and Laurens, who had never been on good terms, quarrelled and fought over the division, and Vanhorn was wounded in the wrist. The wound seemed very slight, however, and he proposed to return and attack the Spanish fleet, offering to board the "Admiral" himself; but Laurens refused, and the buccaneers sailed away, carrying with them over 1000 slaves. The invaders, according to report, had lost but four men in the action. About a fortnight later Vanhorn died of gangrene in his wound, and de Grammont, who was then acting as his lieutenant, carried his ship back to Petit Goave, where Laurens and most of the other captains had already arrived.447
The buccaneers gathered near Cape Catoche, about 1,000 men in total, and set sail for Vera Cruz in mid-May. After learning from some captured individuals that the Spaniards onshore were waiting for two ships from Caracas, they packed around 800 men onto two of their ships, raised the Spanish flag, and headed toward the city. The unfortunate locals mistook them for their own and even lit fires to guide them in. The pirates landed at midnight on May 17, about two miles from the town, and by dawn had taken control of the city and its forts. They found the soldiers and guards asleep, and "all the people in the houses as quiet and still as if in their graves." They held the city for four days, robbing churches, homes, and convents. When they didn't find as much gold and jewels as they expected, they threatened to burn the cathedral and all the prisoners inside unless a ransom was brought from nearby towns. On the third day, Governor Don Luis de Cordova was found by an Englishman hiding in the hay in a stable and was ransomed for 70,000 pieces of eight. During this time, the Spanish Flota, made up of twelve or fourteen ships from Cadiz, had been sitting just outside the harbor, visible from the city, yet it didn’t attempt to land or attack the deserted buccaneer ships. However, the presence of such a fleet made the pirates anxious, especially with the Spanish viceroy coming with an army from Mexico. Therefore, on the fourth day, they sailed away right in front of the Flota to a nearby cay, where they divided the loot into over 1,000 shares of 800 pieces of eight each. {243} Vanhorn is said to have received thirty shares for himself and his two ships. He and Laurens, who had never gotten along well, argued and fought over the division, and Vanhorn was injured in the wrist. The wound seemed minor, though, and he suggested returning to attack the Spanish fleet, even offering to board the "Admiral" himself; but Laurens declined, and the buccaneers sailed away with over 1,000 slaves. Reports indicated that the invaders lost only four men in the skirmish. Around two weeks later, Vanhorn died of gangrene from his wound, and de Grammont, who was then acting as his lieutenant, took his ship back to Petit Goave, where Laurens and most of the other captains had already arrived.447
The Mexican fleet, which returned to Cadiz on 18th December, was only half its usual size because of the lack of a market after the visit of the corsairs; and the Governor of Vera Cruz was sentenced to lose his head for his remissness in defending the city.448 The Spanish ambassador in London, Ronquillo, requested Charles II. to command Sir Thomas Lynch to co-operate with a commissioner whom the Spanish Government was sending to the West Indies to inquire into this latest outrage of the buccaneers, and such orders were dispatched to Lynch in April 1684.449
The Mexican fleet returned to Cadiz on December 18th, but it was only half its usual size due to a lack of market after the corsairs' visit. The Governor of Vera Cruz was sentenced to death for his failure to defend the city.448 The Spanish ambassador in London, Ronquillo, asked Charles II to instruct Sir Thomas Lynch to work with a commissioner that the Spanish Government was sending to the West Indies to investigate the latest attack by the buccaneers. Those orders were sent to Lynch in April 1684.449
M. de Cussy, who had been appointed by the French {244} King to succeed his former colleague, de Pouançay, arrived at Petit Goave in April 1684, and found the buccaneers on the point of open revolt because of the efforts of de Franquesnay, the temporary governor, to enforce the strict orders from France for their suppression.450 De Cussy visited all parts of the colony, and by tact, patience and politic concessions succeeded in restoring order. He knew that in spite of the instructions from France, so long as he was surrounded by jealous neighbours, and so long as the peace in Europe remained precarious, the safety of French Hispaniola depended on his retaining the presence and good-will of the sea-rovers; and when de Grammont and several other captains demanded commissions against the Spaniards, the governor finally consented on condition that they persuade all the freebooters driven away by de Franquesnay to return to the colony. Two commissioners, named Begon and St. Laurent, arrived in August 1684 to aid him in reforming this dissolute society, but they soon came to the same conclusions as the governor, and sent a memoir to the French King advising less severe measures. The king did not agree with their suggestion of compromise, and de Cussy, compelled to deal harshly with the buccaneers, found his task by no means an easy one.451 Meanwhile, however, many of the freebooters, seeing the determined attitude of the {245} established authorities, decided to transfer their activities to the Pacific coasts of America, where they would be safe from interference on the part of the English or French Governments. The expedition of Harris, Coxon, Sharp and their associates across the isthmus in 1680 had kindled the imaginations of the buccaneers with the possibilities of greater plunder and adventure in these more distant regions. Other parties, both English and French, speedily followed in their tracks, and after 1683 it became the prevailing practice for buccaneers to make an excursion into the South Seas. The Darien Indians and their fiercer neighbours, the natives of the Mosquito Coast, who were usually at enmity with the Spaniards, allied themselves with the freebooters, and the latter, in their painful marches through the dense tropical wilderness of these regions, often owed it to the timely aid and friendly offices of the natives that they finally succeeded in reaching their goal.
M. de Cussy, who was appointed by the French King to take over from his former colleague, de Pouançay, arrived at Petit Goave in April 1684. He found the buccaneers on the verge of open rebellion due to the efforts of de Franquesnay, the temporary governor, to enforce strict orders from France to suppress them. De Cussy traveled throughout the colony and, through tact, patience, and strategic concessions, managed to restore order. He understood that despite the instructions from France, as long as he was surrounded by jealous neighbors and the peace in Europe remained unstable, the safety of French Hispaniola relied on maintaining the presence and goodwill of the sea rovers. When de Grammont and several other captains requested commissions against the Spaniards, the governor eventually agreed on the condition that they convince all the freebooters who had been driven away by de Franquesnay to return to the colony. Two commissioners, Begon and St. Laurent, arrived in August 1684 to assist him in reforming this unruly society, but they quickly reached the same conclusions as the governor and sent a memo to the French King recommending less harsh measures. The king did not agree with their suggestion for compromise, and de Cussy, forced to deal strictly with the buccaneers, found his job far from easy. Meanwhile, many of the freebooters, seeing the determined stance of the established authorities, decided to shift their activities to the Pacific coasts of America, where they would be safe from interference by the English or French governments. The expedition of Harris, Coxon, Sharp, and their associates across the isthmus in 1680 had sparked the imaginations of buccaneers with dreams of greater plunder and adventure in these distant lands. Other groups, both English and French, quickly followed in their footsteps, and after 1683 it became common for buccaneers to venture into the South Seas. The Darien Indians and their fiercer neighbors, the natives of the Mosquito Coast, who were typically at odds with the Spaniards, allied themselves with the freebooters. The latter, during their difficult marches through the dense tropical wilderness of these areas, often relied on the timely assistance and friendly support of the natives to ultimately reach their destination.
In the summer of 1685, a year after the arrival of de Cussy in Hispaniola, de Grammont and Laurens de Graff united their forces again at the Isle la Vache, and in spite of the efforts of the governor to persuade them to renounce their project, sailed with 1100 men for the coasts of Campeache. An attempt on Merida was frustrated by the Spaniards, but Campeache itself was occupied after a feeble resistance, and remained in possession of the French for six weeks. After reducing the city to ashes and blowing up the fortress, the invaders retired to Hispaniola.452 According to Charlevoix, before the buccaneers sailed away they celebrated the festival of St. Louis by a huge bonfire in honour of the king, in which they burnt logwood to the value of 200,000 crowns, representing the greater part of their booty. The Spaniards of Hispaniola, who kept up a constant desultory warfare with their {246} French neighbours, were incited by the ravages of the buccaneers in the South Seas, and by the sack of Vera Cruz and Campeache, to renewed hostilities; and de Cussy, anxious to attach to himself so enterprising and daring a leader as de Grammont, obtained for him, in September 1686, the commission of "Lieutenant de Roi" of the coast of San Domingo. Grammont, however, on learning of his new honour, wished to have a last fling at the Spaniards before he settled down to respectability. He armed a ship, sailed away with 180 men, and was never heard of again.453 At the same time Laurens de Graff was given the title of "Major," and he lived to take an active part in the war against the English between 1689 and 1697.454
In the summer of 1685, a year after de Cussy arrived in Hispaniola, de Grammont and Laurens de Graff joined forces again at Isle la Vache. Despite the governor's attempts to persuade them to abandon their plan, they sailed with 1,100 men to the coasts of Campeche. An attack on Merida was thwarted by the Spaniards, but they managed to capture Campeche after minimal resistance, holding it for six weeks. After reducing the city to ashes and blowing up the fortress, the invaders retreated to Hispaniola.452 According to Charlevoix, before the buccaneers left, they celebrated the festival of St. Louis with a massive bonfire in honor of the king, burning logwood worth 200,000 crowns, which represented most of their loot. The Spaniards of Hispaniola, who maintained a constant, sporadic conflict with their French neighbors, were encouraged by the destruction caused by the buccaneers in the South Seas, and by the looting of Vera Cruz and Campeche, to resume hostilities. De Cussy, eager to align himself with an adventurous and fearless leader like de Grammont, secured him the commission of "Lieutenant de Roi" of the coast of San Domingo in September 1686. However, upon learning of his new position, Grammont wanted to have one last go at the Spaniards before settling into a respectable life. He armed a ship, set sail with 180 men, and was never heard from again.453 At the same time, Laurens de Graff received the title of "Major" and lived to play an active role in the war against the English from 1689 to 1697.454
These semi-pirates, whom the French governor dared {247} not openly support yet feared to disavow, were a constant source of trouble to the Governor of Jamaica. They did not scruple to attack English traders and fishing sloops, and when pursued took refuge in Petit Goave, the port in the cul-de-sac at the west end of Hispaniola which had long been a sanctuary of the freebooters, and which paid little respect to the authority of the royal governor.455 In Jamaica they believed that the corsairs acted under regular commissions from the French authorities, and Sir Thomas Lynch sent repeated complaints to de Pouançay and to his successor. He also wrote to England begging the Council to ascertain from the French ambassador whether these governors had authority to issue commissions of war, so that his frigates might be able to distinguish between the pirate and the lawful privateer.456 Except at {248} Petit Goave, however, the French were really desirous of preserving peace with Jamaica, and did what they could to satisfy the demands of the English without unduly irritating the buccaneers. They were in the same position as Lynch in 1671, who, while anxious to do justice to the Spaniards, dared not immediately alienate the freebooters who plundered them, and who might, if driven away, turn their arms against Jamaica. Vanhorn himself, it seems, when he left Hispaniola to join Laurens in the Gulf of Honduras, had been sent out by de Pouançay really to pursue "La Trompeuse" and other pirates, and his lieutenant, de Grammont, delivered letters to Governor Lynch to that effect; but once out of sight he steered directly for Central America, where he anticipated a more profitable game than pirate-hunting.457
These semi-pirates, whom the French governor didn’t openly support but was too afraid to reject, constantly caused trouble for the Governor of Jamaica. They didn't hesitate to attack English traders and fishing boats, and when chased, they sought refuge in Petit Goave, the port in the cul-de-sac at the west end of Hispaniola that had long been a hideout for freebooters and showed little respect for the royal governor's authority.455 In Jamaica, they believed that the corsairs were operating under official commissions from the French authorities, and Sir Thomas Lynch repeatedly complained to de Pouançay and his successor. He also wrote to England asking the Council to find out from the French ambassador whether these governors had the authority to issue war commissions so that his frigates could differentiate between pirates and lawful privateers.456 However, except at Petit Goave, the French genuinely wanted to keep the peace with Jamaica and did what they could to meet the English demands without overly irritating the buccaneers. They were in the same predicament as Lynch in 1671, who, while eager to do right by the Spaniards, couldn't afford to alienate the freebooters who raided them, as the freebooters might turn their attacks against Jamaica if pushed away. Vanhorn himself, it seems, when he left Hispaniola to join Laurens in the Gulf of Honduras, had actually been sent by de Pouançay to pursue "La Trompeuse" and other pirates, and his lieutenant, de Grammont, delivered letters to Governor Lynch to that effect; but once he was out of sight, he headed straight for Central America, where he expected to find a more profitable venture than chasing pirates.457
On the 24th of August 1684 Sir Thomas Lynch died in Jamaica, and Colonel Hender Molesworth, by virtue of his commission as lieutenant-governor, assumed the authority.458 Sir Henry Morgan, who had remained lieutenant-governor when Lynch returned to Jamaica, had afterwards been suspended from the council and from all other public employments on charges of drunkenness, disorder, and encouraging disloyalty to the government. His brother-in-law, Byndloss, was dismissed for similar reasons, and Roger Elletson, who belonged to the same faction, was removed from his office as attorney-general of the island. Lynch had had the support of both the assembly and the council, and his actions were at once confirmed {249} in England.459 The governor, however, although he had enjoyed the confidence of most of the inhabitants, who looked upon him as the saviour of the island, left behind in the persons of Morgan, Elletson and their roystering companions, a group of implacable enemies, who did all in their power to vilify his memory to the authorities in England. Several of these men, with Elletson at their head, accused the dead governor of embezzling piratical goods which had been confiscated to the use of the king; but when inquiry was made by Lieutenant-Governor Molesworth, the charges fell to the ground. Elletson's information was found to be second-hand and defective, and Lynch's name was more than vindicated. Indeed, the governor at his death had so little ready means that his widow was compelled to borrow £500 to pay for his funeral.460
On August 24, 1684, Sir Thomas Lynch died in Jamaica, and Colonel Hender Molesworth, as lieutenant-governor, took over the authority.458 Sir Henry Morgan, who had been lieutenant-governor when Lynch returned to Jamaica, was later suspended from the council and all other public jobs due to accusations of drunkenness, disorder, and promoting disloyalty to the government. His brother-in-law, Byndloss, was let go for similar reasons, and Roger Elletson, who was part of the same faction, was removed from his position as attorney-general of the island. Lynch had the backing of both the assembly and the council, and his actions were immediately approved in England.{249} The governor, however, although he had the trust of most residents, who saw him as the island's savior, left behind a group of relentless enemies in Morgan, Elletson, and their rowdy associates, who did everything they could to tarnish his legacy with the authorities in England. Several of these men, led by Elletson, accused the deceased governor of stealing piratical goods that had been seized for the king; but when Lieutenant-Governor Molesworth investigated, the charges were proven false. Elletson's claims were found to be second-hand and flawed, and Lynch's name was more than cleared. In fact, at the time of his death, the governor had so little money that his widow had to borrow £500 to cover his funeral expenses.460
The last years of Sir Thomas Lynch's life had been troublous ones. Not only had the peace of the island been disturbed by "La Trompeuse" and other French corsairs which hovered about Hispaniola; not only had his days been embittered by strife with a small, drunken, insolent faction which tried to belittle his attempts to introduce order and sobriety into the colony; but the hostility of the Spanish governors in the West Indies still continued to neutralize his efforts to root out buccaneering. Lynch had in reality been the best friend of the Spaniards in America. He had strictly forbidden the cutting of logwood in Campeache and Honduras, when the Spaniards were outraging and enslaving every Englishman they found upon those coasts;461 he had sent word to the Spanish governors of the intended sack of {250} Vera Cruz;462 he had protected Spanish merchant ships with his own men-of-war and hospitably received them in Jamaican ports. Yet Spanish corsairs continued to rob English vessels, and Spanish governors refused to surrender English ships and goods which were carried into their ports.463 On the plea of punishing interlopers they armed small galleys and ordered them to take all ships which had on board any products of the Indies.464 Letters to the governors at Havana and St. Jago de Cuba were of no avail. English trade routes were interrupted and dangerous, the turtling, trading and fishing sloops, which supplied a great part of the food of Jamaica, were robbed and seized, and Lynch was compelled to construct a galley of fifty oars for their protection.465 Pirates, it is true, were frequently brought into Port Royal by the small frigates employed by the governor, and there were numerous executions;466 yet the outlaws seemed to increase daily. Some black vessel was generally found hovering about the island ready to pick up any who wished to join it, and when the runaways were prevented from returning by the statute against piracy, they retired to the Carolinas or to New England to dispose of their loot and refit their ships.467 When such retreats were available the laws against piracy did not reduce buccaneering so much as they depopulated Jamaica of its white inhabitants.
The last years of Sir Thomas Lynch's life were full of troubles. Not only was the peace of the island disrupted by "La Trompeuse" and other French pirates lurking around Hispaniola, but he also faced conflicts with a small, drunken, rude group that undermined his efforts to bring order and sobriety to the colony. Additionally, the hostility from the Spanish governors in the West Indies continued to sabotage his attempts to eliminate piracy. In fact, Lynch had been the best ally the Spaniards had in America. He had strictly banned the cutting of logwood in Campeachy and Honduras, even when the Spaniards were mistreating and enslaving every Englishman they encountered on those coasts;461 he notified the Spanish governors about the planned raid on {250} Vera Cruz;462 he protected Spanish merchant ships with his own warships and welcomed them into Jamaican ports. Yet, Spanish pirates continued to steal from English ships, and the Spanish governors refused to return English vessels and goods that had been taken into their ports.463 Under the pretense of punishing interlopers, they armed small galleys and ordered them to capture any ships carrying products from the Indies.464 Letters sent to the governors in Havana and St. Jago de Cuba were useless. English trade routes became unsafe, the turtling, trading, and fishing boats that provided much of Jamaica's food were robbed and seized, and Lynch had to build a 50-oar galley for their protection.465 It is true that pirates were often brought into Port Royal by the small frigates the governor used, and there were many executions;466 yet the number of outlaws seemed to grow every day. A black ship was usually found lurking around the island, ready to pick up anyone wanting to join, and when the runaway pirates were stopped from returning due to anti-piracy laws, they moved to the Carolinas or New England to sell their loot and repair their ships.467 As long as such refuges existed, the laws against piracy did little to curb buccaneering and instead thinned out Jamaica's white population.
After 1680, indeed, the North American colonies became more and more the resort of the pirates who were being driven from West Indian waters by the stern {251} measures of the English governors. Michel Landresson, alias Breha, who had accompanied Pain in his expedition against St. Augustine in 1683, and who had been a constant source of worriment to the Jamaicans because of his attacks on the fishing sloops, sailed to Boston and disposed of his booty of gold, silver, jewels and cocoa to the godly New England merchants, who were only too ready to take advantage of so profitable a trade and gladly fitted him out for another cruise.468 Pain himself appeared in Rhode Island, displayed the old commission to hunt for pirates given him by Sir Thomas Lynch, and was protected by the governor against the deputy-collector of customs, who endeavoured to seize him and his ship.469 The chief resort of the pirates, however, was the colony of Carolina. Indented by numerous harbours and inlets, the shores of Carolina had always afforded a safe refuge for refitting and repairing after a cruise, and from 1670 onwards, when the region began to be settled by colonists from England, the pirates found in the new communities a second Jamaica, where they could sell their cargoes and often recruit their forces. In the latter part of 1683 Sir Thomas Lynch complained to the Lords of the Committee for Trade and Plantations;470 and in February of the following year the king, at the suggestion of the committee, ordered that a draft of the Jamaican law against pirates be sent to all the plantations in America, to be passed and enforced in each as a statute of the {252} province.471 On 12th March 1684 a general proclamation was issued by the king against pirates in America, and a copy forwarded to all the colonial governors for publication and execution.472 Nevertheless in Massachusetts, in spite of these measures and of a letter from the king warning the governors to give no succour or aid to any of the outlaws, Michel had been received with open arms, the proclamation of 12th March was torn down in the streets, and the Jamaica Act, though passed, was never enforced.473 In the Carolinas, although the Lords Proprietors wrote urging the governors to take every care that no pirates were entertained in the colony, the Act was not passed until November 1685.474 There were few, if any, convictions, and the freebooters plied their trade with the same security as before. Toward the end of 1686 three galleys from St. Augustine landed about 150 men, Spaniards, Indians and mulattos, a few leagues below Charleston, and laid waste several plantations, including that of Governor Moreton. The enemy pushed on to Port Royal, completely destroyed the Scotch colony there, and retired before a force could be raised to oppose them. To avenge this inroad the inhabitants immediately began preparations for a descent upon St. Augustine; and an expedition consisting of two French privateering vessels and about 500 men was organized and about to sail, when a new governor, James Colleton, arrived and ordered it to disband.475 Colleton was instructed to arrest Governor Moreton on the charge of encouraging piracy, and to punish those who entertained and abetted the freebooters;476 and on 12th February 1687 he had a new and more explicit law to suppress the evil enacted by {253} the assembly.477 On 22nd May of the same year James II. renewed the proclamation for the suppression of pirates, and offered pardon to all who surrendered within a limited time and gave security for future good behaviour.478 The situation was so serious, however, that in August the king commissioned Sir Robert Holmes to proceed with a squadron to the West Indies and make short work of the outlaws;479 and in October he issued a circular to all the governors in the colonies, directing the most stringent enforcement of the laws, "a practice having grown up of bringing pirates to trial before the evidence was ready, and of using other evasions to insure their acquittal."480 On the following 20th January another proclamation was issued by James to insure the co-operation of the governors with Sir Robert Holmes and his agents.481 The problem, however, was more difficult than the king had anticipated. The presence of the fleet upon the coast stopped the evil for a time, but a few years later, especially in the Carolinas under the administration of Governor Ludwell (1691-1693), the pirates again increased in numbers and in boldness, and Charleston was completely overrun with the freebooters, who, with the connivance of the merchants and a free display of gold, set the law at defiance.
