This is a modern-English version of Ancient Law: Its Connection to the History of Early Society, originally written by Maine, Henry Sumner, Sir. It has been thoroughly updated, including changes to sentence structure, words, spelling, and grammar—to ensure clarity for contemporary readers, while preserving the original spirit and nuance. If you click on a paragraph, you will see the original text that we modified, and you can toggle between the two versions.

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Everyman, I will go with thee, and be thy guide,
In thy most need to go by thy side.

This is No. 734 of Everyman's Library. A list of authors and their works in this series will be found at the end of this volume. The publishers will be pleased to send freely to all applicants a separate, annotated list of the Library.

This is No. 734 of Everyman's Library. A list of authors and their works in this series can be found at the end of this volume. The publishers are happy to send a separate annotated list of the Library for free to anyone who requests it.


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SIR HENRY JAMES SUMNER MAINE, the son of a doctor, born 1822 in India. Educated at Christ's Hospital and Pembroke College, Cambridge. In 1847 professor of civil law at Cambridge; 1850, called to the Bar. Member of Indian Council for seven years. Died at Cannes, 1888.

SIR HENRY JAMES SUMNER MAINE, the son of a doctor, was born in 1822 in India. He was educated at Christ's Hospital and Pembroke College, Cambridge. In 1847, he became a professor of civil law at Cambridge; in 1850, he was called to the Bar. He served as a member of the Indian Council for seven years. He died in Cannes in 1888.


ANCIENT LAW

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SIR HENRY MAINE

INTRODUCTION BY PROF. J. H. MORGAN

LONDON: J. M. DENT & SONS LTD.
NEW YORK: E. P. DUTTON & CO. INC.

All rights reserved
Made in Great Britain
at The Temple Press Letchworth
and decorated by Eric Ravilious
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Aldine House Bedford St. London
First Published in this Edition 1917
Reprinted 1927, 1931, 1936

vii

vii

INTRODUCTION

No one who is interested in the growth of human ideas or the origins of human society can afford to neglect Maine's Ancient Law. Published some fifty-six years ago it immediately took rank as a classic, and its epoch-making influence may not unfitly be compared to that exercised by Darwin's Origin of Species. The revolution effected by the latter in the study of biology was hardly more remarkable than that effected by Maine's brilliant treatise in the study of early institutions. Well does one of Maine's latest and most learned commentators say of his work that "he did nothing less than create the natural history of law." This is only another way of saying that he demonstrated that our legal conceptions—using that term in its largest sense to include social and political institutions—are as much the product of historical development as biological organisms are the outcome of evolution. This was a new departure, inasmuch as the school of jurists, represented by Bentham and Austin, and of political philosophers, headed by Hobbes, Locke, and their nineteenth-century disciples, had approached the study of law and political society almost entirely from an unhistoric point of view and had substituted dogmatism for historical investigation. They had read history, so far as they troubled to read it at all, "backwards," and had invested early man and early society with conceptions which, as a matter of fact, are themselves historical products. The jurists, for example, had in their analysis of legal sovereignty postulated the commands of a supreme lawgiver by simply ignoring the fact that, in point of time, custom precedes legislation and that early law is, to use Maine's own phrase, "a habit" and not a conscious exercise of the volition of a lawgiver or a legislature. The political philosophers, similarly, had sought the origin of political society in a "state of nature"—humane, according to Locke and Rousseau, barbarous, according to Hobbes—in which men freely subscribed to viiian "original contract" whereby each submitted to the will of all. It was not difficult to show, as Maine has done, that contract—i.e. the recognition of a mutual agreement as binding upon the parties who make it—is a conception which comes very late to the human mind. But Maine's work covers much wider ground than this. It may be summed up by saying that he shows that early society, so far as we have any recognisable legal traces of it, begins with the group, not with the individual.

No one interested in the development of human ideas or the origins of human society can overlook Maine's Ancient Law. Published about fifty-six years ago, it quickly became a classic, and its groundbreaking impact can be compared to that of Darwin's Origin of Species. The revolution brought about by the latter in the study of biology was hardly more significant than the one caused by Maine's insightful work in the examination of early institutions. One of Maine's recent and most knowledgeable commentators aptly describes his contribution by stating that "he did nothing less than create the natural history of law." This essentially means he showed that our legal ideas—understanding that term broadly to include social and political institutions—are as much the result of historical development as biological organisms are a product of evolution. This represented a new direction, as the group of jurists, embodied by Bentham and Austin, and the political philosophers, led by Hobbes, Locke, and their nineteenth-century followers, had approached the study of law and political society almost entirely from a non-historical perspective and had replaced historical inquiry with dogmatism. They had read history, if they bothered to engage with it at all, "backwards," attributing concepts to early humans and societies that, in reality, are historical products themselves. For instance, the jurists, in analyzing legal sovereignty, assumed the commands of a supreme lawgiver while ignoring that, historically, custom predates legislation and that early law is, as Maine described it, "a habit" rather than a deliberate action by a lawmaker or legislature. Similarly, the political philosophers sought the origins of political society in a "state of nature"—considered humane by Locke and Rousseau, and barbaric by Hobbes—where individuals willingly accepted an "original contract" submitting to the collective will. It wasn't hard for Maine to demonstrate that the concept of a contract—meaning the acknowledgment of a mutual agreement as binding for those involved—is a notion that emerges late in human thought. However, Maine's work spans much broader territory. In summary, he illustrates that early society, as far as we have recognizable legal evidence of it, starts with the group, not with the individual.

This group was, according to Maine's theory, the Family—that is to say the Family as resting upon the patriarchal power of the father to whom all its members, wife, sons, daughters, and slaves, were absolutely subject. This, the central feature of Maine's speculation, is worked out with infinite suggestiveness and great felicity of style in chapter V. ("Primitive Society and Ancient Law") of the present work, and his chief illustrations are sought in the history of Roman law. The topics of the other chapters are selected largely with a view to supplying confirmation of the theory in question and, as we shall see in a moment, Maine's later works do but serve to carry the train of reasoning a step further by the use of the Comparative Method in invoking evidence from other sources, notably from Irish and Hindu Law. Let us, however, confine ourselves for the moment to "Ancient Law." Maine works out the implications of his theory by showing that it, and it alone, can serve to explain such features of early Roman law as Agnation, i.e. the tracing of descent exclusively through males, and Adoption, i.e. the preservation of the family against the extinction of male heirs. The perpetual tutelage of women is the consequence of this position. Moreover, all the members of the family, except its head, are in a condition best described as status: they have no power to acquire property, or to bequeath it, or to enter into contracts in relation to it. The traces of this state of society are clearly visible in the pages of that classical text-book of Roman Law, the Institutes of Justinian,1 compiled in the sixth century A.D., though equally visible is the disintegration wrought in it by the reforming activity ixof the praetor's edicts. That reformation followed the course of a gradual emancipation of the members of the family, except those under age, from the despotic authority of the father. This gradual substitution of the Individual for the Family was effected in a variety of ways, but in none more conspicuously than by the development of the idea of contract, i.e. of the capacity of the individual to enter into independent agreements with strangers to his family-group by which he was legally bound—an historical process which Maine sums up in his famous aphorism that the movement of progressive societies has hitherto been a movement from Status to Contract.

This group was, according to Maine's theory, the Family—that is, the Family based on the patriarchal authority of the father, to whom all members, including the wife, sons, daughters, and slaves, were completely submissive. This central idea of Maine's theory is explored in depth and with great skill in chapter V. ("Primitive Society and Ancient Law") of this work, with his main examples drawn from the history of Roman law. The topics in the other chapters are chosen mainly to provide support for this theory, and as we'll see shortly, Maine's later works simply expand on this reasoning by using the Comparative Method and introducing evidence from other sources, particularly Irish and Hindu Law. For now, let’s focus on "Ancient Law." Maine explores the implications of his theory by demonstrating that it, and only it, can explain certain aspects of early Roman law, like Agnation, which means tracing descent solely through males, and Adoption, which refers to preserving the family line in case male heirs are lost. The constant guardianship of women stems from this situation. Additionally, all family members, except the head, are in a condition best described as status: they cannot acquire property, leave it in a will, or enter into contracts regarding it. The remnants of this societal structure are clearly seen in the classic text on Roman Law, the Institutes of Justinian, compiled in the sixth century A.D., although the impact of the praetor's edicts is also evident in the changes that followed. This reformation led to a gradual liberation of family members, apart from minors, from the absolute control of the father. This slow shift from the Family to the Individual happened in various ways, most notably through the evolution of the idea of contract, which involves an individual's ability to make independent agreements with people outside their family group that legally bind them—an historical process Maine summarizes in his famous saying that the progress of societies has been a movement from Status to Contract.

In the chapters on the early history of Wills, Property, and Contract, Maine supports his theory by showing that it is the key which unlocks many, if not all, of the problems which those topics present. The chapter on Wills—particularly the passage in which he explains what is meant by Universal Succession—is a brilliant example of Maine's analytic power. He shows that a Will—in the sense of a secret and revocable disposition of property only taking effect after the death of the testator—is a conception unknown to early law, and that it makes its first appearance as a means of transmitting the exercise of domestic sovereignty, the transfer of the property being only a subsidiary feature; wills only being permitted, in early times, in cases where there was likely to be a failure of proper heirs. The subsequent popularity of wills, and the indulgence with which the law came to regard them, were due to a desire to correct the rigidity of the Patria Potestas, as reflected in the law of intestate succession, by giving free scope to natural affection. In other words, the conception of relationship as reckoned only through males, and as resting on the continuance of the children within their father's power, gave way, through the instrumentality of the will, to the more modern and more natural conception of relationship.

In the chapters on the early history of Wills, Property, and Contract, Maine supports his theory by showing that it’s the key that unlocks many, if not all, of the problems these topics present. The chapter on Wills—especially the part where he explains what Universal Succession means—is a great example of Maine’s analytical skills. He shows that a Will—in the sense of a private and revocable arrangement for property that only takes effect after the testator's death—is a concept unknown to early law, and it first appears as a way to pass on the exercise of domestic authority, with the transfer of property being just a secondary feature; wills were only allowed in early times when there was a likelihood of no proper heirs. The later popularity of wills and the leniency the law developed toward them were due to a desire to soften the strictness of the Patria Potestas, as seen in the laws of intestate succession, by allowing for natural affection. In other words, the idea of relationship being counted only through males, and based on the continuation of children under their father’s control, was replaced—through the use of the will—by a more modern and natural understanding of relationships.

In the chapter on Property Maine again shows that the theory of its origin in occupancy is too individualistic and that not separate ownership but joint ownership is the really archaic institution. The father was in some sense (we must avoid importing modern terms) the trustee of the joint property of the family. Here Maine makes an xexcursion into the fields of the Early Village Community, and has, too, to look elsewhere than to Rome, where the village community had already been transformed by coalescence into the city-state. He therefore seeks his examples from India and points to the Indian village as an example of the expansion of the family into a larger group of co-proprietors, larger but still bearing traces of its origin to the patriarchal power. And, to quote his own words, "the most important passage in the history of Private Property is its gradual separation from the co-ownership of kinsmen." The chapter on Contract, although it contains some of Maine's most suggestive writing, and the chapter on Delict and Crime, have a less direct bearing on his main thesis except in so far as they go to show that the reason why there is so little in early law of what we call civil, as distinct from criminal, law, and in particular of the Law of Contract, is to be found in the fact that, in the infancy of society, the Law of Persons, and with it the law of civil rights, is merged in the common subjection to Paternal Power.

In the chapter on Property, Maine again demonstrates that the idea of its origin in occupancy is too focused on individuals and that joint ownership, rather than separate ownership, is the truly ancient institution. The father was, in a sense (we need to avoid using modern terms), the trustee of the family's joint property. Here, Maine ventures into the area of the Early Village Community, and he also has to look beyond Rome, where the village community had already merged into the city-state. Therefore, he looks to examples from India and points to the Indian village as an illustration of how the family expands into a larger group of co-owners, which is bigger but still reflects its patriarchal origins. To quote his own words, "the most important passage in the history of Private Property is its gradual separation from the co-ownership of kinsmen." The chapter on Contract, although it includes some of Maine's most thought-provoking writing, and the chapter on Delict and Crime, are less directly related to his main argument, except to show that the reason there is so little early law concerning what we call civil law, as opposed to criminal law, and particularly the Law of Contract, can be found in the fact that, in the early stages of society, the Law of Persons, along with civil rights law, is intertwined with the common subordination to Paternal Power.

Such, putting it in the simplest possible language, is the main argument of Ancient Law. The exigencies of space and of simplicity compel me to pass by, to a large extent, most of the other topics with which Maine deals—the place of custom, code, and fiction in the development of early law, the affiliation of international Law to the Jus Gentium and the Law of Nature, the origins of feudalism and of primogeniture, the early history of delict and crime, and that most remarkable and profound passage in which Maine shows the heavy debt of the various sciences to Roman law and the influence which it has exerted on the vocabulary of political science, the concepts of moral philosophy, and the doctrines of theology. I must confine myself to two questions: how far did Maine develop or modify in his subsequent writings the main thesis of Ancient Law? to what extent has this thesis stood the test of the criticism and research of others? As regards the first point, it is to be remembered that Ancient Law is but the first, though doubtless the most important, of a whole series of works by its author on the subject of early law. It was followed at intervals by three volumes: Village Communities in the East and West, Early Institutions, and Early Law and xiCustom. In the first of these he dealt with a subject which has excited an enormous degree of attention and not a little controversy among English, French, German, and Russian scholars,2 amounting as it does to nothing less than an investigation into the origin of private property in land. The question has been put in various forms: did it commence with joint (or, as some would put it, less justifiably, communal or corporate) ownership or with individual ownership, and again was the village community free or servile? It is now pretty generally recognised that there was more than one type, though common cultivation was doubtless a feature of them all, and even in India there were at least two types, of which the one presenting several, as opposed to communal, ownership is not the less ancient. But it may well be that, as Maitland so often pointed out, much of the controversy has been literally an anachronism; that is to say, that nineteenth-century men have been asking the Early Ages questions which they could not answer and reading back into early history distinctions which are themselves historical products. Ownership is itself a late abstraction developed out of use. We may say with some certainty that family "ownership" preceded individual ownership, but in what sense there was communal ownership by a whole village it is not so easy to say.

In the simplest terms, this is the main argument of Ancient Law. Due to the constraints of space and simplicity, I will largely skip over most of the other topics Maine addresses—the role of custom, code, and fiction in the evolution of early law, the connection between international law and the Jus Gentium and the Law of Nature, the beginnings of feudalism and primogeniture, the early history of delict and crime, and the significant and insightful section where Maine illustrates how much various sciences owe to Roman law and its impact on political science vocabulary, moral philosophy concepts, and theological doctrines. I will focus on two questions: how much did Maine develop or change the main thesis of Ancient Law in his later writings? To what extent has this thesis withstood the scrutiny and research of others? Regarding the first point, it’s important to note that Ancient Law is just the first—and undoubtedly the most significant—of a series of works by its author on early law. It was followed at intervals by three additional volumes: Village Communities in the East and West, Early Institutions, and Early Law and xiCustom. In the first of these, he tackled a topic that has generated a significant amount of interest and some controversy among scholars from England, France, Germany, and Russia, involving nothing less than an investigation into the origins of private land ownership. The question has been posed in various ways: did it start with joint (or, as some less justifiably may call it, communal or corporate) ownership or with individual ownership? And was the village community free or under servitude? It is now widely accepted that there were multiple types, although communal cultivation was definitely a common feature among them all. Even in India, there were at least two types, one of which showed several forms of ownership rather than communal ownership, and it is no less ancient. However, as Maitland frequently pointed out, much of the debate has been a literal anachronism; in other words, people in the nineteenth century have been asking questions of the Early Ages that they couldn’t answer and imposing distinctions from the past that are themselves products of history. Ownership itself is a later concept that developed from usage. We can assert with some confidence that family "ownership" came before individual ownership, but it’s not as straightforward to define the extent of communal ownership by an entire village.

Maine was on surer ground when, as in his studies of Irish and Hindu law, he confined himself to the more immediate circle of the family group. In his Early Institutions he subjects the Brehon Laws of early Ireland to a suggestive examination as presenting an example of Celtic law largely unaffected by Roman influences. He there shows, as he has shown in Ancient Law, that in early times the only social brotherhood recognised was that of kinship, and that almost every form of social organisation, tribe, guild, and religious fraternity, was conceived of under a similitude of it. Feudalism converted the village community, based on a real or assumed consanguinity of its members, into the fief in which the relations of tenant and lord were those of contract, while those of the unfree tenant xiirested on status. In his Early Law and Custom he pursues much the same theme by an examination of Hindu Law as presenting a peculiarly close implication of early law with religion. Here he devotes his attention chiefly to Ancestor-worship, a subject which about this time had engaged the attention, as regards its Greek and Roman forms, of that brilliant Frenchman, Fustel de Coulanges, whose monograph La Cité Antique is now a classic. As is well known, the right of inheriting a dead man's property and the duty of performing his obsequies are co-relative to this day in Hindu law, and his investigation of this subject brings Maine back to the subject of the Patriarchal Power. He points out that both worshipper and the object of worship were exclusively males, and concludes that it was the power of the father which generated the practice of worshipping him, while this practice in turn, by the gradual admission of women to participate in the ceremonies, gradually acted as a solvent upon the power itself. The necessity of finding some one to perform these rites, on failure of direct male heirs, marked the beginning of the recognition of a right in women to inherit. The conception of the family becomes less intense and more extensive. These discussions brought Maine, in chapter VII. of Early Law and Custom, to reconsider the main theory of Ancient Law in the light of the criticism to which it had been exposed, and every reader of Ancient Law who desires to understand Maine's exact position in regard to the scope of his generalisations should read for himself the chapter in the later work entitled "Theories of Primitive Society." His theory of the patriarchal power had been criticised by two able and industrious anthropologists, M'Lennan and Morgan, who, by their investigation of "survivals" among barbarous tribes in our own day, had arrived at the conclusion that, broadly speaking, the normal process through which society had passed was not patriarchal but "matriarchal," i.e. understanding by that term a system in which descent is traced through females. It would take up far too much space to enter into this controversy in detail. It is sufficient to say that the counter-theory rested on the assumption that society originated not in families, based on the authority of the father and relationship through him, but in promiscuous hordes among whom the only certain xiiifact, and, consequently, the only recognised basis of relationship, was maternity. Maine's answer to this was that his generalisations as to the prevalence of the patriarchal power were confined to Indo-European races, and that he did not pretend to dogmatise about other races, also that he was dealing not with all societies but all that had any permanence. He argues that the promiscuous horde, where and when it is found, is to be explained as an abnormal case of retrogression due to a fortuitous scarcity of females resulting in polyandry, and he opposes to the theory of its predominance the potency of sexual jealousy which might serve as only another name for the patriarchal power. On the whole the better opinion is certainly with Maine. His theory, at any rate, alone accords with a view of society so soon as it is seen to possess any degree of civilisation and social cohesion.

Maine had a stronger footing when, similar to his studies of Irish and Hindu law, he focused on the more immediate circle of the family. In his Early Institutions, he provides an insightful analysis of the Brehon Laws of early Ireland, showcasing them as an example of Celtic law largely free from Roman influences. He demonstrates, as he did in Ancient Law, that in earlier times, the only social bond recognized was kinship, and almost every form of social organization—tribe, guild, and religious group—was modeled after it. Feudalism transformed the village community, based on a real or presumed family connection among its members, into a fief, where the relationships between tenant and lord were contractual, and those of the unfree tenant were based on status. In Early Law and Custom, he explores a similar theme through the study of Hindu Law, which shows a unique connection between early law and religion. Here, he primarily focuses on ancestor worship, a topic that around this time caught the interest of the brilliant French scholar, Fustel de Coulanges, whose monograph La Cité Antique has become a classic. It is well-known that the right to inherit a deceased person's property and the obligation to conduct their funerals are still interlinked in Hindu law, and his exploration of this subject leads Maine back to the concept of Patriarchal Power. He notes that both the worshipper and the worshipped were exclusively male, concluding that the father's authority inspired the practice of worshipping him, while this practice, by gradually allowing women to participate in the ceremonies, subtly weakened that power. The need to find someone to perform these rites, when there were no direct male heirs, marked the beginning of women’s recognition as having the right to inherit. The understanding of family becomes broader and less intense. These discussions prompted Maine, in chapter VII. of Early Law and Custom, to reassess the main theory of Ancient Law in light of the criticisms it had faced. Every reader of Ancient Law who wants to grasp Maine's position regarding the scope of his generalizations should read the chapter titled "Theories of Primitive Society" in the later work. His theory of patriarchal power faced criticism from two competent anthropologists, M'Lennan and Morgan, who, through their investigation of "survivals" among contemporary tribal communities, concluded that, broadly speaking, normal societal development was not patriarchal but "matriarchal," meaning a system where descent is traced through females. It would require too much space to delve into this debate in detail. It suffices to say that the opposing theory assumed that society did not originate from families grounded in paternal authority, but from promiscuous groups where the only certain fact—and thus the sole recognized basis of relationship—was maternity. Maine's response was that his generalizations regarding the prevalence of patriarchal power were limited to Indo-European races, and that he did not claim to make definitive statements about other races, emphasizing that he was addressing only societies with some level of permanence. He argued that the existence of such promiscuous groups, when and where they occur, should be seen as an abnormal regression due to a random shortage of females leading to polyandry, and he countered the theory of its prevalence with the strong influence of sexual jealousy, which can be viewed as another expression of patriarchal power. Overall, the prevailing view certainly favors Maine. His theory, at the very least, aligns with a perspective on society as soon as it exhibits any level of civilization and social cohesion.

It will be seen that Maine's work, like that of most great thinkers, presents a singular coherence and intellectual elegance. It is distinguished also by an extraordinary wide range of vision. He lays under contribution with equal felicity and suggestiveness the Old Testament, the Homeric poems, the Latin dramatists, the laws of the Barbarians, the sacerdotal laws of the Hindus, the oracles of the Brehon caste, and the writings of the Roman jurists. In other words, he was a master of the Comparative Method. Few writers have thrown so much light on the development of the human mind in its social relations. We know now—a hundred disciples have followed in Maine's footsteps and applied his teaching—how slow is the growth of the human intellect in these matters, with what painful steps man learns to generalise, how convulsively he clings in the infancy of civilisation to the formal, the material, the realistic aspects of things, how late he develops such abstractions as "the State." In all this Maine first showed the way. As Sir Frederick Pollock has admirably put it—

It’s clear that Maine's work, like that of many great thinkers, has a unique coherence and intellectual elegance. It is also remarkable for its exceptionally broad perspective. He draws on a variety of sources with equal skill and insight, including the Old Testament, the Homeric poems, Latin dramatists, the laws of the Barbarians, the religious laws of the Hindus, the oracles of the Brehon caste, and the writings of Roman jurists. In short, he mastered the Comparative Method. Few writers have illuminated the evolution of the human mind in social contexts as he has. We now understand—thanks to the hundred followers who have explored Maine's teachings—how slowly human intellect develops in these areas, how painstakingly people learn to generalize, how desperately they cling to the formal, material, and realistic aspects of life in the early stages of civilization, and how late they come to understand abstractions like "the State." In all of this, Maine was the trailblazer. As Sir Frederick Pollock has brilliantly stated—

Nowadays it may be said that "all have got the seed," but this is no justification for forgetting who first cleared and sowed the ground. We may till fields that the master left untouched, and one man will bring a better ox to yoke to the plough, and another a worse; but it is the master's plough still.

Nowadays, it can be said that "everyone has the seed," but that doesn’t justify forgetting who first cleared and planted the ground. We might cultivate fields that the master left untouched, and one person might bring a better ox to yoke to the plow while another brings a worse one; but it’s still the master's plow.

We may conclude with some remarks on Maine's views xivof the contemporary problems of political society. Maine was what, for want of a better term, may be called a Conservative, and, indeed, it may be doubted whether, with the single exception of Burke, any English writer has done more to provide English Conservatives with reasons for the faith that is in them. He has set forth his views in a collection of polemical essays under the title of Popular Government, which were given to the world in book form in 1885. He viewed the advent of Democracy with more distrust than alarm—he appears to have thought it a form of government which could not last—and he has an unerring eye for its weaknesses.3 Indeed, his remarks on the facility with which Democracy yields itself to manipulation by wire-pullers, newspapers, and demagogues, have found not a little confirmation in such studies of the actual working of democratic government as M. Ostrogorski's Democracy and the Organisation of Political Parties. Maine emphasised the tyranny of majorities, the enslavement of untutored minds by political catchwords, their susceptibility to "suggestion," their readiness to adopt vicarious opinion in preference to an intellectual exercise of their own volition. It is not surprising that the writer who had subjected the theories of the Social Contract to such merciless criticism sighed for a scientific analysis of political terms as the first step to clear thinking about politics. Here he was on strong ground, but for such an analysis we have yet to wait.4 He seems to have placed his hopes in the adoption of some kind of written constitution which, like the American prototype, would safeguard us from fundamental changes by the caprice of a single assembly. But this is not the place to pursue such highly debateable matters. Enough if we say that the man who wishes to serve an apprenticeship to an intelligent understanding of the political society xvof the present cannot do better than begin by a careful study of Maine's researches into the political society of the past.

We can wrap up with some thoughts on Maine's views xiv regarding the current issues facing political society. Maine was what we might call a Conservative, and it’s likely that, apart from Burke, no other English writer has provided more reasons for English Conservatives to believe in their ideals. He laid out his views in a collection of argumentative essays titled Popular Government, published in book form in 1885. He approached the emergence of Democracy with more skepticism than fear—he seemed to think it was a type of government that wouldn't last—and he has a keen insight into its vulnerabilities.3 In fact, his observations on how easily Democracy can be manipulated by puppet masters, newspapers, and demagogues have been confirmed by studies like M. Ostrogorski's Democracy and the Organisation of Political Parties. Maine highlighted the tyranny of majorities, the enslavement of uneducated minds by political slogans, their susceptibility to "suggestion," and their tendency to adopt others' opinions rather than think for themselves. It's not surprising that someone who critically analyzed the theories of the Social Contract longed for a scientific examination of political terms as the first step towards clear political thinking. He had strong grounds for this, but such analysis is still awaited.4 He seemed to hope for some kind of written constitution that, like the American model, would protect us from fundamental changes due to the whims of a single assembly. But this is not the place to delve into such highly debatable issues. It suffices to say that anyone aiming to gain an intelligent understanding of today's political society xv should start by carefully studying Maine's research on the political society of the past.

J. H. MORGAN.

J.H. Morgan.

Note.—The reader who desires to study Maine in the light of modern criticism is recommended to read Sir F. Pollock's "Notes on Maine's Ancient Law" (published by John Murray at 2s. 6d., or, with the text, at 5s.). The best short study of Maine with which I am acquainted is the article by Professor Vinogradoff in the Law Quarterly Review for April 1904. The field of research covered by Maine in his various writings is so vast that it is impossible to refer the reader, except at great length, to anything like an adequate list of later books on the subjects of his investigation. In addition to the works on the Village Community mentioned in a previous footnote, I may, however, refer the beginner to Mr. Edward Jenks' little book on The History of Politics in Dent's Primers, to Professor Ashley's translation of a fragment of Fustel de Coulanges under the title of The Origin of Property in Land, and to Sir Frederick Pollock's brilliant little book, The Expansion of the Common Law. The reader is also recommended to study Mr. H.A.L. Fisher's succinct survey of the contributions of Maitland to legal history under the title of F.W. Maitland; an Appreciation (Cambridge University Press). One of the most brilliant and ingenious studies of the origins of European civilisation is to be found in the work of the great German jurist, Ihering, Die Vorgeschichte der Indo-Europder, translated into English under the title of The Early History of the Indo-European Races (Sonnenschein, 1897).

Note.—Readers interested in exploring Maine through a modern lens are encouraged to check out Sir F. Pollock's "Notes on Maine's Ancient Law" (published by John Murray for 2s. 6d., or with the text for 5s.). The best concise study of Maine that I know of is the article by Professor Vinogradoff in the Law Quarterly Review from April 1904. The scope of research that Maine covers in his various writings is so extensive that it's challenging to provide a complete list of later books on his topics without going into great detail. Besides the works on the Village Community mentioned in a previous footnote, I can suggest for beginners Mr. Edward Jenks' concise book on The History of Politics in Dent's Primers, Professor Ashley's translation of a piece by Fustel de Coulanges titled The Origin of Property in Land, and Sir Frederick Pollock's excellent little book, The Expansion of the Common Law. It's also recommended to look at Mr. H.A.L. Fisher's brief overview of Maitland's contributions to legal history called F.W. Maitland; an Appreciation (Cambridge University Press). One of the most brilliant and insightful studies on the origins of European civilization can be found in the work of the notable German jurist, Ihering, Die Vorgeschichte der Indo-Europder, which has been translated into English as The Early History of the Indo-European Races (Sonnenschein, 1897).

1 The reader who desires to pursue the subject by reference to one of Maine's chief authorities is recommended to read the translation of the Institutes by Sandars.

1 Readers interested in exploring this topic further should check out Sandars' translation of the Institutes, which is considered one of Maine's primary sources.

2 English literature on the subject is best studied in Maitland's Domesday Book and Beyond, Vinogradoff's The Growth of the Manor and Villeinage in England (with an excellent historical introduction), and Seebohm's English Village Community.

2 The best English literature on this topic can be found in Maitland's Domesday Book and Beyond, Vinogradoff's The Growth of the Manor and Villeinage in England (which includes a great historical introduction), and Seebohm's English Village Community.

3 Witness the characteristic sentence: "On the whole they [i.e. the studies of earlier society] suggest that the differences which, after ages of change, separate the civilised man from savage or barbarian, are not so great as the vulgar opinion would have them.... Like the savage, he is a man of party with a newspaper for a totem ... and like a savage he is apt to make of his totem his God."

3 Check out this telling statement: "Overall, they [i.e. the studies of earlier society] indicate that the differences that, after ages of change, set civilized people apart from savages or barbarians aren't as significant as common beliefs suggest.... Like the savage, he belongs to a group with a newspaper as his totem ... and, similar to a savage, he tends to worship his totem as if it were his God."

4 Something of the kind was done many years ago by Sir George Cornewall Lewis in his little book on the Use and Abuse of Political Terms. I have attempted to carry the task a step farther in an article which appeared in the form of a review of Lord Morley's "History and Politics" in the Nineteenth Century for March 1913.

4 Something similar was done many years ago by Sir George Cornewall Lewis in his short book on the Use and Abuse of Political Terms. I've tried to take it a step further in an article that was published as a review of Lord Morley's "History and Politics" in the Nineteenth Century for March 1913.


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BIBLIOGRAPHY

Navis ornate atque armata in aquam deducitur (Prize Poem), 1842; The Birth of the Prince of Wales (Prize Poem), 1842; Cæsar ad Rubiconem constitit (Prize Poem), 1842; Memoir of H.F. Hallam, 1851; Roman Law and Legal Education (Essay), 1856; Ancient Law: its Connection with the Early History of Society and its Relation to Modern Ideas, 1861; Short Essays and Reviews on the Educational Policy of the Government of India, 1866; Village Communities in the East and West (Lectures), 1871; The Early History of the Property of Married Women as collected from Roman and Hindoo Law (Lecture), 1873; The Effects of Observation of India on Modern European Thought (Lecture), 1875; Lectures on the Early History of Institutions, 1875; Village Communities, etc.; third ed. with other Lectures and Addresses, 1876; Dissertations on Early Law and Custom (selected from Lectures), 1883; Popular Government (four Essays), 1885; India [1837-1887] (in "The Reign of Queen Victoria," ed. by Thos. Humphry Ward, vol. i.), 1887; The Whewell Lectures: International Law, 1887, 1888; Ancient Law (ed. with introduction and notes by Sir Frederick Pollock), 1906; Ancient Law (Allahabad ed., with introduction by K.C. Banerji), 1912.

Navis ornate atque armata in aquam deducitur (Prize Poem), 1842; The Birth of the Prince of Wales (Prize Poem), 1842; Cæsar ad Rubiconem constitit (Prize Poem), 1842; Memoir of H.F. Hallam, 1851; Roman Law and Legal Education (Essay), 1856; Ancient Law: its Connection with the Early History of Society and its Relation to Modern Ideas, 1861; Short Essays and Reviews on the Educational Policy of the Government of India, 1866; Village Communities in the East and West (Lectures), 1871; The Early History of the Property of Married Women as collected from Roman and Hindoo Law (Lecture), 1873; The Effects of Observation of India on Modern European Thought (Lecture), 1875; Lectures on the Early History of Institutions, 1875; Village Communities, etc.; third ed. with other Lectures and Addresses, 1876; Dissertations on Early Law and Custom (selected from Lectures), 1883; Popular Government (four Essays), 1885; India [1837-1887] (in "The Reign of Queen Victoria," ed. by Thos. Humphry Ward, vol. i.), 1887; The Whewell Lectures: International Law, 1887, 1888; Ancient Law (ed. with introduction and notes by Sir Frederick Pollock), 1906; Ancient Law (Allahabad ed., with introduction by K.C. Banerji), 1912.

Contributions to: "Morning Chronicle," 1851; "Cornhill Magazine," 1871; "Quarterly Review," 1886; "Saturday Review," and "St. James's Gazette."

Contributions to: "Morning Chronicle," 1851; "Cornhill Magazine," 1871; "Quarterly Review," 1886; "Saturday Review," and "St. James's Gazette."

A brief memoir of the life of Sir Henry Maine, by Sir M.E. Grant Duff; with some of his Indian speeches and minutes, selected by Whitley Stokes, 1892.

A short memoir about the life of Sir Henry Maine, by Sir M.E. Grant Duff; including some of his speeches and notes from India, chosen by Whitley Stokes, 1892.


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PREFACE

The chief object of the following pages is to indicate some of the earliest ideas of mankind, as they are reflected in Ancient Law, and to point out the relation of those ideas to modern thought. Much of the inquiry attempted could not have been prosecuted with the slightest hope of a useful result if there had not existed a body of law, like that of the Romans, bearing in its earliest portions the traces of the most remote antiquity and supplying from its later rules the staple of the civil institutions by which modern society is even now controlled. The necessity of taking the Roman law as a typical system has compelled the author to draw from it what may appear a disproportionate number of his illustrations; but it has not been his intention to write a treatise on Roman jurisprudence, and he has as much as possible avoided all discussions which might give that appearance to his work. The space allotted in the third and fourth chapters to certain philosophical theories of the Roman Jurisconsults has been appropriated to them for two reasons. In the first place, those theories appear to the author to have had a wider and more permanent influence on the thought and action of the world than is usually supposed. Secondly, they are believed to be the ultimate source of most of the views which have been prevalent, till quite recently, on the subjects treated of in this volume. It was impossible for the author to proceed far with his undertaking without stating his opinion on the origin, meaning, and value of those speculations.

The main purpose of the following pages is to highlight some of humanity's earliest ideas as reflected in Ancient Law and to show how those ideas relate to modern thinking. Much of the inquiry conducted could not have progressed with even a hint of useful results if there hadn't been a legal framework, like that of the Romans, which contains traces of very ancient times in its earliest sections and provides, through its later rules, the foundation of the civil institutions that continue to govern modern society today. The need to take Roman law as a typical system has forced the author to draw from it what may seem like an excessive number of examples; however, it was not his intention to write a treatise on Roman jurisprudence, and he has tried as much as possible to avoid discussions that might make his work appear that way. The space dedicated in the third and fourth chapters to certain philosophical theories of the Roman jurists has been allotted for two reasons. First, those theories seem to the author to have had a broader and more lasting impact on the world's thought and actions than is generally recognized. Second, they are believed to be the ultimate source of most perspectives that have been common, until very recently, on the topics discussed in this volume. It was impossible for the author to move forward with his project without expressing his views on the origin, meaning, and significance of those speculations.

H. S. M.

HSM

    London, January 1861.

London, January 1861.


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CONTENTS

chapter   page
I.

Ancient Codes

Old Codes

1
II.

Legal Fictions

Legal Fictions

13
III.

Law of Nature and Equity

Natural Law and Equity

26
IV.

The Modern History of the Law of Nature

The Recent History of Natural Law

43
V.

Primitive Society and Ancient Law

Early Society and Ancient Law

67
VI.

The Early History of Testamentary Succession

The Early History of Inheritance via Wills

101
VII.

Ancient and Modern Ideas Respecting Wills And Successions

Modern Perspectives on Wills and Inheritances

127
VIII.

The Early History of Property

The Early History of Property

144
IX.

The Early History of Contract

The Early History of Contracts

179
X.

The Early History of Delict and Crime

The Early History of Torts and Crime

216
 

Index

Index

235

CHAPTER I

old codes

The most celebrated system of jurisprudence known to the world begins, as it ends, with a Code. From the commencement to the close of its history, the expositors of Roman Law consistently employed language which implied that the body of their system rested on the Twelve Decemviral Tables, and therefore on a basis of written law. Except in one particular, no institutions anterior to the Twelve Tables were recognised at Rome. The theoretical descent of Roman jurisprudence from a code, the theoretical ascription of English law to immemorial unwritten tradition, were the chief reasons why the development of their system differed from the development of ours. Neither theory corresponded exactly with the facts, but each produced consequences of the utmost importance.

The most famous legal system in the world starts and ends with a Code. From the beginning to the end of its history, the interpreters of Roman Law consistently used language that suggested their system was based on the Twelve Decemviral Tables, and therefore on written law. With one exception, no legal institutions prior to the Twelve Tables were recognized in Rome. The theoretical descent of Roman law from a code, and the theoretical attribution of English law to ancient unwritten tradition, were the main reasons why the development of their system was different from the development of ours. Neither theory exactly matched the facts, but each had very important consequences.

I need hardly say that the publication of the Twelve Tables is not the earliest point at which we can take up the history of law. The ancient Roman code belongs to a class of which almost every civilised nation in the world can show a sample, and which, so far as the Roman and Hellenic worlds were concerned, were largely diffused over them at epochs not widely distant from one another. They appeared under exceedingly similar circumstances, and were produced, to our knowledge, by very similar causes. Unquestionably, many jural phenomena lie behind these codes and preceded them in point of time. Not a few documentary records exist which profess to give us information concerning the early phenomena of law; but, until philology has effected a complete analysis of the Sanskrit literature, our best sources of knowledge are undoubtedly the Greek Homeric poems, considered of course not as a history of actual occurrences,002 but as a description, not wholly idealised, of a state of society known to the writer. However the fancy of the poet may have exaggerated certain features of the heroic age, the prowess of warriors and the potency of gods, there is no reason to believe that it has tampered with moral or metaphysical conceptions which were not yet the subjects of conscious observation; and in this respect the Homeric literature is far more trustworthy than those relatively later documents which pretend to give an account of times similarly early, but which were compiled under philosophical or theological influences. If by any means we can determine the early forms of jural conceptions, they will be invaluable to us. These rudimentary ideas are to the jurist what the primary crusts of the earth are to the geologist. They contain, potentially, all the forms in which law has subsequently exhibited itself. The haste or the prejudice which has generally refused them all but the most superficial examination, must bear the blame of the unsatisfactory condition in which we find the science of jurisprudence. The inquiries of the jurist are in truth prosecuted much as inquiry in physics and physiology was prosecuted before observation had taken the place of assumption. Theories, plausible and comprehensive, but absolutely unverified, such as the Law of Nature or the Social Compact, enjoy a universal preference over sober research into the primitive history of society and law; and they obscure the truth not only by diverting attention from the only quarter in which it can be found, but by that most real and most important influence which, when once entertained and believed in, they are enabled to exercise on the later stages of jurisprudence.

I hardly need to point out that the publication of the Twelve Tables is not the earliest point from which we can explore the history of law. The ancient Roman code belongs to a category that nearly every civilized nation in the world can represent, and which, as far as the Roman and Hellenic worlds are concerned, was widely spread across them at times that weren’t too far apart. They emerged under very similar circumstances and were created, as far as we know, by quite similar causes. Undoubtedly, many legal phenomena existed behind these codes and preceded them chronologically. There are several documentary records that claim to provide information about the early developments of law; however, until philology thoroughly analyzes the Sanskrit literature, our best sources of knowledge are clearly the Greek Homeric poems. These should not be viewed as a history of actual events,002 but as a description, not entirely idealized, of a society familiar to the writer. No matter how much the poet may have enhanced certain aspects of the heroic age, such as the bravery of warriors and the power of gods, there’s no reason to believe that it has altered moral or metaphysical concepts that were not yet subjects of conscious understanding; in this regard, Homeric literature is far more reliable than those relatively later documents that claim to recount similarly early times but were created under philosophical or theological influences. If we can uncover the early forms of legal concepts, they will be incredibly valuable to us. These basic ideas are to the jurist what the primary layers of the earth are to the geologist. They contain, potentially, all the forms that law has taken since then. The rush or bias that has generally dismissed them in favor of only the most superficial examination is to blame for the unsatisfactory state we find the science of jurisprudence in. The inquiries of jurists are, in fact, pursued much like the inquiries in physics and physiology before observation replaced assumption. Theories, which are plausible and comprehensive but entirely unverified, like the Law of Nature or the Social Compact, tend to overshadow more careful investigation into the primitive history of society and law; they obscure the truth not only by distracting attention from where it can actually be found but also by that very real and significant influence that they are permitted to exert on the later stages of jurisprudence once they are accepted and believed.

The earliest notions connected with the conception, now so fully developed, of a law or rule of life, are those contained in the Homeric words "Themis" and "Themistes." "Themis," it is well known, appears in the later Greek pantheon as the Goddess of Justice, but this is a modern and much developed idea, and it is in a very different sense that Themis is described in the Iliad as the assessor of Zeus. It is now clearly seen by all trustworthy observers of the primitive condition of mankind that, in the infancy of the race, men could only account for sustained or periodically recurring action by supposing a personal agent. Thus, the wind blowing was a person and of course a divine person;003 the sun rising, culminating, and setting was a person and a divine person; the earth yielding her increase was a person and divine. As, then, in the physical world, so in the moral. When a king decided a dispute by a sentence, the judgment was assumed to be the result of direct inspiration. The divine agent, suggesting judicial awards to kings or to gods, the greatest of kings, was Themis. The peculiarity of the conception is brought out by the use of the plural. Themistes, Themises, the plural of Themis, are the awards themselves, divinely dictated to the judge. Kings are spoken of as if they had a store of "Themistes" ready to hand for use; but it must be distinctly understood that they are not laws, but judgments. "Zeus, or the human king on earth," says Mr. Grote, in his History of Greece, "is not a lawmaker, but a judge." He is provided with Themistes, but, consistently with the belief in their emanation from above, they cannot be supposed to be connected by any thread of principle; they are separate, isolated judgments.

The earliest ideas associated with the concept of a law or rule of life, which is now so well developed, come from the Homeric terms "Themis" and "Themistes." "Themis" is known to later Greek culture as the Goddess of Justice, but this is a modern and much evolved interpretation. In the Iliad, Themis is described in a very different way, as the advisor of Zeus. Observers studying the primitive state of humanity now clearly see that, in the early days of our species, people could only explain consistent or recurring actions by imagining a personal agent. So, the blowing wind was seen as a person, and definitely a divine one; the sun rising, reaching its peak, and setting was also a personal and divine entity; the earth producing its harvest was viewed similarly. Just as in the physical world, the same applies in the moral realm. When a king resolved a dispute with a ruling, it was believed to be inspired directly. The divine agent that prompted these judicial decisions for kings or the greatest of kings was Themis. The uniqueness of this idea is highlighted by the plural form. Themistes, or Themises, the plural of Themis, refers to the specific judgments that were divinely dictated to the judge. Kings were thought to have a collection of "Themistes" readily available; however, it is important to understand that these are not laws, but judgments. "Zeus, or the human king on earth," says Mr. Grote in his History of Greece, "is not a lawmaker, but a judge." He has Themistes at his disposal, but because of the belief that they come from a higher power, they are not connected by a thread of principle; they are distinct, isolated judgments.

Even in the Homeric poems, we can see that these ideas are transient. Parities of circumstance were probably commoner in the simple mechanism of ancient society than they are now, and in the succession of similar cases awards are likely to follow and resemble each other. Here we have the germ or rudiment of a Custom, a conception posterior to that of Themistes or judgments. However strongly we, with our modern associations, may be inclined to lay down à priori that the notion of a Custom must precede that of a judicial sentence, and that a judgment must affirm a Custom or punish its breach, it seems quite certain that the historical order of the ideas is that in which I have placed them. The Homeric word for a custom in the embryo is sometimes "Themis" in the singular—more often "Dike," the meaning of which visibly fluctuates between a "judgment" and a "custom" or "usage." Νόμος, a Law, so great and famous a term in the political vocabulary of the later Greek society, does not occur in Homer.

Even in the Homeric poems, we can see that these ideas are temporary. Situations were probably more similar in the straightforward setup of ancient society than they are now, and in the sequence of similar cases, outcomes are likely to be similar and follow one another. Here we have the beginning of a Custom, which comes after the concept of Themistes or judgments. No matter how much we, with our modern views, might want to believe that the idea of a Custom must come before a legal decision, and that a judgment must confirm a Custom or penalize its violation, it seems clear that the historical order of these ideas is as I’ve described it. The Homeric term for a custom in its early form is sometimes "Themis" in the singular—more often "Dike," the meaning of which shifts visibly between a "judgment" and a "custom" or "usage." Νόμος, a Law, which is such a significant and well-known term in the political language of later Greek society, does not appear in Homer.

This notion of a divine agency, suggesting the Themistes, and itself impersonated in Themis, must be kept apart from other primitive beliefs with which a superficial inquirer might confound it. The conception of the Deity dictating an entire code or body of law, as in the case of the Hindoo laws of Menu, seems to belong to a range of ideas more recent and more004 advanced. "Themis" and "Themistes" are much less remotely linked with that persuasion which clung so long and so tenaciously to the human mind, of a divine influence underlying and supporting every relation of life, every social institution. In early law, and amid the rudiments of political thought, symptoms of this belief meet us on all sides. A supernatural presidency is supposed to consecrate and keep together all the cardinal institutions of those times, the State, the Race, and the Family. Men, grouped together in the different relations which those institutions imply, are bound to celebrate periodically common rites and to offer common sacrifices; and every now and then the same duty is even more significantly recognised in the purifications and expiations which they perform, and which appear intended to deprecate punishment for involuntary or neglectful disrespect. Everybody acquainted with ordinary classical literature will remember the sacra gentilicia, which exercised so important an influence on the early Roman law of adoption and of wills. And to this hour the Hindoo Customary Law, in which some of the most curious features of primitive society are stereotyped, makes almost all the rights of persons and all the rules of succession hinge on the due solemnisation of fixed ceremonies at the dead man's funeral, that is, at every point where a breach occurs in the continuity of the family.

This idea of a divine force, represented by the Themistes and embodied in Themis, should be distinguished from other primitive beliefs that a casual observer might confuse it with. The concept of a deity providing a complete set of laws, like in the case of the Hindu laws of Manu, seems to belong to a more recent and sophisticated range of ideas. "Themis" and "Themistes" are much less connected to the belief that persisted for so long in the human mind about a divine influence underpinning and sustaining every aspect of life and every social institution. In early law and the basics of political thought, we encounter signs of this belief everywhere. A supernatural presence is thought to bless and unify all the key institutions of those times: the State, the Race, and the Family. People, gathered in the various roles these institutions imply, are expected to regularly participate in common rituals and offer shared sacrifices; and at times, this duty is even more clearly recognized through the purifications and atonements they carry out, which seem aimed at avoiding punishment for unintentional or careless disrespect. Anyone familiar with classic literature will recall the sacra gentilicia, which had a significant impact on early Roman laws regarding adoption and wills. Even today, Hindu Customary Law, which preserves some of the most interesting aspects of primitive society, relies almost entirely on the proper performance of established ceremonies at the deceased's funeral—meaning at every moment where the family's continuity is interrupted.

Before we quit this stage of jurisprudence, a caution may be usefully given to the English student. Bentham, in his Fragment on Government, and Austin, in his Province of Jurisprudence Determined, resolve every law into a command of the lawgiver, an obligation imposed thereby on the citizen, and a sanction threatened in the event of disobedience; and it is further predicated of the command, which is the first element in a law, that it must prescribe, not a single act, but a series or number of acts of the same class or kind. The results of this separation of ingredients tally exactly with the facts of mature jurisprudence; and, by a little straining of language, they may be made to correspond in form with all law, of all kinds, at all epochs. It is not, however, asserted that the notion of law entertained by the generality is even now quite in conformity with this dissection; and it is curious that, the farther we penetrate into the primitive history of thought, the farther we find ourselves from a conception of law which at all resembles a compound005 of the elements which Bentham determined. It is certain that, in the infancy of mankind, no sort of legislature, not even a distinct author of law, is contemplated or conceived of. Law has scarcely reached the footing of custom; it is rather a habit. It is, to use a French phrase, "in the air." The only authoritative statement of right and wrong is a judicial sentence after the facts, not one presupposing a law which has been violated, but one which is breathed for the first time by a higher power into the judge's mind at the moment of adjudication. It is of course extremely difficult for us to realise a view so far removed from us in point both of time and of association, but it will become more credible when we dwell more at length on the constitution of ancient society, in which every man, living during the greater part of his life under the patriarchal despotism, was practically controlled in all his actions by a regimen not of law but of caprice. I may add that an Englishman should be better able than a foreigner to appreciate the historical fact that the "Themistes" preceded any conception of law, because, amid the many inconsistent theories which prevail concerning the character of English jurisprudence, the most popular, or at all events the one which most affects practice, is certainly a theory which assumes that adjudged cases and precedents exist antecedently to rules, principles, and distinctions. The "Themistes" have too, it should be remarked, the characteristic which, in the view of Bentham and Austin, distinguishes single or mere commands from laws. A true law enjoins on all the citizens indifferently a number of acts similar in class or kind; and this is exactly the feature of a law which has most deeply impressed itself on the popular mind, causing the term "law" to be applied to mere uniformities, successions, and similitudes. A command prescribes only a single act, and it is to commands, therefore, that "Themistes" are more akin than to laws. They are simply adjudications on insulated states of fact, and do not necessarily follow each other in any orderly sequence.

Before we finish this part of legal theory, it’s important to give a warning to English students. Bentham, in his Fragment on Government, and Austin, in his Province of Jurisprudence Determined, break down every law into a command from the lawmaker, an obligation placed on the citizen, and a sanction threatened if there’s disobedience. Furthermore, the command, which is the first element of a law, must specify not just a single act but a series of acts of the same type. The results of this breakdown match exactly with the realities of developed legal systems; and, with a bit of linguistic stretching, they can be made to fit all types of law, from all times. However, it is not claimed that the general understanding of law aligns with this breakdown, and it's interesting that the deeper we go into the early history of thought, the further we find ourselves from a view of law that resembles the combination of elements Bentham identified. It’s clear that in humanity’s early days, there was no concept of any legislature or even a distinct creator of law. Law had barely reached the level of custom; it was more like a habit. It was, to borrow a French phrase, "in the air." The only authoritative definition of right and wrong is a judicial ruling based on the facts, not one that assumes a violated law, but rather one that is inspired for the first time by a higher power into the judge's mind at the moment of making the decision. It's extremely difficult for us to grasp a perspective so distant from us in both time and context, but it becomes more believable when we consider ancient society, where every person lived for most of their life under patriarchal tyranny, and was essentially governed by whims instead of laws. An English person might be better able than a foreigner to appreciate the historical fact that the "Themistes" came before any concept of law, because among the many conflicting theories regarding the nature of English law, the most popular—or at least the one that has the biggest impact on practice—is one that assumes that judged cases and precedents exist before rules, principles, and distinctions. It’s also worth noting that the "Themistes" have the characteristic that, according to Bentham and Austin, distinguishes single or mere commands from laws. A true law requires all citizens equally to perform a number of similar acts; this distinctive feature of law has notably shaped public perception, leading the term "law" to be applied to mere consistencies, sequences, and similarities. A command only dictates a single act, so "Themistes" are more similar to commands than to laws. They are simply decisions about isolated circumstances and do not necessarily follow one another in any systematic order.

The literature of the heroic age discloses to us law in the germ under the "Themistes" and a little more developed in the conception of "Dike." The next stage which we reach in the history of jurisprudence is strongly marked and surrounded by the utmost interest. Mr. Grote, in the second part and second chapter of his History, has fully described006 the mode in which society gradually clothed itself with a different character from that delineated by Homer. Heroic kingship depended partly on divinely given prerogative, and partly on the possession of supereminent strength, courage, and wisdom. Gradually, as the impression of the monarch's sacredness became weakened, and feeble members occurred in the series of hereditary kings, the royal power decayed, and at last gave way to the dominion of aristocracies. If language so precise can be used of the revolution, we might say that the office of the king was usurped by that council of chiefs which Homer repeatedly alludes to and depicts. At all events from an epoch of kingly rule we come everywhere in Europe to an era of oligarchies; and even where the name of the monarchical functions does not absolutely disappear, the authority of the king is reduced to a mere shadow. He becomes a mere hereditary general, as in Lacedæmon, a mere functionary, as the King Archon at Athens, or a mere formal hierophant, like the Rex Sacrificulus at Rome. In Greece, Italy, and Asia Minor, the dominant orders seem to have universally consisted of a number of families united by an assumed relationship in blood, and, though they all appear at first to have laid claim to a quasi-sacred character, their strength does not seem to have resided in their pretended sanctity. Unless they were prematurely overthrown by the popular party, they all ultimately approached very closely to what we should now understand by a political aristocracy. The changes which society underwent in the communities of the further Asia occurred of course at periods long anterior in point of time to these revolutions of the Italian and Hellenic worlds; but their relative place in civilisation appears to have been the same, and they seem to have been exceedingly similar in general character. There is some evidence that the races which were subsequently united under the Persian monarchy, and those which peopled the peninsula of India, had all their heroic age and their era of aristocracies; but a military and a religious oligarchy appear to have grown up separately, nor was the authority of the king generally superseded. Contrary, too, to the course of events in the West, the religious element in the East tended to get the better of the military and political. Military and civil aristocracies disappear, annihilated or crushed into insignificance between the kings and the sacerdotal order;007 and the ultimate result at which we arrive is, a monarch enjoying great power, but circumscribed by the privileges of a caste of priests. With these differences, however, that in the East aristocracies became religious, in the West civil or political, the proposition that a historical era of aristocracies succeeded a historical era of heroic kings may be considered as true, if not of all mankind, at all events of all branches of the Indo-European family of nations.

The literature from the heroic age reveals the early concept of law in "Themistes" and a bit more advanced in the idea of "Dike." The next phase in the history of law is clearly defined and very interesting. Mr. Grote, in the second part and second chapter of his History, fully describes006 how society gradually transformed into a different character than what Homer portrayed. Heroic kingship relied partly on divine rights and partly on extraordinary strength, courage, and wisdom. Over time, as the sacredness of the monarch faded and weak heirs appeared in the line of kings, royal power dwindled, eventually giving way to aristocracies. If we can use such precise language about the revolution, we might say that the king's role was taken over by the council of chiefs that Homer frequently refers to. In any case, we transition from an era of kings across Europe to a time of oligarchies; even where the title of monarchy doesn’t completely disappear, the king's authority is reduced to just a shadow. He becomes merely an inherited general, like in Sparta, just a functionary, like the King Archon in Athens, or merely a ceremonial priest, like the Rex Sacrificulus in Rome. In Greece, Italy, and Asia Minor, the ruling classes generally seemed to consist of several families claiming a supposed blood relationship, and although they all initially appeared to have a quasi-sacred status, their power did not seem to rely on that assumed sanctity. Unless they were overthrown early by the popular faction, they all eventually came very close to what we would now see as a political aristocracy. The changes that occurred in the societies of further Asia happened long before the revolutions in the Italian and Hellenic worlds, but their status in civilization seems to have been the same, and they appeared to be very similar in character. There is some evidence that the races later united under the Persian monarchy and those that settled in India each had their heroic age and their period of aristocracies; however, a military and religious oligarchy seem to have developed separately, and the authority of the king was generally not replaced. Additionally, unlike the developments in the West, in the East, the religious aspect tended to overshadow the military and political. Military and civil aristocracies vanished, either destroyed or diminished between the kings and the priestly class;007 and the final outcome we reach is a monarch with significant power, but limited by the privileges of a priestly caste. With these differences, though, that in the East aristocracies became religious while in the West they became civil or political, the idea that a historical period of aristocracies followed a historical period of heroic kings can be considered true, at least for all branches of the Indo-European family of nations, if not all humanity.

The important point for the jurist is that these aristocracies were universally the depositaries and administrators of law. They seem to have succeeded to the prerogatives of the king, with the important difference, however, that they do not appear to have pretended to direct inspiration for each sentence. The connection of ideas which caused the judgments of the patriarchal chieftain to be attributed to superhuman dictation still shows itself here and there in the claim of a divine origin for the entire body of rules, or for certain parts of it, but the progress of thought no longer permits the solution of particular disputes to be explained by supposing an extra-human interposition. What the juristical oligarchy now claims is to monopolise the knowledge of the laws, to have the exclusive possession of the principles by which quarrels are decided. We have in fact arrived at the epoch of Customary Law. Customs or Observances now exist as a substantive aggregate, and are assumed to be precisely known to the aristocratic order or caste. Our authorities leave us no doubt that the trust lodged with the oligarchy was sometimes abused, but it certainly ought not to be regarded as a mere usurpation or engine of tyranny. Before the invention of writing, and during the infancy of the art, an aristocracy invested with judicial privileges formed the only expedient by which accurate preservation of the customs of the race or tribe could be at all approximated to. Their genuineness was, so far as possible, insured by confiding them to the recollection of a limited portion of the community.

The key point for the legal expert is that these aristocracies were universally the guardians and managers of the law. They seem to have taken over the powers of the king, with the important difference that they didn't claim to have divine inspiration for every ruling. The connection of ideas that led people to attribute the decisions of the patriarchal leader to superhuman guidance still surfaces occasionally in the assertion of a divine origin for the entire set of rules, or for certain aspects of it. However, the advancement of thought no longer allows for the resolution of specific disputes to be explained by assuming some supernatural intervention. What the legal elite now claims is the exclusive knowledge of the laws and the sole possession of the principles that govern how conflicts are resolved. We have indeed reached the era of Customary Law. Customs or Observances now exist as a significant set of practices, and it's assumed that they are well understood by the aristocratic class. Our sources confirm that the trust placed in the elite was sometimes misused, but it definitely shouldn’t be seen as just a simple grab for power or a tool of oppression. Before the invention of writing, and during the early stages of that skill, an aristocracy with judicial powers was the only way to ensure the accurate preservation of the customs of the race or tribe. Their authenticity was, as much as possible, guaranteed by entrusting them to the memory of a small part of the community.

The epoch of Customary Law, and of its custody by a privileged order, is a very remarkable one. The condition of the jurisprudence which it implies has left traces which may still be detected in legal and popular phraseology. The law, thus known exclusively to a privileged minority, whether a caste, an aristocracy, a priestly tribe, or a sacerdotal college is true unwritten law. Except this, there is no such thing as008 unwritten law in the world. English case-law is sometimes spoken of as unwritten, and there are some English theorists who assure us that if a code of English jurisprudence were prepared we should be turning unwritten law into written—a conversion, as they insist, if not of doubtful policy, at all events of the greatest seriousness. Now, it is quite true that there was once a period at which the English common law might reasonably have been termed unwritten. The elder English judges did really pretend to knowledge of rules, principles, and distinctions which were not entirely revealed to the bar and to the lay-public. Whether all the law which they claimed to monopolise was really unwritten, is exceedingly questionable; but at all events, on the assumption that there was once a large mass of civil and criminal rules known exclusively to the judges, it presently ceased to be unwritten law. As soon as the Courts at Westminster Hall began to base their judgments on cases recorded, whether in the year books or elsewhere, the law which they administered became written law. At the present moment a rule of English law has first to be disentangled from the recorded facts of adjudged printed precedents, then thrown into a form of words varying with the taste, precision, and knowledge of the particular judge, and then applied to the circumstances of the case for adjudication. But at no stage of this process has it any characteristic which distinguishes it from written law. It is written case-law, and only different from code-law because it is written in a different way.

The era of Customary Law, and its preservation by a privileged class, is quite notable. The state of the legal system during this time has left marks that can still be seen in legal and everyday language. The law, known solely to a select few—be it a caste, an aristocracy, a religious group, or a clergy—is what we truly call unwritten law. Aside from this, there isn't anything considered 008 unwritten law in the world. English case law is sometimes referred to as unwritten, and some English theorists argue that if a code of English law were created, we would be turning unwritten law into written law—something they claim is of great seriousness, if not questionable policy. It’s true that there was a time when English common law could have rightly been called unwritten. Earlier English judges did assert knowledge of rules, principles, and distinctions that were not fully disclosed to lawyers and the general public. Whether all the law they claimed to control was truly unwritten is very doubtful; however, assuming there was once a significant amount of civil and criminal rules known only to the judges, it eventually stopped being unwritten law. Once the Courts at Westminster Hall started to base their judgments on documented cases, whether in yearbooks or elsewhere, the law they enforced became written law. Right now, a rule of English law first has to be unraveled from the documented facts of established printed precedents, then phrased in a way that varies with the preferences, accuracy, and knowledge of the particular judge, and then applied to the specifics of the case being judged. But at no point in this process does it possess any features that set it apart from written law. It is written case law, differing from code law only in the manner it is written.

From the period of Customary Law we come to another sharply defined epoch in the history of jurisprudence. We arrive at the era of Codes, those ancient codes of which the Twelve Tables of Rome were the most famous specimen. In Greece, in Italy, on the Hellenised sea-board of Western Asia, these codes all made their appearance at periods much the same everywhere, not, I mean, at periods identical in point of time, but similar in point of the relative progress of each community. Everywhere, in the countries I have named, laws engraven on tablets and published to the people take the place of usages deposited with the recollection of a privileged oligarchy. It must not for a moment be supposed that the refined considerations now urged in favour of what is called codification had any part or place in the change I have described. The ancient codes were doubtless originally009 suggested by the discovery and diffusion of the art of writing. It is true that the aristocracies seem to have abused their monopoly of legal knowledge; and at all events their exclusive possession of the law was a formidable impediment to the success of those popular movements which began to be universal in the western world. But, though democratic sentiment may have added to their popularity, the codes were certainly in the main a direct result of the invention of writing. Inscribed tablets were seen to be a better depositary of law, and a better security for its accurate preservation, than the memory of a number of persons however strengthened by habitual exercise.

From the time of Customary Law, we move to a clearly defined period in the history of law. We reach the era of Codes, of which the Twelve Tables of Rome are the most well-known example. In Greece, in Italy, and along the Hellenized coast of Western Asia, these codes emerged around the same time, not identically in timing, but similar in terms of the relative development of each society. Across the regions mentioned, laws engraved on tablets and shared with the public replaced the customs held in the memories of a privileged few. It should not be assumed for a second that the sophisticated arguments made today in favor of what's called codification played any role in this transition. The ancient codes were likely primarily driven by the invention and spread of writing. It's true that aristocracies may have exploited their control over legal knowledge, and their exclusive hold on the law significantly hindered the success of the popular movements that began to emerge universally in the western world. However, while democratic sentiment may have boosted their popularity, the codes were fundamentally a direct outcome of the invention of writing. Inscribed tablets proved to be a more reliable way to store law and ensure its accurate preservation than relying on the memories of various people, no matter how well-trained.

The Roman code belongs to the class of codes I have been describing. Their value did not consist in any approach to symmetrical classifications, or to terseness and clearness of expression, but in their publicity, and in the knowledge which they furnished to everybody, as to what he was to do, and what not to do. It is, indeed, true that the Twelve Tables of Rome do exhibit some traces of systematic arrangement, but this is probably explained by the tradition that the framers of that body of law called in the assistance of Greeks who enjoyed the later Greek experience in the art of law-making. The fragments of the Attic Code of Solon show, however, that it had but little order, and probably the laws of Draco had even less. Quite enough too remains of these collections, both in the East and in the West, to show that they mingled up religious, civil, and merely moral ordinances, without any regard to differences in their essential character; and this is consistent with all we know of early thought from other sources, the severance of law from morality, and of religion from law, belonging very distinctly to the later stages of mental progress.

The Roman code is part of the type of codes I've been discussing. Their value didn't come from being neatly classified or from brevity and clarity in expression, but from their public nature and the information they provided to everyone about what to do and what not to do. It's true that the Twelve Tables of Rome show some signs of organization, but this is likely because the creators of that legal body consulted Greeks who had more experience in law-making. The fragments of the Attic Code of Solon, however, indicate that it had very little order, and the laws of Draco likely had even less. There's still enough left of these collections, both in the East and the West, to show that they combined religious, civil, and moral rules without considering their fundamental differences; this aligns with what we know about early thought from other sources, as the separation of law from morality, and of religion from law, is clearly a feature of the later stages of mental development.

But, whatever to a modern eye are the singularities of these Codes, their importance to ancient societies was unspeakable. The question—and it was one which affected the whole future of each community—was not so much whether there should be a code at all, for the majority of ancient societies seem to have obtained them sooner or later, and, but for the great interruption in the history of jurisprudence created by feudalism, it is likely that all modern law would be distinctly traceable to one or more of these fountain-heads. But the point on which turned the history of the race was, at what010 period, at what stage of their social progress, they should have their laws put into writing. In the western world the plebeian or popular element in each state successfully assailed the oligarchical monopoly, and a code was nearly universally obtained early in the history of the Commonwealth. But in the East, as I have before mentioned, the ruling aristocracies tended to become religious rather than military or political, and gained, therefore, rather than lost in power; while in some instances the physical conformation of Asiatic countries had the effect of making individual communities larger and more numerous than in the West; and it is a known social law that the larger the space over which a particular set of institutions is diffused, the greater is its tenacity and vitality. From whatever cause, the codes obtained by Eastern societies were obtained, relatively, much later than by Western, and wore a very different character. The religious oligarchies of Asia, either for their own guidance, or for the relief of their memory, or for the instruction of their disciples, seem in all cases to have ultimately embodied their legal learning in a code; but the opportunity of increasing and consolidating their influence was probably too tempting to be resisted. Their complete monopoly of legal knowledge appears to have enabled them to put off on the world collections, not so much of the rules actually observed as of the rules which the priestly order considered proper to be observed. The Hindoo code, called the Laws of Menu, which is certainly a Brahmin compilation, undoubtedly enshrines many genuine observances of the Hindoo race, but the opinion of the best contemporary orientalists is, that it does not, as a whole, represent a set of rules ever actually administered in Hindostan. It is, in great part, an ideal picture of that which, in the view of the Brahmins, ought to be the law. It is consistent with human nature and with the special motives of their authors, that codes like that of Menu should pretend to the highest antiquity and claim to have emanated in their complete form from the Deity. Menu, according to Hindoo mythology, is an emanation from the supreme God; but the compilation which bears his name, though its exact date is not easily discovered, is, in point of the relative progress of Hindoo jurisprudence, a recent production.

But to a modern eye, the peculiarities of these Codes might seem odd, yet their significance to ancient societies was immense. The key question—which impacted the whole future of each community—wasn't so much whether there should be a code at all; most ancient societies eventually developed them. If not for the major disruption in legal history caused by feudalism, it’s likely that all modern law would trace back to one or more of these original sources. The crucial issue that shaped the history of mankind was at what point, at which stage of their social development, they would write down their laws. In the western world, the common people in each state successfully challenged the oligarchs and a code was almost universally established early in the history of the Commonwealth. However, in the East, as I've mentioned before, the ruling aristocracies became more religious than military or political, thereby gaining rather than losing power. In some cases, the geographic layout of Asian countries led to individual communities being larger and more numerous than in the West; and it's a known social principle that the larger the area over which a particular set of institutions spreads, the more enduring and vital it becomes. For whatever reason, the codes adopted by Eastern societies came later compared to Western ones and had a very different character. The religious elites of Asia, either for their own guidance, to help with memory, or to teach their followers, ultimately seemed to codify their legal knowledge; however, the temptation to increase and solidify their influence was likely too strong to resist. Their complete control over legal knowledge seems to have allowed them to impose collections that reflected not the rules actually followed but those deemed appropriate by the priestly class. The Hindu code known as the Laws of Manu, which is definitely a Brahmin compilation, certainly contains many true practices of the Hindu people, but leading contemporary Orientalists believe that it doesn’t, as a whole, represent a set of rules ever actually enforced in Hindostan. Much of it is an idealized representation of what the Brahmins believed the law should be. It’s in line with human nature and the particular motives of its authors that codes like Manu would claim to be extremely ancient and profess to have come directly from the Deity. According to Hindu mythology, Manu is a manifestation of the supreme God; however, the compilation that bears his name, while its exact date is difficult to pinpoint, is relatively recent in the context of Hindu legal development.

Among the chief advantages which the Twelve Tables and similar codes conferred on the societies which obtained them,011 was the protection which they afforded against the frauds of the privileged oligarchy and also against the spontaneous depravation and debasement of the national institutions. The Roman Code was merely an enunciation in words of the existing customs of the Roman people. Relatively to the progress of the Romans in civilisation, it was a remarkably early code, and it was published at a time when Roman society had barely emerged from that intellectual condition in which civil obligation and religious duty are inevitably confounded. Now a barbarous society practising a body of customs, is exposed to some especial dangers which may be absolutely fatal to its progress in civilisation. The usages which a particular community is found to have adopted in its infancy and in its primitive seats are generally those which are on the whole best suited to promote its physical and moral well-being; and, if they are retained in their integrity until new social wants have taught new practices, the upward march of society is almost certain. But unhappily there is a law of development which ever threatens to operate upon unwritten usage. The customs are of course obeyed by multitudes who are incapable of understanding the true ground of their expediency, and who are therefore left inevitably to invent superstitious reasons for their permanence. A process then commences which may be shortly described by saying that usage which is reasonable generates usage which is unreasonable. Analogy, the most valuable of instruments in the maturity of jurisprudence, is the most dangerous of snares in its infancy. Prohibitions and ordinances, originally confined, for good reasons, to a single description of acts, are made to apply to all acts of the same class, because a man menaced with the anger of the gods for doing one thing, feels a natural terror in doing any other thing which is remotely like it. After one kind of food has been interdicted for sanitary reasons, the prohibition is extended to all food resembling it, though the resemblance occasionally depends on analogies the most fanciful. So, again, a wise provision for insuring general cleanliness dictates in time long routines of ceremonial ablution; and that division into classes which at a particular crisis of social history is necessary for the maintenance of the national existence degenerates into the most disastrous and blighting of all human institutions—Caste. The fate of the Hindoo012 law is, in fact, the measure of the value of the Roman code. Ethnology shows us that the Romans and the Hindoos sprang from the same original stock, and there is indeed a striking resemblance between what appear to have been their original customs. Even now, Hindoo jurisprudence has a substratum of forethought and sound judgment, but irrational imitation has engrafted in it an immense apparatus of cruel absurdities. From these corruptions the Romans were protected by their code. It was compiled while the usage was still wholesome, and a hundred years afterwards it might have been too late. The Hindoo law has been to a great extent embodied in writing, but, ancient as in one sense are the compendia which still exist in Sanskrit, they contain ample evidence that they were drawn up after the mischief had been done. We are not of course entitled to say that if the Twelve Tables had not been published the Romans would have been condemned to a civilisation as feeble and perverted as that of the Hindoos, but thus much at least is certain, that with their code they were exempt from the very chance of so unhappy a destiny.013

Among the main benefits that the Twelve Tables and similar codes provided to the societies that adopted them,011 was the protection they offered against the fraud of the privileged elite and also against the natural degradation and decline of national institutions. The Roman Code was simply a written expression of the existing customs of the Roman people. Considering the advancement of the Romans in civilization, it was a remarkably early code, published at a time when Roman society had just begun to move past an intellectual state where civil obligations and religious duties were often confused. A primitive society practicing a set of customs faces specific dangers that can be severely detrimental to its progress in civilization. The customs that a community adopts in its early days and original locations are usually best suited to support its physical and moral welfare; if these customs are maintained until new social needs bring about new practices, the society is likely to progress. However, there is an inevitable law of development that can affect unwritten customs. Many people follow these customs without understanding the real reasons behind their usefulness, leading them to create superstitious explanations for their persistence. This sets off a process where reasonable customs give rise to unreasonable ones. Analogy, which is a crucial tool in the development of law, can be the most misleading trap in its early stages. Prohibitions and rules that were initially limited for valid reasons to specific actions become extended to all similar actions because a person fearing divine punishment for one action naturally feels apprehensive about any other similar action. When one type of food is banned for health reasons, the ban often expands to all foods resembling it, even when the resemblance may be based on the most tenuous analogies. Similarly, a sensible rule for ensuring general cleanliness evolves into long rituals of ceremonial washing, and the social divisions necessary for the survival of a nation can degenerate into the most devastating and oppressive of all human institutions—Caste. The fate of Hindu law,012 is a measure of the value of the Roman code. Ethnology indicates that Romans and Hindus share the same ancestral roots, and there is a notable similarity between what seem to be their original customs. Even today, Hindu law has a foundation of foresight and sound reasoning, but irrational mimicry has added a large number of cruel absurdities. The Romans were shielded from these corruptions by their code. It was created while customs were still healthy, and a hundred years later, it might have been too late. Hindu law has largely been written down, but while the ancient texts still exist in Sanskrit, they show clear evidence that they were composed after considerable damage had occurred. While we can't claim that without the Twelve Tables, the Romans would have faced a civilization as weak and distorted as that of the Hindus, it is certain that with their code, they were protected from the very possibility of such an unfortunate fate.013


CHAPTER II

legal assumptions

When primitive law has once been embodied in a Code, there is an end to what may be called its spontaneous development. Henceforward the changes effected in it, if effected at all, are effected deliberately and from without. It is impossible to suppose that the customs of any race or tribe remained unaltered during the whole of the long—in some instances the immense—interval between their declaration by a patriarchal monarch and their publication in writing. It would be unsafe too to affirm that no part of the alteration was effected deliberately. But from the little we know of the progress of law during this period, we are justified in assuming that set purpose had the very smallest share in producing change. Such innovations on the earliest usages as disclose themselves appear to have been dictated by feelings and modes of thought which, under our present mental conditions, we are unable to comprehend. A new era begins, however, with the Codes. Wherever, after this epoch, we trace the course of legal modification we are able to attribute it to the conscious desire of improvement, or at all events of compassing objects other than those which were aimed at in the primitive times.

When primitive law has been established in a Code, its natural evolution comes to an end. From that point on, any changes made to it, if they do happen, are done intentionally and from outside influences. It's hard to believe that the customs of any race or tribe remained unchanged throughout the long—often very long—period between their announcement by a patriarchal ruler and their written documentation. It would also be risky to claim that no part of the changes was made intentionally. However, based on what we know about the development of law during this time, we can reasonably assume that purposeful intent played a minimal role in causing change. The innovations that emerged from the earliest practices seem to have been influenced by feelings and ways of thinking that we cannot fully understand today. A new era begins with the Codes. From this point on, when we track legal changes, we can link them to a conscious desire for improvement, or at least to goals that differ from those pursued in primitive times.

It may seem at first sight that no general propositions worth trusting can be elicited from the history of legal systems subsequent to the codes. The field is too vast. We cannot be sure that we have included a sufficient number of phenomena in our observations, or that we accurately understand those which we have observed. But the undertaking will be seen to be more feasible, if we consider that after the epoch of codes the distinction between stationary and progressive societies begins to make itself felt. It is only with the progressive that we are concerned, and nothing is more remarkable than their extreme fewness. In spite of overwhelming evidence, it is most difficult for a citizen of western Europe to bring thoroughly home to himself the truth that the civilisation which surrounds him is a rare exception in the014 history of the world. The tone of thought common among us, all our hopes, fears, and speculations, would be materially affected, if we had vividly before us the relation of the progressive races to the totality of human life. It is indisputable that much the greatest part of mankind has never shown a particle of desire that its civil institutions should be improved since the moment when external completeness was first given to them by their embodiment in some permanent record. One set of usages has occasionally been violently overthrown and superseded by another; here and there a primitive code, pretending to a supernatural origin, has been greatly extended, and distorted into the most surprising forms, by the perversity of sacerdotal commentators; but, except in a small section of the world, there has been nothing like the gradual amelioration of a legal system. There has been material civilisation, but, instead of the civilisation expanding the law, the law has limited the civilisation. The study of races in their primitive condition affords us some clue to the point at which the development of certain societies has stopped. We can see that Brahminical India has not passed beyond a stage which occurs in the history of all the families of mankind, the stage at which a rule of law is not yet discriminated from a rule of religion. The members of such a society consider that the transgression of a religious ordinance should be punished by civil penalties, and that the violation of a civil duty exposes the delinquent to divine correction. In China this point has been passed, but progress seems to have been there arrested, because the civil laws are coextensive with all the ideas of which the race is capable. The difference between the stationary and progressive societies is, however, one of the great secrets which inquiry has yet to penetrate. Among partial explanations of it I venture to place the considerations urged at the end of the last chapter. It may further be remarked that no one is likely to succeed in the investigation who does not clearly realise that the stationary condition of the human race is the rule, the progressive the exception. And another indispensable condition of success is an accurate knowledge of Roman law in all its principal stages. The Roman jurisprudence has the longest known history of any set of human institutions. The character of all the changes which it underwent is tolerably well ascertained. From its commencement to its close, it was progressively015 modified for the better, or for what the authors of the modification conceived to be the better, and the course of improvement was continued through periods at which all the rest of human thought and action materially slackened its pace, and repeatedly threatened to settle down into stagnation.

At first glance, it may seem that we can't draw any reliable general conclusions from the history of legal systems after the codifications. The topic is just too broad. We can't be sure that we've observed enough instances or that we fully understand those we've looked at. However, it becomes clearer if we recognize that after the era of codes, the difference between static and dynamic societies starts to become apparent. Our main focus is on the dynamic societies, which are strikingly few in number. Despite overwhelming evidence, it's incredibly hard for someone in Western Europe to fully grasp that the civilization they live in is a rare exception in the history of the world. Our common way of thinking—our hopes, fears, and speculations—would be profoundly affected if we were more aware of how progressive societies relate to humanity as a whole. It's undeniable that the vast majority of people have never shown any desire to improve their civil institutions since they were first established in some permanent form. One set of customs has sometimes been violently replaced by another; occasionally, an ancient code claiming divine origin has been expanded and twisted into bizarre forms by the distortions of religious commentators. But aside from a small part of the world, there’s been nothing like the gradual improvement of a legal system. There may have been material progress, but instead of the advancement of civilization leading to legal growth, the law has constrained civilization. Studying races in their primitive stages gives us some insight into where certain societies have stagnated. For instance, we see that Brahminical India hasn’t progressed beyond a stage found in all human societies, where the distinction between secular law and religious law hasn't yet emerged. In such societies, people believe that breaking a religious law should be punished with civil penalties, and violating a civil duty exposes someone to divine punishment. China has moved past this stage, but progress seems to have stalled there since the civil laws cover all the ideas that the society can comprehend. However, the difference between static and dynamic societies remains one of the significant mysteries that research has yet to solve. Among the partial explanations, I would include the points made at the end of the previous chapter. It's also important to note that those investigating this will likely fail if they don't recognize that the stationary condition of humanity is the norm, while progress is the exception. Additionally, a thorough understanding of Roman law in its main stages is crucial for success. Roman jurisprudence has the longest documented history of any human institution. The nature of all the changes it underwent is fairly well understood. From beginning to end, it was gradually improved—or at least modified for what its authors thought would be improvements—even during periods when human thought and action slowed down significantly and threatened to fall into stagnation.

I confine myself in what follows to the progressive societies. With respect to them it may be laid down that social necessities and social opinion are always more or less in advance of Law. We may come indefinitely near to the closing of the gap between them, but it has a perpetual tendency to reopen. Law is stable; the societies we are speaking of are progressive. The greater or less happiness of a people depends on the degree of promptitude with which the gulf is narrowed.

I will focus in what follows on progressive societies. For these societies, it's clear that social needs and public opinion are always somewhat ahead of the law. We can get closer to closing the gap between them, but it always has a tendency to reopen. Law is stable; the societies we're discussing are progressive. The overall happiness of a community depends on how quickly this gap is narrowed.

A general proposition of some value may be advanced with respect to the agencies by which Law is brought into harmony with society. These instrumentalities seem to me to be three in number, Legal Fictions, Equity, and Legislation. Their historical order is that in which I have placed them. Sometimes two of them will be seen operating together, and there are legal systems which have escaped the influence of one or other of them. But I know of no instance in which the order of their appearance has been changed or inverted. The early history of one of them, Equity, is universally obscure, and hence it may be thought by some that certain isolated statutes, reformatory of the civil law, are older than any equitable jurisdiction. My own belief is that remedial Equity is everywhere older than remedial Legislation; but, should this be not strictly true, it would only be necessary to limit the proposition respecting their order of sequence to the periods at which they exercise a sustained and substantial influence in transforming the original law.

A general idea of some importance can be proposed regarding the ways in which law aligns with society. I believe there are three main tools for this: Legal Fictions, Equity, and Legislation. The historical order in which I've presented them reflects their development. Sometimes, two of these tools will work together, and there are legal systems that have avoided the impact of one or the other. However, I don't know of any cases where their sequence has been changed or reversed. The early history of one of these, Equity, is generally unclear, leading some to think that certain standalone statutes aimed at reforming civil law are older than any equitable jurisdiction. I personally believe that remedial Equity has always been older than remedial Legislation; but if that’s not strictly accurate, it would only require us to adjust the statement about their order of appearance to the times when they exert a consistent and significant influence on reshaping the original law.

I employ the word "fiction" in a sense considerably wider than that in which English lawyers are accustomed to use it, and with a meaning much more extensive than that which belonged to the Roman "fictiones." Fictio, in old Roman law, is properly a term of pleading, and signifies a false averment on the part of the plaintiff which the defendant was not allowed to traverse; such, for example, as an averment that the plaintiff was a Roman citizen, when in truth he was a foreigner. The object of these "fictiones" was, of course, to give jurisdiction, and they therefore strongly016 resembled the allegations in the writs of the English Queen's Bench, and Exchequer, by which those Courts contrived to usurp the jurisdiction of the Common Pleas:—the allegation that the defendant was in custody of the king's marshal, or that the plaintiff was the king's debtor, and could not pay his debt by reason of the defendant's default. But I now employ the expression "Legal Fiction" to signify any assumption which conceals, or affects to conceal, the fact that a rule of law has undergone alteration, its letter remaining unchanged, its operation being modified. The words, therefore, include the instances of fictions which I have cited from the English and Roman law, but they embrace much more, for I should speak both of the English Case-law and of the Roman Responsa Prudentum as resting on fictions. Both these examples will be examined presently. The fact is in both cases that the law has been wholly changed; the fiction is that it remains what it always was. It is not difficult to understand why fictions in all their forms are particularly congenial to the infancy of society. They satisfy the desire for improvement, which is not quite wanting, at the same time that they do not offend the superstitious disrelish for change which is always present. At a particular stage of social progress they are invaluable expedients for overcoming the rigidity of law, and, indeed, without one of them, the Fiction of Adoption which permits the family tie to be artificially created, it is difficult to understand how society would ever have escaped from its swaddling clothes, and taken its first steps towards civilisation. We must, therefore, not suffer ourselves to be affected by the ridicule which Bentham pours on legal fictions wherever he meets them. To revile them as merely fraudulent is to betray ignorance of their peculiar office in the historical development of law. But at the same time it would be equally foolish to agree with those theorists, who, discerning that fictions have had their uses, argue that they ought to be stereotyped in our system. They have had their day, but it has long since gone by. It is unworthy of us to effect an admittedly beneficial object by so rude a device as a legal fiction. I cannot admit any anomaly to be innocent, which makes the law either more difficult to understand or harder to arrange in harmonious order. Now legal fictions are the greatest of obstacles to symmetrical classification. The rule of law remains sticking in the system, but it017 is a mere shell. It has been long ago undermined, and a new rule hides itself under its cover. Hence there is at once a difficulty in knowing whether the rule which is actually operative should be classed in its true or in its apparent place, and minds of different casts will differ as to the branch of the alternative which ought to be selected. If the English law is ever to assume an orderly distribution, it will be necessary to prune away the legal fictions which, in spite of some recent legislative improvements, are still abundant in it.

I use the term "fiction" in a much broader sense than what English lawyers typically mean, and with a meaning that goes beyond the Roman "fictiones." In ancient Roman law, fictio is primarily a term used in legal pleading, referring to a false statement made by the plaintiff that the defendant wasn't allowed to dispute; for instance, claiming that the plaintiff was a Roman citizen when actually, he was a foreigner. The purpose of these "fictiones" was to establish jurisdiction, and they closely resemble the claims made in the writs of the English Queen's Bench and Exchequer, by which those courts managed to take over the jurisdiction of the Common Pleas: for example, claiming that the defendant was in the custody of the king's marshal, or that the plaintiff was the king's debtor and couldn't pay his debt due to the defendant's failure. However, when I use the term "Legal Fiction," I mean any assumption that hides, or pretends to hide, the fact that a legal rule has changed, even though its wording remains the same, while its application is modified. Therefore, the term covers the examples of fictions I've mentioned from English and Roman law, but it encompasses much more because I would also consider both English case law and Roman Responsa Prudentum as being based on fictions. Both examples will be discussed shortly. The fact in both instances is that the law has completely changed; the fiction is that it still appears to be the same. It's easy to see why fictions in all forms are appealing during the early stages of society. They satisfy the desire for progress without provoking the superstitious resistance to change that is always present. At a certain stage of social advancement, they are essential tools for overcoming the rigidity of the law. In fact, without the Fiction of Adoption, which allows the family bond to be artificially created, it's hard to see how society would have broken free from its constraints and taken its initial steps toward civilization. Therefore, we shouldn't allow ourselves to be influenced by the ridicule that Bentham heaps on legal fictions wherever he encounters them. To denounce them as simply fraudulent reveals a lack of understanding of their unique role in the historical development of law. At the same time, it would be equally unwise to agree with those theorists who, recognizing that fictions have had their purposes, argue that they should be preserved in our system. They have served their time, but that time has passed. It does a disservice to us to achieve an undeniably beneficial goal through such a crude device as a legal fiction. I cannot accept any anomaly as harmless that makes the law either harder to understand or more difficult to organize coherently. Legal fictions are major obstacles to orderly classification. The rule of law remains stuck in the system, but it’s just a shell. It has long been undermined, and a new rule lies hidden beneath it. Therefore, there’s an immediate problem in determining whether the rule that is actually effective should be classified in its true or apparent place, and people of different perspectives will disagree on which option should be chosen. If English law is ever going to achieve a structured distribution, it will be necessary to remove the legal fictions that, despite some recent legislative improvements, are still quite prevalent.

The next instrumentality by which the adaptation of law to social wants is carried on I call Equity, meaning by that word any body of rules existing by the side of the original civil law, founded on distinct principles and claiming incidentally to supersede the civil law in virtue of a superior sanctity inherent in those principles. The Equity whether of the Roman Prætors or of the English Chancellors, differs from the Fictions which in each case preceded it, in that the interference with law is open and avowed. On the other hand, it differs from Legislation, the agent of legal improvement which comes after it, in that its claim to authority is grounded, not on the prerogative of any external person or body, not even on that of the magistrate who enunciates it, but on the special nature of its principles, to which it is alleged that all law ought to conform. The very conception of a set of principles, invested with a higher sacredness than those of the original law and demanding application independently of the consent of any external body, belongs to a much more advanced stage of thought than that to which legal fictions originally suggested themselves.

The next way that law is adapted to meet social needs is what I call Equity. By this term, I mean a set of rules that exists alongside the original civil law, based on different principles and claiming to replace the civil law due to a greater importance inherent in those principles. The Equity, whether from Roman Prætors or English Chancellors, is different from the Fictions that came before it because it openly acknowledges its interference with the law. On the other hand, it differs from Legislation, which is an agent of legal improvement that comes afterward, because its claim to authority is not based on the power of any outside person or group, even the magistrate who states it, but on the unique nature of its principles, which it claims all law should follow. The idea of a set of principles that have greater sacredness than those of the original law and require application without the consent of any outside body represents a much more advanced level of thinking than that which gave rise to legal fictions initially.

Legislation, the enactments of a legislature which, whether it take the form of an autocratic prince or of a parliamentary assembly, is the assumed organ of the entire society, is the last of the ameliorating instrumentalities. It differs from Legal Fictions just as Equity differs from them, and it is also distinguished from Equity, as deriving its authority from an external body or person. Its obligatory force is independent of its principles. The legislature, whatever be the actual restraints imposed on it by public opinion, is in theory empowered to impose what obligations it pleases on the members of the community. There is nothing to prevent its legislating in the wantonness of caprice. Legislation may be dictated by equity, if that last word be used to indicate some standard018 of right and wrong to which its enactments happen to be adjusted; but then these enactments are indebted for their binding force to the authority of the legislature and not to that of the principles on which the legislature acted; and thus they differ from rules of Equity, in the technical sense of the word, which pretend to a paramount sacredness entitling them at once to the recognition of the courts even without the concurrence of prince or parliamentary assembly. It is the more necessary to note these differences, because a student of Bentham would be apt to confound Fictions, Equity, and Statute law under the single head of legislation. They all, he would say, involve law-making; they differ only in respect of the machinery by which the new law is produced. That is perfectly true, and we must never forget it; but it furnishes no reason why we should deprive ourselves of so convenient a term as Legislation in the special sense. Legislation and Equity are disjoined in the popular mind and in the minds of most lawyers; and it will never do to neglect the distinction between them, however conventional, when important practical consequences follow from it.

Legislation, the laws created by a governing body, whether that’s a ruling monarch or a parliamentary group, is considered the representative of society as a whole. It serves as the final method of improvement. It’s different from Legal Fictions in the same way that Equity differs from them, and it’s also distinct from Equity, as it derives its authority from an outside entity or individual. The force of its obligations stands apart from its underlying principles. The legislature, regardless of the limits that public opinion may impose on it, theoretically has the power to set whatever obligations it chooses for the community members. There’s nothing stopping it from making laws based purely on whim. Legislation can be influenced by equity, if we use that term to refer to a standard of right and wrong to which its laws conform; however, these laws draw their binding force from the authority of the legislature rather than from the principles guiding its decisions. Therefore, they differ from rules of Equity, which claim a superior sacredness that grants them automatic recognition by the courts, even without the agreement of a monarch or parliamentary body. It’s important to note these differences because a student of Bentham might mistakenly group Fictions, Equity, and Statute law under the single category of legislation. He might argue that they all involve law-making; they only differ in the process by which new laws are created. This is true, and we should always keep it in mind; but it doesn’t justify losing the useful term Legislation in its specific sense. Legislation and Equity are viewed as separate by the general public and most legal professionals, and ignoring the distinction between them, no matter how traditional, is unwise when significant practical consequences arise from it.

It would be easy to select from almost any regularly developed body of rules examples of legal fictions, which at once betray their true character to the modern observer. In the two instances which I proceed to consider, the nature of the expedient employed is not so readily detected. The first authors of these fictions did not perhaps intend to innovate, certainly did not wish to be suspected of innovating. There are, moreover, and always have been, persons who refuse to see any fiction in the process, and conventional language bears out their refusal. No examples, therefore, can be better calculated to illustrate the wide diffusion of legal fictions, and the efficiency with which they perform their two-fold office of transforming a system of laws and of concealing the transformation.

It’s easy to find examples of legal fictions in almost any established set of rules, which reveal their true nature to today’s reader. In the two cases I will discuss, the method used isn’t as easily recognized. The original creators of these fictions likely didn’t intend to create something new and certainly didn’t want to be seen as doing so. Additionally, there have always been people who refuse to see any fiction in the process, and the traditional language supports their stance. Therefore, there are no better examples to show the widespread presence of legal fictions and how effectively they serve their dual purpose of changing a legal system while hiding that change.

We in England are well accustomed to the extension, modification, and improvement of law by a machinery which, in theory, is incapable of altering one jot or one line of existing jurisprudence. The process by which this virtual legislation is effected is not so much insensible as unacknowledged. With respect to that great portion of our legal system which is enshrined in cases and recorded in law reports, we habitually019 employ a double language and entertain, as it would appear, a double and inconsistent set of ideas. When a group of facts come before an English Court for adjudication, the whole course of the discussion between the judge and the advocate assumes that no question is, or can be, raised which will call for the application of any principles but old ones, or any distinctions but such as have long since been allowed. It is taken absolutely for granted that there is somewhere a rule of known law which will cover the facts of the dispute now litigated, and that, if such a rule be not discovered, it is only that the necessary patience, knowledge, or acumen is not forthcoming to detect it. Yet the moment the judgment has been rendered and reported, we slide unconsciously or unavowedly into a new language and a new train of thought. We now admit that the new decision has modified the law. The rules applicable have, to use the very inaccurate expression sometimes employed, become more elastic. In fact they have been changed. A clear addition has been made to the precedents, and the canon of law elicited by comparing the precedents is not the same with that which would have been obtained if the series of cases had been curtailed by a single example. The fact that the old rule has been repealed, and that a new one has replaced it, eludes us, because we are not in the habit of throwing into precise language the legal formulas which we derive from the precedents, so that a change in their tenor is not easily detected unless it is violent and glaring. I shall not now pause to consider at length the causes which have led English lawyers to acquiesce in these curious anomalies. Probably it will be found that originally it was the received doctrine that somewhere, in nubibus or in gremio magistratuum, there existed a complete, coherent, symmetrical body of English law, of an amplitude sufficient to furnish principles which would apply to any conceivable combination of circumstances. The theory was at first much more thoroughly believed in than it is now, and indeed it may have had a better foundation. The judges of the thirteenth century may have really had at their command a mine of law unrevealed to the bar and to the lay-public, for there is some reason for suspecting that in secret they borrowed freely, though not always wisely, from current compendia of the Roman and Canon laws. But that storehouse was closed so soon as the points decided at Westminster Hall became020 numerous enough to supply a basis for a substantive system of jurisprudence; and now for centuries English practitioners have so expressed themselves as to convey the paradoxical proposition that, except by Equity and Statute law, nothing has been added to the basis since it was first constituted. We do not admit that our tribunals legislate; we imply that they have never legislated; and yet we maintain that the rules of the English common law, with some assistance from the Court of Chancery and from Parliament, are coextensive with the complicated interests of modern society.

We in England are quite familiar with the way laws are expanded, changed, and improved by a system that, in theory, shouldn't be able to alter any part of existing law. The way this informal kind of legislation happens isn’t so much unnoticed as it is unrecognized. Regarding the large part of our legal system that's based on cases and documented in law reports, we tend to use a sort of double language and seem to carry a contradictory set of beliefs. When facts are presented to an English Court for a decision, the whole discussion between the judge and the lawyer assumes that no new questions will arise that would require applying anything but established principles or distinctions that have been accepted for a long time. It's taken for granted that there exists a known rule of law that applies to the facts in the current case, and if that rule can't be found, it’s simply seen as a lack of patience, knowledge, or insight to uncover it. However, once the judgment has been made and reported, we unconsciously or quietly shift into a new way of speaking and thinking. We now acknowledge that the new ruling has indeed modified the law. The rules that apply have, using a somewhat imprecise term, become more flexible. In reality, they have changed. There’s been a clear addition to the precedents, and the legal principles derived from comparing those precedents are not the same as they would have been if just one case had sufficed. We often overlook that the old rule has been replaced by a new one because we don't typically articulate the legal principles we get from precedents clearly, making it hard to notice a change unless it's dramatic and obvious. I won’t dive into the reasons that have led English lawyers to accept these strange inconsistencies at length right now. It likely stems from the once-held belief that there was, somewhere, either in the clouds or within the courts, a complete and coherent body of English law, ample enough to provide principles for every possible situation. This theory was believed much more firmly in the past than it is now, and it may have had more foundation. The judges of the thirteenth century might have actually had access to a wealth of law that was unknown to lawyers and the general public, since it seems they borrowed freely, though not always wisely, from existing works on Roman and Canon law in secret. But that source was closed off as soon as the decisions made at Westminster Hall became numerous enough to form a substantial legal system; for centuries now, English practitioners have expressed themselves in a way that suggests the paradoxical idea that, aside from Equity and Statute law, nothing has been added to that foundation since it was first established. We don’t acknowledge that our courts create laws; we suggest they have never done so; yet we argue that the rules of English common law, with some help from the Court of Chancery and Parliament, adequately cover the complex interests of modern society.

A body of law bearing a very close and very instructive resemblance to our case-law in those particulars which I have noticed, was known to the Romans under the name of the Responsa Prudentum, the "answers of the learned in the law." The form of these Responses varied a good deal at different periods of the Roman jurisprudence, but throughout its whole course they consisted of explanatory glosses on authoritative written documents, and at first they were exclusively collections of opinions interpretative of the Twelve Tables. As with us, all legal language adjusted itself to the assumption that the text of the old Code remained unchanged. There was the express rule. It overrode all glosses and comments, and no one openly admitted that any interpretation of it, however eminent the interpreter, was safe from revision on appeal to the venerable texts. Yet in point of fact, Books of Responses bearing the names of leading jurisconsults obtained an authority at least equal to that of our reported cases, and constantly modified, extended, limited or practically overruled the provisions of the Decemviral law. The authors of the new jurisprudence during the whole progress of its formation professed the most sedulous respect for the letter of the Code. They were merely explaining it, deciphering it, bringing out its full meaning; but then, in the result, by piecing texts together, by adjusting the law to states of fact which actually presented themselves and by speculating on its possible application to others which might occur, by introducing principles of interpretation derived from the exegesis of other written documents which fell under their observation, they educed a vast variety of canons which had never been dreamed of by the compilers of the Twelve Tables and which were in truth rarely or never to be found there. All these treatises of the jurisconsults claimed respect021 on the ground of their assumed conformity with the Code, but their comparative authority depended on the reputation of the particular jurisconsults who gave them to the world. Any name of universally acknowledged greatness clothed a Book of Responses with a binding force hardly less than that which belonged to enactments of the legislature; and such a book in its turn constituted a new foundation on which a further body of jurisprudence might rest. The Responses of the early lawyers were not however published, in the modern sense, by their author. They were recorded and edited by his pupils, and were not therefore in all probability arranged according to any scheme of classification. The part of the students in these publications must be carefully noted, because the service they rendered to their teacher seems to have been generally repaid by his sedulous attention to the pupils' education. The educational treatises called Institutes or Commentaries, which are a later fruit of the duty then recognised, are among the most remarkable features of the Roman system. It was apparently in these Institutional works, and not in the books intended for trained lawyers, that the jurisconsults gave to the public their classifications and their proposals for modifying and improving the technical phraseology.

