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Front cover



Contributions from

The Museum of History and Technology:

Paper 3




The Start of Affordable Steel


Philip W. Bishop






STEEL BEFORE THE 1850's 29
BESSEMER AND HIS COMPETITORS 30
ROBERT MUSHET 33
EBBW VALE AND THE BESSEMER PROCESS 35
MUSHET AND BESSEMER 37
WILLIAM KELLY'S AIR-BOILING PROCESS 42
CONCLUSIONS 46

 


 

THE BEGINNINGS OF CHEAP STEEL

By Philip W. Bishop


 

Other inventors claimed a part in the invention of the Bessemer process of making steel. Here, the contemporary discussion in the technical press is re-examined to throw light on the relations of these various claimants to the iron and steel industry of their time, as having a possible connection with the antagonism shown by the ironmasters toward Bessemer's ideas.

Other inventors asserted their involvement in the creation of the Bessemer process for making steel. In this section, the current dialogue in the technical press is revisited to shed light on the relationships of these various claimants to the iron and steel industry of their era, potentially linking to the opposition that the ironmasters had toward Bessemer's ideas.

The Author: Philip W. Bishop is curator of arts and manufactures, Museum of History and Technology, in the Smithsonian Institution's United States National Museum.

The Writer: Philip W. Bishop is the curator of arts and manufacturing at the Museum of History and Technology, part of the Smithsonian Institution's National Museum of American History.

 

The development of the world's productive resources during the 19th century, accelerated in general by major innovations in the field of power, transportation, and textiles, was retarded by the occurrence of certain bottlenecks. One of these affected the flow of suitable and economical raw materials to the machine tool and transportation industries: in spite of a rapid growth of iron production, the methods of making steel remained as they were in the previous century; and outputs remained negligible.

The development of the world's productive resources during the 19th century, generally boosted by major innovations in power, transportation, and textiles, was hindered by certain bottlenecks. One of these issues impacted the supply of affordable and suitable raw materials to the machine tool and transportation industries: despite a rapid increase in iron production, the techniques for making steel were still the same as in the previous century, and the production levels remained minimal.

In the decade 1855-1865, this situation was completely changed in Great Britain and in Europe generally; and when the United States emerged from the Civil War, that country found itself in a position to take advantage of the European innovations and to start a period of growth which, in the next 50 years, was to establish her as the world's largest producer of steel.

In the years 1855-1865, this situation changed dramatically in Great Britain and Europe as a whole; and when the United States came out of the Civil War, it found itself positioned to capitalize on European innovations and begin a growth period that would, over the next 50 years, establish it as the world's largest steel producer.

This study reviews the controversy as to the origin of the process which, for more than 35 years1 provided the greater part of the steel production of the United States. It concerns four men for whom priority of invention in one or more aspects of the process has been claimed.

This study examines the debate regarding the origin of the process that, for over 35 yearsBelow , was responsible for most of the steel production in the United States. It involves four individuals who have been credited with priority of invention in one or more aspects of the process.

The process consists in forcing through molten cast iron, held in a vessel called a converter, a stream of cold air under pressure. The combination of the oxygen in the air with the silicon and carbon in the metal raises the temperature of the latter in a spectacular way and after "blowing" for a certain period, eliminates the carbon from the metal. Since steel of various qualities demands the inclusion of from 0.15 to 1.70 percent of carbon, the blow has to be terminated before the elimination of the whole carbon content; or if the carbon content has been eliminated the appropriate percentage of carbon has to be put back. This latter operation is carried out by adding a precise quantity of manganiferous pig-iron (spiegeleisen) or ferromanganese, the manganese serving to remove the oxygen, which has combined with the iron during the blow.

The process involves pushing cold air under pressure through molten cast iron in a vessel called a converter. The oxygen in the air reacts with the silicon and carbon in the metal, dramatically raising its temperature, and after "blowing" for a set time, it removes the carbon from the metal. Since different types of steel require carbon content between 0.15 and 1.70 percent, the blowing must stop before all the carbon is removed; if the carbon is fully eliminated, the correct amount of carbon must be added back in. This is done by adding a specific amount of manganiferous pig iron (spiegeleisen) or ferromanganese, with the manganese helping to remove the oxygen that combined with the iron during the blowing process.

The controversy which surrounded its development concerned two aspects of the process: The use of the cold air blast to raise the temperature of the molten metal, and the application of manganese to overcome the problem of control of the carbon and oxygen content.

The controversy surrounding its development involved two aspects of the process: using cold air blast to increase the temperature of the molten metal and applying manganese to address the issue of controlling the carbon and oxygen content.

Bessemer, who began his experiments in the making of iron and steel in 1854, secured his first patent in Great Britain in January 1855, and was persuaded to present information about his discovery to a meeting of the British Association for the Advancement of Science held at Cheltenham, Gloucestershire, in August 1856. His title "The Manufacture of Iron without Fuel" was given wide publicity in Great Britain and in the United States. Among those who wrote to the papers to contest Bessemer's theories were several claimants to priority of invention.

Bessemer, who started his experiments on making iron and steel in 1854, got his first patent in Great Britain in January 1855. He was encouraged to share details about his discovery at a meeting of the British Association for the Advancement of Science in Cheltenham, Gloucestershire, in August 1856. The title "The Manufacture of Iron without Fuel" received significant attention in both Great Britain and the United States. Several people who claimed to have invented it before him wrote to newspapers to challenge Bessemer's theories.

Two men claimed that they had anticipated Bessemer in the invention of a method of treating molten metal with air-blasts for the purpose of "purifying" or decarbonizing iron. Both were Americans. Joseph Gilbert Martien, of Newark, New Jersey, who at the time of Bessemer's address was working at the plant of the Ebbw Vale Iron Works, in South Wales, secured a provisional patent a few days before Bessemer obtained one of his series of patents for making cast steel, a circumstance which provided ammunition for those who wished to dispute Bessemer's somewhat spectacular claims. William Kelly, an ironmaster of Eddyville, Kentucky, brought into action by an American report of Bessemer's British Association paper, opposed the granting of a United States patent to Bessemer and substantiated, to the satisfaction of the Commissioner of Patents, his claim to priority in the "air boiling" process.

Two men claimed they had anticipated Bessemer in creating a method for treating molten metal with air blasts to "purify" or decarbonize iron. Both were Americans. Joseph Gilbert Martien from Newark, New Jersey, who was working at the Ebbw Vale Iron Works in South Wales when Bessemer gave his address, secured a provisional patent just a few days before Bessemer got one of his series of patents for making cast steel. This situation provided evidence for those who wanted to challenge Bessemer's somewhat dramatic claims. William Kelly, an ironmaster from Eddyville, Kentucky, motivated by an American report on Bessemer's paper from the British Association, opposed granting Bessemer a U.S. patent and successfully proved to the Commissioner of Patents that he had priority in the "air boiling" process.

A third man, this one a Scot resident in England, intervened to claim that he had devised the means whereby Martien's and Bessemer's ideas could be made practical. He was Robert Mushet of Coleford, Gloucestershire, a metallurgist and self-appointed "sage" of the British iron and steel industry who also was associated with the Ebbw Vale Iron Works as a consultant. He, like his American contemporaries, has become established in the public mind as one upon whom Henry Bessemer was dependent for the origin and success of his process. Since Bessemer was the only one of the group to make money from the expansion of the steel industry consequent upon the introduction of the new technique, the suspicion has remained that he exploited the inventions of the others, if indeed he did not steal them.

A third man, a Scot living in England, stepped in to say that he had figured out how to make Martien's and Bessemer's ideas work in practice. He was Robert Mushet from Coleford, Gloucestershire, a metallurgist and self-proclaimed "expert" of the British iron and steel industry who also worked as a consultant for the Ebbw Vale Iron Works. Like his American peers, he has been viewed by the public as someone on whom Henry Bessemer relied for the creation and success of his process. Since Bessemer was the only one among them to profit from the growth of the steel industry that followed the introduction of the new technique, there has been a lingering suspicion that he took advantage of the inventions of others, if he didn't outright steal them.

In this study, based largely upon the contemporary discussion in the technical press, the relation of the four men to each other is re-examined and an attempt is made to place the controversy of 1855-1865 in focus. The necessity for a reappraisal arises from the fact that today's references to the origin of Bessemer steel2 often contain chronological and other inaccuracies arising in many cases from a dependence on secondary and sometimes unreliable sources. As a result, Kelly's contribution has, perhaps, been overemphasized, with the effect of derogating from the work of another American, Alexander Lyman Holley, who more than any man is entitled to credit for establishing Bessemer steel in America.3

In this study, which heavily draws on current discussions in the technical press, the relationships between the four men are re-examined, and an effort is made to clarify the controversy from 1855 to 1865. The need for a fresh look comes from the fact that today’s references to the origin of Bessemer steel2 often include chronological and other inaccuracies, often because of reliance on secondary and sometimes unreliable sources. Consequently, Kelly's role might have been overstated, which undermines the contributions of another American, Alexander Lyman Holley, who rightfully deserves recognition for establishing Bessemer steel in America.3

Steel Before the 1850's

Steel Before the 1850s

In spite of a rapid increase in the use of machines and the overwhelming demand for iron products for the expanding railroads, the use of steel had expanded little prior to 1855. The methods of production were still largely those of a century earlier. Slow preparation of the steel by cementation or in crucibles meant a disproportionate consumption of fuel and a resulting high cost. Production in small quantities prevented the adoption of steel in uses which required large initial masses of metal. Steel was, in fact, a luxury product.

Despite the rapid rise in machine usage and the huge demand for iron products for the growing railroads, the use of steel had barely increased before 1855. The production methods were still mainly the same as they were a century earlier. The slow process of making steel through cementation or in crucibles led to excessive fuel consumption and high costs. Producing it in small amounts stopped steel from being used in applications that needed large quantities of metal. Steel was, in fact, a luxury item.

The work of Réaumur and, especially, of Huntsman, whose development of cast steel after 1740 secured an international reputation for Sheffield, had established the cementation and crucible processes as the primary source of cast steel, for nearly 100 years. Josiah Marshall Heath's patents of 1839, were the first developments in the direction of cheaper steel, his process leading to a reduction of from 30 to 40 percent in the price of good steel in the Sheffield market.4 Heath's secret was the addition to the charge of from 1 to 3 percent of carburet of manganese5 as a deoxidizer. Heath's failure to word his patent so as to cover also his method of producing carburet of manganese led to the effective breakdown of that patent and to the general adoption of his process without payment of license or royalty. In spite of this reduction in the cost of its production, steel remained, until after the midpoint of the century, an insignificant item in the output of the iron and steel industry, being used principally in the manufacture of cutlery and edge tools.

The work of Réaumur and, especially, Huntsman, whose development of cast steel after 1740 gave Sheffield an international reputation, had established the cementation and crucible processes as the main sources of cast steel for nearly 100 years. Josiah Marshall Heath's patents from 1839 were the first steps towards cheaper steel, with his process reducing the price of quality steel in the Sheffield market by 30 to 40 percent.4 Heath's secret was adding 1 to 3 percent of manganese carbide5 as a deoxidizer. Heath's failure to phrase his patent to also cover how he produced manganese carbide led to the effective breakdown of that patent, allowing his process to be widely adopted without payment of license or royalty. Despite the reduction in production costs, steel remained a minor product in the iron and steel industry until after the midpoint of the century, mainly used for making cutlery and edge tools.

The stimulus towards new methods of making steel and, indeed, of making new steels came curiously enough from outside the established industry, from a man who was not an ironmaster—Henry Bessemer. The way in which Bessemer challenged the trade was itself unusual. There are few cases in which a stranger to an industry has taken the risk of giving a description of a new process in a public forum like a meeting of the British Association for the Advancement of Science. He challenged the trade, not only to attack his theories but to produce evidence from their own plants that they could provide an alternative means of satisfying an emergent demand. Whether or not Bessemer is entitled to claim priority of invention, one can but agree with the ironmaster who said:6 "Mr. Bessemer has raised such a spirit of enquiry throughout ... the land as must lead to an improved system of manufacture."

The push for new ways to make steel, and even to create new types of steel, surprisingly came from outside the established industry, from a man who wasn't an ironmaster—Henry Bessemer. Bessemer's approach to challenging the industry was quite unique. There are few instances where someone outside an industry has taken the risk of publicly sharing a new process at a meeting of the British Association for the Advancement of Science. He dared the industry not only to dispute his theories but to provide evidence from their own facilities that they could fulfill a growing demand in different ways. Whether or not Bessemer can claim to be the first to invent this method, one can agree with the ironmaster who said:6 "Mr. Bessemer has raised such a spirit of inquiry throughout ... the land as must lead to an improved system of manufacture."

Bessemer and his Competitors

Bessemer and His Competitors

Henry Bessemer (1813-1898), an Englishman of French extraction, was the son of a mechanical engineer with a special interest in metallurgy. His environment and his unusual ability to synthesize his observation and experience enabled Bessemer to begin a career of invention by registering his first patent at the age of 25. His active experimenting continued until his death, although the public record of his results ended with a patent issued on the day before his seventieth birthday. A total of 117 British patents7 bear his name, not all of them, by any means, successful in the sense of producing a substantial income. Curiously, Bessemer's financial stability was assured by the success of an invention he did not patent. This was a process of making bronze powder and gold paint, until the 1830's a secret held in Germany. Bessemer's substitute for an expensive imported product, in the then state of the patent laws, would have failed to give him an adequate reward if he had been unable to keep his process secret. To assure this reward, he had to design, assemble, and organize a plant capable of operation with a minimum of hired labor and with close security control. The fact that he kept the method secret for 40 years, suggests that his machinery8 (Bessemer describes it as virtually automatic in operation) represented an appreciation of coordinated design greatly in advance of his time. His experience must have directly contributed to his conception of his steel process not as a metallurgical trick but as an industrial process; for when the time came, Bessemer patented his discovery as a process rather than as a formula.

Henry Bessemer (1813-1898), an Englishman of French descent, was the son of a mechanical engineer with a keen interest in metallurgy. His surroundings and his unique ability to combine observation and experience allowed Bessemer to start a career in invention by securing his first patent at the age of 25. He continued to experiment actively until his death, although the public record of his results concluded with a patent issued the day before his seventieth birthday. A total of 117 British patents bear his name, not all of them, by any means, successful in terms of generating significant income. Interestingly, Bessemer's financial security came from the success of an invention he didn’t patent. This was a method for making bronze powder and gold paint, which until the 1830s was a secret held in Germany. Bessemer's alternative to an expensive imported product, given the state of patent laws at the time, would not have provided him with adequate compensation had he not managed to keep his process confidential. To ensure this compensation, he had to design, build, and organize a facility that could operate with minimal hired labor and strict security measures. The fact that he kept the method secret for 40 years suggests that his machinery (Bessemer describes it as nearly automatic in operation) showed a level of coordinated design well ahead of his time. His experience likely played a key role in his view of his steel process not as a metallurgical gimmick but as an industrial method; when the opportunity arose, Bessemer patented his discovery as a process rather than a formula.

In the light of subsequent developments, it is necessary to consider Bessemer's attitude toward the patent privilege. He describes his secret gold paint as an example of "what the public has had to pay for not being able to give ... security to the inventor" in a situation where the production of the material "could not be identified as having been made by any particular form of mechanism."9 The inability to obtain a patent over the method of production meant that the disclosure of his formula, necessary for patent specification, would openly invite competitors, including the Germans, to evolve their own techniques. Bessemer concludes:10

In light of recent developments, it’s important to look at Bessemer's view on patent rights. He talks about his secret gold paint as an example of "what the public has had to pay for not being able to protect ... the inventor" when the production of the material "couldn't be traced to any specific type of machinery." 9 The inability to secure a patent for the production method meant that sharing his formula, which was needed for the patent application, would directly encourage competitors, including the Germans, to create their own methods. Bessemer concludes: 10

Had the invention been patented, it would have become public property in fourteen years from the date of the patent, after which period the public would have been able to buy bronze powder at its present [i.e., ca. 1890] market price, viz. from two shillings and three pence to two shillings and nine pence per pound. But this important secret was kept for about thirty-five years and the public had to pay excessively high prices for twenty-one years longer than they would have done had the invention become public property in fourteen years, as it would have been if patented. Even this does not represent all the disadvantages resulting from secret manufacture. While every detail of production was a profound secret, there were no improvements made by the outside public in any one of the machines employed during the whole thirty-five years; whereas during the fourteen years, if the invention had been patented, there would, in all probability have been many improved machines invented and many novel features applied to totally different manufactures.

If the invention had been patented, it would have become public property fourteen years after the patent date, at which point the public could have purchased bronze powder at its current [i.e., ca. 1890] market price, which is between two shillings and three pence to two shillings and nine pence per pound. However, this crucial secret was kept for about thirty-five years, causing the public to pay excessively high prices for twenty-one years longer than they would have if the invention had been made public in fourteen years, as it would have been had it been patented. This situation doesn't even capture all the disadvantages of keeping production a secret. While every production detail was a closely guarded secret, no improvements were made by outsiders to any of the machines used throughout those thirty-five years. If the invention had been patented, it’s likely that many improved machines would have been invented and many new features would have been applied to completely different manufacturing processes within the fourteen-year period.

While these words, to some extent, were the rationalizations of an old man, Bessemer's career showed that his philosophy had a practical foundation; and, if this was indeed his belief, the episode explains in large measure Bessemer's later insistence on the legal niceties of the patent procedure. The effect of this will be seen.

While these words were, to some degree, the justifications of an old man, Bessemer's career demonstrated that his philosophy had a practical basis; and if this was truly his belief, this incident largely explains Bessemer's later insistence on the legal details of the patent process. The impact of this will be evident.

