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The text is based on scans of two different physical copies of the same edition; see endnotes for one variant reading. Typographical errors are marked with mouse-hover popups. All pilcrows in the body text were added by the transcriber (see endnotes).

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The book was originally (1550) printed together with Erasmus’s The Education of Children. The introduction (1961) mentions Erasmus briefly; the Index refers only to Sherry’s Treatise. Since the two texts have no connection except that Sherry is assumed to be the translator of the Erasmus essay, they have been made into separate e-texts.

The book was originally printed in 1550 along with Erasmus’s The Education of Children. The introduction from 1961 mentions Erasmus briefly, and the Index only refers to Sherry’s Treatise. Since the two texts are unrelated except that Sherry is thought to be the translator of the Erasmus essay, they have been created as separate e-texts.

Introduction (1961)
Contents (1961)
Main Text
Index (1961)
Transcriber’s Notes

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see text page 1

A Guide

Of schemes and tropes
(1550)

BY

RICHARD SHERRY

AND HIS TRANSLATION OF

Kids' education

BY

DESIDERIUS ERASMUS

A FACSIMILE REPRODUCTION

WITH AN INTRODUCTION AND INDEX

BY

HERBERT W. HILDEBRANDT

The University of Michigan

Gainesville, FL
SCHOLARS’ FACSIMILES & REPRINTS
1961

SCHOLARS’ FACSIMILES & REPRINTS
118 N.W. 26th Street Gainesville, Florida, U.S.A. Harry R. Warfel, General Editor

REPRODUCED FROM A COPY IN
AND WITH THE PERMISSION OF

BODLEIAN LIBRARY

Oxford

L.C. Catalog Card No.: 61-5030

MANUFACTURED IN THE U.S.A.
LETTERPRESS BY J. N. ANZEL, INC.
PHOTOLITHOGRAPHY BY EDWARDS BROTHERS
BINDING BY UNIVERSAL-DIXIE BINDERY

INTRODUCTION

Richard Sherry’s A Treatise of Schemes and Tropes (1550), a familiar work of the Renaissance, is primarily thought of as a sixteenth-century English textbook on the figures. Yet it is also a mirror of one variation of rhetoric which came to be called the rhetoric of style. As a representative of this stylistic school, it offers little that is new to the third part of classical rhetoric. Instead, it carries forward the medieval concept that ornateness in communication is desirable; it suggests that figures are tools for achieving this ornateness; it supplies examples of ornateness to be imitated in writing and speaking; it supports knowing the figures in order to understand both secular and religious writings; it proposes that clarity is found in the figures. In short, the work assisted Englishmen to understand eloquence as well as to create it.

Richard Sherry’s A Treatise of Schemes and Tropes (1550), a well-known work from the Renaissance, is mostly seen as a 16th-century English textbook on rhetorical figures. However, it also reflects one interpretation of rhetoric known as the rhetoric of style. As a representative of this stylistic approach, it doesn’t introduce much that is new to the third part of classical rhetoric. Instead, it continues the medieval idea that ornate communication is desirable; it suggests that rhetorical figures are tools for achieving this ornateness; it provides examples of ornamentation to be emulated in writing and speaking; it emphasizes the importance of knowing these figures to understand both secular and religious texts; and it claims that clarity can be found through these figures. In short, the work helped English speakers grasp and produce eloquence.

Four-fifths of ancient rhetoric is omitted in the Treatise. The nod is given to elocution. Invention is discussed, but only as a tool to assist the communicator in amplifying his ideas, as a means to spin out his thoughts to extreme lengths. Arrangement, memory, and delivery are overlooked. Accordingly, the Treatise neatly fits into the category of a Renaissance rhetoric on style. It is this school which recognized the traditional five Ciceronian parts of rhetoric, but considered style to be the most significant precept. vi The Treatise is not the first to support an emphasis wholly on style, nor the foremost. We know that Aristotle’s Rhetoric, Cicero’s works on rhetoric, and Quintilian’s Institutes discussed the significance of style, but they had a broad view. However, in England, about the time of Bede, arose a limited concept that rhetoric is mainly style, particularly that of the figures. It is this latter truncated version of rhetoric that the Treatise continues in the Renaissance. Rhetoric in Sherry’s work has lost its ancient meaning.

Four-fifths of ancient rhetoric is left out in the Treatise. It acknowledges elocution. Invention is mentioned, but only as a tool to help the communicator expand on his ideas, a way to elaborate on his thoughts in great detail. Arrangement, memory, and delivery are ignored. As a result, the Treatise fits neatly into the category of Renaissance rhetoric focused on style. This school recognized the traditional five Ciceronian components of rhetoric but viewed style as the most important principle. vi The Treatise isn’t the first to emphasize style completely, nor is it the most prominent. We know that Aristotle’s Rhetoric, Cicero’s writings on rhetoric, and Quintilian’s Institutes discussed the importance of style, but they had a broader perspective. However, in England, around the time of Bede, a limited idea emerged that rhetoric is mainly about style, especially regarding figures. It is this narrower version of rhetoric that the Treatise continues during the Renaissance. Rhetoric in Sherry’s work has lost its ancient meaning.

The Treatise is highly prescriptive. It was born in an age of rules. So much so, that the rhetorician who named his rules and tools was not out of rapport with the period. This accounts for the rigidity, the love of classification, and the schematic presentation of the work. It is nothing more than a highly organized dictionary of ancient, medieval, and Renaissance schemes and tropes. In fact, the major variation from previous Latin compilers is to be found in the headnotes relative to the various kinds of figures. Nor is it as thorough in handling the figures as its predecessors. It utilizes, however, the customary Greek and Latin terms and supplies a definition, but here the similarity with contemporaries and ancients ends. It is weak in amplification of examples during an age when amplification was practiced. Sherry economizes by selecting usually one example in support of a figure while contemporary cataloguers, and ancients for that matter, are more definitive.

The Treatise is very prescriptive. It was created in a time of strict rules. So much so that the rhetorician who outlined his rules and tools was in tune with the era. This explains the rigidity, the passion for classification, and the organized presentation of the work. It basically serves as a highly structured dictionary of ancient, medieval, and Renaissance schemes and tropes. In fact, the main difference from previous Latin compilers is found in the headnotes related to the various kinds of figures. It also doesn't cover the figures as thoroughly as its predecessors. However, it does use the standard Greek and Latin terms and provides definitions, but that's where the resemblance to contemporaries and ancients stops. It's lacking in examples during a time when expanding on examples was common. Sherry tends to be economical by usually providing just one example to support a figure, while contemporary catalogers, and ancients as well, are more detailed.

vii

Whether the work was ever popular within the schools or without is unclear. Probably it did not have extensive success because only one issue of the work appeared and a revised edition was brought out in 1555. By contrast, during the sixteenth century, Erasmus’ De Copia (1512) had at least eleven printings, Mosellanus’ Table (c. 1529) had at least eight editions, Susenbrotus’ Epitome (1541) had at least twenty printings, Peacham’s Garden (1577) had two editions, and Day’s Secretorie (1586) underwent at least five editions. Some of these works had new editions printed in the seventeenth century and would seem to reflect a greater public acceptance than the Treatise. Some were also written in Latin while Sherry moves in the vernacular. It still was an age of Latin, and Sherry in part recognized this by his alternate Latin and English movement in his second rhetoric on style published in 1555. Moreover, people seemed content to remain with the giants of the Renaissance, notably Erasmus and his De Copia instead of turning to a lesser light such as Sherry.

Whether the work was ever popular in schools or elsewhere is unclear. It probably didn’t achieve much success because only one edition was published, and a revised version came out in 1555. In contrast, during the sixteenth century, Erasmus' De Copia (1512) had at least eleven printings, Mosellanus’ Table (c. 1529) had at least eight editions, Susenbrotus’ Epitome (1541) had at least twenty printings, Peacham’s Garden (1577) had two editions, and Day’s Secretorie (1586) went through at least five editions. Some of these works had new editions printed in the seventeenth century, suggesting greater public acceptance than the Treatise. Some were also written in Latin, while Sherry was writing in the vernacular. It was still a time when Latin was dominant, and Sherry partly acknowledged this through his switching between Latin and English in his second rhetoric on style published in 1555. Furthermore, people seemed happy to stick with the giants of the Renaissance, especially Erasmus and his De Copia, rather than turning to a lesser figure like Sherry.

The Treatise does have merit. The work cannot be judged entirely by tallying its meager number of editions, its lack of thoroughness, or its artificial divisions. Its signal contribution rests upon the fact that it is a pioneering effort at permitting the figures to march, for the first time, in English. Here Sherry had an opportunity to provide the English reader with additional words, ideas, and material to be employed in vernacular communication. His efforts in his works on rhetoric, the two editions of the Treatise, provided viii the sixteenth century Englishman with the identical schemes and tropes which had been a heritage of the Latin language since antiquity. Hence the work can be called a complicated ordering of the figures, but it is also a sincere attempt to provide in English those figures which would lend ornateness to the expression of an idea.

The Treatise has its value. You can't judge the work solely by counting its limited editions, its lack of depth, or its somewhat arbitrary divisions. Its significant contribution lies in being one of the first efforts to allow figures to be expressed in English. Here, Sherry had a chance to give English readers new words, ideas, and material for everyday communication. His work on rhetoric and the two editions of the Treatise offered the English speakers of the sixteenth century the same strategies and rhetorical devices that had been part of the Latin language since ancient times. Therefore, while the work can be seen as a complex arrangement of figures, it also sincerely aims to present those figures in English that would enhance the expression of an idea.

To indicate that the Treatise was part of a continuing school of rhetoric, we must consider a few rhetoricians subsequent to Sherry’s work. Indeed, one notices the continuance of dictionaries of figures which carry the admonition that the usual manner of utterance was to be despised. Thomas Wilson’s The Arte of Rhetorique (1553), although preserving the classical idea of rhetoric, also felt the definition of a figure employed in communication involved the uncommon. Twenty-seven years subsequent to Sherry, England again has a pure catalogue of the figures; this is Peacham’s Garden of Eloquence. More elaborate than the Treatise, it too suggests that rhetoric is decoration. Continued interest in the stylistic tools is also seen in Puttenham’s The Arte of English Poesie (1589). When we move to the latter part of the sixteenth century and then change the genre as exemplified in Day’s The English Secretorie, we see a stylistic extension to the art of letter writing which borrowed rhetorical terms and rules and applied them to written correspondence. The emphasis in these rhetorics on style is the same: ornateness in communication is achieved through using the figures.

To show that the Treatise was part of an ongoing tradition in rhetoric, we need to look at a few rhetoricians who came after Sherry’s work. It's clear that dictionaries of figures continued to emphasize that the typical way of speaking should be looked down upon. Thomas Wilson’s The Arte of Rhetorique (1553) maintains the classical view of rhetoric but also believes that the definition of a figure used in communication involves the unusual. Twenty-seven years after Sherry, England presents another straightforward list of figures with Peacham’s Garden of Eloquence. This work is more detailed than the Treatise, and it similarly suggests that rhetoric serves as decoration. Interest in stylistic tools is also evident in Puttenham’s The Arte of English Poesie (1589). As we move to the later part of the sixteenth century and shift genres with Day’s The English Secretorie, we see a stylistic expansion into the art of letter writing that borrowed rhetorical terms and rules for written correspondence. The focus in these rhetorics on style remains the same: ornate communication is achieved by using figures.

When we look in the opposite direction, to works which preceded Sherry, the figures, definitions, and examples in the Treatise derive more from contemporaries than from the ancients. It relies extensively upon intermediaries. Sherry explains that Erasmus and Mosellanus will be major sources. Hence the De Copia, the Ecclesiastae, and the Tabulae de schematibus et tropis are used with regularity. Although further removed in time, the Rhetorica ad Herennium is the primary ancient source. But beyond this first-hand reliance on the ancients, examples from Vergil, Cicero, and Terence, to mention several, as well as definitions of the figures, depend heavily upon neo-classical intermediaries.

When we look back at the works that came before Sherry, the figures, definitions, and examples in the Treatise come more from contemporary authors than ancient ones. It heavily relies on intermediaries. Sherry notes that Erasmus and Mosellanus will be key sources. Therefore, the De Copia, the Ecclesiastae, and the Tabulae de schematibus et tropis are frequently referenced. Although it's further back in time, the Rhetorica ad Herennium is the main ancient source. But aside from this direct reliance on ancient texts, examples from Vergil, Cicero, and Terence, to name a few, as well as definitions of the figures, heavily depend on neoclassical intermediaries.

Appended to the text on the figures of rhetoric is a seemingly gratuitous section entitled “That chyldren oughte to be taught and brought vp gently in vertue and learnynge, and that euen forthwyth from theyr natiuitie: a declamacion of a briefe theme, by Erasmus of Roterodame.” This essay occupies almost two-thirds of the Treatise and receives its first English translation from the Latin at the hands of Sherry. William Woodward in his Desiderius Erasmus Concerning the Aim and Method of Education gave us another English translation in 1904. One other translation, in German, by August Israel, is entitled “Vortrag über die Nothwendigkeit, die Knaben gleich von der Geburt an in einer für Freigeborne würdigen Weise sittlich und wissenschaftlich ausbilden zu lassen.”

Appended to the text on the figures of rhetoric is a seemingly unnecessary section titled “That children ought to be taught and raised kindly in virtue and learning, and even from their birth: a declamation of a brief theme, by Erasmus of Rotterdam.” This essay takes up almost two-thirds of the Treatise and was first translated into English from the Latin by Sherry. William Woodward provided another English translation in 1904 in his Desiderius Erasmus Concerning the Aim and Method of Education. There is also one other translation, in German, by August Israel, titled “Lecture on the Necessity of Educating Boys, from Birth, in a Manner Appropriate for Freeborn Individuals.”

The reason for the inclusion of the Erasmian essay is never clearly stated in the other sections of the Treatise. Nor do the other translators suppose a reason. From the internal evidence of the essay and from headnotes preceding it, we may assume that the purpose is one of supplying readers with an example of amplification of a brief theme, first illustrated in miniature, and then full blown into a long declamation. The essay does not appear to be illustrating the numerous figures discussed in the initial section of the work.

The reason for including the Erasmian essay isn't clearly explained in the other parts of the Treatise. Other translators also don't seem to provide a reason. From the content of the essay and the introductory notes before it, we can assume that its purpose is to give readers an example of expanding a short theme, first shown briefly and then elaborated into a longer speech. The essay doesn't seem to demonstrate the various figures mentioned in the initial section of the work.

Of Sherry we know little. Beyond the dates in the DNB, we infer from his works that he had an intense interest in English and had a desire for his countrymen to communicate well in the vernacular. He was interested in religion, was most likely a Protestant, and hoped to continue an interest in religion which he developed in his youth. He was also a teacher. And although Latin was still a living language, the task of inculcating a new tongue in the students fell to the schoolmaster; Sherry was active in this capacity. This does not weaken an acclamation we possess of the man: “He was a Person elegantly learned.”

We know little about Sherry. Aside from the dates listed in the DNB, we can tell from his works that he had a strong interest in English and wanted his fellow countrymen to communicate effectively in their native language. He was interested in religion, likely a Protestant, and wanted to maintain the religious interest he had developed in his youth. He was also a teacher. Even though Latin was still commonly used, it was the schoolmaster's job to teach a new language to the students, and Sherry was active in this role. This does not undermine the praise we have for him: “He was a Person elegantly learned.”

Herbert W. Hildebrandt

The University of Michigan
February 25, 1960

A Treatise of Schemes and Tropes by Richard Sherry A Guide to Figures of Speech by Richard Sherry	1
Introduction	2
Eloquucion	17
Of Evidence and Plainness	19
Of the Three Kyndes of Style	21
Scheme and Figure	25
Faute	32
Garnyshyng and His Kyndes	38
Figures of Sentence	62
Proves	78
The Education of Children by Desiderius Erasmus Teaching Kids by Desiderius Erasmus	97

¶ A treatise
of Schemes & Tropes
very profytable
for the better vnderstanding of good
authors, gathered out of the best
Grammarians & Oratours
by Rychard Sherry Lon
doner.

A discussion
of Schemes & Tropes
highly profitable
for a better understanding of great
authors, collected from the best
Grammar experts & speakers
by Richard Sherry, London.

¶ Whervnto is added a declamacion,
That chyldren euen strayt frõ their
infancie should be well and gent-
ly broughte vp in learnynge.
Written fyrst in Latin
by the most excel-
lent and
famous Clearke, Erasmus
of Rotero-
dame.

¶ To this is added a statement,
That children right from their
infancy should be raised well and gently
in learning.
Written first in Latin
by the most excellent and
famous Scholar, Erasmus
of Rotterdam.

The tytle of thys worcke straunge. Doubt not but that the title of this treatise all straunge vnto our Englyshe eares, wil cause some men at the fyrst syghte to maruayle what the matter of it should meane: yea, and peraduenture if they be rashe of iudgement, to cal it some newe fangle, and so casting it hastily from thẽ, wil not once vouchsafe to reade it: and if they do, yet perceiuynge nothing to be therin that pleaseth their phansy, wyl count it but a tryfle, & a 3 A.ii. tale of Robynhoode. But of thys sorte as I doubte not to fynde manye, so perhaps there wyll be other, whiche moued with the noueltye thereof, wyll thynke it worthye to be looked vpon, and se what is contained therin. Sheme and Trope. These words, Scheme and Trope, are not vsed in our Englishe tongue, neither bene they Englyshe wordes. Vse maketh straũge thinges familier. No more be manye whiche nowe in oure tyme be made by continual vse, very familier to most men, and come so often in speakyng, that aswel is knowen amongest vs the meanyng of them, as if they had bene of oure owne natiue broode. Who hath not in hys mouthe nowe thys worde Paraphrasis, homelies, vsurped, abolyshed, wyth manye other 4 lyke? And what maruail is it if these words haue not bene vsed heretofore, seynge there was no suche thynge in oure Englishe tõgue where vnto they shuld be applyed? Good cause haue we therefore to gyue thankes vnto certayne godlye and well learned men, whych by their greate studye enrychynge our tongue both wyth matter and wordes, haue endeuoured to make it so copyous and plentyfull that therein it maye compare wyth anye other whiche so euer is the best. Oure language falsely accused of barbarousnes. It is not vnknowen that oure language for the barbarousnes and lacke of eloquence hathe bene complayned of, and yet not trewely, for anye defaut in the toungue it selfe, but 5 rather for slackenes of our coũtrimen, whiche haue alwayes set lyght by searchyng out the elegance and proper speaches that be ful many in it: as plainly doth appere not only by the most excellent monumentes of our aũciẽt forewriters, Gower. Chawcer. Lidgate. Gower, Chawcer and Lydgate, but also by the famous workes of many other later: Syr Thomas Elyot. inespeciall of y^e ryght worshipful knyght syr Thomas Eliot, which first in hys dictionarye as it were generallye searchinge oute the copye of oure language in all kynde of wordes and phrases, after that setting abrode goodlye monumentes of hys wytte, lernynge and industrye, aswell in historycall knowledge, as of eyther the Philosophies, 6 hathe herebi declared the plentyfulnes of our mother toũge, loue toward hys country, hys tyme not spent in vanitye and tryfles. What shuld I speake of that ornamente Syr Thomas Wyat? which beside most excellente gyftes bothe of fortune and bodye, so flouryshed in the eloquence of hys natiue tongue, that as he passed therin those wyth whome he lyued, so was he lykelye to haue bene equal wyth anye other before hym, had not enuious death to hastely beriued vs of thys iewel: teachyng al men verely, no filicitie in thys worlde to be so suer and stable, but that quicklye it may be ouerthrowen and broughte to the grounde. Manye other there be yet lyuynge 7 A.iiii. whose excellente wrytynges do testifye wyth vs to be wordes apte and mete elogantly to declare oure myndes in al kindes of Sciences: and that, what sentence soeuer we conceiue, the same to haue Englyshe oracion natural, and holpẽ by art, wherby it may most eloquẽtly be vttered. The occasion of thys treatise. Of the whych thynge as I fortuned to talke wyth you, Master Brooke, among other matters this present argument of Schemes and Tropes came in place, and offered it selfe, demed to be bothe profitable and pleasaunte if they were gathered together, and handsomelye set in a playne ordre, and wyth theire descriptions hansomely put into our Englishe tongue. 8 And bicause longe ago, I was well acquaynted with them, when I red them to other in y^e Latin, and that they holpe me verye muche in the exposicion of goode authores, I was so muche the more ready to make them speak English, partli to renew the pleasure of mine old studies, and partelye to satysfy your request.
Rodulphus Agricola. ¶ Beside this, I was moued also wyth the authorytye of that famous clarke Rodulphus Agricola, whyche in a certeine epistle wryten vnto a frynde of hys, exhorteth mẽ what soeuer they reade in straunge tongues, diligently to translate the same into their owne language: because that in it we sonar perceiue if there 9 be any faute in our speaking, and howe euerye thynge eyther rightly hangeth together or is darkely, ruggishly, and superfluously wryttẽ. No lerned nacion hath there bene but y^e learned in it haue written of schemes & fygures, which thei wold not haue don, except thei had perceyued the valewe.
¶ Wherefore after theyr example obtaynyng a lytle lesure, I red ouer sundrye treatises, as wel of those which wrot long ago, as of other now in our daies: fyndynge amonge them some to haue wrytten ouer brieflye, some confuselye, and falselye some. Mosellain. Mosellane hathe in hys tables shewed a fewe fygures of grammer, and so hathe confoũded them together, that his 10 second order called of Loquucion pertayneth rather to the rhetoricians then to hys purpose. Quintilian. Quintilian briefly hathe wrytten bothe of the Gramatical and rhetorical Shemes, but so that you may soone perceyue he did it by the waye, as muche as serued hys purpose. Cicero. Cicero in hys boke of an oratour with hys incompetable eloquence hathe so hid the preceptes, that scarselye they may be tryed oute by theyr names, or by theyr exãples. Erasmus. Erasmus in hys double copye of words and thynges, hath made as y^e tytle declareth but a comentarye of them bothe, and as it wer a litle bil of remembraũce. Wherefore to make these thinges more playne to y^e students 11 that lyst to reade them in oure tongue, I haue taken a lytle payne, more thorowelye to try the definicions, to apply the examples more aptly, & to make things defused more plaine, as in dede it shal ryght wel apere to the dylygente. I haue not translated them orderly out of anye one author, but runninge as I sayde thorowe many, and vsyng myne owne iudgement, haue broughte them into this body as you se, and set them in so playne an order, that redelye maye be founde the figure, and the vse wherevnto it serueth. Thoughe vnto greate wittes occupyed with weightye matters, they do not greatelye pertayne, yet to such as perchaũce shal not haue perfecte instructoures, 12 they may be commodious to helpe them selues for y^e better vnderstandynge of such good authors as they reade. ¶ For thys darre I saye, no eloquente wryter maye be perceiued as he shulde be, wythoute the knowledge of them: for asmuche as al togethers they belonge to Eloquucion, whyche is the thyrde and pryncipall parte of rhetorique. The common scholemasters be wont in readynge, to saye vnto their scholers: Hic est figura: and sometyme to axe them, Per quam figuram? But what profit is herein if they go no further? In speakynge and wrytynge nothyng is more folyshe than to affecte or fondly to laboure to speake darkelye for the nonce, sithe the 13 proper vse of speach is to vtter the meaning of our mynd with as playne wordes as maye be. A figure not to be vsed but for a cause. But syth it so chaunseth y^t somtyme ether of necessitie, or to set out the matter more plaĩly we be compelled to speake otherwyse then after common facion, onles we wil be ignorante in the sence or meaninge of the mater that excellente authors do wryghte of, we muste nedes runne to the helpe of schemes & fygures: which verely come no sildomer in the writing and speaking of eloquente english men, then either of Grecians or Latins. Many thinges might I brynge in to proue not onely a great profyt to be in them but that they are to be learned euen of necessitie, for as muche 14 as not only prophane authors wythout them may not be wel vnderstand, but that also they greatelye profit vs in the readinge of holye scripture, where if you be ignoraunte in the fyguratiue speches and Tropes, you are lyke in manye greate doubtes to make but a slender solucion: Westimerus as ryght wyll do testefy Castelio Vestimerus and Augustinus y^t noble doctor saint Augustine. I confesse I haue not made the matter here so perfecte as my wyll and desyer is it shoulde haue ben, and that I haue but brieflye touched, and as it were with my litle fynger poynted to these thinges, which require a lẽger declaracion. For what can be hasted, and absolute to? But if God spare me lyfe, I 15 truste hereafter to make it an introducciõ, wherbi our youth not onlye shall saue that moste precious Iewell, Time, whyle they wander by them selues, readynge at all aduentures sundry and varyous authors: but that also thei shalbe able better to vnderstande and iudge of the goodlye gyftes and ornamentes in mooste famous and eloquente oratoures. And apte similitude. For as lyke plesure is not to him whiche gooeth into a goodlye garden garnyshed wyth dyuers kindes of herbes and flowers, and that there doeth no more but beholde them, of whome it maye be sayde that he wente in for nothynge but that he wold come out, and to hym which besyde the corporall eie pleasure, 16 knoeth of eueri one the name & propertye: so verelye much difference is there in readynge good authors, and in sundrye sortes of menne that do it: and muche more pleasure, and profit hathe he whiche vseth arte and iudgement, then the other, whiche wyth greate studye in dede turneth them ouer but for lacke of the knowledge of preceptes wanteth also the fruite and delectacyon that he more amplye myghte obtayne. The lyuynge God from whome all good giftes do procede, gyue vs grace so to order all oure words and speache, that it may be to his honour and glory for euer and euer. Amen.