A body of law that closely resembles our case law in the aspects I've mentioned was known to the Romans as the Responsa Prudentum, or "answers of the learned in the law." The format of these Responses varied quite a bit at different times in Roman law, but throughout its history, they consisted of explanatory notes on authoritative written documents. Initially, they were solely collections of opinions interpreting the Twelve Tables. Similar to us, all legal language adapted to the belief that the text of the old Code remained unchanged. There was a clear rule that took precedence over all notes and comments, and no one openly acknowledged that any interpretation, no matter how respected the interpreter, was immune to review against the respected texts. However, in reality, Books of Responses named after leading legal experts gained authority equal to that of our reported cases, and regularly modified, extended, limited, or effectively overruled the provisions of the Decemviral law. The creators of new legal principles, throughout its development, claimed to show great respect for the letter of the Code. They were simply interpreting it, clarifying it, and revealing its full meaning, but ultimately, by piecing together texts, adapting the law to real situations, and speculating about how it might apply in future scenarios, while introducing interpretative principles from other texts they encountered, they produced a wide array of rules that had never been imagined by the creators of the Twelve Tables and which were rarely found there. All these writings of the legal experts demanded respect on the basis of their supposed alignment with the Code, yet their relative authority depended on the prestige of the specific legal experts who published them. Any name of universally recognized greatness granted a Book of Responses a level of authority nearly as binding as that of laws enacted by the legislature, and such a book, in turn, became a new foundation for additional legal principles. However, the Responses of the early lawyers were not published in the modern sense by their authors. They were recorded and edited by their students, and therefore were likely not organized according to any specific classification scheme. The role of the students in these publications is significant because the support they provided their teacher seems to have been generally reciprocated by his dedicated attention to their education. The educational texts known as Institutes or Commentaries, which were a later outcome of this recognized duty, are among the most notable features of the Roman system. It seems that in these Institutional works, not in the texts aimed at trained lawyers, the legal experts shared their classifications and suggestions for modifying and improving technical language.

In comparing the Roman Responsa Prudentum with their nearest English counterpart, it must be carefully borne in mind that the authority by which this part of the Roman jurisprudence was expounded was not the bench, but the bar. The decision of a Roman tribunal, though conclusive in the particular case, had no ulterior authority except such as was given by the professional repute of the magistrate who happened to be in office for the time. Properly speaking, there was no institution at Rome during the republic analogous to the English Bench, the Chambers of Imperial Germany, or the Parliaments of Monarchical France. There were magistrates indeed, invested with momentous judicial functions in their several departments, but the tenure of the magistracies was but for a single year, so that they are much less aptly compared to a permanent judicature than to a cycle of offices briskly circulating among the leaders of the bar. Much might be said on the origin of a condition of things which looks to us like a startling anomaly, but which was in fact much more congenial than our own system to the spirit022 of ancient societies, tending, as they always did, to split into distinct orders which, however exclusive themselves, tolerated no professional hierarchy above them.

When comparing the Roman Responsa Prudentum with their closest English equivalent, it's important to remember that the authority behind this part of Roman law came from the bar, not the bench. A Roman tribunal's decision was final in the specific case, but its authority didn't extend further than the professional reputation of the magistrate currently in office. Essentially, there was no equivalent in Rome during the republic to the English Bench, the Chambers of Imperial Germany, or the Parliaments of Monarchical France. There were indeed magistrates with significant judicial powers in their respective areas, but their terms lasted only a year, making them more similar to a rotating set of offices among the leaders of the bar rather than a permanent judiciary. There’s much to discuss about the origins of a system that might seem anomalous to us, but which actually aligned more closely with the spirit of ancient societies, which tended to divide into distinct orders that, while exclusive themselves, did not accept any professional hierarchy above them.

It is remarkable that this system did not produce certain effects which might on the whole have been expected from it. It did not, for example, popularise the Roman law—it did not, as in some of the Greek republics, lessen the effort of intellect required for the mastery of the science, although its diffusion and authoritative exposition were opposed by no artificial barriers. On the contrary, if it had not been for the operation of a separate set of causes, there were strong probabilities that the Roman jurisprudence would have become as minute, technical, and difficult as any system which has since prevailed. Again, a consequence which might still more naturally have been looked for, does not appear at any time to have exhibited itself. The jurisconsults, until the liberties of Rome were overthrown, formed a class which was quite undefined and must have fluctuated greatly in numbers; nevertheless, there does not seem to have existed a doubt as to the particular individuals whose opinion, in their generation, was conclusive on the cases submitted to them. The vivid pictures of a leading jurisconsult's daily practice which abound in Latin literature—the clients from the country flocking to his antechamber in the early morning, and the students standing round with their note-books to record the great lawyer's replies—are seldom or never identified at any given period with more than one or two conspicuous names. Owing too to the direct contact of the client and the advocate, the Roman people itself seems to have been always alive to the rise and fall of professional reputation, and there is abundance of proof, more particularly in the well-known oration of Cicero, Pro Muræna, that the reverence of the commons for forensic success was apt to be excessive rather than deficient.

It’s interesting that this system didn’t produce certain effects that might have been expected overall. For instance, it didn’t popularize Roman law—it didn’t, like in some of the Greek republics, reduce the intellectual effort needed to master the subject, even though there were no artificial barriers to its spread and official explanation. On the contrary, if it hadn't been for a different set of factors, it’s likely that Roman jurisprudence would have become as detailed, technical, and complicated as any legal system that came after it. Additionally, a consequence that seems even more predictable never really appeared. Until Rome lost its liberties, jurists formed a class that was quite undefined and probably varied a lot in size; however, there seems to have been no doubt about the specific individuals whose opinions were decisive on the cases brought to them during that time. The vivid descriptions of a leading jurist’s daily work that are common in Latin literature—the clients from the countryside arriving at his office early in the morning, and students gathering around with their notebooks to jot down the great lawyer’s answers—are rarely or never linked to more than one or two notable names at any specific time. Due to the direct interaction between clients and advocates, the Roman people also seemed to always be aware of the rise and fall of professional reputations, and there’s plenty of evidence, particularly in Cicero's famous speech, Pro Muræna, that the common people’s respect for legal success tended to be excessive rather than lacking.

We cannot doubt that the peculiarities which have been noted in the instrumentality by which the development of the Roman law was first effected, were the source of its characteristic excellence, its early wealth in principles. The growth and exuberance of principle was fostered, in part, by the competition among the expositors of the law, an influence wholly unknown where there exists a Bench, the depositaries intrusted by king or commonwealth with the023 prerogative of justice. But the chief agency, no doubt, was the uncontrolled multiplication of cases for legal decision. The state of facts which caused genuine perplexity to a country client was not a whit more entitled to form the basis of the jurisconsult's Response, or legal decision, than a set of hypothetical circumstances propounded by an ingenious pupil. All combinations of fact were on precisely the same footing, whether they were real or imaginary. It was nothing to the jurisconsult that his opinion was overruled for the moment by the magistrate who adjudicated on his client's case, unless that magistrate happened to rank above him in legal knowledge or the esteem of his profession. I do not, indeed, mean it to be inferred that he would wholly omit to consider his client's advantage, for the client was in earlier times the great lawyer's constituent and at a later period his paymaster, but the main road to the rewards of ambition lay through the good opinion of his order, and it is obvious that under such a system as I have been describing this was much more likely to be secured by viewing each case as an illustration of a great principle, or an exemplification of a broad rule, than by merely shaping it for an insulated forensic triumph. A still more powerful influence must have been exercised by the want of any distinct check on the suggestion or invention of possible questions. Where the data can be multiplied at pleasure, the facilities for evolving a general rule are immensely increased. As the law is administered among ourselves, the judge cannot travel out of the sets of facts exhibited before him or before his predecessors. Accordingly each group of circumstances which is adjudicated upon receives, to employ a Gallicism, a sort of consecration. It acquires certain qualities which distinguish it from every other case genuine or hypothetical. But at Rome, as I have attempted to explain, there was nothing resembling a Bench or Chamber of judges; and therefore no combination of facts possessed any particular value more than another. When a difficulty came for opinion before the jurisconsult, there was nothing to prevent a person endowed with a nice perception of analogy from at once proceeding to adduce and consider an entire class of supposed questions with which a particular feature connected it. Whatever were the practical advice given to the client, the responsum treasured up in the notebooks of listening pupils would doubtless contemplate the024 circumstances as governed by a great principle, or included in a sweeping rule. Nothing like this has ever been possible among ourselves, and it should be acknowledged that in many criticisms passed on the English law the manner in which it has been enunciated seems to have been lost sight of. The hesitation of our courts in declaring principles may be much more reasonably attributed to the comparative scantiness of our precedents, voluminous as they appear to him who is acquainted with no other system, than to the temper of our judges. It is true that in the wealth of legal principle we are considerably poorer than several modern European nations, But they, it must be remembered, took the Roman jurisprudence for the foundation of their civil institutions. They built the débris of the Roman law into their walls; but in the materials, and workmanship of the residue there is not much which distinguishes it favourably from the structure erected by the English judicature.

We can’t deny that the unique features of how Roman law initially developed contributed significantly to its distinct quality and early richness in principles. The growth and richness of these principles were partly fueled by competition among legal scholars, an influence that’s completely absent in systems where judges are appointed by a king or state to uphold justice. However, the key factor was undoubtedly the unrestricted increase in cases requiring legal decisions. The confusing situations that troubled a common client were just as valid for the legal expert’s advice or ruling as a set of hypothetical scenarios posed by a clever student. All factual combinations were considered equally valid, whether actual or imagined. It didn’t matter to the legal expert if a judge overruled his opinion in a case, unless that judge was deemed superior in legal knowledge or held greater respect in the profession. I certainly don’t mean to suggest that he would disregard his client’s interests entirely, as clients were once the major source of business for top lawyers, and later, their employers. Nonetheless, the primary path to career advancement lay in the approval of his peers. It’s clear that within the system I described, a case was more likely to be viewed as a reflection of a significant principle or a broad rule rather than just a chance for individual legal victory. An even stronger influence was the lack of any clear limitation on the proposed or invented legal questions. When data can be endlessly generated, the possibilities for developing a general rule increase tremendously. In our legal system, a judge cannot consider facts outside those presented to him or his predecessors. Consequently, each set of circumstances reviewed gains a sort of unique status. It attains certain qualities that set it apart from every other real or hypothetical case. However, in Rome, as I have tried to explain, there was nothing like a structured court or panel of judges; therefore, no set of facts held any more specific value than another. When a question arose for a legal expert’s opinion, there was nothing stopping someone with a keen sense of analogy from immediately bringing up and examining an entire category of hypothetical questions related to a specific aspect. Whatever practical advice was given to the client, the responsum recorded in the notebooks of attentive students would surely consider the details as governed by a broad principle or included under an overarching rule. Nothing like this has ever been possible in our legal system, and it should be acknowledged that many criticisms aimed at English law have overlooked how it has been articulated. The reluctance of our courts to declare principles may be more reasonably attributed to the relatively limited number of precedents, even if they seem plentiful to someone unfamiliar with other systems, than to the attitudes of our judges. It’s true that we are considerably less rich in legal principles compared to several modern European nations. However, it’s important to remember that they based their civil institutions on Roman law. They incorporated the remnants of Roman law into their frameworks, but the quality of the materials and craftsmanship in the final product does not significantly differ favorably from what the English judiciary has built.

The period of Roman freedom was the period during which the stamp of a distinctive character was impressed on the Roman jurisprudence; and through all the earlier part of it, it was by the Responses of the jurisconsults that the development of the law was mainly carried on. But as we approach the fall of the republic there are signs that the Responses are assuming a form which must have been fatal to their farther expansion. They are becoming systematised and reduced into compendia. Q. Mucius Scævola, the Pontifex, is said to have published a manual of the entire Civil Law, and there are traces in the writings of Cicero of growing disrelish for the old methods, as compared with the more active instruments of legal innovation. Other agencies had in fact by this time been brought to bear on the law. The Edict, or annual proclamation of the Prætor, had risen into credit as the principal engine of law reform, and L. Cornelius Sylla, by causing to be enacted the great group of statutes called the Leges Corneliæ, had shown what rapid and speedy improvements can be effected by direct legislation. The final blow to the Responses was dealt by Augustus, who limited to a few leading jurisconsults the right of giving binding opinions on cases submitted to them, a change which, though it brings us nearer the ideas of the modern world, must obviously have altered fundamentally the characteristics of the legal profession and the nature of its influence on Roman law. At a later period025 another school of jurisconsults arose, the great lights of jurisprudence for all time. But Ulpian and Paulus, Gaius and Papinian, were not authors of Responses. Their works were regular treatises on particular departments of the law, more especially on the Prætor's Edict.

The time of Roman freedom was when a unique character was established in Roman law; throughout the earlier part of this time, the development of the law was largely driven by the Responses of legal experts. However, as we near the collapse of the republic, there are indications that these Responses are taking on a form that could hinder their further development. They are becoming organized and condensed into summaries. Q. Mucius Scævola, the Pontifex, reportedly published a manual covering the entire Civil Law, and in Cicero's writings, there are signs of a growing dissatisfaction with traditional methods compared to the more dynamic approaches to legal reform. By this point, other influences were also affecting the law. The Edict, or yearly announcement from the Prætor, had gained recognition as the main vehicle for legal reform, and L. Cornelius Sylla demonstrated how fast and effective improvements could be made through direct legislation with the enactment of the group of laws known as the Leges Corneliæ. The final blow to the Responses came from Augustus, who restricted the right to give binding opinions on cases to a few leading legal experts. This change, while bringing us closer to modern concepts, undoubtedly transformed the nature of the legal profession and its impact on Roman law. Later on, another group of legal experts emerged, becoming pivotal figures in the field of jurisprudence for all time. However, Ulpian, Paulus, Gaius, and Papinian were not authors of Responses; instead, their works were formal treatises focused on specific areas of the law, particularly on the Prætor's Edict.

The Equity of the Romans and the Prætorian Edict by which it was worked into their system, will be considered in the next chapter. Of the Statute Law it is only necessary to say that it was scanty during the republic, but became very voluminous under the empire. In the youth and infancy of a nation it is a rare thing for the legislature to be called into action for the general reform of private law. The cry of the people is not for change in the laws, which are usually valued above their real worth, but solely for their pure, complete, and easy administration; and recourse to the legislative body is generally directed to the removal of some great abuse, or the decision of some incurable quarrel between classes and dynasties. There seems in the minds of the Romans to have been some association between the enactment of a large body of statutes and the settlement of society after a great civil commotion. Sylla signalised his reconstitution of the republic by the Leges Corneliæ; Julius Cæsar contemplated vast additions to the Statute Law; Augustus caused to be passed the all-important group of Leges Juliæ; and among later emperors the most active promulgators of constitutions are princes who, like Constantine, have the concerns of the world to readjust. The true period of Roman Statute Law does not begin till the establishment of the empire. The enactments of the emperors, clothed at first in the pretence of popular sanction, but afterwards emanating undisguisedly from the imperial prerogative, extend in increasing massiveness from the consolidation of Augustus's power to the publication of the Code of Justinian. It will be seen that even in the reign of the second emperor a considerable approximation is made to that condition of the law and that mode of administering it with which we are all familiar. A statute law and a limited board of expositors have risen into being; a permanent court of appeal and a collection of approved commentaries will very shortly be added; and thus we are brought close on the ideas of our own day.026

The Equity of the Romans and the Prætorian Edict that integrated it into their system will be discussed in the next chapter. Regarding Statute Law, it was limited during the republic but became extensive under the empire. In the early stages of a nation, it's uncommon for the legislature to be activated for a broad reform of private law. People usually don't call for changes in the laws, which are often valued more than their actual worth, but instead for their fair, comprehensive, and straightforward application. Appeals to the legislative body are mainly for addressing significant abuses or resolving persistent conflicts between social classes and ruling families. The Romans seemed to associate creating a large number of statutes with stabilizing society after significant civil unrest. Sylla marked his restoration of the republic with the Leges Corneliæ; Julius Cæsar planned to make extensive additions to Statute Law; Augustus enacted the crucial group of Leges Juliæ; and among later emperors, the most active issuers of laws were those, like Constantine, who needed to reorganize the world's affairs. The real era of Roman Statute Law doesn't start until the establishment of the empire. The laws from the emperors, initially presented as having popular approval but later clearly originating from imperial authority, grew increasingly substantial from the time Augustus solidified his power to the release of the Code of Justinian. Even in the reign of the second emperor, there is a notable approach toward the state of law and its administration that we recognize today. A statutory law and a limited body of interpreters have emerged; a permanent court of appeal and a collection of recognized commentaries will soon follow, bringing us closer to modern concepts.026


CHAPTER III

natural law and equity

The theory of a set of legal principles, entitled by their intrinsic superiority to supersede the older law, very early obtained currency both in the Roman state and in England. Such a body of principles, existing in any system, has in the foregoing chapters been denominated Equity, a term which, as will presently be seen, was one (though only one) of the designations by which this agent of legal change was known to the Roman jurisconsults. The jurisprudence of the Court of Chancery, which bears the name of Equity in England, could only be adequately discussed in a separate treatise. It is extremely complex in its texture and derives its materials from several heterogeneous sources. The early ecclesiastical chancellors contributed to it, from the Canon Law, many of the principles which lie deepest in its structure. The Roman law, more fertile than the Canon Law in rules applicable to secular disputes, was not seldom resorted to by a later generation of Chancery judges, amid whose recorded dicta we often find entire texts from the Corpus Juris Civilis imbedded, with their terms unaltered, though their origin is never acknowledged. Still more recently, and particularly at the middle and during the latter half of the eighteenth century, the mixed systems of jurisprudence and morals constructed by the publicists of the Low Countries appear to have been much studied by English lawyers, and from the chancellorship of Lord Talbot to the commencement of Lord Eldon's chancellorship these works had considerable effect on the rulings of the Court of Chancery. The system, which obtained its ingredients from these various quarters, was greatly controlled in its growth by the necessity imposed on it of conforming itself to the analogies of the common law, but it has always answered the description of a body of comparatively novel legal principles claiming to override the older jurisprudence of the country on the strength of an intrinsic ethical superiority.027

The idea that a set of legal principles, because of their inherent superiority, can replace older laws has been accepted for a long time in both the Roman state and England. This group of principles, found in any legal system, has been referred to as Equity in the chapters above. Equity, as will soon be shown, was one (but not the only) term used by Roman legal experts to describe this vehicle for legal change. The legal principles of the Court of Chancery in England, known as Equity, require a separate discussion to fully understand. It is very complex and draws from various diverse sources. Early church chancellors contributed many key principles from Canon Law that form the foundation of this system. The Roman law, which has more applicable rules for secular disputes than Canon Law, was often referenced by later Chancery judges, who inserted complete texts from the Corpus Juris Civilis without changing the wording, although they never acknowledged their origin. More recently, particularly in the middle and latter parts of the eighteenth century, English lawyers seemed to study the mixed legal and moral systems developed by scholars in the Low Countries. From the time of Lord Talbot’s chancellorship until Lord Eldon took over, these works significantly influenced the decisions of the Court of Chancery. This system, which drew its elements from these various sources, had to develop in a way that aligned with common law, but it has always been described as a collection of relatively new legal principles that claim to surpass the older laws of the country based on their intrinsic ethical superiority.027

The Equity of Rome was a much simpler structure, and its development from its first appearance can be much more easily traced. Both its character and its history deserve attentive examination. It is the root of several conceptions which have exercised profound influence on human thought, and through human thought have seriously affected the destinies of mankind.

The Equity of Rome was a much simpler system, and its evolution from its initial emergence can be more easily followed. Both its nature and its history warrant careful examination. It is the foundation of several ideas that have significantly impacted human thought, and through human thought, have seriously influenced the fate of humanity.

The Romans described their legal system as consisting of two ingredients. "All nations," says the Institutional Treatise published under the authority of the Emperor Justinian, "who are ruled by laws and customs, are governed partly by their own particular laws, and partly by those laws which are common to all mankind. The law which a people enacts is called the Civil Law of that people, but that which natural reason appoints for all mankind is called the Law of Nations, because all nations use it." The part of the law "which natural reason appoints for all mankind" was the element which the Edict of the Prætor was supposed to have worked into Roman jurisprudence. Elsewhere it is styled more simply Jus Naturale, or the Law of Nature; and its ordinances are said to be dictated by Natural Equity (naturalis æquitas) as well as by natural reason. I shall attempt to discover the origin of these famous phrases, Law of Nations, Law of Nature, Equity, and to determine how the conceptions which they indicate are related to one another.

The Romans described their legal system as made up of two parts. "All nations," says the Institutional Treatise published under the authority of Emperor Justinian, "that are governed by laws and customs are ruled partly by their own specific laws and partly by those laws that are common to all humanity. The law that a people creates is called the Civil Law of that people, but the law that natural reason sets for all humanity is called the Law of Nations, because all nations use it." The part of the law "that natural reason sets for all humanity" was the aspect that the Edict of the Prætor was meant to incorporate into Roman jurisprudence. At other times, it’s simply referred to as Jus Naturale, or the Law of Nature; its principles are said to be dictated by Natural Equity (naturalis æquitas) as well as by natural reason. I will try to uncover the origin of these well-known terms: Law of Nations, Law of Nature, Equity, and explore how the ideas they represent are interconnected.

The most superficial student of Roman history must be struck by the extraordinary degree in which the fortunes of the republic were affected by the presence of foreigners, under different names, on her soil. The causes of this immigration are discernible enough at a later period, for we can readily understand why men of all races should flock to the mistress of the world; but the same phenomenon of a large population of foreigners and denizens meets us in the very earliest records of the Roman State. No doubt, the instability of society in ancient Italy, composed as it was in great measure of robber tribes, gave men considerable inducement to locate themselves in the territory of any community strong enough to protect itself and them from external attack, even though protection should be purchased at the cost of heavy taxation, political disfranchisement, and much social humiliation. It is probable, however, that this explanation is imperfect, and that it could only be completed by taking into account those028 active commercial relations which, though they are little reflected in the military traditions of the republic, Rome appears certainly to have had with Carthage and with the interior of Italy in pre-historic times. Whatever were the circumstances to which it was attributable, the foreign element in the commonwealth determined the whole course of its history, which, at all its stages, is little more than a narrative of conflicts between a stubborn nationality and an alien population. Nothing like this has been seen in modern times; on the one hand, because modern European communities have seldom or never received any accession of foreign immigrants which was large enough to make itself felt by the bulk of the native citizens, and on the other, because modern states, being held together by allegiance to a king or political superior, absorb considerable bodies of immigrant settlers with a quickness unknown to the ancient world, where the original citizens of a commonwealth always believed themselves to be united by kinship in blood, and resented a claim to equality of privilege as a usurpation of their birthright. In the early Roman republic the principle of the absolute exclusion of foreigners pervaded the Civil Law no less than the Constitution. The alien or denizen could have no share in any institution supposed to be coeval with the State. He could not have the benefit of Quiritarian law. He could not be a party to the nexum which was at once the conveyance and the contract of the primitive Romans. He could not sue by the Sacramental Action, a mode of litigation of which the origin mounts up to the very infancy of civilisation. Still, neither the interest nor the security of Rome permitted him to be quite outlawed. All ancient communities ran the risk of being overthrown by a very slight disturbance of equilibrium, and the mere instinct of self-preservation would force the Romans to devise some method of adjusting the rights and duties of foreigners, who might otherwise—and this was a danger of real importance in the ancient world—have decided their controversies by armed strife. Moreover, at no period of Roman history was foreign trade entirely neglected. It was therefore probably half as a measure of police and half in furtherance of commerce that jurisdiction was first assumed in disputes to which the parties were either foreigners or a native and a foreigner. The assumption of such a jurisdiction brought with it the immediate necessity of discovering some029 principles on which the questions to be adjudicated upon could be settled, and the principles applied to this object by the Roman lawyers were eminently characteristic of the time. They refused, as I have said before, to decide the new cases by pure Roman Civil Law. They refused, no doubt because it seemed to involve some kind of degradation, to apply the law of the particular State from which the foreign litigant came. The expedient to which they resorted was that of selecting the rules of law common to Rome and to the different Italian communities in which the immigrants were born. In other words, they set themselves to form a system answering to the primitive and literal meaning of Jus Gentium, that is, Law common to all Nations. Jus Gentium was, in fact, the sum of the common ingredients in the customs of the old Italian tribes, for they were all the nations whom the Romans had the means of observing, and who sent successive swarms of immigrants to Roman soil. Whenever a particular usage was seen to be practised by a large number of separate races in common it was set down as part of the Law common to all Nations, or Jus Gentium. Thus, although the conveyance of property was certainly accompanied by very different forms in the different commonwealths surrounding Rome, the actual transfer, tradition, or delivery of the article intended to be conveyed was a part of the ceremonial in all of them. It was, for instance, a part, though a subordinate part, in the Mancipation or conveyance peculiar to Rome. Tradition, therefore, being in all probability the only common ingredient in the modes of conveyance which the jurisconsults had the means of observing, was set down as an institution Juris Gentium, or rule of the Law common to all Nations. A vast number of other observances were scrutinised with the same result. Some common characteristic was discovered in all of them, which had a common object, and this characteristic was classed in the Jus Gentium. The Jus Gentium was accordingly a collection of rules and principles, determined by observation to be common to the institutions which prevailed among the various Italian tribes.

The most casual student of Roman history must notice how much the fate of the republic was influenced by the presence of foreigners, going by various names, on its land. The reasons for this immigration become clearer over time; it's easy to see why people from all backgrounds would flock to the dominant power of the world. However, we find the same trend of a large foreign and resident population in the very earliest records of the Roman State. Certainly, the instability of society in ancient Italy, largely comprised of raider tribes, motivated people to settle in areas of any community strong enough to defend itself and them from outside threats, even if this protection came at the cost of heavy taxes, political exclusion, and significant social humiliation. Nevertheless, this explanation might be incomplete and could be enhanced by considering the active trade relations that Rome clearly had with Carthage and other areas of Italy in prehistoric times, even if this aspect is rarely highlighted in the military traditions of the republic. Regardless of the reasons behind it, the foreign element in the commonwealth shaped the entire course of its history, which, at every stage, is primarily a story of conflicts between a determined national identity and an outside population. This scenario has not been observed in modern times; on one hand, modern European countries typically haven’t experienced a significant influx of foreign immigrants large enough to impact most native citizens, while on the other, modern states, bound together by loyalty to a king or political leader, can integrate substantial groups of immigrant settlers more rapidly than was possible in the ancient world, where original citizens often believed they were united by blood ties and resented any claim to equal status as a violation of their birthright. In the early Roman republic, the absolute exclusion of foreigners was a principle that permeated both Civil Law and the Constitution. Aliens or residents could not participate in any institution believed to be as old as the State. They couldn't benefit from Quiritarian law. They couldn't engage in the nexum, which was both a transfer and a contract for the early Romans. They couldn't litigate through the Sacramental Action, a legal method dating back to the dawn of civilization. Still, the interests and security of Rome did not allow them to be completely marginalized. All ancient societies were at risk of being toppled by even a slight disruption, and the instinct for self-preservation required the Romans to create some way of managing the rights and responsibilities of foreigners, who could otherwise—this was a significant risk in the ancient world—resolve their disputes with violence. Moreover, at no point in Roman history was foreign trade entirely ignored. Therefore, it was likely a mix of law enforcement and the promotion of commerce that led to the establishment of jurisdiction over disputes involving either foreigners or a native and a foreigner. Taking on such jurisdiction immediately required figuring out some principles for resolving these issues, and the principles applied by Roman lawyers were distinctly characteristic of that era. They refused, as I mentioned before, to address new cases using pure Roman Civil Law. They also declined, likely out of concern that it would imply some form of degradation, to apply the laws of the specific state from which the foreign litigant came. Instead, they opted to choose the legal rules common to both Rome and the various Italian communities from which the immigrants originated. In other words, they set out to create a system that reflects the original, literal meaning of Jus Gentium, meaning Law common to all Nations. Jus Gentium was essentially the sum of the shared elements in the customs of the old Italian tribes, as they represented all the nations that the Romans were able to observe, sending waves of immigrants to Roman land. Whenever a particular practice was observed among a large number of different peoples, it was accepted as part of the Law common to all Nations, or Jus Gentium. Thus, even though property transfer took on various forms among the different states surrounding Rome, the fundamental act of transferring, handing over, or delivering the intended item was part of the process in all of them. For instance, it was a feature, albeit a minor one, in the Mancipation or transfer distinctive to Rome. As a result, tradition was likely the only common aspect in the transfer methods the legal scholars could observe, and it was categorized as an institution of Juris Gentium, or a rule of the Law common to all Nations. A vast number of other practices were analyzed with the same conclusion. A common theme was identified among them, sharing a similar objective, and this theme was included in the Jus Gentium. Thus, the Jus Gentium became a collection of rules and principles identified through observation as shared by the institutions among various Italian tribes.

The circumstances of the origin of the Jus Gentium are probably a sufficient safeguard against the mistake of supposing that the Roman lawyers had any special respect for it. It was the fruit in part of their disdain for all foreign law, and in part of their disinclination to give the foreigner the advan030tage of their own indigenous Jus Civile. It is true that we, at the present day, should probably take a very different view of the Jus Gentium, if we were performing the operation which was effected by the Roman jurisconsults. We should attach some vague superiority or precedence to the element which we had thus discerned underlying and pervading so great a variety of usage. We should have a sort of respect for rules and principles so universal. Perhaps we should speak of the common ingredient as being of the essence of the transaction into which it entered, and should stigmatise the remaining apparatus of ceremony, which varied in different communities, as adventitious and accidental. Or it may be, we should infer that the races which we were comparing had once obeyed a great system of common institutions of which the Jus Gentium was the reproduction, and that the complicated usages of separate commonwealths were only corruptions and depravations of the simpler ordinances which had once regulated their primitive state. But the results to which modern ideas conduct the observer are, as nearly as possible, the reverse of those which were instinctively brought home to the primitive Roman. What we respect or admire, he disliked or regarded with jealous dread. The parts of jurisprudence which he looked upon with affection were exactly those which a modern theorist leaves out of consideration as accidental and transitory; the solemn gestures of the mancipation; the nicely adjusted questions and answers of the verbal contract; the endless formalities of pleading and procedure. The Jus Gentium was merely a system forced on his attention by a political necessity. He loved it as little as he loved the foreigners from whose institutions it was derived and for whose benefit it was intended. A complete revolution in his ideas was required before it could challenge his respect, but so complete was it when it did occur, that the true reason why our modern estimate of the Jus Gentium differs from that which has just been described, is that both modern jurisprudence and modern philosophy have inherited the matured views of the later jurisconsults on this subject. There did come a time, when from an ignoble appendage of the Jus Civile, the Jus Gentium came to be considered a great though as yet imperfectly developed model to which all law ought as far as possible to conform. This crisis arrived when the Greek theory of a Law of Nature was applied to the031 practical Roman administration of the Law common to all Nations.

The circumstances surrounding the origin of the Jus Gentium likely serve as a good warning against mistakenly thinking that Roman lawyers held it in special regard. It partly emerged from their disdain for all foreign laws and their unwillingness to give foreigners the advantage of their own native Jus Civile. Today, we would probably view the Jus Gentium quite differently if we were performing the same tasks that Roman legal experts undertook. We would likely attribute some vague superiority or precedence to the common elements we recognized as underlying and permeating various customs. We might respect rules and principles that are so universal. Perhaps we would consider the common aspect as essential to the transactions it influenced and label the differing ceremonies that varied among communities as incidental and accidental. Alternatively, we might conclude that the peoples we were comparing had historically adhered to a significant system of shared institutions from which the Jus Gentium was derived, and that the complex practices of individual societies were merely corruptions and distortions of the simpler regulations that once governed their early states. However, the insights that modern perspectives lead to are almost the exact opposite of what the primitive Roman intuitively understood. What we admire or respect, he viewed with disdain or jealous apprehension. The aspects of law he cherished were precisely those that a modern theorist dismisses as incidental and fleeting: the solemn gestures during emancipation, the carefully structured exchanges in verbal contracts, and the endless formalities of pleading and procedure. To him, the Jus Gentium was just a system imposed upon him by political necessity. He cherished it as little as he did the foreigners from whom it originated and for whose benefit it was designed. A complete shift in his thinking was necessary before it could earn his respect, but when that shift did happen, it was so profound that the real reason our modern evaluation of the Jus Gentium differs from what has just been described is that both contemporary legal thought and modern philosophy have adopted the refined views of later legal experts on this issue. There was indeed a time when, transitioning from a mere appendage of the Jus Civile, the Jus Gentium came to be viewed as a significant, albeit still imperfectly realized, model that all laws should strive to conform to. This turning point came when the Greek concept of a Law of Nature was applied to the practical Roman administration of the Law that was common to all nations.

The Jus Naturale, or Law of Nature, is simply the Jus Gentium or Law of Nations seen in the light of a peculiar theory. An unfortunate attempt to discriminate them was made by the jurisconsult Ulpian, with the propensity to distinguish characteristic of a lawyer, but the language of Gaius, a much higher authority, and the passage quoted before from the Institutes leave no room for doubt, that the expressions were practically convertible. The difference between them was entirely historical, and no distinction in essence could ever be established between them. It is almost unnecessary to add that the confusion between Jus Gentium, or Law common to all Nations, and international law is entirely modern. The classical expression for international law is Jus Feciale or the law of negotiation and diplomacy. It is, however, unquestionable that indistinct impressions as to the meaning of Jus Gentium had considerable share in producing the modern theory that the relations of independent states are governed by the Law of Nature.

The Jus Naturale, or Law of Nature, is basically the Jus Gentium or Law of Nations understood through a specific theory. An unfortunate attempt to differentiate them was made by the legal expert Ulpian, who had a tendency to make distinctions typical of a lawyer, but the language of Gaius, a much more authoritative figure, along with the previously quoted passage from the Institutes, leaves no doubt that these terms were essentially interchangeable. The difference between them was purely historical, and no essential distinction could be established. It's almost unnecessary to mention that the confusion between Jus Gentium, or the law shared by all nations, and international law is entirely modern. The traditional term for international law is Jus Feciale, or the law of negotiation and diplomacy. However, it's undeniable that vague understandings of what Jus Gentium means played a significant role in creating the modern theory that the relationships between independent states are governed by the Law of Nature.

It becomes necessary to investigate the Greek conceptions of nature and her law. The word φύσις, which was rendered in the Latin natura and our nature, denoted beyond all doubt originally the material universe, but it was the material universe contemplated under an aspect which—such is our intellectual distance from those times—it is not very easy to delineate in modern language. Nature signified the physical world regarded as the result of some primordial element or law. The oldest Greek philosophers had been accustomed to explain the fabric of creation as the manifestation of some single principle which they variously asserted to be movement, force, fire, moisture, or generation. In its simplest and most ancient sense, Nature is precisely the physical universe looked upon in this way as the manifestation of a principle. Afterwards, the later Greek sects, returning to a path from which the greatest intellects of Greece had meanwhile strayed, added the moral to the physical world in the conception of Nature. They extended the term till it embraced not merely the visible creation, but the thoughts, observances, and aspirations of mankind. Still, as before, it was not solely the moral phenomena of human society which they understood by032 Nature, but these phenomena considered as resolvable into some general and simple laws.

It’s important to explore the Greek ideas about nature and its laws. The word φύσις, which translates into Latin as natura and into English as nature, originally referred to the material universe. However, it was viewed in a way that is difficult for us to capture in modern language due to our distance from those times. Nature meant the physical world seen as the result of some fundamental element or law. The earliest Greek philosophers explained the structure of creation as a manifestation of a single principle, which they interpreted in various ways—such as movement, force, fire, moisture, or generation. In its most basic and ancient sense, Nature is simply the physical universe viewed this way as an expression of a principle. Later Greek schools of thought, returning to ideas that the greatest thinkers of Greece had diverged from, incorporated the moral aspects alongside the physical world in their understanding of Nature. They broadened the definition to include not just the visible universe, but also the thoughts, practices, and hopes of humanity. Yet, like before, they didn’t only consider the moral aspects of human society as Nature, but these aspects understood as being connected to some general and simple laws.

Now, just as the oldest Greek theorists supposed that the sports of chance had changed the material universe from its simple primitive form into its present heterogeneous condition, so their intellectual descendants imagined that but for untoward accident the human race would have conformed itself to simpler rules of conduct and a less tempestuous life. To live according to nature came to be considered as the end for which man was created, and which the best men were bound to compass. To live according to nature was to rise above the disorderly habits and gross indulgences of the vulgar to higher laws of action which nothing but self-denial and self-command would enable the aspirant to observe. It is notorious that this proposition—live according to nature—was the sum of the tenets of the famous Stoic philosophy. Now on the subjugation of Greece that philosophy made instantaneous progress in Roman society. It possessed natural fascinations for the powerful class who, in theory at least, adhered to the simple habits of the ancient Italian race, and disdained to surrender themselves to the innovations of foreign fashions. Such persons began immediately to affect the Stoic precepts of life according to nature—an affectation all the more grateful, and, I may add, all the more noble, from its contrast with the unbounded profligacy which was being diffused through the imperial city by the pillage of the world and by the example of its most luxurious races. In the front of the disciples of the new Greek school, we might be sure, even if we did not know it historically, that the Roman lawyers figured. We have abundant proof that, there being substantially but two professions in the Roman republic, the military men were generally identified with the party of movement, but the lawyers were universally at the head of the party of resistance.

Now, just as the earliest Greek theorists believed that games of chance transformed the material universe from its simple, original state into its current complex form, their intellectual successors thought that, but for unfortunate accidents, humanity would have adapted to simpler rules of behavior and a less chaotic life. Living according to nature became seen as the ultimate goal for which humans were created, and which the best individuals were expected to achieve. To live according to nature meant rising above the disorganized habits and excessive indulgences of the masses to adhere to higher principles of action that only self-discipline and self-control would allow one to follow. It's well-known that this idea—living according to nature—was the core of the renowned Stoic philosophy. After Greece was conquered, this philosophy quickly gained traction in Roman society. It held a natural appeal for the powerful class who, at least in theory, clung to the simple ways of the ancient Italian people and resisted the temptations of foreign trends. These individuals soon began to endorse the Stoic teachings of living in accordance with nature—an endorsement that was especially pleasing and, I might add, even more admirable, in contrast to the rampant debauchery spreading through the imperial city due to the looting of the world and the influence of its most lavish cultures. At the forefront of the followers of this new Greek school, we can be sure, even without knowing the historical details, that Roman lawyers played a significant role. We have plenty of evidence that, effectively, there were only two main professions in the Roman Republic; military personnel were typically aligned with the party of progress, while lawyers were universally at the forefront of the party of resistance.

The alliance of the lawyers with the Stoic philosophers lasted through many centuries. Some of the earliest names in the series of renowned jurisconsults are associated with Stoicism, and ultimately we have the golden age of Roman jurisprudence fixed by general consent at the era of the Antonine Cæsars, the most famous disciples to whom that philosophy has given a rule of life. The long diffusion of these doctrines among the members of a particular profession was033 sure to affect the art which they practised and influenced. Several positions which we find in the remains of the Roman jurisconsults are scarcely intelligible, unless we use the Stoic tenets as our key; but at the same time it is a serious, though a very common, error to measure the influence of Stoicism on Roman law by counting up the number of legal rules which can be confidently affiliated on Stoical dogmas. It has often been observed that the strength of Stoicism resided not in its canons of conduct, which were often repulsive or ridiculous, but in the great though vague principle which it inculcated of resistance to passion. Just in the same way the influence on jurisprudence of the Greek theories, which had their most distinct expression in Stoicism, consisted not in the number of specific positions which they contributed to Roman law, but in the single fundamental assumption which they lent to it. After nature had become a household word in the mouths of the Romans, the belief gradually prevailed among the Roman lawyers that the old Jus Gentium was in fact the lost code of Nature, and that the Prætor in framing an Edictal jurisprudence on the principles of the Jus Gentium was gradually restoring a type from which law had only departed to deteriorate. The inference from this belief was immediate, that it was the Prætor's duty to supersede the Civil Law as much as possible by the Edict, to revive as far as might be the institutions by which Nature had governed man in the primitive state. Of course, there were many impediments to the amelioration of law by this agency. There may have been prejudices to overcome even in the legal profession itself, and Roman habits were far too tenacious to give way at once to mere philosophical theory. The indirect methods by which the Edict combated certain technical anomalies, show the caution which its authors were compelled to observe, and down to the very days of Justinian there was some part of the old law which had obstinately resisted its influence. But, on the whole, the progress of the Romans in legal improvement was astonishingly rapid as soon as stimulus was applied to it by the theory of Natural Law. The ideas of simplification and generalisation had always been associated with the conception of Nature; simplicity, symmetry, and intelligibility came therefore to be regarded as the characteristics of a good legal system, and the taste for involved language, multiplied ceremonials, and034 useless difficulties disappeared altogether. The strong will, and unusual opportunities of Justinian were needed to bring the Roman law to its existing shape, but the ground plan of the system had been sketched long before the imperial reforms were effected.

The collaboration between lawyers and Stoic philosophers lasted for many centuries. Some of the earliest notable names in the history of well-known legal experts are linked to Stoicism, and ultimately, we recognize the golden age of Roman law, generally agreed upon as occurring during the time of the Antonine Caesars, the most famous followers of this philosophy who provided a way of life. The widespread influence of these ideas among the members of a specific profession was033 sure to impact the practice and art they were involved in. Several concepts found in the writings of Roman legal experts are hardly understandable unless we use Stoic principles as our guide; however, it's a significant, though common, mistake to gauge the impact of Stoicism on Roman law simply by counting how many legal rules can be accurately linked to Stoic beliefs. It's often noted that the strength of Stoicism lay not in its codes of conduct, which were frequently unappealing or absurd, but in the broad, albeit vague, principle it promoted of resisting passion. Similarly, the impact of Greek theories, which were most clearly expressed in Stoicism, was not in the number of specific rules they added to Roman law, but in the one fundamental idea they contributed. Once the concept of nature became common among the Romans, a belief started to grow among Roman lawyers that the old Jus Gentium was actually the lost code of Nature, and that the Prætor, while developing an Edictal legal system based on the principles of the Jus Gentium, was gradually restoring a framework from which law had only deviated to decline. The immediate conclusion from this belief was that it was the Prætor's responsibility to replace the Civil Law as much as possible with the Edict, to revive, as much as possible, the systems by which Nature governed humanity in its early state. Naturally, there were many obstacles to improving law through this method. There may have been biases to overcome even within the legal profession, and Roman customs were far too entrenched to be easily replaced by mere philosophical theory. The indirect strategies by which the Edict addressed certain technical anomalies demonstrate the caution its authors had to exercise, and even during the times of Justinian, there were parts of the old law that stubbornly resisted its influence. However, overall, the Romans made remarkably swift progress in legal improvement as soon as the theory of Natural Law provided motivation. The ideas of simplification and generalization had always been connected with the idea of Nature; thus, simplicity, symmetry, and clarity became seen as key traits of a good legal system, while the preference for complicated language, excessive formalities, and034 unnecessary complexities faded away. The strong will and unique opportunities of Justinian were needed to shape Roman law into its current form, but the foundational structure of the system had already been outlined long before the imperial reforms took place.

What was the exact point of contact between the old Jus Gentium and the Law of Nature? I think that they touch and blend through Æquitas, or Equity in its original sense; and here we seem to come to the first appearance in jurisprudence of this famous term, Equity. In examining an expression which has so remote an origin and so long a history as this, it is always safest to penetrate, if possible, to the simple metaphor or figure which at first shadowed forth the conception. It has generally been supposed that Æquitas is the equivalent of the Greek ἰσότης, i.e. the principle of equal or proportionate distribution. The equal division of numbers or physical magnitudes is doubtless closely entwined with our perceptions of justice; there are few associations which keep their ground in the mind so stubbornly or are dismissed from it with such difficulty by the deepest thinkers. Yet in tracing the history of this association, it certainly does not seem to have suggested itself to very early thought, but is rather the offspring of a comparatively late philosophy. It is remarkable too that the "equality" of laws on which the Greek democracies prided themselves—that equality which, in the beautiful drinking song of Callistratus, Harmodius and Aristogiton are said to have given to Athens—had little in common with the "equity" of the Romans. The first was an equal administration of civil laws among the citizens, however limited the class of citizens might be; the last implied the applicability of a law, which was not civil law, to a class which did not necessarily consist of citizens. The first excluded a despot; the last included foreigners, and for some purposes slaves. On the whole, I should be disposed to look in another direction for the germ of the Roman "Equity." The Latin word "æquus" carries with it more distinctly than the Greek "ἴσος" the sense of levelling. Now its levelling tendency was exactly the characteristic of the Jus Gentium, which would be most striking to a primitive Roman. The pure Quiritarian law recognised a multitude of arbitrary distinctions between classes of men and kinds of property; the Jus Gentium, generalised from a comparison of various035 customs, neglected the Quiritarian divisions. The old Roman law established, for example, a fundamental difference between "Agnatic" and "Cognatic" relationship, that is, between the Family considered as based upon common subjection to patriarchal authority and the Family considered (in conformity with modern ideas) as united through the mere fact of a common descent. This distinction disappears in the "law common to all nations," as also does the difference between the archaic forms of property, Things "Mancipi" and Things "nec Mancipi." The neglect of demarcations and boundaries seems to me, therefore, the feature of the Jus Gentium which was depicted in Æquitas. I imagine that the word was at first a mere description of that constant levelling or removal of irregularities which went on wherever the prætorian system was applied to the cases of foreign litigants. Probably no colour of ethical meaning belonged at first to the expression; nor is there any reason to believe that the process which it indicated was otherwise than extremely distasteful to the primitive Roman mind.

What was the exact connection between the old Jus Gentium and the Law of Nature? I think they intersect and merge through Æquitas, or Equity in its original sense; and here we seem to see the first appearance of this well-known term, Equity, in legal terms. When examining a term with such ancient roots and a long history, it's usually best to dig down to the simple metaphor or figure that initially represented the idea. It has generally been thought that Æquitas is equivalent to the Greek ἰσότης, i.e. the principle of equal or proportionate distribution. The equal division of numbers or physical amounts is undoubtedly closely tied to our ideas of justice; there are few connections that can hold their place in thought as stubbornly or be dismissed so easily by even the deepest thinkers. However, in tracing the history of this connection, it certainly doesn’t seem to have been a concept that early thinkers readily suggested; rather, it seems to come from a relatively recent philosophy. It’s also noteworthy that the "equality" of laws that the Greek democracies were proud of—that equality that, in the lovely drinking song of Callistratus, Harmodius and Aristogiton are said to have brought to Athens—had little in common with the Roman "equity." The former was about equal administration of civil laws among citizens, regardless of how limited the class of citizens was; the latter implied the application of a law that wasn’t civil law to a group that didn’t necessarily consist of citizens. The former excluded a despot; the latter included foreigners and, for some purposes, slaves. Overall, I would look elsewhere for the origin of the Roman "Equity." The Latin word "æquus" carries a clearer sense of levelling compared to the Greek "ἴσος." This levelling aspect was exactly what stood out about the Jus Gentium to a primitive Roman. The pure Quiritarian law recognized many arbitrary distinctions between classes of people and types of property; the Jus Gentium, generalized from a comparison of various customs, ignored the Quiritarian divisions. For example, the old Roman law established a fundamental difference between "Agnatic" and "Cognatic" relationships, meaning the Family viewed as based on common subjection to patriarchal authority and the Family viewed (in line with modern ideas) as united just by a common descent. This distinction fades in the "law common to all nations," as does the difference between the outdated forms of property, Things "Mancipi" and Things "nec Mancipi." The disregard for demarcations and boundaries seems to me to be the feature of the Jus Gentium depicted in Æquitas. I believe that the word was initially just a description of that constant levelling or removal of irregularities occurring wherever the prætorian system was applied to the cases of foreign litigants. At first, it likely carried no ethical meaning; nor is there any reason to think that the process it represented was anything other than highly unpleasant to the primitive Roman mindset.

On the other hand, the feature of the Jus Gentium which was presented to the apprehension of a Roman by the word Equity, was exactly the first and most vividly realised characteristic of the hypothetical state of nature. Nature implied symmetrical order, first in the physical world, and next in the moral, and the earliest notion of order doubtless involved straight lines, even surfaces, and measured distances. The same sort of picture or figure would be unconsciously before the mind's eye, whether it strove to form the outlines of the supposed natural state, or whether it took in at a glance the actual administration of the "law common to all nations"; and all we know of primitive thought would lead us to conclude that this ideal similarity would do much to encourage the belief in an identity of the two conceptions. But then, while the Jus Gentium had little or no antecedent credit at Rome, the theory of a Law of Nature came in surrounded with all the prestige of philosophical authority, and invested with the charms of association with an elder and more blissful condition of the race. It is easy to understand how the difference in the point of view would affect the dignity of the term which at once described the operation of the old principles and the results of the new theory. Even to modern ears it is not at all the036 same thing to describe a process as one of "levelling" and to call it the "correction of anomalies," though the metaphor is precisely the same. Nor do I doubt that, when once Æquitas was understood to convey an allusion to the Greek theory, associations which grew out of the Greek notion of ἰσότης began to cluster round it. The language of Cicero renders it more than likely that this was so, and it was the first stage of a transmutation of the conception of Equity, which almost every ethical system which has appeared since those days has more or less helped to carry on.

On the other hand, the aspect of Jus Gentium that was understood by a Roman through the term Equity was actually the first and most clearly recognized feature of the theoretical state of nature. Nature suggested a balanced order, first in the physical realm and then in the moral realm, and the earliest idea of order certainly included straight lines, flat surfaces, and measured distances. The same kind of image would likely be unconsciously present in the mind, whether trying to outline the supposed natural state or looking at the actual enforcement of the "law common to all nations"; and everything we know about primitive thinking suggests that this ideal similarity would greatly support the belief in the unity of the two ideas. However, while Jus Gentium had little or no previous recognition in Rome, the theory of a Law of Nature came with the full weight of philosophical authority and the appealing associations of an earlier and happier state of humanity. It's easy to see how the difference in perspective would influence the significance of the term that described both the practice of old principles and the results of the new theory. Even to modern ears, it's not the same to refer to a process as one of "leveling" versus calling it the "correction of anomalies," although the metaphor is exactly the same. I also believe that once Æquitas started to be recognized as alluding to the Greek theory, associations stemming from the Greek concept of ἰσότης began to gather around it. Cicero’s language strongly suggests this was the case, and it marked the beginning of a transformation in the understanding of Equity, which almost every ethical system since then has helped to further.

Something must be said of the formal instrumentality by which the principles and distinctions associated, first with the Law common to all Nations, and afterwards with the Law of Nature, were gradually incorporated with the Roman law. At the crisis of primitive Roman history which is marked by the expulsion of the Tarquins, a change occurred which has its parallel in the early annals of many ancient states, but which had little in common with those passages of political affairs which we now term revolutions. It may best be described by saying that the monarchy was put into commission. The powers heretofore accumulated in the hands of a single person were parcelled out among a number of elective functionaries, the very name of the kingly office being retained and imposed on a personage known subsequently as the Rex Sacrorum or Rex Sacrificulus. As part of the change, the settled duties of the supreme judicial office devolved on the Prætor, at the time the first functionary in the commonwealth, and together with these duties was transferred the undefined supremacy over law and legislation which always attached to ancient sovereigns and which is not obscurely related to the patriarchal and heroic authority they had once enjoyed. The circumstances of Rome gave great importance to the more indefinite portion of the functions thus as transferred, as with the establishment of the republic began that series of recurrent trials which overtook the state, in the difficulty of dealing with a multitude of persons who, not coming within the technical description of indigenous Romans, were nevertheless permanently located within Roman jurisdiction. Controversies between such persons, or between such persons and native-born citizens, would have remained without the pale of the remedies provided by Roman law, if the Prætor had not undertaken to decide them,037 and he must soon have addressed himself to the more critical disputes which in the extension of commerce arose between Roman subjects and avowed foreigners. The great increase of such cases in the Roman Courts about the period of the first Punic War is marked by the appointment of a special Prætor, known subsequently as the Prætor Peregrinus, who gave them his undivided attention. Meantime, one precaution of the Roman people against the revival of oppression, had consisted in obliging every magistrate whose duties had any tendency to expand their sphere, to publish, on commencing his year of office, an Edict or proclamation, in which he declared the manner in which he intended to administer his department. The Prætor fell under the rule with other magistrates; but as it was necessarily impossible to construct each year a separate system of principles, he seems to have regularly republished his predecessor's Edict with such additions and changes as the exigency of the moment or his own views of the law compelled him to introduce. The Prætor's proclamation, thus lengthened by a new portion every year, obtained the name of the Edictum Perpetuum, that is, the continuous or unbroken edict. The immense length to which it extended, together perhaps with some distaste for its necessarily disorderly texture, caused the practice of increasing it to be stopped in the year of Salvius Julianus, who occupied the magistracy in the reign of the Emperor Hadrian. The edict of that Prætor embraced therefore the whole body of equity jurisprudence, which it probably disposed in new and symmetrical order, and the perpetual edict is therefore often cited in Roman law merely as the Edict of Julianus.

Something needs to be said about the formal way in which the principles and distinctions connected first with the common law of all nations and later with the law of nature were gradually incorporated into Roman law. During a pivotal moment in early Roman history marked by the expulsion of the Tarquins, a change occurred that can be seen in the early records of many ancient states, but it didn't really resemble the political upheavals we now refer to as revolutions. It can best be described as the monarchy being put into a sort of commission. The powers that had previously been concentrated in the hands of one individual were distributed among several elected officials, with the title of king still being used for a figure known later as the Rex Sacrorum or Rex Sacrificulus. Along with this change, the established responsibilities of the highest judicial office were transferred to the Prætor, who was then the leading official in the republic. This transfer included the ambiguous superiority over law and legislation that had always belonged to ancient rulers, which is closely tied to the patriarchal and heroic authority they once held. The unique circumstances of Rome made this more ambiguous part of the functions especially significant, as the establishment of the republic began a series of ongoing challenges for the state in dealing with a large number of individuals who, although not fitting the strict description of native Romans, were still permanently within Roman jurisdiction. Disputes among these individuals, or between them and native citizens, would not have been covered by the remedies offered by Roman law if the Prætor hadn't stepped in to resolve them, and he would soon have to deal with the more pressing disputes that arose between Roman subjects and acknowledged foreigners due to the expansion of trade. The significant rise in such cases in the Roman courts around the time of the first Punic War is highlighted by the appointment of a special Prætor, later known as the Prætor Peregrinus, who focused solely on these matters. Meanwhile, one safeguard the Roman people had against the resurgence of oppression was requiring every magistrate whose role involved any potential for expanding their authority to publish, at the start of their term, an Edict or proclamation detailing how they intended to manage their responsibilities. The Prætor was included in this rule along with other magistrates; however, since crafting a completely new set of principles each year was impractical, he would typically reissue his predecessor's Edict with the additions and modifications necessitated by current circumstances or his own interpretation of the law. This proclamation from the Prætor, which grew longer each year, came to be known as the Edictum Perpetuum, meaning the continuous or unbroken edict. The vast length it reached, possibly along with some dissatisfaction with its inherently chaotic structure, led to the practice of extending it being halted in the year of Salvius Julianus, who held the office during the reign of Emperor Hadrian. Thus, the edict of that Prætor encompassed the entire body of equity law, likely arranged in a new and orderly fashion, and so the perpetual edict is often simply referred to in Roman law as the Edict of Julianus.037

Perhaps the first inquiry which occurs to an Englishman who considers the peculiar mechanism of the Edict is, what were the limitations by which these extensive powers of the Prætor were restrained? How was authority so little definite reconciled with a settled condition of society and of law? The answer can only be supplied by careful observation of the conditions under which our own English law is administered. The Prætor, it should be recollected, was a jurisconsult himself, or a person entirely in the hands of advisers who were jurisconsults, and it is probable that every Roman lawyer waited impatiently for the time when he should fill or control the great judicial magistracy. In the interval, his tastes,038 feelings, prejudices, and degree of enlightenment were inevitably those of his own order, and the qualifications which he ultimately brought to office were those which he had acquired in the practice and study of his profession. An English Chancellor goes through precisely the same training, and carries to the woolsack the same qualifications. It is certain when he assumes office that he will have, to some extent, modified the law before he leaves it; but until he has quitted his seat, and the series of his decisions in the Law Reports has been completed, we cannot discover how far he has elucidated or added to the principles which his predecessors bequeathed to him. The influence of the Prætor on Roman jurisprudence differed only in respect of the period at which its amount was ascertained. As was before stated, he was in office but for a year, and his decisions rendered during his year, though of course irreversible as regarded the litigants, were of no ulterior value. The most natural moment for declaring the changes he proposed to effect occurred therefore at his entrance on the prætorship, and hence, when commencing his duties, he did openly and avowedly that which in the end his English representative does insensibly and sometimes unconsciously. The checks on this apparent liberty are precisely those imposed on an English judge. Theoretically there seems to be hardly any limit to the powers of either of them, but practically the Roman Prætor, no less than the English Chancellor, was kept within the narrowest bounds by the prepossessions imbibed from early training and by the strong restraints of professional opinion, restraints of which the stringency can only be appreciated by those who have personally experienced them. It may be added that the lines within which movement is permitted, and beyond which there is to be no travelling, were chalked with as much distinctness in the one case as in the other. In England the judge follows the analogies of reported decisions on insulated groups of facts. At Rome, as the intervention of the Prætor was at first dictated by simple concern for the safety of the state, it is likely that in the earliest times it was proportioned to the difficulty which it attempted to get rid of. Afterwards, when the taste for principle had been diffused by the Responses, he no doubt used the Edict as the means of giving a wider application to those fundamental principles, which he and the other practising039 jurisconsults, his contemporaries, believed themselves to have detected underlying the law. Latterly he acted wholly under the influence of Greek philosophical theories, which at once tempted him to advance and confined him to a particular course of progress.

Perhaps the first question that comes to mind for an Englishman thinking about the unique structure of the Edict is what limitations were placed on the extensive powers of the Prætor. How did such vague authority fit with an established society and legal system? The answer can only come from closely observing how our own English law is carried out. The Prætor, it should be remembered, was a legal expert himself or someone completely reliant on advisors who were legal experts. It's likely that every Roman lawyer eagerly awaited the chance to take on or manage the significant judicial role. In the meantime, his tastes, 038 feelings, biases, and level of knowledge would naturally reflect those of his own class, and the qualifications he ultimately brought to the position were those he gained through practicing and studying his profession. An English Chancellor goes through the exact same training and brings similar qualifications to the woolsack. It is certain that when he takes office, he will have, to some extent, modified the law before he leaves; however, until he has stepped down and his series of decisions in the Law Reports has been completed, we cannot tell how much he has clarified or added to the principles passed down to him by his predecessors. The Prætor's influence on Roman law only differed in when its extent was measured. As mentioned earlier, his term lasted just a year, and his decisions made during that year, though obviously final for the disputing parties, held no further value. The most logical time to announce the changes he intended to make would be at the beginning of his term, and thus, when starting his duties, he openly and deliberately did what his English counterpart tends to do subconsciously and sometimes unknowingly. The limitations on this apparent freedom are exactly those imposed on an English judge. Theoretically, it seems there are hardly any limits to their powers, but in reality, the Roman Prætor, just like the English Chancellor, was kept within strict bounds by the biases learned from early training and by the powerful constraints of professional opinion, constraints that can only be fully understood by those who have experienced them firsthand. It's also worth noting that the parameters within which movement is allowed, and beyond which no progress is permitted, were drawn as clearly in both cases. In England, the judge follows the analogies of reported decisions on specific sets of facts. In Rome, since the Prætor's involvement initially stemmed from a basic concern for the state's safety, it's likely that in the early days, it matched the challenges he aimed to resolve. Later, when the appreciation for principles spread through the Responses, he undoubtedly used the Edict to expand the application of those fundamental principles, which he and his fellow legal experts of the time believed to be foundational to the law. Eventually, he acted completely under the influence of Greek philosophical ideas, which both encouraged him to push forward and limited him to a specific direction of progress.

The nature of the measures attributed to Salvius Julianus has been much disputed. Whatever they were, their effects on the Edict are sufficiently plain. It ceased to be extended by annual additions, and henceforward the equity jurisprudence of Rome was developed by the labours of a succession of great jurisconsults who fill with their writings the interval between the reign of Hadrian and the reign of Alexander Severus. A fragment of the wonderful system which they built up survives in the Pandects of Justinian, and supplies evidence that their works took the form of treatises on all parts of Roman Law, but chiefly that of commentaries on the Edict. Indeed, whatever be the immediate subject of a jurisconsult of this epoch, he may always be called an expositor of Equity. The principles of the Edict had, before the epoch of its cessation, made their way into every part of Roman jurisprudence. The Equity of Rome, it should be understood, even when most distinct from the Civil Law, was always administered by the same tribunals. The Prætor was the chief equity judge as well as the great common law magistrate, and as soon as the Edict had evolved an equitable rule the Prætor's court began to apply it in place of or by the side of the old rule of the Civil Law, which was thus directly or indirectly repealed without any express enactment of the legislature. The result, of course, fell considerably short of a complete fusion of law and equity, which was not carried out till the reforms of Justinian. The technical severance of the two elements of jurisprudence entailed some confusion and some inconvenience, and there were certain of the stubborner doctrines of the Civil Law with which neither the authors nor the expositors of the Edict had ventured to interfere. But at the same time there was no corner of the field of jurisprudence which was not more or less swept over by the influence of Equity. It supplied the jurist with all his materials for generalisation, with all his methods of interpretation, with his elucidations of first principles, and with that great mass of limiting rules which are040 rarely interfered with by the legislator, but which seriously control the application of every legislative act.

The nature of the measures attributed to Salvius Julianus has been widely debated. Whatever they were, their impact on the Edict is clear. It stopped being updated with annual additions, and from then on, the equity jurisprudence of Rome was shaped by a series of great legal scholars whose writings filled the gap between the reigns of Hadrian and Alexander Severus. A piece of the remarkable system they created still exists in the Pandects of Justinian, which shows that their works included treatises on all aspects of Roman Law, especially commentaries on the Edict. In fact, no matter the immediate focus of a legal scholar from this time, they can always be seen as an interpreter of Equity. The principles of the Edict had made their way into every aspect of Roman law before it was halted. It’s important to note that Roman Equity, even when distinct from Civil Law, was always handled by the same courts. The Prætor served as the main equity judge as well as the primary common law magistrate, and once the Edict established an equitable rule, the Prætor's court began to use it alongside or instead of the old Civil Law rule, effectively repealing it either directly or indirectly without any formal legislative action. The outcome, of course, didn't achieve a complete integration of law and equity, which only happened with the reforms of Justinian. The technical separation of the two elements of law caused some confusion and inconvenience, and there were certain stubborn doctrines of Civil Law that neither the creators nor the interpreters of the Edict dared to challenge. However, there was no area of law that was not influenced by Equity to some extent. It provided jurists with all the materials for generalization, methods of interpretation, explanations of fundamental principles, and that significant set of limiting rules which are040 rarely interfered with by lawmakers but which greatly influence how every legislative act is applied.

The period of jurists ends with Alexander Severus. From Hadrian to that emperor the improvement of law was carried on, as it is at the present moment in most continental countries, partly by approved commentaries and partly by direct legislation. But in the reign of Alexander Severus the power of growth in Roman Equity seems to be exhausted, and the succession of jurisconsults comes to a close. The remaining history of the Roman law is the history of the imperial constitutions, and, at the last, of attempts to codify what had now become the unwieldy body of Roman jurisprudence. We have the latest and most celebrated experiment of this kind in the Corpus Juris of Justinian.

The era of jurists comes to an end with Alexander Severus. From Hadrian to that emperor, the advancement of law continued, similar to what's seen today in most continental countries, through approved commentaries and direct legislation. However, during the reign of Alexander Severus, the growth of Roman Equity seems to have stalled, marking the end of the line for jurisconsults. The remaining history of Roman law focuses on imperial constitutions and, ultimately, efforts to codify what had turned into a cumbersome body of Roman jurisprudence. The most notable and recent attempt at this is the Corpus Juris of Justinian.

It would be wearisome to enter on a detailed comparison or contrast of English and Roman Equity, but it may be worth while to mention two features which they have in common. The first may be stated as follows. Each of them tended, and all such systems tend, to exactly the same state in which the old common law was when Equity first interfered with it. A time always comes at which the moral principles originally adopted have been carried out to all their legitimate consequences, and then the system founded on them becomes as rigid, as unexpansive, and as liable to fall behind moral progress as the sternest code of rules avowedly legal. Such an epoch was reached at Rome in the reign of Alexander Severus; after which, though the whole Roman world was undergoing a moral revolution, the Equity of Rome ceased to expand. The same point of legal history was attained in England under the chancellorship of Lord Eldon, the first of our equity judges who, instead of enlarging the jurisprudence of his court by indirect legislation, devoted himself through life to explaining and harmonising it. If the philosophy of legal history were better understood in England, Lord Eldon's services would be less exaggerated on the one hand and better appreciated on the other than they appear to be among contemporary lawyers. Other misapprehensions too, which bear some practical fruit, would perhaps be avoided. It is easily seen by English lawyers that English Equity is a system founded on moral rules; but it is forgotten that these rules are the morality of past centuries—not of the present—that they have received nearly as much041 application as they are capable of, and that though of course they do not differ largely from the ethical creed of our own day, they are not necessarily on a level with it. The imperfect theories of the subject which are commonly adopted have generated errors of opposite sorts. Many writers of treatises on Equity, struck with the completeness of the system in its present state, commit themselves expressly or implicitly to the paradoxical assertion that the founders of the chancery jurisprudence contemplated its present fixity of form when they were settling its first bases. Others, again, complain—and this is a grievance frequently observed upon in forensic arguments—that the moral rules enforced by the Court of Chancery fall short of the ethical standard of the present day. They would have each Lord Chancellor perform precisely the same office for the jurisprudence which he finds ready to his hand, which was performed for the old common law by the fathers of English equity. But this is to invert the order of the agencies by which the improvement of the law is carried on. Equity has its place and its time; but I have pointed out that another instrumentality is ready to succeed it when its energies are spent.

It would be tedious to go into a detailed comparison of English and Roman Equity, but it’s worth mentioning two features they share. The first is this: both systems aimed, like all such systems do, for the same state that the old common law was in when Equity first intervened. A time inevitably comes when the moral principles originally adopted have been fully executed, and then the system based on them becomes as rigid, unyielding, and likely to lag behind moral progress as the strictest legal code. Such a moment occurred in Rome during the reign of Alexander Severus; after which, even as the entire Roman world underwent a moral transformation, Roman Equity stopped evolving. The same point in legal history was reached in England under Lord Eldon’s chancellorship, the first of our equity judges who, instead of expanding the jurisprudence of his court through indirect legislation, dedicated his life to explaining and reconciling it. If the philosophy of legal history were better understood in England, Lord Eldon's contributions would be both less overstated on one hand and more appreciated on the other than they seem among modern lawyers. Other misunderstandings, which sometimes lead to practical issues, might also be avoided. English lawyers easily recognize that English Equity is based on moral principles; however, it’s often overlooked that these principles are the morality of past centuries—not of today—that they have been applied nearly as much as they can be, and that while they don’t greatly differ from the ethical beliefs of now, they are not necessarily equivalent to them. The flawed theories that are commonly accepted have led to opposite errors. Many authors of works on Equity, impressed by the completeness of the system as it stands, either explicitly or implicitly claim the founders of the chancery jurisprudence envisioned its current rigidity when they laid its foundations. Others, meanwhile, frequently lament—in legal debates—that the moral principles enforced by the Court of Chancery fall short of today’s ethical standards. They expect each Lord Chancellor to perform exactly the same role for the jurisprudence he inherits as was carried out for the old common law by the pioneers of English equity. But this flips the sequence of the agencies by which legal improvement occurs. Equity has its place and its time; however, I have indicated that another mechanism is ready to take its place when its efforts are exhausted.

Another remarkable characteristic of both English and Roman Equity is the falsehood of the assumptions upon which the claim of the equitable to superiority over the legal rule is originally defended. Nothing is more distasteful to men, either as individuals or as masses, than the admission of their moral progress as a substantive reality. This unwillingness shows itself, as regards individuals, in the exaggerated respect which is ordinarily paid to the doubtful virtue of consistency. The movement of the collective opinion of a whole society is too palpable to be ignored, and is generally too visible for the better to be decried; but there is the greatest disinclination to accept it as a primary phenomenon, and it is commonly explained as the recovery of a lost perfection—the gradual return to a state from which the race has lapsed. This tendency to look backward instead of forward for the goal of moral progress produced anciently, as we have seen, on Roman jurisprudence effects the most serious and permanent. The Roman jurisconsults, in order to account for the improvement of their jurisprudence by the Prætor, borrowed from Greece the doctrine of a Natural state of man—a Natural society—042 anterior to the organisation of commonwealths governed by positive laws. In England, on the other hand, a range of ideas especially congenial to Englishmen of that day, explained the claim of Equity to override the common law by supposing a general right to superintend the administration of justice which was assumed to be vested in the king as a natural result of his paternal authority. The same view appears in a different and a quainter form in the old doctrine that Equity flowed from the king's conscience—the improvement which had in fact taken place in the moral standard of the community being thus referred to an inherent elevation in the moral sense of the sovereign. The growth of the English constitution rendered such a theory unpalatable after a time; but, as the jurisdiction of the Chancery was then firmly established, it was not worth while to devise any formal substitute for it. The theories found in modern manuals of Equity are very various, but all are alike in their untenability. Most of them are modifications of the Roman doctrine of a natural law, which is indeed adopted in tenour by those writers who begin a discussion of the jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery by laying down a distinction between natural justice and civil.043

Another remarkable feature of both English and Roman Equity is the false basis on which the claim of equity to be superior to legal rules is originally defended. Nothing is more unpleasant for people, whether as individuals or in groups, than admitting that their moral progress is a real thing. This reluctance shows up in individuals as an exaggerated respect for the questionable virtue of consistency. The shift in collective opinion in society is too obvious to ignore and is often too evident for the better to be dismissed, but there is a strong resistance to accepting it as a fundamental phenomenon, commonly explaining it as the recovery of a lost perfection—the gradual return to a state the race has fallen from. This tendency to look back instead of forward for the goal of moral progress had serious and lasting effects on Roman jurisprudence, as we’ve seen. The Roman jurists, trying to explain the improvements in their laws by the Prætor, borrowed from Greece the idea of a Natural state of man—a Natural society—042 that existed before the creation of commonwealths governed by positive laws. In England, on the other hand, a set of ideas particularly appealing to Englishmen of that time explained equity's claim to take precedence over common law by suggesting a general right to oversee the administration of justice, which was assumed to be inherent to the king as a natural extension of his paternal authority. This perspective also appears in a different and more old-fashioned way in the old idea that equity stemmed from the king's conscience—the actual improvement in the community's moral standards being thus attributed to an inherent uplift in the sovereign's moral sense. The evolution of the English constitution made such a theory undesirable over time; however, since the jurisdiction of the Chancery was firmly established, it wasn’t worth creating a formal substitute for it. The theories found in modern equity manuals are quite varied, but they all share the same flaw of being untenable. Most are modifications of the Roman idea of natural law, which is indeed embraced by those writers who start a discussion about the Court of Chancery’s jurisdiction by establishing a distinction between natural justice and civil.043


CHAPTER IV

the contemporary history of natural law

It will be inferred from what has been said that the theory which transformed the Roman jurisprudence had no claim to philosophical precision. It involved, in fact, one of those "mixed modes of thought" which are now acknowledged to have characterised all but the highest minds during the infancy of speculation, and which are far from undiscoverable even in the mental efforts of our own day. The Law of Nature confused the Past and the Present. Logically, it implied a state of Nature which had once been regulated by natural law; yet the jurisconsults do not speak clearly or confidently of the existence of such a state, which indeed is little noticed by the ancients except where it finds a poetical expression in the fancy of a golden age. Natural law, for all practical purposes, was something belonging to the present, something entwined with existing institutions, something which could be distinguished from them by a competent observer. The test which separated the ordinances of Nature from the gross ingredients with which they were mingled was a sense of simplicity and harmony; yet it was not on account of their simplicity and harmony that these finer elements were primarily respected, but on the score of their descent from the aboriginal reign of Nature. This confusion has not been successfully explained away by the modern disciples of the jurisconsults, and in truth modern speculations on the Law of Nature betray much more indistinctness of perception and are vitiated by much more hopeless ambiguity of language than the Roman lawyers can be justly charged with. There are some writers on the subject who attempt to evade the fundamental difficulty by contending that the code of Nature exists in the future and is the goal to which all civil laws are moving, but this is to reverse the assumptions on which the old theory rested, or rather perhaps to mix together two inconsistent theories. The tendency to look not to the past but to the future for types of perfection was brought into044 the world by Christianity. Ancient literature gives few or no hints of a belief that the progress of society is necessarily from worse to better.

It can be inferred from what has been mentioned that the theory that transformed Roman law didn’t really aim for philosophical precision. It actually involved one of those "mixed modes of thought" that are now recognized as typical of almost everyone except the most exceptional thinkers during the early stages of speculation, and which can still be found in the intellectual efforts of our time. The Law of Nature blurred the lines between the Past and the Present. Logically, it suggested a state of Nature that had once been governed by natural law; however, the legal experts don't speak clearly or confidently about the existence of such a state, which is hardly addressed by ancient thinkers except when it’s poetically depicted in the idea of a golden age. Natural law, for practical purposes, was seen as something belonging to the present, something intertwined with existing institutions, and something a knowledgeable observer could differentiate from them. The standard that separated the laws of Nature from the less refined elements they mixed with was a sense of simplicity and harmony; yet, it wasn't primarily because of their simplicity and harmony that these finer aspects were valued, but because they were thought to originate from the original reign of Nature. This confusion has not been successfully clarified by modern followers of the legal experts, and in reality, current ideas about the Law of Nature show much greater lack of clarity and are plagued by far more confusing language than the Roman lawyers can justly be accused of. Some writers on the topic try to sidestep the main issue by claiming that the code of Nature exists in the future and is the ultimate goal toward which all civil laws are evolving, but this flips the assumptions on which the old theory was based, or perhaps even mixes two contradictory theories together. The inclination to look to the future rather than the past for examples of perfection was introduced to the world by Christianity. Ancient literature offers few or no hints of a belief that society’s progress is inherently from worse to better.

But the importance of this theory to mankind has been very much greater than its philosophical deficiencies would lead us to expect. Indeed, it is not easy to say what turn the history of thought, and therefore, of the human race, would have taken, if the belief in a law natural had not become universal in the ancient world.

But the significance of this theory to humanity has been much greater than its philosophical shortcomings might suggest. In fact, it's hard to determine what direction the history of thought, and consequently, of mankind, would have taken if the belief in a natural law hadn't become widespread in the ancient world.

There are two special dangers to which law, and society which is held together by law, appear to be liable in their infancy. One of them is that law may be too rapidly developed. This occurred with the codes of the more progressive Greek communities, which disembarrassed themselves with astonishing facility from cumbrous forms of procedure and needless terms of art, and soon ceased to attach any superstitious value to rigid rules and prescriptions. It was not for the ultimate advantage of mankind that they did so, though the immediate benefit conferred on their citizens may have been considerable. One of the rarest qualities of national character is the capacity for applying and working out the law, as such, at the cost of constant miscarriages of abstract justice, without at the same time losing the hope or the wish that law may be conformed to a higher ideal. The Greek intellect, with all its nobility and elasticity, was quite unable to confine itself within the strait waistcoat of a legal formula; and, if we may judge them by the popular courts of Athens, of whose working we possess accurate knowledge, the Greek tribunals exhibited the strongest tendency to confound law and fact. The remains of the Orators and the forensic commonplaces preserved by Aristotle in his Treatise on Rhetoric, show that questions of pure law were constantly argued on every consideration which could possibly influence the mind of the judges. No durable system of jurisprudence could be produced in this way. A community which never hesitated to relax rules of written law whenever they stood in the way of an ideally perfect decision on the facts of particular cases, would only, if it bequeathed any body of judicial principles to posterity, bequeath one consisting of the ideas of right and wrong which happened to be prevalent at the time. Such a jurisprudence would contain no framework to which the more advanced conceptions of subsequent045 ages could be fitted. It would amount at best to a philosophy marked with the imperfections of the civilisation under which it grew up.

There are two specific dangers that law, and the society sustained by law, seem to face in their early stages. One of these is that the law may evolve too quickly. This happened with the legal codes of the more progressive Greek communities, which easily freed themselves from complicated procedures and unnecessary legal jargon, soon disregarding any superstitious belief in strict rules and regulations. Although this provided immediate benefits to their citizens, it wasn’t ultimately advantageous for humanity. One of the rarest traits of national character is the ability to apply and implement the law while enduring frequent failures of abstract justice, all without losing the hope or desire for the law to align with a higher ideal. The Greek intellect, with all its nobility and adaptability, struggled to fit itself within the rigid confines of legal formulas; and based on what we know about the popular courts of Athens, it’s clear that the Greek courts often blurred the lines between law and fact. The remnants of the Orators and the legal arguments preserved by Aristotle in his Treatise on Rhetoric indicate that questions of pure law were frequently debated with every conceivable factor that could influence the judges' minds. No lasting system of law could emerge this way. A society that readily bent written laws whenever they obstructed an ideally perfect decision regarding particular cases would, if it left behind any body of judicial principles for future generations, only pass down the ideas of right and wrong that were prevalent at that time. Such a legal system would lack a structure that could accommodate the more advanced concepts of later eras. At best, it would reflect a philosophy filled with the flaws of the civilization from which it emerged.

Few national societies have had their jurisprudence menaced by this peculiar danger of precocious maturity and untimely disintegration. It is certainly doubtful whether the Romans were ever seriously threatened by it, but at any rate they had adequate protection in their theory of Natural Law. For the Natural Law of the jurisconsults was distinctly conceived by them as a system which ought gradually to absorb civil laws, without superseding them so long as they remained unrepealed. There was no such impression of its sanctity abroad, that an appeal to it would be likely to overpower the mind of a judge who was charged with the superintendence of a particular litigation. The value and serviceableness of the conception arose from its keeping before the mental vision a type of perfect law, and from its inspiring the hope of an indefinite approximation to it, at the same time that it never tempted the practitioner or the citizen to deny the obligation of existing laws which had not yet been adjusted to the theory. It is important too to observe that this model system, unlike many of those which have mocked men's hopes in later days, was not entirely the product of imagination. It was never thought of as founded on quite untested principles. The notion was that it underlay existing law and must be looked for through it. Its functions were in short remedial, not revolutionary or anarchical. And this, unfortunately, is the exact point at which the modern view of a Law of Nature has often ceased to resemble the ancient.

Few national societies have faced the unusual threat of premature maturity and untimely disintegration in their legal systems. It's questionable whether the Romans were ever genuinely at risk, but they certainly had sufficient safeguards in their understanding of Natural Law. For them, the Natural Law concept was clearly designed as a system that should gradually incorporate civil laws, without replacing them as long as they remained valid. There was no widespread belief in its sacredness that would lead a judge overseeing a specific case to be swayed by it. The value and utility of this concept came from its ability to present an ideal version of law and inspire the hope of getting closer to it, while still reminding practitioners and citizens of the obligations of current laws that hadn’t yet aligned with the theory. It’s also important to note that this ideal system, unlike many that have disappointed people’s hopes in more recent times, wasn’t just a product of imagination. It was never considered to be based on completely untested ideas. The belief was that it provided a foundation for existing law and should be sought through it. Its role was essentially remedial, not revolutionary or chaotic. Unfortunately, this is precisely where the contemporary interpretation of a Law of Nature has often diverged from the ancient understanding.

The other liability to which the infancy of society is exposed has prevented or arrested the progress of far the greater part of mankind. The rigidity of primitive law, arising chiefly from its early association and identification with religion, has chained down the mass of the human race to those views of life and conduct which they entertained at the time when their usages were first consolidated into a systematic form. There were one or two races exempted by a marvellous fate from this calamity, and grafts from these stocks have fertilised a few modern societies, but it is still true that, over the larger part of the world, the perfection of law has always been considered as consisting in adherence to the ground plan046 supposed to have been marked out by the original legislator. If intellect has in such cases been exercised on jurisprudence, it has uniformly prided itself on the subtle perversity of the conclusions it could build on ancient texts, without discoverable departure from their literal tenour. I know no reason why the law of the Romans should be superior to the laws of the Hindoos, unless the theory of Natural Law had given it a type of excellence different from the usual one. In this one exceptional instance, simplicity and symmetry were kept before the eyes of a society whose influence on mankind was destined to be prodigious from other causes, as the characteristics of an ideal and absolutely perfect law. It is impossible to overrate the importance to a nation or profession of having a distinct object to aim at in the pursuit of improvement. The secret of Bentham's immense influence in England during the past thirty years is his success in placing such an object before the country. He gave us a clear rule of reform. English lawyers of the last century were probably too acute to be blinded by the paradoxical commonplace that English law was the perfection of human reason, but they acted as if they believed it for want of any other principle to proceed upon. Bentham made the good of the community take precedence of every other object, and thus gave escape to a current which had long been trying to find its way outwards.

The other challenge that the early stages of society face has held back the progress of most people. The strictness of primitive law, mainly due to its early ties to religion, has kept most of humanity stuck in the mindsets they had when their customs were first organized into a structured system. A few races were fortunate enough to avoid this fate, and offshoots from these groups have enriched some modern societies, but it remains true that, for most of the world, the idea of perfect law has always been tied to sticking to the original plan laid out by the first lawmakers. When intellect has been applied to law in these cases, it has taken pride in the clever twist of conclusions drawn from ancient texts, without straying from their literal meaning. I see no reason why Roman law should be better than Hindu law, unless the concept of Natural Law has given it a unique kind of excellence. In this one exceptional case, simplicity and balance were held up as ideals in a society whose impact on humanity was destined to be immense for other reasons, seen as the hallmarks of an ideal and truly perfect law. It's impossible to overstate how important it is for a nation or profession to have a clear goal in their efforts for improvement. The key to Bentham's significant influence in England over the past thirty years is that he successfully presented such a goal to the nation. He provided us with a straightforward rule for reform. Last century, English lawyers were probably too perceptive to genuinely believe the contradictory idea that English law was the pinnacle of human reason, but they acted as if they did due to the lack of any other guiding principle. Bentham prioritized the welfare of the community above all else, thereby releasing a force that had long been trying to break free.

It is not an altogether fanciful comparison if we call the assumptions we have been describing the ancient counterpart of Benthamism. The Roman theory guided men's efforts in the same direction as the theory put into shape by the Englishman; its practical results were not widely different from those which would have been attained by a sect of law-reformers who maintained a steady pursuit of the general good of the community. It would be a mistake, however, to suppose it a conscious anticipation of Bentham's principles. The happiness of mankind is, no doubt, sometimes assigned, both in the popular and in the legal literature of the Romans, as the proper object of remedial legislation, but it is very remarkable how few and faint are the testimonies to this principle compared with the tributes which are constantly offered to the overshadowing claims of the Law of Nature. It was not to anything resembling philanthropy, but to their sense of simplicity and harmony—of what they significantly047 termed "elegance"—that the Roman jurisconsults freely surrendered themselves. The coincidence of their labours with those which a more precise philosophy would have counselled has been part of the good fortune of mankind.

It's not too far off to compare the ideas we've been discussing to an ancient version of Benthamism. The Roman theory steered people's efforts similarly to the ideas developed by the Englishman; its practical outcomes weren't that different from those that would have emerged from a group of legal reformers focused on the overall good of the community. However, it would be a mistake to think it was a conscious precursor to Bentham's principles. The happiness of humanity is sometimes noted, both in the popular and legal writings of the Romans, as a legitimate goal of remedial legislation, but it's quite striking how few and weak the references to this idea are when compared to the continuous praise for the more dominating claims of the Law of Nature. The Roman jurists were driven not by anything like philanthropy, but by their appreciation for simplicity and harmony—what they importantly referred to as "elegance." The alignment of their efforts with those suggested by a more precise philosophy has been part of humanity's good fortune.

Turning to the modern history of the law of nature, we find it easier to convince ourselves of the vastness of its influence than to pronounce confidently whether that influence has been exerted for good or for evil. The doctrines and institutions which may be attributed to it are the material of some of the most violent controversies debated in our time, as will be seen when it is stated that the theory of Natural Law is the source of almost all the special ideas as to law, politics, and society which France during the last hundred years has been the instrument of diffusing over the western world. The part played by jurists in French history, and the sphere of jural conceptions in French thought, have always been remarkably large. It was not indeed in France, but in Italy, that the juridical science of modern Europe took its rise, but of the schools founded by emissaries of the Italian universities in all parts of the continent, and attempted (though vainly) to be set up in our island, that established in France produced the greatest effect on the fortunes of the country. The lawyers of France immediately formed a strict alliance with the kings of the house of Capet, and it was as much through their assertions of royal prerogative, and through their interpretations of the rules of feudal succession, as by the power of the sword, that the French monarchy at last grew together out of the agglomeration of provinces and dependencies. The enormous advantage which their understanding with the lawyers conferred on the French kings in the prosecution of their struggle with the great feudatories, the aristocracy, and the church, can only be appreciated if we take into account the ideas which prevailed in Europe far down into the middle ages. There was, in the first place, a great enthusiasm for generalisation and a curious admiration for all general propositions, and consequently, in the field of law, an involuntary reverence for every general formula which seemed to embrace and sum up a number of the insulated rules which were practised as usages in various localities. Such general formulas it was, of course, not difficult for practitioners familiar with the Corpus Juris or the Glosses to supply in almost any quantity. There was,048 however, another cause which added yet more considerably to the lawyers' power. At the period of which we are speaking, there was universal vagueness of ideas as to the degree and nature of the authority residing in written texts of law. For the most part, the peremptory preface, Ita scriptum est, seems to have been sufficient to silence all objections. Where a mind of our own day would jealously scrutinise the formula which had been quoted, would inquire its source, and would (if necessary) deny that the body of law to which it belonged had any authority to supersede local customs, the elder jurist would not probably have ventured to do more than question the applicability of the rule, or at best cite some counter proposition from the Pandects or the Canon Law. It is extremely necessary to bear in mind the uncertainty of men's notions on this most important side of juridical controversies, not only because it helps to explain the weight which the lawyers threw into the monarchical scale, but on account of the light which it sheds on several curious historical problems. The motives of the author of the Forged Decretals and his extraordinary success are rendered more intelligible by it. And, to take a phenomenon of smaller interest, it assists us, though only partially, to understand the plagiarisms of Bracton. That an English writer of the time of Henry III. should have been able to put off on his countrymen as a compendium of pure English law a treatise of which the entire form and a third of the contents were directly borrowed from the Corpus Juris, and that he should have ventured on this experiment in a country where the systematic study of the Roman law was formally proscribed, will always be among the most hopeless enigmas in the history of jurisprudence; but still it is something to lessen our surprise when we comprehend the state of opinion at the period as to the obligatory force of written texts, apart from all consideration of the source whence they were derived.

Turning to the modern history of natural law, we find it easier to recognize its vast influence than to confidently say if that influence has been good or bad. The teachings and institutions linked to it have fueled some of the most intense debates of our time. For instance, the theory of Natural Law is the origin of almost all the specific ideas about law, politics, and society that France has spread across the western world over the past hundred years. The role of legal scholars in French history and the scope of legal ideas in French thought have always been remarkably significant. While modern European legal science originated in Italy, the schools established by Italian university emissaries across the continent, especially in France, had the greatest impact on the country's fate. French lawyers quickly formed a close alliance with the kings of the Capetian dynasty. It was through their claims of royal power and interpretations of feudal succession rules, alongside military force, that the French monarchy eventually unified diverse provinces and territories. The enormous advantage this alliance with lawyers gave to the French kings in their battle against powerful landlords, the aristocracy, and the church can only be understood in light of the prevailing ideas in Europe well into the Middle Ages. First, there was a strong enthusiasm for generalization and an unusual admiration for general principles, leading to an automatic respect for any legal formula that appeared to capture and summarize the isolated rules practiced in different regions. Experienced practitioners familiar with the Corpus Juris or the Glosses could easily provide such general formulas. However, there was also another factor that significantly increased lawyers' power. During this time, there was widespread ambiguity about the level and nature of authority in written laws. Generally, the authoritative phrase, Ita scriptum est, seemed enough to silence any objections. While a modern mind would closely examine the quoted formula, question its source, and even challenge the law's authority over local customs, earlier jurists probably only questioned the rule's applicability or cited some counter-argument from the Pandects or Canon Law. It's essential to consider the uncertainty surrounding this crucial aspect of legal debates, as it helps explain the influence lawyers had in supporting the monarchy and sheds light on several intriguing historical issues. It provides additional insight into the motivations of the author of the Forged Decretals and his remarkable success. Additionally, it offers some understanding of Bracton's plagiarisms. The fact that an English writer from the time of Henry III managed to present as a compilation of pure English law a work comprised of borrowed content and form from the Corpus Juris—and that he dared to do so in a setting where the systematic study of Roman law was openly banned—remains one of the most perplexing enigmas in legal history. However, recognizing the prevailing attitudes about the binding nature of written texts, independent of their origin, helps to reduce our astonishment.

When the kings of France had brought their long struggle for supremacy to a successful close, an epoch which may be placed roughly at the accession of the branch of Valois-Angoulême to the throne, the situation of the French jurists was peculiar and continued to be so down to the outbreak of the revolution. On the one hand, they formed the best instructed and nearly the most powerful class in the nation. They had made good their footing as a privileged order by049 the side of the feudal aristocracy, and they had assured their influence by an organisation which distributed their profession over France in great chartered corporations possessing large defined powers and still larger indefinite claims. In all the qualities of the advocate, the judge, and the legislator, they far excelled their compeers throughout Europe. Their juridical tact, their ease of expression, their fine sense of analogy and harmony, and (if they may be judged by the highest names among them) their passionate devotion to their conceptions of justice, were as remarkable as the singular variety of talent which they included, a variety covering the whole ground between the opposite poles of Cujas and Montesquieu, of D'Aguesseau and Dumoulin. But, on the other hand, the system of laws which they had to administer stood in striking contrast with the habits of mind which they had cultivated. The France which had been in great part constituted by their efforts was smitten with the curse of an anomalous and dissonant jurisprudence beyond every other country in Europe. One great division ran through the country and separated it into Pays du Droit Ecrit and Pays du Droit Coutumier, the first acknowledging the written Roman law as the basis of their jurisprudence, the last admitting it only so far as it supplied general forms of expression, and courses of juridical reasoning which were reconcileable with the local usages. The sections thus formed were again variously subdivided. In the Pays du Droit Coutumier province differed from province, county from county, municipality from municipality, in the nature of its customs. In the Pays du Droit Ecrit the stratum of feudal rules which overlay the Roman law was of the most miscellaneous composition. No such confusion as this ever existed in England. In Germany it did exist, but was too much in harmony with the deep political and religious divisions of the country to be lamented or even felt. It was the special peculiarity of France that an extraordinary diversity of laws continued without sensible alteration while the central authority of the monarchy was constantly strengthening itself, while rapid approaches were being made to complete administrative unity, and while a fervid national spirit had been developed among the people. The contrast was one which fructified in many serious results, and among them we must rank the effect which it produced on the minds of the050 French lawyers. Their speculative opinions and their intellectual bias were in the strongest opposition to their interests and professional habits. With the keenest sense and the fullest recognition of those perfections of jurisprudence which consist in simplicity and uniformity, they believed, or seemed to believe, that the vices which actually infested French law were ineradicable; and in practice they often resisted the reformation of abuses with an obstinacy which was not shown by many among their less enlightened countrymen. But there was a way to reconcile these contradictions. They became passionate enthusiasts for Natural Law. The Law of Nature overleapt all provincial and municipal boundaries; it disregarded all distinctions between noble and burgess, between burgess and peasant; it gave the most exalted place to lucidity, simplicity and system; but it committed its devotees to no specific improvement, and did not directly threaten any venerable or lucrative technicality. Natural law may be said to have become the common law of France, or, at all events, the admission of its dignity and claims was the one tenet which all French practitioners alike subscribed to. The language of the præ-revolutionary jurists in its eulogy is singularly unqualified, and it is remarkable that the writers on the Customs, who often made it their duty to speak disparagingly of the pure Roman law, speak even more fervidly of Nature and her rules than the civilians who professed an exclusive respect for the Digest and the Code. Dumoulin, the highest of all authorities on old French Customary Law, has some extravagant passages on the Law of Nature; and his panegyrics have a peculiar rhetorical turn which indicated a considerable departure from the caution of the Roman jurisconsults. The hypothesis of a Natural Law had become not so much a theory guiding practice as an article of speculative faith, and accordingly we shall find that, in the transformation which it more recently underwent, its weakest parts rose to the level of its strongest in the esteem of its supporters.

When the kings of France finally wrapped up their long struggle for dominance, which we can roughly date to the time when the Valois-Angoulême branch took the throne, the situation for French legal scholars was unique and remained so until the revolution broke out. On one hand, they were the best-educated and arguably the most influential group in the nation. They secured their status as a privileged class alongside the feudal aristocracy and guaranteed their influence through an organization that spread their profession across France in large chartered corporations with significant defined powers and even more extensive, vague claims. In terms of advocacy, judgment, and legislation, they far surpassed their peers throughout Europe. Their legal acumen, verbal fluency, keen sense of analogy and harmony, and, judging by the most prominent among them, their passionate commitment to their conceptions of justice were as impressive as the remarkable variety of talent they encompassed, spanning the spectrum from Cujas to Montesquieu and D'Aguesseau to Dumoulin. However, the legal system they were tasked with administering stood in stark contrast to the mindset they had developed. The France they had largely helped shape was burdened by an inconsistent and jarring legal framework, unlike any other country in Europe. A significant division split the country into Pays du Droit Ecrit and Pays du Droit Coutumier, with the former embracing written Roman law as the foundation of their legal system, while the latter only acknowledged it to the extent that it offered general forms of expression and legal reasoning compatible with local customs. These sections were further subdivided. In the Pays du Droit Coutumier, provinces varied from each other, counties differed, and municipalities had distinct customs. In the Pays du Droit Ecrit, the layer of feudal rules above the Roman law was a patchwork of various influences. No such chaos existed in England. In Germany, it did exist, but it aligned too closely with the country's deep political and religious divisions to be lamented or even acknowledged. France's unique situation was that an extraordinary variety of laws persisted without any significant change, even as the central authority of the monarchy grew stronger, as steps were taken toward complete administrative unity, and as a passionate national spirit emerged among the people. This contrast led to numerous serious consequences, including its impact on the mindset of French lawyers. Their theoretical views and intellectual leanings frequently clashed with their interests and professional practices. Despite their clear sense of the principles of law that should be based on simplicity and consistency, they believed, or at least appeared to believe, that the flaws plaguing French law were impossible to eliminate; and in practice, they often resisted attempts to reform these issues with a stubbornness not seen in many of their less enlightened compatriots. However, there was a way to bridge these contradictions. They became fervent advocates for Natural Law. Natural Law transcended all provincial and municipal boundaries; it ignored distinctions between the nobility and the bourgeoisie, as well as between the bourgeoisie and peasants; it prioritized clarity, simplicity, and system; but it did not commit its followers to any specific improvements and did not directly challenge any time-honored or profitable technical details. Natural law can be viewed as the common law of France, or at the very least, recognizing its significance and authority was the one principle that all French legal practitioners agreed upon. The pre-revolutionary jurists spoke of it with remarkable enthusiasm, and it's striking that writers on the Customs, who often felt compelled to criticize pure Roman law, spoke even more passionately about Nature and her rules than those who strictly respected the Digest and the Code. Dumoulin, the foremost authority on old French Customary Law, wrote some extravagant passages about Natural Law; his praise had a rhetorical flair that really marked a departure from the restraint typical of Roman legal scholars. The idea of Natural Law evolved from being just a guiding theory to becoming a speculative conviction, and as a result, we will see that in its more recent transformation, its weaker elements rose to match the regard of its strongest aspects in the eyes of its proponents.

The eighteenth century was half over when the most critical period in the history of Natural Law was reached. Had the discussion of the theory and of its consequences continued to be exclusively the employment of the legal profession, there would possibly have been an abatement of the respect which it commanded; for by this time the Esprit des Lois051 had appeared. Bearing in some exaggerations the marks of the excessive violence with which its author's mind had recoiled from assumptions usually suffered to pass without scrutiny, yet showing in some ambiguities the traces of a desire to compromise with existing prejudice, the book of Montesquieu, with all its defects, still proceeded on that Historical Method before which the Law of Nature has never maintained its footing for an instant. Its influence on thought ought to have been as great as its general popularity; but, in fact, it was never allowed time to put it forth, for the counter-hypothesis which it seemed destined to destroy passed suddenly from the forum to the street, and became the key-note of controversies far more exciting than are ever agitated in the courts or the schools. The person who launched it on its new career was that remarkable man who, without learning, with few virtues, and with no strength of character, has nevertheless stamped himself ineffaceably on history by the force of a vivid imagination, and by the help of a genuine and burning love for his fellow-men, for which much will always have to be forgiven him. We have never seen in our own generation—indeed the world has not seen more than once or twice in all the course of history—a literature which has exercised such prodigious influence over the minds of men, over every cast and shade of intellect, as that which emanated from Rousseau between 1749 and 1762. It was the first attempt to re-erect the edifice of human belief after the purely iconoclastic efforts commenced by Bayle, and in part by our own Locke, and consummated by Voltaire; and besides the superiority which every constructive effort will always enjoy over one that is merely destructive, it possessed the immense advantage of appearing amid an all but universal scepticism as to the soundness of all foregone knowledge in matters speculative. Now, in all the speculations of Rousseau, the central figure, whether arrayed in an English dress as the signatory of a social compact, or simply stripped naked of all historical qualities, is uniformly Man, in a supposed state of nature. Every law or institution which would misbeseem this imaginary being under these ideal circumstances is to be condemned as having lapsed from an original perfection; every transformation of society which would give it a closer resemblance to the world over which the creature of Nature reigned, is admirable and worthy052 to be effected at any apparent cost. The theory is still that of the Roman lawyers, for in the phantasmagoria with which the Natural Condition is peopled, every feature and characteristic eludes the mind except the simplicity and harmony which possessed such charms for the jurisconsult; but the theory is, as it were, turned upside down. It is not the Law of Nature, but the State of Nature, which is now the primary subject of contemplation. The Roman had conceived that by careful observation of existing institutions parts of them could be singled out which either exhibited already, or could by judicious purification be made to exhibit, the vestiges of that reign of nature whose reality he faintly affirmed. Rousseau's belief was that a perfect social order could be evolved from the unassisted consideration of the natural state, a social order wholly irrespective of the actual condition of the world and wholly unlike it. The great difference between the views is that one bitterly and broadly condemns the present for its unlikeness to the ideal past; while the other, assuming the present to be as necessary as the past, does not affect to disregard or censure it. It is not worth our while to analyse with any particularity that philosophy of politics, art, education, ethics, and social relation which was constructed on the basis of a state of nature. It still possesses singular fascination for the looser thinkers of every country, and is no doubt the parent, more or less remote, of almost all the prepossessions which impede the employment of the Historical Method of inquiry, but its discredit with the higher minds of our day is deep enough to astonish those who are familiar with the extraordinary vitality of speculative error. Perhaps the question most frequently asked nowadays is not what is the value of these opinions, but what were the causes which gave them such overshadowing prominence a hundred years ago. The answer is, I conceive, a simple one. The study which in the last century would best have corrected the misapprehensions into which an exclusive attention to legal antiquities is apt to betray was the study of religion. But Greek religion, as then understood, was dissipated in imaginative myths. The Oriental religions, if noticed at all, appeared to be lost in vain cosmogonies. There was but one body of primitive records which was worth studying—the early history of the Jews. But resort to this was prevented by the prejudices of the time. One of the few characteristics053 which the school of Rousseau had in common with the school of Voltaire was an utter disdain of all religious antiquities; and, more than all, of those of the Hebrew race. It is well known that it was a point of honour with the reasoners of that day to assume not merely that the institutions called after Moses were not divinely dictated, nor even that they were codified at a later date than that attributed to them, but that they and the entire Pentateuch were a gratuitous forgery, executed after the return from the Captivity. Debarred, therefore, from one chief security against speculative delusion, the philosophers of France, in their eagerness to escape from what they deemed a superstition of the priests, flung themselves headlong into a superstition of the lawyers.