Bessemer's intervention in the field of iron and steel was preceded by a period of experiments in the manufacture of glass. Here Bessemer claims to have made glass for the first time in the open hearth of a reverberatory furnace.11 His work in glass manufacture at least gave him considerable experience in the problems of fusion under high temperatures and provided some support for his later claim that in applying the reverberatory furnace to the manufacture of malleable iron as described in his first patent of January 1855, he had in some manner anticipated the work of C. W. Siemens and Emil Martin.12

Bessemer's work in the iron and steel industry came after he experimented with glass manufacturing. He claims to have produced glass for the first time in the open hearth of a reverberatory furnace.11 His experience in glass production gave him valuable insights into the challenges of melting materials at high temperatures and supported his later assertion that by using the reverberatory furnace for making malleable iron, as outlined in his first patent from January 1855, he had, in some way, predicted the contributions of C. W. Siemens and Emil Martin.12

The general interest in problems of ordnance and armor, stimulated by the Crimean War (1854-1856), was shared by Bessemer, whose ingenuity soon produced a design for a projectile which could provide its own rotation when fired from a smooth-bore gun.13 Bessemer's failure to interest the British War Office in the idea led him to submit his design to the Emperor Napoleon III. Trials made with the encouragement of the Emperor showed the inadequacy of the cast-iron guns of the period to deal with the heavier shot; and Bessemer was presented with a new problem which, with "the open mind which derived from a limited knowledge of the metallurgy of war," he attacked with impetuosity. Within three weeks of his experiments in France, he had applied for a patent for "Improvements in the Manufacture of Iron and Steel."14 This covered the fusion of steel with pig or cast iron and, though this must be regarded as only the first practical step toward the Bessemer process,15 it was his experiments with the furnace which provided Bessemer with the idea for his later developments.

The general interest in issues related to weapons and armor, sparked by the Crimean War (1854-1856), was also felt by Bessemer, whose creativity quickly led to a design for a projectile that could generate its own rotation when fired from a smooth-bore gun.13 Bessemer's inability to get the British War Office interested in his idea drove him to present his design to Emperor Napoleon III. Tests conducted with the Emperor's support highlighted the limitations of the cast-iron guns of the time in handling heavier projectiles, which presented Bessemer with a new challenge that he approached with enthusiasm, despite having limited knowledge of wartime metallurgy. Within three weeks of starting his experiments in France, he applied for a patent for "Improvements in the Manufacture of Iron and Steel."14 This covered the fusion of steel with pig or cast iron, and although this was merely the first practical step towards the Bessemer process,15 his experiments with the furnace inspired Bessemer's later innovations.

These were described in his patent dated October 17, 1855 (British patent 2321). This patent is significant to the present study because his application for an American patent, based on similar specifications, led to the interference of William Kelly and to the subsequent denial of the American patent.16 In British patent 2321 Bessemer proposed to convert his steel in crucibles, arranged in a suitable furnace and each having a vertical tuyère, through which air under pressure was forced through the molten metal. As Dredge17 points out, Bessemer's association of the air blast with the increase in the temperature of the metal "showed his appreciation of the end in view, and the general way of attaining it, though his mechanical details were still crude and imperfect."

These were outlined in his patent dated October 17, 1855 (British patent 2321). This patent is important to the current study because his application for an American patent, based on similar specifications, resulted in interference from William Kelly and the eventual denial of the American patent.16 In British patent 2321, Bessemer suggested converting his steel in crucibles arranged in a suitable furnace, each equipped with a vertical tuyère, through which air under pressure was pushed through the molten metal. As Dredge17 points out, Bessemer's link between the air blast and the rise in the metal's temperature "showed his understanding of the goal and the general way to achieve it, even though his mechanical details were still rough and flawed."

Bessemer's Design for a Converter

Figure 1.—Bessemer's Design for a Converter, as Shown in U.S. Patent 16082. This patent, dated November 11, 1856, corresponds with British patent 356, dated February 12, 1856. The more familiar design of converter appeared first in British patent 578, March 1, 1860. The contrast with Kelly's schematic drawing in Fig. 2 (p. 42) is noticeable.

Figure 1.—Bessemer's design for a converter, as seen in U.S. Patent 16082. This patent, dated November 11, 1856, matches British patent 356, dated February 12, 1856. The more well-known design of the converter was first seen in British patent 578, dated March 1, 1860. The difference with Kelly's schematic drawing in Fig. 2 (p. 42) is striking.

Experiments were continued and several more British patents were applied for before Bessemer made his appearance before the British Association on August 13, 1856.18 Bessemer described his first converter and its operation in some detail. Although he was soon to realize that he "too readily allowed myself to bring my inventions under public notice,"19 Bessemer had now thrown out a challenge which eventually had to be taken up, regardless of the strength of the vested interests involved. The provocation came from his claims that the product of the first stage of the conversion was the equivalent of charcoal iron, the processes following the smelting being conducted without contact with, or the use of, any mineral fuel; and that further blowing could be used to produce any quality of metal, that is, a steel with any desired percentage of carbon. Yet, the principal irritant to the complacency of the ironmaster must have been Bessemer's attack on an industry which had gone on increasing the size of its smelting furnaces, thus improving the uniformity of its pig-iron, without modifying the puddling process, which at best could handle no more than 400 to 500 pounds of iron at a time, divided into the "homeopathic doses" of 70 or 80 pounds capable of being handled by human labor.20 Bessemer's claim to "do" 800 pounds of metal in 30 minutes against the puddling furnace's output of 500 pounds in two hours was calculated to arouse the opposition of those who feared the loss of capital invested in puddling furnaces and of those who suspected that their jobs might be in jeopardy. The ensuing criticism of Bessemer has to be interpreted, therefore, with this in mind; not by any means was it entirely based on objective consideration of the method or the product.21

Experiments continued, and several more British patents were filed before Bessemer presented himself to the British Association on August 13, 1856.18 Bessemer described his first converter and how it worked in some detail. Although he soon realized that he "too readily allowed myself to bring my inventions under public notice,"19 Bessemer had now issued a challenge that would eventually have to be addressed, no matter how strong the existing interests were. The provocation came from his claims that the product of the first stage of conversion was equivalent to charcoal iron, with the processes following smelting carried out without contact with or use of any mineral fuel; and that further blowing could produce any quality of metal, meaning steel with any desired amount of carbon. However, the main annoyance to the ironmasters must have been Bessemer's attack on an industry that had been increasing the size of its smelting furnaces to improve the consistency of its pig iron, without changing the puddling process, which could handle at most 400 to 500 pounds of iron at a time, broken down into the "homeopathic doses" of 70 or 80 pounds that could be managed by human labor.20 Bessemer's claim to "do" 800 pounds of metal in 30 minutes, compared to the puddling furnace's output of 500 pounds in two hours, was sure to provoke opposition from those worried about losing their investments in puddling furnaces and those who feared for their jobs. Therefore, the criticism of Bessemer must be understood with this context in mind; it was not solely based on an objective evaluation of the method or the product.21

Within a month of his address, Bessemer had sold licenses to several ironmasters (outside Sheffield) and so provided himself with capital with which to continue his development work; but he refused to sell his patents outright to the Ebbw Vale Iron Works and by this action, as will be seen, he created an enemy for himself.

Within a month of his speech, Bessemer had sold licenses to several ironmasters (outside Sheffield), giving himself the capital he needed to keep working on his developments. However, he refused to sell his patents outright to the Ebbw Vale Iron Works, and this decision, as we will see, made him an enemy.

The three years between 1856 and 1859, when Bessemer opened his own steel works in Sheffield, were occupied in tracing the causes of his initial difficulties. There was continued controversy in the technical press. Bessemer (unless he used a nom-de-plume) took no part in it and remained silent until he made another public appearance before the Institution of Civil Engineers in London (May 1859). By this time Bessemer's process was accepted as a practical one, and the claims of Robert Mushet to share in his achievement was becoming clamorous.

The three years between 1856 and 1859, when Bessemer started his own steelworks in Sheffield, were spent figuring out the reasons for his early challenges. There was ongoing debate in the technical press. Bessemer (unless he used a pen name) didn't engage in it and stayed quiet until he made another public appearance before the Institution of Civil Engineers in London (May 1859). By this point, Bessemer's process was widely recognized as practical, and Robert Mushet's claims to share in his success were becoming increasingly vocal.

Robert Mushet

Robert Mushet

Robert (Forester) Mushet (1811-1891), born in the Forest of Dean, Gloucestershire, of a Scots father (David, 1772-1847) himself a noted contributor to the metallurgy of iron and steel, is, like the American William Kelly, considered by many to have been a victim of Bessemer's astuteness—or villainy. Because of Robert Mushet's preference for the quiet of Coleford, many important facts about his career are lacking; but even if his physical life was that of a recluse, his frequent and verbose contributions to the correspondence columns of the technical press made him well-known to the iron trade. It is from these letters that he must be judged.

Robert (Forester) Mushet (1811-1891), born in the Forest of Dean, Gloucestershire, to a Scottish father (David, 1772-1847) who was also a significant contributor to the metallurgy of iron and steel, is, like the American William Kelly, seen by many as a victim of Bessemer's cleverness—or deception. Because Robert Mushet preferred the solitude of Coleford, many important details about his career are missing; however, even if his personal life was that of a recluse, his frequent and lengthy contributions to the correspondence columns of the technical press made him well-known in the iron industry. It is from these letters that he should be evaluated.

In view of his propensity to intervene pontifically in every discussion concerning the manufacture of iron and steel, it is somewhat surprising that he refrained from comment on Bessemer's British Association address of August 1856 for more than fourteen months. The debate was opened over the signature of his brother David who shared the family facility with the pen.22 Recognizing Bessemer's invention as a "congruous appendage to [the] now highly developed powers of the blast furnace" which he describes as "too convenient, too powerful and too capable of further development to be superseded by any retrograde process," David Mushet greeted Bessemer's discovery as "one of the greatest operations ever devised in metallurgy."23 A month later, however, David Mushet had so modified his opinion of Bessemer as to come to the conclusion that the latter "must indeed be classed with the most unfortunate inventors." He gave as his reason for this turnabout his discovery that Joseph Martien had demonstrated his process of "purifying" metal successfully and had indeed been granted a provisional patent a month before Bessemer. The sharp practice of Martien's patent lawyer, Mushet claimed, had deprived him of an opportunity of proving priority of invention against Bessemer. Mushet was convinced that Martien's was the first in the field.24

Given his tendency to jump into every discussion about iron and steel, it's surprising that he held back from commenting on Bessemer's address to the British Association in August 1856 for over fourteen months. The conversation was initiated by his brother David, who had the family's talent for writing. 22 Recognizing Bessemer's invention as a "suitable addition to [the] highly developed capabilities of the blast furnace," which he described as "too convenient, too powerful, and too capable of further improvement to be replaced by any outdated method," David Mushet welcomed Bessemer's discovery as "one of the greatest innovations ever made in metallurgy." 23 A month later, though, David Mushet had changed his view on Bessemer, concluding that the latter "must indeed be considered one of the most unfortunate inventors." He explained this shift by noting that Joseph Martien had successfully demonstrated his process of "purifying" metal and had actually received a provisional patent a month before Bessemer. Mushet claimed that the underhanded tactics of Martien's patent lawyer had robbed him of the chance to prove he was the first inventor ahead of Bessemer. Mushet was convinced that Martien was the pioneer in this area. 24

Robert Mushet's campaign on behalf of his own claims to have made the Bessemer process effective was introduced in October 1857, two years after the beginning of Bessemer's experiment and after one year of silence on Bessemer's part. Writing as "Sideros"25 he gave credit to Martien for "the great discovery that pig-iron can, whilst in the fluid state, be purified ... by forcing currents of air under it ...," though Martien had failed to observe the use of temperature by the "deflation of the iron itself"; and for discovering that—

Robert Mushet's campaign to promote his own claims about making the Bessemer process effective began in October 1857, two years after Bessemer started his experiments and a year of silence from Bessemer. Writing under the name "Sideros"25 , he credited Martien for "the great discovery that pig iron can, while in a liquid state, be purified by forcing air currents underneath it," although Martien hadn’t noticed the effect of temperature due to "the deflation of the iron itself"; and for discovering that—

when the carbon has been all, or nearly all, dissipated, the temperature increases to an almost inconceivable extent, so that the mass, when containing only as much carbon as is requisite to constitute with it cast steel ... still retains a perfect degree of fluidity.

when the carbon has been mostly, or almost completely, used up, the temperature rises to an almost unimaginable level, so that the mass, when it contains just enough carbon to make cast steel with it ... still maintains a perfect level of fluidity.

This, says "Sideros," was no new observation; "it had been before the metallurgical world, both practical and scientific, for centuries," but Bessemer was the first to show that this generation of heat could be attained by blowing cold air through the melted iron. Mushet goes on to show, however, that the steel thus produced by Bessemer was not commercially valuable because the sulphur and phosphorous remained, and the dispersion of oxide of iron through the mass "imported to it the inveterate hot-short quality which no subsequent operation could expel." "Sideros" concludes that Bessemer's discovery was "at least for a time" now shelved and arrested in its progress; and it had been left "to an individual of the name of Mushet" to show that if "fluid metallic manganese" were combined with the fluid Bessemer iron, the portion of manganese thus alloyed would unite with the oxygen of the oxide and pass off as slag, removing the hot-short quality of the iron. Robert Mushet had demonstrated his product to "Sideros" and had patented his discovery, though "not one print, literary or scientific, had condescended to notice it."

This, says "Sideros," was nothing new; "it had been in front of the metallurgical world, both practical and scientific, for centuries," but Bessemer was the first to demonstrate that this generation of heat could be achieved by blowing cold air through melted iron. Mushet further explains, however, that the steel produced by Bessemer wasn’t commercially viable because the sulphur and phosphorus remained, and the distribution of iron oxide throughout the mass "gave it the persistent hot-short quality which no subsequent process could eliminate." "Sideros" concludes that Bessemer's discovery was "at least for a time" now put on hold and had been left "to someone named Mushet" to show that if "liquid metallic manganese" were mixed with molten Bessemer iron, the manganese portion would bond with the oxygen in the oxide and be removed as slag, eliminating the hot-short quality of the iron. Robert Mushet had demonstrated his product to "Sideros" and had patented his discovery, although "not one publication, literary or scientific, had bothered to acknowledge it."

"Sideros" viewed Mushet's discovery as a "spark amongst dry faggots that will one day light up a blaze which will astonish the world when the unfortunate inventor can no longer reap the fruits of his life-long toil and unflinching perseverance." In an ensuing letter he26 summed up the situation as he saw it:

"Sideros" saw Mushet's discovery as a "spark among dry twigs that will one day ignite a fire that will amaze the world when the unfortunate inventor can no longer enjoy the benefits of his lifelong hard work and unwavering determination." In a following letter he26 summed up the situation as he saw it:

Nothing that Mr. Mushet can hereafter invent can entitle him to the merit of Mr. Bessemer's great discovery ... and ... nothing that Mr. Bessemer may hereafter patent can deprive Mr. Robert Mushet of having been the first to remove the obstacles to the success of Mr. Bessemer's process.

Nothing that Mr. Mushet invents from now on can give him credit for Mr. Bessemer's great discovery ... and ... nothing that Mr. Bessemer patents in the future can take away from Mr. Robert Mushet being the first to overcome the challenges to the success of Mr. Bessemer's process.

Bessemer still did not intervene in the newspaper discussion; nor had he had any serious supporters, at least in the early stage.27

Bessemer still didn’t get involved in the newspaper debate, nor did he have any serious supporters, at least in the beginning.27

Publication in the Mining Journal of a list of Mushet's patents,28 evidently in response to Sideros' complaint, now presented Bessemer with notice of Robert Mushet's activity, even if he had not already observed his claims as they were presented to the Patent Office. Mushet, said the Mining Journal

Publication in the Mining Journal of a list of Mushet's patents, 28 evidently in response to Sideros' complaint, now informed Bessemer about Robert Mushet's activity, even if he hadn't already noticed his claims as they were submitted to the Patent Office. Mushet, the Mining Journal

appears to intend to carry on his researches from the point where Mr. J. G. Martien left off and is proceeding on the Bessemer plan of patenting each idea as it occurs to his imaginative brain. He proposes to make both iron and steel but does not appear to have quite decided as to the course of action ... to accomplish his object, and therefore claims various processes, some of which are never likely to realize the inventor's expectations, although decidedly novel, whilst others are but slight modification of inventions which have already been tried and failed.

appears to want to continue his research from where Mr. J. G. Martien stopped and is following the Bessemer method of patenting every idea that pops into his creative mind. He plans to produce both iron and steel but doesn’t seem to have fully decided on his approach to achieve his goals, which is why he is claiming various processes. Some of these are unlikely to meet the inventor's expectations, even though they are definitely new, while others are just minor tweaks of inventions that have already been attempted and failed.

The contemporary attitude is reflected in another comment by the Mining Journal:29

The modern attitude is shown in another remark by the Mining Journal:29

Although the application of chemical knowledge to the manufacture of malleable iron cannot fail to produce beneficial results, the quality of the metal depends more upon the mechanical than the chemical processes.... Without wishing in any way to discourage the iron chemists, we have no hesitation in giving this as our opinion which we shall maintain until the contrary be actually proved. With regard to steel, there may be a large field for chemical research ... however, we believe that unless the iron be of a nature adapted for the manufacture of steel by ordinary processes, the purely chemical inventions will only give a metal of a very uniform quality.

Although using chemical knowledge to produce malleable iron is bound to lead to positive outcomes, the quality of the metal relies more on the mechanical processes than on the chemical ones. Without wanting to discourage iron chemists in any way, we confidently state this opinion and will stand by it until proven otherwise. Concerning steel, there might be a significant opportunity for chemical research; however, we believe that if the iron isn't suitable for making steel using traditional methods, purely chemical innovations will only result in a metal of very consistent quality.