The title of this piece is unusual. Don’t doubt that the title of this treatise may sound strange to our English ears and might make some people wonder what it's all about at first glance. Indeed, if they are hasty in judgment, they might dismiss it as some trendy new idea and, without even bothering to read it, cast it aside. Even if they do read it, if they don't find anything that pleases their fancy, they'll consider it nothing but a trivial tale of Robin Hood. But while I don’t doubt I’ll find many such people, perhaps there will also be others who, intrigued by its novelty, will think it’s worth checking out to see what it contains. Shame and Stereotype. These words, Scheme and Trope, are not used in our English language, nor are they English words. Use familiarizes strange things. Just as many things in our time have become very familiar to most people through constant use, being spoken so often that we know their meanings as well as if they were part of our own native vocabulary. Who doesn’t use the word Paraphrasis, homilies, usurped, abolished, and many other similar terms these days? And what’s the surprise if these words were not used before, considering that there was no such thing in our English language to which they could be applied? We have good reason to thank certain godly and well-learned individuals who, through their great study, have enriched our language with content and words, making it so abundant and plentiful that it can compare with any other renowned language. Our language is wrongly accused of being barbaric. It's no secret that our language has been criticized for being barbaric and lacking in eloquence, yet that’s not true, not due to any flaw in the language itself, but rather because of the negligence of our countrymen, who have always taken little initiative in seeking out the elegance and proper expressions that are numerous within it. This is clearly evident not just from the excellent works of our ancient writers, Gower. Chaucer. Lydgate. Gower, Chaucer, and Lydgate, but also from the famous works of many others from later years: Sir Thomas Elyot. Especially the respected knight Sir Thomas Elyot, who first in his dictionary attempted a comprehensive search for the richness of our language in all kinds of words and phrases, and thereafter shared fine examples of his wit, learning, and dedication, both in historical knowledge and philosophical understanding, 6 has demonstrated the abundance of our mother tongue, love for his country, and the productive use of his time instead of wasting it in trivialities. What more can I say about the talent of Sir Thomas Wyatt? Who, besides having most excellent gifts of fortune and character, excelled in the eloquence of his native tongue to the point that while he thrived above his contemporaries, he was likely to have equaled anyone else before him, had not jealous death taken this jewel from us too soon, teaching everyone that there is no certainty in this world that is so sure and stable but can be quickly toppled and brought to the ground. There are many others still living 7 A.iiii. whose excellent writings confirm that we have words suitable and fitting enough to express our thoughts across all kinds of sciences: that, whatever ideas we devise, they have a natural English expression, aided by art, which allows it to be articulated most eloquently. The occasion of this paper. While discussing this topic with you, Master Brooke, among other matters, the current subject of Schemes and Tropes came up, deemed both useful and enjoyable if gathered together, arranged neatly, and presented with their descriptions nicely translated into English. 8 And because I was already familiar with them from long ago when I read them to others in Latin, and because they greatly assisted me in interpreting good authors, I was all the more eager to make them speak English, partly to rekindle the enjoyment of my earlier studies and partly to satisfy your request.
Rodolphus Agricola. ¶ Additionally, I was also inspired by the authority of that famous scholar Rodolphus Agricola, who in a certain letter written to a friend urges men to diligently translate everything they read in foreign tongues into their own language: because in doing so, we can more clearly perceive if there are any faults in our speech, and how everything either connects correctly or is poorly, awkwardly, and unnecessarily written. No learned nation has existed where the learned have not written about schemes and figures; they would not have done so unless they realized their value.
¶ Therefore, following their example, I found a little time to read through various treatises, both those written long ago and some recent ones: finding that some had written too briefly, some confusedly, and some incorrectly. Moselle. Mosellan has shown a few figures of grammar in his tables, but he has mixed them together in such a way that his 10 second classification, called of Loquucion, pertains more to rhetoric than to his purpose. Quintilian. Quintilian has written briefly about both the grammatical and rhetorical schemes, but clearly did it as much as suited his needs. Cicero. Cicero, in his book on oratory, with his unmatched eloquence has obscured the precepts so much that they can hardly be found by their names or examples. Erasmus. Erasmus, in his dual copy of words and things, has made what the title suggests—nothing but a commentary on both, almost like a brief reminder. Therefore, to make these matters clearer for the students 11 who wish to read them in our tongue, I have taken some effort to examine the definitions more thoroughly, to apply the examples more fittingly, and to clarify things, as will indeed be clear to the diligent. I have not translated them directly from any one author, but rather blended them, using my own judgment to create this body as you see, arranging them in such a straightforward order that each figure and its application can be readily found. Though to great minds occupied with serious matters these may not seem particularly relevant, for those who perhaps do not have perfect instructors, 12 they may be useful in assisting them towards a better understanding of the good authors they read. ¶ For this reason, I state that no eloquent writer can be fully appreciated without knowledge of these things: as they all pertain to Eloquucion, which is the third and principal part of rhetoric. Common schoolteachers often say to their students while reading, Hic est figura, and sometimes ask them, Per quam figuram? But what benefit is there from this if they go no further? In speaking and writing, nothing is more foolish than to strive or foolishly to labor to speak obscurely for the sake of it, since the proper use of speech is to express the meaning of our thoughts with the clearest words possible. A figure meant to be used only for a purpose. But since it sometimes happens, either out of necessity or to present the matter more clearly, that we are compelled to express ourselves differently from the common fashion, unless we wish to remain ignorant of the sense or meaning of the material that excellent authors write about, we must then resort to the aid of schemes and figures: which indeed, often appear in the writing and speaking of eloquent Englishmen no less than with Greeks or Latins. I could provide plenty of examples to prove that not only is there great benefit in them, but they must be learned out of necessity, because not only can secular authors not be well understood without them, but they also greatly assist us in the reading of holy scripture, where, if you are ignorant of figurative language and tropes, you're likely to find many significant doubts with only weak solutions: Westimerus as rightly testified by Castelio Vestimerus and Augustine the noble doctor St. Augustine. I admit that I have not made this matter as perfect as I wish it were, and that I have only briefly touched upon, as it were, with my little fingertip pointed at these things, which require a more extensive explanation. For what can be rushed and perfect? But if God spares my life, I 15 hope to create an introduction in the future, through which our youth will not only save that most precious jewel, time, while wandering on their own, reading various authors at random: but they will also be better able to understand and appreciate the wonderful gifts and embellishments of the most renowned and eloquent orators. And a fitting analogy. For just as the pleasure is not the same for someone who walks into a lovely garden filled with various kinds of herbs and flowers and only looks at them, who may be said to have gone in for nothing but to come out again, compared to someone who, besides enjoying the visual pleasure, 16 knows the name and properties of each one: so indeed, there is much difference in reading good authors and in the different types of people who do it: and much more pleasure and profit has one who uses art and judgment than the other, who, with great effort, merely turns them over but, lacking knowledge of the precepts, misses out on the fruit and delight they could otherwise attain. May the living God, from whom all good gifts proceed, grant us grace to order all our words and speech so that it may be for His honor and glory forever and ever. Amen.

¶ Geuen at London the.
xiii. day of Decembre.
Anno .M.D.L.

¶ Given at London the.
13th day of December.
Year 1550.

17 B.i.

Eloquucion Loquucion, which the Greekes call Phrase, whereof also the name of eloquence dothe ryse, as of al partes it is the goodlyest, so also is it the most profitable and hardeste: in the whyche is seene that diuine myghte and vertue of an oratoure, whych as Cicero in hys oratorie particions defineth, is nothyng else but wisedom speakyng eloquently. For vnto the maruelous greate inuencion of all thynges, bothe it addeth a fulnes, and varietie: it setteth oute & garnysheth wyth lyghtes of eloquent speche, the thinges that be spoken of and also wyth very graue sentences, choyse wordes, proper, aptly translated, and wel soundyng, it bryngeth that greate fludde of eloquence vnto a certein kynd of stile 18 and indyghtyng. And oute of thys greate streame of eloquucion, not only must we chose apte, and mete wordes, but also take hede of placinge, and settinge them in order. For the myghte and power of eloquucion consisteth in wordes considered by them selues, and when they be ioyned together. Apt wordes by searchyng muste be founde oute, and after by diligence conueniently coupled. For there is a garnyshynge, euen when they be pure and fyne by them selues, and an other, whẽ they be ioyned together. To chose thẽ oute finely, and handsomlye to bestow them in their places, after the mynde of Cicero and Quintilian, is no easy thynge. So Marcus Antonius was wonte to say, that he had knowen many wel spoken men, but none eloquente. ¶ Tullye and Quintilian thoughte that inuencion and disposiciõ were the partes of a wytty and prudent man, but eloquence of an oratour. For howe to finde out matter, and set it in order, may be comen to all men, whyche eyther make abridgementes 19 B.ii. of the excellent workes of aunciente wryters, and put histories in remẽbraunce, or that speake of anye matter them selues: but to vtter the mynde aptely, distinctly, and ornately, is a gyft geuen to very fewe. And because we haue deuided eloquucion into two partes, that is, wordes symple, or considered by them selues, and compound or ioyned together in speache, accordyng to thys we saye, that euerye eloquente oracion must haue in it thre poyntes: euidence, which belongeth to the fyrst parte of eloquucion, composicion & dignitie, which belongeth to the other.

Eloquucion Loquucion, which the Greeks call Phrase, and from which the term eloquence is derived, is the most beautiful of all parts and also the most useful and challenging: in it, one can see the divine power and virtue of a speaker, which Cicero defines in his discussions of oratory as nothing more than wisdom expressed eloquently. It contributes fullness and variety to the marvelous great invention of all things; it highlights and decorates with the lights of eloquent speech the subjects being discussed, also with very serious sentences, carefully chosen words, apt translations, and pleasing sounds, guiding that great surge of eloquence into a certain style of expression. 18 and composition. And out of this great stream of eloquence, we must not only select fitting and appropriate words but also pay attention to their placement and ordering. For the strength and power of eloquence lies in words considered individually and also when they are joined together. Appropriate words must be discovered through search, and then diligently paired correctly. There is a stylishness even when they are pure and fine by themselves, and a different one when they are combined. To choose them well and neatly place them according to the ideas of Cicero and Quintilian is not an easy task. Marcus Antonius used to say that he had known many who spoke well, but none who were eloquent. ¶ Tully and Quintilian believed that invention and arrangement were the hallmarks of a witty and prudent person, while eloquence belonged to a speaker. For finding topics and organizing them can come to anyone who either summarizes the excellent works of ancient writers or recalls histories, or who speaks on any subject themselves: but expressing thoughts appropriately, clearly, and elegantly is a gift given to very few. And since we have divided eloquence into two parts: wordes symple, or considered individually, and compound, or joined together in speech, according to this we say that every eloquent statement must include three points: clarity, which belongs to the first part of eloquence, composition & dignity, which belong to the other.

Of Euidence and plainenes.

Of these thynges that we put in eloquucion, lette thys be the fyrste care, to speake euidentlye after the dignitye and nature of thynges, and to vtter suche wordes, whych as Cicero sayth in hys oratour, no man may iustely reprehende. The playne and euident speche is learned of Gramarians, and it keepeth the oracion pure, and without all faute, and maketh that euerye 20 thyng may seme to be spoken purelye apertlye, and clerelye. Euerye speche standeth by vsuall wordes that be in vse of daylye talke, and proper wordes that belonge to the thinge, of the which we shal speke. Neyther be properties to be referred onely to the name of the thing, but much more to the strength and power of the significacion: & must be considered not by hearyng, but by vnderstandyng. So translacion in the whych comonly is the greatest vse of eloquuciõ, applieth wordes not the selfe proper thinges. But yet an vnvsed worde or poetical, hath also somtyme in the oracion hys dignitie, and beyng put in place (as Cicero sayeth) oftentymes the oracion may seme greater, and of more antiquitie, for that Poetes do speake in a maner as it were in another tonge, it is righte sone perceiued. Finally two fautes are cõmitted in euerye language, whereby it is not pure: Barbarisme, and Solecisme. Of the whych, that on is committed, when anye worde is fautely spoken or writen: 21 B.iii. that other, when in many wordes ioyned together, the worde that foloweth is not wel applyed to that that goeth before. Of composicion and dygnitye, we wyll speake here after, when we come to the figures of rethoryque.

Of these things that we express, let this be the first concern: to speak clearly according to the dignity and nature of the subjects, and to use words that, as Cicero says in his orator, no one can justly criticize. Plain and clear speech is learned from grammarians, and it keeps the speech pure and free from any faults, making everything seem to be expressed purely, clearly, and straightforwardly. Every speech relies on common words used in everyday conversation, and appropriate terms that relate to the subject we will discuss. Neither should properties be attributed only to the name of the thing, but much more to the strength and power of its meaning; these must be considered not just by hearing but through understanding. Thus, translation, which commonly has the greatest use in eloquence, applies words not to the actual proper things. However, an unusual or poetic word also sometimes has its place in the speech, which, as Cicero says, can often make the expression seem greater and more ancient because poets speak almost as if in another language, and this is soon apparent. Finally, two faults are committed in every language that make it impure: Barbarism and Solecism. The first occurs when any word is incorrectly spoken or written; the second occurs when, in a series of words joined together, the subsequent word does not properly relate to the one that came before. We will discuss composition and dignity later when we come to the figures of rhetoric.

Of the three kyndes of style or endyghtynge.

Before we come to the precepts of garnishing an oraciõ, we thinke good, bryeflye, to shewe you of the thre kyndes of stile or endyghting, in the whych all the eloquucion of an oratoure is occupied. For that there be thre sundry kyndes, called of the Grekes characters, of vs figures, I trowe there is no man, though he be meanlye learned, but he knoweth, namely when we se so manye wryters of sciences, bothe Greke and latine, whych haue ben before tyme, to haue folowed for the mooste parte sundrye sortes of wrytyng, the one vnlyke to the other. And there hath bene marked inespecially thre kyndes of endightynge: The greate, the small, the meane.

Before we discuss the principles of crafting an oration, it's important to briefly explain the three types of style or composition that encompass all the eloquence of a speaker. There are three distinct types, referred to by the Greeks as characters, and by us as figures. I believe that anyone, even those with basic education, is aware of this, especially when we see numerous writers of sciences, both Greek and Latin, who have historically followed different kinds of writing, each one unlike the others. Notably, three kinds of composition have been identified: the grand, the simple, and the medium.

The greate kynde.

The greate, the noble, the mightye, and the full kynde of endyghtynge, wyth an incredible, & a certen diuine power of oracion, is vsed in wayghty causes: for it hathe wyth an ample maiestye verye garnyshed wordes, proper, translated, & graue sentences, whych ar handled in amplificacion, and commiseracion, and it hathe exornations bothe of woordes and sentences, wherunto in oracions they ascribe verye great strength and grauitie. And they that vse thys kynde, bee vehement, various, copious, graue, appoynted and readye thorowlye to moue and turne mens myndes. Thys kynd dyd Cicero vse in the oracion for Aulus Cluencius, for Sylla, for Titus Annius Milo, for Caius Rabirius: agaynste Catiline, agaynste Verres, agaynste Piso. But they that can not skyll of it oftentimes fall into fautes, when vnto them that seemeth a graue oracion, whych swelleth, and is puffed vp, whych vseth straunge wordes hardelye translated, or to 23 B.iiii. olde, and that be nowe longe sythens lefte of from vse of daylye talke, or more graue then the thing requyreth.

The great, the noble, the mighty, and the kind of writing, with an incredible and certain divine power of speech, is used in important matters: for it has with ample majesty very well-crafted words, proper, translated, and serious sentences, which are elaborated on with expansion and compassion, and it has embellishments both of words and sentences, to which in speeches they attribute very great strength and seriousness. Those who use this style are passionate, diverse, abundant, serious, well-prepared, and thoroughly ready to move and change people's minds. This style was used by Cicero in the speech for Aulus Cluencius, for Sylla, for Titus Annius Milo, for Caius Rabirius: against Catiline, against Verres, against Piso. But those who can't master it often fall into mistakes when what seems to them a serious speech, which is inflated and pompous, uses unfamiliar words that are poorly translated, or is outdated and has long since been dropped from everyday conversation, or more serious than the situation requires.

The small kynde.

The small kynde of indighting, is in a subtile, pressed, and fyled oracion, meete for causes that be a lytel sharper then are in the comon vse of speakynge. For it is a kynde of oracion that is lette downe euen to the mooste vsed custume of pure and clere speakyng. It hathe fyne sentences, subtile, sharpe, teachyng all thynges, and makynge them more playne, not more ample. ¶ And in the same kynde (as Cicero sayeth in hys oratoure) some bee craftye, but vnpolyshed, and of purpose lyke the rude and vnskylfull: Other in that leaues are trymme, that is somwhat floryshynge also and garnyshed. Cicero vsed thys kynde in hys philosophicall disputacions, in the oraciõ for Quincius for Roscius y^e Comedy plaier, & Terẽce, & Plautus in their Comedies. Such as cã not hãdsomly vse them 24 selues in that mery conceyted slendernes of wordes, fall into a drye and feble kynde of oracion.

The small kind of writing is in a subtle, concise, and refined style, suitable for topics that are a bit sharper than what is commonly used in speaking. It’s a type of speech that is reduced to the most common usage of pure and clear language. It has fine sentences, subtle and sharp, explaining everything and making them clearer, not more extensive. ¶ And in the same style (as Cicero says in his rhetoric), some are clever but unrefined, intentionally resembling the crude and inexperienced: Others are neat, somewhat embellished and decorated. Cicero used this style in his philosophical discussions, in the speech for Quinctius for Roscius the comedian, and Terence and Plautus in their comedies. Those who cannot skillfully employ this playful subtlety of words fall into a dry and weak kind of speech. 24

The meane kynde.

The mean and temperate kynd of indyghting standeth of the lower, and yet not of the loweste, and moste comen wordes and sentẽces. And it is ryghtyly called the temperate kynde of speakyng, because it is very nygh vnto the small, and to the greate kynde, folowyng a moderacion and temper betwyxt thẽ. And it foloweth as we saye in one tenour, distinguyshyng all the oracion wyth small ornamentes both of wordes, and sentences. Cicero vseth thys for the lawe of Manilius, for Aulus Cecinna, for Marcus Marcellus, and moste of all in hys bookes of offices. In this it is fautye to come to the kynd that is nye vnto it, whyche is called dissolute, because it waueth hyther and thyther, as it were wythout senowes and ioyntes, standyng surely in no poynte. And suche an oracion can not cause the hearer to take anye heede, when it goeth so in and out, 25 and comprehendeth not any thyng wyth perfecte wordes.

The mild and moderate style of writing consists of simpler, yet not the simplest, and most common words and sentences. It is rightly called the moderate style of speaking because it is very close to the simple and the grand styles, finding a balance between the two. It flows, as we say, in a consistent manner, distinguishing all the sentences with small embellishments, both in words and in structure. Cicero uses this for the law of Manilius, for Aulus Cecinna, for Marcus Marcellus, and especially in his books on duties. It is a mistake to adopt the style that is close to it, which is called dissolute, because it wanders back and forth, as if it has no structure or support, standing firmly at no point. Such a style does not engage the listener, as it fluctuates in and out, and does not convey anything with precise words. 25

Of Schemes and Tropes.

Scheme Scheme is a Greke worde, and signifyeth properlye the maner of gesture that daunsers vse to make, whẽ they haue won the best game, but by translacion is taken for the fourme, fashion, and shape of anye thynge expressed in wrytynge or payntinge: and is taken here now of vs for the fashion of a word, sayynge, or sentence, otherwyse wrytten or spoken then after the vulgar and comen vsage, and that thre sũdry waies: by figure, faute, vertue.

Scheme Scheme is a Greek word that properly refers to the way dancers move when they have won the best game. But in translation, it means the form, style, and shape of anything expressed in writing or painting. Here, we use it to refer to the way a word, phrase, or sentence is arranged differently from common usage, and that can happen in three different ways: by figure, fault, or virtue.

Figure.

Fygure, of Scheme y^e fyrst part, is a behaueoure, maner, or fashion eyther of sentence, oracion, or wordes after some new wyse, other thẽ men do commenlye vse to wryte or speake: and is of two sortes. Dianoias, that is of sentence, and Lexeos of worde.

Fygure, of Scheme y^e fyrst part, is a behavior, manner, or style either of sentences, phrases, or words in some new way, different from what people usually write or speak: and is of two types. Dianoias, which relates to sentences, and Lexeos which relates to words.

Figure of Dianoias, or sentence, because it properlye belongeth to oratoures, we wyll speake of it hereafter in place conuenient, 26 now wyll we entrete of the figure Lexeos, or of worde, as it perteyneth to the Gramarians.

Figure of Dianoias, or sentence, because it properly belongs to orators, we will discuss it later in an appropriate place, 26 now we will address the figure Lexeos, or of word, as it pertains to the grammarians.

Figure of worde.

Figure Lexeos, or of worde, is when in speakyng or wrytyng any thynge touchynge the wordes is made newe or straunge, otherwyse then after y^e comen custume: & is of .ii. kyndes; diccion, & construccion.

Figure Lexeos, or of worde, is when in speaking or writing anything regarding the words is made new or strange, otherwise than according to the common custom: & is of .ii. kinds; diction, & construction.