The eighteenth century was halfway through when the most important period in the history of Natural Law arrived. If the discussion of the theory and its consequences had remained solely in the hands of the legal profession, it might have lost some of its respected status; by this time, the Esprit des Lois051 had been published. While it exaggerated and reflected the extreme reactions of its author against commonly accepted assumptions, it also revealed a wish to compromise with existing biases. Montesquieu's book, despite its flaws, followed the Historical Method, which natural law has never consistently upheld. Its impact on thought should have matched its popularity; however, it never had the chance to manifest itself, as the opposing theory it seemed set to counter suddenly shifted from the forum to the streets, becoming the central theme in far more captivating debates than those seen in courts or schools. The person who set this new course was a remarkable individual who, lacking formal education and virtues, and with little strength of character, has nonetheless left an indelible mark on history through the power of his imagination and a genuine passion for humanity, for which he will always be forgiven much. In our lifetime—indeed, throughout history—rarely has there been a body of literature that has had such an incredible impact on people's minds, cutting across all types of intellect, as that produced by Rousseau between 1749 and 1762. It was the first serious attempt to reconstruct human belief following the purely destructive efforts initiated by Bayle and partly by our own Locke, and completed by Voltaire. Besides the inherent advantage any constructive effort has over a merely destructive one, it also benefited from emerging during a period of widespread skepticism regarding the validity of past knowledge in speculative matters. In Rousseau's speculations, the main focus, whether dressed as the signer of a social contract or simply portrayed without historical context, is always Man in a supposed state of nature. Any law or institution that seems out of place for this imagined being in these ideal circumstances is deemed to have deviated from original perfection; any societal transformation that brings it closer to the world ruled by Nature’s creature is seen as admirable and worth pursuing at any evident cost. The theory still aligns with that of Roman lawyers, for in the illusion of the Natural Condition, all features and characteristics escape the mind except for the simplicity and harmony that appealed to the legal experts. However, the theory has, in a way, been flipped. Now, it is not the Law of Nature, but the State of Nature that takes center stage in contemplation. The Roman thinker believed that by carefully observing contemporary institutions, he could identify aspects that either already revealed or could, through careful refinement, reveal the remnants of that natural reign whose reality he only loosely affirmed. Rousseau’s belief was that a perfect social order could arise solely from the contemplation of the natural state, one that was entirely independent of the actual state of the world and fundamentally different from it. The significant distinction between the two viewpoints is that one harshly criticizes the present for its dissimilarity to the ideal past, while the other, accepting the present as equally necessary as the past, does not claim to ignore or condemn it. It is not worthwhile to delve deeply into the philosophy of politics, art, education, ethics, and social relationships that was built upon the notion of a state of nature. It continues to captivate the less rigorous thinkers from various countries and is likely the distant origin of nearly all the biases that obstruct the use of the Historical Method of inquiry, yet it has lost considerable credibility among the more insightful minds of our time, enough to surprise those familiar with the resilience of speculative errors. Perhaps the most frequent question asked today is not about the value of these opinions, but rather about the reasons that gave them such overwhelming prominence a hundred years ago. The answer, I believe, is straightforward. The study that could have best corrected the misunderstandings often caused by an exclusive focus on legal history was the study of religion. However, Greek religion, as it was understood at the time, had deteriorated into imaginative myths. The Eastern religions, if acknowledged at all, seemed lost in meaningless cosmogonies. There was only one set of ancient records worth examining—the early history of the Jews. Yet, access to this was blocked by the era’s prejudices. One of the few things the Rousseau school shared with the Voltaire school was a complete disdain for all religious antiquities, particularly those of the Hebrew people. It is well known that it was considered a point of pride among the rational thinkers of that time to assert not only that the institutions attributed to Moses were not divinely inspired, nor even that they were codified later than claimed, but also that the entire Pentateuch was a baseless forgery created after the return from captivity. Consequently, deprived of a principal safeguard against speculative delusion, the French philosophers, in their rush to escape what they perceived as priestly superstition, plunged headfirst into a superstition of the lawyers.

But though the philosophy founded on the hypothesis of a state of nature has fallen low in general esteem, in so far as it is looked upon under its coarser and more palpable aspect, it does not follow that in its subtler disguises it has lost plausibility, popularity, or power. I believe, as I have said, that it is still the great antagonist of the Historical Method; and whenever (religious objections apart) any mind is seen to resist or contemn that mode of investigation, it will generally be found under the influence of a prejudice or vicious bias traceable to a conscious or unconscious reliance on a non-historic, natural, condition of society or the individual. It is chiefly, however, by allying themselves with political and social tendencies that the doctrines of Nature and her law have preserved their energy. Some of these tendencies they have stimulated, others they have actually created, to a great number they have given expression and form. They visibly enter largely into the ideas which constantly radiate from France over the civilised world, and thus become part of the general body of thought by which its civilisation is modified. The value of the influence which they thus exercise over the fortunes of the race is of course one of the points which our age debates most warmly, and it is beside the purpose of this treatise to discuss it. Looking back, however, to the period at which the theory of the state of nature acquired the maximum of political importance, there are few who will deny that it helped most powerfully to bring about the grosser disappointments of which the first French Revolution was fertile. It gave birth, or intense stimulus, to the vices of mental habit all but universal at the054 time, disdain of positive law, impatience of experience, and the preference of à priori to all other reasoning. In proportion too as this philosophy fixes its grasp on minds which have thought less than others and fortified themselves with smaller observation, its tendency is to become distinctly anarchical. It is surprising to note how many of the Sophismes Anarchiques which Dumont published for Bentham, and which embody Bentham's exposure of errors distinctively French, are derived from the Roman hypothesis in its French transformation, and are unintelligible unless referred to it. On this point too it is a curious exercise to consult the Moniteur during the principal eras of the Revolution. The appeals to the Law and State of Nature become thicker as the times grow darker. They are comparatively rare in the Constituent Assembly; they are much more frequent in the Legislative; in the Convention, amid the din of debate on conspiracy and war, they are perpetual.

But even though the philosophy based on the idea of a state of nature has lost a lot of its status, when viewed in its more basic form, it doesn't mean that in its more refined forms it has lost its appeal, popularity, or influence. I believe, as I've mentioned, that it is still the main rival of the Historical Method; and whenever anyone—setting aside religious objections—refuses or looks down on that way of investigation, it usually stems from a prejudice or bias based on a conscious or unconscious belief in a non-historic, natural state of society or the individual. However, the ideas of Nature and its laws have mainly maintained their strength by connecting with political and social movements. Some of these movements they have energized, others they have actually created, and many they have given voice and form. They significantly contribute to the concepts that frequently spread from France across the civilized world, becoming part of the overall mindset that shapes its civilization. The significance of the influence they have on the future of humankind is, of course, one of the hottest topics of debate in our age, and discussing it is outside the scope of this work. However, looking back to the time when the theory of the state of nature had the most political impact, few would deny that it played a powerful role in causing the significant disappointments that emerged during the first French Revolution. It fueled, or at least intensified, the widespread mental habits of that time, such as disdain for positive law, impatience with experience, and a preference for a priori reasoning over all other types. Moreover, as this philosophy gains traction among people who have thought less critically and relied on limited observation, it tends to become explicitly anarchic. It's surprising to see how many of the *Sophismes Anarchiques* that Dumont published for Bentham, which reflect Bentham's critique of distinctly French errors, are derived from the Roman hypothesis in its French form and are incomprehensible without referring to it. It's also interesting to look at the *Moniteur* during key periods of the Revolution. Appeals to the Law and State of Nature become more frequent as times get tougher. They are relatively rare in the Constituent Assembly, more common in the Legislative Assembly, and become constant in the Convention amid the chaos of debates on conspiracy and war.

There is a single example which very strikingly illustrates the effects of the theory of natural law on modern society, and indicates how very far are those effects from being exhausted. There cannot, I conceive, be any question that to the assumption of a Law Natural we owe the doctrine of the fundamental equality of human beings. That "all men are equal" is one of a large number of legal propositions which, in progress of time, have become political. The Roman jurisconsults of the Antonine era lay down that "omnes homines naturâ æquales sunt," but in their eyes this is a strictly juridical axiom. They intend to affirm that, under the hypothetical Law of Nature, and in so far as positive law approximates to it, the arbitrary distinctions which the Roman Civil Law maintained between classes of persons cease to have a legal existence. The rule was one of considerable importance to the Roman practitioner, who required to be reminded that, wherever Roman jurisprudence was assumed to conform itself exactly to the code of Nature, there was no difference in the contemplation of the Roman tribunals between citizen and foreigner, between freeman and slave, between Agnate and Cognate. The jurisconsults who thus expressed themselves most certainly never intended to censure the social arrangements under which civil law fell somewhat short of its speculative type; nor did they apparently believe that the world would ever see human society completely055 assimilated to the economy of nature. But when the doctrine of human equality makes its appearance in a modern dress it has evidently clothed itself with a new shade of meaning. Where the Roman jurisconsult had written "æquales sunt," meaning exactly what he said, the modern civilian wrote "all men are equal" in the sense of "all men ought to be equal." The peculiar Roman idea that natural law coexisted with civil law and gradually absorbed it, had evidently been lost sight of, or had become unintelligible, and the words which had at most conveyed a theory concerning the origin, composition, and development of human institutions, were beginning to express the sense of a great standing wrong suffered by mankind. As early as the beginning of the fourteenth century, the current language concerning the birth-state of men, though visibly intended to be identical with that of Ulpian and his contemporaries, has assumed an altogether different form and meaning. The preamble to the celebrated ordinance of King Louis Hutin enfranchising the serfs of the royal domains would have sounded strangely to Roman ears. "Whereas, according to natural law, everybody ought to be born free; and by some usages and customs which, from long antiquity, have been introduced and kept until now in our realm, and peradventure by reason of the misdeeds of their predecessors, many persons of our common people have fallen into servitude, therefore, We, etc." This is the enunciation not of a legal rule but of a political dogma; and from this time the equality of men is spoken of by the French lawyers just as if it were a political truth which happened to have been preserved among the archives of their science. Like all other deductions from the hypothesis of a Law Natural, and like the belief itself in a Law of Nature, it was languidly assented to and suffered to have little influence on opinion and practice until it passed out of the possession of the lawyers into that of the literary men of the eighteenth century and of the public which sat at their feet. With them it became the most distinct tenet of their creed, and was even regarded as a summary of all the others. It is probable, however, that the power which it ultimately acquired over the events of 1789 was not entirely owing to its popularity in France, for in the middle of the century it passed over to America. The American lawyers of the time, and particularly those of Virginia, appear to have possessed a stock of know056ledge which differed chiefly from that of their English contemporaries in including much which could only have been derived from the legal literature of continental Europe. A very few glances at the writings of Jefferson will show how strongly his mind was affected by the semi-juridical, semi-popular opinions which were fashionable in France, and we cannot doubt that it was sympathy with the peculiar ideas of the French jurists which led him and the other colonial lawyers who guided the course of events in America to join the specially French assumption that "all men are born equal" with the assumption, more familiar to Englishmen, that "all men are born free," in the very first lines of their Declaration of Independence. The passage was one of great importance to the history of the doctrine before us. The American lawyers, in thus prominently and emphatically affirming the fundamental equality of human beings, gave an impulse to political movements in their own country, and in a less degree in Great Britain, which is far from having yet spent itself; but besides this they returned the dogma they had adopted to its home in France, endowed with vastly greater energy and enjoying much greater claims on general reception and respect. Even the more cautious politicians of the first Constituent Assembly repeated Ulpian's proposition as if it at once commended itself to the instincts and intuitions of mankind; and of all the "principles of 1789" it is the one which has been least strenuously assailed, which has most thoroughly leavened modern opinion, and which promises to modify most deeply the constitution of societies and the politics of states.

There’s one clear example that vividly shows the impact of natural law theory on modern society and highlights how far those effects are from being fully realized. There can be no doubt that the idea of Natural Law has led to the belief in the fundamental equality of all people. The statement "all men are equal" is among many legal principles that over time have become political. Roman legal experts from the Antonine period stated that "omnes homines naturâ æquales sunt," but they viewed this purely as a legal principle. They meant to assert that, under the hypothetical Law of Nature, and as far as positive law aligns with it, the arbitrary distinctions made by Roman Civil Law between different classes of people lose their legal validity. This rule was significant for Roman lawyers, who needed to be reminded that wherever Roman law was thought to comply exactly with the code of Nature, there was no distinction in the eyes of Roman courts between citizen and foreigner, between free person and slave, between Agnate and Cognate. The legal experts who made these statements certainly didn’t intend to criticize the social structures that civil law imposed, which fell short of this ideal; nor did they seem to believe that the world would ever fully reflect the natural order. However, when the concept of human equality emerged in a modern context, it clearly took on a new meaning. Where the Roman legal expert wrote "æquales sunt," stating exactly what they meant, modern legal texts assert "all men are equal" in the sense that "all men should be equal." The unique Roman belief that natural law existed alongside civil law and gradually integrated it appears to have been overlooked or become unclear. The phrases that once expressed theories about the origin, structure, and evolution of human institutions began to reflect a significant injustice faced by mankind. As early as the early fourteenth century, the common language regarding the birthright of individuals, although clearly meant to echo that of Ulpian and his contemporaries, had taken on an entirely different form and meaning. The introduction to King Louis Hutin's famous decree freeing the serfs from royal properties would have sounded odd to Roman ears: "Whereas, according to natural law, everyone ought to be born free; and due to certain customs and practices, which, from ancient times, have been established and maintained in our realm, and perhaps because of the wrongs of their ancestors, many individuals of our common people have become enslaved, therefore, We, etc." This is not a legal ruling but rather a political statement; from this point onward, the equality of men was treated by French lawyers as if it were a political truth preserved in the archives of their discipline. Like every other conclusion drawn from the idea of Natural Law, and like the belief in a Law of Nature itself, it was passively accepted and had little influence on thoughts and practices until it transitioned from lawyers to the literary figures of the eighteenth century and to the public that embraced their ideas. For them, it became a core principle of their beliefs, even regarded as a summary of all others. However, it is likely that the influence it ultimately had during the events of 1789 wasn’t solely due to its popularity in France, since it made its way to America in the mid-century. The American lawyers of the time, particularly those in Virginia, seemed to have a wealth of knowledge that mainly differed from their English counterparts by including much from legal literature in continental Europe. A brief look at Jefferson’s writings reveals how strongly he was influenced by the semi-legal, semi-popular views that were in vogue in France. It’s clear that his sympathy for the unique perspectives of French jurists led him, along with other colonial lawyers guiding the American revolution, to combine the distinctly French assertion that "all men are born equal" with the more familiar English idea that "all men are born free" in the opening lines of their Declaration of Independence. This statement was crucial to the history of the doctrine we are discussing. By prominently and emphatically asserting the fundamental equality of all human beings, the American lawyers inspired political movements in their country and, to a lesser extent, in Great Britain—movements that are far from exhausted. Moreover, they brought back this principle to France, now infused with significantly more power and with strong claims for widespread acceptance and respect. Even the more cautious politicians of the first Constituent Assembly echoed Ulpian's statement as if it naturally resonated with human instincts and intuitions; of all the "principles of 1789," it has faced the least vigorous opposition, has most thoroughly influenced modern thought, and holds the greatest potential to reshape societal structures and state politics.

The grandest function of the Law of Nature was discharged in giving birth to modern International Law and to the modern Law of War, but this part of its effects must here be dismissed with consideration very unequal to its importance.

The greatest role of the Law of Nature was fulfilled in creating modern International Law and the modern Law of War, but this aspect of its impact must be addressed with far less attention than it deserves.

Among the postulates which form the foundation of International Law, or of so much of it as retains the figure which it received from its original architects, there are two or three of pre-eminent importance. The first of all is expressed in the position that there is a determinable Law of Nature. Grotius and his successors took the assumption directly from the Romans, but they differed widely from the Roman jurisconsults and from each other in their ideas as to the mode of determination. The ambition of almost every Publicist057 who has flourished since the revival of letters has been to provide new and more manageable definitions of Nature and of her law, and it is indisputable that the conception in passing through the long series of writers on Public Law has gathered round it a large accretion, consisting of fragments of ideas derived from nearly every theory of ethics which has in its turn taken possession of the schools. Yet it is a remarkable proof of the essentially historical character of the conception that, after all the efforts which have been made to evolve the code of nature from the necessary characteristics of the natural state, so much of the result is just what it would have been if men had been satisfied to adopt the dicta of the Roman lawyers without questioning or reviewing them. Setting aside the Conventional or Treaty Law of Nations, it is surprising how large a part of the system is made up of pure Roman law. Wherever there is a doctrine of the jurisconsults affirmed by them to be in harmony with the Jus Gentium, the publicists have found a reason for borrowing it, however plainly it may bear the marks of a distinctively Roman origin. We may observe too that the derivative theories are afflicted with the weakness of the primary notion. In the majority of the Publicists, the mode of thought is still "mixed." In studying these writers, the great difficulty is always to discover whether they are discussing law or morality—whether the state of international relations they describe is actual or ideal—whether they lay down that which is, or that which, in their opinion, ought to be.

Among the basic principles that underpin International Law, or at least the parts that still reflect what the original creators intended, there are a few that stand out as particularly important. The most significant of these is the idea that there is a definable Law of Nature. Grotius and others who followed him took this assumption straight from the Romans, but they had different views from each other and from Roman legal experts about how to define it. Since the Renaissance, almost every scholar in Public Law has aimed to offer new and clearer definitions of Nature and her law. It's undeniable that the concept has evolved over time, collecting various ideas from nearly every ethical theory that has been influential in academia. Nevertheless, it’s intriguing that despite all the efforts to define the code of nature based on the essential traits of the natural state, much of the outcome resembles what it would have been if people had simply accepted the views of Roman lawyers without questioning them. Excluding Conventional or Treaty Law among nations, it's surprising how much of the system is composed of pure Roman law. Whenever there's a doctrine from the Roman experts claimed to align with the Jus Gentium, publicists have found reasons to adopt it, regardless of its clear Roman roots. We can also note that these derivative theories often share the same weaknesses as the original idea. For many Publicists, their thinking tends to be "mixed." When studying these writers, it’s often challenging to determine whether they are discussing law or morality—whether the state of international relations they describe is real or ideal—whether they are stating what is or what they believe should be.

The assumption that Natural Law is binding on states inter se is the next in rank of those which underlie International Law. A series of assertions or admissions of this principle may be traced up to the very infancy of modern juridical science, and at first sight it seems a direct inference from the teaching of the Romans. The civil condition of society being distinguished from the natural by the fact that in the first there is a distinct author of law, while in the last there is none, it appears as if the moment a number of units were acknowledged to obey no common sovereign or political superior they were thrown back on the ulterior behests of the Law Natural. States are such units; the hypothesis of their independence excludes the notion of a common lawgiver, and draws with it, therefore, according to a certain range of ideas, the notion of subjection to the primeval order of nature.058 The alternative is to consider independent communities as not related to each other by any law, but this condition of lawlessness is exactly the vacuum which the Nature of the jurisconsults abhorred. There is certainly apparent reason for thinking that if the mind of a Roman lawyer rested on any sphere from which civil law was banished, it would instantly fill the void with the ordinances of Nature. It is never safe, however, to assume that conclusions, however certain and immediate in our own eyes, were actually drawn at any period of history. No passage has ever been adduced from the remains of Roman law which, in my judgment, proves the jurisconsults to have believed natural law to have obligatory force between independent commonwealths; and we cannot but see that to citizens of the Roman empire who regarded their sovereign's dominions as conterminous with civilisation, the equal subjection of states to the Law of Nature, if contemplated at all, must have seemed at most an extreme result of curious speculation. The truth appears to be that modern International Law, undoubted as is its descent from Roman law, is only connected with it by an irregular filiation. The early modern interpreters of the jurisprudence of Rome, misconceiving the meaning of Jus Gentium, assumed without hesitation that the Romans had bequeathed to them a system of rules for the adjustment of international transactions. This "Law of Nations" was at first an authority which had formidable competitors to strive with, and the condition of Europe was long such as to preclude its universal reception. Gradually, however, the western world arranged itself in a form more favourable to the theory of the civilians; circumstances destroyed the credit of rival doctrines; and at last, at a peculiarly felicitous conjuncture, Ayala and Grotius were able to obtain for it the enthusiastic assent of Europe, an assent which has been over and over again renewed in every variety of solemn engagement. The great men to whom its triumph is chiefly owing attempted, it need scarcely be said, to place it on an entirely new basis, and it is unquestionable that in the course of this displacement they altered much of its structure, though far less of it than is commonly supposed. Having adopted from the Antonine jurisconsults the position that the Jus Gentium and the Jus Naturæ were identical, Grotius, with his immediate predecessors and his immediate successors, attributed to the059 Law of Nature an authority which would never perhaps have been claimed for it, if "Law of Nations" had not in that age been an ambiguous expression. They laid down unreservedly that Natural Law is the code of states, and thus put in operation a process which has continued almost down to our own day, the process of engrafting on the international system rules which are supposed to have been evolved from the unassisted contemplation of the conception of Nature. There is too one consequence of immense practical importance to mankind which, though not unknown during the early modern history of Europe, was never clearly or universally acknowledged till the doctrines of the Grotian school had prevailed. If the society of nations is governed by Natural Law, the atoms which compose it must be absolutely equal. Men under the sceptre of Nature are all equal, and accordingly commonwealths are equal if the international state be one of nature. The proposition that independent communities, however different in size and power, are all equal in the view of the law of nations, has largely contributed to the happiness of mankind, though it is constantly threatened by the political tendencies of each successive age. It is a doctrine which probably would never have obtained a secure footing at all if International Law had not been entirely derived from the majestic claims of Nature by the Publicists who wrote after the revival of letters.

The idea that Natural Law applies to states inter se is one of the key principles underlying International Law. You can trace a series of acknowledgments of this concept back to the early days of modern legal science, and at first glance, it seems to directly follow from Roman teachings. Society's civil state is different from the natural state because, in civil society, there is a clear authority that creates laws, whereas in the natural state, there isn't one. It appears that when several units are recognized as not obeying any common authority or political superior, they revert to the broader rules of Natural Law. States are such units; the assumption of their independence implies that there isn’t a common lawmaker, which then aligns with the idea of being subject to the original natural order.058 The other option is to treat independent communities as having no laws connecting them, but this state of lawlessness is precisely what the nature of legal scholars could not accept. It seems reasonable to think that if a Roman lawyer considered a space devoid of civil law, they would immediately fill that gap with Natural Law's principles. However, it's never wise to assume that conclusions we see as obvious were actually reached at any point in history. No evidence has been found in Roman law that proves legal scholars believed natural law was binding on independent states; and we must understand that for citizens of the Roman Empire, who saw their ruler's territories as synonymous with civilization, the idea that states are equally subjected to Natural Law, if it crossed their minds at all, would have seemed a far-fetched conclusion. The reality is that while modern International Law undeniably traces its roots to Roman law, its connection is somewhat irregular. The early modern interpreters of Roman jurisprudence, misunderstanding the meaning of Jus Gentium, assumed that the Romans left them a system for managing international relations. This "Law of Nations" initially faced strong competition, and Europe's situation long prevented its widespread acceptance. However, as Western civilization gradually organized itself in a way that favored the civilians' theory, the credibility of rival doctrines diminished, and eventually, during a particularly opportune moment, Ayala and Grotius were able to gain enthusiastic support for it across Europe, support that has been repeatedly reaffirmed through various solemn agreements. The prominent figures instrumental in its success aimed to establish it on a completely new foundation, and it’s clear that in this shift, they transformed much of its structure, though perhaps not as much as people generally believe. After adopting the view from the Antonine legal scholars that Jus Gentium and Jus Naturæ were the same, Grotius, along with his immediate predecessors and successors, attributed to the059 Law of Nature an authority that might not have been claimed for it if "Law of Nations" hadn’t been such an ambiguous term at the time. They emphatically stated that Natural Law is the code for states, thus initiating a process that continues to this day, of incorporating into the international system principles believed to arise from an independent reflection on Nature. There is also one highly significant consequence for humanity that, although not entirely unknown in early modern European history, was never clearly or universally recognized until the Grotian doctrines gained acceptance. If the society of nations is governed by Natural Law, the individual entities that make it up must all be completely equal. Under Natural Law, all men are equal, and so are governments if the international order is seen as natural. The idea that independent communities, no matter how different in size and power, are all equal according to the law of nations has greatly contributed to human happiness, even as it faces challenges from the political trends of each era. This principle likely would not have gained a solid foundation at all if International Law hadn’t been fully derived from Nature's authoritative claims by the legal thinkers of the post-Renaissance period.

On the whole, however, it is astonishing, as I have observed before, how small a proportion the additions made to International Law since Grotius's day bear to the ingredients which have been simply taken from the most ancient stratum of the Roman Jus Gentium. Acquisition of territory has always been the great spur of national ambition, and the rules which govern this acquisition, together with the rules which moderate the wars in which it too frequently results, are merely transcribed from the part of the Roman law which treats of the modes of acquiring property jure gentium. These modes of acquisition were obtained by the elder jurisconsults, as I have attempted to explain, by abstracting a common ingredient from the usages observed to prevail among the various tribes surrounding Rome; and, having been classed on account of their origin in the "law common to all nations," they were thought by the later lawyers to fit in, on the score of their simplicity, with the more recent conception of a Law060 Natural. They thus made their way into the modern Law of Nations, and the result is that those parts of the international system which refer to dominion, its nature, its limitations, the modes of acquiring and securing it, are pure Roman Property Law—so much, that is to say, of the Roman Law of Property as the Antonine jurisconsults imagined to exhibit a certain congruity with the natural state. In order that these chapters of International Law may be capable of application, it is necessary that sovereigns should be related to each other like the members of a group of Roman proprietors. This is another of the postulates which lie at the threshold of the International Code, and it is also one which could not possibly have been subscribed to during the first centuries of modern European history. It is resolvable into the double proposition that "sovereignty is territorial," i.e. that it is always associated with the proprietorship of a limited portion of the earth's surface, and that "sovereigns inter se are to be deemed not paramount, but absolute, owners of the state's territory."

Overall, it’s surprising, as I’ve pointed out before, how little the additions to International Law since Grotius’s time compare to the elements that have simply been borrowed from the oldest layers of Roman Jus Gentium. The acquisition of territory has always been a major motivation for national ambition, and the rules that govern this acquisition, along with the rules that regulate the wars it often leads to, are basically copied from the part of Roman law that deals with ways to acquire property jure gentium. These methods of acquisition were developed by early legal experts, as I’ve tried to explain, by identifying a common factor from the practices seen among the various tribes around Rome; they were categorized as part of the "law common to all nations," and later lawyers thought they fit well, due to their simplicity, with the newer idea of a Law060 Natural. As a result, they made their way into modern Law of Nations, and this means that the aspects of the international system that relate to dominion, its nature, its restrictions, and the ways of obtaining and securing it, are essentially Roman Property Law—specifically, that part of the Roman Law of Property that the Antonine jurists believed aligned with the natural condition. For these chapters of International Law to be applicable, it’s essential that sovereigns relate to each other like members of a group of Roman property owners. This is another premise that lies at the foundation of the International Code, and it’s one that couldn’t have been accepted during the early centuries of modern European history. It can be broken down into the two propositions that "sovereignty is territorial," meaning it’s always linked to ownership of a specific area of the earth’s surface, and that "sovereigns inter se are to be considered not paramount, but absolute, owners of the state's territory."

Many contemporary writers on International Law tacitly assume that the doctrines of their system, founded on principles of equity and common sense, were capable of being readily reasoned out in every stage of modern civilisation. But this assumption, while it conceals some real defects of the international theory, is altogether untenable, so far as regards a large part of modern history. It is not true that the authority of the Jus Gentium in the concerns of nations was always uncontradicted; on the contrary, it had to struggle long against the claims of several competing systems. It is again not true that the territorial character of sovereignty was always recognised, for long after the dissolution of the Roman dominion the minds of men were under the empire of ideas irreconcileable with such a conception. An old order of things, and of views founded on it, had to decay—a new Europe, and an apparatus of new notions congenial to it, had to spring up—before two of the chiefest postulates of International Law could be universally conceded.

Many modern writers on International Law assume that the principles of their system, based on fairness and logic, could easily be reasoned out in every phase of today's society. However, this assumption, while it hides some real flaws in international theory, is completely unrealistic when it comes to a significant portion of modern history. It's not true that the authority of International Law regarding nations was always uncontested; in fact, it had to fight hard against several rival systems. It's also not true that the territorial nature of sovereignty was always accepted; for a long time after the fall of the Roman Empire, people's thoughts were influenced by ideas that were incompatible with such a belief. An old order and the views based on it had to decline—a new Europe with new ideas related to it had to emerge—before two of the main principles of International Law could be widely accepted.

It is a consideration well worthy to be kept in view, that during a large part of what we usually term modern history no such conception was entertained as that of "territorial sovereignty." Sovereignty was not associated with dominion over a portion or subdivision of the earth. The world had lain061 for so many centuries under the shadow of Imperial Rome as to have forgotten that distribution of the vast spaces comprised in the empire which had once parcelled them out into a number of independent commonwealths, claiming immunity from extrinsic interference, and pretending to equality of national rights. After the subsidence of the barbarian irruptions, the notion of sovereignty that prevailed seems to have been twofold. On the one hand it assumed the form of what may be called "tribe-sovereignty." The Franks, the Burgundians, the Vandals, the Lombards, and Visigoths were masters, of course, of the territories which they occupied, and to which some of them have given a geographical appellation; but they based no claim of right upon the fact of territorial possession, and indeed attached no importance to it whatever. They appear to have retained the traditions which they brought with them from the forest and the steppe, and to have still been in their own view a patriarchal society, a nomad horde, merely encamped for the time upon the soil which afforded them sustenance. Part of Transalpine Gaul, with part of Germany, had now become the country de facto occupied by the Franks—it was France; but the Merovingian line of chieftains, the descendants of Clovis, were not Kings of France, they were Kings of the Franks. The alternative to this peculiar notion of sovereignty appears to have been—and this is the important point—the idea of universal dominion. The moment a monarch departed from the special relation of chief to clansmen, and became solicitous, for purposes of his own, to invest himself with a novel form of sovereignty, the only precedent which suggested itself for his adoption was the domination of the Emperors of Rome. To parody a common quotation, he became "aut Cæsar aut nullus." Either he pretended to the full prerogative of the Byzantine Emperor, or he had no political status whatever. In our own age, when a new dynasty is desirous of obliterating the prescriptive title of a deposed line of sovereigns, it takes its designation from the people, instead of the territory. Thus we have Emperors and Kings of the French, and a King of the Belgians. At the period of which we have been speaking, under similar circumstances a different alternative presented itself. The Chieftain who would no longer call himself King of the tribe must claim to be Emperor of the world. Thus, when the hereditary Mayors of the Palace had ceased to062 compromise with the monarchs they had long since virtually dethroned, they soon became unwilling to call themselves Kings of the Franks, a title which belonged to the displaced Merovings; but they could not style themselves Kings of France, for such a designation, though apparently not unknown, was not a title of dignity. Accordingly they came forward as aspirants to universal empire. Their motive has been greatly misapprehended. It has been taken for granted by recent French writers that Charlemagne was far before his age, quite as much in the character of his designs as in the energy with which he prosecuted them. Whether it be true or not that anybody is at any time before his age, it is certainly true that Charlemagne, in aiming at an unlimited dominion, was emphatically taking the only course which the characteristic ideas of his age permitted him to follow. Of his intellectual eminence there cannot be a question, but it is proved by his acts and not by his theory.

It's worth noting that for a significant part of what we commonly refer to as modern history, the idea of "territorial sovereignty" wasn't even a concept. Sovereignty wasn't linked to control over a specific area of land. For centuries, the world was under the influence of Imperial Rome, so much so that it forgot the way vast regions within that empire had once been divided into independent states, each claiming independence from outside interference and asserting equal rights as nations. After the invasions by barbarian tribes, the prevalent idea of sovereignty seemed to have two forms. On one hand, there was what might be called "tribe-sovereignty." The Franks, Burgundians, Vandals, Lombards, and Visigoths were in control of the lands they occupied, some of which they even named; however, they didn't base their rights on that land ownership and, in fact, didn't see it as important at all. They seemed to have kept the traditions they brought from their earlier lives in forests and steppes, still perceiving themselves as a patriarchal society, a nomadic horde just temporarily settled on the land that provided them food. Parts of what is now France and some of Germany were effectively occupied by the Franks, but the Merovingian chieftains, descendants of Clovis, were not considered Kings of France; they were Kings of the Franks. The alternative to this unique understanding of sovereignty seems to have been the idea of universal rule. The moment a monarch moved away from his specific role of chief to his followers and sought to reshape his sovereignty for his own interests, the only example that came to mind was the control exercised by the Roman Emperors. To paraphrase a well-known quote, he became "aut Cæsar aut nullus." Either he claimed the full powers of the Byzantine Emperor, or he had no political status at all. In today's world, when a new dynasty wants to erase the legitimate claim of a dethroned line of rulers, it adopts its name from the people instead of the territory. Hence, we have Emperors and Kings of the French and a King of the Belgians. During the time we're discussing, under similar conditions, another option was available. A chieftain who no longer wanted to be called King of the tribe had to claim to be Emperor of the world. So, when the hereditary Mayors of the Palace stopped compromising with the monarchs they had long since effectively dethroned, they quickly became reluctant to call themselves Kings of the Franks, a title that belonged to the deposed Merovings. However, they couldn't name themselves Kings of France, as that designation, although known, wasn't a title of prestige. Thus, they positioned themselves as contenders for universal rule. Their intentions have often been misunderstood. Recent French writers have assumed that Charlemagne was ahead of his time in both his ambitions and the determination with which he pursued them. Whether or not anyone can truly be ahead of their time, it's undeniably clear that Charlemagne, in pursuing an expansive rule, was unequivocally following the only path allowed by the prevailing ideas of his age. His intellectual brilliance is beyond question, but it shows through his actions, not just his ideas.

These singularities of view were not altered on the partition of the inheritance of Charlemagne among his three grandsons. Charles the Bald, Lewis, and Lothair were still theoretically—if it be proper to use the word—Emperors of Rome. Just as the Cæsars of the Eastern and Western Empires had each been de jure emperor of the whole world, with de facto control over half of it, so the three Carlovingians appear to have considered their power as limited, but their title as unqualified. The same speculative universality of sovereignty continued to be associated with the Imperial throne after the second division on the death of Charles the Fat, and, indeed, was never thoroughly dissociated from it so long as the empire of Germany lasted. Territorial sovereignty—the view which connects sovereignty with the possession of a limited portion of the earth's surface—was distinctly an offshoot, though a tardy one, of feudalism. This might have been expected à priori, for it was feudalism which for the first time linked personal duties, and by consequence personal rights, to the ownership of land. Whatever be the proper view of its origin and legal nature, the best mode of vividly picturing to ourselves the feudal organisation is to begin with the basis, to consider the relation of the tenant to the patch of soil which created and limited his services—and then to mount up, through narrowing circles of super-feudation, till we approximate063 to the apex of the system. Where that summit exactly was during the later portion of the dark ages it is not easy to decide. Probably, wherever the conception of tribe sovereignty had really decayed, the topmost point was always assigned to the supposed successor of the Cæsars of the West. But before long, when the actual sphere of Imperial authority had immensely contracted, and when the emperors had concentrated the scanty remains of their power upon Germany and North Italy, the highest feudal superiors in all the outlying portions of the former Carlovingian empire found themselves practically without a supreme head. Gradually they habituated themselves to the new situation, and the fact of immunity put at last out of sight the theory of dependence; but there are many symptoms that this change was not quite easily accomplished; and, indeed, to the impression that in the nature of things there must necessarily be a culminating domination somewhere, we may, no doubt, refer the increasing tendency to attribute secular superiority to the See of Rome. The completion of the first stage in the revolution of opinion is marked, of course, by the accession of the Capetian dynasty in France. When the feudal prince of a limited territory surrounding Paris began, from the accident of his uniting an unusual number of suzerainties in his own person, to call himself King of France, he became king in quite a new sense, a sovereign standing in the same relation to the soil of France as the baron to his estate, the tenant to his freehold. The precedent, however, was as influential as it was novel, and the form of the monarchy in France had visible effects in hastening changes which were elsewhere proceeding in the same direction. The kingship of our Anglo-Saxon regal houses was midway between the chieftainship of a tribe and a territorial supremacy; but the superiority of the Norman monarchs, imitated from that of the King of France, was distinctly a territorial sovereignty. Every subsequent dominion which was established or consolidated was formed on the later model. Spain, Naples, and the principalities founded on the ruins of municipal freedom in Italy, were all under rulers whose sovereignty was territorial. Few things, I may add, are more curious than the gradual lapse of the Venetians from one view to the other. At the commencement of its foreign conquests, the republic regarded064 itself as an antitype of the Roman commonwealth, governing a number of subject provinces. Move a century onwards, and you find that it wishes to be looked upon as a corporate sovereign, claiming the rights of a feudal suzerain over its possessions in Italy and the Ægean.

These unique perspectives didn't change when Charlemagne's inheritance was divided among his three grandsons. Charles the Bald, Lewis, and Lothair still considered themselves—if it's appropriate to say this—Emperors of Rome. Just like the Caesars of the Eastern and Western Empires were each the legal rulers of the whole world, while effectively controlling half of it, these three Carolingians saw their power as limited, but their title as absolute. The same idea of universal sovereignty continued to be tied to the Imperial throne after the second division following Charles the Fat's death, and indeed, it was never completely separated from it as long as the German empire existed. Territorial sovereignty—the idea that sovereignty is linked to the control of a specific area of land—was clearly an offshoot, albeit a late one, of feudalism. This was to be expected, as feudalism was the first system to connect personal duties, and therefore personal rights, to land ownership. To vividly understand the feudal organization, it helps to start with the foundation: looking at the relationship between the tenant and the land that defined and constrained his obligations—and then work upward through layers of feudal relationships until we approach the top of the hierarchy. It’s tricky to pinpoint the exact peak during the later part of the dark ages. Likely, wherever the idea of tribal sovereignty had faded, the highest authority was seen as belonging to the assumed successor of the Western Caesars. However, as the actual extent of Imperial power greatly shrank, and when emperors focused the leftover remnants of their authority on Germany and Northern Italy, the top feudal lords in the outer areas of the former Carolingian empire found themselves effectively without a supreme leader. Gradually, they adapted to this new reality, and the fact of independence eventually overshadowed the notion of dependence; yet, multiple signs suggest that this transition wasn’t entirely smooth. Indeed, the belief that there must inherently be a central authority somewhere likely contributed to the growing tendency to assign secular superiority to the Papacy in Rome. The culmination of the first phase in this shift in thinking is marked by the rise of the Capetian dynasty in France. When the feudal lord of a limited area around Paris started to call himself King of France due to his unusual accumulation of lordships, he became a king in a completely new sense—a sovereign connected to the land of France in a way similar to that of a baron to his estate, or a tenant to his freehold. However, this precedent was as powerful as it was new, and the style of monarchy in France visibly sped up changes happening elsewhere in the same direction. The kingship of our Anglo-Saxon royal houses was a blend of tribal leadership and territorial authority; however, the dominance of the Norman kings, modeled after the King of France, was distinctly territorial sovereignty. Every subsequent authority that was established or consolidated followed this later model. Spain, Naples, and the principalities that emerged from the collapse of municipal independence in Italy all fell under rulers whose sovereignty was territorial. Few things are more fascinating than the gradual shift of the Venetians from one perspective to another. At the start of its foreign conquests, the republic viewed itself as a counterpart to the Roman republic, governing multiple subject provinces. Move a century ahead, and you see that it seeks recognition as a corporate sovereign, claiming the rights of a feudal lord over its territories in Italy and the Aegean.

During the period through which the popular ideas on the subject of sovereignty were undergoing this remarkable change, the system which stood in the place of what we now call International Law, was heterogeneous in form and inconsistent in the principles to which it appealed. Over so much of Europe as was comprised in the Romano-German empire, the connection of the confederate states was regulated by the complex and as yet incomplete mechanism of the Imperial constitution; and, surprising as it may seem to us, it was a favourite notion of German lawyers that the relations of commonwealths, whether inside or outside the empire, ought to be regulated not by the Jus Gentium, but by the pure Roman jurisprudence, of which Cæsar was still the centre. This doctrine was less confidently repudiated in the outlying countries than we might have supposed antecedently; but, substantially, through the rest of Europe feudal subordinations furnished a substitute for a public law; and when those were undetermined or ambiguous, there lay behind, in theory at least, a supreme regulating force in the authority of the head of the Church. It is certain, however, that both feudal and ecclesiastical influences were rapidly decaying during the fifteenth, and even the fourteenth century; and if we closely examine the current pretexts of wars, and the avowed motives of alliances, it will be seen that, step by step with the displacement of the old principles, the views afterwards harmonised and consolidated by Ayala and Grotius were making considerable progress, though it was silent and but slow. Whether the fusion of all the sources of authority would ultimately have evolved a system of international relations, and whether that system would have exhibited material differences from the fabric of Grotius, is not now possible to decide, for as a matter of fact the Reformation annihilated all its potential elements except one. Beginning in Germany, it divided the princes of the empire by a gulf too broad to be bridged over by the Imperial supremacy, even if 065the Imperial superior had stood neutral. He, however, was forced to take colour with the church against the reformers; the Pope was, as a matter of course, in the same predicament; and thus the two authorities to whom belonged the office of mediation between combatants became themselves the chiefs of one great faction in the schism of the nations. Feudalism, already enfeebled and discredited as a principle of public relations, furnished no bond whatever which was stable enough to countervail the alliances of religion. In a condition, therefore, of public law which was little less than chaotic, those views of a state system to which the Roman jurisconsults were supposed to have given their sanction alone remained standing. The shape, the symmetry, and the prominence which they assumed in the hands of Grotius are known to every educated man; but the great marvel of the Treatise "De Jure Belli et Pacis," was its rapid, complete, and universal success. The horrors of the Thirty Years' War, the boundless terror and pity which the unbridled license of the soldiery was exciting, must, no doubt, be taken to explain that success in some measure, but they do not wholly account for it. Very little penetration into the ideas of that age is required to convince one that if the ground plan of the international edifice which was sketched in the great book of Grotius had not appeared to be theoretically perfect, it would have been discarded by jurists and neglected by statesmen and soldiers.

During the time when popular ideas about sovereignty were changing dramatically, the system that replaced what we now know as International Law was diverse in its structure and inconsistent in the principles it relied on. Throughout the regions of Europe within the Romano-German Empire, the connection between the confederate states was governed by the complicated and still incomplete framework of the Imperial constitution. Surprisingly to us, it was a common belief among German lawyers that the relationships between states, whether within or outside the empire, should be guided not by the Jus Gentium, but by pure Roman law, with Cæsar still being the focal point. This concept was not entirely dismissed in distant countries as we might have previously thought; however, throughout most of Europe, feudal hierarchies served as a substitute for public law, and where those were uncertain or unclear, there theoretically lay a supreme regulating force in the authority of the Church's head. However, it’s clear that both feudal and ecclesiastical influences were quickly declining during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. If we closely analyze the justifications for wars and the stated reasons for alliances, we can see that along with the fading of old principles, the ideas later aligned and consolidated by Ayala and Grotius were making significant slow yet steady advancements. Whether the merging of all authority sources would have eventually created a system of international relations, and whether that system would have differed materially from Grotius's structure, is impossible to determine now, as the Reformation effectively destroyed all its potential components except one. Starting in Germany, it created a divide among the princes of the empire that was too wide to be crossed by Imperial authority, even if the Imperial superior had remained neutral. However, he was compelled to side with the Church against the reformers; the Pope was naturally in the same situation; thus, the two authorities responsible for mediating between opponents became the leaders of one significant faction in the nations' schism. Feudalism, already weakened and discredited as a public relations principle, provided no stable bond strong enough to withstand the alliances formed over religion. In a state of public law that was nearly chaotic, only the views of the state system endorsed by the Roman legal scholars remained intact. The shape, structure, and significance they took on in Grotius's work are recognized by every educated person; but the remarkable aspect of the Treatise "De Jure Belli et Pacis" was its swift, complete, and widespread success. The horrors of the Thirty Years' War and the immense terror and sorrow caused by the unchecked actions of soldiers undoubtedly played a role in that success, but they do not fully explain it. It takes very little insight into the ideas of that era to realize that if the foundational concept of the international framework outlined in Grotius's great book had not seemed theoretically flawless, it would have been rejected by legal scholars and ignored by leaders and military officials.

It is obvious that the speculative perfection of the Grotian system is intimately connected with that conception of territorial sovereignty which we have been discussing. The theory of International Law assumes that commonwealths are, relatively to each other, in a state of nature; but the component atoms of a natural society must, by the fundamental assumption, be insulated and independent of each other. If there be a higher power connecting them, however slightly and occasionally by the claim of common supremacy, the very conception of a common superior introduces the notion of positive law, and excludes the idea of a law natural. It follows, therefore, that if the universal suzerainty of an Imperial head had been admitted even in bare theory, the labours of Grotius would have been idle. Nor is this the only point of junction between modern public law and those views of sovereignty of which I have endeavoured to describe the066 development. I have said that there are entire departments of international jurisprudence which consist of the Roman Law of Property. What then is the inference? It is, that if there had been no such change as I have described in the estimate of sovereignty—if sovereignty had not been associated with the proprietorship of a limited portion of the earth, had not, in other words, become territorial—three parts of the Grotian theory would have been incapable of application.067

It’s clear that the ideal of the Grotian system is closely tied to the idea of territorial sovereignty we’ve been discussing. The theory of International Law suggests that states are, in relation to each other, in a state of nature; however, the basic assumption is that the individual parts of a natural society must be isolated and independent from one another. If there’s a higher power connecting them, even slightly or occasionally through the claim of common authority, the very idea of a common superior brings in the notion of positive law and dismisses the concept of natural law. Thus, if the universal authority of an imperial leader had been accepted, even in theory, Grotius's work would have been pointless. This isn’t the only connection between modern public law and the ideas of sovereignty that I’ve tried to outline. I have mentioned that there are entire areas of international law that are based on Roman Law of Property. So what’s the conclusion? It’s that if there hadn’t been the changes I’ve described in how sovereignty is viewed—if sovereignty hadn’t been linked to owning a specific piece of land, in other words, become territorial—three-quarters of the Grotian theory would have been inapplicable.


CHAPTER V

primitive society and ancient law

The necessity of submitting the subject of jurisprudence to scientific treatment has never been entirely lost sight of in modern times, and the essays which the consciousness of this necessity has produced have proceeded from minds of very various calibre, but there is not much presumption, I think, in asserting that what has hitherto stood in the place of a science has for the most part been a set of guesses, those very guesses of the Roman lawyers which were examined in the two preceding chapters. A series of explicit statements, recognising and adopting these conjectural theories of a natural state, and of a system of principles congenial to it, has been continued with but brief interruption from the days of their inventors to our own. They appear in the annotations of the Glossators who founded modern jurisprudence, and in the writings of the scholastic jurists who succeeded them. They are visible in the dogmas of the canonists. They are thrust into prominence by those civilians of marvellous erudition, who flourished at the revival of ancient letters. Grotius and his successors invested them not less with brilliancy and plausibility than with practical importance. They may be read in the introductory chapters of our own Blackstone, who has transcribed them textually from Burlamaqui, and wherever the manuals published in the present day for the guidance of the student or the practitioner begin with any discussion of the first principles of law, it always resolves itself into a restatement of the Roman hypothesis. It is however from the disguises with which these conjectures sometimes clothe themselves, quite as much as from their native form, that we gain an adequate idea of the subtlety with which they mix themselves in human thought. The Lockeian theory of the origin of Law in a Social Compact scarcely conceals its Roman derivation, and indeed is only the dress by which the ancient views were rendered more attractive to a particular generation of the moderns; but on the068 other hand the theory of Hobbes on the same subject was purposely devised to repudiate the reality of a law of nature as conceived by the Romans and their disciples. Yet these two theories, which long divided the reflecting politicians of England into hostile camps, resemble each other strictly in their fundamental assumption of a non-historic, unverifiable, condition of the race. Their authors differed as to the characteristics of the præ-social state, and as to the nature of the abnormal action by which men lifted themselves out of it into that social organisation with which alone we are acquainted, but they agreed in thinking that a great chasm separated man in his primitive condition from man in society, and this notion we cannot doubt that they borrowed, consciously or unconsciously, from the Romans. If indeed the phenomena of law be regarded in the way in which these theorists regarded them—that is, as one vast complex whole—it is not surprising that the mind should often evade the task it has set to itself by falling back on some ingenious conjecture which (plausibly interpreted) will seem to reconcile everything, or else that it should sometimes abjure in despair the labour of systematization.

The need to approach the subject of law with a scientific mindset has never been completely ignored in modern times. The essays inspired by this awareness have come from all kinds of thinkers, but I believe it’s not too bold to claim that what has traditionally passed for a science has mostly been a collection of guesses—those very guesses made by Roman lawyers that were examined in the previous two chapters. A series of clear statements that recognize and adopt these speculative theories about a natural state and a system of principles that align with it has continued, with only brief interruptions, from the time of their creators to today. They can be found in the comments of the Glossators who laid the groundwork for modern law, and in the works of the scholastic lawyers who followed them. They appear in the doctrines of the canonists and are highlighted by those highly learned civil law scholars who thrived during the revival of classical literature. Grotius and his successors made these theories just as attractive and plausible as they did practically significant. You can read about them in the introductory chapters of Blackstone's work, who quoted them directly from Burlamaqui, and in modern manuals aimed at students or practitioners, discussions on the foundational principles of law always boil down to a restatement of the Roman hypothesis. However, it’s important to note that it is through the disguises these theories sometimes take, as much as their original form, that we gain a proper understanding of how subtly they embed themselves in human thought. The Lockean theory of law’s origin in a social contract barely hides its Roman roots and is just a way of repackaging old ideas to appeal to a specific generation of modern thinkers. On the other hand, Hobbes’ theory was intentionally created to reject the idea of a natural law as understood by the Romans and their followers. Yet these two theories, which for a long time split the thoughtful politicians of England into opposing sides, are actually very similar in their basic assumption of a non-historic, unverifiable condition of humanity. Their creators disagreed about the characteristics of the pre-social state and the extraordinary actions that allowed people to transition from it to the social organization we recognize today, but they shared the belief that a significant gap exists between humans in their primitive state and humans in society—a notion they likely borrowed, consciously or unconsciously, from the Romans. If we view the phenomena of law through the lens these theorists used—that is, as a vast, complex whole—it’s not surprising that the mind might often avoid the task at hand by reverting to some clever speculation that seems to explain everything, or alternatively, that it might sometimes give up in frustration at the effort of creating a systematic understanding.

From the theories of jurisprudence which have the same speculative basis as the Roman doctrine two of much celebrity must be excepted. The first of them is that associated with the great name of Montesquieu. Though there are some ambiguous expressions in the early part of the Esprit des Lois, which seem to show its writer's unwillingness to break quite openly with the views hitherto popular, the general drift of the book is certainly to indicate a very different conception of its subject from any which had been entertained before. It has often been noticed that, amidst the vast variety of examples which, in its immense width of survey, it sweeps together from supposed systems of jurisprudence, there is an evident anxiety to thrust into especial prominence those manners and institutions which astonish the civilised reader by their uncouthness, strangeness, or indecency. The inference constantly suggested is, that laws are the creatures of climate, local situation, accident, or imposture—the fruit of any causes except those which appear to operate with tolerable constancy. Montesquieu seems, in fact, to have looked on the nature of man as entirely plastic, as passively reproducing the impressions, and submitting implicitly to the impulses,069 which it receives from without. And here no doubt lies the error which vitiates his system as a system. He greatly underrates the stability of human nature. He pays little or no regard to the inherited qualities of the race, those qualities which each generation receives from its predecessors, and transmits but slightly altered to the generation which follows it. It is quite true, indeed, that no complete account can be given of social phenomena, and consequently of laws, till due allowance has been made for those modifying causes which are noticed in the Esprit des Lois; but their number and their force appear to have been overestimated by Montesquieu. Many of the anomalies which he parades have since been shown to rest on false report or erroneous construction, and of those which remain not a few prove the permanence rather than the variableness of man's nature, since they are relics of older stages of the race which have obstinately defied the influences that have elsewhere had effect. The truth is that the stable part of our mental, moral, and physical constitution is the largest part of it, and the resistance it opposes to change is such that, though the variations of human society in a portion of the world are plain enough, they are neither so rapid nor so extensive that their amount, character, and general direction cannot be ascertained. An approximation to truth may be all that is attainable with our present knowledge, but there is no reason for thinking that is so remote, or (what is the same thing) that it requires so much future correction, as to be entirely useless and uninstructive.

From the theories of jurisprudence that share the same speculative foundation as Roman doctrine, two well-known exceptions stand out. The first is linked to the renowned name of Montesquieu. Although there are some vague phrases at the beginning of the Esprit des Lois that suggest the author was hesitant to fully break away from previously popular views, the overall direction of the book clearly indicates a very different understanding of its subject than had been considered before. It's often noted that, amidst the wide variety of examples gathered from various supposed systems of jurisprudence, there is a clear effort to highlight those customs and institutions that astonish the civilized reader with their awkwardness, strangeness, or indecency. The constant implication is that laws are shaped by climate, local circumstances, chance, or deceit—arising from any causes except those that seem to work consistently. Montesquieu appears, in fact, to view human nature as completely malleable, passively mirroring the influences and effortlessly yielding to the external prompts it receives. Here lies, undoubtedly, the flaw that undermines his system as a whole. He significantly underestimates the stability of human nature. He pays little or no attention to the inherited traits of humanity, those characteristics handed down from one generation to the next, only slightly altered. It is indeed true that a complete explanation of social phenomena, and thus laws, cannot be provided without considering those modifying factors noted in the Esprit des Lois; however, Montesquieu seems to have overvalued their number and influence. Many of the oddities he presents have since been shown to be based on misinformation or misinterpretation, and among those that remain, many highlight the permanence of human nature rather than its variability, as they are remnants of earlier phases of humanity that have stubbornly resisted influences that have been effective elsewhere. The reality is that the stable components of our mental, moral, and physical makeup constitute the largest part, and the resistance to change is strong enough that, while variations in human society in parts of the world are noticeable, they are neither so rapid nor so extensive as to make their overall amount, character, and direction impossible to determine. An approximation to the truth may be all we can achieve with our current understanding, but there’s no reason to believe it’s so far off or (which is the same) that it needs so much future correction that it becomes entirely useless and uninformative.

The other theory which has been adverted to is the historical theory of Bentham. This theory which is obscurely (and, it might even be said, timidly) propounded in several parts of Bentham's works is quite distinct from that analysis of the conception of law which he commenced in the "Fragment on Government," and which was more recently completed by Mr. John Austin. The resolution of a law into a command of a particular nature, imposed under special conditions, does not affect to do more than protect us against a difficulty—a most formidable one certainly—of language. The whole question remains open as to the motives of societies in imposing these commands on themselves, as to the connection of these commands with each other, and the nature of their dependence on those which preceded them, and which070 they have superseded. Bentham suggests the answer that societies modify, and have always modified, their laws according to modifications of their views of general expediency. It is difficult to say that this proposition is false, but it certainly appears to be unfruitful. For that which seems expedient to a society, or rather to the governing part of it, when it alters a rule of law is surely the same thing as the object, whatever it may be, which it has in view when it makes the change. Expediency and the greatest good are nothing more than different names for the impulse which prompts the modification; and when we lay down expediency as the rule of change in law or opinion, all we get by the proposition is the substitution of an express term for a term which is necessarily implied when we say that a change takes place.

The other theory that has been mentioned is Bentham's historical theory. This theory, which is somewhat unclear (and we might even say, hesitant) in several parts of Bentham's works, is quite different from the analysis of the concept of law that he began in the "Fragment on Government," and which was later completed by Mr. John Austin. Breaking down a law into a specific kind of command imposed under certain conditions does not aim to do more than protect us from a major difficulty—certainly a daunting one—of language. The entire issue remains open regarding the motivations of societies in enforcing these commands on themselves, how these commands relate to one another, and the nature of their dependence on those that came before and that070 they have replaced. Bentham proposes that societies change their laws based on shifts in their views of general expediency. It’s hard to say that this idea is false, but it certainly seems to be unproductive. What seems expedient to a society, or more accurately to the ruling part of it, when it changes a legal rule is surely the same as the goal, whatever it may be, that it has in mind when making the change. Expediency and the greatest good are just different names for the motivation that drives the modification; and when we establish expediency as the guideline for changes in law or opinion, all we accomplish with the statement is the replacement of an explicit term for one that is inherently implied when we say that a change occurs.

There is such wide-spread dissatisfaction with existing theories of jurisprudence, and so general a conviction that they do not really solve the questions they pretend to dispose of, as to justify the suspicion that some line of inquiry necessary to a perfect result has been incompletely followed or altogether omitted by their authors. And indeed there is one remarkable omission with which all these speculations are chargeable, except perhaps those of Montesquieu. They take no account of what law has actually been at epochs remote from the particular period at which they made their appearance. Their originators carefully observed the institutions of their own age and civilisation, and those of other ages and civilisations with which they had some degree of intellectual sympathy, but, when they turned their attention to archaic states of society which exhibited much superficial difference from their own, they uniformly ceased to observe and began guessing. The mistake which they committed is therefore analogous to the error of one who, in investigating the laws of the material universe, should commence by contemplating the existing physical world as a whole, instead of beginning with the particles which are its simplest ingredients. One does not certainly see why such a scientific solecism should be more defensible in jurisprudence than in any other region of thought. It would seem antecedently that we ought to commence with the simplest social forms in a state as near as possible to their rudimentary condition. In other words, if we followed the course usual in such inquiries, we should penetrate as far up as we could in the history of primitive071 societies. The phenomena which early societies present us with are not easy at first to understand, but the difficulty of grappling with them bears no proportion to the perplexities which beset us in considering the baffling entanglement of modern social organisation. It is a difficulty arising from their strangeness and uncouthness, not from their number and complexity. One does not readily get over the surprise which they occasion when looked at from a modern point of view; but when that is surmounted they are few enough and simple enough. But even if they gave more trouble than they do, no pains would be wasted in ascertaining the germs out of which has assuredly been unfolded every form of moral restraint which controls our actions and shapes our conduct at the present moment.

There is widespread dissatisfaction with current theories of law, and a general sense that they don’t really address the questions they claim to resolve. This justifies the suspicion that some essential line of inquiry necessary for a complete understanding has been either partially explored or completely overlooked by their authors. In fact, there is one notable omission that all these theories are guilty of, except perhaps those by Montesquieu. They don’t consider what law has actually looked like in times far removed from the period in which they were created. The authors carefully observed the institutions of their own time and civilization, as well as those of other times and civilizations they could relate to intellectually. However, when they shifted their focus to archaic societies that seemed quite different from their own, they stopped observing and started guessing. The mistake they made is similar to that of someone studying the laws of the physical universe who starts by looking at the entire existing physical world, rather than beginning with the basic particles that make it up. There’s no reason to think that this scientific blunder should be more acceptable in law than in any other area of thought. It would seem logical that we should start with the simplest forms of society that are as close as possible to their most basic state. In other words, if we were to follow the typical approach in such inquiries, we would explore as far back as possible in the history of primitive societies. The phenomena that early societies present can be challenging to understand at first, but the difficulty of confronting them is minor compared to the complexities we face when considering the confusing intricacies of modern social organization. This challenge arises from their unfamiliarity and strangeness, not from their sheer number or complexity. It’s hard to shake off the surprise they provoke when viewed from a modern perspective, but once that initial shock is overcome, they are actually few and fairly simple. Even if they were more difficult to analyze, it would still be worth the effort to identify the basic elements from which every form of moral restraint that governs our actions and shapes our behavior today has surely evolved.

The rudiments of the social state, so far as they are known to us at all, are known through testimony of three sorts—accounts by contemporary observers of civilisations less advanced than their own, the records which particular races have preserved concerning their primitive history, and ancient law. The first kind of evidence is the best we could have expected. As societies do not advance concurrently, but at different rates of progress, there have been epochs at which men trained to habits of methodical observation have really been in a position to watch and describe the infancy of mankind. Tacitus made the most of such an opportunity; but the Germany, unlike most celebrated classical books, has not induced others to follow the excellent example set by its author, and the amount of this sort of testimony which we possess is exceedingly small. The lofty contempt which a civilised people entertains for barbarous neighbours has caused a remarkable negligence in observing them, and this carelessness has been aggravated at times by fear, by religious prejudice, and even by the use of these very terms—civilisation and barbarism—which convey to most persons the impression of a difference not merely in degree but in kind. Even the Germany has been suspected by some critics of sacrificing fidelity to poignancy of contrast and picturesqueness of narrative. Other histories too, which have been handed down to us among the archives of the people to whose infancy they relate, have been thought distorted by the pride of race or by the religious sentiment of a newer age. It is important then to observe that these suspicions, whether groundless or rational,072 do not attach to a great deal of archaic law. Much of the old law which has descended to us was preserved merely because it was old. Those who practised and obeyed it did not pretend to understand it; and in some cases they even ridiculed and despised it. They offered no account of it except that it had come down to them from their ancestors. If we confine our attention, then, to those fragments of ancient institutions which cannot reasonably be supposed to have been tampered with, we are able to gain a clear conception of certain great characteristics of the society to which they originally belonged. Advancing a step further, we can apply our knowledge to systems of law which, like the Code of Menu, are as a whole of suspicious authenticity; and, using the key we have obtained, we are in a position to discriminate those portions of them which are truly archaic from those which have been affected by the prejudices, interests, or ignorance of the compiler. It will at least be acknowledged that, if the materials for this process are sufficient, and if the comparisons be accurately executed, the methods followed are as little objectionable as those which have led to such surprising results in comparative philology.

The basics of the social state, as far as we know, are understood through three types of evidence—accounts from contemporary observers of civilizations less advanced than their own, records that specific races have preserved about their early history, and ancient laws. The first type of evidence is the best we could have hoped for. Since societies don't progress at the same pace but rather at different rates, there have been times when people trained in methodical observation could actually watch and describe the early stages of humanity. Tacitus took full advantage of such an opportunity; however, the Germany, unlike many other famous classical works, has not inspired others to follow the great example set by its author, and the amount of this kind of testimony we have is very limited. The strong disdain that a civilized society feels for its barbaric neighbors has led to a notable neglect in observing them, and this carelessness has sometimes been compounded by fear, religious bias, and even by the usage of the very terms—civilization and barbarism—which for many people suggest a difference not just in degree but in kind. Even the Germany has faced skepticism from some critics for prioritizing striking contrast and vivid storytelling over accuracy. Other histories that have been passed down to us from the cultures they discuss are also believed to be twisted by racial pride or the religious sentiments of a later time. It's important to note that these doubts, whether unfounded or valid,072 don't apply to a significant amount of ancient law. Much of the old law we have today was preserved simply because it was old. Those who practiced and followed it didn’t claim to understand it; in some cases, they even mocked and scorned it. They offered no explanation other than that it had been passed down from their ancestors. If we focus on those fragments of ancient institutions that can't reasonably be thought to have been altered, we can gain a clear understanding of certain key characteristics of the society they originally belonged to. Going one step further, we can apply our knowledge to legal systems that, like the Code of Menu, are overall of questionable authenticity; and, using the insights we've gained, we can distinguish the truly ancient parts from those that have been influenced by the biases, interests, or ignorance of the compiler. It can at least be agreed that, if the materials for this analysis are sufficient, and if the comparisons are done accurately, then the methods used are as justifiable as those that have led to surprising findings in comparative philology.

The effect of the evidence derived from comparative jurisprudence is to establish that view of the primeval condition of the human race which is known as the Patriarchal Theory. There is no doubt, of course, that this theory was originally based on the Scriptural history of the Hebrew patriarchs in Lower Asia; but, as has been explained already, its connection with Scripture rather militated than otherwise against its reception as a complete theory, since the majority of the inquirers who till recently addressed themselves with most earnestness to the colligation of social phenomena, were either influenced by the strongest prejudice against Hebrew antiquities or by the strongest desire to construct their system without the assistance of religious records. Even now there is perhaps a disposition to undervalue these accounts, or rather to decline generalising from them, as forming part of the traditions of a Semitic people. It is to be noted, however, that the legal testimony comes nearly exclusively from the institutions of societies belonging to the Indo-European stock, the Romans, Hindoos, and Sclavonians supplying the greater part of it; and indeed the difficulty at the present stage of the inquiry, is to know where to stop, to say of what races073 of men it is not allowable to lay down that the society in which they are united was originally organised on the patriarchal model. The chief lineaments of such a society, as collected from the early chapters in Genesis, I need not attempt to depict with any minuteness, both because they are familiar to most of us from our earliest childhood, and because, from the interest once attaching to the controversy which takes its name from the debate between Locke and Filmer, they fill a whole chapter, though not a very profitable one, in English literature. The points which lie on the surface of the history are these:—The eldest male parent—the eldest ascendant—is absolutely supreme in his household. His dominion extends to life and death, and is as unqualified over his children and their houses as over his slaves; indeed the relations of sonship and serfdom appear to differ in little beyond the higher capacity which the child in blood possesses of becoming one day the head of a family himself. The flocks and herds of the children are the flocks and herds of the father, and the possessions of the parent, which he holds in a representative rather than in a proprietary character, are equally divided at his death among his descendants in the first degree, the eldest son sometimes receiving a double share under the name of birthright, but more generally endowed with no hereditary advantage beyond an honorary precedence. A less obvious inference from the Scriptural accounts is that they seem to plant us on the traces of the breach which is first effected in the empire of the parent. The families of Jacob and Esau separate and form two nations; but the families of Jacob's children hold together and become a people. This looks like the immature germ of a state or commonwealth, and of an order of rights superior to the claims of family relation.

The impact of the evidence from comparative legal studies is to establish the idea of the original state of humanity known as the Patriarchal Theory. There's no doubt that this theory was initially based on the biblical history of the Hebrew patriarchs in Lower Asia; however, as mentioned earlier, its connection to Scripture often worked against its acceptance as a complete theory. This is because most researchers who have recently focused on social phenomena were either heavily biased against Hebrew history or eager to build their systems without relying on religious texts. Even today, there may be a tendency to underestimate these accounts, or rather to avoid generalizing from them, since they are part of the traditions of a Semitic culture. It’s important to note, however, that nearly all legal evidence comes from the institutions of societies of Indo-European origin, with the Romans, Hindus, and Slavs providing the majority. The challenge at this stage of research is knowing where to draw the line regarding which races of people it is not acceptable to claim were originally organized in a patriarchal manner. The main features of such a society, as derived from the early chapters of Genesis, need not be described in detail, both because they are well known to most of us from childhood and because they are the subject of a lengthy debate—though not a particularly fruitful one—in English literature. The key points from the history are these: the eldest male parent—the eldest ancestor—is completely dominant in his household. His authority extends to matters of life and death and is equally absolute over his children and their families as it is over his slaves; in fact, the relationships of parent and child and master and servant differ little beyond the child's potential to one day become the head of a family himself. The livestock owned by the children are considered the livestock of the father, and the parent’s belongings, which he holds in a representative rather than a proprietary capacity, are generally divided equally among his direct descendants at his death, the eldest son sometimes receiving a double portion known as the birthright, but more often honored with no hereditary privilege beyond a status advantage. A less obvious takeaway from the biblical accounts is that they seem to hint at the first break in the authority of the parent. The families of Jacob and Esau split and form two nations; however, the families of Jacob’s children remain united and become a single people. This appears to represent the early stages of a state or commonwealth, along with a system of rights that surpasses family ties.

If I were attempting for the more special purposes of the jurist to express compendiously the characteristics of the situation in which mankind disclose themselves at the dawn of their history, I should be satisfied to quote a few verses from the Odyssee of Homer:

If I were trying to summarize the key traits of the situation in which humanity reveals itself at the beginning of its history, I would be happy to quote a few lines from Homer's Odyssey:

But there are neither assembly meetings for deliberation nor lawful standards. *         *         *         Themistocles had a strong influence. The children and their spouses do not care for each other.

"They have neither assemblies for consultation nor themistes,074 but every one exercises jurisdiction over his wives and his children, and they pay no regard to one another." These lines are applied to the Cyclops, and it may not perhaps be an altogether fanciful idea when I suggest that the Cyclops is Homer's type of an alien and less advanced civilisation; for the almost physical loathing which a primitive community feels for men of widely different manners from its own usually expresses itself by describing them as monsters, such as giants, or even (which is almost always the case in Oriental mythology) as demons. However that may be, the verses condense in themselves the sum of the hints which are given us by legal antiquities. Men are first seen distributed in perfectly insulated groups, held together by obedience to the parent. Law is the parent's word, but it is not yet in the condition of those themistes which were analysed in the first chapter of this work. When we go forward to the state of society in which these early legal conceptions show themselves as formed, we find that they still partake of the mystery and spontaneity which must have seemed to characterise a despotic father's commands, but that at the same time, inasmuch as they proceed from a sovereign, they presuppose a union of family groups in some wider organisation. The next question is, what is the nature of this union and the degree of intimacy which it involves? It is just here that archaic law renders us one of the greatest of its services and fills up a gap which otherwise could only have been bridged by conjecture. It is full, in all its provinces, of the clearest indications that society in primitive times was not what it is assumed to be at present, a collection of individuals. In fact, and in the view of the men who composed it, it was an aggregation of families. The contrast may be most forcibly expressed by saying that the unit of an ancient society was the Family, of a modern society the Individual. We must be prepared to find in ancient law all the consequences of this difference. It is so framed as to be adjusted to a system of small independent corporations. It is therefore scanty, because it is supplemented by the despotic commands of the heads of households. It is ceremonious, because the transactions to which it pays regard resemble international concerns much more than the quick play of intercourse between individuals. Above all it has a peculiarity of which the full importance cannot be 075shown at present. It takes a view of life wholly unlike any which appears in developed jurisprudence. Corporations never die, and accordingly primitive law considers the entities with which it deals, i.e. the patriarchal or family groups, as perpetual and inextinguishable. This view is closely allied to the peculiar aspect under which, in very ancient times, moral attributes present themselves. The moral elevation and moral debasement of the individual appear to be confounded with, or postponed to, the merits and offences of the group to which the individual belongs. If the community sins, its guilt is much more than the sum of the offences committed by its members; the crime is a corporate act, and extends in its consequences to many more persons than have shared in its actual perpetration. If, on the other hand, the individual is conspicuously guilty, it is his children, his kinsfolk, his tribesmen, or his fellow-citizens, who suffer with him, and sometimes for him. It thus happens that the ideas of moral responsibility and retribution often seem to be more clearly realised at very ancient than at more advanced periods, for, as the family group is immortal, and its liability to punishment indefinite, the primitive mind is not perplexed by the questions which become troublesome as soon as the individual is conceived as altogether separate from the group. One step in the transition from the ancient and simple view of the matter to the theological or metaphysical explanations of later days is marked by the early Greek notion of an inherited curse. The bequest received by his posterity from the original criminal was not a liability to punishment, but a liability to the commission of fresh offences which drew with them a condign retribution; and thus the responsibility of the family was reconciled with the newer phase of thought which limited the consequences of crime to the person of the actual delinquent.

"They have no gatherings for discussion or themistes,074 but everyone has control over his wives and children, and they pay no attention to one another." These lines refer to the Cyclops, and it might not be too far-fetched to suggest that the Cyclops represents Homer's idea of an alien and less sophisticated society; since a primitive community's almost physical aversion to people with very different customs typically manifests in describing them as monsters, like giants, or even (which is almost always the case in Eastern mythology) as demons. Regardless, these lines capture the essence of the insights we gain from ancient legal systems. Initially, people are seen organized in completely isolated groups, united by obedience to the parent. Law is essentially the parent's command, but it hasn't yet developed into those themistes discussed in the first chapter of this work. As we advance to the social structure in which these early legal concepts manifest, we find they still carry some of the mystery and spontaneity that likely characterized the commands of a despotic father, but at the same time, since they come from a sovereign, they imply a union of family groups within a broader organization. The next question is: what is the nature of this union, and how close does it need to be? This is precisely where archaic law provides us with one of its greatest benefits and fills a gap that could only be bridged by speculation. It clearly indicates across all its domains that primitive society was not what we assume today—a collection of individuals. In reality, and from the perspective of the people who made it up, it was an aggregation of families. This contrast can be powerfully expressed by stating that the unit of ancient society was the Family, while that of modern society is the Individual. We should expect to find all the implications of this difference in ancient law. It is structured to fit a system of small, independent groups. Therefore, it is limited, as it is supplemented by the absolute commands of household heads. It is formal, as the interactions it concerns resemble international relations much more than the fast-paced interactions between individuals. Most importantly, it has a characteristic whose full significance cannot be 075 fully appreciated right now. It presents a view of life that is entirely different from what appears in developed legal systems. Corporations never die, so primitive law regards the entities it deals with, i.e. the patriarchal or family groups, as eternal and indestructible. This perspective closely relates to the unique way, in very ancient times, moral qualities are perceived. An individual's moral rise and fall seem to be mixed up with, or secondary to, the merits and wrongdoings of the group to which the individual belongs. If the community commits a sin, its guilt outweighs the total of the offenses committed by its members; the crime represents a corporate act and affects many more people than just those who physically carried it out. Conversely, if an individual is glaringly guilty, it’s his children, relatives, tribesmen, or fellow citizens who share in his suffering, and sometimes even suffer for him. As a result, the concepts of moral responsibility and punishment often appear to be more clearly understood in very ancient times than in more advanced periods; for since the family group is everlasting and its accountability for punishment is boundless, the primitive mind isn’t troubled by the questions that become complicated once the individual is viewed as completely separate from the group. A step in the transition from the ancient and straightforward perspective to the theological or metaphysical interpretations of later times is marked by the early Greek concept of an inherited curse. The inheritance passed down from the original offender to his descendants was not a liability to punishment but a predisposition to commit new offenses that would bring about appropriate retribution; thus, the family's responsibility was reconciled with the newer perspective that limited the consequences of wrongdoing to the actual offender.

It would be a very simple explanation of the origin of society if we could base a general conclusion on the hint furnished us by the scriptural example already adverted to, and could suppose that communities began to exist wherever a family held together instead of separating at the death of its patriarchal chieftain. In most of the Greek states and in Rome there long remained the vestiges of an ascending series of groups out of which the State was at first constituted. The Family, House, and Tribe of the Romans may be taken as the type of them, and they are so described to us that we076 can scarcely help conceiving them as a system of concentric circles which have gradually expanded from the same point. The elementary group is the Family, connected by common subjection to the highest male ascendant. The aggregation of Families forms the Gens or House. The aggregation of Houses makes the Tribe. The aggregation of Tribes constitutes the Commonwealth. Are we at liberty to follow these indications, and to lay down that the commonwealth is a collection of persons united by common descent from the progenitor of an original family? Of this we may at least be certain, that all ancient societies regarded themselves as having proceeded from one original stock, and even laboured under an incapacity for comprehending any reason except this for their holding together in political union. The history of political ideas begins, in fact, with the assumption that kinship in blood is the sole possible ground of community in political functions; nor is there any of those subversions of feeling, which we term emphatically revolutions, so startling and so complete as the change which is accomplished when some other principle—such as that, for instance, of local contiguity—establishes itself for the first time as the basis of common political action. It may be affirmed then of early commonwealths that their citizens considered all the groups in which they claimed membership to be founded on common lineage. What was obviously true of the Family was believed to be true first of the House, next of the Tribe, lastly of the State. And yet we find that along with this belief, or, if we may use the word, this theory, each community preserved records or traditions which distinctly showed that the fundamental assumption was false. Whether we look to the Greek states, or to Rome, or to the Teutonic aristocracies in Ditmarsh which furnished Niebuhr with so many valuable illustrations, or to the Celtic clan associations, or to that strange social organisation of the Sclavonic Russians and Poles which has only lately attracted notice, everywhere we discover traces of passages in their history when men of alien descent were admitted to, and amalgamated with, the original brotherhood. Adverting to Rome singly, we perceive that the primary group, the Family, was being constantly adulterated by the practice of adoption, while stories seem to have been always current respecting the exotic extraction of one of the original Tribes and concerning a large addition077 to the houses made by one of the early kings. The composition of the state, uniformly assumed to be natural, was nevertheless known to be in great measure artificial. This conflict between belief or theory and notorious fact is at first sight extremely perplexing; but what it really illustrates is the efficiency with which Legal Fictions do their work in the infancy of society. The earliest and most extensively employed of legal fictions was that which permitted family relations to be created artificially, and there is none to which I conceive mankind to be more deeply indebted. If it had never existed, I do not see how any one of the primitive groups, whatever were their nature, could have absorbed another, or on what terms any two of them could have combined, except those of absolute superiority on one side and absolute subjection on the other. No doubt, when with our modern ideas we contemplate the union of independent communities, we can suggest a hundred modes of carrying it out, the simplest of all being that the individuals comprised in the coalescing groups shall vote or act together according to local propinquity; but the idea that a number of persons should exercise political rights in common simply because they happened to live within the same topographical limits was utterly strange and monstrous to primitive antiquity. The expedient which in those times commanded favour was that the incoming population should feign themselves to be descended from the same stock as the people on whom they were engrafted; and it is precisely the good faith of this fiction, and the closeness with which it seemed to imitate reality, that we cannot now hope to understand. One circumstance, however, which it is important to recollect, is that the men who formed the various political groups were certainly in the habit of meeting together periodically, for the purpose of acknowledging and consecrating their association by common sacrifices. Strangers amalgamated with the brotherhood were doubtless admitted to these sacrifices; and when that was once done we can believe that it seemed equally easy, or not more difficult, to conceive them as sharing in the common lineage. The conclusion then which is suggested by the evidence is, not that all early societies were formed by descent from the same ancestor, but that all of them which had any permanence and solidity either were so descended or assumed that they were. An indefinite number078 of causes may have shattered the primitive groups, but wherever their ingredients recombined, it was on the model or principle of an association of kindred. Whatever were the fact, all thought, language, and law adjusted themselves to the assumption. But though all this seems to me to be established with reference to the communities with whose records we are acquainted, the remainder of their history sustains the position before laid down as to the essentially transient and terminable influence of the most powerful Legal Fictions. At some point of time—probably as soon as they felt themselves strong enough to resist extrinsic pressure—all these states ceased to recruit themselves by factitious extensions of consanguinity. They necessarily, therefore, became Aristocracies, in all cases where a fresh population from any cause collected around them which could put in no claim to community of origin. Their sternness in maintaining the central principle of a system under which political rights were attainable on no terms whatever except connection in blood, real or artificial, taught their inferiors another principle, which proved to be endowed with a far higher measure of vitality. This was the principle of local contiguity, now recognised everywhere as the condition of community in political functions. A new set of political ideas came at once into existence, which, being those of ourselves, our contemporaries, and in great measure of our ancestors, rather obscure our perception of the older theory which they vanquished and dethroned.

It would be a straightforward explanation of society's origin if we could draw a general conclusion from the scriptural example mentioned earlier and assume that communities started wherever a family stayed together instead of breaking apart after the death of its leader. In many Greek states and in Rome, there remained traces of a series of groups from which the State was initially formed. The Roman Family, House, and Tribe can serve as examples, described in such a way that we can easily imagine them as a system of concentric circles gradually expanding from a single point. The basic group is the Family, united by shared allegiance to the oldest male ancestor. A collection of Families creates the Gens or House. The grouping of Houses forms the Tribe. The coming together of Tribes constitutes the Commonwealth. Are we allowed to follow these clues and conclude that the commonwealth is a collection of individuals united by a common ancestry from an original family? At the very least, we know that all ancient societies believed they descended from one original group and struggled to understand any other reason for their political unity. The history of political thought actually begins with the idea that blood kinship is the only possible basis for community in political matters; no episodes of feeling, which we call revolutions, are as shocking and complete as the change that occurs when a different principle—like local proximity—establishes itself as the foundation for political action. We can say that in early commonwealths, citizens viewed all groups they belonged to as rooted in common lineage. What was evidently true for the Family was thought to also be true for the House, then the Tribe, and finally the State. However, we find that alongside this belief, or rather this theory, each community maintained records or traditions revealing that the fundamental assumption was false. Whether looking at the Greek states, Rome, or the Teutonic aristocracies in Ditmarsh, which provided Niebuhr with valuable insights, or at the Celtic clans, or the unusual social structures of the Sclavonic Russians and Poles recently highlighted, we see evidence throughout their histories that people of different backgrounds were admitted to and merged with the original community. Focusing on Rome alone, we notice that the primary group, the Family, was often mixed through adoption practices, and stories circulated regarding the foreign origins of one of the original Tribes and substantial growth to the houses made by an early king. The state's structure, assumed to be natural, was nevertheless acknowledged to be largely artificial. This clash between belief or theory and obvious fact is initially confusing; however, it truly illustrates how effectively Legal Fictions operate in society’s early stages. The most commonly used legal fiction allowed for the artificial creation of family relationships, and humanity owes a great deal to this concept. Without it, I don’t see how any of the primitive groups could have absorbed another, or how two could have come together, except under conditions of total superiority and total subjection. Of course, with our modern understanding, when we think about uniting independent communities, we can suggest countless ways to achieve this, the simplest being that individuals in merging groups act together based on their geographical closeness; but the notion that a number of people should share political rights simply because they lived within the same area was utterly bizarre and horrifying to ancient people. The approach favored at that time was that the incoming population would pretend to be descended from the same lineage as those they were joining; and it is precisely the sincerity of this fiction and how closely it appeared to resemble reality that we can no longer fully comprehend. One important thing to remember is that the men who made up the various political groups regularly met to acknowledge and validate their association through shared sacrifices. Strangers who joined the brotherhood were certainly welcomed to these sacrifices; and once that occurred, it likely seemed equally easy to view them as part of the common lineage. The conclusion supported by the evidence is not that all early societies derived from the same ancestor, but that all of them with any permanence either did come from a common ancestor or believed they did. Countless factors may have disrupted the original groups, but wherever their elements came together again, it was based on a model of kinship. Regardless of the facts, all thought, language, and law adapted to this assumption. However, while this appears established for the communities we know of, the rest of their history reinforces the idea previously presented about the essentially temporary and limited influence of the most powerful Legal Fictions. At some point—probably as soon as they felt strong enough to resist outside pressures—all these states stopped expanding through artificial blood connections. Therefore, they inevitably became Aristocracies whenever a new population gathered around them that had no claims to shared origins. Their strictness in upholding the fundamental principle of a system where political rights were only achievable through genuine or artificial blood connections taught their subordinates another principle, one that proved to be much more enduring. This was the principle of local proximity, now accepted as the basis for common political functions. A new set of political ideas suddenly emerged, which, being from ourselves, our contemporaries, and largely from our ancestors, somewhat obscures our view of the older theory they defeated and displaced.

The Family then is the type of an archaic society in all the modifications which it was capable of assuming; but the family here spoken of is not exactly the family as understood by a modern. In order to reach the ancient conception we must give to our modern ideas an important extension and an important limitation. We must look on the family as constantly enlarged by the absorption of strangers within its circle, and we must try to regard the fiction of adoption as so closely simulating the reality of kinship that neither law nor opinion makes the slightest difference between a real and an adoptive connection. On the other hand, the persons theoretically amalgamated into a family by their common descent are practically held together by common obedience to their highest living ascendant, the father, grandfather, or great-grandfather. The patriarchal authority of a chieftain079 is as necessary an ingredient in the notion of the family group as the fact (or assumed fact) of its having sprung from his loins; and hence we must understand that if there be any persons who, however truly included in the brotherhood by virtue of their blood-relationship, have nevertheless de facto withdrawn themselves from the empire of its ruler, they are always, in the beginnings of law, considered as lost to the family. It is this patriarchal aggregate—the modern family thus cut down on one side and extended on the other—which meets us on the threshold of primitive jurisprudence. Older probably than the State, the Tribe, and the House, it left traces of itself on private law long after the House and the Tribe had been forgotten, and long after consanguinity had ceased to be associated with the composition of States. It will be found to have stamped itself on all the great departments of jurisprudence, and may be detected, I think, as the true source of many of their most important and most durable characteristics. At the outset, the peculiarities of law in its most ancient state lead us irresistibly to the conclusion that it took precisely the same view of the family group which is taken of individual men by the systems of rights and duties now prevalent throughout Europe. There are societies open to our observation at this very moment whose laws and usages can scarcely be explained unless they are supposed never to have emerged from this primitive condition; but in communities more fortunately circumstanced the fabric of jurisprudence fell gradually to pieces, and if we carefully observe the disintegration we shall perceive that it took place principally in those portions of each system which were most deeply affected by the primitive conception of the family. In one all-important instance, that of the Roman law, the change was effected so slowly, that from epoch to epoch we can observe the line and direction which it followed, and can even give some idea of the ultimate result to which it was tending. And, in pursuing this last inquiry, we need not suffer ourselves to be stopped by the imaginary barrier which separates the modern from the ancient world. For one effect of that mixture of refined Roman law with primitive barbaric usage, which is known to us by the deceptive name of feudalism, was to revive many features of archaic jurisprudence which had died out of the Roman world, so that the decomposition080 hich had seemed to be over commenced again, and to some extent is still proceeding.

The family is essentially a model of an ancient society in all the different forms it could take; however, the family being discussed here isn't quite the same as how we think of family today. To grasp the ancient idea, we need to broaden and limit our modern concepts significantly. We should view the family as continually expanding by welcoming outsiders into its fold, and we should consider adoption as so similar to actual kinship that neither law nor society sees any difference between a biological connection and an adopted one. Conversely, the individuals who are theoretically united by their shared descent are actually connected by their obedience to their highest living ancestor, whether that is the father, grandfather, or great-grandfather. The patriarchal authority of a leader is as essential to the idea of the family unit as the fact (or assumed fact) that it has come from his lineage; thus, we should understand that if any individuals, no matter how genuinely part of the group by blood relations, have nonetheless withdrawn from the authority of its leader, they are considered lost to the family in the early stages of law. This patriarchal grouping—the modern family thus reduced on one side and expanded on the other—faces us at the beginning of primitive law. Likely older than the State, the Tribe, and the House, it left traces on private law long after the House and the Tribe had been forgotten, and long after blood relationships were no longer linked to the formation of States. It can be seen in all major areas of law, and I believe it to be the true source of many important and lasting characteristics. From the outset, the unique features of law in its earliest state lead us to the conclusion that it viewed the family group in the same way that current systems of rights and duties view individual people. There are societies observable right now whose laws and customs can hardly be understood unless we assume they never progressed from this primitive state; however, in more fortunate societies, the framework of law gradually broke down, and upon careful examination of this disintegration, we can see that it mainly occurred in those parts of each system most influenced by the early concept of family. In one crucial instance, that of Roman law, the change happened slowly enough that we can trace its path over time and get some insight into the eventual outcome. In this investigation, we shouldn't let ourselves be hindered by the artificial divide between the modern and ancient worlds. One consequence of the blending of advanced Roman law with primitive barbaric customs, known to us by the misleading term feudalism, was the revival of many characteristics of archaic law that had faded from the Roman world, so the deterioration that seemed to have ended began anew, and to some extent is still ongoing.

On a few systems of law the family organisation of the earliest society has left a plain and broad mark in the life-long authority of the Father or other ancestor over the person and property of his descendants, an authority which we may conveniently call by its later Roman name of Patria Potestas. No feature of the rudimentary associations of mankind is deposed to by a greater amount of evidence than this, and yet none seems to have disappeared so generally and so rapidly from the usages of advancing communities. Gaius, writing under the Antonines, describes the institution as distinctively Roman. It is true that, had he glanced across the Rhine or the Danube to those tribes of barbarians which were exciting the curiosity of some among his contemporaries, he would have seen examples of patriarchal power in its crudest form; and in the far East a branch of the same ethnical stock from which the Romans sprang was repeating their Patria Potestas in some of its most technical incidents. But among the races understood to be comprised within the Roman empire, Gaius could find none which exhibited an institution resembling the Roman "Power of the Father," except only the Asiatic Galatæ. There are reasons, indeed, as it seems to me, why the direct authority of the ancestor should, in the greater number of progressive societies, very shortly assume humbler proportions than belonged to it in their earliest state. The implicit obedience of rude men to their parent is doubtless a primary fact, which it would be absurd to explain away altogether by attributing to them any calculation of its advantages; but, at the same time, if it is natural in the sons to obey the father, it is equally natural that they should look to him for superior strength or superior wisdom. Hence, when societies are placed under circumstances which cause an especial value to be attached to bodily and mental vigour, there is an influence at work which tends to confine the Patria Potestas to the cases where its possessor is actually skilful and strong. When we obtain our first glimpse of organised Hellenic society, it seems as if supereminent wisdom would keep alive the father's power in persons whose bodily strength had decayed; but the relations of Ulysses and Laertes in the Odyssee appear to show that, where extraordinary valour and sagacity were united in the son, the father081 in the decrepitude of age was deposed from the headship of the family. In the mature Greek jurisprudence, the rule advances a few steps on the practice hinted at in the Homeric literature; and though very many traces of stringent family obligation remain, the direct authority of the parent is limited, as in European codes, to the nonage or minority of the children, or, in other words, to the period during which their mental and physical inferiority may always be presumed. The Roman law, however, with its remarkable tendency to innovate on ancient usage only just so far as the exigency of the commonwealth may require, preserves both the primeval institution and the natural limitation to which I conceive it to have been subject. In every relation of life in which the collective community might have occasion to avail itself of his wisdom and strength, for all purposes of counsel or of war, the filius familias, or Son under Power, was as free as his father. It was a maxim of Roman jurisprudence that the Patria Potestas did not extend to the Jus Publicum. Father and son voted together in the city, and fought side by side in the field; indeed, the son, as general, might happen to command the father, or, as magistrate, decide on his contracts and punish his delinquencies. But in all the relations created by Private Law, the son lived under a domestic despotism which, considering the severity it retained to the last, and the number of centuries through which it endured, constitutes one of the strangest problems in legal history.

On some legal systems, the family structure of the earliest societies has clearly and broadly influenced the lifelong authority of the Father or other ancestors over the person and property of their descendants, an authority we can conveniently refer to by its later Roman name, Patria Potestas. Few aspects of primitive human associations are supported by as much evidence as this, and yet none seems to have faded so generally and quickly from the practices of advancing communities. Gaius, writing during the reign of the Antonines, describes this institution as distinctly Roman. It's true that if he had looked across the Rhine or Danube at the barbarian tribes that intrigued some of his contemporaries, he would have seen examples of patriarchal power in its most basic form; and far to the East, a branch of the same ethnic group from which the Romans descended was practicing their Patria Potestas in some of its most specific forms. However, among the races considered part of the Roman Empire, Gaius could find only the Asian Galatians exhibiting anything resembling the Roman "Power of the Father." There are reasons, it seems to me, why the direct authority of the ancestor should, in most progressive societies, quickly shrink from what it was in their early stages. The unquestioning obedience of primitive people to their parents is undoubtedly a fundamental reality, which it would be ridiculous to completely dismiss by attributing it to any calculation of its benefits; but at the same time, while it is natural for sons to obey their fathers, it's equally natural for them to expect superior strength or wisdom from them. Thus, in societies where bodily and mental vigor are especially valued, there’s an influence that tends to limit Patria Potestas to situations where its holder is genuinely skilled and strong. When we first observe organized Hellenic society, it seems that exceptional wisdom would maintain a father's power in those whose physical strength had waned; however, the relationship between Ulysses and Laertes in the Odyssey suggests that when extraordinary courage and intelligence are present in the son, the father, in his old age, loses the leadership of the family. In mature Greek law, the rule progresses a bit beyond what the Homeric literature hints at; although many traces of strict family obligations remain, the direct authority of the parent is restricted, as in European codes, to the minority of their children, meaning the time during which their mental and physical inferiority is presumed. Roman law, however, with its notable inclination to innovate on ancient practices only as necessitated by the common good, retains both the original institution and the natural limitations I believe it to have experienced. In every life situation where the community could benefit from his wisdom and strength—for counsel or warfare—the filius familias, or Son under Power, was as free as his father. A principle of Roman law stated that Patria Potestas did not apply to Jus Publicum. Fathers and sons voted together in the city and fought alongside each other in battle; indeed, the son, as a general, could command his father or, as a magistrate, decide on his contracts and impose penalties for his wrongdoings. Yet, in all the relationships defined by Private Law, the son lived under a domestic tyranny which, considering its severity and the centuries it lasted, remains one of the most unusual problems in legal history.

The Patria Potestas of the Romans, which is necessarily our type of the primeval paternal authority, is equally difficult to understand as an institution of civilised life, whether we consider its incidence on the person or its effects on property. It is to be regretted that a chasm which exists in its history cannot be more completely filled. So far as regards the person, the parent, when our information commences, has over his children the jus vitæ necisque, the power of life and death, and à fortiori of uncontrolled corporal chastisement; he can modify their personal condition at pleasure; he can give a wife to his son; he can give his daughter in marriage; he can divorce his children of either sex; he can transfer them to another family by adoption; and he can sell them. Late in the Imperial period we find vestiges of all these powers, but they are reduced within very narrow limits. The unqualified right of domestic chastisement has become a right082 of bringing domestic offences under the cognisance of the civil magistrate; the privilege of dictating marriage has declined into a conditional veto; the liberty of selling has been virtually abolished, and adoption itself, destined to lose almost all its ancient importance in the reformed system of Justinian, can no longer be effected without the assent of the child transferred to the adoptive parentage. In short, we are brought very close to the verge of the ideas which have at length prevailed in the modern world. But between these widely distant epochs there is an interval of obscurity, and we can only guess at the causes which permitted the Patria Potestas to last as long as it did by rendering it more tolerable than it appears. The active discharge of the most important among the duties which the son owed to the state must have tempered the authority of his parent if they did not annul it. We can readily persuade ourselves that the paternal despotism could not be brought into play without great scandal against a man of full age occupying a high civil office. During the earlier history, however, such cases of practical emancipation would be rare compared with those which must have been created by the constant wars of the Roman republic. The military tribune and the private soldier who were in the field three-quarters of a year during the earlier contests, at a later period the proconsul in charge of a province, and the legionaries who occupied it, cannot have had practical reason to regard themselves as the slaves of a despotic master; and all these avenues of escape tended constantly to multiply themselves. Victories led to conquests, conquests to occupations; the mode of occupation by colonies was exchanged for the system of occupying provinces by standing armies. Each step in advance was a call for the expatriation of more Roman citizens and a fresh draft on the blood of the failing Latin race. We may infer, I think, that a strong sentiment in favour of the relaxation of the Patria Potestas had become fixed by the time that the pacification of the world commenced on the establishment of the Empire. The first serious blows at the ancient institution are attributed to the earlier Cæsars, and some isolated interferences of Trajan and Hadrian seem to have prepared the ground for a series of express enactments which, though we cannot always determine their dates, we know to have limited the father's powers on the one hand, and on the other to have multiplied facilities for083 their voluntary surrender. The older mode of getting rid of the Potestas, by effecting a triple sale of the son's person, is evidence, I may remark, of a very early feeling against the unnecessary prolongation of the powers. The rule which declared that the son should be free after having been three times sold by his father seems to have been originally meant to entail penal consequences on a practice which revolted even the imperfect morality of the primitive Roman. But even before the publication of the Twelve Tables it had been turned, by the ingenuity of the jurisconsults, into an expedient for destroying the parental authority wherever the father desired that it should cease.

The Patria Potestas of the Romans, which serves as our example of early paternal authority, is just as challenging to grasp as a feature of civilized society, whether we look at its impact on individuals or its consequences for property. It’s unfortunate that a gap in its history cannot be more thoroughly filled. When our knowledge begins, the parent holds over their children the jus vitæ necisque, the power of life and death, and à fortiori, the unrestricted right to physically punish them; they can change their children’s personal status at will; they can arrange marriage for their son; they can give their daughter away; they can divorce their children of any gender; they can adopt them into another family; and they can sell them. By the later Imperial period, we can still see remnants of all these powers, but they are significantly restricted. The absolute right to punish at home has transformed into a right to bring domestic misdemeanors to the attention of civil authorities; the ability to dictate marriages has diminished to a conditional veto; the right to sell has essentially been abolished, and adoption has lost almost all its historical significance in the reformed system of Justinian and can no longer happen without the child’s consent to the adoptive parentage. In short, we approach the ideas that have ultimately prevailed in the modern world. However, between these vastly different periods, there’s a haze of uncertainty, and we can only speculate on the reasons that allowed the Patria Potestas to endure for as long as it did by making it appear more acceptable. The active fulfillment of the most significant duties that the son owed to the state must have moderated the parent’s authority if it did not completely negate it. We can easily convince ourselves that paternal tyranny could not be enforced without significant embarrassment against an adult holding a high civic position. However, during the early days, such cases of practical emancipation were likely rare compared to the numerous situations created by the ongoing wars of the Roman Republic. Military tribunes and soldiers spending three-quarters of the year in the field during earlier conflicts, and later, proconsuls in charge of provinces along with the stationed legions, could not realistically consider themselves as the slaves of a tyrannical master; all these pathways for escape were continually increasing. Victories led to conquests, and conquests led to occupations; the method of settling with colonies shifted to occupying provinces with standing armies. Each advancement called for more Roman citizens to expatriate and a new demand on the dwindling Latin population. I think we can infer that by the time the world began to see peace with the establishment of the Empire, a strong sentiment in favor of loosening the Patria Potestas had taken root. The first significant blows against the ancient institution are credited to the earlier Cæsars, and some isolated actions by Trajan and Hadrian seemed to prepare the ground for a series of specific laws that, while we can’t always determine their dates, we know limited the father’s powers on one hand while increasing options for their voluntary renouncement on the other. The older method of escaping the Potestas by completing a triple sale of the son’s person is proof, I may note, of an early sentiment against the unnecessary extension of these powers. The rule that stated a son would be free after being sold three times by his father seems to have originally been intended to impose penalties on a practice that even the primitive Roman's limited morality found appalling. However, even before the Twelve Tables were published, it had, through the cleverness of the legal experts, been transformed into a means of abolishing parental authority whenever the father wished for it to end.