Another correspondent, William Green, was of the opinion that Mushet's "new compounds and alloys," promised well as an auxiliary to the Bessemer process but that "the evil which it was intended to remove was more visionary than real." Bessemer's chief difficulty was the phosphorus, not the oxide of iron "as Mr. Mushet assumes." This, Bessemer no doubt would deal with in due course, but meanwhile he did well "to concentrate his energies upon the steel operations," after which he would have time to tackle "the difficulties which have so far retarded the iron operations."30

Another correspondent, William Green, thought that Mushet's "new compounds and alloys" looked promising as a supplement to the Bessemer process, but believed that "the problem it aimed to solve was more imagined than real." Bessemer's biggest challenge was phosphorus, not the oxide of iron "as Mr. Mushet suggests." Bessemer would surely address this in time, but for now, it was wise for him "to focus his efforts on the steel operations," after which he would have a chance to tackle "the challenges that have held back the iron operations."30

Mushet
claims to have taken out his patent of September 22, 1856, covering the famous "triple compound," after he—

had fully ascertained, upon the ordinary scale of manufacture that air-purified cast-iron, when treated as set forth in my specifications, would afford tough malleable iron ... I found, however, that the remelting of the coke pig-iron, in contact with coke fuel, hardened the iron too much, and it became evident that an air-furnace was more proper for my purpose ... [the difficulties] arose, not from any defect in my process, but were owing to the small quantity of the metal operated upon and the imperfect arrangement of the purifying vessel, which ought to be so constituted that it may be turned upon an axis, the blast taken off, the alloy added and the steel poured out through a spout ... Such a purifying vessel Mr. Bessemer has delineated in one of his patents.

I had fully confirmed, based on standard manufacturing practices, that air-purified cast iron, when processed as described in my specifications, would produce tough, malleable iron. However, I discovered that remelting the coke pig iron in contact with coke fuel made the iron too hard. It became clear that an air furnace was more suitable for my needs. The challenges I faced were not due to any flaws in my process, but were because of the small amount of metal I was working with and the inadequate design of the purifying vessel, which should be designed to rotate on an axis, allow the blast to be turned off, add the alloy, and let the steel flow out through a spout. Mr. Bessemer has illustrated such a purifying vessel in one of his patents.

Mushet also claimed to have designed his own "purifying and mixing" furnace, of 20-ton capacity, which he had submitted to the Ebbw Vale Iron Works "many months ago," without comment from them. There is an intriguing reference to the painful subject of two patents not proceeded with, and not discussed "in the avaricious hope that the parties connected with the patents will make me honorable amends ... these patents were suppressed without my knowledge or consent." Lest his qualifications should be questioned, Mushet concludes:

Mushet also claimed to have designed his own "purifying and mixing" furnace with a 20-ton capacity, which he had submitted to the Ebbw Vale Iron Works "many months ago," but they hadn't commented on it. There’s an interesting mention of the sensitive issue of two patents that weren’t pursued, and not mentioned "in the greedy hope that those involved with the patents will make me a fair compensation ... these patents were hidden from me without my knowledge or consent." To defend his qualifications, Mushet concludes:

I do not profess to be an iron chemist, but I have undoubtedly made more experiments upon the subject of iron and steel than any man now living and I am thereby enabled to say that all I know is but little in comparison with what has yet to be discovered.

I don't claim to be an expert on iron chemistry, but I've certainly conducted more experiments on iron and steel than anyone else alive today, and because of that, I can say that what I know is just a small fraction of what still remains to be discovered.

So began Mushet's claim to have solved Bessemer's problem, a claim which was to fill the correspondence columns of the engineering journals for the next ten years. Interpretation of this correspondence is made difficult by our ignorance of the facts concerning the control of Mushet's patents. These have to be pieced together from his scattered references to the subject.

So started Mushet's assertion that he had figured out Bessemer's issue, a claim that would dominate the letters section of engineering journals for the next decade. Understanding this correspondence is tricky due to our lack of knowledge about the specifics of Mushet's patent control. This information has to be assembled from his various mentions of the topic.

His experiments were conducted, at least nearly up to the close of the year 1856, with the cooperation of Thomas Brown of the Ebbw Vale Iron Works.32 The price of this assistance was apparently half interest in Mushet's patents, though for reasons which Mushet does not explain the deed prepared to effect the transfer was never executed.33 Mushet continued, however, to regard the patents as "wholly my own, though at the same time, I am bound in honor to take no unfair advantage of the non-execution of that deed." A possible explanation of this situation may be found in Ebbw Vale's activities in connection with Martien and Bessemer, as well as with an Austrian inventor, Uchatius.

His experiments were carried out, at least up until the end of 1856, with the help of Thomas Brown from the Ebbw Vale Iron Works.32 The cost of this assistance was apparently half interest in Mushet's patents, but for reasons that Mushet doesn't clarify, the paperwork to finalize the transfer was never completed.33 Mushet still considered the patents to be "completely my own, though I feel obligated not to take unfair advantage of the fact that the deed wasn't executed." A possible explanation for this situation can be found in Ebbw Vale's involvement with Martien and Bessemer, as well as with an Austrian inventor, Uchatius.

Ebbw Vale and the Bessemer Process

Ebbw Vale and the Bessemer Process

After his British Association address in August 1856, Bessemer had received applications from several ironmasters for licenses, which were issued in return for a down payment and a nominal royalty of 25 pence per ton. Among those who started negotiations was Mr. Thomas Brown of Ebbw Vale Iron Works, one of the largest of the South Wales plants. He proposed, however, instead of a license, an outright purchase of Bessemer's patents for £50,000. Bessemer refused to sell, and according to his34 account—

After his speech to the British Association in August 1856, Bessemer received requests from several ironmasters for licenses, which were granted in exchange for a down payment and a small royalty of 25 pence per ton. Among those who began discussions was Mr. Thomas Brown from Ebbw Vale Iron Works, one of the biggest plants in South Wales. However, he suggested instead of a license, buying Bessemer's patents outright for £50,000. Bessemer declined to sell, and according to his34 account—

intense disappointment and anger quite got the better of [Brown] and for the moment he could not realize the fact of my refusal.... [He then] left me very abruptly, saying in an irritated tone ... "I'll make you see the matter differently yet" and slammed the door after him.

intense disappointment and anger completely overwhelmed [Brown], and for the moment he couldn't grasp the reality of my refusal.... [He then] left me abruptly, saying in an irritated tone ... "I'll make you see it differently yet," and slammed the door behind him.

David Mushet's advocacy of Martien's claim to priority over Bessemer has already been noticed (p. 33). From him we learn35 that Martien's experiments leading to his patent of September 15, 1855, had been carried out at the Ebbw Vale Works in South Wales, where he engaged in "perfecting the Renton process."36 Martien's own process consisted in passing air through metal as it was run in a trough from the furnace and before it passed into the puddling furnace.

David Mushet's support for Martien's claim to precedence over Bessemer has already been mentioned (p. 33). From him we learn35 that Martien's experiments leading to his patent on September 15, 1855, took place at the Ebbw Vale Works in South Wales, where he worked on "perfecting the Renton process."36 Martien's process involved blowing air through the metal as it flowed in a trough from the furnace and before it entered the puddling furnace.

It is known that Martien's patent was in the hands of the Ebbw Vale Iron Works by March 1857.37 This fact must be added to our knowledge that Mushet's patent of September 22, 1856 was drawn up with a specific reference to the application of his "triple compound" to "iron ... purified by the action of air, in the manner invented by Joseph Gilbert Martien,"38 and that this and his other manganese patents were under the effective control of Ebbw Vale. It seems a reasonable deduction from these circumstances that Brown's offer to buy out Bessemer and his subsequent threat were the consequences of a determination by Ebbw Vale to attack Bessemer by means of patent infringement suits.

It is known that Martien's patent was in the hands of the Ebbw Vale Iron Works by March 1857.37 This fact must be added to our knowledge that Mushet's patent from September 22, 1856, was created with a specific reference to the use of his "triple compound" on "iron ... purified by the action of air, in the manner invented by Joseph Gilbert Martien,"38 and that this along with his other manganese patents were under the effective control of Ebbw Vale. It seems reasonable to deduce from these circumstances that Brown's offer to buy out Bessemer and his subsequent threat were the results of a decision by Ebbw Vale to take action against Bessemer through patent infringement lawsuits.

Some aspects of the Ebbw Vale situation are not yet explained. Martien came to South Wales from Newark, New Jersey, where he had been manager of Renton's Patent Semi-Bituminous Coal Furnace, owned by James Quimby, and where he had something to do with the installation of Renton's first furnace in 1854. The first furnace was unsuccessful.39 Martien next appears in Britain, at the Ebbw Vale Iron Works. No information is available as to whether Martien's own furnace was actually installed at Ebbw Vale, although as noted above, David Mushet claims to have been invited to see it there.

Some aspects of the Ebbw Vale situation are still unexplained. Martien came to South Wales from Newark, New Jersey, where he had managed Renton's Patent Semi-Bituminous Coal Furnace, owned by James Quimby, and where he had some involvement in the installation of Renton's first furnace in 1854. The first furnace was a failure.39 Martien next appears in Britain, at the Ebbw Vale Iron Works. There's no information on whether Martien's own furnace was actually installed at Ebbw Vale, although, as mentioned earlier, David Mushet claims he was invited to see it there.

Martien secured an American patent for his process in 1857 and to file his application appears to have gone to the United States, where he remained at least until October 1858.40 He seems to have taken the opportunity to apply for another patent for a furnace similar to that of James Renton. This led to interferences proceedings in which Martien showed that he had worked on this furnace at Bridgend, Glamorganshire (one of the Ebbw Vale plants), improving Renton's design by increasing the number of "deoxydizing tubes." This variation in Renton's design was held not patentable, and in any case Renton's firm was able to show that they had successfully installed the furnace at Newark in 1852-1853, while Martien could not satisfy the Commissioner that his installation had been made before September 1854. Priority was therefore awarded to Quimby, Brown, Renton, and Creswell.41

Martien obtained an American patent for his process in 1857 and likely traveled to the United States to submit his application, where he stayed at least until October 1858.40 He seemed to take the chance to apply for another patent for a furnace similar to James Renton's. This led to interference proceedings in which Martien demonstrated that he had worked on this furnace at Bridgend, Glamorganshire (one of the Ebbw Vale plants), improving Renton's design by increasing the number of "deoxydizing tubes." This change to Renton's design was deemed not patentable, and in any case, Renton's firm could prove that they had successfully installed the furnace at Newark in 1852-1853, while Martien couldn't convince the Commissioner that his installation had been completed before September 1854. As a result, priority was granted to Quimby, Brown, Renton, and Creswell.41

Since Renton had not patented his furnace in Great Britain, Martien's use of his earlier knowledge of Renton's work and of his experience at Bridgend in an attempt to upset Renton's priority is a curious and at present unexplainable episode. Perhaps the early records of the Ebbw Vale Iron Works, if they exist, will show whether this episode was in some way linked to the firm's optimistic combination of the British patents of Martien and Mushet.

Since Renton hadn't patented his furnace in Great Britain, Martien's use of his earlier knowledge of Renton's work and his experience at Bridgend to try to undermine Renton's priority is an odd and currently unexplainable situation. Maybe the early records of the Ebbw Vale Iron Works, if they exist, will reveal whether this situation was somehow connected to the firm's hopeful combination of the British patents of Martien and Mushet.

That Ebbw Vale exerted every effort to find an alternative to Bessemer's process is suggested, also, by their purchase in 1856 of the British rights to the Uchatius process, invented by an Austrian Army officer. The provisional patent specifications, dated October 1, 1855, showed that Uchatius proposed to make cast steel directly from pig-iron by melting granulated pig-iron in a crucible with pulverized "sparry iron" (siderite) and fine clay or with gray oxide of manganese, which would determine the amount of carbon combining with the iron. This process, which was to prove commercially successful in Great Britain and in Sweden but was not used in America,42 appeared to Ebbw Vale to be something from which, "we can have steel produced at the price proposed by Mr. Bessemer, notwithstanding the failure of his process to fulfil the promise."43

That Ebbw Vale made every effort to find an alternative to Bessemer's process is also indicated by their purchase in 1856 of the British rights to the Uchatius process, created by an Austrian Army officer. The provisional patent specifications, dated October 1, 1855, revealed that Uchatius suggested making cast steel directly from pig iron by melting granulated pig iron in a crucible with pulverized "sparry iron" (siderite) and fine clay or with gray oxide of manganese, which would control the amount of carbon combining with the iron. This process, which was commercially successful in Great Britain and in Sweden but was not used in America, appeared to Ebbw Vale to be something from which, "we can have steel produced at the price proposed by Mr. Bessemer, despite the failure of his process to fulfill the promise."

So far as is known only one direct attempt was made, presumably instigated by Ebbw Vale, to enforce their patents against Bessemer, who records44 a visit by Mushet's agent some two or three months before a renewal fee on Mushet's basic manganese patents became payable in 1859. Bessemer "entirely repudiated" Mushet's patents and offered to perform his operations in the presence of Mushet's lawyers and witnesses at the Sheffield Works so that a prosecution for infringement "would be a very simple matter." That, he says, was the last heard from the agent or from Mushet on the subject.45 The renewal fee was not paid and the patents were therefore abandoned by Ebbw Vale and their associates, a fact which did not come to Mushet's knowledge until 1861, when he himself declared that the patent "was never in my hands at all [so] that I could not enforce it."46

As far as we know, there was only one direct attempt, likely initiated by Ebbw Vale, to enforce their patents against Bessemer. Bessemer notes44 that Mushet's agent visited about two or three months before a renewal fee for Mushet's basic manganese patents was due in 1859. Bessemer "completely rejected" Mushet's patents and suggested he could carry out his processes in front of Mushet's lawyers and witnesses at the Sheffield Works, making a prosecution for infringement "a very straightforward matter." He claims that was the last he heard from the agent or from Mushet on the topic.45 The renewal fee was not paid, so Ebbw Vale and their associates abandoned the patents, a fact Mushet only discovered in 1861, when he stated that the patent "was never in my hands at all [so] that I could not enforce it."46

Further support for the thesis that Ebbw Vale's policy was in part dictated by a desire to make Bessemer "see the matter differently" is to be found in the climatic episode. Work on Martien's patents had not been abandoned and in 1861 certain patents were taken out by George Parry, Ebbw Vale's furnace manager. These, represented as improvements of Martien's designs, were regarded by Bessemer as clear infringements of his own patents.47 When it came to Bessemer's knowledge that Ebbw Vale was proposing to "go to the public" for additional capital with which to finance, in part, a large scale working of Parry's process, he threatened the financial promoter with injunctions and succeeded in opening negotiations for a settlement. All the patents "which had been for years suspended" over Bessemer were turned over to him for £30,000. Ebbw Vale, thereupon, issued their prospectus48 with the significant statement that the directors "have agreed for a license for the manufacture of steel by the Bessemer process which, from the peculiar resources they possess, they will be enabled to produce in very large quantities...." So Bessemer became the owner of the Martien and Parry patents. Mushet's basic patents no longer existed.

Further evidence supporting the idea that Ebbw Vale's policy was partly driven by a desire to make Bessemer "see the matter differently" can be found in the climate of the situation. Work on Martien's patents hadn’t been abandoned, and in 1861, some patents were taken out by George Parry, Ebbw Vale's furnace manager. These were presented as improvements on Martien's designs but were seen by Bessemer as clear violations of his own patents.47 When Bessemer learned that Ebbw Vale was planning to "go to the public" for additional capital to help finance a large-scale operation of Parry's process, he threatened the financial promoter with legal action and successfully initiated negotiations for a settlement. All the patents "that had been suspended for years" over Bessemer were handed over to him for £30,000. Ebbw Vale then released their prospectus48 with the important statement that the directors "have agreed to a license for the manufacture of steel using the Bessemer process, which, due to their unique resources, they will be able to produce in very large quantities...." As a result, Bessemer became the owner of the Martien and Parry patents. Mushet's basic patents no longer existed.

Mushet and Bessemer

Mushet and Bessemer

That Mushet was "used" by Ebbw Vale against Bessemer is, perhaps, only an assumption; but that he was badly treated by Ebbw Vale is subject to no doubt. Mushet's business capacity was small but it is difficult to believe that he could have been so foolish as to assign an interest in his patents to Ebbw Vale without in some way insuring his right of consultation about their disposition. He claims that even in the drafting of his specifications he was obliged to follow die demands of Ebbw Vale, which firm, believing, "on the advice of Mr. Hindmarsh, the most eminent patent counsel of the day,"49 that Martien's patent outranked Bessemer's, insisted that Mushet link his process to Martien's. This, as late as 1861, Mushet believed to be in effective operation.50 His later repudiation of the process as an absurd and impracticable patent process "possessing neither value nor utility"51 may more truly represent his opinion, especially as, when he wrote his 1861 comment, he still did not know of the disappearance of his patents.

That Mushet was "used" by Ebbw Vale against Bessemer is probably just an assumption; however, it's clear that he was treated poorly by Ebbw Vale. Mushet's business skills were limited, but it's hard to believe he would be so naive as to assign rights to his patents to Ebbw Vale without somehow ensuring he had a say in how they were handled. He claims that even when drafting his specifications, he had to follow Ebbw Vale's demands, which, based on the advice of Mr. Hindmarsh, the leading patent lawyer of the time, insisted that Mushet connect his process to Martien's, believing that Martien's patent was superior to Bessemer's. As late as 1861, Mushet thought this arrangement was still in place. His later rejection of the process as a ridiculous and unworkable patent "lacking any value or utility" may genuinely reflect his views, especially since, when he wrote his 1861 comments, he was still unaware that his patents had disappeared.