After 1680, the North American colonies increasingly became a hideout for pirates who were being forced out of West Indian waters by the strict actions of the English governors. Michel Landresson, also known as Breha, who had joined Pain in his expedition against St. Augustine in 1683, had been a constant headache for the Jamaicans due to his attacks on fishing boats. He sailed to Boston and sold his loot of gold, silver, jewels, and cocoa to the devout New England merchants, who eagerly took advantage of such a lucrative trade and gladly equipped him for another voyage. Pain himself appeared in Rhode Island, showed the old commission he received from Sir Thomas Lynch to hunt for pirates, and was protected by the governor from the deputy-collector of customs, who was trying to seize him and his ship. However, the main refuge for pirates was the colony of Carolina. With its many harbors and inlets, the shores of Carolina had always offered a safe haven for repairs after a voyage, and starting in 1670, when the area began to be settled by colonists from England, pirates discovered in the new communities a second Jamaica, where they could sell their cargoes and often recruit new crew members. In late 1683, Sir Thomas Lynch complained to the Lords of the Committee for Trade and Plantations; and in February of the following year, the king, following the committee's suggestion, ordered that a copy of the Jamaican law against pirates be sent to all the plantations in America, to be adopted and enforced in each as a statute of the province. On March 12, 1684, a general proclamation was issued by the king against pirates in America, and a copy was sent to all the colonial governors for announcement and enforcement. Nevertheless, in Massachusetts, despite these measures and a letter from the king instructing the governors not to provide any support to outlaws, Michel was welcomed with open arms, the proclamation from March 12 was torn down in the streets, and although the Jamaica Act was passed, it was never enforced. In the Carolinas, even though the Lords Proprietors wrote urging the governors to ensure that no pirates were allowed in the colony, the Act was not passed until November 1685. There were few, if any, convictions, and the pirates operated with the same impunity as before. Toward the end of 1686, three galleys from St. Augustine landed around 150 men—Spaniards, Indians, and mulattos—a few leagues below Charleston, and raided several plantations, including Governor Moreton's. The enemy moved on to Port Royal, completely destroyed the Scottish colony there, and retreated before a force could be raised to confront them. To retaliate for this incursion, the residents quickly began preparations for an attack on St. Augustine; and an expedition consisting of two French privateering ships and about 500 men was organized and about to set sail when a new governor, James Colleton, arrived and ordered it to be disbanded. Colleton was instructed to arrest Governor Moreton for encouraging piracy and to punish those who supported and aided the pirates; and on February 12, 1687, he had a new and clearer law enacted by the assembly to combat this issue. On May 22 of the same year, James II renewed the proclamation to suppress pirates and offered a pardon to all who surrendered within a limited time and provided guarantees for future good behavior. However, the situation was so critical that in August the king commissioned Sir Robert Holmes to go to the West Indies with a squadron and deal decisively with the outlaws; and in October he sent a circular to all the governors in the colonies, directing them to strictly enforce the laws, noting that "a practice has developed of bringing pirates to trial before the evidence was ready and using other loopholes to ensure their acquittal." On January 20 of the following year, another proclamation was issued by James to ensure collaboration between the governors and Sir Robert Holmes and his agents. The challenge, however, was more complicated than the king had expected. The fleet's presence along the coast temporarily curtailed the problem, but a few years later, especially in the Carolinas under Governor Ludwell's administration (1691-1693), pirate numbers and audacity surged again, and Charleston became completely overrun with pirates, who, with the merchants' complicity and flaunting their gold, openly defied the law.
In Jamaica Lieutenant-Governor Molesworth continued in the policy and spirit of his predecessor. He sent a frigate to the Bay of Darien to visit Golden Isle and the Isle of Pines (where the buccaneers were accustomed to make their rendezvous when they crossed over to the South Seas), with orders to destroy any piratical craft in that vicinity, and he made every exertion to {254} prevent recruits from leaving Jamaica.482 The stragglers who returned from the South Seas he arrested and executed, and he dealt severely with those who received and entertained them.483 By virtue of the king's proclamation of 1684, he had the property in Port Royal belonging to men then in the South Seas forfeited to the crown.484 A Captain Bannister, who in June 1684 had run away from Port Royal on a privateering venture with a ship of thirty guns, had been caught and brought back by the frigate "Ruby," but when put on trial for piracy was released by the grand jury on a technicality. Six months later Bannister managed to elude the forts a second time, and for two years kept dodging the frigates which Molesworth sent in pursuit of him. Finally, in January 1687, Captain Spragge sailed into Port Royal with the buccaneer and three of his companions hanging at the yard-arms, "a spectacle of great satisfaction to all good people, and of terror to the favourers of pirates."485 It was during the government of Molesworth that the "Biscayners" began to appear in American waters. These privateers from the Bay of Biscay seem to have been taken into the King of Spain's service to hunt pirates, but they interrupted English trade more than the pirates did. They captured and plundered English merchantmen right and left, and carried them to Cartagena, Vera Cruz, San Domingo and other Spanish ports, where the governors took charge of their prisoners and allowed them to dispose of their captured goods. They held their commissions, it seems, {255} directly from the Crown, and so pretended to be outside the pale of the authority of the Spanish governors. The latter, at any rate, declared that they could give no redress, and themselves complained to the authorities in Jamaica of the independence of these marauders.486 In December 1688 the king issued a warrant to the Governor of Jamaica authorizing him to suppress the Biscayans with the royal frigates.487
In Jamaica, Lieutenant-Governor Molesworth continued the policies and approach of his predecessor. He sent a frigate to the Bay of Darien to visit Golden Isle and the Isle of Pines (where the buccaneers usually met when they crossed over to the South Seas), with orders to destroy any pirate ships in the area. He made every effort to prevent recruits from leaving Jamaica. The stragglers who returned from the South Seas were arrested and executed, and he dealt harshly with those who helped and sheltered them. By virtue of the king's proclamation of 1684, he had the property in Port Royal belonging to men currently in the South Seas forfeited to the crown. Captain Bannister, who had fled from Port Royal on a privateering mission with a ship of thirty guns in June 1684, was caught and brought back by the frigate "Ruby," but when he was put on trial for piracy, he was released by the grand jury on a technicality. Six months later, Bannister managed to escape the forts a second time, successfully evading the frigates Molesworth sent after him for two years. Finally, in January 1687, Captain Spragge returned to Port Royal with the buccaneer and three of his companions hanging from the yard-arms, "a sight of great satisfaction to all good people, and of terror to those who supported pirates." It was during Molesworth's administration that the "Biscayners" began to show up in American waters. These privateers from the Bay of Biscay appeared to be working for the King of Spain to hunt pirates, but they disrupted English trade more than the pirates themselves did. They captured and looted English merchant ships left and right, taking them to Cartagena, Vera Cruz, San Domingo, and other Spanish ports, where the governors took charge of the prisoners and allowed them to sell their looted goods. They seemed to hold their commissions directly from the Crown, thus claiming to be outside the authority of the Spanish governors. The latter, at any rate, claimed that they could provide no help and complained to the authorities in Jamaica about the independence of these marauders. In December 1688, the king issued a warrant to the Governor of Jamaica, granting him the authority to suppress the Biscayans with the royal frigates.
On 28th October 1685 the governorship of the island was assigned to Sir Philip Howard,488 but Howard died shortly after, and the Duke of Albemarle was appointed in his stead.489 Albemarle, who arrived at Port Royal in December 1687,490 completely reversed the policy of his predecessors, Lynch and Molesworth. Even before he left England he had undermined his health by his intemperate habits, and when he came to Jamaica he leagued himself with the most unruly and debauched men in the colony. He seems to have had no object but to increase his fortune at the expense of the island. Before he sailed he had boldly petitioned for powers to dispose of money without the advice and consent of his council, and, if he saw fit, to reinstate into office Sir Henry Morgan and Robert Byndloss. The king, however, decided that the suspension of Morgan and Byndloss should remain until Albemarle had reported on their case from Jamaica.491 When the Duke entered upon his new government, he immediately appointed Roger Elletson to be Chief Justice of the island in the place of Samuel Bernard. Three assistant-judges of the Supreme Court thereupon resigned their positions on the bench, and one was, in revenge, {256} dismissed by the governor from the council. Several other councillors were also suspended, contrary to the governor's instructions against arbitrary dismissal of such officers, and on 18th January 1688 Sir Henry Morgan, upon the king's approval of the Duke's recommendation, was re-admitted to the council-chamber.492 The old buccaneer, however, did not long enjoy his restored dignity. About a month later he succumbed to a sharp illness, and on 26th August was buried in St. Catherine's Church in Port Royal.493
On October 28, 1685, the governorship of the island was given to Sir Philip Howard,488 but Howard died shortly after, and the Duke of Albemarle was appointed in his place.489 Albemarle, who arrived at Port Royal in December 1687,490 completely changed the policies of his predecessors, Lynch and Molesworth. Even before leaving England, he had harmed his health through excessive drinking, and when he arrived in Jamaica, he aligned himself with the most unruly and corrupt individuals in the colony. His main goal seemed to be to build his wealth at the island's expense. Before he set sail, he had audaciously requested powers to manage finances without the advice and consent of his council, and to reinstate Sir Henry Morgan and Robert Byndloss if he deemed it appropriate. However, the king decided that the suspensions of Morgan and Byndloss should stay in place until Albemarle reported on their situation from Jamaica.491 When the Duke began his new governorship, he immediately appointed Roger Elletson as Chief Justice of the island, replacing Samuel Bernard. Three assistant judges of the Supreme Court then resigned from their positions, and one was dismissed by the governor from the council in retaliation. Several other councillors were also suspended, going against the governor's orders against the arbitrary dismissal of such officers, and on January 18, 1688, Sir Henry Morgan, after the king approved the Duke's recommendation, was allowed back into the council chamber.492 However, the old buccaneer did not enjoy his restored position for long. About a month later, he fell ill and passed away, and on August 26, he was buried in St. Catherine's Church in Port Royal.493
In November 1688 a petition was presented to the king by the planters and merchants trading to Jamaica protesting against the new régime introduced by Lord Albemarle:—"The once flourishing island of Jamaica is likely to be utterly undone by the irregularities of some needy persons lately set in power. Many of the most considerable inhabitants are deserting it, others are under severe fines and imprisonments from little or no cause.... The provost-marshal has been dismissed and an indebted person put in his place; and all the most substantial officers, civil and military, have been turned out and necessitous persons set up in their room. The like has been done in the judicial offices, whereby the benefit of appeals and prohibitions is rendered useless. Councillors are suspended without royal order and without a hearing. Several persons have been forced to give security not to leave the island lest they should seek redress; others have been brought before the council for trifling offences and innumerable fees taken from them; money has been raised twenty per cent. over its value to defend creditors. Lastly, the elections have been tampered with by the indebted provost-marshal, and since the Duke of Albemarle's death are continued without your royal {257} authority."494 The death of Albemarle, indeed, at this opportune time was the greatest service he rendered to the colony. Molesworth was immediately commanded to return to Jamaica and resume authority. The duke's system was entirely reversed, and the government restored as it had been under the administration of Sir Thomas Lynch. Elletson was removed from the council and from his position as chief justice, and Bernard returned in his former place. All of the rest of Albemarle's creatures were dismissed from their posts, and the supporters of Lynch's régime again put in control of a majority in the council.495 This measure of plain justice was one of the last acts of James II. as King of England. On 5th November 1688 William of Orange landed in England at Torbay, and on 22nd December James escaped to France to live as a pensioner of Louis XIV. The new king almost immediately wrote to Jamaica confirming the reappointment of Molesworth, and a commission to the latter was issued on 25th July 1689.496 Molesworth, unfortunately for the colony, died within a few days,497 and the Earl of Inchiquin was appointed on 19th September to succeed him.498 Sir Francis Watson, President of the Council in Jamaica, obeyed the instructions of William III., although he was a partizan of Albemarle; yet so high was the feeling between the two factions that the greatest confusion reigned in the government of the island until the arrival of Inchiquin in May 1690.499
In November 1688, a petition was submitted to the king by the planters and merchants trading to Jamaica complaining about the new regime introduced by Lord Albemarle: “The once thriving island of Jamaica is likely to be completely ruined by the misconduct of some desperate individuals recently put in power. Many of the most significant residents are leaving, while others are facing heavy fines and imprisonment for little to no reason…. The provost-marshal has been fired and an indebted person placed in his position; and all the most reliable civil and military officials have been removed and replaced by needy individuals. The same has happened in the judicial offices, making the benefits of appeals and prohibitions worthless. Councillors are suspended without royal orders and without a fair hearing. Several individuals have been forced to provide security not to leave the island for fear of seeking redress; others have been brought before the council for minor offenses and charged countless fees; money has been raised twenty percent above its value to pay off creditors. Lastly, the elections have been manipulated by the indebted provost-marshal, and since the Duke of Albemarle’s death, they have continued without your royal authority.” The death of Albemarle, indeed, at this timely moment was the greatest service he provided to the colony. Molesworth was immediately ordered to return to Jamaica and reclaim authority. The duke’s policies were completely overturned, and the government was restored to how it was under Sir Thomas Lynch's administration. Elletson was removed from the council and his position as chief justice, and Bernard returned to his former role. All of Albemarle's supporters were dismissed from their positions, and the advocates of Lynch’s regime were once again put in control of a majority in the council. This act of straightforward justice was one of the last actions of James II as King of England. On November 5, 1688, William of Orange landed in England at Torbay, and on December 22, James fled to France to live as a pensioner of Louis XIV. The new king almost immediately wrote to Jamaica confirming Molesworth’s reappointment, and a commission for him was issued on July 25, 1689. Unfortunately for the colony, Molesworth died within a few days, and the Earl of Inchiquin was appointed on September 19 to succeed him. Sir Francis Watson, President of the Council in Jamaica, followed the instructions of William III, although he was a supporter of Albemarle; yet the tension between the two factions was so high that great confusion prevailed in the island's government until Inchiquin's arrival in May 1690.
The Revolution of 1688, by placing William of Orange on the English throne, added a powerful kingdom to the European coalition which in 1689 attacked Louis XIV. over the question of the succession of the Palatinate. That {258} James II. should accept the hospitality of the French monarch and use France as a basis for attack on England and Ireland was, quite apart from William's sympathy with the Protestants on the Continent, sufficient cause for hostilities against France. War broke out in May 1689, and was soon reflected in the English and French colonies in the West Indies. De Cussy, in Hispaniola, led an expedition of 1000 men, many of them filibusters, against St. Jago de los Cavalleros in the interior of the island, and took and burnt the town. In revenge the Spaniards, supported by an English fleet which had just driven the French from St. Kitts, appeared in January 1691 before Cap François, defeated and killed de Cussy in an engagement near the town, and burned and sacked the settlement. Three hundred French filibusters were killed in the battle. The English fleet visited Leogane and Petit Goave in the cul-de-sac of Hispaniola, and then sailed to Jamaica. De Cussy before his death had seized the opportunity to provide the freebooters with new commissions for privateering, and English shipping suffered severely.500 Laurens with 200 men touched at Montego Bay on the north coast in October, and threatened to return and plunder the whole north side of the island. The people were so frightened that they sent their wives and children to Port Royal; and the council armed several vessels to go in pursuit of the Frenchmen.501 It was a new experience to feel the danger of invasion by a foreign foe. The Jamaicans had an insight into the terror which their Spanish neighbours felt for the buccaneers, whom the English islanders had always been so ready to fit out, or to shield from the arm of the law. Laurens in the meantime was as good as his word. He returned to Jamaica in the beginning of {259} December with several vessels, seized eight or ten English trading sloops, landed on the north shore and plundered a plantation.502 War with France was formally proclaimed in Jamaica on the 13th of January 1690.503
The Revolution of 1688, which brought William of Orange to the English throne, strengthened the European coalition that attacked Louis XIV in 1689 over the Palatinate succession issue. That {258} James II accepted hospitality from the French king and used France as a base to launch attacks on England and Ireland was, aside from William’s support for Protestants in Europe, a valid reason for conflict with France. War began in May 1689 and quickly spread to English and French colonies in the West Indies. De Cussy, in Hispaniola, led an expedition of 1,000 men, many of them privateers, against St. Jago de los Cavalleros in the interior of the island, capturing and burning the town. In retaliation, the Spaniards, backed by an English fleet that had recently expelled the French from St. Kitts, attacked Cap François in January 1691, defeated and killed de Cussy in a battle near the town, and burned and raided the settlement. Three hundred French privateers died in the battle. The English fleet then visited Leogane and Petit Goave in the cul-de-sac of Hispaniola before heading to Jamaica. Before his death, de Cussy had taken the chance to give new commissions for privateering to the privateers, causing significant losses to English shipping.500 Laurens, with 200 men, arrived at Montego Bay on the north coast in October and threatened to return to loot the entire north side of the island. The locals were so terrified that they sent their wives and children to Port Royal, and the council armed several ships to pursue the French.501 It was a new experience to feel the threat of invasion from an outside enemy. The Jamaicans gained an understanding of the fear their Spanish neighbors felt toward the buccaneers, whom the English islanders had always been eager to support or protect from the law. Laurens, in the meantime, kept his promise. He returned to Jamaica at the beginning of {259} December with several ships, seizing eight or ten English trading sloops, landing on the north shore, and robbing a plantation.502 War with France was officially declared in Jamaica on January 13, 1690.503
Two years later, in January 1692, Lord Inchiquin also succumbed to disease in Jamaica, and in the following June Colonel William Beeston was chosen by the queen to act as lieutenant-governor.504 Inchiquin before he left England had solicited for the power to call in and pardon pirates, so as to strengthen the island during the war by adding to its forces men who would make good fighters on both land and sea. The Committee on Trade and Plantations reported favourably on the proposal, but the power seems never to have been granted.505 In January 1692, however, the President of the Council of Jamaica began to issue commissions to privateers, and in a few months the surrounding seas were full of armed Jamaican sloops.506 On 7th June of the same year the colony suffered a disaster which almost proved its destruction. A terrible earthquake overwhelmed Port Royal and "in ten minutes threw down all the churches, dwelling-houses and sugar-works in the island. Two-thirds of Port Royal were swallowed up by the sea, all the forts and fortifications demolished and great part of its inhabitants miserably knocked on the head or drowned."507 The French in Hispaniola took advantage of the distress caused by the earthquake to invade the island, and nearly every week hostile bands landed and plundered the coast of negroes and other property.508 In December 1693 a party of 170 {260} swooped down in the night upon St. Davids, only seven leagues from Port Royal, plundered the whole parish, and got away again with 370 slaves.509 In the following April Ducasse, the new French governor of Hispaniola, sent 400 buccaneers in six small vessels to repeat the exploit, but the marauders met an English man-of-war guarding the coast, and concluding "that they would only get broken bones and spoil their men for any other design," they retired whence they had come.510 Two months later, however, a much more serious incursion was made. An expedition of twenty-two vessels and 1500 men, recruited in France and instigated, it is said, by Irish and Jacobite refugees, set sail under Ducasse on 8th June with the intention of conquering the whole of Jamaica. The French landed at Point Morant and Cow Bay, and for a month cruelly desolated the whole south-eastern portion of the island. Then coasting along the southern shore they made a feint on Port Royal, and landed in Carlisle Bay to the west of the capital. After driving from their breastworks the English force of 250 men, they again fell to ravaging and burning, but finding they could make no headway against the Jamaican militia, who were now increased to 700 men, in the latter part of July they set sail with their plunder for Hispaniola.511 Jamaica had been denuded of men by the earthquake and by sickness, and Lieutenant-Governor Beeston had wisely abandoned the forts in the east of the island and concentrated all his strength at Port Royal.512 It was this expedient which doubtless {261} saved the island from capture, for Ducasse feared to attack the united Jamaican forces behind strong intrenchments. The harm done to Jamaica by the invasion, however, was very great. The French wholly destroyed fifty sugar works and many plantations, burnt and plundered about 200 houses, and killed every living thing they found. Thirteen hundred negroes were carried off besides other spoil. In fighting the Jamaicans lost about 100 killed and wounded, but the loss of the French seems to have been several times that number. After the French returned home Ducasse reserved all the negroes for himself, and many of the freebooters who had taken part in the expedition, exasperated by such a division of the spoil, deserted the governor and resorted to buccaneering on their own account.513
Two years later, in January 1692, Lord Inchiquin also fell ill and died in Jamaica, and the following June, Colonel William Beeston was appointed by the queen as lieutenant-governor.504 Before leaving England, Inchiquin had asked for the power to call in and pardon pirates to strengthen the island during the war by adding capable fighters for both land and sea. The Committee on Trade and Plantations viewed the proposal positively, but it seems the power was never granted.505 However, in January 1692, the President of the Council of Jamaica began issuing commissions to privateers, and within a few months, the surrounding seas were filled with armed Jamaican sloops.506 On June 7 of the same year, the colony experienced a disaster that nearly led to its destruction. A devastating earthquake struck Port Royal and "within ten minutes, demolished all the churches, houses, and sugar plantations on the island. Two-thirds of Port Royal sank into the sea, all forts and defenses were destroyed, and many of its inhabitants were either killed or drowned."507 The French in Hispaniola took advantage of the chaos caused by the earthquake to invade the island, with hostile groups landing nearly every week to loot the coast of slaves and other property.508 In December 1693, a group of 170 swooped down at night on St. Davids, just seven leagues from Port Royal, plundered the entire parish, and escaped with 370 slaves.509 The following April, Ducasse, the new French governor of Hispaniola, sent 400 buccaneers in six small ships to carry out a similar raid, but the marauders encountered an English warship patrolling the coast, and deciding "that they would only end up with broken bones and ruin their men for anything else," they retreated.510 Two months later, though, a much more serious invasion occurred. An expedition of twenty-two ships and 1,500 men, recruited in France and reportedly instigated by Irish and Jacobite refugees, set sail under Ducasse on June 8 with the aim of conquering all of Jamaica. The French landed at Point Morant and Cow Bay and, for a month, ravaged the entire southeastern part of the island. Then, while sailing along the southern coast, they made a feint attack on Port Royal and landed in Carlisle Bay to the west of the capital. After driving away the English force of 250 men from their defenses, they resumed their pillaging and burning, but finding they couldn't make any progress against the Jamaican militia, which had now grown to 700 men, they eventually left with their loot for Hispaniola in late July.511 Jamaica had lost many men due to the earthquake and sickness, and Lieutenant-Governor Beeston wisely abandoned the forts in the eastern part of the island, concentrating all his forces at Port Royal.512 This strategy likely saved the island from being captured, as Ducasse was hesitant to attack the united Jamaican forces behind strong defenses. However, the damage done to Jamaica by the invasion was substantial. The French completely destroyed fifty sugarworks and numerous plantations, burned down about 200 houses, and killed every living being they encountered. Over 1,300 slaves were taken, among other spoils. In the fighting, the Jamaicans lost about 100 killed and wounded, but the French casualties seemed to be several times that number. After the French returned home, Ducasse kept all the slaves for himself, leading many of the pirates who had participated in the expedition, frustrated by such a division of the loot, to abandon the governor and turn to piracy on their own.513
Colonel, now become Sir William, Beeston, from his first arrival in Jamaica as lieutenant-governor, had fixed his hopes upon a joint expedition with the Spaniards against the French at Petit Goave; but the inertia of the Spaniards, and the loss of men and money caused by the earthquake, had prevented his plans from being realized.514 In the early part of 1695, however, an army of 1700 soldiers on a fleet of twenty-three ships sailed from England under command of Commodore Wilmot for the West Indies. Uniting with 1500 Spaniards from San Domingo and the Barlovento fleet of three sail, they captured and sacked Cap François and Port de Paix in the French end of the island. It had been the intention of the allies to proceed to the cul-de-sac and destroy Petit Goave and Leogane, but they had lost many men by sickness and bad management, and the Spaniards, satisfied with the booty already obtained, were anxious to return home. So the English fleet sailed away to Port {262} Royal.515 These hostilities so exhausted both the French in Hispaniola and the English in Jamaica that for a time the combatants lay back to recover their strength.