Figure of Diccion.

Figure of diccion is the transformacion of one word, either written or pronoũced: & hath these partes.

Figure of diction is the transformation of one word, either written or pronounced: & has these parts.

Prosthesis. Appositio, apposiciõ, the putting to, eyther of letter or sillable at the begynnyng of a worde, as: He all to bewretched hym.

Prosthesis. Appositio, apposition, it's the addition of a letter or syllable at the beginning of a word, like: He completely ruined himself.

Apheresis Ablatio, the takynge awaye of a letter or sillable from the begynnynge of a worde, of a letter, when we say: The pẽthesis of thys house is to low, for the epenthesis. Wher note this y^e word pẽthesis is a greke worde, & yet is vsed as an englishe, as many mo be, and is called a pentis by these figures, Sincope and Apheresis, the whole word beynge as is before, epenthesis, so called because 27 it is betwyxt y^e lyght & vs, as in al occupiers shops cõmenli it is.

Apheresis Ablatio, the removal of a letter or syllable from the beginning of a word, as when we say: The pẽthesis of this house is too low, for the epenthesis. Note that this word pẽthesis is a Greek word, yet it is used as an English word, like many others, and is called a pentis by these figures, Sincope and Apheresis, the whole word being as previously stated, epenthesis, so called because 27 it is between the light and us, as is commonly found in all occupiers' shops.

Epenthesis. Interpositio, when a letter is added betwene the fyrste sillable of a word and the laste, as: Relligiõ for religion, relliques for reliques.

Epenthesis. Interpositio, when a letter is added between the first syllable of a word and the last, as: Relligiõ for religion, relliques for reliques.

Syncope. Consicio, contrary to Epenthesis, is when somewhat is cutte of from the myddeste of the worde, as: Idolatry for Idololatry.

Syncope. Consicio, unlike Epenthesis, is when part of a word is removed from the middle, as in: Idolatry for Idololatry.

Proparalepsis. Preassumpcio, when a sillable is added to a word, the significacion of the worde therby nothyng altered, as: He vseth to slacken his matters, for to slacke his matters.

Proparalepsis. Preassumpcio, when a syllable is added to a word, the meaning of the word is not changed, as in: He tends to relax his tasks, in order to relax his tasks.

Apocope. Absissio, y^e cuttyng away of a letter or sillable frõ the end of a word, as: She is a wel fayr may, for maid.

Apocope. Absissio, y^e dropping a letter or syllable from the end of a word, like: She is a good fair maid, instead of maid.

Ectasis. Extensio, the making lõg of a sillable whych by nature is short, as: This was ordeined by acte, for ordined.

Ectasis. Extensio, the creation of a syllable that is naturally short, like: This was ordained by act, for ordained.

Systole. Contractio, the makynge short of a sillable which bi nature is lõg, as He is a man of good perseueraũce: wher some men cõmit .ii. fautes at once, one y^t they take perseueraũce for knoweledge, which signifieth 28 alwais cõtinuance, an other y^t they make this sillable (ue) short, where it is euer longe: and so do they erre in thys worde, adherentes, also, makyng (he) short, when it is alwayes longe, as when they saye: I defye hym, and all his adherentes.

Systole. Contractio, the shortening of a syllable that is naturally long, as he is a man of great perseverance: where some people commit two mistakes at once, one is that they confuse perseverance with knowledge, which means 28 always continuity, and the other is that they make this syllable (ue) short when it is always long: and so they err in this word, adherentes, too, making (he) short when it is always long, as when they say: I defy him, and all his adherents.

Synolephe. Delecio, puttynge oute, when .ii. vowels comyng together, the first is as it were put out: as thone and thother, for the one and the other.

Synolephe. Delecio, putting out, when two vowels come together, the first one is like it's dropped: as this one and that one, for one and the other.

Antisthecon. Littera pro littera. One letter for an other, as akecorne for okecorne.

Antisthecon. Littera pro littera. One letter for another, like akecorne for okecorne.

Transposicio. Transposing of letters in wrytynge, as chambre, for chamber.

Transposicio. Switching letters in writing, like chambre for chamber.

Figure of construccion.

Figure of construccion is when the order of construccion is otherwyse then after the comen maner. And the kyndes be these.

Figure of construction is when the order of construction is different from the usual way. And the types are these.

Prolepsis. Presumpcio, a takynge before, or generall speakynge of those thynges whych afterwardes be declared more perticulerlye: as, in the meane seasõ that kyng Henry rode royally to Calais on a sumpteous 29 courser, Lewes in a gorgeous chariot was caried to Boloygne.

Prolepsis. Presumpcio, a general overview of those things which will be explained in more detail later: for instance, during this time, King Henry rode grandly to Calais on an extravagant 29 horse, while Lewes was carried to Boulogne in a lavish chariot.

Zeugma. Iunctio, ioynyng, as Linacer sayeth, is when in lyke sentences a certen comen thyng that is put in the one, and not chaunged in the other is not expressed, but lefte out: as in Vyrgyll. Before I forget Cesar, eyther the Parthian shall drynke of the flud Araris, or Germany of Tigris: here is left out, shall drynke. Or to define it more playnelye. ¶ Iniunctio, is when the verbe in diuerse lyke sentences is referred to one: and that thre maner of waies.

Zeugma. Iunctio, joining, as Linacre says, is when in similar sentences a certain common thing that is included in one and not changed in the other is implied but left out: as in Virgil. Before I forget, Caesar, either the Parthian will drink from the river Araris, or Germany from the Tigris: what’s left out is, will drink. Or to define it more clearly. ¶ Iniunctio, is when the verb in various similar sentences refers to one: and in three different ways.

Presozeugma. Fyrste when it is set before, and is called preiunctio, as: There dyd ouercome in hym, lechery, his chastitie, saucines his feare, madnesse hys reason.

Presozeugma. First, when it's established before, and is referred to as preiunctio, like: There he overcame in him, lust, his purity, arrogance, his fear, madness, his reason.

Mesozeugma. Secondlye when it is set in the middes, & is called, Media iunctio, as bewtye, eyther by age decaieth, or by syckenes.

Mesozeugma. Secondly, when it's in the middle and referred to as Media iunctio, beauty either declines with age or due to illness.

Hypozeugma. Thyrdly whẽ it is put in the end and is called Postiunctio, as bewtie by syckenes, by sorowe, or by age decayeth.

Hypozeugma. Thirdly, when it is placed at the end and is called Postiunctio, it decays from beauty through sickness, sorrow, or old age.

Diazeugma. Disiunctio, disiunccion, when of those thynges of whych we speake, eyther both, or eche one of them is concluded with their certen verbe, thus: The people of Rome destroyed Numance, ouerthrew Cartage, cast downe Corinth, and raced Fregels. Couetousnes hurteth the bodye, and corrupteth the mynd.

Diazeugma. Disiunctio, disjunction, when discussing things we mentioned, either both or each one of them is concluded with their definite verb, like this: The people of Rome destroyed Numantia, overthrew Carthage, brought down Corinth, and razed Fréjus. Greed harms the body and corrupts the mind.

Silepsis. Concepcio, when in vnlike clauses a certeyn cõmon thynge that is put in one of thẽ, can not agre with the other, excepte it be chaunged. But thys is more playne in the latine because of the concordes, albeit in englyshe for the verbe we may vse this example. The Nobles and the Kynge was taken. Hys head and hys handes were cutte of: In the whyche sentences the verbe agreeth wyth the nexte.

Silepsis. Concepcio, when in unlike clauses a certain common thing that is placed in one of them cannot agree with the other unless it is changed. But this is clearer in Latin because of the agreements, although in English for the verb we can use this example. The Nobles and the King were taken. His head and his hands were cut off: In which sentences the verb agrees with the next.

Epergesis. Appositio, when two substãtiues are put together immediatly withoute any verbe betwyxt, the one to declare the other, as in Vyrgyll. ¶ Coridõ loued faire Alexis his masters darlynge.

Epergesis. Appositio, when two substitutes are put together immediately without any verb in between, one declares the other, as in Virgil. ¶ Coridon loved fair Alexis, his master's darling.

Hyperbaton Transgressio, when the ryghte 31 order of wordes is troubled, & hath these kyndes.

Hyperbaton Transgressio, when the right 31 order of words is disturbed, and has these kinds.

Anastrophe. Reuersio, a preposterous order of the woordes contrarye to the good order of speakyng, as: He fell from of the wall, for he fel of from the walle.

Anastrophe. Reuersio, a ridiculous arrangement of words that goes against proper speaking, like: He fell off the wall, instead of saying he fell from the wall.

Hysterologia. Prepostera loquutio, when y^t that is done afterwardes, is set in speaking in the former place, as: plucke of my bootes and spurres.

Hysterologia. Prepostera loquutio, once that is done later, is mentioned again in the earlier context, like: take off my boots and spurs.

Tmesis Dissectio, a cutting, when the ioynyng of a compound worde is losed by putting somewhat betwixt, as: Hys saying was true, as here shal appere after, for hereafter. He shal by punyshed what man so euer offẽdeth, for whatsoeuer man.

Tmesis Dissectio, a cutting, when the joining of a compound word is interrupted by inserting something in between, as: His statement was true, as will be evident later, for hereafter. He shall be punished whoever offends, for whoever it may be.

Parenthesis Interpositio, Interposicion, is a dissoluciõ of the order of the words by putting a sentence betwixt, as: The man (I speke it for no harme) wyl somtime haue his owne wyll.

Parenthesis Interpositio, Interposition is a rearrangement of the words by inserting a statement in between, such as: The man (I say this with no bad intentions) will sometimes have his own way.

Eclipsis. Defectus, when somewhat lacketh in speakyng, but cõmenlye vsed to be vnderstand, as: Good morowe, good nyght.

Eclipsis. Defectus, when somewhat lacking in speech, but commonly used to be understood, like: Good morning, good night.

Antiptosis. Casus pro casu, when one case is 32 putte for another, as me thynke it is so.

Antiptosis. Casus pro casu, when one situation is 32 substituted for another, as it seems to me.

Faute.

Of Scheme, the second parte is in speach as it were a faute, which though it be pardoned in Poetes, yet in prose it is not to be suffered. The kyndes bee these: obscure, inordinate, barbarous.

Of Scheme, the second part is considered a mistake in speech, which, although it may be forgiven in poetry, is not acceptable in prose. The types are: obscure, disorganized, barbaric.

Obscure and hys partes.

Obscure is, when ther is a darknes thorow faut, eyther of the wordes, or of the settynge of them, and these ben the partes.

Obscure is when there is darkness due to flaws, either in the words or how they are arranged, and these are the parts.

Acyrologia. Improprietas, when a worde nothynge at all in hys proper significacion is broughte into a sentence as a cloude: as you shall haue syxe strypes you longe for.

Acyrologia. Improprietas, when a word means nothing at all in its proper sense is brought into a sentence like a cloud: as you'll have six stripes you long for.

Pleonasmus. Superabundancia, when y^e sentence is laden with superfluous wordes, as, he spake it wyth his mouthe, he sawe it wyth hys eyes.

Pleonasmus. Superabundancia, when you sentence is filled with unnecessary words, as, he said it with his mouth, he saw it with his eyes.

Perissologia. Sermo superfluus, when a sentẽce is added, y^e matter therby made neuer the waightyer, as y^e Embassadours obteining no peace, returned backe home, frõ whẽce they came.

Perissologia. Sermo superfluus, when a sentence is added, the matter does not become any heavier, as the ambassadors, having achieved no peace, returned home from where they came.

33 C.i.

Tautologia. Inutilis repeticio eiusdem, is a vayne repeting agayn of one word or moe in all one sentence, whyche faute by takyng lytle heede, Cicero also fell into, as in the oracion for Aulus Cluencius. Therefore that iudgemẽt was not lyke a iudgemẽt O Iudges.

Tautologia. Inutilis repeticio eiusdem is just a pointless repetition of one word or more in the same sentence, a mistake that Cicero made too, as shown in his speech for Aulus Cluencius. So that judgment wasn’t really like a judgment, O Judges.

Homiologia. Sermo ubique sui similis, a greater faute then the other, is when the whole matter is all alyke, and hath no varietie to auoyde tediousnes, as: He came thither to y^e bath, yet he saide afterwardes. Here one seruaunt bet me. Afterwardes he sayde vnto hym: I wyll consider. Afterwardes he chyd wyth hym, & cryed more and more when manye were presente. Suche a folyshe tellyng of a tale shall you heare in many simple & halfe folyshe persons.

Homiologia. Sermo ubique sui similis, a bigger mistake than the other, is when the entire story is the same and has no variety to avoid being boring, as in: He went to the bath, yet he said afterward. Here one servant bet me. Later he said to him: I will think about it. Afterward, he scolded him and shouted more and more while many were present. Such foolish storytelling is something you’ll hear from many simple and somewhat foolish people.

Amphibologia. Ambiguitas, when thorow faute of ioynyng the wordes, it is doutefull to whych the verbe belongeth, as: Hys father loueth hym better then hys mother.

Amphibologia. Ambiguitas, when the lack of joining the words makes it unclear which verb applies, like: His father loves him better than his mother.

Periergia. Sedulitas superflua, when ther is in speakyng to much diligence and 34 curiositye, and the sentence ouerladen with superfluous wordes, whiche faute is the same, or verye lyke to that, Macrologia that is called Macrologia, whych is when the sentence vpon desyre to seme fyne and eloquent, is longer then it shulde be.

Periergia. Sedulitas superflua, when there is too much effort in speaking, and 34 curiosity, causing the sentence to be overloaded with unnecessary words, this fault is the same, or very similar to, Macrologia what is called Macrologia, which occurs when a sentence, in the desire to seem fine and eloquent, is longer than it should be.

Inordinate and his partes.

Inordinate is, when eyther order or dignitie lacketh in the wordes: and the kyndes ben these:

Inordinate is when either order or dignity is missing in the words: and the kinds are these:

Tapinosis. Humiliatio, when the dygnitye of the thyng is diminyshed by basenes of the worde: as if we shuld say to a greate prynce or a kynge: If it please your mastershyp.

Tapinosis. Humiliatio, when the dignity of the thing is lowered by the simplicity of the words: as if we were to say to a great prince or a king: If it pleases your highness.

Aschrologia. Turpis loquutio, when the words be spoken, or ioyned together, that they may be wronge into a fylthye sence. Of thys it nedeth not to put any example, when lewde wanton persons wyl soone fynde inowe.

Aschrologia. Turpis loquutio, when the words are spoken or joined together, they can quickly turn into something dirty. There's no need to provide an example, as immoral and reckless people will easily find enough.

Cacozelia. Mala affectatio, euyll affectaciõ or leude folowyng, when the wytte lacketh iudgement, and fondlye folowyng a good maner of speaking, runne into a faute, as when affectyng copy, we fall into a vaine bablynge, 35 C.ii. or laboryng to be brief, wax bare & drye. Also if we shuld saye: a phrase of building, or an audiẽce of shepe, as a certẽ homely felow dyd.

Cacozelia. Mala affectatio, our expression can become affected or overly loud, especially when our minds lack sound judgment and we mindlessly imitate a particular speaking style, leading us to errors. This is similar to when we try to be elaborate and end up engaging in pointless chatter, 35 C.ii. or when we attempt to be concise but end up sounding empty and lifeless. Also, we might say: a “phrase of construction” or an “audience of sheep,” similar to how a certain simple fellow did.

Aschematistõ Male figuratum, when the oracion is all playne and symple, & lacketh his figures, wherby as it wer wyth starres it might shyne: which faute is counted of wryters, not amonge the leaste.

Aschematistõ Male figuratum, when the sentence is clear and simple, and lacks its figures, which makes it shine like stars: this flaw is considered by writers to be one of the more significant ones.

Cacosintheton. Male collocatum, when wordes be naughtelye ioyned together, or set in a place wher thei shuld not be.

Cacosintheton. Male collocatum, when words are awkwardly joined together, or placed where they shouldn't be.

Soraismus. Cumulatio, a mynglyng and heapyng together of wordes of diuerse languages into one speche: as of Frenche, welche, spanyshe, into englyshe: and an vsynge of wordes be they pure or barbarous. And although great authors somtyme in long workes vse some of these fautes, yet must not their examples be folowed, nor brought into a cõmon vsage of speakyng.

Soraismus. Cumulatio, a mixing and gathering of words from different languages into one speech: like from French, Welsh, Spanish, into English: and using words whether they are pure or foreign. And even though great authors sometimes use some of these mistakes in their lengthy works, their examples should not be followed or adopted into common speech.

Barbarie and hys partes.

Barbarie is a faute, whych turneth the speche frõ his purenes, and maketh it foule and rude, and the partes be these.

Barbarism is a fault that takes language away from its purity and makes it dirty and crude, and the parts are these.

Barbarismus. Barbarismus is, when a worde is either naughtely wrytten or pronoũced cõtrary to the ryght law & maner of speakynge. And it is done by addicion, detracciõ, chaunging, transposynge, eyther of a letter, a syllable, tyme, accent or aspiraciõ. Hereof we haue shewed exampels partly wher they be called figures, and partly, doute ye not, but both the speakynge and wrytyng of barbarouse men wyll gyue you inow. Hytherto be referred the fautes of euil pronouncing certein letters, & of to much gapyng, or contrarye of speakyng in the mouth.

Barbarismus. Barbarism occurs when a word is either incorrectly written or pronounced contrary to the proper rules and manner of speaking. This can happen through the addition, omission, changing, or rearranging of a letter, a syllable, time, accent, or aspiration. Here we have provided examples, partly where they are referred to as figures, and partly, don’t doubt, that both the speech and writing of barbarous people will give you enough. The mistakes of mispronouncing certain letters and excessive gaps, or speaking incorrectly with the mouth, are included here.

Solecismus. Inconueniens structura, is an vnmete and vnconuenient ioynynge together the partes of spech in construccion, whych is marked by all thynges that belong to the partes of speche: as when one parte is put for another, when gender for gender, case for case, tyme for tyme, mode for mode, number for number, aduerbe for aduerbe, preposicion for preposiciõ, whych because it is vsed of famous authores, instede of fautes, be called figures.

Solecismus. Inconueniens structura, is an unmeasured and inconvenient joining together the parts of speech in construction, which is marked by everything that belongs to the parts of speech: as when one part is used for another, when gender for gender, case for case, time for time, mood for mood, number for number, adverb for adverb, preposition for preposition, which, because it is used by famous authors, instead of faults, is called figures.

37 C.iii.

Vertue.

Vertue, or as we saye, a grace & dygnitye in speakynge, the thyrde kynde of Scheme, is when the sentence is bewtyfied and lyfte vp aboue the comen maner of speaking of the people. Of it be two kyndes: Proprietie and garnyshyng.

Virtue, or what we call a grace and dignity in speaking, the third type of Scheme, is when a sentence is beautified and elevated above the common way people speak. There are two kinds of it: Property and embellishment.

Proprietie and his partes.

Proprietie is when in wryting and pronunciacion ther be no fautes committed, but thynges done as they shulde be. The partes bee proposicion, and accenting.

Proprietary means that in writing and pronunciation, there are no mistakes made, but things are done as they should be. The parts are proposition and accenting.

Analogia. Proportio, proporcion is, whereby the maner of true wrytynge is conserued. By thys the barbarous tonge is seperated from the verye true and naturall speche, as be the fyne metals from the grosser. To speke is no faute, but an obseruacion or markyng, not leanyng vpõ cause, but vpon example. For in eloquence, the iudgement of excellẽt men standeth for reason, as saythe Quintilian in hys fyrst boke.

Analogia. Proportio, provision is, where the art of true writing is preserved. This way, the crude language is separated from the genuine and natural speech, like fine metals from coarser ones. Speaking is not a fault, but an observation or mark, not based on cause, but on example. In eloquence, the judgment of excellent individuals serves as reason, as Quintilian says in his first book.

Tasis. Extensio, is that wherby a swete and pleasaunt modulacion or tunablenes 38 of wordes is kepte, because some are spoken wyth a sharpe tenure or accent, some wyth a flatte, some strayned out. This grace specially perteineth to a turnyng of y^e voyce in pleasaunte pronunciation.

Tasis. Extensio, is that where a sweet and pleasant melody or tunefulness 38 of words is maintained, because some are spoken with a sharp tone or accent, some with a flat tone, some stretched out. This grace particularly relates to the turning of the voice in pleasant pronunciation.

Garnyshyng and his kyndes.

Garnishyng as the word it selfe declareth, is whẽ the oraciõ is gaylye set oute and floryshed w^t diuerse goodly figures, causyng much pleasauntnes and delectaciõ to the hearer: and hath two kyndes, composicion, and exornacion.

Garnishing, as the word itself suggests, is when the prayer is beautifully presented and adorned with various attractive elements, creating much pleasure and delight for the listener. It has two kinds: composition and decoration.

Sinthesis. Composicion is an apte settinge together of wordes, whych causeth all the partes of an oracion to bee trymmed al alyke. And in it muste be considered that we so order our wordes, that the sentence decrease not by puttynge a weaker word after a stronger, but that it styl go vpwarde and increase. There is also a naturall order, as to saye: men & women, daye and nyght, easte, and weste, rather then backewardes. In thys muste be auoyded also to often comyng together of vowels, which make the oracion wyde and 39 C.iiii. gapyng. To muche repetyng of all one letter in the beginning of wordes, to much repeting of one word, and that they ende not to much all alyke, that the sentence be not held on to longe, which werieth the hearer, and the speaker: nor that manye consonãtes run not to harshely together, wyth many other, which Cicero speaketh of in hys thyrde booke of hys oratour, and Quintilian in hys nynth, wherof here to put examples were to longe.

Sinthesis. Composicion is an appropriate arrangement of words that makes all parts of a sentence balanced. We need to order our words so that the sentence doesn’t lose strength by placing a weaker word after a stronger one, but continues to build and enhance. There is also a natural order, such as saying: men & women, day and night, east and west, rather than backwards. In this, we must also avoid having vowels come together too frequently, as they can make the sentence wide and 39 C.iiii. awkward. Excessive repetition of the same letter at the beginning of words, too much repetition of the same word, and having words end too similarly can make the sentence drag on too long, which tires both the listener and the speaker; also, too many consonants shouldn’t clash harshly together, along with many other points that Cicero discusses in his third book on rhetoric and Quintilian in his ninth, of which providing examples here would be too lengthy.

Exornacion is a fyne polyshinge of wordes and sentences by disseueryng thẽ w^t diuerse goodly colours and tropes or chaũgings of speach.

Exornacion is a fine polishing of words and sentences by discovering the diverse beautiful colors and figures of speech.

Tropes.

Emonge authors manye tymes vnder the name of figures, Tropes also be comprehended: Neuerthelesse ther is a notable difference betwixt thẽ. In figure is no alteracion in the wordes frõ their proper significacions, but only is the oracion & sẽtence made by thẽ more plesaũt, sharpe & vehemẽt, after y^e affecciõ of him that speketh or writeth: to y^e which vse although tropes also do serue, yet properlye be they so 40 called, because in them for necessitye or garnyshynge, there is a mouynge and chaungynge of a worde and sentence, from theyr owne significaciõ into another, whych may agre wyth it by a similitude. The former partes ben these.