Mushet's boast52 that he had never been into an ironworks other than his own in Coleford is a clue to the interpretation of his behavior in general and also of his frequent presumptuous claims. When, for instance, the development of the Uchatius process was publicized, he gave his opinion53 that the process was a useless one and had been patented before Uchatius "understood its nature"; yet later54 he could claim that the process was "in fact, my own invention and I had made and sold the steel thus produced for some years previously to the date of Captain Uchatius' patent". Moreover, he claims to have instructed Uchatius' agents in its operation! He may, at this later date, have recalled his challenge (the first of many such) in which he offered Uchatius' agent in England to pay a monetary penalty if he could not show a superior method of producing "sound serviceable cast steel from British coke pig-iron, on the stomic plan and without any mixture of clay, oxide of manganese or any of these pot destroying ingredients."55

Mushet's claim that he had never visited any ironworks besides his own in Coleford offers insight into his overall behavior and his frequent overconfident assertions. For example, when the Uchatius process was announced, he expressed his view that the process was pointless and had been patented before Uchatius "understood its nature"; however, later on, he insisted that the process was "in fact, my own invention and I had made and sold the steel produced this way for several years before Captain Uchatius' patent." Additionally, he stated that he had trained Uchatius' agents in how to use it! At this later point, he might have remembered his challenge (the first of many) in which he offered Uchatius' representative in England to pay a fine if they couldn't demonstrate a better method of producing "sound serviceable cast steel from British coke pig-iron, on the stomic plan and without any mixture of clay, oxide of manganese, or any of those pot-destroying ingredients."

It was David Mushet (or Robert, using his brother's name)56 who accused Bessemer, or rather his patent agent, Carpmael, of sharp practice in connection with Martien's specification, an allegation later supported by Martien's first patent agent, Avery.57 The story was that for the drafting of his final specification, Martien, presumably with the advice of the Ebbw Vale Iron Works, consulted the same Carpmael, as "the leading man" in the field. The latter advised that the provisional specification restricted Martien to the application of his method to iron flowing in a channel or gutter from the blast furnace, and so prevented him from applying his aeration principle in any kind of receptacle. In effect, Carpmael was acting unprofessionally by giving Bessemer the prior claim to the use of a receptacle. According to Mushet, Martien had in fact "actually and publicly proved" his process in a receptacle and not in a gutter, so that his claim to priority could be maintained on the basis of the provisional specification.

It was David Mushet (or Robert, using his brother's name)56 who accused Bessemer, or rather his patent agent, Carpmael, of unethical practices regarding Martien's specification, a claim later backed by Martien's first patent agent, Avery.57 The story was that for drafting his final specification, Martien, likely with advice from the Ebbw Vale Iron Works, consulted Carpmael, who was seen as "the leading man" in the field. Carpmael advised that the provisional specification limited Martien to using his method only with iron flowing through a channel or gutter from the blast furnace, preventing him from applying his aeration principle in any type of container. Essentially, Carpmael was acting unprofessionally by giving Bessemer the prior claim to using a container. According to Mushet, Martien had actually and publicly proven his process in a container and not in a gutter, allowing his claim to priority to stand based on the provisional specification.

This, like other Mushet allegations, was ignored by Bessemer, and probably with good reason. At any rate, Martien's American patent is in terms similar to those of the British specification; he or his advisers seem to have attached no significance to the distinction between a gutter and a receptacle.

This, like other allegations from Mushet, was overlooked by Bessemer, likely for good reason. In any case, Martien's American patent is worded similarly to the British specification; he or his advisors don't seem to have attached any importance to the difference between a gutter and a receptacle.

Mushet's claim to have afforded Bessemer the means of making his own process useful is still subject to debate. Unfortunately, documentation of the case is almost wholly one sided, since his biggest publicizer was Mushet himself. An occasional editorial in the technical press and a few replies to Mushet's "lucubrations" are all the material which exists, apart from Bessemer's own story.

Mushet's assertion that he provided Bessemer with the means to make his process practical is still up for debate. Unfortunately, the documentation of the case is mostly one-sided, as Mushet was his own biggest promoter. The only other materials that exist, aside from Bessemer's own account, are a few editorials in technical publications and some responses to Mushet's "writings."

Mushet and at least five other men patented the use of manganese in steel making in 1856; his own provisional specification was filed within a month of the publication of Bessemer's British Association address in August 1856. So it is strange that Robert Mushet did not until more than a year later join in the controversy which followed that address.58 In one of his early letters he claims to have made of "his" steel a bridge rail of 750 pounds weight; although his brother insists that he saw the same rail in the Ebbw Vale offices in London in the spring of 1857, when it was presented as a specimen of Uchatius steel!59 Robert Mushet's indignant "advertisement" of January 5, 1858,60 reiterating his parentage of this sample, also claimed a double-headed steel rail "made by me under another of my patent processes," and sent to Derby to be laid down there to be "subjected to intense vertricular triturations." Mushet's description of the preparation of this ingot61 shows that it was derived from "Bessemer scrap" made by Ebbw Vale in the first unsuccessful attempts of that firm to simulate the Bessemer process. This scrap Mushet had remelted in pots with spiegel in the proportions of 44 pounds of scrap to 3 of melted spiegel. It was his claim that the rail was rolled direct from the ingot, something Bessemer himself could not do at that time.

Mushet and at least five other men patented the use of manganese in steel making in 1856; he filed his own provisional specification within a month of the publication of Bessemer's British Association address in August 1856. So it's odd that Robert Mushet didn't join the debate that followed that address until over a year later.58 In one of his early letters, he claimed to have made a bridge rail weighing 750 pounds from "his" steel; however, his brother insisted he saw the same rail in the Ebbw Vale offices in London in the spring of 1857 when it was presented as a specimen of Uchatius steel!59 Robert Mushet's outraged "advertisement" on January 5, 1858,60 reiterating his connection to this sample, also claimed a double-headed steel rail "made by me under another of my patent processes," and sent to Derby to be laid down there to be "subjected to intense vertricular triturations." Mushet's description of how this ingot was prepared61 shows that it came from "Bessemer scrap" produced by Ebbw Vale during their initial unsuccessful attempts to replicate the Bessemer process. Mushet had remelted this scrap in pots with spiegel in the ratio of 44 pounds of scrap to 3 pounds of melted spiegel. He claimed the rail was rolled directly from the ingot, something Bessemer himself couldn’t do at that time.

This was the beginning of a series of claims by Mushet as to his essential contributions to Bessemer's invention. The silence of the latter during this period is impressive, for according to Bessemer's own account62 his British Association address was premature, and although the sale of licenses actually provided him with working funds, the impatience of those experimenting with the process and the flood of competing "inventions" all embarrassed him at the most critical stage of this development of the process: "It was, however, no use for me to argue the matter in the press. All that I could say would be mere talk and I felt that action was necessary, and not words."63

This was the start of Mushet’s claims about his crucial contributions to Bessemer's invention. The silence from Bessemer during this time is striking because, according to his own account, his British Association address came too early. Even though selling licenses gave him some funds to work with, the frustration of those testing the process and the surge of competing "inventions" all hindered him at the most critical point in developing this process: "It was, however, no use for me to argue the matter in the press. All that I could say would be mere talk and I felt that action was necessary, and not words."

Action took the form of continued experiments and, by the end of 1857, a decision to build his own plant at Sheffield.64 An important collateral development resulted from the visit to London in May 1857 of G. F. Goransson of Gefle, Sweden. Using Bessemer equipment, Goransson began trials of the process in November 1857 and by October 1858 was able to report: "Our firm has now entirely given up the manufacture of bar iron, and our blast furnaces and tilt mills are now wholly employed in making steel by the Bessemer process, which may, therefore, be now considered an accomplished commercial fact."65

Action took the form of ongoing experiments and, by the end of 1857, a decision was made to build his own plant in Sheffield.64 An important related development came from G. F. Goransson of Gefle, Sweden, who visited London in May 1857. Using Bessemer equipment, Goransson began testing the process in November 1857 and by October 1858 was able to report: "Our firm has now completely stopped the production of bar iron, and our blast furnaces and tilt mills are now fully dedicated to making steel using the Bessemer process, which can now be regarded as a confirmed commercial reality."65

Goransson was later to claim considerable improvements on the method of introducing the blast, and, in consequence, the first effective demonstration of the Bessemer method66—this at a time when Bessemer was still remelting the product of his converter in crucibles, after granulating the steel in water. If Mushet is to be believed, this success of Goransson's was wholly due to his ore being "totally free from phosphorous and sulphur."67 However, Bessemer's own progress was substantial, for his Sheffield works were reported as being in active operation in April 1859, and a price for his engineers' tool and spindle steel was included in the Mining Journal "Mining Market" weekly quotations for the first time68 on June 4, 1859.

Goransson later claimed significant improvements in the method of introducing the blast, which led to the first successful demonstration of the Bessemer method66—at a time when Bessemer was still remelting the product of his converter in crucibles after granulating the steel in water. If we’re to believe Mushet, Goransson's success was entirely because his ore was "totally free from phosphorous and sulphur."67 However, Bessemer made substantial progress too, as his Sheffield works were reported to be actively operating in April 1859, and the price for his engineers' tool and spindle steel was included in the Mining Journal "Mining Market" weekly quotations for the first time68 on June 4, 1859.

In May 1859 Bessemer gave a paper, his first public pronouncement since August 1856, before the Institution of Civil Engineers.69 The early process, he admitted, had led to failure because the process had not reduced the quantity of sulphur and phosphorous, but his account is vague as to the manner in which he dealt with this problem:

In May 1859, Bessemer presented a paper, his first public statement since August 1856, before the Institution of Civil Engineers.69 He acknowledged that the early process had failed because it hadn't lowered the levels of sulfur and phosphorus, but his description of how he addressed this issue is unclear:

Steam and pure hydrogen gas were tried, with more or less success in the removal of sulphur, and various flues, composed chiefly of silicates of the oxide of iron and manganese were brought in contact with the fluid metal, during the process and the quantity of phosphorous was thereby reduced.

Steam and pure hydrogen gas were used, with varying levels of success, to remove sulfur, and different flues made mainly of silicates of iron and manganese oxide were brought in contact with the molten metal during the process, which reduced the amount of phosphorus.

But the clear implication is that the commercial operation at Sheffield was based on the use of the best Swedish pig iron and the hematite pig from Workington. The use of manganese as standard practice at this time is not referred to,70 but the rotary converter and the use of ganister linings are mentioned for the first time.

But it’s clear that the commercial operation in Sheffield relied on the best Swedish pig iron and the hematite pig from Workington. The use of manganese as a standard practice at that time isn’t mentioned,70 but the rotary converter and the use of ganister linings are noted for the first time.

Mushet had, with some intuition, found opportunity to reassert his contributions to Bessemer a few days before this address, describing his process as perhaps lacking "the extraordinary merit of Mr. Bessemer," being "merely a vigorous offshoot proceeding from that great discovery; but, combined with Mr. Bessemer's process, it places within the reach of every iron manufacturer to produce cast steel at the same cost for which he can now make his best iron."71

Mushet had, with some insight, found a chance to reaffirm his contributions to Bessemer just a few days before this speech. He described his process as potentially lacking "the extraordinary merit of Mr. Bessemer," being "just a strong offshoot of that great discovery; but, when combined with Mr. Bessemer's process, it allows every iron manufacturer to produce cast steel at the same cost as their best iron."71

One of Mushet's replies to the paper itself took the form of the announcement of his provisional patent for the use of his triple compound which, in the opinion of The Mining Journal appeared to be "but a very slight modification of several of Mr. Bessemer's inventions." Another half dozen patents appeared within two months, "so that it is apparent that Mr. Mushet's failure to make the public appreciate his theories has not injured his inventive faculties."72 These patents include, besides variations on his "triple compound" theme, his important patent on the use of tungsten for cutting tools, later to be known as Mushet steel.73

One of Mushet's responses to the paper was the announcement of his provisional patent for his triple compound, which, according to The Mining Journal, seemed to be "just a minor modification of several of Mr. Bessemer's inventions." Another six patents were filed within two months, "showing that Mr. Mushet's inability to get the public to understand his theories hasn't harmed his creative abilities." 72 These patents include, in addition to variations of his "triple compound," his significant patent on using tungsten for cutting tools, which later became known as Mushet steel. 73

Mushet's formal pronouncement on Bessemer's paper, dated June 28, 1859, is perhaps his most intelligible communication on the subject. He alone "from the first consistently advocated the merits and pointed out the defects of the Bessemer process," and within a few days of the British Association address he had shown Ebbw Vale "where the defect would be found and what would remedy" it. It was not, in fact, the presence of one-tenth of a percent of sulphur or phosphorous which affected the result if the Bessemer process were combined with his process by adding a triple compound of iron, carbon, and manganese to the pig. "There never was a bar of first-rate cast steel made by the Bessemer process alone"; (and that included Goransson's product) "and there never can be, but a cheap kind of steel applicable to several purposes may be thus produced." After emphasizing the uniqueness of his attempt to make Bessemer's process successful, he asserts:74

Mushet's official statement regarding Bessemer's paper, dated June 28, 1859, is probably his clearest communication on the topic. He alone "from the beginning consistently championed the strengths and identified the weaknesses of the Bessemer process," and just a few days after his address to the British Association, he demonstrated to Ebbw Vale "where the flaw would occur and how to fix it." In reality, it wasn't just the presence of one-tenth of a percent of sulfur or phosphorus that impacted the outcome if the Bessemer process was combined with his method by adding a triple compound of iron, carbon, and manganese to the pig iron. "There has never been a bar of top-quality cast steel produced solely by the Bessemer process"; (and this includes Goransson's product) "and there never will be, but a low-cost type of steel suitable for various uses can be created this way." After stressing the originality of his effort to make Bessemer's process work, he declares:74

In short, I merely availed myself of a great metallurgical fact, which has been for years before the eyes of the metallurgical world, namely that the presence of metallic manganese in iron and steel conferred upon both an amount of toughness either when cold or when heated, which the presence at the same time of a notable amount of sulphur and phosphorous could not overcome.

In short, I simply took advantage of a significant metallurgical fact, which has been for years visible to the metallurgical community: specifically, that the presence of metallic manganese in iron and steel gave both materials a level of toughness, whether cold or hot, that a considerable amount of sulfur and phosphorus couldn't diminish.

The succeeding years were enlivened, one by one, by some controversy in which Mushet invoked the shadow of his late father as support for some pronouncement, or "edict," as some said, on the subject of making iron and steel. In 1860, on the question of suitable metal for artillery, later to be the subject of high controversy among the leading experts of the day, Mushet found a ready solution in his own gun metal. This he had developed fifteen years before. It was of a tensile strength better even than that of Krupp of Essen who was then specializing in the making of large blocks of cast steel for heavy forgings, and particularly for guns. Indeed, he was able publicly to challenge Krupp to produce a cast gun metal or cast steel to stand test against his.75 A year later his attack on the distinguished French metallurgist Fremy, whom he describes as an "ass" for his interest in the so-called cyanogen process of steel making, did little to enhance his reputation, whatever the scientific justification for his attack. His attitude toward the use of New Zealand (Taranaki) metalliferous sand, which he had previously favored and then condemned in such a way as to "injure a project he can no longer control,"76 was another example of a public behavior evidently resented.

The following years were filled, one by one, with controversies where Mushet called on the memory of his late father to back up some statements, or "edict," as some called it, about making iron and steel. In 1860, regarding the right metal for artillery, which would later spark intense debates among the top experts of the time, Mushet confidently presented his own gun metal as the solution. He had developed this fifteen years earlier. Its tensile strength was even better than that of Krupp of Essen, who was then focused on producing large blocks of cast steel for heavy forgings, especially for guns. In fact, he publicly challenged Krupp to create a cast gun metal or cast steel that could pass tests against his.75 A year later, his criticism of the renowned French metallurgist Fremy, whom he called an "ass" for his interest in the so-called cyanogen process of steelmaking, did little to improve his reputation, regardless of the scientific basis for his criticism. His shifting stance on the use of New Zealand (Taranaki) metalliferous sand, which he had previously supported and then condemned in a way that would "injure a project he can no longer control,"76 was another instance of public behavior that was clearly resented.

By mid-1861, on the other hand, Bessemer was beginning to meet with increasing respect from the trade. The Society of Engineers received a dispassionate account of the achievement at the Sheffield Works from E. Riley, whose firm (Dowlais) was among the earlier and disappointed licensees of the process.77 In August 1861, five years after the ill-fated address before the British Association, the Institution of Mechanical Engineers, meeting in Sheffield, the center of the British steel trade, heard papers from Bessemer and from John Brown, a famous ironmaster. The latter described the making of Bessemer rails, the product which above all was to absorb the Bessemer plants in America after 1865. After the meeting, the engineers visited Bessemer's works; and later it was reported,78 "at Messrs. John Brown and Company's works, the Bessemer process was repeated on a still larger scale and a heavy armor plate rolled in the presence of some 250 visitors...."

By mid-1861, Bessemer was starting to gain more respect from the industry. The Society of Engineers received an objective report on the achievement at the Sheffield Works from E. Riley, whose company (Dowlais) was one of the earlier and disappointed licensees of the process.77 In August 1861, five years after the unsuccessful address before the British Association, the Institution of Mechanical Engineers met in Sheffield, the heart of the British steel trade, and heard presentations from Bessemer and John Brown, a well-known ironmaster. Brown talked about making Bessemer rails, the product that would mainly interest the Bessemer plants in America after 1865. After the meeting, the engineers toured Bessemer's works; and later it was reported,78 "at Messrs. John Brown and Company's works, the Bessemer process was repeated on an even larger scale and a heavy armor plate was rolled in front of around 250 visitors...."