Colonel, now Sir William, Beeston, had pinned his hopes on a joint mission with the Spaniards against the French at Petit Goave since arriving in Jamaica as lieutenant-governor. However, the inactivity of the Spaniards and the losses in personnel and funds from the earthquake had thwarted his plans.514 In early 1695, though, an army of 1,700 soldiers set sail from England on twenty-three ships under the command of Commodore Wilmot for the West Indies. They joined forces with 1,500 Spaniards from San Domingo and the Barlovento fleet of three ships, capturing and plundering Cap François and Port de Paix in the French territory of the island. The allies had intended to move on to the cul-de-sac to destroy Petit Goave and Leogane, but they suffered many casualties due to illness and poor management. The Spaniards, happy with the loot they had collected, were eager to go home. Consequently, the English fleet headed off to Port {262} Royal.515 These conflicts left both the French in Hispaniola and the English in Jamaica so drained that for a while, the fighters took a step back to regain their strength.
The last great expedition of this war in the West Indies serves as a fitting close to the history of the buccaneers. On 26th September 1696 Ducasse received from the French Minister of Marine, Pontchartrain, a letter informing him that the king had agreed to the project of a large armament which the Sieur de Pointis, aided by private capital, was preparing for an enterprise in the Mexican Gulf.516 Ducasse, although six years earlier he had written home urging just such an enterprise against Vera Cruz or Cartagena, now expressed his strong disapproval of the project, and dwelt rather on the advantages to be gained by the capture of Spanish Hispaniola, a conquest which would give the French the key to the Indies. A second letter from Pontchartrain in January 1697, however, ordered him to aid de Pointis by uniting all the freebooters and keeping them in the colony till 15th February. It was a difficult task to maintain the buccaneers in idleness for two months and prohibit all cruising, especially as de Pointis, who sailed from Brest in the beginning of January, did not reach Petit Goave till about 1st March.517 The buccaneers murmured and threatened to disband, and it required all the personal ascendancy of Ducasse to hold them together. The Sieur de Pointis, although a man of experience and resource, capable of forming a large design and sparing nothing to {263} its success, suffered from two very common faults—vanity and avarice. He sometimes allowed the sense of his own merits to blind him to the merits of others, and considerations of self-interest to dim the brilliance of his achievements. Of Ducasse he was insanely jealous, and during the whole expedition he tried in every way to humiliate him. Unable to bring himself to conciliate the unruly spirit of the buccaneers, he told them plainly that he would lead them not as a companion in fortune but as a military superior, and that they must submit themselves to the same rules as the men on the king's ships. The freebooters rebelled under the haughtiness of their commander, and only Ducasse's influence was able to bring them to obedience.518 On 18th March the ships were all gathered at the rendezvous at Cape Tiburon, and on the 13th of the following month anchored two leagues to the east of Cartagena.519 De Pointis had under his command about 4000 men, half of them seamen, the rest soldiers. The reinforcements he had received from Ducasse numbered 1100, and of these 650 were buccaneers commanded by Ducasse himself. He had nine frigates, besides seven vessels belonging to the buccaneers, and numerous smaller boats.520 The appearance of so formidable an armament in the West Indies caused a great deal of concern both in England and in Jamaica. Martial law was proclaimed in the colony and every means taken to put Port Royal in a state of defence.521 Governor Beeston, at the first news of de Pointis' fleet, sent advice to the governors of Porto Bello and Havana, against whom he suspected that the expedition was intended.522 A squadron of thirteen vessels was sent out from England under {264} command of Admiral Nevill to protect the British islands and the Spanish treasure fleets, for both the galleons and the Flota were then in the Indies.523 Nevill touched at Barbadoes on 17th April,524 and then sailed up through the Leeward Islands towards Hispaniola in search of de Pointis. The Frenchman, however, had eluded him and was already before Cartagena.
The last major expedition of this war in the West Indies marks a fitting conclusion to the history of the buccaneers. On September 26, 1696, Ducasse received a letter from the French Minister of Marine, Pontchartrain, informing him that the king had approved a plan for a large armada that Sieur de Pointis, supported by private funding, was preparing for an operation in the Gulf of Mexico.516 Although Ducasse had urged such an operation against Vera Cruz or Cartagena six years earlier, he now strongly opposed the project and emphasized the benefits of capturing Spanish Hispaniola instead, a conquest that would give the French control over the Indies. However, a second letter from Pontchartrain in January 1697 ordered him to assist de Pointis by uniting all the buccaneers and keeping them in the colony until February 15. It was a tough job to keep the buccaneers inactive for two months and prevent all cruising, especially since de Pointis, who left Brest at the start of January, didn’t reach Petit Goave until around March 1.517 The buccaneers complained and threatened to disband, and it took all of Ducasse's personal influence to keep them together. Even though the Sieur de Pointis was experienced and resourceful, capable of devising a large plan and willing to spare no effort for its success, he suffered from two common flaws—vanity and greed. He sometimes let his sense of his own worth blind him to the worth of others, and his self-interest overshadowed his achievements. He was irrationally jealous of Ducasse and during the entire expedition, he attempted to undermine him in every possible way. Unable to pacify the unruly buccaneers, he bluntly told them he would lead them not as an equal partner but as a military superior, and that they had to follow the same rules as the crew on the king's ships. The buccaneers rebelled against their commander's arrogance, and only Ducasse's influence was able to restore order.518 On March 18, the ships all gathered at the meeting point at Cape Tiburon, and on the 13th of the following month, they anchored two leagues east of Cartagena.519 De Pointis was in command of about 4,000 men, half of whom were sailors and the rest soldiers. The reinforcements he received from Ducasse totaled 1,100, with 650 of those being buccaneers led by Ducasse himself. He had nine frigates, along with seven ships belonging to the buccaneers, and many smaller boats.520 The sight of such a formidable force in the West Indies raised a lot of alarm in both England and Jamaica. Martial law was declared in the colony, and every effort was made to prepare Port Royal for defense.521 Governor Beeston, upon hearing about de Pointis' fleet, informed the governors of Porto Bello and Havana, as he suspected the expedition was aimed at them.522 A squadron of thirteen vessels was dispatched from England under the command of Admiral Nevill to protect the British islands and the Spanish treasure fleets, as both the galleons and the Flota were in the Indies at that time.523 Nevill stopped at Barbados on April 17,524 and then sailed through the Leeward Islands towards Hispaniola in search of de Pointis. However, the Frenchman had evaded him and was already in front of Cartagena.
Cartagena, situated at the eastward end of a large double lagoon, was perhaps the strongest fortress in the Indies, and the Spaniards within opposed a courageous defence.525 After a fortnight of fighting and bombardment, however, on the last day of April the outworks were carried by a brilliant assault, and on 6th May the small Spanish garrison, followed by the Cabildo or municipal corporation, and by many of the citizens of the town, in all about 2800 persons, marched out with the honours of war. Although the Spaniards had been warned of the coming of the French, and before their arrival had succeeded in withdrawing the women and some of their riches to Mompos in the interior, the treasure which fell into the hands of the invaders was enormous, and has been variously estimated at from six million crowns to twenty millions sterling. Trouble soon broke out between de Pointis and the buccaneers, for the latter wanted the whole of the plunder to be divided equally among the {265} men, as had always been their custom, and they expected, according to this arrangement, says de Pointis in his narrative, about a quarter of all the booty. De Pointis, however, insisted upon the order which he had published before the expedition sailed from Petit Goave, that the buccaneers should be subject to the same rule in the division of the spoil as the sailors in the fleet, i.e., they should receive one-tenth of the first million and one-thirtieth of the rest. Moreover, fearing that the buccaneers would take matters into their own hands, he had excluded them from the city while his officers gathered the plunder and carried it to the ships. On the repeated remonstrances of Ducasse, de Pointis finally announced that the share allotted to the men from Hispaniola was 40,000 crowns. The buccaneers, finding themselves so miserably cheated, broke out into open mutiny, but were restrained by the influence of their leader and the presence of the king's frigates. De Pointis, meanwhile, seeing his own men decimated by sickness, put all the captured guns on board the fleet and made haste to get under sail for France. South of Jamaica he fell in with the squadron of Admiral Nevill, to which in the meantime had been joined some eight Dutch men-of-war; but de Pointis, although inferior in numbers, outsailed the English ships and lost but one or two of his smaller vessels. He then manœuvred past Cape S. Antonio, round the north of Cuba and through the Bahama Channel to Newfoundland, where he stopped for fresh wood and water, and after a brush with a small English squadron under Commodore Norris, sailed into the harbour of Brest on 19th August 1697.526
Cartagena, located at the eastern end of a large double lagoon, was possibly the strongest fortress in the Indies, and the Spaniards inside put up a brave defense.525 After two weeks of fighting and bombardment, on the last day of April, the outer defenses were captured in a daring assault, and on May 6, the small Spanish garrison, followed by the municipal corporation known as the Cabildo and many citizens of the town—about 2,800 people in total—marched out with military honors. Although the Spaniards had been warned about the French approaching and had managed to evacuate the women and some of their riches to Mompos inland before their arrival, the treasure that fell into the invaders' hands was immense, estimated at between six million crowns and twenty million sterling. Soon after, tensions sprang up between de Pointis and the buccaneers, as the latter wanted the entire plunder to be evenly divided among the crew, as was their custom, and expected, according to de Pointis's narrative, about a quarter of all the loot. However, de Pointis insisted on the order he had established prior to the expedition leaving Petit Goave, stating that the buccaneers would be subject to the same rules for dividing the spoils as the sailors in the fleet, meaning they would receive one-tenth of the first million and one-thirtieth of the remainder. Further, fearing that the buccaneers might take control, he had barred them from the city while his officers collected the loot and transported it to the ships. After repeated protests from Ducasse, de Pointis finally announced that the share designated for the men from Hispaniola was 40,000 crowns. The buccaneers, feeling severely cheated, erupted into open rebellion but were held back by the authority of their leader and the presence of the king's frigates. Meanwhile, de Pointis, seeing his own men struck down by illness, loaded all the captured guns onto the fleet and hurried to set sail for France. South of Jamaica, he encountered Admiral Nevill's squadron, which had been reinforced by about eight Dutch warships; nevertheless, de Pointis, though outnumbered, outpaced the English ships and only lost one or two of his smaller vessels. He then maneuvered past Cape S. Antonio, around the north of Cuba, and through the Bahama Channel to Newfoundland, where he stopped for fresh wood and water, and after a skirmish with a small English squadron under Commodore Norris, sailed into the harbor of Brest on August 19, 1697.526
The buccaneers, even before de Pointis sailed for France, had turned their ships back toward Cartagena to reimburse themselves by again plundering the city. De {266} Pointis, indeed, was then very ill, and his officers were in no condition to oppose them. After the fleet had departed the freebooters re-entered Cartagena, and for four days put it to the sack, extorting from the unfortunate citizens, and from the churches and monasteries, several million more in gold and silver. Embarking for the Isle la Vache, they had covered but thirty leagues when they met with the same allied fleet which had pursued de Pointis. Of the nine buccaneer vessels, the two which carried most of the booty were captured, two more were driven ashore, and the rest succeeded in escaping to Hispaniola. Ducasse, who had returned to Petit Goave when de Pointis sailed for France, sent one of his lieutenants on a mission to the French Court to complain of the ill-treatment he had received from de Pointis, and to demand his own recall; but the king pacified him by making him a Chevalier of St. Louis, and allotting 1,400,000 francs to the French colonists who had aided in the expedition. The money, however, was slow in reaching the hands of those to whom it was due, and much was lost through the malversations of the men charged with its distribution.527
The buccaneers, even before de Pointis set sail for France, had turned their ships back toward Cartagena to loot the city again. De {266}Pointis was quite ill, and his officers weren’t in any shape to stop them. After the fleet left, the pirates re-entered Cartagena and for four days ransacked it, extorting several million more in gold and silver from the unfortunate citizens and from the churches and monasteries. Heading for Isle la Vache, they hadn’t traveled far—only about thirty leagues—when they ran into the same allied fleet that had been chasing de Pointis. Of the nine buccaneer ships, two carrying most of the loot were captured, two were forced ashore, and the rest managed to escape to Hispaniola. Ducasse, who had returned to Petit Goave when de Pointis left for France, sent one of his lieutenants to the French Court to complain about how he had been treated by de Pointis and to request his recall; however, the king calmed him down by making him a Chevalier of St. Louis and allocating 1,400,000 francs to the French colonists who had supported the expedition. Unfortunately, the money was slow to reach those it was promised to, and much was lost due to the mismanagement of the people responsible for distributing it.527
With the capture of Cartagena in 1697 the history of the buccaneers may be said to end. More and more during the previous twenty years they had degenerated into mere pirates, or had left their libertine life for more civilised pursuits. Since 1671 the English government had been consistent in its policy of suppressing the freebooters, {267} and with few exceptions the governors sent to Jamaica had done their best to uphold and enforce the will of the councils at home. Ten years or more had to elapse before the French Court saw the situation in a similar light, and even then the exigencies of war and defence in French Hispaniola prevented the governors from taking any effective measures toward suppression. The problem, indeed, had not been an easy one. The buccaneers, whatever their origin, were intrepid men, not without a sense of honour among themselves, wedded to a life of constant danger which they met and overcame with surprising hardiness. When an expedition was projected against their traditional foes, the Spaniards, they calculated the chances of profit, and taking little account of the perils to be run, or indeed of the flag under which they sailed, English, French and Dutch alike became brothers under a chief whose courage they perfectly recognised and whom they servilely obeyed. They lived at a time when they were in no danger of being overhauled by ubiquitous cruisers with rifled guns, and so long as they confined themselves to His Catholic Majesty's ships and settlements, they had trusted in the immunity arising from the traditional hostility existing between the English and the Spaniards of that era. And for the Spaniards the record of the buccaneers had been a terrible one. Between the years 1655 and 1671 alone, the corsairs had sacked eighteen cities, four towns and more than thirty-five villages—Cumana once, Cumanagote twice, Maracaibo and Gibraltar twice, Rio de la Hacha five times, Santa Marta three times, Tolu eight times, Porto Bello once, Chagre twice, Panama once, Santa Catalina twice, Granada in Nicaragua twice, Campeache three times, St. Jago de Cuba once, and other towns and villages in Cuba and Hispaniola for thirty leagues inland innumerable times. And this fearful tale of robbery and outrage does not {268} embrace the various expeditions against Porto Bello, Campeache, Cartagena and other Spanish ports made after 1670. The Marquis de Barinas in 1685 estimated the losses of the Spaniards at the hands of the buccaneers since the accession of Charles II. to be sixty million crowns; and these figures covered merely the destruction of towns and treasure, without including the loss of more than 250 merchant ships and frigates.528 If the losses and suffering of the Spaniards had been terrible, the advantages accruing to the invaders, or to the colonies which received and supported them, scarcely compensated for the effort it cost them. Buccaneering had denuded Jamaica of its bravest men, lowered the moral tone of the island, and retarded the development of its natural resources. It was estimated that there were lost to the island between 1668 and 1671, in the designs against Tobago, Curaçao, Porto Bello, Granada and Panama, about 2600 men,529 which was a large number for a new and very weak colony surrounded by powerful foes. Says the same writer later on: "People have not married, built or settled as they would in time of peace—some for fear of being destroyed, others have got much suddenly by privateers bargains and are gone. War carries away all freemen, labourers and planters of provisions, which makes work and victuals dear and scarce. Privateering encourages all manner of disorder and dissoluteness; and if it succeed, does but enrich the worst sort of people and provoke and alarm the Spaniards."530
With the capture of Cartagena in 1697, the era of the buccaneers can be considered over. Over the previous twenty years, they had increasingly turned into regular pirates or abandoned their free-spirited lifestyle for more civilized pursuits. Since 1671, the English government had been committed to eliminating the freebooters, and with few exceptions, the governors sent to Jamaica had done their best to enforce the directives from home. It took over ten years for the French Court to see the situation in a similar way, and even then, the demands of war and defense in French Hispaniola stopped the governors from taking any effective measures against them. The problem was indeed complicated. The buccaneers, regardless of their background, were brave men with a sense of honor among themselves, devoted to a life filled with danger that they faced and overcame with remarkable resilience. When planning an expedition against their traditional enemies, the Spaniards, they would weigh the potential rewards, often ignoring the risks or the flag they sailed under; English, French, and Dutch alike became like brothers under a leader whose courage they recognized and obeyed. They lived in a time when they did not fear being pursued by relentless cruisers with advanced weaponry, and as long as they targeted His Catholic Majesty's ships and settlements, they believed they were protected by the longstanding animosity between the English and Spaniards at that time. For the Spaniards, the record of the buccaneers was devastating. Between 1655 and 1671 alone, the corsairs plundered eighteen cities, four towns, and over thirty-five villages—Cumana once, Cumanagote twice, Maracaibo and Gibraltar twice, Rio de la Hacha five times, Santa Marta three times, Tolu eight times, Porto Bello once, Chagre twice, Panama once, Santa Catalina twice, Granada in Nicaragua twice, Campeache three times, St. Jago de Cuba once, and many more towns and villages in Cuba and Hispaniola countless times. This alarming account of theft and violence does not even include the various raids on Porto Bello, Campeache, Cartagena, and other Spanish ports made after 1670. The Marquis de Barinas in 1685 estimated the Spaniards' losses at the hands of the buccaneers since Charles II took the throne to be sixty million crowns; and this amount only covered the destruction of towns and treasure, without counting the loss of more than 250 merchant ships and frigates. If the losses and suffering of the Spaniards were significant, the gains for the invaders or for the colonies that welcomed and supported them hardly justified the effort it took. Buccaneering had depleted Jamaica of its bravest men, degraded the moral standards of the island, and hampered the development of its natural resources. It was estimated that between 1668 and 1671, around 2,600 men were lost to the island in attempts against Tobago, Curaçao, Porto Bello, Granada, and Panama, a considerable number for a new and fragile colony surrounded by powerful enemies. The same writer noted later: "People have not married, built, or settled as they would in peacetime—some out of fear of being wiped out, others have made quick fortunes through privateering and left. War drives away all free men, laborers, and growers of provisions, making work and food expensive and scarce. Privateering encourages all kinds of disorder and decadence; and even if it succeeds, it only enriches the worst types of people and provokes and alarms the Spaniards."
The privateers, moreover, really injured English trade as much as they injured Spanish navigation; and if the {269} English in the second half of the seventeenth century had given the Spaniards as little cause for enmity in the West Indies as the Dutch had done, they perhaps rather than the Dutch would have been the convoys and sharers in the rich Flotas. The Spaniards, moreover, if not in the court at home, at least in the colonies, would have readily lent themselves to a trade, illicit though it be, with the English islands, a trade, moreover, which it was the constant aim of English diplomacy to encourage and maintain, had they been able to assure themselves that their English neighbours were their friends. But when outrage succeeded upon outrage, and the English Governors seemed, in spite of their protestations of innocence, to make no progress toward stopping them, the Spaniards naturally concluded that the English government was the best of liars and the worst of friends. From another point of view, too, the activity of the buccaneers was directly opposed to the commercial interests of Great Britain. Of all the nations of Europe the Spaniards were those who profited least from their American possessions. It was the English, the French and the Dutch who carried their merchandize to Cadiz and freighted the Spanish-American fleets, and who at the return of these fleets from Porto Bello and Vera Cruz appropriated the greater part of the gold, silver and precious stuffs which composed their cargoes. And when the buccaneers cut off a Spanish galleon, or wrecked the Spanish cities on the Main, it was not so much the Spaniards who suffered as the foreign merchants interested in the trade between Spain and her colonies. If the policy of the English and French Governments toward the buccaneers gradually changed from one of connivance or encouragement to one of hostility and suppression, it was because they came to realise that it was easier and more profitable to absorb the trade and riches of Spanish America through the peaceful agencies of treaty and {270} concession, than by endeavouring to enforce a trade in the old-fashioned way inaugurated by Drake and his Elizabethan contemporaries.
The privateers really hurt English trade just as much as they harmed Spanish shipping. If the English in the latter half of the seventeenth century had given the Spaniards as little reason to be hostile in the West Indies as the Dutch had, they might have become the ones to escort and share in the valuable Flotas instead of the Dutch. Moreover, the Spaniards, if not in their homeland’s court, at least in the colonies, would have eagerly engaged in a trade—though illegal—with the English islands, a trade that English diplomacy constantly aimed to promote and sustain, had they been assured that their English neighbors were friendly. However, when violence followed violence, and the English Governors seemed to make no progress in stopping it despite claiming innocence, the Spaniards naturally concluded that the English government was the best liar and the worst friend. From another perspective, the activities of the buccaneers directly conflicted with Britain's commercial interests. Of all the nations in Europe, the Spaniards gained the least from their American territories. It was the English, French, and Dutch who delivered goods to Cadiz and loaded the Spanish-American fleets, and who, upon the return of these fleets from Porto Bello and Vera Cruz, took the majority of the gold, silver, and precious items that made up their cargoes. When the buccaneers attacked a Spanish galleon or destroyed Spanish cities on the mainland, it wasn't so much the Spaniards who suffered, but the foreign merchants involved in the trade between Spain and its colonies. As the policies of the English and French governments toward the buccaneers gradually shifted from tolerance or support to hostility and suppression, it was because they realized it was easier and more profitable to capture the trade and wealth of Spanish America peacefully through treaties and concessions than to try to enforce trade in the traditional manner started by Drake and his Elizabethan peers.