Among authors, many times under the term "figures," tropes are also included. However, there is a notable difference between them. A figure does not change the words from their original meanings, but instead makes the sentence more pleasant, sharp, and intense, depending on the feelings of the speaker or writer. While tropes can also serve this purpose, they are properly called so because they involve a movement and change of a word or sentence from its original meaning into another, which may relate to it by similarity. The previous parts are these. 40

Metaphora. Translatio, translacion, that is a worde translated from the thynge that it properlye signifieth, vnto another whych may agre with it by a similitude. And amonge all vertues of speche, this is the chyefe. ¶ None perswadeth more effecteouslye, none sheweth the thyng before oure eyes more euidently, none moueth more mightily the affeccions, none maketh the oraciõ more goodlye, pleasaunt, nor copious.

Metaphora. Translatio, translation, is a word that is translated from the thing it properly signifies to another that may correspond with it by similarity. Among all the virtues of speech, this is the most important. ¶ None persuades more effectively, none presents the thing before our eyes more clearly, none stirs our emotions more powerfully, none makes the expression more beautiful, pleasant, or abundant.

Translacions be diuerse.

i. Some frõ the body to the mynd, as: I haue but lately tasted the Hebrue tonge, for newely begunne it. Also I smell where aboute you go, for I perceyue.

i. Some from the body to the mind, like this: I have only recently experienced the Hebrew language, as I have just started it. I can also tell where you are going, because I can perceive it.

ii. From the reasonable to the vnresonable, as Vyrgyll in hys Georgexe applyed the counselles and fashion of warres belongynge to 41 men; to bees.

ii. From the reasonable to the unreasonable, as Virgil in his Georgics applied the advice and style of warfare relating to 41 men; to bees.

iii. From the vnreasonable to the resonable. What whinest thou, what chatterest thou? That one taken of a wolfe, that other of a pye.

iii. From the unreasonable to the reasonable. What are you whining about, what are you chattering about? One thing taken from a wolf, another from a magpie.

iiii. From the liuinge to the not liuyng. The mouthe of the well, the fatnes of the earth. The lande wyl spewe them oute.

iiii. From the living to the non-living. The mouth of the well, the richness of the earth. The land will spit them out.

v. From the not lyuynge to the liuyng. Cicero florisheth in eloquẽce.

v. From the not lying to the living. Cicero excels in eloquence.

vi. From the liuyng, to the liuynge. The iews winched against Moses.

vi. From the living to the living. The Jews complained about Moses.

vii. From the not liuinge to the not liuynge. The wordes flewe oute of hys mouth. He is good for a greue wounde.

vii. From the living to the dead. The words flew out of his mouth. He is good for a serious wound.

Catachresis. Abusio, when for a certeyne and proper worde, we abuse a lyke, or that is nie vnto it, as when we say: longe counsel, lytle talke, smal matter. Here maye we soone perceyue that by abusion wee take wordes that be somwhat nye, whych property do belong to vnlyke thinges.

Catachresis. Abusio, when we use a word inaccurately or one that is similar, like when we say: long advice, little talk, small matter. Here we can quickly see that by misusing words, we choose terms that are somewhat similar, which actually belong to different things.

Metalepsis. Transsumptio, Transsũpcion, is when by degrees we go to y^t that is shewed as: he hyd hym selfe in the blacke dennes. By blacke is vnderstand 42 ful of darkenes & consequently stepe downe and verye depe.

Metalepsis. Transsumptio, Transsũpcion is when, gradually, we reach that which is revealed as: he hid himself in the dark caves. By dark, it is understood 42 full of darkness & therefore steep and very deep.

Metonomia. Metonomya, Transnominacion, when a worde that hathe a proper significacion of hys owne, beynge referred to another thing, hath another: & this is done diuerse waies.

Metonomia. Metonomya, Transnominacion, when a word that has its own specific meaning is used to refer to something else, takes on a different meaning: and this occurs in various ways.

i. When the chiefe master or doar of a thyng is put for y^e thing it self, as: Put vpon you the Lorde Iesus Christ. Also: you play Iudas w^t me.

i. When the main master or door of something stands for the thing itself, like: Put on the Lord Jesus Christ. Also: you play Judas with me.

ii. When the place, or that that cõteineth, is put for the thyng that is in it, as: All the round earthe prayseth God. Oxforth (some say) hath not forsaken all popery, for the studentes therin.

ii. When the location, or what it contains, is used to refer to the thing inside it, as in: The entire earth praises God. Oxford (some say) hasn’t completely abandoned all aspects of Catholicism, because of the students there.

iii. When that that is conteyned is put for that that doth conteine, as: The fryer Austens is goodly buylded, for y^e house wher y^e fryers wer.

iii. When what is contained is referred to as what contains it, for example: The Augustine friary is well built, for the house where the friars were.

iiii. When the doer is put for that y^t is done, as: God brought the Israelites out of Egypte wyth a stretched out arme, and stronge hande. Also: Is gods hand drawen in? for power and strength.

iiii. When the person doing something is referred to by what has been accomplished, as in: God brought the Israelites out of Egypt with a powerful arm and a strong hand. Also: Is God's hand withdrawn? For power and strength.

v. When y^t is done is put for y^e doer.

v. When y^t is completed, it represents y^e doer.

Synecdoche. Intellectio, Intelleccion whẽ one 43 thyng is vnderstand by another y^t is of the same maner and kynd, and this is done many wayes.

Synecdoche. Intellectio, Intellect is when one 43 thing is understood by another that is of the same nature and kind, and this happens in many ways.

i. When of the whole is vnderstãd a parte, as: Abraham set a calfe before them, for calues fleshe.

i. When the whole is understood through a part, as: Abraham set a calf before them, for calf's flesh.

ii. By a parte the whole, as: He receyued the straũgers vnder the succour of hys house rofe, for into hys house.

ii. By a part of the whole, as: He received the strangers under the protection of his roof, for into his house.

iii. By one many, as: The Frenchemã in y^e batail had the ouerthrow.

iii. By one many, as: The Frenchmen in the battle had the defeat.

iiii. By a kynd y^e general, as: If thou se thyne enemies Asse fal vnder his burden, for cattell.

iiii. By a kind ye general, as: If you see your enemies’ herd fall under its load, for cattle.

v. By the general the kynd: Eue the mother of al liuing things, for of al mẽ: Preach to al creaturs, to al mẽ

v. By the general kind: Eve, the mother of all living things, for all people: Preach to all creatures, to all people

vi. By that goeth before, the thynge that foloweth, as: He set hys spurres to hys horse, for he rode a pace, or fled faste awaye.

vi. From what comes before, the thing that follows is: He urged his horse on with his spurs because he was riding quickly or fleeing fast.

vii. By that y^t foloweth, the thinge wente before, as: I got it wyth the swete of my face, for w^t my labour.

vii. As a result, what happened earlier followed: I earned it through the sweat of my brow, for my hard work.

viii. By the matter, y^e thynge that is made of it, as: Fleshe and bloude shewed the not it.
ix. ¶ By the signe, y^e thyng y^t is signified 44 as: Lo, naw the toppe of the chymneyes in the villages smoke a farre of: wherby Vyrgyl signifieth night to be at hande.

viii. By the matter, the thing that is made from it, like: Flesh and blood showed this not.
ix. ¶ By the sign, the thing that is signified 44 like: Look, now the tops of the chimneys in the villages smoke from far away: whereby Virgil signifies that night is approaching.

Pronominacio. Antonomasia is, whych for y^e proper name putteth some other word: As: the Archebyshop confuted the errour, for Cranmer. The Philosopher lyed that the worlde was eternall, for Aristotle. The Apostle sayeth wee be iustified by faythe, for Paule.

Pronominacio. Antonomasia is, which means that a proper name includes some other word: For example, the Archbishop corrected the mistake, for Cranmer. The philosopher claimed that the world was eternal, for Aristotle. The Apostle says we are justified by faith, for Paul.

Periphrasis. Circuicio, is a larger descripcion eyther to garnyshe it, or if it bee foule to hyde it, or if it be bryefe to make it more playn: by etimology, by sygnes, by definicion. ¶ Example of the fyrste: The prouidẽce of Scipio ouerthrew y^e might of Carthage. Here saue onlye for garnyshyng sake he myghte haue sayde playnlye: Scipio ouerthrew Carthage. Of the nexte: When Saule was doyng his busines, Dauid might haue killed hym. Doyng hys busines, ye wot what it meaneth. Of y^e thyrd, you haue the larger exposicions vpon the Gospels called by the name of thys figure.

Periphrasis. Circuicio, is a larger description either to embellish it, or if it’s bad to hide it, or if it’s brief to make it clearer: by etymology, by signs, by definition. ¶ Example of the first: The providence of Scipio overthrew the might of Carthage. Here, just for embellishment, he could have simply said: Scipio overthrew Carthage. Of the next: When Saul was handling his affairs, David could have killed him. Handling his affairs, you know what that means. Of the third, you have the longer expositions on the Gospels referred to by the name of this figure.

By Etymologie or shewyng the reasõ of the name. Well maye he be called a parasite, for a parasite is y^t loueth other because of his meat.

By Etymologie or showing the reason for the name. He can certainly be called a parasite, because a parasite loves another only for what they can provide.

By sygnes, as when by certeine notes, we describe anye thynge, as if a man vnderstãdyng anger wyll saye that it is the boylynge of the mynde, or color whych bryngeth in palenes into the coũtenaũce, fiersenes of the eies, and trẽblyng in the members.

By sygnes, just as we describe things using specific indicators, a person understanding anger might say it is the boiling of the mind, or the color that brings paleness to the face, fierceness to the eyes, and trembling to the limbs.

By destincion. The arte of well indyghting, for Rethorique.

By distinction. The art of well-inditing, for Rhetoric.

The second parte of Trope.

Allegoria, the seconde parte of Trope is an inuersion of wordes, where it is one in wordes, and another in sentence or meanynge.

Allegoria, the second part of Trope is a play on words, where it says one thing in words and means something different in meaning or context.

Aenigma. Sermo obscurus, a riddle or darke allegorie, as: The halfe is more thẽ the hole.

Aenigma. Sermo obscurus, a riddle or dark allegory, like: The half is more than the whole.

Paremia. Adagium, a sayinge muche vsed and notable for some noueltye, as: The wolfe is in our tale.

Paremia. Adagium, a saying widely used and known for its uniqueness, as: The wolf is in our story.

Ironia. Dissimulatio, is a mockyng whiche is not perceiued by the wordes but eyther by the pronũciacion, or 46 by the behaueour of the person or by the nature of the thyng, as You are an honest man in deede.

Ironia. Dissimulatio, is a mockery that isn't recognized through the words but either by the pronunciation or 46 by the person's behavior or by the nature of the thing, as you are truly an honest man.

Sarcasmus. Amara irrisio, is a bitter sporting & mocke of our enemye, of a maner of iestyng or scoffinge bytynglye, a nyppyng tawnte, as: The Iewes saide to Christ, he saued other, but he could not saue hym selfe.

Sarcasmus. Amara irrisio, is a harsh way to mock our enemy, a form of teasing or scornful jibe, a biting taunt, like when the Jews said to Christ, "He saved others, but he couldn't save himself."

Astysmus. Festiua urbanitas, is a certen mery conceyted speakyng, as on a tyme a mery felow metynge w^t one that had a very whyte head, axed him if he had lyen in the snowe al nyght.

Astysmus. Festiua urbanitas, is a somewhat amusing and conceited observation, as once a cheerful guy ran into someone with a very white head and asked him if he had slept in the snow all night.

Mycterismus. Subsannatio, a skornyng by some iesture of the face, as by wrythinge the nose, putting out the tonge, pottyng, or suche lyke.

Mycterismus. Subsannatio, a gesture that can be expressed through facial movements, like wrinkling the nose, sticking out the tongue, making faces, or similar actions.

Antiphrasis. Dictio cõtrariũ significans, when the mock is in a worde by a contrarye sence, as when we call a fustilugges, a minion.

Antiphrasis. Dictio cõtrariũ significans, when the mock is in a word with an opposite meaning, like when we refer to a bad-tempered person as a favorite.

Charientismus. Graciosa nugatio, when wordes roughly spokẽ be molified by pleasaunt wordes: as when we saye to hym that threatneth vs: I praye you be good master to me.

Charientismus. Graciosa nugatio, when harsh words are softened by kind words: like when we say to someone who threatens us: Please, be a good master to me.

The fyrst order of the
figures Rethoricall.

Epanaphora Repeticio, repeticion, when in lyke and diuerse thynges, we take our begynnyng cõtinually at one & the selfe same word, thus: To you this thyng is to be ascribed, to you thanke is to be geuen, to you thys thynge shal be honour. In this exornacion is much plesantnes, grauitie, and sharpnes, & it is much vsed of al oratours, & notably setteth oute, and garnysheth the oracion.

Epanaphora Repeticio, repetition, when in similar and diverse things, we continually start with one and the same word, like this: To you this thing is to be attributed, to you thanks are to be given, to you this thing shall be honored. This ornamentation has a lot of pleasantness, seriousness, and sharpness, and it is widely used by all speakers, notably highlighting and embellishing the speech.

Antistrophe. Conuersio, conuersion is whych taketh not hys begynnynges at al one and the same worde, but w^t all one worde styll closeth vp the sentence, & it is contrary to that other before, as: Sence the time y^e cõcord was takẽ awaye from the citie, lyberty was takẽ awai: fidelity was takẽ away: frẽship was takẽ away.

Antistrophe. Conuersio, conversion does not take its beginnings from just one word at all, but with all one word still closes up the sentence, and it is opposite to the other before, as: Since the time the agreement was taken away from the city, liberty was taken away: fidelity was taken away: friendship was taken away.

Symploce. Cõplexio, complexion cõpriseth both two exornacions, both this, & that whych we declared before, y^t both all one fyrste worde shulde be oftẽ repeted, & we shuld turne often to all one laste word, as: Who toke Sedechias prisoner, & put out both 48 hys eyes? Nabuchodonozer. Who put Daniell and hys felowes into the burnyng furnace? Nabuchodonozer. Who was transformed frõ a man into a beast, & eate haye wyth oxen? Nabuchodonozer.

Symploce. Cõplexio, complexion includes both two adornments, this and that which we mentioned earlier, that the same first word should be repeated often, and we should frequently return to the same last word, such as: Who took Zedekiah prisoner and blinded him? Nebuchadnezzar. Who threw Daniel and his friends into the burning furnace? Nebuchadnezzar. Who was turned from a man into a beast and ate grass like oxen? Nebuchadnezzar. 48

Anadiplosis. Reduplicatio, is a continent rehearsyng agayne of all one worde, or wordes, for the more vehemence, and some affect of the mynde. Cicero agaynst Catiline. Yet he liueth, liueth: yea commeth also into the counsel house. It is thou, it is thou that troublest all the houshold. ¶ Also, dareste thou nowe come into our syght, y^e traitour of thy cõtrei? Thou traitour I say of thy contrei, darest thou come into oure syght?

Anadiplosis. Reduplicatio, is a continent rehearsing again all in one word, or words, for more impact, and some emotion of the mind. Cicero against Catiline. Yet he lives, he lives: yes, he even comes into the council house. It is you, it is you who trouble the whole household. ¶ Also, do you dare now to come into our sight, you traitor of your country? You traitor, I say of your land, do you dare to come into our sight?

Epanodus. Traduccio, Traduccion is, whyche maketh that whẽ all one word is oftentymes vsed, that yet it doth not onlye not displease the mynde, but also make y^e oracion more trim in this wyse: Suffer ryches to belonge to riche men, but prefer thou vertue before ryches. For if y^u wylt compare ryches wyth vertue, thou shalte scarse thynke them meete to be called ryches, whych ar but hãdmaydens 49 D.i. to vertue. Also, we are vnto God the swete sauour of Christ. To the one part are we the sauour of death vnto deathe, and vnto the other part are we the sauour of lyfe vnto lyfe .ii.Cor.ii.

Epanodus. Traduccio, Translation is, which means that when one word is often used, it not only doesn't annoy the mind, but also makes the sentence flow better like this: Let wealth belong to wealthy people, but prioritize virtue over wealth. Because if you compare wealth with virtue, you will hardly find them worthy of being called wealth, which is just a means to virtue. 49 D.I. to virtue. Also, to God, we are the sweet aroma of Christ. On one hand, we are the aroma of death leading to death, and on the other hand, we are the aroma of life leading to life. ii.Cor.ii.

Sinonimia Nominis cõmunio, cõmunion of the word, when we renewe not the selfe same worde by rehearsyng agayn, but chaunge that that is put wyth an other word of the same valewe, thus: Thou hast ouerthrowen the comon wealth euen from the foundacion, and cast downe the citye, euen from the roote. The iuste man shall floryshe as the palme tre, and shall be multiplyed as the Ceder tre. Cicero for .Q. Ligarius. ¶ Whose syde wolde that poynte of thy swerd haue pricked? what meaned thy weapons? what was thy mynde? what meante thyne eyes? handes, that burning of thy mynd? what desiredst y^u? what wyshedste thou? Lytle differeth thys figure from the other before, only because the wordes be chaũged, the sentẽce remayning.

Sinonimia Nominis cõmunio, communion of the word, when we don’t just repeat the same word over again, but replace it with another word of the same value, like this: You have destroyed the commonwealth right from the foundation and brought down the city, right from the roots. The righteous person will thrive like the palm tree and will be multiplied like the cedar tree. Cicero for .Q. Ligarius. ¶ Whose side would that point of your sword have pricked? What did your weapons mean? What was your intention? What did your eyes mean? Hands, what was the burning of your mind? What did you desire? What did you wish for? This figure is only slightly different from the one before, simply because the words have changed while the sentence remains the same.

Sinathrismus. Frequentacio, frequentacion is, when the thynges that be dispersed thorowout all the cause, are gathered together into one place that y^e oracion shulde be the wayghtier, & rebukefuller, thus: What faute is he without? why shuld you O Iudges be mynded to deliuer hym? He is an harlot of hys owne bodye, he lyeth in wayte for others, gredy, intemperate, wanton, proud, vnnatural to his parentes, vnkynd to hys frindes, troubleous to hys kynsefolke, stubborn to hys betters, dysdaynful to his equals, cruel to hys inferiours, finally, intollerable to all men.

Sinathrismus. Frequentacio, concentration is when the things that are scattered throughout everything are brought together into one place so that the argument is stronger and more forceful, like this: What fault does he not have? Why should you, O Judges, consider letting him go? He is a disgrace to himself, he preys on others, greedy, excessive, reckless, arrogant, unnatural to his parents, unkind to his friends, troublesome to his relatives, defiant to his superiors, disdainful to his equals, cruel to those beneath him, and ultimately, unbearable to everyone.

Epiphonesis. Exclamacio, exclamaciõ is, whiche sheweth the signification of sorowe, or of anger, by callyng vpon eyther a man, a place, or a thynge? Cicero in hys oratour: O deceitful hope of men, and frayle fortune: & our vayne contencions, whych oftẽ tymes are broken in the myd way, rushe downe, and in the fal ar quite ouerthrowen before they can se the hauen. Hereunto belõgeth expectaciõ, obtestaciõ, wishyng, rebuking.

Epiphonesis. Exclamacio, exclamation is, which shows the meaning of sorrow or anger, by calling upon either a person, a place, or a thing? Cicero in his orator: O deceitful hope of men, and fragile fortune: and our vain disputes, which are often interrupted midway, rush down, and in the fall are completely overturned before they can see the harbor. This includes expectation, pleading, wishing, and rebuking.

51 D.ii.

Areia. Execracio, execracion: O fye vpon Idolatry, that taketh away the honoure due vnto God alone, and geueth it to synfull creatures, and Images made by mans hand.

Areia. Execracio, curse: Oh, shame on Idolatry, that steals the honor that belongs to God alone and gives it to sinful beings and images created by human hands.

Deesis. Obtestacio, obtestacion, whẽ for God, or for mannes sake we vehemently desyre to haue any thynge. As Cicero for Publius Sestius: O I praye you, & for the Gods sakes most herteli besech you, y^t as it was your wylles to saue me, so you wyl vouchsaf to saue thẽ thorew whose helpe you receiued me agayne.

Deesis. Obtestacio, when we earnestly desire something for the sake of God or for others. As Cicero said for Publius Sestius: Oh, I beg you, and for the Gods' sake, I sincerely implore you, that as it was your will to save me, so you would also be willing to save those through whom you helped me once more.

Euche. Votum, wyshynge: O wolde God that the adulterer had bene drowned in the ragyng sea, whan wyth hys nauye of shyppes he sayled to Lacedemonia.

Euche. Votum, wishing: Oh, I wish God would have drowned the adulterer in the raging sea when he sailed to Lacedemonia with his fleet of ships.

Epiplexis Increpacio, Cicero agaynst Catiline: Thynkest thou that thy counselles are not knowen? and that we knowe not what thou dyddest the laste nyghte? and what the nyghte before?

Epiplexis Increpacio, Cicero against Catiline: Do you think your plans are a secret? And that we don’t know what you did last night? And the night before?

Erotesis. Interrogacio, Euerye interrogaciõ is not of grauity, neither yet a Scheme, but thys whyche when 52 those thinges be rehearsed vp whiche hurte oure aduersaryes cause, strengthneth that thynge that is gone before, thus seynge then that he spake all these wordes, and dyd all these thynges, whether dyd he put away our felowes myndes frõ the cõmon wealthe or not?

Erotesis. Interrogacio, Not every question is serious, nor is it a Scheme, but rather this which, when 52 the things that harm our opponents' case are mentioned, strengthens what has already been said. So, seeing that he spoke all these words and did all these things, did he divert our allies' minds from the common good or not?

Erotema. Raciocinatio, raciocinacion is, by the whych we our selues axe a reason of oure selfe, wherefore euerye thynge shulde be spoken, & that oftentymes we demaund of our selues a declaracion of euery proposicion after thys maner: Thys was well ordeined of oure elders to depryue no kynge of hys lyfe whome they had taken in batayl. Why so? for the power whyche fortune had geuen vs, it to consume in the punyshement of them whom the same fortune a lytle before had set in hyeste degree, were agaynste reason. Yea but he brought a greate army agaynst you? I wyl not remember it. Why so? For it is the poynte of a valiaunte man, suche as contend for the vyctorye, them to count enemyes: suche as be ouercome, those 53 D.iii. to count mẽ: so that fortitude maye diminishe war, humanitie increase peace. But he if he had ouercome, wolde he haue done so? Verelye he wolde not haue bene so wyse. Why shulde ye spare hym then? because such foly I am wont to despise, not to folowe.

Erotema. Raciocinatio, reasoning is our ability to question ourselves, asking why everything should be explained, and often we seek clarification for every idea in this way: It was wisely decided by our ancestors to spare no king taken in battle. Why? Because using the power that fortune gives us to punish those whom it had only recently elevated to the highest rank is against reason. But he brought a large army against you? I won’t remember that. Why not? Because it's the mark of a brave person, like those who fight for victory, to see their enemies as foes: those who are defeated should be counted as men; thus courage can reduce war while humanity can foster peace. But if he had won, would he have acted that way? Truly, he wouldn't have been so wise. So why spare him? Because such foolishness is something I tend to despise, not follow. 53 D.iii.

Prosapodosis. Subiectio, when we axe of oure selfe what can be saide agaynst vs, and answere to our selues thus: ¶ Shall we tary in synne? God forbyd. Or compell our aduersarye to answer thus: O Iewes, what can you say for denyall of Christe. Wyl you saye that you haue not youre Messias? but your prophets say the contrarye. Your Types are confoũded. Whom wyl you be iudged by? by Hystories? Oures declare that you be out of the way, & shall come agayne to Christ.