These proceedings invited Robert Mushet's intervention. Still under the impression that his patent was still alive and, with Martien's, in the "able hands" of the Ebbw Vale Iron Company, he condemned Bessemer for his "lack of grace" to do him justice, and took the occasion to indict the patent system which denied him and Martien the fruits of their labors.79

These proceedings prompted Robert Mushet to get involved. Believing that his patent was still valid and, along with Martien's, in the "capable hands" of the Ebbw Vale Iron Company, he criticized Bessemer for his "lack of grace" in not giving him credit and took the opportunity to attack the patent system that denied him and Martien the rewards of their efforts.79

The Engineer found Mushet's position untenable on the very grounds he was pleading—that patents should not be issued to different men at different times for the same thing; and showed that Bessemer in his patents of January 4, 1856, and later, had clearly anticipated Mushet. In a subsequent article, The Engineer disposed of Martien's and Mushet's claims with a certain finality. The Ebbw Vale Iron Works had spent £7,000 trying to carry out the Martien process and it was unlikely that they would have allowed Bessemer to infringe upon that patent if they had any grounds for a case. Bessemer was not imitating Mushet. The latter's "triple compound" required manganese pig-iron (with a content of 2 to 5 percent of manganese) at £13 per ton while Bessemer used an oxide of manganese (at a 50 percent concentration): at £7 per ton.

The Engineer found Mushet's position impossible to defend based on his own argument—that patents shouldn’t be given to different people at different times for the same invention; and demonstrated that Bessemer, in his patents dated January 4, 1856, and afterward, had clearly anticipated Mushet’s work. In a later article, The Engineer dismissed Martien's and Mushet's claims with a definite finality. The Ebbw Vale Iron Works had spent £7,000 attempting to implement the Martien process, and it was unlikely they would have allowed Bessemer to infringe that patent if they had any legitimate grounds for a case. Bessemer was not copying Mushet. Mushet's "triple compound" required manganese pig-iron (with 2 to 5 percent manganese content) at £13 per ton, while Bessemer used a manganese oxide (at a 50 percent concentration) costing £7 per ton.

The alloy of manganese and other materials now used in the atmospheric process contains 50 percent of manganese a proportion which could never be obtained from the blast furnace, owing to the highly oxidisable nature of that metal. And it is absolutely necessary, in order to apply any useful alloy of iron, carbon and manganese, in the manufacture of malleable iron and very soft steel that the manganese should be largely in excess of the carbon present.80

The blend of manganese and other materials now used in the atmospheric process contains 50 percent manganese, a level that could never be achieved in a blast furnace due to the highly oxidizable nature of that metal. It's essential, to use any effective alloy of iron, carbon, and manganese in making malleable iron and very soft steel, that the manganese is significantly more than the carbon present.80

Sufficient answer to Mushet was at any rate available in the fact that many hundreds of tons of excellent "Bessemer metal" made without any mixture of manganese or spiegeleisen in any form were in successful use. And, moreover, spiegeleisen was not a discovery of Robert Mushet or an exclusive product of Germany since it had been made for twenty years at least from Tow Law (Durham) ores. If Bessemer had refused Mushet a license (and this was an admitted fact), Bessemer's refusal must have been made in self-defense:

Sufficient response to Mushet was definitely found in the fact that many hundreds of tons of high-quality "Bessemer metal" produced without any manganese or spiegeleisen in any form were successfully being used. Furthermore, spiegeleisen was not a discovery of Robert Mushet or a unique product of Germany since it had been made for at least twenty years from Tow Law (Durham) ores. If Bessemer denied Mushet a license (which was a recognized fact), Bessemer's refusal must have been made in self-defense:

Mr. Mushet having set up a number of claims for "improvements" upon which claims, we have a right to suppose, he was preparing to take toll from Mr. Bessemer, but which claims, the latter gentleman discovered, in time, were worthless and accordingly declined any negotiations with the individual making them.81

Mr. Mushet had filed several claims for "improvements" on which we can assume he was getting ready to charge Mr. Bessemer. However, Mr. Bessemer found out in time that these claims were worthless and therefore refused to engage in any negotiations with the person making them.81

Mushet's claims were by this time rarely supported in the periodicals. One interesting article in his favor came in 1864 from a source of special interest to the American situation. Mushet's American patent82 had been bought by an American group interested in the Kelly process at about this time,83 and Bessemer's American rights had also been sold to an American group that included Alexander Lyman Holley,84 who had long been associated with Zerah Colburn, another American engineer. Colburn, who subsequently (1866) established the London periodical Engineering and is regarded as one of the founders of engineering journalism, was from 1862 onward a frequent contributor to other trade papers in London. Colburn's article of 186485 seems to have been of some importance to Mushet, who, in the prospectus of the Titanic Steel and Iron Company, Ltd., issued soon after, brazenly asserted86 that, "by the process of Mr. Mushet especially when in combination with the Bessemer process, steel as good as Swedish steel" would be produced at £6 per ton. Mushet may have intended to invite a patent action, but evidently Bessemer could now more than ever afford to ignore the "sage of Coleford."

Mushet's claims were rarely backed by publications at this point. One interesting article supporting him came in 1864 from a source particularly relevant to the American context. Mushet's American patent82 had been purchased by an American group interested in the Kelly process around this time,83 and Bessemer's American rights had also been sold to a group that included Alexander Lyman Holley,84 who had long been associated with Zerah Colburn, another American engineer. Colburn, who later (in 1866) founded the London periodical Engineering and is considered one of the pioneers of engineering journalism, began frequently contributing to other trade publications in London starting in 1862. Colburn's 1864 article85 seemed to hold some significance for Mushet, who, in the prospectus of the Titanic Steel and Iron Company, Ltd., released shortly after, boldly claimed86 that, "by the process of Mr. Mushet especially when in combination with the Bessemer process, steel as good as Swedish steel" would be produced at £6 per ton. Mushet might have aimed to provoke a patent lawsuit, but it was clear that Bessemer could now afford to disregard the "sage of Coleford" more than ever.

The year 1865 saw Mushet less provocative and more appealing; as for instance: "It was no fault of Mr. Bessemer's that my patent was lost, but he ought to acknowledge his obligations to me in a manly, straightforward manner and this would stamp him as a great man as well as a great inventor."87

The year 1865 found Mushet less confrontational and more likable; for example: "It wasn't Mr. Bessemer's fault that my patent was lost, but he should recognize his obligations to me honestly and straightforwardly, and this would show that he is both a great man and a great inventor."87

But Bessemer evidently remained convinced of the security of his own patent position. In an address before the British Association at Birmingham in September 1865 he made his first public reply to Mushet.88 In his long series of patents Mushet had attempted to secure—

But Bessemer clearly still believed in the strength of his patent rights. In a speech at the British Association in Birmingham in September 1865, he gave his first public response to Mushet.88 In his long list of patents, Mushet had tried to secure—

almost every conceivable mode of introducing manganese into the metal.... Manganese and its compounds were so claimed under all imaginable conditions that if this series of patents could have been sustained in law, it would have been utterly impossible for [me] to have employed manganese with steel made by his process, although it was considered by the trade to be impossible to make steel from coke-made iron without it.

almost every possible way to introduce manganese into the metal.... Manganese and its compounds were claimed under every conceivable condition, and if this series of patents could have held up in court, it would have been completely impossible for [me] to use manganese with steel produced by his process, even though the industry believed it was impossible to create steel from coke-made iron without it.

The failure of those who controlled Mushet's batch of patents to renew them at the end of three years, Bessemer ascribed to the low public estimation to which Mushet's process had sunk in 1859, and he had therefore, "used without scruple any of these numerous patents for manganese without feeling an overwhelming sense of obligation to the patentee." He was now using ferromanganese made in Glasgow. Another alloy, consisting of 60 to 80 percent of metallic manganese was also available to him from Germany.

The failure of those who managed Mushet's patents to renew them after three years was something Bessemer attributed to the low public opinion of Mushet's process in 1859. Because of this, he felt justified in using any of the various manganese patents without feeling a strong obligation to the patent holder. He was now using ferromanganese produced in Glasgow. Additionally, he had access to another alloy made up of 60 to 80 percent metallic manganese from Germany.

This renewed publicity brought forth no immediate reply from Mushet, but a year later he was invited to read a paper before the British Association. A report on the meeting stated that in his paper he repeated his oft-told story, and that "he still thought that the accident (of the non-payment of the patent stamp duties) ought not to debar him from receiving the reward to which he was justly entitled." Bessemer, who was present, reiterated his constant willingness to submit the matter to the courts of law, but pointed out that Mushet had not accepted the challenge.89

This renewed publicity didn’t get an immediate response from Mushet, but a year later he was invited to present a paper to the British Association. A report on the meeting mentioned that in his paper, he told his familiar story again and maintained that "he still believed the accident (of not paying the patent stamp duties) shouldn't prevent him from receiving the reward he rightly deserved." Bessemer, who was there, repeated his ongoing willingness to take the matter to court, but noted that Mushet hadn’t accepted the challenge.89

Three months later, in December 1866, Mushet's daughter called on Bessemer and asked his help to prevent the loss of their home: "They tell me you use my father's inventions and are indebted to him for your success." Bessemer replied characteristically:

Three months later, in December 1866, Mushet's daughter visited Bessemer and sought his help to save their home: "I've been told that you use my father's inventions and owe him for your success." Bessemer responded, as usual:

I use what your father has no right to claim; and if he had the legal position you seem to suppose, he could stop my business by an injunction tomorrow and get many thousands of pounds compensation for my infringement of his rights. The only result which followed from your father taking out his patents was that they pointed out to me some rights which I already possessed, but of which I was not availing myself. Thus he did me some service and even for this unintentional service, I cannot live in a state of indebtedness....

I use what your father has no right to claim; and if he had the legal standing you think he has, he could halt my business with an injunction tomorrow and demand a large sum in compensation for infringing on his rights. The only outcome of your father filing his patents was that they made me aware of some rights I already had but wasn’t using. So he actually helped me, and even for this unintentional help, I can't be in debt...

With that he gave Miss Mushet money to cover a debt for which distraint was threatened.90 Soon after this action, Bessemer made Mushet a "small allowance" of £300 a year. Bessemer's reasons for making this payment, he describes as follows: "There was a strong desire on my part to make him (Mushet) my debtor rather than the reverse, and the payment had other advantages: the press at that time was violently attacking my patent and there was the chance that if any of my licensees were thus induced to resist my claims, all the rest might follow the example."91

With that, he gave Miss Mushet money to pay off a debt that was about to lead to legal action. 90 Soon after this, Bessemer provided Mushet with a "small allowance" of £300 a year. Bessemer explains his reasons for this payment: "I really wanted to make him (Mushet) my debtor instead of the other way around, and the payment had additional benefits: at that time, the press was aggressively attacking my patent, and there was a chance that if any of my licensees were encouraged to challenge my claims, others might follow suit." 91

Mushet's Titanic Steel and Iron Company was liquidated in 1871 and its principal asset, "R. Mushet's special steel," that is, his tungsten alloy tool metal, was taken over by the Sheffield firm of Samuel Osborn and Company. The royalties from this, with Bessemer's pension seem to have left Mushet in a reasonably comfortable condition until his death in 1891;92 but even the award of the Bessemer medal by the Iron and Steel Institute in 1876 failed to remove the conviction that he had been badly treated. One would like to know more about the politics which preceded the award of the trade's highest honor. Bessemer at any rate was persuaded to approve of the presentation and attended the meeting. Mushet himself did not accept the invitation, "as I may probably not be then alive."93 The President of the Institute emphasized the present good relations between Mushet and Bessemer and the latter recorded that the hatchet had "long since" been buried. Yet Mushet continued to brood over the injustice done to him and eventually recorded his story of the rise and progress of the "Bessemer-Mushet" process in a pamphlet94 written apparently without reference to his earlier statements and so committing himself to many inconsistencies.

Mushet's Titanic Steel and Iron Company was dissolved in 1871, and its main asset, "R. Mushet's special steel," which was his tungsten alloy tool metal, was acquired by the Sheffield firm of Samuel Osborn and Company. The royalties from this, along with Bessemer's pension, seemed to keep Mushet in a fairly comfortable position until his death in 1891;92 but even receiving the Bessemer medal from the Iron and Steel Institute in 1876 couldn’t shake his belief that he had been treated poorly. One would like to know more about the politics that led to the awarding of the industry’s highest honor. At least Bessemer was convinced to agree to the presentation and showed up at the meeting. Mushet himself declined the invitation, saying, "as I may probably not be then alive."93 The President of the Institute highlighted the current good relationship between Mushet and Bessemer, and Bessemer noted that the feud had been "long since" resolved. Yet Mushet continued to dwell on the injustice he felt, and eventually documented his version of the development of the "Bessemer-Mushet" process in a pamphlet94 that seemed to ignore his earlier statements, leading to several inconsistencies.

William Kelly's "Air-boiling" Process

William Kelly's "Air-boiling" Method

An account of Bessemer's address to the British Association was published in the Scientific American on September 13, 1856.95 On September 16, 1856, Martien filed application for a U.S. patent on his furnace and Mushet for one on the application of his triple compound to cast iron "purified or decarbonized by the action of air blown or forced into ... its particles while it is in a molten ... state."96 Mushet, by this time, had apparently decided to generalize the application of his compound instead of citing its use in conjunction with Martien's process, or, as he put it, he had been obliged to do for his English specification by the Ebbw Vale Iron Works.

An article about Bessemer's speech to the British Association was published in the Scientific American on September 13, 1856.95 On September 16, 1856, Martien applied for a U.S. patent for his furnace, and Mushet sought a patent for the use of his triple compound in cast iron "purified or decarbonized by the action of air blown or forced into ... its particles while in a molten ... state."96 By this time, Mushet had apparently decided to broaden the application of his compound instead of mentioning its use alongside Martien's process, or as he expressed it, he had been required to do for his English specification by the Ebbw Vale Iron Works.

Drawing of the furnace

Figure 2.—Only Known Design for Kelly's Air-Boiling Furnace, From U.S. Patent 17628. A is "the flue to carry off the carbonic gas formed in decarbonizing the iron," B is the port through which the charge of fluid iron is received, C and C' are the tuyères, and D is the tap hole for letting out the refined metal.

Figure 2.—Only Known Design for Kelly's Air-Boiling Furnace, From U.S. Patent 17628. A is "the flue to carry off the carbonic gas formed in decarbonizing the iron," B is the port through which the charge of fluid iron is received, C and C' are the tuyères, and D is the tap hole for letting out the refined metal.

The discussion in the Scientific American, which was mostly concerned with Martien's claim to priority, soon evoked a letter from William Kelly. Writing under date of September 30, 1856, from the Suwanee Iron Works, Eddyville, Kentucky, he claimed to have started "a series of experiments" in November 1851 which had been witnessed by hundreds of persons and "discussed amongst the ironmasters, etc., of this section, all of whom are perfectly familiar with the whole principle ... as discovered by me nearly five years ago." A number of English puddlers had visited him to see his new process. "Several of them have since returned to England and may have spoken of my invention there." Kelly expected "shortly to have the invention perfected and bring it before the public."97

The article in Scientific American, which mostly focused on Martien's claim to priority, quickly prompted a letter from William Kelly. In his letter dated September 30, 1856, from the Suwanee Iron Works in Eddyville, Kentucky, he stated that he began "a series of experiments" in November 1851, witnessed by hundreds of people, and "discussed among the ironmasters and others in this area, all of whom are completely familiar with the whole principle... as discovered by me nearly five years ago." Several English puddlers had come to see his new process. "Some of them have since gone back to England and may have talked about my invention there." Kelly anticipated that he would "soon have the invention perfected and present it to the public."97

Bessemer's application for an American patent was granted during the week ending November 18, 1856, and Kelly began his interference proceedings sometime before January 1857.98

Bessemer's application for an American patent was approved during the week ending November 18, 1856, and Kelly started his interference proceedings sometime before January 1857.98

Kelly's witnesses were almost wholly from the ranks of employees or former employees. The only exception was Dr. Alfred H. Champion, a physician of Eddyville. Dr. Champion describes a meeting in the fall of 1851 with "two or three practical Ironmasters and others" at which Kelly described his process and invited all present to see it in operation. He stated:

Kelly's witnesses were mostly employees or former employees. The only exception was Dr. Alfred H. Champion, a doctor from Eddyville. Dr. Champion recounted a meeting in the fall of 1851 with "two or three practical Ironmasters and others" where Kelly explained his process and invited everyone there to see it in action. He stated:

The company present all differed in opinion from Mr. Kelly and appealed to me as a chemist in confirmation of their doubts. I at once decided that Mr. Kelly was correct in his Theory and then went on to explain the received opinion of chemists a century ago on this subject, and the present received opinion which was in direct confirmation of the novel theory of Mr. Kelly. I also mentioned the analogy of said Kelly's process in decarbonising iron to the process of decarbonising blood in the human lungs.

The people at the company all disagreed with Mr. Kelly and turned to me as a chemist to back up their doubts. I immediately concluded that Mr. Kelly was right in his theory and then explained what chemists believed a century ago about this topic, as well as the current accepted views that supported Mr. Kelly's new theory. I also pointed out the similarity between Kelly's method of removing carbon from iron and the process of removing carbon from blood in the human lungs.

The Doctor does not say, specifically, if he or any of the "company" went to see the process in operation.

The Doctor doesn't specifically mention whether he or anyone in the "company" went to see the process in action.

Kelly obtained affidavits from another seventeen witnesses. Ten of these recorded their recollections of experiments conducted in 1847. Five described the 1851 work. Two knew of or had seen both. One of the last group was John B. Evans who became forge manager of Kelly's Union Forge, a few miles from Suwanee. This evidence is of interest since a man in his position should have been in a position to tell something about the results of Kelly's operations in terms of usable metal. Unfortunately, he limits himself to a comment on the metal which had chilled around a tuyère which had been sent back to the Forge ("it was partly malleable and partly refined pig-iron") and to an account of a conversation with others who had worked some of Kelly's "good wrought iron" made by the new process.