The pirate successors of the buccaneers were distinguished from their predecessors mainly by the fact that they preyed on the commerce of all flags indiscriminately, and were outlawed and hunted down by all nations alike. They, moreover, widely extended their field of operations. No longer content with the West Indies and the shores of the Caribbean Sea, they sailed east to the coast of Guinea and around Africa to the Indian Ocean. They haunted the shores of Madagascar, the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf, and ventured even as far as the Malabar Coast, intercepting the rich trade with the East, the great ships from Bengal and the Islands of Spice. And not only did the outlaws of all nations from America and the West Indies flock to these regions, but sailors from England were fired by reports of the rich spoils obtained to imitate their example. One of the most remarkable instances was that of Captain Henry Avery, alias Bridgman. In May 1694 Avery was on an English merchantman, the "Charles II.," lying near Corunna. He persuaded the crew to mutiny, set the captain on shore, re-christened the ship the "Fancy," and sailed to the East Indies. Among other prizes he captured, in September 1695, a large vessel called the "Gunsway," belonging to the Great Mogul—an exploit which led to reprisals and the seizure of the English factories in India. On application of the East India Company, proclamations were issued on 17th July, 10th and 21st August 1696, by the Lords Justices of England, declaring Avery and his crew pirates and offering a reward for their apprehension.531 Five of the crew were seized on their return to England in the autumn of the same year, were tried at the Old Bailey {271} and hanged, and several of their companions were arrested later.532
The pirate successors of the buccaneers stood out from their predecessors mainly because they targeted the commerce of all nations without discrimination and were outlawed and pursued by every nation equally. Additionally, they significantly expanded their range of operations. No longer satisfied with just the West Indies and the Caribbean Sea, they sailed east to the coast of Guinea and around Africa to the Indian Ocean. They frequented the shores of Madagascar, the Red Sea, and the Persian Gulf, even venturing as far as the Malabar Coast, intercepting the lucrative trade with the East, including the large ships from Bengal and the Spice Islands. Not only did outlaws from America and the West Indies flock to these areas, but English sailors were also inspired by stories of the rich spoils to follow suit. One of the most notable examples was Captain Henry Avery, also known as Bridgman. In May 1694, Avery was on an English merchant ship, the "Charles II," anchored near Corunna. He convinced the crew to mutiny, got the captain to leave the ship, renamed it the "Fancy," and set sail for the East Indies. Among other prizes, he captured a large vessel called the "Gunsway," which belonged to the Great Mogul, in September 1695—an act that led to retaliation and the seizure of English trading posts in India. On the request of the East India Company, proclamations were issued on July 17, August 10, and August 21, 1696, by the Lords Justices of England, declaring Avery and his crew as pirates and offering a reward for their capture.531 Five of the crew were captured upon their return to England in the autumn of that same year, were tried at the Old Bailey {271} and executed, and several of their associates were arrested later.532
In the North American colonies these new pirates still continued to find encouragement and protection. Carolina had long had an evil reputation as a hot-bed of piracy, and deservedly so. The proprietors had removed one governor after another for harbouring the freebooters, but with little result. In the Bahamas, which belonged to the same proprietors, the evil was even more flagrant. Governor Markham of the Quaker colony of Pennsylvania allowed the pirates to dispose of their goods and to refit upon the banks of the Delaware, and William Penn, the proprietor, showed little disposition to reprimand or remove him. Governor Fletcher of New York was in open alliance with the outlaws, accepted their gifts and allowed them to parade the streets in broad daylight. The merchants of New York, as well as those of Rhode Island and Massachusetts, who were prevented by the Navigation Laws from engaging in legitimate trade with other nations, welcomed the appearance of the pirate ships laden with goods from the East, provided a ready market for their cargoes, and encouraged them to repeat their voyages.
In the North American colonies, these new pirates continued to receive support and protection. Carolina had a long-standing bad reputation as a hotspot for piracy, and rightly so. The proprietors removed one governor after another for sheltering the pirates, but it had little effect. In the Bahamas, which were owned by the same proprietors, the problem was even worse. Governor Markham of the Quaker colony of Pennsylvania let the pirates sell their goods and repair their ships on the banks of the Delaware, and William Penn, the proprietor, showed little desire to reprimand or remove him. Governor Fletcher of New York was openly allied with the outlaws, accepted their gifts, and let them walk the streets in broad daylight. Merchants in New York, as well as those in Rhode Island and Massachusetts, who were restricted by the Navigation Laws from engaging in legitimate trade with other countries, welcomed the sight of pirate ships filled with goods from the East, provided a ready market for their cargoes, and encouraged them to make more voyages.
In 1699 an Act was passed through Parliament of such severity as to drive many of the outlaws from American waters. It was largely a revival of the Act of 28, Henry VIII., was in force for seven years, and was twice renewed. The war of the Spanish Succession, moreover, gave many men of piratical inclinations an opportunity of sailing under lawful commissions as privateers against the French and Spaniards. In this long war, too, the French filibusters were especially numerous and active. In 1706 there were 1200 or 1300 who made their headquarters in {272} Martinique alone.533 While keeping the French islands supplied with provisions and merchandise captured in their prizes, they were a serious discouragement to English commerce in those regions, especially to the trade with the North American colonies. Occasionally they threatened the coasts of Virginia and New England, and some combined with their West Indian cruises a foray along the coasts of Guinea and into the Red Sea. These corsairs were not all commissioned privateers, however, for some of them seized French shipping with as little compunction as English or Dutch. Especially after the Treaty of Utrecht there was a recrudescence of piracy both in the West Indies and in the East, and it was ten years or more thereafter before the freebooters were finally suppressed.
In 1699, an Act was passed in Parliament that was so strict it forced many of the outlaws out of American waters. It was mainly a revival of the Act of 28, Henry VIII, and was in effect for seven years, being renewed twice. The War of the Spanish Succession also gave many would-be pirates a chance to sail under legal commissions as privateers against the French and Spaniards. During this prolonged conflict, French filibusters were particularly numerous and active. In 1706, there were about 1,200 or 1,300 based in Martinique alone.{272}533 While supplying the French islands with provisions and goods taken from their captures, they significantly hampered English trade in those areas, especially with the North American colonies. They occasionally threatened the coasts of Virginia and New England, and some combined their West Indian expeditions with raids along the coasts of Guinea and into the Red Sea. However, not all of these corsairs were commissioned privateers, as some would seize French ships with as little guilt as English or Dutch ones. Especially after the Treaty of Utrecht, piracy surged again in both the West Indies and the East, and it took over ten years before the freebooters were finally put down.
Footnote 424: (return)C.S.P. Colon., 1681-85, Nos. 501, 552. Cf. also Nos. 197, 227.
C.S.P. Colon., 1681-85, Nos. 501, 552. Also see Nos. 197, 227.
Footnote 425: (return)C.S.P. Colon., 1681-85, Nos. 364-366, 431, 668.
C.S.P. Colon., 1681-85, Nos. 364-366, 431, 668.
Footnote 426: (return)Ibid., Nos. 476, 609, 668. Paine was sent from Jamaica under arrest to Governor de Cussy in 1684, and thence was shipped on a frigate to France. (Bibl. Nat., Nouv. Acq., 9325, f. 334.)
Same source., Nos. 476, 609, 668. Paine was arrested in Jamaica and sent to Governor de Cussy in 1684, and then he was transported on a frigate to France. (Bibl. Nat., Nouv. Acq., 9325, f. 334.)
Footnote 428: (return)C.S.P. Colon., 1681-85, Nos. 769, 963, 993.
C.S.P. Colon., 1681-85, No. 769, 963, 993.
Footnote 433: (return)Ibid., Nos. 1168, 1190, 1223, 1344; cf. also Nos. 1381, 1464, 1803.
Ibid., Nos. 1168, 1190, 1223, 1344; cf. also Nos. 1381, 1464, 1803.
In June 1684 we learn that "Hamlin, captain of La Trompeuse, got into a ship of thirty-six guns on the coast of the Main last month, with sixty of his old crew and as many new men. They call themselves pirates, and their ship La Nouvelle Trompeuse, and talk of their old station at Isle de Vaches." (Ibid., No. 1759.)
In June 1684, we learn that "Hamlin, captain of La Trompeuse, boarded a ship with thirty-six guns off the coast of the Main last month, along with sixty of his former crew and just as many new members. They refer to themselves as pirates, their ship is La Nouvelle Trompeuse, and they are talking about their previous location at Isle de Vaches." (Ibid., No. 1759.)
Footnote 434: (return)C.S.P. Colon., 1681-85, Nos. 777, 1188, 1189, 1223, 1376, 1471-1474, 1504, 1535, 1537, 1731.
C.S.P. Colon., 1681-85, Nos. 777, 1188, 1189, 1223, 1376, 1471-1474, 1504, 1535, 1537, 1731.
Footnote 435: (return)Ibid., Nos. 1222, 1223, 1676, 1678, 1686, 1909; cf. also Nos. 1382, 1547, 1665.
Ibid., Nos. 1222, 1223, 1676, 1678, 1686, 1909; cf. also Nos. 1382, 1547, 1665.
Footnote 436: (return)Ibid., Nos. 552, 599, 668, 712.
Ibid., Nos. 552, 599, 668, 712.
Coxon continued to vacillate between submission to the Governor of Jamaica and open rebellion. In October 1682 he was sent by Sir Thos. Lynch with three vessels to the Gulf of Honduras to fetch away the English logwood-cutters. "His men plotted to take the ship and go privateering, but he valiently resisted, killed one or two with his own hand, forced eleven overboard, and brought three here (Port Royal) who were condemned last Friday." (Ibid., No. 769. Letter of Sir Thos. Lynch, 6th Nov. 1682.) A year later, in November 1683, he had again reverted to piracy (ibid., No. 1348), but in January 1686 surrendered to Lieut.-Governor Molesworth and was ordered to be arrested and tried at St. Jago de la Vega (ibid., 1685-88, No. 548). He probably in the meantime succeeded in escaping from the island, for in the following November he was reported to be cutting logwood in the Gulf of Campeache, and Molesworth was issuing a proclamation declaring him an outlaw (ibid., No. 965). He remained abroad until September 1688 when he again surrendered to the Governor of Jamaica (ibid., No. 1890), and again by some hook or crook obtained his freedom.
Coxon kept alternating between following the orders of the Governor of Jamaica and outright defiance. In October 1682, he was sent by Sir Thos. Lynch with three ships to the Gulf of Honduras to retrieve the English logwood-cutters. "His crew intended to take the ship and go pirating, but he bravely fought back, killed one or two himself, forced eleven overboard, and brought three to Port Royal, who were sentenced last Friday." (Ibid., No. 769. Letter of Sir Thos. Lynch, 6th Nov. 1682.) A year later, in November 1683, he returned to piracy (ibid., No. 1348), but in January 1686, he surrendered to Lieut.-Governor Molesworth and was ordered to be arrested and tried at St. Jago de la Vega (ibid., 1685-88, No. 548). He likely escaped from the island during this time, because the following November, he was reported to be cutting logwood in the Gulf of Campeache, prompting Molesworth to issue a proclamation declaring him an outlaw (ibid., No. 965). He remained abroad until September 1688 when he surrendered once again to the Governor of Jamaica (ibid., No. 1890), and somehow managed to regain his freedom again.
Footnote 439: (return)He is not to be confused with the Peter Paine who brought "La Trompeuse" to Port Royal. Thomas Pain, a few months before he arrived in the Bahamas, had come in and submitted to Sir Thomas Lynch, and had been sent out again by the governor to cruise after pirates. (C.S.P. Colon., 1681-85, Nos. 769, 1707.)
He should not be confused with Peter Paine, who brought "La Trompeuse" to Port Royal. Thomas Pain, a few months before arriving in the Bahamas, had reported to Sir Thomas Lynch and was sent back out by the governor to search for pirates. (C.S.P. Colon., 1681-85, Nos. 769, 1707.)
Footnote 440: (return)C.S.P. Colon., 1681-85, Nos. 1509, 1540, 1590, 1924, 1926.
C.S.P. Colon., 1681-85, Nos. 1509, 1540, 1590, 1924, 1926.
Footnote 443: (return)Charlevoix, op. cit., liv. viii. p. 130. In 1684 there were between 2000 and 3000 filibusters who made their headquarters in French Hispaniola. They had seventeen vessels at sea with batteries ranging from four to fifty guns. (C.S.P. Colon., 1681-85, No. 668; Bibl. Nat., Nouv. Acq., 9325, f. 336.)
Charlevoix, op. cit., book viii, p. 130. In 1684, there were about 2,000 to 3,000 filibusters based in French Hispaniola. They operated seventeen ships at sea, armed with cannons that had between four and fifty guns. (C.S.P. Colon., 1681-85, No. 668; Bibl. Nat., Nouv. Acq., 9325, f. 336.)
Footnote 444: (return)Charlevoix, op. cit., liv. viii. pp. 128-30.
Charlevoix, op. cit., book viii, pages 128-30.
Footnote 445: (return)C.S.P. Colon., 1681-85, Nos. 963, 998, 1065.
C.S.P. Colon., 1681-85, Nos. 963, 998, 1065.
Footnote 447: (return)C.S.P. Colon., 1681-85, No. 1163; Charlevoix, liv. viii. p. 133; Narrative contained in "The Voyages and Adventures of Captain Barth, Sharpe and others in the South Sea." Lon. 1684.
C.S.P. Colon., 1681-85, No. 1163; Charlevoix, liv. viii. p. 133; Narrative found in "The Voyages and Adventures of Captain Barth, Sharpe, and others in the South Sea." London, 1684.
Governor Lynch wrote in July 1683: "All the governors in America have known of this very design for four or five months." Duro, quoting from a Spanish MS. in the Coleccion Navarrete, t. x. No. 33, says that the booty at Vera Cruz amounted to more than three million reales de plata in jewels and merchandise, for which the invaders demanded a ransom of 150,000 pieces of eight. They also carried away, according to the account, 1300 slaves. (Op. cit., v. p. 271.) A real de plata was one-eighth of a peso or piece of eight.
Governor Lynch wrote in July 1683: "All the governors in America have been aware of this plan for about four or five months." Duro, referencing a Spanish manuscript in the Coleccion Navarrete, t. x. No. 33, states that the plunder in Vera Cruz amounted to over three million silver reales in jewels and goods, for which the invaders demanded a ransom of 150,000 pieces of eight. They also reportedly captured 1,300 slaves. (Op. cit., v. p. 271.) A real de plata was one-eighth of a peso or piece of eight.
Footnote 449: (return)Ibid., vol. 70, f. 57; C.S.P. Colon., 1681-85, No. 1633.
Ibid., vol. 70, f. 57; C.S.P. Colon., 1681-85, No. 1633.
Footnote 450: (return)During de Franquesnay's short tenure of authority, Laurens, driven from Hispaniola by the stern measures of the governor against privateers, made it understood that he desired to enter the service of the Governor of Jamaica. The Privy Council empowered Lynch to treat with him, offering pardon and permission to settle on the island on giving security for his future good behaviour. But de Cussy arrived in the meantime, reversed the policy of de Franquesnay, received Laurens with all the honour due to a military hero, and endeavoured to engage him in the services of the government (Charlevoix, op. cit., liv. viii. pp. 141, 202; C.S.P. Colon., 1681-85, Nos. 1210, 1249, 1424, 1461, 1649, 1718 and 1839).
During de Franquesnay's short time in charge, Laurens, who had been driven out of Hispaniola by the governor's harsh treatment of privateers, made it clear he wanted to serve the Governor of Jamaica. The Privy Council allowed Lynch to negotiate with him, offering him a pardon and the opportunity to settle on the island in exchange for promising to behave well in the future. However, de Cussy arrived in the meantime, reversed de Franquesnay's policies, welcomed Laurens with all the respect due to a military hero, and attempted to recruit him for government service (Charlevoix, op. cit., liv. viii. pp. 141, 202; C.S.P. Colon., 1681-85, Nos. 1210, 1249, 1424, 1461, 1649, 1718 and 1839).
Footnote 451: (return)Charlevoix, op. cit., liv. viii. pp. 139-145; C.S.P. Colon., 1685-88, No. 378.
Charlevoix, op. cit., vol. viii, pp. 139-145; C.S.P. Colon., 1685-88, No. 378.
Footnote 452: (return)Charlevoix, op. cit., liv. ix. pp. 197-99; Duro., op. cit., v. pp. 273-74; C.S.P. Colon., 1685-88, Nos. 193, 339, 378, 778.
Charlevoix, same source as above, book IX, pages 197-99; Duro., same source as above, volume pages 273-74; C.S.P. Colon., 1685-88, Numbers 193, 339, 378, 778.
Footnote 453: (return)According to Charlevoix, de Grammont was a native of Paris, entered the Royal Marine, and distinguished himself in several naval engagements. Finally he appeared in the West Indies as the commander of a frigate armed for privateering, and captured near Martinique a Dutch vessel worth 400,000 livres. He carried his prize to Hispaniola, where he lost at the gaming table and consumed in debauchery the whole value of his capture; and not daring to return to France he joined the buccaneers.
Charlevoix noted that de Grammont was from Paris, joined the Royal Marine, and distinguished himself in several naval battles. Later, he arrived in the West Indies as the captain of a privateering frigate and captured a Dutch ship valued at 400,000 livres near Martinique. He took his prize to Hispaniola, where he lost everything at the gambling table and squandered the full value of his capture on partying; not wanting to return to France, he chose to join the buccaneers.
Footnote 454: (return)"Laurens-Cornille Baldran, sieur de Graff, lieutenant du roi en l'isle de Saint Domingue, capitaine de frégate légère, chevalier de Saint Louis"—so he was styled after entering the service of the French king (Vaissière, op cit., p. 70, note). According to Charlevoix he was a native of Holland, became a gunner in the Spanish navy, and for his skill and bravery was advanced to the post of commander of a vessel. He was sent to American waters, captured by the buccaneers, and joined their ranks. Such was the terror inspired by his name throughout all the Spanish coasts that in the public prayers in the churches Heaven was invoked to shield the inhabitants from his fury. Divorced from his first wife, whom he had married at Teneriffe in 1674, he was married again in March 1693 to a Norman or Breton woman named Marie-Anne Dieu-le-veult, the widow of one of the first inhabitants of Tortuga (ibid.). The story goes that Marie-Anne, thinking one day that she had been grievously insulted by Laurens, went in search of the buccaneer, pistol in hand, to demand an apology for the outrage. De Graff, judging this Amazon to be worthy of him, turned about and married her (Ducéré, op. cit., p. 113, note). In October 1698 Laurens de Graff, in company with Iberville, sailed from Rochefort with two ships, and in Mobile and at the mouths of the Mississippi laid the foundations of Louisiana (Duro, op. cit., v. p. 306). De Graff died in May 1704. Cf. also Bibl. Nat., Nouv. Acq., 9325 f. 311.
"Laurens-Cornille Baldran, sieur de Graff, lieutenant of the king in the Isle of Saint Domingue, captain of a light frigate, knight of Saint Louis"—that’s what he was called after he started serving the French king (Vaissière, op cit., p. 70, note). Charlevoix mentioned that he was originally from Holland, became a gunner in the Spanish navy, and was promoted to ship commander for his skill and bravery. He was sent to American waters, captured by buccaneers, and joined their crew. His name instilled such fear along the Spanish coasts that public prayers in churches asked Heaven to protect the people from his wrath. After divorcing his first wife, whom he had married in Tenerife in 1674, he married again in March 1693 to a woman named Marie-Anne Dieu-le-veult, who was either from Normandy or Brittany and the widow of one of the first settlers of Tortuga (ibid.). According to the story, Marie-Anne, thinking she had been seriously insulted by Laurens, confronted the buccaneer with a pistol to demand an apology for the offense. De Graff, seeing this fierce woman as worthy of him, turned around and married her (Ducéré, op. cit., p. 113, note). In October 1698, Laurens de Graff, along with Iberville, set sail from Rochefort with two ships, and in Mobile and at the mouths of the Mississippi, they established the foundations of Louisiana (Duro, op. cit., v. p. 306). De Graff died in May 1704. Cf. also Bibl. Nat., Nouv. Acq., 9325 f. 311.
Footnote 455: (return)C.S.P. Colon., 1681-85, Nos. 1958, 1962, 1964, 1991, 2000.
C.S.P. Colon., 1681-85, Nos. 1958, 1962, 1964, 1991, 2000.
Dampier writes (1685) that "it hath been usual for many years past for the Governor of Petit Guaves to send blank Commissions to Sea by many of his Captains, with orders to dispose of them to whom they saw convenient.... I never read any of these French Commissions ... but I have learnt since that the Tenor of them is to give a Liberty to Fish, Fowl and Hunt. The Occasion of this is, that ... in time of Peace these Commissions are given as a Warrant to those of each side (i.e., French and Spanish in Hispaniola) to protect them from the adverse Party: But in effect the French do not restrain them to Hispaniola, but make them a pretence for a general ravage in any part of America, by Sea or Land."—Edition 1906, I. pp. 212-13.
Dampier writes (1685) that "for many years, the Governor of Petit Guaves has been sending blank commissions to sea with many of his captains, instructing them to give these to anyone they find suitable.... I have never seen any of these French commissions ... but I have since learned that their main purpose is to grant permission to fish, hunt, and gather game. This happens because ... during times of peace, these commissions are issued as a guarantee for those on both sides (i.e., French and Spanish in Hispaniola) to protect them from the opposing faction. However, in reality, the French don’t limit them to Hispaniola but use them as an excuse for widespread looting anywhere in America, whether by sea or land."—Edition 1906, I. pp. 212-13.