Prosapodosis. Subiectio, when we ask ourselves what can be said against us, and answer ourselves like this: ¶ Shall we continue in sin? God forbid. Or we compel our adversary to answer like this: Oh Jews, what can you say in denial of Christ? Will you say that you do not have your Messiah? But your prophets say otherwise. Your signs are confused. Who will you be judged by? By histories? Ours declare that you are on the wrong path, and will return to Christ.

Antiphora. Tacite obiectioni responsio. whẽ we make answere to a thynge that myght priuely be obiected agaynst vs, as in the fyrst epystle of Ouide, Penelope wylling her husband Vlysses to come home hymselfe, and wryte nothyng vnto her. Wher he 54 myght haue layed for hys tarying the warres, she priuely toke away y^t excuse, saying: Troy is destroied.

Antiphora. Tacite obiectioni responsio. when we respond to something that might be privately objected against us, as in the first letter of Ovid, Penelope is asking her husband Ulysses to come home himself and not write anything to her. Where he 54 could have used the war as an excuse for his delay, she subtly removed that excuse by saying: Troy has been destroyed.

Aporia. Dubitatio, Dubitacion; when wee doute of two thynges, or of many, which we shuld inespecially speke of. Much hurted the cõmonwealth at that tyme, whether I shuld saye the folyshenesse of the consolles, or the malyce, or bothe, I can not tell.

Aporia. Dubitatio, Doubt; when we doubt about two things, or many, that we should mainly talk about. It really hurt the community at that time, whether I should talk about the foolishness of the consolations, or the malice, or both, I can't say.

Apophasis. Expeditio, expedicion, when many reasons rehearsed vp, wherby a thynge myghte be done or not, the other are taken away, and one left that we entende, thus: It muste needes bee that thys controuersie touching the sacrament must stand eyther vpon the much pressyng and rigour of the wordes; or vpon the meanynge and vnderstandynge of them. The wordes as they stande, brynge wyth them greate inconuenience, to wytte, to expositoures, and the other textes. The meaning doth not so but auoydeth al these incõueniences, & satisfieth reason, expositours, & texts of the scripture, wherfore wyt, expositour, & scripture thinketh it better to take the sentence, then the worde.

Apophasis. Expeditio, expedition, when many reasons are considered regarding whether something can be done or not, the other reasons are dismissed, and one remains that we focus on like this: It must be that this controversy about the sacrament relies either on the strict interpretation of the words or on their meaning and understanding. The words as they are lead to great complications, especially for interpreters and the other texts. The meaning doesn’t lead to these complications and satisfies reason, interpreters, and the texts of scripture, which is why reason, interpreters, and scripture find it better to consider the meaning rather than just the words.

55 D.iiii.

Epilogus. Conclusio, conclusiõ is, which by a brief argumẽtacion of these thinges that be spoken before or done, inferreth that thynge that necessarilye shulde folowe, thus: And if a reuelacion wer geuen to the Troianes, y^t Troy myght not be taken without y^e arowes of Philectetes, and thei did nothing else but strike Alexander to kyl him that in dede was Troy to be taken.

Epilogus. Conclusio, the conclusion is that, through a brief argument about the things that have been previously mentioned or done, it infers what must necessarily follow. So, if a revelation was given to the Trojans, Troy could not be taken without the arrows of Philoctetes, and they did nothing but aim to kill Alexander, who was indeed the reason Troy was to be taken.

Epitrope. Permissio, permission, when we shew y^t we geue & graũt any thyng altogether to a mans wyll, thus: ¶ Because al thynges takẽ away, only is left vnto me my body & mynd, these thynges, whych only ar lefte vnto me of many, I graunte thẽ to you and to your power.

Epitrope. Permissio, permission, when we show that we give and grant anything completely to someone's will, like this: ¶ Because everything else is taken away, all that’s left for me is my body and mind. These things, which are all I have left out of many, I grant to you and your control.

Anacinosis. Cõmunicacio, cõmunicacion is, when we leaue sumwhat to y^e Iudges to be estemed, thus: I leaue vnto you o iudges to be thought what hurt y^e cõmõ welth shal take hereof Diuisio, Dialisis. diuision is which diuiding one thyng frõ another, endeth thẽ both by shewing a reasõ, thus: why shuld I lay ani thing to thi charge? if y^u bee good, y^u haste not deserued 56 it, if thou be naught, thou carest not for it. Also, what shuld I speake of myne owne good turnes towarde the. If thou do remember them, I shuld but trouble you: If you haue forgotten them, when by deede I haue profited nothyng, what good can I do in wordes?

Anacinosis. Cõmunicacio, communication is, when we leave something for you judges to consider, like this: I leave it to you, judges, to think about what harm the common good will suffer from this Diuisio, Dialisis. division is that, by separating one thing from another, ends both by providing a reason, like this: why should I blame you for anything? if you are good, you haven’t deserved it; if you are bad, you don’t care about it. Also, what should I say about my own good deeds towards you? If you do remember them, I would only be bothering you; if you have forgotten them, and by action I have gained nothing, what good can I do with words? 56

Antitheton. Contentio, contencion, when the reason stãdeth by contrary wordes or contraries be rehearsed by cõparison, thus: Flattery hath pleasaũt begynnynges, but the same hathe verye bytter endynges. Cicero agaynst Catiline: when they coulde not lyue honestlye, they had rather dye shamefully. They that be after the fleshe, care for these thynges y^t be of the fleshe. They that be after the spirite, care for the thynges of the spirite.

Antitheton. Contentio, continuation, when the reason stands by contrasting words or opposites are presented by comparison, like this: Flattery has pleasant beginnings, but it has very bitter endings. Cicero against Catiline: when they couldn’t live honestly, they would rather die shamefully. Those who live according to the flesh care about the things that are of the flesh. Those who live according to the spirit care about the things of the spirit.

Antithesis. Contrarium, contrary is, that of two diuerse thynges confirmeth y^e one bryefely and easelye, thus: For he that alwayes wyll be an enemy to hys owne rekenyngs, how shuld a man trust that he wold be a frind to other mens matters? He that in familiare cõmunicacion and company 57 of hys friendes wyl neuer say truth, thinkest thẽ y^t he wil absteine from a lye in a cõmon audience.

Antithesis. Contrarium, on the contrary, highlights that two different things confirm one another briefly and easily, like this: If someone is always going to be an enemy to their own reasoning, how can anyone trust that they would be a friend to other people's concerns? If they never speak the truth in casual conversation and among friends, do you think they will avoid lying in a public setting? 57

Colon. Membrum oracionis, a mẽber of the reasõ is so called when a thinge is shewed perfitely in fewe wordes the whole sentence not shewed, but receyued agayne w^t an other parte, thus: Thou dyddest bothe profite thyne enemie, and hurte thy frynd. Thys exornacion may be made of two partes only, but the perfiteste is made of thre, thus: Thou diddest profite thine enemy, hurt thi frind, and dydst no good to thy selfe.

Colon. Membrum oracionis, a member of the reason is called that when something is shown perfectly in a few words, the whole sentence is not shown, but received again with another part, like this: You both helped your enemy and hurt your friend. This explanation can be made with two parts only, but the best one is made with three, like this: You helped your enemy, hurt your friend, and did no good for yourself.

Dialyton. Articulus, article is, when eche word is set asunder by cutting the oracion thus. By sharpnes, voyce, countenaunce, thou madeste thyne enemyes afrayd. Thou destroyedst thyne enemyes wyth enuye, wronges, power, falsehead.

Dialyton. Articulus, article is, when each word is separated by breaking the sentence like this. With sharpness, voice, demeanor, you frightened your enemies. You destroyed your enemies with envy, wrongs, power, and deceit.

Isocolon. Compar, euen or equall, is when the oracion hath in it the partes of the whyche we spake before, & that they be made of euen number of sillables: but thys equalitie must not stand by numbrynge of them, but by perceyuyng of it in y^e mynd. Christe 58 afore the Iudge was led, & on hys head a croune of thorne was putte, in token that in dede, the kynge of Iews he was borne. Here be some mo wordes in on mẽber then in an other, yet sound they to the eare of lyke lengthe.

Isocolon. Compar, even or equal, is when the sentence contains the parts we talked about before, and they are made up of an equal number of syllables: but this equality shouldn’t just be measured by counting them, but by perceiving it in the mind. Christ 58 was led before the Judge, and a crown of thorns was placed on his head, as a sign that he was indeed born the king of the Jews. Here are some more words in one member than in another, yet they sound to the ear as if they are of similar length.

Homioptotõ Similiter cadens, fallyng al alike is, when in the same construccion of wordes ther be two wordes or mo which be spoken alyke in the selfe same cases, thus: Thou praysest a man nedye of vertue, plenteful of money. Cicero for Flaccus: There is in thẽ no varietie of opinion, none of wyll, none of talke.

Homioptotõ Similiter cadens, falling all alike is, when in the same construction of words there are two or more that are spoken alike in the very same cases, like this: You praise a man who is in need of virtue, but rich in money. Cicero for Flaccus: There is in them no variety of opinion, none of will, none of conversation.

Homotelẽto.* Similiter desinens, endynge al alyke, when words or sentẽces haue alyke endyng, as: Thou dareste do fylthely, and studiest to speke baudely. Content thy selfe w^t thy state, in thy herte do no man hate, be not the cause of stryfe and bate.

Homotelẽto.* Similiter desinens, ending all alike, when words or sentences have the same ending, as: You dare to act disgracefully, and you're trying to speak obscenely. Be content with your position, in your heart do not hate anyone, and do not be the cause of strife and conflict.

Climax. Gradacio, is, when we rehearse again the word y^t goth next before, & descẽd to other thinges by degrees thus: To Affrican industry gat vertue, vertue glory, glory hatered. Orismus. Definicio, definiciõ, wher by y^e proper 59 effect of any thynge is declared briefely & absolutely in this wyse: This is not diligẽce but couetousnes, because y^t diligẽce is a nedy sauing of thine own: couetousnes is a wrongful desyre of other mens. Metabasis. ¶ Transicio, transiciõ is, wherby briefly we monyshe what hath ben spoken, & what may folowe, as: What he hath ben to hys contrey I haue told, now ye shal hear how he hath shewed him self to hys parẽtes. Also Cicero for the law of Manilius: Because we haue spoken of y^e kind of the warre, now wyll we shewe a fewe thynges of the greatnes of it. Paralepsis. ¶ Occupatia, occupacion is, when we make as though we do not knowe, or wyl not know of y^e thyng y^t wee speke of most of al, in this wyse: I wyl not say that y^u tokest money of our felowes, I wyl not stand much in thys that y^u robbedst kingdoms, cityes, and al mens houses: I passe ouer thy theftes, & al thy rauyns. Asindeton. ¶ Dissolutio, when the oracion lacketh coniũccions, thus: Obey thy parẽtes, be ruled by thi kinsfolke, folow thy fryndes, obey the lawes.

Climax. Gradacio is when we go over the word y^t goth again, and move on to other things gradually like this: From African effort comes virtue, from virtue comes glory, and from glory comes hatred. Orismus. Definicio, definition, where the proper 59 effect of anything is briefly and precisely stated like this: This is not diligence but greed, because diligence is a careful saving of your own, while greed is an wrongful desire for what belongs to others. Metabasis. ¶ Transicio, transition is when we briefly sum up what has been said and what might follow, for example: What he has been to his country I have told you, now you shall hear how he has presented himself to his parents. Also, Cicero regarding the law of Manilius: Because we have spoken of the nature of the war, now we will show a few things about its magnitude. Paralepsis. ¶ Occupatia, occupation is when we pretend that we do not know, or do not wish to acknowledge the thing we speak of the most, like this: I will not say that you took money from our fellows, I will not dwell on the fact that you robbed kingdoms, cities, and all people's homes: I pass over your thefts and all your plunders. Asindeton. ¶ Dissolutio, when a sentence lacks conjunctions, as follows: Obey your parents, be guided by your relatives, follow your friends, obey the laws.

Apostrophe. Auersio, auersion, when we turne our speche from them to whom we dyd speake to another personne, eyther present or absent, or to a thing to the whych we fayne a person, as a precher, speaking of priestes, that feede not the flocke, may fytly turn hys speche vnto Peter, sayinge: O Peter, I wold thou liuedst, & sawest what thy brethren do, howe far they be gone frõ that thou prescribedst them to do. Againe: O world, howe pleasant be the thynges that thou dost promyse, how bytter ben they that thou geuest.

Apostrophe. Auersio, in conversation, when we shift our speech from the person we were addressing to someone else, whether they are there or not, or to something we imagine as a person, like a preacher speaking about priests who don’t care for their flock, might appropriately direct his words to Peter, saying: Oh Peter, I wish you were alive and could see what your brethren are doing, how far they’ve strayed from what you taught them to do. Again: Oh world, how sweet are the things you promise, yet how bitter are those you actually give.

Anangeon. Necessum, necessitie, when we cõfesse the thynge to be done, but excuse it by necessitye, eyther of y^e person or tyme, thus: I confesse that thys I dyd. But the woman that thou gauest me, dyd deceyue me. Also, somtyme I was in that opinion, but the tyme so required.

Anangeon. Necessum, necessity, when we acknowledge that something needs to be done, but justify it by necessity, either of the person or time, like this: I admit that I did this. But the woman you gave me deceived me. Also, sometimes I believed that too, but the situation demanded it.

Anaclasis. Refractio, that is the turninge backe agayne of a worde into a cõtrary significacion, thus: I knowe kynge Ezechias that all thys lyfe is but bitternes, but I praye thee, gyue me suche bytternes.

Anaclasis. Refractio, that is the returning of a word to a contrary meaning, like this: I know King Hezekiah that all this life is just bitterness, but I beg you, give me that bitterness.

Bomphiologia. Verborum bombus, when small & triflyng thynges are set out wyth great gasyng wordes. Example of this haue you in Terrence of the boasting souldiar, & creping smel feast.

Bomphiologia. Verborum bombus, when minor and trivial things are described with exaggerated language. You can see an example of this in Terence's portrayal of the bragging soldier and the sneaky smel feast.

Miosis. Diminutio, when greate matters are made lyghte of by wordes, as when he was wel beatẽ bi a knaue, that knaue wyll saye he dyd but a lytle stryke hym.

Miosis. Diminutio, when serious issues are downplayed by words, like when he got really beaten up by a thug, that thug will claim he only hit him a little.

Liptote. Extenuatio, the makyng lesse of a thynge to auoyde arrogance, thus: If I haue any wit O Iudges, if any exercyse of endyghtyng, al may I thanke Archias the Poete of. ¶ Cicero for Archias.

Liptote. Extenuatio, the making less of something to avoid arrogance, goes like this: If I have any wit, O Judges, if I have any skill in writing, I owe it all to Archias the Poet. ¶ Cicero for Archias.

Diasirmus. Eleuacio, when we make lyghte of, and dyspyse great argumentes brought agaynst vs, whych to aunswer vnto it is labour, and we saye they perteyne not to the purpose, or that they are vnworthy to be answered vnto, or that we kepe them tyll another tyme: Of thys ther nedeth none example.

Diasirmus. Eleuacio, when we disregard and dismiss significant arguments brought against us, which require effort to respond to, we claim they are irrelevant to the matter at hand, that they aren't worth responding to, or that we will address them later: There is no need for an example of this.

S oute of lytle springs ariseth greate fluddes: so now these preceptes of grammer finyshed, and the fyrste order of the Rethorical figures: We nowe come vnto that greate declaracion of eloquence, called of Quintilian & Cicero, the ornametẽs of sentence.

Out of Lytle Springs comes great floods: now that these grammar rules are finished, along with the first set of rhetorical figures, we will now move on to that great explanation of eloquence, referred to by Quintilian and Cicero as the embellishments of sentences.

Figures of sentence.

Particio. Particion called also diuision & distribucion rethoricall, is when a thing that mai be generally spokẽ, is more largely declared, and diuided into partes. Example: He is perfitely seene in all the sciences. ¶ This sẽtence spoken as it were in a sũme, may be enlarged, if seuerally you reherse vp al the kindes of learning. There is no kynd of doctrine at al but he is exquisitely sene in it. There is no science, but he hathe learned it thorowly, and so learned it, that you wolde thynke he had labored onely in it. So maruelouslye he knoweth all the fables of al the Poetes, he so aboundeth in the floures of the Rethoricians: He hath so boulted oute the paynefull 63 rules of the gramarians. So perfitely knoweth he the subtilnesse of the Logicians, and hath so soughte oute the priuities of natural thynges, and ouercome the harde poyntes of supernaturall wisedome: he hathe passed thorowe the secretes of the diuines, and hath thorowlie perceyued the mathematical demõstracions. He so knoweth the mocions of the starres, the reasons of numbers, the measurynges of the earth, the situacions, names & spaces of cities, mountaynes, fluddes, and fountaynes, he so knoweth the difference and harmonies of tunes: He so remẽbreth all hystoryes olde and late: So knoweth all good authors, all antiquities & nouelties, and also is perfitelye well seene as wel in Greke as latyne. Finallye whatsoeuer learnynge hathe bene found and taught of good authors, al that thorowlye hath he perceyued, knowen and remẽbred. Here these wordes, he is perfitelye seene in all the sciences, bee declared in theyr partes.

Particio. Particion, also known as diuision & distribucion rhetorically, is when something that can be generally stated is explained in more detail and divided into parts. Example: He is perfectly knowledgeable in all the sciences. ¶ This sentence, expressed as a summary, can be expanded if you detail all the types of learning. There is no type of teaching at all that he isn't thoroughly familiar with. There is no science that he hasn't mastered, and he has studied it so well that you would think he focused solely on it. He knows all the myths from all the poets so remarkably; he is rich in the elements of rhetoric. He has thoroughly analyzed the complex rules of grammar. He knows the nuances of logic deeply and has explored the complexities of natural things, while also tackling the challenging aspects of supernatural wisdom. He has delved into the secrets of theology and has fully grasped mathematical proofs. He understands the movements of the stars, the principles of numbers, the measurements of the earth, and the locations, names, and dimensions of cities, mountains, rivers, and springs. He knows the differences and harmonies of music. He remembers all histories, both ancient and modern. He is familiar with all great authors, all antiquities and novelties, and he is perfectly proficient in both Greek and Latin. Ultimately, whatever knowledge has been discovered and taught by reputable authors, he has thoroughly perceived, understood, and remembered. Here, the words, he is perfectly knowledgeable in all the sciences, are elaborated in their parts.

Enumeracio. Enumeracion is much lyke vnto thys, when not beynge contente 64 at once to declare the ende of the matter, we rehearse vp all y^t went before it was done. Enumeraciõ of thynges that go before Example: Cicero oppressed the mischeuous purposes of Catiline. Thus maye you set it forth: The myscheuous enterpryses of Catiline by most vngracious yonge men, whych went about the destruccion of the citie of Rome, M Tullius the consull dyd quickelye smell out by hys foresyghte, and by hys singuler vigilancye sought thẽ oute, by his hyghe prudence espyed them, by his incredible eloquence conuinced them, and by hys graue authoritie repressed thẽ, by force of armes subdued them, & with great happines toke them quyte awaye.

Enumeracio. Enumeration is much like this, when not being content 64 to immediately reveal the conclusion of the matter, we go over all that happened before it was done. Listing of things that come before Example: Cicero thwarted the evil intentions of Catiline. So you may present it like this: The wicked schemes of Catiline by the most ungracious young men, who plotted the destruction of the city of Rome, M. Tullius the consul quickly figured out through his foresight, and by his exceptional vigilance sought them out, by his great wisdom uncovered them, and by his incredible eloquence convicted them, and by his serious authority suppressed them, by the force of arms subdued them, and with great success completely removed them.

Enumeraciõ of the causes. Hitherto also apperteineth, whẽ we expoũd a thyng not barely, but repete the causes also sumwhat before, and of what begynnynges it came of. As if not contente to haue sayd, that the Frenchmen made bataile with the Neapolitans, we rehearse also what wer the causes of theyr stryfe, who was the setter forward, and what was the occasion of the warre, what hope and truste 65 E.i. eyther of them had to the victorye. Of these ar many examples in Saluste & Liuie. Enumeraciõ of effectes, & consequẽtes. From thys differeth not when we do not simplye shewe forthe the matter, but reherse also those thynges that eyther go with it, or folowe it, as thus: We thanke the of thys warre. Thus maye you dilate the matter. The treasure spente vpon the Barbariens, the youthe broken wyth laboures, the corne troden downe, the catel driuen awaye, stretes and vyllages euery where set on fyre, fieldes lefte desolate, walles ouerthrowen, houses robbed, temples spoyled, so many olde men chylderles, so manye orphanes, so manye wyddowes, so many virgins shamefully defiled, y^e maners of so many yong mẽ made worse by leude liberty, so many mẽ slayne, so great mourning, so many good artes loste, lawes oppressed, religion blotted, al thynges of god and man confounded, all good order of the citie corrupted: I say all this heape of myschiefs that riseth of war, we mai thãke the only of it, which wast y^e beginner of this war

Causes listed. Up until now, we haven't just discussed a thing in isolation; we also need to touch on the causes leading up to it and where it all began. For example, instead of just stating that the French fought against the Neapolitans, we also talk about the reasons behind their conflict, who instigated it, and what triggered the war, as well as the hopes and expectations each side had for victory. 65 E.g. eyther of them had to the victorye. There are many examples of this in Sallust and Livy. Listing of effects and consequences. This differs from simply stating the matter, as we also mention things that accompany or follow it. For example: We thank you for this war. In this way, you can elaborate on the matter. The treasure spent on the Barbarians, the youth worn down by labor, the crops trampled, the livestock driven away, towns and villages set ablaze, fields left desolate, walls torn down, houses looted, temples desecrated, so many elderly left childless, so many orphans, so many widows, so many virgins dishonored, the moral degradation of many young men due to unchecked freedom, so many men killed, immense sorrow, so many lost skills, laws oppressed, religion tarnished, all things divine and human thrown into chaos, all good order of the city corrupted: I say all this heap of misfortunes that arises from war, we may attribute solely to it, which was the instigator of this war.

Energia. Enargia, euidence or perspicuitie called also descripcion rethoricall, is when a thynge is so described that it semeth to the reader or hearer y^t he beholdeth it as it were in doyng. Of thys figure ben many kyndes.

Energia. Enargia, evidence or clarity also known as rhetorical description, is when something is described so vividly that the reader or listener feels like they are witnessing it in action. There are many kinds of this figure.

The fyrste, called effiguracion or descripcion of a thynge, whereby the figure and forme of it is set out: as of the vniuersall flud.

The first, called effiguracion or descripcion of a thing, which illustrates its figure and shape: as in the universal flood.

The seconde, the descripcion of a personne, when a man is described, as are the noble menne in Plutarch, and the Emperours in Suetonius. Howe be it the rethoricianes vse thys worde Prosopopeia, that is descripcion of a personne to comprehende the sixe kyndes folowinge.

The second, the description of a person, when a man is described, like the noble men in Plutarch and the emperors in Suetonius. However, the rhetoricians use this term Prosopopeia, which is the description of a person to include the following six kinds.

Charactirismus. The thyrde kinde is called Charactirismus, that is the efficcion or pycture of the bodye or mynde, as Dauus describeth Crito, & Mitio describeth Demea.