Kelly obtained affidavits from another seventeen witnesses. Ten of these detailed their memories of experiments conducted in 1847. Five described the work done in 1851. Two were familiar with or had seen both. One of the last group was John B. Evans, who became the forge manager of Kelly's Union Forge, a few miles from Suwanee. This evidence is noteworthy since someone in his role should have been able to provide insight into the results of Kelly's operations regarding usable metal. Unfortunately, he only comments on the metal that had cooled around a tuyère sent back to the Forge ("it was partly malleable and partly refined pig-iron") and shares a recount of a conversation with others who had worked with some of Kelly's "good wrought iron" produced by the new process.

Only one of the witnesses (William Soden) makes a reference to the phenomenon which is an accompaniment of the blowing of a converter: the prolonged and violent emission of sparks and flames which startled Bessemer in his first use of the process99 and which still provides an exciting, if not awe-inspiring, interlude in a visit to a steel mill. Soden refers, without much excitement, to a boiling commotion, but the results of Kelly's "air-boiling" were, evidently, not such as to impress the rest of those who claimed to have seen his furnace in operation. Only five of the total of eighteen of the witnesses say that they witnessed the operations. Soden, incidentally, knew of seven different "air-boiling" furnaces, some with four and some with eight tuyères, but he also neglected to report on the use of the metal.

Only one of the witnesses (William Soden) mentions the phenomenon that occurs when a converter is blown: the prolonged and intense bursts of sparks and flames that surprised Bessemer during his first use of the process99 and still provide an exciting, if not breathtaking, experience during a tour of a steel mill. Soden describes, without much enthusiasm, a chaotic scene, but the results of Kelly's "air-boiling" clearly didn’t impress the others who claimed to have seen his furnace in action. Only five out of the eighteen witnesses said they actually saw the operations. Soden also mentioned seven different "air-boiling" furnaces, some with four and others with eight tuyères, but he failed to provide details about the use of the metal.

As is well known, Kelly satisfied the Acting Commissioner that he had "made this invention and showed it by drawings and experiment as early as 1847," and he was awarded priority by the Acting Commissioner's decision of April 13, 1857, and U.S. Patent 17628 was granted him as of June 23, 1857. The Scientific American sympathized with Bessemer's realization that his American patent was "of no more value to him than so much waste paper" but took the opportunity of chastising Kelly for his negligence in not securing a patent at a much earlier date and complained of a patent system which did not require an inventor to make known his discovery promptly. The journal advocated a "certain fixed time" after which such an inventor "should not be allowed to subvert a patent granted to another who has taken proper measures to put the public in possession of the invention."100

As everyone knows, Kelly convinced the Acting Commissioner that he had "created this invention and demonstrated it through drawings and experiments as early as 1847," and he was given priority according to the Acting Commissioner's decision on April 13, 1857. U.S. Patent 17628 was granted to him effective June 23, 1857. The Scientific American expressed sympathy for Bessemer's realization that his American patent was "no more valuable to him than so much waste paper" but took the chance to criticize Kelly for not securing a patent much earlier. It also complained about a patent system that didn’t require inventors to announce their discoveries promptly. The journal recommended a "certain fixed time" after which any inventor "should not be allowed to undermine a patent granted to another who has taken proper steps to inform the public about the invention." 100

Little authentic is known about Kelly's activities following the grant of his patent. His biographer101 does not document his statements, many of which appear to be based on the recollections of members of Kelly's family, and it is difficult to reconcile some of them with what few facts are available. Kelly's own account of his invention,102 itself undated, asserts that he could "refine fifteen hundredweight of metal in from five to ten minutes," his furnace "supplying a cheap method of making run-out metal" so that "after trying it a few days we entirely dispensed with the old and troublesome run-out fires."103 This statement suggests that Kelly's method was intended to do just this; and it is not without interest to note that several of his witnesses in the Interference proceedings, refer to bringing the metal "to nature," a term often used in connection with the finery furnace. If this is so, his assumption that he had anticipated Bessemer was based on a misapprehension of what the latter was intending to do, that is, to make steel.

Little is known for sure about Kelly's activities after he got his patent. His biographer 101 doesn’t record his statements, many of which seem to rely on memories from Kelly's family. It's hard to match some of these with the few facts that are available. Kelly's own account of his invention, 102 , which doesn't have a date, claims that he could "refine fifteen hundredweight of metal in from five to ten minutes," and his furnace "provided an inexpensive way to make run-out metal," to the point that "after trying it for a few days, we completely stopped using the old and troublesome run-out fires." 103 This statement implies that Kelly's method was meant to accomplish exactly that. It’s worth noting that several of his witnesses in the Interference proceedings referred to bringing the metal "to nature," a phrase often associated with the finery furnace. If that’s the case, his belief that he had anticipated Bessemer was likely based on a misunderstanding of what Bessemer was actually trying to do—namely, create steel.

This statement leaves the reader under the impression that the process was in successful use. It is to be contrasted with the statement quoted above (page 43), dated September 1856, when the process had, clearly, not been perfected. In this connection, it should be noted that in the report on the Suwanee Iron Works, included in The iron manufacturer's guide,104 it is stated that "It is at this furnace that Mr. Kelly's process for refining iron in the hearth has been most fully experimented upon."

This statement gives the reader the impression that the process was successfully in use. It is meant to be compared with the statement quoted earlier (page 43), dated September 1856, when the process clearly had not been perfected. In this context, it's important to point out that in the report on the Suwanee Iron Works, included in The iron manufacturer's guide, 104 it mentions that "It is at this furnace that Mr. Kelly's process for refining iron in the hearth has been most fully tested."

A major financial crisis affected United States business in the fall of 1857. It began in the first week of October and by October 31 the Economist (London) reported that the banks of the United States had "almost universally suspended specie payment."105 Kelly was involved in this crisis and his plant was closed down. According to Swank,106 some experiments were made to adapt Kelly's process to need of rolling mills at the Cambria Iron Works in 1857 and 1858, Kelly himself being at Johnstown, at least in June 1858. That the experiments were not particularly successful is suggested by the lack of any American contributions to the correspondence in the English technical journals. Kelly was not mentioned as having done more than interfere with Bessemer's first patent application. The success of the latter in obtaining patents107 in the United States in November 1856, covering "the conversion of molten crude iron ... into steel or malleable iron, without the use of fuel ..." also escaped the attention of both English and American writers.

A major financial crisis hit American businesses in the fall of 1857. It started in the first week of October, and by October 31, the Economist (London) reported that banks across the U.S. had "almost universally suspended specie payment." 105 Kelly was affected by this crisis, and his plant was shut down. According to Swank, 106 some experiments were conducted to adjust Kelly's process for the rolling mills at the Cambria Iron Works in 1857 and 1858, with Kelly being in Johnstown at least in June 1858. The lack of American contributions in English technical journals suggests that these experiments were not particularly successful. Kelly was not noted for contributing more than interfering with Bessemer's initial patent application. The success of Bessemer in securing patents 107 in the United States in November 1856, covering "the conversion of molten crude iron ... into steel or malleable iron, without the use of fuel ..." also went unnoticed by both English and American writers.

It was not until 1861 that the question arose as to what happened to Kelly's process. The occasion was the publication of an account of Bessemer's paper at the Sheffield meeting of the (British) Society of Mechanical Engineers on August 1, 1861. Accepting the evidence of "the complete industrial success" of Bessemer's process, the Scientific American108 asked: "Would not some of our enterprising manufacturers make a good operation by getting hold of the [Kelly] patent and starting the manufacture of steel in this country?"

It wasn’t until 1861 that people began to wonder what happened to Kelly's process. This came up when an article was published about Bessemer's presentation at the Sheffield meeting of the (British) Society of Mechanical Engineers on August 1, 1861. Acknowledging the proof of "the complete industrial success" of Bessemer's process, the Scientific American108 posed the question: "Wouldn't some of our innovative manufacturers benefit from acquiring the [Kelly] patent and starting steel production in this country?"

There was no response to this rhetorical question, but a further inquiry as to whether the Kelly patent "could be bought"109 elicited a response from Kelly. Writing from Hammondsville, Ohio, Kelly110 said, in part:

There was no answer to this rhetorical question, but a follow-up ask about whether the Kelly patent "could be bought"109 got a reply from Kelly. Writing from Hammondsville, Ohio, Kelly110 said, in part:

I would say that the New England states and New York would be sold at a fair rate.... I removed from Kentucky about three years ago, and now reside at New Salisbury about three miles from Hammondsville and sixty miles from Pittsburg. Accept my thanks for your kind efforts in endeavoring to draw the attention of the community to the advantages of my process.

I’d say that the New England states and New York would be sold at a fair price.... I moved from Kentucky about three years ago, and now I live in New Salisbury, which is about three miles from Hammondsville and sixty miles from Pittsburgh. Thank you for your efforts to bring the community's attention to the benefits of my process.

This letter suggests that the Kelly process had been dormant since 1858. Whether or not as a result of the publication of this letter, interest was resumed in Kelly's experiments. Captain Eber Brock Ward of Detroit and Z. S. Durfee of New Bedford, Massachusetts, obtained control of Kelly's patent. Durfee himself went to England in the fall of 1861 in an attempt to secure a license from Bessemer. He returned to the United States in the early fall of 1862, assuming that he was the only "citizen of the United States" who had even seen the Bessemer apparatus.111

This letter implies that the Kelly process had been inactive since 1858. Whether or not this letter sparked renewed interest in Kelly's experiments is unclear. Captain Eber Brock Ward from Detroit and Z. S. Durfee from New Bedford, Massachusetts, took control of Kelly's patent. Durfee traveled to England in the fall of 1861 to try to obtain a license from Bessemer. He came back to the United States in early fall 1862, believing he was the only "citizen of the United States" who had even seen the Bessemer equipment.111

In June, 1862, W. F. Durfee, a cousin of Z. S. Durfee, was asked by Ward to report on Kelly's process. The report112 was unfavorable. "The description of [the apparatus] used by Mr. Kelly at his abandoned works in Kentucky satisfied me that it was not suited for an experiment on so large a scale as was contemplated at Wyandotte [Detroit]." Since it was "confidently expected that Z. S. Durfee would be successful in his efforts to purchase [Bessemer's patents], it was thought only to be anticipating the acquisition of property rights ... to use such of his inventions as best suited the purpose in view."

In June 1862, W. F. Durfee, a cousin of Z. S. Durfee, was asked by Ward to review Kelly's process. The report112 was not positive. "The description of [the equipment] used by Mr. Kelly at his abandoned site in Kentucky made it clear to me that it was unsuitable for an experiment on the large scale that was planned at Wyandotte [Detroit]." Since it was "fully expected that Z. S. Durfee would be successful in his efforts to acquire [Bessemer's patents], it was considered simply a matter of anticipating the acquisition of property rights ... to use any of his inventions that best fit the intended purpose."

Thus the first "Bessemer" plant in the United States came into being without benefit of a license and supported only by a patent "not suited" for a large experiment. Kelly seems to have had no part in these developments. They took some time to come to formation. Although the converter was ready by September 1862, the blowing engine was not completed until the spring of 1864 and the first "blow" successfully made in 1864. It may be no more than a coincidence that the start of production seems to have been impossible before the arrival in this country of a young man, L. M. Hart, who had been trained in Bessemer operations at the plant of the Jackson Brothers at St. Seurin (near Bordeaux) France. The Jacksons had become Bessemer's partners in respect of the French rights; and the recruitment of Hart suggests the possibility that it was from this French source that Z. S. Durfee obtained his initial technical data on the operation of the Bessemer process.113

Thus, the first "Bessemer" plant in the United States was established without a license and backed only by a patent that wasn't suitable for a large-scale experiment. Kelly appears to have had no involvement in these developments. It took some time for things to take shape. Although the converter was ready by September 1862, the blowing engine wasn't finished until the spring of 1864, and the first successful "blow" happened in 1864. It might just be a coincidence that production couldn't start until a young man, L. M. Hart, arrived in the country; he had been trained in Bessemer operations at the Jackson Brothers' plant in St. Seurin (near Bordeaux), France. The Jacksons had partnered with Bessemer regarding the French rights, and Hart's recruitment suggests that Z. S. Durfee may have obtained his initial technical information on the Bessemer process from this French source.113

During the organization of the plant at Wyandotte, Kelly was called back to Cambria, probably by Daniel J. Morrell, who, later, became a partner with Ward and Z. S. Durfee in the formation of the Kelly Pneumatic Process Company.114 We learn from John E. Fry,115 the iron moulder who was assigned to help Kelly, that—

During the setup of the plant in Wyandotte, Kelly was summoned back to Cambria, likely by Daniel J. Morrell, who later became a partner with Ward and Z. S. Durfee in starting the Kelly Pneumatic Process Company.114 We learn from John E. Fry,115 the iron moulder assigned to assist Kelly, that—

in 1862 Mr. Kelly returned to Johnstown for a crucial, and as it turned out, a final series of experiments by him with a rotative [Bessemer converter] made abroad and imported for his purpose. This converter embodied in its materials and construction several of Mr. Bessemer's patented factors, of which, up to the close of Mr. Kelly's experiments above noted, he seemed to have no knowledge or conception. And it was as late as on the occasion of his return in 1862, to operate the experimental Bessemer converter, that he first recognized, by its adoption, the necessity for or the importance of any after treatment of, or additions required by the blown metal to convert it into steel.

In 1862, Mr. Kelly came back to Johnstown for a critical, and ultimately final, series of experiments with a rotary Bessemer converter made abroad and brought in for his use. This converter included several of Mr. Bessemer's patented features in its materials and design, which Mr. Kelly seemed to have no knowledge of until the end of his noted experiments. It wasn't until his return in 1862, when he operated the experimental Bessemer converter, that he first realized the need for or significance of any additional treatment or modifications needed for the blown metal to turn it into steel.

Fry later asserted116 that Kelly's experiments in 1862 were simply attempts to copy Bessemer's methods. (The possibility is under investigation that the so-called "pioneer converter" now on loan to the U.S. National Museum from the Bethlehem Steel Company, is the converter referred to by Fry.)

Fry later claimed116 that Kelly's experiments in 1862 were just efforts to replicate Bessemer's techniques. (It's being investigated whether the so-called "pioneer converter" currently on loan to the U.S. National Museum from the Bethlehem Steel Company is the converter Fry mentioned.)

William Kelly, in effect, disappeared from the record until 1871 when he applied for an extension of his patent of June 23, 1857. The application was opposed (by whom, the record does not state) on the grounds that the invention was not novel when it was originally issued, and that it would be against the public interest to extend its term. The Commissioner ruled that,117 on the first question, it was settled practice of the Patent Office not to reconsider former decisions on questions of fact; the novelty of Kelly's invention had been re-examined when the patent was reissued in November 1857. Testimony showed that the patent was very valuable; and that Kelly "had been untiring in his efforts to introduce it into use but the opposition of iron manufacturers and the amount of capital required prevented him from receiving anything from his patent until within very few years past." Kelly's expenditures were shown to have amounted to $11,500, whereas he had received only $2,400. Since no evidence was filed in support of the public interest aspect of the case, the Commissioner found no substantial reason for denying the extension; indeed "very few patentees are able to present so strong grounds for extension as the applicant in the case."

William Kelly essentially vanished from the records until 1871 when he applied to extend his patent from June 23, 1857. The application faced opposition (who opposed it is not specified) on the grounds that the invention was not novel when it was initially issued and extending its term would not benefit the public. The Commissioner ruled that, 117 on the first question, it was established practice for the Patent Office not to revisit previous decisions on factual matters; the novelty of Kelly's invention had been reassessed when the patent was reissued in November 1857. Evidence indicated that the patent was quite valuable, and that Kelly "had been relentless in his efforts to bring it into use, but the resistance from iron manufacturers and the amount of capital needed prevented him from profiting from his patent until just a few years ago." Kelly's expenses totaled $11,500, while he had only made $2,400. Since no evidence was submitted to support the public interest argument, the Commissioner found no significant reason to deny the extension; in fact, "very few patentees are able to present such strong grounds for extension as the applicant in this case."

In a similar application in the previous year, Bessemer had failed to win an extension of his U.S. patent 16082, of November 11, 1856, for the sole reason that his British patent with which it had been made co-terminal had duly expired at the end of its fourteen years of life, and it would have been inequitable to give Bessemer protection in the United States while British iron-masters were not under similar restraint. But if it had not been for this consideration, Bessemer "would be justly entitled to what he asks on this occasion." The Commissioner118 observed: "It may be questioned whether [Bessemer] was first to discover the principle upon which his process was founded. But we owe its reduction to practice to his untiring industry and perseverance, his superior skill and science and his great outlay."

In a similar situation the previous year, Bessemer failed to secure an extension of his U.S. patent 16082, dated November 11, 1856, simply because his British patent, which it was aligned with, had expired after its fourteen-year term. It wouldn't have been fair to grant Bessemer protection in the United States while British iron manufacturers faced no such limitations. However, without that factor, Bessemer "would justly be entitled to what he is asking for this time." The Commissioner118 remarked: "It's debatable whether [Bessemer] was the first to discover the principle behind his process. Nonetheless, we owe its practical implementation to his relentless dedication and perseverance, his superior skill and knowledge, and his significant investment."

Conclusions

Conclusions

Martien was probably never a serious contender for the honor of discovering the atmospheric process of making steel. In the present state of the record, it is not an unreasonable assumption that his patent was never seriously exploited and that the Ebbw Vale Iron Works hoped to use it, in conjunction with the Mushet patents, to upset Bessemer's patents.

Martien was likely never a serious candidate for the honor of discovering the process of making steel from the atmosphere. Given the current state of the record, it seems reasonable to assume that his patent was never seriously utilized and that the Ebbw Vale Iron Works aimed to use it, alongside the Mushet patents, to challenge Bessemer's patents.