Footnote 456: (return)C.S.P. Colon., 1681-85, Nos. 668, 769, 942, 948, 1281, 1562, 1759; ibid., 1685-88, No. 558.
C.S.P. Colon., 1681-85, Nos. 668, 769, 942, 948, 1281, 1562, 1759; ibid., 1685-88, No. 558.
In a memoir of MM. de St. Laurent and Begon to the French King in February 1684, they report that in the previous year some French filibusters discovered in a patache captured from the Spaniards a letter from the Governor of Jamaica exhorting the Spaniards to make war on the French in Hispaniola, and promising them vessels and other means for entirely destroying the colony. This letter caused a furious outburst of resentment among the French settlers against the English (cf. also C.S.P. Colon., 1681-85, No. 1348). Shortly after, according to the memoir, an English ship of 30 guns appeared for several days cruising in the channel between Tortuga and Port de Paix. The sieur de Franquesnay, on sending to ask for an explanation of this conduct, received a curt reply to the effect that the sea was free to everyone. The French governor thereupon sent a barque with 30 filibusters to attack the Englishman, but the filibusters returned well beaten. In despair de Franquesnay asked Captain de Grammont, who had just returned from a cruise in a ship of 50 guns, to go out against the intruder. With 300 of the corsairs at his back de Grammont attacked the English frigate. The reception accorded by the latter was as vigorous as before, but the result was different, for de Grammont at once grappled with his antagonist, boarded her and put all the English except the captain to the sword.—Bibl. Nat., Nouv. Acq., 9325 f. 332.
In a memo from MM. de St. Laurent and Begon to the French King in February 1684, they reported that the year before, some French filibusters found a letter in a patache taken from the Spaniards. This letter was from the Governor of Jamaica, urging the Spaniards to attack the French in Hispaniola and promising them ships and other resources to completely destroy the colony. This letter triggered a strong reaction among the French settlers towards the English (cf. also C.S.P. Colon., 1681-85, No. 1348). Soon after, according to the memo, an English ship armed with 30 guns sailed around for several days in the channel between Tortuga and Port de Paix. Sieur de Franquesnay, when seeking an explanation for this activity, received a blunt response stating that the sea was open to all. The French governor then dispatched a barque with 30 filibusters to confront the English ship, but the filibusters returned defeated. In desperation, de Franquesnay asked Captain de Grammont, who had just returned from a cruise on a 50-gun ship, to take on the intruder. With 300 corsairs supporting him, de Grammont attacked the English frigate. The English response was just as fierce as before, but this time the outcome was different, as de Grammont quickly grappled with his opponent, boarded her, and killed all the English except for the captain. —Bibl. Nat., Nouv. Acq., 9325 f. 332.
No reference to this incident is found in the English colonial records.
No record of this incident can be found in the English colonial documents.
Footnote 459: (return)C.S.P. Colon., 1681-85, Nos. 1246, 1249, 1250, 1294, 1295, 1302, 1311, 1348, 1489, 1502, 1503, 1510, 1562, 1563, 1565.
C.S.P. Colon., 1681-85, Nos. 1246, 1249, 1250, 1294, 1295, 1302, 1311, 1348, 1489, 1502, 1503, 1510, 1562, 1563, 1565.
Footnote 460: (return)Ibid., No. 1938; ibid., 1685-88, Nos. 33, 53, 57, 68, 128, 129, 157.
Same source., No. 1938; same source., 1685-88, Nos. 33, 53, 57, 68, 128, 129, 157.
Footnote 461: (return)Ibid., 1681-85, Nos. 668, 769; ibid., 1685-88, No. 986.
Ibid., 1681-85, Nos. 668, 769; ibid., 1685-88, No. 986.
Footnote 462: (return)C.S.P. Colon., 1681-85, Nos. 1163, 1198; Bibl. Nat., Nouv. Acq., 9325, f. 332.
C.S.P. Colon., 1681-85, Nos. 1163, 1198; Bibl. Nat., Nouv. Acq., 9325, f. 332.
Footnote 463: (return)C.S.P. Colon., 1681-85, Nos. 1796, 1854, 1855, 1943; ibid., 1685-88, Nos. 218, 269, 569, 591, 609, 706, 739.
C.S.P. Colon., 1681-85, Nos. 1796, 1854, 1855, 1943; ibid., 1685-88, Nos. 218, 269, 569, 591, 609, 706, 739.
Footnote 464: (return)Ibid., 1681-85, Nos. 1163, 1198, 1249, 1630.
Same source, 1681-85, Nos. 1163, 1198, 1249, 1630.
Footnote 465: (return)Ibid., Nos. 963, 992, 1938, 1949, 2025, 2067.
Same source., Nos. 963, 992, 1938, 1949, 2025, 2067.
Footnote 468: (return)C.S.P. Colon., 1681-85, Nos. 1845, 1851, 1862, 2042.
C.S.P. Colon., 1681-85, Nos. 1845, 1851, 1862, 2042.
His ship is called in these letters "La Trompeuse." Unless this is a confusion with Hamlin's vessel, there must have been more than one "La Trompeuse" in the West Indies. Very likely the fame or ill-fame of the original "La Trompeuse" led other pirate captains to flatter themselves by adopting the same name. Breha was captured in 1686 by the Armada de Barlovento and hung with nine or ten of his companions (Charlevoix, op. cit., liv. ix. p. 207).
This ship is mentioned in these letters as "La Trompeuse." Unless there's a mistake with Hamlin's ship, there must have been more than one "La Trompeuse" in the West Indies. It's very likely that the reputation, whether positive or negative, of the original "La Trompeuse" inspired other pirate captains to name their ships after it. Breha was captured in 1686 by the Armada de Barlovento and was hanged along with nine or ten of his crew members (Charlevoix, op. cit., liv. ix. p. 207).
Footnote 471: (return)C.S.P. Colon., 1681-85, Nos. 1560, 1561.
C.S.P. Colon., 1681-85, Nos. 1560, 1561.
Footnote 474: (return)Ibid., 1685-88, Nos. 363, 364, 639, 1164.
Same source., 1685-88, Nos. 363, 364, 639, 1164.
Footnote 475: (return)Ibid., Nos. 1029, 1161; Hughson: Carolina Pirates, p. 24.
Same source, Nos. 1029, 1161; Hughson: Carolina Pirates, p. 24.
Footnote 478: (return)C.S.P. Colon., 1685-88, Nos. 1277, 1278.
C.S.P. Colon., 1685-88, Nos. 1277, 1278.
Footnote 481: (return)Ibid., No. 1602; cf. also ibid., 1693-96, No. 2243.
Ibid., No. 1602; cf. also ibid., 1693-96, No. 2243.
Footnote 482: (return)C.S.P. Colon., 1685-88, Nos. 116, 269, 805.
C.S.P. Colon., 1685-88, Nos. 116, 269, 805.
Footnote 485: (return)Ibid., 1681-85, Nos. 1759, 1852, 2067; ibid., 1685-88, No. 1127 and cf. Index.
Same source., 1681-85, Nos. 1759, 1852, 2067; same source, 1685-88, No. 1127 and see also Index.
For the careers of John Williams (alias Yankey) and Jacob Everson (alias Jacobs) during these years cf. C.S.P. Colon., 1685-88, Nos. 259, 348, 897, 1449, 1476-7, 1624, 1705, 1877; Hist. MSS. Comm., xi. pt. 5, p. 136 (Earl of Dartmouth's MSS.).
For information on the careers of John Williams (also known as Yankey) and Jacob Everson (also known as Jacobs) during these years, refer to C.S.P. Colon., 1685-88, Nos. 259, 348, 897, 1449, 1476-7, 1624, 1705, 1877; Hist. MSS. Comm., xi. pt. 5, p. 136 (Earl of Dartmouth's MSS.).
Footnote 486: (return)C.S.P. Colon., 1685-88, Nos. 1406, 1656, 1670, 1705, 1723, 1733; ibid., 1689-92, Nos. 52, 515; Hist. MSS. Commiss., xi. pt. 5, p. 136.
C.S.P. Colon., 1685-88, Nos. 1406, 1656, 1670, 1705, 1723, 1733; ibid., 1689-92, Nos. 52, 515; Hist. MSS. Commiss., xi. pt. 5, p. 136.
Footnote 491: (return)Ibid., Nos. 758, 920, 927, 930, 1001, 1187, 1210.
Same source., Nos. 758, 920, 927, 930, 1001, 1187, 1210.
Footnote 492: (return)C.S.P. Colon., 1685-88, Nos. 1567, 1646, 1655, 1656, 1659, 1663, 1721, 1838, 1858.
C.S.P. Colon., 1685-88, Nos. 1567, 1646, 1655, 1656, 1659, 1663, 1721, 1838, 1858.
Footnote 494: (return)C.S.P. Colon., 1685-88, No. 1941; cf. also 1906.
C.S.P. Colon., 1685-88, No. 1941; see also 1906.
Footnote 499: (return)Ibid., Nos. 7, 50, 52, 54, 85, 120, 176-178, 293, 296-299, 514, 515, 874, 880, 980, 1041.
Same source., Nos. 7, 50, 52, 54, 85, 120, 176-178, 293, 296-299, 514, 515, 874, 880, 980, 1041.
Footnote 500: (return)C.S.P. Colon., 1689-92, Nos. 293, 467; Ibid., 1693-96, Nos. 1931, vii., 1934.
C.S.P. Colon., 1689-92, Nos. 293, 467; Ibid., 1693-96, Nos. 1931, vii., 1934.
Footnote 501: (return)Ibid., 1689-92, Nos. 515, 616, 635, 769.
Same source., 1689-92, Nos. 515, 616, 635, 769.
Footnote 502: (return)C.S.P. Colon., 1689-92, Nos. 873, 980, 1021, 1041.
C.S.P. Colon., 1689-92, Nos. 873, 980, 1021, 1041.
Footnote 504: (return)Ibid., Nos. 2034, 2043, 2269, 2496, 2498, 2641, 2643.
Same source., Nos. 2034, 2043, 2269, 2496, 2498, 2641, 2643.
Footnote 506: (return)Ibid., Nos. 2034, 2044, 2047, 2052, 2103.
Same source., Nos. 2034, 2044, 2047, 2052, 2103.
Footnote 508: (return)Ibid., 1693-96, Nos. 634, 635, 1009, 1236.
Same source, 1693-96, Nos. 634, 635, 1009, 1236.
Footnote 509: (return)C.S.P. Colon., 1693-96, Nos. 778, 876; Archives Coloniales, Corresp. Gen. de St. Dom. III. Letter of Ducasse, 30 March 1694.
C.S.P. Colon., 1693-96, Nos. 778, 876; Colonial Archives, General Correspondence of St. Dom. III. Letter from Ducasse, March 30, 1694.
Footnote 510: (return)C.S.P. Colon., 1693-96, Nos. 1109, 1236 (i.).
C.S.P. Colon., 1693-96, Nos. 1109, 1236 (i.).
Footnote 511: (return)Ibid., Nos. 1074, 1083, 1106, 1109, 1114, 1121, 1131, 1194, 1236; Charlevoix, I. x. p. 256 ff.; Stowe MSS., 305 f., 205 b; Ducéré: Les corsaires sous l'ancien regime, p. 142.
Ibid., Nos. 1074, 1083, 1106, 1109, 1114, 1121, 1131, 1194, 1236; Charlevoix, I. x. p. 256 ff.; Stowe MSS., 305 f., 205 b; Ducéré: Les corsaires sous l'ancien regime, p. 142.
Footnote 512: (return)The number of white men on the island at this time was variously estimated from 2000 to 2400 men. (C.S.P. Colon., 1693-96, Nos. 1109 and 1258.)
At this time, the estimated number of white men on the island was between 2000 and 2400. (C.S.P. Colon., 1693-96, Nos. 1109 and 1258.)
Footnote 515: (return)C.S.P. Colon., 1693-96, Nos. 1946, 1973, 1974, 1980, 1983, 2022. According to Charlevoix, it was the dalliance and cowardice of Laurens de Graff, who was in command at Cap François, and feared falling into the hands of his old enemies the English and Spaniards, which had much to do with the success of the invasion. After the departure of the allies Laurens was deprived of his post and made captain of a light corvette. (Charlevoix, I. x. p. 266 ff.)
C.S.P. Colon., 1693-96, Nos. 1946, 1973, 1974, 1980, 1983, 2022. According to Charlevoix, the romantic interests and cowardice of Laurens de Graff, who was in charge at Cap François and feared falling into the hands of his former enemies, the English and Spaniards, significantly contributed to the success of the invasion. After the allies departed, Laurens lost his position and was made captain of a light corvette. (Charlevoix, I. x. p. 266 ff.)
Footnote 518: (return)Narrative of de Pointis; C.S.P. Colon., 1696-97, No. 824.
Narrative of de Pointis; C.S.P. Colon., 1696-97, No. 824.
Footnote 519: (return)Narrative of de Pointis; C.S.P. Colon., 1696-97, No. 868.
Narrative of de Pointis; C.S.P. Colon., 1696-97, No. 868.
Footnote 521: (return)C.S.P. Colon., 1696-97, Nos. 373-376, 413, 661, 769.
C.S.P. Colon., 1696-97, Nos. 373-376, 413, 661, 769.
Footnote 525: (return)The mouth of the harbour, called Boca Chica, was defended by a fort with 4 bastions and 33 guns; but the guns were badly mounted on flimsy carriages of cedar, and were manned by only 15 soldiers. Inside the harbour was another fort called Santa Cruz, well-built with 4 bastions and a moat, but provided with only a few iron guns and without a garrison. Two other forts formed part of the exterior works of the town, but they had neither garrison nor guns. The city itself was surrounded by solid walls of stone, with 12 bastions and 84 brass cannon, to man which there was a company of 40 soldiers. Such was the war footing on which the Spanish Government maintained the "Key of the Indies." (Duro, op. cit., v. p. 287.)
The entrance to the harbor, called Boca Chica, was defended by a fort with 4 bastions and 33 cannons. However, the cannons were poorly mounted on weak cedar carriages and operated by only 15 soldiers. Inside the harbor was another fort named Santa Cruz, which was well-built with 4 bastions and a moat, but it only had a few iron cannons and no garrison. Two more forts were part of the outer defenses of the town, but they had no garrison or cannons. The city itself was surrounded by strong stone walls, featuring 12 bastions and 84 brass cannons, manned by a company of 40 soldiers. This was the military condition in which the Spanish Government maintained the "Key of the Indies." (Duro, op. cit., v. p. 287.)
Footnote 526: (return)Narrative of de Pointis. Cf. Charlevoix, op cit., liv. xi., for the best account of the whole expedition.
Narrative of de Pointis. See Charlevoix, op. cit., book xi., for the most comprehensive account of the whole expedition.
Footnote 527: (return)Charlevoix, op. cit., liv. xi. p. 352.
Charlevoix, op. cit., book 11, page 352.
In one of the articles of capitulation which the Governor of Cartagena obtained from de Pointis, the latter promised to leave untouched the plate, jewels and other treasure of the churches and convents. This article was not observed by the French. On the return of the expedition to France, however, Louis XIV. ordered the ecclesiastical plate to be sequestered, and after the conclusion of the Peace of Ryswick sent it back to San Domingo to be delivered to the governor and clergy of the Spanish part of the island. (Duro, op. cit., v. pp. 291, 296-97).
In one of the surrender agreements that the Governor of Cartagena received from de Pointis, the latter promised not to disturb the silver, jewels, and other treasures belonging to the churches and convents. The French did not uphold this agreement. However, when the expedition returned to France, Louis XIV ordered the church silver to be seized, and after the Peace of Ryswick was signed, he sent it back to San Domingo to be given to the governor and clergy of the Spanish side of the island. (Duro, op. cit., v. pp. 291, 296-97).
Footnote 530: (return)Ibid.; cf. C.S.P. Colon., 1669-74, No. 138: "The number of tippling houses is now doubly increased, so that there is not now resident upon the place ten men to every house that selleth strong liquors. There are more than 100 licensed houses, besides sugar and rum works that sell without licence."
Ibid.; cf. C.S.P. Colon., 1669-74, No. 138: "The number of bars has now doubled, meaning there aren't even ten men for every house that sells alcoholic beverages. There are over 100 licensed establishments, not counting sugar and rum businesses that operate without a license."
Footnote 531: (return)Crawford: Bibliotheca Lindesiana. Handlist of Proclamations.
Crawford: Bibliotheca Lindesiana. Proclamations List.
Footnote 532: (return)Firth: Naval Songs and Ballads, pp. l.-lii.; cf. also Archives Coloniales, Corresp. Gén. de St Dom., vols. iii.-ix.; Ibid., Martinique, vols. viii.-xix.
Firth: Naval Songs and Ballads, pp. 1-52; see also Archives Coloniales, Corresp. Gén. de St Dom., vols. 3-9; Ibid., Martinique, vols. 8-19.
Footnote 533: (return)Archives Coloniales, Corresp. Gén. de Martinique, vol. xvi.
Colonial Archives, General Correspondence of Martinique, vol. 16.
APPENDIX I
An account of the English buccaneers belonging to Jamaica and Tortuga in 1663, found among the Rawlinson MSS., makes the number of privateering ships fifteen, and the men engaged in the business nearly a thousand. The list is as follows:—
An account of the English buccaneers from Jamaica and Tortuga in 1663, found among the Rawlinson MSS., states that there were fifteen privateering ships and nearly a thousand men involved in the business. The list is as follows:—
Captain | Ship | Men | Guns |
Sir Thomas Whetstone | a Spanish prize | 60 | 7 |
Captain Smart | Griffon, frigate | 100 | 14 |
Captain Guy | James, frigate | 90 | 14 |
Captain James | American, frigate | 70 | 6 |
Captain Cooper | his frigate | 80 | 10 |
Captain Morris | a brigantine | 60 | 7 |
Captain Brenningham | his frigate | 70 | 6 |
Captain Mansfield | a brigantine | 60 | 4 |
Captain Goodly | a pink | 60 | 6 |
Captain Blewfield, belonging to Cape Gratia de Dios | a barque | 50 | 3 |
Captain Herdue | a frigate | 40 | 4 |
There were four more belonging to Jamaica, of which no account was available. The crews were mixed of English, French and Dutch.
There were four more from Jamaica, but no details were available about them. The crews were made up of English, French, and Dutch members.
APPENDIX II
List of filibusters and their vessels on the coasts of French San Domingo in 1684:—
List of filibusters and their ships along the shores of French San Domingo in 1684:—
Captain | Ship | Men | Guns |
Le sieur Grammont | le Hardy | 300 | 52 |
Le capitaine Laurens de Graff | Le Neptune | 210 | 54 |
Le capitaine Michel | la Mutine | 200 | 44 |
Le capitaine Janquais | la Dauphine | 180 | 30 |
Le capitaine le Sage | le Tigre | 130 | 30 |
Le capitaine Dedran | le Chasseur | 120 | 20 |
Le sieur du Mesnil | la Trompeuse | 100 | 14 |
Le capitaine Jocard | l'Irondelle | 120 | 18 |
Le capitaine Brea | la Fortune | 100 | 14 |
La prise du capne. Laurens | — | 80 | 18 |
Le sieur de Bernanos | la Schitie | 60 | 8 |
Le capitaine Cachemarée | le St Joseph | 70 | 6 |
Le capitaine Blot | la Quagone | 90 | 8 |
Le capitaine Vigeron | la Louse (barque) | 30 | 4 |
Le capitaine Petit | le Ruzé (bateau) | 40 | 4 |
Le capitaine Lagarde | la Subtille | 30 | 2 |
Le capitaine Verpre | le Postilion | 25 | 2 |
(Paris, Archives Coloniales, Corresp. gén. de St. Dom., vol. i.—Mémoire sur l'estat de Saint Domingue à M. de Seignelay par M. de Cussy.)
(Paris, Archives Coloniales, Corresp. gén. de St. Dom., vol. i.—Report on the state of Saint Domingue to M. de Seignelay by M. de Cussy.)
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Dampier, William: Voyages. Edited by J. Masefield. 2 vols. London, 1906.
Gage, Thomas: The English American ... or a new survey of the West Indies, etc. London, 1648.
Gage, Thomas: The English American ... or a new survey of the West Indies, etc. London, 1648.
Historical Manuscripts Commission: Reports. London, 1870 (in progress).
Historical Manuscripts Commission: Reports. London, 1870 (ongoing).
Margry, Pierre: Relations et mémoires inédits pour servir à l'histoire de la France dans les pays d'outremer. Paris, 1867.
Margry, Pierre: Unpublished relations and memoirs to serve the history of France in overseas territories. Paris, 1867.
Pacheco, Cardenas, y Torres de Mendoza: Coleccion de documentos relativos al describrimiento, conquista y colonizacion de las posesiones españoles en América y Oceania. 42 vols. Madrid, 1864-83; continued as Coleccion de documentos ineditos ... de ultramar. 13 vols. Madrid, 1885-1900.
Pacheco, Cardenas, and Torres de Mendoza: Collection of documents related to the discovery, conquest, and colonization of Spanish possessions in America and Oceania. 42 vols. Madrid, 1864-83; continued as Collection of unpublished documents ... from overseas. 13 vols. Madrid, 1885-1900.
Pointis, Jean Bernard Desjeans, sieur de: Relation de l'expedition de Carthagène faite par les François en 1697. Amsterdam, 1698.
Pointis, Jean Bernard Desjeans, lord of: Account of the expedition to Cartagena carried out by the French in 1697. Amsterdam, 1698.
Present state of Jamaica ... to which is added an exact account of Sir Henry Morgan's voyage to ... Panama, etc. London, 1683.
Present state of Jamaica ... which includes a detailed account of Sir Henry Morgan's journey to ... Panama, etc. London, 1683.
Recopilacion de leyes de los reynos de las Indias, mandadas imprimir y publicar por rey Carlos II. 4 vols. Madrid, 1681.
Recopilation of laws from the kingdoms of the Indies, ordered to be printed and published by King Charles II. 4 vols. Madrid, 1681.
Sharp, Bartholomew: The voyages and adventures of Captain B. Sharp ... in the South Sea ... Also Captain Van Horn with his buccanieres surprising of la Vera Cruz, etc. London, 1684.