Many of the causes which helped to mitigate the stringency of the father's power over the persons of his children are doubtless among those which do not lie upon the face of history. We cannot tell how far public opinion may have paralysed an authority which the law conferred, or how far natural affection may have rendered it endurable. But though the powers over the person may have been latterly nominal, the whole tenour of the extant Roman jurisprudence suggests that the father's rights over the son's property were always exercised without scruple to the full extent to which they were sanctioned by law. There is nothing to astonish us in the latitude of these rights when they first show themselves. The ancient law of Rome forbade the Children under Power to hold property apart from their parent, or (we should rather say) never contemplated the possibility of their claiming a separate ownership. The father was entitled to take the whole of the son's acquisitions, and to enjoy the benefit of his contracts without being entangled in any compensating liability. So much as this we should expect from the constitution of the earliest Roman society, for we can hardly form a notion of the primitive family group unless we suppose that its members brought their earnings of all kinds into the common stock while they were unable to bind it by improvident individual engagements. The true enigma of the Patria Potestas does not reside here, but in the slowness with which these proprietary privileges of the parent were curtailed, and in the circumstance that, before they were seriously diminished, the whole civilised world was brought within their sphere. No innovation of any kind was attempted till the first years of the Empire, when the acquisitions of084 soldiers on service were withdrawn from the operation of the Patria Potestas, doubtless as part of the reward of the armies which had overthrown the free commonwealth. Three centuries afterwards the same immunity was extended to the earnings of persons who were in the civil employment of the state. Both changes were obviously limited in their application, and they were so contrived in technical form as to interfere as little as possible with the principle of Patria Potestas. A certain qualified and dependent ownership had always been recognised by the Roman law in the perquisites and savings which slaves and sons under power were not compelled to include in the household accounts, and the special name of this permissive property, Peculium, was applied to the acquisitions newly relieved from Patria Potestas, which were called in the case of soldiers Castrense Peculium, and Quasi-castrense Peculium in the case of civil servants. Other modifications of the parental privileges followed, which showed a less studious outward respect for the ancient principle. Shortly after the introduction of the Quasi-castrense Peculium, Constantine the Great took away the father's absolute control over property which his children had inherited from their mother, and reduced it to a usufruct, or life-interest. A few more changes of slight importance followed in the Western Empire, but the furthest point reached was in the East, under Justinian, who enacted that unless the acquisitions of the child were derived from the parent's own property, the parent's rights over them should not extend beyond enjoying their produce for the period of his life. Even this, the utmost relaxation of the Roman Patria Potestas, left it far ampler and severer than any analogous institution of the modern world. The earliest modern writers on jurisprudence remark that it was only the fiercer and ruder of the conquerors of the empire, and notably the nations of Sclavonic origin, which exhibited a Patria Potestas at all resembling that which was described in the Pandects and the Code. All the Germanic immigrants seem to have recognised a corporate union of the family under the mund, or authority of a patriarchal chief; but his powers are obviously only the relics of a decayed Patria Potestas, and fell far short of those enjoyed by the Roman father. The Franks are particularly mentioned as not having the Roman Institution, and accordingly the old French lawyers, even when most busily engaged085 in filling the interstices of barbarous custom with rules of Roman law, were obliged to protect themselves against the intrusion of the Potestas by the express maxim, Puyssance de père en France n'a lieu. The tenacity of the Romans in maintaining this relic of their most ancient condition is in itself remarkable, but it is less remarkable than the diffusion of the Potestas over the whole of a civilisation from which it had once disappeared. While the Castrense Peculium constituted as yet the sole exception to the father's power over property, and while his power over his children's persons was still extensive, the Roman citizenship, and with it the Patria Potestas, were spreading into every corner of the empire. Every African or Spaniard, every Gaul, Briton, or Jew, who received this honour by gift, purchase, or inheritance, placed himself under the Roman Law of Persons, and, though our authorities intimate that children born before the acquisition of citizenship could not be brought under Power against their will, children born after it and all ulterior descendants were on the ordinary footing of a Roman filius familias. It does not fall within the province of this treatise to examine the mechanism of the later Roman society, but I may be permitted to remark that there is little foundation for the opinion which represents the constitution of Antoninus Caracalla conferring Roman citizenship on the whole of his subjects as a measure of small importance. However we may interpret it, it must have enormously enlarged the sphere of the Patria Potestas, and it seems to me that the tightening of family relations which it effected is an agency which ought to be kept in view more than it has been, in accounting for the great moral revolution which was transforming the world.

Many of the factors that helped lessen a father's control over his children are likely not immediately obvious in history. We can't determine how much public opinion may have weakened an authority given by law, or how much natural affection may have made it bearable. But even if the father's control over the children’s well-being may have been more formal in later times, existing Roman laws suggest that a father's rights over his son's property were always exercised fully without hesitation, to the extent allowed by law. There's nothing surprising about the broad nature of these rights when they first appear. Ancient Roman law prohibited children under a father's authority from owning property separately from their parent, or (more accurately) never considered the possibility of them claiming ownership independently. The father had the right to take all of the son's earnings and to benefit from his contracts without any corresponding liability. We would expect this based on the structure of early Roman society, as it’s hard to imagine a primitive family group without the members pooling their resources while being unable to enter into risky individual agreements. The real puzzle of the Patria Potestas doesn't lie here, but in the gradual limitation of these parental property rights and the fact that, before they were significantly reduced, the entire civilized world fell under their influence. No changes were attempted until the early years of the Empire, when the property earned by soldiers on duty was excluded from the Patria Potestas, likely as part of the reward for the armies that had overthrown the free republic. Three centuries later, this same exemption was extended to the earnings of those in civil employment. Both changes were clearly limited in scope, and they were framed in a technical way to minimize disruption to the principle of Patria Potestas. Roman law always recognized a certain qualified and dependent ownership of the perks and savings that slaves and sons under authority were not required to include in household accounts, and this permitted property, known as Peculium, was applied to the possessions newly exempt from Patria Potestas termed Castrense Peculium for soldiers and Quasi-castrense Peculium for civil servants. Other modifications to parental privileges followed that showed less regard for the ancient principle. Soon after the introduction of Quasi-castrense Peculium, Constantine the Great limited a father’s absolute control over property inherited by his children from their mother, reducing it to a usufruct, or life interest. A few more minor changes occurred in the Western Empire, but the furthest reached was in the East under Justinian, who ruled that unless a child's earnings came from the parent's property, the parent's rights over these earnings would only extend to enjoying their benefits during their lifetime. Even this maximum relaxation of Roman Patria Potestas was still far broader and stricter than any similar institution in the modern world. Early modern writers on law noted that only the tougher, more primitive conquerors of the empire, especially those of Slavic origin, displayed a Patria Potestas resembling that described in the Pandects and the Code. All the Germanic immigrants seemed to acknowledge a corporate family unit under the mund or authority of a patriarch, but his powers were clearly just remnants of a faded Patria Potestas and fell significantly short of those held by a Roman father. The Franks are specifically noted as lacking the Roman Institution, and so the old French lawyers, even while deeply engaged in integrating barbaric customs with Roman laws, had to protect themselves against the encroachment of the Potestas with the clear maxim, Puyssance de père en France n'a lieu. The Romans' insistence on maintaining this remnant of their ancient condition is notable in itself, but it’s even more remarkable how the Potestas spread throughout a civilization from which it had once vanished. While the Castrense Peculium was still the only exception to the father's control over property, and while his control over his children was still extensive, Roman citizenship and the Patria Potestas were expanding into every corner of the empire. Every African or Spaniard, every Gaul, Briton, or Jew who received this honor through gift, purchase, or inheritance placed themselves under Roman Law of Persons, and although our sources suggest that children born before citizenship acquisition could not be placed under Power against their wishes, those born afterward and all future descendants were on the same footing as a Roman filius familias. This treatise does not delve into the workings of later Roman society, but it’s worth noting that the view that Antoninus Caracalla's grant of Roman citizenship to all his subjects was of little importance lacks substantial support. However we interpret it, it must have significantly expanded the scope of the Patria Potestas, and I believe the tightening of family relations that resulted deserves greater attention in explaining the major moral transformation occurring in the world.

Before this branch of our subject is dismissed, it should be observed that the Paterfamilias was answerable for the delicts (or torts) of his Sons under Power. He was similarly liable for the torts of his slaves; but in both cases he originally possessed the singular privilege of tendering the delinquent's person in full satisfaction of the damage. The responsibility thus incurred on behalf of sons, coupled with the mutual incapacity of parent and Child under Power to sue one another, has seemed to some jurists to be best explained by the assumption of a "unity of person" between the Paterfamilias 086and the Filius-familias. In the chapter on Successions I shall attempt to show in what sense, and to what extent, this "unity" can be accepted as a reality. I can only say at present that these responsibilities of the Paterfamilias, and other legal phenomena which will be discussed hereafter, appear to me to point at certain duties of the primitive Patriarchal chieftain which balanced his rights. I conceive that, if he disposed absolutely of the persons and fortune of his clansmen, this representative ownership was coextensive with a liability to provide for all members of the brotherhood out of the common fund. The difficulty is to throw ourselves out of our habitual associations sufficiently for conceiving the nature of his obligation. It was not a legal duty, for law had not yet penetrated into the precinct of the Family. To call it moral is perhaps to anticipate the ideas belonging to a later stage of mental development; but the expression "moral obligation" is significant enough for our purpose, if we understand by it a duty semi-consciously followed and enforced rather by instinct and habit than by definite sanctions.

Before we move on from this topic, it’s important to note that the head of the family (Paterfamilias) was responsible for the wrongful actions (or torts) of his sons who were under his authority. He was also liable for the actions of his slaves; however, in both situations, he had the unique right to offer the wrongdoer's person as compensation for the damage caused. This responsibility for sons, along with the fact that parents and children under authority couldn’t sue each other, has led some legal scholars to suggest that there was a kind of “unity of person” between the Paterfamilias 086 and the Filius-familias. In the chapter on Successions, I will try to explain how and to what extent this “unity” can be seen as real. For now, I can only say that these responsibilities of the Paterfamilias, along with other legal aspects we will discuss later, suggest to me certain duties of the early patriarchal leader that balanced out his rights. I believe that if he had total control over the lives and wealth of his tribespeople, this ownership came with an obligation to care for all members of the community from the shared resources. The challenge is to step outside our usual views enough to understand the nature of his obligations. It wasn’t a legal duty, as the law hadn’t yet entered family matters. Calling it moral might imply ideas from a more advanced stage of thought; however, the term “moral obligation” is relevant for our discussion if we interpret it as a duty that was followed somewhat instinctively and habitually rather than enforced by specific laws.

The Patria Potestas, in its normal shape, has not been, and, as it seems to me, could not have been, a generally durable institution. The proof of its former universality is therefore incomplete so long as we consider it by itself; but the demonstration may be carried much further by examining other departments of ancient law which depend on it ultimately, but not by a thread of connection visible in all its parts or to all eyes. Let us turn for example to Kinship, or in other words, to the scale on which the proximity of relatives to each other is calculated in archaic jurisprudence. Here again it will be convenient to employ the Roman terms, Agnatic and Cognatic relationship. Cognatic relationship is simply the conception of kinship familiar to modern ideas; it is the relationship arising through common descent from the same pair of married persons, whether the descent be traced through males or females. Agnatic relationship is something very different: it excludes a number of persons whom we in our day should certainly consider of kin to ourselves, and it includes many more whom we should never reckon among our kindred. It is in truth the connection existing between the members of the Family, conceived as it was in the most ancient times. The limits of this connection are far from conterminous with those of modern relationship.087

The Patria Potestas, in its usual form, hasn't really been a lasting institution, and, as I see it, probably couldn't have been. The evidence of its past universality is lacking as long as we look at it in isolation; however, we can explore it more thoroughly by examining other areas of ancient law that ultimately rely on it, even if the connections aren't obvious to everyone or clear in every detail. For instance, let's look at Kinship, or in other words, how we measure the closeness of relatives in ancient legal systems. Here it makes sense to use the Roman terms, Agnatic and Cognatic relationships. Cognatic relationship aligns with modern understandings of kinship; it's about being related through shared descent from the same married couple, regardless of whether you trace that descent through males or females. Agnatic relationship, however, is quite different: it leaves out many people we would consider relatives today, while including others we wouldn't view as family at all. It's essentially about the connections among members of the Family as understood in ancient times. The boundaries of this connection don't match those of contemporary relationships.087

Cognates then are all those persons who can trace their blood to a single ancestor and ancestress; or, if we take the strict technical meaning of the word in Roman law, they are all who trace their blood to the legitimate marriage of a common pair. "Cognation" is therefore a relative term, and the degree of connection in blood which it indicates depends on the particular marriage which is selected as the commencement of the calculation. If we begin with the marriage of father and mother, Cognation will only express the relationship of brothers and sisters; if we take that of the grandfather and grandmother, then uncles, aunts, and their descendants will also be included in the notion of Cognation, and following the same process a larger number of Cognates may be continually obtained by choosing the starting point higher and higher up in the line of ascent. All this is easily understood by a modern; but who are the Agnates? In the first place, they are all the Cognates who trace their connection exclusively through males. A table of Cognates is, of course, formed by taking each lineal ancestor in turn and including all his descendants of both sexes in the tabular view; if then, in tracing the various branches of such a genealogical table or tree, we stop whenever we come to the name of a female and pursue that particular branch or ramification no further, all who remain after the descendants of women have been excluded are Agnates, and their connection together is Agnatic Relationship. I dwell a little on the process which is practically followed in separating them from the Cognates, because it explains a memorable legal maxim, "Mulier est finis familiæ"—a woman is the terminus of the family. A female name closes the branch or twig of the genealogy in which it occurs. None of the descendants of a female are included in the primitive notion of family relationship.

Cognates are all the people who can trace their ancestry to a single ancestor or ancestress. In the strict legal sense from Roman law, they are those who can trace their lineage to the legitimate marriage of a common couple. "Cognation" is therefore a relative term, and the degree of blood connection it indicates depends on the specific marriage chosen as the starting point for the calculation. If we start with the marriage of father and mother, Cognation will only refer to the relationship of brothers and sisters. If we take the marriage of grandparents, then uncles, aunts, and their descendants will also be included in the concept of Cognation. Following the same process, a larger number of Cognates can be continually obtained by selecting starting points higher up the family tree. This is easily understood by a modern person, but who are the Agnates? First of all, they are all the Cognates who trace their connection only through males. A table of Cognates is formed by considering each direct ancestor in turn and including all of their descendants, regardless of gender, in the table. If, while tracing the various branches of such a genealogical table or tree, we stop whenever we reach a female name and do not pursue that branch any further, all who remain after excluding the descendants of women are Agnates, and their connection is known as Agnatic Relationship. I emphasize the method used to separate them from the Cognates because it clarifies a significant legal principle, "Mulier est finis familiæ"—a woman is the end of the family. A female name closes the branch or twig of the genealogy where it appears. None of the descendants of a female are included in the original idea of family relationship.

If the system of archaic law at which we are looking be one which admits Adoption, we must add to the Agnate thus obtained all persons, male or female, who have been brought into the Family by the artificial extension of its boundaries. But the descendants of such persons will only be Agnates, if they satisfy the conditions which have just been described.

If the outdated legal system we’re examining allows for adoption, we need to include anyone, male or female, who has joined the family through the artificial expansion of its limits as Agnates. However, the descendants of these individuals will only be considered Agnates if they meet the conditions that have just been outlined.

What then is the reason of this arbitrary inclusion and exclusion? Why should a conception of Kinship, so elastic as to include strangers brought into the family by adoption, be nevertheless so narrow as to shut out the descendants088 of a female member? To solve these questions, we must recur to the Patria Potestas. The foundation of Agnation is not the marriage of Father and Mother, but the authority of the Father. All persons are Agnatically connected together who are under the same Paternal Power, or who have been under it, or who might have been under it if their lineal ancestor had lived long enough to exercise his empire. In truth, in the primitive view, Relationship is exactly limited by Patria Potestas. Where the Potestas begins, Kinship begins; and therefore adoptive relatives are among the kindred. Where the Potestas ends, Kinship ends; so that a son emancipated by his father loses all rights of Agnation. And here we have the reason why the descendants of females are outside the limits of archaic kinship. If a woman died unmarried, she could have no legitimate descendants. If she married, her children fell under the Patria Potestas, not of her Father, but of her Husband, and thus were lost to her own family. It is obvious that the organisation of primitive societies would have been confounded, if men had called themselves relatives of their mother's relatives. The inference would have been that a person might be subject to two distinct Patriæ Potestates; but distinct Patriæ Potestates implied distinct jurisdictions, so that anybody amenable to two of them at the same time would have lived under two different dispensations. As long as the Family was an imperium in imperio, a community within the commonwealth, governed by its own institutions of which the parent was the source, the limitation of relationship to the Agnates was a necessary security against a conflict of laws in the domestic forum.

What is the reason for this random inclusion and exclusion? Why should a concept of Kinship be flexible enough to include strangers who join the family through adoption, yet narrow enough to exclude the descendants of a female member? To answer these questions, we need to look at Patria Potestas. The basis of Agnation is not the marriage of the Father and Mother, but the authority of the Father. All individuals are Agnatically connected if they are under the same Paternal Power, or have been under it, or could have been if their ancestor had lived long enough to assert his authority. In essence, in the early view, Relationship is strictly defined by Patria Potestas. Where Potestas begins, Kinship begins; therefore, adoptive relatives are considered part of the family. Where Potestas ends, Kinship ends; a son freed by his father loses all rights of Agnation. This is why the descendants of females fall outside the boundaries of ancient kinship. If a woman died unmarried, she could have no legitimate descendants. If she married, her children came under the Patria Potestas of her Husband, not her Father, and thus were removed from her family. It's clear that the structure of primitive societies would have been confused if men considered themselves relatives of their mother's relatives. The implication would be that a person could be subject to two different Patriæ Potestates, but distinct Patriæ Potestates would mean distinct jurisdictions, which would create conflicts if someone were subject to both at the same time. As long as the Family was an imperium in imperio, a community within the state governed by its own rules, with the parent as the origin, restricting relationship to the Agnates was necessary to prevent conflicts of laws in domestic matters.

The Parental Powers proper are extinguished by the death of the Parent, but Agnation is as it were a mould which retains their imprint after they have ceased to exist. Hence comes the interest of Agnation for the inquirer into the history of jurisprudence. The Powers themselves are discernible in comparatively few monuments of ancient law, but Agnatic Relationship, which implies their former existence, is discoverable almost everywhere. There are few indigenous bodies of law belonging to communities of the Indo-European stock, which do not exhibit peculiarities in the most ancient part of their structure which are clearly referable to Agnation. In Hindoo law, for example, which is saturated with the089 primitive notions of family dependency, kinship is entirely Agnatic, and I am informed that in Hindoo genealogies the names of women are generally omitted altogether. The same view of relationship pervades so much of the laws of the races who overran the Roman Empire as appears to have really formed part of their primitive usage, and we may suspect that it would have perpetuated itself even more than it has in modern European jurisprudence, if it had not been for the vast influence of the later Roman law on modern thought. The Prætors early laid hold on Cognation as the natural form of kinship, and spared no pains in purifying their system from the older conception. Their ideas have descended to us, but still traces of Agnation are to be seen in many of the modern rules of succession after death. The exclusion of females and their children from governmental functions, commonly attributed to the usage of the Salian Franks, has certainly an agnatic origin, being descended from the ancient German rule of succession to allodial property. In Agnation too is to be sought the explanation of that extraordinary rule of English Law, only recently repealed, which prohibited brothers of the half-blood from succeeding to one another's lands. In the Customs of Normandy, the rule applies to uterine brothers only, that is, to brothers by the same mother but not by the same father; and, limited in this way, it is a strict deduction from the system of Agnation, under which uterine brothers are no relations at all to one another. When it was transplanted to England, the English judges, who had no clue to its principle, interpreted it as a general prohibition against the succession of the half-blood, and extended it to consanguineous brothers, that is to sons of the same father by different wives. In all the literature which enshrines the pretended philosophy of law, there is nothing more curious than the pages of elaborate sophistry in which Blackstone attempts to explain and justify the exclusion of the half-blood.

The parental rights are ended by the death of a parent, but agnation acts like a mold that keeps their imprint even after they're gone. This is why agnation is interesting for anyone studying the history of law. The actual powers are only seen in a few ancient legal documents, but agnatic relationships, which indicate their previous existence, can be found almost everywhere. There are very few legal systems among Indo-European communities that don't show unique features in their ancient structure tied to agnation. In Hindu law, for example, which is deeply rooted in the original ideas of family dependency, kinship is entirely agnatic, and I've heard that Hindu genealogies usually leave out the names of women entirely. The same perspective on relationships can be found throughout the laws of the races that invaded the Roman Empire, which seems to have been a genuine part of their original customs. We might think that this would have persisted even more in modern European law if it weren’t for the strong impact of later Roman law on contemporary thought. The Prætors quickly embraced cognation as the natural form of kinship and worked hard to refine their system from the older view. Their ideas have come down to us, but we can still see remnants of agnation in many modern inheritance rules after a person's death. The exclusion of females and their children from official roles, often linked to the practices of the Salian Franks, definitely has an agnatic origin, stemming from the old German rule of succession to allodial property. Agnation also explains that peculiar rule in English law, recently abolished, which barred half-brothers from inheriting each other's land. In the customs of Normandy, this rule applies only to uterine brothers, who share the same mother but not the same father; and, limited this way, it's a strict result of the agnatic system, under which uterine brothers aren't considered relatives at all. When this was brought to England, the English judges, not understanding its principle, mistakenly interpreted it as a general ban on the inheritance rights of half-blood relatives, expanding it to include consanguineous brothers, or sons of the same father from different marriages. In all the literature that claims to discuss the philosophy of law, nothing is more intriguing than the pages of complex reasoning where Blackstone tries to explain and justify the exclusion of half-blood relatives.

It may be shown, I think, that the Family, as held together by the Patria Potestas, is the nidus out of which the entire Law of Persons has germinated. Of all the chapters of that Law the most important is that which is concerned with the status of Females. It has just been stated that Primitive Jurisprudence, though it does not allow a Woman to communicate any rights of Agnation to her descendants, includes 090herself nevertheless in the Agnatic bond. Indeed, the relation of a female to the family in which she was born is much stricter, closer, and more durable than that which unites her male kinsmen. We have several times laid down that early law takes notice of Families only; this is the same thing as saying that it only takes notice of persons exercising Patria Potestas, and accordingly the only principle on which it enfranchises a son or grandson at the death of his Parent, is a consideration of the capacity inherent in such son or grandson to become himself the head of a new family and the root of a new set of Parental Powers. But a woman, of course, has no capacity of the kind, and no title accordingly to the liberation which it confers. There is therefore a peculiar contrivance of archaic jurisprudence for retaining her in the bondage of the Family for life. This is the institution known to the oldest Roman law as the Perpetual Tutelage of Women, under which a Female, though relieved from her Parent's authority by his decease, continues subject through life to her nearest male relations as her Guardians. Perpetual Guardianship is obviously neither more nor less than an artificial prolongation of the Patria Potestas, when for other purposes it has been dissolved. In India, the system survives in absolute completeness, and its operation is so strict that a Hindoo Mother frequently becomes the ward of her own sons. Even in Europe, the laws of the Scandinavian nations respecting women preserved it until quite recently. The invaders of the Western Empire had it universally among their indigenous usages, and indeed their ideas on the subject of Guardianship, in all its forms, were among the most retrogressive of those which they introduced into the Western world. But from the mature Roman jurisprudence it had entirely disappeared. We should know almost nothing about it, if we had only the compilations of Justinian to consult; but the discovery of the manuscript of Gaius discloses it to us at a most interesting epoch, just when it had fallen into complete discredit and was verging on extinction. The great jurisconsult himself scouts the popular apology offered for it in the mental inferiority of the female sex, and a considerable part of his volume is taken up with descriptions of the numerous expedients, some of them displaying extraordinary ingenuity, which the Roman lawyers had devised for enabling Women to defeat the ancient rules. Led by their theory of Natural Law, the jurisconsults had evidently at this time assumed091 the equality of the sexes as a principle of their code of equity. The restrictions which they attacked were, it is to be observed, restrictions on the disposition of property, for which the assent of the woman's guardians was still formally required. Control of her person was apparently quite obsolete.

It can be shown, I believe, that the Family, held together by the Patria Potestas, is the origin from which the entire Law of Persons has developed. Of all the sections of that Law, the most significant is the one that addresses the status of Women. It has just been mentioned that Primitive Jurisprudence, although it does not permit a Woman to pass on any rights of Agnation to her descendants, still includes 090 herself in the Agnatic bond. In fact, a woman’s relationship to the family she was born into is much stricter, closer, and more enduring than the ties that bind her male relatives. We have repeatedly stated that early law recognizes only Families; this means it only acknowledges individuals exercising Patria Potestas, and thus, the only reason it grants freedom to a son or grandson upon the death of his Parent is based on the potential of such son or grandson to become the head of a new family and the source of a new set of Parental Powers. However, a woman has no such capacity and therefore no claim to the rights granted. As a result, there is a specific mechanism in ancient jurisprudence to keep her bound to the Family for life. This is known in the oldest Roman law as the Perpetual Tutelage of Women, under which a Female, though freed from her Parent's authority upon his death, remains under the guardianship of her closest male relatives for her entire life. Perpetual Guardianship is clearly nothing more than an artificial extension of the Patria Potestas when it has otherwise ended. In India, this system still exists in its entirety, and its enforcement is so strict that a Hindu Mother often becomes the ward of her own sons. Even in Europe, the laws of Scandinavian countries regarding women upheld it until quite recently. The invaders of the Western Empire widely practiced it among their indigenous customs, and indeed, their views on the matter of Guardianship in all its forms were among the most regressive that they brought to the Western world. However, it completely disappeared from mature Roman jurisprudence. We would know almost nothing about it if we only had the compilations of Justinian to refer to; but the discovery of the manuscript of Gaius reveals it to us during a very interesting period, just when it had fallen into complete disrepute and was on the brink of extinction. The great legal scholar himself dismisses the common justification for it, based on the supposed mental inferiority of women, and a significant portion of his work is dedicated to describing the various clever strategies, some quite ingenious, that Roman lawyers had developed to allow Women to overcome the old rules. Guided by their theory of Natural Law, the legal experts at this time clearly adopted 091 the principle of gender equality as a tenet of their fair code. The limitations they challenged were restrictions on the control of property, for which the approval of the woman's guardians was still formally required. Control over her person, however, seemed to be entirely outdated.

Ancient Law subordinates the woman to her blood-relations, while a prime phenomenon of modern jurisprudence has been her subordination to her husband. The history of the change is remarkable. It begins far back in the annals of Rome. Anciently, there were three modes in which marriage might be contracted according to Roman usage, one involving a religious solemnity, the other two the observance of certain secular formalities. By the religious marriage or Confarreation; by the higher form of civil marriage, which was called Coemption; and by the lower form, which was termed Usus, the Husband acquired a number of rights over the person and property of his wife, which were on the whole in excess of such as are conferred on him in any system of modern jurisprudence. But in what capacity did he acquire them? Not as Husband, but as Father. By the Confarreation, Coemption, and Usus, the woman passed in manum viri, that is, in law she became the Daughter of her husband. She was included in his Patria Potestas. She incurred all the liabilities springing out of it while it subsisted, and surviving it when it had expired. All her property became absolutely his, and she was retained in tutelage after his death to the guardian whom he had appointed by will. These three ancient forms of marriage fell, however, gradually into disuse, so that, at the most splendid period of Roman greatness, they had almost entirely given place to a fashion of wedlock—old apparently, but not hitherto considered reputable—which was founded on a modification of the lower form of civil marriage. Without explaining the technical mechanism of the institution now generally popular, I may describe it as amounting in law to little more than a temporary deposit of the woman by her family. The rights of the family remained unimpaired, and the lady continued in the tutelage of guardians whom her parents had appointed and whose privileges of control overrode, in many material respects, the inferior authority of her husband. The consequence was that the situation of the Roman female, whether married or unmarried, became one of great personal and proprietary independence, for the tendency of the later092 law, as I have already hinted, was to reduce the power of the guardian to a nullity, while the form of marriage in fashion conferred on the husband no compensating superiority. But Christianity tended somewhat from the very first to narrow this remarkable liberty. Led at first by justifiable disrelish for the loose practices of the decaying heathen world, but afterwards hurried on by a passion of asceticism, the professors of the new faith looked with disfavour on a marital tie which was in fact the laxest the Western world has seen. The latest Roman law, so far as it is touched by the constitutions of the Christian Emperors, bears some marks of a reaction against the liberal doctrines of the great Antonine jurisconsults. And the prevalent state of religious sentiment may explain why it is that modern jurisprudence, forged in the furnace of barbarian conquest, and formed by the fusion of Roman jurisprudence with patriarchal usage, has absorbed, among its rudiments, much more than usual of those rules concerning the position of women which belong peculiarly to an imperfect civilisation. During the troubled era which begins modern history, and while the laws of the Germanic and Sclavonic immigrants remained superposed like a separate layer above the Roman jurisprudence of their provincial subjects, the women of the dominant races are seen everywhere under various forms of archaic guardianship, and the husband who takes a wife from any family except his own pays a money-price to her relations for the tutelage which they surrender to him. When we move onwards, and the code of the middle ages has been formed by the amalgamation of the two systems, the law relating to women carries the stamp of its double origin. The principle of the Roman jurisprudence is so far triumphant that unmarried females are generally (though there are local exceptions to the rule) relieved from the bondage of the family; but the archaic principle of the barbarians has fixed the position of married women, and the husband has drawn to himself in his marital character the powers which had once belonged to his wife's male kindred, the only difference being that he no longer purchases his privileges. At this point therefore the modern law of Western and Southern Europe begins to be distinguished by one of its chief characteristics, the comparative freedom it allows to unmarried women and widows, the heavy disabilities it imposes 093on wives. It was very long before the subordination entailed on the other sex by marriage was sensibly diminished. The principal and most powerful solvent of the revived barbarism of Europe was always the codified jurisprudence of Justinian, wherever it was studied with that passionate enthusiasm which it seldom failed to awaken. It covertly but most efficaciously undermined the customs which it pretended merely to interpret. But the Chapter of law relating to married women was for the most part read by the light, not of Roman, but of Canon Law, which in no one particular departs so widely from the spirit of the secular jurisprudence as in the view it takes of the relations created by marriage. This was in part inevitable, since no society which preserves any tincture of Christian institution is likely to restore to married women the personal liberty conferred on them by the middle Roman law, but the proprietary disabilities of married females stand on quite a different basis from their personal incapacities, and it is by keeping alive and consolidating the former that the expositors of the Canon Law have deeply injured civilisation. There are many vestiges of a struggle between the secular and ecclesiastical principles, but the Canon Law nearly everywhere prevailed. In some of the French provinces married women, of a rank below nobility, obtained all the powers of dealing with property which Roman jurisprudence had allowed, and this local law has been largely followed by the Code Napoléon; but the state of the Scottish law shows that scrupulous deference to the doctrines of the Roman jurisconsults did not always extend to mitigating the disabilities of wives. The systems however which are least indulgent to married women are invariably those which have followed the Canon Law exclusively, or those which, from the lateness of their contact with European civilisation, have never had their archaisms weeded out. The Scandinavian laws, harsh till lately to all females, are still remarkable for their severity to wives. And scarcely less stringent in the proprietary incapacities it imposes is the English Common Law, which borrows far the greatest number of its fundamental principles from the jurisprudence of the Canonists. Indeed, the part of the Common Law which prescribes the legal situation of married women may serve to give an Englishman clear notions of the great institution which has been the principal subject of this chapter. I do not know how the operation and nature of the ancient Patria094 Potestas can be brought so vividly before the mind as by reflecting on the prerogatives attached to the husband by the pure English Common Law, and by recalling the rigorous consistency with which the view of a complete legal subjection on the part of the wife is carried by it, where it is untouched by equity or statutes, through every department of rights, duties, and remedies. The distance between the eldest and latest Roman law on the subject of Children under Power may be considered as equivalent to the difference between the Common Law and the jurisprudence of the Court of Chancery in the rules which they respectively apply to wives.

Ancient Law places women under the authority of their blood relatives, while a key aspect of modern law has been their subordination to their husbands. The history of this change is fascinating and traces back to ancient Rome. Traditionally, marriage could be established in three ways according to Roman customs: one involved a religious ceremony, while the other two required the completion of certain secular formalities. Through religious marriage or Confarreation; the higher form of civil marriage called Coemption; and the lower form known as Usus, the husband gained various rights over his wife's person and property, which were generally more extensive than those granted in any modern legal system. But in what capacity did he acquire these rights? Not as Husband, but as Father. Through Confarreation, Coemption, and Usus, the woman passed in manum viri, meaning she legally became her husband’s Daughter. She fell under his Patria Potestas. She assumed all the liabilities that arose while it was in effect and even after it had ended. All her property became his, and she remained under the guardianship of the person he designated in his will even after his death. However, these three ancient forms of marriage gradually fell out of use, so that by the peak of Roman power, they had mostly been replaced by a form of marriage—seemingly old, but not previously regarded as respectable—which was based on a modification of the lower form of civil marriage. Without delving into the specific legal workings of the now widely accepted institution, I would describe it as essentially a temporary arrangement with the woman provided by her family. The family's rights remained intact, and the woman stayed under the guardianship of those her parents had chosen, whose powers of control often surpassed, in many significant ways, her husband’s lesser authority. As a result, the situation for Roman women, whether married or unmarried, became one of considerable personal and property independence, as the trend in later law, as I have indicated, was to diminish the power of guardians to almost nothing, while the prevailing form of marriage granted the husband no corresponding superiority. However, Christianity tended from the outset to restrict this remarkable freedom. Initially driven by a justified aversion to the loose behaviors of the declining pagan society, and later propelled by a zeal for asceticism, followers of the new faith viewed the marital bond—the loosest seen in the Western world—negatively. The latest Roman law, touched by the edicts of Christian Emperors, shows evidence of a backlash against the progressive ideas of the great Antonine legal scholars. The dominant religious sentiment may explain why modern law, birthed from the chaos of barbarian conquest and shaped by the blend of Roman jurisprudence with patriarchal traditions, has incorporated much more than usual of those rules related to women's status that are characteristic of an imperfect civilization. During the tumultuous era marking the start of modern history, while the laws of the Germanic and Slavic immigrants existed as a distinct layer above the Roman law of their provincial subjects, women of the dominant groups were seen continuously subjected to various forms of archaic guardianship. The husband who married a woman from a different family typically compensated her relatives with a monetary payment for the guardianship they relinquished. As we progress through time, and as the code of the Middle Ages emerges from the combination of the two systems, the legal standards concerning women reflect its dual origins. The principle of Roman law has prevailed to such an extent that unmarried women are generally (though there are local exceptions) freed from family control, but the ancient principles of the barbarians have determined the status of married women, with the husband summoning powers once held by his wife's male relatives, the only difference being that he no longer has to buy these privileges. At this juncture, the modern law of Western and Southern Europe starts to differentiate itself by offering comparatively greater freedom to unmarried women and widows, while imposing significant limitations on wives. It took a long time for the subjugation that marriage imposed on the other sex to noticeably lessen. The primary and most effective counter to the rekindled barbarism of Europe has always been the codified law of Justinian, wherever it has been studied with that fervent enthusiasm which it rarely failed to inspire. It insidiously, yet powerfully undermined the customs that it claimed to merely interpret. However, the chapter of law regarding married women was mostly understood through the lens of Canon Law, which diverges most significantly from secular jurisprudence in its perspective on the relationships formed by marriage. This divergence was, in part, unavoidable, as no society retaining even a hint of Christian influence is likely to restore the personal freedoms married women enjoyed under Middle Roman law. Yet, the property disabilities of married women rest on a different foundation than their personal limitations, and by perpetuating and strengthening the former, the interpreters of Canon Law have deeply harmed civilization. Numerous remnants of a conflict between secular and ecclesiastical principles exist, but Canon Law predominated almost universally. In some French territories, married women of a status lower than nobility gained all the property rights granted by Roman law, and this local law has been largely adopted by the Code Napoléon; however, the status of Scottish law indicates that strict adherence to Roman legal doctrines did not always lead to the alleviation of wives' disabilities. Nevertheless, the systems that are least forgiving to married women are invariably those that have adhered strictly to Canon Law or those that, due to their delayed contact with European civilization, have never shed their archaic elements. Scandinavian laws, previously harsh to all women, still notably treat wives very severely. The English Common Law, borrowing many of its foundational principles from the jurisprudence of the Canonists, is similarly stringent in the property limitations it places on married women. In fact, the segment of Common Law addressing the legal position of married women can provide an Englishman with a clear understanding of the significant institution that has been the main focus of this chapter. I can't think of a clearer way to illustrate the workings and implications of the ancient Patria 094 Potestas than by considering the prerogatives assigned to husbands under pure English Common Law and recalling the strict consistency with which the notion of a complete legal subjugation of wives—where unaffected by equity or statutes—pervades all aspects of rights, duties, and remedies. The difference between early and late Roman law concerning Children under Power may be likened to the disparity between Common Law and the jurisprudence of the Court of Chancery regarding the standards they apply to wives.

If we were to lose sight of the true origin of Guardianship in both its forms and were to employ the common language on these topics, we should find ourselves remarking that, while the Tutelage of Women is an instance in which systems of archaic law push to an extravagant length the fiction of suspended rights, the rules which they lay down for the Guardianship of Male Orphans are an example of a fault in precisely the opposite direction. All such systems terminate the Tutelage of males at an extraordinary early period. Under the ancient Roman law, which may be taken as their type, the son who was delivered from Patria Potestas by the death of his Father or Grandfather remained under guardianship till an epoch which for general purposes may be described as arriving with his fifteenth year; but the arrival of that epoch placed him at once in the full enjoyment of personal and proprietary independence. The period of minority appears therefore to have been as unreasonably short as the duration of the disabilities of women was preposterously long. But, in point of fact, there was no element either of excess or of shortcoming in the circumstances which gave their original form to the two kinds of guardianship. Neither the one nor the other of them was based on the slightest consideration of public or private convenience. The guardianship of male orphans was no more designed originally to shield them till the arrival of years of discretion than the tutelage of women was intended to protect the other sex against its own feebleness. The reason why the death of the father delivered the son from the bondage of the family was the son's capacity for becoming himself the head of a new family and the founder of a new Patria Potestas; no such capacity was possessed by095 the woman and therefore she was never enfranchised. Accordingly the Guardianship of Male Orphans was a contrivance for keeping alive the semblance of subordination to the family of the Parent, up to the time when the child was supposed capable of becoming a parent himself. It was a prolongation of the Patria Potestas up to the period of bare physical manhood. It ended with puberty, for the rigour of the theory demanded that it should do so. Inasmuch, however, as it did not profess to conduct the orphan ward to the age of intellectual maturity or fitness for affairs, it was quite unequal to the purposes of general convenience; and this the Romans seem to have discovered at a very early stage of their social progress. One of the very oldest monuments of Roman legislation is the Lex Lætoria or Plætoria which placed all free males who were of full years and rights under the temporary control of a new class of guardians, called Curatores, whose sanction was required to validate their acts or contracts. The twenty-sixth year of the young man's age was the limit of this statutory supervision; and it is exclusively with reference to the age of twenty-five that the terms "majority" and "minority" are employed in Roman law. Pupilage or wardship in modern jurisprudence had adjusted itself with tolerable regularity to the simple principle of protection to the immaturity of youth both bodily and mental. It has its natural termination with years of discretion. But for protection against physical weakness and for protection against intellectual incapacity, the Romans looked to two different institutions, distinct both in theory and design. The ideas attendant on both are combined in the modern idea of guardianship.

If we were to overlook the true origin of Guardianship in both its forms and use everyday language on these topics, we would likely note that, while the Tutelage of Women is a case where outdated laws exaggerate the idea of suspended rights, the rules they set for the Guardianship of Male Orphans illustrate a flaw in the opposite direction. All such systems end the Tutelage of males at an unusually young age. Under ancient Roman law, which can be seen as a standard, a son who was released from Patria Potestas due to the death of his father or grandfather remained under guardianship until what can generally be described as around his fifteenth year; but reaching this age instantly granted him full personal and property independence. Therefore, the period of minority seems to have been unreasonably short, just as the limitations on women were absurdly long. However, in reality, there was no element of excess or deficiency in the circumstances that formed the two kinds of guardianship. Neither was based on any real consideration of public or private convenience. The guardianship of male orphans was not originally meant to shield them until they reached maturity, just as the tutelage of women was not designed to protect them from their own weakness. The reason the death of the father freed the son from family control was that the son had the potential to become the head of a new family and establish a new Patria Potestas; women did not have that capability, and so they were never freed. Thus, the Guardianship of Male Orphans was a way to maintain the appearance of subordination to the parent's family until the child was thought capable of becoming a parent themselves. It extended the Patria Potestas until the boy reached physical adulthood. This guardianship ended with puberty, as the theory demanded. However, since it didn’t aim to guide the orphan ward to intellectual maturity or readiness for responsibilities, it fell short of serving the general good; the Romans seemed to realize this very early in their social development. One of the oldest pieces of Roman legislation is the Lex Lætoria or Plætoria, which placed all free males of legal age under the temporary control of a new category of guardians called Curatores, whose approval was necessary to validate their actions or contracts. The age limit for this legal supervision was set at twenty-six, and the terms "majority" and "minority" in Roman law specifically refer to the age of twenty-five. Pupilage or wardship in modern law has adjusted itself reasonably well to the simple principle of protecting the immaturity of youth, both physically and mentally. It naturally ends when a person reaches maturity. However, for protection against physical weakness and intellectual incapacity, the Romans relied on two separate institutions, distinct in both theory and purpose. The concepts related to both have merged into the modern idea of guardianship.

The Law of Persons contains but one other chapter which can be usefully cited for our present purpose. The legal rules by which systems of nature jurisprudence regulate the connection of Master and Slave, present no very distinct traces of the original condition common to ancient societies. But there are reasons for this exception. There seems to be something in the institution of Slavery which has at all times either shocked or perplexed mankind, however little habituated to reflection, and however slightly advanced in the cultivation of its moral instincts. The compunction which ancient communities almost unconsciously experienced appears to have always resulted in the adoption of some096 imaginary principle upon which a defence, or at least a rationale, of slavery could be plausibly founded. Very early in their history the Greeks explained the institution as grounded on the intellectual inferiority of certain races and their consequent natural aptitude for the servile condition. The Romans, in a spirit equally characteristic, derived it from a supposed agreement between the victor and the vanquished in which the first stipulated for the perpetual services of his foe; and the other gained in consideration the life which he had legitimately forfeited. Such theories were not only unsound but plainly unequal to the case for which they affected to account. Still they exercised powerful influence in many ways. They satisfied the conscience of the Master. They perpetuated and probably increased the debasement of the Slave. And they naturally tended to put out of sight the relation in which servitude had originally stood to the rest of the domestic system. The relation, though not clearly exhibited, is casually indicated in many parts of primitive law, and more particularly in the typical system—that of ancient Rome.

The Law of Persons has one other chapter that can be relevant for our current discussion. The legal rules by which systems of natural law govern the relationship between Master and Slave don’t clearly reflect the original state common in ancient societies. However, there are reasons for this exception. There always seems to be something about the institution of Slavery that has either horrified or confused people, regardless of how reflective they are or how advanced their moral development. The guilt that ancient communities almost instinctively felt seems to have led to the adoption of some096 imaginary principle to provide a defense, or at least a justification, for slavery. Early in their history, the Greeks rationalized the institution as based on the perceived intellectual inferiority of certain races and their supposed natural suitability for servitude. The Romans, in a similar vein, claimed it arose from a supposed agreement between the victor and the defeated, in which the victor required the perpetual services of his foe in exchange for sparing his life, which he had otherwise forfeited. These theories were not only flawed but obviously inadequate for the situations they intended to explain. Nevertheless, they had a strong influence in various ways. They eased the conscience of the Master. They perpetuated and likely deepened the degradation of the Slave. And they naturally obscured the original relationship between servitude and the rest of the domestic system. This relationship, though not clearly shown, is mentioned in various aspects of primitive law, particularly in the typical system of ancient Rome.

Much industry and some learning have been bestowed in the United States of America on the question whether the Slave was in the early stages of society a recognised member of the Family. There is a sense in which an affirmative answer must certainly be given. It is clear, from the testimony both of ancient law and of many primeval histories, that the Slave might under certain conditions be made the Heir, or Universal Successor, of the Master, and this significant faculty, as I shall explain in the Chapter on Succession, implies that the government and representation of the Family might, in a particular state of circumstances, devolve on the bondman. It seems, however, to be assumed in the American arguments on the subject that, if we allow Slavery to have been a primitive Family institution, the acknowledgment is pregnant with an admission of the moral defensibility of Negro-servitude at the present moment. What then is meant by saying that the Slave was originally included in the Family? Not that his situation may not have been the fruit of the coarsest motives which can actuate man. The simple wish to use the bodily powers of another person as a means of ministering to one's own ease or pleasure is doubtless the foundation of 097Slavery, and as old as human nature. When we speak of the Slave as anciently included in the Family, we intend to assert nothing as to the motives of those who brought him into it or kept him there; we merely imply that the tie which bound him to his master was regarded as one of the same general character with that which united every other member of the group to its chieftain. This consequence is, in fact, carried in the general assertion already made that the primitive ideas of mankind were unequal to comprehending any basis of the connection inter se of individuals, apart from the relations of family. The Family consisted primarily of those who belonged to it by consanguinity and next of those who had been engrafted on it by adoption; but there was still a third class of persons who were only joined to it by common subjection to its head, and these were the Slaves. The born and the adopted subjects of the chief were raised above the Slave by the certainty that in the ordinary course of events they would be relieved from bondage and entitled to exercise powers of their own; but that the inferiority of the Slave was not such as to place him outside the pale of the Family, or such as to degrade him to the footing of inanimate property, is clearly proved, I think, by the many traces which remain of his ancient capacity for inheritance in the last resort. It would, of course, be unsafe in the highest degree to hazard conjectures how far the lot of the Slave was mitigated, in the beginnings of society, by having a definite place reserved to him in the empire of the Father. It is, perhaps, more probable that the son was practically assimilated to the Slave, than that the Slave shared any of the tenderness which in later times was shown to the son. But it may be asserted with some confidence of advanced and matured codes that, wherever servitude is sanctioned, the Slave has uniformly greater advantages under systems which preserve some memento of his earlier condition than under those which have adopted some other theory of his civil degradation. The point of view from which jurisprudence regards the Slave is always of great importance to him. The Roman law was arrested in its growing tendency to look upon him more and more as an article of property by the theory of the Law of Nature; and hence it is that, wherever servitude is sanctioned by institutions which have been deeply affected by Roman jurisprudence, the servile condition is never intolerably wretched. There is a great deal of evidence that in those American098 States which have taken the highly Romanised code of Louisiana as the basis of their jurisprudence, the lot and prospects of the negro-population are better in many material respects than under institutions founded on the English Common Law, which, as recently interpreted, has no true place for the Slave, and can only therefore regard him as a chattel.

A lot of work and some study have gone into whether the Slave was recognized as a member of the Family in the early stages of society in the United States. In a way, we have to say yes. It’s clear from both ancient laws and many early histories that the Slave could, under certain conditions, be made the Heir or Universal Successor of the Master. This important ability, as I’ll explain in the Chapter on Succession, suggests that in specific circumstances, the management and representation of the Family could fall to the bondman. However, the American arguments on this topic seem to assume that if we accept Slavery as a primitive Family institution, it implies that we think Negro servitude is morally acceptable today. So, what does it mean when we say the Slave was originally part of the Family? It doesn’t mean that his situation was free from the worst motivations humans can have. The basic desire to use another person's physical abilities for one's own comfort or pleasure is certainly the root of Slavery, and it’s as old as humanity itself. When we refer to the Slave as historically included in the Family, we’re not making any claims about the motivations of those who brought him into it or kept him there; we’re simply suggesting that the connection between him and his master was seen as similar to the ties that linked every other member of the group to its leader. This conclusion is implied in the general statement made earlier that early human concepts couldn’t understand individual connections outside family relations. The Family originally consisted of those related by blood and those adopted into it; however, there was also a third group of people who were connected by their common subjugation to the head of the Family, and these were the Slaves. The born and adopted members of the chief were viewed as superior to the Slave because they were expected to eventually be freed and able to exercise their own rights; yet, the Slave's inferiority didn’t exclude him from being considered part of the Family, nor did it reduce him to mere property, as shown by the remnants of his ancient ability to inherit. Of course, it would be highly unsafe to speculate on how much the Slave's situation was improved in the early society by having a specific role in the Father's domain. It may be more likely that the son was seen similarly to the Slave, rather than the Slave being treated with the kind of affection later shown to the son. However, we can confidently assert that, where servitude is accepted, the Slave tends to have better conditions under systems that retain some reminder of his earlier status than under those that have adopted a different notion of his civil degradation. The perspective from which the law views the Slave is always significant for him. Roman law was held back in its growing trend to see him more as property by the theory of Natural Law; thus, in places where servitude is authorized by institutions influenced by Roman law, the servile condition never becomes unbearably awful. There is substantial evidence that in those American States which have based their laws on the highly Romanized code of Louisiana, the conditions and prospects for the Black population are better in many important ways than in systems founded on English Common Law, which, in its recent interpretations, has no real place for the Slave and thus can only view him as a possession.

We have now examined all parts of the ancient Law of Persons which fall within the scope of this treatise, and the result of the inquiry is, I trust, to give additional definiteness and precision to our view of the infancy of jurisprudence. The Civil laws of States first make their appearance as the Themistes of a patriarchal sovereign, and we can now see that these Themistes are probably only a developed form of the irresponsible commands which, in a still earlier condition of the race, the head of each isolated household may have addressed to his wives, his children, and his slaves. But, even after the State has been organised, the laws have still an extremely limited application. Whether they retain their primitive character as Themistes, or whether they advance to the condition of Customs or Codified Texts, they are binding not on individuals, but on Families. Ancient jurisprudence, if a perhaps deceptive comparison may be employed, may be likened to International Law, filling nothing, as it were, excepting the interstices between the great groups which are the atoms of society. In a community so situated, the legislation of assemblies and the jurisdiction of Courts reaches only to the heads of families, and to every other individual the rule of conduct is the law of his home, of which his Parent is the legislator. But the sphere of civil law, small at first, tends steadily to enlarge itself. The agents of legal change, Fictions, Equity, and Legislation, are brought in turn to bear on the primeval institutions, and at every point of the progress, a greater number of personal rights and a larger amount of property are removed from the domestic forum to the cognisance of the public tribunals. The ordinances of the government obtain gradually the same efficacy in private concerns as in matters of state, and are no longer liable to be overridden by the behests of a despot enthroned by each hearthstone. We have in the annals of Roman law a nearly complete history of the crumbling away of an archaic system, and of the formation of new institutions from the recombined099 materials, institutions some of which descended unimpaired to the modern world, while others, destroyed or corrupted by contact with barbarism in the dark ages, had again to be recovered by mankind. When we leave this jurisprudence at the epoch of its final reconstruction by Justinian, few traces of archaism can be discovered in any part of it except in the single article of the extensive powers still reserved to the living Parent. Everywhere else principles of convenience, or of symmetry, or of simplification—new principles at any rate—have usurped the authority of the jejune considerations which satisfied the conscience of ancient times. Everywhere a new morality has displaced the canons of conduct and the reasons of acquiescence which were in unison with the ancient usages, because in fact they were born of them.

We have now looked at all aspects of the ancient Law of Persons covered in this treatise, and I hope the findings clarify our understanding of the early development of jurisprudence. The Civil laws of States first appeared as the Themistes of a patriarchal ruler, and we can see that these Themistes probably evolved from the arbitrary commands that heads of isolated households may have given to their wives, children, and slaves in a much earlier time. However, even after the State was established, the laws still had a very limited reach. Whether they kept their original character as Themistes or evolved into Customs or Codified Texts, they applied not to individuals, but to Families. Ancient jurisprudence, if it can be compared, resembles International Law, filling in the gaps between the major groups that make up society. In such a community, the laws passed by assemblies and the rulings of Courts apply only to family heads, and for everyone else, the guiding rules come from their home life, where the Parent is the legislator. However, the sphere of civil law, small in the beginning, gradually expands. The mechanisms of legal change—Fictions, Equity, and Legislation—are applied to the ancient institutions, and at each stage of progress, more personal rights and more property move from the domestic realm to public courts. Government ordinances begin to hold the same weight in private matters as they do in state affairs and can no longer be overridden by the commands of a despot by every hearth. In the history of Roman law, we find a nearly complete account of the breakdown of an ancient system and the creation of new institutions from the rearranged materials, some of which remained intact into the modern era, while others, damaged or altered by barbarism during the Dark Ages, had to be rediscovered by society. When we examine this jurisprudence at the time of its final restructuring by Justinian, few remnants of its archaic roots can be found, aside from the extensive powers still held by the living Parent. Everywhere else, principles of convenience, symmetry, or simplification—new principles, in any case—have taken the place of the simplistic considerations that once satisfied the conscience of ancient times. A new morality has replaced the codes of conduct and the justifications for compliance that aligned with ancient practices because they were actually derived from them.

The movement of the progressive societies has been uniform in one respect. Through all its course it has been distinguished by the gradual dissolution of family dependency and the growth of individual obligation in its place. The Individual is steadily substituted for the Family, as the unit of which civil laws take account. The advance has been accomplished at varying rates of celerity, and there are societies not absolutely stationary in which the collapse of the ancient organisation can only be perceived by careful study of the phenomena they present. But, whatever its pace, the change has not been subject to reaction or recoil, and apparent retardations will be found to have been occasioned through the absorption of archaic ideas and customs from some entirely foreign source. Nor is it difficult to see what is the tie between man and man which replaces by degrees those forms of reciprocity in rights and duties which have their origin in the Family. It is Contract. Starting, as from one terminus of history, from a condition of society in which all the relations of Persons are summed up in the relations of Family, we seem to have steadily moved towards a phase of social order in which all these relations arise from the free agreement of Individuals. In Western Europe the progress achieved in this direction has been considerable. Thus the status of the Slave has disappeared—it has been superseded by the contractual relation of the servant to his master. The status of the Female under Tutelage, if the tutelage be understood of persons other than her husband, has also ceased to exist; from her coming of age to her marriage all the relations she may form are100 relations of contract. So too the status of the Son under Power has no true place in law of modern European societies. If any civil obligation binds together the Parent and the child of full age, it is one to which only contract gives its legal validity. The apparent exceptions are exceptions of that stamp which illustrate the rule. The child before years of discretion, the orphan under guardianship, the adjudged lunatic, have all their capacities and incapacities regulated by the Law of Persons. But why? The reason is differently expressed in the conventional language of different systems, but in substance it is stated to the same effect by all. The great majority of Jurists are constant to the principle that the classes of persons just mentioned are subject to extrinsic control on the single ground that they do not possess the faculty of forming a judgment on their own interests; in other words, that they are wanting in the first essential of an engagement by Contract.

The movement of progressive societies has been consistent in one way. Throughout its development, it has been marked by the gradual decline of family dependency and the rise of individual responsibility instead. The Individual is increasingly becoming the focus for civil laws, replacing the Family as the primary unit considered. This change has happened at different speeds, and while some societies may seem stagnant, the breakdown of the old structure can only be noted with careful observation of their conditions. Regardless of how fast it happens, this transformation has not faced any backlash, and any apparent slowdowns can be attributed to the integration of outdated ideas and practices from completely different sources. It’s also clear what connects individuals as this shift away from familial reciprocity in rights and duties takes place: it is Contract. Starting from a point in history where all relationships are defined through family ties, we seem to have gradually moved towards a social structure where relationships emerge from the voluntary agreements of Individuals. In Western Europe, significant progress has been made in this area. For example, the status of the Slave has disappeared, replaced by the contractual relationship between a servant and their master. The legal status of a woman under guardianship—if that guardianship refers to anyone besides her husband—has also vanished; from the time she becomes an adult until her marriage, all her relationships are based on contracts. Likewise, the status of a Son under parental authority has no real place in the modern laws of European societies. If any civil obligation links a parent and their adult child, it is one that contract law recognizes. The apparent exceptions illustrate the general rule. A child before reaching the age of discretion, an orphan with guardianship, or a legally deemed lunatic have their capabilities and limitations controlled by personal law. But why? The reasoning may be phrased differently in various legal systems, but essentially, all convey the same idea. The vast majority of legal scholars agree that these categories of individuals are under external control solely because they do not have the ability to make judgments about their own interests; in other words, they lack the essential quality needed for a binding Contract.

The word Status may be usefully employed to construct a formula expressing the law of progress thus indicated, which, whatever be its value, seems to me to be sufficiently ascertained. All the forms of Status taken notice of in the Law of Persons were derived from, and to some extent are still coloured by, the powers and privileges anciently residing in the Family. If then we employ Status, agreeably with the usage of the best writers, to signify these personal conditions only, and avoid applying the term to such conditions as are the immediate or remote result of agreement, we may say that the movement of the progressive societies has hitherto been a movement from Status to Contract.101

The term Status can be effectively used to create a formula that represents the law of progress mentioned earlier, which, regardless of its value, seems to be fairly well established. All the forms of Status referenced in the Law of Persons originated from, and are still somewhat influenced by, the powers and privileges that once belonged to the Family. Therefore, if we use Status, in line with the terminology of leading writers, to mean these personal conditions only, and refrain from using the term for conditions that are the direct or indirect result of an agreement, we can say that the evolution of progressive societies has so far been a movement from Status to Contract.101


CHAPTER VI

the early history of will-based inheritance

If an attempt were made to demonstrate in England the superiority of the historical method of investigation to the modes of inquiry concerning Jurisprudence which are in fashion among us, no department of Law would better serve as an example than Testaments or Wills. Its capabilities it owes to its great length and great continuity. At the beginning of its history we find ourselves in the very infancy of the social state, surrounded by conceptions which it requires some effort of mind to realise in their ancient form; while here, at the other extremity of its line of progress, we are in the midst of legal notions which are nothing more than those same conceptions disguised by the phraseology and by the habits of thought which belong to modern times, and exhibiting therefore a difficulty of another kind, the difficulty of believing that ideas which form part of our everyday mental stock can really stand in need of analysis and examination. The growth of the Law of Wills between these extreme points can be traced with remarkable distinctness. It was much less interrupted at the epoch of the birth of feudalism, than the history of most other branches of law. It is, indeed, true that, as regards all provinces of jurisprudence, the break caused by the division between ancient and modern history, or in other words by the dissolution of the Roman empire, has been very greatly exaggerated. Indolence has disinclined many writers to be at the pains of looking for threads of connection entangled and obscured by the confusions of six troubled centuries, while other inquirers, not naturally deficient in patience and industry, have been misled by idle pride in the legal system of their country, and by consequent unwillingness to confess its obligations to the jurisprudence of Rome. But these unfavourable influences have had comparatively little effect on the province of Testamentary Law. The barbarians were confessedly strangers to any such conception 102as that of a Will. The best authorities agree that there is no trace of it in those parts of their written codes which comprise the customs practised by them in their original seats, and in their subsequent settlements on the edge of the Roman empire. But soon after they became mixed with the population of the Roman provinces they appropriated from the Imperial jurisprudence the conception of a Will, at first in part, and afterwards in all its integrity. The influence of the Church had much to do with this rapid assimilation. The ecclesiastical power had very early succeeded to those privileges of custody and registration of Testaments which several of the heathen temples had enjoyed; and even thus early it was almost exclusively to private bequests that the religious foundations owed their temporal possessions. Hence it is that the decrees of the earliest Provincial Councils perpetually contain anathemas against those who deny the sanctity of Wills. Here, in England, Church influence was certainly chief among the causes which by universal acknowledgment have prevented that discontinuity in the history of Testamentary Law, which is sometimes believed to exist in the history of other provinces of Jurisprudence. The jurisdiction over one class of Wills was delegated to the Ecclesiastical Courts, which applied to them, though not always intelligently, the principles of Roman jurisprudence; and, though neither the courts of Common Law nor the Court of Chancery owned any positive obligation to follow the Ecclesiastical tribunals, they could not escape the potent influence of a system of settled rules in course of application by their side. The English law of testamentary succession to personalty has become a modified form of the dispensation under which the inheritances of Roman citizens were administered.

If someone tried to show in England that the historical method of investigation is superior to the current ways of studying Jurisprudence we use today, no area of Law would illustrate this better than Testaments or Wills. This strength comes from its extensive history and continuity. At the start of its history, we find ourselves in the very early days of society, surrounded by ideas that take some effort to comprehend in their old form. Meanwhile, at the other end of its timeline, we find ourselves amidst legal concepts that are just the same ideas masked by modern language and thinking, leading to a different kind of challenge—the challenge of recognizing that concepts we deal with daily might actually need to be analyzed and examined. The evolution of the Law of Wills between these two extremes can be clearly traced. It was much less disrupted at the time feudalism began than the histories of most other legal branches. It’s true that, in all areas of jurisprudence, the divide between ancient and modern history—essentially marked by the fall of the Roman Empire—has been greatly overstated. Laziness has led many writers to avoid the effort of finding connections tangled and obscured by the chaos of six troubled centuries, while others, who are usually patient and thorough, have been misled by a misguided pride in their country’s legal system and its reluctance to acknowledge its debts to Roman law. However, these negative influences have had relatively little impact on Testamentary Law. The barbarians were notably unfamiliar with the concept of a Will. The best scholars agree that there’s no evidence of it in their written codes that cover the customs they practiced in their original homelands or in their later settlements on the edges of the Roman Empire. But shortly after they mingled with the people in the Roman provinces, they took on the idea of a Will from Roman law, initially in part, and later in its entirety. The Church played a significant role in this quick adaptation. Early on, ecclesiastical authority took over the rights to keep and register Testaments that several pagan temples once had. It was primarily from private bequests that religious institutions gained their material wealth. This is why the decrees of the earliest Provincial Councils constantly include curses for those who deny the sacredness of Wills. Here in England, the Church's influence was undoubtedly key to preventing the discontinuity in the history of Testamentary Law, which is sometimes thought to occur in other areas of Jurisprudence. The jurisdiction over one type of Wills was given to the Ecclesiastical Courts, which applied, not always wisely, Roman legal principles. While neither the Common Law courts nor the Court of Chancery had any obligation to follow the Ecclesiastical courts, they couldn't ignore the strong influence of a system of established rules that was being applied alongside their own. The English law of testamentary succession to personal property has evolved into a modified version of the system under which the inheritances of Roman citizens were managed.

It is not difficult to point out the extreme difference of the conclusions forced on us by the historical treatment of the subject from those to which we are conducted when, without the help of history, we merely strive to analyse our primâ facie impressions. I suppose there is nobody who, starting from the popular or even the legal conception of a Will, would not imagine that certain qualities are necessarily attached to it. He would say, for example, that a Will necessarily takes effect at death only—that it is secret, not known as a matter of course to persons taking interests under its provisions—that it is revocable, i.e. always capable of being superseded by103 a new act of testation. Yet I shall be able to show that there was a time when none of these characteristics belonged to a Will. The Testaments from which our Wills are directly descended at first took effect immediately on their execution; they were not secret; they were not revocable. Few legal agencies are, in fact, the fruit of more complex historical agencies than that by which a man's written intentions control the posthumous disposition of his goods. Testaments very slowly and gradually gathered round them the qualities I have mentioned; and they did this from causes and under pressure of events which may be called casual, or which at any rate have no interest for us at present, except so far as they have affected the history of law.

It’s not hard to see the significant difference between the conclusions we draw from the historical treatment of the subject and those we reach when we simply try to analyze our initial impressions without historical context. I think it’s safe to say that anyone starting with the common or even the legal understanding of a Will would believe that certain qualities are inherently associated with it. For instance, they might say that a Will only takes effect at death—that it is secret, meaning it’s not automatically known to those who have interests under its terms—that it is revocable, that is, it can always be replaced by a new act of testament. However, I can demonstrate that there was a time when none of these traits were part of a Will. The Testaments that directly influenced our Wills initially took effect immediately upon execution; they were not secret; and they were not revocable. Few legal concepts are, in fact, the result of more intricate historical developments than the way a person’s written wishes determine the distribution of their property after death. Testaments gradually acquired the characteristics I mentioned, and they did so due to circumstances and events that could be considered random or that, in any case, don’t interest us right now, except to the extent that they have influenced the history of law.

At a time when legal theories were more abundant than at present—theories which, it is true, were for the most part gratuitous and premature enough, but which nevertheless rescued jurisprudence from that worse and more ignoble condition, not unknown to ourselves, in which nothing like a generalisation is aspired to, and law is regarded as a mere empirical pursuit—it was the fashion to explain the ready and apparently intuitive perception which we have of certain qualities in a Will, by saying that they were natural to it, or, as the phrase would run in full, attached to it by the Law of Nature. Nobody, I imagine, would affect to maintain such a doctrine, when once it was ascertained that all these characteristics had their origin within historical memory; at the same time, vestiges of the theory of which the doctrine is an offshoot, linger in forms of expression which we all of us use and perhaps scarcely know how to dispense with. I may illustrate this by mentioning a position common in the legal literature of the seventeenth century. The jurists of that period very commonly assert that the power of Testation itself is of Natural Law, that it is a right conferred by the Law of Nature. Their teaching, though all persons may not at once see the connection, is in substance followed by those who affirm that the right of dictating or controlling the posthumous disposal of property is a necessary or natural consequence of the proprietary rights themselves. And every student of technical jurisprudence must have come across the same view, clothed in the language of a rather different school, which, in its rationale of this department of law, treats succession ex testamento as the mode of devolution which the property of104 deceased persons ought primarily to follow, and then proceeds to account for succession ab intestato as the incidental provision of the lawgiver for the discharge of a function which was only left unperformed through the neglect or misfortune of the deceased proprietor. These opinions are only expanded forms of the more compendious doctrine that Testamentary disposition is an institution of the Law of Nature. It is certainly never quite safe to pronounce dogmatically as to the range of association embraced by modern minds, when they reflect on Nature and her Law; but I believe that most persons, who affirm that the Testamentary Power is of Natural Law, may be taken to imply either that, as a matter of fact, it is universal, or that nations are prompted to sanction it by an original instinct and impulse. With respect to the first of these positions, I think that, when explicitly set forth, it can never be seriously contended for in an age which has seen the severe restraints imposed on the Testamentary Power by the Code Napoléon, and has witnessed the steady multiplication of systems for which the French codes have served as a model. To the second assertion we must object that it is contrary to the best-ascertained facts in the early history of law, and I venture to affirm generally that, in all indigenous societies, a condition of jurisprudence in which Testamentary privileges are not allowed, or rather not contemplated, has preceded that later stage of legal development in which the mere will of the proprietor is permitted under more or less of restriction to override the claims of his kindred in blood.

At a time when there were more legal theories than there are today—though, to be fair, most of those theories were somewhat unfounded and premature—these ideas helped steer jurisprudence away from a less honorable state, one where no one aimed for generalization and the law was seen as just an empirical endeavor. It was common to explain our immediate and seemingly intuitive understanding of certain qualities in a Will by saying they were natural to it or, as the complete phrase would go, linked to it by the Law of Nature. I doubt anyone would try to uphold such a belief once it’s clear that all these traits originated from recorded history; however, traces of the theory that this belief stems from remain in the expressions we all use and perhaps cannot easily do without. I can illustrate this by pointing out a common stance in the legal writings of the seventeenth century. Jurists from that time often claimed that the power of Testation itself is part of Natural Law, a right granted by the Law of Nature. Even if not everyone can immediately see the link, the idea is essentially supported by those who state that the right to dictate or control what happens to property after death is a necessary or natural outcome of ownership rights. Anyone studying legal principles will have encountered this same perspective, framed in the terminology of a different school that discusses succession ex testamento as the main method by which a deceased person's property should be passed on, while explaining succession ab intestato as the legal backup to fulfill a duty that only goes unfulfilled due to the oversight or misfortune of the deceased owner. These beliefs are merely expanded versions of the more concise idea that testamentary disposition is a feature of the Law of Nature. It’s always a bit tricky to make definitive statements about what modern minds link when considering Nature and her Law; however, I think most people who say that Testamentary Power is part of Natural Law typically mean that either it is universally accepted or that nations feel an instinctive drive to support it. Concerning the first point, I believe that when explicitly stated, it cannot be seriously argued in an era that has witnessed strict limitations placed on Testamentary Power by the Code Napoléon and has seen the steady growth of systems inspired by these French codes. We must counter the second assertion, as it goes against well-established facts in the early legal history, and I would venture to say that in all indigenous societies, there existed a legal framework where testamentary rights were not permitted, or rather not considered, before reaching a later legal development stage that allows a property owner’s wishes to take precedence over the claims of their blood relatives, albeit with some restrictions.

The conception of a Will or Testament cannot be considered by itself. It is a member, and not the first, of a series of conceptions. In itself a Will is simply the instrument by which the intention of the testator is declared. It must be clear, I think, that before such an instrument takes its turn for discussion, there are several preliminary points to be examined—as, for example, what is it, what sort of right or interest, which passes from a dead man on his decease? to whom and in what form does it pass? and how came it that the dead were allowed to control the posthumous disposition of their property? Thrown into technical language, the dependence of the various conceptions which contribute to the notion of a Will is thus expressed. A Will or Testament is an instrument by which the devolution of an inheritance is105 prescribed. Inheritance is a form of universal succession. A universal succession is a succession to a universitas juris, or university of rights and duties. Inverting this order we have therefore to inquire what is a universitas juris; what is a universal succession; what is the form of universal succession which is called an inheritance? And there are also two further questions, independent to some extent of the points I have mooted, but demanding solution before the subject of Wills can be exhausted. These are, how came an inheritance to be controlled in any case by the testator's volition, and what is the nature of the instrument by which it came to be controlled?

The concept of a Will or Testament can't be considered in isolation. It's part of a series of ideas rather than the first one. A Will is basically the tool through which the testator's intentions are expressed. It's clear that before we discuss this tool, we need to look at several preliminary points—like, what is it? What kind of right or interest transfers from someone who has died? To whom does it transfer and in what way? And how is it that the deceased are allowed to determine the future distribution of their property? To put this in technical terms, the interconnected ideas that shape the notion of a Will can be summarized as follows: a Will or Testament is a document that dictates the transfer of an inheritance. Inheritance is a type of universal succession. Universal succession refers to inheriting a complete set of rights and responsibilities. If we reverse this order, we need to ask what a complete set of rights and responsibilities is; what is universal succession; and what form of universal succession is specifically called inheritance? Additionally, there are two more questions that, while somewhat separate from what I've just discussed, still need to be answered before we can fully explore the topic of Wills. These are: how did the testator gain control over an inheritance, and what type of document is it that allows for this control?

The first question relates to the universitas juris; that is, a university (or bundle) of rights and duties. A universitas juris is a collection of rights and duties united by the single circumstance of their having belonged at one time to some one person. It is, as it were, the legal clothing of some given individual. It is not formed by grouping together any rights and any duties. It can only be constituted by taking all the rights and all the duties of a particular person. The tie which so connects a number of rights of property, rights of way, rights to legacies, duties of specific performance, debts, obligations to compensate wrongs—which so connects all these legal privileges and duties together as to constitute them a universitas juris, is the fact of their having attached to some individual capable of exercising them. Without this fact there is no university of rights and duties. The expression universitas juris is not classical, but for the notion jurisprudence is exclusively indebted to Roman law; nor is it at all difficult to seize. We must endeavour to collect under one conception the whole set of legal relations in which each one of us stands to the rest of the world. These, whatever be their character and composition, make up together a universitas juris; and there is but little danger of mistake in forming the notion, if we are only careful to remember that duties enter into it quite as much as rights. Our duties may overbalance our rights. A man may owe more than he is worth, and therefore if a money value is set on his collective legal relations he may be what is called insolvent. But for all that the entire group of rights and duties which centres in him is not the less a "juris universitas."

The first question relates to the universitas juris; that is, a university (or collection) of rights and duties. A universitas juris is a collection of rights and duties tied together by the fact that they once belonged to a specific person. It is, in a way, the legal identity of a certain individual. It isn't created by simply grouping any rights and any duties. It can only be made by considering all the rights and duties of a particular person. The connection that links various property rights, rights of way, rights to legacies, duties of specific performance, debts, and obligations to compensate for wrongs—which links all these legal entitlements and obligations together to form a universitas juris—is the fact that they are associated with an individual capable of exercising them. Without this fact, there is no university of rights and duties. The term universitas juris is not classical, but the concept comes entirely from Roman law; it's not hard to understand. We should try to gather all the legal relationships in which each of us is involved with the rest of the world under a single idea. These, regardless of their nature and makeup, together form a universitas juris; and there's little chance of confusion in forming this concept if we remember that duties are just as important as rights. Our duties can outweigh our rights. A person may owe more than they own, and thus if a monetary value is placed on their collective legal relationships, they may be considered insolvent. But even so, the complete set of rights and duties that revolve around them is still a "juris universitas."

We come next to a "universal succession." A universal succession is a succession to a universitas juris. It occurs when106 one man is invested with the legal clothing of another, becoming at the same moment subject to all his liabilities and entitled to all his rights. In order that the universal succession may be true and perfect, the devolution must take place uno ictu, as the jurists phrase it. It is of course possible to conceive one man acquiring the whole of the rights and duties of another at different periods, as for example by successive purchases; or he might acquire them in different capacities, part as heir, part as purchaser, part as legatee. But though the group of rights and duties thus made up should in fact amount to the whole legal personality of a particular individual, the acquisition would not be a universal succession. In order that there may be a true universal succession, the transmission must be such as to pass the whole aggregate of rights and duties at the same moment and in virtue of the same legal capacity in the recipient. The notion of a universal succession, like that of a juris universitas, is permanent in jurisprudence, though in the English legal system it is obscured by the great variety of capacities in which rights are acquired, and, above all, by the distinction between the two great provinces of English property, "realty" and "personalty." The succession of an assignee in bankruptcy to the entire property of the bankrupt is, however, a universal succession, though as the assignee only pays debts to the extent of the assets, this is only a modified form of the primary notion. Were it common among us for persons to take assignments of all a man's property on condition of paying all his debts, such transfers would exactly resemble the universal successions known to the oldest Roman Law. When a Roman citizen adrogated a son, i.e. took a man, not already under Patria Potestas, as his adoptive child, he succeeded universally to the adoptive child's estate, i.e. he took all the property and became liable for all the obligations. Several other forms of universal succession appear in the primitive Roman Law, but infinitely the most important and the most durable of all was that one with which we are more immediately concerned, Hæreditas or Inheritance. Inheritance was a universal succession occurring at a death. The universal successor was Hæres or Heir. He stepped at once into all the rights and all the duties of the dead man. He was instantly clothed with his entire legal person, and I need scarcely add that the special character of the Hæres remained the same, whether he107 was named by a Will or whether he took on an Intestacy. The term Hæres is no more emphatically used of the Intestate than of the Testamentary Heir, for the manner in which a man became Hæres had nothing to do with the legal character he sustained. The dead man's universal successor, however he became so, whether by Will or by Intestacy, was his Heir. But the Heir was not necessarily a single person. A group of persons considered in law as a single unit, might succeed as co-heirs to the Inheritance.

We now turn to "universal succession." Universal succession is when someone takes over the legal status of another person, becoming responsible for all their debts and entitled to all their rights at the same time. For universal succession to be valid and complete, the transfer must happen all at once, as the legal scholars would say. It's possible to imagine one person acquiring the full set of rights and obligations of another over time, for instance through multiple purchases, or they might obtain them in different ways—part as an heir, part as a buyer, part as a beneficiary. But even if the combination of rights and obligations adds up to the whole legal identity of a specific individual, it wouldn't count as a universal succession. For a true universal succession to occur, the transfer must convey the entire bundle of rights and obligations at the same moment and under the same legal capacity of the recipient. The concept of universal succession, similar to that of a legal entity, is a constant in legal theory, even though it is somewhat complicated in the English legal system because of the wide range of ways rights can be acquired, especially due to the distinction between "real" and "personal" property. However, the succession of an assignee in bankruptcy to the complete property of the bankrupt does represent a universal succession, though since the assignee only pays off debts up to the value of the assets, it's a modified version of the basic idea. If it were common for people to take over all of another's property on the condition of settling all their debts, such transfers would closely resemble the universal successions recognized in ancient Roman Law. When a Roman citizen adopted a son, meaning he took a man not already under paternal authority as his adoptive child, he universally inherited the adoptive child's estate, meaning he took on all the property and liabilities. Several other forms of universal succession existed in primitive Roman Law, but the most significant and lasting was the concept we're discussing, Hæreditas or Inheritance. Inheritance was a universal succession that occurred upon death. The universal successor was called Hæres or Heir. They immediately assumed all the rights and responsibilities of the deceased, fully embodying their legal identity. It's worth noting that the status of the Hæres remained unchanged, whether they were designated by a will or inherited through intestacy. The term Hæres applies equally to both intestate and testamentary heirs, since the way someone became Hæres had no bearing on their legal status. Regardless of how they became the universal successor—either through a will or intestacy—they were recognized as the Heir. However, the Heir didn't have to be just one person. A group of people, treated as a single entity under the law, could inherit as co-heirs.

Let me now quote the usual Roman definition of an Inheritance. The reader will be in a position to appreciate the full force of the separate terms. Hæreditas est successio in universum jus quod defunctus habuit ("an inheritance is a succession to the entire legal position of a deceased man"). The notion was that, though the physical person of the deceased had perished, his legal personality survived and descended unimpaired on his Heir or Co-heirs, in whom his identity (so far as the law was concerned) was continued. Our own law, in constituting the Executor or Administrator the representative of the deceased to the extent of his personal assets, may serve as an illustration of the theory from which it emanated, but, although it illustrates, it does not explain it. The view of even the later Roman Law required a closeness of correspondence between the position of the deceased and of his Heir which is no feature of an English representation; and in the primitive jurisprudence everything turned on the continuity of succession. Unless provision was made in the will for the instant devolution of the testator's rights and duties on the Heir or Co-heirs, the testament lost all its effect.

Let me now quote the standard Roman definition of an inheritance. The reader will be able to appreciate the full meaning of the separate terms. Hæreditas est successio in universum jus quod defunctus habuit ("an inheritance is a succession to the entire legal position of a deceased man"). The idea was that, although the physical person of the deceased had died, his legal identity lived on and passed on unchanged to his Heir or Co-heirs, in whom his identity (as far as the law was concerned) continued. Our own law, in making the Executor or Administrator the representative of the deceased regarding his personal assets, may serve as an illustration of the theory from which it came, but, while it illustrates, it does not explain it. Even later Roman Law required a close connection between the position of the deceased and that of his Heir, which is not a feature of English representation; and in early legal systems, everything hinged on the continuity of succession. If the will did not provide for the immediate transfer of the testator's rights and duties to the Heir or Co-heirs, the will lost all its effect.

In modern Testamentary jurisprudence, as in the later Roman law, the object of first importance is the execution of the testator's intentions. In the ancient law of Rome the subject of corresponding carefulness was the bestowal of the Universal Succession. One of these rules seems to our eyes a principle dictated by common sense, while the other looks very much like an idle crotchet. Yet that without the second of them the first would never have come into being is as certain as any proposition of the kind can be.

In today's Testamentary law, just like in later Roman law, the main focus is on carrying out what the testator intended. In ancient Roman law, great care was also taken in how Universal Succession was granted. One of these rules seems like a straightforward principle, while the other comes across as rather pointless. However, it's clear that without the second rule, the first one could never have existed.

In order to solve this apparent paradox, and to bring into greater clearness the train of ideas which I have been endeavouring to indicate, I must borrow the results of the inquiry which was attempted in the earlier portion of the108 preceding chapter. We saw one peculiarity invariably distinguishing the infancy of society. Men are regarded and treated, not as individuals, but always as members of a particular group. Everybody is first a citizen, and then, as a citizen, he is a member of his order—of an aristocracy or a democracy, of an order of patricians or plebeians; or, in those societies which an unhappy fate has afflicted with a special perversion in their course of development, of a caste. Next, he is a member of a gens, house, or clan; and lastly, he is a member of his family. This last was the narrowest and most personal relation in which he stood; nor, paradoxical as it may seem, was he ever regarded as himself, as a distinct individual. His individuality was swallowed up in his family. I repeat the definition of a primitive society given before. It has for its units, not individuals, but groups of men united by the reality or the fiction of blood-relationship.

To resolve this apparent contradiction and clarify the line of thought I've been trying to express, I need to reference the findings from the earlier part of the108 previous chapter. We identified one consistent feature that characterizes the early stages of society. People are seen and treated not as individuals, but always as members of a specific group. Everyone is first a citizen, and as a citizen, they belong to their social class—whether that's an aristocracy or a democracy, a group of patricians or plebeians; or, in societies that have unfortunately encountered a unique deviation in their development, a caste. Next, they belong to a gens, household, or clan; and finally, they belong to their family. This last relationship is the most intimate and personal one they have, yet, paradoxically, they are never viewed as themselves, as separate individuals. Their individuality gets absorbed by their family. I reiterate the definition of a primitive society mentioned earlier. It is made up of units that are not individuals, but groups of people connected by either real or perceived blood ties.

It is in the peculiarities of an undeveloped society that we seize the first trace of a universal succession. Contrasted with the organisation of a modern state, the commonwealths of primitive times may be fairly described as consisting of a number of little despotic governments, each perfectly distinct from the rest, each absolutely controlled by the prerogative of a single monarch. But though the Patriarch, for we must not yet call him the Pater-familias, had rights thus extensive, it is impossible to doubt that he lay under an equal amplitude of obligations. If he governed the family, it was for its behoof. If he was lord of its possessions, he held them as trustee for his children and kindred. He had no privilege or position distinct from that conferred on him by his relation to the petty commonwealth which he governed. The Family, in fact, was a Corporation; and he was its representative or, we might almost say, its Public officer. He enjoyed rights and stood under duties, but the rights and the duties were, in the contemplation of his fellow-citizens and in the eye of the law, quite as much those of the collective body as his own. Let us consider for a moment the effect which would be produced by the death of such a representative. In the eye of the law, in the view of the civil magistrate, the demise of the domestic authority would be a perfectly immaterial event. The person representing the collective body of the family and primarily responsible to municipal jurisdiction would bear a different name; and that would be all. The rights and109 obligations which attached to the deceased head of the house would attach, without breach of continuity, to his successor; for, in point of fact, they would be the rights and obligations of the family, and the family had the distinctive characteristic of a corporation—that it never died. Creditors would have the same remedies against the new chieftain as against the old, for the liability being that of the still existing family would be absolutely unchanged. All rights available to the family would be as available after the demise of the headship as before it—except that the Corporation would be obliged—if indeed language so precise and technical can be properly used of these early times—would be obliged to sue under a slightly modified name.

It is in the unique aspects of an undeveloped society that we find the first signs of a universal progression. Compared to the structure of a modern state, the communities of primitive times can be accurately described as made up of several small despotic governments, each clearly separate from the others, each fully controlled by the authority of a single ruler. However, although the Patriarch—since we shouldn't call him the Pater-familias yet—had extensive rights, it's undeniable that he also had a significant number of obligations. If he governed the family, it was for its benefit. If he owned its assets, he held them as a trustee for his children and relatives. He had no privileges or status that were not granted to him through his relationship with the small community he governed. The Family, in fact, functioned as a Corporation; and he was its representative or, we might almost say, its public officer. He had rights and responsibilities, but these rights and obligations were, in the eyes of his fellow-citizens and the law, just as much those of the collective body as they were his own. Let’s take a moment to consider the impact of the death of such a representative. In the eyes of the law, according to the civil authorities, the loss of the family leader would be a completely insignificant event. The person representing the collective body of the family and primarily accountable to municipal jurisdiction would simply have a different name, and that would be all. The rights and obligations that were tied to the deceased head of the household would seamlessly transfer to his successor; in reality, they would be the rights and obligations of the family, which had the defining feature of a corporation—that it never dies. Creditors would have the same remedies against the new leader as against the old one, because the liability belonging to the still-existing family would remain completely unchanged. All rights available to the family would still apply after the head's death as they did before—except that the Corporation would need to—if language so precise and technical can appropriately be applied to these early times—would need to sue under a slightly altered name.

The history of jurisprudence must be followed in its whole course, if we are to understand how gradually and tardily society dissolved itself into the component atoms of which it is now constituted—by what insensible gradations the relation of man to man substituted itself for the relation of the individual to his family and of families to each other. The point now to be attended to is that even when the revolution had apparently quite accomplished itself, even when the magistrate had in great measure assumed the place of the Pater-familias, and the civil tribunal substituted itself for the domestic forum, nevertheless the whole scheme of rights and duties administered by the judicial authorities remained shaped by the influence of the obsolete privileges and coloured in every part by their reflection. There seems little question that the devolution of the Universitas Juris, so strenuously insisted upon by the Roman Law as the first condition of a testamentary or intestate succession, was a feature of the older form of society which men's minds had been unable to dissociate from the new, though with that newer phase it had no true or proper connection. It seems, in truth, that the prolongation of a man's legal existence in his heir, or in a group of co-heirs, is neither more nor less than a characteristic of the family transferred by a fiction to the individual. Succession in corporations is necessarily universal, and the family was a corporation. Corporations never die. The decease of individual members makes no difference to the collective existence of the aggregate body, and does not in any way affect its legal incidents, its faculties or liabilities. Now in the idea of a Roman universal succession110 all these qualities of a corporation seem to have been transferred to the individual citizen. His physical death is allowed to exercise no effect on the legal position which he filled, apparently on the principle that that position is to be adjusted as closely as possible to the analogies of a family, which, in its corporate character, was not of course liable to physical extinction.

The history of law needs to be followed in its entirety if we want to understand how slowly and gradually society broke down into the individual parts that make it up today—how the relationship between people took the place of the relationship of individuals to their families and of families to one another. What's important to note is that even when the revolution seemed to be complete, and the magistrate largely took over the role of the head of the family, while civil courts replaced domestic ones, the whole system of rights and responsibilities managed by judicial authorities still reflected the outdated privileges. It's clear that the passing down of the Universitas Juris, which Roman Law insisted was essential for either a will or intestate succession, was a remnant of the older societal form that people's minds struggled to separate from the new system, even though it had no real connection to it. In fact, the continuation of a man's legal existence in his heir, or a group of co-heirs, is just a trait of the family that has been fictively transferred to the individual. Succession in corporations is always universal, and the family operated as a corporation. Corporations never die. The death of individual members doesn’t affect the collective existence of the whole body, nor does it change its legal aspects, powers, or obligations. Now, in the concept of Roman universal succession110 all these characteristics of a corporation seem to have been assigned to the individual citizen. His physical death does not impact the legal position he held, seemingly based on the principle that this position should be aligned as closely as possible with the dynamics of a family, which, in its corporate form, is not subject to physical extinction.

I observe that not a few continental jurists have much difficulty in comprehending the nature of the connection between the conceptions blended in a universal succession, and there is perhaps no topic in the philosophy of jurisprudence on which their speculations, as a general rule, possess so little value. But the student of English law ought to be in no danger of stumbling at the analysis of the idea which we are examining. Much light is cast upon it by a fiction in our own system with which all lawyers are familiar. English lawyers classify corporations as Corporations aggregate and Corporations sole. A Corporation aggregate is a true Corporation, but a Corporation sole is an individual, being a member of a series of individuals, who is invested by a fiction with the qualities of a Corporation. I need hardly cite the King or the Parson of a Parish as instances of Corporations sole. The capacity or office is here considered apart from the particular person who from time to time may occupy it, and, this capacity being perpetual, the series of individuals who fill it are clothed with the leading attribute of Corporations—Perpetuity. Now in the older theory of Roman Law the individual bore to the family precisely the same relation which in the rationale of English jurisprudence a Corporation sole bears to a Corporation aggregate. The derivation and association of ideas are exactly the same. In fact, if we say to ourselves that for purposes of Roman Testamentary Jurisprudence each individual citizen was a Corporation sole, we shall not only realise the full conception of an inheritance, but have constantly at command the clue to the assumption in which it originated. It is an axiom with us that the King never dies, being a Corporation sole. His capacities are instantly filled by his successor, and the continuity of dominion is not deemed to have been interrupted. With the Romans it seemed an equally simple and natural process, to eliminate the fact of death from the devolution of rights and obligations. The testator lived on in his heir or in the group of his co-heirs. He111 was in law the same person with them, and if any one in his testamentary dispositions had even constructively violated the principle which united his actual and his posthumous existence, the law rejected the defective instrument, and gave the inheritance to the kindred in blood, whose capacity to fulfil the conditions of heirship was conferred on them by the law itself, and not by any document which by possibility might be erroneously framed.

I notice that many continental legal scholars struggle to understand the connection between the ideas involved in universal succession, and there's probably no topic in legal philosophy where their theories, in general, hold as little value. However, a student of English law shouldn't have any trouble analyzing the concept we're discussing. Our legal system sheds light on this through a familiar fiction. English lawyers categorize corporations as Corporations aggregate and Corporations sole. A Corporation aggregate is a true Corporation, whereas a Corporation sole is an individual, part of a series of individuals, who is granted the qualities of a Corporation through a fiction. I hardly need to mention the King or the Parson of a Parish as examples of Corporations sole. Here, the position or role is considered separately from the specific individual who may occupy it at different times, and since this role is perpetual, the series of individuals embody the defining feature of Corporations—Perpetuity. In the earlier theory of Roman Law, the individual had the same relationship to the family as a Corporation sole does to a Corporation aggregate in English law. The connections and associations of ideas are exactly the same. In fact, if we consider that, for the purposes of Roman inheritance law, each individual citizen was a Corporation sole, we will not only grasp the concept of inheritance fully, but we’ll also always have insight into its origin. It's a basic principle for us that the King never dies, being a Corporation sole. His powers are immediately taken over by his successor, and the continuity of authority is not seen as interrupted. The Romans also found it a straightforward and natural process to exclude death from the transfer of rights and obligations. The testator continued to exist in his heir or in the group of his co-heirs. He was legally considered the same person as them, and if anyone in his will even constructively violated the principle that connected his current existence with his future one, the law would reject the flawed document and award the inheritance to his blood relatives, whose ability to meet the requirements of inheritance was granted by the law itself, not by any potentially flawed document.

When a Roman citizen died intestate or leaving no valid Will, his descendants or kindred became his heirs according to a scale which will be presently described. The person or class of persons who succeeded did not simply represent the deceased, but, in conformity with the theory just delineated, they continued his civil life, his legal existence. The same results followed when the order of succession was determined by a Will, but the theory of the identity between the dead man and his heirs was certainly much older than any form of Testament or phase of Testamentary jurisprudence. This indeed is the proper moment for suggesting a doubt which will press on us with greater force the further we plumb the depths of this subject,—whether wills would ever have come into being at all if it had not been for these remarkable ideas connected with universal succession. Testamentary law is the application of a principle which may be explained on a variety of philosophical hypotheses as plausible as they are gratuitous; it is interwoven with every part of modern society, and it is defensible on the broadest grounds of general expediency. But the warning can never be too often repeated, that the grand source of mistake in questions of jurisprudence is the impression that those reasons which actuate us at the present moment, in the maintenance of an existing institution, have necessarily anything in common with the sentiment in which the institution originated. It is certain that, in the old Roman Law of Inheritance, the notion of a will or testament is inextricably mixed up, I might almost say confounded, with the theory of a man's posthumous existence in the person of his heir.

When a Roman citizen died without a will or leaving no valid will, his descendants or relatives became his heirs based on a hierarchy that will be described soon. The person or group that inherited didn’t just represent the deceased; according to the theory just explained, they continued his civil life and legal existence. The same outcomes happened when the order of inheritance was dictated by a will, but the idea that the deceased and his heirs were identical was definitely much older than any version of a will or phase of testamentary law. This is indeed the right time to raise a question that will weigh on us more as we explore this topic further—would wills ever have existed if it weren't for these fascinating concepts linked to universal succession? Testamentary law applies a principle that can be explained through various philosophical theories, all as plausible as they are unfounded. It’s intertwined with every part of modern society and can be justified on broad grounds of general necessity. However, it’s crucial to remember that a major source of confusion in legal questions is the belief that the reasons motivating us today in supporting an existing institution have anything in common with the sentiments that originally created that institution. It's clear that in ancient Roman Law of Inheritance, the concept of a will or testament is inextricably linked, I might even say confused, with the idea of a person’s continued existence through the heir.

The conception of a universal succession, firmly as it has taken root in jurisprudence, has not occurred spontaneously to the framers of every body of laws. Wherever it is now found, it may be shown to have descended from Roman law; and with it have come down a host of legal rules on the112 subject of Testaments and Testamentary gifts, which modern practitioners apply without discerning their relation to the parent theory. But, in the pure Roman jurisprudence, the principle that a man lives on in his Heir—the elimination, if we may so speak, of the fact of death—is too obviously for mistake the centre round which the whole Law of Testamentary and Intestate succession is circling. The unflinching sternness of the Roman law in enforcing compliance with the governing theory would in itself suggest that the theory grew out of something in the primitive constitution of Roman society; but we may push the proof a good way beyond the presumption. It happens that several technical expressions, dating from the earliest institution of Wills at Rome, have been accidentally preserved to us. We have in Gaius the formula of investiture by which the universal successor was created. We have the ancient name by which the person afterwards called Heir was at first designated. We have further the text of the celebrated clause in the Twelve Tables by which the Testamentary power was expressly recognised, and the clauses regulating Intestate Succession have also been preserved. All these archaic phrases have one salient peculiarity. They indicate that what passed from the Testator to the Heir was the Family, that is, the aggregate of rights and duties contained in the Patria Potestas and growing out of it. The material property is in three instances not mentioned at all; in two others, it is visibly named as an adjunct or appendage of the Family. The original Will or Testament was therefore an instrument, or (for it was probably not at first in writing) a proceeding, by which the devolution of the Family was regulated. It was a mode of declaring who was to have the chieftainship, in succession to the Testator. When Wills are understood to have this for their original object, we see at once how it is that they came to be connected with one of the most curious relics of ancient religion and law, the sacra, or Family Rites. These sacra were the Roman form of an institution which shows itself wherever society has not wholly shaken itself free from its primitive clothing. They are the sacrifices and ceremonies by which the brotherhood of the family is commemorated, the pledge and the witness of its perpetuity. Whatever be their nature,—whether it be true or not that in all cases they are the worship of some mythical ancestor,—they are everywhere113 employed to attest the sacredness of the family-relation; and therefore they acquire prominent significance and importance, whenever the continuous existence of the Family is endangered by a change in the person of its chief. Accordingly we hear most about them in connection with demises of domestic sovereignty. Among the Hindoos, the right to inherit a dead man's property is exactly co-extensive with the duty of performing his obsequies. If the rites are not properly performed or not performed by the proper person, no relation is considered as established between the deceased and anybody surviving him; the Law of Succession does not apply, and nobody can inherit the property. Every great event in the life of a Hindoo seems to be regarded as leading up to and bearing upon those solemnities. If he marries, it is to have children who may celebrate them after his death; if he has no children, he lies under the strongest obligation to adopt them from another family, "with a view," writes the Hindoo doctor, "to the funeral cake, the water, and the solemn sacrifice." The sphere preserved to the Roman sacra in the time of Cicero, was not less in extent. It embraced Inheritances and Adoptions. No Adoption was allowed to take place without due provision for the sacra of the family from which the adoptive son was transferred, and no Testament was allowed to distribute an Inheritance without a strict apportionment of the expenses of these ceremonies among the different co-heirs. The differences between the Roman law at this epoch, when we obtain our last glimpse of the sacra, and the existing Hindoo system, are most instructive. Among the Hindoos, the religious element in law has acquired a complete predominance. Family sacrifices have become the keystone of all the Law of Persons and much of the Law of Things. They have even received a monstrous extension, for it is a plausible opinion that the self-immolation of the widow at her husband's funeral, a practice continued to historical times by the Hindoos, and commemorated in the traditions of several Indo-European races, was an addition grafted on the primitive sacra, under the influence of the impression, which always accompanies the idea of sacrifice, that human blood is the most precious of all oblations. With the Romans, on the contrary, the legal obligation and the religious duty have ceased to be blended. The necessity of solemnising the sacra forms no part of the theory of civil114 law, but they are under the separate jurisdiction of the College of Pontiffs. The letters of Cicero to Atticus, which are full of allusions to them, leave no doubt that they constituted an intolerable burden on Inheritances; but the point of development at which law breaks away from religion has been passed, and we are prepared for their entire disappearance from the later jurisprudence.

The idea of universal succession, as firmly established in law, didn't just come about naturally for every legal system. Where it exists today, it can be traced back to Roman law; along with it came a set of legal rules about 112 Testaments and Testamentary gifts that modern lawyers apply without realizing their connection to the original theory. In traditional Roman law, the principle that a person continues on through their Heir—the idea of bypassing death, so to speak—is clearly the core around which the entire Law of Testamentary and Intestate succession revolves. The strictness of Roman law in enforcing this fundamental idea suggests that it originated from something inherent in the early structure of Roman society; however, there is evidence that goes beyond mere speculation. Several legal terms from the earliest establishment of Wills in Rome have accidentally survived to this day. We have Gaius's formula for the creation of the universal successor. We have the original term used to refer to what we now call an Heir. Additionally, we still have the text of the well-known clause in the Twelve Tables that explicitly recognized the power of Testaments, along with the clauses governing Intestate Succession. All these ancient terms share one important feature. They indicate that what passed from the Testator to the Heir was the Family, which encompasses the bundle of rights and responsibilities tied to the Patria Potestas. In three instances, material property is not mentioned at all; in two other instances, it is clearly identified as a secondary part of the Family. The original Will or Testament was, therefore, an instrument—or possibly, since it probably wasn't initially in writing, a procedure—through which the transfer of the Family was established. It served to declare who would take on the leadership role after the Testator. Understanding Wills in this light reveals their connection to one of the most intriguing remnants of ancient religion and law, the sacra, or Family Rites. These sacra represent the Roman version of an institution that appears wherever society has not entirely shed its primitive roots. They involve the sacrifices and ceremonies that commemorate family unity and serve as a pledge and testament to its continuity. Regardless of their specific nature—whether or not they are seen as the worship of some mythical ancestor—they are consistently used to emphasize the sacredness of family relationships; thus, they gain particular importance whenever the ongoing existence of the Family is threatened by a change in its leadership. Consequently, we hear most about them in the context of the transition of domestic authority. Among the Hindoos, the right to inherit a deceased person's property is precisely matched by the obligation to carry out their funeral rites. If these rites are not properly performed or conducted by the correct person, no relationship is recognized between the deceased and anyone who survives them; the Law of Succession does not apply, and no one can inherit the property. Every significant event in a Hindu's life seems to lead up to and relate to these solemn rites. If he marries, it's primarily to have children who can perform these rites after his passing; if he has no children, he's strongly compelled to adopt from another family "with a view," writes the Hindu scholar, "to the funeral cake, the water, and the solemn sacrifice." The importance of the Roman sacra during Cicero's era was equally extensive. It included inheritances and adoptions. No adoption could occur without due consideration for the sacra of the family from which the adopted son came, and no Will could allocate an inheritance without properly dividing the costs of these ceremonies among the co-heirs. The contrasts between Roman law at this time when we last glimpse the sacra and the current Hindu system are quite revealing. With the Hindoos, the religious aspect of law plays a dominant role. Family sacrifices have become the cornerstone of all the Law of Persons and much of the Law of Things. They have even been grotesquely expanded, as some believe that the practice of widow self-immolation at her husband's funeral—a tradition that persisted among the Hindoos and is remembered in the lore of several Indo-European peoples—was an addition grafted onto the original sacra, influenced by the idea of sacrifice that human blood is the highest form of offering. In contrast, with the Romans, the legal obligation and the religious duty were no longer intertwined. The requirement to perform the sacra does not form part of civil law theory; instead, they fall under the separate authority of the College of Pontiffs. Cicero's letters to Atticus, filled with references to these rites, clearly show that they constituted a heavy burden on inheritances; however, the point at which law diverged from religion had already been reached, and we are set for their complete disappearance from later legal systems.