The position of Mushet is not so clear, and it is hoped that further research can eventually throw a clearer light on his relationship with the Ebbw Vale Iron Works. It may well be that the "opinion of metallurgists in later years"119 is sound, and that both Mushet and Bessemer had successfully worked at the same problem. The study of Mushet's letters to the technical press and of the attitude of the editors of those papers to Mushet suggests the possibility that he, too, was used by Ebbw Vale for the purposes of their attacks on Bessemer. Mushet admits that he was not a free agent in respect of these patents, and the failure of Ebbw Vale to ensure their full life under English patent law indicates clearly enough that by 1859 the firm had realized that their position was not strong enough to warrant a legal suit for infringement against Bessemer. Their purchase of the Uchatius process and their final attempt to develop Martien's ideas through the Parry patents, which exposed them to a very real risk of a suit by Bessemer, are also indications of the politics in the case. Mushet seems to have been a willing enough victim of Ebbw Vale's scheming. His letters show an almost presumptuous assumption of the mantle of his father; while his sometimes absurd claims to priority of invention (and demonstration) of practically every new idea in the manufacturing of iron and steel progressively reduced the respect for his name. Bessemer claims an impressive array of precedents for the use of manganese in steel making and, given his attitude to patents and his reliance on professional advice in this respect, he should perhaps, be given the benefit of the doubt. A dispassionate judgment would be that Bessemer owed more to the development work of his Swedish licensees than to Mushet.

The situation with Mushet isn't very clear, and it's hoped that more research can eventually clarify his connection to the Ebbw Vale Iron Works. It’s possible that the "opinions of metallurgists in later years"119 are correct, and that both Mushet and Bessemer were tackling the same issue. An examination of Mushet's letters to the technical press and how the editors of those publications treated him suggests that he may have been used by Ebbw Vale to attack Bessemer. Mushet acknowledges that he wasn't entirely free regarding these patents, and Ebbw Vale's failure to fully protect them under English patent law clearly indicates that by 1859, the company realized their position wasn't strong enough to pursue a legal case against Bessemer for infringement. Their acquisition of the Uchatius process and their final attempt to advance Martien's ideas using the Parry patents, which put them at significant risk of a lawsuit by Bessemer, also highlight the political dynamics at play. Mushet appears to have been a willing participant in Ebbw Vale's schemes. His letters reveal a somewhat arrogant assumption of his father's legacy; at the same time, his increasingly outlandish claims to have invented (and demonstrated) nearly every new idea in iron and steel manufacturing diminished his reputation. Bessemer boasts an impressive list of precedents for using manganese in steel production, and considering his approach to patents and his reliance on professional advice, he might deserve some credit. An objective evaluation would suggest that Bessemer benefitted more from the development efforts of his Swedish licensees than from Mushet.

Kelly's right to be adjudged the joint inventor of what is now often called the Kelly-Bessemer process is questionable.120 Admittedly, he experimented in the treatment of molten metal with air blasts, but it is by no means clear, on the evidence, that he got beyond the experimental stage. It is certain that he never had the objective of making steel, which was Bessemer's primary aim. Nor is there evidence that his process was taken beyond the experimental stage by the Cambria Works. The rejection of his "apparatus" by W. F. Durfee must have been based, to some extent at least, upon the Johnstown trials. There are strong grounds then, for agreeing with one historian121 who concludes:

Kelly's claim to be recognized as a co-inventor of what is now commonly known as the Kelly-Bessemer process is questionable.120 It's true that he experimented with treating molten metal using air blasts, but the evidence doesn't clearly show that he progressed beyond the experimental phases. It's also clear that he never aimed to produce steel, which was Bessemer's main goal. Additionally, there’s no proof that his process moved beyond the experimental stage at the Cambria Works. The rejection of his "apparatus" by W. F. Durfee likely stemmed, at least in part, from the Johnstown trials. Therefore, there is strong support for agreeing with one historian121 who concludes:

The fact that Kelly was an American is evidently the principal reason why certain popular writers have made much of an invention that, had not Bessemer developed his process, would never have attracted notice. Kelly's patent proved very useful to industrial interests in this country as a bargaining weapon in negotiations with the Bessemer group for the exchange of patent rights.

The fact that Kelly was American is clearly the main reason why some popular writers have emphasized an invention that, if Bessemer hadn't developed his process, would have gone unnoticed. Kelly's patent became very useful to industrial interests in this country as a bargaining chip in negotiations with the Bessemer group for exchanging patent rights.

Kelly's suggestion122 that some British puddlers may have communicated his secret to Bessemer can, probably, never be verified. All that can be said is that Bessemer was not an ironman; his contacts with the iron trade were, so far as can be ascertained, nonexistent until he himself invaded Sheffield. So it is unlikely that such a secret would have been taken to him, even if he were a well-known inventor.

Kelly's suggestion122 that some British puddlers might have shared his secret with Bessemer probably can never be proven. All that can be said is that Bessemer wasn't an ironman; his connections to the iron trade were, as far as we know, nonexistent until he came to Sheffield himself. So it's unlikely that such a secret would have reached him, even if he were a well-known inventor.


Footnotes

Footnotes

1From 1870 through 1907, "Bessemer" production accounted for not less than 50 percent of United States steel production. From 1880 through 1895, 80 percent of all steel came from this source: Historical Statistics of the United States 1789-1945 (Washington, U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, 1949), Tables J. 165-170 at p. 187.

1From 1870 to 1907, "Bessemer" production accounted for at least 50 percent of steel production in the United States. Between 1880 and 1895, 80 percent of all steel was produced using this method: Historical Statistics of the United States 1789-1945 (Washington, U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, 1949), Tables J. 165-170 at p. 187.

2See especially material distributed by the American Iron and Steel Institute in connection with its celebration of the centennial of Steel: "Steel centennial (1957), press information," prepared by Hill and Knowlton, Inc., and released by the Institute as of May 1, 1957

2Refer to the materials provided by the American Iron and Steel Institute related to its celebration of the 100th anniversary of Steel: "Steel centennial (1957), press information," created by Hill and Knowlton, Inc., and published by the Institute on May 1, 1957.

3Holley's work is outside the scope of this paper. Belatedly, his biography is now being written. It can hardly fail to substantiate the contention that during his short life (1832-1882) Holley, who negotiated the purchase of the American rights to Bessemer's process, also adapted his methods to the American scene and laid a substantial part of the foundation for the modern American steel industry

3Holley's work isn't discussed in this paper. His biography is finally being written now. It will definitely reinforce the notion that during his short life (1832-1882), Holley, who obtained the American rights to Bessemer's process, also adapted his methods for the U.S. and significantly contributed to the development of the modern American steel industry.

4Andrew Ure, Dictionary of arts, manufactures and mines, New York, 1856, p. 735

4Andrew Ure, Dictionary of Arts, Manufactures, and Mines, New York, 1856, p. 735

5See abridgement of British patent 8021 of 1839 quoted by James S. Jeans, Steel, London, 1880, p. 28 ff. It is not clear that Heath was aware of the precise chemical effect of the use of manganese in this way

5Refer to the summary of British patent 8021 from 1839 mentioned by James S. Jeans, Steel, London, 1880, p. 28 ff. It's uncertain if Heath understood the precise chemical effects of using manganese in this manner.

6Mining Journal, 1857, vol. 27, p. 465

6Mining Journal, 1857, vol. 27, p. 465

7Sir Henry Bessemer, F.R.S., an autobiography, London, 1905, p. 332

7Sir Henry Bessemer, F.R.S., An Autobiography, London, 1905, p. 332

8Ibid., p. 59 ff

8Same source., p. 59 ff

9Ibid., p. 82

9Same source, p. 82

10Ibid., p. 83

10Same source, p. 83

11Ibid., p. 108 ff

11Same source, p. 108 ff

12Ibid., p. 141. Bessemer's assertion that he had approached "within measurable distance" of anticipating the Siemens-Martin process, made in a paper presented at a meeting of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (Transactions of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers, 1897, vol. 28, p. 459), evoked strong criticism of Bessemer's lack of generosity (ibid., p. 482). One commentator, friendly to Bessemer, put it that "Bessemer's relation to the open-hearth process was very much like Kelly's to the Bessemer process.... Although he was measurably near to the open-hearth process, he did not follow it up and make it a commercial success...." (ibid., p. 491)

12Ibid., p. 141. Bessemer claimed that he had come "within measurable distance" of predicting the Siemens-Martin process, as stated in a paper he presented at an American Society of Mechanical Engineers meeting (Transactions of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers, 1897, vol. 28, p. 459). This faced significant criticism for Bessemer's lack of generosity (ibid., p. 482). One supporter of Bessemer remarked, "Bessemer's link to the open-hearth process was very similar to Kelly's link to the Bessemer process.... While he was relatively close to the open-hearth process, he didn’t pursue it and make it a commercial success...." (ibid., p. 491)

13British patent 2489, November 24, 1854

13British patent 2489, November 24, 1854

14Bessemer, op. cit. (footnote 7), p. 137 He received British patent 66, dated January 10, 1855

14Bessemer, op. cit. (footnote 7), p. 137. He was granted British patent 66 on January 10, 1855.

15See James W. Dredge, "Henry Bessemer 1813-1898," Transactions of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers, 1898, vol. 19, p. 911

15See James W. Dredge, "Henry Bessemer 1813-1898," Transactions of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers, 1898, vol. 19, p. 911

16See U.S. Patent Office, Decision of Commissioner of Patents, dated April 13, 1857, in Kelly vs. Bessemer Interference. This is further discussed below (p. 42)

16See U.S. Patent Office, Decision of Commissioner of Patents, dated April 13, 1857, in Kelly vs. Bessemer Interference. This is discussed further below (p. 42).

17Dredge, op. cit. (footnote 15), p. 912

17Dredge, same source (footnote 15), p. 912

18Bessemer's paper was reported in The Times, London, August 14, 1856. By the time the Transactions of the British Association were prepared for publication, the controversy aroused by Bessemer's claim to manufacture "malleable iron and steel without fuel" had broken out and it was decided not to report the paper. Dredge (op. cit., footnote 15, p. 915) describes this decision as "sagacious."

18Bessemer's paper was published in The Times, London, on August 14, 1856. By the time the Transactions of the British Association were set for publication, the controversy ignited by Bessemer's assertion of creating "malleable iron and steel without fuel" had escalated, and it was decided not to publish the paper. Dredge (op. cit., footnote 15, p. 915) calls this decision "wise."

19Bessemer, op. cit. (footnote 7), p. 164

19Bessemer, same source (footnote 7), p. 164

20The Times, London, August 14, 1856

20The Times, London, August 14, 1856

21David Mushet recognized that Bessemer's great feature was this effort to "raise the after processes ... to a level commensurate with the preceding case" (Mining Journal, 1856, p. 599)

21David Mushet recognized that Bessemer's biggest achievement was his effort to "raise the following processes ... to a level similar to the initial case" (Mining Journal, 1856, p. 599)

22See Mining Journal, 1857, vol. 27, pp. 839 and 855. David Mushet withdrew from the discussion after 1858 and his relapse into obscurity is only broken by an appeal for funds for the family of Henry Cort. A biographer of the Mushets is of the opinion that Robert Mushet wrote these letters and obtained David's signature to them (Fred M. Osborn, The story of the Mushets, London, 1952, p. 44, footnote). The similarity in the style of the two brothers is extraordinary enough to support this idea. If this is so, Robert Mushet who disagreed with himself as "Sideros" was also in controversy with himself writing as "David."

22See Mining Journal, 1857, vol. 27, pp. 839 and 855. David Mushet withdrew from the discussion after 1858, and his decline into obscurity is only interrupted by a request for donations for Henry Cort's family. A biographer of the Mushets suggests that Robert Mushet wrote these letters and got David's signature on them (Fred M. Osborn, The Story of the Mushets, London, 1952, p. 44, footnote). The similarities in writing style between the two brothers are significant enough to support this idea. If this is true, then Robert Mushet, who had disagreements with himself as "Sideros," was also at odds with himself while writing as "David."

23Mining Journal, 1856, vol. 26, p. 567

23Mining Journal, 1856, vol. 26, p. 567

24Ibid., pp. 631 and 647. The case of Martien will be discussed below (p. 36). David Mushet had overlooked Bessemer's patent of January 10, 1855

24Ibid., pp. 631 and 647. The Martien case will be discussed below (p. 36). David Mushet had overlooked Bessemer's patent from January 10, 1855.

25Mining Journal, 1857, vol. 27, p. 723. Robert Mushet was a constant correspondent of the Mining Journal from 1848. The adoption of a pseudonym, peculiar apparently to 1857-1858 (see Dictionary of national biography, vol. 39, p. 429), enabled him to carry on two debates at a time and also to sing his own praises

25Mining Journal, 1857, vol. 27, p. 723. Robert Mushet had been a regular contributor to the Mining Journal since 1848. By using a pseudonym that appeared to be exclusive to 1857-1858 (refer to Dictionary of National Biography, vol. 39, p. 429), he was able to participate in two discussions simultaneously and also promote himself.

26Ibid., p. 823. Mushet's distinction between an inventor and a patentee is indicative of the disdain of a son of David Mushet for an amateur (see also p. 886)

26Ibid., p. 823. Mushet's distinction between an inventor and a patentee reveals the disdain that a son of David Mushet has for an amateur (see also p. 886).

27One William Green had commented extensively on David Mushet's early praise of the Bessemer process and on his sudden reversal in favor of Martien soon after Bessemer's British Association address (Mechanics' Magazine, 1856, vol. 65, p. 373 ff.). Green wrote from Caledonian Road, and the proximity to Baxter House, Bessemer's London headquarters, suggests the possibility that Green was writing for Bessemer

27William Green wrote extensively about David Mushet's early support for the Bessemer process and his rapid shift to backing Martien right after Bessemer's talk at the British Association (Mechanics' Magazine, 1856, vol. 65, p. 373 ff.). Green was located on Caledonian Road, and since he was near Baxter House, Bessemer's London office, it's likely that Green was writing on behalf of Bessemer.

28Mining Journal, 1857, vol. 27, p. 764

28Mining Journal, 1857, vol. 27, p. 764

29Ibid., p. 764

29Same source, p. 764

30Ibid., p.791

30Same source, p.791

31Ibid., p. 770 (italics supplied)

31Same source., p. 770 (italics supplied)

32Ibid., p. 770

32Same source, p. 770

33Ibid., p. 823

33Same Source, p. 823

34Bessemer, op. cit. (footnote 7), p. 169

34Bessemer, same source (footnote 7), p. 169

35Mining Journal, 1856, vol. 26, p. 631

35Mining Journal, 1856, vol. 26, p. 631

36James Renton's process (U.S. patent 8613, December 23, 1851) had been developed at Newark, New Jersey, in 1854. It was a modification of the puddling furnace, in which the ore and carbon were heated in tubs, utilizing the waste heat of the reverberatory furnace (see the Mechanics' Magazine, vol. 62, p. 246, 1855). Renton died at Newark in September 1856 (Mechanics' Magazine, 1856, vol. 65, p. 422)

36James Renton's process (U.S. patent 8613, December 23, 1851) was created in Newark, New Jersey, in 1854. It was an improvement on the puddling furnace, where the ore and carbon were heated in tubs, utilizing the waste heat from the reverberatory furnace (see the Mechanics' Magazine, vol. 62, p. 246, 1855). Renton died in Newark in September 1856 (Mechanics' Magazine, 1856, vol. 65, p. 422).

37Mining Journal, 1857, vol. 27, p. 193

37Mining Journal, 1857, vol. 27, p. 193

38British patent 2219, September 22, 1856

38British patent 2219, September 22, 1856

39Joseph P. Lesley, The iron manufacturer's guide, New York, 1859, p. 34. Martien's name is spelled Marteen. A description of the furnace is given in Scientific American of February 11, 1854, (vol. 9, p. 169). In the patent interference proceedings referred to below, it was stated that the furnace was in successful operation in 1854

39Joseph P. Lesley, The Iron Manufacturer's Guide, New York, 1859, p. 34. Martien's name is spelled Marteen. A description of the furnace can be found in Scientific American from February 11, 1854, (vol. 9, p. 169). In the patent interference proceedings mentioned below, it was noted that the furnace was successfully operational in 1854.

40U.S. patent 16690, February 22, 1857. A correspondent of the Mining Journal (1858, vol. 28, p. 713) states that Martien had not returned to England by October 1858

40U.S. patent 16690, February 22, 1857. A writer for the Mining Journal (1858, vol. 28, p. 713) mentions that Martien had not returned to England by October 1858.

41U.S. Patent Office, Decision of Commissioner of Patents, dated May 26, 1859 in the matter of interference between the application of James M. Quimby and others ... and of Joseph Martien

41U.S. Patent Office, Decision of the Commissioner of Patents, dated May 26, 1859, about the dispute between the application of James M. Quimby and others ... and Joseph Martien

42J. S. Jeans, op. cit. (footnote 5), p. 108. The process is not mentioned by James M. Swank, History of the manufacture of iron in all ages, Philadelphia, American Iron and Steel Association, 1892

42J. S. Jeans, op. cit. (footnote 5), p. 108. James M. Swank does not mention the process in History of the Manufacture of Iron in All Ages, Philadelphia, American Iron and Steel Association, 1892.

43Mining Journal, 1856, vol. 26, p. 707

43Mining Journal, 1856, vol. 26, p. 707

44Bessemer, op. cit. (footnote 7), p. 290

44Bessemer, same source (footnote 7), p. 290

45The American Iron and Steel Institute's "Steel centennial (1957) press information" (see footnote 2), includes a pamphlet, "Kelly lighted the fireworks ..." by Vaughn Shelton (New York, 1956), which asserts (p. 12) that Bessemer paid the renewal fee and became the owner of Mushet's "vital" patent

45The American Iron and Steel Institute's "Steel Centennial (1957) press information" (see footnote 2) includes a pamphlet titled "Kelly lit the fireworks ..." by Vaughn Shelton (New York, 1956), which states (p. 12) that Bessemer paid the renewal fee and became the owner of Mushet's "vital" patent.