Sharp, Bartholomew: The journeys and adventures of Captain B. Sharp ... in the South Sea ... Also Captain Van Horn with his buccaneers surprising la Vera Cruz, etc. London, 1684.
Thurloe, John. A collection of the State papers of, etc. Edited by Thomas Birch. 7 vols. London, 1742.
Thurloe, John. A collection of State papers, etc. Edited by Thomas Birch. 7 vols. London, 1742.
Venables, General. The narrative of, etc. Edited by C.H. Firth. London, 1900.
Venables, General. The narrative of, etc. Edited by C.H. Firth. London, 1900.
Wafer, Lionel: A new voyage and description of the Isthmus of America, etc. London, 1699.
Wafer, Lionel: A new journey and description of the Isthmus of America, etc. London, 1699.
Winwood, Sir Ralph. Memorials of affairs of State ... collected from the original papers of, etc. Edited by Edmund Sawyer. London, 1725.
Winwood, Sir Ralph. Memorials of Affairs of State ... collected from the original papers of, etc. Edited by Edmund Sawyer. London, 1725.
Among the printed sources one of the earliest and most important is the well-known history of the buccaneers written by Alexander Olivier Exquemelin (corrupted by the English into Esquemeling, by the French into Oexmelin). Of the author himself very little is known. Though sometimes claimed as a native of France, he was probably a Fleming or a Hollander, for the first edition of his works was written in the Dutch language. He came to Tortuga in 1666 as an engagé of the French West India Company, and after serving three years under a cruel master was rescued by the governor, M. d'Ogeron, joined the filibusters, and remained with them till 1674, taking part in most of their exploits. He seems to have exercised among them the profession of barber-surgeon. Returning to Europe in 1674, he published a narrative of the exploits in which he had taken part, or of which he at least had a first-hand knowledge. This "history" is the oldest and most elaborate chronicle we possess of the extraordinary deeds {278} and customs of these freebooters who played so large a part in the history of the West Indies in the seventeenth century, and it forms the basis of all the popular modern accounts of Morgan and other buccaneer captains. Exquemelin, although he sadly confuses his dates, seems to be a perfectly honest witness, and his accounts of such transactions as fell within his own experience are closely corroborated by the official narratives.
Among the printed sources, one of the earliest and most important is the well-known history of the buccaneers written by Alexander Olivier Exquemelin (incorrectly referred to in English as Esquemeling and in French as Oexmelin). Very little is known about the author himself. Although he is sometimes claimed to be a native of France, he was likely a Fleming or a Hollander, as the first edition of his works was written in Dutch. He arrived in Tortuga in 1666 as an engagé for the French West India Company and, after serving three years under a cruel master, was rescued by Governor M. d'Ogeron. He then joined the filibusters and stayed with them until 1674, participating in most of their exploits. He appears to have worked as a barber-surgeon among them. After returning to Europe in 1674, he published a narrative about the exploits he had taken part in or at least had direct knowledge of. This "history" is the oldest and most detailed account we have of the extraordinary deeds and customs of these freebooters who played such a significant role in the history of the West Indies in the seventeenth century, and it serves as the foundation for all modern popular accounts of Morgan and other buccaneer captains. Exquemelin, although he unfortunately confuses his dates, seems to be a completely honest witness, and his accounts of events he personally experienced are closely supported by official narratives.
(Biographies of Exquemelin are contained in the "Biographie Universelle" of Michaud, vol. xxxi. p. 201, and in the "Nouvelle Biographie Générale" of Hoefer, vol. xxxviii. p. 544. But both are very unsatisfactory and display a lamentable ignorance of the bibliography of his history of the buccaneers. According to the preface of a French edition of the work published at Lyons in 1774 and cited in the "Nouvelle Biographie," Exquemelin was born about 1645 and died after 1707.)
(Biographies of Exquemelin can be found in Michaud's "Biographie Universelle," vol. xxxi, p. 201, and in Hoefer's "Nouvelle Biographie Générale," vol. xxxviii, p. 544. However, both are quite unsatisfactory and show a disappointing lack of knowledge regarding the bibliography of his history of the buccaneers. According to the preface of a French edition of the work published in Lyon in 1774, which is mentioned in the "Nouvelle Biographie," Exquemelin was born around 1645 and died after 1707.)
The first edition of the book, now very rare, is entitled:
The first edition of the book, which is now quite rare, is titled:
De Americaensche Zee-Roovers. Behelsende eene pertinente en waerachtige Beschrijving van alle de voornaemste Roveryen en onmenschliycke wreend heden die Englese en France Rovers tegens de Spanjaerden in America gepleeght hebben; Verdeelt in drie deelen ... Beschreven door A. O. Exquemelin ... t'Amsterdam, by Jan ten Hoorn, anno 1678, in 4º.
The American Buccaneers. Contains a relevant and true account of all the major raids and inhumane atrocities that English and French pirates committed against the Spaniards in America; divided into three parts... Described by A. O. Exquemelin ... in Amsterdam, by Jan ten Hoorn, in the year 1678, in 4º.
(Brit. Mus., 1061. Cf. 20 (2). The date, 1674, of the first Dutch edition cited by Dampierre ("Essai sur les sources de l'histoire des Antilles Françaises," p. 151) is doubtless a misprint.)
(Brit. Mus., 1061. See 20 (2). The date, 1674, of the first Dutch edition mentioned by Dampierre ("Essai sur les sources de l'histoire des Antilles Françaises," p. 151) is likely a typo.)
(Both Dampierre (op. cit., p. 152) and Sabin ("Dict. of Books relating to America," vi. p. 310) cite, as the earliest separate account of the buccaneers, Claes G. Campaen's "Zee-Roover," Amsterdam, 1659. This little volume, however, does not deal with the buccaneers in the West Indies, but with privateering along the coasts of Europe and Africa.)
(Both Dampierre (op. cit., p. 152) and Sabin ("Dict. of Books relating to America," vi. p. 310) mention Claes G. Campaen's "Zee-Roover," published in Amsterdam in 1659, as the earliest separate account of the buccaneers. However, this small book doesn't focus on the buccaneers in the West Indies; instead, it covers privateering along the coasts of Europe and Africa.)
This book was reprinted several times and numerous translations were made, one on the top of the other. What appears to be a German translation of Exquemelin appeared in 1679 with the title:
This book was reprinted multiple times, and many translations were made, stacked one on top of the other. A German translation of Exquemelin came out in 1679 with the title:
Americanische Seeräuber. Beschreibung der grössesten durch die Französische und Englische Meer-Beuter wider die Spanier in Amerika verübten Raubery Grausamheit ... Durch A. O. Nürnberg, 1679. 12º.
American Pirates. A description of the most significant acts of theft and brutality carried out by French and English privateers against the Spanish in America... By A. O. Nuremberg, 1679. 12º.
("Historie der Boecaniers of Vrybuyters van America ... Met Figuuren, 3 Deel. t'Amsterdam, 1700," 4º.—Brit. Mus., 9555. c. 19.)
("History of the Buccaneers or Freebooters of America ... With Illustrations, 3 Volumes. Amsterdam, 1700," 4º.—British Museum, 9555. c. 19.)
This was followed two years later by a Spanish edition, also taken from the Dutch original:
This was followed two years later by a Spanish edition, also based on the Dutch original:
Piratas de la America y luz a la defensa de las costas de Indias Occidentales. Dedicado a Don Bernadino Antonio de Pardinas Villar de Francos ... por el zelo y cuidado de Don Antonio Freyre ... Traducido de la lingua Flamenca en Espanola por el Dor. de Buena-Maison ... Colonia Agrippina, en casa de Lorenzo Struickman. Ano de 1681. 12º.
Pirates of America and the lack of protection for the coasts of the West Indies. Dedicated to Don Bernardino Antonio de Pardinas Villar de Francos ... in appreciation of the efforts of Don Antonio Freyre ... Translated from Flemish to Spanish by Dr. Buena-Maison ... Cologne, at the home of Lorenzo Struickman. Year 1681. 12º.
(Brit. Mus., G. 7179. The appended description of the Spanish Government in America was omitted and a few Spanish verses were added in one or two places, but otherwise the translation seems to be trustworthy. The portraits and the map of the isthmus of Panama are the same as in the Dutch edition, but the other plates are different and better. In the Bibl. Nat. there is another Spanish edition of 1681 in quarto.)
(Brit. Mus., G. 7179. The added description of the Spanish Government in America was left out, and a few Spanish verses were included in one or two spots, but otherwise the translation appears to be reliable. The portraits and the map of the isthmus of Panama are the same as in the Dutch edition, but the other illustrations are different and better. In the Bibl. Nat. there is another Spanish edition from 1681 in quarto.)
This Spanish text, which seems to be a faithful rendering of the Dutch, was reprinted with a different dedication in 1682 and in 1684, and again in Madrid in 1793. It is the version on which the first English edition was based. The English translation is entitled:
This Spanish text, which appears to be an accurate translation of the Dutch, was reprinted with a different dedication in 1682 and 1684, and once more in Madrid in 1793. It is the version that the first English edition relied on. The English translation is titled:
Bucaniers of America; or a true account of the ... assaults committed ... upon the coasts of the West Indies, by the Bucaniers of Jamaica and Tortuga ... especially the ... exploits of Sir Henry Morgan ... written originally in Dutch by J. Esquemeling ... now ... rendered into English. W. Crooke; London, 1684. 4º.
Buccaneers of America; or a true account of the ... attacks carried out ... on the shores of the West Indies, by the Buccaneers of Jamaica and Tortuga ... especially the ... actions of Sir Henry Morgan ... originally written in Dutch by J. Esquemeling ... now ... translated into English. W. Crooke; London, 1684. 4º.
(Brit. Mus., 1198, a. 12 (or) 1197, h. 2.; G. 7198.)
(Brit. Mus., 1198, a. 12 (or) 1197, h. 2.; G. 7198.)
The first English edition of Exquemelin was so well received that within three months a second was published, to which was added the account of a voyage by Captain Cook and a brief chapter on the exploits of {280} Barth. Sharp in the Pacific Ocean. In the same year, moreover, there appeared an entirely different English version, with the object of vindicating the character of Morgan from the charges of brutality and lust which had appeared in the first translation and in the Dutch original. It was entitled:
The first English edition of Exquemelin was so well received that within three months a second one was published, which included an account of a voyage by Captain Cook and a short chapter on the exploits of {280} Barth. Sharp in the Pacific Ocean. That same year, an entirely different English version was also released, aimed at defending Morgan's character from the accusations of brutality and lust that had been made in the first translation and the Dutch original. It was titled:
The History of the Bucaniers; being an impartial relation of all the battels, sieges, and other most eminent assaults committed for several years upon the coasts of the West Indies by the pirates of Jamaica and Tortuga. More especially the unparalleled achievements of Sir Henry Morgan ... very much corrected from the errors of the original, by the relations of some English gentlemen, that then resided in those parts. Den Engelseman is een Duyvil voor een Mensch. London, printed for Thomas Malthus at the Sun in the Poultry. 1684.
The History of the Buccaneers; an impartial account of all the battles, sieges, and other significant attacks conducted over many years on the coasts of the West Indies by the pirates from Jamaica and Tortuga. It particularly highlights the incredible exploits of Sir Henry Morgan … extensively revised to correct the errors of the original, based on accounts from some English gentlemen who lived in those areas at the time. Den Engelseman is een Duyvil voor een Mensch. London, printed for Thomas Malthus at the Sun in the Poultry. 1684.
(Brit. Mus., G. 13,674.)
(Brit. Mus., G. 13,674.)
The first edition of 1684 was reprinted with a new title-page in 1695, and again in 1699. The latter included, in addition to the text of Exquemelin, the journals of Basil Ringrose and Raveneau de Lussan, both describing voyages in the South Seas, and the voyage of the Sieur de Montauban to Guinea in 1695. This was the earliest of the composite histories of the {281} buccaneers and became the model for the Dutch edition of 1700 and the French editions published at Trevoux in 1744 and 1775.
The first edition from 1684 was reprinted with a new title page in 1695 and again in 1699. The latter edition included, besides Exquemelin's text, the journals of Basil Ringrose and Raveneau de Lussan, which both described voyages in the South Seas, as well as the voyage of Sieur de Montauban to Guinea in 1695. This was the first of the composite histories of the {281} buccaneers and became the blueprint for the Dutch edition of 1700 and the French editions published in Trevoux in 1744 and 1775.
The first French translation of Exquemelin appeared two years after the English edition of 1684. It is entitled:
The first French translation of Exquemelin came out two years after the English edition of 1684. It's titled:
Histoire des Aventuriers qui se sont signalez dans les Indes contenant ce qu'ils ont fait de plus remarquable depuis vingt années. Avec la vie, les Moeurs, les Coutumes des Habitans de Saint Domingue et de la Tortuë et une Description exacte de ces lieux; ... Le tout enrichi de Cartes Geographiques et de Figures en Taille-douce. Par Alexandre Olivier Oexmelin. A Paris, chez Jacques Le Febre. MDCLXXXVI., 2 vols. 12º.
History of the Adventurers who made their mark in the Indies, detailing their most remarkable actions over the past twenty years. Includes information about the lifestyle, customs, and habits of the inhabitants of Saint Domingue and Tortuga, along with an accurate description of these places; ... All enriched with geographic maps and engravings. By Alexandre Olivier Oexmelin. In Paris, by Jacques Le Febre. 1686, 2 volumes, 12º.
(Brit. Mus., 9555, aa. 4.)
(Brit. Mus., 9555, aa. 4.)
This version may have been based on the Dutch original; although the only indication we have of this is the fact that the work includes at the end a description of the government and revenues of the Spanish Indies, a description which is found in none of the earlier editions of Exquemelin, except in the Dutch original of 1678. The French text, however, while following the outline of Exquemelin's narrative, is greatly altered and enlarged. The history of Tortuga and French Hispaniola is elaborated with details from another source, as are also the descriptions of the manners and customs of the cattle-hunters and the freebooters. Accounts of two other buccaneers, Montbars and Alexandre Bras-le-Fer, are inserted, but d'Ogeron's shipwreck on Porto Rico and the achievements of Admiral d'Estrees against the Dutch are omitted. In general the French editor, the Sieur de {282} Frontignières, has re-cast the whole story. A similar French edition appeared in Paris in 1688, (Brit. Mus., 278, a. 13, 14.) and in 1713 a facsimile of this last was published at Brussels by Serstevens (Dampierre, p. 153). Sabin (op. cit., vi. 312) mentions an edition of 1699 in three volumes which included the journal of Raveneau de Lussan. In 1744, and again in 1775, another French edition was published in four volumes at Trevoux, to which was added the voyage of Montauban to the Guinea Coast, and the expeditions against Vera Cruz in 1683, Campeache in 1685, and Cartagena in 1697. The third volume contained the journal of R. de Lussan, and the fourth a translation of Johnson's "History of the Pirates." (Brit. Mus., 9555, aa. 1.) A similar edition appeared at Lyons in 1774, but I have had no opportunity of examining a copy. (Nouvelle Biographie Générale, tom. xxxviii. 544. The best bibliography of Exquemelin is in Sabin, op. cit., vi. 309.)
This version may have been based on the Dutch original; the only evidence we have is that the work includes a description of the government and revenues of the Spanish Indies at the end, which isn't found in earlier editions of Exquemelin, except in the Dutch original from 1678. However, while the French text follows the structure of Exquemelin's narrative, it has been significantly changed and expanded. The history of Tortuga and French Hispaniola is detailed with information from another source, as are the descriptions of the cattle-hunters' and freebooters' ways of life. Accounts of two other buccaneers, Montbars and Alexandre Bras-le-Fer, are included, but d'Ogeron's shipwreck in Puerto Rico and Admiral d'Estrees' exploits against the Dutch are left out. Overall, the French editor, the Sieur de Frontignières, has reworked the entire story. A similar French edition was published in Paris in 1688, (Brit. Mus., 278, a. 13, 14.) and in 1713 a facsimile of this edition was produced in Brussels by Serstevens (Dampierre, p. 153). Sabin (op. cit., vi. 312) mentions a 1699 edition in three volumes that included the journal of Raveneau de Lussan. In 1744, and again in 1775, another French edition was published in four volumes in Trevoux, which added the voyage of Montauban to the Guinea Coast, along with expeditions against Vera Cruz in 1683, Campeache in 1685, and Cartagena in 1697. The third volume contained R. de Lussan's journal, and the fourth had a translation of Johnson's "History of the Pirates." (Brit. Mus., 9555, aa. 1.) A similar edition came out in Lyons in 1774, but I haven't had the chance to look at a copy. (Nouvelle Biographie Générale, tom. xxxviii. 544. The best bibliography of Exquemelin is in Sabin, op. cit., vi. 309.)
Secondary Works
Additional Works
Of the secondary works concerned with the history of the buccaneers, the oldest are the writings of the French Jesuit historians of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Dutertre (Histoire générale des Antilles. Paris, 1667-71), a chronicler of events within his own experience as well as a reliable historian, unfortunately brings his narrative to a close in 1667, but up to that year he is the safest guide to the history of the French Antilles. Labat, in his "Nouveau Voyage aux Isles de l'Amerique" (Paris, 1722), gives an account of eleven years, between 1694 and 1705, spent in Martinique and Guadeloupe, and although of little value as an historian, he supplies us with {283} a fund of the most picturesque and curious details about the life and manners of the people in the West Indies at the end of the seventeenth century. A much more important and accurate work is Charlevoix's "Histoire de l'Isle Espagnole ou de S. Domingue" (Paris, 1732), and this I have used as a general introduction to the history of the French buccaneers. Raynal's "Histoire philosophique et politique des établissements et du commerce européen dans les deux Indes" (Amsterdam, 1770) is based for the origin of the French Antilles upon Dutertre and Labat and is therefore negligible for the period of the buccaneers. Adrien Dessalles, who in 1847 published his "Histoire générale des Antilles," preferred, like Labat and Raynal, to depend on the historians who had preceded him rather than endeavour to gain an intimate knowledge of the sources.
Of the secondary works focused on the history of the buccaneers, the earliest are the writings of French Jesuit historians from the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Dutertre (Histoire générale des Antilles. Paris, 1667-71), who chronicled events from his own experiences as well as serving as a reliable historian, unfortunately ends his narrative in 1667, but until that year, he is the most trustworthy guide to the history of the French Antilles. Labat, in his "Nouveau Voyage aux Isles de l'Amerique" (Paris, 1722), recounts eleven years spent in Martinique and Guadeloupe between 1694 and 1705, and although he holds little value as a historian, he offers a wealth of vivid and interesting details about the life and customs of the people in the West Indies at the end of the seventeenth century. A much more significant and accurate work is Charlevoix's "Histoire de l'Isle Espagnole ou de S. Domingue" (Paris, 1732), which I have used as a general introduction to the history of the French buccaneers. Raynal's "Histoire philosophique et politique des établissements et du commerce européen dans les deux Indes" (Amsterdam, 1770) relies on Dutertre and Labat for the origins of the French Antilles and is thus not useful for the buccaneer period. Adrien Dessalles, who published his "Histoire générale des Antilles" in 1847, chose to rely on the historians before him, like Labat and Raynal, rather than strive for in-depth knowledge of the sources.
In the English histories of Jamaica written by Long, Bridges, and Gardner, whatever notice is taken of the buccaneers is meagre and superficial, and the same is true of Bryan Edwards' "History, civil and commercial, of the British colonies in the West Indies." Thomas Southey, in his "Chronological History of the West Indies" (Lond. 1827), devotes considerable space to their achievements, but depends entirely upon the traditional sources. In 1803 J.W. von Archenholz published "Die Geschichte der Flibustier," a superficial, diffuse and even puerile narrative, giving no references whatever to authorities. (It was translated into French (Paris, 1804), and into English by Geo. Mason (London, 1807).) In 1816 a "History of the Buccaneers in America" was published by James Burney as the fourth volume of "A chronological History of the Discoveries in the South Seas or Pacific Ocean." Burney casts but a rapid glance over the West Indies, devoting most of the volume to an account of the voyages of the freebooters along the coast {284} of South America and in the East Indies. Walter Thornbury in 1858 wrote "The Buccaneers, or the Monarchs of the Main," a hasty compilation, florid and overdrawn, and without historical judgment or accuracy. In 1895 M. Henri Lorin presented a Latin thesis to the Faculty of History in Paris, entitled:—"De praedonibus Insulam Santi Dominici celebrantibus saeculo septimo decimo," but he seems to have confined himself to Exquemelin, Le Pers, Labat, Dutertre and a few documents drawn from the French colonial archives. The best summary account in English of the history and significance of the buccaneers in the West Indies is contained in Hubert H. Bancroft's "History of Central America" (ii. chs. 26, 28-30). Within the past year there has appeared an excellent volume by M. Pierre de Vaissière describing creole life and manners in the French colony of San Domingo in the century and a half preceding the Revolution. (Vaissière, Pierre de: Saint Dominigue. (1629-1789). Paris, 1909.) It is a reliable monograph, and like his earlier volume, "Gentilshommes campagnards de l'ancienne France," is written in a most entertaining style. De Vaissière contributes much valuable information, especially in the first chapter, about the origins and customs of the French "flibustiers."
In the English histories of Jamaica written by Long, Bridges, and Gardner, any mention of the buccaneers is limited and basic, and the same goes for Bryan Edwards' "History, Civil and Commercial, of the British Colonies in the West Indies." Thomas Southey, in his "Chronological History of the West Indies" (London, 1827), spends a good amount of time on their achievements but relies solely on traditional sources. In 1803, J.W. von Archenholz published "Die Geschichte der Flibustier," a shallow, lengthy, and even childish narrative, which provides no references to authorities whatsoever. (It was translated into French (Paris, 1804) and into English by Geo. Mason (London, 1807).) In 1816, James Burney released a "History of the Buccaneers in America" as the fourth volume of "A Chronological History of the Discoveries in the South Seas or Pacific Ocean." Burney takes a quick look at the West Indies, dedicating most of the volume to the voyages of the freebooters along the coast of South America and in the East Indies. Walter Thornbury wrote "The Buccaneers, or the Monarchs of the Main" in 1858, a rushed compilation that is flowery and exaggerated, lacking historical judgment or accuracy. In 1895, M. Henri Lorin submitted a Latin thesis to the Faculty of History in Paris titled, "De praedonibus Insulam Santi Dominici celebrantibus saeculo septimo decimo," but he appears to have limited himself to Exquemelin, Le Pers, Labat, Dutertre, and a few documents from the French colonial archives. The best English summary of the history and significance of the buccaneers in the West Indies can be found in Hubert H. Bancroft's "History of Central America" (ii. chs. 26, 28-30). In the past year, an outstanding volume by M. Pierre de Vaissière has been published, detailing creole life and customs in the French colony of San Domingo in the one hundred and fifty years leading up to the Revolution. (Vaissière, Pierre de: Saint Dominigue. (1629-1789). Paris, 1909.) It is a reliable study, and like his earlier book, "Gentilshommes campagnards de l'ancienne France," it is written in a very engaging style. De Vaissière provides a lot of valuable information, especially in the first chapter, regarding the origins and customs of the French "flibustiers."