In Hindoo law there is no such thing as a true Will. The place filled by Wills is occupied by Adoptions. We can now see the relation of the Testamentary Power to the Faculty of Adoption, and the reason why the exercise of either of them could call up a peculiar solicitude for the performance of the sacra. Both a Will and an Adoption threaten a distortion of the ordinary course of Family descent, but they are obviously contrivances for preventing the descent being wholly interrupted, when there is no succession of kindred to carry it on. Of the two expedients Adoption, the factitious creation of blood-relationship, is the only one which has suggested itself to the greater part of archaic societies. The Hindoos have indeed advanced one point on what was doubtless the antique practice, by allowing the widow to adopt when the father has neglected to do so, and there are in the local customs of Bengal some faint traces of the Testamentary powers. But to the Romans belongs pre-eminently the credit of inventing the Will, the institution which, next to the Contract, has exercised the greatest influence in transforming human society. We must be careful not to attribute to it in its earliest shape the functions which have attended it in more recent times. It was at first, not a mode of distributing a dead man's goods, but one among several ways of transferring the representation of the household to a new chief. The goods descend no doubt to the Heir, but that is only because the government of the family carries with it in its devolution the power of disposing of the common stock. We are very far as yet from that stage in the history of Wills in which they become powerful instruments in modifying society through the stimulus they give to the circulation of property and the plasticity they produce in proprietary rights. No such consequences as these appear in fact to have been associated with the Testamentary power even by the latest Roman lawyers. It will be found that Wills were never looked upon in the Roman community as a contrivance for parting Property115 and the Family, or for creating a variety of miscellaneous interests, but rather as a means of making a better provision for the members of a household than could be secured through the rules of Intestate succession. We may suspect indeed that the associations of a Roman with the practice of will-making were extremely different from those familiar to us nowadays. The habit of regarding Adoption and Testation as modes of continuing the Family cannot but have had something to do with the singular laxity of Roman notions as to the inheritance of sovereignty. It is impossible not to see that the succession of the early Roman Emperors to each other was considered reasonably regular, and that, in spite of all that had occurred, no absurdity attached to the pretension of such Princes as Theodosius or Justinian to style themselves Cæsar and Augustus.

In Hindu law, there isn’t really a true Will. Instead, Adoptions take its place. We can now understand how the power to make a Will relates to the option of Adoption, and why using either could create special concern for carrying out the sacra. Both a Will and an Adoption disrupt the normal path of family inheritance, but they clearly serve as ways to prevent the inheritance from completely stopping when there are no relatives to continue it. Of the two options, Adoption, which creates a connection similar to blood ties, is the only one that has occurred to most ancient societies. The Hindus have actually taken a step forward from what was likely the ancient practice by allowing a widow to adopt if the father hasn’t done so, and there are some slight indications of testamentary powers in the local customs of Bengal. However, the Romans are primarily credited with inventing the Will, an institution that, after the Contract, has significantly influenced the transformation of human society. We must be cautious not to assign the same functions to it in its earliest form that it has had in more recent times. Originally, it wasn’t just a way to distribute a deceased person’s possessions, but one of several methods to transfer the representation of the household to a new leader. The possessions do indeed go to the Heir, but that’s mainly because the management of the family includes the authority to manage the shared resources. We are still quite far from the point in the history of Wills where they become key tools in changing society by encouraging the circulation of property and increasing flexibility in property rights. No such outcomes, in fact, seem to have been connected with the Testamentary power even by later Roman lawyers. It will be found that Wills were never seen in Roman society as a way to separate Property and the Family, or to create a mix of different interests, but rather as a method for ensuring a better provision for household members than what could be obtained through the rules of Intestate succession. We can indeed suspect that a Roman’s associations with will-making were very different from those familiar to us today. The tendency to view Adoption and Testament as methods for continuing the Family likely influenced the unique leniency in Roman views on the inheritance of power. It’s hard not to notice that the succession of the early Roman Emperors among themselves was seen as reasonably organized, and that despite everything that happened, no ridiculousness attached to the claims of princes like Theodosius or Justinian to refer to themselves as Cæsar and Augustus.

When the phenomena of primitive societies emerge into light, it seems impossible to dispute a proposition which the jurists of the seventeenth century considered doubtful, that Intestate Inheritance is a more ancient institution than Testamentary Succession. As soon as this is settled, a question of much interest suggests itself, how and under what conditions were the directions of a will first allowed to regulate the devolution of authority over the household, and consequently the posthumous distribution of property. The difficulty of deciding the point arises from the rarity of Testamentary power in archaic communities. It is doubtful whether a true power of testation was known to any original society except the Roman. Rudimentary forms of it occur here and there, but most of them are not exempt from the suspicion of a Roman origin. The Athenian will was, no doubt, indigenous, but then, as will appear presently, it was only an inchoate Testament. As to the Wills which are sanctioned by the bodies of law which have descended to us as the codes of the barbarian conquerors of Imperial Rome, they are almost certainly Roman. The most penetrating German criticism has recently been directed to these leges Barbarorum, the great object of investigation being to detach those portions of each system which formed the customs of the tribe in its original home from the adventitious ingredients which were borrowed from the laws of the Romans. In the course of this process, one result has invariably disclosed itself, that the ancient nucleus of the code contains no116 trace of a Will. Whatever testamentary law exists, has been taken from Roman jurisprudence. Similarly, the rudimentary Testament which (as I am informed) the Rabbinical Jewish law provides for, has been attributed to contact with the Romans. The only form of testament, not belonging to a Roman or Hellenic society, which can reasonably be supposed indigenous, is that recognised by the usages of the province of Bengal; and the testament of Bengal is only a rudimentary Will.

When the features of primitive societies come to light, it's hard to argue against the idea that intestate inheritance is an older practice than testamentary succession, a point that jurists in the seventeenth century found questionable. Once this is established, an intriguing question arises: how and under what circumstances did the directions of a will come to govern the transfer of authority over a household and, consequently, the distribution of property after death? The challenge in addressing this arises from the infrequent occurrence of testamentary power in ancient societies. It's unclear whether any original society besides the Romans truly had the power to make wills. Basic forms of it appear occasionally, but many are suspected to have Roman roots. The Athenian will was indeed local, but, as we will see shortly, it was only a rudimentary testament. As for the wills recognized by the legal frameworks passed down to us from the barbarian conquerors of Imperial Rome, they are almost certainly of Roman origin. Recent sharp German critiques have focused on these leges Barbarorum, aiming to separate the parts of each system that were the customs of the tribe in their original location from the additional elements borrowed from Roman law. Throughout this analysis, one consistent finding has emerged: the ancient core of the code shows no116 sign of a will. Any testamentary law that exists has been derived from Roman jurisprudence. Similarly, the basic testament that, as I’ve been informed, Rabbinical Jewish law allows for, has been linked to Roman influence. The only form of testament that can reasonably be considered indigenous and not associated with a Roman or Hellenic society is that recognized by the customs of the Bengal province; however, the testament of Bengal is merely a rudimentary will.

The evidence, however, such as it is, seems to point to the conclusion that Testaments are at first only allowed to take effect on failure of the persons entitled to have the inheritance by right of blood genuine or fictitious. Thus, when Athenian citizens were empowered for the first time by the Laws of Solon to execute Testaments, they were forbidden to disinherit their direct male descendants. So, too, the Will of Bengal is only permitted to govern the succession so far as it is consistent with certain overriding claims of the family. Again, the original institutions of the Jews having provided nowhere for the privileges of Testatorship, the later Rabbinical jurisprudence, which pretends to supply the casus omissi of the Mosaic law, allows the Power of Testation to attach when all the kindred entitled under the Mosaic system to succeed have failed or are undiscoverable. The limitations by which the ancient German codes hedge in the testamentary jurisprudence which has been incorporated with them are also significant, and point in the same direction. It is the peculiarity of most of these German laws, in the only shape in which we know them, that, besides the allod or domain of each household, they recognise several subordinate kinds or orders of property, each of which probably represents a separate transfusion of Roman principles into the primitive body of Teutonic usage. The primitive German or allodial property is strictly reserved to the kindred. Not only is it incapable of being disposed of by testament but it is scarcely capable of being alienated by conveyance inter vivos. The ancient German law, like the Hindoo jurisprudence, makes the male children co-proprietors with their father, and the endowment of the family cannot be parted with except by the consent of all its members. But the other sorts of property, of more modern origin and lower dignity than the allodial possessions, are much more easily alienated than they, and117 follow much more lenient rules of devolution. Women and the descendants of women succeed to them, obviously on the principle that they lie outside the sacred precinct of the Agnatic brotherhood. Now, it is on these last descriptions of property, and on these only, that the Testaments borrowed from Rome were at first allowed to operate.

The evidence, as limited as it may be, suggests that wills are initially only valid when those who have a rightful inheritance by blood, whether genuine or fabricated, are no longer able to inherit. When Athenian citizens were first allowed to create wills under Solon's laws, they were not permitted to disinherit their direct male descendants. Similarly, in Bengal, a will is only allowed to dictate inheritance if it aligns with certain primary family claims. Moreover, the original Jewish laws didn’t provide for the rights of testators, but later Rabbinical laws, which claim to address gaps in Mosaic law, permit wills to take effect if all relatives entitled to inherit under the Mosaic system have either died or cannot be found. The restrictions imposed by ancient German laws surrounding testamentary rights also indicate a similar trend. Most of these German laws, as we know them, uniquely recognize not just the main household property, or allod, but also several subordinate categories of property, each likely representing different influences from Roman law integrated into early Teutonic customs. Allodial property in ancient Germany is strictly reserved for family members. It cannot be disposed of through a will, and it can barely be transferred through a living sale. Like Hindu law, ancient German law views male children as co-owners with their father, and family assets cannot be divided without the agreement of all family members. However, the other categories of property, which are more modern and of lesser importance than allodial properties, can be transferred more easily and follow much more relaxed rules for inheritance. Women and their descendants can inherit these properties, apparently because they are outside the male-only family lineage. Initially, the wills derived from Roman law were only permitted to apply to this last type of property.

These few indications may serve to lend additional plausibility to that which in itself appears to be the most probable explanation of an ascertained fact in the early history of Roman Wills. We have it stated on abundant authority that Testaments, during the primitive period of the Roman State, were executed in the Comitia Calata, that is, in the Comitia Curiata, or Parliament of the Patrician Burghers of Rome, when assembled for Private Business. This mode of execution has been the source of the assertion, handed down by one generation of civilians to another, that every Will at one era of Roman history was a solemn legislative enactment. But there is no necessity whatever for resorting to an explanation which has the defect of attributing far too much precision to the proceedings of the ancient assembly. The proper key to the story concerning the execution of Wills in the Comitia Calata must no doubt be sought in the oldest Roman Law of intestate succession. The canons of primitive Roman jurisprudence regulating the inheritance of relations from each other were, so long as they remained unmodified by the Edictal Law of the Prætor, to the following effect:—First, the sui or direct descendants who had never been emancipated succeeded. On the failure of the sui, the Nearest Agnate came into their place, that is, the nearest person or class of the kindred who was or might have been under the same Patria Potestas with the deceased. The third and last degree came next, in which the inheritance devolved on the gentiles, that is on the collective members of the dead man's gens or House. The House, I have explained already, was a fictitious extension of the family, consisting of all Roman Patrician citizens who bore the same name, and who, on the ground of bearing the same name, were supposed to be descended from a common ancestor. Now the Patrician Assembly called the Comitia Curiata was a Legislature in which Gentes or Houses were exclusively represented. It was a representative assembly of the Roman people, constituted on the assumption that the constituent unit of the state was the Gens. This118 being so, the inference seems inevitable, that the cognizance of Wills by the Comitia was connected with the rights of the Gentiles, and was intended to secure them in their privilege of ultimate inheritance. The whole apparent anomaly is removed, if we suppose that a Testament could only be made when the testator had no gentiles discoverable, or when they waived their claims, and that every Testament was submitted to the General Assembly of the Roman Gentes, in order that those aggrieved by its dispositions might put their veto upon it if they pleased, or by allowing it to pass might be presumed to have renounced their reversion. It is possible that on the eve of the publication of the Twelve Tables this vetoing power may have been greatly curtailed or only occasionally and capriciously exercised. It is much easier, however, to indicate the meaning and origin of the jurisdiction confided to the Comitia Calata, than to trace its gradual development or progressive decay.

These few points may help enhance the credibility of what seems to be the most likely explanation of a well-established fact in the early history of Roman Wills. It's widely reported that Wills during the early days of the Roman State were made in the Comitia Calata, also known as the Comitia Curiata, or Parliament of the Patrician Citizens of Rome, when they came together for Private Business. This process has led to the belief, passed down from one generation of legal scholars to another, that every Will at a certain point in Roman history was a formal legislative act. However, there’s no need to lean on an explanation that inaccurately suggests the proceedings of the ancient assembly were too precise. The real insight into the execution of Wills in the Comitia Calata must be found in the earliest Roman Law of intestate succession. The rules of primitive Roman law governing inheritance among relatives remained unchanged by the Edictal Law of the Prætor and were as follows: First, the sui or direct descendants who had never been freed from parental control inherited. If there were no sui, the nearest Agnate took their place, meaning the closest relative who shared the same Patria Potestas as the deceased. Lastly, the inheritance went to the gentiles, or the collective members of the deceased’s gens or House. The House, as previously explained, was a fictional extension of the family, made up of all Roman Patrician citizens who shared the same name and were believed to be descended from a common ancestor. The Patrician Assembly known as the Comitia Curiata was a Legislature where Gentes or Houses were exclusively represented. It was a representative assembly of the Roman people, based on the idea that the Gens was the fundamental unit of the state. This118 being true, it seems likely that the awareness of Wills by the Comitia was linked to the rights of the Gentiles and was meant to protect their privilege of ultimate inheritance. The apparent confusion disappears if we assume that a Testament could only be created when the testator had no identifiable gentiles, or when they chose not to claim their rights, and that each Testament was presented to the General Assembly of the Roman Gentes, allowing those affected by its terms to veto it if they wanted, or by letting it pass, to be assumed to have given up their claims. It's possible that just before the publication of the Twelve Tables, this veto power was significantly limited or only exercised occasionally and whimsically. However, it's easier to clarify the meaning and origin of the authority given to the Comitia Calata than to trace its gradual change or decline.

The Testament to which the pedigree of all modern Wills may be traced is not, however, the Testament executed in the Calata Comitia, but another Testament designed to compete with it and destined to supersede it. The historical importance of this early Roman Will, and the light it casts on much of ancient thought, will excuse me for describing it at some length.

The Testament that all modern Wills can be traced back to isn't the one created in the Calata Comitia, but a different Testament that was meant to challenge it and ultimately replace it. The historical significance of this early Roman Will, and the insights it provides into much of ancient thinking, justifies me describing it in detail.

When the Testamentary power first discloses itself to us in legal history, there are signs that, like almost all the great Roman institutions, it was the subject of contention between the Patricians and the Plebeians. The effect of the political maxim, Plebs Gentem non habet, "a Plebeian cannot be a member of a House," was entirely to exclude the Plebeians from the Comitia Curiata. Some critics have accordingly supposed that a Plebeian could not have his Will read or recited to the Patrician Assembly, and was thus deprived of Testamentary privileges altogether. Others have been satisfied to point out the hardships of having to submit a proposed Will to the unfriendly jurisdiction of an assembly in which the Testator was not represented. Whatever be the true view, a form of Testament came into use, which has all the characteristics of a contrivance intended to evade some distasteful obligation. The Will in question was a conveyance inter vivos, a complete and irrevocable alienation of the Testator's family and substance to the person whom he119 meant to be his heir. The strict rules of Roman law must always have permitted such an alienation, but, when the transaction was intended to have a posthumous effect, there may have been disputes whether it was valid for Testamentary purposes without the formal assent of the Patrician Parliament. If a difference of opinion existed on the point between the two classes of the Roman population, it was extinguished, with many other sources of heartburning, by the great Decemviral compromise. The text of the Twelve Tables is still extant which says, "Pater familias uti de pecuniâ tutelâve rei suæ legâssit, ita jus esto"—a law which can hardly have had any other object than the legalisation of the Plebeian Will.

When the Testamentary power first appears in legal history, it’s clear that, like many major Roman institutions, it was a topic of conflict between the Patricians and the Plebeians. The political principle, Plebs Gentem non habet, meaning "a Plebeian cannot be a member of a House," completely barred the Plebeians from the Comitia Curiata. Some critics have thus claimed that a Plebeian couldn’t have their Will read or recited to the Patrician Assembly, effectively denying them Testamentary rights altogether. Others have noted the difficulties of having to submit a proposed Will to an unfriendly assembly where the Testator wasn’t represented. Regardless of the actual situation, a form of Testament emerged that seemed designed to bypass some unwanted obligation. The Will in question was a conveyance inter vivos, a complete and irreversible transfer of the Testator's property and assets to the person they intended to be their heir. The strict rules of Roman law must have always allowed such a transfer, but when the transaction aimed to have a posthumous effect, there may have been controversies regarding its validity for Testamentary purposes without the formal approval of the Patrician Parliament. If there was disagreement on this issue between the two classes of Roman society, it was resolved, along with many other points of contention, by the significant Decemviral compromise. The text of the Twelve Tables still exists, stating, "Pater familias uti de pecuniâ tutelâve rei suæ legâssit, ita jus esto"—a law that likely aimed to legalize the Plebeian Will.

It is well known to scholars that, centuries after the Patrician Assembly had ceased to be the legislature of the Roman State, it still continued to hold formal sittings for the convenience of private business. Consequently, at a period long subsequent to the publication of the Decemviral Law, there is reason to believe that the Comitia Calata still assembled for the validation of Testaments. Its probable functions may be best indicated by saying that it was a Court of Registration, with the understanding however that the Wills exhibited were not enrolled, but simply recited to the members, who were supposed to take note of their tenor and to commit them to memory. It is very likely that this form of Testament was never reduced to writing at all, but at all events if the Will had been originally written, the office of the Comitia was certainly confined to hearing it read aloud, the document being retained afterwards in the custody of the Testator, or deposited under the safeguard of some religious corporation. This publicity may have been one of the incidents of the Testament executed in the Comitia Calata which brought it into popular disfavour. In the early years of the Empire the Comitia still held its meetings, but they seem to have lapsed into the merest form, and few Wills, or none, were probably presented at the periodical sitting.

It is widely recognized by scholars that, centuries after the Patrician Assembly stopped being the legislative body of the Roman State, it continued to hold formal meetings to handle private matters. Therefore, long after the Decemviral Law was published, there’s reason to believe that the Comitia Calata still gathered to validate Wills. Its likely role can best be described as a Registration Court, with the understanding that the Wills presented were not enrolled, but simply read aloud to the members, who were expected to remember their contents. It’s very possible that this type of Will was never written down, but if it had been created in writing, the job of the Comitia was certainly just to hear it read, with the document kept afterward by the Testator or placed under the protection of a religious organization. This public nature might have contributed to the fact that Wills done in the Comitia Calata became unpopular. In the early years of the Empire, the Comitia still met, but these meetings seemed to have become ceremonial, and few, if any, Wills were likely presented during the sessions.

It is the ancient Plebeian Will—the alternative of the Testament just described—which in its remote effects has deeply modified the civilisation of the modern world. It acquired at Rome all the popularity which the Testament submitted to the Calata Comitia appears to have lost. The key to all its characteristics lies in its descent from the120 mancipium, or ancient Roman conveyance, a proceeding to which we may unhesitatingly assign the parentage of two great institutions without which modern society can scarcely be supposed capable of holding together, the Contract and the Will. The mancipium, or as the word would exhibit itself in later Latinity, the Mancipation, carries us back by its incidents to the infancy of civil society. As it sprang from times long anterior, if not to the invention, at all events to the popularisation, of the art of writing, gestures, symbolical acts, and solemn phrases take the place of documentary forms, and a lengthy and intricate ceremonial is intended to call the attention of the parties to the importance of the transaction, and to impress it on the memory of the witnesses. The imperfection too of oral, as compared with written, testimony necessitates the multiplication of the witnesses and assistants beyond what in later times would be reasonable or intelligible limits.

It is the ancient Plebeian Will—the alternative to the Testament just described—which has profoundly influenced the civilization of the modern world in its long-term effects. In Rome, it gained all the popularity that the Testament, when presented to the Calata Comitia, seems to have lost. The key to all its features lies in its origin from the 120 mancipium, or ancient Roman transfer process, which we can confidently link to the roots of two significant institutions essential for modern society: the Contract and the Will. The mancipium, or as the term evolved in later Latin, the Mancipation, takes us back to the early stages of civil society. Since it comes from an era long before, if not before the invention, certainly before the popularization of writing, gestures, symbolic acts, and formal phrases replaced written documents, and a detailed and complex ceremony was meant to highlight the significance of the transaction and engrave it in the memories of the witnesses. The limitations of oral testimony compared to written accounts also required an increase in the number of witnesses and participants beyond what would be considered reasonable or understandable in later times.

The Roman Mancipation required the presence first of all of the parties, the vendor and vendee, or we should perhaps rather say, if we are to use modern legal language, the grantor and grantee. There were also no less than five witnesses; and an anomalous personage, the Libripens, who brought with him a pair of scales to weigh the uncoined copper money of ancient Rome. The Testament we are considering—the Testament per æs et libram, "with the copper and the scales," as it long continued to be technically called—was an ordinary Mancipation with no change in the form and hardly any in words. The Testator was the grantor; the five witnesses and the libripens were present; and the place of grantee was taken by a person known technically as the familiæ emptor, the Purchaser of the Family. The ordinary ceremony of a Mancipation was then proceeded with. Certain formal gestures were made and sentences pronounced. The Emptor familiæ simulated the payment of a price by striking the scales with a piece of money, and finally the Testator ratified what had been done in a set form of words called the "Nuncupatio" or publication of the transaction, a phrase which, I need scarcely remind the lawyer, has had a long history in Testamentary jurisprudence. It is necessary to attend particularly to the character of the person called familiæ emptor. There is no doubt that at first he was the Heir himself. The Testator conveyed to him outright his whole121 "familia," that is, all the rights he enjoyed over and through the family; his property, his slaves, and all his ancestral privileges, together, on the other hand, with all his duties and obligations.

The Roman Manumission required the presence of the parties involved, the seller and buyer, or in more contemporary legal terms, the grantor and grantee. There also had to be at least five witnesses, along with a peculiar figure known as the Libripens, who brought scales to weigh the uncoined copper money of ancient Rome. The will we are discussing—the will per æs et libram, "with the copper and the scales," as it was technically known for a long time—was a standard Manumission with little change in form and hardly any change in wording. The Testator acted as the grantor; the five witnesses and the libripens were present; and the role of grantee was filled by a person known as the familiæ emptor, the Purchaser of the Family. The usual ceremony of a Manumission then took place. Certain formal gestures were made and statements were pronounced. The Emptor familiæ pretended to pay a price by striking the scales with a coin, and finally, the Testator confirmed what had been done using a set phrase called the "Nuncupatio" or publication of the transaction, a term that has a long history in estate law. It is essential to pay particular attention to the role of the person called familiæ emptor. Initially, he was undoubtedly the Heir himself. The Testator transferred his entire121 "familia" to him, which included all the rights he held over and through the family; his property, his slaves, and all his ancestral privileges, along with all his responsibilities and obligations.

With these data before us, we are able to note several remarkable points in which the Mancipatory Testament, as it may be called, differed in its primitive form from a modern will. As it amounted to a conveyance out-and-out of the Testator's estate, it was not revocable. There could be no new exercise of a power which had been exhausted.

With this information in front of us, we can highlight several significant ways in which the Mancipatory Testament, as it could be called, differed in its original form from a modern will. Since it served as a complete transfer of the Testator's estate, it was not revocable. There could be no further use of a power that had been fully exercised.

Again, it was not secret. The Familiæ Emptor, being himself the Heir, knew exactly what his rights were, and was aware that he was irreversibly entitled to the inheritance; a knowledge which the violences inseparable from the best-ordered ancient society rendered extremely dangerous. But perhaps the most surprising consequence of this relation of Testaments to Conveyances was the immediate vesting of the inheritance in the Heir. This has seemed so incredible to not a few civilians, that they have spoken of the Testator's estate as vesting conditionally on the Testator's death or as granted to him from a time uncertain, i.e. the death of the grantor. But down to the latest period of Roman jurisprudence there was a certain class of transactions which never admitted of being directly modified by a condition, or of being limited to or from a point of time. In technical language they did not admit conditio or dies. Mancipation was one of them, and therefore, strange as it may seem, we are forced to conclude that the primitive Roman Will took effect at once, even though the Testator survived his act of Testation. It is indeed likely that Roman citizens originally made their Wills only in the article of death, and that a provision for the continuance of the Family effected by a man in the flower of life would take the form rather of an Adoption than of a Will. Still we must believe that, if the Testator did recover, he could only continue to govern his household by the sufferance of his Heir.

Again, it wasn't a secret. The Familiæ Emptor, being the Heir, knew exactly what his rights were and understood that he was permanently entitled to the inheritance; a knowledge that the violence inherent in even the best-ordered ancient society made extremely dangerous. But perhaps the most surprising consequence of the relationship between Testaments and Conveyances was the immediate transfer of the inheritance to the Heir. This seemed so incredible to many legal experts that they referred to the Testator's estate as vesting conditionally upon the Testator's death or as granted to him from an uncertain time, i.e., the death of the grantor. However, up until the latest period of Roman law, there was a certain category of transactions that could never be directly modified by a condition or be limited to or from a specific point in time. In technical terms, they did not allow for conditio or dies. Mancipation was one of those transactions, so, strange as it may seem, we have to conclude that the primitive Roman Will took effect immediately, even if the Testator survived the act of making the Will. It's likely that Roman citizens originally made their Wills only in anticipation of death, and that a provision for the continuation of the Family made by a man in the prime of life would take the form of Adoption rather than a Will. Still, we have to believe that, if the Testator did recover, he could only continue to manage his household with the tolerance of his Heir.

Two or three remarks should be made before I explain how these inconveniences were remedied, and how Testaments came to be invested with the characteristics now universally associated with them. The Testament was not necessarily written: at first, it seems to have been invariably oral, and, even in later times, the instrument declaratory of the bequests122 was only incidentally connected with the Will and formed no essential part of it. It bore in fact exactly the same relation to the Testament, which the deed leading the uses bore to the Fines and Recoveries of old English law, or which the charter of feoffment bore to the feoffment itself. Previously, indeed, to the Twelve Tables, no writing would have been of the slightest use, for the Testator had no power of giving legacies, and the only persons who could be advantaged by a will were the Heir or Co-heirs. But the extreme generality of the clause in the Twelve Tables soon produced the doctrine that the Heir must take the inheritance burdened by any directions which the Testator might give him, or in other words, take it subject to legacies. Written testamentary instruments assumed thereupon a new value, as a security against the fraudulent refusal of the heir to satisfy the legatees; but to the last it was at the Testator's pleasure to rely exclusively on the testimony of the witnesses, and to declare by word of mouth the legacies which the familiæ emptor was commissioned to pay.

Before I explain how these issues were resolved and how Testaments gained the features we now associate with them, a couple of points need to be made. Initially, the Testament wasn't necessarily written; it seems to have been primarily oral at first, and even later, the document that stated the bequests122 was only somewhat related to the Will and wasn’t a fundamental part of it. It essentially had the same relationship to the Testament as the document leading the uses had to the Fines and Recoveries of old English law, or as the charter of feoffment related to the feoffment itself. In fact, before the Twelve Tables, any written document would have been completely useless, since the Testator had no authority to give legacies, and the only individuals who could benefit from a will were the Heir or Co-heirs. However, the broad language of the clause in the Twelve Tables quickly led to the principle that the Heir had to accept the inheritance along with any instructions the Testator might provide, meaning they had to take it along with legacies. Written testamentary documents then gained new importance as protection against the heir’s fraudulent refusal to honor the legacies; however, ultimately, the Testator had the choice to rely solely on the witnesses' testimony and verbally declare the legacies that the familiæ emptor was meant to pay.

The terms of the expression Emptor familiæ demand notice. "Emptor" indicates that the Will was literally a sale, and the word "familiæ," when compared with the phraseology in the Testamentary clause in the Twelve Tables, leads us to some instructive conclusions. "Familia," in classical Latinity, means always a man's slaves. Here, however, and generally in the language of ancient Roman law, it includes all persons under his Potestas, and the Testator's material property or substance is understood to pass as an adjunct or appendage of his household. Turning to the law of the Twelve Tables, it will be seen that it speaks of tutela rei suæ, "the guardianship of his substance," a form of expression which is the exact reverse of the phrase just examined. There does not therefore appear to be any mode of escaping from the conclusion, that, even at an era so comparatively recent as that of the Decemviral compromise, terms denoting "household" and "property" were blended in the current phraseology. If a man's household had been spoken of as his property we might have explained the expression as pointing to the extent of the Patria Potestas, but, as the interchange is reciprocal, we must allow that the form of speech carries us back to that primeval period in which property is owned by the family, and the family is123 governed by the citizen, so that the members of the community do not own their property and their family, but rather own their property through their family.

The terms of the expression Emptor familiæ are worth noting. "Emptor" indicates that the Will was literally a sale, and the word "familiæ," when compared with the wording in the Testamentary clause in the Twelve Tables, leads us to some insightful conclusions. "Familia," in classical Latin, always refers to a man's slaves. However, here, and generally in the language of ancient Roman law, it includes all persons under his Potestas, and the Testator's material property or assets are understood to pass as part of his household. Looking at the law of the Twelve Tables, it mentions tutela rei suæ, "the guardianship of his substance," which is the exact opposite of the phrase we just examined. Therefore, there doesn’t seem to be any way to avoid the conclusion that, even at a time as relatively recent as the Decemviral compromise, terms referring to "household" and "property" were mixed in common language. If a man's household had been referred to as his property, we might have interpreted the expression as indicating the extent of the Patria Potestas, but since the interchange is mutual, we must accept that this way of speaking takes us back to that ancient time when property was owned by the family, and the family was governed by the citizen, so that community members do not own their property and their family, but rather own their property through their family.

At an epoch not easy to settle with precision, the Roman Prætors fell into the habit of acting upon Testaments solemnised in closer conformity with the spirit than the letter of the law. Casual dispensations became insensibly the established practice, till at length a wholly new form of Will was matured and regularly engrafted on the Edictal Jurisprudence. The new or Prætorian Testament derived the whole of its impregnability from the Jus Honorarium or Equity of Rome. The Prætor of some particular year must have inserted a clause in his inaugural Proclamation declaratory of his intention to sustain all Testaments which should have been executed with such and such solemnities; and, the reform having been found advantageous, the article relating to it must have been again introduced by the Prætor's successor, and repeated by the next in office, till at length it formed a recognised portion of that body of jurisprudence which from these successive incorporations was styled the Perpetual or Continuous Edict. On examining the conditions of a valid Prætorian Will they will be plainly seen to have been determined by the requirements of the Mancipatory Testament, the innovating Prætor having obviously prescribed to himself the retention of the old formalities just so far as they were warrants of genuineness or securities against fraud. At the execution of the Mancipatory Testament seven persons had been present besides the Testator. Seven witnesses were accordingly essential to the Prætorian Will: two of them corresponding to the libripens and familiæ emptor, who were now stripped of their symbolical character, and were merely present for the purpose of supplying their testimony. No emblematic ceremony was gone through; the Will was merely recited; but then it is probable (though not absolutely certain) that a written instrument was necessary to perpetuate the evidence of the Testator's dispositions. At all events, whenever a writing was read or exhibited as a person's last Will, we know certainly that the Prætorian Court would not sustain it by special intervention, unless each of the seven witnesses had severally affixed his seal to the outside. This is the first appearance of sealing in the history of jurisprudence, considered as a mode of authentication. It is to be observed that the seals of Roman124 Wills, and other documents of importance, did not simply serve as the index of the presence or assent of the signatory, but were literally fastenings which had to be broken before the writing could be inspected.

At a time that’s hard to pinpoint exactly, the Roman Praetors began to regularly operate based on wills that conformed more to the spirit than the letter of the law. Gradually, informal exceptions became standard practice, leading to the development of a completely new kind of will that was integrated into the edictal legal system. This new or Praetorian will gained its strength from the Jus Honorarium or Roman Equity. A Praetor in a given year must have included a clause in his inaugural proclamation stating his intent to uphold all wills executed with specified formalities; and since this reform proved beneficial, his successors must have reintroduced this clause until it became a recognized part of the legal framework, referred to as the Perpetual or Continuous Edict. When looking at the requirements for a valid Praetorian will, it’s clear they were influenced by the conditions of the Mancipatory will, with the innovative Praetor intentionally keeping the old formalities only as guarantees of authenticity or safeguards against fraud. In the execution of a Mancipatory will, seven people were present alongside the testator. Thus, seven witnesses became necessary for the Praetorian will: two corresponding to the libripens and familiæ emptor, who now lost their symbolic role and were there just to provide testimony. No ceremonial process was performed; the will was simply recited. However, it’s likely (though not certain) that a written document was needed to preserve the testator's wishes. Regardless, whenever a document was read or shown as someone's last will, we know for sure that the Praetorian Court would not validate it without the special intervention unless each of the seven witnesses had signed their seal on the outside. This marks the first instance of sealing in legal history as a form of authentication. It's important to note that the seals on Roman124 wills and other significant documents didn’t just indicate the presence or agreement of the signer; they literally secured the document so that the seals had to be broken before the writing could be examined.

The Edictal Law would therefore enforce the dispositions of a Testator, when, instead of being symbolised through the forms of mancipation, they were simply evidenced by the seals of seven witnesses. But it may be laid down as a general proposition, that the principal qualities of Roman property were incommunicable except through processes which were supposed to be coeval with the origin of the Civil Law. The Prætor therefore could not confer an Inheritance on anybody. He could not place the Heir or Co-heirs in that very relation in which the Testator had himself stood to his own rights and obligations. All he could do was to confer on the person designated as Heir the practical enjoyment of the property bequeathed, and to give the force of legal acquittances to his payments of the Testator's debts. When he exerted his powers to these ends, the Prætor was technically said to communicate the Bonorum Possessio. The Heir specially inducted under these circumstances, or Bonorum Possessor, had every proprietary privilege of the Heir by the Civil Law. He took the profits and he could alienate, but then, for all his remedies for redress against wrong, he must go, as we should phrase it, not to the Common Law, but to the Equity side of the Prætorian Court. No great chance of error would be incurred by describing him as having an equitable estate in the inheritance; but then, to secure ourselves against being deluded by the analogy, we must always recollect that in one year the Bonorum Possessio was operated upon a principle of Roman Law known as Usucapion, and the Possessor became Quiritarian owner of all the property comprised in the inheritance.

The Edictal Law would thus enforce the wishes of a Testator when, instead of being represented through the forms of mancipation, they were simply shown by the seals of seven witnesses. However, it can be stated as a general rule that the main qualities of Roman property could not be transferred except through processes believed to be from the beginning of Civil Law. Therefore, the Prætor could not grant an Inheritance to anyone. He could not put the Heir or Co-heirs in the exact position that the Testator had held concerning his own rights and obligations. All he could do was give the person designated as Heir the practical enjoyment of the property left behind and give the legal validity to their payments of the Testator's debts. When he used his powers for these purposes, the Prætor was technically said to transfer the Bonorum Possessio. The Heir specifically initiated under these circumstances, or Bonorum Possessor, had all the property rights of the Heir under Civil Law. He could take the profits, and he could sell the property, but for any remedies to address wrongs, he had to go, as we would say, not to the Common Law, but to the Equity side of the Prætorian Court. There would be little risk of error in describing him as having an equitable estate in the inheritance; however, to protect ourselves from being misled by the analogy, we must always remember that within a year, the Bonorum Possessio was based on a principle of Roman Law known as Usucapion, and the Possessor became the Quiritarian owner of all the property included in the inheritance.

We know too little of the older law of Civil Process to be able to strike the balance of advantage and disadvantage between the different classes of remedies supplied by the Prætorian Tribunal. It is certain, however, that, in spite of its many defects, the Mancipatory Testament by which the universitas juris devolved at once and unimpaired was never entirely superseded by the new Will; and at a period less bigoted to antiquarian forms, and perhaps not quite alive to their significance, all the ingenuity of the Jurisconsults seems125 to have been expended on the improvement of the more venerable instrument. At the era of Gaius, which is that of the Antonine Cæsars, the great blemishes of the Mancipatory Will had been removed. Originally, as we have seen, the essential character of the formalities had required that the Heir himself should be the Purchaser of the Family, and the consequence was that he not only instantly acquired a vested interest in the Testator's Property, but was formally made aware of his rights. But the age of Gaius permitted some unconcerned person to officiate as Purchaser of the Family. The heir, therefore, was not necessarily informed of the succession to which he was destined; and Wills thenceforward acquired the property of secrecy. The substitution of a stranger for the actual Heir in the functions of "Familiæ Emptor" had other ulterior consequences. As soon as it was legalised, a Roman Testament came to consist of two parts or stages—a conveyance, which was a pure form, and a Nuncupatio, or Publication. In this latter passage of the proceeding, the Testator either orally declared to the assistants the wishes which were to be executed after his death, or produced a written document in which his wishes were embodied. It was not probably till attention had been quite drawn off from the imaginary Conveyance, and concentrated on the Nuncupation as the essential part of the transaction, that Wills were allowed to become revocable.

We know too little about the older laws of Civil Process to weigh the pros and cons of the different types of remedies provided by the Prætorian Tribunal. However, it's clear that, despite its flaws, the Mancipatory Testament, which transferred the universitas juris immediately and unchanged, was never completely replaced by the new Will. During a time less fixated on old forms, and perhaps not fully aware of their importance, the expertise of the Jurisconsults seems to have been focused on improving the older tool. By the time of Gaius, during the era of the Antonine Cæsars, the major shortcomings of the Mancipatory Will had been fixed. Originally, as we’ve noted, the formal requirements meant that the Heir had to be the Purchaser of the Family, which resulted in him not only gaining a vested interest in the Testator's Property but also being formally informed of his rights. However, in Gaius's time, a neutral party could act as the Purchaser of the Family. Thus, the heir was not necessarily made aware of the succession that awaited him; from then on, Wills became more about secrecy. Replacing the actual Heir with a stranger in the role of "Familiæ Emptor" brought about additional consequences. Once this was legalized, a Roman Testament came to be made up of two parts: a conveyance, which was just a formality, and a Nuncupatio, or Publication. In this second part of the process, the Testator either verbally communicated his wishes to those present or presented a written document outlining those wishes. It was likely only after the focus shifted away from the imaginary Conveyance and became centered on the Nuncupation as the key part of the process that Wills were permitted to become revocable.

I have thus carried the pedigree of Wills some way down in legal history. The root of it is the old Testament "with the copper and the scales," founded on a Mancipation or Conveyance. This ancient Will has, however, manifold defects, which are remedied, though only indirectly, by the Prætorian law. Meantime the ingenuity of the Jurisconsults effects, in the Common-Law Will or Mancipatory Testament, the very improvements which the Prætor may have concurrently carried out in Equity. These last ameliorations depend, however, on mere legal dexterity, and we see accordingly that the Testamentary Law of the day of Gaius or Ulpian is only transitional. What changes next ensued we know not; but at length, just before the reconstruction of the jurisprudence by Justinian, we find the subjects of the Eastern Roman Empire employing a form of Will of which the pedigree is traceable to the Prætorian Testament on one side, and to the Testament "with the copper and the scales" on the other.126 Like the Testament of the Prætor, it required no Mancipation, and was invalid unless sealed by seven witnesses. Like the Mancipatory Will, it passed the Inheritance and not merely a Bonorum Possessio. Several, however, of its most important features were annexed by positive enactments, and it is out of regard to this threefold derivation from the Prætorian Edict, from the Civil Law, and from the Imperial Constitutions, that Justinian speaks of the Law of Wills in his own day as Jus Tripertitum. The new Testament thus described is the one generally known as the Roman Will. But it was the Will of the Eastern Empire only; and the researches of Savigny have shown that in Western Europe the old Mancipatory Testament, with all its apparatus of conveyance, copper, and scales, continued to be the form in use far down in the Middle Ages.127

I have traced the history of Wills somewhat through legal history. Its origins lie in the Old Testament "with the copper and the scales," based on a Mancipation or Conveyance. This ancient Will has many flaws, which are fixed, although only indirectly, by the Prætorian law. Meanwhile, the creativity of legal experts leads to the Common-Law Will or Mancipatory Testament, which includes improvements that the Prætor may have also established in Equity at the same time. However, these changes depend on mere legal skill, and we can see that the Testamentary Law from the time of Gaius or Ulpian is only a transitional phase. We do not know what changes came next; however, just before Justinian restructured the law, we find people in the Eastern Roman Empire using a form of Will that traces its lineage back to the Prætorian Testament on one side and to the Testament "with the copper and the scales" on the other.126 Like the Prætor's Testament, this form did not require Mancipation and was invalid unless sealed by seven witnesses. Similar to the Mancipatory Will, it transferred the Inheritance and not just a Bonorum Possessio. Several of its key features, however, were added by specific laws, and it is due to this threefold origin from the Prætorian Edict, Civil Law, and Imperial Constitutions that Justinian refers to the Law of Wills in his time as Jus Tripertitum. The new Testament being described is commonly known as the Roman Will. However, it was only the Will of the Eastern Empire; and research by Savigny has shown that in Western Europe, the old Mancipatory Testament, along with all its elements of conveyance, copper, and scales, remained the form in use well into the Middle Ages.127


CHAPTER VII

ancient and modern ideas about wills and inheritances

Although there is much in the modern European Law of Wills which is intimately connected with the oldest rules of Testamentary disposition practised among men, there are nevertheless some important differences between ancient and modern ideas on the subject of Wills and Successions. Some of the points of difference I shall endeavour to illustrate in this chapter.

Although there's a lot in modern European Law of Wills that's closely related to the oldest rules of making wills used by people, there are still some significant differences between ancient and modern concepts regarding Wills and Successions. I will try to highlight some of these differences in this chapter.

At a period, removed several centuries from the era of the Twelve Tables, we find a variety of rules engrafted on the Roman Civil Law with the view of limiting the disinherison of children; we have the jurisdiction of the Prætor very actively exerted in the same interest; and we are also presented with a new remedy, very anomalous in character and of uncertain origin, called the Querela Inofficiosi Testamenti, "the Plaint of an Unduteous Will," directed to the reinstatement of the issue in inheritances from which they had been unjustifiably excluded by a father's Testament. Comparing this condition of the law with the text of the Twelve Tables which concedes in terms the utmost liberty of Testation, several writers have been tempted to interweave a good deal of dramatic incident into their history of the Law Testamentary. They tell us of the boundless license of disinherison in which the heads of families instantly began to indulge, of the scandal and injury to public morals which the new practices engendered, and of the applause of all good men which hailed the courage of the Prætor in arresting the progress of paternal depravity. This story, which is not without some foundation for the principal fact it relates, is often so told as to disclose very serious misconceptions of the principles of legal history. The Law of the Twelve Tables is to be explained by the character of the age in which it was enacted. It does not license a tendency which a later era thought itself bound to counteract, but it proceeds on the assumption that no such tendency128 exists, or, perhaps we should say, in ignorance of the possibility of its existence. There is no likelihood that Roman citizens began immediately to avail themselves freely of the power to disinherit. It is against all reason and sound appreciation of history to suppose that the yoke of family bondage, still patiently submitted to, as we know, where its pressure galled most cruelly, would be cast off in the very particular in which its incidence in our own day is not otherwise than welcome. The Law of the Twelve Tables permitted the execution of Testaments in the only case in which it was thought possible that they could be executed, viz. on failure of children and proximate kindred. It did not forbid the disinherison of direct descendants, inasmuch as it did not legislate against a contingency which no Roman lawgiver of that era could have contemplated. No doubt, as the offices of family affection progressively lost the aspect of primary personal duties, the disinherison of children was occasionally attempted. But the interference of the Prætor, so far from being called for by the universality of the abuse, was doubtless first prompted by the fact that such instances of unnatural caprice were few and exceptional, and at conflict with the current morality.

At a time, many centuries after the era of the Twelve Tables, we see various rules added to Roman Civil Law aimed at limiting the disinheritance of children. The Prætor's authority was actively used for this purpose, and we also have a new remedy, quite unusual in nature and of unclear origin, called the Querela Inofficiosi Testamenti, "the Complaint of an Unduteous Will," intended to restore the rights of children in inheritances from which they had been wrongfully excluded by a father's will. Comparing this situation with the stipulations of the Twelve Tables, which clearly grants the utmost freedom of testamentary power, many writers have been tempted to embellish the history of Testamentary Law with dramatic elements. They recount the excessive freedom of disinheritance that heads of families quickly embraced, the scandal and harm to public morals that the new practices caused, and the praise from all good people for the Prætor's courage in curbing the advances of parental immorality. This narrative, which has some basis in the main fact it discusses, is often presented in a way that reveals serious misunderstandings of legal history. The Law of the Twelve Tables must be understood in the context of the time it was enacted. It does not allow for a tendency that a later period felt compelled to counteract; instead, it operates on the assumption that no such tendency exists, or, we might say, in ignorance of the possibility of its existence. It’s unlikely that Roman citizens began to freely exploit their power to disinherit immediately. It defies reason and a proper understanding of history to think that the burden of family obligations, still endured, as we know, where it was most oppressive, would be discarded in an area where its impact is not unwelcome in our own time. The Law of the Twelve Tables allowed for the creation of Wills only in cases where it was believed they could be executed, namely, when there were no children and immediate relatives. It did not prohibit the disinheritance of direct descendants because it did not legislate against a possibility that no Roman lawmaker of that time could have foreseen. Certainly, as the responsibilities of family love gradually lost their primary personal significance, the disinheritance of children was sometimes attempted. However, the Prætor's intervention, rather than being prompted by widespread abuse, was likely initiated because such cases of unnatural behavior were few and exceptional, and ran counter to prevailing morals.

The indications furnished by this part of Roman Testamentary Law are of a very different kind. It is remarkable that a Will never seems to have been regarded by the Romans as a means of disinheriting a Family, or of effecting the unequal distribution of a patrimony. The rules of law preventing its being turned to such a purpose, increase in number and stringency as the jurisprudence unfolds itself; and these rules correspond doubtless with the abiding sentiment of Roman society, as distinguished from occasional variations of feeling in individuals. It would rather seem as if the Testamentary Power were chiefly valued for the assistance it gave in making provision for a Family, and in dividing the inheritance more evenly and fairly than the Law of Intestate Succession would have divided it. If this be the true reading of the general sentiment on the point, it explains to some extent the singular horror of Intestacy which always characterised the Roman. No evil seems to have been considered a heavier visitation than the forfeiture of Testamentary privileges; no curse appears to have been bitterer than that which imprecated on an enemy that he might die129 without a Will. The feeling has no counterpart, or none that is easily recognisable, in the forms of opinion which exist at the present day. All men at all times will doubtless prefer chalking out the destination of their substance to having that office performed for them by the law; but the Roman passion for Testacy is distinguished from the mere desire to indulge caprice by its intensity; and it has of course nothing whatever in common with that pride of family, exclusively the creation of feudalism, which accumulates one description of property in the hands of a single representative. It is probable, à priori, that it was something in the rules of Intestate Succession which caused this vehement preference for the distribution of property under a Testament over its distribution by law. The difficulty, however, is, that on glancing at the Roman Law of Intestate Succession, in the form which it wore for many centuries before Justinian shaped it into that scheme of inheritance which has been almost universally adopted by modern lawgivers, it by no means strikes one as remarkably unreasonable or inequitable. On the contrary, the distribution it prescribes is so fair and rational, and differs so little from that with which modern society has been generally contented, that no reason suggests itself why it should have been regarded with extraordinary distaste, especially under a jurisprudence which pared down to a narrow compass the testamentary privileges of persons who had children to provide for. We should rather have expected that, as in France at this moment, the heads of families would generally save themselves the trouble of executing a Will, and allow the Law to do as it pleased with their assets. I think, however, if we look a little closely at the pre-Justinianean scale of Intestate Succession, we shall discover the key to the mystery. The texture of the law consists of two distinct parts. One department of rules comes from the Jus Civile, the Common-Law of Rome; the other from the Edict of the Prætor. The Civil Law, as I have already stated for another purpose, calls to the inheritance only three orders of successors in their turn; the Unemancipated children, the nearest class of Agnatic kindred, and the Gentiles. Between these three orders, the Prætor interpolates various classes of relatives, of whom the Civil Law took no notice whatever. Ultimately, the combination of the Edict and of the Civil Law forms a table of succession not materially different from130 that which has descended to the generality of modern codes.

The insights provided by this part of Roman Testamentary Law are quite different. It’s interesting that the Romans never seemed to view a Will as a way to disinherit a family or to create an unequal distribution of an estate. The legal rules preventing such uses become more numerous and strict as the law develops, and these rules likely reflect the enduring values of Roman society, as opposed to occasional individual feelings. It appears that the Testamentary Power was mainly valued for the aid it offered in providing for a family and in dividing inheritance more equally and fairly than the Law of Intestate Succession would have done. If this interpretation of the general sentiment is accurate, it partly explains the Roman society's strong aversion to dying without a Will. No wrong seems to have been viewed as a greater burden than losing the right to make a Testament; no curse appears to have been more severe than wishing an enemy would die129 without a Will. This sentiment has no counterpart, or one that's easily identifiable, in today's opinions. People throughout history will likely prefer to determine the fate of their assets rather than have the law decide for them; however, the Roman obsession with Testacy is marked by its intensity, which differs from simply wanting to act on whims, and it has nothing to do with the pride of family, a concept mainly arising from feudalism, which tends to consolidate property in the hands of a single heir. It’s probable, à priori, that some aspects of the rules of Intestate Succession led to this strong preference for distributing property via a Testament rather than by law. However, the challenge is that when looking at the Roman Law of Intestate Succession as it existed for many centuries before Justinian codified it into the inheritance system that has been widely adopted by modern lawmakers, it doesn’t seem particularly unreasonable or unfair. In fact, the distribution it specifies is quite fair and logical, and differs little from what modern society generally accepts, making it hard to see why it would be viewed with such strong disapproval, especially under a legal system that limited the testamentary rights of people with children. One might expect that, like in France today, heads of families would usually skip the hassle of writing a Will and let the Law manage their assets as it saw fit. However, I believe that if we take a closer look at the pre-Justinian system of Intestate Succession, we can uncover the key to this mystery. The structure of the law consists of two distinct parts. One set of rules comes from the Jus Civile, the Common Law of Rome, while the other derives from the Edict of the Prætor. The Civil Law, as I previously noted for another purpose, designates three categories of heirs in a specific order: Unemancipated children, the closest class of Agnatic relatives, and the Gentiles. The Prætor introduces various classes of relatives that the Civil Law ignores altogether. Ultimately, the combination of the Edict and the Civil Law results in a succession table that is not significantly different from130 what has been passed down to most modern legal codes.

The point for recollection is that there must anciently have been a time at which the rules of the Civil Law determined the scheme of Intestate Succession exclusively, and at which the arrangements of the Edict were non-existent, or not consistently carried out. We cannot doubt that, in its infancy, the Prætorian jurisprudence had to contend with formidable obstructions, and it is more than probable that, long after popular sentiment and legal opinion had acquiesced in it, the modifications which it periodically introduced were governed by no certain principles, and fluctuated with the varying bias of successive magistrates. The rules of Intestate Succession, which the Romans must at this period have practised, account, I think—and more than account—for that vehement distaste for an Intestacy to which Roman society during so many ages remained constant. The order of succession was this: on the death of a citizen, having no will or no valid will, his Unemancipated children became his Heirs. His emancipated sons had no share in the inheritance. If he left no direct descendants living at his death, the nearest grade of the Agnatic kindred succeeded, but no part of the inheritance was given to any relative united (however closely) with the dead man through female descents. All the other branches of the family were excluded, and the inheritance escheated to the Gentiles, or entire body of Roman citizens bearing the same name with the deceased. So that on failing to execute an operative Testament, a Roman of the era under examination left his emancipated children absolutely without provision, while, on the assumption that he died childless, there was imminent risk that his possessions would escape from the family altogether, and devolve on a number of persons with whom he was merely connected by the sacerdotal fiction that assumed all members of the same gens to be descended from a common ancestor. The prospect of such an issue is in itself a nearly sufficient explanation of the popular sentiment; but, in point of fact, we shall only half understand it, if we forget that the state of things I have been describing is likely to have existed at the very moment when Roman society was in the first stage of its transition from its primitive organisation in detached families. The empire of the father had indeed received one of the earliest blows directed at it131 through the recognition of Emancipation as a legitimate usage, but the law, still considering the Patria Potestas to be the root of family connection, persevered in looking on the emancipated children as strangers to the rights of Kinship and aliens from the blood. We cannot, however, for a moment suppose that the limitations of the family imposed by legal pedantry had their counterpart in the natural affection of parents. Family attachments must still have retained that nearly inconceivable sanctity and intensity which belonged to them under the Patriarchal system; and, so little are they likely to have been extinguished by the act of emancipation, that the probabilities are altogether the other way. It may be unhesitatingly taken for granted that enfranchisement from the father's power was a demonstration, rather than a severance, of affection—a mark of grace and favour accorded to the best-beloved and most esteemed of the children. If sons thus honoured above the rest were absolutely deprived of their heritage by an Intestacy, the reluctance to incur it requires no farther explanation. We might have assumed à priori that the passion for Testacy was generated by some moral injustice entailed by the rules of Intestate succession; and here we find them at variance with the very instinct by which early society was cemented together. It is possible to put all that has been urged in a very succinct form. Every dominant sentiment of the primitive Romans was entwined with the relations of the family. But what was the Family? The Law defined it one way—natural affection another. In the conflict between the two, the feeling we would analyse grew up, taking the form of an enthusiasm for the institution by which the dictates of affection were permitted to determine the fortunes of its objects.

The key point to remember is that there must have been a time when the rules of Civil Law exclusively dictated how intestate succession worked, a time when the arrangements from the Edict either didn’t exist or weren’t consistently followed. We can't doubt that, in its early days, Praetorian law faced significant challenges, and it's likely that even after public opinion had accepted it, the changes it introduced didn’t follow any clear principles and varied with the differing biases of successive magistrates. The rules of intestate succession that Romans practiced during this period explain—and more than explain—the strong dislike for intestacy that persisted in Roman society for many ages. The order of succession was as follows: when a citizen died without a will or with an invalid one, his unemancipated children became his heirs. His emancipated sons received nothing from the inheritance. If he had no living direct descendants at his death, the closest agnatic relatives would inherit, but no part would go to any relatives connected through female lines. All other branches of the family were excluded, and the inheritance would go to the Gentiles, or the entire body of Roman citizens sharing the deceased’s name. So, failing to create a valid will left a Roman of that time with his emancipated children completely unprovided for, and if he died childless, there was a real risk that his property would fall out of the family and be passed on to people he was only connected to through a ceremonial belief that all members of the same gens were descended from a common ancestor. The likelihood of this situation explains the public sentiment, but we may only partially understand it if we forget that the circumstances I’ve described likely existed at the same time when Roman society was first transitioning from its primitive structure of separate families. The authority of the father had indeed begun to diminish with the acceptance of emancipation as a legitimate practice, but the law still viewed patria potestas as the foundation of family ties, regarding emancipated children as strangers to kinship rights and outsiders to the family bloodline. However, we shouldn't imagine that the limitations imposed by legal technicalities mirrored parents' natural affection. Family bonds must have still held that incredible sanctity and intensity that belonged to them under the patriarchal system; and in fact, these feelings were probably strengthened rather than diminished by emancipation. We can confidently assume that freeing a child from a father’s control was a demonstration of love rather than a severance—a sign of favor shown to the most beloved and esteemed children. If these honored sons were completely deprived of their inheritance due to intestacy, the deep hesitation to face such a situation is easily understood. We might have assumed that the strong desire for a will stemmed from some moral injustice brought about by the rules of intestate succession; and here we see these rules at odds with the very instinct that originally bonded early society. All that has been discussed can be summarized succinctly: every strong sentiment of the early Romans was intertwined with family relationships. But what was the Family? The law defined it one way—natural affection defined it another. In the clash between the two, the feeling we wish to analyze emerged, taking the form of a passion for the institution that allowed feelings of love to shape the fortunes of its members.

I regard, therefore, the Roman horror of Intestacy as a monument of a very early conflict between ancient law and slowly changing ancient sentiment on the subject of the Family. Some passages in the Roman Statute-Law, and one statute in particular which limited the capacity for inheritance possessed by women, must have contributed to keep alive the feeling; and it is the general belief that the system of creating Fidei-Commissa, or bequests in trust, was devised to evade the disabilities imposed by those statutes. But the feeling itself, in its remarkable intensity, seems to point back to some deeper antagonism between law and opinion; nor132 is it at all wonderful that the improvements of jurisprudence by the Prætor should not have extinguished it. Everybody conversant with the philosophy of opinion is aware that a sentiment by no means dies out, of necessity, with the passing away of the circumstances which produced it. It may long survive them; nay, it may afterwards attain to a pitch and climax of intensity which it never attained during their actual continuance.

I see the Roman fear of Intestacy as a testament to an early struggle between ancient laws and the slowly evolving views on Family. Some parts of Roman Statute Law, especially one law that restricted women's inheritance rights, must have kept this feeling alive. It's commonly believed that the system of creating Fidei-Commissa, or trusts, was established to get around the limitations imposed by those laws. However, the intensity of this feeling seems to indicate a deeper conflict between law and popular opinion; it’s not surprising that the advancements in law by the Prætor didn't eliminate it. Anyone familiar with the philosophy of opinion knows that a sentiment doesn’t necessarily fade away just because the circumstances that created it have changed. It can endure for a long time; in fact, it might even reach a level of intensity that it never had while those circumstances were still present.

The view of a Will which regards it as conferring the power of diverting property from the Family, or of distributing it in such uneven proportions as the fancy or good sense of the Testator may dictate, is not older than that later portion of the Middle Ages in which Feudalism had completely consolidated itself. When modern jurisprudence first shows itself in the rough, Wills are rarely allowed to dispose with absolute freedom of a dead man's assets. Wherever at this period the descent of property was regulated by Will—and over the greater part of Europe moveable or personal property was the subject of Testamentary disposition—the exercise of the Testamentary power was seldom allowed to interfere with the right of the widow to a definite share, and of the children to certain fixed proportions, of the devolving inheritance. The shares of the children, as their amount shows, were determined by the authority of Roman law. The provision for the widow was attributable to the exertions of the Church, which never relaxed its solicitude for the interest of wives surviving their husbands—winning, perhaps, one of the most arduous of its triumphs when, after exacting for two or three centuries an express promise from the husband at marriage to endow his wife, it at length succeeded in engrafting the principle of Dower on the Customary Law of all Western Europe. Curiously enough, the dower of lands proved a more stable institution than the analogous and more ancient reservation of certain shares of the personal property to the widow and children. A few local customs in France maintained the right down to the Revolution, and there are traces of similar usages in England; but on the whole the doctrine prevailed that moveables might be freely disposed of by Will, and, even when the claims of the widow continued to be respected, the privileges of the children were obliterated from jurisprudence. We need not hesitate to attribute the change to the influence of Primogeniture. As the Feudal law of land practically disinherited133 all the children in favour of one, the equal distribution even of those sorts of property which might have been equally divided ceased to be viewed as a duty. Testaments were the principal instruments employed in producing inequality, and in this condition of things originated the shade of difference which shows itself between the ancient and the modern conception of a Will. But, though the liberty of bequest, enjoyed through Testaments, was thus an accidental fruit of Feudalism, there is no broader distinction than that which exists between a system of free Testamentary disposition and a system, like that of the Feudal land-law, under which property descends compulsorily in prescribed lines of devolution. This truth appears to have been lost sight of by the authors of the French Codes. In the social fabric which they determined to destroy, they saw Primogeniture resting chiefly on Family settlements, but they also perceived that Testaments were frequently employed to give the eldest son precisely the same preference which was reserved to him under the strictest of entails. In order, therefore, to make sure of their work, they not only rendered it impossible to prefer the eldest son to the rest in marriage-arrangements, but they almost expelled Testamentary succession from the law, lest it should be used to defeat their fundamental principle of an equal distribution of property among children at the parent's death. The result is that they have established a system of small perpetual entails, which is infinitely nearer akin to the system of feudal Europe than would be a perfect liberty of bequest. The land-law of England, "the Herculaneum of Feudalism," is certainly much more closely allied to the land-law of the Middle Ages than that of any Continental country, and Wills with us are frequently used to aid or imitate that preference of the eldest son and his line which is a nearly universal feature in marriage settlements of real property. But nevertheless feeling and opinion in this country have been profoundly affected by the practice of free Testamentary disposition; and it appears to me that the state of sentiment in a great part of French society, on the subject of the conservation of property in families, is much liker that which prevailed through Europe two or three centuries ago than are the current opinions of Englishmen.

The perspective on a Will that views it as a means to shift property away from the family or distribute it in uneven ways as dictated by the wishes or judgment of the Testator is relatively new, emerging only in the latter part of the Middle Ages when Feudalism had fully established itself. When modern law first began to take shape, Wills rarely allowed for complete freedom in distributing a deceased person's assets. During this time, where property distribution was governed by a Will—and most of Europe allowed for the distribution of movable or personal property—this power was often restricted to safeguard the widow's right to a specific share and the children's right to fixed portions of the inherited estate. The amounts allocated to children were influenced largely by Roman law. The provisions for widows stemmed from the Church's commitment to protect the interests of wives after their husbands' deaths—achieving one of its significant victories after demanding for two to three centuries that husbands promise to provide for their wives upon marriage, eventually establishing the principle of Dower in the customary law throughout Western Europe. Interestingly, the dower of land proved to be a more enduring institution than the older practice of allocating certain shares of personal property to the widow and children. Some local customs in France upheld this right until the Revolution, and similar practices can be seen in England; however, the prevailing understanding was that movable property could be freely disposed of through a Will, and even when a widow's claims were acknowledged, the rights of children were often disregarded in legal terms. We can directly link this change to the concept of Primogeniture. As Feudal land laws effectively disinherited most children in favor of one, equal distribution of property that could have been shared became less regarded as an obligation. Wills became the main tools for creating inequality, leading to the distinction we see today between ancient and modern interpretations of a Will. While the freedom of bequest that stems from Wills emerged as an unexpected byproduct of Feudalism, the contrast between a system of unrestricted Testamentary disposition and one, like the Feudal land-law, where property descends according to fixed lines of inheritance is stark. This truth appeared to be overlooked by the creators of the French Codes. In the society they sought to dismantle, they saw Primogeniture primarily based on family arrangements, but they also recognized that Wills were often used to grant the eldest son the same advantages as those enshrined in the strictest entails. To ensure the success of their reforms, they not only made it impossible to prioritize the eldest son in marriage arrangements but also nearly eliminated Testamentary succession from the law, to prevent it from undermining their fundamental principle of equal property distribution among children after a parent's death. The outcome is a system of small perpetual entails that is much closer to the feudal systems of Europe than what would result from complete freedom of bequest. The land-law of England, "the Herculaneum of Feudalism," is indeed much more similar to the land-law of the Middle Ages than that of any Continental country, and Wills are often used here to reinforce or mimic the preference for the eldest son and his lineage, a common feature in real estate marriage settlements. Nevertheless, the feelings and perspectives in this country have been deeply influenced by the practice of unrestricted Testamentary disposition, and it seems to me that much of French society's sentiment regarding keeping property within families resembles the attitudes prevalent in Europe two or three centuries ago, contrasting sharply with current English opinions.

The mention of Primogeniture introduces one of the most difficult problems of historical jurisprudence. Though I have134 not paused to explain my expressions, it may have been noticed that I have frequently spoken of a number of "co-heirs" as placed by the Roman Law of Succession on the same footing with a single Heir. In point of fact, we know of no period of Roman jurisprudence at which the place of the Heir, or Universal Successor, might not have been taken by a group of co-heirs. This group succeeded as a single unit, and the assets were afterwards divided among them in a separate legal proceeding. When the Succession was ab intestato, and the group consisted of the children of the deceased, they each took an equal share of the property; nor, though males had at one time some advantages over females, is there the faintest trace of Primogeniture. The mode of distribution is the same throughout archaic jurisprudence. It certainly seems that, when civil society begins and families cease to hold together through a series of generations, the idea which spontaneously suggests itself is to divide the domain equally among the members of each successive generation, and to reserve no privilege to the eldest son or stock. Some peculiarly significant hints as to the close relation of this phenomenon to primitive thought are furnished by systems yet more archaic than the Roman. Among the Hindoos, the instant a son is born, he acquires a vested right in his father's property, which cannot be sold without recognition of his joint ownership. On the son's attaining full age, he can sometimes compel a partition of the estate even against the consent of the parent; and, should the parent acquiesce, one son can always have a partition even against the will of the others. On such partition taking place, the father has no advantage over his children, except that he has two of the shares instead of one. The ancient law of the German tribes was exceedingly similar. The allod or domain of the family was the joint-property of the father and his sons. It does not, however, appear to have been habitually divided even at the death of the parent, and in the same way the possessions of a Hindoo, however divisible theoretically, are so rarely distributed in fact, that many generations constantly succeed each other without a partition taking place, and thus the Family in India has a perpetual tendency to expand into the Village Community, under conditions which I shall hereafter attempt to elucidate. All this points very clearly to the absolutely equal division of assets among the male children at death as the practice most usual135 with society at the period when family-dependency is in the first stages of disintegration. Here then emerges the historical difficulty of Primogeniture. The more clearly we perceive that, when the Feudal institutions were in process of formation, there was no source in the world whence they could derive their elements but the Roman law of the provincials on the one hand and the archaic customs of the barbarians on the other, the more are we perplexed at first sight by our knowledge that neither Roman nor barbarian was accustomed to give any preference to the eldest son or his line in the succession to property.

The mention of Primogeniture brings up one of the toughest issues in historical law. Although I haven't taken a moment to clarify my terms, you may have noticed that I've often referred to a number of "co-heirs" as being treated by Roman Succession Law the same as a single heir. In fact, there was never a time in Roman law when the position of the heir, or Universal Successor, couldn't be held by a group of co-heirs. This group acted as a single entity, and the assets were later divided among them in a separate legal process. When the succession was ab intestato, and the group consisted of the deceased's children, they each received an equal share of the property; even though males had some advantages over females at one point, there is no trace of Primogeniture. The method of distribution remained consistent throughout early legal systems. It appears that when civil society begins and families stop staying together over generations, the natural idea is to divide the estate equally among the members of each generation without granting any privilege to the eldest son or family line. Notable indications of the strong connection between this idea and primitive thinking can be found in systems even more ancient than Roman law. For example, among the Hindoos, the moment a son is born, he gains an immediate right to his father's property that cannot be sold without acknowledging his shared ownership. Once he comes of age, he can sometimes force a division of the estate even against the parent's wishes; and if the parent agrees, one son can always demand a partition even if the others disagree. In such a division, the father doesn’t gain any advantage over his children besides having two shares instead of one. The ancient law of the German tribes was very much alike. The allod or family estate was joint property of the father and his sons. However, it doesn’t seem to have been regularly divided even at the parent’s death, and similarly, the possessions of a Hindoo, although theoretically divisible, are rarely divided in practice, resulting in many generations succeeding each other without a partition. This leads to the family in India expanding into the Village Community, a point I’ll explain further later. All of this clearly indicates that the common practice when a father dies was an equal division of assets among male children at death during the early stages of family disintegration. This raises the historical challenge of Primogeniture. The clearer we see that, during the development of Feudal institutions, there was no source for their elements besides the Roman law of the provincials and the ancient customs of the barbarians, the more we are initially confused by the fact that neither Roman nor barbarian customs favored the eldest son or his line in property succession.

Primogeniture did not belong to the Customs which the barbarians practised on their first establishment within the Roman Empire. It is known to have had its origin in the benefices or beneficiary gifts of the invading chieftains. These benefices, which were occasionally conferred by the earlier immigrant kings, but were distributed on a great scale by Charlemagne, were grants of Roman provincial land to be holden by the beneficiary on condition of military service. The allodial proprietors do not seem to have followed their sovereign on distant or difficult enterprises, and all the grander expeditions of the Frankish chiefs and of Charlemagne were accomplished with forces composed of soldiers either personally dependent on the royal house or compelled to serve it by the tenure of their land. The benefices, however, were not at first in any sense hereditary. They were held at the pleasure of the grantor, or at most for the life of the grantee; but still, from the very outset, no effort seems to have been spared by the beneficiaries to enlarge the tenure, and to continue their lands in their family after death. Through the feebleness of Charlemagne's successors these attempts were universally successful, and the Benefice gradually transformed itself into the hereditary Fief. But, though the fiefs were hereditary, they did not necessarily descend to the eldest son. The rules of succession which they followed were entirely determined by the terms agreed upon between the grantor and the beneficiary, or imposed by one of them on the weakness of the other. The original tenures were therefore extremely various; not indeed so capriciously various as is sometimes asserted, for all which have hitherto been described present some combination of the modes of succession familiar to Romans and to barbarians, but still exceedingly miscel136laneous. In some of them, the eldest son and his stock undoubtedly succeeded to the fief before the others, but such successions, so far from being universal, do not even appear to have been general. Precisely the same phenomena recur during that more recent transmutation of European society which entirely substituted the feudal form of property for the domainial (or Roman) and the allodial (or German). The allods were wholly absorbed by the fiefs. The greater allodial proprietors transformed themselves into feudal lords by conditional alienations of portions of their land to dependants; the smaller sought an escape from the oppressions of that terrible time by surrendering their property to some powerful chieftain, and receiving it back at his hands on condition of service in his wars. Meantime, that vast mass of the population of Western Europe whose condition was servile or semi-servile—the Roman and German personal slaves, the Roman coloni and the German lidi—were concurrently absorbed by the feudal organisation, a few of them assuming a menial relation to the lords, but the greater part receiving land on terms which in those centuries were considered degrading. The tenures created during this era of universal infeudation were as various as the conditions which the tenants made with their new chiefs or were forced to accept from them. As in the case of the benefices, the succession to some, but by no means to all, of the estates followed the rule of Primogeniture. No sooner, however, has the feudal system prevailed throughout the West, than it becomes evident that Primogeniture has some great advantage over every other mode of succession. It spread over Europe with remarkable rapidity, the principal instrument of diffusion being Family Settlements, the Pactes de Famille of France and Haus-Gesetze of Germany, which universally stipulated that lands held by knightly service should descend to the eldest son. Ultimately the law resigned itself to follow inveterate practice, and we find that in all the bodies of Customary Law, which were gradually built up, the eldest son and stock are preferred in the succession to estates of which the tenure is free and military. As to lands held by servile tenures (and originally all tenures were servile which bound the tenant to pay money or bestow manual labour), the system of succession prescribed by custom differed greatly in different countries and different provinces. The more general rule was that such lands were137 divided equally at death among all the children, but still in some instances the eldest son was preferred, in some the youngest. But Primogeniture usually governed the inheritance of that class of estates, in some respects the most important of all, which were held by tenures that, like the English Socage, were of later origin than the rest, and were neither altogether free nor altogether servile.

Primogeniture wasn't part of the customs practiced by the barbarians when they first settled in the Roman Empire. It originated from the beneficiary gifts made by invading leaders. These gifts, sometimes given by earlier kings but mainly distributed by Charlemagne, involved grants of Roman provincial land given to recipients under the condition of military service. The allodial owners didn’t seem to follow their ruler on distant or challenging campaigns, and all the grand military endeavors of the Frankish leaders and Charlemagne were carried out with troops that were either directly tied to the royal family or obligated to serve due to their landholding. However, the benefices initially weren’t hereditary. They were granted at the discretion of the giver or, at most, for the lifetime of the recipient; nonetheless, the beneficiaries worked from the start to secure a longer tenure and keep the land within their families after death. Due to the weakness of Charlemagne's successors, these efforts were largely successful, and the benefice gradually evolved into an hereditary fief. Even though the fiefs became hereditary, they didn't necessarily go to the eldest son. The rules of succession were determined by the agreements between the grantor and the beneficiary, or by one party imposing their will on the other. Therefore, the original tenures were extremely diverse; they were not as randomly varied as is sometimes claimed, because they had combinations of succession methods familiar to both Romans and barbarians, but they were still quite miscellaneous. In some cases, the eldest son and his descendants definitely inherited the fief first, but such successions were far from universal and didn't even appear to be common. The same patterns emerged during the later transformation of European society that replaced the Roman and German systems of ownership with the feudal system. The allods were completely absorbed into the fiefs. The larger allodial landowners became feudal lords by conditionally giving parts of their land to dependents, while the smaller owners sought relief from the harsh conditions of that era by surrendering their property to powerful leaders and receiving it back under terms of military service. Meanwhile, a large segment of the population in Western Europe, who were in servile or semi-servile conditions—the Roman and German personal slaves, the Roman coloni, and the German lidi—were also incorporated into the feudal system, with some taking on a servile role under the lords, but most receiving land under terms that were considered degrading at the time. The tenures established during this period of widespread feudalism were as varied as the agreements made between the tenants and their new leaders. Like with the benefices, succession for some, but not all, estates followed the rule of Primogeniture. However, once the feudal system became dominant in the West, it became clear that Primogeniture had significant advantages over any other succession method. It spread quickly across Europe, primarily due to Family Settlements, the Pactes de Famille in France, and Haus-Gesetze in Germany, which stipulated that lands held through knightly service should be passed down to the eldest son. In the end, the law came to accept longstanding practices, and we see that in all the bodies of Customary Law that developed, the eldest son and his heirs were favored in the succession of estates with free and military tenure. For lands held under servile tenures (and originally, all tenures linked the tenant to paying money or performing labor), the rules of succession varied widely across countries and provinces. The general trend was that such lands were equally divided among all offspring at death, but in some cases, the eldest son had priority, and in others, the youngest did. Nonetheless, Primogeniture typically governed the inheritance of the most important estates, held under tenures like the English Socage, which were of more recent origin and were neither fully free nor completely servile.

The diffusion of Primogeniture is usually accounted for by assigning what are called Feudal reasons for it. It is asserted that the feudal superior had a better security for the military service he required when the fief descended to a single person, instead of being distributed among a number on the decease of the last holder. Without denying that this consideration may partially explain the favour gradually acquired by Primogeniture, I must point out that Primogeniture became a custom of Europe much more through its popularity with the tenants than through any advantage it conferred on the lords. For its origin, moreover, the reason given does not account at all. Nothing in law springs entirely from a sense of convenience. There are always certain ideas existing antecedently on which the sense of convenience works, and of which it can do no more than form some new combination; and to find these ideas in the present case is exactly the problem.

The spread of Primogeniture is usually explained by what's referred to as Feudal reasons. It's claimed that a feudal lord had better assurance of the military service he required when the fief passed down to one person, rather than being divided among several when the last holder died. While I don't deny that this factor may help explain the growing preference for Primogeniture, I must emphasize that it became a custom in Europe primarily due to its appeal to tenants rather than any benefits it provided to the lords. Additionally, the reason given does not adequately explain its origin. No law arises solely from a sense of convenience. There are always certain ideas that exist beforehand on which the sense of convenience operates, and it can only create some new combination from those ideas; identifying these ideas in this case is the real challenge.

A valuable hint is furnished to us from a quarter fruitful of such indications. Although in India the possessions of a parent are divisible at his death, and may be divisible during his life, among all his male children in equal shares, and though this principle of the equal distribution of property extends to every part of the Hindoo institutions, yet wherever public office or political power devolves at the decease of the last Incumbent, the succession is nearly universally according to the rules of Primogeniture. Sovereignties descend therefore to the eldest son, and where the affairs of the Village Community, the corporate unit of Hindoo society, are confided to a single manager, it is generally the eldest son who takes up the administration at his parent's death. All offices, indeed, in India, tend to become hereditary, and, when their nature permits it, to vest in the eldest member of the oldest stock. Comparing these Indian successions with some of the ruder social organisations which have survived in Europe almost to our own day, the conclusion suggests itself that, when Patriarchal power is not only domestic but political, it is not138 distributed among all the issue at the parent's death, but is the birthright of the eldest son. The chieftainship of a Highland clan, for example, followed the order of Primogeniture. There seems, in truth, to be a form of family-dependency still more archaic than any of those which we know from the primitive records of organised civil societies. The Agnatic Union of the kindred in ancient Roman law, and a multitude of similar indications, point to a period at which all the ramifying branches of the family tree held together in one organic whole; and it is no presumptuous conjecture, that, when the corporation thus formed by the kindred was in itself an independent society, it was governed by the eldest male of the oldest line. It is true that we have no actual knowledge of any such society. Even in the most elementary communities, family-organisations, as we know them, are at most imperia in imperio. But the position of some of them, of the Celtic clans in particular, was sufficiently near independence within historical times to force on us the conviction that they were once separate imperia, and that Primogeniture regulated the succession to the chieftainship. It is, however, necessary to be on our guard against modern associations with the term of law. We are speaking of a family-connection still closer and more stringent than any with which we are made acquainted by Hindoo society or ancient Roman law. If the Roman Paterfamilias was visibly steward of the family possessions, if the Hindoo father is only joint-sharer with his sons, still more emphatically must the true patriarchal chieftain be merely the administrator of a common fund.

A valuable insight comes from a source rich in such observations. In India, while a parent's assets can be divided upon their death and may even be divided during their lifetime among all their male children equally, this principle of equal distribution of property applies throughout Hindoo traditions. However, when public office or political power passes on after the last holder's death, the succession almost always follows the rules of Primogeniture. Therefore, sovereignty typically goes to the eldest son. In cases where the affairs of the Village Community—the fundamental unit of Hindoo society—are managed by a single leader, it is usually the eldest son who assumes the role after the parent's death. In fact, most positions in India tend to become hereditary and, when possible, are held by the eldest member of the oldest lineage. Comparing these Indian successions to some of the simpler social structures that have persisted in Europe almost to the present day, it becomes clear that when Patriarchal power is both domestic and political, it is not distributed among all the offspring at the parent's death, but is the birthright of the eldest son. For example, the leadership of a Highland clan followed the order of Primogeniture. There appears to be a form of family dependency that is even more primitive than any recorded in the early histories of organized civil societies. The Agnatic Union of kin in ancient Roman law and numerous similar signs indicate a time when all the branching parts of the family tree functioned as a cohesive whole; it is a plausible assumption that when the group formed by the kin acted as an independent entity, it was led by the eldest male from the oldest line. It is true that we do not have concrete evidence of such societies. Even in the most basic communities, family organizations, as we know them, are at most imperia in imperio. However, the status of some of these groups, particularly the Celtic clans, was close enough to independence in historical times to lead us to believe they were once separate imperia, with Primogeniture governing succession to leadership. That said, we must be cautious about modern interpretations of legal terms. We are talking about a family connection that is even closer and more binding than any found in Hindoo society or ancient Roman law. While the Roman Paterfamilias was the visible steward of family property, and the Hindoo father is merely a joint-sharer with his sons, the true patriarchal leader is fundamentally just the caretaker of a shared resource.

The examples of succession by Primogeniture which were found among the Benefices may, therefore, have been imitated from a system of family-government known to the invading races, though not in general use. Some ruder tribes may have still practised it, or, what is still more probable, society may have been so slightly removed from its more archaic condition that the minds of some men spontaneously recurred to it, when they were called upon to settle the rules of inheritance for a new form of property. But there is still the question, Why did Primogeniture gradually supersede every other principle of succession? The answer, I think, is, that European society decidedly retrograded during the dissolution of the Carlovingian empire. It sank a point or two back even from the miserably low degree which it had marked during the139 early barbarian monarchies. The great characteristic of the period was the feebleness, or rather the abeyance, of kingly and therefore of civil authority; and hence it seems as if, civil society no longer cohering, men universally flung themselves back on a social organisation older than the beginnings of civil communities. The lord with his vassals, during the ninth and tenth centuries, may be considered as a patriarchal household, recruited, not as in the primitive times by Adoption, but by Infeudation; and to such a confederacy, succession by Primogeniture was a source of strength and durability. So long as the land was kept together on which the entire organisation rested, it was powerful for defence and attack; to divide the land was to divide the little society, and voluntarily to invite aggression in an era of universal violence. We may be perfectly certain that into this preference for Primogeniture there entered no idea of disinheriting the bulk of the children in favour of one. Everybody would have suffered by the division of the fief. Everybody was a gainer by its consolidation. The Family grew stronger by the concentration of power in the same hands; nor is it likely that the lord who was invested with the inheritance had any advantage over his brethren and kinsfolk in occupations, interests, or indulgences. It would be a singular anachronism to estimate the privileges succeeded to by the heir of a fief, by the situation in which the eldest son is placed under an English strict settlement.

The examples of succession by primogeniture found among the benefices may have been influenced by a system of family governance known to the invading groups, even if it wasn't commonly practiced. Some more primitive tribes might still have used it, or it's even more likely that society was so slightly evolved from its ancient state that some individuals naturally referred back to it when establishing inheritance rules for new types of property. However, there remains the question: why did primogeniture gradually replace every other principle of succession? I believe the answer lies in the fact that European society significantly regressed during the breakdown of the Carolingian Empire. It slipped back a point or two from the already low level it had reached during the early barbarian monarchies. The standout feature of this period was the weakness—or rather, the absence—of royal and civil authority; thus, it appears that, as civil society fell apart, people turned back to a social structure that was older than the formation of civil communities. The lord alongside his vassals, during the ninth and tenth centuries, can be seen as a patriarchal household, formed not as in primitive times by adoption, but by feudal bonds; and within such a confederation, succession by primogeniture was a source of strength and stability. As long as the land that supported this entire structure remained unified, it was effective for both defense and offense; dividing the land meant dividing the small community and willingly inviting attack in a time of widespread violence. We can be quite sure that the preference for primogeniture did not stem from a desire to disinherit most children in favor of one. Everyone would have suffered from the division of the fief, while consolidation was beneficial for all. The family became stronger through the concentration of power in the same hands; it's unlikely that the lord who inherited had any advantages over his siblings and relatives in matters of work, interests, or pleasures. It would be a peculiar anachronism to compare the privileges inherited by the heir of a fief to the situation of the eldest son under an English strict settlement.

I have said that I regard the early feudal confederacies as descended from an archaic form of the Family, and as wearing a strong resemblance to it. But then in the ancient world, and in the societies which have not passed through the crucible of feudalism, the Primogeniture which seems to have prevailed never transformed itself into the Primogeniture of the later feudal Europe. When the group of kinsmen ceased to be governed through a series of generations by a hereditary chief, the domain which had been managed for all appears to have been equally divided among all. Why did this not occur in the feudal world? If during the confusions of the first feudal period the eldest son held the land for the behoof of the whole family, why was it that when feudal Europe had consolidated itself, and regular communities were again established, the whole family did not resume that capacity for equal inheritance which had belonged to Roman and German alike? The140 key which unlocks this difficulty has rarely been seized by the writers who occupy themselves in tracing the genealogy of Feudalism. They perceive the materials of the feudal institutions, but they miss the cement. The ideas and social forms which contributed to the formation of the system were unquestionably barbarian and archaic, but, as soon as Courts and lawyers were called in to interpret and define it, the principles of interpretation which they applied to it were those of the latest Roman jurisprudence, and were therefore excessively refined and matured. In a patriarchally governed society, the eldest son may succeed to the government of the Agnatic group, and to the absolute disposal of its property. But he is not therefore a true proprietor. He has correlative duties not involved in the conception of proprietorship, but quite undefined and quite incapable of definition. The later Roman jurisprudence, however, like our own law, looked upon uncontrolled power over property as equivalent to ownership, and did not, and, in fact, could not, take notice of liabilities of such a kind, that the very conception of them belonged to a period anterior to regular law. The contact of the refined and the barbarous notion had inevitably for its effect the conversion of the eldest son into legal proprietor of the inheritance. The clerical and secular lawyers so defined his position from the first; but it was only by insensible degrees that the younger brother, from participating on equal terms in all the dangers and enjoyments of his kinsman, sank into the priest, the soldier of fortune, or the hanger-on of the mansion. The legal revolution was identical with that which occurred on a smaller scale, and in quite recent times, through the greater part of the Highlands of Scotland. When called in to determine the legal powers of the chieftain over the domains which gave sustenance to the clan, Scottish jurisprudence had long since passed the point at which it could take notice of the vague limitations on completeness of dominion imposed by the claims of the clansmen, and it was inevitable therefore that it should convert the patrimony of many into the estate of one.

I’ve said that I see the early feudal confederacies as coming from a very old version of the Family and looking quite similar to it. However, in the ancient world and in societies that didn’t go through feudalism, the Primogeniture that seems to have existed never turned into the Primogeniture of later feudal Europe. When the group of relatives stopped being led by a hereditary chief over generations, the land that had been managed for everyone was divided equally among all. Why didn’t this happen in the feudal world? If, during the chaos of the first feudal period, the eldest son held the land for the whole family, why didn’t the whole family regain their ability to inherit equally when feudal Europe became more stable and regular communities were reestablished, just like the Romans and Germans had? The140 answer to this question is something that writers tracing the genealogy of Feudalism often overlook. They see the basic elements of feudal institutions, but they miss how they were held together. The ideas and social structures that helped create the system were certainly primitive and old-fashioned, but as soon as Courts and lawyers were involved to interpret and define it, the principles they used were the latest Roman legal ideas, which were very sophisticated and developed. In a patriarchal society, the eldest son may take over the leadership of the Agnatic group and have complete control over its property. But that doesn't mean he is a true owner. He has responsibilities that don't fit into the idea of ownership, which are not clearly defined and can't easily be defined. Later Roman law, like our own, viewed unchecked control over property as equivalent to ownership and didn’t, and in fact couldn’t, recognize responsibilities of such a kind, as these concepts belonged to a time before formal law. The mixture of sophisticated and primitive ideas inevitably led to the eldest son being seen as the legal owner of the inheritance. Both clerical and secular lawyers defined his role this way from the start; however, it was only gradually that the younger brother, who had shared in all the risks and rewards of his relative, slipped into the roles of priest, mercenary, or dependent of the household. The legal shift was similar to what happened more recently across much of the Scottish Highlands. When asked to clarify the legal powers of the chieftain over the land that supported the clan, Scottish law had long passed the stage where it could recognize any vague limits on ownership imposed by the claims of the clansmen, making it unavoidable that the common inheritance of many would turn into the estate of one.

For the sake of simplicity I have called the mode of succession Primogeniture whenever a single son or descendant succeeds to the authority over a household or society. It is remarkable, however, that in the few very ancient examples which remain to us of this sort of succession, it is not always141 the eldest son, in the sense familiar to us, who takes up the representation. The form of Primogeniture which has spread over Western Europe has also been perpetuated among the Hindoos, and there is every reason to believe that it is the normal form. Under it, not only the eldest son, but the eldest line is always preferred. If the eldest son fails, his eldest son has precedence not only over brothers but over uncles; and, if he too fails, the same rule is followed in the next generation. But when the succession is not merely to civil but to political power, a difficulty may present itself which will appear of greater magnitude according as the cohesion of society is less perfect. The chieftain who last exercised authority may have outlived his eldest son, and the grandson who is primarily entitled to succeed may be too young and immature to undertake the actual guidance of the community, and the administration of its affairs. In such an event, the expedient which suggests itself to the more settled societies is to place the infant heir under guardianship till he reaches the age of fitness for government. The guardianship is generally that of the male Agnates; but it is remarkable that the contingency supposed is one of the rare cases in which ancient societies have consented to the exercise of power by women, doubtless out of respect to the overshadowing claims of the mother. In India, the widow of a Hindoo sovereign governs in the name of her infant son, and we cannot but remember that the custom regulating succession to the throne of France—which, whatever be its origin, is doubtless of the highest antiquity—preferred the queen-mother to all other claimants for the Regency, at the same time that it rigorously excluded all females from the throne. There is, however, another mode of obviating the inconvenience attending the devolution of sovereignty on an infant heir, and it is one which would doubtless occur spontaneously to rudely organised communities. This is to set aside the infant heir altogether, and confer the chieftainship on the eldest surviving male of the first generation. The Celtic clan-associations, among the many phenomena which they have preserved of an age in which civil and political society were not yet even rudimentarily separated, have brought down this rule of succession to historical times. With them, it seems to have existed in the form of a positive canon, that, failing the eldest son, his next brother succeeds in priority to all grandsons, whatever142 be their age at the moment when the sovereignty devolves. Some writers have explained the principle by assuming that the Celtic customs took the last chieftain as a sort of root or stock, and then gave the succession to the descendant who should be least remote from him; the uncle thus being preferred to the grandson as being nearer to the common root. No objection can be taken to this statement if it be merely intended as a description of the system of succession; but it would be a serious error to conceive the men who first adopted the rule as applying a course of reasoning which evidently dates from the time when feudal schemes of succession begun to be debated among lawyers. The true origin of the preference of the uncle to the grandson is doubtless a simple calculation on the part of rude men in a rude society that it is better to be governed by a grown chieftain than by a child, and that the younger son is more likely to have come to maturity than any of the eldest son's descendants. At the same time, we have some evidence that the form of Primogeniture with which we are best acquainted is the primary form, in the tradition that the assent of the clan was asked when an infant heir was passed over in favour of his uncle. There is a tolerably well authenticated instance of this ceremony in the annals of the Macdonalds.

For simplicity, I call the method of succession Primogeniture whenever a single son or descendant inherits control over a household or society. However, it's interesting to note that in the few very ancient examples we have of this type of succession, it's not always the eldest son, as we understand it today, who assumes the role. The form of Primogeniture that has spread across Western Europe has also been maintained among the Hindus, and it's reasonable to believe that this is the standard practice. Under this system, not just the eldest son, but the eldest line is always preferred. If the oldest son is not available, his eldest son takes precedence over brothers and uncles; if he also cannot take up the role, the same rule continues to the next generation. However, when the succession involves not just civil but also political authority, challenges can arise that become more significant as the cohesion of society lessens. The last leader may have outlived his eldest son, and the grandson who is first in line may be too young and inexperienced to actually lead the community and manage its affairs. In such cases, more settled societies often choose to appoint a guardian for the young heir until he reaches an age suitable for governance. Guardianship is typically assigned to male Agnates, but it's notable that the scenario described is one of the few instances in which ancient societies have allowed women to hold power, likely out of respect for the mother's significant role. In India, the widow of a Hindu king rules in her infant son's name, and we remember that the custom governing succession to the French throne—which, regardless of its origins, undoubtedly has ancient roots—preferred the queen mother to all other candidates for regency while firmly excluding all females from the throne. However, there’s another way to manage the issue of an infant heir taking over sovereignty, which would likely occur naturally in loosely structured communities. This method is to completely ignore the infant heir and give chieftainship to the eldest surviving male from the first generation. The Celtic clan associations, which have preserved many traits from a time when civil and political society were not yet distinctly separated, maintained this rule of succession into historical times. With them, it seems to have been a clear mandate that if the eldest son was not available, his next brother would succeed over all grandsons, regardless of their age when sovereignty passed. Some writers have explained this principle by suggesting that Celtic customs viewed the last chieftain as a sort of root or stock, passing succession to the descendant who was least removed from him; hence, the uncle was favored over the grandson due to being closer to the original root. This explanation can be accepted if understood as a description of the succession system; however, it would be a mistake to think that these early adopters of the rule used reasoning that clearly emerged when feudal succession debates surfaced among lawyers. The real reason behind the preference for the uncle over the grandson likely comes down to a basic understanding by primitive individuals in a primitive society that it is better to be led by an adult chieftain than by a child and that the younger son is much more likely to have reached maturity than any offspring of the eldest son. At the same time, we have some evidence that the form of Primogeniture we're most familiar with is indeed the oldest form, as tradition dictates that clan approval was sought when an infant heir was overlooked in favor of his uncle. There is a well-documented instance of this ceremony in the history of the Macdonalds.

Under Mahometan law, which has probably preserved an ancient Arabian custom, inheritances of property are divided equally among sons, the daughters taking a half share; but if any of the children die before the division of the inheritance, leaving issue behind, these grandchildren are entirely excluded by their uncles and aunts. Consistently with this principle, the succession, when political authority devolves, is according to the form of Primogeniture which appears to have obtained among the Celtic societies. In the two great Mahometan families of the West, the rule is believed to be, that the uncle succeeds to the throne in preference to the nephew, though the latter be the son of an elder brother; but though this rule has been followed quite recently in Egypt, I am informed that there is some doubt as to its governing the devolution of the Turkish sovereignty. The policy of the Sultans has in fact hitherto prevented cases for its application from occurring, and it is possible that their wholesale massacres of their younger brothers may have been perpetuated quite as much in the interest of their children as for the sake of143 making away with dangerous competitors for the throne. It is evident, however, that in polygamous societies the form of Primogeniture will always tend to vary. Many considerations may constitute a claim on the succession, the rank of the mother, for example, or her degree in the affections of the father. Accordingly, some of the Indian Mahometan sovereigns, without pretending to any distinct testamentary power, claim the right of nominating the son who is to succeed. The blessing mentioned in the Scriptural history of Isaac and his sons has sometimes been spoken of as a will, but it seems rather to have been a mode of naming an eldest son.144

Under Muslim law, which likely reflects an ancient Arabian custom, inheritances of property are divided equally among sons, while daughters receive half. However, if any of the children die before the inheritance is divided, leaving behind children, those grandchildren are completely excluded by their uncles and aunts. In line with this principle, succession when political power passes is based on the form of Primogeniture, which seems to have been practiced among Celtic societies. In the two major Muslim families of the West, it is thought that the uncle inherits the throne before the nephew, even if the nephew is the son of an older brother; although this rule has been recently followed in Egypt, I have been told there is some uncertainty about its application to the transmission of Turkish sovereignty. The policy of the Sultans has, in fact, so far prevented situations that would require its application, and it’s possible that their systematic killings of younger brothers have been motivated as much by protecting their children’s interests as eliminating potential rivals for the throne. It is clear, however, that in polygamous societies, the form of Primogeniture will always tend to change. Various factors can influence a claim to the succession, such as the mother's status or her level of affection from the father. Consequently, some Indian Muslim rulers, without claiming any explicit will-making authority, assert the right to choose which son will succeed them. The *blessing* referenced in the biblical story of Isaac and his sons has sometimes been described as a will, but it seems to have functioned more as a way of identifying the eldest son.144


CHAPTER VIII

the history of property

The Roman Institutional Treatises, after giving their definition of the various forms and modifications of ownership, proceed to discuss the Natural Modes of Acquiring Property. Those who are unfamiliar with the history of jurisprudence are not likely to look upon these "natural modes" of acquisition as possessing, at first sight, either much speculative or much practical interest. The wild animal which is snared or killed by the hunter, the soil which is added to our field by the imperceptible deposits of a river, the tree which strikes its roots into our ground, are each said by the Roman lawyers to be acquired by us naturally. The older jurisconsults had doubtless observed that such acquisitions were universally sanctioned by the usages of the little societies around them, and thus the lawyers of a later age, finding them classed in the ancient Jus Gentium, and perceiving them to be of the simplest description, allotted them a place among the ordinances of Nature. The dignity with which they were invested has gone on increasing in modern times till it is quite out of proportion to their original importance. Theory has made them its favourite food, and has enabled them to exercise the most serious influence on practice.

The Roman Institutional Treatises, after defining the different types and changes in ownership, go on to talk about the Natural Ways of Acquiring Property. Those who aren’t familiar with the history of law are unlikely to find these "natural ways" of acquiring anything particularly interesting, either theoretically or practically, at first glance. A wild animal that is caught or killed by a hunter, the land that is added to our field through the gradual deposits of a river, and a tree whose roots extend into our ground are all said by Roman lawyers to be acquired by us naturally. The earlier legal experts likely noticed that such acquisitions were universally accepted by the customs of the small societies around them, leading later lawyers to categorize them in the ancient Jus Gentium and recognize them as some of the most basic forms of acquisition, giving them a place among Nature’s rules. The respect given to these concepts has only grown over time, far exceeding their initial significance. Theory has taken them as its favorite subject, allowing them to have a significant impact on practical applications.

It will be necessary for us to attend to one only among these "natural modes of acquisition," Occupatio or Occupancy. Occupancy is the advisedly taking possession of that which at the moment is the property of no man, with the view (adds the technical definition) of acquiring property in it for yourself. The objects which the Roman lawyers called res nullius—things which have not or have never had an owner—can only be ascertained by enumerating them. Among things which never had an owner are wild animals, fishes, wild fowl, jewels disinterred for the first time, and lands newly discovered or never before cultivated. Among things which have not an owner are moveables which have been abandoned, lands which have been deserted, and (an anomalous but most145 formidable item) the property of an enemy. In all these objects the full rights of dominion were acquired by the Occupant who first took possession of them with the intention of keeping them as his own—an intention which, in certain cases, had to be manifested by specific acts. It is not difficult, I think, to understand the universality which caused the practice of Occupancy to be placed by one generation of Roman lawyers in the Law common to all Nations, and the simplicity which occasioned its being attributed by another to the Law of Nature. But for its fortunes in modern legal history we are less prepared by à priori considerations. The Roman principle of Occupancy, and the rules into which the jurisconsults expanded it, are the source of all modern International Law on the subject of Capture in War and of the acquisition of sovereign rights in newly discovered countries. They have also supplied a theory of the Origin of Property, which is at once the popular theory, and the theory which, in one form or another, is acquiesced in by the great majority of speculative jurists.

We need to focus on just one of these "natural modes of acquisition": Occupatio or Occupancy. Occupancy involves deliberately taking possession of something that currently belongs to no one, with the intention of acquiring it for yourself. The items the Roman lawyers referred to as res nullius—things that have never had an owner—can only be identified by listing them. Things that never had an owner include wild animals, fish, birds, newly discovered jewels, and lands that have never been cultivated. Things without an owner include abandoned items, deserted lands, and (an unusual but significant exception) the property of an enemy. In all these cases, full ownership rights were obtained by the Occupant who first took possession with the intention of claiming them as their own—an intention that, in some cases, had to be demonstrated through specific actions. It’s not hard to see why the practice of Occupancy was placed by one generation of Roman lawyers in the Law common to all Nations, and why another generation viewed it as part of the Law of Nature. However, we are less prepared to address its evolution in modern legal history based on à priori considerations. The Roman principle of Occupancy and the rules that the legal experts expanded upon serve as the foundation for all modern International Law regarding the capture of goods in war and the acquisition of sovereign rights in newly discovered territories. They have also provided a theory for the Origin of Property, which is both a popular belief and one that most speculative jurists accept in various forms.