Charactirismus. The third kind is called Charactirismus, which refers to the effect or representation of the body or mind, as Daun describes Crito, and Mitio describes Demea.

Prosopographia. The .iiii. is the fainyng of a persõ called Prosopographia, and is of .ii. sorts. Fyrst y^e descripciõ of a fained 67 E.ii. person, as Vyrgyl in the syxt of Eneid, faineth Sibil to be mad, & fayneth the persons in hell. An other forme is whẽ we fayne persõ, cõmunicacion, or affecte of a man or of a beaste, to a dumme thynge, or that hath no bodye, or to a dead man: as to the Harpies, furies, deuils, slepe hongar, enuie, fame, vertue, iustice, and suche lyke, the poetes fayne a person, and communicacion. This seconde fashion the Poetes do call Prosopopey. Aetopeia. The fyrst kind is called AEtopeia, that is an expressiõ of maners or mylde affeccions, and hath thre kyndes: of the whych the fyrst is a significacion or expression of maners somewhat longer, as of wittes, artes, vertues, vices. Thus we expresse Thraso a boaster, and Demea a sowre felowe.

Prosopographia. The .iiii. refers to a fictional character called Prosopographia, and has .ii. types. First, the description of a fictional 67 E.ii. person, like how Virgil in the sixth of the Aeneid portrays the Sibyl as insane, and depicts the characters in hell. Another form is when we attribute traits, speech, or emotions of a human or an animal to something inanimate, or that lacks a body, or to a deceased person: such as the Harpies, furies, devils, sleep, hunger, envy, fame, virtue, justice, and similar concepts; poets personify these and give them speech. This second style is what the poets call Prosopopey. Aetopeia. The first type is called AEtopeia, which means an expression of manners or mild emotions, and it consists of three types: of which the first is a slightly longer expression or depiction of manners, such as wit, arts, virtues, and vices. Thus, we describe Thraso as a braggart, and Demea as a sour fellow.

The seconde forme, is an expression of naturall propensitie, and inclinacions to naturall affeccions, as of the fathers loue toward the chyldren .&c. of fryendshyppe, neyghbourhod & cetr. as you maye se in hystoryes.
68 ¶ The thyrd kynde is the expression of lighter affeccions, as when wee go about by fayre meanes to gette the mery affeccions of menne to vs ward or to other, & when the mynd is lyft vp into hope, myrth, & laughter, and as be louyng salutations, promises, & cõmunynges together in familiar epistles and dialogues, and the getting of loue and fauour in the begynnynges, and finallye thys figure doth teach, that Rethorique is a part of flattery. Pathopeia. The sixt kynde of rethoricall descripcion is Pathopeia, that is expressyng of vehement affeccions and perturbacions, of y^e whych ther be two sortes. The fyrste called Donysis, or intencion, and some call it imaginacion, wherby feare, anger, madnes, hatered, enuye, and lyke other perturbacions of mynde is shewed and described, as in Ciceros inuectiues. Another forme is called Oictros, or cõmiseracion, wherby teares be pyked out, or pyty is moued, or forgeuenes, as in Ciceros peroraciõs, and complaintes in Poets: And to 69 E.iii. be shorte ther is gotten no greater admiracion or commendacion of eloquence then of these two, AEtopeia, and Pathopeia, if they be vsed in place. dialogismus The .vii. kind is Dialogismus whych is how often a short or long communicacion is fayned to a person, accordyng to the comelines of it. Such be the concious in Liuie, & other historians. Mimisis. The .viii. kynd is called Mimisis, that is folowing eyther of the wordes or manoures whereby we expresse not onlye the wordes of the person, but also the gesture: and these foresayd sixe kindes Quintiliane dothe put vnder Prosopopeia. The .ix. kynde is the descripcion of a place, as of Carthage in the fyrst of Eneid. Referre hither Cosmographie and Geographie. The .x. kynd is called Topotesia, that is ficcion of a place, when a place is described such one peraduenture as is not, as of the fieldes called Elisii in Virgil: refer hither Astrothesiam, that is the descripciõ of starres. The .xi. kinde is Chronographia, 70 that is the descripcion of the tyme, as of nyght, daye, and the foure tymes of the yere.

The second type is an expression of natural tendencies and inclinations toward natural feelings, such as a father's love for his children, friendships, neighborhood bonds, etc., as you can see in histories.
68 ¶ The third kind expresses lighter feelings, such as when we try to win over people's good feelings towards us or others through pleasant means. It lifts the mind into hope, joy, and laughter, like loving greetings, promises, and exchanges in friendly letters and conversations. It also involves gaining love and favor from the beginning, and ultimately shows that rhetoric is a form of flattery. Pathopeia. The sixth kind of rhetorical description is Pathopeia, which expresses intense feelings and disturbances, and there are two sorts. The first is called Donysis, or intention, and some refer to it as imagination, through which fear, anger, madness, hatred, envy, and similar mental disturbances are shown and described, as seen in Cicero's invectives. Another form is called Oictros, or compassion, which evokes tears, stirs pity, or calls for forgiveness, as in Cicero's perorations and complaints in poetry: And to 69 E.iii. put simply, there is no greater admiration or praise of eloquence than these two, AEtopeia and Pathopeia, if they are used in the right context. dialogismus The seventh kind is Dialogismus, which describes how often a short or long conversation is imagined with someone, depending on its appropriateness. Such are the dialogues in Livy and other historians. Mimisis. The eighth kind is called Mimisis, which refers to following either words or actions in a way that we express not only what the person says but also their gestures. These six kinds mentioned are categorized by Quintilian under Prosopopeia. The ninth kind is the descripcion of a place, like Carthage in the first of the Aeneid. Refer to Cosmographie and Geographie. The tenth kind is called Topotesia, which is a fictional description of a place, when a location is described that perhaps does not exist, like the fields called Elysium in Virgil: refer here Astrothesiam, which is the description of the stars. The eleventh kind is Chronographia, 70 which is the description of time, such as night, day, and the four seasons of the year.

Amplificacio A greate parte of eloquence is set in increasing and diminyshing, and serueth for thys purpose, that the thyng shulde seme as great as it is in dede, lesser or greater then it seemeth to manye. For the rude people haue commonly a preposterous iudgemẽt, and take the worst thynges for the beste, and the beste for the worst. Al amplificacion and diminucion is taken eyther of thinges, or of wordes. Of thynges ryse effeccions, of words those fashions that nowe I wyll shewe. The first waye of increasyng or diminishing is by chaungynge the worde of the thynge, when in encreasynge we vse a more cruell worde, and a softer in diminyshynge, as when we call an euyll man a thiefe, and saye he hathe kylled vs, when he hathe beaten vs. And it is more vehemẽte if by correccion we compare greater wordes wyth those that we put before: As thou haste broughte not a thyefe, but an extorcioner, not 71 E.iiii. an adulterer, but a rauysher. &c. ¶ Lyke vnto this is Hyperbole, whyche say the more then the truthe is in deede, as when we saye: The crye was hearde to heauen, meanyng it was a greate crye. An other kynde is by increase, whyche is when the thynges goyng before beynge exaggerate, we come from them to the hyeste: As agaynste Verres. It is a myscheuous deede to bynde a Citizen of Rome, haynous to beate hym, what? shall I saye to hange hym? An other waye of increase is, when wythoute distinccion in the context and course of the oracion, the circumstaunces sette in order, somewhat alwayes is added bygger then the fyrste, and that we come to the hyest by a swyfte pace. As he was not ashamed to playe at dyce wyth iesters in the common cokerye, beynge a prieste, a Person, a Diuine, and a Monke. There is another kynde of amplyfienge that is by comparison contrary to increase. For as in increase the thynges that go before beyng exaggerat, we go from 72 them to the hyest, so comparison taketh increase of the lesser, whych if they be greater in all mens opinions, that must nedes appeare verie greate that we wyll haue amplified: And comparison is made by ficcion, & by puttynge to an example. By ficcion, eyther in one degree, or in many. As in the fyrst part of the amplifiyng of Antonies vomite, for he fayneth it had happened vnto hym at supper beyng but a priuate person. If at supper in these great bowles of thine thys happened vnto thee, who wolde not haue counted it a shame: But now in y^e syght of the people of Rome beynge a cõmon officer, master of the horse, to whom it was shame once to belch, he wyth hys gobbets of meat that stanke al of wyne, fylled al his lap, and the iudgement seate. Here amplificacion is taken of smaller thinges, and is made by one degree of many degrees, this maye be an example. If a mã gaue the euery yere .xl. poũd, woldest y^u not thanke him? If a friend had redemed the out of prison w^t hys money, woldest thou 73 not loue hym? If eyther in battell or shypwracke a man by hys valiantnes had saued the, woldest thou not worshyp hym as God, and saye thou were neuer able to make hym amendes? What ingratitude is it then that Christ God & man, which hathe made the, to whom thou dost owe al that thou hast, &c. so to dispyse hym, so wyth dayely fautes to anger him, & for so great beniuolẽce to geue hym agayn so great contumelye and despyte? Neyther skylleth it that we haue rehearsed ficcion and comparicion amonge argumentes, for there is no cause why that amplificacion and oruacion shuld not be taken out of the same places from whence ther commeth probacion. Nor it is no newes the selfe same thynges to be applyed to diuerse vses. As of all circumstaunces both of the thyng, and of the person are taken argumentes, but euen oute of the selfe same are set affeccions and exaggeracions, whych is manifest in the kynde demonstratiue: As when we prayse chastitie in a yonge man, we go not 74 aboute to perswade that he was chaste, but that that vertue shulde appeare greater in floryshyng age. To lyke vse serue examples and similitudes, as in Esaye: The Oxe knewe hys owner, and the Asse the maunger of hys master, but Israel hathe not knowen me. The example of the Oxe & the Asse is not vsed for this to proue that the Hebrewes dyd not knowe their God, but that the impietie and folishnes of that nacion shulde be amplified. The same may be applied to profe after thys maner. If the Oxe and Asse knowledge theyr masters, of whõ they are norished and do serue them, how much more conueniente is it, that mã shuld knowledge hys maker and norisher, and serue him bothe in bodye and mynd. Contrarye, when Paul sayth: no man serueth in warre on his owne wages, he proueth by similitudes, that it is not comelye, that they that war vnder the gospell, shulde be compelled to be carefull for their liuynge. He shuld haue applied it to amplifiyng, if he had propouned it thus. 75 They that serue vnder a capteine be not careful for their liuyng, but lokinge for the sustenaunce of their capteine, only studye for thys to do hym faythful seruice, howe muche more shame is it that some menne that haue promised to fyght vnder Christ in the gospel, to distrust such a capteyne, and studye all they can to gather riches. Cõparison by puttyng to example is, whẽ by setting out as it were a lyke example, wee brynge to passe that that we exaggerate may be thought either very lyke, eyther equal, either bygger. ¶ And in this kynd both the whole is cõpared to the whole, & the partes to partes: as in the oracion of Cicero for Milo. Did I pray you y^t noble mã Scipio being a priuat persõ kil Tiberius Gracchus whych shaked the cõmõ wealthe but a lytle, & shall wee beynge consulles suffer Catiline, that gothe aboute to wast the whole worlde wyth murther and fyre? Here both Catiline is compared to Gracchus, and the estate of the common wealthe to the whole world, & a lytle shakyng 76 to slaughter, fyer and wastyng, and a priuate person to the consuls. ¶ Ther is an amplificacion also whẽ contraries be set together, wherby bothe the partes seme bygger, and more euidente. As when exhorting men to liberalitie, we shewe howe foule a faute couetousenes is, that the foulnes of the faute being exaggerate, the goodlines of the vertue shulde be more encreased. There is another kynd of amplifiyng called reasonynge, when of those thinges that eyther folowe or go before, the hearer doth gather how great that thynge is that we wolde to be amplified. By thynges that go before, as when Homer armeth Achylles, or Hector to batayle, by the greate preparacion, we gather how sore y^e sight shal be. Of thinges y^t folowe: How much wyne Antony dranke, when y^t hauyng such a strong body he was not able to digeste it, but spewed it vp the nexte daye after. Of thynges ioyned to: as whẽ Maro sayeth to Poliphemus: He had the bodye of a pineapple tree for a staffe in hys hande. Manye other 77 kyndes ben there of amplifiynge, which who so wyl se more at large, may read that right excellent boke of the famouse doctor Erasmus, whych he intituled the preacher.

Amplificacio A large part of eloquence is about making things seem bigger or smaller, depending on the purpose. The idea is to make something appear as significant as it truly is or to make it look less significant than it really is. People often have a distorted perception, viewing the worst things as the best and the best as the worst. Amplification and diminution can come from either things or words. From things arise emotions, and from words come the styles I will now explain. The first method of increasing or decreasing is by changing the word for the thing; when we amplify, we use a harsher word, and when we diminish, we use a softer one—like calling a bad person a thief when we say he has killed us, but in reality, he just beat us. It sounds more dramatic if we compare greater words to lesser ones: "You didn’t just bring a thief but an extortionist, not an adulterer but a rapist," etc. ¶ Similar to this is Hyperbole, where we say more than the truth actually is, like saying, "The cry was heard to heaven," meaning it was a loud cry. Another kind is by increase, which refers to moving from lesser points to the highest: "Against Verres, it is a wicked act to bind a Roman citizen, atrocious to beat him; should I even say to hang him?" Another form of increase occurs when, without distinguishing in the context of the statement, circumstances are ordered such that something larger than the initial point is always added, quickly reaching the highest point—like saying "He was not ashamed to gamble with jesters in the common kitchen, despite being a priest, a person of the cloth, a divine, and a monk." There is another type of amplification that is comparison, which is opposite to increase. Just as in increase, we exaggerate earlier things, in comparison we take increase from the lesser, which, if viewed as greater by all, must certainly be significant if we wish to amplify it. Comparisons are made by ficcion and by using examples. By means of fiction, either in one degree or several. For instance, in the first part of Antony's speech, he claims it happened to him at a private dinner. If such a thing had happened to you in those great bowls of yours, who would not see it as shameful? But now, in front of the people of Rome, being a public officer, master of the horse, for whom it was once shameful to burp, he filled his lap and the judgment seat with spoiled food, reeking of wine. Here, amplification is taken from smaller things, created through one degree of many, which serves as an example. If a man gave you £40 every year, would you not thank him? If a friend redeemed you from prison with his money, would you not love him? If in battle or shipwreck, a man saved you by his bravery, would you not worship him as a god and say you could never repay him? What ingratitude then, that Christ, God and man, who created you, to whom you owe everything, should be so despised, so angered by your daily faults, and for so great a kindness, treated with such contempt and disdain? It does not matter that we have discussed fiction and comparison among arguments; there is no reason why amplification and conversation should not derive from the same sources as proof. Nor is it unusual for the same things to be applied for different purposes. Both arguments and affections and exaggerations can be drawn from the same circumstances regarding the thing or the person, which is clear in demonstrative cases: When we praise chastity in a young man, we do not merely persuade that he was chaste, but that that virtue should be emphasized more in flourishing age. Similar uses serve examples and similitudes, as in Isaiah: "The ox knows its owner, and the donkey its master's manger, but Israel does not know me." The example of the ox and the donkey is not used to prove that the Hebrews did not know their God but to amplify the impiety and foolishness of that nation. The same can be applied to proof in this manner. If the ox and donkey know their masters, from whom they are nourished and serve, how much more fitting is it that man should know his maker and nourisher, and serve him in both body and mind? Conversely, when Paul says: "No soldier serves in war at his own expense," he proves by similitudes that it is not appropriate for those who serve under the gospel to be burdened with seeking their living. He should have applied it to amplification if he had presented it like this. 75 Those who serve under a captain do not worry about their living; instead, looking for the support from their captain, they only strive to serve him faithfully. How much more shameful it is for some men, who have promised to fight under Christ in the gospel, to distrust such a captain and strive to gather riches. Cõparison by adding example is when we present an example that is similar, leading to the thought that what we exaggerate is either very similar, or equal, or larger. ¶ In this kind, both the whole is compared to the whole, and the parts to the parts, as in Cicero's speech for Milo: "I ask you, noble man Scipio, who being a private person killed Tiberius Gracchus, who only slightly shook the commonwealth, and shall we, being consuls, allow Catiline, who is seeking to destroy the whole world through murder and fire?" Here, both Catiline is compared to Gracchus and the state of the commonwealth to the whole world, with slight shaking leading to slaughter, fire, and destruction, and a private individual compared to the consuls. ¶ There is also an amplificacion when contraries are set together, making both parts seem larger and more evident. When encouraging men to generosity, we show how foul greed is, so that the magnitude of the fault being exaggerated, the goodness of the virtue should be increased. There’s another kind of amplification called reasonynge, wherein the listener gathers the significance of what we want to amplify based on preceding or following elements. From preceding elements, like when Homer arms Achilles or Hector for battle, the great preparation suggests the seriousness of the encounter. From following elements: How much wine Antony drank, when despite such a strong body, he was unable to digest it, but vomited it the next day. From associated things: as when Maro says to Polyphemus: "He had the body of a pineapple tree for a staff in his hand." Many other 77 forms of amplification exist, which those who wish to explore more can read in the excellent book by the famous doctor Erasmus, which he titled The Preacher.

The inuencion of many proposicions is, when the chyefe state or principal proposionof the cause is declared and proued by manye other proposicions and argumẽtes, so set in iuste order that there be no confusion of proposions. And proposicions be taken partely of those that be cõmon, and partly of those thynges that belonge properlye to the cause: As if a man wolde counsell Tullye not to take the condicion offered of Antony, that is, that by burnynge of hys bookes called philippia, he shulde haue hys lyfe, hy myght vse commonly these proposicions. Fyrste y^t no man oughte to by his life so dere, that therby he shulde lose hys immortall name. ¶ To thys generall may serue a perticuler taken oute of circumstaunces, that it oughte not to be done, inespecialy of Cicero, whych by so many laboures hathe gotten vnto 78 hym selfe an excellente and euerlastyng name, and that hath shewed moste eloquently by putting out so manye noble workes that deathe ought to be despised, inespeciallye seynge that now he hath not much tyme to lyue beynge an olde man. ¶ Agayn, another principall proposicion shall be taken of the circũstaũces. That nothynge is worse, then that Cicero beyng a very good mã shulde owe his lyfe to Antonye the worst man of the world. The third proposicion shal be cõiectural: how that Antony craftely goeth about that the bookes beynge burned, in the whych he perceiueth bothe hys owne immortal infamye to be, and the immortal glory of Cicero, whẽ he hath afterwardes taken awaye hys lyfe, he maye vtterlye extinguyshe Cicero.

The inuencion of many proposicions is when the main point or principal proposition of the matter is declared and proven by many other propositions and arguments, arranged in such a way that there is no confusion of propositions. Propositions are partly taken from common knowledge and partly from things that are specific to the cause: For instance, if someone were to advise Cicero not to accept the condition offered by Antony, which is that by burning his books called Philippics, he would be granted his life, they might commonly use these propositions. First, that no one should value their life so highly that in doing so they lose their immortal reputation. ¶ To this general point, a specific example can be taken from the circumstances, that it should not be done, especially regarding Cicero, who by his many efforts has earned for himself an excellent and everlasting name, and has most eloquently shown by producing so many noble works that death should be despised, especially since he does not have much time left to live, being an old man. ¶ Again, another principal proposition can be taken from the circumstances. That there is nothing worse than Cicero, being a very good man, having to owe his life to Antony, the worst man in the world. The third proposition will be conjectural: that Antony is cleverly scheming so that by burning the books, in which he realizes both his own immortal infamy and the immortal glory of Cicero, when he later takes Cicero's life, he can completely extinguish Cicero.

¶ A copious heaping of probacions.

Proues. So when proposicions be found, remaineth argumẽtaciõ or proues, called in Greke Pistis, because they make suretye of a doutefull thyng. Two sortes of proues. Of proues some be artificiall, some vnartificial. Vnartificial be, foreiudgementes, 79 rumoures, tormentes, tabelles, othe, wytnesses, diuinacion, oracles. Signes be referred to proues vnartificial, & why? To these be referred whych the Greekes cal Symeia or sygnes: For they also commonlye are not set by the wytte of hym that disputeth, but are ministred otherwyse. Signes wherfore. They be called signes properlye, whyche rysynge of the thynge it selfe that is in question come vnder the sences of menne, Signes be referred to tyme. as threatninges, whych be of the time that is paste, cryinge herde oute of a place, whyche is of the tyme presente, palenesse of hym whyche is axed of the murther, whyche is of the tyme folowynge, or that bloud leapte oute of the bodye latelye slayne, when he came that dyd the murther. Two maner of signes. Also of signes some bee necessary, as that he liueth whiche dothe breathe, and some probable, as bloude in the garmente, whych myghte also come oute of the nose, or otherwyse. Proues takẽ oute of circũstauces. Also proues and argumentes are taken oute of circũstaunces, partly of the person, partlye of the cause or thyng it self, and be called also of the Rethoricians 80 places, neyther cleane contrarie to those that Aristotle hath taughte, neyther the very same: for some agree wyth them, some be all one, and some diuerse. How proues of circũstaũces differ frõ Aristotels places. Onlye differeth the manour of teachynge, because the Rethoricianes do teache a patrone, the philosopher generally helpeth iudgement. Circũstãces of person. Circumstaunces of the person ben these. Kinred, nacion, contrey, kynde, age, bryngynge vp, or discipline, hauioure of the body, fortune, condicion, nature of the mynde, studies, affectacion, wordes forespoken, & deedes done before, commocion, counsell, name. Kynred. Kynred monisheth vs to cõsider of what progeny a man dothe come. For it is semely, and happeneth cõmonlye that the sonnes be lyke the forefathers, and thereof procedeth causes to lyue well or euyll: Nacion Naciõ sheweth what disposicion and maners euery nacion hath peculiarly of theyr owne. Kynd. The difference of kynde is knowen to euerye man: Age. To diuerse ages diuerse thyngs be conueniente. Educacion. It skylleth more by whom, and by what wayes men be 81 F.i. brought vp, then of whom they be begotten. Hauiour of the bodie. The hauioure of the bodye comprehendeth fayrnes or foulnes, strength or weaknes: For more credible is the accusacion of lecherye in a fayre body then in a foule, and violence more probable in the strong, then in the weake. Fortune Fortune perteineth to ryches, kynred, friendes, seruitures, dignities, honours. Condicion. Condicion comprehendeth manye thynges: as whether he be noble or not noble, an officer, or a priuate person, a father or a sonne, a citizen or a straunger, a fre man, or a seruaunt, a maried manne, or a single man, a father or none, hauinge had but one wyfe, or two. The nature of the mynd The nature of the mynde hath manifold varieties in men. Some be fearful, some strong, some gentle, some vehemẽt, chaste, lecherous, glorious, modeste &c. Studies Studies, for other be the maners of the rustical, then of the lawyer, of the marchaunte, then of the Soldier, of the shipman then of the phisicion. Affectacion. To these they adde affectacion: For it skylleth muche what maner man euerye one wolde seme 82 to be, whether he be y^e same or not: as ryche, or eloquent, iuste or mightie, mery or sad, a fauorer of the people, or of the great men. Wordes spoken, & deedes done before Both wordes that be spoken before time, and dedes that be done, be also considered. For of thynges that be paste, the present be estemed, & also thinges that be to come. Commocion Cõmocion in thys differeth from the nature of the mynde, because that one is perpetuall, that other for a whyle: as anger is commocion, rancour the nature of the mynde, and feare a cõmocion, fearefulnesse nature.
Name. ¶ To these they adde the name of the person, of whence many tymes an argument is takẽ: as Cicero iesteth muche vpon Verres, or sweepers name, because beyng a strong thief, he swepte altogether. Thus haue we shewed that much matter may be taken of thynges belongyng to a personne, so maye be also of those that belonge to a thynge or cause, whiche places bee so handeled of Quintiliane, that he myngleth thẽ wyth the places whyche Aristotle hathe comprehended in hys eyghte 83 F.ii. bookes of Topyckes. Circũstaunces of things be these. Circumstances of the thynges be these: Cause, place, tyme, chaunce, facultie, instrumente, manour. And fyrste of euerye thinge there be foure causes, efficient, materiall, formall and finall. Matter is the receptacle of al formes. The forme causeth it to be thys, and not another thynge: as the reasonable soule geueth to the body that it is a man, and the soule because it is a substaunce hathe her vnnamed forme, whereby she is a soule, and not an aungel. Fine or ende. And what soeuer is made, is made to a certen ende, and one thynge maye haue diuerse endes: as nature hathe geuen brestes vnto women to geue milke, and also for comlynesse of theyr bodies, neyther doth any man that is of a sounde mynde take vpon hym anye businesse, but for that he desyreth to haue some thynge: nor there is nothynge desyred, but vnder the consideracion of good or profite. ¶ So the ende whyche is laste in effecte, and fyrste in intencion, loketh vpon the gettinge of profites, increase, and cõfirmacion of them, 84 and also vpon them, eschuynge of disprofites, diminyshynge, or puttyng them awaye. But in chosyng them, false perswacion deceyueth manye, whylest by errour they beleue that to be good y^t is naughte. ¶ This place therfore serueth for many thynges, to make more or lesse. ¶ Greatly happy shulde men be, if euerye man wolde looke vpon the marke, not the whych desyre hathe sette before hym, but whyche God and honest reason hath prefixed. ¶ And of such strengthe is the ende, that hereof is taken the felicitie of euery thyng. To fast that the body maye obeye the mynde, to do good workes is an holy deede. To fast to be counted holye, is hypocrisie. To faste to encrease thy good, is couetousenesse. To faste to be whole in thy bodie is phisycke, and so of praiynge, almose, and other laudable workes. After lyke maner must be wayed the secondarie endes. Place. An other circumstaunce of a thynge, is the place, whose qualitie oftentimes maketh the faute either greter or lesser: as to steale an holye 85 F.iii. thing out of an holy place, is worse then some other kynde of theft. Tyme. No lesse matter of argumentacion ministreth the qualitie of time, which signifieth two thynges. Time hathe two significacions. Fyrst it is taken playnly for the time present, past, or to come: Seconde it signifieth oportunitie to do a thynge, and so when a man cometh as we wold haue it, we saye he cometh in time. And in the seuenth of Ihon, when Christ sayth: My tyme is not yet come, tyme is taken for oportunitie of tyme. And lykewyse in the syxt to the Galat. Therfore whyle we haue tyme. &c. Chaunce. The Rethoricianes put chaunce vnder tyme, because the ende of a thynge perteyneth to the time that foloweth: but of thys wyll we speke in the place called Euent. Facultie is a power to do the thynge that is taken in hand: and in coniectures two thinges speciallye be considered: whether he could or wold. Wyll is gathered of hope to performe it, and is made more probable whẽ the nature of the mynde is ioyned to it: as it is not like he wyl abide in his 86 glorye, because he is enuious and ambicious. Also when we counsell one to leaue of vayne mournynge, when it is not in his power to get agayne that is gone.