I have been able to find only two Spanish works which refer at all to the buccaneers. One is entitled:
I have only been able to find two Spanish works that mention the buccaneers at all. One is titled:
Piraterias y agresiones de los ingleses y de otros pueblos de Europa en la America espanola desde el siglo XVI. al XVIII., deducidas de las obras de D. Dionisio de Alcedo y Herrera. Madrid, 1883. 4º.
Piracies and assaults by the English and other European nations in Spanish America from the 16th to the 18th century, based on the writings of D. Dionisio de Alcedo y Herrera. Madrid, 1883. 4º.
Except for a long introduction by Don Justo Zaragoza based upon Exquemelin and Alcedo, it consists of a {285} collection of extracts referring to freebooters on the coasts of Peru and Chili, and deals chiefly with the eighteenth century. The other Spanish work is an elaborate history of the Spanish navy lately published in nine volumes by Cesareo Fernandez Duro, and entitled:—
Except for a long introduction by Don Justo Zaragoza based on Exquemelin and Alcedo, it consists of a {285} collection of extracts about pirates on the coasts of Peru and Chile, focusing mainly on the eighteenth century. The other Spanish work is an extensive history of the Spanish navy recently published in nine volumes by Cesareo Fernandez Duro, titled:—
Armada espanola desde la union de los reinos de Castilla y de Aragon. Madrid, 1895.
Spanish Armada since the union of the kingdoms of Castile and Aragon. Madrid, 1895.
There are numerous chapters dealing with the outrages of the French and English freebooters in the West Indies, some of them based upon Spanish sources to which I have had no access. But upon comparison of Duro's narrative, which in so far as it relates to the buccaneers is often meagre, with the sources available to me, I find that he adds little to what may be learned on the subject here in England.
There are many chapters about the atrocities committed by the French and English pirates in the West Indies, some of which rely on Spanish sources that I have not been able to access. However, when I compare Duro's account, which is often lacking in details regarding the buccaneers, with the sources available to me, I discover that he contributes little to what can be learned about the topic here in England.
One of the best English descriptions of the Spanish colonial administration and commercial system is still that contained in book viii. of Robertson's "History of America" (Lond. 1777). The latest and best summary account, however, is in French, in the introduction to vol. i. of "La traite négrière aux Indes de Castille" (Paris, 1906), by Georges Scelle. Weiss, in vol. ii. of his history of "L'Espagne depuis Philippe II. jusqu'aux Bourbons" (Paris, 1844), treats of the causes of the economic decadence of Spain, and gives an account of the contraband trade in Spanish America, drawn largely from Labat. On this general subject Leroy-Beaulieu, "De la colonization chez les peuples modernes" (Paris, 1874), has been especially consulted.
One of the best English descriptions of the Spanish colonial administration and trade system is still found in Book VIII of Robertson's "History of America" (Lond. 1777). The latest and most comprehensive summary, however, is in French, in the introduction to Vol. I of "La traite négrière aux Indes de Castille" (Paris, 1906), by Georges Scelle. Weiss, in Vol. II of his history "L'Espagne depuis Philippe II. jusqu'aux Bourbons" (Paris, 1844), discusses the causes of Spain’s economic decline and provides an account of the illegal trade in Spanish America, largely based on Labat. For this broader topic, Leroy-Beaulieu’s "De la colonization chez les peuples modernes" (Paris, 1874) has been particularly referenced.
The best account of the French privateers of the sixteenth century in America is in an essay entitled: "Les corsairs français au XVIe siècle dans les Antilles" (Paris, 1902), by Gabriel Marcel. It is a short monograph based on the collections of Spanish documents brought together by Pacheco and Navarrete. The volume by E. Ducéré {286} entitled, "Les corsairs sous l'ancien regîme" (Bayonne, 1895), is also valuable for the history of privateering. For the history of the Elizabethan mariners I have made use of the two works by J. S. Corbett: "Drake and the Tudor Navy" (Lond. 1898), and "The successors of Drake" (Lond. 1900). Other works consulted were:
The best account of the French privateers in America during the sixteenth century is in an essay titled: "Les corsairs français au XVIe siècle dans les Antilles" (Paris, 1902), by Gabriel Marcel. It's a short monograph based on the collections of Spanish documents compiled by Pacheco and Navarrete. The book by E. Ducéré {286} titled, "Les corsairs sous l'ancien régime" (Bayonne, 1895), is also useful for the history of privateering. For the history of Elizabethan mariners, I referred to two works by J. S. Corbett: "Drake and the Tudor Navy" (Lond. 1898), and "The successors of Drake" (Lond. 1900). Other works consulted were:
Arias de Miranda, José: Examen critico-historico del influyo que tuvo en el comercio, industria y poblacion de Espana su dominacion en America. Madrid, 1854.
Arias de Miranda, José: Critical-Historical Examination of the Influence That Spain's Domination in America Had on Its Trade, Industry, and Population. Madrid, 1854.
Blok, Pieter Johan: History of the people of the Netherlands. Translated by C. A. Bierstadt and Ruth Putnam. 4 vols. New York, 1898.
Blok, Pieter Johan: History of the People of the Netherlands. Translated by C. A. Bierstadt and Ruth Putnam. 4 vols. New York, 1898.
Brown, Alex.: The Genesis of the United States. 2 vols. Lond., 1890.
Brown, Alex: The Genesis of the United States. 2 vols. London, 1890.
Crawford, James Ludovic Lindsay, 26th Earl of: Bibliotheca Lindesiana. Handlist of proclamations. 3 vols. Aberdeen, 1893-1901.
Crawford, James Ludovic Lindsay, 26th Earl of: Bibliotheca Lindesiana. Handlist of proclamations. 3 vols. Aberdeen, 1893-1901.
Dumont, Jean: Corps universel diplomatique. 13 vols. Hague, 1726-39.
Dumont, Jean: Universal Diplomatic Corps. 13 vols. The Hague, 1726-39.
Froude, James Anthony: History of England from the fall of Wolsey to the defeat of the Spanish armada. 12 vols. 1870-75. English seamen in the sixteenth century. Lond., 1901.
Froude, James Anthony: History of England from the fall of Wolsey to the defeat of the Spanish armada. 12 vols. 1870-75. English seamen in the sixteenth century. Lond., 1901.
Gardiner, Samuel Rawson: History of the Commonwealth and Protectorate, 1649-1660. 3 vols. Lond., 1894-1903.
Gardiner, Samuel Rawson: History of the Commonwealth and Protectorate, 1649-1660. 3 vols. London, 1894-1903.
Geographical and historical description of ... Cartagena, Porto Bello, La Vera Cruz, the Havana and San Augustin. Lond., 1741.
Geographical and historical description of ... Cartagena, Porto Bello, La Vera Cruz, Havana, and San Augustine. London, 1741.
Gibbs, Archibald R.: British Honduras ... from ... 1670. Lond., 1883.
Gibbs, Archibald R.: British Honduras ... from ... 1670. London, 1883.
Hakluyt, Richard: The principal navigations ... of the English nation, etc. 3 vols. Lond., 1598-1600.
Hakluyt, Richard: The Main Navigations ... of the English Nation, etc. 3 vols. London, 1598-1600.
Herrera y Tordesillas, Antonio: Historia general de las Indias. 4 vols. Madrid, 1601-15.
Herrera y Tordesillas, Antonio: General History of the Indies. 4 vols. Madrid, 1601-15.
Hughson, Shirley C.: The Carolina pirates and colonial commerce. Baltimore, 1894.
Hughson, Shirley C.: The Carolina Pirates and Colonial Commerce. Baltimore, 1894.
Lucas, C. P.: A historical geography of the British colonies. 4 vols. Oxford, 1905. Vol. ii. The West Indies.
Lucas, C. P.: A historical geography of the British colonies. 4 vols. Oxford, 1905. Vol. ii. The West Indies.
Monson, Sir William: The naval tracts of ... Edited ... by M. Oppenheim. Vols. i. and ii. Lond., 1902—(in progress).
Monson, Sir William: The naval writings of ... Edited ... by M. Oppenheim. Vols. i. and ii. London, 1902—(ongoing).
Oviedo y Valdes, Gonzalo Fernandez de: Historia general de las Indias. Salamanca, 1547.
Oviedo y Valdes, Gonzalo Fernandez de: General History of the Indies. Salamanca, 1547.
Peytraud, Lucien: L'Esclavage aux Antilles françaises avant 1789, etc. Paris, 1897.
Peytraud, Lucien: Slavery in the French Antilles before 1789, etc. Paris, 1897.
Saint-Yves, G.: Les compagnes de Jean d'Estrées dans la mer des Antilles, 1676-78. Paris, 1900.
Saint-Yves, G.: The Companions of Jean d'Estrées in the Caribbean Sea, 1676-78. Paris, 1900.
Strong, Frank: Causes of Cromwell's West Indian expedition. (Amer. Hist. Review. Jan. 1899).
Strong, Frank: Reasons for Cromwell's West Indian expedition. (Amer. Hist. Review. Jan. 1899).
Veitia Linaje, Josef de: Norte de la Contratacion de las Indias Occidentales. Sevilla, 1672.
Veitia Linaje, Josef de: North of the Trade of the West Indies. Seville, 1672.
Vignols, Leon: La piraterie sur l'Atlantique au XVIIIe siècle. Rennes, 1891.
Vignols, Leon: Piracy in the Atlantic in the 18th Century. Rennes, 1891.
INDEX
Acapulco, 21
Acapulco, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Aix-la-Chapelle, peace of, 156
Aachen, Treaty of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Albemarle, first duke of, see Monck, George
Albemarle, first duke of, see __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
" second duke of, see Monck, Christopher
second duke of, see __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Albuquerque, Duke of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__
Allison, Captain (buccaneer), 224
Allison, Captain (pirate), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Antigua, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__
Araya salt-mine, 53-54
Araya salt mine, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Archenholz, J.W. von, 283
Archenholz, J.W. von, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Arlington, Earl of, see Bennett, Sir Henry
Arlington, Earl of, see __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Assiento of Black people, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__ n.
Association, Island, see Tortuga
Association, Island, see __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Aston, Lord of Forfar, 102
Aston, Lord of Forfar, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Avery, Captain Henry, 270-71
Avery, Captain Henry, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Aves, Isle d', see Isle d'Aves
Aves, Isle, see __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Aylett, Captain (buccaneer), 156
Aylett, Captain (pirate), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Bahamas, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__ and n., __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__
Bahia, 49
Bahia, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Bancroft, Hubert H., 284
Bancroft, Hubert H., __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Banister, Major James, 205
Banister, Major James, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Bannister, Captain (buccaneer) 254
Bannister, Captain (pirate) __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Barbacoa, 68
Barbacoa, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Barbados, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_4__ and n., __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_5__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_6__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_7__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_8__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_9__, etc.
Barbuda, 48
Barbuda, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Barinas, Marques de, 268
Barinas, Marquess of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Barker, Andrew, 40
Barker, Andrew, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Barlovento, Navy of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__ n., __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__
Barnard, Captain (buccaneer), 111
Barnard, Captain (pirate), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Barnes, Captain ( " ), 219
Barnes, Captain (" "), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Barre, Charles, 215
Barre, Charles, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Barry, Colonel Samuel, 118 and n.
Barry, Colonel Samuel, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ and n.
Beckford, Peter, 217
Beckford, Peter, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Benavides, Don Juan de, 50
Benavides, Don Juan de, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Berkeley, Sir Thomas, 41
Berkeley, Sir Thomas, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Bermuda, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__
Bernanos, Captain (buccaneer), 274
Bernanos, Captain (pirate), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Bigford, Captain (buccaneer), 156
Bigford, Captain (pirate), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
"Biscayners," 254-5
"Biscayners," __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Blake, Captain, R.N., 93
Blake, Captain, R.N., __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Blewfield, Captain (buccaneer), 273
Blewfield, Captain (pirate), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Blot, Captain (buccaneer), 274
Blot, Captain (pirate), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Boston (Mass.), 251
Boston, MA, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Bradley, Lieutenant-Colonel Joseph (buccaneer), 164-5
Bradley, Lt. Colonel Joseph (buccaneer), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Brayne, Lt. Gen. William, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__
Brazil, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_4__ and n., __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_5__
Breda, treaties of, 141
Breda, treaties of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Breha, Captain, see Landresson, Michel
Breha, Captain, check __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Brenningham, Captain (buccaneer), 273
Brenningham, Captain (pirate), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Brest, corsairs of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__
Bridges, George W., 283
Bridges, George W., __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Browne, Captain James (buccaneer), 217-18
Browne, Captain James (buccaneer), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Browne, Richard (pirate), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__ n., __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__
Buccaneers, acts of cruelty, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__ n., __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__ ff.
" derivation of the word, 66
derivation of the word, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Buccaneers, laws against, see Laws against privateers and pirates
Buccaneers, laws against, see __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
numbers of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__ n., __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__
origins of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__
" suppression of, 200 ff.
suppression of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ ff.
" vessels of, 75
vessels of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Bull of Pope Alexander VI., see Alexander VI.
Bull of Pope Alexander VI., see __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Burney, James, 283
Burney, James, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Burough, Cornelius, 99
Burough, Cornelius, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Butler, Gregory (Commissioner of Jamaica), 85 n.
Butler, Gregory (Commissioner of Jamaica), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ n.
Byndloss, Colonel Robert, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__
Cabral, Pedro Alvarez, 3
Cabral, Pedro Alvarez, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Cachemarée, Captain (buccaneer), 274
Cachemarée, Captain (pirate), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Cadiz, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ n., __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__ and n., __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__ and n., __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_4__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_5__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_6__ n., __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_7__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_8__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_9__ n., etc.
Campeche, city of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ n., __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_4__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_5__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_6__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_7__
province of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__ n., __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_4__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_5__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_6__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_7__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_8__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_9__, etc.
Canary Islands, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__
Cap François, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_4__ n.
Caracas, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__ n., __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_4__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_5__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_6__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_7__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_8__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_9__
Carey, Colonel Theod., __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__
Carleill, General Christopher, 39
Carleill, General Christopher, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Carleton, Sir Dudley, Viscount Dorchester, 102
Carleton, Sir Dudley, Viscount Dorchester, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Carlile, Captain Charles, R.N., 236
Carlile, Captain Charles, R.N., __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Carlisle, Earl of, see Howard, Charles
Carlisle, Earl of, see __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Carolinas, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_4__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_5__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_6__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_7__
Cartagena (New Granada), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ n., __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__ and n., __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_4__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_5__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_6__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_7__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_8__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_9__, etc.
Cartago (Costa Rica), 136 and n.
Cartago, Costa Rica, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ and n.
Casa de Contratación, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__ n., __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_4__ and n., __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_5__
Catherine of Braganza, 100
Catherine of Braganza, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Cattle wranglers, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__
Cavallos (Honduras), 21
Cavallos (Honduras), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
"Centurion," __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__ and noun.
Chagre, port of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__
"river, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ n., __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_4__"
Chaloner, Captain, 54
Chaloner, Capt., __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Charles I, King of England, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__
" II., King of Spain, 268
II, King of Spain, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
V., Emperor, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__ n., __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__
Charlevoix, Pierre-François-Xavier, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_4__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_5__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_6__ n., __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_7__ n., __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_8__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_9__ n.
Chasse-partie, 73
Hunting party, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Chili, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_4__
Cinquantaines, 63
Secret trade, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ and n., __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__
Clifford, George, Earl of Cumberland, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__
Codrington, Christopher (Deputy-Governor of Nevis), 229
Codrington, Christopher (Deputy Governor of Nevis), 229
Colbert, Jean-Baptiste, Marquis de Seignelay, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ n., __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__ n.
Coligny, Admiral Gaspard de, 47
Coligny, Admiral Gaspard de, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Colleton, James (Governor of Carolina), 252
Colleton, James (Governor of Carolina), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Collier, Edward (buccaneer), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__ noun, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_4__ noun, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_5__
Colombia, U.S. of, see New Granada
Colombia, U.S., see __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Contraband trade, see Clandestine trade
Illegal trade, see __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Cooke, Captain (buccaneer), 224
Cooke, Captain (pirate), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Cooper, Captain (pirate), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__
Corbett, Julian S., 286
Corbett, Julian S., __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Cordova, Don Luis de, 242
Cordova, Don Luis de, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Cornwallis, Sir Charles, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__
Coro (Venezuela), 98
Coro, Venezuela, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Costa Rico, 136 and n.
Costa Rica, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ and n.
Cottington, Francis, Lord, 101-2
Cottington, Francis, Lord, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Council of the Indies, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ and n., __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__ n., __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_4__
"Cour Volant," 155-6, and n.
"Flying Court," __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, and n.
Coxon, Captain John (buccaneer), 220, 223, 224, 225 n., 226, 227-8 and n., 235, 237 and n., 238, 245, etc.
Coxon, Captain John (buccaneer), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__ n., __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_4__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_5__ and n., __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_6__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_7__ and n., __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_8__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_9__, etc.
Cranborne, Viscount, see Cecil, Robert
Cranborne, Viscount, see __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Criminals exiled to the colonies, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__
Cromwell, Oliver, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__
Cuba, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_4__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_5__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_6__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_7__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_8__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_9__, etc.
Cumana (Venezuela), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__
Cumanagote (Venezuela), 267
Cumanagote, Venezuela, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Cumberland, Earl of, see Clifford, George
Cumberland, Earl of, see __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Curaçao, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_4__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_5__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_6__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_7__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_8__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_9__, etc.
Dalyson, Captain William, 99 n.
Dalyson, Captain William, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Dampier, William, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ n., __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__ n., __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__ n., __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__ n., __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_4__ n., __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_5__ n.
Daniel, Captain (buccaneer), 74
Daniel, Captain (pirate), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Deane, John (buccaneer), 213-14
Deane, John (pirate), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Dedran, Captain (buccaneer), 274
Captain Dedran (buccaneer), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Dempster, Captain (buccaneer), 154
Dempster, Captain (pirate), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Deseada, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__
Desjeans, Jean-Bernard, Sieur de Pointis, 262 ff.
Desjeans, Jean-Bernard, Sieur de Pointis, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ ff.
Dessalles, Adrien, 283
Dessalles, Adrien, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Diaz Pimienta, Don Francisco, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__ n.
Diego Grillo (buccaneer), 201 and n.
Diego Grillo (pirate), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ and n.
Dominica, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__
"Don Francisco," 207
"Don Francisco," __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
"Don Juan Morf," __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ and noun, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__
Dorchester, Viscount see Carleton, Sir Dudley
Dorchester, Viscount see __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Drake, Sir Francis, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_4__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_5__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_6__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_7__ and n., __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_8__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_9__, etc.
Ducéré, Eduard, 285-6
Ducéré, Eduard, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Duro, Cesario Fernandez, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ n., __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__ n., __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__ n., __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__
Dutch wars, see War
Dutch wars, see __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Dutertre, Jean-Baptiste, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__ n., __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__ n., __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_4__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_5__
East Indies, see Indies, East
East Indies, see __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Edmondes, Sir Thomas, 54
Edmondes, Sir Thomas, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Edwards, Bryan, 283
Edwards, Bryan, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Elizabeth, Queen, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_4__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_5__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_6__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_7__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_8__
Elletson, Robert, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__
Engaged, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__
Esnambuc, Mons. d', 63
Esnambuc, Mons. d', __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Essex, Captain Cornelius (buccaneer), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__
Estrées, Jean, Count of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ n., __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__
Everson, Captain Jacob (buccaneer), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ and n., __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__ n.
Exquemelin, Alexander Olivier, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_4__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_5__ n., __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_6__ n., __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_7__ n., __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_8__ n., __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_9__
Fanshaw, Sir Richard, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_4__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_5__
Fitzgerald, Philip, 206-7
Fitzgerald, Philip, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Flibustiers, derivation of the word, 66; see Buccaneers
Buccaneers, origin of the word, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; see __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__
Fload, Captain (Governor of Tortuga), 64 n.
Fload, Captain (Governor of Tortuga), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ n.
Flores, see Azores.
Flores, check __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.
Florida, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__.
Fortescue, Major-General Richard, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__
French wars, see War
French wars, see __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
French West Indies Company, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__
Frobisher, Martin, 39
Frobisher, Martin, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Frogge, William, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ n., __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__ n., __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__ n., __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_4__ n.
Fuemayor, Rui Fernandez de, 61 and n.
Fuemayor, Rui Fernandez de, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ and n.
Gage, Thomas, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ n., __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__ n., __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_4__
Galicia, Company of, 12 n.
Galicia Company, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ n.
Galleons, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_4__ n., __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_5__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_6__ n., __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_7__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_8__; cf. also __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_9__.
Galleons' passage, 15
Galleons' journey, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Gardner, William J., 283
Gardner, William J., __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Gautemala, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__ n., __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_4__
Gaves, Don Gabriel de, 60
Gaves, Don Gabriel de, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
"Gens de la côte," 69
"Coastal people," __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Gibraltar (Venezuela), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__
Godolphin, Sir William, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_4__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_5__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_6__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_7__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_8__
"Golden Hind," 39
"Golden Hind," __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Goodly, Captain (buccaneer), 273
Good Captain (buccaneer), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Goodson, Vice-Admiral William, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__ n., __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__
Grammont, Sieur de (buccaneer), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_4__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_5__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_6__ and n., __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_7__ and n.