46Robert Mushet, The Bessemer-Mushet process, Cheltenham, 1883, p. 24; The Engineer, 1861, vol. 12, pp. 177 and 189

46Robert Mushet, The Bessemer-Mushet process, Cheltenham, 1883, p. 24; The Engineer, 1861, vol. 12, pp. 177 and 189

47The Engineer, 1862, vol. 14, p. 3. Bessemer, op. cit. (footnote 7), p. 296

47The Engineer, 1862, vol. 14, p. 3. Bessemer, op. cit. (footnote 7), p. 296

48Mining Journal, 1864, vol. 34, p. 478

48Mining Journal, 1864, vol. 34, p. 478

49The Engineer, 1861, vol. 12, p. 189

49The Engineer, 1861, vol. 12, p. 189

50Ibid., p. 78

50Same source, p. 78

51Mushet, op. cit. (footnote 46), p. 9

51Mushet, same source (footnote 46), p. 9

52Ibid., p. 25

52Same source., p. 25

53Mining Journal, 1857, vol. 27, p. 755

53Mining Journal, 1857, vol. 27, p. 755

54Mushet, op. cit. (footnote 46), p. 28. The Uchatius process became the "You-cheat-us" process to Mushet (Mining Journal, 1858, vol. 28, p. 34)

54Mushet, op. cit. (footnote 46), p. 28. The Uchatius process was called the "You-cheat-us" process by Mushet (Mining Journal, 1858, vol. 28, p. 34)

55Mining Journal, 1857, vol. 27, p. 755 (italics supplied)

55Mining Journal, 1857, vol. 27, p. 755 (italics provided)

56See footnote 22

56See footnote 22

57Mining Journal, 1856, vol. 26, pp. 583, 631

57Mining Journal, 1856, vol. 26, pp. 583, 631

58October 17, 1857, writing as "Sideros" (Mining Journal, 1857, vol. 27, p. 723)

58October 17, 1857, writing as "Sideros" (Mining Journal, 1857, vol. 27, p. 723)

59Mining Journal, 1857, vol. 27, p. 871, and 1858, vol. 28, p. 12

59Mining Journal, 1857, vol. 27, p. 871, and 1858, vol. 28, p. 12

60Ibid. (1858), p. 34

60Same source. (1858), p. 34

61Mushet, op. cit. (footnote 46), p. 12. The phrase quoted is typical of Mushet's style

61Mushet, op. cit. (footnote 46), p. 12. The quoted phrase shows Mushet's style.

62Bessemer, op. cit. (footnote 7), pp. 161 ff. and 256 ff

62Bessemer, op. cit. (footnote 7), pp. 161 and 256

63Ibid., p. 171

63Same source, p. 171

64This enterprise, started in conjunction with Galloway's of Manchester, one of the firms licensed by Bessemer to make his equipment, was under way by April 1858 (see Mining Journal, 1858, vol. 28, p. 259)

64This project, started in collaboration with Galloway's of Manchester, one of the companies licensed by Bessemer to produce his equipment, was underway by April 1858 (see Mining Journal, 1858, vol. 28, p. 259).

65Mining Journal, 1858, vol. 28, p. 696. Mushet commented (p. 713) that he had done the same thing "eighteen months ago."

65Mining Journal, 1858, vol. 28, p. 696. Mushet remarked (p. 713) that he had done this "eighteen months ago."

66Swank, op. cit. (footnote 42), p. 405

66Swank, same source (footnote 42), p. 405

67The Engineer, 1859, vol. 7, p. 350

67The Engineer, 1859, vol. 7, p. 350

68Mining Journal, 1859, vol. 29, pp. 396 and 401. The price quotation was continued until April 1865

68Mining Journal, 1859, vol. 29, pp. 396 and 401. The price quote remained in effect until April 1865.

69The Engineer, 1859, vol. 7, p. 437

69The Engineer, 1859, vol. 7, p. 437

70Jeans, op. cit. (footnote 5), p. 349 refers to the hematite ores of Lancashire and Cumberland as "the ores hitherto almost exclusively used in the Bessemer process."

70Jeans, op. cit. (footnote 5), p. 349 refers to the hematite ores of Lancashire and Cumberland as "the ores that have almost exclusively been used in the Bessemer process."

 

A definitive account of the Swedish development of the Bessemer process, leading to a well-documented claim that the first practical realization of the process was achieved in Sweden in July 1858, was recently published (Per Carlberg, "Early Production of Bessemer Steel at Edsken," Journal of the Iron and Steel Institute, Great Britain, July 1958, vol. 189, p. 201)

A conclusive account of how Sweden developed the Bessemer process, which supports the claim that the process was first practically implemented in Sweden in July 1858, was recently published (Per Carlberg, "Early Production of Bessemer Steel at Edsken," Journal of the Iron and Steel Institute, Great Britain, July 1958, vol. 189, p. 201)

71The Engineer, 1859, vol. 7, p. 314. Bessemer's intention to present his paper had been announced in April

71The Engineer, 1859, vol. 7, p. 314. Bessemer's plan to present his paper was communicated in April.

72Mining Journal, 1859, vol. 29, p. 539 and 640. Another Mushet patent is described as so much like Uchatius' process that it would seem to be almost unpatentable

72Mining Journal, 1859, vol. 29, p. 539 and 640. Another Mushet patent is described as being so similar to Uchatius' process that it nearly appears unpatentable.

73See Jeans, op. cit. (footnote 5), p. 532

73See Jeans, same source (footnote 5), p. 532

74The Engineer, 1859, vol. 8, p. 13 (italics supplied). It is noted that Mushet's American patent (17389, of May 26, 1857) prefers the use of iron "as free as possible from Sulphur and Phosphorous."

74The Engineer, 1859, vol. 8, p. 13 (italics added). It notes that Mushet's American patent (17389, dated May 26, 1857) advises using iron that is "as free as possible from sulfur and phosphorus."

75The Engineer, 1860, vol. 9, pp. 366, 416, and passim

75The Engineer, 1860, vol. 9, pp. 366, 416, and various pages

76The Engineer, 1861, vol. 11, pp. 189, 202, 290, 304

76The Engineer, 1861, vol. 11, pp. 189, 202, 290, 304

77The Engineer, 1861, vol. 12, p. 10

77The Engineer, 1861, vol. 12, p. 10

78Ibid., p. 63

78Same source, p. 63

79Ibid., pp. 78 and 177

79Same source., pp. 78 and 177

80Ibid., p. 208. There is an intriguing reference in this editorial to an interference on behalf of Martien against a Bessemer application for a U.S. patent. No dates are given and the case has not been located in the record of U.S. Patent Commissioner's decision

80, p. 208. This editorial interestingly notes an intervention by Martien regarding a Bessemer application for a U.S. patent. No dates are given, and the case hasn’t been located in the records of the U.S. Patent Commissioner's decisions.

81Ibid., p. 254

81Same source, p. 254

82U.S. patent 17389, dated May 26, 1857. The patent was not renewed when application was made in 1870, on the grounds that the original patent had been made co-terminal with the British patent. The latter had been abandoned "by Mushet's own fault" so that no right existed to an American renewal (U.S. Patent Office, Decision of Commissioner of Patents, dated September 19, 1870)

82U.S. patent 17389, issued on May 26, 1857. The patent wasn't renewed when the application was filed in 1870 because it was originally connected to the British patent. The British patent was dropped "due to Mushet's own fault," which meant there was no right to renew the American patent (U.S. Patent Office, Decision of Commissioner of Patents, dated September 19, 1870).

83See below, p. 45. The exact date of the purchase of Mushet's patent is not known

83See below, p. 45. The specific date when Mushet's patent was acquired is not known.

84Engineering, 1882, vol. 33, p. 114. The deal was completed in 1863

84Engineering, 1882, vol. 33, p. 114. The agreement was concluded in 1863.

85The Engineer, 1864, vol. 18, pp. 405, 406

85The Engineer, 1864, vol. 18, pp. 405, 406

86Mining Journal, 1864, vol. 34, pp. 77 and 94 (italics supplied). It has not yet been possible to ascertain if this company was successful. Mushet writes from this time on from Cheltenham, where the company had its offices. Research continues in this interesting aspect of his career

86Mining Journal, 1864, vol. 34, pp. 77 and 94 (italics supplied). It's still uncertain if this company was successful. Mushet writes from this period onward from Cheltenham, where the company had its offices. Research is ongoing into this intriguing part of his career.

87Mining Engineer, 1865, vol. 35, p. 86

87Mining Engineer, 1865, vol. 35, p. 86

88The Engineer, 1865, vol. 20, p. 174

88The Engineer, 1865, vol. 20, p. 174

89Mechanics' Magazine, 1866, vol. 16, p. 147

89Mechanics' Magazine, 1866, vol. 16, p. 147

90Bessemer, op. cit. (footnote 7), p. 294

90Bessemer, same source (footnote 7), p. 294

91Ibid.

91Same source.

92See Fred M. Osborn, The story of the Mushets, London, 1852

92See Fred M. Osborn, The Story of the Mushets, London, 1852

93Journal of the Iron and Steel Institute, 1876, p. 3

93Journal of the Iron and Steel Institute, 1876, p. 3

94Robert Mushet, The Bessemer-Mushet process, Cheltenham, 1883

94Robert Mushet, The Bessemer-Mushet process, Cheltenham, 1883

95Scientific American, 1856, vol. 12, p. 6

95Scientific American, 1856, vol. 12, p. 6

96U.S. patent 17389, dated May 26, 1857. Martien's U.S. patent was granted as 16690, dated February 24, 1857

96U.S. patent 17389, issued on May 26, 1857. Martien's U.S. patent, granted as 16690, was dated February 24, 1857.

97Scientific American, 1856, vol. 12, p. 43, Kelly's suggestion of piracy of his ideas was later enlarged upon by his biographer John Newton Boucher, William Kelly: A true history of the so-called Bessemer process, Greensburg, Pennsylvania, 1924

97Scientific American, 1856, vol. 12, p. 43, Kelly's assertion that his ideas were taken was further developed by his biographer John Newton Boucher in William Kelly: A True History of the So-Called Bessemer Process, Greensburg, Pennsylvania, 1924.

98Ibid., p. 82. Kelly's notice of his intention to take testimony was addressed to Bessemer on January 12, 1857. See papers on "Interference, William Kelly vs. Henry Bessemer Decision April 13, 1857." U.S. Patent Office Records. Quotations below are from this file, which is now permanently preserved in the library of the U.S. Patent Office

98Ibid., p. 82. Kelly informed Bessemer of his plan to take testimony on January 12, 1857. Refer to documents about "Interference, William Kelly vs. Henry Bessemer Decision April 13, 1857." U.S. Patent Office Records. The quotes below are from this file, which is now permanently stored in the library of the U.S. Patent Office.

99Bessemer, op. cit. (footnote 7), p. 144

99Bessemer, same source (footnote 7), p. 144

100Scientific American, 1857, vol. 12, p. 341

100Scientific American, 1857, vol. 12, p. 341

101Boucher, op. cit. (footnote 97)

101Boucher, loc. cit. (footnote 97)

102U.S. Bureau of the Census, Report on the manufacturers of the United States at the tenth census (June 1, 1880) ..., Manufacture of iron and steel, report prepared by James M. Swank, special agent, Washington, 1883, p. 124. Mr. Swank was secretary of the American Iron and Steel Association. This material was included in his History of the manufacture of iron in all ages, Philadelphia, 1892, p. 397

102U.S. Bureau of the Census, Report on the manufacturers of the United States at the tenth census (June 1, 1880) ..., Manufacture of iron and steel, report prepared by James M. Swank, special agent, Washington, 1883, p. 124. Mr. Swank was the secretary of the American Iron and Steel Association. This material was included in his History of the Manufacture of Iron in All Ages, Philadelphia, 1892, p. 397.

103Ibid., p. 125. The run-out fire (or "finery" fire) was a charcoal fire "into which pig-iron, having been melted and partially refined in one fire, was run and further refined to convert it to wrought iron by the Lancashire hearth process," according to A. K. Osborn, An encyclopaedia of the iron and steel industry, New York, 1956

103Ibid., p. 125. The run-out fire (also known as "finery" fire) was a charcoal fire "where pig iron, which had been melted and partially refined in one fire, was poured into and further refined to convert it into wrought iron using the Lancashire hearth process," according to A. K. Osborn, An Encyclopaedia of the Iron and Steel Industry, New York, 1956.

104J. P. Lesley, op. cit. (footnote 39), p. 129. The preface is dated April 6, 1859. The data was largely collected by Joseph Lesley of Philadelphia, brother of the author, during a tour of several months. Since Suwanee production is given for 44 weeks only of 1857 (i.e., through November 4 or 5, 1857) it is concluded that Lesley's visit was in the last few weeks of 1857

104J. P. Lesley, op. cit. (footnote 39), p. 129. The preface is dated April 6, 1859. The data was mainly gathered by Joseph Lesley from Philadelphia, who is the author's brother, during a tour that lasted a few months. Since the Suwanee production is recorded for only 44 weeks of 1857 (i.e., up until November 4 or 5, 1857), it’s assumed that Lesley’s visit occurred in the last few weeks of 1857.

105Economist (London), 1857, vol. 15, pp. 1129, 1209

105Economist (London), 1857, vol. 15, pp. 1129, 1209

106Swank, op. cit. (footnote 42), p. 125. John Fritz, in his Autobiography (New York, 1912, p. 162), refers to experiments during his time at Johnstown, i.e., between June 1854 and July 1860. The iron manufacturer's guide (see footnote 104) also refers to Kelly's process as having "just been tried with great success" at Cambria

106Swank, op. cit. (footnote 42), p. 125. John Fritz, in his Autobiography (New York, 1912, p. 162), discusses experiments during his time in Johnstown, i.e. from June 1854 to July 1860. The iron manufacturer's guide (see footnote 104) also notes that Kelly's process had "just been tried with great success" at Cambria.

107U.S. patents 16082, dated November 11, 1856, and 16083, dated November 18, 1856. Bessemer's unsuccessful application corresponded with his British patent 2321, of 1855 (see footnote 98)

107U.S. patents 16082, issued on November 11, 1856, and 16083, issued on November 18, 1856. Bessemer's unsuccessful application was related to his British patent 2321 from 1855 (see footnote 98).

108Scientific American, 1861, new ser., vol. 5, pp. 148-153

108Scientific American, 1861, new series, volume 5, pages 148-153

109Ibid., p. 310

109Same source, p. 310

110Ibid., p. 343

110Same source, p. 343

111His claim is somewhat doubtful. Alexander Lyman Holley, who was later to be responsible for the design of most of the first Bessemer plants in the United States had been in England in 1859, 1860, and 1862. In view of his interest in ordnance and armor, it is unlikely that Bessemer could have escaped his alert observation. His first visit specifically in connection with the Bessemer process appears to have been in 1863, but he is said to have begun to interest financiers and ironmasters in the Bessemer process after his visit in 1862 (Engineering, 1882, vol. 33, p. 115)

111His claim is somewhat questionable. Alexander Lyman Holley, who later designed most of the first Bessemer plants in the United States, was in England in 1859, 1860, and 1862. Given his interest in ordnance and armor, it's unlikely that he would have overlooked Bessemer. His first visit related to the Bessemer process seems to have occurred in 1863, but he reportedly began to gain interest from investors and ironmasters in the Bessemer process after his trip in 1862 (Engineering, 1882, vol. 33, p. 115)

112W. F. Durfee: "An account of the experimental steel works at Wyandotte, Michigan," Transactions of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers, 1884, vol. 6, p. 40 ff

112W. F. Durfee: "A report on the experimental steel works in Wyandotte, Michigan," Transactions of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers, 1884, vol. 6, p. 40 and following

113Research in the French sources continues. The arrival of L. M. Hart at Boston is recorded as of April 1, 1864, his ship being the SS Africa out of Liverpool, England (Archives of the United States, card index of passenger arrivals 1849-1891 list No. 39)

113Research in French sources is still in progress. L. M. Hart's arrival in Boston is recorded as April 1, 1864, on the SS Africa, coming from Liverpool, England (Archives of the United States, card index of passenger arrivals 1849-1891 list No. 39).

114Swank, op. cit. (footnote 42), p. 409

114Swank, same source (footnote 42), p. 409

115Johnstown Daily Democrat, souvenir edition, autumn 1894 (italics supplied). Mr. Fry was at the Cambria Iron Works from 1858 until after 1882

115Johnstown Daily Democrat, souvenir edition, fall 1894 (italics supplied). Mr. Fry was employed at the Cambria Iron Works from 1858 until after 1882.

116Engineering, 1896, vol. 61, p. 615

116Engineering, 1896, vol. 61, p. 615

117See U.S. Patent Office, Decision of Commissioner of Patents, dated June 15, 1871

117See U.S. Patent Office, Decision of Commissioner of Patents, dated June 15, 1871.

118U.S. Patent Office, Decision of Commissioner of Patents dated February 12, 1870

118U.S. Patent Office, Commissioner of Patents' decision from February 12, 1870

119William T. Jeans, The creators of the age of steel, London, 1884

119William T. Jeans, The Creators of the Age of Steel, London, 1884

120Bessemer dealt with Kelly's claim to priority in a letter to Engineering, 1896, vol. 61, p. 367

120Bessemer responded to Kelly's priority claim in a letter to Engineering, 1896, vol. 61, p. 367.

121Louis C. Hunter, "The heavy industries since 1860," in H. F. Williamson (editor), The growth of the American economy, New York, 1944, p. 469

121Louis C. Hunter, "The Heavy Industries Since 1860," in H. F. Williamson (editor), The Growth of the American Economy, New York, 1944, p. 469

122Later developed into a dramatic story by Boucher, op. cit. (footnote 97)

122Later transformed into a dramatic story by Boucher, op. cit. (footnote 97)



        
        
    
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