Proues. So when propositions are found, what remains are arguments or proofs, called in Greek Pistis, because they ensure certainty of a doubtful thing. Two types of proofs. Some proofs are artificiall, while others are unartificial. Vnartificial include prejudgments, 79 rumors, tortures, oaths, witnesses, divination, and oracles. Signs are called authentic proofs, and why is that? These are referred to as the Greeks call Symeia or sygnes: For they are also usually not determined by the intellect of the person debating, but are provided in other ways. Why use signs? They are properly called signs, which arise from the matter itself that is in question and come under the senses of men, Signs refer to time. like threats, which are from the past, cries heard out of a place, which is from the present time, paleness of the person who is questioned about the murder, which is from the future time, or blood that has recently spilled from the body when the murderer appeared. Two types of signs. Also, some signs are necessary, like that he lives who breathes, and some are probable, like blood on the garment, which might also come from the nose, or elsewhere. Proofs based on circumstances. Also, proofs and arguments are taken from circumstances, partly of the person, partly of the cause or thing itself, and are also called by the rhetoricians 80 places, neither entirely contrary to those that Aristotle has taught, nor exactly the same: for some agree with them, some are identical, and some are different. How circumstantial evidence differs from Aristotle's loci. The only difference is the manner of teaching, because the rhetoricians teach a pattern, while the philosopher generally aids judgment. Someone's situation. Circumstances of the person include kinship, nationality, country, kind, age, upbringing or training, physical appearance, fortune, condition, nature of the mind, studies, affections, prior words spoken, and deeds done before, commotion, counsel, and name. Family. Kinship reminds us to consider what lineage a person comes from. For it is fitting, and commonly occurs that children resemble their ancestors, and this leads to reasons for living well or poorly: Nacion Nationality shows what disposition and manners each nation has peculiarly of their own. Kind. The difference in kind is known to everyone: Age. Various ages are suitable for different things. Learning. It matters more who and what ways people are 81 F.e. brought up, than from whom they were born. Looks. Physical appearance encompasses beauty or ugliness, strength or weakness: for accusations of lechery are more credible in a beautiful body than in an ugly one, and violence is more probable in the strong than in the weak. Fortune Fortune pertains to wealth, kinship, friends, servants, dignities, and honors. Condicion. Condition encompasses many things: whether one is noble or not noble, an officer or a private person, a father or a son, a citizen or a stranger, a free man or a servant, a married man or single, a father or none, having had only one wife, or two. The nature of the mind The nature of the mind has manifold varieties in men. Some are fearful, some strong, some gentle, some intense, chaste, lecherous, glorious, modest, etc. Studies Studies show that the manners of the farmer differ from those of the lawyer, from the merchant, from the soldier, from the sailor, and from the physician. Affectacion. They also add affections: for it matters a lot how each person wants to appear—whether he is truly the same or not: as rich or eloquent, just or mighty, cheerful or sad, a favorite of the people, or of the great men. Words spoken and actions taken before Both words spoken beforehand, and deeds done, are also considered. For of past things, the present is assessed, and also things that are yet to come. Chaos Commotion here differs from the nature of the mind because one is perpetual, while the other is temporary: like anger is a commotion, while resentment is the nature of the mind, and fear is a commotion, while fearfulness is the nature.
Name. ¶ They also add the person's name, from which many times an argument is taken: as Cicero jokes a lot about Verres, or the sweeper's name, because being a notorious thief, he "swept" everything away. Thus we have shown that much can be derived from things related to a person, just as it can from those related to a thing or cause, which places are handled by Quintilian, who mixes them with the places that Aristotle has included in his eight 83 F.ii. books of Topics. Circũstaunces of things be these. Circumstances of things include these: cause, place, time, chance, ability, manner. And first, for every thing, there are four causes: efficient, material, formal, and final. Matter is the receptacle of all forms. The form makes it to be this, and not another thing: just as the rational soul grants to the body that it is a man, and the soul because it is a substance has her unnamed form, by which she is a soul, and not an angel. Ultimate purpose. And whatever is made, is made for a certain end, and one thing may have diverse ends: as nature has given breasts to women to provide milk, and also for the beauty of their bodies, nor does any man of sound mind undertake a business except for that he desires to have something: nor is anything desired except under the consideration of good or profit. ¶ So the end which is last in effect, and first in intention, looks toward the acquisition of profits, increase, and confirmation of them, 84 and also upon avoiding losses, diminishing, or putting them away. But in choosing them, false persuasion deceives many, while through error they believe that what is not good is good. ¶ This aspect serves for many things, to increase or decrease. ¶ Greatly fortunate should people be if every man would look at the mark, not the one that desire has set before him, but the one that God and honest reason has defined. ¶ And of such strength is the end, that from this arises the happiness of everything. To fast so that the body may obey the mind, to do good works is a holy deed. To fast to be deemed holy is hypocrisy. To fast to increase one’s wealth is greed. To fast to be whole in body is medicine, and so with praying, almsgiving, and other praiseworthy works. Similarly, the secondary ends must be weighed likewise. Location. Another circumstance of a thing is the place, whose quality often makes the offense either greater or lesser: for to steal a holy object from a holy place is worse than some other kind of theft. 85 F.iii. Time. No less does the quality of time provide material for argument, which signifies two things. Time has two meanings. First, it is taken clearly for the present, past, or future time: second, it signifies the opportunity to do something, and so when a man comes at the right moment, we say he comes in time. And in the seventh of John, when Christ says: My time is not yet come, time is taken for an opportunity. Likewise in the sixth to the Galatians, “Therefore while we have time.” &c. Chaunce. The rhetoricians place chance under time, because the end of a thing pertains to the time that follows: but of this we will speak in the place called Event. Ability is a power to do the thing that is undertaken: and in conjectures, two things are specifically considered: whether he could or would. Will is derived from hope to perform it, and becomes more probable when the nature of the mind is joined to it: as it is unlikely that he will remain in his 86 glory because he is envious and ambitious. Also, when we counsel one to stop vain mourning, when it is not within his power to regain what is lost.

Instrument. Instrument semeth to be a part of facultie: for instrumentes sometyme are cause of oure hablenes to do a thinge: and it is a more mischeuous deede to kyl with venome thẽ with swearde. And to instrumẽt so nie is the manour of doyng, that almoste it is all one. But more properlye perteyne to the manour or fashion, those thynges that be eyther excused, or made greater by wyl: As lesse faute is it to fall into a vice by ignorance or frailtie, then of a purpose and full deliberacion. The vse of circũstances profiteth to amplifie, to extenuate, to euidence, to confirmacion, and probabilitie. And hytherto be referred also the common places that indifferentlye apperteyne to all kyndes and partes of causes, of the whyche Rodulphe entreateth, and Aristotle in his Topyckes. But before we speake of them, it is to be noted, 87 F.iiii. that thys woorde place, is taken foure maner of wayes. They are called common places, because thei be entreated of, of bothe partes, althoughe not in all one cause: as he that is sore spoken agaynste by witnesses, swadeth that we shulde not geue credite to witnesses. Contrarye, he that is holpen by them speaketh in defence of wytnesses, and so of other that we spake of before, when we entreated of vnartificial argumentes. Lyke to thys sorte be sentences, whyche wee exaggerate as it were wythoute the cause, but so that they serue to the cause whiche wee haue in hande: as bee the amplificacions of vertues, and the exaggeracions of vices. As when wee accuse anye manne that by euyll companions he was broughte to do also the mischeuouse deede. ¶ A common place shall bee, wyth wordes to exaggerate howe much it profiteth to keepe goodnesse, to bee in companye wyth good men, and contrarye howe greate myschyefe the companye of euyll men dothe cause.
88 ¶ In the third sence places be called seates of argumentes, whyche the Rethoricianes do applie to eche kyndes of causes: As in the kynde suasorie, honest, profitable, pleasaũt easye, necessarie. &c. In demonstratiue kynde, kynred, contrey, goodes of the bodye and of the mynde. In the Iudiciall kynde, inespecial deniall, those that we spake of euen nowe. The fourth places be general, whych declare what belongeth to euerye thynge, and howe oute of eche of them there be taken argumentes, partly necessary, and partlye probable. These be commen to the Oratours with the Logicians, albeit Aristotle hathe seperatelye written of them in hys Topickes; and in his Rethorickes hathe not touched thẽ, and they profite much both to iudgement, and to endightynge, but the varietie of authors hath made the handlynge of them sumwhat darke, because amonge them selues they can not wel agre, neyther of the names, neyther of the number, neyther of the order.

Instrument. An instrument seems to be a part of our ability: because instruments can sometimes influence our actions. It’s more harmful to kill with poison than with a sword. The way we act and the instrument used are almost the same. More accurately, it relates to the manner or method, which involves things that are either excused or elevated by intention. It is less of a fault to fall into a vice out of ignorance or weakness than it is to do so knowingly and with full intention. The use of circumstances helps to amplify, diminish, clarify, confirm, and provide probability. And also relevant here is the common places that applies equally to all types and aspects of cases, which Rudolphe discusses, as does Aristotle in his Topics. But before we address them, it should be noted, 87 F.iiii. that the word "place" is understood in four different ways. They are called commonplaces, because they are discussed by both sides, even if not in the same case: for example, someone who is accused by witnesses argues that we should not believe witnesses. In contrast, one who is helped by them defends the witnesses, and similarly for other points we mentioned earlier when discussing unartificial arguments. Sentences fit into this category, as they exaggerate without the cause, but serve the current cause at hand: such as the amplifications of virtues and the exaggerations of vices. For instance, when we accuse someone of doing a wicked act due to bad companions.¶ A commonplace would be, with words to exaggerate how beneficial it is to uphold goodness, to associate with good people, and conversely, how harmful the company of bad people can be.
88 ¶ In the third sense, places are called seats of arguments, which rhetoricians apply to all types of cases: such as in persuasive types, honest, beneficial, pleasant, easy, necessary, etc. In the demonstrative type, related to kinship, country, and the well-being of the body and the mind. In the judicial type, particularly denial, those we discussed just now. The fourth places are general, clarifying what pertains to everything, and how arguments can be derived from each, some being necessary, and others probable. These are common to both orators and logicians, although Aristotle has separately written about them in his Topics; and in his Rhetoric, he has not addressed them, but they are quite useful for judgment and crafting arguments, yet the variety of authors has made handling them somewhat confusing, because they do not agree among themselves, neither on the names nor on the number nor on the order.

Examples. An example is a rehearsall of a 89 thynge that is done, and an applyynge of it vnto our cause, eyther for similitude or dissimilitude, profitable to perswade, garnyshe, and delyght. Examples, some be taken out of hystories, some of tales, some of fayned argumẽtes, in comedies; and bothe sortes be dilated by parable and comparacion. Comparacion sheweth it equall, lesse, or bygger. Parable is a feete similitude, whych sheweth y^e example that is brought, either like, vnlyke or cõtrarye. Lyke as Camillus restored the common wealth of the Romaines that was oppressed by the Frenchmen, and when it was brought into extreme losse, by theyr valiauntnesse expelled the Barbariens: So Valla, whan thorowe the ignorãce of y^e Barbarians, learnyng was destroyed, restored it agayn, as it wer from death into hys former brightnes. Vnlike. As not lyke thanke is done to Laurence and Camillus, because that the one moued by vertue wyth the ieopardie of hys lyfe deliuered his contrey from the vngracious, that other styrred vp by desyre 90 of fame, or rather wyth an euyll luste to checke manye, not restored agayn the lattẽ tong oppressed, but brought it as it were into certen rules. Cõtrary, Brutus kylled hys chyldren goyng about treason, Manlius punished by death the valiauntnes of hys sonne. Comparacion sheweth y^e thing y^t is brought, eyther equall, lesse, or bigger: Lesse, as our elders haue warred oftentymes, because theyr marchaũtes and mariners wer euyl entreated. What mynd ought you to be in, so many thousande citizens of Rome slaine at one message, and one time? Equall, as in the same Cicero. ¶ For it happed vnto me to stand for an offyce wyth two gentlemenne, that one very naughte, that other very gentle, yet ouercame I Catiline by dignitie, and Galba by fauoure. Bygger: As for Milo, they saye he shulde not lyue that confesseth he hathe kylled a man, when M. Horacius was quitte, whyche kylled hys owne syster.

Examples. An example is a rehearsal of a 89 thing that has been done, and an application of it to our cause, either for similarity or dissimilarity, useful for persuading, embellishing, and delighting. Examples can be taken from histories, tales, or fictional arguments in comedies; both types can be expanded through parables and comparisons. Comparisons show it as equal, less, or greater. A parable is a figurative similarity that illustrates the example presented, whether it is alike, unlike, or contrary. Just like Camillus restored the Roman Republic, which was oppressed by the French, and when it was brought to the brink of destruction, he bravely expelled the Barbarians: Similarly, Valla, when the ignorance of the Barbarians led to the destruction of learning, restored it as if it were brought back from death to its former glory. Unlike. Unlike the gratitude shown to Laurence and Camillus, because one was motivated by virtue to risk his life to save his country from the wicked, while the other was driven by a desire for fame, or rather a bad lust to reprimand many, did not restore the latter language under oppression, but brought it into certain rules. Contrary, Brutus killed his children while attempting treason, and Manlius punished his son’s bravery with death. Comparacion shows the thing that is brought, either equal, lesser, or greater: Lesser, as our elders have often waged war because their merchants and sailors were mistreated. What mindset should you have, with so many thousands of Roman citizens slain at one message and one time? Equal, as in Cicero. ¶ For it happened to me to stand for an office with two gentlemen, one very bad and the other very good, yet I overcame Catiline by dignity and Galba by favor. Greater: As for Milo, they say he should not live if he confesses to having killed a man, while M. Horatius was acquitted for killing his own sister.

Parable. Parable, which some call similitude, some cõparacion, is a comparyng 91 of a thyng y^t hath no life, or no bodye to our cause and purpose, for some thyng that is lyke or vnlyke. And as example is taken of y^e dede of a man, and the person of an hystorye, or that is fabulous and fayned, so is comparison taken of thinges that be done, or that be ioyned to them by nature, or by chaunce. ¶ As Attilius retournyng agayne to hys enemies is an example of kepynge faythe and promise: But a shyp in the whych the sayles be hoysed vp, or takẽ down after the blowyng of the winde, is a parable whiche teacheth a wyse man to geue place to tyme, and applye hymselfe to the world that is presente. And lyke fashion is of dilatyng a parable, as we haue shewed in example. For sometime it is noted in a word as: Doest thou not vnderstand that the sayles muste be turned? Sometyme it is more largelye declared, as in the oracion for Murena. And if vnto menne that sayle out of the hauen. &c. Analogie.

Parable. A parable, which some call a similitude and others a comparison, is a way of comparing 91 something that isn't alive or lacks a physical form to our situation and purpose, based on something that is similar or different. For example, we take examples from human actions and the characters in a story, whether real or fictional, and comparisons are made from things that happen or are naturally or coincidentally connected to them. ¶ For instance, Attilius returning to his enemies serves as an example of keeping faith and promises. But a ship with its sails raised or lowered according to the wind's direction is a parable that teaches a wise person to adapt to the moment and adjust to the present world. Similarly, parables can be stretched as we've shown in examples. Sometimes it's noted briefly, like: Don’t you understand that the sails need to be adjusted? Other times, it's explained in more detail, as in the speech for Murena. And if they sail out of the harbor. & c. Analogie.

Icon, called of the latines Imago, an Image in Englyshe, is muche 92 lyke to a similitude, and if you declare it is a similitude: as if you saye: As an Asse wyll not be driuen from her meat, no not with a club, vntyl she be full: no more wil a warriour reste from murther vntyll he hath fylled his mynd with it. This is a similitude: but if you saye that a man flewe vpon his enemies like a dragon, or lyke a lyon, it is an Image. Howbeit an Image serueth rather to euidence or grauitie, or iocunditie, then to a profe. There is also a general comparacion, speciallye in the kynde demonstratiue, person wyth person, and one thing with an other, for praise or dispraise

Icon, referred to by the Latins Imago, an Image in English, is much 92 like a simile, and if you explain it as a simile: for instance, if you say: Just as a donkey won't be driven away from its food, not even with a club, until it is full: similarly, a warrior will not stop killing until he is satisfied. This is a simile: but if you say that a man attacked his enemies like a dragon or a lion, that is an Image. However, an Image is more useful for showing evidence or seriousness or humor than for making an argument. There is also a general comparison, especially in the demonstrative kind, comparing one person with another, and one thing with another for praise or criticism.

Indicacio. Indicacio, or authoritie, is the cõparing of an other mans saying or sentence vnto our cause: of the whiche ther be seuen principal kyndes. The fyrst a comon morall sentence, as a common principle perteyning to maners: as continuall laboure ouercommeth all thynges, and as be the sentences of Salomon and Cato: and all morall philosophy is ful of suche sentences. The seconde are common rules, whych be called 93 dignities in euery science. The .iii. a prouerb. The fourth called Chria, which is a very short exposicion of any dede or worde wyth the name of the author recited. The fyfte an Enthimeme, whyche is a sentence of contraries: as if it be a great praise to please good men, surely to please euyl men it is a greate shame. The syxte called AEnos, that is a saying or a sentence, taken out of a tale, as be the interpretacions of fables, and theyr allegories. The seuen is any answere takẽ out of the mouth of God, or taken out of the cõmaundement of God.

Indicacio. Indicatio, or authority, is the comparison of someone else’s words or statements to our cause: there are seven main types of this. The first is a common morall sentence, which is a general principle related to morals: for example, continuous effort can overcome anything, and there are sayings from Solomon and Cato: all moral philosophy is full of such sayings. The second type is common rules, which are called 93 dignities in every field of knowledge. The third is a prouerb. The fourth is called Chria, which is a very brief explanation of any action or word along with the name of the author mentioned. The fifth is an Enthimeme, which is a statement of opposites: for instance, if it’s highly praised to please good people, then to please bad people is truly shameful. The sixth is called AEnos, which is a saying or statement taken from a story, as in the interpretations of fables and their allegories. The seventh is any answer taken from the mouth of God, or drawn from the commandment of God.