I have said that the Roman principle of Occupancy has determined the tenor of that chapter of International Law which is concerned with Capture in War. The Law of Warlike Capture derives its rules from the assumption that communities are remitted to a state of nature by the outbreak of hostilities, and that, in the artificial natural condition thus produced, the institution of private property falls into abeyance so far as concerns the belligerents. As the later writers on the Law of Nature have always been anxious to maintain that private property was in some sense sanctioned by the system which they were expounding, the hypothesis that an enemy's property is res nullius has seemed to them perverse and shocking, and they are careful to stigmatise it as a mere fiction of jurisprudence. But, as soon as the Law of Nature is traced to its source in the Jus Gentium, we see at once how the goods of an enemy came to be looked upon as nobody's property, and therefore as capable of being acquired by the first occupant. The idea would occur spontaneously to persons practising the ancient forms of Warfare, when victory dissolved the organisation of the conquering army and dismissed the soldiers to indiscriminate plunder. It is probable, however, that originally it was only moveable property which was thus permitted to be acquired146 by the Captor. We know on independent authority that a very different rule prevailed in ancient Italy as to the acquisition of ownership in the soil of a conquered country, and we may therefore suspect that the application of the principle of occupancy to land (always a matter of difficulty) dates from the period when the Jus Gentium was becoming the Code of Nature, and that it is the result of a generalisation effected by the jurisconsults of the golden age. Their dogmas on the point are preserved in the Pandects of Justinian, and amount to an unqualified assertion that enemy's property of every sort is res nullius to the other belligerent, and that Occupancy, by which the Captor makes them his own, is an institution of Natural Law. The rules which International jurisprudence derives from these positions have sometimes been stigmatised as needlessly indulgent to the ferocity and cupidity of combatants, but the charge has been made, I think, by persons who are unacquainted with the history of wars, and who are consequently ignorant how great an exploit it is to command obedience for a rule of any kind. The Roman principle of Occupancy, when it was admitted into the modern law of Capture in War, drew with it a number of subordinate canons, limiting and giving precision to its operation, and if the contests which have been waged since the treatise of Grotius became an authority, are compared with those of an earlier date, it will be seen that, as soon as the Roman maxims were received, Warfare instantly assumed a more tolerable complexion. If the Roman law of Occupancy is to be taxed with having had pernicious influence on any part of the modern Law of Nations, there is another chapter in it which may be said, with some reason, to have been injuriously affected. In applying to the discovery of new countries the same principles which the Romans had applied to the finding of a jewel, the Publicists forced into their service a doctrine altogether unequal to the task expected from it. Elevated into extreme importance by the discoveries of the great navigators of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, it raised more disputes than it solved. The greatest uncertainty was very shortly found to exist on the very two points on which certainty was most required, the extent of the territory which was acquired for his sovereign by the discoverer, and the nature of the acts which were necessary to complete the adprehensio or assumption of sovereign possession. Moreover,147 the principle itself, conferring as it did such enormous advantages as the consequence of a piece of good luck, was instinctively mutinied against by some of the most adventurous nations in Europe, the Dutch, the English, and the Portuguese. Our own countrymen, without expressly denying the rule of International Law, never did, in practice, admit the claim of the Spaniards to engross the whole of America south of the Gulf of Mexico, or that of the King of France to monopolise the valleys of the Ohio and the Mississippi. From the accession of Elizabeth to the accession of Charles the Second, it cannot be said that there was at any time thorough peace in the American waters, and the encroachments of the New England Colonists on the territory of the French King continued for almost a century longer. Bentham was so struck with the confusion attending the application of the legal principle, that he went out of his way to eulogise the famous Bull of Pope Alexander the Sixth, dividing the undiscovered countries of the world between the Spaniards and Portuguese by a line drawn one hundred leagues West of the Azores; and, grotesque as his praises may appear at first sight, it may be doubted whether the arrangement of Pope Alexander is absurder in principle than the rule of Public law, which gave half a continent to the monarch whose servants had fulfilled the conditions required by Roman jurisprudence for the acquisition of property in a valuable object which could be covered by the hand.

I’ve mentioned that the Roman principle of Occupancy has shaped the section of International Law related to Capture in War. The Law of Warlike Capture derives its rules from the idea that communities revert to a state of nature when hostilities begin, and in this artificial natural state, private property is largely disregarded concerning the warring parties. Later writers on the Law of Nature have always tried to uphold that private property is, in some form, sanctioned by the system they discussed, which is why the notion that an enemy's property is res nullius appeared perverse and shocking to them, leading them to dismiss it as mere legal fiction. However, once we trace the Law of Nature back to its roots in the Jus Gentium, we understand how enemy goods came to be seen as nobody’s property, hence capable of being taken by the first person who occupies them. This idea would come naturally to those engaging in ancient warfare, where victory would break down the structure of the winning army and release soldiers to loot indiscriminately. Initially, it’s likely that only movable property was allowed to be seized by the Captor. We know from independent sources that a very different rule existed in ancient Italy regarding ownership of the land in a conquered territory, leading us to suspect that applying the principle of occupancy to land—a complex issue—dates from when the Jus Gentium began evolving into the Code of Nature, resulting from generalizations made by the legal scholars of the golden age. Their principles on this matter are preserved in the Pandects of Justinian, asserting unequivocally that enemy property of all kinds is res nullius to the other belligerent, and that Occupancy, through which the Captor claims it, is a principle of Natural Law. Some have criticized the rules derived from these principles as overly lenient toward the brutality and greed of combatants, but this criticism likely comes from those unaware of wartime history and the challenges of enforcing any rule. The Roman principle of Occupancy, once incorporated into modern law on Capture in War, brought with it several subordinate guidelines that defined and limited its application. A comparison of the conflicts occurring since Grotius' treatise became authoritative with those from earlier times shows that warfare took on a more civilized nature once the Roman principles were adopted. If the Roman law of Occupancy is to be criticized for negatively impacting any aspect of modern International Law, another area can be reasonably said to have suffered harm. By applying the same principles to the discovery of new lands that the Romans used when finding a jewel, publicists created a doctrine that was completely inadequate for the challenges it faced. This principle gained significant importance due to the discoveries made by great navigators in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, leading to more disputes than resolutions. The greatest uncertainty quickly arose on two critical points: the extent of territory acquired for the discoverer’s sovereign, and the actions necessary to finalize the adprehensio or claim of sovereign possession. Moreover,147 the principle itself, offering massive advantages from a stroke of luck, was instinctively resisted by some of the most daring nations in Europe, including the Dutch, the English, and the Portuguese. Our own countrymen, without expressly denying the rule of International Law, consistently resisted the Spanish claim to monopolize all of America south of the Gulf of Mexico, or the French King’s claim to dominate the Ohio and Mississippi valleys. From Elizabeth’s accession to Charles the Second's, there was never a time of complete peace in American waters, and the encroachments of the New England Colonists on French territory continued for nearly another century. Bentham was so struck by the chaos surrounding the application of this legal principle that he took the time to praise the famous Papal Bull of Pope Alexander the Sixth, which divided the undiscovered territories of the world between the Spaniards and Portuguese with a line drawn one hundred leagues west of the Azores; and, although his praise might seem strange at first glance, it could be argued that Pope Alexander’s arrangement isn’t any more absurd in principle than the public law that awarded half a continent to the monarch whose servants met the Roman legal conditions for claiming ownership of a valuable object that could be covered by the hand.

To all who pursue the inquiries which are the subject of this volume, Occupancy is pre-eminently interesting on the score of the service it has been made to perform for speculative jurisprudence, in furnishing a supposed explanation of the origin of private property. It was once universally believed that the proceeding implied in Occupancy was identical with the process by which the earth and its fruits, which were at first in common, became the allowed property of individuals. The course of thought which led to this assumption is not difficult to understand, if we seize the shade of difference which separates the ancient from the modern conception of Natural Law. The Roman lawyers had laid down that Occupancy was one of the Natural modes of acquiring property, and they undoubtedly believed that, were mankind living under the institutions of Nature, Occupancy would be one of their practices. How far they persuaded themselves148 that such a condition of the race had ever existed, is a point, as I have already stated, which their language leaves in much uncertainty; but they certainly do seem to have made the conjecture, which has at all times possessed much plausibility, that the institution of property was not so old as the existence of mankind. Modern jurisprudence, accepting all their dogmas without reservation, went far beyond them in the eager curiosity with which it dwelt on the supposed state of Nature. Since then it had received the position that the earth and its fruits were once res nullius, and since its peculiar view of Nature led it to assume without hesitation that the human race had actually practised the Occupancy of res nullius long before the organisation of civil societies, the inference immediately suggested itself that Occupancy was the process by which the "no man's goods" of the primitive world became the private property of individuals in the world of history. It would be wearisome to enumerate the jurists who have subscribed to this theory in one shape or another, and it is the less necessary to attempt it because Blackstone, who is always a faithful index of the average opinions of his day, has summed them up in his 2nd book and 1st chapter.

To everyone who is exploring the topics covered in this book, Occupancy is particularly interesting because of the role it plays in speculative law, providing a supposed explanation for the origin of private property. It was once widely believed that the process involved in Occupancy was the same as the way that the earth and its resources, originally shared, became recognized as individual property. The line of thought that led to this belief is easy to follow if we understand the subtle differences between ancient and modern ideas of Natural Law. Roman lawyers stated that Occupancy was a Natural way to acquire property, and they clearly believed that if humanity were living under Natural institutions, Occupancy would be a practice they would follow. How far they genuinely believed that such a state of society ever existed is unclear, as their language leaves much in doubt. However, they did seem to have speculated—an idea that has always seemed plausible—that the concept of property was not as old as humankind itself. Modern law accepted all their principles without question and went further in its intense curiosity about the supposed state of Nature. It concluded that the earth and its resources were once res nullius, and because its particular view of Nature led it to assume that humans had actually engaged in the Occupancy of res nullius long before civil societies were formed, it naturally followed that Occupancy was the process by which the "no one's goods" of the primitive world turned into private property in the historical world. It would be tedious to list all the legal scholars who have supported this theory in various forms, and there is less need to do so since Blackstone, who is always a reliable reflection of the common opinions of his time, summarized them in his second book and first chapter.

"The earth," he writes, "and all things therein were the general property of mankind from the immediate gift of the Creator. Not that the communion of goods seems ever to have been applicable, even in the earliest ages, to aught but the substance of the thing; nor could be extended to the use of it. For, by the law of nature and reason he who first began to use it acquired therein a kind of transient property that lasted so long as he was using it, and no longer; or to speak with greater precision, the right of possession continued for the same time only that the act of possession lasted. Thus the ground was in common, and no part was the permanent property of any man in particular; yet whoever was in the occupation of any determined spot of it, for rest, for shade, or the like, acquired for the time a sort of ownership, from which it would have been unjust and contrary to the law of nature to have driven him by force, but the instant that he quitted the use of occupation of it, another might seize it without injustice." He then proceeds to argue that "when mankind increased in number, it became necessary to entertain conceptions of more permanent dominion, and149 to appropriate to individuals not the immediate use only, but the very substance of the thing to be used."

"The earth," he writes, "and everything on it were originally the shared property of all humanity, given directly by the Creator. It's not that the idea of shared goods ever really applied, even in the earliest times, to anything beyond the physical substance of the item; it couldn't extend to its use. According to natural law and reason, whoever first began to use something gained a kind of temporary ownership that lasted only as long as they were using it; or more precisely, the right to possess something lasted only for the duration of the act of possession. So the land was common, and no specific part belonged permanently to any individual; however, whoever occupied a specific spot for rest, shade, or something similar, gained a temporary sort of ownership, which it would have been unjust, and against natural law, to take away by force. But the moment they stopped using or occupying it, someone else could take it without wrongdoing." He then goes on to argue that "as humanity grew in number, it became necessary to consider ideas of more permanent ownership, and to assign not just immediate use to individuals, but the very substance of what was being used."

Some ambiguities of expression in this passage lead to the suspicion that Blackstone did not quite understand the meaning of the proposition which he found in his authorities, that property in the earth's surface was first acquired, under the law of Nature, by the occupant; but the limitation which designedly or through misapprehension he has imposed on the theory brings it into a form which it has not infrequently assumed. Many writers more famous than Blackstone for precision of language have laid down that, in the beginning of things, Occupancy first gave a right against the world to an exclusive but temporary enjoyment, and that afterwards this right, while it remained exclusive, became perpetual. Their object in so stating their theory was to reconcile the doctrine that in the state of Nature res nullius became property through Occupancy, with the inference which they drew from the Scriptural history that the Patriarchs did not at first permanently appropriate the soil which had been grazed over by their flocks and herds.

Some unclear wording in this passage raises doubts about whether Blackstone fully grasped the meaning of the concept he found in his sources, that property on the earth's surface was initially acquired, according to Natural Law, by the occupant; however, the limitation he intentionally or mistakenly applied to the theory puts it into a form that it has often taken. Many writers who are more renowned than Blackstone for their precise language have asserted that, at the beginning of time, Occupancy first established a right against the world to exclusive but temporary enjoyment, and that later this right, while still exclusive, became permanent. Their aim in presenting their theory this way was to reconcile the idea that in the state of Nature, res nullius became property through Occupancy with the conclusion they drew from Scripture that the Patriarchs did not initially permanently claim the land that had been grazed by their flocks and herds.

The only criticism which could be directly applied to the theory of Blackstone would consist in inquiring whether the circumstances which make up his picture of a primitive society are more or less probable than other incidents which could be imagined with equal readiness. Pursuing this method of examination, we might fairly ask whether the man who had occupied (Blackstone evidently uses this word with its ordinary English meaning) a particular spot of ground for rest or shade would be permitted to retain it without disturbance. The chances surely are that his right to possession would be exactly coextensive with his power to keep it, and that he would be constantly liable to disturbance by the first comer who coveted the spot and thought himself strong enough to drive away the possessor. But the truth is that all such cavil at these positions is perfectly idle from the very baselessness of the positions themselves. What mankind did in the primitive state may not be a hopeless subject of inquiry, but of their motives for doing it it is impossible to know anything. These sketches of the plight of human beings in the first ages of the world are effected by first supposing mankind to be divested of a great part of the circumstances by which they are now surrounded, and by then150 assuming that, in the condition thus imagined, they would preserve the same sentiments and prejudices by which they are now actuated,—although, in fact, these sentiments may have been created and engendered by those very circumstances of which, by the hypothesis, they are to be stripped.

The only criticism that could be applied to Blackstone's theory is whether the conditions that he describes in his idea of a primitive society are more or less likely than other situations we could just as easily imagine. If we pursue this line of questioning, we could reasonably ask whether a person who had occupied (Blackstone clearly means this in its usual sense) a specific piece of land for rest or shade would be allowed to keep it without being challenged. It seems likely that his right to possess it would only extend as far as his ability to hold onto it, and he would always be at risk of being disturbed by anyone who wanted the spot and believed they were strong enough to take it from him. However, the truth is that complaining about these ideas is pointless because the ideas themselves are fundamentally flawed. While we might be able to inquire into what people did in primitive times, we can't know anything about their motives for doing so. These descriptions of the struggles of early humans begin by imagining them stripped of much of the context that surrounds them now, and then150 assuming that, in this imagined state, they would maintain the same feelings and biases that drive them today—even though, in reality, those feelings may have been shaped by the very circumstances they are supposed to be free from.

There is an aphorism of Savigny which has been sometimes thought to countenance a view of the origin of property somewhat similar to the theories epitomised by Blackstone. The great German jurist has laid down that all Property is founded on Adverse Possession ripened by Prescription. It is only with respect to Roman law that Savigny makes this statement, and before it can fully be appreciated much labour must be expended in explaining and defining the expressions employed. His meaning will, however, be indicated with sufficient accuracy if we consider him to assert that, how far soever we carry our inquiry into the ideas of property received among the Romans, however closely we approach in tracing them to the infancy of law, we can get no farther than a conception of ownership involving the three elements in the canon—Possession, Adverseness of Possession, that is a holding not permissive or subordinate, but exclusive against the world, and Prescription, or a period of time during which the Adverse Possession has uninterruptedly continued. It is exceedingly probable that this maxim might be enunciated with more generality than was allowed to it by its author, and that no sound or safe conclusion can be looked for from investigations into any system of laws which are pushed farther back than the point at which these combined ideas constitute the notion of proprietary right. Meantime, so far from bearing out the popular theory of the origin of property, Savigny's canon is particularly valuable as directing our attention to its weakest point. In the view of Blackstone and those whom he follows, it was the mode of assuming the exclusive enjoyment which mysteriously affected the minds of the fathers of our race. But the mystery does not reside here. It is not wonderful that property began in adverse possession. It is not surprising that the first proprietor should have been the strong man armed who kept his goods in peace. But why it was that lapse of time created a sentiment of respect for his possession—which is the exact source of the universal reverence of mankind for that which has for a long period de facto existed—are questions really151 deserving the profoundest examination, but lying far beyond the boundary of our present inquiries.

There’s a saying by Savigny that’s sometimes thought to support a view of how property originated, which is a bit like the theories outlined by Blackstone. The prominent German jurist stated that all property is based on adverse possession that has matured through prescription. He makes this statement specifically regarding Roman law, and to fully understand it, we need to put in some effort to explain and define the terms he used. However, we can grasp his meaning pretty well if we take it as him asserting that no matter how far we delve into the concepts of property among the Romans, or how closely we try to trace them back to the beginnings of law, we can only get to a notion of ownership that includes three key elements in the canon: possession, adverseness of possession—which means holding it in a way that is not permitted or subordinate, but rather exclusive against everyone—and prescription, or a time period during which the adverse possession has continued uninterrupted. It’s very likely that this principle could be stated more generally than Savigny allowed, and that no reliable conclusions can be drawn from exploring any legal system that goes back further than when these combined ideas define the concept of proprietary rights. In the meantime, rather than supporting the common theory of how property originated, Savigny’s principle is especially useful for pointing out its weakest aspect. According to Blackstone and those who follow his thoughts, it was the way of claiming exclusive enjoyment that strangely influenced the minds of our ancestors. But that’s not where the mystery lies. It’s not surprising that property started with adverse possession. It’s not unexpected that the first owner was a strong person who kept their belongings safe. The real questions that deserve deep investigation, but lie outside our current scope, are why the passage of time created a sense of respect for that possession—which is the exact source of the universal reverence that people have for things that have existed for a long time de facto.

Before pointing out the quarter in which we may hope to glean some information, scanty and uncertain at best, concerning the early history of proprietary right, I venture to state my opinion that the popular impression in reference to the part played by Occupancy in the first stages of civilisation directly reverses the truth. Occupancy is the advised assumption of physical possession; and the notion that an act of this description confers a title to "res nullius," so far from being characteristic of very early societies, is in all probability the growth of a refined jurisprudence and of a settled condition of the laws. It is only when the rights of property have gained a sanction from long practical inviolability and when the vast majority of the objects of enjoyment have been subjected to private ownership, that mere possession is allowed to invest the first possessor with dominion over commodities in which no prior proprietorship has been asserted. The sentiment in which this doctrine originated is absolutely irreconcilable with that infrequency and uncertainty of proprietary rights which distinguish the beginnings of civilisation. Its true basis seems to be, not an instinctive bias towards the institution of Property, but a presumption arising out of the long continuance of that institution, that everything ought to have an owner. When possession is taken of a "res nullius," that is, of an object which is not, or has never been, reduced to dominion, the possessor is permitted to become proprietor from a feeling that all valuable things are naturally the subjects of an exclusive enjoyment, and that in the given case there is no one to invest with the right of property except the Occupant. The Occupant in short, becomes the owner, because all things are presumed to be somebody's property and because no one can be pointed out as having a better right than he to the proprietorship of this particular thing.

Before we identify the time period in which we might gather some limited and uncertain information about the early history of property rights, I want to express my belief that the common view regarding the role of Occupancy in the early stages of civilization is completely opposite to the truth. Occupancy is the intentional act of taking physical possession; the idea that such an act grants ownership of "res nullius" is not typical of very early societies and is likely a product of developed legal systems and established laws. It's only when property rights have been upheld through consistent respect and when most valuable items have been subjected to private ownership, that mere possession can allow the first person to claim control over things that have no prior ownership. The sentiment that gave rise to this doctrine is in direct conflict with the infrequency and uncertainty of property rights that marked the beginnings of civilization. Its true foundation seems to be not an instinctive lean towards the concept of Property, but an assumption driven by the long-standing acceptance of that concept, which suggests that everything should have an owner. When someone takes possession of a "res nullius," meaning an object that is not, or has never been, owned, the possessor is allowed to become the owner based on the belief that all valuable items should be exclusively owned, and in this case, there is no one else to confer property rights upon except the person occupying it. In short, the Occupant becomes the owner because all things are assumed to belong to someone and because no one can be identified as having a better claim than they do to ownership of that particular item.

Even were there no other objection to the descriptions of mankind in their natural state which we have been discussing, there is one particular in which they are fatally at variance with the authentic evidence possessed by us. It will be observed that the acts and motives which these theories suppose are the acts and motives of Individuals. It is each Individual who for himself subscribes the Social Compact. It is some shifting sandbank in which the grains are Individual men,152 that according to the theory of Hobbes is hardened into the social rock by the wholesome discipline of force. It is an Individual who, in the picture drawn by Blackstone, "is in the occupation of a determined spot of ground for rest, for shade, or the like." The vice is one which necessarily afflicts all the theories descended from the Natural Law of the Romans, which differed principally from their Civil Law in the account which it took of Individuals, and which has rendered precisely its greatest service to civilisation in enfranchising the individual from the authority of archaic society. But Ancient Law, it must again be repeated, knows next to nothing of Individuals. It is concerned not with Individuals, but with Families, not with single human beings, but groups. Even when the law of the State has succeeded in permeating the small circles of kindred into which it had originally no means of penetrating, the view it takes of Individuals is curiously different from that taken by jurisprudence in its maturest stage. The life of each citizen is not regarded as limited by birth and death; it is but a continuation of the existence of his forefathers, and it will be prolonged in the existence of his descendants.

Even if there were no other objections to the descriptions of humanity in their natural state that we've been discussing, there's one significant way that they completely contradict the authentic evidence we have. It's important to note that the actions and motives these theories assume are the actions and motives of individuals. Each individual is the one who agrees to the social contract for themselves. It’s like a shifting sandbank made up of individual men, which according to Hobbes' theory becomes a solid social foundation through the necessary force of discipline. In the image painted by Blackstone, "an individual is occupying a specific piece of land for rest, shade, or something similar." This flaw is one that affects all theories stemming from the Roman Natural Law, which mainly differed from their Civil Law in how it treated individuals and has notably contributed to civilization by freeing individuals from the control of outdated society. But Ancient Law, it must be emphasized again, knows almost nothing about individuals. It focuses not on individuals but on families, not on single people but on groups. Even when state law has managed to penetrate the small kinship circles it initially had no way of reaching, the perspective it has on individuals is quite different from that of jurisprudence in its most developed form. Each citizen's life is not viewed as limited by birth and death; it is simply a continuation of their ancestors' existence and will extend into their descendants' lives.

The Roman distinction between the Law of Persons and the Law of Things, which though extremely convenient is entirely artificial, has evidently done much to divert inquiry on the subject before us from the true direction. The lessons learned in discussing the Jus Personarum have been forgotten where the Jus Rerum is reached, and Property, Contract, and Delict, have been considered as if no hints concerning their original nature were to be gained from the facts ascertained respecting the original condition of Persons. The futility of this method would be manifest if a system of pure archaic law could be brought before us, and if the experiment could be tried of applying to it the Roman classifications. It would soon be seen that the separation of the Law of Persons from that of Things has no meaning in the infancy of law, that the rules belonging to the two departments are inextricably mingled together, and that the distinctions of the later jurists are appropriate only to the later jurisprudence. From what has been said in the earlier portions of this treatise, it will be gathered that there is a strong à priori improbability of our obtaining any clue to the early history of property, if we confine our notice to the proprietary rights of individuals. It153 is more than likely that joint-ownership, and not separate ownership, is the really archaic institution, and that the forms of property which will afford us instruction will be those which are associated with the rights of families and of groups of kindred. The Roman jurisprudence will not here assist in enlightening us, for it is exactly the Roman jurisprudence which, transformed by the theory of Natural Law, has bequeathed to the moderns the impression that individual ownership is the normal state of proprietary right, and that ownership in common by groups of men is only the exception to a general rule. There is, however, one community which will always be carefully examined by the inquirer who is in quest of any lost institution of primeval society. How far soever any such institution may have undergone change among the branch of the Indo-European family which has been settled for ages in India, it will seldom be found to have entirely cast aside the shell in which it was originally reared. It happens that, among the Hindoos, we do find a form of ownership which ought at once to rivet our attention from its exactly fitting in with the ideas which our studies in the Law of Persons would lead us to entertain respecting the original condition of property. The Village Community of India is at once an organised patriarchal society and an assemblage of co-proprietors. The personal relations to each other of the men who compose it are indistinguishably confounded with their proprietary rights, and to the attempts of English functionaries to separate the two may be assigned some of the most formidable miscarriages of Anglo-Indian administration. The Village Community is known to be of immense antiquity. In whatever direction research has been pushed into Indian history, general or local, it has always found the Community in existence at the farthest point of its progress. A great number of intelligent and observant writers, most of whom had no theory of any sort to support concerning its nature and origin, agree in considering it the least destructible institution of a society which never willingly surrenders any one of its usages to innovation. Conquests and revolutions seem to have swept over it without disturbing or displacing it, and the most beneficent systems of government in India have always been those which have recognised it as the basis of administration.

The Roman distinction between the Law of Persons and the Law of Things, while very practical, is completely artificial and has clearly diverted our inquiry into the subject at hand from its true path. The lessons learned from discussing the Jus Personarum have been overlooked when it comes to the Jus Rerum, causing Property, Contract, and Delict to be treated as if insights into their original nature couldn't be found in the facts about the original state of Persons. The shortcomings of this approach would become obvious if we encountered a system of pure archaic law and tried applying Roman classifications to it. It would quickly show that separating the Law of Persons from that of Things is meaningless in the early stages of law; the rules related to the two areas are deeply intertwined, and the distinctions made by later jurists are relevant only to a later legal system. As discussed in the earlier sections of this treatise, it is unlikely we can gain any insight into the early history of property if we limit our focus to the ownership rights of individuals. It is highly probable that joint ownership, rather than individual ownership, is the truly ancient institution, and that the property forms providing us with useful knowledge will involve the rights of families and groups of relatives. Roman law won't help us here, since it's precisely Roman jurisprudence, influenced by Natural Law theory, that has left modern society with the belief that individual ownership is the standard state of property rights, and that shared ownership among groups is just an exception to the rule. However, there is one community that will always be carefully examined by anyone searching for any lost institution of primitive society. Regardless of how much such an institution may have evolved within the branch of the Indo-European family that has been settled in India for centuries, it seldom entirely discards the original framework it developed within. In Indian culture, we find a form of ownership that should immediately grab our attention because it aligns perfectly with the ideas our studies in the Law of Persons lead us to about the initial condition of property. The Village Community of India is both an organized patriarchal society and a group of co-owners. The personal relationships among the men in this community are inseparable from their ownership rights, and the attempts by English officials to separate the two have led to some of the biggest failures in Anglo-Indian administration. The Village Community is known to be extremely ancient. No matter how deeply research has been conducted into Indian history, either generally or locally, it has always found the Community existing at the furthest points of its exploration. Many knowledgeable and observant writers, most of whom had no theories to promote regarding its nature and origin, agree that it is the most resilient institution in a society that rarely surrenders any of its practices to change. Conquests and revolutions appear to have swept over it without disrupting or displacing it, and the most effective systems of government in India have always recognized it as the foundation for administration.

The mature Roman law, and modern jurisprudence follow154ing in its wake, look upon co-ownership as an exceptional and momentary condition of the rights of property. This view is clearly indicated in the maxim which obtains universally in Western Europe, Nemo in communione potest invitus detineri ("No one can be kept in co-proprietorship against his will"). But in India this order of ideas is reversed, and it may be said that separate proprietorship is always on its way to become proprietorship in common. The process has been adverted to already. As soon as a son is born, he acquires a vested interest in his father's substance, and on attaining years of discretion he is even, in certain contingencies, permitted by the letter of the law to call for a partition of the family estate. As a fact, however, a division rarely takes place even at the death of the father, and the property constantly remains undivided for several generations, though every member of every generation has a legal right to an undivided share in it. The domain thus held in common is sometimes administered by an elected manager, but more generally, and in some provinces always, it is managed by the eldest agnate, by the eldest representative of the eldest line of the stock. Such an assemblage of joint proprietors, a body of kindred holding a domain in common, is the simplest form of an Indian Village Community, but the Community is more than a brotherhood of relatives and more than an association of partners. It is an organised society, and besides providing for the management of the common fund, it seldom fails to provide, by a complete staff of functionaries, for internal government, for police, for the administration of justice, and for the apportionment of taxes and public duties.

The developed Roman law, and modern legal systems that follow it, view co-ownership as an unusual and temporary state of property rights. This is clearly expressed in the widely accepted maxim in Western Europe, Nemo in communione potest invitus detineri ("No one can be kept in co-ownership against their will"). In contrast, India's perspective is quite different; here, separate ownership is generally seen as transitioning toward joint ownership. This process has already been mentioned. As soon as a son is born, he gains a vested interest in his father's property, and when he reaches maturity, he is even legally allowed, under certain circumstances, to demand a division of the family estate. However, in practice, a division rarely happens, even after the father's death, and the property often remains undivided for several generations, although every member of each generation has a legal claim to an undivided share. The jointly held property is sometimes overseen by an elected manager, but more often, and in some regions always, it is managed by the eldest male relative, representing the oldest branch of the family line. This group of joint owners, a community of relatives sharing a property, represents the simplest form of an Indian Village Community, but the community is more than just a family and more than a partnership. It is an organized society that not only manages the shared resources but also typically establishes a complete set of officials for internal governance, law enforcement, administering justice, and distributing taxes and public responsibilities.

The process which I have described as that under which a Village Community is formed, may be regarded as typical. Yet it is not to be supposed that every Village Community in India drew together in so simple a manner. Although, in the North of India, the archives, as I am informed, almost invariably show that the Community was founded by a single assemblage of blood-relations, they also supply information that men of alien extraction have always, from time to time, been engrafted on it, and a mere purchaser of a share may generally, under certain conditions, be admitted to the brotherhood. In the South of the Peninsula there are often Communities which appear to have sprung not from one but155 from two or more families; and there are some whose composition is known to be entirely artificial; indeed, the occasional aggregation of men of different castes in the same society is fatal to the hypothesis of a common descent. Yet in all these brotherhoods either the tradition is preserved, or the assumption made, of an original common parentage. Mountstuart Elphinstone, who writes more particularly of the Southern Village Communities, observes of them (History of India, i. 126): "The popular notion is that the Village landholders are all descended from one or more individuals who settled the village; and that the only exceptions are formed by persons who have derived their rights by purchase or otherwise from members of the original stock. The supposition is confirmed by the fact that, to this day, there are only single families of landholders in small villages and not many in large ones; but each has branched out into so many members that it is not uncommon for the whole agricultural labour to be done by the landholders, without the aid either of tenants or of labourers. The rights of the landholders are theirs collectively and, though they almost always have a more or less perfect partition of them, they never have an entire separation. A landholder, for instance, can sell or mortgage his rights; but he must first have the consent of the Village, and the purchaser steps exactly into his place and takes up all his obligations. If a family becomes extinct, its share returns to the common stock."

The process I've described for how a Village Community is formed can be seen as typical. However, it's important to note that not every Village Community in India came together in such a straightforward way. In North India, records—so I'm told—usually indicate that the Community was established by a single group of blood relatives. Yet, they also show that people from outside the group have frequently been added over time, and someone who buys a share can often be admitted into the community under certain conditions. In the South of the Peninsula, there are Communities that seem to have arisen not from one but from two or more families; some are known to have an entirely artificial composition. In fact, the occasional gathering of individuals from different castes in the same society weakens the idea of a shared ancestry. Still, in all these groups, either the tradition of a shared origin is maintained, or the assumption of an original common parentage is made. Mountstuart Elphinstone, who focuses more on the Southern Village Communities, notes (in History of India, i. 126): "The popular belief is that the Village landholders all descend from one or more individuals who founded the village; and that the only exceptions are those who gained their rights through purchase or other means from members of the original lineage. This belief is supported by the fact that, even today, only single families are landholders in small villages, and not many in larger ones; each has expanded into so many members that it’s common for the landholders to do all the agricultural work themselves, without needing tenants or laborers. The rights of the landholders are held collectively, and while they usually have a fairly complete division of them, there is never a total separation. For example, a landholder can sell or mortgage his rights, but he must first get the Village's consent, and the buyer takes over his place and assumes all his responsibilities. If a family dies out, its share reverts to the common stock."

Some considerations which have been offered in the fifth chapter of this volume will assist the reader, I trust, in appreciating the significance of Elphinstone's language. No institution of the primitive world is likely to have been preserved to our day, unless it has acquired an elasticity foreign to its original nature through some vivifying legal fiction. The Village Community then is not necessarily an assemblage of blood-relations, but it is either such an assemblage or a body of co-proprietors formed on the model of an association of kinsmen. The type with which it should be compared is evidently not the Roman Family, but the Roman Gens or House. The Gens was also a group on the model of the family; it was the family extended by a variety of fictions of which the exact nature was lost in antiquity. In historical times, its leading characteristics were the very two which Elphinstone remarks in the Village Community. There was156 always the assumption of a common origin, an assumption sometimes notoriously at variance with fact; and, to repeat the historian's words, "if a family became extinct, its share returned to the common stock." In old Roman law, unclaimed inheritances escheated to the Gentiles. It is further suspected by all who have examined their history that the Communities, like the Gentes, have been very generally adulterated by the admission of strangers, but the exact mode of absorption cannot now be ascertained. At present, they are recruited, as Elphinstone tells us, by the admission of purchasers, with the consent of the brotherhood. The acquisition of the adopted member is, however, of the nature of a universal succession; together with the share he has bought, he succeeds to the liabilities which the vendor had incurred towards the aggregate group. He is an Emptor Familiæ, and inherits the legal clothing of the person whose place he begins to fill. The consent of the whole brotherhood required for his admission may remind us of the consent which the Comitia Curiata, the Parliament of that larger brotherhood of self-styled kinsmen, the ancient Roman commonwealth, so strenuously insisted on as essential to the legalisation of an Adoption or the confirmation of a Will.

Some points discussed in the fifth chapter of this book will hopefully help the reader understand the importance of Elphinstone's language. No institution from the early world is likely to have survived to today unless it has gained a flexibility that strays from its original nature through some lively legal fiction. The Village Community is not necessarily just a group of blood relatives; it is either such a group or a body of co-owners modeled after a kinship association. The appropriate comparison isn't the Roman Family but rather the Roman Gens or House. The Gens was also a group similar to a family; it was an extended family created through various fictions, the true nature of which has been lost to history. In historical times, its main features were the exact two that Elphinstone points out in the Village Community. There was always the assumption of a common origin, an assumption that was sometimes clearly at odds with reality; and to quote the historian, "if a family became extinct, its share returned to the common stock." In ancient Roman law, unclaimed inheritances defaulted to the Gentiles. It is also suspected by everyone who has studied their history that the Communities, like the Gentes, have been extensively mixed with outsiders, but the exact process of this integration cannot be determined now. Currently, they are joined, as Elphinstone tells us, by the acceptance of buyers with the approval of the brotherhood. However, when an adopted member is acquired, it resembles a universal succession; along with the share he has purchased, he takes on the liabilities that the seller owed to the entire group. He is an Emptor Familiæ and inherits the legal status of the person whose role he begins to take over. The requirement for unanimous approval from the brotherhood for his admission may remind us of the consent that the Comitia Curiata, the Parliament of that larger group of self-identified relatives, the ancient Roman commonwealth, firmly insisted was essential for the legalization of an Adoption or the validation of a Will.

The tokens of an extreme antiquity are discoverable in almost every single feature of the Indian Village Communities. We have so many independent reasons for suspecting that the infancy of law is distinguished by the prevalence of co-ownership by the intermixture of personal with proprietary rights, and by the confusion of public with private duties, that we should be justified in deducing many important conclusions from our observation of these proprietary brotherhoods, even if no similarly compounded societies could be detected in any other part of the world. It happens, however, that much earnest curiosity has been very recently attracted to a similar set of phenomena in those parts of Europe which have been most slightly affected by the feudal transformation of property, and which in many important particulars have as close an affinity with the Eastern as with the Western world. The researches of M. de Haxthausen, M. Tengoborski, and others, have shown us that the Russian villages are not fortuitous assemblages of men, nor are they unions founded on contract; they are naturally organised communities like those of India. It is true that these villages157 are always in theory the patrimony of some noble proprietor and the peasants have within historical times been converted into the predial, and to a great extent into the personal, serfs of the seignior. But the pressure of this superior ownership has never crushed the ancient organisation of the village, and it is probable that the enactment of the Czar of Russia, who is supposed to have introduced serfdom, was really intended to prevent the peasants from abandoning that co-operation without which the old social order could not long be maintained. In the assumption of an agnatic connection between the villagers, in the blending of personal rights with privileges of ownership, and in a variety of spontaneous provisions for internal administration, the Russian Village appears to be a nearly exact repetition of the Indian Community; but there is one important difference which we note with the greatest interest. The co-owners of an Indian village, though their property is blended, have their rights distinct, and this separation of rights is complete and continues indefinitely. The severance of rights is also theoretically complete in a Russian village, but there it is only temporary. After the expiration of a given, but not in all cases of the same, period separate ownerships are extinguished, the land of the village is thrown into a mass, and then it is re-distributed among the families composing the community, according to their number. This repartition having been effected, the rights of families and of individuals are again allowed to branch out into various lines, which they continue to follow till another period of division comes round. An even more curious variation from this type of ownership occurs in some of those countries which long formed a debateable land between the Turkish empire and the possessions of the House of Austria. In Servia, in Croatia, and the Austrian Sclavonia, the villages are also brotherhoods of persons who are at once co-owners and kinsmen; but there the internal arrangements of the community differ from those adverted to in the last two examples. The substance of the common property is in this case neither divided in practice nor considered in theory as divisible, but the entire land is cultivated by the combined labour of all the villagers, and the produce is annually distributed among the households, sometimes according to their supposed wants, sometimes according to rules which give to particular persons a fixed share of the usufruct. All these158 practices are traced by the jurists of the East of Europe to a principle which is asserted to be found in the earliest Sclavonian laws, the principle that the property of families cannot be divided for a perpetuity.

The signs of ancient times can be found in nearly every feature of Indian village communities. We have multiple independent reasons to suspect that the early development of law is marked by a focus on shared ownership, the blending of personal and property rights, and the mix-up of public and private duties. We could draw many significant conclusions from observing these cooperative groups, even if we didn’t find similar societies elsewhere in the world. However, it turns out that there has been considerable interest lately in similar phenomena in parts of Europe that have been minimally impacted by the feudal transformation of property and bear significant similarities to both the Eastern and Western worlds. Research by M. de Haxthausen, M. Tengoborski, and others has revealed that Russian villages are not random gatherings of people, nor are they unions based on contracts; they are naturally organized communities similar to those in India. It’s true that, theoretically, these villages belong to some noble owner, and throughout history, the peasants have transformed into serfs working the land and, to some extent, personal serfs of the lord. But the weight of this overarching ownership has never completely dismantled the traditional organization of the village, and it’s likely that the decree from the Czar of Russia, believed to have introduced serfdom, was actually intended to stop the peasants from abandoning the cooperation necessary for maintaining the old social order. In terms of a family connection among villagers, the merging of personal rights with ownership privileges, and various spontaneous arrangements for internal governance, the Russian village closely resembles the Indian community. However, there’s one essential difference that piques our interest. In an Indian village, even though their property is mixed, the rights of co-owners are distinct, and this separation of rights is full and lasts indefinitely. The separation of rights is also theoretically complete in a Russian village, but it’s only temporary. After a specified period—though not always the same for everyone—individual ownerships are dissolved, the village land is grouped together, and then it is redistributed among the families in the community based on their number. Once this redistribution happens, the rights of families and individuals branch out again until the next division period arrives. An even more intriguing variation on this type of ownership appears in some countries that were historically contested lands between the Turkish empire and the House of Austria. In Serbia, Croatia, and Austrian Sclavonia, the villages also function as brotherhoods where members are both co-owners and relatives. However, the internal organization of these communities differs from the previous two examples. Here, the common property isn’t practically divided nor considered theoretically divisible; instead, all villagers work together to cultivate the land, and each year the produce is distributed among households based on their assumed needs or according to rules that allocate a fixed share of the benefits to certain individuals. All these practices are traced by Eastern European legal scholars back to a principle found in the oldest Slavic laws: the idea that family property cannot be divided permanently.

The great interest of these phenomena in an inquiry like the present arises from the light they throw on the development of distinct proprietary rights inside the groups by which property seems to have been originally held. We have the strongest reason for thinking that property once belonged not to individuals nor even to isolated families, but to larger societies composed on the patriarchal model; but the mode of transition from ancient to modern ownerships, obscure at best, would have been infinitely obscurer if several distinguishable forms of Village Communities had not been discovered and examined. It is worth while to attend to the varieties of internal arrangement within the patriarchal groups which are, or were till recently, observable among races of Indo-European blood. The chiefs of the ruder Highland clans used, it is said, to dole out food to the heads of the households under their jurisdiction at the very shortest intervals, and sometimes day by day. A periodical distribution is also made to the Sclavonian villagers of the Austrian and Turkish provinces by the elders of their body, but then it is a distribution once for all of the total produce of the year. In the Russian villages, however, the substance of the property ceases to be looked upon as indivisible, and separate proprietary claims are allowed freely to grow up, but then the progress of separation is peremptorily arrested after it has continued a certain time. In India, not only is there no indivisibility of the common fund, but separate proprietorship in parts of it may be indefinitely prolonged and may branch out into any number of derivative ownerships, the de facto partition of the stock being, however, checked by inveterate usage, and by the rule against the admission of strangers without the consent of the brotherhood. It is not of course intended to insist that these different forms of the Village Community represent distinct stages in a process of transmutation which has been everywhere accomplished in the same manner. But, though the evidence does not warrant our going so far as this, it renders less presumptuous the conjecture that private property, in the shape in which we know it, was chiefly formed by the gradual disentanglement159 of the separate rights of individuals from the blended rights of a community. Our studies in the Law of Persons seemed to show us the Family expanding into the Agnatic group of kinsmen, then the Agnatic group dissolving into separate households; lastly the household supplanted by the individual; and it is now suggested that each step in the change corresponds to an analogous alteration in the nature of Ownership. If there be any truth in the suggestion, it is to be observed that it materially affects the problem which theorists on the origin of Property have generally proposed to themselves. The question—perhaps an insoluble one—which they have mostly agitated is, what were the motives which first induced men to respect each other's possessions? It may still be put, without much hope of finding an answer to it, in the form of any inquiry into the reasons which led one composite group to keep aloof from the domain of another. But, if it be true that far the most important passage in the history of Private Property is its gradual elimination from the co-ownership of kinsmen, then the great point of inquiry is identical with that which lies on the threshold of all historical law—what were the motives which originally prompted men to hold together in the family union? To such a question, Jurisprudence, unassisted by other sciences, is not competent to give a reply. The fact can only be noted.

The significant interest in these phenomena in an inquiry like this comes from the insights they provide about the development of distinct property rights within the groups that initially held property. We have strong reasons to believe that property didn't originally belong to individuals or even isolated families, but rather to larger societies structured in a patriarchal way. However, the transition from ancient to modern forms of ownership, which is already quite unclear, would be even more confusing if we hadn't discovered and analyzed several distinguishable forms of Village Communities. It’s worth noting the variety of internal arrangements within patriarchal groups that are, or were until recently, observed among Indo-European races. It's said that the leaders of the more primitive Highland clans would allocate food to the heads of households under their authority at very short intervals, sometimes even daily. Sclavonian villagers in the Austrian and Turkish provinces also receive a periodic distribution from their elders, but it's a distribution of the total produce for the entire year rather than on a regular basis. In Russian villages, however, the nature of property stops being viewed as indivisible, allowing separate ownership claims to arise freely, but this separation is forcibly halted after it has continued for a certain period. In India, there’s not only no indivisibility of the common fund, but individual ownership of portions can be indefinitely extended and can branch into many derivative forms of ownership, though the practical division of the stock is restrained by long-standing customs and the rule against admitting outsiders without the consent of the group. It’s not intended to suggest that these different forms of Village Communities represent distinct stages in a universal process of transformation. However, while the evidence doesn’t fully support this idea, it makes it less presumptuous to speculate that private property, as we understand it, primarily emerged from the gradual separation of individuals' rights from the collective rights of a community. Our study of the Law of Persons seems to show the Family evolving into the Agnatic group of relatives, then the Agnatic group breaking down into separate households, and finally, the household giving way to the individual; each stage in this change is now being suggested as corresponding to a similar alteration in the nature of Ownership. If there’s any truth to this suggestion, it significantly impacts the issue that theorists studying the origin of Property generally confront. The question—perhaps unanswerable—that they mostly debate is what motivated people to respect each other's possessions in the first place. It may still be raised, though not with much hope of a resolution, in the form of an inquiry into the reasons one group chose to distance itself from another. But if it’s true that the most significant shift in the history of Private Property is its gradual separation from the shared ownership among relatives, then the key question is the same as that which lies at the start of all historical law—what were the motivations that originally drove people to remain united in the family structure? Jurisprudence alone, without the support of other sciences, cannot provide an answer to such a question. The fact can only be noted.

The undivided state of property in ancient societies is consistent with a peculiar sharpness of division, which shows itself as soon as any single share is completely separated from the patrimony of the group. This phenomenon springs, doubtless, from the circumstance that the property is supposed to become the domain of a new group, so that any dealing with it, in its divided state, is a transaction between two highly complex bodies. I have already compared Ancient Law to Modern International Law, in respect of the size and complexity of the corporate associations, whose rights and duties it settles. As the contracts and conveyances known to ancient law are contracts and conveyances to which not single individuals, but organised companies of men, are parties, they are in the highest degree ceremonious; they require a variety of symbolical acts and words intended to impress the business on the memory of all who take part in it; and they demand the presence of an inordinate number of witnesses. From these160 peculiarities, and others allied to them, springs the universally unmalleable character of the ancient forms of property. Sometimes the patrimony of the family is absolutely inalienable, as was the case with the Sclavonians, and still oftener, though alienations may not be entirely illegitimate, they are virtually impracticable, as among most of the Germanic tribes, from the necessity of having the consent of a large number of persons to the transfer. Where these impediments do not exist, or can be surmounted, the act of conveyance itself is generally burdened with a perfect load of ceremony, in which not one iota can be safely neglected. Ancient law uniformly refuses to dispense with a single gesture, however grotesque; with a single syllable, however its meaning may have been forgotten; with a single witness, however superfluous may be his testimony. The entire solemnities must be scrupulously completed by persons legally entitled to take part in them, or else the conveyance is null, and the seller is re-established in the rights of which he had vainly attempted to divest himself.

The undivided state of property in ancient societies is linked to a distinct sharpness of division that becomes obvious as soon as any single share is completely separated from the group's inheritance. This situation arises because the property is thought to be taken over by a new group, making any transaction involving it, in its divided form, a complex interaction between two intricate bodies. I have already compared Ancient Law to Modern International Law regarding the size and complexity of the corporate groups that these laws address. Since the contracts and conveyances recognized in ancient law involve organized groups of people rather than individual persons, they are extremely formal; they require a variety of symbolic acts and words designed to embed the business in the memory of everyone involved, and they necessitate the presence of a large number of witnesses. From these peculiarities, among others, arises the rigid nature of ancient property forms. Sometimes, a family's inheritance is completely inalienable, as was the case with the Slavs, and even more frequently, while transfers may not be entirely illegitimate, they are almost impossible among most Germanic tribes due to the need for consent from many individuals for the transfer. Where these obstacles do not exist or can be overcome, the act of conveyance is still typically loaded with extensive ceremony, where not a single detail can be overlooked. Ancient law consistently refuses to omit any gesture, no matter how absurd; any word, even if its meaning is forgotten; or any witness, regardless of how unnecessary their testimony may seem. All the formalities must be meticulously fulfilled by those legally entitled to participate; otherwise, the conveyance is void, and the seller is restored to the rights they unsuccessfully attempted to give up.

These various obstacles to the free circulation of the objects of use and enjoyment, begin of course to make themselves felt as soon as society has acquired even a slight degree of activity, and the expedients by which advancing communities endeavour to overcome them form the staple of the history of Property. Of such expedients there is one which takes precedence of the rest from its antiquity and universality. The idea seems to have spontaneously suggested itself to a great number of early societies, to classify property into kinds. One kind or sort of property is placed on a lower footing of dignity than the others, but at the same time is relieved from the fetters which antiquity has imposed on them. Subsequently, the superior convenience of the rules governing the transfer and descent of the lower order of property becomes generally recognised, and by a gradual course of innovation the plasticity of the less dignified class of valuable objects is communicated to the classes which stand conventionally higher. The history of Roman Property Law is the history of the assimilation of Res Mancipi to Res Nec Mancipi. The history of Property on the European Continent is the history of the subversion of the feudalised law of land by the Romanised law of moveables; and, though the history of ownership in England is not nearly completed, it is visibly161 the law of personalty which threatens to absorb and annihilate the law of realty.

These various obstacles to the free movement of items for use and enjoyment start to become apparent as soon as society gains even a little activity, and the methods that advancing communities use to overcome these issues are central to the history of Property. One method stands out due to its age and widespread acceptance. The idea of categorizing property into types seems to have naturally occurred to many early societies. One type of property is considered less dignified than the others, but it is also freed from the restrictions imposed by tradition. Over time, the advantages of the rules governing the transfer and inheritance of this lower type of property become widely accepted, and through gradual innovation, the flexibility of this less prestigious category of valuable items spreads to the categories that are conventionally seen as higher. The history of Roman Property Law is about the integration of Res Mancipi with Res Nec Mancipi. The history of Property in continental Europe is about the overthrow of feudal land law by Roman law pertaining to movable items; and although the history of ownership in England is not fully written, it is clear that the law regarding personal property threatens to engulf and eliminate the law regarding real property.

The only natural classification of the objects of enjoyment, the only classification which corresponds with an essential difference in the subject-matter, is that which divides them into Moveables and Immoveables. Familiar as is this classification to jurisprudence, it was very slowly developed by Roman law, from which we inherit it, and was only finally adopted by it in its latest stage. The classifications of Ancient Law have sometimes a superficial resemblance to this. They occasionally divide property into categories, and place immoveables in one of them; but then it is found that they either class along with immoveables a number of objects which have no sort of relation with them, or else divorce them from various rights to which they have a close affinity. Thus, the Res Mancipi of Roman Law included not only land, but slaves, horses, and oxen. Scottish law ranks with land a certain class of securities, and Hindoo law associates it with slaves. English law, on the other hand, parts leases of land for years from other interests in the soil, and joins them to personalty under the name of chattels real. Moreover, the classifications of Ancient Law are classifications implying superiority and inferiority; while the distinction between moveables and immoveables, so long at least as it was confined to Roman jurisprudence, carried with it no suggestion whatever of a difference in dignity. The Res Mancipi, however, did certainly at first enjoy a precedence over the Res Nec Mancipi, as did heritable property in Scotland and realty in England, over the personalty to which they were opposed. The lawyers of all systems have spared no pains in striving to refer these classifications to some intelligible principle; but the reasons of the severance must ever be vainly sought for in the philosophy of law: they belong not to its philosophy, but to its history. The explanation which appears to cover the greatest number of instances is, that the objects of enjoyment honoured above the rest were the forms of property known first and earliest to each particular community, and dignified therefore emphatically with the designation of Property. On the other hand, the articles not enumerated among the favoured objects seem to have been placed on a lower standing, because the knowledge of their value was posterior to the epoch at which the catalogue of superior162 property was settled. They were at first unknown, rare, limited in their uses, or else regarded as mere appendages to the privileged objects. Thus, though the Roman Res Mancipi included a number of moveable articles of great value, still the most costly jewels were never allowed to take rank as Res Mancipi, because they were unknown to the early Romans. In the same way chattels real in England are said to have been degraded to the footing of personalty, from the infrequency and valuelessness of such estates under the feudal land-law. But the grand point of interest is, the continued degradation of these commodities when their importance had increased and their number had multiplied. Why were they not successively included among the favoured objects of enjoyment? One reason is found in the stubbornness with which Ancient Law adheres to its classifications. It is a characteristic both of uneducated minds and of early societies, that they are little able to conceive a general rule apart from the particular applications of it with which they are practically familiar. They cannot dissociate a general term or maxim from the special examples which meet them in daily experience; and in this way the designation covering the best-known forms of property is denied to articles which exactly resemble them in being objects of enjoyment and subjects of right. But to these influences, which exert peculiar force in a subject-matter so stable as that of law, are afterwards added others more consistent with progress in enlightenment and in the conceptions of general expediency. Courts and lawyers become at last alive to the inconvenience of the embarrassing formalities required for the transfer, recovery, or devolution of the favoured commodities, and grow unwilling to fetter the newer descriptions of property with the technical trammels which characterised the infancy of law. Hence arises a disposition to keep these last on a lower grade in the arrangements of Jurisprudence, and to permit their transfer by simpler processes than those which, in archaic conveyances, serve as stumbling-blocks to good faith and stepping-stones to fraud. We are perhaps in some danger of underrating the inconveniences of the ancient modes of transfer. Our instruments of conveyance are written, so that their language, well pondered by the professional draftsman, is rarely defective in accuracy. But an ancient conveyance was not written, but acted. Gestures and163 words took the place of written technical phraseology, and any formula mispronounced, or symbolical act omitted, would have vitiated the proceeding as fatally as a material mistake in stating the uses or setting out the remainders would, two hundred years ago, have vitiated an English deed. Indeed, the mischiefs of the archaic ceremonial are even thus only half stated. So long as elaborate conveyances, written or acted, are required for the alienation of land alone, the chances of mistake are not considerable in the transfer of a description of property which is seldom got rid of with much precipitation. But the higher class of property in the ancient world comprised not only land but several of the commonest and several of the most valuable moveables. When once the wheels of society had begun to move quickly, there must have been immense inconvenience in demanding a highly intricate form of transfer for a horse or an ox, or for the most costly chattel of the old world—the Slave. Such commodities must have been constantly and even ordinarily conveyed with incomplete forms, and held, therefore, under imperfect titles.

The only natural way to classify enjoyable objects, the only classification that reflects a fundamental difference in what is being discussed, is the division into Moveables and Immoveables. While this classification is familiar to the law, it developed slowly under Roman law, from which we inherit it, and was only fully embraced in its later stages. The classifications of Ancient Law sometimes superficially resemble this. They occasionally categorize property and include immoveables in one category; however, it turns out they either group immoveables with various unrelated items or separate them from rights with which they are closely connected. For example, the Res Mancipi of Roman Law included not just land, but also slaves, horses, and oxen. Scottish law includes a specific class of securities with land, while Hindoo law associates it with slaves. In contrast, English law separates leases of land for years from other interests in land and categorizes them as personal property under the term chattels real. Moreover, classifications in Ancient Law imply a hierarchy of superiority and inferiority; meanwhile, the distinction between moveables and immoveables, at least as long as it was confined to Roman law, did not suggest any difference in dignity. However, Res Mancipi initially held precedence over Res Nec Mancipi, just as heritable property in Scotland and real estate in England did over personal property. Lawyers throughout different legal systems have worked hard to associate these classifications with some understandable principle; however, the reasons for the separations are rooted in historical context rather than legal philosophy. The explanation that seems to fit the most instances is that the favored objects were the types of property first recognized by each community and were thus elevated with the label of Property. On the other hand, items not listed among the favored objects appear to have been regarded as lesser due to the timing of when their value was recognized compared to when the list of superior property was established. Initially, they were unknown, rare, limited in use, or seen merely as accessories to the favored items. Thus, even though the Roman Res Mancipi included several high-value movable items, the most precious jewels were never classified as Res Mancipi since they were unknown to early Romans. Similarly, chattels real in England were considered of lower status compared to personal property due to their infrequent use and lack of value under feudal land law. However, what’s most interesting is the ongoing devaluation of these items even as their importance grew and their quantity increased. Why weren’t they eventually included among the favored objects? One reason lies in the rigidness of Ancient Law regarding its classifications. It is typical of less educated minds and early societies to struggle with a general rule without the specific instances they are accustomed to. They cannot separate a general term from the specific examples they encounter daily; thus, the term denoting the best-known forms of property is denied to items that closely resemble them as objects of enjoyment and rights. But alongside these influences, which have a strong impact in a field as stable as law, others that support progress in understanding and the concept of general benefit eventually emerge. Courts and lawyers eventually realize the difficulties posed by the cumbersome procedures needed for the transfer, recovery, or passing on of favored commodities and become reluctant to restrict newer types of property with the technical limitations that characterized early law. This leads to a tendency to keep these newer types at a lower level in legal arrangements and to allow their transfer using simpler methods than those found in archaic contracts, which often present obstacles to good faith and opportunities for fraud. We might underestimate the problems posed by ancient transfer methods. Our transfer documents are written, ensuring that their wording, carefully considered by professional drafters, is rarely inaccurate. However, an ancient transfer was not written but acted. Gestures and words replaced formal written language, and any mispronounced formula or overlooked symbolic act could invalidate the whole process, just as a material mistake in detailing uses or remainders would have nullified an English deed two hundred years ago. In fact, the issues with the ancient ceremonial processes are only partially addressed by this. As long as complicated transfers, whether written or acted, are necessary for transferring land alone, the risk of error in exchanging property that isn’t typically disposed of in haste is relatively low. However, the highest class of property in the ancient world not only included land but also many of the most common and valuable movable items. Once society began to accelerate, there must have been significant difficulties in requiring a complex transfer process for a horse, an ox, or the most expensive property of the ancient world—the Slave. Such items must have been routinely and even typically transferred using incomplete methods and therefore held under imperfect titles.

The Res Mancipi of old Roman law were land—in historical times, land on Italian soil,—slaves and beasts of burden, such as horses and oxen. It is impossible to doubt that the objects which make up the class are the instruments of agricultural labour, the commodities of first consequence to a primitive people. Such commodities were at first, I imagine, called emphatically Things or Property, and the mode of conveyance by which they were transferred was called a Mancipium or Mancipation; but it was not probably till much later that they received the distinctive appellation of Res Mancipi, "Things which require a Mancipation." By their side there may have existed or grown up a class of objects, for which it was not worth while to insist upon the full ceremony of Mancipation. It would be enough if, in transferring these last from owner to owner, a part only of the ordinary formalities were proceeded with, namely, that actual delivery, physical transfer, or tradition, which is the most obvious index of a change of proprietorship. Such commodities were the Res Nec Mancipi of the ancient jurisprudence, "things which did not require a Mancipation," little prized probably at first, and not often passed from one group of proprietors to another, While, however, the list of the Res Mancipi was irrevocably164 closed; that of the Res Nec Mancipi admitted of indefinite expansion; and hence every fresh conquest of man over material nature added an item to the Res Nec Mancipi, or effected an improvement in those already recognised. Insensibly, therefore, they mounted to an equality with the Res Mancipi, and the impression of an intrinsic inferiority being thus dissipated, men began to observe the manifold advantages of the simple formality which accompanied their transfer over the more intricate and more venerable ceremonial. Two of the agents of legal amelioration, Fictions and Equity, were assiduously employed by the Roman lawyers to give the practical effects of a Mancipation to a Tradition: and, though Roman legislators long shrank from enacting that the right of property in a Res Mancipi should be immediately transferred by bare delivery of the article, yet even this step was at last ventured upon by Justinian, in whose jurisprudence the difference between Res Mancipi and Res Nec Mancipi disappears, and Tradition or Delivery becomes the one great conveyance known to the law. The marked preference which the Roman lawyers very early gave to Tradition caused them to assign it a place in their theory which has helped to blind their modern disciples to its true history. It was classed among the "natural" modes of acquisition, both because it was generally practised among the Italian tribes, and because it was a process which attained its object by the simplest mechanism. If the expressions of the jurisconsults be pressed, they undoubtedly imply that Tradition, which belongs to the Law Natural, is more ancient than Mancipation, which is an institution of Civil Society; and this, I need not say, is the exact reverse of the truth.

The Res Mancipi from ancient Roman law included land—specifically land on Italian soil—slaves, and working animals like horses and oxen. There's no doubt that these items were essential for agricultural labor and were the most important goods for a primitive society. At first, these goods were probably referred to simply as Things or Property, and the method of transferring them was called a Mancipium or Mancipation. However, it likely took some time before they were specifically identified as Res Mancipi, or "Things that require a Mancipation." Alongside this, there may have been another category of items for which the full Mancipation ceremony wasn't necessary. It sufficed if, when transferring these items from one owner to another, only part of the usual formalities were followed, namely actual delivery, physical transfer, or tradition, which clearly indicated a change in ownership. These items were classified as Res Nec Mancipi, or "things that didn’t require a Mancipation," likely undervalued at first and not often exchanged between groups of owners. However, while the list of Res Mancipi was fixed, the list of Res Nec Mancipi could grow indefinitely. Consequently, every new conquest by humanity over nature added to the Res Nec Mancipi or improved items already recognized. Slowly but surely, these items became equal to Res Mancipi, and the perceived idea of their inherent inferiority faded. People began to see the many benefits of the simpler formalities involved in their transfer compared to the more complex, traditional ceremonies. Roman lawyers actively used two legal tools, Fictions and Equity, to give the practical effects of a Mancipation to a Tradition. Although Roman lawmakers hesitated to allow the immediate transfer of ownership in a Res Mancipi with just the delivery of the item, Justinian eventually took this step. In his legal framework, the distinction between Res Mancipi and Res Nec Mancipi disappeared, and Tradition or Delivery became the primary means of conveyance acknowledged by the law. The strong preference shown by Roman lawyers toward Tradition caused them to place it in a theoretical context that has led modern followers to misunderstand its real history. It was categorized among the "natural" methods of acquiring property, both because it was commonly practiced among the Italian tribes and because it achieved its goal through the simplest means. If one examines what the legal experts say, they imply that Tradition, as part of the Natural Law, is older than Mancipation, which is a construct of Civil Society; and this, I should note, is the exact opposite of the truth.

The distinction between Res Mancipi and Res Nec Mancipi is the type of a class of distinctions to which civilisation is much indebted, distinctions which run through the whole mass of commodities, placing a few of them in a class by themselves, and relegating the others to a lower category. The inferior kinds of property are first, from disdain and disregard, released from the perplexed ceremonies in which primitive law delights, and thus afterwards, in another state of intellectual progress, the simple methods of transfer and recovery which have been allowed to come into use serve as a model which condemns by its convenience and simplicity the165 cumbrous solemnities inherited from ancient days. But, in some societies, the trammels in which Property is tied up are much too complicated and stringent to be relaxed in so easy a manner. Whenever male children have been born to a Hindoo, the law of India, as I have stated, gives them all an interest in his property, and makes their consent a necessary condition of its alienation. In the same spirit, the general usage of the old Germanic peoples—it is remarkable that the Anglo-Saxon customs seem to have been an exception—forbade alienations without the consent of the male children; and the primitive law of the Sclavonians even prohibited them altogether. It is evident that such impediments as these cannot be overcome by a distinction between kinds of property, inasmuch as the difficulty extends to commodities of all sorts; and accordingly, Ancient Law, when once launched on a course of improvement, encounters them with a distinction of another character, a distinction classifying property, not according to its nature but according to its origin. In India, where there are traces of both systems of classification, the one which we are considering is exemplified in the difference which Hindoo law establishes between Inheritances and Acquisitions. The inherited property of the father is shared by the children as soon as they are born; but according to the custom of most provinces, the acquisitions made by him during his lifetime are wholly his own, and can be transferred by him at pleasure. A similar distinction was not unknown to Roman law, in which the earliest innovation on the Parental Powers took the form of a permission given to the son to keep for himself whatever he might have acquired in military service. But the most extensive use ever made of this mode of classification appears to have been among the Germans. I have repeatedly stated that the allod, though not inalienable, was commonly transferable with the greatest difficulty; and moreover, it descended exclusively to the agnatic kindred. Hence an extraordinary variety of distinctions came to be recognised, all intended to diminish the inconveniences inseparable from allodial property. The wehrgeld, for example, or composition for the homicide of a relative, which occupies so large a space in German jurisprudence, formed no part of the family domain, and descended according to rules of succession altogether different. Similarly, the reipus, or fine leviable on the re-marriage of a widow, did not166 enter into the allod of the person to whom it was paid, and followed a line of devolution in which the privileges of the agnates were neglected. The law, too, as among the Hindoos, distinguished the Acquisitions of the chief of the household from his Inherited property, and permitted him to deal with them under much more liberal conditions. Classifications of the other sort were also admitted, and the familiar distinction drawn between land and moveables; but moveable property was divided into several subordinate categories, to each of which different rules applied. This exuberance of classification, which may strike us as strange in so rude a people as the German conquerors of the Empire, is doubtless to be explained by the presence in their systems of a considerable element of Roman law, absorbed by them during their long sojourn on the confines of the Roman dominion. It is not difficult to trace a great number of the rules governing the transfer and devolution of the commodities which lay outside the allod, to their source in Roman jurisprudence, from which they were probably borrowed at widely distant epochs, and in fragmentary importations. How far the obstacles to the free circulation of property were surmounted by such contrivances, we have not the means even of conjecturing, for the distinctions adverted to have no modern history. As I before explained, the allodial form of property was entirely lost in the feudal, and when the consolidation of feudalism was once completed, there was practically but one distinction left standing of all those which had been known to the western world—the distinction between land and goods, immoveables and moveables. Externally this distinction was the same with that which Roman law had finally accepted, but the law of the middle ages differed from that of Rome in distinctly considering immoveable property to be more dignified than moveable. Yet this one sample is enough to show the importance of the class of expedients to which it belongs. In all the countries governed by systems based on the French codes, that is, through much the greatest part of the Continent of Europe, the law of moveables, which was always Roman law, has superseded and annulled the feudal law of land. England is the only country of importance in which this transmutation, though it has gone some way, is not nearly accomplished. Our own, too, it may be added, is the only considerable European country in which the separation167 of moveables from immoveables has been somewhat disturbed by the same influences which caused the ancient classifications to depart from the only one which is countenanced by nature. In the main, the English distinction has been between land and goods; but a certain class of goods have gone as heir-looms with the land, and a certain description of interests in land have from historical causes been ranked with personalty. This is not the only instance in which English jurisprudence, standing apart from the main current of legal modification, has reproduced phenomena of archaic law.

The difference between Res Mancipi and Res Nec Mancipi is a key distinction that civilization heavily relies on. These distinctions permeate the entire range of commodities, placing some items in a separate category while relegating others to a lower rank. The less valued types of property are initially freed from the complicated rituals favored by primitive law due to disdain and neglect. Consequently, in a more advanced intellectual state, the straightforward methods of transfer and recovery that have developed serve as a model that highlights the convenience and simplicity of these processes compared to the cumbersome formalities inherited from ancient times. However, in some societies, the restrictions on Property are too complex and rigid to be easily loosened. For instance, when male children are born to a Hindu, Indian law, as I have mentioned, grants them a share in their father's property, making their consent necessary for any transfer. Similarly, the traditional practices of the old Germanic peoples—remarkably unlike Anglo-Saxon customs—prohibited transfers without the male children's approval, and the early laws of the Sclavonians forbade them entirely. It's clear that such obstacles can't be resolved simply by differentiating types of property, as the challenge affects all kinds of commodities. Thus, Ancient Law, upon embarking on a path of reform, addresses these issues with a different classification, sorting property not by its nature but by its origins. In India, where both systems of classification coexist, we see this in the distinction between Inheritances and Acquisitions in Hindu law. The inherited property from the father is shared by the children from birth, while in most regions, the property he acquires during his life remains entirely his and can be transferred at his discretion. A similar distinction existed in Roman law, where the first change to Parental Powers allowed sons to keep anything they acquired through military service. However, the Germans seemed to use this mode of classification most extensively. As I have pointed out, although the allod was not inalienable, transferring it was usually very difficult, and it passed solely to male relatives. This resulted in a variety of distinctions aimed at reducing the challenges associated with allodial property. For example, the wehrgeld, or compensation for the killing of a relative—a significant topic in German law—was not part of the family estate and followed different succession rules. Likewise, the reipus, a fee payable upon a widow's remarriage, did not belong to the allod of the recipient and had its own descent rules, ignoring the rights of male relatives. The law, like among the Hindoos, differentiated the Acquisitions of the household head from his Inherited property and allowed him to manage them under much more favorable conditions. Other kinds of classifications were also recognized, including the familiar separation between land and movable property, with movable goods divided into various minor categories, each with different regulations. This complex classification, which might seem peculiar for a such a rough society as the German conquerors of the Empire, can likely be explained by the significant influence of Roman law absorbed during their lengthy encounters with the Roman territories. Many of the rules governing the transfer and succession of goods outside the allod trace back to Roman law, likely adopted at various times through fragmented imports. We cannot fully speculate on how these mechanisms overcame barriers to property circulation, as the distinctions referenced lack modern equivalents. I previously noted that the allodial property concept was entirely lost in feudalism, and once feudalism achieved full consolidation, only one distinction remained from those known in the western world—the distinction between land and goods, immovables and moveables. Externally, this distinction resembled the one that Roman law ultimately recognized, yet medieval law differed from Roman law by viewing immovable property as more prestigious than movable property. However, this single example suffices to illustrate the significance of this category of solutions. In all countries governed by legal systems based on the French codes—essentially most of continental Europe—the law of movables, which was always Roman law, has replaced and nullified the feudal law of land. England stands as the only significant country where this transformation, although partially underway, remains incomplete. It's worth noting that we are also the only major European country where the separation between moveables and immovables has been somewhat disrupted by influences that caused ancient classifications to diverge from the only one that nature supports. Generally, the distinction in England has been between land and goods; however, certain types of goods have been treated as heirlooms along with the land, and particular interests in land have historically been classified alongside personal property. This is not the sole instance in which English law has diverged from the main trends of legal evolution, reflecting aspects of archaic law.

I proceed to notice one or two more contrivances by which the ancient trammels of proprietary right were more or less successfully relaxed, premising that the scheme of this treatise only permits me to mention those which are of great antiquity. On one of them in particular it is necessary to dwell for a moment or two, because persons unacquainted with the early history of law will not be easily persuaded that a principle, of which modern jurisprudence has very slowly and with the greatest difficulty obtained the recognition, was really familiar to the very infancy of legal science. There is no principle in all law which the moderns, in spite of its beneficial character, have been so loath to adopt and to carry to its legitimate consequences as that which was known to the Romans as Usucapion, and which has descended to modern jurisprudence under the name of Prescription. It was a positive rule of the oldest Roman law, a rule older than the Twelve Tables, that commodities which had been uninterruptedly possessed for a certain period became the property of the possessor. The period of possession was exceedingly short—one or two years according to the nature of the commodities—and in historical times Usucapion was only allowed to operate when possession had commenced in a particular way; but I think it likely that at a less advanced epoch possession was converted into ownership under conditions even less severe than we read of in our authorities. As I have said before, I am far from asserting that the respect of men for de facto possession is a phenomenon which jurisprudence can account for by itself, but it is very necessary to remark that primitive societies, in adopting the principle of Usucapion, were not beset with any of the speculative doubts and hesitations which have impeded its reception among the moderns. Prescriptions168 were viewed by the modern lawyers, first with repugnance, afterwards with reluctant approval. In several countries, including our own, legislation long declined to advance beyond the rude device of barring all actions based on a wrong which had been suffered earlier than a fixed point of time in the past, generally the first year of some preceding reign; nor was it till the middle ages had finally closed, and James the First had ascended the throne of England, that we obtained a true statute of limitation of a very imperfect kind. This tardiness in copying one of the most famous chapters of Roman law, which was no doubt constantly read by the majority of European lawyers, the modern world owes to the influence of the Canon Law. The ecclesiastical customs out of which the Canon Law grew, concerned as they were with sacred or quasi-sacred interests, very naturally regarded the privileges which they conferred as incapable of being lost through disuse however prolonged; and in accordance with this view, the spiritual jurisprudence, when afterwards consolidated, was distinguished by a marked leaning against Prescriptions. It was the fate of the Canon Law, when held up by the clerical lawyers as a pattern to secular legislation, to have a peculiar influence on first principles. It gave to the bodies of custom which were formed throughout Europe far fewer express rules than did the Roman law, but then it seems to have communicated a bias to professional opinion on a surprising number of fundamental points, and the tendencies thus produced progressively gained strength as each system was developed. One of the dispositions it produced was a disrelish for Prescriptions; but I do not know that this prejudice would have operated as powerfully as it has done, if it had not fallen in with the doctrine of the scholastic jurists of the realist sect, who taught that, whatever turn actual legislation might take, a right, how long soever neglected, was in point of fact indestructible. The remains of this state of feeling still exist. Wherever the philosophy of law is earnestly discussed, questions respecting the speculative basis of Prescription are always hotly disputed; and it is still a point of the greatest interest in France and Germany, whether a person who has been out of possession for a series of years is deprived of his ownership as a penalty for his neglect, or loses it through the summary interposition of the law in its desire to have a finis litium. But no such scruples troubled the mind169 of early Roman society. Their ancient usages directly took away the ownership of everybody who had been out of possession, under certain circumstances, during one or two years. What was the exact tenor of the rule of Usucapion in its earliest shape, it is not easy to say; but, taken with the limitations which we find attending it in the books, it was a most useful security against the mischiefs of a too cumbrous system of conveyance. In order to have the benefit of Usucapion, it was necessary that the adverse possession should have begun in good faith, that is, with belief on the part of the possessor that he was lawfully acquiring the property, and it was farther required that the commodity should have been transferred to him by some mode of alienation which, however unequal to conferring a complete title in the particular case, was at least recognised by the law. In the case therefore of a Mancipation, however slovenly the performance might have been, yet if it had been carried so far as to involve a Tradition or Delivery, the vice of the title would be cured by Usucapion in two years at most. I know nothing in the practice of the Romans which testifies so strongly to their legal genius as the use which they made of Usucapion. The difficulties which beset them were nearly the same with those which embarrassed and still embarrass the lawyers of England. Owing to the complexity of their system, which as yet they had neither the courage nor the power to reconstruct, actual right was constantly getting divorced from technical right, the equitable ownership from the legal. But Usucapion, as manipulated by the jurisconsults, supplied a self-acting machinery, by which the defects of titles to property were always in course of being cured, and by which the ownerships that were temporarily separated were again rapidly cemented together with the briefest possible delay. Usucapion did not lose its advantages till the reforms of Justinian. But as soon as law and equity had been completely fused, and when Mancipation ceased to be the Roman conveyance, there was no further necessity for the ancient contrivance, and Usucapion, with its periods of time considerably lengthened, became the Prescription which has at length been adopted by nearly all systems of modern law.

I notice one or two more methods by which the old constraints of property rights were somewhat successfully relaxed, noting that this treatise only allows me to discuss those that are very ancient. There's one in particular I need to focus on for a moment because people unfamiliar with the early history of law will find it hard to believe that a principle, which modern legal systems have only slowly and with great difficulty recognized, was actually known from the very beginnings of legal science. There's no principle in all of law that modern society, despite its positive effects, has resisted adopting and fully implementing as much as the one the Romans called Usucapion, which has come down to us as Prescription. This was a firm rule of the earliest Roman law, older than the Twelve Tables, stating that goods continuously possessed for a certain period would become the possessor's property. The duration of possession was very short—one or two years depending on the goods—and in historical times, Usucapion was only recognized when possession started in a specific way; but I believe that at an earlier time, possession became ownership under even less strict conditions than those we find in our sources. As I mentioned earlier, I'm not claiming that people's respect for de facto possession can be explained solely by legal theory, but it's important to note that early societies adopting Usucapion weren't burdened by the speculative uncertainties and hesitations that have hindered its acceptance in modern times. Modern lawyers initially viewed Prescriptions with disdain, then gradually accepted them reluctantly. In several countries, including our own, legislation long resisted going beyond the crude method of barring all actions based on a wrong that happened before a certain point in time in the past, usually the first year of some prior reign; it wasn't until the end of the Middle Ages and James the First took the English throne that we got a true statute of limitations, albeit a very imperfect one. This slow adoption of one of the most well-known parts of Roman law, which was undoubtedly frequently reviewed by most European lawyers, is due to the influence of Canon Law. The ecclesiastical customs from which Canon Law emerged, being connected to sacred or quasi-sacred interests, naturally viewed the privileges conferred as unlosable through disuse, no matter how long. Following this perspective, spiritual law, once consolidated, showed a clear bias against Prescriptions. The Canon Law, when presented by clerical lawyers as a model for secular legislation, had a unique impact on foundational principles. It provided far fewer clear rules to the customary laws formed throughout Europe than Roman law did, but it seems to have influenced professional opinions on a surprising number of key issues, with these tendencies growing stronger as each system evolved. One of the outcomes was a dislike for Prescriptions; however, I don't think this bias would have had such a strong effect as it has if it hadn't aligned with the views of scholastic jurists from the realist camp, who taught that, no matter what direction actual law might take, a right, no matter how long neglected, was essentially indestructible. The remnants of this sentiment are still present. Wherever the philosophy of law is seriously debated, questions about the theoretical basis of Prescription are always hotly contested; and it remains a major topic of interest in France and Germany whether someone who has been out of possession for several years loses their ownership as a penalty for neglect or loses it through the law's swift action in seeking a finis litium. But early Roman society had no such concerns. Their ancient customs simply stripped ownership from anyone who had been out of possession under certain conditions for one or two years. The exact wording of the Usucapion rule in its earliest form is not easy to determine; however, with the limitations we see in the texts, it served as a very effective safeguard against the problems caused by an overly complicated system of transfers. To benefit from Usucapion, the adverse possession had to begin in good faith, meaning the possessor believed they were lawfully acquiring the property, and it was also required that the item must have been transferred to them through some means of conveyance that, while perhaps inadequate for conferring full title in the specific case, was at least recognized by the law. Thus, in the case of a Mancipation, no matter how poorly it was carried out, if it was done enough to involve a Tradition or Delivery, the flaw in the title would be corrected by Usucapion in at most two years. I believe there's nothing in Roman practice that highlights their legal ingenuity as much as their use of Usucapion. The challenges they faced were nearly the same as those that still trouble English lawyers today. Due to the complexity of their system, which they neither had the courage nor ability to reconstruct, actual rights were constantly separating from technical rights, with equitable ownership diverging from legal ownership. But Usucapion, as utilized by the jurists, provided an automatic mechanism through which flaws in property titles were continually addressed, and temporary separations of ownership were quickly rejoined with minimal delay. Usucapion didn't lose its advantages until the reforms of Justinian. However, once law and equity merged completely, and when Mancipation ceased to be the Roman method of transfer, the old mechanism was no longer needed, and Usucapion, with its time periods significantly extended, became the Prescription that has since been adopted by nearly all modern legal systems.

I pass by with brief mention another expedient having the same object with the last, which, though it did not imme170diately make its appearance in English legal history, was of immemorial antiquity in Roman law; such indeed is its apparent age that some German civilians, not sufficiently aware of the light thrown on the subject by the analogies of English law, have thought it even older than the Mancipation. I speak of the Cessio in Jure, a collusive recovery, in a Court of law, of property sought to be conveyed. The plaintiff claimed the subject of this proceeding with the ordinary forms of a litigation; the defendant made default; and the commodity was of course adjudged to the plaintiff. I need scarcely remind the English lawyer that this expedient suggested itself to our forefathers, and produced those famous Fines and Recoveries which did so much to undo the harshest trammels of the feudal land-law. The Roman and English contrivances have very much in common and illustrate each other most instructively, but there is this difference between them, that the object of the English lawyers was to remove complications already introduced into the title, while the Roman jurisconsults sought to prevent them by substituting a mode of transfer necessarily unimpeachable for one which too often miscarried. The device is, in fact, one which suggests itself as soon as Courts of Law are in steady operation, but are nevertheless still under the empire of primitive notions. In an advanced state of legal opinion, tribunals regard collusive litigation as an abuse of their procedure; but there has always been a time when, if their forms were scrupulously complied with, they never dreamed of looking further.

I briefly mention another method that serves the same purpose as the last one, which, while it didn’t show up right away in English legal history, has deep roots in Roman law. It's so old that some German legal scholars, who aren’t fully aware of how English law sheds light on the topic, have even thought it predates the Mancipation. I’m talking about the Cessio in Jure, a collusive recovery in a court of law of property that someone wanted to transfer. The plaintiff claimed this property using the usual legal process; the defendant failed to respond, so the property was awarded to the plaintiff. I hardly need to remind English lawyers that this method was considered by our ancestors, leading to those famous Fines and Recoveries that helped to ease the strict burdens of feudal land law. The Roman and English systems have a lot in common and can teach each other a lot, but the key difference is that English lawyers aimed to eliminate complications already in the title, while Roman legal experts tried to prevent them by providing a method of transfer that was guaranteed to be valid instead of one that often failed. This method is something that comes to mind as soon as courts are actively functioning, but are still influenced by basic ideas. In a more developed legal environment, courts see collusive litigation as a misuse of their processes; however, there was always a time when, as long as their procedures were strictly followed, they never thought to question further.

The influence of Courts of Law and of their procedure upon Property has been most extensive, but the subject is too large for the dimensions of this treatise, and would carry us further down the course of legal history than is consistent with its scheme. It is desirable, however, to mention, that to this influence we must attribute the importance of the distinction between Property and Possession—not, indeed, the distinction itself, which (in the language of an eminent English civilian) is the same thing as the distinction between the legal right to act upon a thing and the physical power to do so—but the extraordinary importance which the distinction has obtained in the philosophy of law. Few educated persons are so little versed in legal literature as not to have heard that the language of the Roman jurisconsults on the subject of Possession long occasioned the greatest possible171 perplexity, and that the genius of Savigny is supposed to have chiefly proved itself by the solution which he discovered for the enigma. Possession, in fact, when employed by the Roman lawyers, appears to have contracted a shade of meaning not easily accounted for. The word, as appears from its etymology, must have originally denoted physical contact or physical contact resumeable at pleasure; but, as actually used without any qualifying epithet, it signifies not simply physical detention, but physical detention coupled with the intention to hold the thing detained as one's own. Savigny, following Niebuhr, perceived that for this anomaly there could only be a historical origin. He pointed out that the Patrician burghers of Rome, who had become tenants of the greatest part of the public domain at nominal rents, were, in the view of the old Roman law, mere possessors, but then they were possessors intending to keep their land against all comers. They, in truth, put forward a claim almost identical with that which has recently been advanced in England by the lessees of Church lands. Admitting that in theory they were the tenants-at-will of the state, they contended that time and undisturbed enjoyment had ripened their holding into a species of ownership, and that it would be unjust to eject them for the purpose of redistributing the domain. The association of this claim with the Patrician tenancies, permanently influenced the sense of "possession." Meanwhile the only legal remedies of which the tenants could avail themselves, if ejected or threatened with disturbance, were the Possessory Interdicts, summary processes of Roman law which were either expressly devised by the Prætor for their protection, or else, according to another theory, had in older times been employed for the provisional maintenance of possessions pending the settlement of questions of legal right. It came, therefore, to be understood that everybody who possessed property as his own had the power of demanding the Interdicts, and, by a system of highly artificial pleading, the Interdictal process was moulded into a shape fitted for the trial of conflicting claims to a disputed possession. Then commenced a movement which, as Mr. John Austin pointed out, exactly reproduced itself in English law. Proprietors, domini, began to prefer the simpler forms or speedier course of the Interdict to the lagging and intricate formalities of the Real Action, and for the purpose of availing themselves of172 the possessory remedy fell back upon the possession which was supposed to be involved in their proprietorship. The liberty conceded to persons who were not true Possessors, but Owners, to vindicate their rights by possessory remedies, though it may have been at first a boon, had ultimately the effect of seriously deteriorating both English and Roman jurisprudence. The Roman law owes to it those subtleties on the subject of Possession which have done so much to discredit it, while English law, after the actions which it appropriated to the recovery of real property had fallen into the most hopeless confusion, got rid at last of the whole tangled mass by a heroic remedy. No one can doubt that the virtual abolition of the English real actions which took place nearly thirty years since was a public benefit, but still persons sensitive to the harmonies of jurisprudence will lament that, instead of cleansing, improving, and simplifying the true proprietary actions, we sacrificed them all to the possessory action of ejectment, thus basing our whole system of land recovery upon a legal fiction.

The impact of Courts of Law and their procedures on Property has been significant, but the topic is too broad for this discussion and would take us deeper into legal history than intended. It’s important to note that this influence has led to the distinction between Property and Possession—not the distinction itself, which (in the words of a notable English legal expert) is akin to the difference between the legal right to act on something and the actual physical ability to do so—but the considerable importance that this distinction has gained in legal philosophy. Few educated people are so unfamiliar with legal literature that they haven’t heard how the terminology used by Roman lawyers regarding Possession once caused substantial confusion, and it’s believed that Savigny primarily established his reputation by solving this puzzle. In fact, when used by Roman lawyers, the term “Possession” seems to have developed a specific meaning that is hard to explain. Etymologically, the word must have originally referred to physical contact or contact that could be resumed at will; however, as it was used without any modifiers, it meant not just physical holding but also physical holding along with the intention to keep the item as one's own. Savigny, following Niebuhr, recognized that this anomaly likely had a historical origin. He noted that the Patrician citizens of Rome, who had become tenants of most public land at nominal rents, were seen by ancient Roman law merely as possessors, but they were also possessors intending to retain their land against anyone. They actually made a claim quite similar to that recently put forth in England by the lessees of Church lands. They acknowledged that in theory they were tenants-at-will of the state, but argued that the passage of time and undisturbed enjoyment had transformed their holding into a form of ownership and that it would be unjust to remove them in order to redistribute the land. The connection of this claim with Patrician tenancies permanently affected the understanding of “possession.” Meanwhile, the only legal remedies available to the tenants if they were evicted or threatened were the Possessory Interdicts, which were either specifically created by the Prætor for their protection or, according to another theory, had previously been used for the provisional maintenance of possessions while legal rights were determined. Thus, it became established that anyone who possessed property as their own had the right to demand the Interdicts, and through a complex system of pleading, the Interdictal process was shaped to suit the trial of conflicting claims to disputed possession. This initiated a movement that, as Mr. John Austin pointed out, mirrored itself in English law. Property owners, domini, began to prefer the straightforward forms or quicker processes of the Interdict to the cumbersome and complicated formalities of Real Actions, and in order to utilize the possessory remedy, they relied on the possession that was presumed to come with their ownership. The permission granted to individuals who were not true Possessors, but Owners, to assert their rights through possessory remedies, although initially a benefit, ultimately had the effect of significantly undermining both English and Roman law. Roman law acquired those complexities surrounding Possession that have contributed to its disrepute, while English law, after the actions it adopted for recovering real property fell into chaos, eventually eliminated the whole convoluted system through a drastic remedy. There is no doubt that the near-total abolition of English real actions nearly thirty years ago was a public benefit; however, those attuned to the nuances of legal harmony will regret that, instead of purifying, improving, and streamlining the real proprietary actions, we sacrificed all of them for the possessory action of ejectment, thus basing our entire system of land recovery on a legal fiction.

Legal tribunals have also powerfully assisted to shape and modify conceptions of proprietary right by means of the distinction between Law and Equity, which always makes its first appearance as a distinction between jurisdictions. Equitable property in England is simply property held under the jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery. At Rome, the Prætor's Edict introduced its novel principles in the guise of a promise that under certain circumstances a particular action or a particular plea would be granted; and, accordingly, the property in bonis, or Equitable Property, of Roman law was property exclusively protected by remedies which had their source in the Edict. The mechanism by which equitable rights were saved from being overridden by the claims of the legal owner was somewhat different in the two systems. With us their independence is secured by the Injunction of the Court of Chancery. Since however Law and Equity, while not as yet consolidated, were administered under the Roman system by the same Court, nothing like the Injunction was required, and the Magistrate took the simpler course of refusing to grant to the Civil Law Owner those actions and pleas by which alone he could obtain the property that belonged in equity to another. But the practical operation of both systems was nearly the same. Both, by means of a173 distinction in procedure, were able to preserve new forms of property in a sort of provisional existence, until the time should come when they were recognised by the whole law. In this way, the Roman Prætor gave an immediate right of property to the person who had acquired a Res Mancipi by mere delivery, without waiting for the ripening of Usucapion. Similarly he in time recognised an ownership in the Mortgagee who had at first been a mere "bailee" or depositary, and in the Emphyteuta, or tenant of land which was subject to a fixed perpetual rent. Following a parallel line of progress, the English Court of Chancery created a special proprietorship for the Mortgagor, for the Cestui que Trust, for the Married Woman who had the advantage of a particular kind of settlement, and for the Purchaser who had not yet acquired a complete legal ownership. All these are examples in which forms of proprietory right, distinctly new, were recognised and preserved. But indirectly Property has been affected in a thousand ways by equity both in England and at Rome. Into whatever corner of jurisprudence its authors pushed the powerful instrument in their command, they were sure to meet, and touch, and more or less materially modify the law of property. When in the preceding pages I have spoken of certain ancient legal distinctions and expedients as having powerfully affected the history of ownership, I must be understood to mean that the greatest part of their influence has arisen from the hints and suggestions of improvement infused by them into the mental atmosphere which was breathed by the fabricators of equitable systems.

Legal courts have significantly influenced how we understand property rights by creating a clear difference between Law and Equity, which initially appears as a difference in jurisdictions. Equitable property in England refers to property managed by the Court of Chancery. In Rome, the Prætor’s Edict introduced new principles as a promise that specific actions or pleas would be granted under certain circumstances. Thus, property in bonis, or Equitable Property, in Roman law was protected by remedies based on the Edict. The way equitable rights were safeguarded from being overridden by the legal owner's claims varied between the two systems. In our system, this independence is ensured by an Injunction from the Court of Chancery. However, since Law and Equity were not yet unified and were administered by the same Court in Rome, there was no need for such an Injunction; the Magistrate simply opted to deny the Civil Law Owner the actions and pleas that would allow them to obtain property that belonged to another in equity. Yet, the practical function of both systems was quite similar. Both systems preserved new forms of property in a kind of temporary state until they were fully recognized by the law through a173 process difference. For example, the Roman Prætor granted immediate property rights to someone who acquired a Res Mancipi just through delivery, without waiting for the full development of Usucapion. Similarly, he later recognized ownership for the Mortgagee, who initially was just a "bailee" or depositary, and for the Emphyteuta, or tenant of land under a fixed perpetual rent. In a similar progression, the English Court of Chancery established special property rights for the Mortgagor, the Cestui que Trust, Married Women with a special type of settlement, and for Purchasers without complete legal ownership. All these cases show how new forms of property rights were acknowledged and safeguarded. However, property has also been indirectly influenced in countless ways by equity in both England and Rome. Wherever its authors applied their powerful tool, they invariably interacted with and modified property law to some extent. When I previously discussed certain historical legal distinctions and strategies as having significantly impacted ownership history, I meant that most of their influence stemmed from the hints and suggestions of improvement they contributed to the mindset of those who created equitable systems.

But to describe the influence of Equity on Ownership would be to write its history down to our own days. I have alluded to it principally because several esteemed contemporary writers have thought that in the Roman severance of Equitable from Legal property we have the clue to that difference in the conception of Ownership, which apparently distinguishes the law of the middle ages from the law of the Roman Empire. The leading characteristic of the feudal conception is its recognition of a double proprietorship, the superior ownership of the lord of the fief co-existing with the inferior property or estate of the tenant. Now, this duplication of proprietary right looks, it is urged, extremely like a generalised form of the Roman distribution of rights over property into Quiritarian or legal, and (to use a word of late origin) Bonitarian174 or equitable. Gaius himself observes upon the splitting of dominion into two parts as a singularity of Roman law, and expressly contrasts it with the entire or allodial ownership to which other nations were accustomed. Justinian, it is true, re-consolidated dominion into one, but then it was the partially reformed system of the Western Empire, and not Justinian's jurisprudence, with which the barbarians were in contact during so many centuries. While they remained poised on the edge of the Empire, it may well be that they learned this distinction, which afterwards bore remarkable fruit. In favour of this theory, it must at all events be admitted that the element of Roman law in the various bodies of barbarian custom has been very imperfectly examined. The erroneous or insufficient theories which have served to explain Feudalism resemble each other in their tendency to draw off attention from this particular ingredient in its texture. The older investigators, who have been mostly followed in this country, attached an exclusive importance to the circumstances of the turbulent period during which the Feudal system grew to maturity; and in later times a new source of error has been added to those already existing, in that pride of nationality which has led German writers to exaggerate the completeness of the social fabric which their forefathers had built up before their appearance in the Roman world. One or two English inquirers who looked in the right quarter for the foundations of the feudal system, failed nevertheless to conduct their investigations to any satisfactory result, either from searching too exclusively for analogies in the compilations of Justinian, or from confining their attention to the compendia of Roman law which are found appended to some of the extant barbarian codes. But, if Roman jurisprudence had any influence on the barbarous societies, it had probably produced the greatest part of its effects before the legislation of Justinian, and before the preparation of these compendia. It was not the reformed and purified jurisprudence of Justinian, but the undigested system which prevailed in the Western Empire, and which the Eastern Corpus Juris never succeeded in displacing, that I conceive to have clothed with flesh and muscle the scanty skeleton of barbarous usage. The change must be supposed to have taken place before the Germanic tribes had distinctly appropriated, as conquerors, any portion of the Roman175 dominions, and therefore long before Germanic monarchs had ordered breviaries of Roman law to be drawn up for the use of their Roman subjects. The necessity for some such hypothesis will be felt by everybody who can appreciate the difference between archaic and developed law. Rude as are the Leges Barbarorum which remain to us, they are not rude enough to satisfy the theory of their purely barbarous origin; nor have we any reason for believing that we have received, in written records, more than a fraction of the fixed rules which were practised among themselves by the members of the conquering tribes. If we can once persuade ourselves that a considerable element of debased Roman law already existed in the barbarian systems, we shall have done something to remove a grave difficulty. The German law of the conquerors and the Roman law of their subjects would not have combined if they had not possessed more affinity for each other than refined jurisprudence has usually for the customs of savages. It is extremely likely that the codes of the barbarians, archaic as they seem, are only a compound of true primitive usage with half-understood Roman rules, and that it was the foreign ingredient which enabled them to coalesce with a Roman jurisprudence that had already receded somewhat from the comparative finish which it had acquired under the Western Emperors.

But to explain how Equity has influenced Ownership would be to recount its history up to the present day. I mention it primarily because several respected modern writers believe that the Roman separation of Equitable from Legal property provides insight into the differences in the concept of Ownership that seems to set apart medieval law from Roman law. The main feature of the feudal view is its acknowledgment of dual ownership, where the superior ownership of the lord of the fief exists alongside the inferior property or estate of the tenant. This duplication of property rights appears to resemble a generalized version of the Roman division of property rights into Quiritarian or legal, and (using a more recent term) Bonitarian174 or equitable. Gaius himself noted the splitting of dominion into two parts as a unique aspect of Roman law, directly contrasting it with the complete or allodial ownership that other nations were accustomed to. It is true that Justinian re-consolidated dominion into one, but it was the partially reformed system of the Western Empire, not Justinian's legal system, that the barbarians encountered for many centuries. While they lingered on the edge of the Empire, they likely learned this distinction, which later had significant repercussions. In support of this theory, it must be acknowledged that the influence of Roman law on the various bodies of barbarian customs has not been thoroughly examined. The flawed or incomplete theories that have attempted to explain Feudalism share a tendency to divert attention from this specific element in its fabric. Earlier researchers, who are mainly followed in this country, placed undue importance on the chaotic conditions during which the Feudal system developed; and in more recent times, a new source of error has arisen from a sense of national pride that has led German writers to overstate the completeness of the social structures that their ancestors created before entering the Roman world. A few English investigators who sought the true foundations of the feudal system failed to reach satisfactory conclusions, either by focusing too narrowly on parallels in Justinian's compilations or by limiting their investigations to the summaries of Roman law found attached to some existing barbarian codes. However, if Roman law influenced barbaric societies, it probably had most of its effects before the legislation of Justinian and before these summaries were prepared. It was not Justinian's refined and purified legal system, but the undigested system that prevailed in the Western Empire, which the Eastern Corpus Juris never managed to replace, that I believe shaped the scant framework of barbaric practice. This transformation must have occurred before the Germanic tribes distinctly claimed any part of the Roman175 territories as conquerors, and thus long before Germanic kings ordered compilations of Roman law for their Roman subjects. The need for such a hypothesis will be clear to anyone who can understand the difference between primitive and developed law. As primitive as the Leges Barbarorum may be, they are not primitive enough to support the theory of a purely barbaric origin; nor do we have any reason to believe that we have received, in written records, more than a small fraction of the established rules practiced among the members of the conquering tribes. If we can convince ourselves that there was a significant element of degraded Roman law already present in the barbarian systems, we will have made progress in addressing a serious challenge. The German law of the conquerors and the Roman law of their subjects would not have fused if they had not had more in common than refined law typically has with the customs of primitive societies. It is highly probable that the codes of the barbarians, as archaic as they seem, are merely a blend of true primitive practices with loosely understood Roman regulations, and that it was this foreign element that allowed them to merge with a Roman legal system that had already somewhat declined from the level of sophistication it had attained under the Western Emperors.