Granada (Nicaragua), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ n., __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_4__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_5__
Grenville, Sir Richard, 40
Grenville, Sir Richard, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Guadaloupe, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_4__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_5__
"Guanahani," 2
"Guanahani," __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Guiana, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__
Guinea, coast of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_4__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_5__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_6__
Guipuzcoa, Company of, 12 n.
Guipuzkoa, Company of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ n.
"Gunsway," 270
"Gunsway," __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Guy, Captain (buccaneer), 273
Captain Guy, buccaneer, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Guzman, Gonzalo de, 43
Guzman, Gonzalo de, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
" Don Juan Perez de, see Perez de Guzman.
Don Juan Perez de, see __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.
Hamlin, Captain Jean (pirate), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ and n., __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__ n.
Hampton, Thomas, 37-38
Hampton, Thomas, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Haro, Don Francisco de, 183 n.
Haro, Don Francisco de, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ n.
" Don Luis de, 100
Don Luis de, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Harris, Captain Peter (pirate), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__
Harrison, Captain, (buccaneer), 162
Harrison, Captain, (pirate), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Hattsell, Captain, ( " ), 136
Hattsell, Captain, ( " ), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Havana, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_4__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_5__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_6__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_7__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_8__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_9__, etc.
Havre, corsairs, of, 48
Havre, privateers, of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Hawkins, Sir John, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_4__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_5__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_6__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_7__.
" William, 36
William, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Heath, Attorney-General Sir Robert, 52
Heath, Attorney General Sir Robert, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Henry II., King of France, 53
Henry II, King of France, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
" VIII. King of England, 36 and n.
VIII. King of England, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ and n.
Herdue, Captain (buccaneer), 273
Herdue, Captain (pirate), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Hilton, Captain (Governor of Tortuga), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__
Hispaniola, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__ and n. __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_4__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_5__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_6__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_7__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_8__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_9__, etc.
Holland, Earl of, see Rich, Henry
Holland, Earl of, see __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Holmes, Admiral Sir Robert, 253
Holmes, Admiral Sir Robert, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Honduras, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_4__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_5__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_6__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_7__
Hopton, Sir Arthur, 53
Hopton, Sir Arthur, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
" Sir Philip, 255
Sir Philip, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Humanes, Conde de, 102
Humanes, Count of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Ibarra, Don Carlos, 62 n.
Ibarra, Don Carlos, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ n.
Inchiquin, Earl of, see O'Brien, William
Inchiquin, Earl of, see __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Indian Ocean, pirates in, see Pirates
Indian Ocean, pirates, see __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Indians, see Spain, cruelties to Indians
Indians, check out __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Indies, Council of the, see Council
Indies, Council of the, see __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
" exclusion of foreigners from, see Spain
"exclusion of foreigners from, see __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__"
Indies, East, pirates in, see Pirates
Indies, East, pirates, see __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
" West, colonisation of, 45-48
"Indults," 25
"Exemptions," __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Interlopers, see Clandestine trade
Interlopers, check __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Isabella, Queen, see Ferdinand and Isabella
Isabella, Queen, see __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Isle d'Aves, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ and n., __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__
Jackman, Captain (pirate), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__
Jackson, Captain William, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__
Jacobs, Captain (buccaneer), see Everson
Jacobs, Captain (buccaneer), see __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Jamaica, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_4__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_5__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_6__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_7__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_8__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_9__, etc.
assembly of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_4__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_5__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_6__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_7__
Council of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_4__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_5__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_6__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_7__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_8__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_9__, etc.
James, Captain (buccaneer), 273
James, Captain (pirate), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
" ("President of Tortuga"), 64 n.
("President of Tortuga"), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ n.
James I, King of England, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__ n.
II, King of England, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__
Jamestown (Virginia), 47
Jamestown, VA, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Jenkins, Sir Leoline, 208
Jenkins, Sir Leoline, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Jiménez, Don José Sánchez, 139
Jiménez, Don José Sánchez, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Jocard, Captain (buccaneer), 274
Jocard, Captain (pirate), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Johnson, Captain (buccaneer), 202-3
Captain Johnson (buccaneer), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
" " R.N., 234
" " RN, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
"Judith," 39
"Judith," __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Juzgado de Indias, 13 n.
Indian Court, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ n.
Labat, Jean-Baptiste, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_4__
Lagarde, Captain (buccaneer), 274
Lagarde, Captain (pirate), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
La Guayra (Venezuela), 240-41
La Guaira (Venezuela), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Lancers, see Cinquantaines
Lancers, check __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Langford, Captain Abraham, 118-19
Langford, Captain Abraham, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Laurens de Graff, see Graff.
Laurens de Graff, see __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.
La Vivon, Mons., 155-6 and n.
La Vivon, Mons., __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ and n.
Laws against privateers and pirates, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_4__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_5__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_6__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_7__
Le Clerc, Captain François, 42
Le Clerc, Captain François, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Legane (Hispaniola), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__
Legrand, Pierre (buccaneer), 135 n.
Legrand, Pierre (pirate), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ n.
"Le Pain," see Paine, Peter
"Le Pain," see __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Le Pers (Jesuit writer), 284 and n.
Le Pers (Jesuit writer), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ and n.
Lerma, Duque de, 9 n.
Lerma, Duke of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ n.
Leroy-Beaulieu, Pierre-Paul, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__
Le Sage, Captain (buccaneer), 274
Le Sage, Captain (pirate), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Lessone, " ( " ), 224
Lessone, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Levasseur, Mr., __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__
Ley, James, Earl of Marlborough, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__
Lilburne, Robert (Governor of Bahamas), 238-39
Lilburne, Robert (Governor of Bahamas), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Lima, Peru, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__
Linhares, Conde de, 102
Linhares, Count of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Logwood, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_4__
" Samuel, 226
"Samuel, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__"
Lonvilliers, Mons. de, 81
Lonvilliers, Mr. de, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Lorin, Henri, 284
Lorin, Henri, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Louis XIV, King of France, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ n., __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_4__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_5__ n.
Ludbury, Captain (buccaneer), 162
Ludbury, Captain (pirate), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Ludwell, Philip (Governor of Carolina), 253
Ludwell, Philip (Governor of Carolina), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Madeira, 42
Madeira, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Maggott, Captain (buccaneer), 224
Maggott, Captain (pirate), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Maintenon, Marquis de, 222
Maintenon, Marquis, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Maldonado de Aldana, 108
Maldonado de Aldana, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
"Mansvelt," see Mansfield
"Mansvelt," see __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Maracaibo, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_4__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_5__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_6__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_7__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_8__
Marcel, Gabriel, 285
Marcel, Gabriel, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Margarita Island, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_4__
patache, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__ and n.
Margot, Port (Hispaniola), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_4__
Markham, William (Governor of Pennsylvania), 271
Markham, William (Governor of PA), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Marlborough, Earl of, see Ley, James
Marlborough, Earl of, see __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
"Marston Moor," __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__ and n., __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__
Marteen, Captain David (buccaneer), 134
Marteen, Captain David (pirate), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Martinique, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_4__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_5__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_6__ n., __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_7__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_8__
"Mary of Guildford," 36 n.
"Mary of Guildford," __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ n.
Mary, Queen of England, 259
Mary, Queen of England, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Matelotage, 69
Shipmate bonding, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Medina Coeli, Duque de, 199
Medina Coeli, Duke of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Mesnil, Captain (buccaneer), 274
Mesnil, Captain (pirate), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Mexico, see New Spain
Mexico, see __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Michel, Captain (buccaneer), 274
Michel, Captain (pirate), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
"le Basque (pirate), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__"
Mitchell, Captain (buccaneer), 108 n.
Mitchell, Captain (pirate), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ n.
Modyford, Colonel Charles, 203
Modyford, Colonel Charles, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Sir James, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__ n., __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__ n.
Moledi, Don Patricio, 111
Moledi, Don Patricio, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Molesworth, Hender (Lieutenant Governor of Jamaica), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ n., __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_4__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_5__
Mompos (New Granada), 264
Mompos (New Granada), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Monck, Christopher, second Duke of Albemarle (Governor of Jamaica), 255-57
Monck, Christopher, second Duke of Albemarle (Governor of Jamaica), 255-57
Montagu, Edward, Earl of Sandwich, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__
Montemayor, Don Juan Francisco de, 82
Montemayor, Don Juan Francisco de, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Montespan, Marquise de, 218 n.
Montespan, Marquise de, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ n.
Moralis, Don Pedro de, 105
Moralis, Don Pedro de, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Moreton, Joseph (Governor of Carolina), 252
Moreton, Joseph (Governor of Carolina), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Morgan, Captain (buccaneer), 235
Morgan, Captain (pirate), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Colonel Blodre (pirate), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ n., __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__ n.
Colonel Edward, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_4__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_5__ n., __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_6__
Lieutenant Colonel Thomas, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ n., __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__ n.
Morris, Captain John (pirate), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__ n., __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_4__
Mosquito Coast, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_4__
Munden, Captain Robert, 118
Munden, Captain Robert, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Myngs, Captain Christopher, R.N., __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ and n., __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__ and n., __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_4__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_5__ and n., __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_6__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_7__
Nata de los Santos (Darien), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ noun, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__ noun
Nau, Jean-David (pirate), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ and n., __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__
Navigation Laws, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__ n., __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_4__
"Navio del Oro," 17
"Gold Ship," __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Negro slave-trade, 36-38; cf. also Clandestine trade
African slave trade, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; cf. also __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__
Negroes, Assiento of, see Assiento
African slaves, Assiento of, see __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Netherlands, truce of 1609, 52
Netherlands, truce of 1609, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
" wars of, see War
wars of, see __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Nevill, Vice-Admiral John, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__
Nevis, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_4__
New England, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_4__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_5__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_6__
New Providence Island (Bahamas), 237-39
New Providence Island, Bahamas, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
New Spain, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_4__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_5__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_6__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_7__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_8__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_9__, etc.
New York, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__
Nicaragua, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__
Nimuegen, peace of, 240
Nijmegen, peace of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Nombre de Dios (Darien), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ n., __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__ n., __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__
Norris, Commodore Sir John, 265
Norris, Commodore Sir John, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Olivares, Conde de, 9 n.
Olivares, Count of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ n.
Olonnais (buccaneer), see Nau, Jean-David
Olonnais (buccaneer), see __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Orinoco River, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__ noun, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__ noun, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_4__
Oxenham, John, 40
Oxenham, John, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
"Oxford," 155
"Oxford," __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Pain, Captain Thomas (buccaneer), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ and n., __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__
Paine, Peter, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ and n., __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__ n.
Panama City, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__ and n., __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_4__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_5__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_6__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_7__ n., __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_8__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_9__, etc.
" Isthmus of, see Darien
"Isthmus of, see __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__"
" President of, see Perez de Guzman
President of, see __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Penalva, Conde de, 113
Penalva, Count of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Penn, Admiral William, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ and n., __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_4__
" William (proprietor of Penns.), 271
"William (owner of Penns.), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__"
Pennsylvania, 271
Pennsylvania, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
" Diego, 44
Diego, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Pernambuco, 49
Pernambuco, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Perry, Mr. 61 n.
Perry, Mr. __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Peru, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_4__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_5__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_6__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_7__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_8__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_9__, etc.
Petit, Captain (buccaneer), 274
Captain Petit, buccaneer, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Petit-Goave (Hispaniola), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_4__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_5__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_6__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_7__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_8__ and n., __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_9__, etc.
Philip II, King of Spain, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_4__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_5__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_6__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_7__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_8__
Philip III., King of Spain, 51
Philip III, King of Spain, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
IV., King of Spain, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ n., __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__
"Piece of eight," value of, 77 n.
"Piece of eight," value of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ n.
"Pie de Palo," see Heyn, Admiral Piet and Le Clerc, François
"Pie de Palo," see __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ and __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__
Pirates, attacks in the East, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__
" laws against, see Laws
laws against, see __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
"trials of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_4__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_5__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_6__"
Plenneville, Clement de, 118
Plenneville, Clement de, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Pointis, Sieur de, see Desjeans
Pointis, Sieur de, see __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Pontchartrain, Louis Phelypeaux, Comte de, 262
Pontchartrain, Louis Phelypeaux, Comte de, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Port de Paix (Hispaniola), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__ n., __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__
Porto Bello, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_4__ and n., __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_5__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_6__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_7__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_8__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_9__, etc.
Puerto Rico, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__ and n., __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__ n., __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_4__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_5__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_6__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_7__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_8__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_9__, etc.
Port Royal (Carolina), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__
(Jamaica), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__ and n., __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_4__ and n., __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_5__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_6__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_7__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_8__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_9__, etc.
Prince, Captain Lawrence (pirate), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__ n.
Privateers, laws against, see Laws
Privateers, laws against, see __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Providence Company, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__ and n., __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__ n., __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_4__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_5__ n.
Puerta de Plata (Hispaniola), 115
Puerta de Plata (Hispaniola), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Puerto Cabello (Venezuela), 98
Puerto Cabello, Venezuela, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Principe (Cuba), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__ and n., __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__
Queen Regent of Spain, see Marie-Anne of Austria
Queen Regent of Spain, see __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Quito, province of, see Equador
Quito, province of, see __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Raleigh, Sir Walter, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_4__
Rancherias (New Granada), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__
Rausset, Sieur de, see Deschamps
Rausset, Sieur de, see __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Raynal, Guillaume, Thomas-François, 283
Raynal, Guillaume, Thomas-François, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Red Sea, pirates in, see Pirates
Red Sea, pirates, see __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Rhode Island, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__
Rich, Henry, Earl of Holland, 59
Rich, Henry, Earl of Holland, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Robert, Earl of Warwick, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ and n., __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__
Rio Garta, 138
Rio Garta, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Rio Nuevo (Jamaica), 91
Rio Nuevo (Jamaica), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Riskinner, Captain Nicholas (Governor of Tortuga), 62
Riskinner, Captain Nicholas (Governor of Tortuga), 62
Rivero Pardal, Manuel, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__
Roanoke Island (Carolina), 47
Roanoke Island, NC, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Robertson, William, 285
Robertson, William, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Rogers, Captain Thomas (buccaneer), 174 n.
Rogers, Captain Thomas (buccaneer), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ n.
Ronquillo, Don Pedro, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ n., __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__
Row, Captain (buccaneer), 224
Row, Captain (pirate), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Roxas de Valle-Figueroa, Don Gabriel, 82-83
Roxas de Valle-Figueroa, Don Gabriel, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Ruyter, Admiral Michel-Adriaanszoon van, 129
Ruyter, Admiral Michel-Adriaanszoon van, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Ryswick, treaty of, 266 n.
Ryswick Treaty, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ n.
St. Augustine, FL, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__
St. Christopher, see St. Kitts
St. Christopher, see __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
St. Eustatius, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__ and n., __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_4__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_5__
St. Jago de Cuba, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_4__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_5__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_6__ n., __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_7__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_8__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_9__, etc.
de la Vega (Jamaica), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_4__ n.
de los Cavalleros (Hispaniola), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__
St. Kitts, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_4__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_5__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_6__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_7__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_8__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_9__, etc.
St. Laurent, Mr. de, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__ n.
St. Malo, corsairs of, 48
St. Malo, privateers of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
St. Martins, 130
St. Martin's, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
St. Thomas, 235-7
St. Thomas, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Salisbury, Earl of, see Cecil, Robert
Salisbury, Earl of, see __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Samana, 77 n.
Samana, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ n.
Samballas Islands, 228 n.
Samballas Islands, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ n.
"Samson," 36 n.
"Samson," __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ n.
Sancti Spiritus (Cuba), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__ and n.
San Domingo, city of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ n., __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_4__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_5__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_6__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_7__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_8__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_9__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_10__, etc.
" French, see Hispaniola
French, check __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Sandwich, Earl of, see Montagu, Edward
Sandwich, Earl of, see __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
San Juan, PR, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__
" d'Ulloa, see Vera Cruz
d'Ulloa, see __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
River (Nicaragua), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__
San Lorenzo, castle of (Chagre), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__ n., __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__ and n.
San Lucar, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__
Santa Catalina, see Providence Island
Santa Catalina, see __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Santa Cruz, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__
Santa Marta (New Granada), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_4__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_5__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_6__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_7__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_8__
Sasi Arnoldo, Don Christopher, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__
"Satisfaction," 156 n.
"Satisfaction," __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ noun
Sawkins, Captain (buccaneer), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__
Scaliger, Joseph-Juste, 28
Scaliger, Joseph-Juste, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Searle, Daniel (Governor of Barbadoes), 85 n.
Searle, Daniel (Governor of Barbados), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ n.
Searles, Captain Robert (pirate), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__
Sedgwick, Major General Robert, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__
Seignelay, Marquis de, see Colbert
Seignelay, Marquis de, see __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Seville, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_4__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_5__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_6__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_7__ n., __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_8__, etc.
Sharp, Captain Bartholomew (buccaneer), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__ n., __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_4__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_5__
Shirley, Sir Anthony, 85
Shirley, Sir Anthony, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
"Sloop-trade," 27
"Sloop trade," __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Smart, Captain (buccaneer), 273
Smart Captain, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Smith, Major Samuel, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__
Southey, Thomas, 283
Southey, Thomas, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Spain, colonial laws, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_4__
" colonial system, 1 ff.
colonial system, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ ff.
" commercial system, 6-13
"commercial system, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__"
cruelties to English sailors, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__ n., __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_4__
privateers of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__ and n.
" trade relations with England, 101-104
"trade relations with England, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__"
" " 1670 with England, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__
" truce of 1609 with the Netherlands, see Netherlands
" truce of 1609 with the Netherlands, see Netherlands
" weakness of Spanish ships, 23
"weakness of Spanish ships, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__"
Spragge, Captain, R.N., 254
Spragge, Captain, R.N., __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Stanley, Captain (buccaneer), 140
Stanley, Captain (pirate), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Stedman, Captain (buccaneer), 131 and n.
Stedman, Captain (buccaneer), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ and n.
Style, John, 153 n.
Style, John, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ noun
Taylor, John, 102
Taylor, John, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Terrier, Jean, 42
Terrier, Jean, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Thomas, Dalby, 33
Thomas, Dalby, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Thornbury, Walter, 284
Thornbury, Walter, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Thurloe, John (Secretary of State), 104
Thurloe, John (Secretary of State), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Thurston, Captain (buccaneer), 201
Thurston, Captain (buccaneer), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Tobago, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_4__
Toledo, Don Federico de, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__
Tortola, 130
Tortola, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Tortuga, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_4__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_5__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_6__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_7__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_8__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_9__, etc.
Trade, clandestine, see Clandestine trade
Trade, secret, see __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Treasure fleets, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__; see also __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__ and __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_4__
Treval, Mons. de, 82
Treval, Mr. de, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Trinidad, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__ n., __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_4__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_5__
"Trompense, La," __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__ noun, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_4__ noun
" La Nouvelle," 236 n.
"La Nouvelle," __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ n.
Truxillo (Honduras), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_4__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_5__
Turrialva (Costa Rica), 136
Turrialba (Costa Rica), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Utrecht, Treaty of, 272
Utrecht Treaty, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Vache, Isle la, see Isle la Vache
Vache, Isle la, view __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Registry ships, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__ and n.
Vaissière, Pierre de, 284
Vaissière, Pierre de, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Valladolid (Yucatan), 210
Valladolid (Yucatán), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Valle-Figueroa, Don Gabriel Roxas de, see Roxas de Valle-Figueroa
Valle-Figueroa, Don Gabriel Roxas de, see __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Van Horn, Captain Nicholas (pirate), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__
Venables, General Robert, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ and n., __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_4__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_5__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_6__
Venezuela, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__
Venta Cruz (Darien), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ n., __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__ n., __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__ and n., __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_4__ n., __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_5__ n., __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_6__
Vera Cruz (New Spain), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__ n., __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_4__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_5__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_6__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_7__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_8__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_9__, etc., __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_10__
Veragua, 136 and n.
Veragua, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ and n.
Vernon, Admiral Edward, 195
Vernon, Admiral Edward, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Verpre, Captain (buccaneer), 274
Verpre, Captain (pirate), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Vervins, Treaty of, 48
Vervins Treaty, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Viande boucannée, 66
Smoked meat, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Vigneron, Captain (buccaneer), 274
Winemaker, Captain (pirate), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Villa de Mosa (Tabasco), 138 and n.
Villa de Mosa (Tabasco), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ and n.
Villars, Marquis de, 9 n.
Villars, Marquis de, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ n.
Virgin Islands, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__
Virginia, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_4__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_5__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_6__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_7__
War between England and Netherlands, 1665-67, 127-41
War between England and the Netherlands, 1665-67, 127-41
War between France and Netherlands, 1674-78, 219 ff.
War between France and the Netherlands, 1674-78, 219 ff.
War of the Spanish Succession, 271-72
War of the Spanish Succession, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
" Succession of the Palatinate, 258 ff.
Succession of the Palatinate, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ ff.
Watson, Sir Francis, 257
Watson, Sir Francis, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Watts, Elias (Governor of Tortuga), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__ and n., __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__
Watts, Colonel William (Governor of St. Kitts), 130 n.
Watts, Colonel William (Governor of St. Kitts), 130 n.
Weiss, Charles, 285
Weiss, Charles, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
West Indies, see Indies, West
West Indies, see __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Whitstone, Sir Thomas (pirate), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__
Wilgress, Captain, 201
Wilgress, Captain, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
William III, King of England, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__
" Captain Morris (buccaneer), 122 and n.
Captain Morris (buccaneer), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ and n.
Willoughby, William, Lord (Governor of Barbadoes), 131
Willoughby, William, Lord (Governor of Barbados), 131
Wilmot, Commodore Robert, 261
Wilmot, Commodore Robert, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Winslow, Edward (Commissioner of Jamaica), 85 n.
Winslow, Edward (Commissioner of Jamaica), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ n.
Winter, Sir William, 40
Winter, Sir William, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Witherborn, Captain Francis (buccaneer), 202
Witherborn, Captain Francis (pirate), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Yallahs, Captain (pirate) __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__
"Yankey," see Williams, Captain John
"Yankey," check out __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Yucatán, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__ n., __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_4__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_5__
Zuniga, Don Pedro de, 51
Zuniga, Don Pedro de, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
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