Exergasia. Expolicion is, when we tarye in one thynge, speakynge the same in diuerse wordes and fashions, as though it were not one matter but diuerse. A goodlye example of the moste largest expolicion is rehearsed in Erasmus, whych, because it is very profitable, I wyll wholye rehearse it. A wyse man for the cõmon wealth sake shall eschue no peryll: euen for thys cause that it happeneth oftẽ, that wher he wold not 94 dye for the common wealth, he perysheth yet of necessitie wyth the cõmon wealth. And because all the commodities we haue be taken of our contrey, ther ought no incõmoditie to be counted paynfull, taken for our contrey. They therfore that flye that peryll which must be takẽ for the cõmon wealth, do folyshely: for neither can they auoyde it, and they be found vngrate to the citie. But they that by their owne peril put away the perils of their cõtrei, they are to be counted wyse, seyng that bothe they geue to the cõmon wealth that honour y^t they shulde geue, and had rather dye for many, thẽ w^t many. For it is much against reason that receiuing thy naturall lyfe by thy contrey, to deliuer it agayne to nature when she compelleth the, and not to geue it to thy cõtrey when she desyreth the. And where y^u mayst wyth hye valiauntnes & honour die for thy contrei, to haue rather lyke a cowarde to liue in shame. And for thy fryndes and parentes, and other acquayntance to put thy selfe in peryll: for the 95 cõmon wealth in the whyche both it & that most reuerende name of the contrey is conteyned, not to be willynge to come in ieopardye. Wherfore as he is to be dyspised whyche being vpon the sea had rather haue hym selfe safe, then the ship: so is he to be rebuked, whych in ieopardye of the commen wealthe, prouideth more for his own then for y^e cõmon wealthe. When the shyppe hathe ben broken, many haue ben saued: But after the shypwrake of the cõtrey no man can escape. Whyche thynge me thynketh Decius dyd wel perceiue, whych reported wholy to haue bestowed hym selfe, and for the sauegard of his men of war to haue run amonge the myddest of hys enemyes. Wherfore he loste not hys lyfe, but let it go: for he redemed for a thynge of verye small pryce, a ryght dere thyng. He gaue his life, but he receiued his contrei. He loste his life, but he inioyed glorye, whyche written to his greate prayse, shyneth euerye daye more and more. Wherefore if we haue proued both by reason & by exãple, 96 that we be bounde to put oure selfe in peryll for the common wealthe, they are to be counted wyse men, whych for the sauegarde of the contrey auoyde no peryll. It wolde be meete to exercyse chyldren in suche themes, wherby shal be gottẽ bothe wysedome and eloquence. And here me thynketh I maye ryghte well ende these Rethoricall preceptes, although I be not ignoraunt that much helpeth bothe to persuasions and copye, the proper handlyng of tales taken oute of the nature of beastes, dreames, fayned narracions, sumwhat lyke vnto the truth, w^t allegories much vsed of diuines. But because they requyre a longer treatie, for this tyme I leaue them of, addynge vnto these before written rules of oratory, a declamacion

Exergasia. Expolicion is when we focus on one thing, expressing it in different words and styles, as if it's not just one topic but many. A great example of extensive explanation is found in Erasmus, which, because it is very useful, I will recount entirely. A wise person, for the sake of the common good, will not avoid any danger: for it often happens that where he would not want to die for the common good, he ends up perishing by necessity along with it. And since all the benefits we have come from our country, no inconvenience should be considered painful if it is for our country. Therefore, those who flee from the danger that must be faced for the common good are foolish: for they can neither avoid it nor are they seen as grateful to the city. But those who risk their own safety to eliminate the dangers to their country should be regarded as wise, seeing that they both give the common good the honor it deserves and would rather die for many than with many. For it is quite unreasonable that, having received your natural life from your country, you would surrender it back to nature when she forces you, rather than giving it to your country when she desires it. And when you have the chance to die for your country with great valor and honor, would you instead choose to live in shame like a coward? And for the sake of your friends, family, and acquaintances, to put yourself in danger for the common good, which encompasses both it and the most revered name of the country, is to be unwilling to risk yourself. Therefore, just as one should be scorned who, while at sea, would rather keep himself safe than the ship, so too should one be criticized who, in the danger of the common good, cares more for himself than for the commonwealth. When the ship has been wrecked, many may be saved: but after the country is wrecked, no one can escape. I think Decius understood this well, who is said to have entirely devoted himself, running into the midst of his enemies for the safety of his soldiers. He did not lose his life; he let it go: for he redeemed something of very low value with a very precious thing. He gave his life, but he gained his country. He lost his life, but he enjoyed glory, which, written of him for great praise, shines brighter every day. Therefore, if we have proved both by reason and by example that we are bound to put ourselves in danger for the common good, those who do not avoid any peril for the safety of the country should be regarded as wise men. It would be fitting to train children in such themes, through which both wisdom and eloquence can be gained. And here I think I may rightly conclude these rhetorical precepts, although I am not unaware that much aids in both persuasion and abundance, the proper handling of tales drawn from the nature of beasts, dreams, fictitious narratives, somewhat resembling the truth, with allegories commonly used by divines. But because they require a longer discussion, for this time, I leave them off, adding to these previously written rules of oratory, a declamation.

bothe profitable and verye elo-
quente, wrytten by Erasmus
vnto the moste noble Duke
of Cleue, as here appe-
reth after.

both profitable and very eloquent, written by Erasmus to the most noble Duke of Cleve, as it appears hereafter.

232

¶ Impryn-
ted at London by Iohn Day,
dwellinge ouer Aldersgate, beneth
saint Martyns. And are to be sold
at his shop by the litle conduit
in Chepesyde at the sygne
of the Resurrec-
tion.

¶ Printed in London by John Day,
living over Aldersgate, beneath
Saint Martin's. And are to be sold
at his shop by the little conduit
in Cheapside at the sign
of the Resurrection.

Cum priuilegio ad imprimendum
solum. Per septennium.

With permission to print
only. For seven years.

233

INDEX TO AUTHORS AND ORATORS

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Afer, Publius Terentius, 23, 61

Afer, Publius Terentius, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

Africanus, Julius, 58

Africanus, Julius, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Agricola, Rodolphus, 8, 86

Agricola, Rodolphus, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

Antonius, Marcus (143-87 B.C.), 18

Antonius, Marcus (143-87 BCE), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Archias, Aulus, 61

Archias, Aulus, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Aristotle, 80, 82, 86, 88

Aristotle, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__

Augustine, Saint, 14

Saint Augustine, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Brooke, Thomas, 2, 7

Brooke, Thomas, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

Caecina, Aulus, 24

Caecina, Aulus, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Calpurnius, Lucius (Piso), 22

Calpurnius, Lucius (Piso), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Castellio, Sebastianus, 14

Castellio, Sebastian, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Catiline, Lucius, 22, 48, 51, 56, 64, 75, 90

Catiline, Lucius, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_4__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_5__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_6__

Chaucer, Geoffrey, 5

Chaucer, Geoffrey, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Cicero, Marcus Tullius, 10, 17, 18, 19, 20, 22, 23, 24, 33, 39, 41, 48, 49, 50, 51, 56, 58, 59, 61, 62, 64, 68, 75, 77, 78, 82, 90

Cicero, Marcus Tullius, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_4__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_5__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_6__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_7__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_8__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_9__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_10__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_11__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_12__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_13__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_14__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_15__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_16__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_17__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_18__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_19__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_20__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_21__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_22__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_23__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_24__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_25__, 90

Cluencius, Aulus, 22, 33

Cluencius, Aulus, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

Elyot, Thomas, 5

Elyot, Thomas, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Erasmus, Desiderius, 1, 10, 77, 93, 96, 97

Erasmus, Desiderius, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_4__, 97

Flaccus, Lucius, 58

Flaccus, Lucius, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Gower, John, 5

Gower, John, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Homer, 76

Homer, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Ligarius, Quintus, 49

Ligarius, Quintus, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Linacre, Thomas, 29

Linacre, Thomas, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Livy, Titus, 65, 69

Livy, Titus, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

Lydgate, John, 5

Lydgate, John, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Manilius, Gaius, 24, 59

Manilius, Gaius, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

Marcellus, Marcus Claudius, 24

Marcellus, Marcus Claudius, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Milo, Titus Annius, 22, 75, 90

Milo, Titus Annius, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__

Mosellanus, Petrus (Peter Schade), 9

Mosellanus, Petrus (Peter Schade), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Murena, Lucius, 91

Murena, Lucius, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Ovid, 53

Ovid, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Plautus, Titus, 23

Plautus, Titus, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Plutarch, 86

Plutarch, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Quintilian, 10, 18, 37, 39, 62, 69, 82

Quintilian, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_4__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_5__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_6__

Quintus, Caius, 23

Quintus, Caius, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Rabirius, Gaius, 22

Rabirius, Gaius, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Roscius, Quintus, 23

Roscius, Quintus, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Sallust, Gaius, 65

Sallust, Gaius, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Sestius, Publius, 51

Sestius, Publius, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Sulla, Lucius, 22

Sulla, Lucius, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Suetonius, Gaius, 66

Suetonius, Gaius, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Vergil, 29, 30, 40, 44, 67, 69

Vergil, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_4__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_5__

Verres, Gaius, 22, 71, 82

Verres, Gaius, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__

Westimerus, Bartholomew (Westheimer), 14

Westimerus, Bartholomew (Westheimer), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Wyatt, Thomas, 6

Wyatt, Thomas, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

234

INDEX OF FIGURES

Links in this section lead directly to the referenced word. In general, Greek-derived terms are in sidenotes, and Latin-derived terms are printed in different type. English terms appear either in the body text (generally uncapitalized) or as section headers.

Links in this section lead straight to the referenced word. Generally, Greek-derived terms are in sidenotes, and Latin-derived terms are printed in a different style. English terms appear either in the body text (typically uncapitalized) or as section headers.

Ablatio, 26 Ablation, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Absissio, 27 Absissio, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Abusio, 41 Abuse, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Acyrologia, 32 Acyrologia, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Adagium, 45 Adage, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Aenigma, 45 Aenigma, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Aenos, 93 Aenos, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Aetopeia, 67, 69 Aetopeia, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__ Allegoria, 45 Allegory, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Amara irrisio, 46 Amara laugh, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Ambiguitas, 33 Ambiguity, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Amphibologia, 33 Amphibology, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Amplificacio, 70, 76 Amplification, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__ Anacinosis, 55 Anacinosis, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Anaclasis, 60 Anaclasis, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Anadiplosis, 48 Anadiplosis, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Analogia, 37, 91 Analogy, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__ Anangeon, 60 Anangeon, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Anastrophe, 31 Anastrophe, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__	Antiphora, 53 Antiphora, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Antiphrasis, 46 Antiphrasis, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Antiptosis, 31 Antiptosis, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Antisthecon, 28 Antisthecon, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Antithesis, 56 Antithesis, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Antitheton, 56 Antithesis, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Antistrophe, 47 Antistrophe, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Antonomasia, 44 Antonomasia, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Apheresis, 26 Apheresis, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Apocope, 27 Apocope, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Apophasis, 54 Apophasis, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Aporia, 54 Aporia, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Apostrophe, 60 Apostrophe, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Appositio, 26, 30 Apposition, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__ Areia, 51 Areia, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Articulus, 57 Articulus, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Aschematiston, 35 Aschematiston, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Aschrologia, 34 Aschrologia, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Asindeton, 59 Asyndeton, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Astrothesiam, 69 Astrothesiam, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Astysmus, 46 Astysmus, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Auersio, 60 Auersio, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Barbarie, 35 Barbarie, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Barbarismus, 36 Barbarism, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Bomphiologia, 61 Bomphiologia, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Cacosintheton, 35 Cacosintheton, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Cacozelia, 34 Cacozelia, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Casus pro casu, 31 Case by case, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Catachresis, 41 Catachresis, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Charactirismus, 66 Charactirismus, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Charientismus, 46 Charientismus, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Chria, 93 Chria, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Chronographia, 69 Chronographia, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Circuicio, 44 Circuicio, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Circumstances of thynges, 83 Circumstances of things, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Climax, 58 Climax, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ 235 Colon, 57 Colon, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Commonplaces, 86 Commonplaces, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Common rules, 92 Common rules, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Communicacio, 55 Communication, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__	Compar, 57 Compar, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Comparison, 71, 75, 90 Comparison, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__ Complexio, 47 Complexion, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Composicion, 38 Composition, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Concepcio, 30 Conception, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Conclusio, 55 Conclusion, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Consicio, 27 Consortium, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Construccion, 28 Construcción, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Contentio, 56 Contentio, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Contractio, 27 Contractio, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Contraries, 76 Contradictions, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Contrarium, 56 Contrarium, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Conuersio, 47 Convergence, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Correction, 70 Correction, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Cosmographie, 69 Cosmography, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Cumulatio, 35 Cumulatio, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Deesis, 51 Deesis, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Defectus, 31 Defect, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Definicio, 58 Definition, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Definicion, 45 Definition, 45 Delecio, 28 Delecio, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Description, 66, 69 Description, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__ Dialisis, 55 Dialysis, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Dialogismus, 69 Dialogism, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Dialyton, 57 Dialyton, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Dianoias, 25 Dianoias, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Diasirmus, 61 Diasirmus, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Diazeugma, 30 Diazeugma, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__	Diccion, 26 Diccion, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Dictio contrarium significans, 46 Contradictory meaning, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Diminutio, 61 Diminution, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Disiunctio, 30 Disjunction, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Dissectio, 31 Dissection, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Dissimulatio, 45 Dissimulation, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Dissolutio, 59 Dissolution, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Distribucion, 62 Distribución, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Diuisio, 55 Diuisio, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Donysis, 68 Donysis, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Dubitatio, 54 Dubitatio, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Eclipsis, 31 Eclipses, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Ectasis, 27 Ectasis, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Effiguracion, 66 Effigy, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Eleuacio, 61 Eleuacio, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Eloquucion, 17 Eloquucion, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Energia, 66 Energy, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Enthimeme, 93 Enthimeme, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Enumeracio, 63 Enumerate, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Epanaphora, 47 Epanaphora, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Epanodus, 48 Epanodus, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Epenthesis, 27 Epenthesis, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Epergesis, 30 Epergesis, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Epilogus, 55 Epilogue, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Epiphonesis, 50 Epiphonesis, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Epiplexis, 51 Epiplexis, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Epitrope, 55 Epitrope, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__	Erotema, 52 Erotema, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Erotesis, 51 Erotesis, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Etymologie, 45 Etymology, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Euche, 51 Euche, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Exaggeration, 71 Exaggeration, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Example, 74, 75, 88 Understood! Please provide the text you'd like to modernize. Exclamacio, 50 Exclamation, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Execracio, 51 Execration, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Exergasia, 93 Exergasia, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Exornacion, 39 Exornation, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ 236 Expeditio, 54 Expedition, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Expolicion, 93 Explication, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Extensio, 27, 37 Extensio, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__ Extenuatio, 61 Extenuation, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Faute (fault), 32; Fault, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; obscure, 32; obscure, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; inordinate, 34; excessive, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; barbarous, 35 barbaric, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Festiua urbanitas, 46 Urban festival, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Ficcion, 72 Fiction, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Frequentacio, 50 Frequent visits, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Fygure, of scheme, 25; Fygure, of scheme, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; of diccion, 26; of diction, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; of words, 26; of words, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; of construction, 28; of construction, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; rethoricall, 47; rhetorically, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; of sentences, 62 of sentences, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__	Garnyshyng, 38 Garnishing, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Geographie, 69 Geography, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Graciosa nugatio, 46 Graciosa joke, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Gradacio, 58 Gradation, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Homiologia, 33 Homiologia, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Homioptoton, 58 Homioptoton, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Homotelento, 58 Homotelento, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Humiliatio, 34 Humiliation, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Hyperbaton, 30 (last line) Hyperbaton, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Hyperbole, 71 Hyperbole, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Hypozeugma, 29 Hypozeugma, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Hysterologia, 31 Hysterology, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Icon, 91 Icon, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Image, 91 Image, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Improprietas, 32 Impropriety, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Inconueniens structura, 36 Inconvenient structure, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Increase, 71 Increase, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Increpacio, 51 Increpation, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Indicacio, 92 Indication, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Iniunctio, 29 Iniunctio, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Inordinate, 34 Excessive, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Intellectio, 42 Intellect, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__	Interpositio, 27, 31 Interposition, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__ Interrogacio, 51 Interrogation, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Inuencion, 77; Invention, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; proposicions, 77; propositions, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; artificial proues, 78; artificial prowess, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; unartificial proues, 79, 80; unnatural skills, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; circumstances of thynges, 83; circumstances of things, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; commonplaces, 86 common topics, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Ironia, 45 Irony, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Isocolon, 57 Isocolon, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Iunctio, 29 Iunctio, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Lexeos, 25, 26 Lexeos, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__ Liptote, 61 Liptote, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Littera pro littera, 28 Letter for letter, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Macrologia, 34 Macrologia, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Mala affectatio, 34 Mala affectation, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Male collocatum, 35 Male collocatum, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Male figuratum, 35 Male figure, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Media iunctio, 29 Media iunctio, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Membrum oracionis, 57 Membrane of the sentence, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Mesozeugma, 29 Mesozeugma, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__	Metabasis, 59 Metabasis, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Metalepsis, 41 Metalepsis, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Metaphora, 40 Metaphor, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Metonomia, 42 Metonymy, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Mimisis, 69 Mimisis, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Miosis, 61 Miosis, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Morall sentence, 92 Moral of the story, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Mouth of God, 93 Mouth of God, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ 237 Mycterismus, 46 Mycterismus, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Necessum, 60 Necessity, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Nominis communio, 49 Nominations community, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__	Obscure, 32 Obscure, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Obtestacio, 51 Obtestatio, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Occupatia, 59 Occupatia, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Oictros, 68 Oictros, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Orismus, 58 Orismus, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Parable, 90 Parable, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Paralepsis, 59 Paralepsis, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Paremia, 45 Paremia, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Parenthesis, 31 Parentheses, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Particio, 62 Particio, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Pathopeia, 68, 69 Pathopeia, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__ Periergia, 33 Periergia, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Periphrasis, 44 Periphrasis, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Perissologia, 32 Perissologia, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Permissio, 55 Permission, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Pistis, 78 Pistis, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Pleonasmus, 32 Pleonasm, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Postiunctio, 29 Postiunctio, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Preassumpcio, 27 Preconception, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Preiunctio, 29 Preemption, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Prepostera loquutio, 31 Preposterous talk, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Presozeugma, 29 Presozeugma, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Presumpcio, 28 Assumption, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__	Probacions, 78 Probation, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Prolepsis, 28 Prolepsis, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Pronominacio, 44 Pronominacio, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Proparalepsis, 27 Proparalepsis, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Proportio, 37 Proportio, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Proposicions, 77 Proposals, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Proprietie, 37 Property, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Prosapodosis, 53 Prosapodosis, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Prosopographia, 66 Prosopography, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Prosopopeia, 66, 67, 69 Prosopopeia, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__ Prosthesis, 26 Prosthetic, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Prouerb, 93 Proverb, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Proues (proof), 78-90 Proues (proof), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Raciocinatio, 52 Raciocinatio, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Reasonynge, 76 Reasoning, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Reduplicatio, 48 Reduplicatio, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Refractio, 60 Refractive, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__	Repeticio, 47; Repetition, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; inutilis, 33 inutilis, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Rethoricall, figures, 47; Rhetorical figures, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; diuision, 62 division, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Reuersio, 31 Reversal, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Sarcasmus, 46 Sarcasm, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Scheme, 3, 25; Plan, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__; faute of, 32; lack of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; vertue of, 37 virtue of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Sedulitas superflua, 33 Unnecessary diligence, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Sentence, figures of, 62 Sentence, figures of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Sermo, superfluus, 32; Talk is cheap, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; ubique sui similis, 33; everywhere like himself, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; obscurus, 45 obscurus, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Silepsis, 30 Silepsis, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Similiter cadens, 58; Similiter falling, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; desinens, 58 desinens, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Similitudes, 74 Similarities, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Sinathrismus, 50 Sinathrismus, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Sinonimia, 49 Sinonimia, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Sinthesis, 38 Synthesis, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__	Solecismus, 36 Solecism, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Soraismus, 35 Soraismus, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Style, kinds, 21; Style, types, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; greate, 22; great, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; small, 23; small, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; meane, 24 meanie, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ 238 Subsannatio, 46 Subsannatio, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Subiectio, 53 Subjection, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Superabundancia, 32 Super abundance, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Sygnes, 45, 79 Sygnes, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__ Symeia, 79 Symeia, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Symploce, 47 Symploce, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Syncope, 27 Fainting, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Synecdoche, 42 Synecdoche, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Synolephe, 28 Synolephe, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Systole, 27 Systole, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__
Tapinosis, 34 Tapinosis, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Tacite objectioni responsio, 53 Tacite response to objections, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Tasis, 37 Tasis, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Tautologia, 33 Tautology, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Tmesis, 31 Tmesis, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Topotesia, 69 Topotesia, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Traduccio, 48 Translation, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Transgressio, 30 Transgression, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Transicio, 59 Transicio, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Translatio, 40 Translating, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Transposicio, 28 Transposition, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Transsumptio, 41 Transmutation, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Tropes, 3, 39-46 Tropes, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__ Turpis loquutio, 34 Turpis talk, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__	Verborum bombus, 61 Word buzz, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Votum, 51 Vote, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Worde, 26; Word, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; compound, 19; compound, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; simple, 19 easy, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Zeugma, 29 Zeugma, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Dedication

To the ryght worshyp
ful Master Thomas Brooke
Esquire, Rychard Shyrrey
wysheth health euer-
lastynge.

To the esteemed
Thomas Brooke
Esquire, Richard Shyrrey
wishes you lasting health.

Figures and Tropes

¶ A briefe note of eloquciõ, the third
parte of Rhetoricke, wherunto
all Figures and Tropes be
referred.

¶ A brief note on eloquence, the third
part of Rhetoric, to which
all figures and tropes are
referred.

Notes on the Text

Paragraphs

Some paragraph breaks in this e-text are conjectural. The printed book had the following kinds of breaks:

Some paragraph breaks in this e-text are uncertain. The printed book had these types of breaks:

conventional paragraph with indented first line

unambiguous paragraph with non-indented first line

ambiguous paragraph: previous line ends with blank space, but the space is not large enough to contain the first syllable of the following line

sentence break corresponds to line break: this happens randomly in any printed book, and only becomes ambiguous when the book also has non-indented paragraphs

sentence break corresponds to line break: this happens randomly in any printed book, and only becomes unclear when the book also has non-indented paragraphs

In this e-text, the second type of paragraph is marked with a simple line break (no extra space) and pilcrow ¶. The third type has a pilcrow ¶ but no line break. The fourth type is not marked.

In this e-text, the second type of paragraph is marked with a simple line break (no extra space) and a pilcrow ¶. The third type has a pilcrow ¶ but no line break. The fourth type is unmarked.

Transcriber’s Footnote

* homotelento, -teleto:
In the facsimile edition, the body text has homoteleto but the Index has homotelento. In the other available text, the body text has homotelẽto with clear overline. The correct form is “homeoteleuton” (in this book’s spelling, probably “homioteleuton”).

* homotelento, -teleto:
In the copy edition, the body text uses homoteleto but the Index uses homotelento. In the other available text, the body text has homotelẽto with a distinct overline. The correct form is "homeoteleuton" (spelled as "homioteleuton" in this book).

Spelling

The pattern of initial v, non-initial u is followed consistently.

The pattern of initial v and non-initial u is followed consistently.

The spelling “they” is more common than “thei”.

The spelling “they” is more common than “thei.”

The form “then” is normally used for both “then” and “than”; “than” is rare.

The form “then” is usually used for both “then” and “than”; “than” is uncommon.

The most common spelling is “wyll”, but “wyl”, “wil” and “will” also occur.

The most common spelling is “wyll,” but “wyl,” “wil,” and “will” also appear.

Word Division

Line-end hyphens were completely arbitrary; words split at line break were hyphenated about two-thirds of the time. The presence or absence of a hyphen has not been noted. Hyphenless words at line-end were joined or separated depending on behavior elsewhere in the text:

Line-end hyphens were totally random; words split at line breaks were hyphenated about two-thirds of the time. Whether a hyphen was used or not wasn't documented. Words without hyphens at the end of lines were either joined or separated based on their usage elsewhere in the text:

Always one word (re-joined at line break): som(e)what, without, afterward(e)s

Always one word: somewhat, without, afterwards

Usually one word: often( )times, what( )so( )euer

Usually one word: often, whatever

One or two words: an( )other

another

Usually two words: it/him/my...( )self/selues; shal( )be; straight( )way

Typically two words: it/him/my...( )self/selves; shall( )be; straight( )way

Always two words: here to

here to

Roman Numerals

Numbers were printed with leading and following .period. When the number came at the beginning or end of a line, the “outer” period was sometimes omitted. These have been supplied for consistency.

Numbers were printed with leading and following periods. When the number was at the start or end of a line, the “outer” period was sometimes left out. These have been added for consistency.

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