But, though all this must be allowed, there are several considerations which render it unlikely that the feudal form of ownership was directly suggested by the Roman duplication of domainial rights. The distinction between legal and equitable property strikes one as a subtlety little likely to be appreciated by barbarians; and, moreover, it can scarcely be understood unless Courts of Law are contemplated in regular operation. But the strongest reason against this theory is the existence in Roman Law of a form of property—a creation of Equity, it is true—which supplies a much simpler explanation of the transition from one set of ideas to the other. This is the Emphyteusis, upon which the Fief of the middle ages has often been fathered, though without much knowledge of the exact share which it had in bringing feudal ownership into the world. The truth is that the Emphyteusis, not probably as yet known by its Greek designation, marks one stage in a current of ideas which led ultimately to feudalism. The first mention in Roman history of estates larger176 than could be farmed by a Paterfamilias, with his household of sons and slaves, occurs when we come to the holdings of the Roman patricians. These great proprietors appear to have had no idea of any system of farming by free tenants. Their latifundia seem to have been universally cultivated by slave-gangs, under bailiffs who were themselves slaves or freedmen; and the only organisation attempted appears to have consisted in dividing the inferior slaves into small bodies, and making them the peculium of the better and trustier sort, who thus acquired a kind of interest in the efficiency of their labour. This system was, however, especially disadvantageous to one class of estated proprietors, the Municipalities. Functionaries in Italy were changed with the rapidity which often surprises us in the administration of Rome herself; so that the superintendence of a large landed domain by an Italian corporation must have been excessively imperfect. Accordingly, we are told that with the municipalities began the practice of letting out agri vectigules, that is, of leasing land for a perpetuity to a free tenant, at a fixed rent, and under certain conditions. The plan was afterwards extensively imitated by individual proprietors, and the tenant, whose relation to the owner had originally been determined by his contract, was subsequently recognised by the Prætor as having himself a qualified proprietorship, which in time became known as an Emphyteusis. From this point the history of tenure parts into two branches. In the course of that long period during which our records of the Roman Empire are most incomplete, the slave-gangs of the great Roman families became transformed into the coloni, whose origin and situation constitute one of the obscurest questions in all history. We may suspect that they were formed partly by the elevation of the slaves, and partly by the degradation of the free farmers; and that they prove the richer classes of the Roman Empire to have become aware of the increased value which landed property obtains when the cultivator had an interest in the produce of the land. We know that their servitude was predial; that it wanted many of the characteristics of absolute slavery, and that they acquitted their service to the landlord in rendering to him a fixed portion of the annual crop. We know further that they survived all the mutations of society in the ancient and 177modern worlds. Though included in the lower courses of the feudal structure, they continued in many countries to render to the landlord precisely the same dues which they had paid to the Roman dominus, and from a particular class among them, the coloni medietarii who reserved half the produce for the owner, are descended the metayer tenantry, who still conduct the cultivation of the soil in almost all the South of Europe. On the other hand, the Emphyteusis, if we may so interpret the allusions to it in the Corpus Juris, became a favourite and beneficial modification of property; and it may be conjectured that wherever free farmers existed, it was this tenure which regulated their interest in the land. The Prætor, as has been said, treated the Emphyteuta as a true proprietor. When ejected, he was allowed to reinstate himself by a Real Action, the distinctive badge of proprietory right, and he was protected from disturbance by the author of his lease so long as the canon, or quit-rent, was punctually paid. But at the same time it must not be supposed that the ownership of the author of the lease was either extinct or dormant. It was kept alive by a power of re-entry on nonpayment of the rent, a right of pre-emption in case of sale, and a certain control over the mode of cultivation. We have, therefore, in the Emphyteusis a striking example of the double ownership which characterised feudal property, and one, moreover, which is much simpler and much more easily imitated than the juxtaposition of legal and equitable rights. The history of the Roman tenure does not end, however, at this point. We have clear evidence that between the great fortresses which, disposed along the line of the Rhine and Danube, long secured the frontier of the Empire against its barbarian neighbours, there extended a succession of strips of land, the agri limitrophi, which were occupied by veteran soldiers of the Roman army on the terms of an Emphyteusis. There was a double ownership. The Roman State was landlord of the soil, but the soldiers cultivated it without disturbance so long as they held themselves ready to be called out for military service whenever the state of the border should require it. In fact, a sort of garrison-duty, under a system closely resembling that of the military colonies on the Austro-Turkish border, had taken the place of the quit-rent which was the service of the ordinary Emphyteuta. It seems impossible to doubt that this was the precedent copied by the 178barbarian monarchs who founded feudalism. It had been within their view for some hundred years, and many of the veterans who guarded the border were, it is to be remembered, themselves of barbarian extraction, who probably spoke the Germanic tongues. Not only does the proximity of so easily followed a model explain whence the Frankish and Lombard Sovereigns got the idea of securing the military service of their followers by granting away portions of their public domain; but it perhaps explains the tendency which immediately showed itself in the Benefices to become hereditary, for an Emphyteusis, though capable of being moulded to the terms of the original contract, nevertheless descended as a general rule to the heirs of the grantee. It is true that the holder of a benefice, and more recently the lord of one of those fiefs into which the benefices were transformed, appears to have owed certain services which were not likely to have been rendered by the military colonist, and were certainly not rendered by the Emphyteuta. The duty of respect and gratitude to the feudal superior, the obligation to assist in endowing his daughter and equipping his son, the liability to his guardianship in minority, and many other similar incidents of tenure, must have been literally borrowed from the relations of Patron and Freedman under Roman law, that is, of quondam-master and quondam-slave. But then it is known that the earliest beneficiaries were the personal companions of the sovereign, and it is indisputable that this position, brilliant as it seems, was at first attended by some shade of servile debasement. The person who ministered to the Sovereign in his Court had given up something of that absolute personal freedom which was the proudest privilege of the allodial proprietor.179

But even though all of this must be acknowledged, there are several factors that make it unlikely that the feudal system of ownership was directly inspired by the Roman separation of domain rights. The distinction between legal and equitable property seems like a subtlety that barbarians would be unlikely to grasp; moreover, it can hardly be understood without Courts of Law operating regularly. The strongest reason against this theory is the existence of a type of property in Roman Law—a creation of Equity, to be sure—which provides a much simpler explanation for the shift from one set of ideas to another. This is the Emphyteusis, from which the Fief of the Middle Ages has often been claimed, though without much understanding of its exact role in the development of feudal ownership. The truth is that the Emphyteusis, likely not yet known by its Greek name, represents one step in a series of concepts that eventually led to feudalism. The first mention in Roman history of estates larger than what could be managed by a Paterfamilias, with his household of sons and slaves, occurs when we look at the holdings of the Roman patricians. These large landowners seemed to have no concept of a farming system run by free tenants. Their latifundia appear to have been worked exclusively by slave gangs, overseen by bailiffs who were themselves slaves or freedmen; and the only organization attempted consisted of dividing the lesser slaves into small groups, making them the peculium of the more capable and trustworthy slaves, who thus developed a sort of interest in the effectiveness of their labor. However, this system was especially disadvantageous for one group of landowners: the Municipalities. Officials in Italy were replaced with a speed that often surprises us in the administration of Rome itself, meaning that the management of a large landhold by an Italian corporation must have been quite ineffective. Consequently, we learn that with the municipalities began the practice of leasing agri vectigules, which is to say leasing land for an indefinite term to a free tenant, at a fixed rent, and under certain conditions. This approach was later widely imitated by individual proprietors, and the tenant, whose relationship with the owner had originally been defined by his contract, was subsequently recognized by the Prætor as having a qualified form of ownership that eventually became known as Emphyteusis. From this point onward, the history of tenancy diverges into two paths. During that long period when our records of the Roman Empire are most lacking, the slave gangs of the great Roman families transformed into the coloni, whose origins and status remain one of the most obscure topics in all history. We may suspect that they emerged partly from the elevation of slaves and partly from the decline of free farmers, and that they indicate that the wealthier classes of the Roman Empire became aware of the increased value that land has when the cultivator has a stake in the yield of the land. We know that their servitude was tied to the land; it lacked many features of absolute slavery, and they compensated their landlord by paying a fixed share of the annual harvest. Furthermore, we know that they survived all the changes in society in both the ancient and modern worlds. Although they fell into the lower tiers of the feudal system, they continued in many regions to pay the same dues to the landlord that they had paid to the Roman dominus, and from a specific group among them, the coloni medietarii who set aside half the harvest for the owner, are descended the metayer tenants, who still manage agricultural work throughout much of Southern Europe. On the other hand, the Emphyteusis, if we can interpret its references in the Corpus Juris, became a popular and beneficial form of property, and it can be speculated that wherever free farmers existed, it was this type of tenancy that governed their interest in the land. The Prætor, as previously mentioned, treated the Emphyteuta as a true owner. When evicted, he was allowed to reestablish himself through a Real Action, the definitive sign of property rights, and he was protected from being disturbed by the author of his lease as long as the canon, or quit-rent, was paid on time. However, it should not be assumed that the ownership of the author of the lease was either extinguished or inactive. It was maintained by a right to reclaim the land for non-payment of rent, a right of first refusal in case of sale, and some oversight over the method of cultivation. Therefore, the Emphyteusis is a clear example of the dual ownership that characterized feudal property, and one that is much simpler and easier to imitate than the juxtaposition of legal and equitable rights. The history of Roman tenure, however, does not conclude here. There is clear evidence that between the large fortifications that lined the Rhine and Danube rivers, securing the Empire’s border against its barbarian neighbors, there lay a series of strips of land, the agri limitrophi, which were occupied by veteran soldiers of the Roman army under an Emphyteusis arrangement. There was a dual ownership. The Roman State was the landlord of the soil, but the soldiers farmed it without interference as long as they were prepared to be called up for military duty whenever the state of the border required it. In fact, a kind of garrison duty, following a system very similar to that of military colonies on the Austro-Turkish border, had replaced the quit-rent usually required from the ordinary Emphyteuta. It seems undeniable that this was the model copied by the 178barbarian kings who established feudalism. They had been observing it for hundreds of years, and many of the veterans guarding the border were, it should be noted, themselves of barbarian descent, likely speaking Germanic languages. Not only does this close model clarify where the Frankish and Lombard rulers got the idea of securing the military service of their followers by granting portions of their public land, but it perhaps also explains the immediate tendency of Benefices to become hereditary, as an Emphyteusis, though adaptable to the terms of the original contract, generally passed down to the heirs of the grantee. It’s true that the holder of a benefice, and more recently the lord of one of those fiefs into which the benefices eventually transformed, seems to have owed certain services that were unlikely to have been performed by the military colonist, and were certainly not provided by the Emphyteuta. The duty of loyalty and gratitude to the feudal superior, the obligation to assist in marrying off his daughter and equipping his son, the responsibility for his guardianship during minority, and many other similar aspects of tenure were likely borrowed literally from the relationships of Patron and Freedman in Roman law, that is, from the former master and former slave. But it is known that the earliest beneficiaries were the personal attendants of the sovereign, and it is undeniable that this seemingly prestigious position initially came with a degree of servile diminishment. The individual who served the Sovereign in his Court had given up some of that absolute personal freedom which was the proudest privilege of the allodial landowner.179


CHAPTER IX

the history of contracts

There are few general propositions concerning the age to which we belong which seem at first sight likely to be received with readier concurrence than the assertion that the society of our day is mainly distinguished from that of preceding generations by the largeness of the sphere which is occupied in it by Contract. Some of the phenomena on which this proposition rests are among those most frequently singled out for notice, for comment, and for eulogy. Not many of us are so unobservant as not to perceive that in innumerable cases where old law fixed a man's social position irreversibly at his birth, modern law allows him to create it for himself by convention; and indeed several of the few exceptions which remain to this rule are constantly denounced with passionate indignation. The point, for instance, which is really debated in the vigorous controversy still carried on upon the subject of negro servitude, is whether the status of the slave does not belong to bygone institutions, and whether the only relation between employer and labourer which commends itself to modern morality be not a relation determined exclusively by contract. The recognition of this difference between past ages and the present enters into the very essence of the most famous contemporary speculations. It is certain that the science of Political Economy, the only department of moral inquiry which has made any considerable progress in our day, would fail to correspond with the facts of life if it were not true that Imperative Law had abandoned the largest part of the field which it once occupied, and had left men to settle rules of conduct for themselves with a liberty never allowed to them till recently. The bias indeed of most persons trained in political economy is to consider the general truth on which their science reposes as entitled to become universal, and, when they apply it as an art, their efforts are ordinarily directed to enlarging the province of Contract and to curtailing that of Imperative Law, except so far as law180 is necessary to enforce the performance of Contracts. The impulse given by thinkers who are under the influence of these ideas is beginning to be very strongly felt in the Western world. Legislation has nearly confessed its inability to keep pace with the activity of man in discovery, in invention, and in the manipulation of accumulated wealth; and the law even of the least advanced communities tends more and more to become a mere surface-stratum having under it an ever-changing assemblage of contractual rules with which it rarely interferes except to compel compliance with a few fundamental principles or unless it be called in to punish the violation of good faith.

There are few general ideas about our current age that seem more likely to be agreed upon than the statement that today’s society is mainly set apart from earlier generations by the significant role of Contract. Some of the evidence supporting this idea is among those most often highlighted for attention, discussion, and praise. Not many of us are so oblivious as to miss that, in countless situations where old laws fixed a person’s social status at birth, modern laws allow individuals to create their own status through agreements; in fact, several of the few exceptions to this trend are frequently criticized with intense indignation. For example, the real issue debated in the ongoing heated discussions about slavery is whether the condition of the slave belongs to outdated systems, and whether the only acceptable relationship between employer and worker in today’s moral framework is one strictly defined by contract. Acknowledging this difference between past and present is fundamental to the most renowned contemporary theories. It's clear that the field of Political Economy, the only area of moral study that has made significant strides in our time, would not align with the realities of life if it were not true that mandatory laws have relinquished much of their previous territory, leaving people to establish their own conduct rules with a level of freedom they had never experienced until recently. The tendency of most individuals trained in political economy is to view the general principle their field is based on as deserving universal application, and when they practice it as a discipline, they typically focus on expanding the domain of Contract while limiting that of Mandatory Law, except where the law is needed to enforce contract compliance. The motivation sparked by thinkers influenced by these ideas is beginning to be strongly felt in the Western world. Legislation has nearly admitted its inability to keep up with human activity in discovery, invention, and the management of amassed wealth; and the law, even in the least developed communities, increasingly resembles just a surface layer under which an ever-changing set of contractual rules exists, rarely intervening except to enforce a few fundamental principles or to punish breaches of good faith.

Social inquiries, so far as they depend on the consideration of legal phenomena, are in so backward a condition that we need not be surprised at not finding these truths recognised in the commonplaces which pass current concerning the progress of society. These commonplaces answer much more to our prejudices than to our convictions. The strong disinclination of most men to regard morality as advancing seems to be especially powerful when the virtues on which Contract depends are in question, and many of us have almost instinctive reluctance to admitting that good faith and trust in our fellows are more widely diffused than of old, or that there is anything in contemporary manners which parallels the loyalty of the antique world. From time to time, these prepossessions are greatly strengthened by the spectacle of frauds, unheard of before the period at which they were observed, and astonishing from their complication as well as shocking from criminality. But the very character of these frauds shows clearly that, before they became possible, the moral obligations of which they are the breach must have been more than proportionately developed. It is the confidence reposed and deserved by the many which affords facilities for the bad faith of the few, so that, if colossal examples of dishonesty occur, there is no surer conclusion than that scrupulous honesty is displayed in the average of the transactions which, in the particular case, have supplied the delinquent with his opportunity. If we insist on reading the history of morality as reflected in jurisprudence, by turning our eyes not on the law of Contract but on the law of Crime, we must be careful that we read it aright. The only form of dishonesty treated of in the most ancient Roman law is181 Theft. At the moment at which I write, the newest chapter in the English criminal law is one which attempts to prescribe punishment for the frauds of Trustees. The proper inference from this contrast is not that the primitive Romans practised a higher morality than ourselves. We should rather say that, in the interval between their days and ours, morality has advanced from a very rude to a highly refined conception—from viewing the rights of property as exclusively sacred, to looking upon the rights growing out of the mere unilateral reposal of confidence as entitled to the protection of the penal law.

Social inquiries that rely on legal phenomena are in such a poor state that it's not surprising we don't see these truths reflected in the common beliefs about societal progress. These beliefs often align more with our biases than with our actual convictions. Many people seem especially resistant to viewing morality as something that's improving, particularly when it comes to the virtues underlying contracts. A lot of us have an almost instinctual hesitation to accept that trust and good faith among people are more widespread now than in the past, or that contemporary behavior can be compared to the loyalty found in ancient times. Occasionally, these biases are reinforced by witnessing frauds that are unprecedented and shocking both in their complexity and in their criminal nature. However, the very nature of these frauds indicates that, before they could occur, the moral obligations they violate must have been significantly more developed. It's the trust that is generally placed and earned by the majority that creates opportunities for the dishonesty of the few. So, if we see massive examples of dishonesty, the clear conclusion is that there's a high level of honesty in the typical transactions that allowed the wrongdoer to exploit their chance. If we choose to examine morality through the lens of law, focusing on crime rather than contracts, we need to be cautious in our interpretation. The only type of dishonesty addressed in the earliest Roman law is181 theft. Currently, the latest chapter in English criminal law deals with punishing the frauds committed by trustees. The correct takeaway from this contrast isn't that the early Romans had a higher moral standard than we do. Instead, we should argue that, over the time between their era and ours, morality has shifted from a very basic understanding to a much more sophisticated one—from viewing property rights as exclusively sacred to recognizing that rights arising from mere unilateral trust should also be protected by the law.

The definite theories of jurists are scarcely nearer the truth in this point than the opinions of the multitude. To begin with the views of the Roman lawyers, we find them inconsistent with the true history of moral and legal progress. One class of contracts, in which the plighted faith of the contracting parties was the only material ingredient, they specifically denominated Contracts juris gentium, and though these contracts were undoubtedly the latest born into the Roman system, the expression employed implies, if a definite meaning be extracted from it, that they were more ancient than certain other forms of engagement treated of in Roman law, in which the neglect of a mere technical formality was as fatal to the obligation as misunderstanding or deceit. But then the antiquity to which they were referred was vague, shadowy, and only capable of being understood through the Present; nor was it until the language of the Roman lawyers became the language of an age which had lost the key to their mode of thought that a "Contract of the Law of Nations" came to be distinctly looked upon as a Contract known to man in a State of Nature. Rousseau adopted both the juridical and the popular error. In the Dissertation on the effects of Art and Science upon Morals, the first of his works which attracted attention and the one in which he states most unreservedly the opinions which made him the founder of a sect, the veracity and good faith attributed to the ancient Persians are repeatedly pointed out as traits of primitive innocence which have been gradually obliterated by civilisation; and at a later period he found a basis for all his speculations in the doctrine of an original Social Contract. The Social Contract or Compact is the most systematic form which has ever been assumed by the error we are discussing.182 It is a theory which, though nursed into importance by political passions, derived all its sap from the speculations of lawyers. True it certainly is that the famous Englishmen, for whom it had first had attraction, valued it chiefly for its political serviceableness, but, as I shall presently attempt to explain, they would never have arrived at it, if politicians had not long conducted their controversies in legal phraseology. Nor were the English authors of the theory blind to that speculative amplitude which recommended it so strongly to the Frenchmen who inherited it from them. Their writings show they perceived that it could be made to account for all social, quite as well as for all political phenomena. They had observed the fact, already striking in their day, that of the positive rules obeyed by men, the greater part were created by Contract, the lesser by Imperative Law. But they were ignorant or careless of the historical relation of these two constituents of jurisprudence. It was for the purpose, therefore, of gratifying their speculative tastes by attributing all jurisprudence to a uniform source, as much as with the view of eluding the doctrines which claimed a divine parentage for Imperative Law, that they devised the theory that all Law had its origin in Contract. In another stage of thought, they would have been satisfied to leave their theory in the condition of an ingenious hypothesis or a convenient verbal formula. But that age was under the dominion of legal superstitions. The State of Nature had been talked about till it had ceased to be regarded as paradoxical, and hence it seemed easy to give a fallacious reality and definiteness to the contractual origin of Law by insisting on the Social Compact as a historical fact.

The definitive theories of legal experts aren’t much closer to the truth on this point than the opinions of the masses. Looking at the views of Roman lawyers, we see they conflict with the actual history of moral and legal development. One category of contracts, where the promised trust of the parties involved was the only key element, was specifically called Contracts juris gentium. Even though these contracts were definitely the newest in the Roman system, the term suggests—if you pull a clear meaning from it—that they were older than certain other types of agreements discussed in Roman law, where ignoring a mere technicality was just as damaging to the obligation as misunderstanding or deceit. However, the ancient origins they referred to were vague and shadowy, understandable only through the present. It wasn’t until the Roman lawyers’ language became that of a time that had lost the key to their way of thinking that a "Contract of the Law of Nations" was clearly viewed as a contract known to humanity in a state of nature. Rousseau fell into both the legal and the popular trap. In his first notable work, the Dissertation on the effects of Art and Science on Morals, where he openly expresses the opinions that made him the founder of a movement, he repeatedly points out the honesty and good faith attributed to ancient Persians as traits of primitive innocence that have gradually been erased by civilization. Later on, he built his theories on the idea of an original Social Contract. The Social Contract or Compact represents the most organized form of the error we’re discussing. This theory, although fueled by political passions, drew all its substance from legal speculations. It’s true that the famous English figures who first found it appealing valued it mainly for its political usefulness, but, as I will explain shortly, they would never have reached it if politicians hadn’t long argued their points using legal language. The English creators of the theory were not oblivious to the speculative scope that made it so attractive to the French who adopted it from them. Their writings show they recognized it could explain all social as well as all political phenomena. They noted, as was already striking in their time, that most of the positive rules governing people were established by contracts, with fewer created by imperative law. Yet, they were either unaware or indifferent to the historical relationship between these two parts of law. Therefore, to satisfy their speculative interests by attributing all law to a single source, and also to avoid doctrines that claimed a divine origin for imperative law, they developed the theory that all law originated from contracts. In a different perspective, they might have been content to keep their theory as a clever hypothesis or a practical phrase. But that era was dominated by legal superstitions. The State of Nature had been discussed so much that it ceased to seem paradoxical, which made it appear easy to give a misleading sense of reality and certainty to the contractual origin of law by insisting on the Social Compact as a historical fact.182

Our own generation has got rid of these erroneous juridical theories, partly by outgrowing the intellectual state to which they belong, and partly by almost ceasing to theorise on such subjects altogether. The favourite occupation of active minds at the present moment, and the one which answers to the speculations of our forefathers on the origin of the social state, is the analysis of society as it exists and moves before our eyes; but, through omitting to call in the assistance of history, this analysis too often degenerates into an idle exercise of curiosity, and is especially apt to incapacitate the inquirer for comprehending states of society which differ considerably from that to which he is accustomed. The mistake of judging183 the men of other periods by the morality of our own day has its parallel in the mistake of supposing that every wheel and bolt in the modern social machine had its counterpart in more rudimentary societies. Such impressions ramify very widely, and masque themselves very subtly, in historical works written in the modern fashion; but I find the trace of their presence in the domain of jurisprudence in the praise which is frequently bestowed on the little apologue of Montesquieu concerning the Troglodytes, inserted in the Lettres Persanes. The Troglodytes were a people who systematically violated their Contracts, and so perished utterly. If the story bears the moral which its author intended, and is employed to expose an anti-social heresy by which this century and the last have been threatened, it is most unexceptionable; but if the inference be obtained from it that society could not possibly hold together without attaching a sacredness to promises and agreements which should be on something like a par with the respect that is paid to them by a mature civilisation, it involves an error so grave as to be fatal to all sound understanding of legal history. The fact is that the Troglodytes have flourished and founded powerful states with very small attention to the obligations of Contract. The point which before all others has to be apprehended in the constitution of primitive societies is that the individual creates for himself few or no rights, and few or no duties. The rules which he obeys are derived first from the station into which he is born, and next from the imperative commands addressed to him by the chief of the household of which he forms part. Such a system leaves the very smallest room for Contract. The members of the same family (for so we may interpret the evidence) are wholly incapable of contracting with each other, and the family is entitled to disregard the engagements by which any one of its subordinate members has attempted to bind it. Family, it is true, may contract with family, chieftain with chieftain, but the transaction is one of the same nature, and encumbered by as many formalities, as the alienation of property, and the disregard of one iota of the performance is fatal to the obligation. The positive duty resulting from one man's reliance on the word of another is among the slowest conquests of advancing civilisation.

Our generation has moved beyond these outdated legal theories, partly because we've outgrown the mindset they come from, and partly because we've nearly stopped theorizing about such topics altogether. Right now, the main focus of active minds, which parallels the thoughts of our ancestors on the origins of society, is the examination of society as it currently exists and functions. However, by failing to incorporate historical context, this analysis often turns into a pointless exercise of curiosity and can hinder the investigator's ability to understand societies that are significantly different from their own. The error of judging people from different eras by today's standards of morality is similar to the mistake of assuming that every piece of the modern social machine had its equivalent in simpler societies. These misconceptions spread widely and subtly disguise themselves in historical works written in a contemporary style; I particularly notice their presence in the field of law through the praise given to Montesquieu's little tale about the Troglodytes, which is included in the Lettres Persanes. The Troglodytes were a people who systematically broke their contracts and ultimately perished. If the story conveys the moral intended by its author and is used to highlight an anti-social belief that has threatened us in this century and the last, then it is perfectly acceptable. However, if the takeaway is that society could not possibly maintain itself without treating promises and agreements with a sacred respect similar to that found in a mature civilization, it leads to an error so serious that it undermines any accurate understanding of legal history. The reality is that the Troglodytes thrived and established strong states with little regard for contractual obligations. The primary thing to understand about primitive societies is that individuals create few or no rights or duties for themselves. The rules they follow are primarily derived from their social status at birth and the direct orders given by the head of the household they belong to. This system allows minimal space for contracts. Family members (as the evidence suggests) are completely unable to contract with one another, and the family can ignore any commitments that one of its members has tried to impose. Families can indeed enter contracts with each other, and chiefs can contract with other chiefs, but these transactions are similar in nature and burdened by as many formalities as property transfers, where failing to fulfill even a single aspect nullifies the obligation. The positive duty that arises from one person relying on another's word is one of the slowest achievements of advancing civilization.

Neither Ancient Law nor any other source of evidence discloses to us society entirely destitute of the conception of184 Contract. But the conception, when it first shows itself, is obviously rudimentary. No trustworthy primitive record can be read without perceiving that the habit of mind which induces us to make good a promise is as yet imperfectly developed, and that acts of flagrant perfidy are often mentioned without blame and sometimes described with approbation. In the Homeric literature, for instance, the deceitful cunning of Ulysses appears as a virtue of the same rank with the prudence of Nestor, the constancy of Hector, and the gallantry of Achilles. Ancient law is still more suggestive of the distance which separates the crude form of Contract from its maturity. At first, nothing is seen like the interposition of law to compel the performance of a promise. That which the law arms with its sanctions is not a promise, but a promise accompanied with a solemn ceremonial. Not only are formalities of equal importance with the promise itself, but they are, if anything, of greater importance; for that delicate analysis which mature jurisprudence applies to the conditions of mind under which a particular verbal assent is given appears, in ancient law, to be transferred to the words and gestures of the accompanying performance. No pledge is enforced if a single form be omitted or misplaced, but, on the other hand, if the forms can be shown to have been accurately proceeded with, it is of no avail to plead that the promise was made under duress or deception. The transmutation of this ancient view into the familiar notion of a Contract is plainly seen in the history of jurisprudence. First one or two steps in the ceremonial are dispensed with; then the others are simplified or permitted to be neglected on certain conditions; lastly, a few specific contracts are separated from the rest and allowed to be entered into without form, the selected contracts being those on which the activity and energy of social intercourse depends. Slowly, but most distinctly, the mental engagement isolates itself amid the technicalities, and gradually becomes the sole ingredient on which the interest of the jurisconsult is concentrated. Such a mental engagement, signified through external acts, the Romans called a Pact or Convention; and when the Convention has once been conceived as the nucleus of a Contract, it soon becomes the tendency of advancing jurisprudence to break away the external shell of form and ceremony. Forms are thenceforward only retained so far185 as they are guarantees of authenticity, and securities for caution and deliberation. The idea of a Contract is fully developed, or, to employ the Roman phrase, Contracts are absorbed in Pacts.

Neither Ancient Law nor any other source of evidence reveals a society completely lacking the concept of184 Contract. However, when this idea first appears, it's clearly in a basic form. Any reliable primitive record shows that the mental habit that drives us to honor a promise is still not fully developed, and acts of blatant betrayal are often mentioned without criticism and sometimes even regarded positively. For example, in Homeric literature, the deceitful cleverness of Ulysses is viewed as a virtue on par with the wisdom of Nestor, the loyalty of Hector, and the bravery of Achilles. Ancient law further highlights the gap between the rough form of Contract and its more mature understanding. At first, there’s no sign of law enforcing the fulfillment of a promise. What the law supports with its penalties is not just a promise but a promise alongside a formal ceremony. Not only are the formalities as important as the promise itself, they may even be more crucial; the detailed analysis that mature legal theory applies to the mental conditions under which a specific verbal agreement is made seems, in ancient law, to focus instead on the words and gestures of the accompanying performance. No pledge is enforced if any single form is missing or incorrect, but on the other hand, if the forms are proven to have been properly followed, it doesn’t matter if the promise was made under pressure or deceit. The transformation of this ancient perspective into the modern notion of a Contract is clearly evident in the history of legal development. Initially, a step or two in the ceremony is omitted; then the remaining steps are simplified or allowed to be skipped under certain conditions; finally, some specific contracts are distinguished from others and can be made without formality, with those being the contracts essential to active social interaction. Gradually, but clearly, the mental commitment stands out from the technical aspects, becoming the main focus of legal interest. Such a commitment, expressed through external actions, was termed a Pact or Convention by the Romans; and once the Convention is recognized as the core of a Contract, advancing legal thought tends to peel away the external forms and ceremonies. From then on, forms are kept only as far as they serve as guarantees of authenticity and ensure caution and thoughtfulness. The concept of a Contract is fully developed, or, to use the Roman term, Contracts are absorbed in Pacts.

The history of this course of change in Roman law is exceedingly instructive. At the earliest dawn of the jurisprudence, the term in use for a Contract was one which is very familiar to the students of historical Latinity. It was nexum, and the parties to the contract were said to be nexi, expressions which must be carefully attended to on account of the singular durableness of the metaphor on which they are founded. The notion that persons under a contractual engagement are connected together by a strong bond or chain, continued till the last to influence the Roman jurisprudence of Contract; and flowing thence it has mixed itself with modern ideas. What then was involved in this nexum or bond? A definition which has descended to us from one of the Latin antiquarians describes nexum as omne quod geritur per æs et libram, "every transaction with the copper and the balance," and these words have occasioned a good deal of perplexity. The copper and the balance are the well-known accompaniments of the Mancipation, the ancient solemnity described in a former chapter, by which the right of ownership in the highest form of Roman Property was transferred from one person to another. Mancipation was a conveyance, and hence has arisen the difficulty, for the definition thus cited appears to confound Contracts and Conveyances, which in the philosophy of jurisprudence are not simply kept apart, but are actually opposed to each other. The jus in re, right in rem, right "availing against all the world," or Proprietary Right, is sharply distinguished by the analyst of mature jurisprudence from the jus ad rem, right in personam, right "availing a single individual or group," or obligation. Now Conveyances transfer Proprietary Rights, Contracts create Obligations—how then can the two be included under the same name or same general conception? This, like many similar embarrassments, has been occasioned by the error of ascribing to the mental condition of an unformed society a faculty which pre-eminently belongs to an advanced stage of intellectual development, the faculty of distinguishing in speculation ideas which are blended in practice. We have indications not to be mistaken of a state186 of social affairs in which Conveyances and Contracts were practically confounded; nor did the discrepance of the conceptions become perceptible till men had begun to adopt a distinct practice in contracting and conveying.

The history of the changes in Roman law is very enlightening. At the very beginning of legal studies, the term used for a contract was one that is quite familiar to those who study historical Latin. It was nexum, and the parties involved in the contract were referred to as nexi. These terms should be noted carefully because they are based on a metaphor that has proven to be very enduring. The idea that people in a contractual agreement are linked by a strong bond or chain continued to influence Roman contract law up until the end; this concept has then blended with modern ideas. So what did this nexum or bond involve? A definition passed down to us from one of the Latin antiquarians describes nexum as omne quod geritur per æs et libram, "every transaction with the copper and the balance," and this has caused quite a bit of confusion. The copper and the balance are well-known elements of Mancipation, the ancient ritual described in a previous chapter, through which ownership of the highest form of Roman property was transferred from one person to another. Mancipation was a conveyance, which creates a complexity, as the cited definition seems to mix up Contracts and Conveyances, which, in legal philosophy, are not just kept separate, but are actually opposed to each other. The jus in re, right in rem, which is a right "applicable against everyone," or Proprietary Right, is clearly distinguished by the analyst of mature legal thought from the jus ad rem, right in personam, which is a right "applicable to a specific individual or group," or obligation. Now, Conveyances transfer Proprietary Rights, while Contracts create Obligations—so how can the two be categorized under the same name or concept? This, like many similar confusions, has arisen from the mistake of attributing to an undeveloped society a capability that primarily belongs to a more advanced stage of intellectual development, the ability to distinguish in theory ideas that are mixed in practice. We have unmistakable signs of a social situation in which Conveyances and Contracts were practically indistinguishable; and it wasn't until people began to adopt distinct practices in contracting and conveying that the difference between the concepts became noticeable.

It may here be observed that we know enough of ancient Roman law to give some idea of the mode of transformation followed by legal conceptions and by legal phraseology in the infancy of Jurisprudence. The change which they undergo appears to be a change from general to special; or, as we might otherwise express it, the ancient conceptions and the ancient terms are subjected to a process of gradual specialisation. An ancient legal conception corresponds not to one but to several modern conceptions. An ancient technical expression serves to indicate a variety of things which in modern law have separate names allotted to them. If however we take up the history of Jurisprudence at the next stage, we find that the subordinate conceptions have gradually disengaged themselves and that the old general names are giving way to special appellations. The old general conception is not obliterated, but it has ceased to cover more than one or a few of the notions which it first included. So too the old technical name remains, but it discharges only one of the functions which it once performed. We may exemplify this phenomenon in various ways. Patriarchal Power of all sorts appears, for instance, to have been once conceived as identical in character, and it was doubtless distinguished by one name. The Power exercised by the ancestor was the same whether it was exercised over the family or the material property—over flocks, herds, slaves, children, or wife. We cannot be absolutely certain of its old Roman name, but there is very strong reason for believing, from the number of expressions indicating shades of the notion of power into which the word manus enters, that the ancient general term was manus. But, when Roman law has advanced a little, both the name and the idea have become specialised. Power is discriminated, both in word and in conception, according to the object over which it is exerted. Exercised over material commodities or slaves, it has become dominium—over children, it is Potestas—over free persons whose services have been made away to another by their own ancestor, it is mancipium—over a wife, it is still manus. The old word, it will be perceived, has not altogether fallen187 into desuetude, but is confined to one very special exercise of the authority it had formerly denoted. This example will enable us to comprehend the nature of the historical alliance between Contracts and Conveyances. There seems to have been one solemn ceremonial at first for all solemn transactions, and its name at Rome appears to have been nexum. Precisely the same forms which were in use when a conveyance of property was effected seem to have been employed in the making of a contract. But we have not very far to move onwards before we come to a period at which the notion of a Contract has disengaged itself from the notion of a Conveyance. A double change has thus taken place. The transaction "with the copper and the balance," when intended to have for its office the transfer of property, is known by the new and special name of Mancipation. The ancient Nexum still designates the same ceremony, but only when it is employed for the special purpose of solemnising a contract.

It can be noted that we know enough about ancient Roman law to get an idea of how legal concepts and language transformed during the early days of jurisprudence. The change they experienced seems to be a shift from general to specific; or, to put it another way, ancient concepts and terms went through a gradual process of specialization. An ancient legal concept corresponds to multiple modern concepts. An ancient technical term refers to a range of things that now have distinct names in modern law. However, if we examine the history of jurisprudence at the next phase, we find that the subordinate concepts have gradually separated, and the old general terms are giving way to specific names. The old general concept hasn't disappeared, but it now only applies to one or a few of the ideas it once covered. Similarly, the old technical term still exists, but it now serves only one of the functions it used to perform. We can illustrate this phenomenon in various ways. Patriarchal power, for example, seems to have once been understood as having the same character, likely identified by a single name. The power held by the ancestor was the same whether exercised over the family or property—over flocks, herds, slaves, children, or a wife. We can't be entirely certain of its old Roman name, but there's strong evidence suggesting, based on the number of terms that suggest nuances of the concept of power associated with the word manus, that the ancient general term was indeed manus. However, as Roman law progressed, both the name and the concept became specialized. Power is differentiated, both in terminology and conception, depending on the object it’s exerted over. When applied to material goods or slaves, it became dominium—over children, it is Potestas—over free people who have been sold into servitude by their own ancestor, it is mancipium—and over a wife, it remains manus. The old term, it should be noted, hasn't completely fallen out of use, but is now limited to a very specific exercise of the authority it used to represent. This example helps us understand the historical connection between contracts and conveyances. Initially, there seems to have been one formal ceremony for all significant transactions, which in Rome was called nexum. The same procedures used to transfer property also appeared in contract formation. However, it doesn't take long before we reach a point where the idea of a contract has separated from the idea of a conveyance. Thus, a double change has occurred. The transaction "with the copper and the balance," meant for transferring property, is now referred to by the new and specific name of Mancipation. The ancient Nexum still signifies the same ceremony but is only used for the particular purpose of formalizing a contract.

When two or three legal conceptions are spoken of as anciently blended in one, it is not intended to imply that some one of the included notions may not be older than the others, or, when those others have been formed, may not greatly predominate over and take precedence over them. The reason why one legal conception continues so long to cover several conceptions, and one technical phrase to do instead of several, is doubtless that practical changes are accomplished in the law of primitive societies long before men see occasion to notice or name them. Though I have said that Patriarchal Power was not at first distinguished according to the objects over which it was exercised, I feel sure that Power over Children was the root of the old conception of Power; and I cannot doubt that the earliest use of the Nexum, and the one primarily regarded by those who resorted to it, was to give proper solemnity to the alienation of property. It is likely that a very slight perversion of the Nexum from its original functions first gave rise to its employment in Contracts, and that the very slightness of the change long prevented its being appreciated or noticed. The old name remained because men had not become conscious that they wanted a new one; the old notion clung to the mind because nobody had seen reason to be at the pains of examining it. We have had the process clearly exemplified188 in the history of Testaments. A Will was at first a simple conveyance of property. It was only the enormous practical difference that gradually showed itself between this particular conveyance and all others which caused it to be regarded separately, and even as it was, centuries elapsed before the ameliorators of law cleared away the useless encumbrance of the nominal mancipation, and consented to care for nothing in the Will but the expressed intentions of the Testator. It is unfortunate that we cannot track the early history of Contracts with the same absolute confidence as the early history of Wills, but we are not quite without hints that contracts first showed themselves through the nexum being put to a new use and afterwards obtained recognition as distinct transactions through the important practical consequences of the experiment. There is some, but not very violent, conjecture in the following delineation of the process. Let us conceive a sale for ready money as the normal type of the Nexum. The seller brought the property of which he intended to dispose—a slave, for example—the purchaser attended with the rough ingots of copper which served for money—and an indispensable assistant, the libripens, presented himself with a pair of scales. The slave with certain fixed formalities was handed over to the vendee—the copper was weighed by the libripens and passed to the vendor. So long as the business lasted it was a nexum, and the parties were nexi; but the moment it was completed, the nexum ended, and the vendor and purchaser ceased to bear the name derived from their momentary relation. But now, let us move a step onward in commercial history. Suppose the slave transferred, but the money not paid. In that case, the nexum is finished, so far as the seller is concerned, and when he has once handed over his property, he is no longer nexus; but, in regard to the purchaser, the nexum continues. The transaction, as to his part of it, is incomplete, and he is still considered to be nexus. It follows, therefore, that the same term described the Conveyance by which the right of property was transmitted, and the personal obligation of the debtor for the unpaid purchase-money. We may still go forward, and picture to ourselves a proceeding wholly formal, in which nothing is handed over and nothing paid; we are brought at once to a transaction indicative of much higher commercial activity, an executory Contract of Sale.189

When two or three legal concepts are described as being combined for a long time, it doesn’t mean that any of the included ideas can’t be older than the others, or that once those other ideas formed, one might not dominate and take precedence over the rest. The reason one legal concept continues to encompass several ideas, and one technical term can replace multiple ones, is likely because practical changes happen in the law of early societies long before people notice or name them. Although I mentioned that Patriarchal Power wasn’t initially classified by the subjects over which it was exercised, I strongly believe that Power over Children was the foundation of the old idea of Power; and I have no doubt that the original use of the Nexum, and the one first considered by those who used it, was to formalize the transfer of property. It’s probable that a very slight alteration of the Nexum from its original purpose first led to its use in Contracts, and that this minor change prevented it from being fully recognized or acknowledged for a long time. The old name remained because people weren’t aware they needed a new one; the old idea persisted in people’s minds because no one had taken the trouble to analyze it. We have a clear example of this process in the history of Wills. A Will originally was just a simple transfer of property. It was only the significant practical difference that eventually emerged between this type of transfer and all others that led it to be seen as distinct, and even so, centuries went by before those improving the law eliminated the unnecessary burden of the nominal mancipation, agreeing to focus solely on the expressed intentions of the Testator. It’s unfortunate that we can’t trace the early history of Contracts with the same level of confidence as we can with Wills, but we do have some clues suggesting that contracts initially emerged when the nexum was repurposed, and later gained recognition as separate transactions due to the important practical outcomes of this change. There’s some speculation, but not extreme, in the following outline of that process. Let’s imagine a cash sale as the standard example of the Nexum. The seller brought the property he intended to sell—a slave, for example—the buyer showed up with the raw copper ingots that served as money—and an essential assistant, the libripens, came with a pair of scales. The slave was handed over to the buyer following certain formal procedures—the copper was weighed by the libripens and passed to the seller. As long as the transaction was ongoing, it was a nexum, and the parties were nexi; but the moment it concluded, the nexum ended, and the seller and buyer stopped being referred to by the names derived from their temporary relationship. But let’s take a step further in commercial history. Suppose the slave is transferred but the money hasn’t been paid. In that case, the nexum is finished for the seller, and once he hands over his property, he is no longer nexus; but for the buyer, the nexum persists. His side of the transaction remains incomplete, and he is still regarded as nexus. Consequently, the same term described both the transfer of property rights and the personal obligation of the buyer for the unpaid purchase price. We can keep moving forward and imagine a scenario that is entirely formal, where nothing is transferred and nothing is paid; this leads us directly to a transaction reflecting significantly more commercial activity, an executory Contract of Sale.189

If it be true that, both in the popular and in the professional view, a Contract was long regarded as an incomplete Conveyance, the truth has importance for many reasons. The speculations of the last century concerning mankind in a state of nature, are not unfairly summed up in the doctrine that "in the primitive society property was nothing, and obligation everything;" and it will now be seen that, if the proposition were reversed, it would be nearer the reality. On the other hand, considered historically, the primitive association of Conveyances and Contracts explains something which often strikes the scholar and jurist as singularly enigmatical, I mean the extraordinary and uniform severity of very ancient systems of law to debtors, and the extravagant powers which they lodge with creditors. When once we understand that the nexum was artificially prolonged to give time to the debtor, we can better comprehend his position in the eye of the public and of the law. His indebtedness was doubtless regarded as an anomaly, and suspense of payment in general as an artifice and a distortion of strict rule. The person who had duly consummated his part in the transaction must, on the contrary, have stood in peculiar favour; and nothing would seem more natural than to arm him with stringent facilities for enforcing the completion of a proceeding which, of strict right, ought never to have been extended or deferred.

If it's true that, both in popular and professional views, a Contract was long seen as an incomplete Conveyance, this truth matters for many reasons. The speculations of the last century about humans in a state of nature can be summarized in the idea that "in primitive society, property was nothing, and obligation was everything"; however, it's now clearer that if this idea were flipped, it would be closer to reality. Historically speaking, the way Conveyances and Contracts were initially connected helps explain something that often seems puzzling to scholars and legal experts: the extreme and consistent harshness of very old legal systems toward debtors, and the excessive powers they granted to creditors. Once we understand that the nexum was artificially extended to give debtors more time, we can better grasp how they were viewed by society and the law. Their indebtedness was likely seen as an oddity, and delaying payment as a trick and a deviation from strict rules. The person who had properly fulfilled their part in the transaction would, in contrast, have been held in special regard; it makes sense that they would be given strong tools to ensure the completion of a process that, by strict rights, should never have been postponed or delayed.

Nexum, therefore, which originally signified a Conveyance of property, came insensibly to denote a Contract also, and ultimately so constant became the association between this word and the notion of a Contract, that a special term, Mancipium or Mancipatio, had to be used for the purpose of designating the true nexum or transaction in which the property was really transferred. Contracts are therefore now severed from Conveyances, and the first stage in their history is accomplished, but still they are far enough from that epoch of their development when the promise of the contractor has a higher sacredness than the formalities with which it is coupled. In attempting to indicate the character of the changes passed through in this interval, it is necessary to trespass a little on a subject which lies properly beyond the range of these pages, the analysis of Agreement effected by the Roman jurisconsults. Of this analysis, the most beautiful monument of their sagacity, I need not say more than that it is190 based on the theoretical separation of the Obligation from the Convention or Pact. Bentham and Mr. Austin have laid down that the "two main essentials of a contract are these: first, a signification by the promising party of his intention to do the acts or to observe the forbearances which he promises to do or to observe. Secondly, a signification by the promisee that he expects the promising party will fulfil the proffered promise." This is virtually identical with the doctrine of the Roman lawyers, but then, in their view, the result of these "significations" was not a Contract, but a Convention or Pact. A Pact was the utmost product of the engagements of individuals agreeing among themselves, and it distinctly fell short of a Contract. Whether it ultimately became a Contract depended on the question whether the law annexed an Obligation to it. A Contract was a Pact (or Convention) plus an Obligation. So long as the Pact remained unclothed with the Obligation, it was called nude or naked.

Nexum, which originally referred to a transfer of property, gradually came to also mean a contract. Eventually, the connection between this word and the idea of a contract became so strong that a specific term, Mancipium or Mancipatio, had to be introduced to refer specifically to the true nexum or transaction where the property was actually transferred. Contracts are now separated from conveyances, marking the first stage of their evolution, but they are still far from the time when a contractor's promise held more weight than the formal processes attached to it. To highlight the changes that occurred during this period, it’s necessary to touch on a topic that goes beyond the scope of this text: the analysis of agreements made by Roman jurists. This analysis, a remarkable testament to their insight, is based on the theoretical separation of obligation from the convention or pact. Bentham and Mr. Austin established that the "two main essentials of a contract are these: first, a clear indication by the promising party of their intention to perform the actions or refrain from actions they have promised. Secondly, a clear indication by the promisee that they expect the promising party to fulfill the promise offered." This is essentially the same as the doctrine of Roman lawyers, but they viewed the outcome of these "indications" as a convention or pact rather than a contract. A pact represented the fullest extent of agreements made by individuals among themselves, and it clearly fell short of being a contract. Whether it eventually became a contract depended on whether the law imposed an obligation on it. A contract was a pact (or convention) plus an obligation. As long as the pact remained without the obligation, it was referred to as nude or naked.

What was an Obligation? It is defined by the Roman lawyers as "Juris vinculum, quo necessitate adstringimur alicujus solvendæ rei." This definition connects the Obligation with the Nexum through the common metaphor on which they are founded, and shows us with much clearness the pedigree of a peculiar conception. The Obligation is the "bond" or "chain" with which the law joins together persons or groups of persons, in consequence of certain voluntary acts. The acts which have the effect of attracting an Obligation are chiefly those classed under the heads of Contract and Delict, of Agreement and Wrong; but a variety of other acts have a similar consequence which are not capable of being comprised in an exact classification. It is to be remarked, however, that the act does not draw to itself the Obligation in consequence of any moral necessity; it is the law which annexes it in the plenitude of its power, a point the more necessary to be noted, because a different doctrine has sometimes been propounded by modern interpreters of the Civil Law who had moral or metaphysical theories of their own to support. The image of a vinculum juris colours and pervades every part of the Roman law of Contract and Delict. The law bound the parties together, and the chain could only be undone by the process called solutio, an expression still figurative, to which our word "payment" is only occasionally191 and incidentally equivalent. The consistency with which the figurative image was allowed to present itself, explains an otherwise puzzling peculiarity of Roman legal phraseology, the fact that "Obligation" signified rights as well as duties, the right, for example, to have a debt paid as well as the duty of paying it. The Romans kept in fact the entire picture of the "legal chain" before their eyes, and regarded one end of it no more and no less than the other.

What is an Obligation? It's defined by Roman lawyers as "Juris vinculum, quo necessitate adstringimur alicujus solvendæ rei." This definition links the Obligation with the Nexum through the common metaphor they are based on, clearly showing us the origins of this particular concept. The Obligation is the "bond" or "chain" that the law uses to connect people or groups due to certain voluntary actions. The actions that create an Obligation mainly fall under the categories of Contract and Delict, of Agreement and Wrong; however, various other actions also lead to similar consequences that can't be neatly classified. It's important to note that the act does not bring about the Obligation due to any moral necessity; it's the law that attaches it with full authority. This point is crucial to recognize because a different idea has sometimes been suggested by modern interpreters of Civil Law who had their own moral or metaphysical theories to uphold. The concept of a vinculum juris influences and saturates every aspect of Roman law regarding Contract and Delict. The law binds the parties together, and the chain can only be broken through a process called solutio, a term that is still figurative, and for which our word "payment" is only occasionally and incidentally equivalent. The consistency with which this figurative image is presented explains an otherwise puzzling aspect of Roman legal language—the fact that "Obligation" referred to both rights and duties, such as the right to have a debt paid as well as the duty of paying it. The Romans maintained a complete image of the "legal chain" in their minds, viewing both ends equally.

In the developed Roman law, the Convention, as soon as it was completed, was, in almost all cases, at once crowned with the Obligation, and so became a Contract; and this was the result to which contract-law was surely tending. But for the purpose of this inquiry, we must attend particularly to the intermediate stage—that in which something more than a perfect agreement was required to attract the Obligation. This epoch is synchronous with the period at which the famous Roman classification of Contracts into four sorts—the Verbal, the Literal, the Real, and the Consensual—had come into use, and during which these four orders of Contracts constituted the only descriptions of engagement which the law would enforce. The meaning of the fourfold distribution is readily understood as soon as we apprehend the theory which severed the Obligation from the Convention. Each class of contracts was in fact named from certain formalities which were required over and above the mere agreement of the contracting parties. In the Verbal Contract, as soon as the Convention was effected, a form of words had to be gone through before the vinculum juris was attached to it. In the Literal Contract, an entry in a ledger or table-book had the effect of clothing the Convention with the Obligation, and the same result followed, in the case of the Real Contract, from the delivery of the Res or Thing which was the subject of the preliminary engagement. The contracting parties came, in short, to an understanding in each case; but, if they went no further, they were not obliged to one another, and could not compel performance or ask redress for a breach of faith. But let them comply with certain prescribed formalities, and the Contract was immediately complete, taking its name from the particular form which it had suited them to adopt. The exceptions to this practice will be noticed presently.

In the developed Roman law, as soon as a Convention was completed, it almost always immediately became a Contract because of the Obligation attached to it; this was the direction that contract law was clearly headed toward. However, for this inquiry, we need to focus on the intermediate stage—when something more than just a perfect agreement was necessary to invoke the Obligation. This period coincides with when the well-known Roman classification of Contracts into four types—the Verbal, the Literal, the Real, and the Consensual—came into use, and during which these four types of Contracts were the only forms of agreements that the law would enforce. The meaning of this fourfold classification becomes clear once we understand the theory that separated the Obligation from the Convention. Each class of contracts was named after specific formalities that were needed in addition to the simple agreement of the parties involved. In a Verbal Contract, once the Convention was made, a certain set of words had to be spoken before the legal bond was established. In a Literal Contract, making an entry in a ledger or table gave the Convention the status of an Obligation, and similarly, in the case of a Real Contract, the delivery of the Res or Thing that was the subject of the initial agreement created the same result. In short, the parties came to an understanding each time; however, if they did not go further, they weren't obliged to each other and could not compel performance or seek remedy for a breach of trust. But if they followed certain required formalities, the Contract was instantly complete, taking its name from the specific form they had chosen. The exceptions to this practice will be addressed shortly.

I have enumerated the four Contracts in their historical192 order, which order, however, the Roman Institutional writers did not invariably follow. There can be no doubt that the Verbal Contract was the most ancient of the four, and that it is the eldest known descendant of the primitive Nexum. Several species of Verbal Contract were anciently in use, but the most important of all, and the only one treated of by our authorities, was effected by means of a stipulation, that is, a Question and Answer; a question addressed by the person who exacted the promise, and an answer given by the person who made it. This question and answer constituted the additional ingredient which, as I have just explained, was demanded by the primitive notion over and above the mere agreement of the persons interested. They formed the agency by which the Obligation was annexed. The old Nexum has now bequeathed to maturer jurisprudence first of all the conception of a chain uniting the contracting parties, and this has become the Obligation. It has further transmitted the notion of a ceremonial accompanying and consecrating the engagement, and this ceremonial has been transmuted into the Stipulation. The conversion of the solemn conveyance, which was the prominent feature of the original Nexum, into a mere question and answer, would be more of a mystery than it is if we had not the analogous history of Roman Testaments to enlighten us. Looking to that history, we can understand how the formal Conveyance was first separated from the part of the proceeding which had immediate reference to the business in hand, and how afterwards it was omitted altogether. As then the question and answer of the Stipulation were unquestionably the Nexum in a simplified shape, we are prepared to find that they long partook of the nature of a technical form. It would be a mistake to consider them as exclusively recommending themselves to the older Roman lawyers through their usefulness in furnishing persons meditating an agreement with an opportunity for consideration and reflection. It is not to be disputed that they had a value of this kind, which was gradually recognised; but there is proof that their function in respect to Contracts was at first formal and ceremonial in the statement of our authorities, that not every question and answer was of old sufficient to constitute a Stipulation, but only a question and answer couched in technical phraseology specially appropriated to the particular occasion.193

I have listed the four Contracts in their historical192 order, though the Roman legal writers didn’t always follow this order. There’s no doubt that the Verbal Contract was the oldest of the four and the earliest known derivative of the primitive Nexum. Several types of Verbal Contract were used in ancient times, but the most important one, and the only one our sources discuss, was established through a stipulation, which means a Question and Answer; a question posed by the person requiring the promise, and an answer from the person making it. This question and answer added an essential element that, as I just explained, was required by the basic concept beyond just the simple agreement of the parties involved. They served as the means by which the Obligation was attached. The old Nexum has now passed down to more developed law the idea of a connection between the contracting parties, which we now call the Obligation. It has also handed down the idea of a ceremony that accompanies and validates the agreement, and this ceremony has evolved into the Stipulation. The shift from the formal conveyance, which was a key aspect of the original Nexum, to a simple question and answer would seem mysterious if we didn’t have the similar history of Roman Testaments to shed light on it. By looking at that history, we can see how the formal Conveyance was initially distinct from the part of the process that related directly to the task at hand, and how it was eventually dropped altogether. Since the question and answer of the Stipulation were undoubtedly a simplified version of the Nexum, we can expect that they long served as a technical form. It would be incorrect to view them as solely appealing to older Roman lawyers for their practicality in giving those contemplating an agreement a chance to think and reflect. It's undeniable that they had this type of value, which was gradually acknowledged; however, there is evidence that their role concerning Contracts was originally formal and ceremonial according to our sources, which state that not just any question and answer was sufficient to make a Stipulation, but only a question and answer expressed in specific technical language tailored for the particular situation.193

But although it is essential for the proper appreciation of the history of contract-law that the Stipulation should be understood to have been looked upon as a solemn form before it was recognised as a useful security, it would be wrong on the other hand to shut our eyes to its real usefulness. The Verbal Contract, though it had lost much of its ancient importance, survived to the latest period of Roman jurisprudence; and we may take it for granted that no institution of Roman law had so extended a longevity unless it served some practical advantage. I observe in an English writer some expressions of surprise that the Romans even of the earliest times were content with so meagre a protection against haste and irreflection. But on examining the Stipulation closely, and remembering that we have to do with a state of society in which written evidence was not easily procurable, I think we must admit that this Question and Answer, had it been expressly devised to answer the purpose which it served, would have been justly designated a highly ingenious expedient. It was the promisee who, in the character of stipulator, put all the terms of the contract into the form of a question, and the answer was given by the promisor. "Do you promise that you will deliver me such and such a slave, at such and such a place, on such and such a day?" "I do promise." Now, if we reflect for a moment, we shall see that this obligation to put the promise interrogatively inverts the natural position of the parties, and, by effectually breaking the tenor of the conversation, prevents the attention from gliding over a dangerous pledge. With us, a verbal promise is, generally speaking, to be gathered exclusively from the words of the promisor. In old Roman law, another step was absolutely required; it was necessary for the promisee, after the agreement had been made, to sum up all its terms in a solemn interrogation; and it was of this interrogation, of course, and of the assent to it, that proof had to be given at the trial—not of the promise, which was not in itself binding. How great a difference this seemingly insignificant peculiarity may make in the phraseology of contract-law is speedily realised by the beginner in Roman jurisprudence, one of whose first stumbling-blocks is almost universally created by it. When we in English have occasion, in mentioning a contract, to connect it for convenience' sake with one of the parties—for example, if we wished to194 speak generally of a contractor—it is always the promisor at whom our words are pointing. But the general language of Roman law takes a different turn; it always regards the contract, if we may so speak, from the point of view of the promisee; in speaking of a party to a contract, it is always the Stipulator, the person who asks the question, who is primarily alluded to. But the serviceableness of the stipulation is most vividly illustrated by referring to the actual examples in the pages of the Latin comic dramatists. If the entire scenes are read down in which these passages occur (ex. gra. Plautus, Pseudolus, Act I. sc. i; Act IV. sc. 6; Trinummus, Act V. sc. 2), it will be perceived how effectually the attention of the person meditating the promise must have been arrested by the question, and how ample was the opportunity for withdrawal from an improvident undertaking.

But while it's crucial to understand that the Stipulation was initially viewed as a formal requirement before it became recognized as a practical safeguard in contract law, it's also important not to ignore its actual usefulness. The Verbal Contract, despite losing much of its former significance, continued to exist until the end of Roman legal history; we can assume that no aspect of Roman law would have lasted so long if it didn’t provide some practical benefit. I’ve noticed an English author expressing surprise that early Romans were satisfied with such minimal protection against rash decisions. However, when we closely examine the Stipulation and remember that written proof wasn’t easily available in that society, we must acknowledge that the Question and Answer format, if explicitly designed for that purpose, would be rightly considered a clever solution. The promisee, acting as the stipulator, framed all the contract terms as questions, and the promisor would respond. "Do you promise to deliver me a specific slave at a certain place on a certain day?" "I do promise." If we think about this for a moment, we can see that this requirement to state the promise as a question flips the usual roles of the parties and effectively disrupts the flow of conversation, preventing attention from glossing over a serious commitment. In English, a verbal promise is generally understood solely from the words of the promisor. In ancient Roman law, however, an additional step was required; after the agreement, the promisee had to summarize all the terms in a formal question, and proof at trial had to be given for this question and its acceptance—not for the promise itself, which was not binding on its own. The significant difference this seemingly minor detail can make in contract law language is quickly realized by newcomers to Roman law, who often stumble over it. In English, when we refer to a contract and connect it to one of the parties for convenience, we typically mean the promisor. But Roman law looks at contracts from the perspective of the promisee; when referring to a party in a contract, it always points to the Stipulator, the person asking the question. The usefulness of the stipulation is best illustrated through actual examples found in the works of Latin comic playwrights. If we read the entire scenes where these references appear (for example, Plautus, Pseudolus, Act I, sc. i; Act IV, sc. 6; Trinummus, Act V, sc. 2), we can see how effectively the promisee's question must have captured the attention of the person making the promise and how ample the chance was for them to withdraw from a hasty agreement.

In the Literal or Written Contract, the formal act, by which an Obligation was superinduced on the Convention, was an entry of the sum due, where it could be specifically ascertained, on the debit side of a ledger. The explanation of this Contract turns on a point of Roman domestic manners, the systematic character and exceeding regularity of bookkeeping in ancient times. There are several minor difficulties of old Roman law, as, for example, the nature of the Slave's Peculium, which are only cleared up when we recollect that a Roman household consisted of a number of persons strictly accountable to its head, and that every single item of domestic receipt and expenditure, after being entered in waste books, was transferred at stated periods to a general household ledger. There are some obscurities, however, in the descriptions we have received of the Literal Contract, the fact being that the habit of keeping books ceased to be universal in later times, and the expression "Literal Contract" came to signify a form of engagement entirely different from that originally understood. We are not, therefore, in a position to say, with respect to the primitive Literal Contract, whether the obligation was created by a simple entry on the part of the creditor, or whether the consent of the debtor or a corresponding entry in his own books was necessary to give it legal effect. The essential point is however established that, in the case of this Contract, all formalities were dispensed with on a condition being complied with. This is another step downwards in the history of contract-law.195

In the Literal or Written Contract, the formal act that created an obligation based on the agreement involved writing the owed amount on the debit side of a ledger. Understanding this contract relies on a detail of Roman domestic life: the systematic and precise bookkeeping practices of ancient times. There are several minor complexities in old Roman law, such as the nature of a Slave's Peculium, that only make sense when we remember that a Roman household was made up of individuals who were strictly accountable to its head, and that every item of income and expense, after being recorded in temporary logs, was transferred at regular intervals to a central household ledger. However, there are some ambiguities in the descriptions we have of the Literal Contract, because the practice of bookkeeping stopped being universal in later periods, and the term "Literal Contract" began to refer to a type of agreement that was entirely different from the original understanding. Thus, we cannot definitively state regarding the primitive Literal Contract whether the obligation was created merely by an entry from the creditor or if the debtor's consent or a corresponding entry in their own records was required to make it legally binding. The crucial point, however, is that in this case, all formalities were waived as long as a condition was met. This marks another regression in the history of contract law.195

The Contract which stands next in historical succession, the Real Contract, shows a great advance in ethical conceptions. Whenever any agreement had for its object the delivery of a specific thing—and this is the case with the large majority of simple engagements—the Obligation was drawn down as soon as the delivery had actually taken place. Such a result must have involved a serious innovation on the oldest ideas of Contract; for doubtless, in the primitive times, when a contracting party had neglected to clothe his agreement in a stipulation, nothing done in pursuance of the agreement would be recognised by the law. A person who had paid over money on loan would be unable to sue for its repayment unless he had formally stipulated for it. But, in the Real Contract, performance on one side is allowed to impose a legal duty on the other—evidently on ethical grounds. For the first time then moral considerations appear as an ingredient in Contract-law, and the Real Contract differs from its two predecessors in being founded on these, rather than on respect for technical forms or on deference to Roman domestic habits.

The next contract in historical order, the Real Contract, represents a significant advancement in ethical concepts. Whenever an agreement involved the delivery of a specific item—and this applies to the vast majority of simple agreements—the obligation was established as soon as the delivery actually occurred. This change must have marked a serious shift from the oldest ideas of contracts; certainly, in ancient times, if a contracting party failed to formalize his agreement with a stipulation, nothing done in accordance with the agreement would be recognized by the law. For example, a person who paid money as a loan would not be able to claim repayment unless they had specifically stipulated for it. However, with the Real Contract, performance by one party creates a legal obligation for the other—clearly based on ethical grounds. For the first time, moral considerations become a part of contract law, and the Real Contract stands apart from its two predecessors by being based on these principles, rather than on strict adherence to technical forms or respect for Roman domestic customs.

We now reach the fourth class, or Consensual Contracts, the most interesting and important of all. Four specified Contracts were distinguished by this name: Mandatum, i.e. Commission or Agency; Societas or Partnership; Emtio Venditio or Sale; and Locatio Conductio or Letting and Hiring. A few pages ago, after stating that a Contract consisted of a Pact or Convention to which an Obligation had been superadded, I spoke of certain acts or formalities by which the law permitted the Obligation to be attracted to the Pact. I used this language on account of the advantage of a general expression, but it is not strictly correct unless it be understood to include the negative as well as the positive. For, in truth, the peculiarity of these Consensual Contracts is that no formalities, are required to create them out of the Pact. Much that is indefensible, and much more that is obscure, has been written about the Consensual Contracts, and it has even been asserted that in them the consent of the Parties is more emphatically given than in any other species of agreement. But the term Consensual merely indicates that the Obligation is here annexed at once to the Consensus. The Consensus, or mutual assent of the parties, is the final and crowning ingredient in the Convention, and it is the special196 characteristic of agreements falling under one of the four heads of Sale, Partnership, Agency, and Hiring, that, as soon as the assent of the parties has supplied this ingredient, there is at once a Contract. The Consensus draws with it the Obligation, performing, in transactions of the sort specified, the exact functions which are discharged, in the other contracts, by the Res or Thing, by the Verba stipulationis, and by the Literæ or written entry in a ledger. Consensual is therefore a term which does not involve the slightest anomaly, but is exactly analogous to Real, Verbal, and Literal.

We now move on to the fourth category, or Consensual Contracts, which is the most interesting and important of all. Four specific Contracts are recognized under this name: Mandatum, meaning Commission or Agency; Societas or Partnership; Emtio Venditio or Sale; and Locatio Conductio or Letting and Hiring. A few pages back, after stating that a Contract consists of a Pact or Agreement with an added Obligation, I mentioned certain acts or formalities that the law allows to connect the Obligation to the Pact. I chose this wording for clarity, but it's not entirely accurate unless it is understood to include both the negative and the positive. In reality, the uniqueness of these Consensual Contracts is that no formalities are needed to create them from the Pact. Much that is questionable and even more that is unclear has been written about Consensual Contracts, and it has even been claimed that in these contracts, the consent of the parties is expressed more strongly than in any other type of agreement. However, the term Consensual simply means that the Obligation is directly tied to the Consensus. The Consensus, or mutual agreement of the parties, is the final vital component in the Agreement, and it is specifically characteristic of agreements within the four categories of Sale, Partnership, Agency, and Hiring that, as soon as the parties agree on this element, there is immediately a Contract. The Consensus brings with it the Obligation, fulfilling, in the specified transactions, exactly the roles that the Res or Thing, the Verba stipulationis, and the Literæ or written entries in a ledger fulfill in other contracts. Therefore, Consensual is a term that does not suggest any anomaly but is perfectly similar to Real, Verbal, and Literal.

In the intercourse of life the commonest and most important of all the contracts are unquestionably the four styled Consensual. The larger part of the collective existence of every community is consumed in transactions of buying and selling, of letting and hiring, of alliances between men for purposes of business, of delegation of business from one man to another; and this is no doubt the consideration which led the Romans, as it has led most societies, to relieve these transactions from technical incumbrance, to abstain as much as possible from clogging the most efficient springs of social movement. Such motives were not of course confined to Rome, and the commerce of the Romans with their neighbours must have given them abundant opportunities for observing that the contracts before us tended everywhere to become Consensual, obligatory on the mere signification of mutual assent. Hence, following their usual practice, they distinguished these contracts as contracts Juris Gentium. Yet I do not think that they were so named at a very early period. The first notions of a Jus Gentium may have been deposited in the minds of the Roman lawyers long before the appointment of a Prætor Peregrinus, but it would only be through extensive and regular trade that they would be familiarised with the contractual system of other Italian communities, and such a trade would scarcely attain considerable proportions before Italy had been thoroughly pacified, and the supremacy of Rome conclusively assured. Although, however, there is strong probability that the Consensual Contracts were the latest-born into the Roman system, and though it is likely that the qualification, Juris Gentium, stamps the recency of their origin, yet this very expression, which attributes them to the "Law of Nations," has in modern times produced the notion of their extreme197 antiquity. For, when the "Law of Nations" had been converted into the "Law of Nature," it seemed to be implied that the Consensual Contracts were the type of the agreements most congenial to the natural state; and hence arose the singular belief that the younger the civilisation, the simpler must be its forms of contract.

In everyday life, the most common and significant contracts are undoubtedly the four known as Consensual. Much of the daily activities in every community revolve around transactions involving buying and selling, renting, forming business partnerships, and delegating tasks from one person to another. This is likely the reason the Romans, like many societies, aimed to simplify these transactions, minimizing any technical complications to keep the social interactions flowing smoothly. These motivations were not exclusive to Rome; their trade with neighboring societies provided them with plenty of chances to notice that these contracts tended to be more Consensual, binding on just the mutual agreement of the parties involved. Consequently, as was their custom, they labeled these contracts as Juris Gentium. However, I believe they weren't referred to by that name until quite later. The early concepts of a Jus Gentium might have formed in the minds of Roman lawyers long before the establishment of a Prætor Peregrinus, but it would be through extensive and regular trade that they could become acquainted with the contract systems of other Italian communities. Such trade likely wouldn't reach significant levels until Italy was fully pacified and Roman dominance was established. Despite strong evidence suggesting that Consensual Contracts were among the latest to emerge in the Roman legal system and the term Juris Gentium indicating their relatively recent origin, this very phrase, linking them to the "Law of Nations," has led to the modern misconception of their ancient roots. When the "Law of Nations" evolved into the "Law of Nature," it implied that Consensual Contracts represented the agreements most in line with a natural state, contributing to the unique belief that the simpler the civilization, the more straightforward its contract forms must be.

The Consensual Contracts, it will be observed, were extremely limited in number. But it cannot be doubted that they constituted the stage in the history of Contract-law from which all modern conceptions of contract took their start. The motion of the will which constitutes agreement was now completely insulated, and became the subject of separate contemplation; forms were entirely eliminated from the notion of contract, and external acts were only regarded as symbols of the internal act of volition. The Consensual Contracts had, moreover, been classed in the Jus Gentium, and it was not long before this classification drew with it the inference that they were the species of agreement which represented the engagements approved of by Nature and included in her code. This point once reached, we are prepared for several celebrated doctrines and distinctions of the Roman lawyers. One of them is the distinction between Natural and Civil Obligations. When a person of full intellectual maturity had deliberately bound himself by an engagement, he was said to be under a natural obligation, even though he had omitted some necessary formality, and even though through some technical impediment he was devoid of the formal capacity for making a valid contract. The law (and this is what the distinction implies) would not enforce the obligation, but it did not absolutely refuse to recognise it; and natural obligations differed in many respects from obligations which were merely null and void, more particularly in the circumstance that they could be civilly confirmed, if the capacity for contract were subsequently acquired. Another very peculiar doctrine of the jurisconsults could not have had its origin earlier than the period at which the Convention was severed from the technical ingredients of Contract. They taught that though nothing but a Contract could be the foundation of an action, a mere Pact or Convention could be the basis of a plea. It followed from this, that though nobody could sue upon an agreement which he had not taken the precaution to mature into a Contract by198 complying with the proper forms, nevertheless a claim arising out of a valid contract could be rebutted by proving a counter-agreement which had never got beyond the state of a simple convention. An action for the recovery of a debt could be met by showing a mere informal agreement to waive or postpone the payment.

The Consensual Contracts were very few in number. However, it’s clear they marked a pivotal point in the history of Contract law, from which all modern ideas about contracts originated. The will to form an agreement was now fully isolated and became something to think about separately; formalities were completely removed from the concept of a contract, and external actions were seen only as symbols of the internal act of willingness. Additionally, the Consensual Contracts were classified under the Jus Gentium, and it didn’t take long for this classification to imply that these agreements were the type approved by Nature and included in her laws. Once we reach this understanding, we are ready for several well-known doctrines and distinctions from Roman lawyers. One of them is the difference between Natural and Civil Obligations. When an individual in full intellectual capacity committed themselves to an engagement, they were considered to be under a natural obligation, even if they skipped some necessary formality, and even if some technical barrier meant they lacked the formal ability to make a valid contract. The law (and this is what this distinction means) wouldn’t enforce the obligation, but it didn’t completely ignore it either; natural obligations were different in many ways from obligations that were just null and void, especially in that they could be civilly confirmed if the ability to contract was later established. Another unique doctrine from the legal experts couldn’t have arisen until the time when the Convention was separated from the technical aspects of Contracts. They stated that while only a Contract could serve as the basis for an action, a simple Pact or Convention could form the basis for a plea. This meant that while no one could sue on an agreement that they hadn’t taken steps to turn into a Contract by198 following the appropriate formalities, a claim arising from a valid contract could be challenged by showing a counter-agreement that had never advanced beyond the level of a simple convention. A lawsuit for debt recovery could be countered by demonstrating an informal agreement to waive or delay the payment.

The doctrine just stated indicates the hesitation of the Prætors in making their advances towards the greatest of their innovations. Their theory of Natural law must have led them to look with especial favour on the Consensual Contracts and on those Pacts or Conventions of which the Consensual Contracts were only particular instances; but they did not at once venture on extending to all Conventions the liberty of the Consensual Contracts. They took advantage of that special superintendence over procedure which had been confided to them since the first beginnings of Roman law, and, while they still declined to permit a suit to be launched which was not based on a formal contract, they gave full play to their new theory of agreement in directing the ulterior stages of the proceeding. But, when they had proceeded thus far, it was inevitable that they should proceed farther. The revolution of the ancient law of Contract was consummated when the Prætor of some one year announced in his Edict that he would grant equitable actions upon Pacts which had never been matured at all into Contracts, provided only that the Pacts in question had been founded on a consideration (causa). Pacts of this sort are always enforced under the advanced Roman jurisprudence. The principle is merely the principle of the Consensual Contract carried to its proper consequence; and, in fact, if the technical language of the Romans had been as plastic as their legal theories, these Pacts enforced by the Prætor would have been styled new Contracts, new Consensual Contracts. Legal phraseology is, however, the part of the law which is the last to alter, and the Pacts equitably enforced continued to be designated simply Prætorian Pacts. It will be remarked that unless there were consideration for the Pact, it would continue nude so far as the new jurisprudence was concerned; in order to give it effect, it would be necessary to convert it by a stipulation into a Verbal Contract.

The principle just mentioned shows the Prætors’ hesitation to fully embrace their biggest innovations. Their understanding of Natural law must have made them particularly supportive of Consensual Contracts and of those Pacts or Agreements of which the Consensual Contracts were just specific examples; however, they didn't immediately extend the freedom of Consensual Contracts to all Agreements. They utilized the special oversight over procedures that had been entrusted to them since the early days of Roman law, and while they still held back from allowing a lawsuit that wasn't based on a formal contract, they fully embraced their new theory of agreement in guiding the later stages of the proceedings. But once they got this far, it was only natural that they would go further. The transformation of the ancient law of Contract was completed when a Prætor in a certain year declared in his Edict that he would allow equitable actions for Pacts that had never actually been formed into Contracts, as long as those Pacts were based on a consideration (causa). Such Pacts are always enforced in advanced Roman law. This principle is simply the principle of the Consensual Contract taken to its logical conclusion; in fact, if the technical language of the Romans had been as adaptable as their legal theories, these Pacts enforced by the Prætor would have been called new Contracts, new Consensual Contracts. However, legal terminology is often the last part of the law to change, and the equitably enforced Pacts continued to be known simply as Prætorian Pacts. It should be noted that unless there was consideration for the Pact, it would remain nude in terms of the new jurisprudence; to give it effect, it would be necessary to transform it by a stipulation into a Verbal Contract.

The extreme importance of this history of Contract, as a safeguard against almost innumerable delusions, must be199 my justification for discussing it at so considerable a length. It gives a complete account of the march of ideas from one great landmark of jurisprudence to another. We begin with Nexum, in which a Contract and a Conveyance are blended, and in which the formalities which accompany the agreement are even more important than the agreement itself. From the Nexum we pass to the Stipulation, which is a simplified form of the older ceremonial. The Literal Contract comes next, and here all formalities are waived, if proof of the agreement can be supplied from the rigid observances of a Roman household. In the Real Contract a moral duty is for the first time recognised, and persons who have joined or acquiesced in the partial performance of an engagement are forbidden to repudiate it on account of defects in form. Lastly, the Consensual Contracts emerge, in which the mental attitude of the contractors is solely regarded, and external circumstances have no title to notice except as evidence of the inward undertaking. It is of course uncertain how far this progress of Roman ideas from a gross to a refined conception exemplifies the necessary progress of human thought on the subject of Contract. The Contract-law of all other ancient societies but the Roman is either too scanty to furnish information, or else is entirely lost; and modern jurisprudence is so thoroughly leavened with the Roman notions that it furnishes us with no contrasts or parallels from which instruction can be gleaned. From the absence, however, of everything violent, marvellous, or unintelligible in the changes I have described, it may be reasonably believed that the history of ancient Roman Contracts is, up to a certain point, typical of the history of this class of legal conceptions in other ancient societies. But it is only up to a certain point that the progress of Roman law can be taken to represent the progress of other systems of jurisprudence. The theory of Natural law is exclusively Roman. The notion of the vinculum juris, so far as my knowledge extends, is exclusively Roman. The many peculiarities of the mature Roman law of Contract and Delict which are traceable to these two ideas, whether singly or in combination, are therefore among the exclusive products of one particular society. These later legal conceptions are important, not because they typify the necessary results of advancing thought under all conditions, but because they have exercised perfectly enormous200 influence on the intellectual diathesis of the modern world.

The extreme importance of this history of Contract, as a safeguard against almost countless misconceptions, must be199 my reason for discussing it at such length. It provides a thorough account of the evolution of ideas from one significant milestone in law to another. We start with Nexum, where a Contract and a Conveyance are intertwined, and the formalities surrounding the agreement are even more crucial than the agreement itself. From Nexum, we move to the Stipulation, a simpler version of the older formalities. Next is the Literal Contract, where all formalities can be waived if evidence of the agreement can be found from the strict practices of a Roman household. The Real Contract acknowledges a moral obligation for the first time, prohibiting those who have participated in or accepted the partial fulfillment of an agreement from rejecting it due to formal flaws. Lastly, we see the emergence of Consensual Contracts, which focus solely on the mindset of the parties involved, disregarding external circumstances except as evidence of the internal commitment. It is uncertain how much this progression of Roman ideas from simplistic to sophisticated concepts truly reflects the necessary evolution of human thought regarding Contracts. The Contract law of all other ancient societies, aside from the Roman, is either too limited to provide insight or is completely lost; modern legal theory is so deeply influenced by Roman ideas that it offers no contrasts or parallels for learning. However, due to the absence of anything drastic, extraordinary, or incomprehensible in the changes I've described, it's reasonable to believe that the history of ancient Roman Contracts is, to some extent, representative of the history of similar legal concepts in other ancient societies. Yet, it is only to a certain extent that the development of Roman law can be seen as indicative of the development of other legal systems. The theory of Natural law is uniquely Roman. The concept of the vinculum juris, as far as I know, is also uniquely Roman. The many distinctive features of the advanced Roman law of Contract and Delict, which can be traced back to these two ideas, whether individually or together, are therefore unique products of one particular society. These later legal concepts are significant, not because they represent the inevitable outcomes of evolving thought under any circumstances, but because they have had an enormous200 influence on the intellectual framework of the modern world.

I know nothing more wonderful than the variety of sciences to which Roman law, Roman Contract-law more particularly, has contributed modes of thought, courses of reasoning, and a technical language. Of the subjects which have whetted the intellectual appetite of the moderns, there is scarcely one, except Physics, which has not been filtered through Roman jurisprudence. The science of pure Metaphysics had, indeed, rather a Greek than a Roman parentage, but Politics, Moral Philosophy, and even Theology, found in Roman law not only a vehicle of expression, but a nidus in which some of their profoundest inquiries were nourished into maturity. For the purpose of accounting for this phenomenon, it is not absolutely necessary to discuss the mysterious relation between words and ideas, or to explain how it is that the human mind has never grappled with any subject of thought, unless it has been provided beforehand with a proper store of language and with an apparatus of appropriate logical methods. It is enough to remark, that, when the philosophical interests of the Eastern and Western worlds were separated, the founders of Western thought belonged to a society which spoke Latin and reflected in Latin. But in the Western provinces the only language which retained sufficient precision for philosophical purposes was the language of Roman law, which by a singular fortune had preserved nearly all the purity of the Augustan age, while vernacular Latin was degenerating into a dialect of portentous barbarism. And if Roman jurisprudence supplied the only means of exactness in speech, still more emphatically did it furnish the only means of exactness, subtlety, or depth in thought. For at least three centuries, philosophy and science were without a home in the West; and though metaphysics and metaphysical theology were engrossing the mental energies of multitudes of Roman subjects, the phraseology employed in these ardent inquiries was exclusively Greek, and their theatre was the Eastern half of the Empire. Sometimes, indeed, the conclusions of the Eastern disputants became so important that every man's assent to them, or dissent from them, had to be recorded, and then the West was introduced to the results of Eastern controversy, which it generally acquiesced in without interest and without resistance.201 Meanwhile, one department of inquiry, difficult enough for the most laborious, deep enough for the most subtle, delicate enough for the most refined, had never lost its attractions for the educated classes of the Western provinces. To the cultivated citizen of Africa, of Spain, of Gaul and of Northern Italy, it was jurisprudence, and jurisprudence only, which stood in the place of poetry and history, of philosophy and science. So far then from there being anything mysterious in the palpably legal complexion of the earliest efforts of Western thought it would rather be astonishing if it had assumed any other hue. I can only express my surprise at the scantiness of the attention which has been given to the difference between Western ideas and Eastern, between Western theology and Eastern, caused by the presence of a new ingredient. It is precisely because the influence of jurisprudence begins to be powerful that the foundation of Constantinople and the subsequent separation of the Western Empire from the Eastern, are epochs in philosophical history. But continental thinkers are doubtless less capable of appreciating the importance of this crisis by the very intimacy with which notions derived from Roman Law are mingled up with every-day ideas. Englishmen, on the other hand, are blind to it through the monstrous ignorance to which they condemn themselves of the most plentiful source of the stream of modern knowledge, of the one intellectual result of the Roman civilisation. At the same time, an Englishman, who will be at the pains to familiarise himself with the classical Roman law, is perhaps, from the very slightness of the interest which his countrymen have hitherto taken in the subject, a better judge than a Frenchman or a German of the value of the assertions I have ventured to make. Anybody who knows what Roman jurisprudence is, as actually practised by the Romans, and who will observe in what characteristics the earliest Western theology and philosophy differ from the phases of thought which preceded them, may be safely left to pronounce what was the new element which had begun to pervade and govern speculation.

I know nothing more amazing than the variety of sciences that Roman law, especially Roman contract law, has influenced in terms of ways of thinking, reasoning, and technical language. Of the topics that have captured the interest of modern thinkers, there’s hardly one, except Physics, that hasn’t been shaped by Roman jurisprudence. The science of pure Metaphysics indeed has its roots more in Greek than Roman thought, but Politics, Moral Philosophy, and even Theology found in Roman law not just a means of expression but also a nurturing ground for some of their deepest inquiries. To explain this phenomenon, it isn't strictly necessary to analyze the mysterious relationship between words and ideas or how the human mind hasn’t truly engaged with any complex topic without first having a solid language and appropriate logical methods. It suffices to note that when the philosophical interests of the Eastern and Western worlds diverged, the founders of Western thought belonged to a society that spoke and thought in Latin. In the Western provinces, the only language that maintained enough precision for philosophical discussions was the language of Roman law, which, by a unique twist of fate, preserved nearly all the clarity of the Augustan age while everyday Latin was deteriorating into a crude dialect. And while Roman jurisprudence provided the only means of precision in language, it even more importantly provided the only means of precision, subtlety, or depth in thought. For at least three centuries, philosophy and science had no home in the West; although metaphysics and metaphysical theology were consuming the intellectual energy of numerous Roman subjects, the language used in these passionate inquiries was exclusively Greek, and their stage was the Eastern half of the Empire. Sometimes, the conclusions reached by Eastern debaters became so significant that they needed to be recorded for everyone's agreement or disagreement, introducing the West to the outcomes of Eastern debates, which it generally accepted without much interest or opposition.201 Meanwhile, one field of inquiry, challenging enough for even the most diligent, deep enough for the most insightful, delicate enough for the most sophisticated, never lost its appeal to the educated classes of the Western provinces. For the cultured citizens of Africa, Spain, Gaul, and Northern Italy, it was jurisprudence—only jurisprudence—that served as a substitute for poetry and history, for philosophy and science. So rather than finding anything mysterious in the obviously legal nature of the earliest efforts of Western thought, it would be surprising if it had taken on any other character. I can only express my surprise at the little attention paid to the differences between Western and Eastern ideas, between Western and Eastern theology, caused by the introduction of a new element. It is precisely because the influence of jurisprudence begins to be significant that the establishment of Constantinople and the later division of the Western Empire from the Eastern are pivotal moments in philosophical history. However, continental thinkers are likely less equipped to appreciate the significance of this crisis due to the close entanglement of ideas derived from Roman Law with everyday concepts. On the other hand, Englishmen are oblivious to it because of the extreme ignorance they choose to have about the most abundant source of modern knowledge, the singular intellectual legacy of Roman civilization. At the same time, an Englishman who takes the time to familiarize himself with classical Roman law might actually be a better judge than a Frenchman or a German of the value of the claims I’ve made, due to the minimal interest his countrymen have shown in the subject. Anyone who understands what Roman jurisprudence truly is, as practiced by the Romans, and observes the characteristics in which the earliest Western theology and philosophy differ from the thoughts that preceded them, can confidently identify the new element that has begun to permeate and guide speculation.

The part of Roman law which has had most extensive influence on foreign subjects of inquiry has been the law of Obligation, or what comes nearly to the same thing, of Contract and Delict. The Romans themselves were not unaware of the offices which the copious and malleable terminology202 belonging to this part of their system might be made to discharge, and this is proved by their employment of the peculiar adjunct quasi in such expressions as Quasi-Contract and Quasi-Delict. "Quasi," so used, is exclusively a term of classification. It has been usual with English critics to identify the Quasi-contracts with implied contracts, but this is an error, for implied contracts are true contracts, which quasi-contracts are not. In implied contracts, acts and circumstances are the symbols of the same ingredients which are symbolised, in express contracts, by words; and whether a man employs one set of symbols or the other must be a matter of indifference so far as concerns the theory of agreement. But a Quasi-Contract is not a contract at all. The commonest sample of the class is the relation subsisting between two persons one of whom has paid money to the other through mistake. The law, consulting the interests of morality, imposes an obligation on the receiver to refund, but the very nature of the transaction indicates that it is not a contract, inasmuch as the Convention, the most essential ingredient of Contract, is wanting. This word "quasi," prefixed to a term of Roman law, implies that the conception to which it serves as an index is connected with the conception with which the comparison is instituted by a strong superficial analogy or resemblance. It does not denote that the two conceptions are the same or that they belong to the same genus. On the contrary, it negatives the notion of an identity between them; but it points out that they are sufficiently similar for one to be classed as the sequel to the other, and that the phraseology taken from one department of law may be transferred to the other and employed without violent straining in the statement of rules which would otherwise be imperfectly expressed.

The part of Roman law that has had the most significant impact on foreign areas of study is the law of Obligation, which closely relates to Contract and Delict. The Romans recognized the valuable role that their extensive and adaptable terminology202 plays in this area of their legal system. This is evident from their use of the specific term quasi in phrases like Quasi-Contract and Quasi-Delict. The term "quasi," when used this way, is strictly a classification term. English critics often confuse Quasi-contracts with implied contracts, but this is a mistake, as implied contracts are legitimate contracts, while quasi-contracts are not. In implied contracts, actions and situations represent the same elements that are expressed through words in explicit contracts, and it doesn't matter whether someone uses one type of representation or the other from the perspective of agreement theory. However, a Quasi-Contract isn't a contract at all. A common example is when one person mistakenly pays money to another. The law, upholding moral principles, requires the receiver to return the money, but the very nature of the situation shows that it isn't a contract because the Agreement, which is the key component of a Contract, is missing. The term "quasi" added to a term in Roman law indicates that the concept it refers to is linked to the idea it compares to by a strong superficial resemblance. It doesn't mean that the two concepts are identical or belong to the same category. Instead, it denies any notion of them being the same, while indicating that they are similar enough for one to be seen as a follow-up to the other, allowing legal terminology from one area to be adapted to another without excessive strain in explaining rules that would otherwise be inadequately described.

It has been shrewdly remarked, that the confusion between Implied Contracts, which are true contracts, and Quasi Contracts, which are not contracts at all, has much in common with the famous error which attributed political rights and duties to an Original Compact between the governed and the governor. Long before this theory had clothed itself in definite shape, the phraseology of Roman contract-law had been largely drawn upon to describe that reciprocity of rights and duties which men had always conceived as existing between sovereigns and subjects. While the world was full of203 maxims setting forth with the utmost positiveness the claims of kings to implicit obedience—maxims which pretended to have had their origin in the New Testament, but which were really derived from indelible recollections of the Cæsarian despotism—the consciousness of correlative rights possessed by the governed would have been entirely without the means of expression if the Roman law of Obligation had not supplied a language capable of shadowing forth an idea which was as yet imperfectly developed. The antagonism between the privileges of kings and their duties to their subjects was never, I believe, lost sight of since Western history began, but it had interest for few except speculative writers so long as feudalism continued in vigour, for feudalism effectually controlled by express customs the exorbitant theoretical pretensions of most European sovereigns. It is notorious, however, that as soon as the decay of the Feudal System had thrown the mediæval constitutions out of working order, and when the Reformation had discredited the authority of the Pope, the doctrine of the divine right of Kings rose immediately into an importance which had never before attended it. The vogue which it obtained entailed still more constant resort to the phraseology of Roman law, and a controversy which had originally worn a theological aspect assumed more and more the air of a legal disputation. A phenomenon then appeared which has repeatedly shown itself in the history of opinion. Just when the argument for monarchical authority rounded itself into the definite doctrine of Filmer, the phraseology, borrowed from the Law of Contract, which had been used in defence of the rights of subjects, crystallised into the theory of an actual original compact between king and people, a theory which, first in English and afterwards, and more particularly, in French hands, expanded into a comprehensive explanation of all the phenomena of society and law. But the only real connection between political and legal science had consisted in the last giving to the first the benefit of its peculiarly plastic terminology. The Roman jurisprudence of Contract had performed for the relation of sovereign and subject precisely the same service which, in a humbler sphere, it rendered to the relation of persons bound together by an obligation of "quasi-contract." It had furnished a body of words and phrases which approximated with sufficient accuracy to the ideas which then were from time204 to time forming on the subject of political obligation. The doctrine of an Original Compact can never be put higher than it is placed by Dr. Whewell, when he suggests that, though unsound, "it may be a convenient form for the expression of moral truths."

It has been cleverly pointed out that the confusion between Implied Contracts, which are actual contracts, and Quasi Contracts, which aren’t contracts at all, shares similarities with the well-known mistake of attributing political rights and responsibilities to an Original Compact between the governed and the governor. Long before this theory took a clear shape, the language of Roman contract law had been extensively used to describe the mutual rights and responsibilities people believed existed between rulers and their subjects. While society was filled with203 maxims that strongly asserted the kings' claims to unquestioning obedience—maxims that supposedly originated from the New Testament, but were actually rooted in lasting memories of Cæsar's tyranny—the awareness of the reciprocal rights held by the governed would have lacked expression without the Roman law of Obligation providing a framework to convey an idea that was still only partially formed. The conflict between the privileges of kings and their responsibilities to their subjects has never, to my knowledge, been ignored since the beginning of Western history, but it was of little interest to anyone except theoretical writers for as long as feudalism remained strong, as feudalism effectively regulated the excessive theoretical claims of most European monarchs through established customs. However, it is well-known that once the decline of the Feudal System rendered medieval constitutions ineffective, and when the Reformation undermined the Pope's authority, the doctrine of the divine right of Kings surged to a significance it had never seen before. The popularity it gained led to even more frequent use of the language of Roman law, and a debate that initially appeared theological gradually took on the characteristics of a legal dispute. A phenomenon then emerged that has frequently appeared in the history of ideas. Just when the argument for monarchical authority became defined in the doctrine of Filmer, the language borrowed from Contract Law, which had defended the rights of subjects, solidified into the theory of an actual original compact between the king and the people. This theory, first in English and later, especially in French discussions, developed into a comprehensive explanation of all social and legal phenomena. Yet the only true connection between political and legal science was that the latter provided the former with a flexible terminology. The Roman jurisprudence of Contract served the relationship between sovereign and subject in the same way it offered clarity to the relationships of individuals bound by a "quasi-contract." It supplied a vocabulary that closely matched the ideas that were emerging from time204 to time regarding political obligation. The concept of an Original Compact can never be regarded more highly than Dr. Whewell places it when he suggests that, although flawed, "it may be a convenient form for expressing moral truths."

The extensive employment of legal language on political subjects previously to the invention of the Original Compact, and the powerful influence which that assumption has exercised subsequently, amply account for the plentifulness in political science of words and conceptions, which were the exclusive creation of Roman jurisprudence. Of their plentifulness in Moral Philosophy a rather different explanation must be given, inasmuch as ethical writings have laid Roman law under contribution much more directly than political speculations, and their authors have been much more conscious of the extent of their obligation. In speaking of moral philosophy as extraordinarily indebted to Roman jurisprudence, I must be understood to intend moral philosophy as understood previously to the break in its history effected by Kant, that is, as the science of the rules governing human conduct, of their proper interpretation and of the limitations to which they are subject. Since the rise of the Critical Philosophy, moral science has almost wholly lost its older meaning, and, except where it is preserved under a debased form in the casuistry still cultivated by Roman Catholic theologians, it seems to be regarded nearly universally as a branch of ontological inquiry. I do not know that there is a single contemporary English writer, with the exception of Dr. Whewell, who understands moral philosophy as it was understood before it was absorbed by metaphysics and before the groundwork of its rules came to be a more important consideration than the rules themselves. So long, however, as ethical science had to do with the practical regimen of conduct, it was more or less saturated with Roman law. Like all the great subjects of modern thought, it was originally incorporated with theology. The science of Moral Theology, as it was at first called, and as it is still designated by the Roman Catholic divines, was undoubtedly constructed, to the full knowledge of its authors, by taking principles of conduct from the system of the Church, and by using the language and methods of jurisprudence for their expression and expansion. While this process went on, it was inevitable205 that jurisprudence, though merely intended to be the vehicle of thought, should communicate its colour to the thought itself. The tinge received through contact with legal conceptions is perfectly perceptible in the earliest ethical literature of the modern world, and it is evident, I think, that the Law of Contract, based as it is on the complete reciprocity and indissoluble connection of rights and duties, has acted as a wholesome corrective to the predispositions of writers who, if left to themselves, might have exclusively viewed a moral obligation as the public duty of a citizen in the Civitas Dei. But the amount of Roman Law in moral theology becomes sensibly smaller at the time of its cultivation by the great Spanish moralists. Moral theology, developed by the juridical method of doctor commenting on doctor, provided itself with a phraseology of its own, and Aristotelian peculiarities of reasoning and expression, imbibed doubtless in great part from the Disputations on Morals in the academical schools, take the place of that special turn of thought and speech which can never be mistaken by any person conversant with the Roman law. If the credit of the Spanish school of moral theologians had continued, the juridical ingredient in ethical science would have been insignificant, but the use made of their conclusions by the next generation of Roman Catholic writers on these subjects almost entirely destroyed their influence. Moral Theology, degraded into Casuistry, lost all interest for the leaders of European speculation; and the new science of Moral Philosophy, which was entirely in the hands of the Protestants, swerved greatly aside from the path which the moral theologians had followed. The effect was vastly to increase the influence of Roman law on ethical inquiry.

The extensive use of legal language in political topics before the creation of the Original Compact, along with the strong impact that belief has had since then, fully explains the abundance of terms and ideas in political science that originated solely from Roman law. The reason for their abundance in Moral Philosophy requires a different explanation since ethical writings have drawn directly from Roman law to a much greater extent than political theories, and their authors have been more aware of their debt. When I refer to moral philosophy as being heavily influenced by Roman law, I mean moral philosophy as it was understood before the shift in its history brought on by Kant, meaning the study of the rules governing human behavior, their proper interpretation, and the limits they face. Since the emergence of Critical Philosophy, moral science has largely lost its earlier significance, and except where it persists in a simplified form in the casuistry practiced by Roman Catholic theologians, it is now generally viewed as a branch of ontological inquiry. I don’t think there is a single modern English writer, apart from Dr. Whewell, who understands moral philosophy as it was defined before it was absorbed by metaphysics and before the foundation of its rules became more important than the rules themselves. However, as long as ethical science focused on the practical management of conduct, it was somewhat infused with Roman law. Like many major subjects of contemporary thought, it was originally linked with theology. The study of Moral Theology, as it was initially called and is still referred to by Roman Catholic scholars, was certainly formed—fully aware of its authors—by taking principles of behavior from the Church's system and by using the language and methods of law to express and expand them. During this process, it was natural that law, even though merely serving as a way to convey ideas, would influence the ideas themselves. The influence from legal concepts is quite noticeable in the earliest ethical literature of the modern era, and it's clear, I believe, that the Law of Contract, which is based on mutual connection between rights and duties, has served as a beneficial correction to the tendencies of writers who, if left to themselves, might have viewed a moral obligation solely as the public duty of a citizen in the Civitas Dei. However, the presence of Roman Law in moral theology noticeably diminishes during the period when it was studied by the great Spanish moralists. Moral theology, following the legal method of one doctor commenting on another, developed its own terminology, and Aristotelian reasoning and expression, likely learned in part from the Disputations on Morals in academic institutions, replaced the specific styles of thought and language that anyone familiar with Roman law would recognize. If the reputation of the Spanish school of moral theologians had remained strong, the legal component in ethical science would have been minimal, but the way their conclusions were used by the next generation of Roman Catholic writers on these topics almost completely undermined their influence. Moral Theology, reduced to Casuistry, lost all appeal for the leaders of European thought, and the new field of Moral Philosophy, which was wholly controlled by Protestants, greatly diverged from the path previously followed by moral theologians. The result was a significant increase in the influence of Roman law on ethical inquiry.

Shortly5 after the Reformation, we find two great schools of thought dividing this class of subjects between them. The most influential of the two was at first the sect of school known to us as the Casuists, all of them in spiritual communion with the Roman Catholic Church, and nearly all of them affiliated to one or other of her religious orders. On the other side were a body of writers connected with each other by a common intellectual descent from the great author of the treatise De Jure Belli et Pacis, Hugo Grotius. Almost 206all of the latter were adherents of the Reformation, and though it cannot be said that they were formally and avowedly at conflict with the Casuists, the origin and object of their system were nevertheless essentially different from those of Casuistry. It is necessary to call attention to this difference, because it involves the question of the influence of Roman law on that department of thought with which both systems are concerned. The book of Grotius, though it touches questions of pure Ethics in every page, and though it is the parent immediate or remote of innumerable volumes of formal morality, is not, as is well known, a professed treatise on Moral Philosophy; it is an attempt to determine the Law of Nature, or Natural Law. Now, without entering upon the question, whether the conception of a Law Natural be not exclusively a creation of the Roman jurisconsults, we may lay down that, even on the admission of Grotius himself, the dicta of the Roman jurisprudence as to what parts of known positive law must be taken to be parts of the Law of Nature, are, if not infallible, to be received at all events with the profoundest respect. Hence the system of Grotius is implicated with Roman law at its very foundation, and this connection rendered inevitable—what the legal training of the writer would perhaps have entailed without it—the free employment in every paragraph of technical phraseology, and of modes of reasoning, defining, and illustrating, which must sometimes conceal the sense, and almost always the force and cogency, of the argument from the reader who is unfamiliar with the sources whence they have been derived. On the other hand, Casuistry borrows little from Roman law, and the views of morality contended for have nothing whatever in common with the undertaking of Grotius. All that philosophy of right and wrong which has become famous, or infamous, under the name of Casuistry, had its origin in the distinction between Mortal and Venial Sin. A natural anxiety to escape the awful consequences of determining a particular act to be mortally sinful, and a desire, equally intelligible, to assist the Roman Catholic Church in its conflict with Protestantism by disburthening it of an inconvenient theory, were the motives which impelled the authors of the Casuistical philosophy to the invention of an elaborate system of criteria, intended to remove immoral actions, in as many cases as possible, out of the category of mortal offences, and to207 stamp them as venial sins. The fate of this experiment is matter of ordinary history. We know that the distinctions of Casuistry, by enabling the priesthood to adjust spiritual control to all the varieties of human character, did really confer on it an influence with princes, statesmen, and generals, unheard of in the ages before the Reformation, and did really contribute largely to that great reaction which checked and narrowed the first successes of Protestantism. But beginning in the attempt, not to establish, but to evade—not to discover a principle, but to escape a postulate—not to settle the nature of right and wrong, but to determine what was not wrong of a particular nature,—Casuistry went on with its dexterous refinements till it ended in so attenuating the moral features of actions, and so belying the moral instincts of our being, that at length the conscience of mankind rose suddenly in revolt against it, and consigned to one common ruin the system and its doctors. The blow, long pending, was finally struck in the Provincial Letters of Pascal, and since the appearance of those memorable Papers, no moralist of the smallest influence or credit has ever avowedly conducted his speculations in the footsteps of the Casuists. The whole field of ethical science was thus left at the exclusive command of the writers who followed Grotius; and it still exhibits in an extraordinary degree the traces of that entanglement with Roman law which is sometimes imputed as a fault, and sometimes the highest of its recommendations, to the Grotian theory. Many inquirers since Grotius's day have modified his principles, and many, of course, since the rise of the Critical Philosophy, have quite deserted them; but even those who have departed most widely from his fundamental assumptions have inherited much of his method of statement, of his train of thought, and of his mode of illustration; and these have little meaning and no point to the person ignorant of Roman jurisprudence.

Shortly5 after the Reformation, two major schools of thought emerged, each addressing this subject area. The most influential was the group known as the Casuists, who were in spiritual communion with the Roman Catholic Church, with nearly all of them belonging to various religious orders. On the other side were writers connected by a shared intellectual heritage from Hugo Grotius, the author of the treatise De Jure Belli et Pacis. Almost206 all of these writers were supporters of the Reformation. While they weren't openly opposed to the Casuists, their origins and objectives were fundamentally different. It's important to highlight this difference because it relates to the influence of Roman law on the areas both systems focus on. Grotius's book addresses ethical questions on every page and is the source of countless volumes on formal morality, yet it's not a formal treatise on Moral Philosophy; rather, it aims to define Natural Law. Without debating whether the concept of Natural Law is solely a product of Roman legal scholars, we can acknowledge that, even according to Grotius, the interpretations of Roman law regarding which aspects of known positive law should be considered parts of Natural Law, are to be respected, if not infallible. Thus, Grotius's system is fundamentally linked to Roman law, which inevitably led to the frequent use of technical terminology and reasoning that could obscure the meaning and clarity of arguments for readers unfamiliar with their origins. In contrast, Casuistry draws little from Roman law, and its moral viewpoints have no relation to Grotius's work. The famous or infamous philosophy of right and wrong known as Casuistry originated from the distinction between Mortal and Venial Sin. A natural desire to avoid the severe consequences of labeling an act as mortally sinful, combined with a legitimate aim to help the Roman Catholic Church in its struggle against Protestantism, drove the creators of Casuistical philosophy to develop a complex system of criteria designed to categorize immoral actions as much as possible as venial sins. The outcome of this endeavor is common knowledge. We know that the distinctions of Casuistry allowed the priesthood to tailor spiritual guidance to the diverse aspects of human character, providing it with unprecedented influence over princes, politicians, and military leaders following the Reformation, thereby significantly contributing to the backlash that limited the early achievements of Protestantism. However, starting with the intention of evading rather than establishing principles, and attempting to determine what actions weren’t wrong rather than clarifying the nature of right and wrong, Casuistry continued its intricate refinements until it so diluted the moral qualities of actions and contradicted our moral instincts that humanity’s conscience eventually revolted against it, bringing ruin to both the system and its proponents. This long-anticipated blow was finally delivered in the Provincial Letters of Pascal, and since those pivotal papers, no influential or credible moralist has formally followed in the footsteps of the Casuists. As a result, the entire field of ethical science has been dominated by writers who followed Grotius, and it still shows significant traces of that connection to Roman law, which is sometimes criticized as a flaw and at other times regarded as one of its highest merits. Many thinkers since Grotius have modified his principles, and many have entirely abandoned them since the emergence of the Critical Philosophy, but even those who have deviated significantly from his core beliefs have retained much of his method, thought process, and illustrative style, which tend to lack meaning and clarity for those unfamiliar with Roman jurisprudence.

I have already said that, with the exception of the physical sciences, there is no walk of knowledge which has been so slightly affected by Roman law as Metaphysics. The reason is that discussion on metaphysical subjects has always been conducted in Greek, first in pure Greek, and afterwards in a dialect of Latin expressly constructed to give expression to Greek conceptions. The modern languages have only been fitted to metaphysical inquiries by adopting this Latin dialect,208 or by imitating the process which was originally followed in its formation. The source of the phraseology which has been always employed for metaphysical discussion in modern times was the Latin translations of Aristotle, in which, whether derived or not from Arabic versions, the plan of the translator was not to seek for analogous expressions in any part of Latin literature, but to construct anew from Latin roots a set of phrases equal to the expression of Greek philosophical ideas. Over such a process the terminology of Roman law can have exercised little influence; at most, a few Latin law terms in a transmuted shape have made their way into metaphysical language. At the same time it is worthy of remark that whenever the problems of metaphysics are those which have been most strongly agitated in Western Europe, the thought, if not the language, betrays a legal parentage. Few things in the history of speculation are more impressive than the fact that no Greek-speaking people has ever felt itself seriously perplexed by the great question of Free-will and Necessity. I do not pretend to offer any summary explanation of this, but it does not seem an irrelevant suggestion that neither the Greeks, nor any society speaking and thinking in their language, ever showed the smallest capacity for producing a philosophy of law. Legal science is a Roman creation, and the problem of Free-will arises when we contemplate a metaphysical conception under a legal aspect. How came it to be a question whether invariable sequence was identical with necessary connection? I can only say that the tendency of Roman law, which became stronger as it advanced, was to look upon legal consequences as united to legal causes by an inexorable necessity, a tendency most markedly exemplified in the definition of Obligation which I have repeatedly cited, "Juris vinculum quo necessitate adstringimur alicujus solvendæ rei."

I’ve already mentioned that, except for the physical sciences, no area of knowledge has been as minimally impacted by Roman law as Metaphysics. This is because discussions on metaphysical topics have always taken place in Greek, first in pure Greek, and later in a Latin dialect specifically created to convey Greek ideas. Modern languages have only been adapted for metaphysical inquiries by adopting this Latin dialect,208 or by mimicking the process originally used to create it. The source of the language typically used for metaphysical discussions in modern times was the Latin translations of Aristotle, in which, regardless of whether they were derived from Arabic versions or not, the translator aimed not to find similar expressions in any part of Latin literature, but to create a new set of phrases from Latin roots that matched Greek philosophical ideas. This process would have had little influence from the terminology of Roman law; at most, a few Latin legal terms in altered forms have entered metaphysical language. It's also noteworthy that when the issues of metaphysics have been most intensely debated in Western Europe, the thought, if not the language, shows a legal heritage. Few things in the history of philosophy are more striking than the fact that no Greek-speaking society has ever felt seriously challenged by the major question of Free Will versus Necessity. I don’t claim to provide a comprehensive explanation for this, but it seems relevant to point out that neither the Greeks nor any society speaking and thinking in their language ever demonstrated any real ability to create a philosophy of law. Legal science is a Roman invention, and the question of Free Will emerges when we consider a metaphysical idea from a legal perspective. How did it become a question whether an unchanging sequence was the same as a necessary connection? I can only say that the tendency of Roman law, which became stronger with time, was to view legal consequences as linked to legal causes by an unbreakable necessity, a tendency most clearly shown in the definition of Obligation that I’ve mentioned several times: "Juris vinculum quo necessitate adstringimur alicujus solvendæ rei."

But the problem of Free-will was theological before it became philosophical, and, if its terms have been affected by jurisprudence, it will be because Jurisprudence had made itself felt in Theology. The great point of inquiry which is here suggested has never been satisfactorily elucidated. What has to be determined, is whether jurisprudence has ever served as the medium through which theological principles have been viewed; whether, by supplying a peculiar language, a peculiar mode of reasoning, and a peculiar solution of many209 of the problems of life, it has ever opened new channels in which theological speculation could flow out and expand itself. For the purpose of giving an answer it is necessary to recollect what is already agreed upon by the best writers as to the intellectual food which theology first assimilated. It is conceded on all sides that the earliest language of the Christian Church was Greek, and that the problems to which it first addressed itself were those for which Greek philosophy in its later forms had prepared the way. Greek metaphysical literature contained the sole stock of words and ideas out of which the human mind could provide itself with the means of engaging in the profound controversies as to the Divine Persons, the Divine Substance, and the Divine Natures. The Latin language and the meagre Latin philosophy were quite unequal to the undertaking, and accordingly the Western or Latin-speaking provinces of the Empire adopted the conclusions of the East without disputing or reviewing them. "Latin Christianity," says Dean Milman, "accepted the creed which its narrow and barren vocabulary could hardly express in adequate terms. Yet, throughout, the adhesion of Rome and the West was a passive acquiescence in the dogmatic system which had been wrought out by the profounder theology of the Eastern divines, rather than a vigorous and original examination on her part of those mysteries. The Latin Church was the scholar as well as the loyal partizan of Athanasius." But when the separation of East and West became wider, and the Latin-speaking Western Empire began to live with an intellectual life of its own, its deference to the East was all at once exchanged for the agitation of a number of questions entirely foreign to Eastern speculation. "While Greek theology (Milman, Latin Christianity, Preface, 5) went on defining with still more exquisite subtlety the Godhead and the nature of Christ"—"while the interminable controversy still lengthened out and cast forth sect after sect from the enfeebled community"—the Western Church threw itself with passionate ardour into a new order of disputes, the same which from those days to this have never lost their interest for any family of mankind at any time included in the Latin communion. The nature of Sin and its transmission by inheritance—the debt owed by man and its vicarious satisfaction—the necessity and sufficiency of the Atonement—above all the apparent antagonism210 between Free-will and the Divine Providence—these were the points which the West began to debate as ardently as ever the East had discussed the articles of its more special creed. Why is it then that on the two sides of the line which divides the Greek-speaking from the Latin-speaking provinces there lie two classes of theological problems so strikingly different from one another? The historians of the Church have come close upon the solution when they remark that the new problems were more "practical," less absolutely speculative, than those which had torn Eastern Christianity asunder, but none of them, so far as I am aware, has quite reached it. I affirm without hesitation that the difference between the two theological systems is accounted for by the fact that, in passing from the East to the West, theological speculation had passed from a climate of Greek metaphysics to a climate of Roman law. For some centuries before these controversies rose into overwhelming importance, all the intellectual activity of the Western Romans had been expended on jurisprudence exclusively. They had been occupied in applying a peculiar set of principles to all the combinations in which the circumstances of life are capable of being arranged. No foreign pursuit or taste called off their attention from this engrossing occupation, and for carrying it on they possessed a vocabulary as accurate as it was copious, a strict method of reasoning, a stock of general propositions on conduct more or less verified by experience, and a rigid moral philosophy. It was impossible that they should not select from the questions indicated by the Christian records those which had some affinity with the order of speculations to which they were accustomed, and that their manner of dealing with them should borrow something from their forensic habits. Almost everybody who has knowledge enough of Roman law to appreciate the Roman penal system, the Roman theory of the obligations established by Contract or Delict, the Roman view of Debts and of the modes of incurring, extinguishing, and transmitting them, the Roman notion of the continuance of individual existence by Universal Succession, may be trusted to say whence arose the frame of mind to which the problems of Western theology proved so congenial, whence came the phraseology in which these problems were stated, and whence the description of reasoning employed in their solution. It must only be recollected that211 Roman law which had worked itself into Western thought was neither the archaic system of the ancient city, nor the pruned and curtailed jurisprudence of the Byzantine Emperors; still less, of course, was it the mass of rules, nearly buried in a parasitical overgrowth of modern speculative doctrine, which passes by the name of Modern Civil Law. I speak only of that philosophy of jurisprudence, wrought out by the great juridical thinkers of the Antonine age, which may still be partially reproduced from the Pandects of Justinian, a system to which few faults can be attributed except it perhaps aimed at a higher degree of elegance, certainty, and precision, than human affairs will permit to the limits within which human laws seek to confine them.

But the problem of Free will was religious before it became philosophical, and if its terms have been influenced by law, it’s because law made an impact on religion. The main question here has never been clearly explained. What needs to be determined is whether law has ever acted as the lens through which religious principles have been viewed; whether, by providing a unique language, a distinct way of reasoning, and a special resolution to many209 of life's problems, it has opened new pathways for religious thought to emerge and develop. To answer this, it's crucial to remember what the best writers agree on regarding the intellectual foundations that religion first absorbed. It's widely accepted that the earliest language of the Christian Church was Greek and that the issues it first tackled were those for which Greek philosophy had already laid the groundwork. Greek metaphysical literature contained the only vocabulary and ideas that the human mind could use to engage in profound debates about the Divine Persons, the Divine Substance, and the Divine Natures. The Latin language and its limited philosophical scope were inadequate for this task, so the Western or Latin-speaking provinces of the Empire simply adopted the conclusions of the East without questioning or analyzing them. "Latin Christianity," says Dean Milman, "accepted the creed that its narrow and limited vocabulary could hardly express adequately. Yet throughout, Rome and the West's adherence was more of a passive acceptance of the dogmatic system that had been shaped by the deeper theology of the Eastern theologians, rather than a vigorous and original examination of those mysteries on their part. The Latin Church was both a scholar and a loyal supporter of Athanasius." However, when the division between East and West widened, and the Latin-speaking Western Empire began to develop its own intellectual life, its respect for the East quickly transformed into agitation over numerous questions that were completely foreign to Eastern speculation. "While Greek theology (Milman, Latin Christianity, Preface, 5) continued to define the Godhead and the nature of Christ with even more intricate subtlety"—"while the endless controversies continued to grow longer and produced sect after sect from the weakened community"—the Western Church eagerly dove into a new realm of disputes that have remained interesting to any group of people within the Latin communion from then until now. The nature of Sin and its inheritance—the debt owed by humanity and its vicarious satisfaction—the necessity and adequacy of the Atonement—most importantly, the apparent conflict210 between Free will and Divine Providence—these were the issues the West began debating with as much fervor as the East had discussed its more specific doctrines. So why is it that on either side of the divide between the Greek-speaking and Latin-speaking regions there are such strikingly different classes of theological problems? Church historians have come close to the answer when they note that the new problems were more "practical" and less purely speculative than those that had divided Eastern Christianity, but none have fully grasped it, as far as I know. I confidently assert that the difference between the two theological systems can be explained by the fact that, in moving from the East to the West, theological thought transitioned from a context of Greek metaphysics to one of Roman law. For several centuries before these controversies became overwhelmingly significant, all the intellectual efforts of the Western Romans were focused exclusively on law. They were engaged in applying a specific set of principles to all the various circumstances of life. No other interests diverted their focus from this captivating pursuit, and to carry it out they had a vocabulary that was both precise and extensive, a strict reasoning method, a collection of general principles about conduct that were mostly verified by experience, and a rigid moral philosophy. It was inevitable that they would select from the questions raised by the Christian texts those that had some connection with the type of speculation they were used to, and that their approach to these would reflect their legal habits. Anyone knowledgeable enough about Roman law to understand the Roman penal system, the Roman theory of obligations from Contracts or Delicts, the Roman perspective on Debts and the ways to incur, extinguish, and transfer them, and the Roman idea of the continuity of individual existence through Universal Succession, can be trusted to identify the mindset that made the problems of Western theology so appealing, the origin of the terminology used to state these problems, and the style of reasoning employed in their resolution. It's important to note that211 the Roman law that integrated into Western thought was neither the archaic system of ancient cities nor the simplified and limited laws of the Byzantine Emperors; even less so was it the collection of rules, nearly overshadowed by a tangled growth of modern speculative doctrine, known as Modern Civil Law. I refer only to the philosophy of law developed by the great legal thinkers of the Antonine age, which can still be partly retrieved from the Pandects of Justinian, a system to which few faults can be attributed except perhaps its attempt to achieve a higher level of elegance, certainty, and precision than human affairs allow within the confines that human laws seek to establish.

It is a singular result of that ignorance of Roman law which Englishmen readily confess, and of which they are sometimes not ashamed to boast, that many English writers of note and credit have been led by it to put forward the most untenable of paradoxes concerning the condition of human intellect during the Roman Empire. It has been constantly asserted, as unhesitatingly as if there were no temerity in advancing the proposition, that from the close of the Augustan era to the general awakening of interest on the points of the Christian faith, the mental energies of the civilised world were smitten with a paralysis. Now there are two subjects of thought—the only two perhaps with the exception of physical science—which are able to give employment to all the powers and capacities which the mind possesses. One of them is Metaphysical inquiry, which knows no limits so long as the mind is satisfied to work on itself; the other is Law, which is as extensive as the concerns of mankind. It happens that, during the very period indicated, the Greek-speaking provinces were devoted to one, the Latin-speaking provinces to the other, of these studies. I say nothing of the fruits of speculation in Alexandria and the East, but I confidently affirm that Rome and the West had an occupation in hand fully capable of compensating them for the absence of every other mental exercise, and I add that the results achieved, so far as we know them, were not unworthy of the continuous and exclusive labour bestowed on producing them. Nobody except a professional lawyer is perhaps in a position completely to understand how much of the intellectual strength of individuals Law is capable of absorbing, but a212 layman has no difficulty in comprehending why it was that an unusual share of the collective intellect of Rome was engrossed by jurisprudence. "The proficiency6] of a given community in jurisprudence depends in the long run on the same conditions as its progress in any other line of inquiry; and the chief of these are the proportion of the national intellect devoted to it, and the length of time during which it is so devoted. Now, a combination of all the causes, direct and indirect, which contribute to the advancing and perfecting of a science continued to operate on the jurisprudence of Rome through the entire space between the Twelve Tables and the severance of the two Empires,—and that not irregularly or at intervals, but in steadily increasing force and constantly augmenting number. We should reflect that the earliest intellectual exercise to which a young nation devotes itself is the study of its laws. As soon as the mind makes its first conscious efforts towards generalisation, the concerns of every-day life are the first to press for inclusion within general rules and comprehensive formulas. The popularity of the pursuit on which all the energies of the young commonwealth are bent is at the outset unbounded; but it ceases in time. The monopoly of mind by law is broken down. The crowd at the morning audience of the great Roman jurisconsult lessens. The students are counted by hundreds instead of thousands in the English Inns of Court. Art, Literature, Science, and Politics, claim their share of the national intellect; and the practice of jurisprudence is confined within the circle of a profession, never indeed limited or insignificant, but attracted as much by the rewards as by the intrinsic recommendations of their science. This succession of changes exhibited itself even more strikingly at Rome than in England. To the close of the Republic the law was the sole field for all ability except the special talent of a capacity for generalship. But a new stage of intellectual progress began with the Augustan age, as it did with our own Elizabethan era. We all know what were its achievements in poetry and prose; but there are some indications, it should be remarked, that, besides its efflorescence in ornamental literature, it was on the eve of throwing out new aptitudes for conquest in physical science. Here, however, is the point at which the history of mind in the Roman 213State ceases to be parallel to the routes which mental progress had since then pursued. The brief span of Roman literature, strictly so called, was suddenly closed under a variety of influences, which though they may partially be traced it would be improper in this place to analyse. Ancient intellect was forcibly thrust back into its old courses, and law again became no less exclusively the proper sphere for talent than it had been in the days when the Romans despised philosophy and poetry as the toys of a childish race. Of what nature were the external inducements which, during the Imperial period, tended to draw a man of inherent capacity to the pursuits of the jurisconsult may best be understood by considering the option which was practically before him in his choice of a profession. He might become a teacher of rhetoric, a commander of frontier-posts, or a professional writer of panegyrics. The only other walk of active life which was open to him was the practice of the law. Through that lay the approach to wealth, to fame, to office, to the council-chamber of the monarch—it may be to the very throne itself."

It’s a clear result of that ignorance of Roman law that English people often admit to, and sometimes take pride in, that many respected English writers have put forth the most absurd arguments about the state of human intellect during the Roman Empire. It has been repeatedly claimed, confidently as if there was no hesitation in making the statement, that from the end of the Augustan era to the widespread renewed interest in Christian beliefs, the intellectual energy of the civilized world was paralyzed. Now, there are two subjects of thought—the only two, perhaps aside from physical science—that can engage all the powers and capacities of the mind. One of these is Metaphysical inquiry, which has no limits as long as the mind is content to explore itself; the other is Law, which covers all aspects of human concern. During the very period mentioned, the Greek-speaking provinces were focused on one of these studies, while the Latin-speaking provinces were engaged in the other. I won’t comment on the results of speculation in Alexandria and the East, but I can confidently say that Rome and the West had a field of study that could fully compensate for the absence of all other forms of mental exercise, and I add that the results we know of weren’t unworthy of the dedication put into producing them. Few, apart from professional lawyers, fully understand how much intellectual strength law can absorb, but a layperson can easily grasp why a significant share of Rome's collective intellect was consumed by jurisprudence. "The proficiency of a given community in jurisprudence ultimately relies on the same conditions as its progress in any other area of research; and the main factors are the proportion of national intellect devoted to it and the amount of time spent doing so. Now, a combination of all the direct and indirect factors that support the advancement and refinement of a science continued to influence Roman jurisprudence throughout the entire period from the Twelve Tables to the division of the two Empires—not sporadically or irregularly, but consistently with increasing strength and numbers. We should keep in mind that the first intellectual endeavor a young nation typically engages in is the study of its laws. As soon as the mind starts to make its first conscious attempts at generalization, the everyday concerns begin to demand inclusion in general rules and comprehensive formulas. The initial popularity of the pursuit that captures all the energies of the young commonwealth is immense, but it eventually fades. The dominance of law over the intellect breaks down. The audience at the morning gatherings of the prominent Roman jurists dwindles. The number of students in the English Inns of Court becomes hundreds instead of thousands. Art, Literature, Science, and Politics begin to claim their share of national intellect, and the practice of law becomes confined within the realm of a profession, which, while never insignificant, is driven as much by rewards as by the intrinsic appeal of the field. This series of changes was even more pronounced in Rome than in England. Until the end of the Republic, law was the only field for all ability except for those with a talent for military leadership. However, a new stage of intellectual advancement began with the Augustan age, similar to that of our own Elizabethan era. We all know its achievements in poetry and prose; but it's worth noting that, in addition to its flourishing in decorative literature, it was on the brink of developing new abilities in physical science. However, this is where the history of thought in the Roman State stops resembling the paths mental progress took afterward. The brief period of Roman literature, strictly speaking, came to an abrupt end under various influences that may be partially traced but should not be analyzed here. Ancient intellect was forcibly pushed back into its old paths, and law once again became the exclusive domain for talent, just as it had been in times when Romans looked down on philosophy and poetry as trivial pursuits of a childish race. To understand the external factors that drew individuals of inherent ability to the legal arena during the Imperial period, we should consider the options available for choosing a profession. He could be a rhetoric teacher, a frontier military commander, or a professional writer of praises. The only other practical career path open to him was the practice of law. Through that path lay the road to wealth, fame, public office, the monarch's council chamber—it could even lead to the throne itself."

The premium on the study of jurisprudence was so enormous that there were schools of law in every part of the Empire, even in the very domain of Metaphysics. But, though the transfer of the seat of empire to Byzantium gave a perceptible impetus to its cultivation in the East, jurisprudence never dethroned the pursuits which there competed with it. Its language was Latin, an exotic dialect in the Eastern half of the Empire. It is only of the West that we can lay down that law was not only the mental food of the ambitious and aspiring, but the sole aliment of all intellectual activity. Greek philosophy had never been more than a transient fashionable taste with the educated class of Rome itself, and when the new Eastern capital had been created, and the Empire subsequently divided into two, the divorce of the Western provinces from Greek speculation, and their exclusive devotion to jurisprudence, became more decided than ever. As soon then as they ceased to sit at the feet of the Greeks and began to ponder out a theology of their own, the theology proved to be permeated with forensic ideas and couched in a forensic phraseology. It is certain that this substratum of law in Western theology lies exceedingly deep. A new set of Greek theories, the Aristotelian philosophy,214 made their way afterwards into the West and almost entirely buried its indigenous doctrines. But when at the Reformation it partially shook itself free from their influence, it instantly supplied their place with Law. It is difficult to say whether the religious system of Calvin or the religious system of the Arminians has the more markedly legal character.

The emphasis on the study of law was so significant that there were law schools throughout the Empire, even in the realm of Metaphysics. However, even though moving the capital to Byzantium gave a noticeable boost to its study in the East, law never completely took over the other pursuits competing with it there. Its language was Latin, a foreign dialect in the Eastern part of the Empire. We can only say for the West that law was not just the intellectual nourishment for the ambitious and aspiring, but the main source of all intellectual activity. Greek philosophy had only ever been a passing trend among the educated class in Rome, and once the new Eastern capital was established and the Empire divided into two, the separation of the Western provinces from Greek thought and their complete dedication to law became clearer than ever. As soon as they stopped looking up to the Greeks and started developing their own theology, that theology turned out to be full of legal concepts and expressed in legal terms. It's clear that this foundation of law in Western theology runs extremely deep. A new set of Greek theories, Aristotelian philosophy, later made its way into the West and almost completely overshadowed its native doctrines. But when the Reformation allowed the West to partially break free from that influence, it immediately replaced it with Law. It's hard to determine whether Calvin's religious system or the Arminians' has a more distinctly legal character.

The vast influence of the specific jurisprudence of Contract produced by the Romans upon the corresponding department of modern Law belongs rather to the history of mature jurisprudence than to a treatise like the present. It did not make itself felt till the school of Bologna founded the legal science of modern Europe. But the fact that the Romans, before their Empire fell, had so fully developed the conception of Contract becomes of importance at a much earlier period than this. Feudalism, I have repeatedly asserted, was a compound of archaic barbarian usage with Roman law; no other explanation of it is tenable, or even intelligible. The earliest social forms of the feudal period differ in little from the ordinary associations in which the men of primitive civilisations are everywhere seen united. A Fief was an organically complete brotherhood of associates whose proprietary and personal rights were inextricably blended together. It had much in common with an Indian Village Community and much in common with a Highland clan. But still it presents some phenomena which we never find in the associations which are spontaneously formed by beginners in civilisation. True archaic communities are held together not by express rules, but by sentiment, or, we should perhaps say, by instinct; and new comers into the brotherhood are brought within the range of this instinct by falsely pretending to share in the blood-relationship from which it naturally springs. But the earliest feudal communities were neither bound together by mere sentiment nor recruited by a fiction. The tie which united them was Contract, and they obtained new associates by contracting with them. The relation of the lord to the vassals had originally been settled by express engagement, and a person wishing to engraft himself on the brotherhood by commendation or infeudation came to a distinct understanding as to the conditions on which he was to be admitted. It is therefore the sphere occupied in them by Contract which principally distinguishes the feudal institutions from the215 unadulterated usages of primitive races. The lord had many of the characteristics of a patriarchal chieftain, but his prerogative was limited by a variety of settled customs traceable to the express conditions which had been agreed upon when the infeudation took place. Hence flow the chief differences which forbid us to class the feudal societies with true archaic communities. They were much more durable and much more various; more durable, because express rules are less destructible than instinctive habits, and more various, because the contracts on which they were founded were adjusted to the minutest circumstances and wishes of the persons who surrendered or granted away their lands. This last consideration may serve to indicate how greatly the vulgar opinions current among us as to the origin of modern society stand in need of revision. It is often said that the irregular and various contour of modern civilisation is due to the exuberant and erratic genius of the Germanic races, and it is often contrasted with the dull routine of the Roman Empire. The truth is that the Empire bequeathed to modern society the legal conception to which all this irregularity is attributable; if the customs and institutions of barbarians have one characteristic more striking than another, it is their extreme uniformity.216

The significant impact of Roman contract law on modern legal systems is more relevant to the history of established legal thought than to a work like this one. Its influence didn't become apparent until the school of Bologna developed the legal framework for modern Europe. However, the Romans had already thoroughly shaped the idea of contracts well before the fall of their Empire, which is important to note much earlier. I've often stated that feudalism was a mix of ancient barbarian practices and Roman law; any other explanation isn't valid or even makes sense. The earliest social structures of the feudal era are not much different from the typical associations found in primitive societies everywhere. A fief was a cohesive group of associates whose property and personal rights were closely intertwined. It had similarities to an Indian village community and a Highland clan. Yet, it also exhibited some characteristics we don’t see in spontaneously formed groups in early civilization. True primitive communities are held together not by explicit rules, but by feeling—or, we might say, by instinct; newcomers join the group by pretending to share in the blood ties on which the community is based. However, the earliest feudal communities weren’t held together solely by feelings nor were they formed based on a myth. The bond that connected them was a contract, and they gained new members through agreements. The relationship between the lord and the vassals was initially defined by a clear agreement, and someone wanting to join the group through commendation or infeudation would have a clear understanding of the terms of their admission. Therefore, it is the role of contracts in these communities that primarily sets feudal institutions apart from the pure customs of primitive societies. The lord exhibited many traits of a patriarchal leader, but his powers were restricted by various established customs that stemmed from the explicit agreements made during the infeudation. This leads to the main differences that prevent us from categorizing feudal societies as true primitive communities. They were much more stable and diverse; more stable because clear rules are harder to break than instinctive habits, and more diverse because the contracts they were based on were tailored to the specific circumstances and desires of the individuals who gave away or granted their lands. This last point highlights how much the common perceptions about the origins of modern society need to be reevaluated. It's often said that the irregular and varied nature of modern civilization comes from the vibrant and unpredictable spirit of the Germanic peoples, contrasting it with the monotonous routine of the Roman Empire. In reality, the Empire left modern society with the legal concepts that explain all this irregularity; if the customs and institutions of barbarians have one defining feature, it is their extreme uniformity.216

5 The passage quoted is transcribed with slight alterations from a paper contributed by the author to the Cambridge Essays for 1856.

5 The quoted passage has been slightly modified from an essay the author contributed to the Cambridge Essays in 1856.

6 Cambridge Essays, 1856.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ *Cambridge Essays*, 1856.

CHAPTER X

the early history of torts and crimes

The Teutonic Codes, including those of our Anglo-Saxon ancestors, are the only bodies of archaic secular law which have come down to us in such a state that we can form an exact notion of their original dimensions. Although the extant fragments of Roman and Hellenic codes suffice to prove to us their general character, there does not remain enough of them for us to be quite sure of their precise magnitude or of the proportion of their parts to each other. But still on the whole all the known collections of ancient law are characterised by a feature which broadly distinguishes them from systems of mature jurisprudence. The proportion of criminal to civil law is exceedingly different. In the German codes, the civil part of the law has trifling dimensions as compared with the criminal. The traditions which speak of the sanguinary penalties inflicted by the code of Draco seem to indicate that it had the same characteristic. In the Twelve Tables alone, produced by a society of greater legal genius and at first of gentler manners, the civil law has something like its modern precedence; but the relative amount of space given to the modes of redressing wrong, though not enormous, appears to have been large. It may be laid down, I think, that the more archaic the code, the fuller and the minuter is its penal legislation. The phenomenon has often been observed, and has been explained, no doubt to a great extent correctly, by the violence habitual to the communities which for the first time reduced their laws to writing. The legislator, it is said, proportioned the divisions of his work to the frequency of a certain class of incidents in barbarian life. I imagine, however, that this account is not quite complete. It should be recollected that the comparative barrenness of civil law in archaic collections is consistent with those other characteristics of ancient jurisprudence which have been discussed in this treatise. Nine-tenths of the civil part of the law practised by civilised societies217 are made up of the Law of Persons, of the Law of Property and of Inheritance, and of the Law of Contract. But it is plain that all these provinces of jurisprudence must shrink within narrower boundaries, the nearer we make our approaches to the infancy of social brotherhood. The Law of Persons, which is nothing else than the Law of Status, will be restricted to the scantiest limits as long as all forms of status are merged in common subjection to Paternal Power, as long as the Wife has no rights against her Husband, the Son none against his Father, and the infant Ward none against the Agnates who are his Guardians. Similarly, the rules relating to Property and Succession can never be plentiful, so long as land and goods devolve within the family, and, if distributed at all, are distributed inside its circle. But the greatest gap in ancient civil law will always be caused by the absence of Contract, which some archaic codes do not mention at all, while others significantly attest the immaturity of the moral notions on which Contract depends by supplying its place with an elaborate jurisprudence of Oaths. There are no corresponding reasons for the poverty of penal law, and accordingly, even if it be hazardous to pronounce that the childhood of nations is always a period of ungoverned violence, we shall still be able to understand why the modern relation of criminal law to civil should be inverted in ancient codes.

The Teutonic Codes, including those from our Anglo-Saxon ancestors, are the only collections of ancient secular law that have survived in such a way that we can clearly understand their original scope. While the remaining fragments of Roman and Greek codes give us a general idea of their nature, there's not enough left for us to be certain about their exact size or how their parts relate to one another. However, all the known collections of ancient law share a characteristic that sets them apart from more developed legal systems. The ratio of criminal law to civil law is vastly different. In the German codes, the civil law is quite minimal compared to the criminal law. The traditions about the harsh penalties enforced by Draco's code suggest it had a similar feature. In the Twelve Tables, however, created by a society with greater legal insight and initially gentler customs, civil law takes on a more prominent role, though the space devoted to remedies for wrongs, while not extensive, appears to be significant. It can be said that the older the code is, the more detailed and comprehensive its penal legislation tends to be. This phenomenon has often been noted and is largely attributed to the violence common in the communities that first put their laws in writing. It's said that lawmakers adjusted the sections of their work according to the frequency of certain incidents in barbaric life. Nonetheless, I believe this explanation is somewhat incomplete. It's worth noting that the relative lack of civil law in ancient collections aligns with other traits of ancient jurisprudence discussed in this text. Most of the civil law practiced by civilized societies is made up of the Law of Persons, the Law of Property and Inheritance, and the Law of Contract. However, it's clear that all these areas of law must become narrower as we look back towards the early days of social relationships. The Law of Persons, which is essentially the Law of Status, will be very limited as long as all forms of status fall under the common authority of Paternal Power, where the Wife has no rights against her Husband, the Son none against his Father, and the infant Ward none against the Agnates who are his Guardians. Similarly, the rules concerning Property and Succession can never be extensive as long as land and goods pass down within the family and, if allocated at all, are shared only within its circle. However, the most significant gap in ancient civil law arises from the lack of Contract, which is entirely absent in some archaic codes, while others indicate the underdeveloped moral concepts essential for Contract by substituting it with a detailed jurisprudence of Oaths. There are no comparable reasons for the lack of penal law; therefore, even if it is risky to assert that the early stages of nations are always marked by unchecked violence, we can still understand why the modern relationship between criminal law and civil law is reversed in ancient codes.

I have spoken of primitive jurisprudence as giving to criminal law a priority unknown in a later age. The expression has been used for convenience' sake, but in fact the inspection of ancient codes shows that the law which they exhibit in unusual quantities is not true criminal law. All civilised systems agree in drawing a distinction between offences against the State or Community and offences against the Individual, and the two classes of injuries, thus kept apart, I may here, without pretending that the terms have always been employed consistently in jurisprudence, call Crimes and Wrongs, crimina and delicta. Now the penal law of ancient communities is not the law of Crimes; it is the law of Wrongs, or, to use the English technical word, of Torts. The person injured proceeds against the wrong-doer by an ordinary civil action, and recovers compensation in the shape of money-damages if he succeeds. If the Commentaries of Gaius be opened at the place where the writer treats of the218 penal jurisprudence founded on the Twelve Tables, it will be seen that at the head of the civil wrongs recognised by the Roman law stood Furtum or Theft. Offences which we are accustomed to regard exclusively as crimes are exclusively treated as torts, and not theft only, but assault and violent robbery, are associated by the jurisconsult with trespass, libel and slander. All alike gave rise to an Obligation or vinculum juris, and were all requited by a payment of money. This peculiarity, however, is most strongly brought out in the consolidated Laws of the Germanic tribes. Without an exception, they describe an immense system of money compensations for homicide, and with few exceptions, as large a scheme of compensations for minor injuries. "Under Anglo-Saxon law," writes Mr. Kemble (Anglo-Saxons, i. 177), "a sum was placed on the life of every free man, according to his rank, and a corresponding sum on every wound that could be inflicted on his person, for nearly every injury that could be done to his civil rights, honour or peace; the sum being aggravated according to adventitious circumstances." These compositions are evidently regarded as a valuable source of income; highly complex rules regulate the title to them and the responsibility for them; and, as I have already had occasion to state, they often follow a very peculiar line of devolution, if they have not been acquitted at the decease of the person to whom they belong. If therefore the criterion of a delict, wrong, or tort be that the person who suffers it, and not the State, is conceived to be wronged, it may be asserted that in the infancy of jurisprudence the citizen depends for protection against violence or fraud not on the Law of Crime but on the Law of Tort.

I have mentioned primitive law as giving criminal law a priority that is unfamiliar in later times. This term has been used for convenience, but examining ancient codes shows that the law they contain in significant amounts is not genuine criminal law. All civilized legal systems recognize a distinction between offenses against the State or Community and offenses against the Individual, and these two categories of harm, kept separate, can be referred to as Crimes and Wrongs, crimina and delicta. Now, the penal law of ancient societies is not the law of Crimes; it is the law of Wrongs, or, using the English legal term, Torts. The injured party can take legal action against the wrongdoer in a regular civil case and can receive compensation in the form of monetary damages if they win. If you look at Gaius's Commentaries where he discusses penal law based on the Twelve Tables, you'll see that at the top of the civil wrongs recognized by Roman law is Furtum or Theft. Offenses that we normally think of as crimes are treated as torts, and not only theft but also assault and violent robbery are linked by legal experts to trespass, defamation, and slander. All these led to an Obligation or vinculum juris and were all compensated with a payment of money. This distinctive feature is most clearly seen in the compiled laws of the Germanic tribes. Without exception, they outline an extensive system of monetary compensation for homicide, and for lesser injuries, a similarly large compensation scheme exists with few exceptions. "Under Anglo-Saxon law," Mr. Kemble writes in Anglo-Saxons (i. 177), "a monetary value was assigned to the life of every free man, depending on his status, and a corresponding amount was set for every wound that could be inflicted on him, for almost every injury to his civil rights, honor, or peace; the amount increased based on specific circumstances." These compensations are clearly viewed as a significant source of revenue; intricate rules dictate ownership and responsibility regarding them; and, as I have mentioned before, they often follow a unique transfer process if they haven't been settled upon the death of the individual to whom they belong. Therefore, if the defining feature of a delict, wrong, or tort is that it is perceived as harming the individual rather than the State, it can be argued that in the early stages of law, citizens relied on the Law of Tort for protection against violence or fraud rather than on the Law of Crime.

Torts then are copiously enlarged upon in primitive jurisprudence. It must be added that Sins are known to it also. Of the Teutonic codes it is almost unnecessary to make this assertion, because those codes, in the form in which we have received them, were compiled or recast by Christian legislators. But it is also true that non-Christian bodies of archaic law entail penal consequences on certain classes of acts and on certain classes of omissions, as being violations of divine prescriptions and commands. The law administered at Athens by the Senate of Areopagus was probably a special religious code, and at Rome, apparently from a very early period, the Pontifical jurisprudence punished adultery,219 sacrilege and perhaps murder. There were therefore in the Athenian and in the Roman States laws punishing sins. There were also laws punishing torts. The conception of offence against God produced the first class of ordinances; the conception of offence against one's neighbour produced the second; but the idea of offence against the State or aggregate community did not at first produce a true criminal jurisprudence.

Torts are extensively discussed in early legal systems. It should also be mentioned that sins are recognized in these systems. For the Teutonic codes, it’s almost unnecessary to point this out since those codes, as we have them today, were compiled or restructured by Christian lawmakers. However, it's also true that non-Christian ancient laws impose penalties for certain actions and omissions for violating divine rules and commands. The law enforced in Athens by the Senate of Areopagus was likely a specific religious code, and in Rome, it seems that from a very early time, the Pontifical law punished adultery, sacrilege, and perhaps even murder. Therefore, both Athenian and Roman legal systems included laws that punished sins. They also had laws punishing torts. The idea of offending God led to the creation of the first set of laws; the idea of offending one’s neighbor led to the second. However, the concept of offending the State or the community did not initially result in a proper criminal justice system.

Yet it is not to be supposed that a conception so simple and elementary as that of wrong done to the State was wanting in any primitive society. It seems rather that the very distinctness with which this conception is realised is the true cause which at first prevents the growth of a criminal law. At all events, when the Roman community conceived itself to be injured, the analogy of a personal wrong received was carried out to its consequences with absolute literalness, and the State avenged itself by a single act on the individual wrong-doer. The result was that, in the infancy of the commonwealth, every offence vitally touching its security or its interests was punished by a separate enactment of the legislature. And this is the earliest conception of a crimen or Crime—an act involving such high issues that the State, instead of leaving its cognisance to the civil tribunal or the religious court, directed a special law or privilegium against the perpetrator. Every indictment therefore took the form of a bill of pains and penalties, and the trial of a criminal was a proceeding wholly extraordinary, wholly irregular, wholly independent of settled rules and fixed conditions. Consequently, both for the reason that the tribunal dispensing justice was the sovereign state itself and also for the reason that no classification of the acts prescribed or forbidden was possible, there was not at this epoch any Law of crimes, any criminal jurisprudence. The procedure was identical with the forms of passing an ordinary statute; it was set in motion by the same persons and conducted with precisely the same solemnities. And it is to be observed that, when a regular criminal law with an apparatus of Courts and officers for its administration had afterwards come into being, the old procedure, as might be supposed from its conformity with theory, still in strictness remained practicable; and, much as resort to such an expedient was discredited, the people of Rome always retained the power of punishing by a special220 law offences against its majesty. The classical scholar does not require to be reminded that in exactly the same manner the Athenian Bill of Pains and Penalties, or εἰσαγγελία, survived the establishment of regular tribunals. It is known too that when the freemen of the Teutonic races assembled for legislation, they also claimed authority to punish offences of peculiar blackness or perpetrated by criminals of exalted station. Of this nature was the criminal jurisdiction of the Anglo-Saxon Witenagemot.

Yet we shouldn't assume that a concept as straightforward and basic as wrongdoing towards the State was absent in any early society. In fact, the clear understanding of this concept likely explains why criminal law didn't develop initially. At any rate, when the Roman community felt wronged, they took the idea of a personal injury very literally, and the State retaliated against the individual wrongdoer with a direct action. As a result, in the early days of the commonwealth, any offense that threatened its security or interests was punished by specific laws enacted by the legislature. This is the earliest understanding of a crimen or crime—an act of such significance that the State, instead of allowing civil or religious courts to handle it, created a special law or privilegium against the offender. Therefore, every charge was framed as a bill of pains and penalties, and the trial of a criminal was entirely extraordinary, irregular, and independent of established rules and fixed procedures. Consequently, because the tribunal administering justice was the sovereign state itself and because it wasn't possible to categorize the prescribed or forbidden acts, there was no Law of crimes or criminal jurisprudence at this time. The process was identical to that of passing a regular statute; it was initiated by the same people and followed the same formalities. Furthermore, it's worth noting that once a formal criminal law system with courts and officials was established, the old procedures, still theoretically sound, remained available; and despite the general disapproval of such practices, the people of Rome always kept the power to punish offenses against its majesty through special220 laws. Classics scholars don’t need to be reminded that similarly, the Athenian Bill of Pains and Penalties, or εἰσαγγελία, persisted even after regular tribunals were established. It’s also known that when the freemen of the Teutonic races gathered for legislation, they claimed the authority to punish particularly heinous offenses or those committed by high-ranking criminals. Such was the criminal jurisdiction of the Anglo-Saxon Witenagemot.

It may be thought that the difference which I have asserted to exist between the ancient and modern view of penal law has only a verbal existence. The community, it may be said, besides interposing to punish crimes legislatively, has from the earliest times interfered by its tribunals to compel the wrong-doer to compound for his wrong, and, if it does this, it must always have supposed that in some way it was injured through his offence. But, however rigorous this inference may seem to us now-a-days, it is very doubtful whether it was actually drawn by the men of primitive antiquity. How little the notion of injury to the community had to do with the earliest interferences of the State through its tribunals, is shown by the curious circumstances that in the original administration of justice, the proceedings were a close imitation of the series of acts which were likely to be gone through in private life by persons who were disputing, but who afterwards suffered their quarrel to be appeased. The magistrate carefully simulated the demeanour of a private arbitrator casually called in.

It might be thought that the difference I’ve pointed out between the ancient and modern views of penal law is just a matter of words. Some might argue that the community, aside from creating laws to punish crimes, has always intervened through its courts to make wrongdoers compensate for their wrongs; if that’s the case, it must have believed that it was somehow harmed by their offenses. However, no matter how strict this assumption may seem to us today, it’s questionable whether people in ancient times actually made that connection. The idea that the community was injured played a minimal role in the earliest state interventions, as evidenced by the interesting fact that in the original justice system, the procedures closely mirrored the series of actions that would typically take place in a private dispute that was later resolved. The magistrate carefully mimicked the behavior of a private arbitrator who had been casually brought in to help settle the matter.

In order to show that this statement is not a mere fanciful conceit, I will produce the evidence on which it rests. Very far the most ancient judicial proceeding known to us is the Legis Actio Sacramenti of the Romans, out of which all the later Roman Law of Actions may be proved to have grown. Gaius carefully describes its ceremonial. Unmeaning and grotesque as it appears at first sight, a little attention enables us to decipher and interpret it.

To demonstrate that this statement isn't just a fanciful idea, I'll provide the evidence supporting it. The oldest known judicial procedure is the Legis Actio Sacramenti of the Romans, which is the foundation for all later Roman Law of Actions. Gaius thoroughly describes its ceremony. Although it seems pointless and strange at first glance, with a bit of attention, we can decode and make sense of it.

The subject of litigation is supposed to be in Court. If it is moveable, it is actually there. If it be immoveable, a fragment or sample of it is brought in its place; land, for instance, is represented by a clod, a house by a single brick. In the example selected by Gaius, the suit is for a slave. The proceeding begins by the plaintiff's advancing with a rod,221 which, as Gaius expressly tells, symbolised a spear. He lays hold of the slave and asserts a right to him with the words, "Hunc ego hominem ex Jure Quiritium meum esse dico secundum suam causam sicut dixi;" and then saying, "Ecce tibi Vindictam imposui," he touches him with the spear. The defendant goes through the same series of acts and gestures. On this the Prætor intervenes, and bids the litigants relax their hold, "Mittite ambo hominem." They obey, and the plaintiff demands from the defendant the reason of his interference, "Postulo anne dicas quâ ex causâ vindicaveris," a question which is replied to by a fresh assertion of right, "Jus peregi sicut vindictam imposui." On this, the first claimant offers to stake a sum of money, called a Sacramentum, on the justice of his own case, "Quando tu injuriâ provocasti, D æris Sacramento te provoco," and the defendant, in the phrase "Similiter ego te," accepts the wager. The subsequent proceedings were no longer of a formal kind, but it is to be observed that the Prætor took security for the Sacramentum, which always went into the coffers of the State.

The person involved in the lawsuit is supposed to be in court. If it's a movable object, it's actually there. If it's immovable, a piece or sample of it is brought instead; for example, land is represented by a clod of earth, and a house by a single brick. In the example chosen by Gaius, the case is about a slave. The process starts with the plaintiff stepping forward with a rod, which, as Gaius clearly states, symbolized a spear. He grabs the slave and claims him with the words, "Hunc ego hominem ex Jure Quiritium meum esse dico secundum suam causam sicut dixi;" and then says, "Ecce tibi Vindictam imposui," touching him with the spear. The defendant goes through the same actions and gestures. The Praetor then intervenes and tells the parties to let go, "Mittite ambo hominem." They comply, and the plaintiff asks the defendant for the reason for his interference, "Postulo anne dicas quâ ex causâ vindicaveris," to which the defendant responds with a new assertion of right, "Jus peregi sicut vindictam imposui." At this point, the first claimant offers to wager a sum of money, called a Sacramentum, on the fairness of his case, "Quando tu injuriâ provocasti, D æris Sacramento te provoco," and the defendant accepts the wager with the phrase "Similiter ego te." The following proceedings were no longer formal, but it’s worth noting that the Praetor secured the Sacramentum, which always went into the state coffers.

Such was the necessary preface of every ancient Roman suit. It is impossible, I think, to refuse assent to the suggestion of those who see in it a dramatisation of the Origin of Justice. Two armed men are wrangling about some disputed property. The Prætor, vir pietate gravis, happens to be going by, and interposes to stop the contest. The disputants state their case to him, and agree that he shall arbitrate between them, it being arranged that the loser, besides resigning the subject of the quarrel, shall pay a sum of money to the umpire as remuneration for his trouble and loss of time. This interpretation would be less plausible than it is, were it not that, by a surprising coincidence, the ceremony described by Gaius as the imperative course of proceeding in a Legis Actio is substantially the same with one of the two subjects which the God Hephæstus is described by Homer as moulding into the First Compartment of the Shield of Achilles. In the Homeric trial-scene, the dispute, as if expressly intended to bring out the characteristics of primitive society, is not about property but about the composition for a homicide. One person asserts that he has paid it, the other that he has never received it. The point of detail, however, which stamps the picture as the counterpart of the archaic Roman practice is the reward designed for the judges. Two222 talents of gold lie in the middle, to be given to him who shall explain the grounds of the decision most to the satisfaction of the audience. The magnitude of this sum as compared with the trifling amount of the Sacramentum seems to me indicative of the indifference between fluctuating usage and usage consolidated into law. The scene introduced by the poet as a striking and characteristic, but still only occasional, feature of city-life in the heroic age has stiffened, at the opening of the history of civil process, into the regular, ordinary formalities of a lawsuit. It is natural therefore that in the Legis Actio the remuneration of the Judge should be reduced to a reasonable sum, and that, instead of being adjudged to one of a number of arbitrators by popular acclamation, it should be paid as a matter of course to the State which the Prætor represents. But that the incidents described so vividly by Homer, and by Gaius with even more than the usual crudity of technical language, have substantially the same meaning, I cannot doubt; and, in confirmation of this view, it may be added that many observers of the earliest judicial usages of modern Europe have remarked that the fines inflicted by Courts on offenders were originally sacramenta. The State did not take from the defendant a composition for any wrong supposed to be done to itself, but claimed a share in the compensation awarded to the plaintiff simply as the fair price of its time and trouble. Mr. Kemble expressly assigns this character to the Anglo-Saxon bannum or fredum.

This was the necessary introduction to every ancient Roman lawsuit. I think it's hard to disagree with those who see it as a dramatization of the Origin of Justice. Two armed men are arguing over some disputed property. The Praetor, a man of serious character, happens to be passing by and steps in to stop the fight. The disputants present their case to him and agree that he will act as the mediator. They arrange that the loser, in addition to giving up the disputed property, will also pay a sum of money to the mediator as compensation for his effort and lost time. This interpretation would seem less credible if it weren't for the surprising coincidence that the ceremony described by Gaius as the essential process in a Legis Actio is essentially the same as one of the two subjects that the god Hephaestus is described by Homer as shaping into the First Compartment of the Shield of Achilles. In the Homeric trial scene, the dispute is, as if intentionally meant to showcase the features of primitive society, not about property but about compensation for a homicide. One person claims to have paid it, while the other insists he never received it. However, the detail that highlights this picture as parallel to archaic Roman practice is the reward intended for the judges. Two talents of gold are placed in the center to be awarded to whoever can explain the reasoning behind the decision most satisfactorily to the audience. The size of this amount compared to the insignificant sum of the Sacramentum suggests a disregard between changing customs and those that have become law. The scene portrayed by the poet as a striking and typical, yet once-in-a-while, aspect of city life in the heroic age has solidified, at the beginning of civil process history, into the regular, standard procedures of a lawsuit. Therefore, it's natural that in the Legis Actio, the judge's fees should be reduced to a reasonable amount and that, instead of being awarded to one of several arbitrators by popular vote, it should be routinely paid to the State which the Praetor represents. However, I have no doubt that the incidents vividly described by Homer, and by Gaius in even more technically crude language, carry substantially the same meaning; and, to support this view, it's worth noting that many observers of the earliest judicial practices in modern Europe have pointed out that the fines imposed by courts on offenders were originally sacramenta. The State did not take payment from the defendant as compensation for any wrong done to itself but claimed a share in the compensation awarded to the plaintiff merely as a fair price for its time and efforts. Mr. Kemble specifically attributes this role to the Anglo-Saxon bannum or fredum.

Ancient law furnishes other proofs that the earliest administrators of justice simulated the probable acts of persons engaged in a private quarrel. In settling the damages to be awarded, they took as their guide the measure of vengeance likely to be exacted by an aggrieved person under the circumstances of the case. This is the true explanation of the very different penalties imposed by ancient law on offenders caught in the act or soon after it and on offenders detected after considerable delay. Some strange exemplifications of this peculiarity are supplied by the old Roman law of Theft. The Laws of the Twelve Tables seem to have divided Thefts into Manifest and Non-Manifest, and to have allotted extraordinarily different penalties to the offence according as it fell under one head or the other. The Manifest Thief was he who was caught within the house in which he223 had been pilfering, or who was taken while making off to a place of safety with the stolen goods; the Twelve Tables condemned him to be put to death if he were already a slave, and, if he was a freeman, they made him the bondsman of the owner of the property. The Non-Manifest Thief was he who was detected under any other circumstances than those described; and the old code simply directed that an offender of this sort should refund double the value of what he had stolen. In Gaius's day the excessive severity of the Twelve Tables to the Manifest Thief had naturally been much mitigated, but the law still maintained the old principle by mulcting him in fourfold the value of the stolen goods, while the Non-Manifest Thief still continued to pay merely the double. The ancient lawgiver doubtless considered that the injured proprietor, if left to himself, would inflict a very different punishment when his blood was hot from that with which he would be satisfied when the Thief was detected after a considerable interval; and to this calculation the legal scale of penalties was adjusted. The principle is precisely the same as that followed in the Anglo-Saxon and other Germanic codes, when they suffer a thief chased down and caught with the booty to be hanged or decapitated on the spot, while they exact the full penalties of homicide from anybody who kills him after the pursuit has been intermitted. These archaic distinctions bring home to us very forcibly the distance of a refined from a rude jurisprudence. The modern administrator of justice has confessedly one of the hardest tasks before him when he undertakes to discriminate between the degrees of criminality which belong to offences falling within the same technical description. It is always easy to say that a man is guilty of manslaughter, larceny, or bigamy, but it is often most difficult to pronounce what extent of moral guilt he has incurred, and consequently what measure of punishment he has deserved. There is hardly any perplexity in casuistry, or in the analysis of motive, which we may not be called upon to confront, if we attempt to settle such a point with precision; and accordingly the law of our day shows an increasing tendency to abstain as much as possible from laying down positive rules on the subject. In France, the jury is left to decide whether the offence which it finds committed has been attended by extenuating circumstances; in England, a nearly unbounded latitude in the selection of punishments224 is now allowed to the judge; while all States have in reserve an ultimate remedy for the miscarriages of law in the Prerogative of Pardon, universally lodged with the Chief Magistrate. It is curious to observe how little the men of primitive times were troubled with these scruples, how completely they were persuaded that the impulses of the injured person were the proper measure of the vengeance he was entitled to exact, and how literally they imitated the probable rise and fall of his passions in fixing their scale of punishment. I wish it could be said that their method of legislation is quite extinct. There are, however, several modern systems of law which, in cases of graver wrong, admit the fact of the wrong-doer having been taken in the act to be pleaded in justification of inordinate punishment inflicted on him by the sufferer—an indulgence which, though superficially regarded it may seem intelligible, is based, as it seems to me, on a very low morality.

Ancient law provides further evidence that the early administrators of justice mimicked the likely actions of people involved in a personal dispute. When determining the damages to be awarded, they used the potential vengeance a harmed person might seek as their guide. This explains the significantly different penalties imposed by ancient law on offenders caught in the act or shortly after, compared to those caught after a long delay. Some unusual examples of this are found in the old Roman law of Theft. The Laws of the Twelve Tables appeared to categorize Thefts into Manifest and Non-Manifest, assigning drastically different penalties based on which category the offense fell into. The Manifest Thief was someone who was apprehended within the house where he was stealing or was caught fleeing with the stolen goods; the Twelve Tables sentenced him to death if he was already a slave, and if he was a freeman, he became a servant to the owner of the stolen property. The Non-Manifest Thief was caught under different circumstances, and the old code simply required that he repay double the value of what he stole. In Gaius's time, the harshness of the Twelve Tables towards the Manifest Thief had understandably been reduced, but the law still upheld the old principle by imposing a penalty of four times the value of the stolen goods, while the Non-Manifest Thief continued to pay only double. The ancient lawgiver likely believed that the harmed property owner, if left unchecked, would impose very different punishment when his anger was fresh compared to what he would accept if the Theft was discovered after a significant delay; thus, the legal scale of penalties was created. The same principle can be seen in Anglo-Saxon and other Germanic codes, which allowed a thief caught during a chase to be hanged or decapitated on the spot, while imposing full penalties for homicide on anyone who kills him after the chase has stopped. These old distinctions highlight the significant differences between sophisticated and primitive legal systems. The modern justice administrator undoubtedly faces one of the toughest challenges when trying to distinguish between the varying degrees of wrongdoing in crimes that fall under the same technical category. It is easy to label someone as guilty of manslaughter, theft, or bigamy, but often it's very hard to determine the extent of moral guilt and therefore what level of punishment is deserved. There is hardly any confusion in ethical reasoning or in the analysis of motives that we might not encounter if we try to define such a point with precision; thus, contemporary law tends to avoid setting strict rules on the issue as much as possible. In France, the jury decides if the offense has any mitigating circumstances; in England, judges now have almost unlimited freedom in choosing punishments; and all states have a final resort for legal errors in the Prerogative of Pardon, universally held by the Chief Magistrate. It is interesting to see how little the people of early times were bothered by these considerations, how completely they believed that the feelings of the wronged party were the right measure of the vengeance they were entitled to seek, and how closely they reflected the likely rise and fall of his emotions when determining their scale of punishment. I wish it could be said that their legislative approach is completely gone. However, several modern legal systems still allow the fact that the wrongdoer was caught in the act to be used as justification for excessive punishment inflicted by the victim—which, although it may seem understandable at first glance, is, in my view, based on very low moral standards.

Nothing, I have said, can be simpler than the considerations which ultimately led ancient societies to the formation of a true criminal jurisprudence. The State conceived itself to be wronged, and the Popular Assembly struck straight at the offender with the same movement which accompanied its legislative action. It is further true of the ancient world—though not precisely of the modern, as I shall have occasion to point out—that the earliest criminal tribunals were merely subdivisions, or committees, of the legislature. This, at all events, is the conclusion pointed at by the legal history of the two great states of antiquity, with tolerable clearness in one case, and with absolute distinctness in the other. The primitive penal law of Athens entrusted the castigation of offences partly to the Archons, who seem to have punished them as torts, and partly to the Senate of Areopagus, which punished them as sins. Both jurisdictions were substantially transferred in the end to the Heliæa, the High Court of Popular Justice, and the functions of the Archons and of the Areopagus became either merely ministerial or quite insignificant. But "Heliæa" is only an old word for Assembly; the Heliæa of classical times was simply the Popular Assembly convened for judicial purposes, and the famous Dikasteries of Athens were only its subdivisions or panels. The corresponding changes which occurred at Rome are still more easily interpreted, because the Romans confined their experiments225 to the penal law, and did not, like the Athenians, construct popular courts with a civil as well as a criminal jurisdiction. The history of Roman criminal jurisprudence begins with the old Judicia Populi, at which the Kings are said to have presided. These were simply solemn trials of great offenders under legislative forms. It seems, however, that from an early period the Comitia had occasionally delegated its criminal jurisdiction to a Quæstio or Commission, which bore much the same relation to the Assembly as a Committee of the House of Commons bears to the House itself, except that the Roman Commissioners or Quæstores did not merely report to the Comitia, but exercised all powers which that body was itself in the habit of exercising, even to the passing sentence on the Accused. A Quæstio of this sort was only appointed to try a particular offender, but there was nothing to prevent two or three Quæstiones sitting at the same time; and it is probable that several of them were appointed simultaneously, when several grave cases of wrong to the community had occurred together. There are also indications that now and then these Quæstiones approached the character of our Standing Committees, in that they were appointed periodically, and without waiting for occasion to arise in the commission of some serious crime. The old Quæstores Parricidii, who are mentioned in connection with transactions of very ancient date, as being deputed to try (or, as some take it, to search out and try) all cases of parricide and murder, seem to have been appointed regularly every year; and the Duumviri Perduellionis, or Commission of Two for trial of violent injury to the Commonwealth, are also believed by most writers to have been named periodically. The delegations of power to these latter functionaries bring us some way forwards. Instead of being appointed when and as state-offences were committed, they had a general, though a temporary jurisdiction over such as might be perpetrated. Our proximity to a regular criminal jurisprudence is also indicated by the general terms "Parricidium" and "Perduellio" which mark the approach to something like a classification of crimes.

Nothing I've mentioned can be simpler than the factors that ultimately drove ancient societies to establish a real criminal justice system. The State saw itself as wronged, and the Popular Assembly acted directly against the offender, just as it did during legislative actions. It's also true about the ancient world—though not exactly like the modern one, as I’ll explain later—that the earliest criminal courts were simply sections or committees of the legislature. This conclusion is quite clear in the legal history of the two major ancient states, one being fairly clear and the other completely distinct. The basic penal law of Athens allowed the Archons to handle offenses they seemed to punish as torts, and the Senate of Areopagus addressed them as sins. Ultimately, both jurisdictions transferred their powers to the Heliæa, the High Court of Popular Justice, and the roles of the Archons and the Areopagus became either merely administrative or rather insignificant. However, "Heliæa" is just an old term for Assembly; the Heliæa in classical times was simply the Popular Assembly brought together for legal purposes, and the well-known Dikasteries of Athens were just its sub-groups or panels. The similar changes at Rome are even easier to understand, as the Romans limited their experiments225 to criminal law and did not, like the Athenians, create popular courts with both civil and criminal jurisdiction. The history of Roman criminal law starts with the old Judicia Populi, where the Kings were said to preside. These were just formal trials of serious offenders under legislative procedures. However, it seems that from early on, the Comitia occasionally delegated its criminal authority to a Quæstio or Commission, which related to the Assembly similarly to how a Committee of the House of Commons connects to the House itself, except that the Roman Commissioners or Quæstores didn’t just report to the Comitia but held all the powers that the Assembly would typically exercise, including passing sentences on the accused. A Quæstio like this was only assigned to try a specific offender, but there was nothing preventing two or three Quæstiones from sitting at the same time; it’s likely that several were appointed simultaneously when multiple serious wrongs to the community occurred at once. There are also signs that occasionally these Quæstiones resembled our Standing Committees, as they were appointed regularly and didn’t wait for a serious crime to occur before being convened. The old Quæstores Parricidii mentioned in very ancient records, who were said to be assigned to try (or, as some believe, to seek out and try) all cases of parricide and murder, seemed to have been appointed annually; and the Duumviri Perduellionis, or two-person Commission for trying violent injuries to the Commonwealth, are also believed by most scholars to have been named periodically. The delegation of power to these latter officials takes us a step further. Instead of being appointed when and as state offenses occurred, they had a general, though temporary authority over those that might be committed. Our closeness to a structured system of criminal law is also suggested by the general terms "Parricidium" and "Perduellio," which hint at a classification of crimes.

The true criminal law did not however come into existence till the year B.C. 149, when L. Calpurnius Piso carried the statute known as the Lex Calpurnia de Repetundis. The law applied to cases Repetundarum Pecuniarum, that is, claims by226 Provincials to recover monies improperly received by a Governor-General, but the great and permanent importance of this statute arose from its establishing the first Quæstio Perpetua. A Quæstio Perpetua was a Permanent Commission as opposed to those which were occasional and to those which were temporary. It was a regular criminal tribunal whose existence dated from the passing of the statute creating it and continued till another statute should pass abolishing it. Its members were not specially nominated, as were the members of the older Quæstiones, but provision was made in the law constituting it for selecting from particular classes the judges who were to officiate, and for renewing them in conformity with definite rules. The offences of which it took cognisance were also expressly named and defined in this statute, and the new Quæstio had authority to try and sentence all persons in future whose acts should fall under the definitions of crime supplied by the law. It was therefore a regular criminal judicature, administering a true criminal jurisprudence.

The actual criminal law didn't really come into being until the year BCE 149, when L. Calpurnius Piso introduced the statute known as the Lex Calpurnia de Repetundis. This law applied to cases of Repetundarum Pecuniarum, meaning claims by 226 Provincials to recover money wrongfully taken by a Governor-General, but its significant and lasting impact came from establishing the first Quæstio Perpetua. A Quæstio Perpetua was a Permanent Commission, unlike those that were occasional or temporary. It was a regular criminal court that started with the passing of the statute that created it and lasted until another statute abolished it. Its members weren't specially chosen like those in earlier Quæstiones; instead, the law outlined how judges would be selected from specific categories and how they would be replaced following certain rules. The crimes it addressed were clearly named and defined in this statute, and the new Quæstio had the power to try and sentence anyone in the future whose actions fell under the definitions of crime provided by the law. It was, therefore, a legitimate criminal court, executing a true system of criminal law.

The primitive history of criminal law divides itself therefore into four stages. Understanding that the conception of Crime, as distinguished from that of Wrong or Tort and from that of Sin, involves the idea of injury to the State or collective community, we first find that the commonwealth, in literal conformity with the conception, itself interposed directly, and by isolated acts, to avenge itself on the author of the evil which it had suffered. This is the point from which we start; each indictment is now a bill of pains and penalties, a special law naming the criminal and prescribing his punishment. A second step is accomplished, when the multiplicity of crimes compels the legislature to delegate its powers to particular Quæstiones or Commissions, each of which is deputed to investigate a particular accusation, and if it be proved, to punish the particular offender. Yet another movement is made when the legislature, instead of waiting for the alleged commission of a crime as the occasion of appointing a Quæstio, periodically nominates Commissioners like the Quæstores Parricidii and the Duumviri Perduellionis, on the chance of certain classes of crimes being committed, and in the expectation that they will be perpetrated. The last stage is reached when the Quæstiones from being periodical or occasional become permanent Benches or Chambers—when the227 judges, instead of being named in the particular law nominating the Commission, are directed to be chosen through all future time in a particular way and from a particular class—and when certain acts are described in general language and declared to be crimes, to be visited, in the event of their perpetration, with specified penalties appropriated to each description.

The early history of criminal law can be broken down into four stages. It’s important to recognize that the concept of Crime, which is different from Wrong or Tort and Sin, includes the idea of harm to the State or the community as a whole. Initially, we see that the government acted directly, through individual actions, to seek revenge on those who caused it harm. This is our starting point; each charge is now a formal accusation, a specific law that names the criminal and sets out their punishment. A second step occurs when the growing number of crimes forces lawmakers to delegate their authority to specific Quæstiones or Commissions, each assigned to investigate a particular accusation and, if proven, to punish the offender. Another shift happens when the legislature, rather than waiting for a crime to be reported before appointing a Quæstio, regularly appoints Commissioners—like the Quæstores Parricidii and the Duumviri Perduellionis—anticipating certain types of crimes might occur and expecting that they will happen. The last stage is reached when the Quæstiones transition from being temporary or occasional to becoming permanent Courts or Chambers—when the227 judges, instead of being appointed by a specific law that creates the Commission, are required to be chosen in a set manner from a designated group in the future—and when certain behaviors are defined broadly and labeled as crimes, subject to certain penalties if committed.

If the Quæstiones Perpetuæ had had a longer history, they would doubtless have come to be regarded as a distinct institution, and their relation to the Comitia would have seemed no closer than the connection of our own Courts of Law with the Sovereign, who is theoretically the fountain of justice. But the Imperial despotism destroyed them before their origin had been completely forgotten, and, so long as they lasted, these Permanent Commissions were looked upon by the Romans as the mere depositaries of a delegated power. The cognisance of crimes was considered a natural attribute of the legislature, and the mind of the citizen never ceased to be carried back from the Quæstiones, to the Comitia which had deputed them to put into exercise some of its own inalienable functions. The view which regarded the Quæstiones, even when they became permanent, as mere Committees of the Popular Assembly—as bodies which only ministered to a higher authority—had some important legal consequences which left their mark on the criminal law to the very latest period. One immediate result was that the Comitia continued to exercise criminal jurisdiction by way of bill of pains and penalties, long after the Quæstiones had been established. Though the legislature had consented to delegate its powers for the sake of convenience to bodies external to itself, it did not follow that it surrendered them. The Comitia and the Quæstiones went on trying and punishing offenders side by side; and any unusual outburst of popular indignation was sure, until the extinction of the Republic, to call down upon its object an indictment before the Assembly of the Tribes.

If the Quæstiones Perpetuæ had lasted longer, they would probably be seen as a separate institution, and their connection to the Comitia would have seemed as distant as the link between our own Courts of Law and the Sovereign, who is theoretically the source of justice. However, imperial tyranny wiped them out before their origins could fade entirely, and, for as long as they existed, these Permanent Commissions were viewed by the Romans simply as holders of delegated authority. Handling crimes was considered a natural right of the legislature, and citizens constantly recalled the Comitia that had given the Quæstiones the power to carry out some of its own essential functions. The perspective that saw the Quæstiones, even when they became permanent, as mere Committees of the Popular Assembly—bodies that served a higher authority—had important legal implications that influenced criminal law right up until the end. One immediate effect was that the Comitia continued to wield criminal jurisdiction through bills of pains and penalties, long after the Quæstiones were set up. Although the legislature agreed to delegate its powers for convenience to external bodies, it didn’t mean it gave them up entirely. The Comitia and the Quæstiones continued to try and punish offenders simultaneously; any unusual surge of public anger was sure to lead to an indictment before the Assembly of the Tribes until the Republic’s end.

One of the most remarkable peculiarities of the institutions of the Republic is also traceable to this dependance of the Quæstiones on the Comitia. The disappearance of the punishment of Death from the penal system of Republican Rome used to be a very favourite topic with the writers of the last century, who were perpetually using it to point some228 theory of the Roman character or of modern social economy. The reason which can be confidently assigned for it stamps it as purely fortuitous. Of the three forms which the Roman legislature successively assumed, one, it is well known—the Comitia Centuriata—was exclusively taken to represent the State as embodied for military operations. The Assembly of the Centuries, therefore, had all powers which may be supposed to be properly lodged with a General commanding an army, and, among them, it had authority to subject all offenders to the same correction to which a soldier rendered himself liable by breaches of discipline. The Comitia Centuriata could therefore inflict capital punishment. Not so, however, the Comitia Curiata or Comitia Tributa. They were fettered on this point by the sacredness with which the person of a Roman citizen, inside the walls of the city, was invested by religion and law; and, with respect to the last of them, the Comitia Tributa, we know for certain that it became a fixed principle that the Assembly of the Tribes could at most impose a fine. So long as criminal jurisdiction was confined to the legislature, and so long as the assemblies of the centuries and of the Tribes continued to exercise co-ordinate powers, it was easy to prefer indictments for graver crimes before the legislative body which dispensed the heavier penalties; but then it happened that the more democratic assembly, that of the Tribes, almost entirely superseded the others, and became the ordinary legislature of the later Republic. Now the decline of the Republic was exactly the period during which the Quæstiones Perpetuæ were established, so that the statutes creating them were all passed by a legislative assembly which itself could not, at its ordinary sittings, punish a criminal with death. It followed that the Permanent Judicial Commissions, holding a delegated authority, were circumscribed in their attributes and capacities by the limits of the powers residing with the body which deputed them. They could do nothing which the Assembly of the Tribes could not have done; and, as the Assembly could not sentence to death, the Quæstiones were equally incompetent to award capital punishment. The anomaly thus resulting was not viewed in ancient times with anything like the favour which it has attracted among the moderns, and indeed, while it is questionable whether the Roman character was at all the better for it, it is certain that the Roman Constitution was a great deal229 the worse. Like every other institution which has accompanied the human race down the current of its history, the punishment of death is a necessity of society in certain stages of the civilising process. There is a time when the attempt to dispense with it baulks both of the two great instincts which lie at the root of all penal law. Without it, the community neither feels that it is sufficiently revenged on the criminal, nor thinks that the example of his punishment is adequate to deter others from imitating him. The incompetence of the Roman Tribunals to pass sentence of death led distinctly and directly to those frightful Revolutionary intervals, known as the Proscriptions, during which all law was formally suspended simply because party violence could find no other avenue to the vengeance for which it was thirsting. No cause contributed so powerfully to the decay of political capacity in the Roman people as this periodical abeyance of the laws; and, when it had once been resorted to, we need not hesitate to assert that the ruin of Roman liberty became merely a question of time. If the practice of the Tribunals had afforded an adequate vent for popular passion, the forms of judicial procedure would no doubt have been as flagrantly perverted as with us in the reigns of the later Stuarts, but national character would not have suffered as deeply as it did, nor would the stability of Roman institutions have been as seriously enfeebled.

One of the most striking features of the Republic's institutions comes from the dependence of the Quæstiones on the Comitia. The removal of the death penalty from the penal system of Republican Rome used to be a popular topic among writers from the last century, who constantly referenced it to illustrate a theory about Roman character or modern social economics. The reason behind this change can confidently be seen as purely coincidental. Of the three forms the Roman legislature took on, one—the Comitia Centuriata—was solely meant to represent the State for military purposes. Therefore, the Assembly of the Centuries had all the powers one would expect a General in command of an army to possess, including the authority to impose the same penalties on offenders as those a soldier would face for breaking military discipline. The Comitia Centuriata could therefore impose capital punishment. However, the Comitia Curiata and Comitia Tributa could not. They were restricted by the sanctity of a Roman citizen’s person within the city walls, protected by both religion and law; and regarding the Comitia Tributa, it was established that the Assembly of the Tribes could only impose fines. As long as criminal jurisdiction remained within the legislature and the assemblies of the Centuries and Tribes continued to wield equal powers, it was easy to present serious crimes for indictment before the legislative body that could impose heavier penalties. Then, however, the more democratic assembly, that of the Tribes, largely replaced the others and became the main legislative body of the later Republic. The decline of the Republic coincided with the establishment of the Quæstiones Perpetuæ, meaning that the laws creating them were passed by a legislative assembly that could not, in its ordinary sessions, impose the death penalty. This meant that the Permanent Judicial Commissions, which held delegated authority, were limited in their powers to what the body that appointed them could do. They couldn’t enact anything that the Assembly of the Tribes couldn't have done; and since the Assembly couldn't impose a death sentence, the Quæstiones weren't able to either. This resulting issue was not seen in ancient times with the same favor it has gained among modern observers, and while it's debatable whether the Roman character improved because of it, it's clear that the Roman Constitution suffered greatly. Like every other institution that has accompanied humankind throughout history, the death penalty is a necessity in certain stages of civilizational development. There comes a time when trying to eliminate it undermines both of the main instincts at the core of all penal law. Without it, the community doesn’t feel sufficiently avenged against the criminal, nor does it believe the punishment serves as a deterrent for others. The Roman Tribunals' inability to issue death sentences directly led to horrific Revolutionary periods known as the Proscriptions, when all law was suspended simply because party violence needed another way to seek vengeance. No other factor contributed as strongly to the decline of political capacity in the Roman populace as this regular suspension of laws; once it was enacted, we can confidently say that the fall of Roman liberty became just a matter of time. If the Tribunals had provided a sufficient outlet for popular anger, the judicial procedures would have likely been as corrupt as they were during the later Stuart reigns, but the national character wouldn't have suffered as severely, and the stability of Roman institutions wouldn't have been weakened as much.

I will mention two more singularities of the Roman Criminal System which were produced by the same theory of judicial authority. They are, the extreme multiplicity of the Roman criminal tribunals, and the capricious and anomalous classification of crimes which characterised Roman penal jurisprudence throughout its entire history. Every Quæstio, it has been said, whether Perpetual or otherwise, had its origin in a distinct statute. From the law which created it, it derived its authority; it rigorously observed the limits which its charter prescribed to it, and touched no form of criminality which that charter did not expressly define. As then the statutes which constituted the various Quæstiones were all called forth by particular emergencies, each of them being in fact passed to punish a class of acts which the circumstances of the time rendered particularly odious or particularly dangerous, these enactments made not the slightest reference to each other, and were connected by no common principle.230 Twenty or thirty different criminal laws were in existence together, with exactly the same number of Quæstiones to administer them; nor was any attempt made during the Republic to fuse these distinct judicial bodies into one, or to give symmetry to the provisions of the statutes which appointed them and defined their duties. The state of the Roman criminal jurisdiction at this period, exhibited some resemblances to the administration of civil remedies in England at the time when the English Courts of Common Law had not as yet introduced those fictitious averments into their writs which enabled them to trespass on each other's peculiar province. Like the Quæstiones, the Courts of Queen's Bench, Common Pleas, and Exchequer were all theoretical emanations from a higher authority, and each entertained a special class of cases supposed to be committed to it by the fountain of its jurisdiction; but then the Roman Quæstiones were many more than three in number, and it was infinitely less easy to discriminate the acts which fell under the cognisance of each Quæstio, than to distinguish between the provinces of the three Courts in Westminster Hall. The difficulty of drawing exact lines between the spheres of the different Quæstiones made the multiplicity of Roman tribunals something more than a mere inconvenience; for we read with astonishment that when it was not immediately clear under what general description a man's alleged offences ranged themselves, he might be indicted at once or successively before several different Commissions, on the chance of some one of them declaring itself competent to convict him; and, although conviction by one Quæstio ousted the jurisdiction of the rest, acquittal by one of them could not be pleaded to an accusation before another. This was directly contrary to the rule of the Roman civil law; and we may be sure that a people so sensitive as the Romans to anomalies (or, as their significant phrase was, to inelegancies) in jurisprudence, would not long have tolerated it, had not the melancholy history of the Quæstiones caused them to be regarded much more as temporary weapons in the hands of factions than as permanent institutions for the correction of crime. The Emperors soon abolished this multiplicity and conflict of jurisdiction; but it is remarkable that they did not remove another singularity of the criminal law which stands in close connection with the number of the Courts. The classifications of crimes which are231 contained even in the Corpus Juris of Justinian are remarkably capricious. Each Quæstio had, in fact, confined itself to the crimes committed to its cognisance by its charter. These crimes, however, were only classed together in the original statute because they happened to call simultaneously for castigation at the moment of passing it. They had not therefore anything necessarily in common; but the fact of their constituting the particular subject-matter of trials before a particular Quæstio impressed itself naturally on the public attention, and so inveterate did the association become between the offences mentioned in the same statute that, even when formal attempts were made by Sylla and by the Emperor Augustus to consolidate the Roman criminal law, the legislator preserved the old grouping. The Statutes of Sylla and Augustus were the foundation of the penal jurisprudence of the Empire, and nothing can be more extraordinary than some of the classifications which they bequeathed to it. I need only give a single example in the fact that perjury was always classed with cutting and wounding and with poisoning, no doubt because a law of Sylla, the Lex Cornelia de Sicariis et Veneficis, had given jurisdiction over all these three forms of crime to the same Permanent Commission. It seems too that this capricious grouping of crimes affected the vernacular speech of the Romans. People naturally fell into the habit of designating all the offences enumerated in one law by the first name on the list, which doubtless gave its style to the Law Court deputed to try them all. All the offences tried by the Quæstio De Adulteriis would thus be called Adultery.

I’ll highlight two more unique features of the Roman Criminal System that stemmed from the same idea of judicial authority. These are the overwhelming number of Roman criminal courts and the random and unusual classification of crimes that characterized Roman penal law throughout its entire history. It has been said that every Quæstio, whether Perpetual or not, originated from a distinct statute. Its authority stemmed from the law that created it; it strictly adhered to the limits that its charter set and addressed no form of crime that the charter did not explicitly define. Since the statutes that created the various Quæstiones were all prompted by specific situations—each passed to address a class of acts deemed especially offensive or dangerous at the time—these laws did not reference each other and were linked by no common principle.230 At any given time, twenty or thirty different criminal laws existed, along with the same number of Quæstiones to enforce them; during the Republic, there was no effort to combine these distinct judicial bodies into one or to create a coherent framework for the statutes that established them and defined their responsibilities. The state of Roman criminal jurisdiction at this time resembled the administration of civil remedies in England when the English Courts of Common Law had not yet introduced those fictional statements in their writs that allowed them to overlap into each other’s specific areas. Like the Quæstiones, the Courts of Queen's Bench, Common Pleas, and Exchequer were all theoretical extensions of a higher authority, each handling a specific class of cases thought to be assigned to it by the source of its jurisdiction; however, the Roman Quæstiones far outnumbered three, and it was much harder to determine which acts fell under the jurisdiction of each Quæstio than to distinguish between the areas of the three Courts in Westminster Hall. The challenge of clearly defining the boundaries between the different Quæstiones made the abundance of Roman courts more than just a nuisance; we read in astonishment that when it was not immediately clear under what general category a person’s alleged crimes fit, they could be charged simultaneously or in succession before several different Commissions, hoping that one of them would declare itself competent to convict them; and while a conviction by one Quæstio eliminated the jurisdiction of the others, an acquittal by one could not be used in defense against an accusation in another. This was directly contrary to the rule of Roman civil law; and we can be certain that a people as sensitive as the Romans to inconsistencies (or, as they famously termed it, to inelegancies) in the law would not have tolerated it for long if the troubling history of the Quæstiones hadn’t led them to view these courts more as temporary tools for factions than as permanent institutions for addressing crime. The Emperors eventually eliminated this multiplicity and conflict of jurisdiction; however, it’s noteworthy that they did not address another peculiarity of criminal law that is closely related to the number of courts. The classifications of crimes found even in the Corpus Juris of Justinian are notably arbitrary. Each Quæstio had, in reality, limited itself to the crimes assigned to it by its charter. These crimes, however, were only grouped together in the original statute because they simultaneously needed punishment when the law was passed. They did not necessarily share anything in common; but the fact that they constituted the specific subject matter for trials before a particular Quæstio naturally caught public attention, and this association became so ingrained that even when formal attempts were made by Sylla and Emperor Augustus to consolidate Roman criminal law, the lawmakers maintained the old groupings. The Laws of Sylla and Augustus laid the groundwork for the penal system of the Empire, and nothing is more remarkable than some of the classifications they left behind. I only need to mention a single example: perjury was always categorized alongside cutting and wounding and poisoning, likely because a law from Sylla, the Lex Cornelia de Sicariis et Veneficis, granted jurisdiction over all three forms of crime to the same Permanent Commission. It also seems that this arbitrary grouping of crimes influenced the everyday language of the Romans. People naturally fell into the habit of referring to all the offenses listed in one law by the first name on the list, which probably influenced the name of the Law Court assigned to try them all. Thus, all offenses handled by the Quæstio De Adulteriis would simply be called Adultery.

I have dwelt on the history and characteristics of the Roman Quæstiones because the formation of a criminal jurisprudence is nowhere else so instructively exemplified. The last Quæstiones were added by the Emperor Augustus, and from that time the Romans may be said to have had a tolerably complete criminal law. Concurrently with its growth, the analogous process had gone on, which I have called the conversion of Wrongs into Crimes, for, though the Roman legislature did not extinguish the civil remedy for the more heinous offences, it offered the sufferer a redress which he was sure to prefer. Still, even after Augustus had completed his legislation, several offences continued to be regarded as Wrongs, which modern societies look upon exclusively as232 Crimes; nor did they become criminally punishable till some late but uncertain date, at which the law began to take notice of a new description of offences called in the Digest crimina extraordinaria. These were doubtless a class of acts which the theory of Roman jurisprudence treated merely as wrongs; but the growing sense of the majesty of society revolted from their entailing nothing worse on their perpetrator than the payment of money damages, and accordingly the injured person seems to have been permitted, if he pleased, to pursue them as crimes extra ordinem, that is by a mode of redress departing in some respect or other from the ordinary procedure. From the period at which these crimina extraordinaria were first recognised, the list of crimes in the Roman State must have been as long as in any community of the modern world.

I focused on the history and features of the Roman Quæstiones because they provide a clear example of how criminal law developed. The last Quæstiones were introduced by Emperor Augustus, and from then on, the Romans had a fairly complete criminal law system. Alongside this development, there was a similar shift that I refer to as turning Wrongs into Crimes. While the Roman legislature didn’t eliminate civil remedies for serious offenses, it offered victims a form of compensation they would likely prefer. However, even after Augustus finalized his laws, several offenses were still seen as Wrongs, which modern societies view purely as Crimes. These did not become punishable until a later, uncertain time when the law began recognizing a new category of offenses called crimina extraordinaria in the Digest. These were acts that Roman legal theory considered merely wrongs; yet, the increasing awareness of society's dignity rejected the idea that these acts should only lead to monetary damages for the perpetrator. Therefore, it seems that the injured party was allowed, if they wished, to pursue these as crimes extra ordinem, meaning through a method of compensation that deviated from standard procedures. Since the time these crimina extraordinaria were first acknowledged, the list of crimes in the Roman State must have been as extensive as in any modern community.

It is unnecessary to describe with any minuteness the mode of administering criminal justice under the Roman Empire, but it is to be noted that both its theory and practice have had powerful effect on modern society. The Emperors did not immediately abolish the Quæstiones, and at first they committed an extensive criminal jurisdiction to the Senate, in which, however servile it might show itself in fact, the Emperor was no more nominally than a Senator like the rest. But some sort of collateral criminal jurisdiction had been claimed by the Prince from the first; and this, as recollections of the free commonwealth decayed, tended steadily to gain at the expense of the old tribunals. Gradually the punishment of crimes was transferred to magistrates directly nominated by the Emperor and the privileges of the Senate passed to the Imperial Privy Council, which also became a Court of ultimate criminal appeal. Under these influences the doctrine, familiar to the moderns, insensibly shaped itself that the Sovereign is the fountain of all Justice and the depositary of all Grace. It was not so much the fruit of increasing adulation and servility as of the centralisation of the Empire which had by this time perfected itself. The theory of criminal justice had, in fact, worked round almost to the point from which it started. It had begun in the belief that it was the business of the collective community to avenge its own wrongs by its own hand; and it ended in the doctrine that the chastisement of crimes belonged in an especial manner to the Sovereign as representative and mandatary of233 his people. The new view differed from the old one chiefly in the air of awfulness and majesty which the guardianship of justice appeared to throw around the person of the Sovereign.

It's unnecessary to go into detail about how criminal justice was handled during the Roman Empire, but it's important to note that both its theory and practice have had a significant impact on modern society. The Emperors didn't immediately eliminate the Quæstiones, and at first, they handed over a large portion of criminal jurisdiction to the Senate. In practice, though the Senate may have seemed subservient, the Emperor was only nominally a Senator like everyone else. However, some degree of parallel criminal jurisdiction was claimed by the Prince from the beginning; as memories of the free commonwealth faded, this jurisdiction steadily increased at the expense of the old courts. Over time, the responsibility for punishing crimes shifted to magistrates directly appointed by the Emperor, and the Senate’s privileges were transferred to the Imperial Privy Council, which also became the court of last appeal for criminal cases. Under these influences, a doctrine familiar to modern times gradually emerged, asserting that the Sovereign is the source of all Justice and the holder of all Grace. This was less about growing flattery and submission and more about the centralization of the Empire, which had by then become fully established. In fact, the theory of criminal justice had nearly come full circle. It began with the belief that the community collectively should take justice into its own hands to avenge its wrongs and ended with the notion that punishing crimes specifically belonged to the Sovereign as the representative and mandator of his people. The new perspective mainly differed from the old in the sense of awe and majesty that the authority of justice seemed to confer upon the Sovereign.

This later Roman view of the Sovereign's relation to justice certainly assisted in saving modern societies from the necessity of travelling through the series of changes which I have illustrated by the history of the Quæstiones. In the primitive law of almost all the races which have peopled Western Europe there are vestiges of the archaic notion that the punishment of crimes belongs to the general assembly of freemen; and there are some States—Scotland is said to be one of them—in which the parentage of the existing judicature can be traced up to a Committee of the legislative body. But the development of the criminal law was universally hastened by two causes, the memory of the Roman Empire and the influence of the Church. On the one hand traditions of the majesty of the Cæsars, perpetuated by the temporary ascendency of the House of Charlemagne, were surrounding Sovereigns with a prestige which a mere barbarous chieftain could never otherwise have acquired and were communicating to the pettiest feudal potentate the character of guardian of society and representative of the State. On the other hand, the Church, in its anxiety to put a curb on sanguinary ferocity, sought about for authority to punish the graver misdeeds, and found it in those passages of Scripture which speak with approval of the powers of punishment committed to the civil magistrate. The New Testament was appealed to as proving that secular rulers exist for the terror of evildoers; the Old Testament, as laying down that "Whoso sheddeth man's blood, by man shall his blood be shed." There can be no doubt, I imagine, that modern ideas on the subject of crime are based upon two assumptions contended for by the Church in the Dark Ages—first, that each feudal ruler, in his degree, might be assimilated to the Roman Magistrates spoken of by Saint Paul; and next, that the offences which he was to chastise were those selected for prohibition in the Mosaic Commandments, or rather such of them as the Church did not reserve to her own cognisance. Heresy (supposed to be included in the First and Second Commandments), Adultery, and Perjury were ecclesiastical offences, and the Church only admitted the co-operation of the secular arm for the purpose of inflicting severer punishment234 in cases of extraordinary aggravation. At the same time, she taught that murder and robbery with their various modifications were under the jurisdiction of civil rulers, not as an accident of their position but by the express ordinance of God.

This later Roman perspective on the Sovereign's relationship to justice definitely helped modern societies avoid having to undergo the series of changes I illustrated with the history of the Quæstiones. In the early legal systems of nearly all the groups that settled Western Europe, there are remnants of the old idea that punishing crimes was the responsibility of the general assembly of free men; some States—Scotland is mentioned as one of them—can trace their current judicial authority back to a committee within the legislative body. However, the development of criminal law was sped up by two main factors: the legacy of the Roman Empire and the influence of the Church. On one hand, the traditions of the majesty of the Emperors, carried on by the temporary dominance of the House of Charlemagne, surrounded Monarchs with a level of prestige that a mere barbaric chieftain could never achieve, and it granted even the smallest feudal lords the role of guardians of society and representatives of the State. On the other hand, the Church, eager to restrain violent brutality, sought authority to punish serious crimes and found it in sections of Scripture that endorse the powers of punishment given to civil authorities. The New Testament was cited as evidence that secular rulers exist to instill fear in wrongdoers, while the Old Testament was referenced for stating that "Whoever sheds man's blood, by man shall his blood be shed." There is no doubt, I believe, that modern views on crime are based on two assumptions argued by the Church in the Dark Ages—first, that each feudal lord, in their capacity, could be likened to the Roman Magistrates mentioned by Saint Paul; and second, that the offenses they were to punish were those specified for prohibition in the Mosaic Commandments, or at least those the Church did not reserve for its own authority. Heresy (thought to be included in the First and Second Commandments), Adultery, and Perjury were seen as ecclesiastical offenses, and the Church only accepted the collaboration of secular authority to impose harsher penalties in particularly aggravated cases. Meanwhile, it taught that murder and robbery, along with their various forms, were under the control of civil authorities, not as an accident of their role but by God’s direct ordinance.

There is a passage in the writings of King Alfred (Kemble, ii. 209) which brings out into remarkable clearness the struggle of the various ideas that prevailed in his day as to the origin of criminal jurisdiction. It will be seen that Alfred attributes it partly to the authority of the Church and partly to that of the Witan, while he expressly claims for treason against the lord the same immunity from ordinary rules which the Roman Law of Majestas had assigned to treason against the Cæsar. "After this it happened," he writes, "that many nations received the faith of Christ, and there were many synods assembled throughout the earth, and among the English race also after they had received the faith of Christ, both of holy bishops and of their exalted Witan. They then ordained that, out of that mercy which Christ had taught, secular lords, with their leave, might without sin take for every misdeed the bot in money which they ordained; except in cases of treason against a lord, to which they dared not assign any mercy because Almighty God adjudged none to them that despised Him, nor did Christ adjudge any to them which sold Him to death; and He commanded that a lord should be loved like Himself."

There’s a passage in the writings of King Alfred (Kemble, ii. 209) that clearly highlights the different ideas about the origin of criminal jurisdiction during his time. It shows that Alfred attributed it partly to the authority of the Church and partly to the Witan, while he specifically claimed that treason against a lord should have the same immunity from usual rules that Roman Law of Majestas gave to treason against the Cæsar. "After this it happened," he writes, "that many nations accepted the faith of Christ, and many synods were held around the world, including among the English after they adopted the faith of Christ, both by holy bishops and their esteemed Witan. They then established that, out of the mercy that Christ had taught, secular lords, with their permission, could without sin impose a monetary compensation for every wrongdoing they determined; except in cases of treason against a lord, which they did not dare show any mercy towards, because Almighty God judged none deserving of mercy who disrespected Him, nor did Christ extend mercy to those who betrayed Him to death; and He commanded that a lord should be loved as Himself."


INDEX

  • Austin, 69, 171;
    • Province of Jurisprudence Determined, 4
  • Ayala, 64
  •  
  • Bentham, 18, 46, 54, 70, 147;
    • Fragment on Government, 4
  • Blackstone, 67, 89, 150, 152
  •  
  • Cambridge Essays, 1856, Maine, 205, 212
  • Capture in war, 145, 146
  • Casuistry, 205, 206, 207
  • Charlemagne, 62, 233
  • Codes, Attic of Solon, 9;
    • era of, 8;
    • first introduced into the West, 10;
    • Hindoo Law of Menu, 10-12;
    • Justinian, 25, 27;
    • Napoléon, 104;
    • Roman, superiority over Hindoo, 10-12;
    • Twelve Tables of Rome, 1, 8, 9, 12, 20
  • Contract, Austin on, 190;
    • Bentham on, 190;
    • Imperative Law, 182;
    • judicial and popular error, 181;
    • Law of Nations, 181, 196, 197;
    • literal or written, 194;
    • origin lies in the family, 99;
    • pact or convention, 184, 185;
    • real, 195;
    • Roman, classification, 191, 192;
    • consensual, 195-198;
    • Domestic System, 194;
    • Nexum, definition of, 185-189;
    • Rousseau, 181;
    • sale, 188
  • Conveyances and contracts, confusion between, 185-187;
    • and mancipation, 185
  • Corpus juris civilis, 26
  • Creditors, powers of, in ancient system, 189
  • Crimes and wrongs, confusion between, 231, 232;
    • distinction between primitive and modern, 217, 218;
    • Kemble in Anglo-Saxons, 218
  • Criminal Law, Athens, 224;
    • degree of guilt, 223;
    • four stages of primitive history, 226;
    • influence of Church, 233;
    • primitive religious code, 218, 219;
    • Roman, crime against State, 219;
    • BCE 149, 225;
    • origin of, 225;
    • sentence of death, 227-229;
    • theft, 222, 223;
    • tribunals, 228-230;
    • under emperors, 230-232
  • Customary Law, epoch of, 7, 8;
    • Hindoo, 4
  •  
  • Dangers of Law, rigidity, too rapid development, 44, 45
  • Debtors, severity of ancient system, 189
  •  
  • Equity, 172;
    • early history of, 15;
    • Lord Eldon on, 40;
    • English, 40, 41;
    • meaning of, 17;
    • origin, 34, 35;
    • Roman compared with English, 40-42
  •  
  • Feudalism, explanation of, 214
  •  
  • Gaius, 90, 174, 220-223
  • Grote, decline of kingly rule, 6;
    • History of Greece, 3, 5;
    • law administered by aristocracies, 7
  • Grotius, Hugo, 56, 58, 59, 64;
    • De Jure Belli et Pacis, 205
  •  
  • Homer, earliest notions of law derived from, 2, 3;
    • Themis, Themistes, 2-5
  •  
  • Indian (Hindoo) Law, see separate headings Codes, Customary, Primogeniture, Property, Testamentary Law, Village communities
  • Institutional Treatise (Justinian), 27
  • International Law, 64;
    • and occupancy, 145
  •  
  • Law of Nations (Jus Gentium), incorporation with Roman Law, 36, 37;
    • origin of, 27-31
  • Legal fictions, benefit of, 77;
    • examples in English Law, 18;
    • in Roman Law, 15, 16;
    • meaning, useful purpose of, 15, 16
  • Legis Actio Sacramenti, Gaius on, 220, 221
  • Legislation, the agent of legal
    • improvement, 17;
    • differing from equity, legal fictions, 17, 18
  • Lettres Persanes, 183
  •  
  • Maine, Cambridge Essays, 1856, 205, 212
  • Mancipation, 120, 121, 163-169, 185
  • Menu, Laws of, 10-12
  • Montesquieu, 49, 51, 183
  •  
  • Natural Law (Law of Nature), American Law and, 56;
    • antagonistic to historical method, 53;
    • confusing past with present, 43;
    • equality of man, 54-56;
    • equality of sex, 90;
    • feudalism, 62, 65;
    • French history, 47, 48, 50, 53;
    • French Law, 56;
    • Greek interpretation of, 44;
    • Grotian system, 56, 58, 59, 64-66;
    • incorporated with Roman Law, 36, 37;
    • influence of Stoics, 32, 33;
    • Modern International Law, 56-60;
    • most critical period, 50;
    • modern society, 54;
    • occupancy, 145-147, 153;
    • origin of, 31, 32;
    • private property, 164;
    • Rousseau on, 51;
    • slavery, 95;
    • territorial sovereignty, 60-63;
    • Testamentary Law, 103, 104
  •  
  • Occupancy, 144, 145;
    • in Roman Law, 145
  •  
  • Pascal, Provincial Letters, 207
  • Prescriptions, 167, 168;
    • and Canon Law, 168
  •  
  • Primogeniture, Celtic customs, 141, 142;
  •  
  • Property, natural modes of acquiring, 144
  • Property Law, ancient Germanic, 165,
    • ancient Sclavonic, 165;
    • descent in Middle Ages, 132;
    • Indian Law, 165;
    • origin of, 145;
    • possession, 170, 172;
    • private, ancient forms of transfer, 160, 162-164;
    • Roman, 60, 66, 166;
    • Cessio in Jure, 170;
    • Edictum Perpetuum, 37;
    • Emphyteusis, 175-178;
    • Gaius on, 174;
    • Justinian, 174;
    • law of persons and things, 152;
    • mancipation, 163, 169;
    • possessory interdicts, 171;
    • Praetor's interdict, 172;
    • Res Mancipi, 160-164, 173;
    • Res Nec Mancipi, 164;
    • system of farming, 176;
    • usucapion, 167, 169, 173
  •  
  • Roman Law, see separate headings Contracts, Criminal, Property, Occupancy, Testamentary;
    • Decemviral Law, 20;
    • definition of inheritance, 107;
    • end of period of jurists, 40;
    • influence of Praetor, 38;
    • intestacy, 127-130;
    • law of inheritance, 111;
    • Leges Corneliae, 24, 25;
    • Leges Juliae, 25;
    • marriage, 91;
    • obligation in, 190, 191, 195, 197;
    • Pandects of Justinian, 39;
    • powers of Praetor, 37, 39;
    • Praetorian edict, 24, 25;
    • Responsa Prudentum, 20, 21, 24;
    • reverence of Romans for, 22;
    • Statute Law, 25;
    • Twelve Tables, 1, 8, 9, 12, 20
  • Rousseau, on Social Contract, 181
  •  
  • Savigny, 171;
    • on occupancy, 150
  • Slavery, American opinions of, 96;
    • influence of Law of Nature upon, 97;
    • Roman system, 95-97
  • Status, definition of, 100
  •  
  • Testamentary Law, adoption and testation, 114, 115;
    • Church's influence upon, 102;
    • corporation, aggregate and sole, 110;
    • Hindoo Law, 113, 114;
    • Hindoo compared with Roman, 113;
    • Law of Nature, 103, 104;
    • Roman Law, 111, 112, 117-123;
    • mancipation, 120, 123;
    • Praetorian testament, 123-125;
    • Twelve Tables, 112, 119, 122;
    • Roman family, agnatic and cognatic relationship, 86-89;
    • duties and rights of father, 85;
    • effects of Christianity, 92;
    • family, the basis of State, 75, 76;
    • kinship, 86, 88;
    • modification of parental privileges, 84;
    • origin of contract in, 99;
    • origin of law of persons, 89;
    • parental powers, 80-82, 88
  • Theology, and Jurisprudence, 208-210;
  • Theories, based on Roman doctrine, Bentham, 69;
    • Blackstone, 67;
    • differing from Roman Glossators, annotations of, 67;
    • Grotius, 67;
    • Jurisprudence, dissatisfaction with, 70;
    • Locke, 67;
    • Montesquieu, 68;
    • patriarchal, 72-75
  •  
  • Universal succession, 106;
  • "Universatis Juris," 105
  •  
  • Village communities, Indian, 153, 154, 156, 158;
    • Indian, compared with Roman gens, 155;
    • Indian, Elphinstone, History of India, 155, 156;
    • Russian 157
  •  
  • Women, ancient rules defeated by Natural Law, 90;
    • Canon Law, 93;
    • English Common Law, 93, 94;
    • Roman family, 90, 91;
    • gradual independence under Roman Law, 91, 92;
    • Roman, perpetual tutelage of, 90;
    • under Roman Law, 89, 90;
    • subordination to husband in Middle Ages, 92;
    • subordination of Roman to relations, 90

Made at The
Temple Press

Letchworth
in Great Britain

Produced at The
Temple Press

Letchworth
in the UK




        
        
    
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